

# Preliminary Overview of the Economies

of Latin America and  
the Caribbean **2024**



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# Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean **2024**

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Three dots indicate that data are not available or are not separately reported.

A dash indicates that the amount is nil or negligible.

A full stop is used to indicate decimals.

The word "dollars" refers to United States dollars, unless otherwise specified.

A slash between years (e.g. 2023/2024) indicates a 12-month period falling between the two years.

Individual figures and percentages in tables may not always add up to the corresponding total because of rounding.

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# Executive summary

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In 2024 and 2025, global economic growth is set to hold steady at 2023 levels, driven largely by emerging economies

The world's major central banks expanded liquidity in 2024, ending the tight monetary cycle

The region's debt issuance on international markets is increasing, but the net transfer of resources abroad is on the rise

Economic activity remains low and is increasingly dependent on private consumption

Despite continued low job creation, the region's labour markets are showing modest improvements

Fiscal space remains limited in Latin America and the Caribbean

Inflation is converging towards target ranges, albeit at a slower pace

Falling inflation and rate cuts in the United States have prompted looser monetary policy in the region

Projections and outlook for 2024 and 2025

Policies to overcome the trap of low capacity for growth



The countries of the region are facing what the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean has termed a trap of low capacity for growth. Average annual growth for the decade 2015–2024 stands at 1%, pointing to stagnant per capita GDP during that period. While projections for 2024 and 2025 are above the average for the decade, economic growth will remain low.

The international macroeconomic context in which the countries of the region operate points to expected global growth of around 3.2% per year for 2024 and 2025. Growth in international trade in goods and services is at 3.1% for 2024 and 3.4% for 2025. The world's leading central banks have been lowering interest rates, which has coincided with increasing global liquidity and a stronger dollar. This greater liquidity has translated into increased capital flows, however, these have been towards developed economies.

In 2024, the region's debt issuances on bond markets were higher than in 2023. Despite interest rate cuts in international financial markets, the cost of financing remains high. Increased financing costs have driven up interest payments from the region's economies to the rest of the world, which helps to explain the region's net resource transfers abroad in 2024.

In 2024, domestic macroeconomic policy space remained tight. On the fiscal front, regional economies have been under pressure to keep public debt on track as interest payments are expected to reach record highs. On the monetary front, falling inflation and lower interest rates in international markets have helped to lower monetary policy reference rates across the region. However, depreciations in the region's currencies have affected the speed and magnitude of adjustments in these policy rates.

The slowdown in economic growth in the countries of the region has continued. In 2024, the region's economies expanded by an estimated 2.2%, and for 2025, regional growth is projected at 2.4%. This slow growth in regional GDP has led to the declining share of Latin American and Caribbean economies in global growth and persistently weak employment growth.

For the region to break from the trap of low growth capacity, complementary and coherent policies to mitigate business cycle fluctuations and boost long-term trends in regional growth are needed. This means increasing policy space to boost the mobilization of financial resources that will help to smooth the business cycle and support the region's productive transformation for high, inclusive, sustained and sustainable growth. In addition, greater policy space is essential if the region is to meet the mitigation and adaptation challenges posed by the fourth industrial revolution and the intensification of climate change.

## In 2024 and 2025, global economic growth is set to hold steady at 2023 levels, driven largely by emerging economies

The global economy is expected to grow at a rate of around 3.2% in 2024 (compared to 3.3% in 2023) and to remain at that level in 2025. Growth in the United States, which accounts for 25% of global GDP, is estimated at 2.8% in 2024 and 2.2% in 2025, driven by consumption that has been sustained by a labour market with low unemployment and wage increases. Consumption trends also benefited from the wealth effect, reflecting the rise in share prices, which reached record highs towards the end of 2024.

The eurozone is expected to register economic growth of 0.8% in 2024 and 1.2% in 2025, reflecting the decline in industrial production, which has not been offset owing to the sluggishness of the services sector. Germany, the eurozone's largest economy, accounting for 24% of GDP, and the region's largest producer of manufactured goods, has been experiencing economic stagnation since late 2021. This is largely the result of the trend decline in German industry, including the automotive sector, the chemical industry and the engineering sector, since 2017 (between 2017 and 2023, the industrial sector contracted by 2.4% and, according to the latest available data, in September 2024,

the country's industrial production fell by 2.5%). Growth in France and Italy, the two largest economies in the eurozone after Germany, accounting for 17% and 12% of the region's GDP, respectively, was also affected by lacklustre investment, particularly in the machinery and equipment component.

Meanwhile, GDP growth is on the rise in emerging economies and they will be the main drivers of global economic growth. Their estimated growth rate in 2024 was 4.2%, more than double that of the advanced economies, and this is expected to be maintained in the short and medium term. Consequently, emerging economies will play a greater role in driving global growth.

## The world's major central banks expanded liquidity in 2024, ending the tight monetary cycle

Since the second quarter of 2024, the world's major central banks have expanded liquidity, ending the tight monetary policy cycle implemented in 2022 to combat rising inflation. During this period, the money supply increased 0.9% in the United States, 1.3% in Japan, 0.7% in the United Kingdom and 1.7% in the eurozone. In the third quarter, liquidity was expanded further, except in Japan, with growth rates of 2.0% in the United States, 2.2% in the United Kingdom and 2.8% in the eurozone. In line with money supply trends at the world's major central banks, worldwide lending to the non-financial sector trended upwards and showed a clear recovery in the first two quarters of 2024 (with rates of 2.5% and 2.4% in the first and second quarters of 2024, respectively).

Global liquidity is partly explained by the reduction in monetary policy interest rates. In September 2024 the United States Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds rate for the first time since March 2020, by 50 basis points, bringing it from a 5.25%–5.50% target range to 4.75%–5.00%. Subsequently, in November, it cut the federal funds rate again, by 25 basis points, bringing it to a range of 4.50%–4.75%. In the case of the European Central Bank (ECB), it decided on three occasions (June, September and October 2024) to cut the interest rate with which it steers monetary policy by 25 basis points, lowering it from 4.00% to 3.25%. This was the first time in 13 years that ECB has adopted an expansionary monetary policy. Meanwhile, the Bank of England cut its monetary policy rate in November from 5.00% to 4.75%. Lastly, the Bank of Japan left its interest rate unchanged at around 0.25%.

These interest rate cuts are in response to falling inflation rates and inflation expectations that are in line with targets (2% for the world's major banks), and the aim of avoiding a weakening of economic growth and the labour market. The rate of change in global energy prices—which had reached record highs of 168% in October 2021—declined from August 2022 onwards. Between January 2023 and September 2024, world energy prices contracted systematically (except in June and July 2024). In September 2024, the rate of change in international energy prices stood at -16.7%.

Similarly, food price inflation fell from a peak of 10.9% in July 2022 in the United States and 17.9% in May 2023 in the eurozone to lows of 2.3% and 1.4% in September 2024, respectively. In addition, labour market pressures have eased. However, an analysis of the labour market shows that from April 2023 onwards, the ratio between the level of unemployment (labour supply) and the supply of jobs (labour demand), both expressed in numbers, trended upwards. The latest United States labour market survey, released in November, shows that the unemployment rate has remained virtually unchanged at 4.2%.

The lowering of monetary policy interest rates by the world's major central banks and the expectation that this trend will continue in 2025 have had a positive effect on equity market performance. These factors have helped to maintain the upward trend in equity prices since the restrictive monetary policy stance was abandoned in September 2023. Higher share valuations have a direct effect on the economy by increasing corporate and household wealth. Lower monetary policy rates have led to a moderate downswing in interest rates on treasury securities in the eurozone. Between April and September 2024, the average yield on government bonds fell from 3.08% to 2.83%.

The buoyancy of the United States economy, which has kept it from slipping into a recessionary phase and boosted growth, coupled with rising long-term interest rates, growing geopolitical tension in the Middle East and the war in Ukraine, have pushed up the value of the dollar internationally.

The increase in global liquidity has boosted financial flows worldwide. However, the bulk of international financial flows are towards developed countries, where 72% of total foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio flows were concentrated in 2010 and 63% in 2022. Meanwhile, financial flows from developed to developing countries accounted for 10% of total outflows in 2010, a figure that rose by a mere 3 percentage points in 12 years. Financial flows from developing economies to advanced economies also increased by only 3 percentage points, from 8% of total outflows in 2010 to 11% in 2022. Another advantage for developed countries is that they can reduce the borrowing costs of their liabilities, while at the same time increasing the returns on their assets.

## The region's debt issuance on international markets is increasing, but the net transfer of resources abroad is on the rise

The region's overall balance of payments will record a projected deficit of 1.2% of GDP in 2024, as the current account deficit widens in 2024, following a large adjustment in 2023. This reflects the larger share of higher interest payments abroad, recorded in factor account debits, consistent with still-tight global financial conditions. In the first six months of 2024, these interest payments accounted for about 50% of total income account debits.

The goods account is showing signs of recovery and moving towards a surplus. However, the services account remains in deficit —albeit a narrowing one— reflecting the low capacity of exports to finance imports, despite the ongoing recovery in the region's tourism sector and lower transport and freight costs. With the services account deficit fully offset by the goods account surplus, the region's external trade will become a net source of foreign exchange, but less so than in previous decades, reflecting weak external and domestic demand. In addition, the current transfers account, including remittances received, has been a stable source of external resources. On the current transactions side, the income account deficit, which has become structural in the region, has gained prominence. While reinvested earnings represent a significant proportion of the income account debit, they do not, strictly speaking, result in a currency outflow. Rather, the higher interest burden paid abroad has become the main cause of foreign exchange outflows.

The widening current account deficit comes with higher external financing needs. From this perspective, financial inflows have increased, as in the case of emerging economies, while the region's credit risk has fallen on the whole. FDI inflows to the region, the largest source of external financing, have risen sharply to date, sustained by some countries, including Brazil and Mexico. Between the second half of 2023 and the first half of 2024, these flows increased by 56%, accounting for 3.2% of GDP. In addition, there was a slight pick-up in financial outflows from the region, as a result of a reversal of the capital repatriation recorded in the second half of 2023, mainly as a result of portfolio investment.

Higher net capital inflows in 2024, sustained by inward FDI, coincided with a positive change in international reserves. These reserves are equivalent to 0.7% of regional GDP in the first half of 2024. However, the current account deficit —and the resulting higher financing needs— is not expected to be fully offset by net capital transfers, which have been shrinking in the region since 2015. As a result, the search for alternative financing channels has led some countries to turn to international debt markets. In 2024, debt issuance on international markets continued to increase, underpinned mainly by sovereign debt and private corporate issuance, with thematic bonds gaining ground as a means of raising additional financing. In the first nine months of 2024, debt issuance in international markets increased by 35% year-on-year to US\$ 98.9 billion.

## Economic activity remains low and is increasingly dependent on private consumption

In the second half of 2024, GDP in Latin America and the Caribbean is projected to continue growing, at a regional annual average of 2.2%. The slower pace of economic growth compared to previous years reflects faltering domestic demand and a smaller external contribution. On the supply side, with the exception of the manufacturing industry, various economic activities have shown increases in output, although at lower levels than in previous quarters.

At the subregional level, both in South America and in the group comprising Mexico and Central America, growth rates have slowed from the second half of 2022. In South America, the slowdown is more pronounced when Brazil is not included, as that country pushes up the overall subregional GDP growth rate owing to its size and better performance. The output rates of the remaining South American countries vary from those in 2023, with half of them increasing and the other half decreasing, and Argentina experiencing a contraction in activity. Economic growth in South America accelerated in the second half of 2024 to an average rate of 2.6%, compared with the year-earlier period. On the contrary, growth in the Mexico and Central America group slackened in the second half of 2024 compared to the second half of 2023, to a rate of around 1.5%.

The slowdown in economic activity reflects a weakening of both consumption and gross fixed capital formation. However, growth is increasingly dependent on private consumption. In the second quarter of 2024, private consumption increased at an annual rate similar to that recorded in 2023. These patterns in private consumption are the result of the slowdown in eight countries of the region and the acceleration in the rest of the region. Private consumption is being maintained amid inflation control, less of a decline in the purchasing power of real wages and ebbing confidence levels, as well as the start of monetary policy easing in some countries. Similarly, in the second quarter of 2024, public consumption trends remained the same as in the year-earlier period.

Growth in gross fixed capital formation was 1 percentage point lower in the first half of 2024 than in the same period of the previous year, further underlining the signs of stagnation and of a decline in its share of GDP (it was down from 19.0% of GDP in the first half of 2023 to 18.5% of GDP in the first half of 2024). Owing to the global slowdown, net exports have not contributed to GDP growth. Exports and imports have slackened symmetrically. As a result, net exports had a negative contribution of almost 1 percentage point from the first quarter of 2023, while in 2022 it contributed almost nothing to GDP. However, after four quarters in which exports had a negative impact on GDP growth, in the second quarter of 2024 the impact was positive.

Moderated growth has been generalized across the various branches of economic activity, except for the manufacturing industry, where activity has declined. In all branches of economic activity, growth in value added has slowed, except in the general, social and personal services sector, where it was more than double the annual growth of the regional economy in the first half of 2024. In terms of momentum, this was followed by the electricity, gas and water services sector, the transport and communications sector and the financial and business services sector. There was robust growth in agriculture in the second quarter of 2024, owing specifically to the low base of comparison in the case of four countries, where sharp declines in 2023 were followed by recoveries in the second quarter of 2024: Argentina (81.2%), Colombia (10.2%), Peru (14.2%) and Uruguay (25.2%).

## Despite continued low job creation, the region's labour markets are showing modest improvements

There has been limited employment growth in the region, consistent with this low GDP growth. Employment creation in the region is projected to grow by 1.7% in 2024, the lowest level in the post-coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic period.

Sectoral analysis shows that the number of employed persons in the industrial and services sectors grew by an estimated 2.7% and 2.0% in 2024, respectively, while employment in the agricultural sector contracted by 1.3%. In the industrial sector, employment growth was greatest in basic services—electricity, gas and water—which was up 5.4% in the first half of 2024, 1.2 percentage points higher than in the same period of 2023. Employment in the construction sector grew by 1.4% in the first half of 2024, up 1.3 percentage points from the year-earlier period, while employment in manufacturing increased by 1.1% in the first half of 2024, up 0.1 percentage points from the same period in 2023.

Employment growth in the services sector, which accounts for more than 60% of regional employment, slowed by 0.8 percentage points, from 2.8% in 2023 to 2.0% in 2024. These estimates reflect the slowdown observed in the first half of 2024 in employment growth in activities such as commerce, restaurants and hotels (down by 0.1 percentage points), financial and business services (down 1.3 percentage points) and community, social and personal services (down 1.2 percentage points).

After reaching record highs during the COVID-19 pandemic, average unemployment rates in the region have trended down, remaining below 7% since 2022. The projected unemployment rate for 2024 is 6.1%, down slightly from the 6.2% recorded in 2023.

Most countries report declining rates of informal employment in 2024, and the average rate of informal employment in the region is estimated at 46.7%, down 0.4 percentage points compared to 2023 levels. Despite this slight reduction in informality, significant challenges remain regarding the formalization of employment in the region, which underlines the need to implement effective policies promoting more secure and stable working conditions.

Despite the improvement in most labour market indicators, the effects of the crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the socioeconomic measures taken to address it remain evident, especially in labour participation. In spite of a recovery in recent years and a projected post-pandemic peak of 62.8% in 2024, this figure is lower than the level recorded in 2019, 63.3%.

Employment trends by occupational category show a 7.9% increase in employers and others in the first half of 2024. The proportion of wage earners, domestic workers and own-account workers also grew, by 2.3%, 2.0% and 1.7%, respectively. Meanwhile, the number of unpaid family workers contracted by 5.9%, continuing the negative trend seen since the pandemic. Despite the recovery seen in employers and others and domestic workers in the first half of 2024, the number of employed people in both groups remained below pre-pandemic levels. This indicates that there is still a long way to go before the labour market recovers fully, in spite of the progress made.

In the first half of 2024, falling inflation in most Latin American and Caribbean countries, along with adjustments in nominal values, led to wage increases across the region. The real minimum wage climbed in 15 countries (by more than 3% in Colombia, Mexico, Nicaragua and Trinidad and Tobago). However, in that same period it fell in five countries (by more than 10% in Argentina and Haiti). Meanwhile, in the first half of 2024, the average real wage also rose in most countries for which data were available (eight of nine countries), up by more than 4% in Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico and Uruguay. Argentina, where the average real wage declined by 11% over the period, was the only exception.

In the first half of 2024, gender gaps in labour participation and unemployment narrowed slightly, but remained wide. Women's participation rate was 52.1%, up 0.3 percentage points from the prior-year period, the highest level since the first half of 2021. The participation rate for men, meanwhile, was 74.3%, up slightly from the 74.0% recorded in the first half of 2023. These figures indicate a gap of 22.2 percentage points in participation between men and women. Note, however, that this gap is the smallest recorded since the pandemic and the second-narrowest since 2018. Unemployment trended downward among both women and men, falling to the lowest first-half levels since 2018. From 2018 onward, the differences between unemployment rates for women and men also declined, and in both the first half of 2023 and of 2024, women's unemployment was 2.3 percentage points higher than that of men, the smallest first-half gap since 2018, a period over which the corresponding figures ranged from 2.7 to 4.0 percentage points.

## Fiscal space remains limited in Latin America and the Caribbean

Updated official projections indicate stable total central government income in Latin America in 2024, similar to the level seen in 2023. Tax revenue is expected to edge up slightly, driven mainly by revenue collected from taxes on the consumption of goods and services. Revenue from other sources is expected to decline, owing to lower income from non-renewable natural resources.

Meanwhile, official projections for the Caribbean point to a rise in total central government income stemming from the expected increase in external grants to finance public investment projects. At the same time, tax revenue is forecast to remain stable compared to 2023. However, total income is likely to have been weighed down by the significant impact of Hurricane Beryl on many countries in July 2024.

With regard to public spending, updated official projections indicate a slight increase for central governments in Latin America, owing mainly to rising interest payments, in line with the increase in public debt over the past decade, along with higher national and international interest rates. Interest payments are expected to average 3.0% of GDP in 2024, compared to 2.7% in 2023.

In the Caribbean, official projections also point to an increase in public spending. All components of total spending are forecast to rise, especially capital spending. Against this backdrop, the impact of Hurricane Beryl was considerable, as it generated economic damage amounting to 16.5% of GDP in Grenada and 22.0% of GDP in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. As a result, spending forecasts have been revised upward, with greater outlays expected for social assistance and reconstruction.

Amid conditions of stagnant public income and rising public spending, the overall deficit of central governments is estimated to expand slightly in Latin America in 2024. Updated official projections indicate an average overall deficit of 3.3% of GDP, compared to 3.2% of GDP in 2023. However, the primary balance, which excludes interest payments, is forecast to improve slightly as a result of a contraction in primary current expenditure.

In the Caribbean, the overall deficit is expected to widen in 2024. The primary balance is expected to remain in surplus, at an average of 0.4% of GDP, which is lower than in 2023, when it was 1.4% of GDP. This trend is largely due to the estimated increase in total spending, driven by efforts to repair the economic and social damage caused by Hurricane Beryl.

These projections, for both Latin America and the Caribbean, are based on estimated trends in various macroeconomic variables towards the end of the year. The effect of trends in private consumption and imports on tax revenue is notable. At the same time, there may be adjustments in public spending, especially capital spending, in the event of gaps between cumulative fiscal balances and previously established fiscal targets.

Gross central government public debt in Latin America averaged 52.6% of GDP in 2024, compared to 55.0% of GDP in December 2023. Meanwhile, the ratio for the Caribbean was 66.4% of GDP in June 2024, compared to 70.6% of GDP in the prior-year period. Although public debt levels in the region have fallen relative to GDP, they remain high and represent a source of vulnerability, given the current macrofinancial context.

## Inflation is converging towards target ranges, albeit at a slower pace

After peaking in 2022, inflation in Latin American and Caribbean countries has fallen steadily. Average regional inflation fell from 8.2% in 2022 to 3.7% in December 2023, and is expected to continue falling, to 3.4% in 2024, representing a decline of 0.3 percentage points relative to 2023. Although

this variable has moved closer to 3.0%, the middle of the target range of many central banks, the projection for 2024 remains above pre-pandemic levels.

The decrease in regional inflation has been driven by several factors, especially falling international food and energy prices, and restrictive monetary policies implemented in the region to meet inflation targets. Food inflation and core inflation both declined in 2024, and in January–September 2024 fell by 1.5 percentage points and 0.4 percentage points, respectively, compared to the prior-year period, considering that food inflation decreased from 5.9% to 4.4% and core inflation fell from 3.9% to 3.5%. Although both indicators moved closer to the 3.0% target set by most of the region's central banks, the current levels are still higher than those seen in 2018 and 2020.

Restrictions on service provision and the normalization of prices in sectors such as public transport, electricity and gas drove the upturn in the services component of inflation. In 2022 and part of 2023, the prices of such services were partly controlled to mitigate the effects of rising headline inflation. However, in 2024, several countries of the region raised the prices of these services. This trend was also seen globally, and services are one of the reasons why global inflation has failed to decline to the level forecast in mid-2023. Services inflation in the region has risen from 2.4% at the end of 2023 to 3.0% in 2024, an increase of 0.6 percentage points.

## Falling inflation and rate cuts in the United States have prompted looser monetary policy in the region

The continued decline in inflation in Latin American and Caribbean countries, along with looser monetary policy in the United States, have allowed all the countries of the region with inflation-targeting regimes to begin cutting monetary policy rates in 2024.

The lowering of rates has been uneven and cautious, reflecting countries' diverse cyclical positions and considerations of the impact of exchange-rate depreciation on inflation expectations. In Brazil, following a lowering of the benchmark rate from 13.75% in mid-2023 to 10.5% in May 2024, authorities began raising the rate once again in September 2024 owing to mounting inflationary pressure due partly to the fiscal stimulus.

Although the monetary policy stance has eased, it remains restrictive, as real monetary policy rates are still above the natural interest rates reported by the respective central banks.

As benchmark rates have fallen, net domestic credit has risen, driven by lending to the private sector. Against the backdrop of solid capitalization of the region's banking system, lower interest rates in 2024 have resulted in an improvement in asset quality which, nonetheless, has been accompanied by slightly lower profitability. In light of the narrowing of interest rate spreads relative to the United States, nominal currencies have depreciated since mid-2023 and exchange-rate volatility has increased.

Inflation expectation surveys indicate that inflation in several countries, including Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, will remain higher than the targeted levels for the next 24 months. This suggests that future downward adjustments in monetary policy will continue to reflect a cautious stance conditioned by the risk of exchange-rate devaluations.

With the exception of Brazil, where the increase in monetary policy rates is forecast to continue throughout 2025, rates are expected to continue falling, albeit remaining above pre-pandemic benchmark rates.


In light of the relatively high rates expected over a prolonged period, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) has reiterated its call for comprehensive use of the available monetary, foreign-exchange and prudential policy tools to ensure price stability, lessening the impact on economic activity and well-being.

## Projections and outlook for 2024 and 2025

Economic growth in Latin America and the Caribbean is expected to remain low in 2024, at 2.2%, compared to 2.3% in 2023 (see figure 1). In 2025, regional GDP growth is projected at 2.4%, which would still be low. Compared to 2024, GDP is expected to expand by 2.6% in South America. Meanwhile, Central America is forecast to record growth of 2.9%, similar to the level seen in 2024, but slower when including Mexico (by 1.7%), and growth in the Caribbean excluding Guyana will also lose pace, to 2.6%, in line with the trend seen in 2024. This estimated weak performance suggests that in the medium term, Latin American and Caribbean economies' contribution to global growth, expressed in percentage points, will be almost halved.

**Figure 1**

Latin America and the Caribbean: projected GDP growth, 2024 and 2025  
(Percentages)



**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures and ECLAC projections expressed in national currency and at constant prices.

**Note:** Central America includes Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Haiti.

Global economic growth in 2025 is expected to remain stable compared to 2024, at 3.2%, owing mainly to the expansion of emerging economies in Asia (5%), contrasting with the slower growth of advanced economies, including the United States, relative to 2024. International trade in goods and services is forecast to recover and rise by 3.4% (compared to 3.1% in 2024), outstripping global GDP growth. However, this more optimistic global outlook is not expected to benefit the region, owing in part to the economic slowdown projected in major trading partners such as China, the United States and some countries in the region, such as Brazil. External demand, as the driver of economic activity in the countries of the region, will therefore continue to lose momentum.

Global financial conditions are expected to improve in light of the trend seen, especially in the second half of 2024, as a result of the continued loosening of monetary policy, particularly in the United States and other advanced economies, and weaker global inflation. Nonetheless, risks remain, considering that global prices and monetary policy rates are still higher than pre-pandemic levels. As long as there are also risks linked to the strengthening of the dollar, the region could continue to face high financing costs.

Domestically, private consumption is likely to continue to spur growth in the region in 2025, in line with the trend in 2024, albeit more slowly. Employment is expected to continue increasing slightly, while labour participation is projected to remain weaker than it was prior to the pandemic and gender inequalities in labour markets are forecast to persist. In addition, real wages are expected to recover slightly, in line with the 2024 trend. Demand for credit from households continues to improve, helped by more favourable lending conditions. By contrast, the investment outlook for 2025 is discouraging, amid weak public spending. Gross fixed capital formation is projected to continue contracting, which calls into question its role in sustaining the region's medium- and long-term economic growth. Lastly, goods and services exports and imports are expected to recover in 2025 relative to 2024, in line with the projected improvement in global trade and the upturn in imports driven by the loosening of financial conditions, albeit with an estimated weaker contribution to regional growth. Meanwhile, inflation is expected to continue declining in 2025, at a slower pace than in 2024.

In line with the outlook for the external context and international financial conditions, the region's current account deficit is projected at around 1.7% of GDP in 2025. The trade surplus is forecast to narrow slightly relative to 2024, owing to stronger momentum in imports in keeping with less restrictive monetary policies, among other factors. An analysis of the current account balance by component indicates that remittance flows into the countries of the region will continue to be the main net source of foreign exchange income. By contrast, the income account deficit is forecast to widen, amid financial conditions that remain complex in the region. Although capital inflows are expected to remain similar to the level seen in 2024, countries may access more external resources through debt issuances and refinancing of higher-cost long-term loans.

Given the economic outlook for the end of 2024 and 2025, macroeconomic policy space is forecast to remain limited amid weak external demand, still-high commodity prices and tough financing conditions, among other factors, which tends to disturb the internal and external macroeconomic balance. An improvement in fiscal space will be difficult to achieve in the short term, as no upturn in revenues is expected and increasing interest payments will put pressure on public spending. This situation may heighten fiscal sustainability challenges linked to weak GDP growth, high financing costs and exchange-rate fluctuations. In addition, the loosening of monetary policy could be put on hold owing to slower disinflation than in 2024 and risks stemming from local currency devaluation and the monetary policy stance of the United States Federal Reserve. In this scenario, the strengthening of the dollar and rising global long-term interest rates are decisive.

In short, external demand is expected to lose momentum as the driver of regional growth. Despite weaker pressure on supply and global supply chains, along with falling commodity prices, among other factors, underlying risks remain, including the worsening of geopolitical and trade tensions, which could affect international commodity prices, and renewed frictions relating to transport routes and logistics. In addition, there is a significant risk of a return to protectionism, which would further increase inflationary pressures. Thus, although global inflation is expected to continue falling, the pace and magnitude of monetary policy rate cuts may pose a risk given the exposure of the region's countries to the monetary policy stances of advanced economies, particularly the United States.

## Policies to overcome the trap of low capacity for growth

Overcoming the trap of low capacity for growth will require a major mobilization of financial resources and the implementation of productive policies to boost investment and productivity.

The mobilization of domestic resources calls for the strengthening of public finances, which implies focusing on increasing tax revenue and making tax systems more progressive through taxes on income, property and wealth. There is also a need to curb tax evasion and carry out cost-benefit analyses of existing tax expenditures. Strengthening institutional capacity is key to boosting the mobilization of resources and ensuring that they are used more efficiently. To that end, the region must have access to macroeconomic institutions with suitable technical, operational, political and prospective (TOPP) capabilities. This implies, for example, the development of comprehensive public policy frameworks, the improvement of information and budget management systems, the strengthening of coordination of macroeconomic policies and the identification of risks through foresight analysis to guide strategic decisions with a long-term perspective.

The reform of the international financial architecture will also play a central role in enhancing the capacity for resource mobilization in the region. It will require better regional coordination to influence global reforms that facilitate access to resources for development. Such reforms include the modernization of global economic governance, the creation of crisis prevention and resolution mechanisms relating to payment and financing of sovereign debt, the increase in multilateral banks' lending capacity, encouragement of the reallocation of special drawing rights and international tax reforms.

With regard to productive development policies, ECLAC has underscored the need to implement “new generation” policies to drive a productive transformation, which is required to overcome the trap of low capacity for growth.<sup>1</sup> The Commission has thus highlighted the importance of identifying areas with strong potential to drive growth, prioritizing environmental sustainability; science, technology and innovation; digitalization, business financing and attraction of investment. It has also emphasized the need to leverage global value chains to diversify economies.

Implementing these new productive development policies calls for the coordination of action on many fronts. Priority areas include: science, technology and innovation; technology extension; digital transformation; support for entrepreneurship; closing of human talent gaps; financing over the whole life cycle of businesses; attraction of investment, including foreign direct investment; development of specific infrastructure and other public goods; adaptation of regulatory frameworks; and internationalization.

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<sup>1</sup> See Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), *Development Traps in Latin America and the Caribbean: Vital Transformations and How to Manage Them* (LC/SES.40/3-P/-\*), Santiago, 2024.

ECLAC has identified 14 strategic sectors that fall into three categories: industry, services and key sectors for sustainability. These sectors are priorities for Latin American and Caribbean countries, as they harbour considerable potential to boost growth and productivity. They also present cross-cutting opportunities linked to the relocation of global production and value chains, which affects many of these sectors. Each country and territory must define its own sectoral agenda, adapting it to specific conditions, but always with a clear vision of priorities to drive a great productive transformation towards greater inclusiveness and environmental sustainability. Implementing productive development policies requires robust institutions that can design, manage, monitor and evaluate initiatives in various areas. Technical capabilities include the ability to formulate and implement productive development strategies integrated with other dimensions of development, supported by coherent planning. Operational capabilities allow effective harmonization and coordination mechanisms to be established. Political capabilities are essential to build relationships and partnerships to overcome political obstacles that curb productivity. Prospective capabilities, meanwhile, through the analysis of technological and market trends, facilitate the building of future scenarios, reinforcing the ability to design strategic routes, making adjustments in the face of disruptive change.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid.



# CHAPTER

# I

## The global context

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In 2024, global economic growth is expected to remain steady compared to 2023, owing to the economic performance of the United States

Emerging economies have entered a new growth cycle

China's economic slowdown continues, owing to a combination of cyclical and structural factors

The world's largest central banks have cut monetary policy rates, and liquidity conditions have improved

In the United States, short-term interest rates were cut in an effort to improve the financial position of the Federal Reserve and the Treasury

Lower short-term interest rates did not prompt an increase in lending to the real economy or bring down longer-term rates

The dollar has strengthened, and financial transmission mechanisms have not necessarily brought growth and macroeconomic stability to emerging and developing economies

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


## In 2024, global economic growth is expected to remain steady compared to 2023, owing to the economic performance of the United States

The global economy is projected to grow at a rate of 3.2% in 2024 (compared to 3.3% in 2023), and this stability is expected to continue in 2025 (see figure I.1).

**Figure I.1**

Selected regions and countries: GDP growth rate, projections for 2024 and 2025  
(Percentages)



**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of International Monetary Fund (IMF), *World Economic Outlook: Policy Pivot, Rising Threats*, Washington, D.C., October 2024.

<sup>a</sup> The fiscal year begins in April and ends in March.

The United States economy, which accounts for 25% of the world's GDP and is the main driver of global GDP growth, is estimated to expand by 2.8% in 2024 and 2.2% in 2025. This performance is expected to be due largely to consumption (which represented 68% of national GDP and 86% of GDP growth in 2024), buttressed by a solid labour market with low unemployment and wage increases.<sup>1</sup> In addition, consumption was buoyed by the wealth effect as a booming stock market and lofty real estate prices increased net worth in the highest income strata.<sup>2</sup> A third contributor to private consumption is household debt, which rose by US\$ 147 billion in the third quarter to a record US\$ 18 trillion (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2024a).

Expansionary fiscal policy was an additional if lesser contributor. Net government expenditure accounted for the second-largest share (30%) of growth in 2024, after private consumption.

GDP in the eurozone grew at a lacklustre 0.8% in 2024 and is expected to expand by 1.2% in 2025 owing to declining industrial production, which an anaemic services sector has done little to offset.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In October 2024, unemployment was recorded at 4.1%, among the lowest rates in United States history. Nominal private sector wage growth, meanwhile, has been rising since July (from 3.6% that month to 4.0% in October). See Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2024).

<sup>2</sup> Household net worth totalled a record US\$ 164 trillion in the second quarter of 2024. As a booming stock market continues to break records, the average price of real estate sales has remained at historic heights, well above averages recorded since 1965. See Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2024) and Reuters (2024a).

<sup>3</sup> From March to August 2024, industrial production contracted by 2.4% compared to the same period in 2023, while services production increased by a slim 0.1% (European Union, 2024a and 2024b).

The German economy, the largest in the eurozone (24% of total GDP) and the leading producer of manufactured goods, has stagnated since the end of 2021.<sup>4</sup>

This scenario is largely attributable to a downward trend in the eurozone's industrial production, including in the automotive, chemicals and engineering sectors, beginning in 2017. Industry contracted by 2.4% between 2017 and 2023 and, according to the most recent information available in September 2024, industrial production had dropped by 2.5%.<sup>5</sup> In France and Italy, the second- and third-largest eurozone economies (17% and 12% of GDP, respectively), weak investment—especially in machinery and equipment—was a significant factor.<sup>6</sup>

The sluggish economic performance in the eurozone, and in the European Union more broadly, has triggered vigorous debate regarding its more structural causes.<sup>7</sup> According to various analyses, a lack of competitiveness due to weak investment and productivity is the largest impediment to growth.<sup>8</sup> Since the 2000s, the European Union's labour productivity has declined relative to that of the United States, and its investment ratio has consistently trailed the United States ratio since 2012, falling further behind over time.<sup>9</sup>

## Emerging economies have entered a new growth cycle

Emerging and developing economies grew by 4.2% in 2024—more than double the rate of advanced economies—and will likely sustain that pace in the short and medium term. Accordingly, these economies will take on a larger role in driving global growth: estimates indicate that their contribution to the world's economic growth will increase from 53.3% of total growth for the period 2020–2024 to 67.4% for the period 2025–2029.<sup>10</sup>

While economies in the Asia-Pacific region, including China, India, the Philippines and Viet Nam, are projected to lead this expansion, many more economies are likely to benefit. In addition, China's economy, troubled by cyclical and structural factors, will not be the linchpin or sole determinant of this cycle, as was the case for emerging and developing economies in the 2000s.

For the period 2025–2029, the percentage of emerging and developing economies with per capita GDP growth greater than that of the United States is projected at 88%, nearly double the 48% average for the period 2020–2024. This means that between the two periods, the contribution of emerging and developing economies to global growth (excluding China and India) will increase from 17% to 28%.<sup>11</sup>

Investment and exports will propel this cycle of expansion for emerging and developing economies, spurred on by the increased demand for commodities (metals) linked to green technology growth; a flourishing electronics industry thanks to the rise of artificial intelligence; the diversification of value chains; and, in general, reduced dependency on China. More structural factors, such as economic size and geographical location, will also support economic growth.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>4</sup> See Storbeck, Nilsson and Chazan (2024), Radow and Schroers (2024) and Arnold and Pitel (2023).

<sup>5</sup> See Storbeck, Nilsson and Chazan (2024).

<sup>6</sup> See Bank of Italy (2024).

<sup>7</sup> See European Commission (2024) and Wolf (2024).

<sup>8</sup> See European Commission (2024), Wolf (2024) and Draghi (2024).

<sup>9</sup> The percentage difference between the investment ratios of the European Union and the United States was 0.4% in 2012 and 1.6% in 2023. Labour productivity in the European Union amounted to more than 90% of the United States figure in the 2000s but has fallen to around 80% since the 2010s (calculated on the basis of Wolf, 2024). According to the European Commission, the European Union requires annual investment in the amount of 800,000 euros to stimulate economic growth (*Financial Times*, 2024).

<sup>10</sup> See Sharma (2012 and 2024).

<sup>11</sup> China's share of global growth is expected to hold steady at around 30% for both periods, while India's is projected to increase from 6.2% to 9.1%.

<sup>12</sup> See Sharma (2024), Welsh (2024), S&P Global (2024) and Pérez-Goropze, Cárdenas and N. Tesfay (2024).

## China's economic slowdown continues, owing to a combination of cyclical and structural factors

In 2024, the Chinese economy grew by 4.8% —below the government's 5% target— and growth is projected to be lower still in 2025 (4.5%). This performance is partly due to a downward trend in the growth rate dating back to the global financial crisis (2008–2009). China faces four major obstacles to economic growth.

The first factor is the crisis and deep recession in the real estate sector, which contracted by 5.4% in 2024 (1.3% in 2023). Plummeting sales and new construction of houses, down by 38% and 52%, respectively (De Matos, 2024), confirm the presence of a housing glut. The sector's excess inventory has reached historic proportions: the equivalent of 60 million unsold apartments, which will take more than four years to sell without government intervention, according to available estimates (Bloomberg, 2024a). With property developers in precarious financial straits and buyers fearful that purchased housing will not be completed within the agreed time frame, expectations regarding the sector's functioning have dimmed.

The second factor is the effect of falling house prices on the population's net worth which, coupled with higher youth unemployment and uncertainty about China's future economic growth, has weighed on consumption. Retail sales (a proxy for final goods and services consumption) have fallen from an average 10% for the period 2015–2018 to 6% for the period between 2023 and mid-2024.<sup>13</sup>

The third factor is the record level of local government debt, which amounts to US\$ 5.6 trillion according to Chinese authorities, although the International Monetary Fund (IMF) puts it closer to US\$ 8.4 trillion (Armstrong and Reiter, 2024). This includes not just officially reported debt but also “hidden debt” (i.e. shadow loans, bonds and credits of local government financing vehicles that are not reported), which amounts to nearly 48% of China's GDP (Yao and Zhang, 2024).<sup>14</sup> The debt situation not only raises concerns about financial stability, but also threatens to sharply curb investment, which has already been affected by the lack of private sector confidence. After peaking at around 65% in 2015, the private sector's share of gross fixed capital formation has shrunk, with a marked slowdown since 2022, bringing the figure to roughly 51% in 2024.<sup>15</sup>

The fourth factor is the Government of China's approval —following a battery of other economic measures— of a fiscal package estimated at 10 trillion yuan (US\$ 1.4 trillion) to stimulate economic growth and alleviate local government debt. The package, which includes local government issuance of three-year to five-year bonds with a view to restructuring total debt, complements the expansionary monetary measures implemented in September 2024.<sup>16</sup>

Given authorities' undervaluation of the debt by more than US\$ 3 trillion, the fiscal package may not be big enough to resolve local governments' debt woes.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, not all of the announced financing includes new liquidity injections, which could undercut the package's desired impact on growth and debt reduction.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>13</sup> See Borst (2024) and official data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China.

<sup>14</sup> According to IMF, since 2018, China has financed more than US\$ 3.8 trillion in infrastructure spending through off-balance sheet loans (Borst, 2024).

<sup>15</sup> See Borst (2024); official data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China; and Tai and Luo (2024).

<sup>16</sup> See ECLAC (2024).

<sup>17</sup> See Leahy and others (2024) and Armstrong and Reiter (2024).


<sup>18</sup> According to Armstrong and Reiter (2024), the fiscal package includes 4 trillion yuan for local governments.

## The world's largest central banks have cut monetary policy rates, and liquidity conditions have improved

In 2024, shifts in the monetary policy stance of the major central banks boosted global economic growth. Following the contractionary monetary policy cycle from the end of 2021 to the period August–September 2023, the Federal Reserve System of the United States, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England decided to pause monetary policy rate increases. In the second quarter of 2024, they began to gradually reduce short-term rates (see figure I.2), a process which is likely to continue in 2025.

Figure I.2

Monetary policy interest rates of major central banks, January 2014–November 2024



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from Bloomberg.

On three occasions (June, September and October), the Governing Council of the European Central Bank cut its deposit facility rate (the short-term rate that steers monetary policy) by 25 basis points, taking it from 4% to 3.25%.<sup>19</sup> The Federal Reserve lowered its federal funds rate—the interest rate at which commercial banks lend to one another overnight—which it had previously held steady since 26 July 2023. The rate was reduced by 50 basis points in September and by 25 basis points in November, bringing its range from 5.25%–5.50% to 4.50%–4.75%. During the same period, the Federal Reserve lowered its rate on reserve balances from 5.40% to 4.90% in September and to 4.65% in November.<sup>20</sup> That same month, the Bank of England reduced its monetary policy rate by 25 basis points.

These monetary policy changes were in response to cooling inflation at the global and national levels beginning in the fourth quarter of 2022. Indeed, inflation rates are approaching the 2% annual target set by the central banks of most advanced economies (including the United States, the United Kingdom and the eurozone) and of several emerging and developing economies (see figure I.3).<sup>21</sup>


<sup>19</sup> The European Central Bank implements its monetary policy through three monetary policy rates: the deposit facility rate, the main refinancing operations rate and the marginal lending facility rate. The most critical rate is the deposit facility rate, which determines the interest that banks earn on overnight deposits with the central bank. It also directly affects interest-yielding bank accounts. In 2024, concurrent to the deposit facility rate cut, the European Central Bank lowered its rates on main refinancing operations and the marginal lending facility.

<sup>20</sup> In accordance with current legislation, when the deposit facility rate is above 0%, the rate applied to commercial bank reserves deposited with the European Central Bank that meet minimum requirements is 0%; when the deposit facility rate is less than 0%, the deposit facility rate is applied.

<sup>21</sup> The Federal Reserve's annual inflation target of 2% was adopted unofficially in 1996 and officially in 2012. The Bank of England and the European Central Bank adopted the same target in 2003 and 2021, respectively. While the 2% target does not have an empirical justification per se, there is consensus that the figure corresponds to stable prices.

**Figure I.3**

United States, United Kingdom and eurozone: annualized monthly change in inflation rate, January 2021–September 2024  
(Percentages)



**Source:** Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, "Economic Data", Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), 2024 [online] <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/>.

**Note:** Eurozone and United Kingdom inflation rates are calculated on the basis of the consumer price index. The United States inflation rate is calculated on the basis of the personal consumption expenditures price index, the Federal Reserve's preferred indicator for analysis and projections, which measures changes in the price of goods and services consumed by all households and by non-profit institutions serving households.

Three main factors contributed to falling inflation rates: (i) lower energy prices; (ii) easing of labour market restrictions; and (iii) diminished global supply chain pressures. In the United States, data for the period December 2020–September 2022 show that 94% of the rise in inflation was attributable to those three factors: energy prices, 39%; restrictive labour market conditions, 29%; and disruptions to global supply chains, 26% (Ball, Leigh and Mishra, 2022). In the eurozone, global supply chain disruptions were the determining factor behind the increase in prices from 2021 to 2022.


From August 2022 to September 2024, the rate of variation in the global price of energy fell from 105% to -19% in annual terms. In the same period, the ratio of unemployed people to job openings (used to measure wage pressure which will affect the price of goods and services) increased from 0.6 to 0.9, meaning that the labour supply increased relative to demand. Lastly, the Global Supply Chain Pressure Index fell from 1.51 to 0.11 (see figure I.4).

The loosening of monetary policy has been positive for global liquidity. Since the second quarter of 2024, money supply growth was 0.9% in the United States, 0.7% in the United Kingdom and 1.7% in the eurozone. In the third quarter, liquidity growth intensified (2.0%, 2.2% and 2.8% in the United States, the United Kingdom and the eurozone, respectively).<sup>22</sup> In keeping with these developments, financial conditions have eased, as reflected in the downward trend in the United States National Financial Conditions Index (see figure I.5).

<sup>22</sup> See chapter II on global liquidity.

Figure I.4

Global Supply Chain Pressure Index, global price of energy and ratio of labour supply to demand in the United States, January 2022–September 2024




**Source:** Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, "Economic Data", Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), 2024 [online] <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/>; and Federal Reserve Bank of New York, "Global Supply Chain Pressure Index (GSCPI)", 2022 [online] <https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/policy/gscpi#/overview>.

**Note:** The Global Supply Chain Pressure Index, produced by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, measures conditions in global supply chains by combining various indicators of commodity shipping costs (Baltic Dry Index), container shipping rates (Harper Index), airfreight costs and supply chain-related components from Purchasing Managers' Index surveys of the manufacturing sectors of a group of seven economies (China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China, the United Kingdom, the United States and the eurozone).

Figure I.5

United States: National Financial Conditions Index, 6 January 2023–1 November 2024 (Percentages)



**Source:** Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, "Economic Data", Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), 2024 [online] <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/>.

**Note:** The National Financial Conditions Index is a weighted average of 105 risk, credit and leverage indicators in the financial system. The risk component refers to both the premium on risky assets embedded in their returns and the volatility of asset prices. The credit component refers to the willingness to both borrow and lend at prevailing prices. The leverage component refers to the share of debt in the financing of assets. Positive index values indicate tighter financial conditions

## In the United States, short-term interest rates were cut in an effort to improve the financial position of the Federal Reserve and the Treasury

In addition to improving liquidity, interest rate reductions in the United States aimed to improve the Federal Reserve's balance sheet and the government's financial position. Before its monetary policy shift, the Federal Reserve had US\$ 3.3 trillion in reserves at 5.40% interest on the liability side of its balance sheet. This meant that interest payments to commercial banks outstripped investment income from the purchase of United States Treasury bonds.

The resulting accounting loss meant that the Federal Reserve's remittances to the Treasury dried up. In May 2024, the Federal Reserve's accumulated negative net income since September 2022 stood at US\$ 159 billion.<sup>23</sup> Falling interest rates, together with the implementation of quantitative tightening beginning in June 2022 and the resulting US\$ 153 billion reduction in reserves, are expected to help to offset the Federal Reserve's accounting losses.<sup>24</sup> The European Central Bank, meanwhile, recorded its first loss in two decades, estimated at US\$ 1.3 billion for 2023, owing to interest expenses on the Bank's liabilities in excess of interest income on its assets. The loss will be carried forward to 2024 on the Bank's balance sheet.<sup>25</sup>

## Lower short-term interest rates did not prompt an increase in lending to the real economy or bring down longer-term rates

The monetary policy shifts and expanded liquidity have yet to affect bank lending to the real economy. In the United States, the rate of growth in commercial bank lending to the industrial and commercial sectors since the implementation of the new monetary policy measures has been among the lowest recorded since 2011 (around 1%). In the eurozone, a moderate 4% expansion in demand for bank loans in the third quarter of 2024 marked the first increase since the third quarter of 2022.<sup>26</sup> The United Kingdom followed a similar trend, with a 0.21% increase in commercial bank lending to the private sector between the first and second quarters of 2024 and 1% growth projected for the year. Paradoxically, a more noteworthy factor has been the unexpected rise in long-term interest rates. In the United States, yields on longer-term securities have risen across the full spectrum of maturities since monetary policy rates began falling.

Economic growth provides a partial explanation of the trend in long-term yields: the fact that the country's growth has been robust and will likely continue should ensure that short-term interest rates will be lowered less than initially projected. Indeed, in 2024, the intensity of the Federal Reserve's monetary rate cuts has ebbed.

Another explanatory factor may be that, with the adoption of quantitative tightening measures, the private sector will replace the Federal Reserve as the largest purchaser of Treasury bonds and demand higher risk premiums on said bonds.<sup>27</sup>

A third possible factor behind rising long-term yields is the expansion of the United States' fiscal deficit and the likely continuation of this trend in the short and medium term. The deficit amounted to US\$ 1.8 trillion in 2024 (7.0% of GDP) and is expected to total US\$ 2.8 trillion by 2034.<sup>28</sup> Interest

<sup>23</sup> In accordance with the Federal Reserve's accounting conventions, negative net income does not reduce its capital or jeopardize its solvency. Rather, these accounting losses are recorded as deferred assets. See CRS (2024).

<sup>24</sup> For an analysis of quantitative tightening measures, see ECLAC (2023 and 2024).

<sup>25</sup> See ECB (2024).

<sup>26</sup> See Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2024) and ECB (2024).

<sup>27</sup> For additional details, see chapter II on global liquidity.

<sup>28</sup> The deficit is calculated on the basis of the fiscal year beginning 1 October and ending 30 September.

payments, which in 2024 accounted for 44% of the fiscal deficit or 3.1% of GDP (meaning that the primary deficit accounted for 3.9% of GDP), are projected to climb to 4.1% of GDP in 2034 (CBO, 2024). The debt situation of the United States is largely responsible for the US\$ 2.1 trillion increase in global debt in the first half of 2024, bringing the total to a record US\$ 312 trillion (approximately 245% of global GDP) (IIF, 2024).

Rising debt will oblige the Treasury to increase the supply of government securities in the future to repair the fiscal imbalance that would otherwise diminish the value of such securities and thereby generate expected capital losses for securities holders. Moreover, as mentioned above, quantitative tightening could lead private bondholders to demand higher premiums. The supply of government securities has not as yet increased disproportionately, according to available data.<sup>29</sup>

In the eurozone, government bond yields have displayed no discernible trend. From January to June 2024, 10-year bond yields rose (from 2.9% to 3.2%), owing in part to an increase in supply since the beginning of the year.<sup>30</sup> From June to September, yields fell (from 3.2% to 2.8%), an indication of Europe's economic slowdown and the impact of a more expansionary monetary policy. From October onward, yields rose again in anticipation of higher-than-expected inflation.<sup>31</sup>

The victory of the Republican Party in the United States presidential election has reinforced the rising trend in long-term yields, amid concerns about the government's growing deficit, which would lead to an increase in the supply of Treasury bonds and thus cause long-term yields on government securities to rise.

