


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
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
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
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INTRODUCTION

This paper has a modest goal. It does not aim to offer a strict evaluation of the so-called "social policies" or "welfare policies". Rather, its objective is to put together the more general indicators and make a preliminary effort towards situating them in an historical perspective.

The presentation is divided into four parts. The first contains some ideas on the relationship between welfare policies and economic development. The three sections that follow refer respectively to: the educational system, especially basic education; housing and sanitation policies; and the health system, with special reference to the supply of medical and hospital services.



I. WELFARE POLICIES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

International comparisons have shown that the welfare expenditures of national governments bear a relationship to overall development: the richer nations spend more money, as a proportion of GNP, than do the poorer nations, so far as education, housing, health and related items are concerned. However, such a relationship is perceptible only in the long run. Far from an automatic consequence of economic growth, the growth of welfare expenditures is a composite result of economic and "non-economic", especially political factors. Far from keeping a linear relationship with the growth of GNP, therefore, it is more likely to exhibit a zig-zag pattern, reflecting the political forces involved.

Needless to say, the governments of developing nations are to some extent forced to allocate an increasing absolute amount of resources to welfare or welfare-related objectives as a requirement of economic growth itself. This is most typically the case in the early stages of the development process, when the levels of literacy and public health, for example, are simply too low to be neglected even by hard-minded technocrats. In a simplified model which begins with the 19th century pattern of "minimal" government, we would thus have an early departure, characterized by increased welfare expenditures, as well as by relatively heavy investment in infra-structure (roads, electricity, and the like). Once, however, a development process is set rolling, even though welfare conditions in the country may remain extremely low, and eventually even worsen in some respects, governmental priorities tend to be reconsidered. In this second stage, there seems to be considerable room for different views and policies with regard to welfare expenditures. Political options thus become far more consequential, and governmental policy-makers start to differ markedly in their views as to how ambitious welfare goals ought to be.

In the Brazilian case, the literature on government planning seems quite consensual with respect to the following two statements, which we shall therefore take as points of departure for

the present study. First, it seems to have been in the mid-fifties (and more specifically, in the Plano de Metas of the Kubitschek government, 1955-1960) that welfare investments ceased to be conceptualized as an ineluctable precondition of growth, and started to become more and more subject to a cost/benefit approach. This is not to say, of course, that such expenditures then began to decrease systematically, but rather that argument for them could no longer rest on those simple old assumptions in which humanitarian motives and common sense appeared indistinguishably blended. Second, a consensus also seems to exist as to the fact that welfare goals have been and remain a very low priority for Brazilian governments. The amount invested in education, health, housing and related services has tended to be well below what would be expected from Brazil's level of economic development. As a result, no matter what policy is adopted, present governments will necessarily carry a heavy burden accumulated during decades.

The few existing studies of government action during the last ten or fifteen years, plus the analysis of official statistics and governmental plans, seem to make it very clear that welfare goals remain quite secondary in the thought of the Brazilian policy-makers. It is often pointed out that, from this perspective, the transition from a democratic to an authoritarian system made no difference at all. Given the narrow social base of the pre-1964 democratic regime, it is said, the policy pattern would end up being more or less the same as is now deliberately pursued by technically-qualified policy makers.

These notions, now widespread in the literature about the Brazilian "miracle", seem to omit a crucial point, namely that once a certain level of material development has been reached, the key factor influencing the pattern of expenditure, and particularly the option between growth or stagnation of welfare expenditures, is the give-and take of organized social groups, through the political process. The regime established in 1964, often described as an aggressively "modernizing" technocracy supported by the military, has clearly and strongly denied the

legitimacy of such "political" methods of allocation, making itself virtually immune to societal pressures to increase welfare expenditures. The government's behavior in this regard can, of course, be explained in many ways, but a crucial factor, as observed above, is that governmental policy-makers cherish a strong belief in their own rationality, and do not deem it rational, at least for the time being, to assign a higher order of priority to welfare objectives.

