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FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN ROSE 44% IN 2004

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UNITED NATIONS

ECLAC

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean

Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Latin America and the Caribbean rose 44% in 2004 to reach US\$56.4 billion. In South America the increase reached 48% (US\$34.103 billion), while in Mexico and the Caribbean Basin, 43% (US\$22.273 billion). This is the first year that FDI in the region has risen since 1999.

The report, *Foreign Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2004*, considers this trend "very positive". It warns, however, that the region has still not overcome the problem of attracting foreign

capital. The challenge of capturing FDI that provides greater benefits to receiving countries remains and quantities are still lower than inflows in 1996-2000.

Compared to the rest of the world's, the region's percentage of foreign capital inflows has fallen steadily in recent years, reflecting "evident weaknesses in competing for newer, higher-quality investments (in higher-technology manufactures, research and development centres and new services...)," according to the report.

The countries with the greatest increase in foreign capital in 2004 were Brazil (79%) and Chile (73%). Mexico received the second largest amount, with almost US\$17 billion. Trinidad and Tobago, El Salvador and Colombia also saw FDI rise, while Panama and Venezuela experienced a downturn.

The United States remained the region's largest investor (32% of flows), given the decline in European investment, especially from Spain. Asian investment remains low.

(continued on page 3 ➡)

INTEGRATION IN SOUTH AMERICA'S NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY

The potential for gas integration is open in South America but several hurdles must be overcome for it to be successful, according to an **ECLAC** study. To achieve regional integration will require progress in binational interconnection and harmonization of regulatory frameworks.

A common vision, shared by governments, public and private firms is also necessary to create a supra-national instance to coordinate and carry out prospective studies covering longer horizons, for example through 2030.

It is estimated that almost 75% of gas reserves are located in Andean countries, whose domestic consumption is relatively low compared to that of the Southern Cone. Bolivia, Peru and Venezuela have enormous natural gas

reserves. Among the producing countries, Argentina's and Brazil's positions are relatively tenuous in terms of their own natural gas supplies. Chile and Uruguay are importers.

The report *La industria del gas natural en América del Sur: situación y posibilidades de integración de mercados (The Natural Gas Industry in South America: Conditions and Potential for Market Integration)*, by **Roberto Kozulj** (Recursos naturales e infraestructura series N° 77, December 2004, Spanish), examines reforms in the countries mentioned, describing their gas supply, transportation and distribution chains, institutional aspects and different actors, existing and planned gas pipelines for interconnection, and other relevant elements.

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FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: THE NEED TO SUSTAIN THE PAST YEAR'S RECOVERY AND ACHIEVE GREATER BENEFITS

JOSÉ LUIS MACHINEA

Throughout the 20th century, Latin America's approach to foreign direct investment (FDI) was marked by shifting policies. During the first half, passive policies resulted in foreign firms receiving rather liberal treatment, which essentially attracted FDI in search of natural resources and markets for manufactured goods. Nonetheless, growing dissatisfaction with FDI's impact led to more active policies, which were more restrictive.

In the 1960s, these policies became driven by broad and extensive nationalization of foreign firms' subsidiaries associated with natural resource exploitation, along with the creation of new limitations on foreign companies' operations. Coinciding with the external debt crisis and a shortage of external financing, FDI policies then began to change once again.

Since the 1990s, horizontal and passive policies consisting of openness, liberalization and deregulation of Latin American economies have prevailed. Combined with the privatization of state assets, these attracted a lot of FDI.

At the same time, receiving countries have signed different international agreements regarding foreign investment, in an effort to provide juridical security and guarantees to foreign investors and thus eliminate the prevailing mistrust. Most FDI received by Latin America was conditional on two new strategic considerations: a search for domestic service markets and efficiency in conquering third markets.

Thus, FDI made possible both expanded coverage and improved quality of many public service and infrastructure activities (telecommunications, electric power, retail trade, financial services) along with significantly increasing manufactured exports. Some frustration also became apparent, however, with the results from FDI.

In services, problems involving regulation and competition arose, some of which led to investor-state disputes in international forums. Manufactured export platforms revealed little technological transfer, weak production chains, limited human resource training and weak development of local entrepreneurs.

The exhaustion of privatization plans combined with deteriorating macroeconomic conditions in some of the region's main countries led to a weaker rise in FDI, with inflows falling from \$78.1 billion in 2000 to US\$39.1 billion in 2003.



New Expansionary Cycle

In 2004, Latin America may have entered a new expansionary cycle of FDI, with inflows reaching US\$56 billion, up 44% over 2003. Given this scenario, local authorities face enormous challenges: first, how to keep investment flows high in the coming years; and second, how to implement active, unrestrictive new policies that ensure higher quality FDI, compatible with national development goals.