Private sector purchases of Treasury bonds brought on by quantitative tightening are also expected to be accompanied by rising deposit levels in the banking system and, thus, an increased capacity to generate liquidity and a possible expansion of aggregate demand. Greater aggregate demand, in turn, could mean lower aggregate supply, which would push up the general price level.

Impending tariff hikes (up to 60% for Chinese products and 10% for products from the rest of the world) could drive up the cost of production and, consequently, the price of final goods. In addition, the announced deportation of immigrants could constrict supply in certain sectors, in particular construction and food production.

## The dollar has strengthened, and financial transmission mechanisms have not necessarily brought growth and macroeconomic stability to emerging and developing economies

Resilient economic growth in the United States, rising yields on government securities, stock market gains and growth problems for the eurozone and China have had a positive impact on the appreciation of the dollar against other currencies, including the euro and the yuan. The Republican Party's electoral win and the anticipated deregulation of markets and key sectors of the United States economy, as well as tax cuts, have bolstered this trend.<sup>32</sup>

The appreciation of the dollar against other currencies puts pressure on countries with fixed exchange rates or dollar-pegged currencies. For countries with more flexible systems, fluctuating exchange rates are often accompanied by changes in risk indices, such that currency depreciation increases the risk perceptions of developing countries. This, in turn, pushes up the cost of external debt and limits fiscal space.

<sup>29</sup> See chapter II on global liquidity.

<sup>30</sup> See McDougall (2024).

<sup>31</sup> See European Union (2024c) and Reuters (2024b).


<sup>32</sup> See chapter II on global liquidity.

Increased risk perceptions have repercussions for production, as the sovereign risk index tends to dictate risk index trends for the non-financial corporate sector. Exchange-rate fluctuations also affect the non-financial corporate sector and the financial sector in their balance sheets, where foreign currency liabilities are seldom fully covered by foreign currency assets. Thus, exchange-rate depreciation can put firms with foreign debt in a difficult position.

If firms in such a position purchase foreign currencies to cover their foreign exchange liabilities, the resulting increased demand could cause a further depreciation of the exchange rate, which could in turn intensify capital outflows while increasing the debt burden and, ultimately, cause financial vulnerability. These transmission mechanisms could reverse the current trend of rising portfolio flows to emerging and developing economies (see figure I.6).

**Figure I.6**

Portfolio capital flows to emerging markets, January 2022–September 2024  
(Billions of dollars)



**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from the Institute for International Finance (IIF).

A stronger dollar has implications not only for international borrowing conditions in emerging markets but also for domestic borrowing conditions. Empirical data on emerging and developing economies show that the dollar index correlates to wider yield gaps with both foreign and local currencies.

This stylized fact may be attributed to the growing importance of foreign investors' role in local debt markets. Global liquidity conditions, as reflected in nominal-exchange-rate variations, affect the yield on local-currency securities held by these investors.


A depreciation—whether actual or expected—of the local currency against the dollar translates into actual and expected capital losses that increase the risk exposure of foreign investors holding local-currency securities. Thus, nominal-exchange-rate depreciation has an amplifier effect on risk conditions in local-currency securities markets.

Analysis of transmission mechanisms should also take into account the relationship between trends in the dollar's value against other currencies, on the one hand, and commodities prices, on the other. Since mid-2024, prices of commodities, including agricultural products, minerals and metals, and energy, have trended down (see figure I.7), with a positive effect on

commodities importers and a negative effect on commodities exporters. However, this situation could change: indeed, another stylized fact, emerging in the wake of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) crisis, indicates a degree of positive correlation between the dollar's appreciation and the price of commodities.<sup>33</sup>

Figure I.7

Price indices: agricultural products, minerals and metals, and energy, January–September 2024  
(Base year 2010 = 100)



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Bank, “World Bank Commodities Price Data (The Pink Sheet)”, 2024 [online] <https://www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-markets>.

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<sup>33</sup> See Rees (2023).

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# CHAPTER



## Global liquidity

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In 2024, the world's major central banks expanded liquidity, ending the monetary tightening cycle

Improved liquidity conditions have increased wealth, but have not resulted in lower long-term interest rates

Liquidity expansion tends to be concentrated in developed countries

Bibliography




## In 2024, the world's major central banks expanded liquidity, ending the monetary tightening cycle

Since the second quarter of 2024, the world's major central banks have expanded liquidity, ending the tight monetary policy cycle that began in 2022 to combat rising inflation. Money supply grew by 1.3% in Japan, 0.7% in the United Kingdom, 0.9% in the United States and 1.7% in the eurozone in the second quarter. In the third quarter, with the exception of Japan, liquidity expansion intensified (with a rate of 2.2% in the United Kingdom, 2.0% in the United States and 2.8% in the eurozone) (see figure II.1).

**Figure II.1**

Variation in money supply of world's major central banks, fourth quarter 2023–third quarter 2024  
(Percentages)



**Source:** Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, "Economic Data", Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), 2023 [online] <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/>.


**Note:** The money supply is measured as the M2 monetary aggregate in the case of the United States and as M3 in the case of the eurozone, Japan and the United Kingdom.

In line with the trend in the money supply of the world's leading central banks, global credit granted to the non-financial sector reflected an upward trend and a clear recovery in the first two quarters of 2024 (with growth of 2.5% in the first half and 2.4% in the second quarter), compared to the contraction in 2023 (averaging 1.4%). The breakdown of credit into cross-border lending and debt issuance in the international bond market shows that the former expanded by 2.7% and the latter by 2.1% in the second quarter of 2024 (see figure II.2).

The trend in global liquidity is partly explained by the reduction in monetary policy interest rates. In September 2024, the United States Federal Reserve decided to lower the federal funds rate for the first time since March 2020, by 50 basis points, from a range of 5.25% to 5.50% to a range of 4.75% to 5.00%. In November, it lowered the rate again, by 25 basis points, to between 4.50% and 4.75%.

Figure II.2

Variation in global credit, cross-border lending and debt issuance in international bond market, first quarter 2022–second quarter 2024 (Percentages)



Source: Bank of International Settlements (BIS), "Global liquidity" [online] [https://data.bis.org/topics/GLI/BIS,WS\\_GLI,1.0/Q.USD.3P.N.B.I.G.771](https://data.bis.org/topics/GLI/BIS,WS_GLI,1.0/Q.USD.3P.N.B.I.G.771) [accessed on 5 November 2024].

The Governing Council of the European Central Bank decided on three occasions (June, September and October 2024) to lower the interest rate at which it conducts its monetary policy by 25 basis points, from 4.00% to 3.25%. This is the first time in 13 years that the European Central Bank has adopted an expansionary monetary policy. In November, the Bank of England reduced its monetary policy rate from 5.00% to 4.75%. Lastly, the Bank of Japan maintained its interest rate at around 0.25%.

Interest rates were lowered in response to the decreased inflation rate and inflation expectations aligned with the established targets (2% for the world's major banks), in addition to the objective of avoiding diminished economic growth and a weakened labour market. The rate of change of global energy prices, which had reached an all-time high of 168% in October 2021, has decreased since August 2022.

Between January 2023 and September 2024, global energy prices fell steadily (except in June and July 2024). In September 2024, global energy prices had declined by 16.7%. Similarly, food price inflation fell from a high of 10.9% in July 2022 in the United States and 17.9% in May 2023 in the eurozone to lows of 2.3% and 1.4% in September 2024, respectively.

In addition, pressures in the labour market have eased. In the United States, the unemployment rate remained stable in October 2024 at 4.1%, the lowest level recorded since 2000, reflecting the overall strength of the labour market. However, an analysis of the labour market shows that, since April 2023, the ratio between unemployment (labour supply) and the supply of jobs (labour demand), both expressed in figures, has trended upward (see figure II.3).

The latest labour market survey, published in the United States in November 2024, shows that the employment rate (4.2%) has remained virtually unchanged.

Figure II.3

United States: ratio of unemployment (labour supply) to supply of jobs (labour demand), monthly data, September 2022–September 2024



Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, "Economic Data", Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), 2023 [online] <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/>.

## Improved liquidity conditions have increased wealth, but have not resulted in lower long-term interest rates

The reduction of the monetary policy interest rates of the world's major central banks and the expectation that this trend will continue in 2025 have buoyed equity markets. These factors have helped to maintain the upward trend in stock prices since authorities began easing monetary policy in September 2023.

Between September and December 2023, stock price indices rose from 125.6 to 132.6 for the United States and from 147.9 to 154.9 for the eurozone.<sup>1</sup> Between January and September 2024, both indices increased, from 157.4 to 179.7 and from 132.5 to 141.7, respectively. In September 2024, share price index values were the highest on record in the United States and highest since the formation of the eurozone.

Higher stock valuations have a direct effect on the economy through increased corporate and household wealth. For companies, a higher level of wealth improves balance sheets, thereby strengthening their financial position. For households, greater wealth translates into a higher level of consumption.<sup>2</sup> In the United States, together with government spending, the growth of private consumption (0.5% in the third quarter of 2024) is one of the main factors that have helped to sustain economic growth (2.8% in the third quarter of 2024).

The lowering of monetary policy rates has moderately dampened the interest rates of treasury securities in the eurozone. Between April and September 2024, the average yield on government bonds decreased from 3.08% to 2.83%.

<sup>1</sup> These values are indices based on 2015 values. See Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2024).

<sup>2</sup> This reasoning assumes that consumption is a function of disposable income and accumulated wealth.

Paradoxically, United States Treasury bond yields have trended upward since the Federal Reserve began to lower the short-term interest rate. Between mid-September and the end of October 2024, the yield on Treasury bonds increased from 3.66% to 4.28% for those with 10-year maturities, from 4.05% to 4.58% for those with 20-year maturities and from 3.98% to 4.47% for those with 30-year maturities. Similarly, financial conditions for the real estate market have tightened. The mortgage rate increased from 6.08% to 6.72% between the end of September and end of October.

The increase in Treasury bond yields amid easing credit conditions is partly explained by the expansionary phase of the United States economy, which is expected to grow by 2.8% in 2024, surpassing the growth recorded in 2022 (1.9%) and 2023 (2.5%). This implies a smaller interest rate cut than initially envisaged, which would reduce the capital gains from holding Treasury bonds. A lower capital gain is an incentive to substitute government bonds for other higher-yield assets.

Another factor influencing Treasury bond yields is that, in a context of uncertainty, private investors may demand a higher yield for holding treasury bonds. Recent estimates show that volatility explains half of the variation in the Treasury bond yield premium (Whitbread, 2024).

Since the adoption of quantitative tightening monetary policy in 2023, the Federal Reserve has not renewed the stock of maturing Treasury bonds. This implies that the private sector has to absorb the issuance of new treasury bonds by the government to finance the public deficit.<sup>3</sup> Between the adoption of quantitative tightening policies in June 2022 and the second quarter of 2024, the Federal Reserve's share of Treasury bond holdings declined from 24.7% to 17.7% of the total. In contrast, the private sector (individuals, mutual funds, banks and insurance companies) increased its bond holdings from 30.7% to 47.0% of the total in the same period. Within this group, mutual funds are the main holders of Treasury bonds (17.7% of the total).<sup>4</sup>

Lastly, a third factor that could explain the rise in long-term bond yields is the growth of the fiscal deficit. In 2024, the deficit stood at US\$ 2 trillion or 7.0% of GDP (compared to 5.2% of GDP in 2022 and 6.2% in 2023), bringing federal government debt to nearly 100% of GDP and debt service payments to over US\$ 1 trillion (representing 17% of federal spending). In 2025, federal government debt is projected to exceed 100% of GDP.

However, the increase in Treasury securities has not been strong enough to justify a sustained rise in yields. The latest available data indicate that Treasury bond issuance totalled US\$ 2.3 trillion in September 2024, which is only slightly higher than the value of those issued in March and June (US\$ 2.0 trillion and US\$ 1.8 trillion, respectively).<sup>5</sup>

The buoyancy of the United States economy, which has helped to boost growth and avoid sliding into a recession, together with the rise in long-term interest rates and growing geopolitical tensions in the Middle East and the war in Ukraine, have pushed up the international exchange rate of the dollar (see figure II.4).

If this trend continues, the appreciation of the dollar could have a significant financial impact for developing countries, given the hegemony of the dollar as the international reserve currency and foreign investors' significant role in domestic bond markets.

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
<sup>3</sup> See ECLAC (2023a and 2023b).

<sup>4</sup> The remaining holders of Treasury bonds are institutions in other countries (governments and central banks).

<sup>5</sup> See SIFMA (2024).

Figure II.4

Nominal broad dollar index, daily data, 3 September–25 October 2024  
(Index: 2006 = 100)



Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, "Economic Data", Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), 2023 [online] <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/>.

Note: The nominal broad dollar index shows the appreciation of the dollar against a basket of world currencies.

## Liquidity expansion tends to be concentrated in developed countries

The bulk of international financial flows is concentrated in developed countries (72% of total foreign direct investment and portfolio investment flows in 2010 and 63% in 2022). Meanwhile, financial flows from developed countries to developing countries accounted for 10% of the total in 2010 and grew by only 3 percentage points over a 12-year period (see table II.1). Financial flows between developing economies also grew by just 3 percentage points.

Table II.1

Financial flows between selected groups of economies, 2010 and 2022  
(Percentages of total)

Financial flows between groups of economies	2010	2022
Financial flows from advanced economies to emerging and developing economies	10	13
Financial flows between advanced economies	72	63
Financial flows from emerging and developing economies to advanced economies	8	11

Source: Brasil, Federación de Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica (BRICS), *BRICS Chairmanship Research: Improvement of the International Monetary and Financial System*, 2024 [en línea] [https://yakovpartners.ru/upload/iblock/9c2/ci594n0ysoxcuukw7iliw6qtr4xz6cc4/BRICS\\_Research\\_on\\_IMFS.pdf](https://yakovpartners.ru/upload/iblock/9c2/ci594n0ysoxcuukw7iliw6qtr4xz6cc4/BRICS_Research_on_IMFS.pdf).

Another factor that benefits developed countries is that they can reduce the borrowing costs of their liabilities and at the same time earn higher returns on their assets. This has resulted in a considerable transfer of wealth from emerging and developing economies to developed countries and especially to the United States, owing to the dollar's predominance in the international system as a reserve currency.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> This is called "exorbitant privilege". The expression "exorbitant privilege" was coined in the 1960s by France's then Finance Minister, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, under the presidency of Charles de Gaulle, and refers to the unique role of the United States dollar, in terms of the ability to issue debt internationally at interest rates much lower than those of other countries. See Mayer (2021), Gourinchas and Rey (2014) and Eichengreen (2011).

Table II.2 shows the average net risk positions and valuation effects for developing and developed economies and the United States. The average net risk position for developed economies increased from 1.4% in the 1980–1990 period to 2.7% in the 2010–2021 period, while for the United States it increased from 6.8% to 16.0% between these two periods. In contrast, the net risk position for developing economies decreased from -3.9% to -28.1% between these two periods.

**Table II.2**

Net risk positions and valuation effects for developed and developing economies and the United States, 1980–2021

(Percentages, percentages of GDP and billions of dollars)

Economy/group of economies	1980–1990	1990–2000	2000–2010	2010–2021
<b>Net risk positions (Percentages)<sup>a</sup></b>				
Developed economies	1.4	1.0	1.5	2.7
Emerging and developing economies	-3.9	-8.0	-26.9	-28.1
United States	6.8	14.8	16.7	16.0
<b>Valuation effects (Percentages of GDP)<sup>b</sup></b>				
Developed economies	0.44	-0.21	0.77	-1.88
Emerging and developing economies	-0.41	0.21	-2.02	-0.55
United States	1.30	0.20	3.47	2.59
<b>Net position of foreign assets (Billions of dollars)<sup>c</sup></b>				
Developed economies	-6 187	-21 358	-75 376	-147 158
Emerging and developing economies	-394	-907	-169	722
United States	1 400	4 334	13 180	24 703
<b>International reserves (Billions of dollars)</b>				
Emerging and developing economies	870	1 923	7 146	19 686

**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of M. Milesi-Ferretti, “The external wealth of nations database”, The Brookings Institution, 2022; P. O. Gourinchas and H. Rey, “External adjustment, global imbalances, valuation effects”, *Handbook of International Economics*, vol. 4, G. Gopinath, E. Helpman and K. Rogoff (eds.), Elsevier, 2014; and E. Pérez Caldentey, “How economic crises have strengthened the role of the United States dollar and its implications for developing economies”, *Central Banking, Monetary Policy and the Political Economy of Dollarization*, S. A. Kappes and A. Arauz, Cheltham, Edward Elgar, 2025, forthcoming.

<sup>a</sup> Net risk position is defined as the difference between capital assets and direct investment assets as a proportion of total assets and capital inflows and investment liabilities as a proportion of total liabilities.

<sup>b</sup> Valuation effects are calculated using the formula  $VE = \frac{NA_t - NA_{t-1} - CA_t}{GDP_t} VENA_t CA_t GDP_t$ , where  $VE$  = valuation effects;  $NA_t$  = net assets at time  $t$ ;  $CA_t$  = current account at time  $t$ ; and  $GDP_t$  = gross domestic product at time  $t$ .

<sup>c</sup> The net position of external assets is equal to the sum of external assets and liabilities. In the case of developing economies, it was negative between 1970 and 2007 and was positive thereafter (with the exception of 2010).

From the point of view of developed countries, and especially the United States, holding risky assets and providing safe assets to the rest of the world raises the possibility of excessive returns in normal times and losses in times of crisis. In general, the information available for the period 1980–2021 points to positive valuation effects for the United States (see table II.2). The country’s exorbitant privilege of obtaining excessive returns in normal times on its international investment position is attributed in part to its comparative advantage in the financial market. The United States has the largest financial market in the world (Eichengreen, 2011).

The concentration of financial flows in developed countries and the United States is unrelated to the share of trade between emerging and developing economies, which has grown significantly over the last three decades, from 10% in 1995 to 26% in 2022. Trade among this group of countries is expected to rise to 32% of the total by 2032. In contrast, between 1995 and 2022, trade between advanced economies and emerging and developing economies remained constant at 37%, while trade between advanced economies declined from 53% in 1995 to 37% in 2022 (see table II.3).

Table II.3

Trade between selected groups of economies, 1995, 2022 and projections for 2032  
(Percentages of total)

Trade between groups of economies	1995	2022	2032
Trade between advanced economies and emerging and developing economies	37	37	31
Trade between advanced economies	53	37	37
Trade between emerging and developing economies	10	26	32


Source: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), BRICS Chairmanship Research: Improvement of the International Monetary and Financial System, 2024 [online] [https://yakovpartners.ru/upload/iblock/9c2/ci594n0ysoxcuukw7iliw6qtr4xz6cc4/BRICS\\_Research\\_on\\_IMFS.pdf](https://yakovpartners.ru/upload/iblock/9c2/ci594n0ysoxcuukw7iliw6qtr4xz6cc4/BRICS_Research_on_IMFS.pdf).

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# CHAPTER



## External sector

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The region's current account deficit is expected to widen in 2024, owing in part to the growing burden of interest paid on external debt, offset by a sharp increase in direct investment inflows as the main source of external financing

The region's foreign trade is projected to converge to a balanced position by end-2024, sustained by the goods account surplus amid depressed import demand and still-high, albeit declining, international commodity prices

The income account deficit, linked to investment, is expected to widen in 2024, while the current transfers account is likely to show a stable surplus

Amid lower risk perception and more favourable international conditions for the region, financial flows and, in particular, direct investment flows to the region are expected to increase in 2024 compared to 2023, as is direct investment from the countries abroad

Debt issuance on international markets continues to grow in 2024, supported mainly by sovereign debt and private corporate issuance

Bibliography



## The region's current account deficit is expected to widen in 2024, owing in part to the growing burden of interest paid on external debt, offset by a sharp increase in direct investment inflows as the main source of external financing

Following a considerable correction in 2023, the current account deficit of Latin America and the Caribbean is expected to deteriorate, albeit moderately, in 2024. Between January and June 2024, the deficit (US\$ 33.5 billion) represented 1% of regional GDP, compared to 0.9% in the second half of 2023 (see figure III.1A). The negative performance of the income account — particularly the rise in interest paid abroad— has been a determining factor, with a deficit of 3.9% of GDP in the first half of the year, the highest level recorded in the past five years.

In contrast, the region's foreign trade is trending towards a balanced position and, by registering a surplus of 0.6% of GDP in the first half of the year, it should become a moderate net source of foreign exchange in 2024 (ECLAC, 2024a). However, the positive foreign trade performance does not reflect a clear recovery of regional exports, which face weak external demand both from the region's main trading partners and its own economies.<sup>1</sup> Instead, this trend corresponds more to an adjustment in imports owing to both a volume effect, caused by slackening domestic demand, and a price effect, caused by falling import prices in the region.

**Figure III.1**

Latin America and the Caribbean (19 countries):<sup>a</sup> net balance of balance-of-payments components relative to GDP, first half of 2019–first half of 2024  
(Percentages)

### A. Current account



<sup>1</sup> Intra-regional exports represented, on average, 15% of the region's total exports between 2019 and 2023 (data from the International Trade Center, based on statistics from UN Comtrade Database and the Trade Map database).

B. Capital and financial account<sup>b</sup>

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Argentina, the Bahamas, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Suriname and Uruguay. The composition of the group of countries is based on the information available as at 30 October 2024.

<sup>b</sup> The balance of the financial account is indicated with the same sign as the current account according to the sixth edition of the *Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual* of the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2009). A negative sign means that the region is characterized by recourse to external sources of financing or the reduction of foreign assets (and vice versa).

Current transfers are expected to remain in surplus, having risen to 2.3% of GDP in the first half of 2024, with remittances continuing to be a crucial source of foreign exchange, albeit reflecting mixed trends among the countries of the region (ECLAC, 2024b). While remittances are not offset by any items in the balance of payments, their “costs” in terms of significant migration flows and “brain drain” tend to undermine the long-term economic growth of the countries of origin of the migrants sending them (IMF, 2024) and, in turn, the future external position of the countries of the region.

In light of the expected widening of the current account deficit in 2024, gross capital inflows, or net issuance of liabilities, are projected to show stronger growth compared to 2023, albeit lower than before the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic (see figure III.1B). In the first half of 2024, they represented 2.9% of GDP, a clear improvement from the previous half-year. Foreign direct investment inflows were the primary source of external financing, with a significant expansion of 56% in the same period, totalling roughly US\$ 104 billion (3.2% of GDP). In addition, inflows of other investments<sup>2</sup> have gained prominence, which could reflect a change in the private sector’s liquidity management strategy.

Gross capital outflows, or net asset acquisitions, are expected to rebound in 2024, driven by higher portfolio investment and, to a lesser extent, regional outward direct investment. These

<sup>2</sup> The item “other investment” in the financial account includes trade credits, cross-border loans and deposits, and allocations of special drawing rights.

outflows rose to 0.6% of GDP in the first half of 2024, reversing the regional-level repatriation of capital by residents reported in the previous half-year.

Lastly, reserve assets increased significantly to 0.7% of GDP in the first half of 2024, compared to 0.1% of GDP in the previous half, though with mixed trends among countries (see chapter VII.B).

As a result, the regional financial account, which includes the variation in reserve assets, recorded net capital inflows of US\$ 52.9 billion in the first half of 2024, equivalent to 1.6% of GDP, similar to the level seen since the first half of 2023.<sup>3</sup>


### The region's foreign trade is projected to converge to a balanced position by end-2024, sustained by the goods account surplus amid depressed import demand and still-high, albeit declining, international commodity prices<sup>4</sup>

Regional trade in goods has remained relatively stable since late 2022. The value of exports (US\$ 694 billion) remained almost constant in the first half of 2024, with a variation of 0.1% compared to the previous half-year (see figure III.2A). Meanwhile, the value of imports (US\$ 656 billion) contracted by 1.5% over the same period. As a result, the trade balance recorded a surplus of US\$ 37.6 billion, in line with the surplus trend since the first half of 2023.

Figure III.2

Latin America and the Caribbean (19 countries):<sup>a</sup> foreign trade, first half of 2019–first half of 2024  
(Billions of dollars)


#### A. Trade in goods



<sup>3</sup> The difference between the financial account balance and the current account balance is attributed to the capital account balance plus net errors and omissions.

<sup>4</sup> See ECLAC (2024a) for a more in-depth analysis of the recent trends in international trade in the region.

## B. Trade in services



**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Argentina, the Bahamas, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Suriname and Uruguay. The composition of the group of countries is based on information available as at 30 October 2024.

This performance is mainly the result of the stronger momentum in the first half of the year of certain countries with a strong influence on regional trends, notably: Brazil, with a remarkable, though narrower, surplus of US\$ 37.3 billion; Argentina, with a surplus of US\$ 12.1 billion that contrasts with the US\$ 559 million deficit recorded in the previous half; and Peru, with a surplus of US\$ 9.6 billion, which consolidates its favourable position.

Nevertheless, foreign trade in the region remains subject to fragile external demand and moderate economic growth among its main trading partners (see chapter I). The region's sluggish economic activity has also affected imports, including of intermediate and capital goods, which are seen as a possible adjustment variable to mitigate foreign exchange outflows from the region.

In addition, international prices of the region's main exported and imported goods remain elevated, within a higher range than that recorded pre-pandemic (2015–2019) and similar to that observed during the commodity supercycle (2011–2014), albeit in a different economic and international context (see chapter VIII). According to projections by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, 2024a), the terms of trade are expected to show a slight improvement of 1% in 2024 with respect to 2023, owing to a bigger drop in import prices than export prices.

Trade in services is much smaller in scale than trade in goods (see figure III.2B). However, the limited capacity to finance imports through exports has led to a structural deficit in the region, which is a constraint given the foreign currency outflows generated.

Services exports amounted to US\$ 124 billion in the first half of 2024, expanding by 8% relative to the second half of 2023, while services imports (US\$ 141 billion) decreased by 2%. This led to a narrowing of the services account deficit, which totalled roughly US\$ 17 billion and was fully covered by the goods account surplus, as it represented roughly 50% of the latter.

The sectors with the largest contribution in nominal terms included exports of services, which were boosted by the growth in international tourism, while travel registered a 16% six-month increase. In fact, in 2024, the region's tourism sector returned to pre-pandemic levels and, in some cases, surpassed them (see box III.1).

**Box III.1****Latin America and the Caribbean: recent trends in the tourism sector**

According to recent data from the World Tourism Organization (UN Tourism), foreign exchange earnings from international tourism in Latin America and the Caribbean continued to recover in 2023, with all subregions surpassing the levels seen in 2019, prior to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic (see table). The region's foreign exchange earnings grew by 14% compared to 2019. The increase recorded in Central America stands out, with foreign currency inflows 31% above 2019 levels. Similarly, tourist arrivals to the region also recovered in 2023, with a total of 73 million people, 0.8% above the 2019 level. The Caribbean and Central America reflect the strongest growth in this area, while the variation in tourist arrivals to South America remains negative compared to 2019.

**Foreign exchange earnings from international tourism and tourist arrivals**

(Billions of dollars, percentages and number of persons)

	Foreign exchange earnings (Billions of dollars)			Variation (Percentages)	Tourist arrivals (Number of persons)			Variation (Percentages)	Variation (Percentages)
	2019	2022	2023	2023/2019	2019	2023	2024 <sup>a</sup>	2023/2019	2024/2019
The Caribbean	35.5	34.6	40.4	13.8	26.1	28.1	28.4	7.7	8.7
Central America	12.6	13.2	16.5	31.0	10.9	11.5	12.9	5.5	18.6
South America	29.5	22.8	31.5	6.8	35.6	33.6	34.1	-5.6	-4.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>77.6</b>	<b>70.6</b>	<b>88.4</b>	<b>13.9</b>	<b>72.6</b>	<b>73.2</b>	<b>75.4</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>3.8</b>

**Source:** World Tourism Organization (UN Tourism), *World Tourism Barometer*, vol. 21, No. 3, September 2023, and *World Tourism Barometer*, vol. 22, No. 3, September 2024.

<sup>a</sup> Preliminary data.

Travel from the United States to Central America and the Caribbean was a major driver of this recent trend. Tourist arrivals are expected to reflect continued growth in 2024, with a particularly strong rebound in the Caribbean and Central America. Total tourist arrivals in all subregions in the first seven months of 2024 already exceed the total recorded for all of 2023, at 75 million people. This figure is 3.8% higher than the total arrivals registered in 2019.

On the basis of these trends, the tourism sector is expected to recover fully in 2024. However, UN Tourism warns that rising travel and accommodation costs pose a risk to the recovery and growth of this sector in the region.

**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Tourism Organization (UN Tourism).

On the import side, while spending on transportation remains high, it has decreased, owing in part to lower international oil prices and reduced pressure on global supply chains. And yet, a high level of uncertainty persists, linked to prevailing geopolitical tensions, among other factors.

Currently, one of the most notable trends is the decline in spending on business services, which tends to reflect weak investment and uncertainty about domestic demand in general, owing to a cautious corporate sector. This expenditure fell by 13% between the second half of 2023 and the first half of 2024.


In summary, in 2024, the region's foreign trade stabilized amid lacklustre trends in exports, particularly of goods, while imports of both goods and services contracted in line with slowing aggregate domestic demand (see chapter VIII).

## The income account deficit, linked to investment, is expected to widen in 2024, while the current transfers account is likely to show a stable surplus

Current transfers (secondary income), including remittances, maintain a stable surplus (see figure III.3). In the first half of 2024, remittances received in the region stood at US\$ 74.5 billion, with a slight increase of 0.6% compared to the previous half-year. In this context, the surplus on the current transfers account is the region's main source of external resources among the components of the current account, far outstripping the foreign exchange inflows from the net balance of foreign trade in goods and services.

**Figure III.3**

Latin America and the Caribbean (19 countries):<sup>a</sup> remittances received by the region, first half of 2019–first half of 2024<sup>b</sup>  
(Billions of dollars)



**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Argentina, the Bahamas, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Suriname and Uruguay. The composition of the group of countries is based on information available as at 30 October 2024.


<sup>b</sup> Remittances received are estimated using the sum of employee compensation (credit in the income account) and personal transfers (credit in the current transfers account), according to the presentation of balance-of-payments statistics.

Current trends in the external sector point to the importance of the factor income account, which is increasingly becoming the region's main source of foreign currency outflows. This situation has become more pronounced in an international environment that remains uncertain and financial conditions that continue to be restrictive. The income account is characterized not only by structural deficit, but also by the fact that the deficit has increased over the last five years (see figure III.4). In the first half of 2024, the deficit stood at US\$ 127 billion, up by 26% compared to the previous half-year.

Debit in the income account is essentially composed of income from capital inflows under different types of investment (e.g. direct investment and portfolio investment), for which the corresponding entry is recorded in the financial account.

Figure III.4

Latin America and the Caribbean (19 countries):<sup>a</sup> income account, first half of 2019–first half of 2024  
(Billions of dollars)



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Argentina, the Bahamas, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Suriname and Uruguay. The composition of the group of countries is based on information available as at 30 October 2024.

On the credit side, income from direct investment averages 54% of the total, followed by income from reserve assets, representing 17% of the total. Direct investment payments received in the region decreased by 7.3% between the second half of 2023 and the first half of 2024. This is a continuation of the trend seen since the second half of 2022 and, in fact, reflects a 12.7% reduction in reinvested earnings in the same period. The latter represent the main component of such revenues (on average, 65% between 2019 and 2023). Dividends and withdrawals of income from quasi-corporations remained stable in the past five years. Income from reserve assets consists mainly of interest received (95% on average). This revenue category expanded significantly at the end of 2021, and by around 11% between 2022 and 2024, although this growth slowed slightly in the first half of 2024.


On the debit side, most external payments are related to direct investment inflows (up to 61% on average), since they are recorded in the financial account of the balance of payments as net issuance of liabilities. Income paid on portfolio investments represents approximately 25% of the total, while other investment represents 12%.

Payments linked to direct investment inflows have increased by an average of 3% over the past five years, with an 18% rise between the second half of 2023 and the first half of 2024. This recent trend is explained by stronger reinvested earnings, which almost doubled, reflecting the increase in the past five years (9% on average). Dividends and withdrawals of income from quasi-corporations fell by 28% on a half-yearly basis, contrasting with the average increase of 2% over the past five years. The rise in reinvested earnings—an important item in income account debits—means that a large share of earnings remained in the region and will likely help to expand investment, for instance, and does not necessarily imply foreign currency outflows.

As a result, the greatest weight on the debit side of the income account involving foreign currency outflows corresponds to interest payments on external credits, which increased substantially (see figure III.5). Interest payments represent 85% of the payment of income related to portfolio investment, which rose by 14% between the second half of 2023 and the first half of 2024. Meanwhile, 12% of the income from other investments is represented by interest income, with a 10% increase in the same period.

**Figure III.5**

Latin America and the Caribbean (19 countries):<sup>a</sup> foreign interest payments derived from investment income, first quarter of 2019–second quarter of 2024  
(Billions of dollars and percentages)



**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Argentina, the Bahamas, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Suriname and Uruguay. The composition of the group of countries is based on information available as at 30 October 2024.

### Amid lower risk perception and more favourable international conditions for the region, financial flows and, in particular, direct investment flows to the region are expected to increase in 2024 compared to 2023, as is direct investment from the countries abroad

Higher capital inflows are estimated for the region amid improved expectations for emerging economies in general. As a result, credit risk, as measured by the Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI), has declined in most of the region's countries or remained stable, as in the cases of Brazil, Chile, Honduras, Peru and Uruguay (see figure III.6).

Similarly, risk perception improved in countries that tend to have a high index (i.e. above 1,000 points), such as Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Ecuador. The Plurinational State of Bolivia is the exception, registering a decline in this indicator, which averages 2,200 basis points, 1,100 points higher than a year ago.

Figure III.6

Latin America: sovereign risk as measured by Emerging Market Bond Index, January 2019–October 2024<sup>a</sup>  
(Basis points)



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Daily values.

An analysis by functional category shows that net direct investment inflows totalled US\$ 81.2 billion in the first half of 2024, equivalent to 2.5% of GDP (see table III.1). This is explained by the sharp increase in direct investment liabilities, which totalled US\$ 104 billion, 56% more than in the immediately preceding period. Meanwhile, direct investment assets abroad grew by 85%, amounting to US\$ 22.8 billion in the first six months of 2024.<sup>5</sup>

Table III.1

Latin America and the Caribbean (19 countries):<sup>a</sup> net investment balances by functional category, second half of 2023–first half of 2024<sup>b</sup>  
(Billions of dollars)

		Financial account	Direct investment	Portfolio investment	Other investment and financial derivatives
2023	Second half	-48.8	-54.3	4.0	-0.7
2024	First half	-52.9	-81.2	13.1	-6.1
	Variation	-4.1	-26.9	9.1	-5.5

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Argentina, the Bahamas, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Suriname and Uruguay. The composition of the group of countries is based on information available as at 30 October 2024.

<sup>b</sup> A negative (positive) sign indicates an inflow (outflow) of capital for the region.

In general, and as highlighted in previous reports, the level of direct investment assets abroad for the countries of the region is very low compared to that of liabilities, or investment received by these countries.


<sup>5</sup> See ECLAC (2024c) for a complete analysis of direct investment in Latin America.

In absolute terms, Brazil has the highest level of direct investment assets abroad, amounting to US\$ 10.1 billion in the first half of 2024, followed by Mexico, with US\$ 4.5 billion. Next are Chile and Colombia, which lead the ranking when these assets are measured relative to GDP (see figure III.7). The level of liabilities in relation to GDP averages 3.5% for these five countries, although there are several countries with much lower direct investment liabilities, but with corresponding averages of around 5%, such as Costa Rica, Belize, Panama and the Dominican Republic.

**Figure III.7**

Latin America (5 countries):<sup>a</sup> direct investment assets and liabilities, January–June 2024

(Billions of dollars and percentages of GDP)



**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> The selected countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico) are the five largest recipients of direct investment, representing 91% of the total for the first six months of 2024.

The regional trends are explained by the sharp increase in liabilities in Mexico, from almost US\$ 2 billion in the second half of 2023 to US\$ 32.8 billion in the following period, owing mainly to the reinvestment of earnings. Brazil also recorded a significant increase in net direct investment, owing both to stronger inflows into the country (liabilities), which amounted to US\$ 37.8 billion, and to lower assets, in both cases resulting from the reinvestment of earnings and other equity holdings. For Argentina, both assets and liabilities grew during the first half of the year, the latter equivalent to US\$ 8.9 billion. Liabilities fell relative to the previous year, owing especially to a lower participation in debt instruments.

Chile and Colombia showed similar trends in the first half of the year, with a drop in net investment relative to the previous period, to levels close to US\$ 5 billion. In both cases, the weaker net inflows derived from the dual effect of greater assets abroad and lower liabilities in the respective economies. Uruguay is the only country in the region with net direct investment outflows in the first half of the year. This is because it continues to reduce its assets abroad, owing mainly to the cancellation of loans by companies abroad and to the greater reduction of liabilities relative to the reduction of assets, resulting from the cancellation of loans from direct investment companies in Uruguay to related companies abroad.

In Peru, there was a significant increase in net direct investment inflows, owing mainly to the increase in liabilities, which amounted to US\$ 2.3 billion in the first half of 2024, some US\$ 1 billion more than in the immediately preceding period. Panama recorded a strong increase in net inflows during the

period, thanks to the rise in liabilities, which was not offset by the increase in assets. Lastly, the cases of Paraguay and Belize are similar, in that both countries recorded net direct investment outflows in the second half of 2023, then net inflows in the first half of 2024, given the increase in liabilities.

The portfolio investment component of the financial account recorded net outflows of US\$ 13.1 billion in the first half of 2024, an increase of US\$ 9.1 billion compared to the immediately preceding period (see table III.1). Although liabilities for the region rose sharply, to US\$ 20.1 billion (up from US\$ 12 billion in the second half of 2023) in line with the greater capital inflows in emerging markets, this was insufficient to offset the higher assets abroad. In fact, assets abroad amounted to US\$ 33.4 billion, more than double the amount previously recorded.

In the first part of the year, Brazil recorded net outflows of US\$ 6.7 billion—the highest in the region—driven by strong assets abroad, which came to US\$ 11.4 billion, owing mainly to the purchase of debt securities. This figure was higher than the liabilities in the country, amounting to US\$ 4.7 billion, resulting mostly from debt issuance on international markets by both the government and private actors. In contrast, the balance in variable-income instruments was negative since foreign investors sold more shares overall than those purchased in the Brazilian market. Peru also recorded significant net portfolio outflows totalling US\$ 5.2 billion in the first half of the year, owing almost entirely to an increase in assets, largely of pension funds.

In several countries, net portfolio investment outflows are due mainly to asset growth. Argentina saw a notable increase in holdings of debt securities issued by non-residents. In Chile, investment in variable-income instruments by pension funds and, to a lesser extent, mutual funds and companies, is noteworthy. In the case of Mexico, the growth in assets was driven by equity holdings, while debt securities declined owing to repayments by non-residents. In Colombia, there were increases in equity holdings and investment funds, followed by new purchases of debt securities.

In aggregate terms, the composition of portfolio investment has remained relatively stable with respect to the immediately preceding period (see figure III.8).

**Figure III.8**

Latin America (15 countries):<sup>a</sup> portfolio investment assets and liabilities, July 2023–June 2024  
(Billions of dollars)



**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Argentina, the Bahamas, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay. Includes countries with disaggregated portfolio investment information available up to the second quarter of 2024.

The main component of assets is investment in variable-income instruments, such as equity holdings and investment funds, accounting for almost two thirds of total assets in the period, similar to the share of the immediately preceding period. Mexico and Chile account for almost all asset growth, followed far behind by Colombia and Costa Rica. The remaining third of assets corresponds to purchases of debt securities by both public and private investors, mostly in Brazil, while countries such as Mexico, Chile, Uruguay, El Salvador, and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, recorded reductions in debt securities.

Liabilities reflect a different composition, with the main component being debt securities, a highly dynamic mechanism used by both governments and public and private companies to access financing in international markets. Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Peru and Panama are the main actors in this sector. Liabilities in variable-income instruments decreased, once again owing almost entirely to Brazil and Mexico. Portfolio investment liabilities are mostly explained by the issuance of debt securities by companies and governments in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Lastly, other investments and financial derivatives recorded net inflows of US\$ 6.1 billion in the first half of 2024, in contrast to US\$ 700 million in the immediately preceding period. The current figure is explained by a marked reduction in foreign assets, totalling US\$ 51.2 billion, together with a decrease in liabilities, which were also high at US\$ 45.1 billion.

As in the previous half-year, these financial flows in the first half of 2024 were influenced primarily by Mexico, which accounts for half of the reduction in other investment assets and financial derivatives (US\$ 27 billion), followed by Brazil and Chile, which account for the other half (US\$ 14.8 billion and US\$ 10.2 billion, respectively). With much smaller amounts, the remaining countries recorded both decreases and increases in assets.

Mexico accounts for more than half of the reduction in liabilities in the period, with US\$ 24.9 billion, followed by Chile (US\$ 12.4 billion) and Argentina (US\$ 5.4 billion). In general, reductions of liabilities in this category are associated with debt repayments, as in the case of Argentina, which during the year made payments to the International Monetary Fund and the Bank for International Settlements.

## Debt issuance on international markets continues to grow in 2024, supported mainly by sovereign debt and private corporate issuance

In the third quarter of 2024, total debt issuance on international markets stood at US\$ 98.9 billion, up 35% year-on-year. As in recent years, the private corporate sector and national governments have largely shaped the trend in issuance (see table III.2). During the period of analysis, private issuance grew by 55% year-on-year to one third of total issuance, representing US\$ 33.1 billion. Sovereign issuance by national governments increased by 27% to US\$ 44.6 billion, representing 45% of issuance in international debt markets. The remaining 21% corresponds to issuance by quasi-sovereign entities (subnational governments or public companies) and supranational organizations (such as development banks).

Table III.2

Latin America and the Caribbean: debt issuance on international markets  
(Millions of dollars and percentages)

	January–September 2023	January–September 2024	Share (Percentages) <sup>a</sup>	Year-on-year growth (Percentages)
National governments	35 003	44 574	45	27
Private companies	21 395	33 126	34	55
Quasi-sovereign companies	10 900	12 241	12	12
Supranational entities	6 128	8 937	9	46
<b>Total</b>	<b>73 426</b>	<b>98 879</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>35</b>


Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Share of the total for the period from January to September 2024.

As mentioned, Brazil and Mexico accounted for most debt issuance on international markets, amounting to around US\$ 20 billion for each country in the first three quarters of 2024 (see figure III.9). For Brazil, issuance by private companies represents more than half of this amount, while in Mexico, half comes from a total of nine operations carried out by the national government, the majority linked to thematic bonds, which have become increasingly important. The third most important country in terms of issuance is Chile, which carried out operations totalling US\$ 17.5 billion during the period, the majority of which were sovereign operations, followed closely by those of private companies. Issuance was below US\$ 10 billion in four countries: Peru, with mainly sovereign and private issuance; Colombia, where quasi-sovereign issuance was also significant and, together with sovereign and private issuance, accounted for equal parts of total issuance; and the Dominican Republic and Uruguay, with several sovereign bond issues accounting for almost all issuance.

Figure III.9

Latin America (selected countries): debt issuance on international markets, by country and sector, January–September 2024  
(Billions of dollars and percentages)



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

Local currencies play an important role in international issuance, especially that of national governments. This trend has made debt less susceptible to exchange-rate fluctuations, which is particularly crucial for sovereign debt issues, representing the majority of local currency issuance. Until 2022, less than 10% of total issuance was in the same currency as that of the issuer, but that figure rose to 19% in 2023, and in the first three quarters of 2024, 14% of issuance was in local currency. However, while such debt issues present an advantage in terms of currency risk, they are also subject to a higher interest rate than dollar-denominated debt issues, as investors will seek better returns to offset the potential higher risk of the local economy, for example, higher inflation and economic instability. This has been evident in the region in recent years, when the average coupon on dollar-denominated debt issues fell to a low of 4.2% in 2021, compared to 5.9% for local currency debt issues. Thereafter, the average coupon generally rose, irrespective of currency. However, in local currency it has remained, on average, close to half a point above that of the dollar-denominated debt issued in 2023 and thus far in 2024, when it stabilized and trended downward. In 2022, a year of high inflation worldwide, the difference was 5 percentage points.

Since 2021, thematic bonds<sup>6</sup> have accounted for an increasingly larger share of debt issuance on international markets, in line with growth at the global level, with their total value expected to be close to US\$ 1 trillion by 2024 (Cochelin, Popoola and Volland, 2024). Prior to 2021, these bonds accounted for considerably less than 10% of the total, but since then, they have represented around 30% of debt issues in the region, which contrasts with the share of thematic bonds in total bonds issued at the global level, which is close to 12%.

In the first nine months of 2024, thematic bond issues totalled US\$ 27.3 billion, more than half of which correspond to sovereign debt issues by Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Mexico (see table III.3). Brazil, Chile and Mexico have made the most progress in this area, through a solid institutional framework that has attracted international investors for this type of issuance. The three countries thus account for around 80% of the total thematic bond issues in the last five years. The gap between these countries and the rest of the region is expected to narrow as more countries advance in implementing different sustainable taxonomies, which help to define design criteria for thematic bonds. This is the case of Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Panama and Peru, which are at different stages in the development of their respective taxonomies.

Table III.3 details thematic bond issuance in the first nine months of 2024. The sovereign debt issued the Government of Chile stands out, totalling some US\$ 6.4 billion, and corresponds to five bonds issued in both local currency and in dollars, to obtain financing for social programmes. Mexico has also played an active role in thematic sovereign bond issues, in particular through a joint operation of five placements at the end of August denominated in yen and totalling the equivalent of about US\$ 1.05 billion, for investment in environmental and social issues, as well as the issue in January of a bond linked to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), amounting to 2 billion euros.

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<sup>6</sup> Thematic bonds include sustainable, social, green and sustainability-linked bonds. Their main objective is to finance social and environmental protection programmes. In particular, sustainability-linked bonds establish compliance targets based on indicators that may be environmental, social or gender-related, for example. Failure to meet targets leads to an increase in the bond's interest rate, while the rate may be lowered if certain criteria are met.

Table III.3

Latin America and the Caribbean: thematic bond issuance on international markets, by sector and country, January–September 2024  
(Millions of dollars)

	Green	Sustainability-linked	Social	Sustainable	Total
<b>Private firms</b>	<b>8 414</b>	<b>800</b>	<b>320</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>9 644</b>
Chile	2 255		320	110	2 686
Brazil	4 400	800			5 200
Mexico	1 759				1 759
<b>Quasi-sovereign companies</b>				<b>2 250</b>	<b>2 250</b>
Brazil				750	750
Mexico				1 500	1 500
<b>National governments</b>	<b>750</b>		<b>7 664</b>	<b>6 020</b>	<b>14 434</b>
Chile			6 364		6 364
Colombia			1 300		1 300
Guatemala				800	800
Brazil				2 000	2 000
Mexico				3 220	3 220
Dominican Republic	750				750
<b>Supranational entities</b>			<b>727</b>	<b>206</b>	<b>933</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>9 164</b>	<b>800</b>	<b>8 711</b>	<b>8 587</b>	<b>27 262</b>

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

Following the issuance of its first thematic sovereign bond in 2023, Brazil issued its second one in 2024, amounting to US\$ 2 billion, most of which will be used for environmental and social projects. In April, the Government of Colombia made two placements of US\$ 650 million each, and aims to use these resources to advance towards the SDG targets. In July, Guatemala issued debt to finance sustainable development for the first time, through a bond amounting to US\$ 800 million, which will finance programmes to eradicate poverty and chronic undernutrition, improve health and education, and foster the creation of decent jobs and sustainable economic growth. Lastly, the Dominican Republic issued the first bond of this kind: a US\$ 750 million green bond to finance projects that combat climate change and are eligible under the country's first Green, Social and Sustainable Bond Framework.

Thematic bonds issued by the private sector have grown significantly in recent years, from a total of US\$ 3.5 billion in 2022 to US\$ 5.4 billion in 2023 and US\$ 9.6 billion in the first three quarters of 2024. Brazilian companies accounted for the largest share of these bonds in 2024, with US\$ 5.2 billion, including the three green bonds issued by the energy company Raízen, totalling US\$ 2.5 billion, in line with the company's strategy of financing renewable energy, energy efficiency and clean transportation projects. Companies such as América Móvil, from Mexico's telecommunications sector, AES Andes, from Chile's energy sector, and CMPC, from Chile's forestry sector, have also issued thematic bonds to obtain financing for green projects.

Lastly, the Central American Bank for Economic Integration stands out among supranational issuers, with several social bonds issued in the Mexican market and in local currency, equivalent to US\$ 727 million. The resources obtained are intended to finance social projects that are eligible under the Bank's Social Bond Framework, which promotes social development in member countries in order to achieve the SDGs.


In summary, given the region's current account imbalance, countries had to increase sources of external financing, both in the form of foreign direct investment and debt issuance on international markets. As shown in figure III.10, this has resulted in net resource transfers remaining negative so far this year, totalling US\$ 50.731 billion in the first half of the year, an increase of 2% over the second half of 2023. This situation is more pronounced when compared to the second half of 2021.

In other words, capital inflows to the region are not sufficient to offset the foreign exchange outflows stemming from the current account, and the income account deficit in particular, along with the capital outflows recorded in the financial account.