The policy makers' belief in the convenience of keeping welfare goals modest is manifest, for example, in the plans adopted after 1964. It has been shown that their goals in the welfare field have been set far below those envisaged in the Plano Trienal (the last of the pre-1964 period); and, most notably, below the figures actually reached in the case of Education. ^{1/} Although the evidence just cited argues persuasively for the policy-makers' modesty with respect to welfare goals, detailed analysis of the successive plans does not argue as persuasively for their belief in their own rationality: the projections and goals are widely discrepant from one plan to the next, the methodology is quite conventional, to put it mildly, and the factual information is rather poor, recent advances notwithstanding. In these circumstances, evaluation of the impact of welfare policies in recent years becomes a very hazardous task. In what follows, we shall briefly look at some of the basic indicators of educational, health and housing conditions, but it must be kept in mind that they reflect past under-investment as well, allowing for policy evaluation only in the sense that the order of priorities remains unchanged.

II. EDUCATION

Public investment in education in Brazil is more or less equally divided between the federal and the state governments; the

^{1/} Kowarick, Lúcio, Estratégias do Planejamento Social no Brasil, Sao Paulo, Cadernos CEBRAP, N°2.

local governments (municípios) account for only 6 to 7 per cent of the total public money spent in this field. The Plano Decenal of 1967 (which is not actually a plan, but a set of broad guidelines) envisaged an increase in the proportion to be spent by the federal government, with a target of 51 per cent of the public investment in 1976. Public expenditure, in turn, is more or less ten times as large as private expenditure. According to Douglas H. Graham, public expenditure reached 5.780.200 (in Cr\$ of 1970) in 1970; private expenditure in this same year reached 578.000. Foreign funds accounted for 181.000, thus totalling 6.539.200, or 3.8 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product.^{2/} This proportion is the highest since 1960, rising from 2.4 in that year to 3.2 in 1965 to 3.8 per cent in 1969/1970. It is therefore possible to say that aggregate expenditure in education has in fact increased, and that this has been mostly the result of increased public investment. Accounting for 82 per cent in 1960, public expenditure now account for almost 90 per cent of the total.^{3/}

This rise in educational investment as a proportion of the GDP must be qualified, however, in several respects. One, already noted, is that it is mostly a long term correction for a level which was simply too low. Brazilian governments had been geared towards reasonably coherent developmental policies for one or two decades, and more decisively towards a policy of industrialization since the fifties, while at the same time doing virtually nothing about illiteracy, inefficient schooling at the primary and secondary levels, or a university system that seemed well on the way to petrification. Thus, the increase just observed does not deviate significantly from the pattern of under-investment in welfare, at least for the time being; it is better seen as a correction for one-sided economic developmentalism which seemed

2/ Graham, D.H., "The Growth, Change and Reform of Higher education in Brazil", in Riordan Roett, Editor, Brazil in the Sixties, Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1962.

3/ This has been consistent with a reduction of the relative amount destined to education in the expenditure of the federal government.

bound to react negatively upon economic performance itself. Secondly, the rise in educational expenditure is not as such a sufficient indication of social betterment, since we do not know enough about its structure. A review of some major educational indicators will serve to confirm both of these statements.

a) Illiteracy. Table 1 shows the evolution of illiteracy in Brazil, for the population of 15 years of age and over, since the beginning of the century, by region. From an uniform and extremely high rate of illiteracy in the adult population, we see that in

Table 1
ILLITERACY AMONG THE POPULATION OF 15 YEARS AND OVER, BY
REGION
(Percentages)

Year	Region					Total
	North	North-east	East	South	Center-West	
1900	69.2	79.7	72.7	73.0	-	74.5 (12.989.753)
1920	71.4	83.7	75.8	68.0	80.2	65.0 (11.401.715)
1940	59.8	76.3	62.8	44.5	70.9	56.0 (13.269.381)
1950	60.1	76.2	58.0	43.8	64.5	50.5 (15.272.632)
1960 ^{a/}	-	66.0	47.5	32.2	-	39.5 (15.815.903)
1970	36.0	57.9	34.4	21.6	35.5	33.6 (18.146.977)

Source: IBGE, Censos Demográficos.

