Central bank independence and its relationship to inflation

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cepal.bibLevelSección o Parte de un Documento
cepal.callNumberX/C 22(87/2005)
cepal.docTypeRevistas
cepal.idSade25588
cepal.topicEngINFLATION
cepal.topicSpaINFLACIÓN
cepal.workareaEngECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
cepal.workareaSpaDESARROLLO ECONÓMICO
dc.contributor.authorMendonça, Helder Ferreira de
dc.coverage.spatialEngBRAZIL
dc.coverage.spatialSpaBRASIL
dc.date.accessioned2014-01-02T18:44:08Z
dc.date.available2014-01-02T18:44:08Z
dc.date.issued2005-12
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliography
dc.description.abstract This paper builds on earlier studies of central bank independence (CBI);, making a comparison of the rankings of central banks for 15 countries through three different indices. The analysis reveals that there is no shared concept of CBI and that the indices are a measure of the inflation bias. The Brazilian case is used as an example, with the objective of examining the impact on inflation of an increase in independence over time, as measured by Cukierman's index. The findings indicate that CBI is a consequence of the conduct of monetary policy and that it is not an adequate framework for developing credibility.
dc.formatTexto
dc.format.extentpáginas. 167-183
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.unSymbolLC/G.2287-P
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11362/11121
dc.language.isoeng
dc.physicalDescriptionp. 167-183
dc.relation.isPartOfCEPAL Review
dc.relation.isPartOfNo87
dc.relation.isPartOfSeriesCEPAL Review
dc.relation.translationLanguagespa
dc.relation.translationRecordLa independencia de los bancos centrales y su relación con la inflación
dc.relation.translationUrihttps://hdl.handle.net/11362/11088
dc.subject.unbisEngCASE STUDIES
dc.subject.unbisEngCENTRAL BANKS
dc.subject.unbisEngINFLATION
dc.subject.unbisEngMATHEMATICAL MODELS
dc.subject.unbisEngMEASUREMENT
dc.subject.unbisSpaBANCOS CENTRALES
dc.subject.unbisSpaESTUDIOS DE CASOS
dc.subject.unbisSpaINFLACION
dc.subject.unbisSpaMEDICION
dc.subject.unbisSpaMODELOS MATEMATICOS
dc.titleCentral bank independence and its relationship to inflation
dc.type.coarartículo
dspace.entity.typePublication
relation.isAuthorOfPublication3c90a8d3-537c-4f69-9781-4cbcaed8c2fb
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery3c90a8d3-537c-4f69-9781-4cbcaed8c2fb
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