Figure III.10

Latin America and the Caribbean (19 countries): net resource transfers, first half of 2015–first half of 2024

(Billions of dollars)<sup>a</sup>



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Argentina, the Bahamas, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Suriname and Uruguay. Net resource transfers are defined globally as gross capital inflows minus gross capital outflows minus the income account balance (primary income).

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## CHAPTER

# IV

## Economic activity

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Economic growth in Latin America remains low and continues to lose pace

In 2024, the region's per capita GDP reflected the level seen 36 quarters earlier

The economic slowdown reflects a weakening of both consumption and gross fixed capital formation

The slowdown in global economic activity means that net exports have not contributed to GDP growth

More sluggish economic growth is generalized across all sectors, with a decline in manufacturing

Mexico and Central America are performing better than South America owing to a more resilient services sector

Labour productivity figures in Latin America have been positive for two quarters

Bibliography




## Economic growth in Latin America remains low and continues to lose pace

In the second half of 2024, the region's annual GDP growth rate remained unchanged and average annual growth is projected at 2.1% (see figure IV.1) owing to weaker domestic demand and a lower external sector contribution. On the supply side, production increased across several economic sectors with the exception of manufacturing, although at a slower pace than in preceding quarters.

**Figure IV.1**

Latin America: GDP, first quarter of 2022–fourth quarter of 2024  
(Percentages, on the basis of constant dollars at 2018 prices)



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Estimates.

In the subregions, economic growth has slowed since the second half of 2022 in South America and in Mexico and Central America. In South America, the slowdown is steeper if Brazil is excluded, as that country raises the subregional GDP growth rate owing to its size and stronger performance. The pace of production in the remaining countries of South America varies compared with 2023, with production higher in half and lower in the other half. Added to this is the economic downturn in Argentina (see figures IV.2 and IV.3). The South American economies picked up pace in the second half of 2024 compared with the year-earlier period, recording average growth of 2.6%. Similarly, compared with the second half of 2023, the economies of Mexico and Central America saw a downturn in the second half of 2024, with growth of around 2.1%.

Figure IV.2

South America, Mexico and Central America: GDP, first quarter of 2022–fourth quarter of 2024  
(Percentages, on the basis of constant dollars at 2018 prices)



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

The economic slowdown has been widespread in Central American countries and Mexico, and is expected to continue through the remainder of 2024. Economic projections for the second half of 2024 show dampened growth throughout the year in all countries except the Dominican Republic (see figure IV.3).

Figure IV.3

Latin America (15 countries): GDP, first half of 2023–second half of 2024  
(Percentages, on the basis of constant dollars at 2018 prices)




Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

## In 2024, the region's per capita GDP reflected the level seen 36 quarters earlier

Following the sharp GDP contraction in Latin America triggered by the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, the pre-crisis GDP level was regained in the fourth quarter of 2021. In the fourth quarter of 2024 per capita GDP was similar to the level seen 36 quarters earlier, in the fourth quarter of 2015 (see figure IV.4), an evocation of the economy's low capacity for growth and of the difficulties in returning to pre-pandemic income levels. Per capita GDP in 2024 remains equivalent to its level nine years ago.

**Figure IV.4**

Latin America: per capita GDP, first quarter of 2014–fourth quarter of 2024  
(Constant dollars at 2018 prices)



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.


## The economic slowdown reflects a weakening of both consumption and gross fixed capital formation

In the second quarter of 2024, the year-on-year increase in private consumption was similar to that seen in 2023 (see figure IV.5). This trend is the result of a slowdown in eight countries of the region and a quicker pace in the rest. Private consumption is holding steady against a backdrop of inflation control and slower erosion of the purchasing power of real wages and of consumer confidence, and as some countries begin monetary easing. Public consumption in the second quarter of 2024 has also maintained the trend seen in the prior-year period.

Gross fixed capital formation grew by one percentage point less in the first half of 2024 relative to the year-earlier period, an indication of its stagnation and decline as a percentage of GDP (18.5% in the first half of 2024 compared to 19.0% in the first half of 2023).

Figure IV.5

Latin America: components of domestic demand, first quarter of 2022–second quarter of 2024  
(Percentages, on the basis of constant dollars at 2018 prices)



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

## The slowdown in global economic activity means that net exports have not contributed to GDP growth

The external conditions that fostered growth in 2022 deteriorated in 2023 and 2024. With global economic activity slackening, the Chinese economy slowed sharply amid weakness in the real estate sector. Other economies were more buoyant, particularly that of the United States, where a strong labour market kept domestic demand robust. However, the positive effect of this for the region was dampened by the change in the composition of growth, which skewed towards services, most of which are non-tradable.


In parallel, the contribution of exports and imports to GDP growth has declined, with net exports projected to subtract nearly one percentage point from growth since the first quarter of 2023, compared to their neutral contribution in 2022. However, following four consecutive quarters of negative contributions to GDP growth, the impact of exports was positive in the second quarter of 2024 (see figure IV.6). The negative trend of exports in 2023 and early 2024 reflects a widespread contraction in the countries of the region.

## More sluggish economic growth is generalized across all sectors, with a decline in manufacturing

The growth of value added has slowed in all sectors of economic activity save general, social and personal services, which more than doubled the annual growth of the regional economy's value added in the first half of 2024, trailed by electricity, gas and water services, and then, to a lesser extent, by transport and communications and financial and business services. Agriculture recorded robust growth in the second quarter, which can be explained by the low base of comparison in Argentina, Colombia, Peru and Uruguay, where, following steep declines in 2023, the second quarter of 2024 saw recoveries of 81.2%, 10.2%, 14.2% and 25.2%, respectively (see figure IV.7). In addition, the manufacturing industry contracted and commerce expanded very slowly, along with private consumption, which was more subdued.

**Figure IV.6**


Latin America: contribution to GDP of exports and imports, first quarter of 2022–second quarter of 2024  
(Percentages)



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

**Figure IV.7**

Latin America: annual variation in value added, by economic sector, first quarter of 2022–second quarter of 2024  
(Constant dollars at 2018 prices)



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

## Mexico and Central America are performing better than South America owing to a more resilient services sector


In South America, the slowdown has been more pronounced compared with 2022, particularly when Brazil is excluded: a contraction was observed in the third and fourth quarters of 2023 and the first quarter of 2024 relative to the year-earlier period. In contrast, annual economic growth held steady in Mexico and Central America at around 3.5%.

By economic sector, the two subregions differ as a result of the greater resilience of Mexico and Central America in the services sector, and the stagnation and decline of the manufacturing industry in South America (see figure IV.8).


**Figure IV.8**

South America, Mexico and Central America: value added and contributions by economic sector to value added growth, first quarter of 2022–second quarter of 2024  
(Percentages)

### A. South America



### B. Mexico and Central America



Legend: Services (green), Industry (purple), Agriculture and mining (dark green), Value added (dashed line)


Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

## Labour productivity figures in Latin America have been positive for two quarters

Since 1980, when labour productivity reached its highest point since 1950 (ECLAC/ILO, 2022), it slipped by an average rate, year-on-year, of 0.1% for the period 1980–2023. In other words, in the 43 years since the debt crisis, the region has been unable to regain the productivity levels it had previously attained. Labour productivity nonetheless rose in the first two quarters of 2024, growing by 2.1% on average in the first half of the year relative to the same period the previous year. The rise was driven by an increase in activity in two sectors: agriculture—which has grown steadily since the 1990s—and community, social and personal services, which historically had been trending downward and began picking up in the final quarters of 2024 (see figure IV.9).

**Figure IV.9**

Latin America: annual variation in labour productivity, by economic sector, first quarter of 2022–second quarter of 2024  
(Constant dollars at 2018 prices)



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

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CHAPTER

# V

## Prices

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Inflation in the region's economies continues to recede

Inflation in the region has generally declined

Both core and food inflation are slowing and converging to central bank targets

Goods inflation continues to trend down, while services inflation is rising




## Inflation in the region's economies continues to recede

Inflation in the Latin American and Caribbean economies has retreated from its 8.2% peak in 2022, with the median regional rate easing back to 3.7% in December 2023. The rate is expected to drop by a further 0.3 percentage points to 3.4% in 2024 (see figure V.1). Although median regional inflation has moved closer to the centre of the 3.0% target range set by many central banks, the rate projected for 2024 is still above those reported before the pandemic.

**Figure V.1**

Latin America and the Caribbean: median annual rates of change in consumer price index, 2015–2024  
(Percentages)




**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

Regional disinflation has been driven by several factors, especially the reduction in international food and energy prices, supported by the tight monetary policies implemented in the region to achieve inflation targets.

Figure V.2 shows the trend of food and energy prices in international markets between 2021 and 2024. The years of highest inflation, 2021 and 2022, coincide with substantial increases in the international prices of these products: food prices rose by 29.9% in 2021 and by 14.2% in 2022. Meanwhile, energy prices rose by 81% and 60% in those two years, respectively. In 2023, however, food prices declined by 9.2% year-on-year, and this trend has continued in 2024 with a further fall of 7.6%. Energy prices also decreased by 29.9% year-on-year in 2023, and then by 4.1% in 2024. As a result of these movements, food prices dropped by a cumulative 16.1% between 2022 and 2024, and energy prices fell by 32.8% over the same period.

Figure V.2

Energy and food prices in international markets: year-on-year change, 2021–2024  
(Percentages)



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Bank, “World Bank Commodities Price Data (The Pink Sheet)”, several editions.

## Inflation in the region has generally declined

In 2024, inflation is expected to diminish further in most Latin American and Caribbean economies. In September, it was lower in 23 of the region’s 33 economies, with the steepest falls occurring in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Cuba and Suriname (three countries with chronic inflation problems) and in Barbados, all with reductions of more than 10 percentage points. In contrast, inflation gathered pace in 10 economies, although only in Argentina and the Plurinational State of Bolivia did the increase exceed 2 percentage points (see table V.1).

As a result of these developments, all subregions recorded lower inflation. Between September 2023 and September 2024, South America reported a reduction of 1.5 percentage points, while Central America and Mexico, along with the English- and Dutch-speaking economies, posted weighted-average reductions of 0.5 percentage points (see table V.1).

Table V.1

Latin America and the Caribbean: 12-month rates of change in consumer price index, December 2022–September 2024  
(Percentages)

	December 2022	December 2023	September 2023	September 2024
<b>Latin America and the Caribbean</b>	7.6	4.6	5.2	4.1
<b>South America</b>	7.3	4.9	5.7	4.3
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	3.1	2.1	2.8	6.2
Brazil	5.8	4.6	5.2	4.4
Chile	12.8	3.9	5.1	4.2
Colombia	13.1	9.3	11.0	5.8
Ecuador	3.7	1.3	2.2	1.4

	December 2022	December 2023	September 2023	September 2024
Paraguay	8.1	3.7	3.5	4.1
Peru	8.5	3.2	5.0	1.8
Uruguay	8.3	5.1	3.9	5.3
<b>Central America and Mexico</b>	<b>8.0</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>3.9</b>
<b>Central America</b>	<b>8.5</b>	<b>4.0</b>	<b>4.2</b>	<b>2.4</b>
Costa Rica	7.9	-1.8	-2.2	-0.1
Dominican Republic	7.8	3.6	4.4	3.3
El Salvador	7.3	1.2	3.0	0.6
Guatemala	9.2	4.2	4.7	2.1
Honduras	9.8	5.2	6.1	4.5
Mexico	7.8	4.7	4.5	4.6
Nicaragua	11.3	5.6	6.5	3.6
Panama	2.1	1.9	2.3	-0.3
<b>The Caribbean</b>	<b>8.4</b>	<b>4.0</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>4.0</b>
Antigua and Barbuda	9.2	3.3	5.6	7.1 <sup>a</sup>
Bahamas	5.5	1.9	2.2	-0.5 <sup>b</sup>
Barbados	12.5	4.2	11.1	1.0 <sup>a</sup>
Belize	6.7	3.7	4.2	3.2 <sup>a</sup>
Dominica	8.4	2.3	1.3	2.9 <sup>c</sup>
Grenada	2.9	2.2	2.3	1.2 <sup>c</sup>
Guyana	7.2	2.0	1.0	3.4
Jamaica	9.3	6.9	5.9	5.7
Saint Kitts and Nevis	3.9	1.6	3.7	1.0 <sup>c</sup>
Saint Lucia	6.9	2.1	2.6	0.8 <sup>c</sup>
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	6.7	4.0	3.0	3.2 <sup>c</sup>
Trinidad and Tobago	8.7	0.7	3.9	0.4 <sup>a</sup>
Argentina	95.2	210.1	117.0	214.0
Cuba	39.1	38.7	45.0	31.1 <sup>c</sup>
Haiti	48.1	22.1	31.9	30.4 <sup>c</sup>
Suriname	54.6	32.6	54.6	18.6
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	234.1	189.8	404.4	51.4

**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

**Note:** The regional and subregional averages are weighted by population size and do not include data for economies with chronic inflation (Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Cuba, Haiti and Suriname).

<sup>a</sup> Data to August 2024.

<sup>b</sup> Data to July 2024.


<sup>c</sup> Data to June 2024.

## Both core and food inflation are slowing and converging to central bank targets

Food and core inflation have both declined in 2024. In September, food inflation was down by 1.5 percentage points, from 5.9% to 4.4%, and core inflation was 0.4 points lower at 3.5% compared to 3.9% a year earlier (see figure V.3). The figure also shows that, although both indicators are approaching the 3.0% targets commonly set by the region's central banks, their current levels are still above those recorded between 2018 and 2020. Figure V.3 also shows that food inflation has converged towards the target faster than the core component.

Figure V.3

Latin America and the Caribbean: median 12-month rates of change in food and core components of consumer price index, 2018–2024 (Percentages)



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

In 2024, core inflation decreased in 23 of the region's countries, with reductions of more than 10 percentage points recorded in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Suriname. In contrast, core inflation rose by more than 5 points in Argentina and the Plurinational State of Bolivia. As in the case of food inflation, the core component decreased in 22 countries between 2023 and 2024, and by more than 5 percentage points in Barbados, Belize, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Suriname. In contrast, Argentina, Haiti and the Plurinational State of Bolivia saw core inflation rise by more than 5 points.

## Goods inflation continues to trend down, while services inflation is rising

In 2024, the index of price trends among goods traded in the region has fallen by 1.6 percentage points, from 5.1% in 2023 to 3.6% in 2024, as shown in figure V.4. This is the second consecutive year in which this indicator has fallen in the region. The contributory factors include the normalization of international transportation costs and lower prices among certain commodities. In total, goods inflation eased in 24 countries, with reductions of more than 7 percentage points recorded in Barbados, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia and Peru. In contrast, goods inflation rose by more than 8 percentage points in economies such as Argentina and Haiti.

In the case of services, supply constraints and price normalization in sectors such as public transport, electricity and gas, have driven an uptick in this component of inflation. In 2022 and part of 2023, the prices of these services were partially controlled to mitigate the effects of increases in headline inflation. However, in 2024, several of the region's countries have raised these prices. The same trend has also been seen globally, and services are one of the reasons why global inflation has failed to decline to the level forecast in mid-2023. Since the end of 2023, services inflation in the region has risen by 0.6 percentage points, from 2.4% in 2023 to 3.0% in 2024.

**Figure V.4**

Latin America and the Caribbean: median 12-month rates of change in goods and services components of consumer price index, 2018–2024  
(Percentages)



**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

Services inflation declined in 16 of the region's countries, with reductions of over 8 percentage points in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Haiti and Suriname. In contrast, 17 countries recorded increases in this component of the consumer price index, particularly in Argentina, Dominica, Saint Kitts and Nevis and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, where services inflation rose by more than 3 percentage points.



CHAPTER

# VI

## Employment and wages

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Employment in Latin America and the Caribbean grew by 1.7% in 2024, and growth in the number of employed people continued to slacken

The labour participation rate has not yet regained pre-pandemic levels

The unemployment rate remains below pre-pandemic levels

Labour informality receded slightly in 2024

Real wages rose in the first half of 2024

Despite narrowing slightly, large gender gaps in participation and unemployment persist

Bibliography



Job creation in the region has gathered pace in 2024, although the rate of growth in the number of persons employed, at 1.7%, is the lowest since the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. Employment in the industrial sector grew by 2.3%, driven mainly by the momentum of activities related to the generation of electricity, gas and water. Jobs in the services sector, which account for more than 60% of regional employment, grew by 2%, while agricultural employment shrank by 1.3%.


Most countries report lower rates of informal employment, higher real wages and lower unemployment levels for 2024. The data also reveal a slight narrowing of the gender gaps in unemployment and labour participation. Nonetheless, it is worrying that the labour participation rate in many countries has still not regained pre-pandemic levels, which means that a large portion of the working age population remains outside the labour market.

## Employment in Latin America and the Caribbean grew by 1.7% in 2024, and growth in the number of employed people continued to slacken

Various documents, including *Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2024* and the position paper of the session of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), have expressed concern about the trap of low capacity for growth affecting the region (see ECLAC, 2024a and 2024b). Chapter IV of this report notes that economic growth in Latin America and the Caribbean remains weak, a trend that began after the 1980s and has become more pronounced in the last ten years. In keeping with lacklustre GDP growth, employment in the region is also stagnant, with growth of 1.7% estimated for 2024 following the 1.8% recorded the previous year. Although these values exceed the 2013–2022 average of 1.3%, they are below the 2.1% recorded in 2019 (see figure VI.1).

**Figure VI.1**

Latin America and the Caribbean (15 countries):<sup>a</sup> year-on-year change in number of employed people, 2016–2024  
(Percentages)



**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.


<sup>a</sup> Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay.

At the country level, the data available for the first half of 2024 show that employment increased in 11 of the region's countries, but contracted in 4 others. Employment grew by over 4% in Chile, the Dominican Republic and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, and it declined by more than 1% in Costa Rica and Peru (see figure VI.2).

**Figure VI.2**

Latin America and the Caribbean (15 countries): year-on-year change in number of employed people, first half of 2023–first half of 2024

(Percentages)



**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.



Although the number of employed people grew in Brazil, Colombia and Paraguay between the first half of 2023 and the same period in 2024, the reported growth rates are 0.6, 1.4 and 0.9 percentage points lower, respectively, than the rates recorded between the first half of 2022 and the same period in 2023. In contrast, in Chile, the Dominican Republic and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, employment growth rates were more than 4 percentage points higher in the first half of 2024 than in the year-earlier period.

By sector, in 2024 the number of persons employed in the industrial and services sectors increased by 2.3% and 2.0%, respectively, while agricultural employment contracted by 1.3% (see figure VI.3).

Employment in the industrial sector expanded in 11 of the 15 countries that have data available, with increases of over 5% in the Dominican Republic, Paraguay and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, and reductions of more than 4% in Argentina and in Trinidad and Tobago. The rate of growth of industrial employment is 0.8 percentage points higher than in 2023 and 0.7 points more than the rate recorded in 2019.

**Figure VI.3**

Latin America and the Caribbean (15 countries):<sup>a</sup> year-on-year change in number of employed people, by sector, 2023 and 2024  
(Percentages)

**A. 2023****B. 2024**

**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.


<sup>a</sup> Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay.

In terms of jobs, the most dynamic sector was the generation of basic utilities (electricity, gas and water), in which employment grew by 5.5% in the first half of 2024, 1.2 percentage points more than in the year-earlier period (see figure VI.4). Employment in this activity sector grew in most countries for which data are available. In particular, Argentina, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic reported increases of over 10% in the first half of 2024 relative to the same period a year earlier. This contrasts with the trend in the first half of 2023, when employment in this activity retreated from its 2022 levels.

Figure VI.4 also shows that employment in the construction sector grew by 1.4% in the first half of 2024, up by 1.3 percentage points from the 0.1% growth recorded a year earlier. This regional increase in construction employment was driven mainly by growth in countries with large populations, such as Brazil and Mexico, where employment in this sector increased by more than 4%, and in countries such as the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Paraguay and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, which reported year-on-year growth rates of over 6%. This recovery in construction employment reflects a response to monetary easing in several of the region's countries, which, to some extent, enabled a recovery in credit. In contrast, construction employment declined by more than 10% between the first half of 2023 and the same period in 2024 in a number of countries, including Argentina, Costa Rica and Trinidad and Tobago.

**Figure VI.4**

Latin America and the Caribbean (15 countries):<sup>a</sup> year-on-year change in number of employed people, by sector, first half of 2023–first half of 2024  
(Percentages)



**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay.

Employment in manufacturing industry grew by 1.1% in the first half of 2024, 0.1 percentage points more than in the same period a year earlier. The largest year-on-year increases, of above 7%, were recorded in Jamaica, Nicaragua, Paraguay and the Plurinational State of Bolivia. Nonetheless, employment in this sector contracted in several countries, including Argentina, Costa Rica and Uruguay, with reductions in excess of 3%.

In the services sector, which accounts for more than 60% of employment in the region, the number of persons employed in the first half of 2024 grew year-on-year in 14 of the 15 countries (Trinidad and Tobago was the only exception, with a reduction of 3.0%). However, as figure VI.3 shows, the pace of employment growth in this services sector was slower in 2024 than in 2023.

These estimates reflect a slackening of employment growth in the first six months of 2024 in activities such as commerce, restaurants and hotels (0.1 percentage points), financial and business services (1.3 points), and community, social and personal services (1.2 points), as shown in figure VI.5.

**Figure VI.5**

Latin America and the Caribbean (15 countries):<sup>a</sup> year-on-year change in number of employed people, by industry, first half of 2023–first half of 2024 (Percentages)



**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay.

Employment in commerce grew in 13 of the countries that have information available, with rates above 4% recorded in Argentina, Chile, Jamaica, Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia. In contrast, it declined in Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago. Although most of the region's countries reported growth in this sector, in eight economies the pace of jobs growth in the commerce, restaurants and hotels sector slackened in the first half of 2024, relative to a year earlier. Argentina and Paraguay saw reductions of more than 5 percentage points. In contrast, Costa Rica, Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia reported increases of over 6 percentage points comparing the first half of 2024 with the same period in 2023.

Employment in financial and business services also grew in most of the countries that have data available (12 in total), with increases of more than 6% in Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Trinidad and Tobago.


According to ECLAC (2024a), agricultural employment has shrunk considerably in relative terms since 1950, when it provided more than 50% of all jobs. In 2024, the sector share is projected to be less than 12%. In 2023, agricultural employment contracted by 2.4% relative to 2022, and a 1.3% reduction is forecast for 2024. In the first half of 2024, it declined in 8 of the 15 economies in the region that have information available, with reductions of more than 3% in Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay, compared to the first six months of 2023. Countries that recorded increases in agricultural employment included Argentina, Ecuador, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, with rates above 3%.

## The labour participation rate has not yet regained pre-pandemic levels

Despite the recovery seen in most labour market indicators, the effects of the crisis caused by the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic and the socioeconomic measures implemented to address it are still visible, especially when analysing the behaviour of the labour participation rate. This variable, which reflects the willingness of persons of working age to be employed, or who are actively seeking work, has been recovering in recent years, and it is expected to reach 62.8% in 2024, its highest level since the pandemic. Nonetheless, this rate is still below the 63.3% recorded in 2019 (see figure VI.6).

**Figure VI.6**

Latin America and the Caribbean (15 countries):<sup>a</sup> labour force participation rate, 2018–2024  
(Percentages)




**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay.

In the first half of 2024, the labour participation rate was higher than in the year-earlier period in nine countries, and more than 1 percentage point higher in Chile, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay. In contrast, participation declined in six countries, most notably in Costa Rica and Trinidad and Tobago, which recorded reductions of more than 0.5 percentage points (see figure VI.7). These movements reflect the uneven labour market recovery across the region and show that, despite signs of improvement, persistent challenges are preventing labour participation from making a full recovery in some countries.

**Figure VI.7**

Latin America and the Caribbean (15 countries): differences in labour participation rates, first half of 2024 relative to first half of 2023  
(Percentage points)



**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.


As a result of the developments described above, labour participation rates in the first half of 2024 were below those prevailing in the same period of 2019 in eight countries —and by more than 2 percentage points in Costa Rica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru and Trinidad and Tobago. Nonetheless, some countries have managed to recover their pre-pandemic levels. These include Jamaica, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay, where current rates are more than 2 percentage points higher than in 2019. This divergence in the recovery of labour participation underscores the need for targeted policies to address the factors that continue to restrict labour market access in some of the region's economies.

## The unemployment rate remains below pre-pandemic levels

After climbing to record high levels during the pandemic, average unemployment rates in the region have trended down, and have remained below 7% since 2022. For 2024, the unemployment rate is expected to be 6.1%, down slightly from the previous year's 6.2% (see figure VI.8). This decline in unemployment reflects both growth in the number of employed people and the fact that the participation rate has not returned to pre-pandemic levels.

**Figure VI.8**

Latin America and the Caribbean (15 countries):<sup>a</sup> regional unemployment rate, 2018–2024  
(Percentages)



**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay.

In the first half of 2024, the unemployment rate rose in nine countries, with Argentina and Trinidad and Tobago posting increases of more than 1 percentage point. In contrast, the rate fell in six other countries during the same period, and by more than 1 percentage point in Brazil and Costa Rica (see figure VI.9).

Figure VI.9

Latin America and the Caribbean (15 countries): differences in unemployment rate, first half of 2024 relative to first half of 2023  
(Percentage points)




Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

## Labour informality receded slightly in 2024

The informal employment rate has trended down slightly since 2021, when the mobility restrictions imposed during the pandemic were lifted in most of the region's economies. For 2024, a rate of 46.7% is projected, which would represent a reduction of 0.4 percentage points relative to the previous year (see figure VI.10). Although this slight reduction in informality is a sign of the gradual recovery taking place in the region's labour markets, an average informality rate of 46.7% clearly shows that the formalization of employment still faces major challenges.

Figure VI.10

Latin America and the Caribbean (11 countries):<sup>a</sup> informal employment rate, 2019–2024  
(Percentages)




Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay.

In the first half of 2024, labour informality declined in 7 of the 11 countries in the region that report these data, with Costa Rica and Peru reporting reductions of more than 1 percentage point. In contrast, the informal employment rate rose in another four countries, and by 1.5 percentage points in Uruguay (see figure VI.11). In view of this trend, five of the region's countries (Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Uruguay) had informal employment rates below pre-pandemic levels in the first half of 2024.

**Figure VI.11**

Latin America and the Caribbean (11 countries): differences in informal employment rate, first half of 2024 relative to first half of 2023  
(Percentage points)



**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

Employment trends by occupational category show a 7.9% increase in employers and others in the first half of 2024. The proportion of wage earners, domestic workers and own-account workers also grew, by 2.3%, 2.0% and 1.7%, respectively. Meanwhile, the number of unpaid family workers contracted by 5.9%, continuing the negative trend seen since the pandemic. Despite the recovery seen in employers and others and domestic workers in the first half of 2023 and of 2024, the number of employed people in both groups remained below pre-pandemic levels. This indicates that there is still a long way to go before the labour market recovers fully, in spite of the progress made.

## Real wages rose in the first half of 2024


In the first six months of 2024, lower inflation in the vast majority of the region's economies, together with nominal wage hikes, resulted in real wage growth. The real minimum wage increased in 15 economies, and by more than 3% in Colombia, Mexico, Nicaragua and Trinidad and Tobago. In the same period, however, the real minimum wage fell in five economies, and by more than 10% in Argentina and Haiti (see figure VI.12).

The average real wage also grew in the first half of 2024, in eight of the nine countries for which information is available, rising by more than 4% in Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico and Uruguay. The only exception is Argentina, where the average real wage decreased by 11% during the same period.

Figure VI.12

Latin America and the Caribbean (20 countries): year-on-year growth in real minimum wage, first half of 2024 relative to first half of 2023

(Percentages)



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.


## Despite narrowing slightly, large gender gaps in participation and unemployment persist

In the first six months of 2024, the female participation rate was 52.1%, representing an increase of 0.3 percentage points relative to the year-earlier period. This is the highest level attained by this indicator since the first half of 2021. In contrast, the male participation rate was 74.3%, also 0.3 percentage points higher than a year earlier. These figures imply a 22.2 percentage point participation gap between women and men (see figure VI.13).

Figure VI.13

Latin America and the Caribbean (15 countries):<sup>a</sup> male and female labour participation rates, first half of 2018–first half of 2024

(Percentages)



— Men — Women ● Gap

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay.


As shown in figure VI.13, the gap reported in the first half of 2024 is the smallest in the post-pandemic period and the second-smallest since 2018. Figure VI.13 also shows that women's participation has increased steadily since the first half of 2021, whereas the male rate peaked in the first half of 2022.

In terms of unemployment, figure VI.14 shows that both the female and the male rates have trended down to reach the lowest levels recorded in the first six months of a year since 2018. Compared to the first half of that year, women's unemployment rate was down by 2.8 percentage points, and the men's rate was 2.3 points lower. As a result, the differences between the male and female unemployment rates have also narrowed. In both the first half of 2023 and the same period of 2024, the female unemployment rate was 2.3 percentage points higher than the male rate, the smallest gap recorded since the first half of 2018.

**Figure VI.14**

Latin America and the Caribbean (15 countries):<sup>a</sup> male and female unemployment rates, first half of 2018–first half of 2024

(Percentages)



**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay.

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## CHAPTER

# VIII

## Macroeconomic policies

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### A. Fiscal policy

In 2024, government revenues in Latin America are expected to stabilize on the back of taxes on the consumption of goods and services, while a strong showing from other sources of revenue is projected in the Caribbean

Spending pressures from increased interest payments are compounded in the Caribbean by increased outlays for Hurricane Beryl recovery efforts

Fiscal balances will stabilize, but with substantial deficits overall

Despite a continued downward trend, public debt in the region remains high

### B. Monetary, exchange-rate and prudential policies

In 2024, the region's countries continued the cycle of monetary policy rate cuts that began in 2023

Although monetary policy conditions are approaching a neutral state in several countries, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico maintain a restrictive stance

The expansion of the monetary base in the region has gathered pace since the second quarter of 2024

In 2024, interbank rates have continued to trend down, albeit at different rates across country groupings

Net domestic credit is expanding, driven by lending to the private sector in countries with fixed exchange rates and those with inflation targets

The region's depository institutions maintain low arrears rates, which has boosted their profitability, amid robust capitalization

The depreciating trend of the region's nominal exchange rate, which had begun in the second half of 2023, continued in 2024, but with increasing exchange-rate volatility

Latin American and Caribbean countries have continued to accumulate international reserves in 2024

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## A. Fiscal policy


In 2024, government revenues in Latin America are expected to stabilize on the back of taxes on the consumption of goods and services, while a strong showing from other sources of revenue is projected in the Caribbean

According to updated official projections, total central government revenue in Latin America is expected to stabilize around 18.6% of GDP in 2024 (see figure VII.1). Although tax revenues on average are expected to edge up for the year, they varied widely from country to country as a share of GDP in the first eight months of 2024. In some countries, tax revenues saw robust growth, driven primarily by consumption taxes on goods and services, consistent with rising domestic demand. However, in some cases, tax revenue growth has been limited, which could decrease tax revenues as a percentage of GDP at year-end. Faced with these circumstances, and cognizant of growing demand for resources for social spending, many countries are working on reforms to strengthen tax collection (see box VII.1). Revenues from other sources, namely non-tax, capital and external grants, are projected to drop slightly, owing especially to declining revenues from non-renewable natural resources in some countries.


Figure VII.1

Latin America (16 countries): central government total revenue and tax revenues, 2021–2024  
(Percentages of GDP and percentages)

A. Composition of total revenue, 2021–2024<sup>ab</sup>  
(Percentages of GDP)



**B. Year-on-year change in tax revenues, excluding social contributions, January–August 2024 and January–August 2023<sup>c</sup>**  
(Percentages at constant prices)



**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname and Uruguay.

<sup>b</sup> Simple averages. Individual figures may not add up to the corresponding total because of rounding. Figures for 2024 are official estimates. In the cases of Argentina, Mexico and Peru, the figures refer to the national public administration, the federal public sector and the general government, respectively.

<sup>c</sup> Figures for Ecuador, Honduras and Nicaragua refer to January–July. In the cases of Argentina and Mexico, figures refer to the national public administration and the federal public sector, respectively.

### Box VII.1

#### Fiscal reform in Chile: the Compact for Economic Growth, Social Progress and Fiscal Responsibility

On 1 August 2023, the Government of Chile unveiled its Compact for Economic Growth, Social Progress and Fiscal Responsibility, a set of measures aimed at modernizing the State and stimulating investment and growth. The Compact envisages spending of 2.7% of GDP (US\$ 8 billion) in four priority areas: pensions (1.2% of GDP), social protection (0.3% of GDP), health (0.9% of GDP) and public safety (0.3% of GDP).

The Compact's measures and principles are structured in six major components: (i) spending requirements and priorities to meet needs identified by citizens; (ii) reform commitments to strengthen the transparency, efficiency and quality of public services; (iii) growth stimulus through investment, productivity and economic formalization; (iv) principles for a modern tax system in Chile; (v) enforcement of compliance with tax obligations and income tax reform; and (vi) institutional mechanisms for follow-up, monitoring and evaluation of the Pact over a 10-year period.

The tax component of the Compact includes two bills deemed vital to securing the necessary funding for spending priorities: the Tax Compliance Act (adopted in November 2024 and the income tax reform (to be taken up in congress).

The Tax Compliance Act aims to expand tax revenues by 1.5% of GDP (US\$ 4.5 billion) with a view to generating resources to fund spending needs and priorities associated with pensions (1.2% of GDP) and public safety (0.3% of GDP), as identified in the Compact. To that end, the Act envisages a series of measures focused on combating tax avoidance, tax evasion and informality, strengthening the administration of the tax system and providing support for small and medium-sized enterprises.

The adopted Compact also includes a temporary stamp-tax cut, amendments to the Act on Fiscal Responsibility and the Green Hydrogen Action Plan, 2023–2030, and measures to strengthen digital governance and improve the administration of government real estate purchases and transactions. Commitments such as the streamlining of the permitting process for mining investments, as established in the Mining Royalties Act, have already been implemented. Provisions for modernizing the State include the creation of an agency to oversee the quality of public policies and productivity, which is under way; progress towards a balanced, transparent and responsible fiscal decentralization strategy; the development of a national register identifying the beneficial owners of all legal entities in Chile; and the formalization and strengthening of the government’s internal auditing process.


**Source:** Ministry of Finance of Chile, “Capítulo II. Política y Reforma Fiscal”, *Estado de la Hacienda Pública 2024* and Office of the Minister-Secretary General of the Presidency of Chile, “Mensaje de S.E. el Presidente de la República con el que inicia un proyecto de ley de cumplimiento de obligaciones tributarias dentro del Pacto por el Crecimiento Económico, el Progreso Social y la Responsabilidad Fiscal. MENSAJE N° 326-371”, 29 January 2024.; Ministry of Finance of Chile, “Capítulo II. Política y Reforma Fiscal”, *Estado de la Hacienda Pública 2024* and Office of the Minister-Secretary General of the Presidency of Chile, “Mensaje de S.E. el Presidente de la República con el que inicia un proyecto de ley de cumplimiento de obligaciones tributarias dentro del Pacto por el Crecimiento Económico, el Progreso Social y la Responsabilidad Fiscal. MENSAJE N° 326-371”, 29 January 2024.

The recovery of private consumption, in particular in South America, drove the expansion in revenue from consumption taxes on goods and services. Several countries recorded high rates of growth in value added tax (VAT) revenue in the first eight months of the year—an improvement over the significant contractions of the prior-year period (see figure VII.2). Especially notable in that regard was tax revenue from internal transactions, in particular retail and wholesale transactions in the commercial sector. For some countries, other sectors were key. For example, Costa Rica recorded substantial revenue from financial and insurance transactions (Ministry of Finance of Costa Rica, 2024). In the Dominican Republic, the hotel industry boosted internal VAT revenue (Ministry of Finance of the Dominican Republic, 2024a). In Argentina, meanwhile, VAT revenue was dragged down by weaker economic activity.


**Figure VII.2**

Latin America (16 countries): value added tax collection by central government, 2023 and 2024<sup>a</sup>  
(Percentages and percentage points)

**A. Real year-on-year change in value added tax revenue, January–August 2024 and January–August 2023**  
(Percentages at constant prices)



**B. Contribution of each component to year-on-year change in value added tax revenue, January–August 2024**  
(Percentages at constant prices and percentage points)



**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Figures for Ecuador, Honduras and Nicaragua refer to January–July.

VAT on imports, in particular consumer and capital goods, constituted a significant revenue stream in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Nicaragua (Central Bank of the Dominican Republic, 2024; Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador, 2024; Central Bank of Nicaragua, 2024). In some countries, tax revenues were buoyed by an increase in the value of crude oil imports that was due primarily to the increased volume of those imports (Central Bank of Costa Rica, 2024). In contrast, revenue from VAT on imports decreased in Colombia, largely because of a drop in imports and the appreciation of the national currency (Ministry of Finance and Public Credit of Colombia, 2024a).


In many cases, the increase in VAT receipts in the first eight months of the year was attributable to one-off factors. In Brazil, the baseline effect had a notable impact, owing to the exemption of several fuels from taxation in 2023 under the Social Integration Programme/Civil Servant Investment Programme and the Contribution for the Financing of the Social Security System (Secretariat of Federal Revenue of Brazil, 2024). In Ecuador, the VAT rate increased from 12% to 13% in April under the Organic Law on Addressing Internal Armed Conflict and the Socioeconomic Crisis, which also granted the President authority to modify the legal rate, capped at 15%, with the approval of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. That presidential authority was exercised to further increase the rate, from 13% to 15%, also effective 1 April 2024.

Income tax revenue stabilized overall in most countries in the first eight months of the year, but there were differences between revenue from personal income tax and revenue from corporate income tax (see figure VII.3). In several countries, in the context of a strengthened labour market with increases in both wages and the number of formal jobs, personal income tax receipts expanded, owing in particular to greater retention of wage earners (General Directorate of Internal Revenue of the Dominican Republic, 2024; Ministry of Economy and Finance of Peru, 2024; Ministry of Finance and Public Credit of Nicaragua, 2024). In Brazil, this trend was supported by an increase in personal income tax reported by taxpayers in annual returns, thanks in large part to the revaluation or updating of assets and property located abroad pursuant to Act No. 14754 of 2023 (Secretariat of Federal Revenue of Brazil, 2024).


**Figure VII.3**

Latin America (15 countries): income tax collection by central government, 2023–2024<sup>a</sup>  
(Percentages and percentage points)

**A. Real year-on-year change in income tax collection, January–August 2024 and January–August 2023**  
(Percentages at constant prices)



**B. Contribution of each component to year-on-year change in income tax collection, January–August 2024**  
(Percentages at constant prices, and percentage points)



**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.  
<sup>a</sup> Figures for Ecuador, Honduras and Nicaragua refer to January–July.

Meanwhile, corporate income tax had a negative contribution to growth in revenues from income tax in several countries in the first eight months of 2024. This trend is very closely associated with the previous year’s financial results. Annual corporate income tax revenue contracted in several countries, in many cases owing to the fact that on-account payments made in 2023 covered a large portion of businesses’ tax liabilities for the fiscal year (Ministry of Economy and Finance of Peru, 2024). In Chile and Peru, falling mineral and metal prices—in particular copper—impacted mining companies’ annual payments (SII, 2024). In addition, firms’ financial positions and tax situations in 2023 meant that on-account payments for 2024 were calculated at lower rates. In Colombia, revenue was impacted by a ruling of the Constitutional Court, which declared unenforceable a

paragraph of the 2022 tax reform law that prohibited the deduction of mining royalties from income tax. This effectively resulted in a credit balance for mining companies that had made on-account payments in 2023 under that legislation (Ministry of Finance and Public Credit of Colombia, 2024b).

There remains a clear need to strengthen corporate taxation in a globalized economy. Since the adoption of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, in 2015, the General Assembly of the United Nations has been encouraging Member States to improve transparency and strengthen international tax cooperation while making existing initiatives more inclusive and effective. Efforts in this area to date have been insufficient in view of the challenges facing countries. Treaty-based rules aimed at distributing taxing rights among jurisdictions have failed to prevent base erosion and profit shifting. The two-pillar solution developed under the Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the Group of 20 has not sufficiently empowered governments to tax multinational corporations operating within their borders. This has led emerging and developing economies to call for the establishment of a body within the United Nations to promote the adoption of inclusive and effective international tax measures (see box VII.2).

#### Box VII.2

##### Progress towards a United Nations framework convention on international tax cooperation

In December 2023, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted resolution 78/230 on the promotion of inclusive and effective international tax cooperation at the United Nations, in which it decided to establish a Member State-led, open-ended ad hoc intergovernmental committee for the purpose of drafting terms of reference for a United Nations framework convention on international tax cooperation. The General Assembly requested the committee to take into account the needs, priorities and capacities of developing countries, in particular, from a sustainable development perspective that considers the existing expertise of the multiple institutions involved in tax cooperation at the international, regional and local levels.

In August 2024, at its second session, the Ad Hoc Committee to Draft Terms of Reference for a United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation adopted draft terms of reference, which were annexed to the report on that session for submission to the General Assembly. The draft terms call for the framework convention to include the following objectives: (a) establish fully inclusive and effective international tax cooperation in terms of substance and process; (b) establish a system of governance for international tax cooperation capable of responding to existing and future tax and tax-related challenges on an ongoing basis; and (c) establish an inclusive, fair, transparent, efficient, equitable and effective international tax system for sustainable development, with a view to enhancing the legitimacy, certainty, resilience and fairness of international tax rules, while addressing challenges to strengthening domestic resource mobilization.

In alignment with these objectives, the draft terms include a set of principles and commitments to guide negotiations and propose key subjects for two early protocols that should be developed simultaneously within the framework convention. The first protocol should address taxation of income derived from the provision of cross-border services in an increasingly digitalized and globalized economy. The subject of the second early protocol should be decided at the organizational session of the intergovernmental negotiating committee and should be drawn from the following specific priority areas: taxation of the digitalized economy measures against tax-related illicit financial flows; prevention and resolution of tax disputes; and addressing tax evasion by high-net worth individuals and ensuring their effective taxation in relevant Member States. Other possible topics to be addressed in subsequent protocols include tax cooperation on environmental challenges, exchange of information for tax purposes, mutual collaborative assistance on tax matters, and harmful tax practices.

The draft terms state that the framework convention should be elaborated by a Member State-led negotiating committee, which would meet in 2025, 2026 and 2027 for at least three sessions per year, of a duration of no more than 10 working days per session, and complete its work and submit the final text of the framework convention and of the two early protocols to the General Assembly for its consideration in the first quarter of its eighty-second session.

**Source:** United Nations, "Promotion of inclusive and effective international tax cooperation at the United Nations" (A/RES/78/230), 2023; "Report of the second session of the Ad Hoc Committee to Draft Terms of Reference for a United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation" (A/79/333), 2024.

Non-tax, capital and grant revenues varied from country to country in the first eight months of 2024. Colombia and Honduras saw particularly notable increases in revenue from central bank dividends (Ministry of Finance and Public Credit of Colombia, 2024a; Central Bank of Honduras, 2024). In Colombia, for example, at the close of the first half of the year, central bank profits transferred to the treasury amounted to 0.5% of GDP, up from 0.1% of GDP in 2023. In the Dominican Republic, the first payment by Aeropuertos Dominicanos to the government under the airport administration concession was equivalent to 0.2% of GDP (Central Bank of the Dominican Republic, 2024). In Chile, however, falling lithium prices led to a significant contraction of property income, which accounted for 0.4% of GDP in the first eight months of 2024, compared to 1.2% of GDP in the prior-year period (DIPRES, 2024).


In the Caribbean, total revenue is expected to increase in 2024, driven by higher receipts from sources other than taxes (see figure VII.4). However, initial projections could be revised downward, given the severe impact of Hurricane Beryl in July. For example, revenue from other sources, in particular foreign grants, are tied to the implementation of public investment projects, which could be postponed in the wake of the hurricane. Another key factor that could affect the completion of these annual projects is the performance of resources mobilized by citizenship-by-investment programmes in several countries. Indeed, revenue from the citizenship-by-investment programme of Saint Kitts and Nevis amounted to 4.3% of GDP in the first five months of 2024, compared to 14.0% of GDP for the same period in 2023.

Although tax revenues are projected to remain relatively stable in the Caribbean, the repercussions of Hurricane Beryl are likely to have had some effect. However, any such effect could be partially offset by the positive performance of tax revenues in the first half of the year. In Antigua and Barbuda, this performance was attributable to the increase in the VAT rate, from 15% to 17% (Government of Antigua and Barbuda, 2023). Barbados, meanwhile, received a revenue boost from corporate tax reform, which required firms to make monthly payments in lieu of a provisional payment and made certain assets non-deductible for insurance companies as of January (Central Bank of Barbados, 2024). In contrast, revenue from goods and services consumption tax has declined after the uptick driven by the recovery of tourism. In Trinidad and Tobago, tax payments from oil companies decreased owing to falling oil and natural gas prices and declining production volumes (Ministry of Finance of Trinidad and Tobago, 2024).


**Figure VII.4**

The Caribbean (12 countries): central government total revenue and tax revenues, 2021–2024  
(Percentages of GDP and percentages)

**A. Composition of total income, 2021–2024<sup>ab</sup>**  
(Percentages of GDP)



B. Year-on-year change in tax revenues, excluding social contributions, January–July 2024 and January–July 2023<sup>c</sup>  
(Percentages at constant prices)



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.

<sup>b</sup> Simple averages. Individual figures may not add up to the corresponding total because of rounding. Figures for 2024 are official estimates. In the cases of Barbados and Saint Kitts and Nevis, the figures refer to the non-financial public sector and the federal government, respectively.

<sup>c</sup> The figures for Saint Vincent and Saint Lucia refer to January–March; for Antigua and Barbuda, January–April; and for Grenada and Saint Kitts and Nevis, January–May. In the cases of Barbados and Saint Kitts and Nevis, the figures refer to the non-financial public sector and the federal government, respectively.


## Spending pressures from increased interest payments are compounded in the Caribbean by increased outlays for Hurricane Beryl recovery efforts

According to updated official projections, public expenditure in Latin America will rise in 2024. Total central government expenditure will reach 21.8% of GDP, up from 21.7% in 2023 (see figure VII.5). This increase is mainly due to higher interest payments consistent with rising public debt and higher domestic and international interest rates over the past decade. Primary expenditure (i.e. excluding interest payments) is expected to hold steady, mainly on account of increased capital expenditure, although its acceleration in most countries in the first eight months of 2024 suggests that total expenditure at year-end could exceed projections. This trend could moderate in the final quarter, however, if countries adjust capital investments to meet targets established in their fiscal rules.


Figure VII.5

Latin America (16 countries): central government total and primary expenditure, 2021–2024  
(Percentages of GDP and percentages)

**A. Composition of total expenditure, 2021–2024<sup>a,b</sup>**  
(Percentages of GDP)



**B. Year-on-year change in primary expenditure, January–August 2024 and January–August 2023<sup>c</sup>**  
(Percentages at constant prices)



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname and Uruguay.

<sup>b</sup> Simple averages. Individual figures may not add up to the corresponding total because of rounding. Figures for 2024 are official estimates. In the cases of Argentina, Mexico and Peru, the figures refer to the national public administration, the federal public sector and the general government, respectively.


<sup>c</sup> Figures for Ecuador, Honduras and Nicaragua refer to January–July. In the cases of Argentina and Mexico, figures refer to the national public administration and the federal public sector, respectively.

Primary current expenditure is expected to contract, owing mainly to a reduction in subsidies and current transfers, projected at 8.4% of GDP compared to 8.6% of GDP in 2023 (see figure VII.6). This decline largely reflects an expected contraction in Argentina, a projection supported by trends in the first eight months of the year (Ministry of Economy of Argentina, 2024; IMF, 2024). Nevertheless, these expenditures are still above the levels seen prior to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. Despite projections, spending on subsidies and current transfers has been strong in the first eight months of 2024.


**Figure VII.6**

Latin America (16 countries): expenditure on central government subsidies and current transfers, 2015–2024  
(Percentages of GDP and percentages)

**A. Average expenditure on subsidies and current transfers, 2015–2024<sup>a,b</sup>**  
(Percentages of GDP)



**B. Year-on-year change in expenditure on subsidies and current transfers, January–August 2024 and January–August 2023<sup>c</sup>**  
(Percentages at constant prices)



● 2023 ● 2024

**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname and Uruguay.

<sup>b</sup> Simple averages. Figures for 2024 are official estimates. In the cases of Argentina, Mexico and Peru, the figures refer to the national public administration, the federal public sector and the general government, respectively.

<sup>c</sup> Figures for Ecuador, Honduras and Nicaragua refer to January–July. In the cases of Argentina and Mexico, figures refer to the national public administration and the federal public sector, respectively.

In some cases, robust spending has been driven by the previous year's macrofiscal trends. For example, in Brazil, minimum wage increases in 2023 and 2024 affected expenditures on pensions and programmes for older persons (National Treasury of Brazil, 2024). The federal government's special disbursements for flood response in the state of Rio Grande do Sul also played a part. In Colombia, spending on transfers under the General Participation System has risen sharply on the back of a considerable increase in central government current revenue over the past four years (Ministry of Finance and Public Credit of Colombia, 2024a).

Expenditure on subsidies and current transfers related to social protection programmes has also increased. In Mexico, spending on programmes including the Pension for the Well-being of Older Persons, the *La Escuela es Nuestra* school programme, the *Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro* youth programme and scholarships was up (SHCP, 2024). In the Dominican Republic, spending increased on the *Seguimos a Mil* education grant, fuel subsidies and special transfers to political parties for the 2024 elections (Ministry of Finance of the Dominican Republic, 2024b).