^{a/} Probability sample, 1.27 per cent of the population.

the sixties and seventies Brazil confronts two problems: that rate is still very high (39.5 per cent in 1960, 33.6 per cent in 1970) and not at all uniform among regions. The North, East and Center-West regions are close to the national average, but the South and the Northeast deviate sharply from it, with rates of 21.6 and 57.9 per cent, respectively. The East and South seem better off, but only in comparison with the rest of the country, since their rates of adult illiteracy are just slightly below the national average of other Latin American countries, and far above the rate observed in the presently developed countries at the turn of the century. Needless to say, these regional inequalities in literacy rates would appear in darker colours if we took specific states, and especially urban-rural settings, for comparison. Thus, within the South-East region, adult illiteracy rates range from 11 per cent in Guanabara to 48 per cent in Espírito Santo. In the Northeastern region, where all states have a majority of illiterates in the adult population, differences range from 50.3 per cent in Pernambuco to 61.7 per cent in Alagoas.

In view of this situation, the government moved to establish the MOBREAL (Brazilian Literacy Campaign) in 1970. Conceived as a vast operation involving the states and municípios, the target population of the MOBREAL was defined as all illiterate adults between 14 and 35 years of age in 457 municípios which concentrate 70 per cent of the country's total population.

Although we do not have data for an adequate evaluation of the results of the campaign, the government inaugurated in March, 1974, has implicitly admitted that MOBREAL fell short of its objectives, and recommended that new methods or strategies be studied to deal with adult illiteracy. The magnitude of the problem can be gauged by looking at the right column of Table 1: in absolute numbers, the illiterate population over 15 years of age increased by 2.331.000 from 1960 to 1970. Clearly, given the present rates of population growth, the problem is virtually unmanageable unless the population below that age is absorbed by the primary school system.

b) Elementary School. One of the main determinants of the size of the adult illiterate population at a time t_2 is, of course, the rate of enrollment of the non-adult population at time t_1 . The proportion of the non-adult population which is not presently attending elementary school is therefore the key factor to be considered. Table 2 shows the figures for elementary enrollment in 1970, for Brazil as a whole and for three states: Sao Paulo, Minas Gerais and Bahia. Sao Paulo ranks second in the adult literacy rate, and is the country's most populous and economically most important state. Minas Gerais, with the second largest population, is close to the nation's average with respect to adult literacy. Bahia comes after Pernambuco in the adult literacy rate within the Northeastern region, with 51.6 per cent, being therefore at the upper extreme within that region, as suggested above.

Table 2

ENROLLMENT IN ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS FOR THE POPULATION
OF 7-12 YEARS OF AGE, IN BRAZIL AND IN THREE SELECTED STATES
(1970)

State	(A) Population 7-12 years	(B) Enrollment	(B/A)
Sao Paulo	2.612.664	2.059.481	78.8
Minas Gerais	1.977.171	1.566.805	79.2
Bahia	1.292.844	625.723	48.4
BRAZIL	15.244.198	10.380.230	68.1

Source: IBGE, Censo Demográfico de 1970.

Table 2 shows that 32 per cent of Brazil's population between 7 and 12 years of age (almost 5 million) are not presently enrolled in elementary schools. As pointed out above, none of the Northeastern states has less than a majority of illiterates among the adult population. Here we see that Bahia, one of those

states, enrolls less than half of the population between 7 and 12 years of age. ^{4/}

Needless to say, a host of problems, some of which are outside the reach of educational policies, hide themselves behind these figures. It is well-known that the supply of educational facilities produces satisfactory returns in enrollment up to a point, but then becomes wasteful. Socio-economic and cultural factors - including the need for the child's labor-force to supplement the family budget - affect the demand for education, expressing themselves in high dropout rates. The quantitative importance of these factors can be gauged by the fact that the enrollment figures are always somewhat inflated, including a large number of children who remain in the same grade due to failure.

