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Central bank independence and its relationship to inflation

Author(s):
Mendonça, Helder Ferreira de
Date Issued:
2005-12
Serie:
CEPAL Review
p. 167-183
UN symbol:
LC/G.2287-P
Published in:
CEPAL Review   No.87
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This paper builds on earlier studies of central bank independence

(CBI);, making a comparison of the rankings of central banks for 15 countries

through three different indices. The analysis reveals that there is no shared

concept of CBI and that the indices are a measure of the inflation bias. The

Brazilian case is used as an example, with the objective of examining the

impact on inflation of an increase in independence over time, as measured

by Cukierman's index. The findings indicate that CBI is a consequence of

the conduct of monetary policy and that it is not an adequate framework

for developing credibility.

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Physical description:
p. 167-183
UN symbol:
LC/G.2287-P
Physical location:
X/C 22(87/2005)
Type of document:
Revistas
Bibliographic level:
Sección o Parte de un Documento
Notes:
Includes bibliography
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