With regard to capital expenditure, updated official projections for 2024 show a slight average increase. However, considering that this component of public expenditure has been the main adjustment variable in recent years, spending cuts may occur if fiscal balances deviate from targets at the end of the year. Capital expenditure has been highly volatile in the first eight months of 2024, partly because this expenditure component tends to be concentrated in the final quarter. Expenditure on physical capital investment, such as roads and public transport, increased in Chile and the Dominican Republic (DIPRES, 2024; Ministry of Finance of the Dominican Republic, 2024a), while Argentina has seen direct investment and capital transfers decrease significantly in real terms (OPC, 2024).

The growth of interest payments is expected to continue in 2024, reaching an average 3.0% of GDP, compared to 2.7% in 2023. If this projection is borne out, interest payments will reach their highest level in three decades.<sup>1</sup> The gradual expansion of public debt and rise in the main international interest rates are among the explanatory factors behind this trend: rising interest rates mean higher interest payments, both on sovereign bonds issued on markets—including variable-rate and new issuances—and on loans from international financial institutions (Ministry of Finance of Paraguay, 2024). Thus, rising debt-servicing costs are a major contributor to the increase in interest payments (see figure VII.7).

In the Caribbean, an increase is projected across all components of total public expenditure, in particular capital expenditure (see figure VII.8). Hurricane Beryl had a major effect in this regard, having severely impacted several countries in July 2024, with economic damages amounting to 16.5% of GDP in Grenada and 22% of GDP in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (World Bank, 2024a and 2024b). Grenada estimates that capital expenditure could reach 16% of GDP by year-end, compared to the 11% of GDP provided for in the 2024 budget (Ministry of Finance of Grenada, 2024). Similarly, the budget of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines revised in the hurricane's aftermath has allocated 4.5% of GDP to respond to the immediate needs of the population and invest in reconstruction (Office of the Prime Minister of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 2024).

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
<sup>1</sup> Expected to be the highest level ever recorded in the ECLAC database since its inception in 1990.

Figure VII.7

Latin America (15 countries) and the United States: 10-year bond interest rates and year-on-year change in central government interest payments, by component, 2020–2024  
(Percentages and percentage points)


#### A. 10-year bond interest rates, January 2020–August 2024

(Percentages)



#### B. Contribution of each component to the year-on-year change in central government interest payments, January–August 2024<sup>a,b</sup>

(Percentages at constant prices and percentage points)



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), OECD.Stat [online] <https://stats.oecd.org/>.


<sup>a</sup> In the cases of Argentina, Mexico and Peru, the figures refer to the national public administration, the federal public sector and the general government, respectively.

<sup>b</sup> Figures for Ecuador, Honduras and Nicaragua refer to January–July.


**Figure VII.8**

The Caribbean (12 countries): central government total and primary expenditure, 2021–2024  
(Percentages of GDP and percentages)

**A. Composition of total expenditure, 2021–2024<sup>a,b</sup>**  
(Percentages of GDP)



**B. Year-on-year change in primary expenditure, January–June 2024 and January–June 2023<sup>c</sup>**  
(Percentages at constant prices)



**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.

<sup>b</sup> Simple averages. Individual figures may not add up to the corresponding total because of rounding. Figures for 2024 are official estimates. In the cases of Barbados and Saint Kitts and Nevis, the figures refer to the non-financial public sector and the federal government, respectively.


<sup>c</sup> The figures for Saint Vincent and Saint Lucia refer to January–March; for Antigua and Barbuda, January–April; and for Grenada and Saint Kitts and Nevis, January–May. In the cases of Barbados and Saint Kitts and Nevis, the figures refer to the non-financial public sector and the federal government, respectively.

## Fiscal balances will stabilize, but with substantial deficits overall

Amid stagnant public revenue and rising public expenditure, the overall central government deficit in Latin America is expected to widen slightly in 2024, with official updated projections averaging 3.3% of GDP, compared to 3.2% of GDP in 2023 (see figure VII.9). However, the primary balance (excluding interest payments) will improve thanks to a contraction in primary current expenditure. Of course, these projections are based on assumptions about how different macroeconomic variables will perform through the end of the year, including how tax revenues will affect trends in private consumption and imports. Year-end adjustments may be made to public expenditure, in particular capital expenditure, if overall fiscal balances diverge from countries' previously established fiscal targets.

Figure VII.9

Latin America (16 countries):<sup>a</sup> central government fiscal indicators, 2010–2024<sup>b</sup>  
(Percentages of GDP)



■ Total revenue    ◆ Total expenditure    ● Primary balance (right scale)    ■ Overall fiscal balance (right scale)

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.


<sup>a</sup> Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname and Uruguay.

<sup>b</sup> Simple averages. Individual figures may not add up to the corresponding total because of rounding. Figures for 2024 are official estimates. In the cases of Argentina, Mexico and Peru, the figures refer to the national public administration, the federal public sector and the general government, respectively.

In the Caribbean, the overall deficit is expected to widen in 2024, following a contraction in 2023 (see figure VII.10). Meanwhile, the primary balance will record a surplus, albeit a lesser one than in the previous year. This trend is largely attributable to the projected increase in total expenditure due to efforts to address the economic and social damages of Hurricane Beryl. However, these projections are subject to a range of uncertain factors, in particular tax revenues and the degree of efficiency with which recovery and reconstruction programmes are implemented in the second half of the year. Given constraints associated with countries' high levels of public debt, any increase in public expenditure will depend on the extent to which resources can be mobilized by the end of the year.

Figure VII.10

The Caribbean (12 countries):<sup>a</sup> central government fiscal indicators, 2010–2024<sup>b</sup>  
(Percentages of GDP)



■ Total revenue ◆ Total expenditure ● Primary balance (right scale) ■ Overall fiscal balance (right scale)

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.

<sup>b</sup> Simple averages. Individual figures may not add up to the corresponding total because of rounding. Figures for 2024 are official estimates. In the cases of Barbados and Saint Kitts and Nevis, the figures refer to the non-financial public sector and the federal government, respectively.

## Despite a continued downward trend, public debt in the region remains high


In September 2024, average public debt for 16 countries in Latin America stood at 52.6% of GDP, down 2.4 percentage points relative to the end of 2023 (see figure VII.11). However, there is significant variation within the regional average. Levels of public debt as a percentage of GDP between 2020 and September 2024 underscore the magnitude of financing needs for the countries of the region. Despite improvements since 2021, public debt levels remain historically high—above 50% of GDP—similar to the levels registered in the early 2000s in Latin America and the Caribbean.

In the Caribbean, meanwhile, average central government gross public debt for 13 countries stood at 66.4% of GDP in June 2024, 4.2 percentage points lower than at the end of 2023 (see figure II.12). That average was below pre-pandemic levels for the first time since the COVID-19 crisis. Despite the relative decline in the subregional average, debt levels in the Caribbean countries remain very high, in some cases reaching 180% of GDP. An uptick in the subregion's economic growth translated into a strong denominator effect, since absolute levels of public debt remained relatively stable during the year. In GDP terms, the most significant reductions were in the Bahamas (-5.6 percentage points), Barbados (-11.4 percentage points), Belize (-5.7 percentage points) and Suriname (-28.3 percentage points). Guyana is also noteworthy in this regard, with its debt having fallen by several percentage points of GDP since 2022 alongside rapid acceleration of GDP growth—surpassing 40% in 2024 in real terms—thanks to the initiation of offshore oil production.


Figure VII.11

Latin America (16 countries):<sup>a</sup> central government gross public debt, 2000–September 2024<sup>b</sup>  
(Percentages of GDP)

#### A. Central government gross public debt, 2000–September 2024



#### B. Central government gross public debt, by country, December 2023 and September 2024



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official data.

<sup>a</sup> Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname and Uruguay.


<sup>b</sup> Figures for Brazil refer to the general government. Figures for Argentina, Chile and Uruguay refer to June 2024.

<sup>c</sup> Up to September.


**Figure VII.12**

The Caribbean (13 countries):<sup>a</sup> central government gross public debt, 2011–June 2024<sup>b</sup>  
(Percentages of GDP)

**A. Central government gross public debt, 2011–June 2024**



**B. Central government gross public debt, by country, December 2023 and June 2024**



**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.

<sup>b</sup> Figures for Guyana refer to the public sector. Figures for Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Saint Lucia are up to December 2023.


Central government public debt levels in the region have retreated relative to GDP but they remain high and are a source of vulnerability in the current macrofinancial environment.

The risks associated with the accumulation of public debt also undermine the medium-term sustainability of public finances, owing mainly to the increased cost of debt service, which erodes fiscal balances. A number of factors, both domestic and external, influence the accumulation of public debt, such as the primary fiscal deficit, the GDP growth rate, the implicit interest rate and the exchange rate. A factor that is highly significant for the region is the deterioration of domestic financial market conditions, compounded by the depreciation of the local currency and potential downgrades in credit ratings, which has made it difficult to manage the region's public liabilities. Importantly, these factors will affect not only interest payments on the existing debt stock—to the extent that countries have debt denominated in foreign currency or with variable interest rates—, but also interest payments on any new issuances, which will be under less favourable financial conditions. These conditions will pose challenges for the region in terms of refinancing existing public debt.

Maintaining public account sustainability will require active management of debt portfolios. In this regard, it is extremely important for Latin American countries to analyse the risks associated with the composition of debt by type of currency and creditor residency. As shown in figure VII.13, the public debt stock of the region's countries is mostly denominated in dollars, the exceptions being Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica, where debt is denominated mainly in local currency.

**Figure VII.13**

Latin America (12 countries): central government gross public debt, by type of currency, September 2024<sup>a,b</sup>  
(Percentages)



**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.


<sup>a</sup> In Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras, Paraguay and Uruguay, public debt refers to the debt of the central government; in the case of Brazil, the general government; in the case of Colombia, the central national government; in the cases of Ecuador, Panama and Peru, to the public sector; and in the case of the Dominican Republic, the non-financial public sector.

<sup>b</sup> Figures for Argentina, Chile and Uruguay refer to June 2024.

Another significant factor is creditor residency and the burden of this debt for central governments. Although the region on average displays a balance between domestic and external creditors, the situation varies considerably by country. As figure VII.14 shows, external creditors hold around 90% of the total debt of Nicaragua and Paraguay. These countries' potential exposure to exchange rate risks could result in the depreciation of the local currency against the dollar, which would increase the financial cost of the debt. On the other end of the spectrum, Brazil and Mexico have a larger proportion of domestic creditors (holding over 80% of the total debt) and are therefore relatively less exposed to external vulnerabilities.

**Figure VII.14**

Latin America (16 countries): central government gross public debt and subregional averages, by creditor residency, September 2024<sup>a,b</sup>  
(Percentages of the total)



**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Figures for Brazil refer to the general government.

<sup>b</sup> Figures for Argentina, Chile and Uruguay refer to June 2024.

## B. Monetary, exchange-rate and prudential policies

### In 2024, the region's countries continued the cycle of monetary policy rate cuts that began in 2023


The persistent downward trend in inflation across the region, in conjunction with the start of the cycle of monetary policy rate cuts implemented by the United States Federal Reserve, created space to consolidate the easing of monetary policy in the Latin American and Caribbean countries that have adopted an inflation-targeting regime.

As shown in figure VII.15, Guatemala and Jamaica started to lower their monetary policy rates in the second half of 2024, having held them at the peaks attained in the second quarter of 2023 and late 2022, respectively. In doing so, they aligned with the other inflation-targeting countries that had cut their policy rates since 2023.

Figure VII.15

Latin America and the Caribbean (11 countries): index of monetary policy rates and rate prevailing at end of period, January 2023–November 2024

(Index: January 2023 = 100 basis points and percentages)



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

In contrast, Brazil, which started to reduce its monetary policy benchmark rate in August 2023, lowering it from 13.75% in July 2023 to 10.50% as from May 2024, started to raise this rate again in September 2024. This reflects concerns about the trend of inflation expectations, which, as discussed below, are almost 1 percentage point above target, even over a 24-month horizon. Inflation expectations in Brazil mainly reflect the persistence of core inflation, driven by labour market buoyancy and supported by the potential effects of the fiscal stimulus on inflation.

## Although monetary policy conditions are approaching a neutral state in several countries, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico maintain a restrictive stance

Figure VII.16 summarizes the recent trend of the spread between the monetary policy rates in real terms and official estimates of the real natural interest rate in each country.<sup>23</sup> While a positive spread (in other words, a real monetary policy rate above the natural rate) signals a contractionary monetary policy stance, a negative spread is seen as expansionary. Since the natural rate of interest is not observable, its estimation is subject to uncertainty. Accordingly, spreads that lie in a range around zero are considered indicative of a neutral monetary policy.<sup>4</sup>


<sup>2</sup> The real monetary policy rate is obtained by deflating the nominal policy rate by the 12-month inflation expectation.

<sup>3</sup> The natural rate of interest is the real interest rate that in principle keeps the level of economic activity around its potential level and the inflation rate around its target (Laubach and Williams, 2003; Holston, Laubach and Williams, 2023). The natural rate of interest fluctuates over time depending on real factors that affect the relationship between saving and investment, such as potential output, demographic dynamics and income distribution, as well as the risk aversion of savers and investors (Benigno and others, 2024).

<sup>4</sup> The average range of the most recent estimation of countries in the region that estimate their respective natural interest rates is +/- 75 basis points.

Figure VII.16

Latin America (9 countries): spread between real monetary policy rates and natural rate of interest, December 2023 and November 2024  
(Percentage points)



**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

**Note:** The rate spread is calculated relative to the most recent estimate of the natural interest rate made by the monetary authorities of each country. The neutral stance range refers to the average of the range of estimations for each country.

Figure VII.16 also shows that, after the most recent policy rate adjustments, the monetary policy stance is practically neutral in Chile, Costa Rica, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. In the case of Guatemala, where monetary policy has remained expansionary despite the trend in the monetary policy rate, inflation has pushed the rate up slightly in real terms, thereby bringing the policy stance close to neutral. In contrast, in Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, the monetary policy stance remains firmly restrictive.

## The expansion of the monetary base in the region has gathered pace since the second quarter of 2024


In keeping with the easing of monetary policy in the inflation-targeting countries, the year-on-year growth of the monetary base in this group of countries, which had broadly flatlined since the last quarter of 2022, started to gather pace as from the second quarter of 2024.

As figure VII.17 shows, the situation is mixed in the rest of the region. In countries with fixed exchange rates, where the monetary base had hardly grown since the fourth quarter of 2023, it contracted in the third quarter of 2024. In contrast, in countries with exchange-rate and monetary-aggregate targets, where the monetary base had expanded by more than 10% year-on-year since the fourth quarter of 2023, the pace of growth slowed significantly towards the end of the third quarter of 2024. In both cases, the rise in medium-term bond yields in the United States, associated with the uncertainty surrounding the elections in that country, had an impact.

Lastly, in countries with chronic inflation, the growth of the monetary base has accelerated sharply since mid-2023, exceeding 150% year-on-year as from the second quarter of 2024.

Figure VII.17

Latin America and the Caribbean (23 countries): year-on-year growth of monetary base, January 2020–September 2024  
(Percentages)



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Ecuador, El Salvador and Panama.

<sup>b</sup> Honduras, Nicaragua and Trinidad and Tobago.

<sup>c</sup> Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.

<sup>d</sup> Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Suriname.

## In 2024, interbank rates have continued to trend down, albeit at different rates across country groupings


In inflation-targeting countries, the lowering of monetary policy rates pushed the median nominal interbank rate down from close to 10% in mid-2023 to almost 6.5% by the end of the third quarter of 2024.

In countries that maintain exchange-rate and monetary-aggregate targets, which have less monetary autonomy, nominal interbank rates remained at around 5.5% until late in the second quarter of 2024; and they did not fall significantly until the third quarter of that year.

In countries with chronic inflation, where interbank interest rates fluctuate widely, nominal rates reflected an upturn in the first half of 2023, but have fallen significantly since the fourth quarter of that year. Nonetheless, the median nominal rate in this group of countries was still close to 30% late in the third quarter of 2024 (see figure VII.18).

Figure VII.18

Latin America and the Caribbean (16 countries): nominal interbank interest rates, January 2020–September 2024  
(Percentages)



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Honduras, Nicaragua, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, and Trinidad and Tobago.

<sup>b</sup> Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay and Peru.

<sup>c</sup> Argentina and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

## Net domestic credit is expanding, driven by lending to the private sector in countries with fixed exchange rates and those with inflation targets

The combination of falling inflation and interest rate cuts has had an impact on the relative recovery of domestic credit regionwide, which was growing at a rate of 3.1% in real terms by the end of the third quarter of 2024 (see figure VII.19A).


By country grouping, the result is explained by the recovery of credit in inflation-targeting countries and, to a lesser extent, by the growth recorded in those with fixed exchange rates. In the case of countries with exchange-rate and monetary-aggregate targets, despite the slight rebound in real credit growth reported between the fourth quarter of 2023 and the first quarter of 2024, total domestic credit started to decline again as from the second quarter of that year, as it had been doing since the second half of 2021. The situation is similar in countries with chronic inflation, where domestic credit has been contracting almost continuously since early 2021.

By credit destination, both regionally and also in inflation-targeting countries and those with fixed exchange rates, recent performance has been determined by the growth in real terms of lending to the private sector, which, except in the second quarter of 2024, has outpaced lending to the public sector (see figures VII.19B and VII.19C). For countries with exchange-rate and monetary-aggregate targets, the real contraction in domestic credit reflects the reduction in lending to the public sector, since credit to the private sector has been growing at a gradually accelerating pace in real terms since the second half of 2022. In contrast, lending to both the private and the public sectors has decreased in countries with chronic inflation.

Figure VII.19

Latin America and the Caribbean (29 countries): real rate of variation in domestic credit, first quarter of 2020–third quarter of 2024  
(Percentages)

## A. Total domestic credit




## B. Domestic credit granted to public sector



— Latin America and the Caribbean — Countries with fixed exchange rates<sup>a</sup>  
 — Countries with exchange-rate and monetary-aggregate targets (right scale)<sup>b</sup>  
 - - - Countries with inflation targets<sup>c</sup> — Countries with chronic inflation (right scale)<sup>d</sup>

## C. Domestic credit granted to private sector



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Belize, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Panama, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

<sup>b</sup> Guyana, Nicaragua and Trinidad and Tobago.

<sup>c</sup> Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay.

<sup>d</sup> Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Suriname.

## The region's depository institutions maintain low arrears rates, which has boosted their profitability, amid robust capitalization

At the aggregate level, notwithstanding a slight upturn in the share of the non-performing portfolio as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, depository institutions' asset quality has remained at manageable levels of between 2% and 5% of the total gross portfolio, with a slight decline discernible in the most recent data (see figure VII.20A). Profitability, measured as the ratio of gross income to capital, has remained above the 8% level that is considered healthy for depository institutions (see figure VII.20B). Lastly, these institutions display solid capitalization, fulfilling regulatory minima comfortably (see figure VII.20C).


However, when disaggregated by country grouping, the data are more mixed. In inflation-targeting countries, which have the lowest non-performing portfolio ratios, there has been a slight deterioration in the most recent period, associated with the lagged effect that high interest rates have exerted on asset quality. Nonetheless, the profitability of depository institutions has remained constant at around 15%, while maintaining the highest median capitalization in the region.

In contrast, in countries with fixed exchange rates, the non-performing loans ratio has declined, although the most recent figures show that this is still above the 5% that is considered manageable. While the improvement in asset quality has been reflected in higher profitability, the capitalization of depository institutions has also deteriorated slightly.


Figure VII.20

Latin America and the Caribbean (31 countries):<sup>a</sup> indicators of financial soundness of deposit-taking institutions, 2019–2024  
(Percentages)


A. Asset quality



B. Profitability



### C. Capital adequacy



**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

**Note:** The dots in the graph represent the mean of the different country groupings, and the vertical bars show the inter-quartile range of the distribution of observations. Asset quality is measured as the ratio of non-performing loans to total gross loans. Profitability is measured as the ratio of net income to capital. Capital adequacy is measured as the ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets.

<sup>a</sup> Owing to a lack of data, the regional aggregate does not include the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela or Cuba. The data for countries with chronic inflation (Argentina, Haiti and Suriname) are included in the regional aggregate, although not disaggregated because of their volatility.

<sup>b</sup> Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay.

<sup>c</sup> Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Panama, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

<sup>d</sup> Guyana, Honduras, Nicaragua, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, and Trinidad and Tobago.


Lastly, asset quality has improved in countries that maintain exchange-rate and monetary-aggregate targets, which has also been correlated with higher profitability, while maintaining a relatively constant level of capitalization.

## The depreciating trend of the region's nominal exchange rate, which had begun in the second half of 2023, continued in 2024, but with increasing exchange-rate volatility

Although the United States Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England have already started to cut their interest rates, the continuous lowering of monetary policy rates in the region's inflation-targeting countries has resulted in a narrowing of the rate spread with respect to developed countries, while their currencies have continued to depreciate. Depreciations in this group of countries have been greater than in those that maintain exchange-rate and monetary-aggregate targets. Conversely, in the countries with chronic inflation, the exchange rate rose in late 2023, owing to domestic factors that have since dissipated, so that the rise in the exchange rate is now following a trend similar to that of 2023, but at a higher level (see figure VII.21).

Figure VII.21

Latin America and the Caribbean (20 countries): nominal exchange rate index, median by country grouping, January 2023–September 2024  
(Base year 2019 = 100)



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay.

<sup>b</sup> Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay.

<sup>c</sup> Guyana, Honduras, Nicaragua, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, and Trinidad and Tobago.

<sup>d</sup> Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Haiti, and Suriname.


The rise in exchange rates in the region, mainly in the inflation-targeting countries, has pushed up the domestic prices of imported products and, consequently, fuelled headline inflation. As a result, the pace at which central banks have lowered their monetary policy rates is consistent with the aim of avoiding any further rise in the exchange rate and, hence, in inflation.

In addition to the depreciation resulting from the spread in monetary policy rates between the countries of the region and developed countries, there have been price fluctuations in major commodities owing to the vagaries of the Chinese economy. Variations in the activity of that economy and expectations about its future performance have pushed the prices of these goods both up and down. The same has occurred with other trading partners in the region, such as the United States and Europe, whose GDP performance has affected the region's currencies. For example, in mineral- and hydrocarbon-producing countries, the fall in the prices of these products has caused temporary increases in the exchange rate throughout 2024, in accordance with market fluctuations. Compounding this, the demand for dollars as a reserve asset increased towards the end of the third quarter, owing to uncertainty leading up to the presidential elections in the United States.

The events described above have fuelled greater exchange-rate volatility in all country groupings. This has been relatively more intense in inflation-targeting countries, although their volatility levels remain similar to those of 2023 and below those recorded in 2022. In countries with chronic inflation, exchange rates have fluctuated significantly less in 2024 than the previous period, albeit increasing slightly over the course of the year (see figure VII.22).

Figure VII.22

Latin America and the Caribbean (20 countries): nominal exchange-rate volatility, quarterly average of daily variation, median by country grouping, first quarter of 2022–third quarter of 2024  
(Percentages)



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay.

<sup>b</sup> Guyana, Honduras, Nicaragua, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, and Trinidad and Tobago.

<sup>c</sup> Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Haiti and Suriname.

Depreciation in nominal exchange rates has had the effect of reducing the number of countries with appreciations in real exchange rates relative to the world and trading partners. Unlike in 2023, when inflation in Latin American and Caribbean countries was higher than in their trading partners, thereby creating conditions for real appreciations, in 2024 inflation in the region has been declining overall. In conjunction with the rise in the nominal exchange rate against the dollar, this has increased the number of countries with depreciations in real exchange rates (see table VII.1).

Table VII.1

Latin America and the Caribbean (32 countries): variation in real exchange rate relative to year-earlier period, 2023 and January–September 2024  
(Percentages)

	Real exchange rate with the world		Extra-regional real exchange rate	
	2023	2024 (January–September)	2023	2024 (January–September)
Antigua and Barbuda	-0.2	-4.5	-1.4	-4.0
Argentina	-1.1	-26.0	-4.7	-23.7
Bahamas	0.9	3.1	0.9	3.3
Barbados	9.2	4.3	-2.8	5.0
Belize	-0.7	-2.1	-2.8	-0.8
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	1.1	-2.1	-2.8	-3.2
Brazil	-6.5	12.6	-7.8	11.5
Chile	-3.8	5.1	6.0	5.7
Colombia	-6.6	2.5	-7.9	3.7
Costa Rica	-13.4	-0.3	-14.7	0.7

	Real exchange rate with the world		Extra-regional real exchange rate	
	2023	2024 (January–September)	2023	2024 (January–September)
Dominica	-0.8	1.7	-2.7	2.5
Dominican Republic	-4.5	4.2	-2.0	4.6
Ecuador	-0.8	-0.4	-2.8	-0.1
El Salvador	-0.3	0.4	-2.4	1.5
Grenada	0.3	1.5	0.4	2.1
Guatemala	81.3	-2.0	-3.0	-0.3
Guyana	7.3	-0.9	4.3	-0.5
Haiti	-8.4	-13.4	-9.6	-13.0
Honduras	-3.7	-1.7	-4.4	-0.7
Jamaica	-4.8	7.3	-4.5	8.4
Mexico	-14.3	13.5	-14.5	13.7
Nicaragua	-4.1	0.0	-5.0	0.9
Panama	0.7	1.5	-1.2	2.3
Paraguay	3.2	4.8	-2.7	4.7
Peru	-6.8	0.8	-8.6	1.0
Saint Kitts and Nevis	-0.4	2.7	-0.3	3.0
Saint Lucia	-4.3	7.2	-9.5	6.9
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	-0.9	-6.7	-1.1	-6.0
Suriname	3.5	-26.3	2.0	-26.0
Trinidad and Tobago	0.0	1.2	-2.0	2.2
Uruguay	-8.8	2.4	-12.4	2.3
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	-1.4	3.5	-4.7	5.1
Median	-0.8	1.3	-2.8	2.2
Number of countries with real exchange rate appreciation	23	12	28	11

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

Note: Shaded cells indicate exchange rate appreciations.

## Latin American and Caribbean countries have continued to accumulate international reserves in 2024

The region's net international reserves<sup>5</sup> have grown during the first nine months of 2024 to a balance of US\$ 850.198 billion. This is 6.5% above the level recorded in late 2023, a year of relative stability in the regional balance. Net international reserves have thus surpassed both pre-pandemic levels and the 2021 peak, leaving Latin American and Caribbean countries in a better position to confront international uncertainty and exchange-rate volatility (see figure VII.23).

While all country groupings have seen their net international reserves grow, the largest increases occurred in the inflation-targeting countries, whose reserves, representing 98.2% of the total, account for much of the growth in the region's balance. Owing to the size of their economies, the countries with the largest shares of the region's total reserves are Brazil with 43.0%, Mexico with 25.7%, Peru with 9.5%, and Colombia with 6.5%. Accordingly, growth of this type of asset in these countries has a major effect on the regional result. Although net reserves are negative in countries with chronic inflation, owing to liabilities incurred, the situation has improved compared to 2023 because of a reduction in the negative balance of Argentina and increases in the reserves of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Suriname (see figure VII.24).

<sup>5</sup> Standardized net international reserves are calculated as the difference between the stock of official reserve assets and predetermined contractual obligations denominated in foreign currency maturing in the next 12 months (IMF, 2022).

**Figure VII.23**


Latin America and the Caribbean: net international reserves, January 2019–September 2024  
(Billions of dollars)



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

**Figure VII.24**

Latin America and the Caribbean (29 countries): three-month average variation in stock of net international reserves, January 2020–September 2024  
(Billions of dollars)



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Belize, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guyana, Panama, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

<sup>b</sup> Honduras, Nicaragua and Trinidad and Tobago.

<sup>c</sup> Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay.

<sup>d</sup> Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, and Suriname.

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CHAPTER

# VIII

## Economic projections and outlook for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2024 and 2025

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Following expected growth of 2.2% in 2024, the Latin American and Caribbean economy is projected to expand by 2.4% in 2025, thus remaining on the low-growth path that has resulted in the region contributing less to global GDP growth in the medium term

In 2025, there will be less foreign trade momentum in the region to sustain growth, as had been predicted for 2024

International financial conditions are expected to be more benign in 2025 than in 2024, although they will likely remain subject to risks related to the pace and magnitude of benchmark interest rate cuts, a strengthening dollar and heightened geopolitical tensions

The deficit in the region's external accounts is expected to widen in 2025, in keeping with that forecast for 2024

Private consumption is expected to remain the principal driver of regional growth, while reduction in domestic inflation may proceed more slowly

Job creation is likely to remain weak in 2024 and 2025, with gender gaps persisting in the main labour market indicators

In 2024 and 2025, the scope and action of macroeconomic policies will have limited capacity to foster the potential growth of the region's economies

Policies to address the trap of low capacity for growth

Bibliography



## Following expected growth of 2.2% in 2024, the Latin American and Caribbean economy is projected to expand by 2.4% in 2025, thus remaining on the low-growth path that has resulted in the region contributing less to global GDP growth in the medium term

Economic growth in Latin America and the Caribbean is set to remain low in 2024, at 2.2%, almost unchanged compared to the 2.3% recorded in 2023. Central America and Mexico, South America and the Caribbean excluding Guyana are expected to expand by 1.8%, 2.1% and 2.5%, respectively, in 2024 (see table VIII.1). In 2025, the region is expected to recover slightly, to record a growth rate of 2.4%, or 0.2 percentage points higher than in 2024.

**Table VIII.1**

Latin America and the Caribbean: GDP growth rate and projections, 2023–2025  
(Percentages and percentage points)

	GDP growth rate (Percentages)			Year-on-year change (Percentage points)	
	2023	2024	2025	2023/2024	2024/2025
<b>Latin America and the Caribbean</b>	2.3	2.2	2.4	-0.1	0.2
<b>Latin America</b>	2.2	2.0	2.3	-0.2	0.3
<b>South America</b>	1.7	2.1	2.6	0.4	0.5
Argentina	-1.6	-3.2	4.3	-1.6	7.5
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	3.1	1.7	2.1	-1.4	0.4
Brazil	3.2	3.2	2.3	0.0	-0.9
Chile	0.2	2.3	2.2	2.1	-0.1
Colombia	0.6	1.8	2.6	1.2	0.8
Ecuador	2.4	0.8	1.4	-1.6	0.6
Paraguay	4.7	4.2	3.9	-0.5	-0.3
Peru	-0.4	3.1	2.7	3.5	-0.4
Uruguay	0.4	3.1	2.7	2.7	-0.4
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	3.0	6.2	3.1	3.2	-3.1
<b>Central America<sup>a</sup></b>	3.1	2.8	2.9	-0.3	0.1
<b>Central America and Mexico</b>	3.2	1.8	1.7	-1.4	-0.1
Costa Rica	5.1	4.1	3.8	-1.0	-0.3
Cuba	-1.0	-1.0	-0.1	0.0	0.9
Dominican Rep.	2.4	5.2	4.6	2.8	-0.6
El Salvador	3.5	3.0	3.0	-0.5	0.0
Guatemala	3.5	3.5	3.5	0.0	0.0
Haiti	-1.9	-4.0	-0.5	-2.1	3.5
Honduras	3.6	3.6	3.2	0.0	-0.4
Mexico	3.3	1.4	1.2	-1.9	-0.2
Nicaragua	4.6	3.7	3.3	-0.9	-0.4
Panama	7.4	2.6	3.1	-4.8	0.5
<b>The Caribbean</b>	8.7	11.0	5.7	2.3	-5.3
<b>The Caribbean (excluding Guyana)</b>	2.4	2.5	2.6	0.1	0.1
Antigua and Barbuda	3.9	6.0	5.8	2.1	-0.2
Bahamas	2.6	1.9	1.7	-0.7	-0.2

	GDP growth rate (Percentages)			Year-on-year change (Percentage points)	
	2023	2024	2025	2023/2024	2024/2025
Barbados	4.1	3.9	3.0	-0.2	-0.9
Belize	4.8	7.0	4.1	2.2	-2.9
Dominica	4.7	4.6	4.2	-0.1	-0.4
Grenada	3.6	4.2	3.7	0.6	-0.5
Guyana	39.2	41.5	13.6	2.3	-27.9
Jamaica	2.1	1.4	2.2	-0.7	0.8
Saint Kitts and Nevis	2.3	3.5	3.2	1.2	-0.3
Saint Lucia	2.2	4.0	3.0	1.8	-1.0
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	6.0	4.5	4.7	-1.5	0.2
Suriname	2.4	2.9	3.0	0.5	0.1
Trinidad and Tobago	1.4	2.0	2.5	0.6	0.5

**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures and ECLAC projections in local currency and at constant prices.

**Note:** Figures for 2024 and 2025 are projections.

<sup>a</sup> Central America includes Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Haiti.

By subregion, economic activity in South America is expected to rebound to 2.6% in 2025, owing largely to the stronger performance expected for the Argentine economy, which is forecast to grow by 4.3%, or 7.5 percentage points more than in 2024. Growth in Central America is expected to remain stable at around 2.9%, but if Mexico is included, the growth rate is forecast to edge down to 1.7% in 2025 from 1.8% in 2024. Lastly, growth in the Caribbean (excluding Guyana) is set to continue moderating, in line with its performance since 2022, at a rate of 2.6% in 2025. In contrast, Guyana is recording double-digit growth rates and is likely to be one of the world's fastest-growing economies in 2024 and 2025.<sup>1</sup>

Despite the expansion expected in 2025, the region is set to remain on a low-growth path, converging to a rate of 2.5% over the next five years.<sup>2</sup> This stands in stark contrast to projections for the world economy and, in particular, for the developing economies of Asia, which are projected to expand by 3.2% and 4.9%, respectively. In the medium term, all developing regions, except Latin America and the Caribbean, are expected to increase their contribution to the performance of the world economy (see figure VIII.1). Whereas in the 1990s the region's countries accounted for an average of 11% of global growth, their contribution is expected to drop to 5.9% in 2020–2029.


<sup>1</sup> Evaluation based on a sample of 196 economies.

<sup>2</sup> Based on the median of projections made by various international organizations, including the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).


Figure VIII.1

Latin America and the Caribbean: average contribution to annual change in global GDP, at purchasing power parity, by region, 1990–1999 and 2020–2029  
(Percentage points)

## A. 1990–1999



## B. 2020–2029



**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database, October 2024 [online] <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2024/October>.

**Note:** The different contributions are calculated on the basis of GDP measured in international dollars, adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP) to maintain consistency in the aggregation process across countries.

## In 2025, there will be less foreign trade momentum in the region to sustain growth, as had been predicted for 2024

As table VIII.2 shows, the global economy is projected to expand by 3.2% in 2025, similar to the rate recorded in 2024.<sup>3</sup> The global growth trend reflects the increased prominence of emerging economies, which are expected to grow at an average rate of 4% between 2024 and 2025. In contrast, uneven—and still moderate—growth is expected among advanced economies, responding to different trends in private consumption and export momentum, but tending to converge to an average of 1.1% in 2025, compared to the 0.9% estimated for 2024.

<sup>3</sup> Various international agencies upgraded this projection at the start of the fourth quarter of 2024, owing to the improved outlook for economic activity in the United States.

Table VIII.2

Main indicators of external context and projections, average for 2010–2019 and 2023–2025  
(Percentages)

	Average 2010–2019	2023	2024 <sup>a</sup>	2025 <sup>a</sup>
<b>GDP growth at constant prices</b>				
Global growth	3.7	3.3	3.2	3.2
Advanced economies <sup>b</sup>	1.9	1.0	0.9	1.1
Main trading partners in the region <sup>c</sup>	3.2	3.1	2.9	2.6
<b>Foreign trade</b>				
Global goods and services trade	4.6	0.8	3.1	3.4
Global growth of goods exports	4.4	-0.4	2.8	3.5
Global growth of goods imports	4.5	-1.3	2.4	3.2
<b>Inflation</b>				
Global inflation	3.5	6.0	5.0	3.9
Advanced economies <sup>b</sup>	1.5	3.1	2.1	1.9
Main trading partners in the region <sup>c</sup>	2.6	3.2	2.3	2.0
<b>Benchmark interest rate</b>				
Advanced countries	2022 <sup>d</sup>	2023	2024 <sup>a</sup>	2025 <sup>a</sup>
United States	0.3	5.5	4.50	3.50
United Kingdom	0.1	5.25	4.50	3.00
Eurozone	0	4.5	3.15	1.9
Canada	0.3	5.0	3.5	2.5
Australia	0.1	4.4	4.35	3.6
<b>Median</b>	<b>0.1</b>	<b>5.0</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>3.0</b>

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Databases [online] <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/SPROLLS/world-economic-outlook-databases#sort=%40imfdate%20descending>, United Nations, UN Comtrade Database, International Trade Centre (ITC), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and Trading Economics.

<sup>a</sup> The figures shown are projections.

<sup>b</sup> Grouping formed by the countries of the Group of Seven (G7).

<sup>c</sup> Weighted by the volume of international trade in 2019–2023.

<sup>d</sup> Considers the period at the start of the process of raising the monetary policy rate.

Despite the easing of pressures on global production and supply chains, with inflation moderating and international commodity prices generally trending down, the global economy remains hamstrung by the delayed impact of monetary tightening. This is weighing on domestic demand and investment-related imports, in particular, compounded by the potential aggravation of geopolitical and trade tensions, and a greater likelihood of an intensification of climate change. Worldwide growth is thus likely to remain sluggish and below the 3.4% average recorded in 2015–2019, still influenced by the interplay between more restrictive macroeconomic policies and heightened geopolitical and trade concerns.

In these circumstances, growth in the region's main trading partners is expected to slow from 2.9% in 2024 to 2.6% in 2025. In the United States, economic growth is projected to slacken to 2.1% in 2025, compared to 2.8% in 2024, mainly because private consumption is set to weaken as the domestic savings accumulated during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic are depleted. In the

eurozone, economic activity is projected to expand slightly by 1.2% in 2025, in contrast to the 0.8% moderation forecast for 2024. The Chinese economy will continue to post relatively slower growth rates, as seen in 2024. This is explained by problems in the real estate sector and the challenges facing the country as it shifts its growth model towards the domestic market and positions itself in new innovative and technological sectors. Having dipped by 0.8% in 2023, world trade is projected to pick up again in 2025 with growth of 3.4%, thereby outpacing the expansion of the global economy for the first time since 2022 (see table VIII.2). However, global demand for exports to the region is expected to lag behind global economic growth, with expansions of 4% in 2024 and 3% in 2025, in keeping with the sluggish economic activity foreseen for the latter year.

In this global scenario, international commodity prices are set to fall overall, by 1.5% in 2024 relative to 2023 and by 1.3% in 2025 relative to 2024. Despite this moderation, prices are expected to remain well above 2019 levels, on average (see table VIII.3).

**Table VIII.3**

Annual change in international prices of major commodity categories, 2019–2025<sup>a</sup>  
(Percentages)

Main categories	2024/2023	2025/2024	2024/2019
Agricultural products	-6.4	-2.1	26.5
Fertilizers	-4.8	-3.7	53.5
Metals and minerals	6.0	1.0	38.8
Energy	-2.4	-3.9	30.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>-1.5</b>	<b>-1.3</b>	<b>31.5</b>
<b>Total (excluding energy)</b>	<b>-1.3</b>	<b>-0.7</b>	<b>31.7</b>

**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Bank, *Commodity Markets Outlook: October 2024*, Washington, D.C., 2024; International Monetary Fund (FMI), *World Economic Outlook Database, October 2024* [online] <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2024/October>; and Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), "CountryData" [online] <https://store.eiu.com/>.

<sup>a</sup> The figures for 2024 and 2025 are projections.

The metals and minerals category is expected to continue reporting positive annual growth of 1% in 2025.<sup>4</sup> In the case of agricultural products, latent risks persist, associated in particular with climate change and adverse effects derived from the La Niña phenomenon, for example.<sup>5</sup> Lastly, in the energy sector, the projected oil price trend was revised down in 2024 and 2025, albeit subject to future developments, particularly in relation to geopolitical issues. This reflects expectations regarding both demand and supply factors. The former include the slowdown in the Chinese economy and the transition towards more sustainable energy sources, according to the International Energy Agency. Supply-side factors include the potential for a hydrocarbon surplus on international markets, owing to increased production by countries that do not belong to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Plus (OPEC+), including Brazil and the United States, as well as the suspension of voluntary cuts by OPEC+, announced for January 2025.

<sup>4</sup> From this perspective, the international prices of precious metals and especially gold, a safe haven in periods of high uncertainty, stand out. See World Bank (2024).

<sup>5</sup> See NOAA (2024).

## International financial conditions are expected to be more benign in 2025 than in 2024, although they will likely remain subject to risks related to the pace and magnitude of benchmark interest rate cuts, a strengthening dollar and heightened geopolitical tensions

As was the case in 2024, international financial conditions are likely to loosen in 2025, when, among other factors, the global disinflation process and the continuation of the cycle of monetary policy easing gain importance. The outlook for 2025 is for global inflation to continue to ease, but more slowly than in 2024. This is partly because core inflation is expected to lose steam as it approaches central banks' target range. However, the general price level is likely to remain high. For advanced economies, inflation is projected at 1.9% in 2025 (compared to 2.1% in 2024), in line with the trend expected for the region's main trading partners (see table VIII.2).

Accompanying the moderation of inflation, the world's leading central banks are expected to expand liquidity further, thereby interrupting the monetary policy tightening cycle that began in 2022. In line with the trend in money supply, the recovery of global lending to the non-financial sector in 2024 is expected to continue next year. However, the lowering of policy rates is likely to continue gradually in 2025, with mixed situations among advanced and developing economies, given their exposure to different international financial conditions and their vulnerability to the dollar cycle. In the main advanced countries, the short-term interest rate is projected to reflect a median value of 3% in 2025, compared to 4.4% in 2024.

The reduction in monetary policy interest rates among the world's major central banks and the expectation that this trend will continue in 2025 have boosted the performance of equity markets.

Paradoxically, in the case of the United States, Treasury bond yields have trended up since the Federal Reserve started to lower the short-term interest rate. The results of the United States presidential election have reinforced the rise in equity markets and long-term Treasury bond yields.

The momentum of the United States economy has prevented it from slipping into recession and has enabled economic growth to gather pace. Alongside the rise in long-term interest rates, growing geopolitical tensions—both in the Middle East and fuelled by the war in Ukraine—and the recent victory of the Republican Party in the United States, have pushed up the international value of the dollar, in a trend that is likely to persist in the first few months of 2025, at least. This expected dollar appreciation spotlights the transmission channel that emerges between domestic inflation, exchange-rate fluctuations and the level of the monetary policy interest rate for emerging and developing economies, including those in the region.


Higher yields on 10-year United States Treasury bonds suggest that the Federal Reserve may cut rates by less than expected next year. The Fed Funds futures market expects the Federal Reserve to conclude its rate-cutting cycle in late 2025 around the 3.5% mark, compared to previous expectations of 3%.

## The deficit in the region's external accounts is expected to widen in 2025, in keeping with that forecast for 2024

In line with the forecast for end-2024, the regional current account deficit is expected to widen in 2025. Figure VIII.2 shows revised forecasts for the regional current account in 2024, as well as the first projections for 2025, which see the deficit widening from 1.2% of regional GDP in 2024 to 1.7% in 2025.

Figure VIII.2

Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): current account by component, 2019–2025  
(Percentage of GDP)



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> The figures are projections, based on a group of countries that account for more than 90% of the regional GDP.

The external trade surplus is expected to be maintained in 2025, although it is projected to be slightly smaller than in 2024, with imports rebounding in response to less constrained domestic demand following the expected easing of monetary policy in the region. This is compounded by the impact of falling international commodity prices and the potential persistence of low prices for exports from China, one of the region's main trading partners. Nonetheless, the income account is likely to continue deteriorating owing to the persistence of restrictive financial conditions. These stem from the influence of the dollar and high long-term interest rates, partially offset by a slight increase in the surplus in the current transfers account, driven by the buoyancy of workers' remittances to the region.

Given the larger current account deficit, net financial inflows into the region are expected to stay resilient, and foreign direct investment (FDI), in particular, should remain buoyant, in line with the current year's trend. While monetary policy easing is expected to continue globally, and particularly in the United States, the average cost of the outstanding debt is likely to remain high. In addition, countries that need to roll over their long-term debt will probably face higher interest rates.

### Private consumption is expected to remain the principal driver of regional growth, while reduction in domestic inflation may proceed more slowly

Faced with a widening external deficit in the region and limited macroeconomic policy space to boost growth, consumption (particularly private) is expected to be the main driver of economic activity regionwide in 2024 and 2025. In contrast, investment remains lacklustre, while net exports continue to detract from the region's growth.

Private consumption is projected to expand by about 2.6%, with public consumption set to increase by nearly 2.1%. Gross fixed capital formation is expected to grow by 1.3%, which means a reduction in its GDP share. The contribution of net exports to regional growth remains negative in 2024.

Although regional growth is forecast to be slightly higher in 2025 than in 2024, no significant changes are projected in the relative contributions of the different components of aggregate demand in the region. This means that private consumption will again be the main driver of economic activity in the region, driven by slight improvements in real wages, the expansion of domestic credit in real terms and, in many countries, the resources obtained from remittances. If interest rates continue to fall and, thus, credit continues to expand, investment could recover slightly in the coming years.

In this scenario, the trend of domestic prices regionwide is a decisive factor. According to the region's central banks, and in line with estimates by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), inflation is likely to continue falling in 2024 and 2025, thanks to lower energy and food prices on international markets, together with the normalization of global supply chains and lower inflation worldwide.

Although regional inflation is expected to fall further, it is likely to decline more slowly. ECLAC estimations suggest that the region's median inflation rate will fall by 0.3 percentage points, from 3.7% in 2023 to 3.4% in 2024. In 2025, it is expected to end the year 0.2 percentage points lower, at 3.2%.

### Job creation is likely to remain weak in 2024 and 2025, with gender gaps persisting in the main labour market indicators

Consistently with the low-growth scenario, projections for 2024 and 2025 indicate that the region's economies will again have little capacity to create jobs. The rate of growth in the number employed people in the region is expected to increase by 1.7% in 2024 and by 1.8% in 2025. These figures are lower than in 2019, when the number of employed people grew by 2.1%. For this period, the labour participation rate is set to continue rising, to come to 62.8% in 2024 and stay at that level in 2025.

Despite the aforementioned increase, the labour participation rate will still be below pre-pandemic levels, which means that labour inactivity in the region will remain more prevalent than in 2019. As a result, despite the weak growth in the number of employed people, the unemployment rate is historically low; for 2024 it is forecast to be 6.1% and it is set to end 2025 at around 6.0%.

Labour informality rates are not expected to vary significantly in 2024 and 2025, continuing to average around 47% regionwide. In contrast, real wages are expected to recover slightly in both years, given the reductions in inflation throughout the region and the impact of nominal wage hikes.

Although the gender gaps in both participation and unemployment rates have narrowed slightly in recent years, job creation scenarios suggest that no major changes can be expected; and the gaps are projected to persist at over 22 percentage points in participation rates and more than 2 percentage points in unemployment.

### In 2024 and 2025, the scope and action of macroeconomic policies will have limited capacity to foster the potential growth of the region's economies

In both 2024 and 2025, the region will face a new economic scenario that will undoubtedly affect countries' external and fiscal balances: faltering external demand, international commodity prices that remain high and volatile, high interest rates, stubborn global inflation, and a stronger dollar.

Over the last decade, the region's fiscal accounts have run a deficit. The public debt rose significantly in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and, despite stabilizing since, it remains at high levels. Primary balances remain in deficit, while global balances have deteriorated under the weight of heavier interest burdens. Public revenues have regained pre-pandemic levels but face obstacles to growth in the short term, while expenditures, although stable, display certain budgetary rigidities and require a balance to be struck between different objectives, without compromising the strategic role of public spending as a tool to foster productive, inclusive and sustainable development.

In this context, the future outlook requires addressing and weighing a set of fiscal risks for Latin America and the Caribbean. Firstly, the key macroeconomic parameters, such as low GDP growth rates, high interest rates and exchange-rate depreciations, generate fiscal sustainability risks. Secondly, there are more specific risks, such as contingent liabilities or the occurrence of natural disasters and other exceptional events, such as the pandemic. Lastly, other structural risks could constrain public finance management or even increase exposure to external shocks (for example, increased vulnerability stemming from the large share of fiscal revenues obtained from extractive industries).

Materialization of the main fiscal risks facing the region's countries will depend on the prudence and predictability of fiscal policy management, and the active administration of public debt portfolios. Key factors in this context will include the preparation and execution of annual budgets, the capacity to respond effectively to exceptional events, the increase in fiscal space and the ability to put the public finances on a sustainable path.

In addition to limited fiscal policy space, the region's monetary and supervisory authorities will face a set of risks deriving from the fact that efforts to achieve price stability could undermine the buoyancy of economic activity, employment and preservation of the stability of the financial system.

Figure VIII.3 shows that inflation expectations<sup>6</sup> over the 24-month monetary policy horizon are within the target range in all countries except Jamaica, and around the target in Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Paraguay. This, together with the sensitivity of both inflation expectations and exchange-rate fluctuations, means that the future path of the downward adjustment cycle will be cautious, and it will respond, largely, to adjustments made to the monetary policy stance in the United States. For the remainder of the countries, particularly Colombia, Mexico and Uruguay, where short-term (12-month) inflation expectations are close to the upper bound of the inflation target range, the downward adjustment cycle is expected to be even slower. Lastly, in Brazil, which raised its monetary policy rate in September 2024, the upward adjustment cycle is expected to continue through 2025.


Given the resilience of the United States economy, together with the reduction in inflation in the region and the moderate economic recovery, the interest rate spread is expected to be such that exchange rates will either be maintained or depreciate further, which is in line with market participants' 12-month expectations. This is compounded by uncertainty surrounding commodity prices, given the activity of the region's trading partners and the uncertainty that persists globally. Depreciations in nominal exchange rates in conjunction with decreasing inflation would, in turn, be reflected in depreciations in real exchange rates in more of the region's economies.