What happens to those who reach the age of 14 without completing their primary education? These are the hundreds of thousands of elementary school drop-outs. Ineligible for the secondary school, neither are they an object of the well-publicized concern with the illiterate population. For these, there exists the ensino supletivo, mostly night classes, about which not very much is known. Available statistics show a slow evolution, as one might expect, from slightly over 300.000 in 1964 to 720.000 in 1969.

Given the figures for illiteracy and elementary education, entirely typical of an "underdeveloped" nation, it seems pointless, in an analysis of welfare conditions, to study the secondary and college levels in detail. The data presented thus far make it evident that Brazil remains an extremely under-educated society. It is however interesting to point out, in conclusion, with regard to the period 1960-1970, that the higher the level of

^{4/} It would be necessary to correct these figures for the fact that at least a small fraction may have completed their elementary schooling, and may even be already enrolled in the first grades of the secondary. This, however, would not significantly alter either the magnitude or the regional differences shown in the table.


education considered, the higher the rate of growth of the population enrolled. Thus, making 1960 = 100, primary enrollment grew to 133 in 1965, to 172 in 1970; the secondary junior to 180 in 1965, to 339 in 1970; the secondary senior, to 190 in 1965, to 376 in 1970; and finally, the college and superior levels of education, grew to 167 in 1965, to 456 in 1970. These figures seem to indicate that the main beneficiaries of the aggregate increase in educational expenditure (as a proportion of GDP) were primarily the rising middle strata. This is nothing but a hypothesis, which we cannot at the moment examine in further detail, but one that seems consistent with the information presented here and with other studies on Brazilian education.

III. HOUSING AND SANITATION

Housing is an evident and indispensable component of any welfare index. However, even less than in the field of education, we cannot approach the study of housing conditions simply in terms of the supply by governmental or private agents of "X" units. The housing shortage, like illiteracy, in Brazil and in most other Latin American nations, has an overwhelming character, making it ludicrous to take shortage estimates very seriously. We shall thus concentrate our attention on the following two points. First, a brief overview of the housing policies adopted in the last ten years, on the assumption that here we do in fact have important innovations; and second, an overview of indicators of public sanitation, especially water and sewage systems, on the assumption that the minimal quality of housing will be determined, for a long time to come, by the quality of such public services.

a) The National Housing Bank. ^{5/} The basic development with respect to housing was the creation, in August of 1964, of the National Housing Bank (BNH). The objectives and guidelines for

^{5/} See Plano Estratégico de Desenvolvimento, 1968-1970. On the BNH, see also Bolaffi, Gabriel, Aspectos Socio-Economicos do Plano Nacional de Habitacao (Dissertacao, Universidade de Sao Paulo, 1972).



million more than in 1960. Table 3 shows their distribution according to water source utilized and to type of sewage system.

With respect to water supply, although much less than half of the households were linked to the public network in 1970, there is a perceptible increase from 21.0 to 32.8 per cent. As to sewage, however, there has been, if anything, a deterioration of conditions: while the public network reached 17.5 per cent, as against 13.9 per cent in 1960, the category rudimentary cess-pool is more than eight percentage points larger, reaching 33.3 per cent in 1970. In addition, it is necessary to point out that the census collapsed the category "other forms" with the category "without information", in the case of water; and the categories "without installations" and "without information", in the case of sewage. The category resulting from this procedure is the largest, with respect to water as well as to sewage, thus making the data here presented quite inadequate for a more refined analysis. But we can at least examine the distribution of households according to these items of infra-structure and to the regions of the country where they are located in Table 4:

Table 3

**OCCUPIED PRIVATE DWELLINGS ACCORDING TO TYPE OF
WATER-SUPPLY AND SEWAGE INSTALLATIONS**

Years	Dwellings	Water			Sanitary Installations			
		Public Network	Well or Spring	Other or Without Information	Public Network	Septic Tank	Rudimentary Cess-Pool	Without Installation or without Information
1960	13.475.472 (100.0)	21.0	33.1	45.8	13.9	12.0	25.1	49.1
1970	18.086.336 (100.0)	32.8	24.7	42.4	17.5	9.5	33.3	39.8

Source: Anuário Estatístico do Brasil, 1971.

Table 4
 PERMANENT PRIVATE DWELLINGS - INSTALLATIONS EXISTING BY REGION, 1970
 (Percentages)

Regions	Dwellings	Existing Installations and Utilities								
		Water			Elec- tric Light	Sanitary Installations				
		Public Net- Work	Well or Spring	Without Installation or not Declared		Public Net- Work	Septic Tank	Rudimentary Cess-Pool	Disposal by other Means	Without Installation or not Declared
BRAZIL	17 628 699 (100.0)	32.8	24.6	42.6	47.6	13.2	13.4	29.7	4.3	39.4
North	584 379 (100.0)	19.2	17.5	63.3	27.3	1.6	7.2	45.3	8.0	37.9
North- east	5 140 868 (100.0)	12.4	8.3	79.3	23.3	2.3	5.6	18.5	2.6	71.0
South- east	7 901 143 (100.0)	51.6	27.0	21.4	68.7	24.0	19.9	28.7	5.3	22.1
South	3 085 802 (100.0)	25.3	44.2	30.5	43.1	7.3	12.8	47.1	4.2	28.6
Centre- West	916 507 (100.0)	19.9	33.6	46.5	28.6	7.4	7.6	33.6	1.9	49.5

Source: IBGE, Censo Demográfico, 1970.

Here, too, regional inequalities are evident. While in the Southeast, the country's developed and industrialized heartland, at least a bare majority (51.6%) of the households are served by the public water network, this proportion is only 12.4 per cent in the Northeast, 19.2 per cent in the North, and 19.9 per cent in the Center-West. Perhaps even more striking is the fact that almost 80 per cent of the units of the Northeast are classified as "without installations or without information", followed by the North with 63.3 per cent so classified, and by the Center-West with 46.5 per cent.

The distribution according to sewage systems follows the same pattern. While 24.0 per cent of the households located in the Southeast are served by the public network, slightly more than 7 per cent are linked to it in the South and Center-West, 2.3 per cent in the Northeast, and 1.6 per cent in the North. And again, the category "without information or without installations" account for 71.0 per cent in the Northeast, 49.5 per cent in the Center-West, 39.4 per cent in the North. Table 5 presents the distribution of municípios with and without water and sewage systems in 1960 and 1970 for Brazil as a whole and among the three states selected for comparison: Sao Paulo, Minas Gerais and Bahia. It shows that, while some improvement can be perceived with regard to water, this is not the case insofar as sewage is concerned. The increase in the number of municípios, especially at the beginning of the sixties, was not followed by the construction of sewage systems. In 1960, 32.7 per cent of the municípios possessed such an infrastructure, as against 26.1 per cent in 1970. Comparing the three states, we see that at least a small increase took place in Sao Paulo; but not in Minas Gerais and Bahia, where many new (and old) municípios still lack a public sewage system.

Table 5
PUBLIC WATER AND SEWAGE SERVICES IN MUNICIPIOS 1960/70

Number of municípios					
Total	With Water Supply From Municipal Network	Sewage Services From Municipal Network	% of Municípios With Water Supply	Municípios With Sewage System	
BRAZIL					
1960	2 779	1 354	910	48.7	32.7
1970	3 949	2 332	1 029	59.1	26.1
Sao Paulo					
1960	504	370	287	73.4	56.9
1970	571	485	354	84.9	62.0
Minas G.					
1960	485	409	285	84.3	58.8
1970	722	629	407	87.1	56.4
Bahia					
1960	194	64	43	33.0	24.2
1970	336	162	50	48.2	14.9

Source: Anuários Estatísticos - IBGE.