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<sup>6</sup> Inflation expectations are included for inflation-targeting countries.

Figure VIII.3

Latin America and the Caribbean (11 countries): inflation targets and 12- and 24-month inflation expectations, November 2024  
(Percentages)




Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

The scenario of lower inflation could be altered by the hikes in utility rates in the region—especially in the case of electricity—which have pushed up services inflation in the second half of 2024. An intensification of extreme weather conditions could generate supply constraints, which could then raise food prices. Moreover, persistent and heightened political tensions in Ukraine and the Middle East are creating risks for global supply chains which could lead to higher manufacturing prices.

In view of the above, and notwithstanding the start of the rate-cutting cycle, monetary policy rates are expected to remain above pre-pandemic levels (see figure VIII.4).

Figure VIII.4

Latin America and the Caribbean (6 countries): monetary policy rates, December 2019, November 2024 and expectation for November 2025  
(Percentages)



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

In short, as inflation is generally within the target ranges, the monetary policy stance should continue to ease in most countries, while monitoring inflation expectations and the materialization of risks. The latter stem, mainly, from the heightened uncertainty associated with growing geopolitical fragmentation, labour market buoyancy and complementarity with fiscal policy. To supplement the use of short-term rates as a monetary policy instrument, the monetary authorities should make judicious use of the policy tools at their disposal to mitigate the impact on economic activity exerted by the contractionary bias of the policy stance. This should include interventions on foreign exchange markets in the event of sharp fluctuations that could affect the trend in expectations, as well as countercyclical prudential policies.

## Policies to address the trap of low capacity for growth

Reactivating economic growth in the countries of the region requires enhancing the economies' capacity to mobilize domestic financial resources effectively and thus strengthen resilience to economic fluctuations. It is also necessary to strengthen productive capacity in the medium and long term through efforts to increase productivity, encourage investment in productive capital and create quality jobs.

## Mobilization of financial resources

### *Public finance strengthening*

The public sector clearly needs to be proactive in creating conditions to boost and sustain economic growth in the region. This makes it essential to adopt policies aimed at strengthening the public finances by increasing tax revenues and making public expenditure more effective.

Historically, tax revenues have been insufficient to meet spending demands, which has generated a deficit bias in the public accounts. Moreover, the region's tax systems tend to be regressive and rely heavily on taxes levied on the consumption of goods and services. In this context, ECLAC has recommended increasing tax revenue and making tax structures more progressive, especially by strengthening personal income taxation, along with property and wealth taxes.

Another priority is to address inefficiencies in tax collection —particularly tax evasion, which in 2023 amounted to US\$ 433 billion, equivalent to 6.7% of regional GDP. Tax expenditures are another major source of inefficiency, which, in 2021, represented an average of 3.7% of GDP, equivalent to 19% of central government budget expenditures. To expand the fiscal space, it is necessary to strengthen tax oversight systems to reduce evasion and conduct periodic evaluations of tax expenditures in order to ensure that the benefits being sought offset the costs of the related tax waivers.

It is crucial to make public expenditure more effective, in terms of both quality and allocation. This requires developing a strategic approach to public spending that prioritizes investment in key sectors, to boost growth, productivity and employment, while reducing social disparities. Resources must be channelled to the 14 sectors identified by ECLAC as drivers of development, grouped into industry, services and the big push for environmental sustainability. The opportunities presented by the geographical rearrangement of production and value chains worldwide represents a cross-cutting area, which encompasses several of the other sectors mentioned.

The success of this change in the fiscal policy approach depends, largely, on effectively strengthening the technical, operational, political and prospective capabilities of the national institutions responsible for fiscal management. It will also be essential to forge social agreements that introduce tax and public expenditure reforms to implement the structural transformations that are needed in the region.

The impact of rising levels of public debt is an additional challenge in a context of weak economic growth and more constrained international conditions. This has reduced the fiscal space significantly in many of the region's countries. In some cases, these developments have aggravated financial vulnerability, causing sovereign credit ratings to deteriorate, making external financing more expensive and resulting in the allocation of an increasing share of public resources to interest payments on the debt.

#### *Complementarity of monetary, exchange-rate and prudential policies*

To use the available resources more effectively and facilitate their mobilization, the region's economic authorities must make comprehensive use of the macroeconomic stabilization tools at their disposal. This means increasing coordination and enhancing effectiveness between fiscal, monetary, financial, exchange-rate and prudential policies, with the aim of mitigating short-term fluctuations in economic activity and financing the major transformations needed for the region's sustainable development.

Better integration and complementarity of these policies, especially in the current context, would, among other things, enable the monetary authorities to lower interest rates further, by taking advantage of the margin afforded by the favourable trend of inflationary expectations. This would help stimulate domestic credit and thus encourage investment. Moreover, as was evident during the pandemic, the monetary authorities could complement conventional instruments, such as the short-term interest rate, with less traditional tools. Such measures would help to mitigate adverse effects on key variables such as credit and the exchange rate, without making the region's financial institutions more vulnerable. Interest rate adjustments could thus be accompanied by interventions in the foreign exchange market to minimize the impact of exchange-rate fluctuations on inflation expectations.

In addition, the countercyclical use of macroprudential instruments, such as provisions, is likely to be crucial for preventing an excessive accumulation of risks in the financial system. This is particularly important in view of the potential effects of changes in interest rates, monetary liquidity and exchange-rate fluctuations.

The region must also prioritize financial inclusion as a way to mobilize resources for development. This requires coordinated endeavours between the public and private sectors to strengthen economic institutions, macroeconomic stability, legal security and the creation of new instruments for managing economic and financial risks.

In addition, a new approach to financial innovation must be adopted, aimed at channelling resources into the production sector and development objectives. In this context, development banks have a central role to play in fostering innovation in financing, both directly and by working with other banks and financial institutions.

#### *Reform of the international financial architecture*

Domestic resource mobilization requires support from the international community to ensure that the region's economies have sufficient funds to absorb the fluctuations of the business cycle and encourage the transformations needed to achieve sustainable, sustained and inclusive development. Here it is crucial to foster coordinated action among the region's countries to influence reforms of the international financial architecture and facilitate broader and more equitable access to resources for development.

The position document of the fortieth session of ECLAC (2024) refers to the proposals made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on reforming the international financial architecture (United Nations, 2023). This reform seeks to create a more favourable global environment for addressing the financing needs of developing countries. Key proposals include the following: the

modernization of global economic governance; the creation of mechanisms to prevent and resolve crises related to the payment and financing of sovereign debt; an increase in the lending capacity of multilateral banks; the recycling of special drawing rights; and reforms to international taxation.

In terms of mobilizing international private resources, the region's economies must design comprehensive strategies to attract FDI and link this effectively with the local production structure. In addition, the use of family remittances as a source of financing for production activities should be encouraged.

The challenge of attracting and retaining FDI that contributes to the region's sustainable and inclusive development is more pressing than ever. To this end, countries must implement sound and effective policies to ensure that FDI drives development through capacity-building, the creation of quality jobs, technology transfer and the diversification and sophistication of the production mix (ECLAC, 2023).

### *Strengthening the governance and the technical, operational, political and prospective capabilities of macroeconomic institutions*

To increase resource mobilization in the region, the governance and the technical, operational, political and prospective capabilities of macroeconomic institutions must be strengthened.

In terms of technical capabilities, it is essential to improve the framework for managing comprehensive public policies that make it easier to mobilize financial resources, both public and private, as well as to improve governance of fiscal sustainability frameworks.

In the case of operational capabilities, the region's economies must develop comprehensive information systems that link the use of the available financing to policies in key development areas. It is also crucial to strengthen processes associated with the annual national budget, public procurement and national public investment systems, to ensure efficient management aligned with development priorities.

With regard to political capabilities, coordination and consistency of fiscal, monetary, exchange-rate and prudential policies must be improved. In addition, the region must move towards adopting common positions in the various international forums, in order to influence the reform of the international financial architecture.

Lastly, in the domain of prospective capabilities, the region must develop the ability to build alternative future scenarios. This will make it possible to foresee challenges and needs, establish strategies and priorities that will be sustained over time, and guide informed and strategic decision-making.

## How to achieve higher, sustained and sustainable growth in the medium term?

According to ECLAC (2024), overcoming the trap of low capacity for growth requires a great productive transformation, which can only be made feasible by significantly increasing the level of ambition and the scope of productive development policies, with a modern approach. This encompasses a broad spectrum of strategic sectors and is not confined to industrialization alone. It is conceived as a collaborative endeavour between key stakeholders, through a combination of horizontal and vertical policies. The latter include tools such as cluster initiatives that seek to balance top-down strategies with bottom-up ones, that is strategies from the territories. The approach also prioritizes internationalization as a fundamental pillar.

As Salazar-Xirinachs and Llinás (2023) note, fostering these new productive development policies entails coordinating and combining initiatives on multiple fronts. The priority areas include: science, technology and innovation; technology extension; digital transformation; fostering of entrepreneurship;

closure of human talent gaps; financing throughout the business life cycle; attraction of investment (including FDI); development of specific infrastructure and other public goods; upgrading of policy and regulatory frameworks; and internationalization.

As noted above, ECLAC has identified 14 priority sectors for the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, and a cross-cutting area of opportunities involving the geographical rearrangement of production and value chains worldwide, which harbour considerable potential to boost growth and productivity. Each country and territory must define its own sectoral agenda, adapted to its specific conditions, but always with a clear vision of priorities to foster a great productive transformation to enhance inclusiveness and environmental sustainability.

Implementing productive development policies requires a robust institutional framework that is capable of designing, managing, monitoring and evaluating initiatives in various areas. Such an institutional framework needs leadership and technical, operational, political and prospective capabilities. Technical capabilities include the ability to formulate and implement productive development strategies that are integrated with other dimensions of development, within a coherent planning framework. Operational capabilities would make it possible to establish effective coordination and harmonization mechanisms. Political capabilities are essential for building relationships and partnerships to overcome the political obstacles that weigh on productivity. Lastly, prospective capabilities would facilitate the building of future scenarios, by analysing technological and market trends, reinforcing the ability to design strategic routes and changing course in response to disruptive changes.

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# Statistical annex

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Table A1.1

Latin America and the Caribbean: main economic indicators

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023 <sup>a</sup>
<b>Annual growth rates</b>									
Gross domestic product <sup>b</sup>	0.0	-1.1	1.3	1.1	0.0	-6.9	7.0	4.0	2.3
Gross domestic product per capita <sup>b</sup>	-1.0	-2.1	0.3	0.2	-0.9	-7.7	6.3	3.4	1.6
Consumer prices <sup>c</sup>	6.2	4.5	3.9	3.5	3.4	3.3	7.6	7.6	4.6
<b>Percentages</b>									
National unemployment	6.6	7.8	8.1	7.9	8.0	10.0	9.0	6.9	6.2
Total gross external debt/GDP <sup>d,e</sup>	39.3	42.0	39.8	42.5	44.9	53.4	47.5	42.3	39.3
Total gross external debt/exports of goods and services <sup>d,e</sup>	1.8	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.8	2.1	1.7	1.5	1.5
<b>Millions of dollars</b>									
Balance of payments									
Current account balance	-164 086	-104 369	-107 112	-153 205	-111 453	-6 597	-91 213	-132 965	-72 993
Exports of goods f.o.b.	890 738	868 924	971 685	1 058 281	1 047 012	954 934	1 224 122	1 430 461	1 393 592
Imports of goods f.o.b.	945 848	874 812	962 927	1 071 664	1 039 580	878 069	1 199 863	1 444 648	1 349 978
Goods and services balance	-113 454	-53 885	-45 456	-69 128	-38 578	26 649	-39 405	-87 267	-9 185
Primary income	-121 802	-128 073	-145 377	-173 722	-169 788	-138 036	-181 526	-191 552	-215 305
Secondary income	71 171	77 588	83 721	89 645	96 913	104 790	129 717	145 854	151 497
Capital account	5 883	1 502	2 363	662	319	3 601	-4 054	-5 644	-9 672
Financial account	-174 491	-108 647	-119 269	-168 333	-123 388	-11 746	-108 173	-153 201	-100 192
Net foreign direct investment	-132 738	-124 733	-122 863	-147 332	-111 725	-92 431	-101 594	-123 673	-139 663
Other capital movements	-18 733	-10 102	-14 688	-32 997	19 139	66 201	-57 205	-12 813	25 322
Reserve assets <sup>f</sup>	-23 020	26 188	18 282	11 995	-30 803	14 483	50 625	-16 715	14 149
Net errors and omissions	-16 288	-5 780	-14 519	-15 791	-12 254	-8 749	-12 907	-14 592	-17 527
<b>Percentages of GDP</b>									
Fiscal sector <sup>g,h</sup>									
Overall balance	-2.9	-3.2	-2.8	-2.2	-2.6	-6.8	-3.8	-2.3	-2.5
Primary balance	-0.7	-1.0	-0.1	0.4	-0.1	-4.1	-1.2	0.3	0.4
Total revenue	18.2	18.0	18.0	18.1	18.2	20.6	22.2	22.5	22.1
Tax revenue	15.3	15.3	15.2	15.2	15.1	16.7	17.6	17.9	17.7
Total expenditure	21.1	21.2	21.0	20.8	21.1	27.4	26.0	24.8	24.6
Capital expenditure	3.9	3.8	3.6	3.3	3.2	4.2	4.1	4.1	4.0
Central government public debt <sup>h</sup>	36.4	38.5	39.9	43.0	45.3	56.0	52.8	51.7	55.0
Public debt of the non-financial public sector <sup>h</sup>	39.7	41.8	43.4	46.5	49.2	59.7	55.6	54.7	58.2

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Preliminary figures.

<sup>b</sup> Based on official figures expressed in dollars at 2018 prices.

<sup>c</sup> Population-weighted average. Latin America and the Caribbean does not include Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Cuba, Haiti or Suriname.

<sup>d</sup> Weighted average for 17 countries (Latin America). Does not include the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Cuba or Haiti.

<sup>e</sup> Weighted average for 18 countries (Latin America). Does not include the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela or Cuba.

<sup>f</sup> A minus sign (-) indicates an increase in reserve assets.

<sup>g</sup> Central government.

<sup>h</sup> Simple averages for 16 countries (Latin America). Does not include the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Cuba, Haiti or the Plurinational State of Bolivia.

Table A2.1

Latin America and the Caribbean: total gross domestic product at constant prices  
(Annual growth rates)

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
<b>Latin America and the Caribbean</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>-1.1</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>-6.9</b>	<b>7.0</b>	<b>4.0</b>	<b>2.3</b>
<b>Latin America</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>-1.1</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>-6.9</b>	<b>7.0</b>	<b>3.9</b>	<b>2.2</b>
Argentina	2.7	-2.1	2.8	-2.6	-2.0	-9.9	10.4	5.3	-1.6
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	4.9	4.3	4.2	4.2	2.2	-8.7	6.1	3.6	3.1
Brazil	-3.5	-3.3	1.3	1.8	1.2	-3.3	4.8	3.0	3.2
Chile	2.2	1.8	1.4	4.0	0.6	-6.1	11.3	2.1	0.2
Colombia	3.0	2.1	1.4	2.6	3.2	-7.2	10.8	7.3	0.6
Costa Rica	3.7	4.2	4.2	2.6	2.4	-4.3	7.9	4.6	5.1
Cuba	4.4	0.5	1.8	2.2	-0.2	-10.9	1.3	1.8	-1.0
Dominican Republic	6.9	6.7	4.7	7.0	5.1	-6.7	12.3	4.9	2.4
Ecuador	0.1	-0.7	6.0	1.0	0.2	-9.2	9.8	6.2	2.4
El Salvador	2.4	2.5	2.2	2.4	2.4	-7.9	11.9	2.8	3.5
Guatemala	4.1	2.7	3.1	3.4	4.0	-1.8	8.0	4.2	3.5
Haiti	2.6	1.8	2.5	1.7	-1.7	-3.3	-1.8	-1.7	-1.9
Honduras	3.8	3.9	4.8	3.8	2.6	-9.0	12.6	4.1	3.6
Mexico	2.7	1.8	1.9	2.0	-0.4	-8.4	6.0	3.7	3.3
Nicaragua	4.8	4.6	4.6	-3.4	-2.9	-1.8	10.3	3.8	4.6
Panama	5.7	5.0	5.6	3.7	3.1	-17.8	16.5	10.8	7.4
Paraguay	3.0	4.3	4.8	3.2	-0.4	-0.8	4.0	0.2	4.7
Peru	3.3	4.0	2.5	4.0	2.2	-10.9	13.4	2.8	-0.4
Uruguay	0.4	1.7	1.7	0.2	0.9	-7.4	5.6	4.7	0.4
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) <sup>a</sup>	-6.2	-17.0	-15.7	-19.6	-28.0	-30.0	-3.0	12.0	3.0
<b>The Caribbean</b>	<b>0.1</b>	<b>-2.1</b>	<b>-0.6</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>-9.5</b>	<b>5.8</b>	<b>13.1</b>	<b>8.7</b>
Antigua and Barbuda	1.4	4.1	2.5	7.0	3.1	-18.9	8.2	9.5	3.9
Bahamas	1.0	-1.0	2.8	2.6	-1.4	-21.4	15.4	10.8	2.6
Barbados	-0.8	1.8	0.1	-1.2	0.7	-15.1	-0.3	17.8	4.1
Belize	2.9	0.1	-1.8	1.1	4.3	-13.9	17.7	9.7	4.8
Dominica	-2.7	2.8	-6.6	3.5	5.5	-16.6	6.9	5.6	4.7
Grenada	6.4	3.7	4.4	4.4	0.7	-13.8	4.7	7.3	3.6
Guyana	0.7	3.8	3.7	4.4	5.4	43.5	20.1	63.3	39.2
Jamaica	0.9	1.4	1.0	1.9	0.9	-9.9	4.6	5.2	2.1
Saint Kitts and Nevis	0.7	3.9	0.2	2.0	2.8	-15.4	0.5	10.5	2.3
Saint Lucia	0.1	3.4	3.4	2.9	-0.7	-24.4	11.6	20.4	2.2
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	2.8	4.1	1.4	3.2	0.7	-3.7	0.8	7.2	6.0
Suriname	-3.4	-4.9	1.6	4.9	1.2	-16.0	-2.4	2.4	2.4
Trinidad and Tobago	-0.6	-7.4	-4.8	-1.0	0.5	-8.9	-0.9	1.1	1.4

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

Note: Based on official figures expressed in dollars at 2018 prices.

<sup>a</sup> Estimate from 2019.

Table A2.2

Latin America and the Caribbean: per capita total gross domestic product at constant prices  
(Annual growth rates)

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
<b>Latin America and the Caribbean</b>	-1.0	-2.1	0.3	0.2	-0.9	-7.7	6.3	3.4	1.6
<b>Latin America</b>	-1.0	-2.1	0.3	0.1	-0.9	-7.6	6.3	3.3	1.5
Argentina	1.7	-3.0	1.9	-3.4	-2.7	-10.5	9.9	4.7	-2.2
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	3.2	2.7	2.6	2.7	0.7	-10.0	4.9	2.4	1.7
Brazil	-4.4	-4.1	0.5	1.0	0.4	-3.9	4.2	2.5	2.7
Chile	1.1	0.6	-0.2	2.1	-1.2	-7.4	10.2	1.5	0.1
Colombia	2.0	1.0	-0.2	0.6	1.3	-8.5	9.5	6.5	0.2
Costa Rica	2.6	3.2	3.1	1.7	1.5	-5.0	7.3	4.0	4.5
Cuba	4.4	0.5	1.9	2.3	-0.1	-10.8	1.7	2.2	-0.8
Dominican Republic	5.7	5.4	3.5	5.8	3.9	-7.7	11.1	3.8	1.4
Peru	2.0	2.5	1.0	2.0	0.3	-12.2	12.0	1.8	-1.3
Ecuador	-1.4	-2.2	4.3	-0.8	-1.7	-10.5	8.5	5.0	1.3
El Salvador	2.0	2.2	2.0	2.3	2.4	-8.1	11.5	2.4	3.0
Guatemala	2.2	0.9	1.3	1.7	2.5	-3.2	6.5	2.8	2.1
Haiti	1.1	0.4	1.1	0.3	-3.0	-4.6	-3.0	-2.8	-3.1
Honduras	2.0	2.1	3.0	2.1	0.9	-10.4	10.9	2.6	2.0
Mexico	1.5	0.6	0.8	1.0	-1.2	-9.0	5.5	3.1	2.5
Nicaragua	3.3	3.1	3.2	-4.7	-4.2	-3.1	8.8	2.3	3.1
Panama	3.9	3.1	3.8	2.0	1.5	-19.0	14.9	9.3	6.0
Paraguay	1.5	2.8	3.3	1.8	-1.7	-2.1	2.7	-1.0	3.5
Uruguay	0.0	1.4	1.5	0.0	0.9	-7.4	5.6	4.8	0.4
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) <sup>a</sup>	-7.3	-17.6	-15.2	-17.6	-25.9	-28.8	-2.0	11.6	1.1
<b>The Caribbean</b>	-0.5	-2.6	-1.1	0.4	0.2	-9.7	5.3	12.8	8.3
Antigua and Barbuda	0.7	3.3	1.9	6.4	2.5	-19.4	7.6	8.8	3.3
Bahamas	0.1	-1.8	2.0	1.9	-2.0	-21.8	15.0	10.2	2.0
Barbados	-1.1	1.6	-0.1	-1.4	0.5	-15.2	-0.4	17.7	3.9
Belize	0.7	-2.0	-3.8	-0.8	2.4	-15.2	16.2	8.2	3.4
Dominica	-3.6	2.6	-7.0	3.0	4.6	-17.3	6.3	5.1	4.3
Grenada	5.6	2.9	3.7	3.6	-0.1	-14.5	3.9	6.6	2.9
Guyana	0.2	3.2	3.2	1.5	3.6	43.8	19.0	62.5	38.3
Jamaica	0.6	1.1	0.8	1.8	0.8	-10.1	4.3	5.2	2.2
Saint Kitts and Nevis	0.7	3.9	0.2	2.0	3.0	-15.2	0.5	10.3	2.1
Saint Lucia	-0.4	3.0	2.9	2.5	-1.1	-24.6	11.3	20.3	2.0
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	3.2	4.6	1.9	3.4	1.0	-3.5	1.0	7.6	6.2
Suriname	-4.4	-5.9	0.5	3.9	0.1	-16.9	-3.4	1.6	1.5
Trinidad and Tobago	-1.2	-8.0	-5.4	-2.7	-0.5	-8.8	-1.4	0.7	1.2

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

Note: Based on official figures expressed in dollars at 2018 prices.

<sup>a</sup> Estimate from 2019.

Table A2.3

Latin America and the Caribbean: total gross domestic product at constant prices  
(Year-on-year growth rates)

	2022				2023				2024	
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2
Argentina	6.9	7.0	6.0	1.3	1.1	-5.3	-0.7	-1.2	-5.2	-1.7
Bahamas	18.2	9.5	8.7	7.8	9.9	1.0	0.8	-0.7	...	...
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	4.8	4.6	4.1	1.3	2.4	2.0	2.6	5.1	1.3	3.8
Brazil	1.5	3.5	4.3	2.7	4.2	3.5	2.0	2.1	2.5	3.3
Chile	6.3	4.4	0.5	-2.3	0.3	-0.4	0.6	0.4	2.5	1.6
Colombia	8.2	12.3	7.5	2.1	2.6	0.3	-0.6	0.4	0.7	2.1
Costa Rica	6.7	4.3	2.7	4.6	4.4	5.9	5.5	4.7	3.6	5.3
Dominican Republic	6.1	5.1	5.0	3.3	1.4	1.0	2.6	4.2	4.1	6.0
Ecuador	10.4	5.9	6.8	2.6	4.9	5.3	0.9	-1.2	1.6	-1.5
El Salvador	4.9	2.6	2.3	1.6	1.7	4.6	3.3	4.4	2.6	2.1
Guatemala	4.7	4.8	3.9	3.4	4.0	4.1	4.0	2.0	3.2	3.7
Honduras	5.9	5.0	4.2	1.8	2.7	2.8	3.2	5.5	3.3	3.9
Jamaica <sup>a</sup>	5.7	4.3	5.5	4.4	4.5	3.3	2.7	2.5	1.9	1.0
Mexico	2.7	3.0	4.7	4.4	3.6	3.5	3.4	2.3	1.5	2.1
Nicaragua	4.8	4.6	3.4	2.4	3.5	3.6	6.0	5.2	4.9	4.4
Panama	13.2	9.6	10.1	10.2	9.3	8.2	9.0	3.3	1.2	1.7
Paraguay	-0.8	-3.2	3.0	1.8	4.6	5.6	3.7	4.9	4.3	4.8
Peru	4.0	3.4	2.1	1.7	-0.3	-0.4	-0.8	-0.2	1.4	3.6
Uruguay	8.3	8.9	3.3	-1.0	1.9	-2.1	-0.2	2.0	0.6	3.8

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official.

Note: Based on figures in local currency at constant prices.

<sup>a</sup> Gross domestic product measured in basic prices.

Table A2.4

Latin America and the Caribbean: gross fixed capital formation  
(Percentages of GDP)

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
<b>Latin America and the Caribbean</b>	<b>19.7</b>	<b>18.8</b>	<b>18.6</b>	<b>18.7</b>	<b>18.4</b>	<b>17.4</b>	<b>18.7</b>	<b>18.9</b>	<b>19.1</b>
Argentina	14.9	14.3	15.8	15.3	13.1	12.6	15.3	16.2	16.1
Bahamas	24.0	25.5	27.2	25.0	26.1	23.2	22.4	19.0	19.4
Belize	15.9	18.1	15.8	16.6	16.8	17.4	18.7	19.2	19.7
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	19.1	19.0	20.4	20.2	19.0	15.5	16.3	16.6	17.0
Brazil	16.7	15.2	14.6	15.1	15.5	15.8	17.0	16.7	15.7
Chile	24.6	23.6	22.5	23.0	23.9	22.7	23.7	24.1	23.8
Colombia	22.5	21.4	21.5	21.2	21.0	17.3	18.2	18.9	17.1
Costa Rica	18.8	19.1	18.4	18.2	16.3	16.5	16.5	16.0	16.5
Dominican Republic	24.3	25.5	24.3	25.8	26.5	25.0	27.2	27.0	26.9
Ecuador	23.9	20.3	21.5	21.0	20.5	17.6	18.2	18.6	18.2
El Salvador	16.0	16.2	16.4	17.2	17.8	17.9	20.1	20.4	21.4
Guatemala	14.0	13.4	13.6	13.7	14.3	13.9	15.4	15.5	16.0
Haiti	13.2	15.2	16.0	16.1	18.6	14.8	10.7	9.8	8.2
Honduras	25.3	22.6	24.0	24.7	22.9	19.1	...	...	...
Jamaica	21.9	21.7	22.4	23.3	23.5	...	...	...	...
Mexico	24.2	23.9	23.4	23.0	22.1	20.0	20.8	21.6	24.6
Nicaragua	29.3	28.4	27.7	22.4	16.7	18.8	22.9	21.1	22.7
Paraguay	19.5	19.1	19.3	19.9	18.8	20.0	22.7	22.2	20.5
Peru	22.9	21.0	20.8	20.9	21.0	19.8	23.2	22.8	21.6
Uruguay	17.2	16.6	16.5	14.8	14.2	15.0	17.0	18.2	16.8
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	49.4	32.6	21.2	16.5	...	...	...	...	...

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

Note: Based on official figures expressed in dollars at 2018 prices.

Table A3.1

Latin America and the Caribbean: balance of payments

(Millions of dollars)

	Exports of goods f.o.b.			Exports of services			Imports of goods f.o.b.			Imports of services		
	2022	2023	2024 <sup>a</sup>	2022	2023	2024 <sup>a</sup>	2022	2023	2024 <sup>a</sup>	2022	2023	2024 <sup>a</sup>
<b>Latin America and the Caribbean</b>	<b>-132 965</b>	<b>-72 993</b>	<b>-32 686</b>	<b>-5 644</b>	<b>-9 672</b>	<b>-7 922</b>	<b>-153 201</b>	<b>-100 192</b>	<b>-52 933</b>	<b>-14 592</b>	<b>-17 527</b>	<b>-12 324</b>
<b>Latin America</b>	<b>-135 473</b>	<b>-74 942</b>	<b>-33 221</b>	<b>-6 033</b>	<b>-10 145</b>	<b>-7 920</b>	<b>-154 348</b>	<b>-100 567</b>	<b>-53 079</b>	<b>-12 842</b>	<b>-15 479</b>	<b>-11 937</b>
Argentina	-4 055	-20 956	3 695	193	171	183	-7 454	-26 737	4 917	-3 591	-5 953	1 040
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	939	-1 175	-598	4	4	2	-1 286	-3 608	-1 796	-2 229	-2 436	-1 199
Brazil	-40 884	-21 745	-18 874	-7 124	-11 366	-8 551	-46 760	-32 887	-28 669	1 248	224	-1 244
Chile	-26 162	-11 899	-1 278	2	57	26	-27 932	-10 345	-4 093	-1 772	1 497	-2 841
Colombia	-21 185	-9 130	-3 917	...	...	...	-20 483	-8 336	-2 765	702	794	1 152
Costa Rica	-2 272	-1 238	-455	20	22	13	-1 716	-439	-791	536	778	-348
Dominican Republic	-6 549	-4 376	-1 236	...	...	...	-6 192	-5 261	-3 330	357	-885	-2 094
Ecuador	2 093	2 229	3 876	86	82	40	1 889	377	4 422	-290	-1 934	506
El Salvador	-2 182	-466	61	242	336	90	-1 248	-652	-577	692	-523	-727
Guatemala	1 197	3 236	1 699	2	...	...	519	2 531	1 289	-680	-704	-410
Haiti	-492	...	...	70	...	...	-221	...	...	200	...	...
Honduras	-2 105	-1 333	-724	315	313	149	-1 641	-1 417	-763	149	-397	-188
Mexico	-17 599	-5 477	-17 735	-76	-12	7	-14 698	-7 852	-20 746	2 977	-2 363	-3 019
Nicaragua	-387	1 381	236	63	60	1	-1 298	335	-82	-974	-1 106	-319
Panama	-475	-3 739	506	9	9	5	-6 599	-2 242	-2 887	-6 133	1 487	-3 398
Paraguay	-2 995	105	-187	159	171	116	-2 850	-607	-586	-14	-882	-514
Peru	-9 743	2 219	1 894	...	...	...	-13 898	-1 451	1 996	-4 155	-3 671	102
Uruguay	-2 616	-2 579	-185	3	8	0	-2 480	-1 977	1 380	134	594	1 565

	Exports of goods f.o.b.			Exports of services			Imports of goods f.o.b.			Imports of services		
	2022	2023	2024 <sup>a</sup>	2022	2023	2024 <sup>a</sup>	2022	2023	2024 <sup>a</sup>	2022	2023	2024 <sup>a</sup>
<b>The Caribbean</b>	<b>2 508</b>	<b>1 949</b>	<b>535</b>	<b>390</b>	<b>473</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>1 147</b>	<b>375</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>-1 750</b>	<b>-2 047</b>	<b>-387</b>
Antigua and Barbuda	-296	-262	...	28	25	...	-248	-233	...	20	4	...
Bahamas	-1 233	-1 075	-157	...	...	...	-1 221	-1 185	-51	11	-110	106
Barbados	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Belize	-236	-91	-21	29	25	5	-129	-34	56	77	32	72
Dominica	-162	-222	...	131	178	...	-81	-21	...	-50	23	...
Grenada	-136	-184	...	48	126	...	-71	-79	...	18	-21	...
Guyana	-254	...	...	39	...	...	305	...	...	520	...	...
Jamaica	-136	569	229	-30	-19	-9	-558	1 055	299	-391	505	80
Saint Kitts and Nevis	-106	-143	...	94	85	...	-14	-34	...	-2	24	...
Saint Lucia	-67	-45	...	44	42	...	-27	-4	...	-4	-1	...
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	-187	-143	...	7	9	...	-188	-167	...	-8	-34	...
Suriname	76	148	13	...	1	3	205	54	92	129	-95	76
Trinidad and Tobago	5 244	3 397	470	0	0	0	3 174	1 024	-249	-2 070	-2 373	-720

**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of balance of payments information from the region's central banks, according to the guidelines of the sixth edition of the Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (BPM6) of the International Monetary Fund.

**Note:** A negative sign in the financial account represents a net indebtedness of the region or country with respect to the rest of the world, while a positive sign indicates that the region or country is a net creditor of the rest of the world.

<sup>a</sup> Up to the second quarter; for Jamaica, Nicaragua and Trinidad and Tobago, up to the first quarter.

Table A3.1.1

Latin America: exports of goods, f.o.b.

(Millions of dollars)

	2022				2023				2024	
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2
<b>Latin America</b>	<b>320 577</b>	<b>368 350</b>	<b>363 239</b>	<b>347 849</b>	<b>330 900</b>	<b>353 551</b>	<b>350 502</b>	<b>346 945</b>	<b>332 662</b>	<b>363 888</b>
Argentina	19 370	25 041	22 880	21 223	15 909	17 589	17 735	15 604	17 421	20 780
Belize	118	146	130	124	117	135	129	107	106	131
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	3 328	3 895	3 529	2 789	2 619	2 871	2 808	2 495	1 902	2 430
Brazil	73 396	92 314	91 539	82 953	77 365	90 839	88 770	86 846	78 531	90 138
Chile	24 309	24 682	23 987	25 579	25 884	22 903	22 309	23 461	25 535	24 410
Colombia	13 585	16 338	15 661	13 889	13 490	12 825	13 192	13 135	11 763	13 153
Costa Rica	4 005	4 019	4 360	4 263	4 590	4 853	4 682	4 761	4 864	5 264
Dominican Republic	3 333	3 655	3 495	3 268	3 337	3 341	3 171	3 083	3 100	3 729
Ecuador	8 171	8 892	8 082	7 888	7 551	7 770	8 371	7 792	8 158	8 947
El Salvador	1 535	1 505	1 498	1 304	1 492	1 410	1 363	1 256	1 328	1 443
Guatemala	3 704	3 779	3 453	3 319	3 596	3 367	3 085	2 975	3 333	3 540
Honduras	3 067	3 380	3 205	2 630	2 901	3 194	2 879	2 409	2 760	3 017
Jamaica	341	465	467	629	526	505	494	477	493	...
Mexico	132 240	148 893	149 158	147 894	141 166	150 901	150 057	151 450	143 663	156 040
Nicaragua	1 631	1 714	1 570	1 395	1 799	1 765	1 667	1 458	1 716	...
Panama	4 323	4 598	4 747	4 286	4 167	4 229	4 741	2 834	3 645	3 860
Paraguay	2 852	3 605	3 405	2 953	3 721	4 180	4 156	4 200	3 804	4 212
Peru	16 868	15 812	16 431	17 057	16 234	16 378	16 605	18 302	16 322	17 671
Suriname	633	618	561	645	585	507	624	643	626	629
Uruguay	3 770	5 000	5 081	3 762	3 851	3 990	3 665	3 658	3 592	4 495

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of balance of payments information from the region's central banks, according to the guidelines of the sixth edition of the Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (BPM6) of the International Monetary Fund.

Table A3.1.2

Latin America: exports of goods, f.o.b.  
(Millions of dollars)

	2022				2023				2024	
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2
<b>Latin America</b>	<b>324 829</b>	<b>366 745</b>	<b>384 816</b>	<b>345 922</b>	<b>325 937</b>	<b>336 247</b>	<b>343 349</b>	<b>330 416</b>	<b>318 785</b>	<b>340 790</b>
Argentina	16 750	21 976	21 736	15 700	16 262	19 614	19 108	14 789	12 414	13 661
Belize	277	315	294	338	305	307	335	319	340	369
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	2 195	2 591	3 042	2 901	2 555	2 480	2 705	2 793	2 231	2 108
Brazil	63 502	72 490	81 128	71 559	62 852	63 149	63 867	61 675	62 204	69 113
Chile	23 301	24 837	24 953	21 737	19 505	19 730	20 366	19 633	18 684	18 723
Colombia	17 319	18 313	19 346	16 674	15 376	14 516	14 520	14 962	13 839	15 120
Costa Rica	5 358	4 627	5 630	5 698	5 596	5 309	5 496	5 644	5 708	5 866
Dominican Republic	6 952	8 049	8 257	7 655	7 086	7 121	7 421	7 196	6 771	7 667
Ecuador	7 188	7 752	7 901	7 648	7 058	7 047	7 642	7 531	6 405	6 879
El Salvador	3 728	4 021	3 901	3 761	3 568	3 534	3 667	3 616	3 499	3 758
Guatemala	6 796	7 358	7 457	6 944	6 603	6 852	7 011	6 915	6 944	7 391
Honduras	4 369	4 836	4 801	4 315	4 196	4 331	4 586	4 237	4 152	4 630
Jamaica	1 467	1 655	1 759	1 629	1 622	1 550	1 696	1 534	1 586	...
Mexico	137 068	156 972	162 057	149 204	146 049	152 565	153 475	147 033	146 408	158 832
Nicaragua	2 161	2 323	2 323	2 293	2 116	2 347	2 446	2 472	2 378	...
Panama	6 504	6 818	7 280	6 548	6 115	6 543	8 288	9 242	6 195	6 501
Paraguay	3 310	3 606	4 068	3 761	3 582	3 489	4 087	4 271	3 796	3 987
Peru	13 000	14 498	14 885	13 618	11 880	12 145	12 935	12 880	11 861	12 487
Suriname	362	424	445	471	388	373	410	401	403	419
Uruguay	3 222	3 286	3 555	3 470	3 224	3 245	3 288	3 273	2 966	3 280

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of balance of payments information from the region's central banks, according to the guidelines of the sixth edition of the Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (BPM6) of the International Monetary Fund.

Table A3.2

Latin America: international trade of goods  
(Annual growth rates)

Exports of goods f.o.b.	Value			Volume			Unit value		
	2021	2022	2023	2021	2022	2023	2021	2022	2023
<b>Latin America</b>	<b>27.8</b>	<b>16.2</b>	<b>-1.3</b>	<b>7.8</b>	<b>5.5</b>	<b>3.1</b>	<b>18.6</b>	<b>10.1</b>	<b>-4.3</b>
Argentina	41.9	13.5	-24.5	12.8	-2.3	-16.4	25.8	16.2	-9.7
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	58.9	21.5	-20.3	31.9	4.3	-18.5	20.5	16.5	-2.1
Brazil	34.8	19.8	1.1	4.1	5.4	8.1	29.5	13.7	-6.5
Chile	27.8	4.2	-4.1	-1.1	-1.6	-1.2	29.3	5.8	-2.9
Colombia	32.3	39.2	-11.5	-4.7	0.3	3.3	38.8	38.7	-14.3
Costa Rica	22.9	12.3	13.5	20.3	6.8	4.8	2.1	5.1	8.3
Dominican Republic	21.2	10.1	-6.0	16.3	5.9	-6.0	4.2	4.0	0.1
Ecuador	31.1	22.5	-4.7	3.1	1.2	4.0	27.1	21.0	-8.4
El Salvador	33.9	11.3	-5.5	24.7	-2.4	-4.9	7.4	14.0	-0.7
Guatemala	22.1	15.3	-8.6	13.4	5.2	0.9	7.6	9.6	-9.5
Honduras	33.4	19.9	-7.3	24.3	6.1	-10.3	7.3	12.9	3.3
Mexico	18.7	16.7	2.7	8.8	9.1	4.5	9.1	7.0	-1.8
Nicaragua	26.8	13.2	6.0	19.3	-2.1	0.0	6.3	15.6	6.0
Panama	46.8	19.6	-11.0	37.2	13.9	-9.2	7.0	5.0	-2.1
Paraguay	20.7	-3.1	26.9	-5.8	-8.2	53.4	28.1	5.6	-17.3
Peru	47.4	4.8	2.0	12.8	3.0	4.0	30.6	1.8	-1.9
Uruguay	56.9	10.5	-13.9	40.2	0.6	-9.2	11.9	9.8	-5.2
Imports of goods f.o.b.	Value			Volume			Unit value		
	2021	2022	2023	2021	2022	2023	2021	2022	2023
<b>Latin America</b>	<b>36.8</b>	<b>20.4</b>	<b>-6.1</b>	<b>21.4</b>	<b>5.9</b>	<b>-1.1</b>	<b>12.7</b>	<b>13.7</b>	<b>-5.0</b>
Argentina	47.1	28.5	-8.4	28.2	10.5	-2.8	14.7	16.3	-5.8
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	29.7	30.6	-1.8	18.2	5.8	0.4	9.8	23.4	-2.2
Brazil	38.1	19.5	-12.9	22.0	-2.4	-4.5	13.2	22.4	-8.7
Chile	53.0	12.5	-16.4	32.8	-2.8	-10.7	15.2	15.8	-6.4
Colombia	37.7	26.3	-17.1	19.1	11.0	-12.7	15.6	13.8	-5.1
Costa Rica	25.5	20.6	3.4	18.5	3.5	6.5	5.9	16.5	-2.8
Dominican Republic	42.0	27.3	-6.8	24.1	14.5	-1.6	14.4	11.2	-5.3
Ecuador	40.3	27.2	-4.0	25.4	11.9	-1.1	11.9	13.7	-2.9
El Salvador	47.4	16.9	-6.7	25.5	-0.4	-0.6	17.5	17.4	-6.0
Guatemala	41.7	22.6	-4.1	26.5	5.2	-8.1	12.0	16.5	4.3
Honduras	47.0	21.5	-5.3	31.9	7.6	-9.6	11.5	13.0	4.8
Mexico	32.1	19.6	-1.0	18.0	10.8	2.9	11.9	8.0	-3.9
Nicaragua	40.0	21.8	3.1	25.6	2.8	13.3	11.5	18.4	-9.1
Panama	40.8	33.6	11.2	31.5	15.2	15.4	7.0	16.0	-3.7
Paraguay	29.4	17.1	4.6	18.7	-11.5	-0.6	9.1	32.2	5.2
Peru	38.2	16.7	-11.0	18.5	2.6	-4.5	16.6	13.7	-6.8
Uruguay	41.8	20.7	-3.7	22.5	2.9	7.3	15.8	17.3	-10.3

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

Table A3.3

Latin America: terms of trade for goods f.o.b./f.o.b.  
(Annual growth rates)

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
<b>Latin America</b>	<b>-9.3</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>4.9</b>	<b>-0.0</b>	<b>0.1</b>	<b>-0.9</b>	<b>5.2</b>	<b>-3.2</b>	<b>0.8</b>
Argentina	-4.7	6.2	-2.9	0.9	-0.7	0.6	9.7	-0.1	-4.1
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	-25.2	-15.5	14.8	-0.0	-6.2	-14.2	9.8	-5.6	0.1
Brazil	-11.6	2.4	5.7	-1.3	0.1	0.6	14.4	-7.1	2.4
Chile	-2.5	3.7	10.2	-2.6	-1.8	11.4	12.2	-8.6	3.7
Colombia	-24.7	-1.1	17.0	9.4	-1.4	-15.6	20.0	21.9	-9.7
Costa Rica	7.6	3.3	-2.6	-1.8	-0.1	2.3	-3.6	-9.8	11.4
Dominican Republic	8.6	4.5	-4.5	-4.8	4.5	11.0	-8.9	-6.5	5.7
Ecuador	-24.2	-4.6	8.4	9.4	-3.7	-13.2	13.6	6.5	-5.6
El Salvador	4.3	0.6	-2.2	-3.9	1.7	4.3	-8.6	-2.9	5.7
Guatemala	5.3	8.0	-5.2	-4.3	-1.2	7.4	-3.9	-5.9	-13.2
Haiti	5.3	-1.2	3.0	-6.9	-1.0	3.7	-9.0	-9.3	9.7
Honduras	5.4	0.3	0.3	-6.2	-0.8	5.8	-3.8	-0.0	-1.4
Mexico	-3.9	0.9	3.4	-1.4	1.4	-4.2	-2.5	-0.9	2.1
Nicaragua	17.8	-0.9	-2.2	-8.2	3.4	17.8	-4.6	-2.3	16.5
Panama	-2.6	-3.1	-2.2	-1.4	0.2	0.0	0.0	-9.5	1.7
Paraguay	1.7	0.3	-1.1	-2.3	-3.5	33.5	17.4	-20.1	-21.4
Peru	-6.8	-0.3	7.5	-0.4	-1.7	9.1	12.0	-10.5	5.3
Uruguay	1.9	2.8	-0.4	-4.8	3.1	7.2	-3.4	-6.4	5.6

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

Table A3.4

Latin America and the Caribbean (14 countries): remittances from emigrant workers  
(Millions of dollars)

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2023				2024		
							Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	1 318	1 116	1 399	1 437	1 437	643	377	329	343	387	335	308	...
Brazil	2 880	3 312	3 845	4 712	3 997	3 133	1 054	1 042	963	938	958	1 082	1 093
Colombia	7 087	6 909	8 597	9 429	10 091	8 680	2 476	2 397	2 531	2 687	2 721	2 907	3 053
Costa Rica	519	495	559	575	589	335	163	139	140	147	180	156	...
Dominican Republic	7 087	8 219	10 402	9 857	10 157	7 999	2 481	2 539	2 577	2 560	2 636	2 603	2 760
Ecuador	3 235	3 338	4 362	4 744	5 447	3 005	1 192	1 353	1 406	1 496	1 394	1 611	...
El Salvador	5 656	5 930	7 579	7 820	8 182	6 135	1 914	2 105	2 036	2 127	1 896	2 156	2 083
Guatemala	10 508	11 340	15 296	18 040	19 804	15 835	4 433	5 225	5 116	5 030	4 683	5 589	5 564
Honduras	5 522	5 741	7 370	8 686	9 177	7 194	2 120	2 390	2 344	2 324	2 101	2 527	2 567
Jamaica	2 406	2 905	3 497	3 440	3 370	2 239	801	849	876	845	797	854	588 <sup>i</sup>
Mexico	37 250	41 704	52 523	58 868	63 319	48 386	13 970	16 267	16 853	16 228	14 083	17 244	17 060
Nicaragua	1 682	1 851	2 147	3 225	4 660	3 828	1 020	1 195	1 219	1 227	1 141	1 337	1 351
Paraguay	555	486	488	494	621	400	147	150	152	172	164	170	65 <sup>ii</sup>
Peru	3 326	2 904	3 608	3 708	4 446	2 400	995	1 094	1 151	1 207	1 193	1 206	...

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>i</sup> Figures as of August 2024.

<sup>ii</sup> Figures as of July 2024.

Table A3.5

Latin America and the Caribbean: net direct investment flows  
(Millions of dollars)

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024 <sup>a</sup>
<b>Latin America and the Caribbean</b>	<b>-124 733</b>	<b>-122 863</b>	<b>-147 332</b>	<b>-111 725</b>	<b>-92 431</b>	<b>-101 594</b>	<b>-123 673</b>	<b>-139 663</b>	<b>-82 255</b>
<b>Latin America</b>	<b>-122 195</b>	<b>-120 910</b>	<b>-144 877</b>	<b>-108 765</b>	<b>-89 008</b>	<b>-99 694</b>	<b>-124 159</b>	<b>-140 598</b>	<b>-81 389</b>
Argentina	-1 474	-10 361	-9 991	-5 126	-3 707	-5 114	-13 111	-20 905	-7 479
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	-246	-633	-387	265	1 018	-492	-87	-37	-70
Brazil	-59 601	-47 545	-76 159	-46 355	-41 737	-30 201	-41 252	-39 079	-27 713
Chile	-3 487	-2 702	-6 096	-3 234	-5 049	-604	-5 030	-15 460	-5 500
Colombia	-9 341	-10 011	-6 172	-10 836	-5 725	-6 381	-13 799	-15 970	-4 578
Costa Rica	-2 127	-2 652	-2 434	-2 695	-1 644	-3 146	-3 060	-3 701	-2 080
Dominican Republic	-2 407	-3 571	-2 535	-3 021	-2 560	-3 197	-4 099	-4 390	-2 378
Ecuador	-764	-631	-1 389	-979	-1 106	-649	-880	-383	-120
El Salvador	-348	-889	-826	-636	-3	-373	-142	-730	-174
Guatemala	-965	-934	-780	-796	-786	-2 986	-719	-921	-494
Haiti	-105	-375	-105	-75	-25	-51	-39	...	...
Honduras	-900	-1 035	-895	-496	-373	-513	-738	-857	-429
Mexico	-31 030	-30 070	-25 612	-23 862	-26 491	-35 612	-21 767	-29 846	-28 251
Nicaragua	-924	-971	-763	-444	-707	-1 206	-1 274	-1 199	-411
Panama	-4 557	-4 420	-4 570	-3 303	-78	-1 361	-2 872	-1 541	-1 412
Paraguay	-464	-155	-229	-534	-159	-89	-725	-327	-208
Peru	-5 279	-5 992	-6 663	-5 276	1 217	-5 173	-11 789	-2 442	-2 205
Uruguay	1 823	2 037	729	-1 362	-1 094	-2 546	-2 777	-2 810	2 115
<b>The Caribbean</b>	<b>-2 538</b>	<b>-1 953</b>	<b>-2 454</b>	<b>-2 960</b>	<b>-3 422</b>	<b>-1 900</b>	<b>487</b>	<b>934</b>	<b>-866</b>
Antigua and Barbuda	-59	-140	-203	-141	-105	-305	-295	-293	...
Bahamas	-390	-305	-491	-369	-375	-298	-316	-97	-144
Belize	-42	-24	-118	-92	-72	-124	-140	-14	-74
Dominica	-41	-24	-78	-63	-23	-26	-18	-21	...
Grenada	-93	-150	-168	-184	-164	-162	-144	-151	...
Guyana	-137	-327	-1 180	-1 685	-1 281	-2 234	-437	...	...
Jamaica	-658	-855	-762	-219	-258	-264	-258	-380	-37
Saint Kitts and Nevis	-124	-42	-12	-50	1	-25	-45	-34	...
Saint Lucia	-149	-96	-55	-31	-123	-126	-52	-142	...
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	-79	-145	-33	-64	-63	-163	-72	-83	...
Suriname	-300	-98	-119	8	-0	124	-3	63	-30
Trinidad and Tobago	-2	459	765	-70	-958	1 704	2 268	2 086	-582

**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of balance of payments information from the region's central banks, according to the guidelines of the sixth edition of the Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (BPM6) of the International Monetary Fund.