IV. HEALTH

As with housing, it seems unnecessary to emphasize once again that health levels are notoriously low in Brazil. Brazil entered the seventies making international news with respect to public health: bad news, such as the spread of epidemic diseases and the stabilization at high levels - if not, in fact, an increase - in infant mortality. The interpretation of these and other occurrences in this area, must of course be left to health experts, although we can take note of the fact that many of them have emphasized socioeconomic conditions, most notably those related to malnutrition and environmental factors.

Water and sewage systems, considered in the previous section, are undoubtedly indicators of such health-relevant socioeconomic conditions. Our intent here is to consider briefly some indicators of the supply of financial, hospital and human resources. These are obviously under the purview of governmental policy; in fact, all three are keystones in health planning. And here again, it seems possible to conjecture that governmental policies had negligible influence in the changes recorded during the decade. The pattern of low priority and inefficient planning, typical of the whole welfare field, seems to have been kept. The consequences, however, were bound to be extremely negative, due, among other things, to the reduction of real wages, as shown in other parts of this report.

The resources allocated to the Ministry of Health in the federal budget have been declining systematically. Taken as a proportion of the actual expenditures, such resources amounted to 4.11 per cent in 1955, 3.95 per cent in 1960, 2.67 per cent in 1965, and 1.11 per cent in 1970.

In order to estimate the magnitude of health expenditures as a proportion of the GDP, it would be necessary to study not only what goes on at the state and municipal levels, but also a complex and (unlike in the field of education) fast growing

private sector.^{6/} Such an effort is clearly beyond our present scope, but it seems in order to stress that the relative reduction of health resources in the federal budget may be associated with this trend towards the privatization of medical services. Table 7 shows that while the number of public and private non-profit hospitals grew slightly between 1965 and 1970, the number of private profitable hospitals rose from 945 to 1 708. The latter category thus became the largest so far as number of hospitals is concerned. In percentages, we see that the public and private non-profit categories reduced their participation in the total.

Table 6

INFANT MORTALITY IN SAO PAULO
(Per 1.000 Live Births)

1960	82.5
1961	83.2
1962	81.0
1963	82.3
1964	71.8
1965	73.9
1966	76.8
1967	78.9
1968	72.4
1969	84.1
1970	81.4

Source: Jose Yunes, e Vera Ronchezel,
"Evolucao da Mortalidade Geral, infantil e proporcional no Brasil", mimeo.

^{6/} A recent study argues that public expenditure on health has grown somewhat faster than the GDP between 1965 and 1969. See Silva, F., A., R., and Mahar, D., Saúde e Previdencia Social, IPEA, Relatorio de Pesquisa N°21, 1974, pág. 83.

This trend towards privatization, combined with declining real wages cannot fail to elicit serious concern. The data in our table, needless to say, are far from sufficient to evaluate recent policies with respect to health. It would be necessary to know more about the administrative and spacial organization and planning of the health field. In particular, it would be necessary to know whether the relative reduction in the public sector reflects some new long term strategy. Whatever the case may be, 1970 data clearly indicate that Brazil cannot yet boast high levels of health development. The ratio of hospital beds per thousand persons improved only slightly, from 3.0 to 3.8 per cent between 1960 and 1970; the ratio of physicians per thousand, from 4.6 to 6.8 per cent. Both ratios are almost twice as large if we consider Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro separately, reflecting the strong geographical concentration of health resources. With 23 per cent of the population in 1960, Sao Paulo and Rio concentrated 39.4 per cent of the hospital beds, and 48.4 per cent of the medican personnel. In 1970, with 23.6 per cent of the population, the percentage of hospital beds remained the same, whereas the percentage of physicians declined somewhat, from 48.4 to 44.1 per cent.