**Note:** A negative sign in the financial account represents a net indebtedness of the region or country with respect to the rest of the world, while a positive sign indicates that the region or country is a net creditor of the rest of the world.

<sup>a</sup> Up to the second quarter; for Jamaica, Nicaragua and Trinidad and Tobago, up to the first quarter.

Table A3.6

Latin America and the Caribbean: other financial flows  
(Millions of dollars)

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024 <sup>a</sup>
<b>Latin America and the Caribbean</b>	<b>-10 102</b>	<b>-14 688</b>	<b>-32 997</b>	<b>19 139</b>	<b>66 201</b>	<b>-57 205</b>	<b>-12 813</b>	<b>25 322</b>	<b>8 061</b>
<b>Latin America</b>	<b>-9 227</b>	<b>-12 855</b>	<b>-31 982</b>	<b>20 122</b>	<b>69 200</b>	<b>-56 373</b>	<b>-13 194</b>	<b>25 780</b>	<b>7 213</b>
Argentina	-26 802	-35 468	-29 322	21 382	12 796	9 722	-1 263	15 843	6 625
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	1 032	-1 755	-1 139	-192	-238	260	-335	-1 169	-1 189
Brazil	28 172	22 046	17 427	5 063	39 709	-33 933	1 776	-15 180	-5 839
Chile	-2 549	-705	-6 639	-7 404	226	-36 802	-13 700	-1 673	3 849
Colombia	-3 158	-150	-7 962	-5 780	-6 719	-10 936	-7 238	5 928	-20
Costa Rica	816	626	-159	938	2 447	2 170	-458	-1 276	702
Dominican Republic	-48	1 450	-548	-118	-938	-2 198	-3 537	-1 923	1 115
Ecuador	-570	2 473	-518	270	145	2 735	2 201	5 045	2 119
El Salvador	-891	29	-424	-379	453	-1 254	-415	-320	-672
Guatemala	-93	-1 260	177	395	857	1 540	1 205	2 545	1 725
Haiti	-227	20	-390	75	-7	-124	-81	...	...
Honduras	-92	-587	-193	-633	-98	-878	-777	508	259
Mexico	-1 736	1 659	-6 092	5 312	35 289	21 948	8 761	14 412	-2 475
Nicaragua	-137	-411	653	670	-196	-646	-390	520	73
Panama	-3 716	-765	-261	-76	-5 379	1 747	-1 808	-577	-151
Paraguay	457	105	-464	65	-1 535	-1 021	-1 991	-637	-399
Peru	-227	3 410	4 732	-2 101	-7 603	-10 218	2 980	3 751	4 113
Uruguay	542	-3 571	-861	2 635	-10	1 515	1 876	-15	-2 621
<b>The Caribbean</b>	<b>-875</b>	<b>-1 833</b>	<b>-1 015</b>	<b>-983</b>	<b>-2 999</b>	<b>-831</b>	<b>381</b>	<b>-457</b>	<b>849</b>
Antigua and Barbuda	34	85	10	55	-47	16	24	87	...
Bahamas	-402	-1 294	-139	188	-2 186	-1 204	-1 104	-993	-310
Belize	-11	-27	16	-44	-97	173	-48	-11	87
Dominica	41	339	-24	-136	-26	-52	-78	20	...
Grenada	57	98	68	117	32	-10	48	41	...
Guyana	44	-46	30	-972	159	-55	624	...	...
Jamaica	690	-1 091	-365	-475	-380	-459	16	1 085	-27
Saint Kitts and Nevis	-8	-61	-1	65	-60	119	73	8	...
Saint Lucia	91	43	151	89	-62	-182	66	76	...
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	-21,6	100	19	31	-16	-46	-117	-46	...
Suriname	-183	-14	-180	-540	220	-205	-16	-247	49
Trinidad and Tobago	-1 376	18	-600	641	-537	1 074	892	-476	1 050

**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of balance of payments information from the region's central banks, according to the guidelines of the sixth edition of the Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (BPM6) of the International Monetary Fund.

**Note:** Other financial flows include portfolio investment, other investment and financial derivatives items of the financial account. A negative sign in the financial account represents a net indebtedness of the region or country with respect to the rest of the world, while a positive sign indicates that the region or country is a net creditor of the rest of the world.

<sup>a</sup> Up to the second quarter; for Jamaica, Nicaragua and Trinidad and Tobago, up to the first quarter.

Table A3.7

Latin America and the Caribbean: reserve assets  
(Millions of dollars)

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024 <sup>a</sup>
<b>Latin America and the Caribbean</b>	<b>26 188</b>	<b>18 282</b>	<b>11 995</b>	<b>-30 803</b>	<b>14 483</b>	<b>50 625</b>	<b>-16 715</b>	<b>14 149</b>	<b>21 261</b>
<b>Latin America</b>	<b>26 221</b>	<b>18 696</b>	<b>13 194</b>	<b>-30 566</b>	<b>13 320</b>	<b>48 952</b>	<b>-16 995</b>	<b>14 251</b>	<b>21 097</b>
Argentina	14 311	14 556	11 277	-21 375	-7 727	-106	6 920	-21 675	5 772
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	-3 046	-232	-1 230	-2 839	-1 752	-354	-864	-2 401	-536
Brazil	9 237	5 093	2 928	-26 055	-14 232	13 967	-7 284	21 372	4 884
Chile	1 747	-2 766	1 437	-141	-2 870	12 218	-9 201	6 788	-2 441
Colombia	172	536	1 179	3 318	4 311	630	554	1 706	1 833
Costa Rica	-235	-419	390	1 393	-1 755	-263	1 803	4 537	587
Dominican Republic	780	731	847	1 150	1 963	2 304	1 444	1 053	-2 067
Ecuador	1 834	-2 305	171	715	4 146	948	568	-4 285	2 423
El Salvador	452	308	2	876	-1 387	363	-692	399	270
Guatemala	1 424	2 600	988	1 798	3 189	2 809	33	908	58
Haiti	110	201	39	-122	348	92	-101	...	...
Honduras	50	885	45	988	1 911	459	-127	-1 067	-593
Mexico	-136	-4 765	483	2 638	11 990	10 288	-1 692	7 582	9 980
Nicaragua	-52	292	-510	120	903	832	367	1 014	256
Panama	609	-971	-633	1 227	5 545	-1 083	-1 920	-124	-1 324
Paraguay	958	877	-183	-55	1 805	593	-134	357	21
Peru	168	1 629	-3 629	6 909	5 301	4 410	-5 089	-2 760	88
Uruguay	-2 161	2 449	-408	-1 111	1 630	843	-1 578	848	1 886
<b>The Caribbean</b>	<b>-33</b>	<b>-414</b>	<b>-1 198</b>	<b>-236</b>	<b>1 163</b>	<b>1 674</b>	<b>280</b>	<b>-102</b>	<b>164</b>
Antigua and Barbuda	-26	-16	15	-50	-57	102	22	-27	...
Bahamas	95	508	-218	563	616	60	199	-95	403
Belize	-60	-65	-18	-18	70	75	58	-9	42
Dominica	96	-10	-21	-36	11	15	15	-20	...
Grenada	10	-9	35	2	57	55	26	31	...
Guyana	-2	-13	-56	56	105	41	119	...	...
Jamaica	282	498	-249	99	449	752	-316	351	363
Saint Kitts and Nevis	32	44	-2	-0	10	-36	-43	-8	...
Saint Lucia	-12	15	-36	-25	-30	155	-41	61	...
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	26	-17	-12	24	12	84	0	-39	...
Suriname	78	22	148	-208	-83	417	225	238	73
Trinidad and Tobago	-447	-1 122	-784	-644	4	-48	14	-587	-717

**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of balance of payments information from the region's central banks, according to the guidelines of the sixth edition of the Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (BPM6) of the International Monetary Fund.

**Note:** A negative sign means that reserve assets decreased, while a positive sign means that they increased.

<sup>a</sup> Up to the second quarter; for Jamaica, Nicaragua and Trinidad and Tobago, up to the first quarter.

Table A3.8

Latin America and the Caribbean: total gross external debt  
(Millions of dollars at current prices, end-of-period stocks)

		2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024 <sup>a</sup>
Latin America and the Caribbean <sup>b</sup>		1 971 329	2 090 698	2 171 770	2 254 181	2 283 348	2 358 301	2 383 293	2 488 218	2 525 795
Latin America <sup>b</sup>		1 948 249	2 065 598	2 146 652	2 229 179	2 255 155	2 328 819	2 353 329	2 456 479	2 493 923
Argentina	Total	181 432	234 549	277 932	278 489	271 528	267 868	276 694	285 951	286 881
	Public	122 022	161 289	197 330	197 401	193 756	191 097	189 288	181 520	181 853
	Private	59 410	73 260	80 602	81 088	77 772	76 771	87 406	104 431	105 028
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	Total	10 703	11 702	12 491	13 473	14 273	14 846	14 975	15 224	14 930
	Public	7 268	9 428	10 178	11 268	12 172	12 698	13 300	13 588	13 334
	Private	3 435	2 274	2 313	2 206	2 102	2 149	1 675	1 635	1 597
Brazil	Total	675 841	667 103	665 777	675 789	639 308	670 286	681 076	732 655	763 272
	Public	130 274	125 492	129 139	123 810	123 860	131 307	120 434	128 041	141 287
	Private	545 567	541 611	536 638	551 979	515 448	538 979	560 642	604 614	621 985
Chile	Total	165 217	179 976	184 220	198 396	208 485	237 690	233 325	240 968	244 465
	Public	35 697	47 559	51 463	59 826	68 521	81 468	71 981	80 560	80 018
	Private	129 519	132 418	132 757	138 570	139 964	156 222	160 408	160 408	164 447
Colombia	Total	120 153	124 636	132 016	138 683	154 507	171 303	184 052	196 235	197 538
	Public	71 308	71 870	72 999	73 835	89 959	102 395	104 643	112 970	113 192
	Private	48 844	52 767	59 017	64 848	64 548	68 909	79 409	83 265	84 346
Costa Rica	Total	25 565	26 920	29 135	30 795	30 926	31 640	35 127	37 911	39 245
	Public	6 884	7 647	9 836	11 370	11 319	12 522	16 524	18 490	18 599
	Private	18 682	19 274	19 299	19 425	19 607	19 118	18 603	19 421	20 646
Dominican Republic	Public	17 567	18 821	21 565	23 383	30 703	33 341	36 358	38 854	40 709
Ecuador	Total	34 181	40 323	44 239	52 668	56 893	57 583	60 115	59 266	59 466
	Public	25 680	31 750	35 730	41 496	45 369	46 534	48 339	47 809	49 242
	Private	8 909	8 573	8 508	11 172	11 524	11 048	11 777	11 457	10 224
El Salvador	Total	16 376	16 474	16 603	17 350	18 731	20 345	21 190	22 048	22 477
	Public	9 169	9 414	9 236	9 941	10 781	11 808	11 572	12 043	12 379
	Private	7 207	7 060	7 367	7 469	7 950	8 537	9 618	10 004	10 097
Guatemala	Total	23 333	24 928	24 378	24 489	24 938	25 817	24 280	24 744	25 086
	Public	8 645	8 858	8 654	9 743	11 488	11 998	10 989	12 435	12 320
	Private	14 687	16 071	15 725	14 747	13 450	13 820	13 291	12 309	12 767
Haiti	Total	2 013	2 133	2 121	2 100	2 218	2 254	2 268	2 379	...
	Public	2 009	2 129	2 121	2 100	2 218	2 254	2 268	2 379	...
	Private	5	4	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Honduras	Total	7 499	8 572	9 112	9 604	10 981	11 355	11 804	12 097	11 847
	Public	6 108	7 145	7 375	7 699	9 108	9 242	9 548	9 379	9 167
	Private	1 391	1 428	1 736	1 905	1 873	2 114	2 256	2 718	2 680
Mexico	Total	543 012	578 618	592 606	621 607	628 510	602 086	582 239	594 002	590 702
	Public	288 223	308 781	313 276	331 993	339 435	321 162	317 534	331 931	324 521
	Private	254 789	269 837	279 330	289 615	289 075	280 924	264 705	262 070	266 180
Nicaragua	Total	12 120	12 667	12 881	13 498	13 785	14 607	15 523	15 281	15 273
	Public	5 042	5 546	5 950	6 279	6 957	7 806	8 123	8 515	8 606
	Private	7 078	7 121	6 931	7 220	6 828	6 801	7 400	6 766	6 666
Panama	Public	16 902	18 390	20 575	24 223	29 817	32 844	36 853	39 988	42 861

		2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024 <sup>a</sup>
Paraguay	Total	8 500	9 686	10 502	11 470	15 156	15 981	18 127	23 953	25 102
	Public	4 823	5 592	6 403	7 229	10 485	11 804	13 322	14 338	15 395
	Private	3 678	4 094	4 099	4 241	4 671	4 177	4 805	5 016	9 708
Peru	Total	74 968	76 832	78 713	80 857	89 715	101 981	101 699	105 037	105 919
	Public	29 617	32 953	34 912	39 264	48 643	60 538	60 114	60 488	60 522
	Private	45 352	43 880	43 801	41 593	41 072	41 442	41 585	44 550	45 397
Uruguay	Total	40 446	42 318	43 044	45 198	47 823	50 885	55 019	50 176	47 395
	Public	17 581	18 183	18 705	19 795	21 692	22 796	23 327	24 855	25 499
	Private	22 865	24 136	24 339	25 403	26 131	28 089	31 692	25 322	21 896
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	Total	149 859	148 328	148 432	147 899	...	...	...	...	...
	Public	128 056	128 768	128 543	129 260	...	...	...	...	...
	Private	21 803	21 199	19 889	18 639	...	...	...	...	...
<b>The Caribbean</b>		<b>23 080</b>	<b>25 100</b>	<b>25 118</b>	<b>25 002</b>	<b>28 194</b>	<b>29 482</b>	<b>29 965</b>	<b>31 739</b>	<b>31 872</b>
Antigua and Barbuda	Public	562	584	614	650	674	730	736	756	751
Bahamas	Public	2 373	3 234	3 172	3 123	4 478	4 761	5 225	5 373	5 346
Barbados	Public	1 671	1 631	1 687	1 581	2 014	2 266	2 396	2 825	2 857
Belize	Public	1 204	1 257	1 285	1 322	1 453	1 339	1 364	1 429	1 451
Dominica	Public	270	267	253	244	287	323	354	380	369
Grenada	Public	602	533	562	523	569	608	610	649	640
Guyana	Public	1 162	1 248	1 322	1 305	1 321	1 393	1 572	1 775	1 867
Jamaica	Public	8 680	9 307	8 951	8 703	9 127	9 214	8 664	8 525	8 592
Saint Kitts and Nevis	Public	199	156	149	142	136	128	124	116	112
Saint Lucia	Public	529	598	599	628	718	850	873	1 059	1 121
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Public	455	387	391	420	462	562	607	651	697
Suriname	Public	1 869	2 085	2 040	2 150	2 159	2 416	2 568	3 016	3 262
Trinidad and Tobago	Public	3 503	3 813	4 094	4 211	4 796	4 895	4 872	5 184	4 806

**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

**Note:** Includes debt owed to the International Monetary Fund.

<sup>a</sup> Preliminary figures.

<sup>b</sup> Does not include the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela or Haiti.

Table A3.9

Latin America: sovereign spreads on EMBI Global  
(Basis points)

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2023				2024		
						March	June	September	December	March	June	September
<b>Latin America</b>	<b>416</b>	<b>354</b>	<b>381</b>	<b>416</b>	<b>366</b>	<b>447</b>	<b>405</b>	<b>404</b>	<b>366</b>	<b>329</b>	<b>471</b>	<b>441</b>
Argentina	2 196	1 368	1 688	2 196	1 907	2 302	2 061	2 539	1 907	1 452	1 455	1 284
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	563	461	412	563	2 233	1 561	1 112	1 463	2 233	1 796	2 065	2 281
Brazil	258	250	306	258	200	254	229	206	200	201	220	211
Chile	140	144	153	140	132	153	132	135	132	127	120	118
Colombia	369	206	353	369	272	382	370	335	272	292	305	317
Costa Rica	327	631	504	327	235	329	289	247	235	217	213	218
Dominican Republic	358	340	366	358	247	369	333	319	247	231	217	197
Ecuador	1 250	1 062	869	1 250	2 055	1 917	1 922	1 789	2 055	1 233	1 391	1 211
El Salvador	1 839	732	1 491	1 839	684	1 521	1 096	737	684	678	751	569
Guatemala	210	232	271	210	210	237	234	228	210	193	199	207
Honduras	529	271	313	529	362	585	495	355	362	326	401	427
Mexico	386	361	347	386	340	393	376	378	340	314	319	315
Panama	215	149	187	215	282	243	216	221	282	283	260	238
Paraguay	200	213	229	200	186	238	216	212	186	170	169	158
Peru	194	132	170	194	160	209	174	174	160	152	154	154
Uruguay	91	135	127	91	85	119	99	98	85	82	80	90
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	44 840	24 099	55 310	44 840	21 422	34 229	42 210	38 912	21 422	21 720	16 878	19 495

**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from J.P. Morgan, Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI).

**Note:** Figures refer to the end of each period.

Table A3.10

Latin America and the Caribbean: international bond issues  
(Millions of dollars)

	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2023				2024		
						Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3
<b>Total</b>	<b>145 286</b>	<b>148 699</b>	<b>63 789</b>	<b>89 148</b>	<b>98 879</b>	<b>26 241</b>	<b>26 581</b>	<b>20 604</b>	<b>15 723</b>	<b>45 412</b>	<b>26 400</b>	<b>27 067</b>
<b>Latin America and the Caribbean</b>	<b>139 833</b>	<b>142 822</b>	<b>58 398</b>	<b>80 799</b>	<b>89 491</b>	<b>21 604</b>	<b>26 089</b>	<b>19 605</b>	<b>13 500</b>	<b>39 533</b>	<b>24 394</b>	<b>25 565</b>
Argentina	386	1 892	615	517	3 100	57	72	389	-	800	400	1 900
Bahamas	825	55	385	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Barbados	-	550	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	-	-	850	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Brazil	26 975	31 515	10 063	18 826	20 776	2 764	7 162	6 400	2 500	10 566	6 435	3 775
Chile	20 129	31 620	11 080	17 157	17 524	1 084	7 159	5 343	3 570	5 651	5 323	6 550
Colombia	12 391	12 725	1 883	9 000	4 550	4 200	1 900	-	2 900	1 850	2 275	425
Costa Rica	-	300	-	3 400	-	1 900	-	-	1 500	-	-	-
Dominican Republic	7 565	5 153	6 907	3 048	3 530	1 798	-	1 250	-	-	3 530	-
Ecuador	327	-	300	656	-	-	656	-	-	-	-	-
El Salvador	1 000	-	-	-	1 000	-	-	-	-	-	1 000	-
Guatemala	1 400	2 000	1 600	1 665	1 400	75	1 025	565	-	-	-	1 400
Honduras	600	300	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jamaica	225	-	-	302	480	-	-	-	302	-	-	480
Mexico	41 902	31 690	16 364	15 121	20 092	7 627	5 121	1 373	1 000	15 156	-	4 936
Nicaragua	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Panama	8 868	6 705	4 000	3 879	3 100	2 100	-	1 779	-	3 100	-	-
Paraguay	2 161	1 126	501	500	1 001	-	500	-	-	1 001	-	-
Peru	10 800	14 159	1 430	3 548	9 075	-	2 494	686	369	1 410	2 865	4 800
Suriname	-	-	-	660	-	-	-	-	660	-	-	-
Trinidad and Tobago	500	816	570	560	750	-	-	560	-	-	750	-
Uruguay	2 655	1 842	1 850	1 961	3 114	-	-	1 261	700	-	1 816	1 298
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	1 125	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Others	-	375	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Supranational issues</b>	<b>5 453</b>	<b>5 877</b>	<b>5 392</b>	<b>8 350</b>	<b>9 387</b>	<b>4 637</b>	<b>492</b>	<b>999</b>	<b>2 222</b>	<b>5 879</b>	<b>2 006</b>	<b>1 502</b>
Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI)	1 281	1 114	1 113	2 436	2 127	1 433	283	720	-	1 350	300	477
Foreign Trade Bank of Latin America (BLADEX)	435	96	18	29	30	-	21	8	-	5	-	25
Development Bank of Latin America (CAF)	3 236	3 945	3 109	5 831	6 574	3 150	188	270	2 222	4 074	1 500	1 000
Financial Fund for the Development of the River Plate Basin (FONPLATA)	-	387	-	54	206	54	-	-	-	-	206	-
Other	500	336	1 152	-	450	-	-	-	-	450	-	-

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from Merrill Lynch, J.P. Morgan and LatinFinance.

Note: Includes sovereign, bank and corporate bonds.

Table A4.1

Latin America and the Caribbean: labour force participation rate  
(Average rates)

		2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2023				2024	
							Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2
Argentina <sup>a</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>59.1</b>	<b>54.9</b>	<b>59.1</b>	<b>60.1</b>	<b>61.0</b>	<b>61.1</b>	<b>60.3</b>	<b>61.1</b>	<b>61.4</b>	<b>60.5</b>	<b>61.1</b>
	Men	69.9	64.9	69.4	69.9	70.6	70.9	69.8	70.7	71.1	69.4	70.2
	Women	49.4	45.9	49.5	51.0	52.1	52.2	51.5	52.3	52.5	52.2	52.7
Bahamas	<b>Total</b>	<b>80.3</b>	...	...	...	<b>75.9</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Men	83.0	...	...	...	73.4	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Women	75.5	...	...	...	76.5	...	...	...	...	...	...
Barbados <sup>b</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>63.7</b>	<b>60.6</b>	<b>61.2</b>	<b>62.9</b>	<b>62.3</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Men	68.0	64.8	65.3	67.3	67.0	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Women	59.7	56.7	57.6	59.0	58.1	...	...	...	...	...	...
Belize <sup>c</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>68.1</b>	<b>55.1</b>	<b>59.7</b>	<b>58.7</b>	<b>58.1</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Men	80.5	68.7	72.9	73.4	71.5	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Women	55.9	42.4	47.0	44.4	45.2	...	...	...	...	...	...
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) <sup>d</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>73.0</b>	<b>67.0</b>	<b>76.7</b>	<b>77.2</b>	<b>77.4</b>	<b>77.1</b>	<b>77.0</b>	<b>77.5</b>	<b>77.9</b>	<b>78.4</b>	<b>78.3</b>
	Men	80.7	75.4	83.4	83.7	83.2	83.3	82.9	83.2	83.6	83.7	83.8
	Women	65.5	58.9	70.3	71.1	71.8	71.3	71.5	72.1	72.4	73.4	73.0
Brazil	<b>Total</b>	<b>63.6</b>	<b>59.3</b>	<b>61.3</b>	<b>62.4</b>	<b>61.8</b>	<b>61.6</b>	<b>61.6</b>	<b>61.8</b>	<b>62.2</b>	<b>61.9</b>	<b>62.1</b>
	Men	73.5	69.8	71.6	72.4	71.9	71.6	71.7	72.0	72.3	72.2	72.3
	Women	54.3	49.5	51.6	53.0	52.3	52.2	52.1	52.3	52.7	52.3	52.6
Chile	<b>Total</b>	<b>62.8</b>	<b>56.1</b>	<b>57.2</b>	<b>59.8</b>	<b>61.2</b>	<b>61.0</b>	<b>60.9</b>	<b>60.9</b>	<b>61.8</b>	<b>62.4</b>	<b>62.1</b>
	Men	73.6	67.3	68.5	70.2	71.0	71.4	70.7	70.6	71.4	72.4	71.9
	Women	52.5	45.3	46.4	49.8	51.7	51.1	51.5	51.7	52.6	52.8	52.8
Colombia <sup>e</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>62.9</b>	<b>58.6</b>	<b>61.5</b>	<b>63.6</b>	<b>64.1</b>	<b>63.8</b>	<b>64.3</b>	<b>64.5</b>	<b>64.0</b>	<b>63.7</b>	<b>63.9</b>
	Men	73.7	70.7	75.7	76.5	76.6	76.5	76.7	76.8	76.5	76.3	76.6
	Women	52.5	47.3	48.4	51.8	52.6	52.1	52.8	53.1	52.4	52.0	52.3
Costa Rica	<b>Total</b>	<b>62.5</b>	<b>60.2</b>	<b>60.3</b>	<b>59.8</b>	<b>55.4</b>	<b>56.8</b>	<b>56.6</b>	<b>54.3</b>	<b>53.8</b>	<b>55.9</b>	<b>56.2</b>
	Men	74.4	72.2	71.8	71.5	68.4	68.9	69.5	68.1	67.1	68.1	68.7
	Women	50.6	48.1	48.7	48.5	42.3	44.5	43.6	40.5	40.5	43.7	43.5
Cuba	<b>Total</b>	<b>65.2</b>	<b>66.4</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Men	76.0	76.8	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Women	53.3	54.9	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Dominican Republic	<b>Total</b>	<b>65.1</b>	<b>60.2</b>	<b>63.0</b>	<b>63.1</b>	<b>64.1</b>	<b>63.7</b>	<b>63.7</b>	<b>64.1</b>	<b>64.9</b>	<b>64.9</b>	<b>65.3</b>
	Men	78.4	74.0	75.7	76.8	76.7	76.5	76.2	76.6	77.6	77.9	78.0
	Women	52.6	47.6	51.2	50.7	52.6	52.0	52.2	52.8	53.3	53.2	53.9
Ecuador <sup>f</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>66.2</b>	<b>62.5</b>	<b>66.1</b>	<b>66.3</b>	<b>65.2</b>	<b>65.5</b>	<b>64.4</b>	<b>65.6</b>	<b>65.1</b>	<b>64.5</b>	<b>64.8</b>
	Men	78.3	73.8	78.4	78.2	77.5	77.7	77.2	77.8	77.3	76.9	77.2
	Women	54.5	51.3	54.4	55.0	53.4	53.9	52.3	53.9	53.3	52.7	52.9
El Salvador	<b>Total</b>	<b>62.2</b>	<b>61.4</b>	<b>61.4</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Men	80.5	79.0	79.0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Women	46.8	46.6	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Grenada	<b>Total</b>	<b>68.4</b>	<b>65.1</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Men	74.6	71.8	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Women	62.6	59.0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Guatemala	<b>Total</b>	<b>59.2</b>	...	<b>63.0</b>	<b>60.2</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Men	83.7	...	85.6	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Women	37.9	...	43.3	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Honduras <sup>g</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>57.3</b>	<b>59.5</b>	<b>60.7</b>	<b>58.2</b>	<b>54.5</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Men	75.1	73.3	74.3	75.5	74.4	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Women	41.4	47.8	48.7	43.3	38.1	...	...	...	...	...	...
Jamaica <sup>h</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>62.8</b>	<b>62.5</b>	<b>63.2</b>	<b>64.6</b>	<b>65.5</b>	<b>65.4</b>	<b>65.6</b>	<b>65.5</b>	...	<b>68.9</b>	<b>68.8</b>
	Men	69.6	69.2	69.7	70.4	71.3	70.9	71.2	71.7	...	74.5	74.5
	Women	56.3	56.0	57.0	58.4	60.0	60.2	60.1	59.6	...	63.6	63.3

		2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2023				2024	
							Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2
Mexico <sup>i</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>60.1</b>	<b>55.6</b>	<b>58.8</b>	<b>59.8</b>	<b>60.4</b>	<b>60.2</b>	<b>60.2</b>	<b>60.6</b>	<b>60.5</b>	<b>60.0</b>	<b>60.2</b>
	Men	77.2	71.7	75.7	76.3	76.4	76.3	76.1	76.6	76.4	75.9	76.2
	Women	44.7	41.0	43.6	45.0	46.3	45.9	46.1	46.4	46.5	45.9	46.3
Nicaragua	<b>Total</b>	<b>71.1</b>	<b>69.1</b>	<b>67.5</b>	<b>66.7</b>	<b>67.4</b>	<b>67.2</b>	<b>66.9</b>	<b>67.5</b>	<b>67.8</b>	<b>67.9</b>	<b>66.8</b>
	Men	82.3	80.6	79.8	79.5	79.7	79.6	79.1	80.0	79.8	79.2	78.4
	Women	61.0	58.7	56.5	55.5	56.5	56.3	56.1	56.5	57.3	58.0	56.8
Panama <sup>j</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>65.7</b>	<b>63.0</b>	<b>58.7</b>	<b>62.3</b>	<b>62.4</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Men	77.9	74.0	72.2	76.0	74.9	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Women	54.2	53.2	46.2	49.7	50.8	...	...	...	...	...	...
Paraguay <sup>k</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>72.4</b>	<b>70.2</b>	<b>72.1</b>	<b>70.6</b>	<b>70.3</b>	<b>70.1</b>	<b>71.4</b>	<b>70.8</b>	<b>71.1</b>	<b>70.5</b>	<b>69.5</b>
	Men	84.8	83.5	84.4	82.5	82.7	83.1	82.3	83.3	83.3	83.1	81.5
	Women	60.2	57.4	60.1	59.0	58.7	57.4	60.7	59.0	59.6	58.7	58.2
Peru <sup>l</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>72.7</b>	<b>62.3</b>	<b>70.9</b>	<b>71.4</b>	<b>70.1</b>	<b>70.2</b>	<b>70.6</b>	<b>69.9</b>	<b>69.6</b>	<b>70.1</b>	<b>70.2</b>
	Men	81.1	72.1	79.5	76.6	78.4	78.8	78.6	78.4	77.7	78.7	77.9
	Women	64.5	53.2	62.5	63.3	62.0	62.7	62.1	61.6	61.7	61.7	62.7
Saint Lucia <sup>m</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>71.0</b>	<b>68.8</b>	<b>69.9</b>	<b>71.3</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Men	75.7	74.1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Women	66.5	64.3	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Trinidad and Tobago <sup>n</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>57.4</b>	<b>56.6</b>	<b>54.8</b>	<b>55.0</b>	<b>55.6</b>	<b>55.2</b>	<b>56.2</b>	<b>55.6</b>	<b>55.5</b>	<b>54.7</b>	...
	Men	66.1	65.4	63.1	62.7	64.6	65.6	65.4	64.0	63.3	62.7	...
	Women	48.7	47.8	46.8	47.6	47.1	45.4	47.0	47.6	48.2	47.6	...
Uruguay <sup>o</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>62.2</b>	<b>60.5</b>	<b>61.8</b>	<b>62.0</b>	<b>63.4</b>	<b>62.7</b>	<b>63.2</b>	<b>63.6</b>	<b>63.9</b>	<b>64.2</b>	<b>64.0</b>
	Men	70.1	67.9	69.1	70.0	72.0	71.2	71.9	72.5	72.5	73.0	72.8
	Women	54.9	53.8	55.0	54.6	55.4	55.0	55.3	55.5	55.9	56.1	55.8

**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

**Note:** Percentage of the labor force relative to the working-age population. The data relating to the different countries are not comparable owing to differences in coverage and in the definition of the working-age population. Data for 2020 and 2021 may present comparability problems with respect to the data for 2019, owing to adjustments to statistical processes made by national statistical offices in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

<sup>a</sup> 31 urban agglomerates.

<sup>b</sup> Data for 2019 are preliminary and are being reviewed.

<sup>c</sup> Data for 2018 refer to April. Data for the third quarters of 2019 and 2020 are from the September survey and data for 2020 are from the telephone survey.

<sup>d</sup> New measurement since 2016 through the Continuous Employment Survey (ECE); data not comparable with previous years. Quarterly data for 2019 and 2020 include urban coverage.

<sup>e</sup> Does not include hidden unemployment.

<sup>f</sup> Does not include hidden unemployment. The average for the second quarter of 2020 refers to May and June; the averages for the third and fourth quarters of 2020 refer to September and December, respectively.

<sup>g</sup> The 2020 data are preliminary and refer to the telephone survey conducted in November and December.

<sup>h</sup> Does not include hidden unemployment. The 2020 annual average refers to the figures from the first, third and fourth quarters.

<sup>i</sup> The average data for the second and third quarters of 2019 are from the National Occupation and Employment Survey (ENOE), those for the second quarter of 2020 are from the Telephone Survey of Occupation and Employment (ETOE), and those for the third and fourth quarters of 2020 are from the new edition of the National Occupation and Employment Survey.

<sup>j</sup> Excludes hidden unemployment except for 2020 and is therefore not comparable with the rest of the series. Data for the third quarter of 2020 refer to a telephone survey conducted between September and October. Data for 2021 refer to October. Data for 2022 refer to April.

<sup>k</sup> New measurement from 2017 onward through the Continuous Permanent Household Survey (EPHC); data not comparable with previous years.

<sup>l</sup> Data for the first, second, third and fourth quarters of 2020 are preliminary.

<sup>m</sup> The figure for the first half of 2020 refers to data from the first quarter.

<sup>n</sup> The 2020 annual average refers to the first half of the year.

<sup>o</sup> The averages for the first quarter of 2020 are from the Continuous Household Survey (ECH) for January and February; for March, the data are from the Telephone Continuous Household Survey. The average for the second quarter of 2020 refers to the April, May and June Telephone Continuous Household Survey; the averages for the third quarter refer to the July, August and September Telephone Continuous Household Survey; and those for the fourth quarter refer to the October, November and December Telephone Continuous Household Survey. The annual average is preliminary.

Table A4.2

Latin America and the Caribbean: unemployment rate  
(Average rates)

		2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2023				2024	
							Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2
Argentina <sup>a</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>9.8</b>	<b>11.5</b>	<b>8.8</b>	<b>6.8</b>	<b>6.1</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>6.2</b>	<b>5.7</b>	<b>5.7</b>	<b>7.7</b>	<b>7.6</b>
	Men	9.2	10.8	7.9	6.1	5.6	6.1	5.7	5.3	5.4	7.0	6.9
	Women	10.7	12.4	9.9	7.6	6.8	7.8	6.9	6.3	6.1	8.4	8.4
Bahamas	<b>Total</b>	<b>9.5</b>	...	...	...	<b>8.8</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Men	9.2	...	...	...	9.1	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Women	9.9	...	...	...	8.5	...	...	...	...	...	...
Barbados <sup>b</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>9.6</b>	<b>15.6</b>	<b>14.1</b>	<b>8.4</b>	<b>7.9</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Men	11.0	15.6	13.7	8.0	7.6	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Women	8.1	15.7	14.5	8.9	8.2	...	...	...	...	...	...
Belize <sup>c</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>9.1</b>	<b>13.7</b>	<b>21.1</b>	<b>6.8</b>	<b>2.9</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Men	5.9	11.6	21.1	4.0	2.4	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Women	13.5	17.0	21.1	6.0	3.6	...	...	...	...	...	...
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) <sup>d</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>3.7</b>	<b>4.2</b>	<b>5.1</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.6</b>	<b>2.8</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>2.8</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>2.8</b>
	Men	3.5	4.1	4.6	3.0	2.6	3.1	2.5	2.4	2.6	2.5	2.3
	Women	4.0	4.3	5.6	4.1	3.4	4.2	3.2	3.0	3.1	3.6	3.3
Brazil	<b>Total</b>	<b>12.0</b>	<b>13.8</b>	<b>13.2</b>	<b>9.3</b>	<b>8.0</b>	<b>8.8</b>	<b>8.0</b>	<b>7.7</b>	<b>7.4</b>	<b>7.9</b>	<b>6.9</b>
	Men	10.1	11.8	10.7	7.5	6.6	7.2	6.9	6.4	6.0	6.5	5.6
	Women	14.4	16.3	16.5	11.5	9.7	10.8	9.6	9.3	9.2	9.8	8.6
Chile	<b>Total</b>	<b>7.2</b>	<b>10.8</b>	<b>8.9</b>	<b>7.9</b>	<b>8.7</b>	<b>8.8</b>	<b>8.5</b>	<b>8.9</b>	<b>8.5</b>	<b>8.7</b>	<b>8.3</b>
	Men	6.7	10.6	8.6	7.4	8.4	8.3	8.2	8.7	8.2	8.0	7.9
	Women	8.0	11.0	9.2	8.5	9.1	9.5	8.9	9.2	8.8	9.5	9.0
Colombia <sup>e</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>9.9</b>	<b>15.1</b>	<b>13.8</b>	<b>11.2</b>	<b>10.2</b>	<b>11.7</b>	<b>10.2</b>	<b>9.4</b>	<b>9.4</b>	<b>11.9</b>	<b>10.4</b>
	Men	7.8	12.3	11.3	9.0	8.2	9.2	8.1	7.7	7.8	9.6	8.7
	Women	12.6	19.2	17.3	14.3	12.8	15.1	12.9	11.6	11.6	15.0	12.7
Costa Rica	<b>Total</b>	<b>11.8</b>	<b>19.6</b>	<b>16.4</b>	<b>12.2</b>	<b>8.9</b>	<b>10.6</b>	<b>9.6</b>	<b>8.1</b>	<b>7.3</b>	<b>7.8</b>	<b>8.5</b>
	Men	9.3	15.6	12.7	9.4	7.7	8.4	8.0	7.5	6.8	7.2	7.6
	Women	15.3	25.7	22.0	16.5	10.8	14.1	12.1	9.0	8.2	8.7	9.9
Cuba	<b>Total</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.4</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Men	1.2	1.3	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Women	1.2	1.6	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Dominican Republic	<b>Total</b>	<b>6.2</b>	<b>5.8</b>	<b>7.4</b>	<b>5.3</b>	<b>5.3</b>	<b>5.2</b>	<b>5.6</b>	<b>5.4</b>	<b>5.0</b>	<b>5.1</b>	<b>5.3</b>
	Men	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.2	3.0	3.2	3.1
	Women	9.3	8.6	12.1	8.2	8.0	7.6	8.6	8.2	7.7	7.7	8.3
Ecuador <sup>f</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>3.8</b>	<b>6.2</b>	<b>4.6</b>	<b>3.8</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>3.3</b>	<b>3.8</b>	<b>3.2</b>
	Men	3.2	5.3	3.7	3.3	2.8	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.7	3.3	2.7
	Women	4.6	7.6	5.8	4.5	4.1	4.0	4.4	4.2	4.0	4.5	3.8
El Salvador	<b>Total</b>	<b>6.3</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>6.3</b>	<b>5.0</b>	<b>5.2</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Men	7.0	7.1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Women	5.4	6.6	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Guatemala	<b>Total</b>	<b>2.2</b>	...	<b>2.2</b>	<b>3.0</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Men	1.8	...	1.8	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Women	3.0	...	2.9	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Honduras <sup>g</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>5.7</b>	<b>10.9</b>	<b>8.6</b>	<b>8.2</b>	<b>7.4</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Men	4.2	8.7	7.0	4.7	5.3	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Women	8.1	13.7	10.7	11.4	10.7	...	...	...	...	...	...
Jamaica <sup>h</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>5.0</b>	<b>6.6</b>	<b>5.2</b>	<b>3.9</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>4.2</b>	...	<b>5.4</b>	<b>4.2</b>
	Men	3.8	5.8	4.2	3.1	3.3	3.4	3.3	3.1	...	4.0	3.3
	Women	6.5	7.6	6.5	4.8	5.6	5.7	5.8	5.4	...	7.1	5.3
Mexico <sup>i</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>4.1</b>	<b>3.3</b>	<b>2.8</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>2.8</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>2.7</b>
	Men	3.5	4.7	4.1	3.2	2.8	2.6	2.8	3.0	2.7	2.4	2.7
	Women	3.5	4.1	4.2	3.3	2.8	2.7	2.8	3.0	2.7	2.7	2.6

		2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2023				2024	
							Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2
Nicaragua	<b>Total</b>	<b>5.4</b>	<b>5.0</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>3.2</b>	<b>3.6</b>	<b>3.3</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>3.7</b>	<b>3.4</b>
	Men	5.4	5.2	4.6	3.5	3.2	3.1	3.5	3.3	3.0	3.6	3.1
	Women	5.5	4.7	4.4	3.5	3.5	3.2	3.7	3.4	3.8	3.8	3.7
Panama <sup>j</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>5.8</b>	<b>18.6</b>	<b>8.5</b>	<b>8.2</b>	<b>5.8</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Men	4.8	13.6	8.0	6.9	4.4	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Women	7.3	24.7	9.3	9.9	7.7	...	...	...	...	...	...
Paraguay <sup>k</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>6.6</b>	<b>7.7</b>	<b>7.5</b>	<b>6.8</b>	<b>5.9</b>	<b>6.5</b>	<b>5.8</b>	<b>6.0</b>	<b>5.2</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>6.4</b>
	Men	5.5	5.9	5.9	5.9	4.8	4.7	5.5	4.5	4.6	5.3	5.2
	Women	8.0	10.2	9.7	8.1	7.3	9.0	6.3	7.8	6.1	9.1	8.0
Peru <sup>l</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>3.9</b>	<b>7.7</b>	<b>5.9</b>	<b>4.7</b>	<b>5.4</b>	<b>5.9</b>	<b>5.3</b>	<b>5.1</b>	<b>5.3</b>	<b>6.4</b>	<b>5.9</b>
	Men	3.5	7.6	5.2	3.8	4.5	4.8	4.7	4.4	4.3	5.4	5.2
	Women	4.5	7.7	6.6	5.7	6.4	7.1	6.1	6.1	6.5	7.6	6.7
Saint Lucia <sup>m</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>16.8</b>	<b>21.7</b>	<b>23.1</b>	<b>16.5</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Men	14.9	18.5	21.4	14.8	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Women	18.9	25.0	24.9	18.6	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Trinidad and Tobago <sup>n</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>4.7</b>	<b>5.4</b>	<b>4.9</b>	<b>4.0</b>	<b>4.9</b>	<b>3.7</b>	<b>3.2</b>	<b>4.1</b>	<b>5.4</b>	...
	Men	3.7	4.6	4.8	4.4	3.5	4.2	3.5	2.6	3.8	4.8	...
	Women	5.1	4.8	6.1	5.6	4.6	5.8	3.9	4.1	4.5	6.1	...
Uruguay <sup>o</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>8.9</b>	<b>10.1</b>	<b>9.3</b>	<b>7.9</b>	<b>8.3</b>	<b>8.4</b>	<b>8.6</b>	<b>8.1</b>	<b>8.2</b>	<b>8.6</b>	<b>8.5</b>
	Men	7.3	8.7	7.9	6.9	7.4	7.6	7.5	7.4	7.1	7.6	7.8
	Women	10.7	12.4	11.0	9.0	9.4	9.3	9.8	8.9	9.6	9.8	9.5

**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

**Note:** Percentage of unemployed population in relation to the labour force. Data for different countries are not comparable owing to differences in coverage and in the definition of the working-age population. Data for 2020 and 2021 may present comparability problems with respect to the data for 2019, owing to adjustments to statistical processes made by national statistical and census offices in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

<sup>a</sup> 31 urban agglomerates.

<sup>b</sup> Data for 2019 are preliminary and are being reviewed.

<sup>c</sup> Data for 2018 refer to April. Data for the third quarters of 2019 and 2020 are from the September survey and data for 2020 are from the telephone survey.

<sup>d</sup> New measurement as of 2016 through the Continuous Employment Survey (ECE); data not comparable with previous years. Quarterly data for 2019 and 2020 include urban coverage.

<sup>e</sup> Does not include hidden unemployment.

<sup>f</sup> Does not include hidden unemployment. The average for the second quarter of 2020 refers to May and June; the averages for the third and fourth quarters of 2020 refer to September and December, respectively.

<sup>g</sup> The 2020 data are preliminary and refer to the telephone survey conducted in November and December.

<sup>h</sup> Does not include hidden unemployment. The 2020 annual average refers to the figures from the first, third and fourth quarters.

<sup>i</sup> The average data for the second and third quarters of 2019 are from the National Occupation and Employment Survey (ENOE), those for the second quarter of 2020 are from the Telephone Survey of Occupation and Employment (ETOE), and those for the third and fourth quarters of 2020 are from the new edition of the National Occupation and Employment Survey.

<sup>j</sup> Excludes hidden unemployment except for 2020 and is therefore not comparable with the rest of the series. Data for the third quarter of 2020 refer to a telephone survey conducted between September and October. Data for 2021 refer to October. Data for 2022 refer to April.

<sup>k</sup> New measurement from 2017 onward through the Continuous Permanent Household Survey (EPHC); data not comparable with previous years.

<sup>l</sup> Data for the first, second, third and fourth quarters of 2020 are preliminary.

<sup>m</sup> The figure for the first half of 2020 refers to data from the first quarter.

<sup>n</sup> The 2020 annual average refers to the first half of the year.

<sup>o</sup> The averages for the first quarter of 2020 are from the Continuous Household Survey (ECH) for January and February; for March the data are from the Telephone Continuous Household Survey. The average for the second quarter of 2020 refers to the April, May and June Telephone Continuous Household Survey; the averages for the third quarter refer to the July, August and September Telephone Continuous Household Survey; and those for the fourth quarter refer to the October, November and December Telephone Continuous Household Survey. The annual average is preliminary.

Table A4.3

Latin America and the Caribbean: employment rate  
(Average rates)

		2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2023				2024	
							Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2
Argentina <sup>a</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>53.3</b>	<b>48.6</b>	<b>53.9</b>	<b>56.0</b>	<b>57.2</b>	<b>56.9</b>	<b>56.5</b>	<b>57.6</b>	<b>57.9</b>	<b>55.8</b>	<b>56.5</b>
	Men	63.5	57.9	63.9	65.7	66.7	66.5	65.9	66.9	67.3	64.5	65.3
	Women	44.1	40.2	44.7	47.1	48.6	48.1	48.0	49.1	49.3	47.8	48.3
Bahamas	<b>Total</b>	...	...	...	...	<b>69.2</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Men	...	...	...	...	66.7	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Women	...	...	...	...	70.0	...	...	...	...	...	...
Barbados <sup>b</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>57.6</b>	<b>51.1</b>	<b>52.6</b>	<b>57.6</b>	<b>57.4</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Men	60.6	54.7	56.4	62.0	61.9	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Women	54.9	47.8	49.2	53.7	53.3	...	...	...	...	...	...
Belize <sup>c</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>62.0</b>	<b>47.6</b>	<b>53.0</b>	...	<b>56.4</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Men	75.7	60.7	62.5	...	69.8	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Women	48.3	35.2	37.5	...	43.5	...	...	...	...	...	...
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) <sup>d</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>70.3</b>	<b>65.8</b>	<b>72.9</b>	<b>74.5</b>	<b>75.1</b>	<b>74.4</b>	<b>74.8</b>	<b>75.4</b>	<b>75.7</b>	<b>76.0</b>	<b>76.1</b>
	Men	78.0	74.4	79.6	81.2	81.1	80.7	80.8	81.2	81.5	81.6	81.9
	Women	62.9	57.6	66.4	68.2	69.4	68.3	69.2	69.9	70.1	70.8	70.6
Brazil	<b>Total</b>	<b>56.0</b>	<b>51.1</b>	<b>53.2</b>	<b>56.6</b>	<b>56.9</b>	<b>56.1</b>	<b>56.6</b>	<b>57.1</b>	<b>57.6</b>	<b>57.0</b>	<b>57.8</b>
	Men	66.1	61.5	64.0	67.0	67.2	66.4	66.8	67.4	68.0	67.5	68.3
	Women	46.5	41.4	43.1	46.9	47.2	46.5	47.1	47.4	47.9	47.2	48.1
Chile	<b>Total</b>	<b>58.3</b>	<b>50.1</b>	<b>52.1</b>	<b>55.1</b>	<b>55.9</b>	<b>55.7</b>	<b>55.7</b>	<b>55.5</b>	<b>56.6</b>	<b>57.0</b>	<b>56.9</b>
	Men	68.7	60.3	62.6	65.0	65.1	65.4	64.9	64.4	65.5	66.6	66.2
	Women	48.4	40.4	42.1	45.6	47.0	46.3	46.9	46.9	48.0	47.8	48.0
Colombia <sup>e</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>56.6</b>	<b>49.8</b>	<b>53.1</b>	<b>56.5</b>	<b>57.6</b>	<b>56.4</b>	<b>57.7</b>	<b>58.4</b>	<b>58.0</b>	<b>56.1</b>	<b>57.3</b>
	Men	67.9	61.8	67.2	69.6	70.4	69.5	70.5	71.0	70.5	69.0	69.9
	Women	45.9	38.3	40.0	44.4	45.9	44.3	45.9	46.9	46.3	44.2	45.6
Costa Rica	<b>Total</b>	<b>55.2</b>	<b>48.5</b>	<b>50.4</b>	<b>52.5</b>	<b>50.4</b>	<b>50.7</b>	<b>51.2</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>49.9</b>	<b>51.5</b>	<b>51.4</b>
	Men	67.4	61.0	62.7	64.8	63.1	63.1	63.9	63.0	62.5	63.1	63.5
	Women	42.8	35.9	38.0	40.5	37.7	38.2	38.4	36.9	37.2	39.9	39.2
Cuba	<b>Total</b>	<b>64.4</b>	<b>65.4</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Men	75.1	75.8	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Women	52.7	54.0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Dominican Republic	<b>Total</b>	<b>61.0</b>	<b>56.7</b>	<b>58.3</b>	<b>59.8</b>	<b>60.7</b>	<b>60.4</b>	<b>60.1</b>	<b>60.7</b>	<b>61.7</b>	<b>61.6</b>	<b>61.9</b>
	Men	75.3	71.1	72.7	74.4	74.2	73.9	73.6	74.1	75.2	75.4	75.6
	Women	47.8	43.5	45.0	46.5	48.4	48.0	47.7	48.5	49.3	49.1	49.4
Ecuador <sup>f</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>63.7</b>	<b>58.5</b>	<b>62.7</b>	<b>63.5</b>	<b>62.7</b>	<b>63.0</b>	<b>62.0</b>	<b>63.1</b>	<b>62.7</b>	<b>61.9</b>	<b>62.6</b>
	Men	75.8	74.5	75.1	75.3	75.1	75.1	74.7	75.4	75.0	74.2	74.9
	Women	52.0	48.7	51.0	52.2	50.9	51.5	49.8	51.4	51.0	50.1	50.8
El Salvador	<b>Total</b>	<b>58.2</b>	<b>57.2</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Men	74.9	73.4	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Women	44.3	43.5	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Grenada	<b>Total</b>	<b>57.9</b>	<b>50.5</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Men	64.4	58.5	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Women	54.0	43.1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Guatemala	<b>Total</b>	<b>57.9</b>	...	<b>61.6</b>	<b>58.4</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Men	82.1	...	84.0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Women	36.7	...	42.0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Honduras <sup>g</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>54.1</b>	<b>53.0</b>	<b>54.7</b>	<b>54.0</b>	<b>50.5</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Men	71.9	66.9	69.1	70.3	70.5	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Women	38.0	41.2	43.5	38.4	34.0	...	...	...	...	...	...
Jamaica <sup>h</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>57.4</b>	<b>58.4</b>	<b>59.4</b>	<b>60.4</b>	<b>62.6</b>	<b>62.5</b>	...	<b>62.8</b>	...	<b>65.2</b>	<b>65.9</b>
	Men	66.9	63.6	65.0	67.1	68.9	68.5	...	69.5	...	71.5	72.0
	Women	52.7	50.0	51.1	53.9	56.6	56.8	...	56.4	...	59.1	60.0

		2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2023				2024	
							Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2
Mexico <sup>i</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>58.0</b>	<b>53.1</b>	<b>56.4</b>	<b>57.8</b>	<b>58.7</b>	<b>58.6</b>	<b>58.5</b>	<b>58.8</b>	<b>58.9</b>	<b>58.5</b>	<b>58.6</b>
	Men	74.5	68.3	72.6	73.8	74.3	74.3	74.0	74.3	74.4	74.1	74.1
	Women	43.1	39.3	41.8	43.5	45.0	44.7	44.8	45.0	45.3	44.7	45.1
Nicaragua	<b>Total</b>	<b>67.2</b>	<b>65.6</b>	<b>64.5</b>	<b>64.3</b>	<b>65.1</b>	<b>65.1</b>	<b>64.5</b>	<b>65.3</b>	<b>65.5</b>	<b>65.7</b>	<b>64.5</b>
	Men	77.8	76.4	76.1	76.7	77.1	77.1	76.4	77.4	77.4	76.7	75.9
	Women	57.7	56.0	54.0	53.5	54.5	54.5	54.0	54.6	55.1	56.0	54.7
Panama <sup>j</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>61.8</b>	<b>51.3</b>	<b>53.5</b>	<b>56.1</b>	<b>57.8</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Men	74.2	64.0	66.2	69.3	70.4	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Women	50.2	40.1	41.8	44.0	46.1	...	...	...	...	...	...
Paraguay <sup>k</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>67.6</b>	<b>64.8</b>	<b>66.7</b>	<b>65.8</b>	<b>66.2</b>	<b>65.6</b>	<b>67.2</b>	<b>66.6</b>	<b>67.4</b>	<b>65.7</b>	<b>65.1</b>
	Men	80.2	78.5	79.4	77.7	78.7	79.2	78.0	79.5	79.5	78.7	77.3
	Women	55.3	51.6	54.2	54.2	54.4	52.3	56.7	54.4	56.0	53.3	53.5
Peru <sup>l</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>69.8</b>	<b>58.8</b>	<b>66.9</b>	<b>68.8</b>	<b>66.3</b>	<b>66.1</b>	<b>66.9</b>	<b>66.3</b>	<b>66.0</b>	<b>65.6</b>	<b>66.1</b>
	Men	77.7	67.4	75.4	77.1	74.8	75.8	75.4	75.0	74.4	74.5	73.8
	Women	61.8	49.5	58.6	61.4	58.0	59.3	58.5	57.9	57.7	57.0	58.5
Saint Lucia <sup>m</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>59.0</b>	<b>53.9</b>	<b>53.7</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Men	64.4	59.4	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Women	53.9	48.7	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Trinidad and Tobago <sup>n</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>54.9</b>	<b>53.9</b>	<b>51.9</b>	<b>52.3</b>	<b>53.4</b>	<b>52.5</b>	<b>54.1</b>	<b>53.8</b>	<b>53.2</b>	<b>51.8</b>	...
	Men	63.6	62.4	60.1	59.9	62.3	62.8	63.1	62.3	60.9	59.7	...
	Women	46.2	45.5	43.9	44.9	44.9	42.8	45.2	45.6	46.1	44.7	...
Uruguay <sup>o</sup>	<b>Total</b>	<b>56.7</b>	<b>54.3</b>	<b>56.0</b>	<b>57.1</b>	<b>58.1</b>	<b>57.5</b>	<b>57.8</b>	<b>58.5</b>	<b>58.6</b>	<b>58.7</b>	<b>58.5</b>
	Men	64.9	62.1	63.7	65.2	66.7	65.7	66.5	67.1	67.4	67.5	67.1
	Women	49.0	47.1	49.0	49.7	50.2	49.9	49.9	50.5	50.6	50.6	50.5

**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

**Note:** Percentage of employed population in relation to the labour force. Data for different countries are not comparable owing to differences in coverage and in the definition of the working-age population. Data for 2020 and 2021 may present comparability problems with respect to the data for 2019, owing to adjustments to statistical processes made by national statistical and census offices in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

<sup>a</sup> 31 urban agglomerates.

<sup>b</sup> Data for 2019 are preliminary and are being reviewed.

<sup>c</sup> Data for 2018 refer to April. Data for the third quarters of 2019 and 2020 are from the September survey and data for 2020 are from the telephone survey.

<sup>d</sup> New measurement since 2016 through the Continuous Employment Survey (ECE); data not comparable with previous years. Quarterly data for 2019 and 2020 include urban coverage.

<sup>e</sup> Does not include hidden unemployment.

<sup>f</sup> Does not include hidden unemployment. The average for the second quarter of 2020 refers to May and June; the averages for the third and fourth quarters of 2020 refer to September and December, respectively.

<sup>g</sup> The 2020 data are preliminary and refer to the telephone survey conducted in November and December.

<sup>h</sup> Does not include hidden unemployment. The 2020 annual average refers to the figures from the first, third and fourth quarters.

<sup>i</sup> The average data for the second and third quarters of 2019 are from the National Occupation and Employment Survey (ENOE), those for the second quarter of 2020 are from the Telephone Survey of Occupation and Employment (ETOE), and those for the third and fourth quarters of 2020 are from the new edition of the National Occupation and Employment Survey.

<sup>j</sup> Excludes hidden unemployment except for 2020 and is therefore not comparable with the rest of the series. Data for the third quarter of 2020 refer to a telephone survey conducted between September and October. Data for 2021 refer to October. Data for 2022 refer to April.

<sup>k</sup> New measurement from 2017 onward through the Continuous Permanent Household Survey (EPHC); data not comparable with previous years.

<sup>l</sup> Data for the second, third and fourth quarters of 2020 are preliminary.

<sup>m</sup> The figure for the first half of 2020 refers to data from the first quarter.

<sup>n</sup> The 2020 annual average refers to the first half of the year.

<sup>o</sup> The averages for the first quarter of 2020 are from the Continuous Household Survey (ECH) for January and February; for March, the data are from the telephone ECH. The average for the second quarter of 2020 refers to the April, May and June Telephone Continuous Household Survey; the averages for the third quarter refer to the July, August and September Telephone Continuous Household Survey; and those for the fourth quarter refer to the October, November and December Telephone Continuous Household Survey. The annual average is preliminary.

Table A4.4

Latin America: real average wages  
(Index: 2018 = 100)

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2023				2024	
						Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2
Argentina <sup>a</sup>	92.0	91.6	88.5	88.5	86.4	87.6	86.7	88.4	83.1	75.4	79.5
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) <sup>b</sup>	99.6	99.3	100.7	100.1	97.4	97.5	97.8	97.2	97.1	...	...
Brazil <sup>c</sup>	100.5	105.4	97.8	100.2	105.4	104.4	104.2	106.1	106.9	108.4	111.4
Chile <sup>d</sup>	102.1	102.6	103.7	101.9	103.7	102.8	103.5	104.3	104.1	104.6	105.0
Colombia <sup>e</sup>	100.8	95.9	101.9	104.1	104.3	102.9	105.0	104.4	104.7	105.3	107.5
Costa Rica <sup>f</sup>	103.7	106.1	105.9	101.3	105.4	101.8	104.9	105.8	109.1	108.9	109.7
Ecuador <sup>g</sup>	101.0	114.6	120.8	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
El Salvador <sup>h</sup>	101.3	101.2	105.8	103.9	101.7	101.7	...	...	...	...	...
Mexico <sup>i</sup>	102.9	106.9	108.4	111.2	116.9	116.1	118.0	117.5	115.8	122.5	123.5
Nicaragua <sup>j</sup>	99.5	98.5	98.0	95.5	93.8	92.0	94.3	94.5	94.5	95.4	95.9
Panama <sup>k</sup>	102.4	101.0	107.5	115.2	118.3	111.5	117.8	120.1	123.8	...	125.1
Paraguay <sup>l</sup>	101.5	100.6	97.7	95.5	97.3	96.3	96.3	98.3	98.3	...	...
Peru <sup>m</sup>	99.4	94.3	98.3	98.0	95.8	97.4	84.6	98.6	102.8	99.3	88.8
Uruguay <sup>n</sup>	101.3	99.5	98.1	97.5	101.4	100.6	100.0	102.1	102.9	105.4	104.5

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

Note: Average wage deflated by the official consumer price index of each country.

<sup>a</sup> Private sector average wage index.

<sup>b</sup> Average nominal private sector wage.

<sup>c</sup> Average income from main job.

<sup>d</sup> Compensation index. Private sector workers.

<sup>e</sup> Manufacturing industry real wage index.

<sup>f</sup> Average monthly income in the main job.

<sup>g</sup> Compensation index.

<sup>h</sup> Average declared salary of private contributors to social security.

<sup>i</sup> Wages associated with workers insured by the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS).

<sup>j</sup> Average salary of workers insured with the Nicaraguan Social Security Institute (INSS).

<sup>k</sup> Remunerations paid (companies with five or more employees).

<sup>l</sup> Index of wages and salaries.

<sup>m</sup> Average income from work.

<sup>n</sup> Average Wage Index.

Table A4.5

Latin America: real minimum wages

(Index: 2018=100)

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2023				2024		
						Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3
Argentina	89.0	80.9	76.6	79.4	78.8	79.0	79.0	82.5	74.8	53.5	55.3	57.4
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	101.2	100.2	101.4	103.7	106.1	107.0	106.6	105.6	105.3	110.5	108.8	106.3
Brazil	100.8	102.3	99.5	100.3	104.4	106.0	104.4	104.0	103.1	108.7	107.5	106.6
Chile	104.1	107.9	105.6	109.5	117.5	111.9	116.2	120.0	122.0	120.7	119.3	128.4
Colombia	102.4	105.9	105.9	105.9	109.8	113.0	110.3	108.7	107.3	117.5	115.4	114.6
Costa Rica	100.9	102.7	102.2	97.1	103.7	102.8	103.8	104.2	104.1	106.3	106.1	106.1
Dominican Republic	103.9	108.0	107.3	110.2	116.9	106.2	121.7	120.4	119.3	118.2	122.6	121.1
Ecuador	101.8	103.7	103.6	106.4	110.2	111.1	110.6	109.4	109.6	111.9	110.7	110.2
El Salvador	99.9	100.3	104.9	108.6	104.3	104.7	104.5	104.2	103.8	103.8	103.1	103.0
Guatemala	96.4	96.3	92.3	90.5	89.2	90.5	90.1	88.8	87.6	91.6	91.1	90.3
Haiti	99.5	93.8	81.9	80.4	61.2	63.9	61.9	59.4	59.7	51.4	47.6	...
Honduras	100.4	101.9	99.4	98.0	100.9	102.4	101.5	100.2	99.3	103.2	102.1	100.9
Jamaica	103.2	98.6	93.3	102.4	128.1	104.5	119.2	146.1	142.3	141.9	149.9	159.4
Mexico	112.1	130.1	141.6	160.2	182.0	183.8	183.5	181.7	179.0	211.1	210.2	207.6
Nicaragua	99.1	97.6	95.7	92.3	93.3	90.7	94.8	94.2	93.5	94.7	99.2	99.2
Panama	100.4	102.9	101.2	98.4	97.0	97.5	97.0	96.7	96.7	100.3	100.1	100.8
Paraguay	100.9	101.0	98.5	96.8	99.2	98.3	97.6	102.7	98.3	95.1	99.9	100.0
Peru	100.1	98.3	94.6	93.6	90.7	92.0	90.6	90.0	90.2	89.5	89.0	88.6
Trinidad and Tobago	99.0	114.8	112.5	106.4	101.6	101.8	102.1	101.5	101.0	118.6	118.8	...
Uruguay	105.9	102.6	104.8	103.5	106.7	107.9	106.3	106.6	106.1	108.9	107.5	106.7

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

Note: Minimum wage deflated by the official consumer price index of each country.

Table A5.1

Latin America and the Caribbean: monetary indicators

(Percentage variation of mean balances with respect to the year-earlier period)

		2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2023				2024		
							Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3
<b>Latin America and the Caribbean</b>													
Argentina	Monetary base	23.0	55.4	29.5	43.6	55.5	41.4	44.8	50.5	80.7	102.7	181.2	250.1
	Money (M1)	16.9	82.0	48.5	56.6	82.1	61.8	64.2	79.9	111.1	162.4	191.9	194.3 <sup>i</sup>
	M2	25.4	71.4	55.0	69.4	106.3	90.9	101.0	111.5	114.9	154.3	165.8	157.6 <sup>i</sup>
	Foreign-currency deposits	55.2	-4.4	31.5	35.7	130.9	91.6	90.5	130.7	185.3	311.9	310.9	296.8 <sup>i</sup>
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	Monetary base	8.5	15.5	13.2	4.8	...	2.2	...	...	...	...	...	... <sup>ii</sup>
	Money (M1)	0.7	5.1	4.7	...	...	3.0	...	...	...	...	...	... <sup>iii</sup>
	M2	3.5	4.9	6.3	...	...	6.2	...	...	...	...	...	... <sup>iii</sup>
	Foreign-currency deposits	2.1	13.9	11.8	...	...	10.4	...	...	...	...	...	... <sup>iii</sup>
Brazil	Monetary base	3.5	32.0	9.4	-3.2	1.4	2.0	0.7	1.8	1.3	0.6	5.8	9.2 <sup>iv</sup>
	Money (M1)	5.7	36.2	17.8	-1.7	-1.1	-0.6	-1.9	-1.6	-0.5	0.4	7.7	10.1 <sup>iv</sup>
	M2	9.4	32.7	16.8	6.9	11.8	11.6	11.5	11.7	12.3	12.1	13.7	14.5 <sup>iv</sup>
Chile	Monetary base	10.5	54.4	45.4	-21.5	-15.3	-34.6	-22.5	6.9	-1.9	-3.6	8.9	-16.2
	Money (M1)	12.0	41.8	42.6	-13.3	-13.4	-24.1	-18.2	-11.3	-4.8	0.3	1.6	2.8
	M2	5.6	12.7	11.6	0.9	3.5	2.5	3.9	3.7	3.1	3.4	3.0	4.4
	Foreign-currency deposits	15.0	43.9	9.1	17.8	-4.9	1.1	-0.9	-10.0	-6.5	4.3	10.3	8.4
Colombia	Monetary base	11.7	18.7	14.2	10.9	-0.1	4.4	-0.5	-3.1	-1.1	0.6	4.3	12.4 <sup>i</sup>
	Money (M1)	11.1	24.8	19.0	8.5	-4.8	-2.8	-6.2	-6.8	-3.6	-0.8	3.4	5.6 <sup>i</sup>
	M2	7.5	14.4	8.7	13.3	9.5	13.0	9.3	8.0	8.2	6.9	8.4	8.8 <sup>i</sup>
Costa Rica	Monetary base	-1.3	7.9	6.2	6.6	11.5	13.2	18.2	10.0	5.7	5.7	6.9	7.5 <sup>i</sup>
	Money (M1)	6.2	33.9	14.6	-3.6	3.3	-7.5	2.2	7.6	11.7	18.2	17.2	...
	M2	1.3	16.7	5.3	-3.5	6.3	-1.4	2.7	8.9	15.2	19.6	20.7	...
	Foreign-currency deposits	4.3	13.1	22.5	19.2	-16.7	-8.7	-23.0	-19.9	-14.0	-6.4	3.0	...
Dominican Republic	Monetary base	10.1	13.0	17.5	13.8	8.0	16.5	13.6	2.2	1.1	3.2	8.9	16.3 <sup>iv</sup>
	Money (M1)	10.6	26.6	24.8	13.7	10.9	9.8	9.6	12.7	11.5	7.5	5.6	3.2 <sup>iv</sup>
	M2	6.9	13.8	16.8	7.8	14.1	8.3	12.7	17.0	18.1	16.1	14.2	12.6 <sup>iv</sup>
	Foreign-currency deposits	13.4	32.5	15.0	6.2	6.1	5.8	3.4	8.8	6.4	8.4	12.9	10.6 <sup>iv</sup>
Ecuador	Monetary base	3.1	14.9	6.9	0.2	-0.8	-1.3	0.3	-0.5	-1.5	-3.3	0.9	3.8 <sup>i</sup>
	Money (M1)	3.4	7.9	6.0	3.6	1.0	1.5	0.9	0.5	0.9	-0.9	-0.4	0.6 <sup>iv</sup>
	M2	6.5	9.6	10.2	9.3	7.2	7.9	7.5	6.8	6.7	5.7	6.5	8.2 <sup>iv</sup>

		2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2023				2024		
							Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3
El Salvador	Monetary base	10.5	-14.0	-17.3	8.5	-10.5	-14.7	-17.0	-13.9	7.3	0.8	1.1	3.1 <sup>iv</sup>
	Money (M1)	7.3	13.2	11.3	2.5	-2.4	0.4	-4.4	-3.0	-2.6	-1.8	1.5	5.0 <sup>iv</sup>
	M2	7.6	11.8	6.6	4.6	5.9	6.8	4.9	6.0	6.0	0.1	0.3	0.8 <sup>iv</sup>
Guatemala	Monetary base	10.8	20.7	16.0	13.3	11.6	12.7	11.6	11.1	11.0	10.9	9.5	8.6
	Money (M1)	11.6	20.7	17.1	12.0	11.4	11.7	12.8	12.1	9.1	8.6	6.0	5.8 <sup>iv</sup>
	M2	10.5	15.1	13.9	10.8	9.3	9.8	10.2	9.6	7.7	7.6	6.7	7.1 <sup>iv</sup>
	Foreign-currency deposits	5.0	12.5	8.2	-7.4	-2.3	-5.9	-1.7	-0.9	-0.7	-1.2	-2.1	-2.1 <sup>iv</sup>
Haiti	Monetary base	18.5	19.3	16.7	24.5	...	36.9	34.0	...	...	...	...	... <sup>v</sup>
	Money (M1)	11.3	29.6	26.7	21.3	...	32.1	...	...	...	...	...	...
	M2	12.1	23.6	22.7	18.6	...	27.1	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Foreign-currency deposits	28.1	8.5	10.5	31.6	...	43.8	...	...	...	...	...	...
Honduras	Monetary base	10.0	49.8	27.4	-12.4	-4.5	-13.0	-6.8	1.8	9.1	16.0	15.0	12.9 <sup>j</sup>
	Money (M1)	8.2	24.2	22.0	17.1	...	14.6	16.6	9.9	6.1	...	...	... <sup>vi</sup>
	M2	10.2	17.4	16.6	12.9	...	13.2	15.2	13.1	12.6	...	...	... <sup>vi</sup>
	Foreign-currency deposits	4.2	7.9	4.1	7.8	...	9.5	9.5	4.3	1.2	...	...	... <sup>vi</sup>
Mexico	Monetary base	4.0	17.4	17.5	13.8	8.8	8.1	8.6	8.9	9.3	12.9	11.6	12.3 <sup>iv</sup>
	Money (M1)	5.2	17.4	14.7	10.6	7.5	6.4	6.2	7.8	9.7	13.0	11.5	10.7 <sup>iv</sup>
	M2	5.7	14.0	9.4	10.2	9.0	8.5	8.1	9.0	10.4	12.3	11.3	10.1 <sup>iv</sup>
	Foreign-currency deposits	-7.2	8.3	5.9	12.8	-5.5	0.0	-7.2	-7.4	-7.1	-7.3	0.9	10.5 <sup>iv</sup>
Nicaragua	Monetary base	-2.5	17.9	20.7	16.0	14.2	9.6	17.1	16.8	13.6	17.4	11.5	17.7 <sup>i</sup>
	Money (M1)	-4.5	29.5	24.3	16.0	18.6	12.3	19.7	23.5	19.2	19.9	13.1	...
	M2	-4.5	29.5	24.3	16.0	18.6	12.3	19.7	23.5	19.2	19.9	13.1	...
	Foreign-currency deposits	-13.6	9.2	11.5	12.3	12.6	13.2	13.1	12.4	11.7	8.3	11.1	...
Panama	Monetary base	8.1	4.3	16.5	7.4	-6.0	-1.1	-6.9	-13.5	-2.2	-6.3	-3.5	-0.6 <sup>j</sup>
	Money (M1)	-3.2	4.6	12.2	-0.9	-2.7	-3.9	-4.7	-2.2	-0.1	-0.2	-0.5	0.2
	M2	2.4	5.2	-9.9	-2.9	0.3	0.2	-1.3	0.1	2.2	3.6	7.3	8.7
Paraguay	Monetary base	3.4	11.2	7.8	4.3	8.8	5.3	10.1	10.5	9.3	9.6	6.8	7.3 <sup>iv</sup>
	Money (M1)	5.1	18.0	15.1	0.9	2.9	-1.2	4.3	5.1	4.1	6.7	5.7	7.0 <sup>iv</sup>
	M2	6.1	14.4	13.5	2.7	8.0	3.2	8.9	10.6	9.7	11.9	10.4	10.0 <sup>iv</sup>
	Foreign-currency deposits	10.5	18.3	14.5	5.0	8.0	1.3	9.9	10.7	10.8	10.0	9.1	11.1 <sup>iv</sup>
Peru	Monetary base	5.7	25.3	22.5	0.3	-4.3	-2.6	-3.7	-5.9	-5.0	-4.4	0.5	9.8
	Money (M1)	10.0	34.5	16.4	-5.2	-4.0	-2.3	-4.3	-6.0	-3.5	-1.7	7.4	15.2 <sup>iv</sup>
	M2	11.0	26.9	10.8	-1.8	2.3	2.2	3.2	1.5	2.4	4.0	7.4	12.5 <sup>iv</sup>
	Foreign-currency deposits	5.5	12.1	18.5	3.7	-4.1	-1.2	-4.4	-6.4	-4.2	0.7	5.4	6.3 <sup>iv</sup>

		2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2023				2024		
							Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3
Uruguay	Monetary base	6.0	12.5	6.8	-3.8	5.3	9.0	6.0	-2.3	8.4	-5.9	4.0	20.1
	Money (M1)	7.1	11.7	15.7	5.5	6.4	5.3	7.2	6.3	6.9	3.2	6.9	9.7 <sup>iv</sup>
	M2	8.9	11.9	16.1	9.1	11.0	11.4	11.8	9.4	11.3	8.4	12.5	14.8 <sup>iv</sup>
	Foreign-currency deposits	17.3	31.6	16.7	3.9	-6.2	-6.7	-5.3	-9.8	-2.7	0.1	3.6	9.1 <sup>iv</sup>
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	Monetary base	13 737.7	1 256.6	693.6	480.5	260.0	455.3	340.8	325.0	148.0	144.4	164.0	150.9 <sup>iv</sup>
	Money (M1)	9 188.3	1 347.4	1 005.8	367.6	324.1	382.8	340.2	361.5	276.0	212.2	203.3	188.0 <sup>iv</sup>
	M2	9 187.0	1 345.3	1 005.6	368.0	323.8	383.0	340.0	360.9	275.6	211.8	202.9	187.7 <sup>iv</sup>
<b>The Caribbean</b>													
Antigua and Barbuda	Monetary base	-7.6	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Money (M1)	11.1	-4.1	3.6	9.2	22.0	18.7	19.7	24.1	24.2	4.5	5.2	9.8 <sup>iv</sup>
	M2	-0.9	-12.0	7.0	13.1	-5.5	-3.2	-7.0	-5.5	-7.5	4.3	4.0	2.5 <sup>iv</sup>
	Foreign-currency deposits	5.6	-40.5	21.9	46.4	0.2	11.4	-6.7	0.2	-5.5	-4.5	-5.9	-9.1 <sup>iv</sup>
Bahamas	Monetary base	-0.6	33.3	12.2	25.9	-0.7	14.4	0.0	-9.5	-4.6	8.2	7.2	...
	Money (M1)	8.5	17.3	4.4	13.7	4.0	9.1	3.0	2.1	1.8	3.9	3.2	...
	M2	2.7	8.0	2.2	7.4	3.6	6.2	3.1	2.7	2.3	3.1	2.3	...
	Foreign-currency deposits	16.1	14.9	-20.0	25.0	1.6	12.2	5.5	-6.9	-2.4	2.6	-2.4	...
Barbados	Monetary base	12.6	15.1	23.3	10.4	1.1	2.6	1.3	1.0	-0.4	-1.1	-2.5	-6.1 <sup>i</sup>
	Money (M1)	2.8	6.7	7.7	7.3	3.5	4.1	4.0	3.2	2.3	2.8	1.7	...
Belize	Monetary base	0.6	12.0	19.9	15.0	8.7	12.8	5.0	8.9	8.2	4.5	2.5	4.4 <sup>i</sup>
	Money (M1)	4.4	9.8	17.1	10.9	9.8	11.6	8.3	10.0	9.6	8.2	8.8	<sup>i</sup>
Dominica	Monetary base	-21.2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Money (M1)	-14.2	-21.2	11.5	21.3	6.2	6.9	7.4	8.3	2.6	3.0	2.5	1.5 <sup>iv</sup>
	M2	-6.5	-16.0	2.4	1.3	-2.1	-2.6	-2.7	-1.9	-1.0	1.3	0.8	0.5 <sup>iv</sup>
	Foreign-currency deposits	33.2	21.3	-6.1	-6.7	-12.7	-9.7	-10.8	-6.5	-24.4	-3.7	-8.2	-16.2 <sup>iv</sup>
Grenada	Monetary base	4.6	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Money (M1)	10.5	-8.7	14.8	8.0	47.2	67.9	83.8	56.0	8.3	8.9	8.1	10.7 <sup>iv</sup>
	M2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Foreign-currency deposits	33.8	-12.7	35.9	-0.9	-8.7	13.1	15.5	-12.6	-33.3	9.4	-0.3	9.4 <sup>iv</sup>
Guyana	Monetary base	10.8	25.4	22.1	-1.0	25.2	16.1	27.7	31.8	25.6	32.2	28.3	23.0 <sup>iv</sup>
	Money (M1)	20.7	41.8	17.2	14.5	24.3	18.5	22.6	26.4	29.1	30.4	27.4	27.2 <sup>iv</sup>

		2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2023				2024		
							Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3
Jamaica	Monetary base	22.6	17.6	21.7	-5.3	16.9	7.7	10.5	27.7	22.2	13.8	13.8	11.9 <sup>iv</sup>
	Money (M1)	17.1	19.2	17.1	8.7	14.0	11.4	13.0	15.8	15.9	12.0	8.9	6.1 <sup>i</sup>
	M2	15.0	15.7	15.9	8.9	13.6	10.6	13.6	14.8	15.4	13.8	10.6	9.1 <sup>i</sup>
	Foreign-currency deposits	9.6	17.8	14.6	14.6	3.1	4.2	2.4	3.6	2.3	2.3	2.8	3.5 <sup>j</sup>
Saint Kitts and Nevis	Monetary base	-7.1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Money (M1)	9.6	-6.3	0.0	39.0	5.1	7.8	3.5	5.9	3.4	3.9	2.2	7.0 <sup>j</sup>
	M2	2.6	-0.5	3.2	3.1	3.0	1.5	3.4	4.7	2.4	2.3	1.6	3.3 <sup>j</sup>
	Foreign-currency deposits	-1.9	-13.7	-7.8	18.2	-0.8	15.8	-1.1	-4.1	-12.7	-10.9	-1.2	5.4 <sup>j</sup>
Saint Lucia	Monetary base	-7.4	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Money (M1)	8.3	-12.6	14.5	30.9	6.9	4.8	4.9	8.4	9.7	11.2	7.6	2.9 <sup>j</sup>
	M2	3.4	-13.2	7.4	10.4	6.4	4.7	5.5	7.1	8.2	8.4	7.1	4.9 <sup>j</sup>
	Foreign-currency deposits	8.5	-3.3	12.1	9.1	30.8	13.6	46.7	28.8	33.4	40.5	16.8	60.0 <sup>j</sup>
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Monetary base	9.0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Money (M1)	10.4	1.7	13.6	21.7	10.6	20.8	12.6	9.7	11.4	11.4	11.4	10.3 <sup>j</sup>
	M2	5.7	-7.1	7.7	5.3	6.1	3.5	2.4	4.3	7.7	8.3	9.2	10.6 <sup>j</sup>
	Foreign-currency deposits	44.5	-17.8	75.4	7.8	-38.5	-1.8	-19.5	-38.8	-49.8	-42.9	-36.0	-28.5 <sup>j</sup>
Suriname	Monetary base	70.0	47.5	48.6	38.8	29.8	54.1	44.1	22.9	7.5	-0.8	-2.9	-3.0 <sup>iv</sup>
	Money (M1)	26.9	42.5	29.3	31.5	23.3	40.3	29.0	14.5	14.6	15.1	16.5	18.3 <sup>iv</sup>
	M2	24.5	32.3	26.1	25.1	19.1	27.2	23.4	12.1	15.5	19.5	17.2	22.9 <sup>iv</sup>
	Foreign-currency deposits	-3.0	22.3	97.9	38.9	56.5	68.9	82.7	62.3	25.8	8.4	-10.7	-18.2 <sup>iv</sup>
Trinidad and Tobago	Monetary base	-0.1	12.7	-2.3	-8.7	4.2	5.4	12.1	6.2	-6.0	-11.2	-9.0	...
	Money (M1)	-0.3	7.8	7.0	2.1	2.0	4.1	2.1	2.4	-0.4	-0.5	-0.2	...
	M2	1.9	6.8	3.9	0.8	2.6	1.9	2.0	3.7	2.7	3.4	3.1	...
	Foreign-currency deposits	3.9	-0.3	5.1	1.6	-1.8	-2.0	-2.0	0.1	-3.4	-3.2	0.7	...

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>i</sup> Figures as of July 2024.

<sup>ii</sup> Figures as of January 2023.

<sup>iii</sup> Figures as of January 2022.

<sup>iv</sup> Figures as of August 2024.

<sup>v</sup> Figures as of April 2023.

<sup>vi</sup> Figures as of October 2023.

Table A5.2

Latin America and The Caribbean: monetary policy reference rates  
(Percentages)

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2023				2024		
						March	June	September	December	March	June	September
<b>Latin America</b>												
Argentina	61.4	38.0	38.0	75.0	100.0	78.0	97.0	118.0	100.0	80.0	40.0	40.0
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	3.0	2.0	6.0	6.0	...	6.0	...	...	...	...	...	...
Brazil	4.5	2.0	9.3	13.8	11.8	13.8	13.8	12.8	11.8	10.8	10.5	10.8
Chile	1.8	0.5	4.0	11.3	8.3	11.3	11.3	9.5	8.3	7.3	5.8	5.5
Colombia	4.3	1.8	3.0	12.0	13.0	13.0	13.3	13.3	13.0	12.3	11.8	10.8
Costa Rica	2.8	0.8	1.3	9.0	6.0	8.5	7.0	6.5	6.0	5.3	4.8	4.3
Dominican Republic	4.5	3.0	4.5	8.5	7.0	8.5	7.8	7.5	7.0	7.0	7.0	6.8
Guatemala	2.8	1.8	1.8	3.8	5.0	4.8	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.8
Haiti	15.0	10.0	10.0	11.5	...	11.5	11.5	...	...	...	...	...
Honduras	5.5	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	4.0
Mexico	7.3	4.3	5.5	10.5	11.3	11.3	11.3	11.3	11.3	11.0	11.0	10.5
Paraguay	4.0	0.8	5.3	8.5	6.8	8.5	8.5	8.0	6.8	6.0	6.0	6.0
Peru	2.3	0.3	2.5	7.5	6.8	7.8	7.8	7.5	6.8	6.3	5.8	5.3
Uruguay	...	4.5	5.8	11.5	9.0	11.5	11.3	10.0	9.0	9.0	8.5	8.5
<b>The Caribbean</b>												
Antigua and Barbuda	6.5	2.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	...
Bahamas	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
Barbados	7.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	...
Belize	11.0	11.0	11.0	11.0	11.0	11.0	11.0	11.0	11.0	11.0	11.0	...
Dominica	6.5	2.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	...
Grenada	6.5	2.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	...
Guyana	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
Jamaica	0.5	0.5	2.5	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	6.5
Saint Kitts and Nevis	6.5	2.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	...
Saint Lucia	6.5	2.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	...
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	6.5	2.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	...
Trinidad and Tobago	5.0	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

Note: Figures at the end of each period.

Table A5.3

Latin America and the Caribbean: representative lending rates  
(Average rates and percentages)

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2023				2024		
						March	June	September	December	March	June	September
<b>Latin America</b>												
Argentina <sup>a</sup>	66.9	36.8	40.2	56.9	40.0	73.9	91.0	108.6	130.1	101.7	45.9	45.0
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) <sup>b</sup>	6.4	6.3	6.9	6.5	7.7	6.7	6.7	7.2	7.0	7.1	...	...
Brazil <sup>c</sup>	42.7	33.8	34.0	40.6	33.4	42.0	42.9	42.2	41.9	41.6	42.2	42.6
Chile <sup>d</sup>	8.5	8.0	10.0	16.8	9.2	20.1	20.0	18.8	16.6	16.6	14.8	14.6
Colombia <sup>e</sup>	11.8	9.9	9.3	15.8	9.1	22.7	20.8	20.7	19.9	17.9	16.9	16.1
Costa Rica <sup>f</sup>	13.0	10.9	9.5	10.9	9.9	13.3	12.9	12.9	12.4	14.2	13.2	12.2
Dominican Republic <sup>f</sup>	12.5	11.0	9.6	11.9	9.5	15.0	14.7	14.1	13.8	15.0	15.1	15.4
Ecuador <sup>g</sup>	8.6	8.9	8.1	7.7	8.4	8.8	9.0	9.3	9.7	10.3	11.1	11.5
El Salvador <sup>h</sup>	6.6	6.6	6.2	6.3	6.1	7.1	7.3	7.8	7.9	7.9	7.9	8.2
Guatemala <sup>f</sup>	12.7	12.5	12.2	11.9	12.3	11.9	12.0	12.0	12.0	12.2	12.3	12.4
Haiti <sup>i</sup>	18.7	16.2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Honduras <sup>f</sup>	17.3	17.0	16.0	14.6	16.5	14.2	14.3	14.4	14.7	15.2	15.5	16.0
Mexico <sup>j</sup>	30.3	30.2	29.4	30.7	29.6	31.8	32.4	33.2	32.9	32.8	32.8	32.7
Nicaragua <sup>k</sup>	12.5	11.2	9.6	9.2	10.3	8.7	10.0	9.3	9.9	11.3	11.5	11.5
Panama <sup>l</sup>	7.1	7.0	6.9	6.9	6.9	7.3	7.5	7.7	7.8	7.9	8.0	8.0
Paraguay <sup>m</sup>	12.7	10.7	9.8	12.7	10.3	13.9	13.3	13.1	12.8	12.6	11.3	10.9
Peru <sup>n</sup>	14.4	12.9	11.0	12.6	11.7	14.7	15.3	15.8	15.9	15.8	15.7	14.9
Uruguay <sup>o</sup>	13.3	12.7	8.7	11.6	9.6	13.7	13.2	12.0	11.4	10.8	10.5	10.4
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) <sup>p</sup>	29.3	33.2	43.4	49.2	41.1	52.4	48.9	48.6	50.7	55.8	57.6	57.5
<b>The Caribbean</b>												
Antigua and Barbuda <sup>q</sup>	8.6	7.7	7.5	7.5	7.1	7.4	7.1	7.0	6.9	6.9	6.8	...
Bahamas <sup>r</sup>	11.2	10.3	10.0	11.1	10.2	10.9	11.1	11.1	11.0	10.6	10.7	12.1
Barbados <sup>q</sup>	6.5	6.1	5.8	5.6	5.8	5.5	5.5	5.4	5.6	5.4	5.3	...
Belize <sup>s</sup>	9.1	8.7	8.4	8.4	8.5	8.7	8.8	9.0	8.4	8.4	8.5	8.7
Dominica <sup>q</sup>	7.5	6.8	6.3	6.5	6.5	6.0	6.0	5.9	5.9	5.9	5.9	...
Grenada <sup>q</sup>	7.3	6.5	6.3	6.2	6.4	6.8	6.8	6.9	7.0	7.0	7.0	...
Guyana <sup>l</sup>	8.9	8.5	8.5	8.3	8.5	8.2	8.2	8.2	8.1	8.1	8.1	8.1
Jamaica <sup>l</sup>	13.0	12.1	11.5	11.4	11.7	11.5	11.6	11.7	11.8	11.9	12.1	12.0
Saint Kitts and Nevis <sup>q</sup>	8.0	7.2	6.9	6.8	6.9	6.6	6.5	6.4	6.4	6.4	6.4	...
Saint Lucia <sup>q</sup>	7.6	7.0	6.7	6.6	7.0	6.6	6.7	6.7	6.5	6.5	6.5	...
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines <sup>q</sup>	8.3	8.0	7.7	7.4	7.7	7.2	7.1	7.3	7.2	7.1	7.2	...
Suriname <sup>l</sup>	15.0	14.8	14.8	14.7	14.9	13.5	13.9	14.5	14.9	15.0	14.8	14.7
Trinidad and Tobago <sup>u</sup>	9.3	7.9	7.6	7.6	7.6	7.6	7.6	7.6	7.6	7.6	7.6	7.6

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Local-currency loans to the non-financial private sector, at fixed or renegotiable rates, signature loans of up to 89 days.

<sup>b</sup> Nominal local-currency rate for 60-91-day operations.

<sup>c</sup> Interest rate on total consumer credit for individuals.

<sup>d</sup> Non-adjustable 90-360 day operations.

<sup>e</sup> Weighted average of consumer, prime, ordinary and treasury lending rates for the working days of the month.

<sup>f</sup> Weighted average of the system lending rates in local currency.

<sup>g</sup> Effective benchmark lending rate for the corporate commercial segment.

<sup>h</sup> Basic lending rate for up to one year.

<sup>i</sup> Average of minimum and maximum lending rates.

<sup>j</sup> Average interest rate for credit cards from commercial banks and total annual cost (CAT).

<sup>k</sup> Weighted average of short-term lending rates in local currency.

<sup>l</sup> Interest rate on one-year trade credit.

<sup>m</sup> Commercial lending rate in local currency.

<sup>n</sup> Market lending rate, average for transactions conducted in the last 30 business days.

<sup>o</sup> Business credit, 30-367 days.

<sup>p</sup> Average rate for loan operations for the six major commercial banks.

<sup>q</sup> Weighted average of lending rates.

<sup>r</sup> Weighted average of lending and overdraft rates.

<sup>s</sup> Rate for personal and business loans, residential and other construction loans; weighted average.

<sup>t</sup> Basic prime lending rate.

<sup>u</sup> Average of lending rates.

Table A5.4

Latin America and the Caribbean: real domestic credit  
(Percentage variation)

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2023				2024		
						Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3
<b>Latin America</b>												
Argentina	-14.3	14.6	5.8	3.2	-4.7	-8.4	-2.9	1.4	-8.7	-22.4	-21.3	-17.7 <sup>i</sup>
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	8.3	10.0	5.1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Brazil	5.9	12.2	3.8	2.2	6.4	6.0	7.0	5.9	6.6	9.4	10.2	9.4 <sup>i</sup>
Chile	5.5	7.0	-1.2	-1.2	-0.5	1.8	0.1	-1.6	-2.2	-2.6	-2.7	-2.5 <sup>ii</sup>
Colombia	6.3	8.0	0.0	-0.0	-3.7	-6.6	-4.1	-1.1	-2.8	-2.4	-3.8	... <sup>iii</sup>
Costa Rica	0.2	5.1	6.9	-3.7	-3.1	-7.5	-5.4	-0.3	1.2	0.0	2.9	...
Dominican Republic	9.3	5.7	-0.4	5.3	9.1	5.9	9.6	10.3	10.4	14.8	17.0	12.0
Ecuador	10.5	9.9	11.5	12.3	7.8	6.9	8.1	8.7	7.3	8.0	5.3	4.4 <sup>i</sup>
El Salvador	7.4	7.7	4.9	1.4	6.1	4.7	6.2	6.7	6.7	7.2	5.3	4.9 <sup>i</sup>
Guatemala	-0.8	2.3	5.3	6.0	4.4	5.5	5.6	5.4	1.3	2.4	0.5	-0.3 <sup>i</sup>
Haiti	5.1	4.1	9.1	-5.2	...	-19.4	...	...	...	...	...	...
Honduras	6.1	2.2	9.2	11.2	9.6	5.5	12.8	13.0	9.8	...	...	... <sup>iv</sup>
Mexico	5.6	4.8	-1.6	0.1	2.5	0.3	1.6	3.8	4.2	3.2	5.8	4.2 <sup>ii</sup>
Nicaragua	-26.7	-16.3	-14.2	-7.0	-9.8	-6.9	-6.1	-12.4	-13.9	-13.8	-11.9	...
Panama	1.1	-6.0	0.1	3.9	1.9	5.3	3.7	0.6	-1.5	-2.4	0.7	...
Paraguay	12.8	5.1	8.7	7.6	10.2	6.0	9.8	11.5	13.5	10.1	11.0	12.5 <sup>i</sup>
Peru	4.3	24.5	2.3	-1.6	5.8	3.0	5.8	7.3	7.1	5.8	10.5	9.0 <sup>i</sup>
Uruguay	12.5	1.6	1.4	4.3	9.2	10.8	10.3	2.7	13.2	17.5	13.0	20.7 <sup>i</sup>
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) <sup>a</sup>	2.4	-17.4	-39.9	-28.1	7.2	20.8	10.1	5.1	-4.5	-6.8	4.1	5.3 <sup>ii</sup>
<b>The Caribbean</b>												
Antigua and Barbuda	1.7	-2.7	2.8	-6.7	-4.3	-6.8	-4.9	-4.8	-0.3	-0.7	-0.8	1.6 <sup>i</sup>
Bahamas	-1.9	0.4	-4.1	-5.0	3.7	-0.1	3.0	7.8	4.6	0.7	0.3	...
Barbados	-14.8	-0.8	0.2	-0.5	-0.8	-0.4	-0.6	-0.2	-2.0	-3.0	2.9	2.4 <sup>ii</sup>
Belize	6.2	10.1	1.0	-5.1	1.2	-0.8	0.1	2.2	3.2	7.7	4.9	5.3 <sup>ii</sup>
Dominica	39.1	11.6	4.5	1.6	-12.4	-15.7	-14.8	-7.9	-10.9	-2.2	4.3	3.8 <sup>i</sup>
Grenada	-3.7	-17.7	18.9	-25.1	26.6	16.3	121.9	45.7	-15.7	-2.8	-9.1	-21.5 <sup>i</sup>
Guyana	12.7	14.3	-22.3	81.6	15.8	4.3	10.1	24.7	24.4	32.7	26.3	18.8 <sup>i</sup>
Jamaica	6.9	9.8	4.9	-4.4	0.4	-1.9	1.8	1.4	0.5	0.6	-3.0	-3.0 <sup>ii</sup>
Saint Kitts and Nevis	14.5	122.0	24.2	21.9	-3.1	17.4	-17.0	-11.6	2.9	20.6	44.3	66.2 <sup>i</sup>
Saint Lucia	-0.5	4.8	-0.1	-9.0	-36.5	-35.1	-34.9	-34.9	-41.3	-14.9	-14.0	-20.6 <sup>i</sup>
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	-4.3	-2.5	1.6	-6.4	0.6	-3.8	-3.8	3.1	7.4	6.7	16.3	12.9 <sup>i</sup>
Suriname	11.0	7.5	-17.7	-30.5	-29.5	-26.6	-26.4	-29.3	-36.5	-43.5	-39.1	-30.2 <sup>i</sup>
Trinidad and Tobago	15.4	12.8	12.2	-4.7	-5.5	-14.6	-7.5	-2.4	3.8	3.3	-7.6	-17.6 <sup>ii</sup>

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

Note: The figures are considered average balances with respect to the same period of the previous year.

<sup>a</sup> Credit granted by commercial, universal and development banks.

<sup>i</sup> Figures as of August 2024.

<sup>ii</sup> Figures as of July 2024.

<sup>iii</sup> Figures as of May 2024.

<sup>iv</sup> Figures as of October 2023.

Table A5.5

Latin America and the Caribbean: net international reserves  
(Millions of dollars)

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2023				2024		
						March	June	September	December	March	June	September
<b>Latin America and the Caribbean</b>	<b>746 738</b>	<b>803 612</b>	<b>830 021</b>	<b>774 064</b>	<b>800 136</b>	<b>783 151</b>	<b>780 880</b>	<b>769 785</b>	<b>800 136</b>	<b>814 545</b>	<b>820 390</b>	<b>850 198</b>
<b>Latin America</b>	<b>731 640</b>	<b>786 573</b>	<b>810 968</b>	<b>755 381</b>	<b>778 286</b>	<b>764 008</b>	<b>762 007</b>	<b>747 491</b>	<b>778 286</b>	<b>792 046</b>	<b>798 571</b>	<b>828 891</b>
Argentina	-27 879	-18 789	-32 607	-32 859	-41 506	-36 576	-38 561	-44 536	-41 506	-29 909	-36 102	-36 534
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) <sup>a</sup>	6 468	5 276	4 752	3 796	...	3 112	3 158	...	...	...	...	... <sup>i</sup>
Brazil	366 081	361 316	362 809	339 455	353 632	344 314	341 926	339 309	353 632	349 755	357 155	365 399
Chile	34 918	36 376	45 731	36 354	41 319	37 063	37 018	38 987	41 319	38 970	39 299	40 674
Colombia	48 688	53 016	54 577	51 790	51 278	51 488	50 047	49 311	51 278	51 487	52 985	55 396
Costa Rica	5 536	3 520	3 939	4 718	8 947	5 325	6 847	7 189	8 947	10 120	10 358	10 259
Dominican Republic	3 854	6 260	11 155	8 436	9 694	9 530	9 535	9 375	9 694	8 051	7 641	9 111 <sup>ii</sup>
Ecuador <sup>a</sup>	3 397	7 196	7 898	8 459	4 454	8 190	6 967	6 312	4 454	5 300	7 090	8 578
El Salvador	3 937	2 915	3 342	2 441	2 645	2 556	2 580	2 523	2 645	2 715	3 145	3 005
Guatemala	13 662	17 137	19 031	18 633	20 101	18 970	19 624	18 957	20 101	19 959	20 249	23 069
Haiti	775	584	497	241	709	464	449	421	709	...	...	...
Honduras	4 679	7 578	7 943	7 527	6 436	7 162	6 855	6 625	6 436	6 165	5 964	5 967 <sup>ii</sup>
Mexico	168 433	189 881	198 349	192 308	205 574	197 112	201 268	200 960	205 574	209 567	213 732	218 718 <sup>ii</sup>
Nicaragua	2 046	2 482	3 100	3 378	4 553	3 682	3 830	4 182	4 553	4 912	5 071	5 154 <sup>iii</sup>
Panama	4 142	8 672	8 099	6 291	6 236	6 291	5 417	4 208	6 236	7 384	4 943	4 559
Paraguay	7 675	9 490	9 947	9 825	10 197	9 684	9 745	9 991	10 197	10 405	10 281	9 873
Peru	68 316	74 707	78 495	71 883	71 033	72 734	72 943	71 234	71 033	73 828	71 415	80 365
Uruguay	10 282	12 592	13 050	12 827	13 072	13 158	12 548	12 743	13 072	13 327	14 807	14 684 <sup>ii</sup>
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) <sup>a</sup>	6 630	6 364	10 859	9 877	9 912	9 750	9 810	9 702	9 912	10 010	10 537	10 614

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2023				2024		
						March	June	September	December	March	June	September
<b>The Caribbean</b>	<b>15 098</b>	<b>17 039</b>	<b>19 053</b>	<b>18 683</b>	<b>21 850</b>	<b>19 142</b>	<b>18 872</b>	<b>22 293</b>	<b>21 850</b>	<b>22 499</b>	<b>21 819</b>	<b>21 306</b>
Antigua and Barbuda <sup>b</sup>	279	222	324	346	319	355	341	311	319	315	336	358 <sup>ii</sup>
Bahamas	1 631	2 381	2 459	2 596	2 346	2 692	2 712	2 947	2 346	2 897	2 931	2 911 <sup>ii</sup>
Barbados	570	1 104	1 303	1 165	1 278	1 393	1 348	1 198	1 278	1 401	1 410	1 425 <sup>ii</sup>
Belize <sup>a</sup>	279	350	424	482	474	496	523	524	474	475	516	499 <sup>iii</sup>
Dominica <sup>b</sup>	155	166	165	182	164	158	136	135	164	150	125	127 <sup>ii</sup>
Grenada <sup>b</sup>	234	291	324	352	389	366	360	427	389	337	308	311 <sup>ii</sup>
Guyana	576	681	809	938	894	756	735	675	894	908	...	...
Jamaica	2 999	3 513	4 438	3 740	7 511	4 027	4 082	7 628	7 511	8 220	7 910	7 600 <sup>ii</sup>
Saint Kitts and Nevis <sup>b</sup>	355	365	313	270	262	286	262	261	262	261	261	260 <sup>ii</sup>
Saint Lucia <sup>b</sup>	253	224	351	310	372	317	338	421	372	380	418	388 <sup>ii</sup>
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines <sup>b</sup>	192	204	272	273	236	326	349	282	236	268	211	219 <sup>ii</sup>
Suriname	647	585	992	1 195	1 346	1 186	1 091	1 107	1 346	1 365	1 410	1 545
Trinidad and Tobago	6 929	6 954	6 880	6 832	6 258	6 785	6 596	6 378	6 258	5 522	5 983	5 665

**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

**Note:** The figures are considered average balances with respect to the same period of the previous year.

<sup>a</sup> Official reserve assets.