Table 7

NUMBER OF HOSPITALS ACCORDING TO MAINTAINING ENTITY
(1955-70) IN BRAZIL AND 4 CHOSEN STATES

		Absolute Numbers				Relative Numbers				
		Public	Private		Total	Public	Private		TOTAL	
			Profit-Making	Non-Profit-Making			Profit-Making	Non-Profit-Making		
BRASIL	1955	400		1 952	2 352	17.0	-	-	83.0	100.0
	1960	371		2 176	2 547	14.6	-	-	85.4	100.0
	1965	461	945	1 444	2 850	16.2	33.2	50.7	83.8	100.0
	1970	534	1 708	1 538	3 630	15.2	44.6	40.2	84.8	100.0
Sao Paulo	1955	35		447	482	7.3	-	-	92.7	100.0
	1960	44		483	527	8.3	-	-	91.7	100.0
	1965	43	161	339	543	7.9	29.7	62.4	92.1	100.0
	1970	54	291	368	713	7.6	40.8	51.6	92.4	100.0
Minas	1955	32		345	377	8.5	-	-	91.5	100.0
	1960	37		355	392	9.4	-	-	90.6	100.0
	1965	42	99	258	399	10.5	24.8	64.7	89.5	100.0
	1970	49	184	282	515	9.5	35.7	54.8	90.5	100.0
Bahia	1955	22		76	98	22.4	-	-	77.6	100.0
	1960	25		80	105	23.8	-	-	76.2	100.0
	1965	19	19	59	97	19.6	19.6	60.8	80.4	100.0
	1970	31	48	61	140	22.1	34.3	43.6	77.9	100.0
Guanabara	1955	68		106	174	39.1	-	-	60.9	100.0
	1960	63		95	153	39.9	-	-	60.1	100.0
	1965	67	67	39	173	38.7	38.8	22.5	61.3	100.0
	1970	65	92	41	198	32.8	46.5	20.7	67.2	100.0

Source: Anuários Estatísticos - IBGE.


CONCLUSION

In spite of the uncertainty of available statistics and of the scarcity of rigorous evaluative studies, the basic characteristics of Brazilian welfare policies seem to be clear. There is no doubt that Brazil has been until now an under-educated country, as well as an under-covered one concerning housing and sanitation. The levels reached in all of these aspects seem unsatisfactory vis-a-vis the country's degree of urbanization and industrialization. Though many difficulties are involved in this type of comparison, the differences appear in a clear way and, furthermore, they are growing and publicly recognized.

Nevertheless, in two other aspects, extrapolations should be done carefully because of the weakness of our present knowledge. As we saw in the first section, not only the political oligarchies were the ones to define the above mentioned pattern of expenditure in welfare; maybe they were not even the principal factor. The extent to which under-expenditure in education, health, etc. was the result of deliberate options - and it is important in this context to say "the extent to which" - it was obviously an option taken by the planners themselves and by the "developmentist" technocracies of all types. It is possible therefore that - cruel or not, serving or not the dominant oligarchies -, this pattern followed in its beginning an economic rationality. This does not mean, obviously, that such rationality exists still today or, even less, that this approach of the problem maintains the validity it had thirty, forty or fifty years ago. In sum, the information presented in this study aims to contribute to a characterization of a regularity or pattern; it does not try to answer to the evaluative questions that may be raised in this area.

In the same way, this study does not intend to close the door to research on the socio-political structure that has been the basis for the described pattern; on the contrary, it tries

to open it. It has been rightfully mentioned that concerning many aspects the Brazilian panorama is of "non-change" rather than of change. In the same way, the study of welfare policies in Brazil suggests that the situation that must be explained is the degree of "illfare", a generalized situation that persists in spite of economic growth.





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