<sup>b</sup> Imputed reserves.

<sup>i</sup> Figures as of April 2023.

<sup>ii</sup> Figures as of August 2024.

<sup>iii</sup> Figures as of July 2024.

Table A5.6

Latin America and the Caribbean: real effective exchange rates  
(Index: 2015 = 100)

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2023				2024		
						Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3
<b>Latin America</b>												
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	87.9	83.0	86.2	90.6	91.6	91.1	92.7	91.5	91.2	88.8	89.4	87.7
Brazil	99.2	125.2	127.0	118.5	110.8	117.4	110.1	107.4	108.4	106.0	112.1	119.1
Chile	98.5	106.3	101.8	109.3	105.2	102.9	100.7	106.2	111.0	116.7	114.1	114.1
Colombia	102.8	111.1	113.7	125.7	117.4	132.0	120.6	108.9	108.2	102.1	101.3	104.7
Costa Rica	108.6	107.2	116.4	120.7	104.5	106.2	103.9	104.7	103.2	100.7	101.4	103.0
Dominican Republic	107.7	114.4	111.4	106.6	101.8	101.2	99.9	102.6	103.4	106.3	107.4	107.4
Ecuador	101.0	99.7	103.7	106.1	105.2	106.1	105.9	104.2	104.8	104.8	104.8	104.4
El Salvador	100.7	100.6	101.8	100.4	100.1	99.5	100.2	100.5	100.2	101.1	101.1	100.9
Guatemala	89.3	86.2	86.8	87.1	157.8	158.0	158.8	158.6	155.9	156.9	156.1	153.4
Haiti	101.7	95.4	82.3	76.5	70.0	77.9	74.1	67.3	60.8	56.8	52.8	51.6
Honduras	100.4	96.9	94.6	95.0	91.5	92.0	91.8	91.4	90.7	90.1	90.0	89.0
Mexico	108.6	118.0	110.0	107.9	92.4	97.6	92.8	89.0	90.3	86.4	88.2	96.1
Nicaragua	106.3	106.1	107.9	106.9	102.5	103.3	102.5	102.5	101.9	100.8	100.0	100.0
Panama	97.8	97.7	104.2	106.5	107.3	107.4	107.3	107.1	107.2	106.9	107.1	108.2
Paraguay	99.2	97.9	98.8	102.8	106.1	105.8	106.0	105.9	106.8	101.7	104.0	106.1
Peru	97.2	98.9	110.6	106.5	99.3	102.7	98.2	96.6	99.5	97.8	97.3	97.9
Uruguay	93.4	96.0	97.7	92.4	83.6	84.9	83.5	81.7	84.3	80.1	80.0	83.0
<b>The Caribbean</b>												
Antigua and Barbuda	101.0	100.2	101.8	101.2	101.0	102.9	100.4	99.7	100.8	100.6	98.0	96.0
Bahamas	101.4	101.9	103.3	106.1	107.0	107.2	107.0	106.8	106.9	108.6	109.6	110.2
Barbados	92.4	91.1	90.4	89.2	97.4	98.6	97.4	97.0	96.7	97.0	99.3	100.3
Belize	104.1	108.5	109.8	111.2	110.4	111.0	111.4	110.2	109.1	109.7	109.8	108.2
Dominica	102.8	102.5	103.8	105.1	104.3	104.2	104.5	103.6	105.1	105.6	105.8	106.3
Grenada	102.1	102.8	104.5	109.5	109.8	109.1	109.7	110.3	110.1	109.8	110.5	111.2
Guyana	95.3	94.8	94.6	95.8	102.8	101.9	104.0	102.8	102.4	102.7	102.4	101.0
Jamaica	104.1	104.3	107.9	106.7	101.6	101.9	102.9	101.9	99.8	100.7	103.4	105.6
Saint Kitts and Nevis	108.0	109.0	111.2	115.4	115.0	114.1	114.8	115.6	115.5	117.6	117.4	118.1
Saint Lucia	107.3	109.5	109.8	111.0	106.3	112.8	107.0	101.7	103.6	105.8	105.8	110.7
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	101.5	103.3	103.2	105.5	104.5	105.6	104.6	104.3	103.6	104.1	103.1	98.1
Suriname	106.2	95.6	119.4	116.7	120.9	122.6	124.8	120.2	115.9	107.7	94.1	84.1
Trinidad and Tobago	104.5	103.0	104.2	106.7	106.7	105.6	107.0	107.2	107.1	108.0	109.3	108.5

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

Note: The figures are considered average values for the period. A country's overall real effective exchange rate index is calculated by weighting its real bilateral exchange rate indices with each of its trading partners by each partner's share in the country's total trade flows in terms of exports and imports. The extraregional real effective exchange rate index excludes trade with other Latin American and Caribbean countries. A currency depreciates in real effective terms when this index rises and appreciates when it falls.

**Table A5.7**  
Latin America and the Caribbean: financial soundness indicators of deposit takers  
(Percentage at end of period)

		2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2023				2024	
							Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2
<b>Latin America and the Caribbean</b>												
Argentina	Capital adequacy	17.5	24.2	26.2	29.9	32.5	31.2	29.6	31.2	32.5	39.5	37.1
	Asset quality	5.7	4.2	4.3	3.1	3.5	3.1	3.0	2.9	3.5	2.0	1.8
	Profitability	46.4	16.4	7.2	11.4	26.9	11.9	16.8	16.6	26.9	22.0	24.7
	Liquidity	43.2	48.0	49.2	52.1	49.0	52.0	52.0	52.3	49.0	43.9	31.6
	Sensitivity to market risk	8.0	12.4	11.7	29.3	59.8	31.9	44.2	43.7	59.8	18.4	16.8
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	Capital adequacy	13.0	13.1	12.9	12.8	...	13.0	13.7	...	...	...	...
	Asset quality	1.9	1.5	1.5	2.1	...	2.5	2.7	...	...	...	...
	Profitability	11.8	4.8	7.1	8.2	...	5.5	6.5	...	...	...	...
	Liquidity	16.9	17.6	18.4	17.2	...	14.5	17.5	...	...	...	...
	Sensitivity to market risk	-4.6	4.9	7.5	7.0	...	7.8	13.4	...	...	...	...
Brazil	Capital adequacy	19.4	19.1	18.4	17.5	17.9	17.4	17.4	17.9	17.9	17.6	17.5
	Asset quality	2.7	1.9	2.1	2.6	2.8	2.9	3.1	3.1	2.8	2.9	2.8
	Profitability	15.8	11.7	14.9	15.3	13.7	12.3	13.1	13.3	13.7	14.3	14.9
	Liquidity	13.6	16.3	12.7	11.7	13.8	11.8	12.9	13.5	13.8	14.0	13.8
	Sensitivity to market risk	0.2	0.6	2.3	3.3	2.0	3.2	3.1	2.4	2.0	2.1	2.7
Chile	Capital adequacy	12.8	14.7	14.8	15.6	16.2	15.4	15.8	15.7	16.2	...	...
	Asset quality	2.1	1.6	1.2	1.7	2.1	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.2	...
	Profitability	12.4	5.6	16.6	21.0	15.4	15.5	17.0	15.3	15.4	11.4	...
	Liquidity	15.3	22.2	20.1	17.1	16.0	17.2	17.2	17.0	16.0	14.3	...
	Sensitivity to market risk	8.5	14.3	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Colombia	Capital adequacy	16.9	19.2	22.2	18.9	18.5	18.4	18.0	17.8	18.5	18.0	18.0
	Asset quality	3.1	3.7	3.0	2.5	3.5	2.7	3.1	3.3	3.5	3.6	3.6
	Profitability	13.2	5.9	14.3	13.7	7.0	11.9	8.6	7.3	7.0	7.8	6.6
	Liquidity	17.0	19.5	20.1	17.0	18.2	16.8	17.0	16.8	18.2	17.6	18.7
	Sensitivity to market risk	0.9	1.1	0.7	1.1	0.4	1.6	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.8	0.1

		2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2023				2024	
							Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2
Costa Rica	Capital adequacy	17.4	16.7	16.4	17.6	18.5	18.2	18.4	18.6	18.5	18.6	...
	Asset quality	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.1	...
	Profitability	6.8	4.5	6.0	7.4	3.8	2.6	4.4	4.5	3.8	5.8	...
	Liquidity	29.5	33.2	35.4	38.1	32.8	34.0	33.4	33.1	32.8	32.9	...
	Sensitivity to market risk	26.5	28.8	31.0	26.2	21.8	23.6	22.7	22.5	21.8	21.6	...
Dominican Republic	Capital adequacy	16.6	21.0	19.1	16.7	16.1	17.3	17.2	15.9	16.1	17.6	...
	Asset quality	1.5	2.0	1.3	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	0.9	1.1	...
	Profitability	15.9	13.6	17.9	19.6	21.1	23.0	21.7	21.8	21.1	21.6	...
	Liquidity	15.6	14.2	17.1	18.3	17.9	16.7	19.0	17.9	17.9	18.0	...
	Sensitivity to market risk	4.8	8.1	6.1	19.6	16.4	12.1	15.3	10.8	16.4	6.9	...
Ecuador	Capital adequacy	16.7	17.3	15.8	15.7	15.7	14.7	15.1	15.3	15.7	15.0	14.8
	Asset quality	3.2	3.6	3.7	3.7	4.2	4.7	4.6	4.5	4.2	4.7	4.6
	Profitability	8.8	3.1	2.3	9.5	10.7	11.1	11.8	11.5	10.7	9.2	9.1
	Liquidity	16.4	23.6	20.7	18.3	15.8	17.0	15.2	14.8	15.8	15.2	15.6
El Salvador	Capital adequacy	16.0	15.4	15.8	15.4	15.6	15.3	15.4	15.5	15.6	14.9	15.1
	Asset quality	1.7	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.8	1.9	1.8
	Profitability	9.1	6.9	11.5	13.0	13.2	14.5	14.2	13.6	13.2	11.7	12.9
	Liquidity	23.3	19.7	20.1	15.8	17.7	17.5	17.3	17.5	17.7	16.5	16.1
	Sensitivity to market risk	108.3	104.0	108.0	105.6	104.8	101.4	103.1	104.3	104.8	101.1	102.4
Guatemala	Capital adequacy	16.4	16.2	17.4	16.6	16.8	16.5	16.6	16.8	16.8	15.4	15.6
	Asset quality	2.2	1.8	1.7	1.3	1.7	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.7	2.1	2.4
	Profitability	14.2	15.3	15.2	18.6	16.2	19.9	19.4	18.3	16.2	19.0	16.7
	Liquidity	42.4	45.9	44.6	42.2	38.9	41.9	41.3	39.7	38.9	37.1	37.1
	Sensitivity to market risk	14.5	14.6	11.5	11.2	9.7	8.3	11.1	12.3	9.7	13.4	14.0
Haiti	Capital adequacy	8.6	9.1	8.0	7.1	8.5	7.3	7.7	8.0	8.5	8.5	8.2
	Asset quality	6.9	5.4	6.3	10.9	8.8	11.1	10.5	8.5	8.8	12.8	12.0
	Profitability	14.7	20.3	16.7	30.5	14.4	24.5	10.3	5.9	14.4	11.4	7.7
Honduras	Capital adequacy	14.1	14.5	14.4	14.0	...	13.7	13.7	...	...	...	...
	Asset quality	2.4	3.2	2.8	2.4	...	2.2	2.3	...	...	...	...
	Profitability	12.1	7.2	10.7	13.6	...	13.7	14.7	...	...	...	...
	Liquidity	26.8	34.3	33.5	28.7	...	27.1	26.6	...	...	...	...
	Sensitivity to market risk	9.4	10.3	9.3	5.2	...	5.2	7.4	...	...	...	...

		2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2023				2024	
							Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2
Mexico	Capital adequacy	16.0	17.7	19.5	19.0	18.8	19.3	19.5	19.3	18.8	19.5	19.3
	Asset quality	2.2	2.6	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.0
	Profitability	15.5	9.0	14.6	17.6	18.5	18.6	18.9	18.6	18.5	18.1	18.3
	Liquidity	29.6	33.1	34.5	30.1	29.7	28.3	29.7	29.2	29.7	31.0	30.6
	Sensitivity to market risk	10.6	4.2	14.9	7.0	12.0	9.9	14.8	13.6	12.0	12.0	14.6
Nicaragua	Capital adequacy	19.5	19.5	18.9	17.6	17.3	17.1	17.0	17.5	17.3	...	...
	Asset quality	3.1	3.7	2.5	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.5	...	...
	Profitability	7.2	6.0	9.9	11.2	13.4	15.0	14.4	14.2	13.4	...	...
	Liquidity	40.4	46.2	47.5	44.7	41.9	42.9	43.3	42.8	41.9	...	...
	Sensitivity to market risk	107.4	110.6	118.6	120.6	132.3	136.7	143.7	135.8	132.3	...	...
Panama	Capital adequacy	15.2	15.7	15.8	15.3	15.1	15.8	15.3	15.3	15.1	15.2	15.3
	Asset quality	2.0	2.0	2.3	2.5	2.6	2.9	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.5
	Profitability	11.5	6.4	9.1	12.8	16.4	14.7	17.0	16.8	16.4	4.2	8.8
	Liquidity	10.0	10.7	11.4	9.5	9.7	9.4	9.8	9.8	9.7	9.8	9.8
Paraguay	Capital adequacy	17.2	19.1	18.8	17.3	16.4	19.4	18.4	17.4	16.4	18.0	17.4
	Asset quality	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.9	3.0	3.3	3.7	3.4	3.0	3.3	2.9
	Profitability	18.4	13.0	12.8	14.5	17.2	15.0	15.6	16.6	17.2	17.6	17.9
	Liquidity	9.1	14.9	8.7	9.3	9.5	10.0	9.8	8.8	9.5	8.3	7.9
	Sensitivity to market risk	15.8	13.9	9.3	9.6	13.3	7.2	9.7	13.4	13.3	7.9	11.1
Peru	Capital adequacy	14.7	15.6	15.0	14.5	16.3	15.7	16.1	16.2	16.3	...	...
	Asset quality	3.4	4.1	3.9	4.1	4.5	4.2	4.3	4.4	4.5	...	...
	Profitability	18.0	3.1	12.1	16.5	13.0	16.2	15.5	14.5	13.0	...	...
	Liquidity	22.6	30.9	25.7	22.7	23.3	23.6	21.7	22.5	23.3	...	...
	Sensitivity to market risk	1.7	0.8	2.1	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.2	0.0	1.4	...	...
Uruguay	Capital adequacy	16.8	17.7	16.3	16.9	17.0	16.8	17.1	16.9	17.0	17.5	...
	Asset quality	2.6	2.3	1.3	1.4	1.7	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.8	...
	Profitability	21.5	20.8	15.4	11.6	22.7	15.6	19.3	20.3	22.7	22.1	...
	Liquidity	70.2	59.4	59.5	55.9	58.8	56.7	54.9	54.3	58.8	59.5	...
	Sensitivity to market risk	36.2	32.6	29.9	30.6	35.1	35.4	35.4	39.3	35.1	40.6	...

		2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2023				2024	
							Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2
<b>The Caribbean</b>												
Antigua and Barbuda	Capital adequacy	39.4	34.6	31.2	26.4	25.8	22.8	23.2	24.2	25.8	25.3	...
	Asset quality	5.3	7.4	7.8	6.9	6.1	6.7	6.9	6.3	6.1	5.9	...
	Profitability	22.5	4.7	6.8	9.0	18.6	11.6	17.1	18.2	18.6	19.5	...
	Liquidity	46.5	36.9	40.5	43.6	44.1	44.8	43.7	42.4	44.1	45.9	...
	Sensitivity to market risk	203.9	168.9	83.7	85.8	139.0	116.6	123.3	134.0	139.0	163.2	...
Barbados	Capital adequacy	14.0	16.4	16.7	17.7	20.6	18.6	18.5	18.6	20.6	21.2	...
	Asset quality	6.1	6.7	7.2	5.8	5.0	5.5	5.4	5.0	5.0	5.0	...
	Profitability	6.1	6.9	10.0	11.6	15.0	12.6	11.4	16.5	15.0	11.4	...
	Liquidity	26.1	27.7	31.4	32.1	30.9	32.7	32.5	31.8	30.9	32.9	...
	Sensitivity to market risk	67.3	47.4	46.8	38.2	26.0	38.8	35.7	32.6	26.0	24.5	...
Belize	Capital adequacy	22.4	20.5	20.2	17.1	17.7	16.8	18.1	18.2	17.7	17.9	19.3
	Asset quality	5.1	6.5	3.9	4.9	3.9	4.5	3.9	4.0	3.9	3.8	3.3
	Profitability	14.1	6.5	9.4	7.5	15.1	16.4	16.9	15.1	15.1	14.7	14.2
	Liquidity	23.9	28.0	33.4	31.0	29.8	31.7	31.6	32.0	29.8	29.9	30.8
	Sensitivity to market risk	49.7	59.3	103.8	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.2
Dominica	Capital adequacy	13.9	18.9	18.3	15.9	...	18.0	22.9	23.7	...	...	...
	Asset quality	12.2	15.0	15.7	13.8	...	12.2	12.9	13.2	...	...	...
	Profitability	60.4	24.0	3.0	-14.3	...	-8.2	1.1	2.5	...	...	...
	Liquidity	46.7	48.9	46.1	48.1	...	50.5	52.6	51.0	...	...	...
	Sensitivity to market risk	474.8	74.4	232.0	304.1	...	293.0	-276.2	-270.6	...	...	...
Grenada	Capital adequacy	11.9	15.1	15.8	14.1	...	14.0	14.4	13.2	...	...	...
	Asset quality	2.2	2.2	2.9	3.6	...	3.2	4.0	4.4	...	...	...
	Profitability	22.0	4.8	2.9	5.6	...	5.4	8.3	12.3	...	...	...
	Liquidity	43.7	46.8	44.9	49.1	...	50.3	49.6	48.9	...	...	...
	Sensitivity to market risk	238.5	172.7	168.4	179.0	...	170.6	183.4	188.6	...	...	...
Guyana	Capital adequacy	28.0	29.1	27.9	17.2	18.1	18.5	18.4	17.5	18.1	19.3	16.2
	Asset quality	11.1	10.8	7.8	4.7	2.7	4.3	3.4	3.1	2.7	2.4	2.1
	Profitability	4.9	4.2	3.7	4.1	4.3	4.1	4.5	4.7	4.3	4.6	5.1
	Liquidity	31.7	41.1	33.8	32.3	32.7	28.8	27.6	28.9	32.7	33.2	32.9

		2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2023				2024	
							Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2
Jamaica	Capital adequacy	14.5	14.4	14.2	14.2	14.6	14.2	14.8	14.5	14.6	14.3	14.8
	Asset quality	2.2	2.8	2.9	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.4
	Profitability	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.5	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.4
	Liquidity	24.0	24.5	25.6	21.9	21.9	20.3	20.6	22.0	21.9	20.1	18.7
Saint Kitts and Nevis	Capital adequacy	20.2	24.5	21.8	11.1	10.3	9.8	10.4	12.6	10.3	11.1	...
	Asset quality	24.0	23.5	20.9	21.8	19.4	21.8	20.3	19.8	19.4	19.1	...
	Profitability	9.9	24.1	13.3	-34.3	10.8	-19.8	12.0	10.9	10.8	13.1	...
	Liquidity	55.9	58.4	51.6	51.7	47.8	52.1	51.5	50.5	47.8	48.5	...
	Sensitivity to market risk	148.2	72.4	196.1	276.0	264.7	330.6	327.4	300.3	264.7	264.0	...
Saint Lucia	Capital adequacy	25.6	19.0	16.8	15.9	18.0	16.2	16.9	16.6	18.0	14.2	...
	Asset quality	8.2	10.4	12.6	12.8	14.5	12.6	13.6	13.2	14.5	11.9	...
	Profitability	25.8	4.5	9.7	16.3	18.3	16.9	15.0	17.6	18.3	19.3	...
	Liquidity	40.7	37.7	39.3	43.7	47.0	46.1	45.5	46.3	47.0	50.0	...
	Sensitivity to market risk	84.2	103.3	143.7	186.7	173.4	178.2	187.3	183.5	173.4	185.1	...
Saint Vincent and Grenadines	Capital adequacy	22.2	22.3	22.4	23.4	15.0	16.2	16.5	15.0	15.0	16.3	...
	Asset quality	6.4	7.4	7.8	10.1	8.1	8.8	9.3	8.6	8.1	7.4	...
	Profitability	15.0	1.7	5.5	4.5	14.2	2.9	9.6	11.1	14.2	19.7	...
	Liquidity	41.7	44.0	47.2	48.4	43.1	47.0	46.6	43.3	43.1	41.9	...
	Sensitivity to market risk	77.6	183.6	153.1	106.4	72.3	111.1	97.9	95.8	72.3	80.2	...
Suriname	Capital adequacy	...	...	...	16.8	20.3	17.5	18.4	18.7	20.3	21.6	22.3
	Asset quality	10.6	14.6	12.8	12.4	13.0	15.8	16.1	14.3	13.0	10.4	7.1
	Profitability	...	...	...	48.1	36.5	13.9	16.0	27.4	36.5	9.3	13.3
	Liquidity	...	...	...	54.3	53.6	52.0	52.3	53.7	53.6	54.2	54.2
	Sensitivity to market risk	...	...	...	22.1	20.6	15.3	21.0	16.6	20.6	17.7	18.3
Trinidad and Tobago	Capital adequacy	21.2	16.4	17.1	16.8	16.3	16.9	16.7	16.7	16.3	16.4	16.8
	Asset quality	2.9	3.2	3.2	3.1	2.8	3.2	3.1	2.9	2.8	2.9	2.8
	Profitability	17.3	8.6	11.4	13.5	13.9	11.2	12.5	11.6	13.9	12.4	12.6
	Liquidity	41.5	44.8	43.9	20.0	16.7	19.0	19.5	18.2	16.7	18.3	16.8
	Sensitivity to market risk	8.9	12.3	22.3	32.5	24.0	26.6	25.2	24.2	24.0	22.0	17.7

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official and International Monetary Fund figures.

Table A6.1

Latin America and the Caribbean: central government fiscal balances  
(Percentages of GDP)

	Primary balance					Overall balance				
	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Latin America and the Caribbean <sup>a</sup>	-0.1	-4.1	-1.2	0.3	0.4	-2.6	-6.8	-3.8	-2.3	-2.5
Latin America <sup>b</sup>	-0.3	-4.0	-1.6	0.3	-0.4	-2.9	-6.7	-4.0	-2.2	-3.2
Argentina	0.3	-1.4	-2.6	-3.0	-3.0	-4.0	-3.7	-4.3	-4.9	-4.8
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) <sup>c</sup>	-6.1	-12.1	-7.4	-4.5	...	-6.9	-13.1	-8.5	-5.8	...
Brazil	-1.3	-9.8	-0.4	0.5	-2.1	-5.7	-13.5	-4.8	-4.4	-7.2
Chile	-1.9	-6.3	-6.9	2.1	-1.3	-2.9	-7.3	-7.7	1.1	-2.4
Colombia	0.4	-5.0	-3.6	-1.0	-0.3	-2.5	-7.8	-7.0	-5.3	-4.3
Costa Rica	-2.7	-3.4	-0.3	2.1	1.6	-6.7	-8.0	-5.0	-2.5	-3.3
Dominican Republic	-0.7	-4.7	0.2	-0.4	-0.1	-3.5	-7.9	-2.9	-3.2	-3.3
Ecuador	0.7	-2.3	0.0	3.5	-1.2	-2.4	-5.8	-1.8	1.5	-3.9
El Salvador	1.8	-5.0	-0.6	2.5	1.3	-1.6	-9.1	-4.9	-1.8	-2.2
Guatemala	-0.6	-3.2	0.6	-0.0	0.4	-2.2	-4.9	-1.2	-1.7	-1.3
Honduras	0.6	-3.6	-1.8	1.7	-0.4	-2.5	-7.1	-5.0	-1.3	-3.6
Mexico <sup>d</sup>	1.1	0.0	-0.2	-0.5	-0.0	-1.6	-2.8	-2.8	-3.2	-3.3
Nicaragua	1.5	0.2	0.5	2.6	4.5	0.3	-1.1	-0.7	1.3	2.9
Panama	-2.2	-6.2	-4.4	-2.4	-1.2	-4.0	-8.6	-6.7	-4.1	-3.7
Paraguay	-2.0	-5.1	-2.5	-1.7	-2.5	-2.8	-6.1	-3.6	-2.9	-4.2
Peru <sup>c</sup>	-0.1	-6.8	-1.1	0.0	-1.3	-1.4	-8.3	-2.5	-1.4	-2.8
Uruguay	-0.4	-2.4	-1.6	-0.8	-0.8	-2.8	-5.1	-3.7	-3.1	-3.2
The Caribbean <sup>e</sup>	0.3	-4.1	-0.8	0.3	1.4	-2.3	-6.9	-3.4	-2.3	-1.6
Antigua and Barbuda	-1.2	-2.9	-2.0	-1.0	0.7	-3.7	-5.4	-4.2	-3.4	-1.7
Bahamas <sup>f</sup>	0.9	-4.2	-8.9	-1.4	0.3	-1.7	-7.3	-13.1	-5.8	-3.8
Barbados <sup>g,h</sup>	6.1	-0.8	-0.8	2.8	4.3	3.7	-4.0	-4.5	-2.2	-2.0
Belize <sup>g</sup>	-0.9	-8.7	-0.0	1.7	1.2	-3.5	-10.3	-1.4	-0.1	-1.0
Dominica	-13.0	-1.0	-4.2	-5.1	...	-15.1	-3.6	-6.4	-7.6	...
Grenada	6.8	-2.6	2.1	2.5	10.1	5.0	-4.5	0.3	0.9	8.5
Guyana	-2.0	-7.3	-6.7	-4.8	-5.4	-2.8	-7.9	-7.2	-5.1	-5.7
Jamaica <sup>g</sup>	7.1	3.5	6.8	5.8	5.7	0.9	-3.1	0.9	0.3	0.0
Saint Kitts and Nevis	1.8	-1.2	7.3	-2.2	2.2	0.6	-2.6	6.0	-3.5	1.0
Saint Lucia	0.8	-5.8	-2.1	0.5	0.8	-2.3	-9.6	-5.2	-2.3	-2.4
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	-0.9	-3.6	-3.8	-4.5	-5.6	-3.3	-5.9	-6.3	-6.8	-8.2
Suriname <sup>i</sup>	-15.6	-7.5	3.5	0.9	1.3	-18.5	-11.1	1.5	-0.9	-1.7
Trinidad and Tobago <sup>j</sup>	0.6	-7.8	-4.8	3.4	1.4	-2.5	-11.2	-7.9	0.7	-1.6

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Simple averages. Does not include the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Cuba, Dominica, Haiti or the Plurinational State of Bolivia.

<sup>b</sup> Simple averages for 16 countries. Does not include the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Cuba, Haiti or the Plurinational State of Bolivia.

<sup>c</sup> General government.

<sup>d</sup> Federal public sector.

<sup>e</sup> Simple averages for 12 countries. Does not include Dominica.

<sup>f</sup> Fiscal years, from 1 July to 30 June.

<sup>g</sup> Fiscal years, from 1 April to 31 March.

<sup>h</sup> Non-financial public sector.

<sup>i</sup> Includes statistical discrepancy.

<sup>j</sup> Fiscal years, from 1 October to September 30.

Table A6.2

Latin America and the Caribbean: central government public income and expenditure  
(Percentages of GDP)

	Total income		Tax revenues		Other revenue		Total expenditure		Primary current expenditure		Interest payments		Capital expenditure	
	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023
Latin America and the Caribbean <sup>a</sup>	22.5	22.1	17.9	17.7	4.7	4.4	24.8	24.6	18.1	17.7	2.6	2.8	4.1	4.0
Latin America <sup>b</sup>	19.2	18.6	16.2	15.9	3.0	2.7	21.5	21.7	15.7	15.8	2.6	2.7	3.1	3.2
Argentina	16.4	15.1	14.9	13.7	1.5	1.4	21.2	19.9	17.8	16.7	1.9	1.8	1.6	1.3
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) <sup>c</sup>	26.3	...	18.0	...	8.4	...	32.2	...	25.2	...	1.4	...	5.7	...
Brazil	23.0	21.7	19.5	19.2	3.4	2.5	27.3	28.8	21.9	22.8	4.8	5.1	0.6	0.9
Chile	26.0	23.0	22.0	18.8	4.0	4.1	24.9	25.3	20.4	20.8	1.0	1.1	3.5	3.5
Colombia	16.2	18.8	14.4	16.7	1.8	2.1	21.5	23.1	14.5	16.6	4.3	3.9	2.7	2.6
Costa Rica	16.4	15.3	15.2	14.8	1.1	0.4	18.9	18.5	12.9	12.4	4.6	4.8	1.4	1.3
Dominican Republic	15.3	15.7	13.9	14.3	1.4	1.4	18.7	19.1	13.1	12.9	2.8	3.1	2.7	3.0
Ecuador	21.9	17.7	13.0	12.1	9.0	5.7	20.5	21.7	14.0	14.6	2.1	2.7	4.5	4.4
El Salvador	20.8	20.8	20.1	19.7	0.7	1.0	22.6	23.0	16.2	15.7	4.3	3.5	2.1	3.8
Guatemala	12.6	12.5	12.3	12.1	0.2	0.4	14.3	13.7	10.1	9.6	1.7	1.6	2.5	2.5
Honduras	19.8	19.5	17.9	17.6	2.0	1.9	21.1	23.1	15.0	14.7	3.0	3.2	3.1	5.2
Mexico <sup>d</sup>	22.4	22.2	12.9	14.2	9.5	7.9	25.6	25.6	18.5	18.6	2.8	3.3	4.3	3.6
Nicaragua	21.7	21.6	19.8	19.9	1.8	1.7	20.4	18.7	14.2	12.7	1.3	1.6	4.9	4.4
Panama	12.1	12.8	7.7	7.7	4.5	5.1	16.3	16.5	9.6	9.6	1.7	2.6	4.9	4.3
Paraguay	14.0	14.0	11.5	11.3	2.6	2.7	17.0	18.1	12.0	12.9	1.2	1.7	3.8	3.6
Peru <sup>e</sup>	22.1	19.7	19.2	17.1	2.9	2.6	23.5	22.5	16.0	15.7	1.5	1.6	6.1	5.3
Uruguay	26.5	26.9	24.7	25.1	1.8	1.9	29.5	30.1	25.8	26.6	2.2	2.3	1.6	1.2
<b>The Caribbean<sup>e</sup></b>	<b>27.0</b>	<b>26.8</b>	<b>20.1</b>	<b>20.1</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>6.7</b>	<b>29.3</b>	<b>28.3</b>	<b>21.2</b>	<b>20.2</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>5.4</b>	<b>5.1</b>
Antigua and Barbuda	18.1	16.8	14.9	14.7	3.2	2.1	21.5	18.5	16.4	14.4	2.4	2.4	2.6	1.7
Bahamas <sup>f</sup>	21.0	20.4	17.4	17.6	3.6	2.7	26.8	24.2	20.1	17.7	4.4	4.1	2.3	2.3
Barbados <sup>g,h</sup>	30.1	30.0	28.2	28.5	1.9	1.5	32.3	32.1	23.0	22.5	5.0	6.3	4.1	3.2
Belize <sup>g</sup>	23.3	23.4	20.9	21.7	2.4	1.7	23.4	24.4	16.4	16.1	1.8	2.2	5.2	6.2
Dominica	51.7	...	21.3	...	30.4	...	59.3	...	31.9	...	2.6	...	24.9	...
Grenada	32.7	35.9	22.1	23.6	10.7	12.3	31.8	27.4	20.0	18.4	1.6	1.6	10.2	7.4
Guyana	14.4	16.9	9.7	10.3	4.8	6.6	19.6	22.6	10.8	10.4	0.3	0.3	8.5	11.9
Jamaica <sup>g</sup>	30.1	30.5	27.3	27.4	2.7	3.1	29.8	30.5	22.4	23.0	5.5	5.7	1.9	1.8
Saint Kitts and Nevis	50.9	47.4	18.4	18.9	32.4	28.5	54.3	46.4	38.5	35.5	1.2	1.2	14.6	9.7
Saint Lucia	19.1	20.3	16.3	18.2	2.8	2.1	21.4	22.7	15.8	16.4	2.8	3.2	2.8	3.1
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	27.5	26.4	24.0	22.0	3.5	4.4	34.3	34.6	22.8	22.7	2.3	2.5	9.1	9.3
Suriname <sup>i</sup>	27.2	24.9	19.0	16.0	8.2	8.9	28.1	26.6	24.0	20.8	1.8	3.0	2.3	2.8
Trinidad and Tobago <sup>j</sup>	29.5	28.4	23.5	21.7	6.0	6.6	28.8	30.0	24.4	24.8	2.7	3.0	1.7	2.2

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Simple averages. Does not include the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Cuba, Dominica, Haiti or the Plurinational State of Bolivia.

<sup>b</sup> Simple averages for 16 countries. Does not include the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Cuba, Haiti or the Plurinational State of Bolivia.

<sup>c</sup> General government.

<sup>d</sup> Federal public sector.

<sup>e</sup> Simple averages for 12 countries. Does not include Dominica.

<sup>f</sup> Fiscal years, from 1 July to 30 June.

<sup>g</sup> Fiscal years, from 1 April to 31 March.

<sup>h</sup> Non-financial public sector.

<sup>i</sup> Includes statistical discrepancy.

<sup>j</sup> Fiscal years, from 1 October to September 30.

Table A6.3

Latin America and the Caribbean: non-financial public sector gross public debt  
(Percentages of GDP)

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Latin America and the Caribbean <sup>a</sup>	56.7	58.8	59.1	60.9	60.2	74.7	71.2	66.3	66.1
Latin America <sup>a</sup>	39.7	41.8	43.4	46.5	49.2	59.7	55.6	54.7	58.2
Argentina <sup>b</sup>	52.6	53.3	56.5	85.2	89.8	103.8	80.8	85.0	156.6
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) <sup>c</sup>	31.2	34.8	36.7	36.8	43.0	61.1	65.6	65.5	74.2
Brazil <sup>d</sup>	66.5	70.0	74.0	77.2	74.3	88.6	78.3	71.7	74.4
Chile	27.4	30.3	32.2	34.9	38.6	42.7	46.6	47.6	49.5
Colombia	54.9	54.9	54.4	57.5	57.3	71.5	60.1	69.4	64.5
Costa Rica	47.8	51.3	58.0	61.8	71.9	77.1	75.5	68.9	65.1
Dominican Republic	35.1	35.3	36.9	37.6	40.4	56.7	50.4	45.5	45.1
Ecuador	33.0	38.2	44.5	45.0	52.3	63.1	61.8	65.1	65.5
El Salvador	52.2	52.7	52.2	51.4	51.7	65.8	60.7	57.7	57.0
Guatemala <sup>e</sup>	24.8	24.9	25.1	26.4	26.4	31.5	30.7	29.0	27.2
Haiti <sup>e,f</sup>	23.3	23.3	38.3	39.9	47.0	...	...	...	...
Honduras <sup>e</sup>	44.7	46.3	47.3	48.5	48.7	58.9	55.8	53.8	48.6
Mexico <sup>g</sup>	44.2	49.4	46.9	46.9	46.7	53.1	50.7	48.3	47.5
Nicaragua	30.4	31.2	34.5	37.7	41.7	48.1	46.8	45.2	44.3
Panama	37.4	37.4	37.6	38.2	44.5	64.7	63.5	62.1	58.0
Paraguay	15.1	17.3	18.2	19.7	22.9	33.8	33.8	36.0	38.5
Peru	20.9	22.7	24.9	25.8	26.8	34.6	35.9	33.9	32.9
Uruguay	47.7	53.7	51.3	49.4	53.0	61.2	58.7	55.8	56.3
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) <sup>e</sup>	31.7	31.1	34.9	...	...	...	...	...	...
The Caribbean <sup>h</sup>	77.8	79.6	78.3	78.8	73.7	93.1	90.3	80.6	75.8
Antigua and Barbuda	80.8	79.7	80.4	76.3	76.8	96.5	90.1	79.6	71.8
Bahamas	69.7	72.0	77.5	79.0	77.8	115.4	105.1	92.9	91.9
Barbados	142.4	150.5	148.9	178.9	125.0	113.6	135.1	120.3	109.8
Belize	80.9	87.3	95.0	93.6	77.8	101.4	80.1	68.6	70.5
Dominica	74.2	68.3	74.1	73.9	78.0	109.1	109.2	105.1	97.8
Grenada	88.6	80.0	69.7	66.4	59.7	72.9	71.4	64.5	63.1
Guyana	36.0	35.7	35.2	35.9	32.5	47.4	40.8	25.2	26.7
Jamaica <sup>e</sup>	112.9	108.4	104.4	97.1	92.4	103.3	97.5	84.5	74.8
Saint Kitts and Nevis	63.7	59.0	59.3	53.8	54.3	68.1	69.1	60.2	54.9
Saint Lucia	60.4	59.9	59.0	59.9	61.9	97.1	88.1	73.4	74.4
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	79.1	82.1	74.1	69.3	67.9	81.2	89.9	86.7	87.3
Suriname <sup>e,i</sup>	48.6	72.0	67.3	62.7	70.9	120.9	111.7	116.9	89.9
Trinidad and Tobago	73.5	80.1	73.6	77.0	83.4	83.9	86.2	69.3	72.0

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Simple averages. Does not include the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Haiti or the Plurinational State of Bolivia.

<sup>b</sup> Central administration.

<sup>c</sup> Refers to the external debt of the non-financial public sector and central government domestic debt.

<sup>d</sup> General government.

<sup>e</sup> Central government.

<sup>f</sup> Does not include public sector commitments to commercial banks.

<sup>g</sup> Federal public sector.

<sup>h</sup> Simple averages.

<sup>i</sup> International definition.

Table A6.4

Latin America and the Caribbean: central government gross public debt  
(Percentages of GDP)

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
<b>Latin America and the Caribbean<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>51.3</b>	<b>53.2</b>	<b>53.7</b>	<b>55.2</b>	<b>55.0</b>	<b>69.3</b>	<b>66.4</b>	<b>62.5</b>	<b>62.0</b>
<b>Latin America<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>36.4</b>	<b>38.5</b>	<b>39.9</b>	<b>43.0</b>	<b>45.3</b>	<b>56.0</b>	<b>52.8</b>	<b>51.7</b>	<b>55.0</b>
Argentina <sup>b</sup>	52.6	53.3	56.5	85.2	89.8	103.8	80.8	85.0	156.6
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	29.0	32.0	34.0	35.0	40.2	57.9	63.0	63.1	71.4
Brazil <sup>c</sup>	66.5	70.0	74.0	77.2	74.3	88.6	78.3	71.7	74.4
Chile	17.3	21.0	23.6	25.6	28.3	32.5	36.3	38.0	39.4
Colombia	45.0	46.0	44.9	48.6	48.4	61.4	60.1	64.1	53.9
Costa Rica	39.8	43.6	48.4	51.7	56.5	67.6	68.4	63.0	61.1
Dominican Republic	34.4	34.5	36.1	36.8	39.6	56.0	49.9	45.5	44.9
Ecuador	30.9	35.7	41.3	42.2	48.2	59.0	57.0	59.7	60.5
El Salvador	49.7	49.6	48.2	47.6	48.8	62.4	57.6	54.8	54.1
Guatemala	24.8	24.9	25.1	26.4	26.4	31.5	30.7	29.0	27.3
Haiti <sup>d</sup>	23.3	23.3	38.3	39.9	47.0	...	...	...	...
Honduras	44.7	46.3	47.3	48.5	48.7	58.9	55.8	53.8	48.6
Mexico	34.1	37.0	35.2	35.4	36.1	41.4	40.2	39.5	39.9
Nicaragua	29.9	31.2	34.0	37.7	41.7	48.1	47.3	45.2	44.1
Panama	37.1	37.0	37.3	39.3	44.5	64.7	63.5	62.1	58.0
Paraguay	13.3	15.1	15.7	16.9	19.6	29.7	30.1	32.1	34.3
Peru	19.7	21.6	23.3	23.8	24.8	32.9	33.1	31.0	29.9
Uruguay	43.1	49.4	47.3	45.7	49.0	57.8	55.7	53.1	53.2
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	31.7	31.1	34.9	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>The Caribbean<sup>e</sup></b>	<b>69.5</b>	<b>71.3</b>	<b>70.7</b>	<b>70.2</b>	<b>67.0</b>	<b>85.7</b>	<b>83.1</b>	<b>75.7</b>	<b>70.6</b>
Antigua and Barbuda	66.1	65.4	64.8	62.3	62.9	83.0	76.4	68.3	61.6
Bahamas	56.6	58.8	64.3	65.2	64.8	101.1	93.0	88.6	84.2
Barbados	129.6	137.6	137.4	155.8	124.1	113.0	143.1	127.5	116.3
Belize	78.4	84.8	92.4	90.1	74.3	97.5	75.2	64.5	66.3
Dominica	64.0	57.4	62.1	63.6	67.7	97.1	99.0	96.2	89.7
Grenada	82.7	75.7	65.8	62.8	57.7	70.6	69.4	62.6	60.6
Guyana <sup>f</sup>	36.0	35.7	35.2	35.9	32.5	47.4	40.8	25.2	26.7
Jamaica	112.9	108.4	104.4	97.1	92.4	103.3	97.5	84.5	74.8
Saint Kitts and Nevis	51.3	47.9	47.6	38.9	37.8	46.5	47.0	41.5	37.8
Saint Lucia	57.4	57.6	55.2	56.5	58.4	91.9	82.6	68.7	70.0
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	67.6	65.9	67.2	63.7	64.6	78.1	87.2	85.4	86.0
Suriname <sup>g</sup>	48.6	72.0	67.3	62.7	70.9	120.9	111.7	116.9	89.9
Trinidad and Tobago	52.8	59.8	55.8	58.6	62.5	63.7	56.9	53.7	54.5

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Simple averages. Does not include the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Haiti or the Plurinational State of Bolivia.

<sup>b</sup> Central administration.

<sup>c</sup> General government.

<sup>d</sup> Does not include public sector commitments to commercial banks.

<sup>e</sup> Simple averages.

<sup>f</sup> Public sector.

<sup>g</sup> International definition.

Table A7.1

Latin America and the Caribbean: consumer prices  
(12-month percentage variation)

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2023				2024		
						March	June	September	December	March	June	September
<b>Latin America and the Caribbean<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>3.3</b>	<b>7.6</b>	<b>7.6</b>	<b>4.6</b>	<b>6.7</b>	<b>4.9</b>	<b>5.2</b>	<b>4.6</b>	<b>4.1</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>4.1</b>
<b>Latin America<sup>b</sup></b>												
Argentina	52.9	34.1	51.4	95.2	210.1	105.3	117.0	138.3	210.1	289.9	273.7	214.0
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	1.5	0.7	0.9	3.1	2.1	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.1	3.1	3.8	6.2
Brazil	4.3	4.5	10.0	5.8	4.6	4.7	3.2	5.2	4.6	3.9	4.2	4.4
Chile	3.0	3.0	7.2	12.8	3.9	11.1	7.6	5.1	3.9	3.8	4.2	4.2
Colombia	3.8	1.6	5.6	13.1	9.3	13.3	12.1	11.0	9.3	7.4	7.2	5.8
Costa Rica	1.5	0.9	3.3	7.9	-1.8	4.4	-1.0	-2.2	-1.8	-1.2	-0.0	-0.1
Cuba <sup>c</sup>	-1.3	18.5	77.3	39.1	38.7	46.4	45.5	37.7	38.7	41.1	31.1	...
Dominican Republic	3.7	5.6	8.5	7.8	3.6	5.9	4.0	4.4	3.6	3.4	3.5	3.3
Ecuador	-0.1	-0.9	1.9	3.7	1.3	2.8	1.7	2.2	1.3	1.7	1.2	1.4
El Salvador	-0.0	-0.1	6.1	7.3	1.2	6.1	3.8	3.0	1.2	0.8	1.5	0.6
Guatemala	3.4	4.8	3.1	9.2	4.2	8.7	4.9	4.7	4.2	3.2	3.6	2.1
Haiti	20.8	19.2	24.6	48.1	22.1	48.1	43.7	31.9	22.1	27.7	30.0	30.4 <sup>i</sup>
Honduras	4.1	4.0	5.3	9.8	5.2	9.1	5.6	6.1	5.2	4.8	4.9	4.5
Mexico	2.8	3.2	7.4	7.8	4.7	6.8	5.1	4.5	4.7	4.4	5.0	4.6
Nicaragua	6.5	2.6	7.3	11.3	5.6	10.1	9.2	6.5	5.2	4.7	4.5	3.6
Panama	-0.1	-1.6	2.6	2.1	1.9	1.3	-0.6	2.3	1.9	1.7	0.9	-0.3
Paraguay	2.8	2.2	6.8	8.1	3.7	6.4	4.2	3.5	3.7	3.6	4.3	4.1
Peru	1.9	2.0	6.4	8.5	3.2	8.4	6.5	5.0	3.2	3.0	2.3	1.8
Uruguay	8.8	9.4	8.0	8.3	5.1	7.3	6.0	3.9	5.1	3.8	5.0	5.3
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	9 585	2 960	686	234	190	439.6	404.4	317.6	189.8	67.8	51.4	25.8

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2023				2024		
						March	June	September	December	March	June	September
<b>The Caribbean<sup>d</sup></b>												
Antigua and Barbuda	0.7	2.8	1.2	9.2	3.3	4.6	2.8	5.6	3.3	4.9	6.6	7.1 <sup>i</sup>
Bahamas	1.4	1.2	4.1	5.5	1.9	4.1	3.1	2.2	1.9	2.8	0.3	-0.5
Barbados	7.2	1.3	5.0	12.5	4.2	12.6	10.6	11.1	4.2	2.2	1.3	1.0 <sup>i</sup>
Belize	0.2	0.4	4.9	6.7	3.7	5.9	3.3	4.2	3.7	3.4	3.8	3.2 <sup>i</sup>
Dominica	0.1	-0.7	3.8	8.4	2.3	7.1	2.7	1.3	2.3	1.3	2.9	2.9 <sup>i</sup>
Grenada	0.1	-0.8	1.9	2.9	2.2	3.7	2.2	2.3	2.2	1.4	1.2	1.2 <sup>i</sup>
Guyana	2.1	0.9	5.7	7.2	2.0	4.9	1.9	1.0	2.0	2.3	4.0	3.4
Jamaica	6.2	4.5	7.3	9.3	6.9	6.2	6.3	5.9	6.9	5.5	5.3	5.7
Saint Kitts and Nevis	-0.8	-1.2	1.9	3.9	1.6	5.7	3.0	3.7	1.6	0.6	1.0	1.0
Saint Lucia	-0.7	-0.4	4.1	6.9	2.1	7.1	3.9	2.6	2.1	0.6	0.8	0.8
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0.5	-1.0	3.4	6.7	4.0	5.5	5.3	3.0	4.0	4.9	3.2	3.2
Suriname	4.2	60.7	60.7	54.6	32.6	59.5	54.6	50.8	32.6	26.8	16.2	10.5
Trinidad and Tobago	0.4	0.8	3.5	8.7	0.7	7.3	5.8	3.9	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.4 <sup>i</sup>

**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Latin America and the Caribbean does not include data on economies with chronic inflation (Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Cuba, Haiti and Suriname).

<sup>b</sup> Latin America does not include data on economies with chronic inflation (Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Cuba and Haiti).

<sup>c</sup> Refers to national currency markets.

<sup>d</sup> The Caribbean does not include data on economies with chronic inflation (Suriname).

<sup>i</sup> Figures as of August 2024.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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One of the Indigenous symbols featured in the craftwork of the peoples of the Americas, an essential part of their culture and economy. Bas-relief on the spiral tower at ECLAC headquarters in Santiago.

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Latin America and the Caribbean is caught in a trap of low capacity for growth, according to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). The region's economies are projected to expand by 2.2% and 2.4% in 2024 and 2025, respectively. Although these figures are above the 2015–2024 average of 1.0%, they are insufficient to close the gap with the economies of developed countries.

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