In a context of economic expansion, stable game rules must be assured to encourage FDI inflows, while countries must design a policy to maximize the growth benefits of this investment. This requires designing policy that defines what is required of FDI, identifies the transnational companies most functional to these objectives, and how to attract them with different incentives, as well as including mechanisms to evaluate policy results and make any necessary changes. This way FDI policy could be developed that does not undergo drastic changes and yet provides acceptable levels of satisfaction to both investors and the guest country.

Several countries in Asia and Europe have had good experience with improving the quality of FDI inflows through more focused policies. With the exception of some isolated cases, such as Costa Rica and to a lesser degree Chile, Latin America has not achieved benefits of the same magnitude as the large volumes of FDI received in the past cycle. Active, unrestrictive policies could make results more like those of countries in other regions possible.

These strategies will have more chance of success to the degree that domestic policies improve human resources and develop infrastructure that increases the overall competitiveness of investment. 

The author is ECLAC Executive Secretary.

In line with trends worldwide, between 2002 and 2003 the service sector received most FDI (51%), although these were mostly traditional services and not those with a higher technological content, which is preferable. Manufacturing (36%) came next, followed by the primary sector (13%).



“Translatina” Firms on the Rise

Privatization programmes have lost ground to the purchase of private sector assets as a factor attracting foreign capital. The presence of transnational firms among the largest companies operating in Latin America and the Caribbean has fallen in recent years. The ECLAC report reveals that their place has been taken by growth from local private firms that, as they start up operations in other Latin American countries, have become known as translatinas (Petrobras, Telmex, América Móvil, Cemex, Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, Femsas, Odebrecht, Carso Group).



Both Threat and Opportunity

China has emerged as a serious player in FDI flows to and from some of the region’s countries. For Mexico and the Caribbean, this Asian country now represents major competition for efficiency-seeking investment. In contrast, for South America, China offers opportunities as a destination for its natural resource exports.

ECLAC studies reveal that FDI does not automatically offer benefits to receiving countries and that these vary depending on the strategies applied by transnational firms (search for natural resources, local markets, efficiency in conquering third markets and technological assets).

Because of this, ECLAC recommends that receiving countries more clearly define what they expect from FDI, and assign it a role within the framework of their national strategies for developing production. Unlike Europe and Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean still don’t have efficient institutions that evaluate the policy in this area to determine whether they achieved the desired effects.



Investments in Southern Cone Electric Sector

The investment necessary to resolve the electric power shortage in Southern Cone countries from 2004-2008 amounts to US\$20 billion, according to the report, which has a chapter on energy markets. FDI will be essential to meet this target.

Despite the US\$77 billion invested in electricity and gas in the 1990s, FDI flowing into this sector in the Southern Cone did not meet expectations in terms of increasing generation capacity. With the changes introduced in the regulatory framework and the arrival of foreign operators, system capacity was expected to improve automatically, but this did not occur.

Three-quarters of this investment went to purchasing existing assets, while just one-quarter went to improving them or to new

investment, the study reveals. Thus, the new capacity created to satisfy growing demand for electric power was not enough. Increasing generation and transmission in the electric sector remains necessary, along with raising hydrocarbon reserves and building gas pipelines.



Brazil Received the Most FDI

Brazil received the most FDI in the region, with an 80% increase in 2004 to reach more than US\$18 billion. For Brazil, this could be a unique opportunity to consolidate a new cycle of higher quality investment, ECLAC suggests. The country seems to have regained its role as a significant receiver within the strategies of transnational firms, lost after the macroeconomic turbulence it experienced from 1999 to 2000.

The investment boom of the 1990s was driven by the stable economy, the program to privatize state-owned firms, elimination of restrictions on foreign capital and the creation of Mercosur, along with sectoral incentives. In contrast, the current cycle reflects the purchase of private firms. The transnationals' main motivation seems to be the same in both cases: the search for a larger market share. 🌐

Net FDI flows into Latin America and the Caribbean, by country, 1990-2004

(US\$ million) a/

	1990-1995 b/	1996-2000 b/	2001	2002	2003	2004 c/
1. South America	10 684,3	53 173,6	38 566,3	27 421,3	23 418,7	34 103,8
a) Chile	1 498,7	5 667,0	4 199,8	2 549,9	4 385,4	7 602,8
b) Mercosur	5 923,4	36 760,0	24 978,7	17 867,1	11 529,3	20 275,6
Argentina	3 457,2	11 561,1	2 166,1	1 093,0	1 020,4	1 800,0
Brazil	2 229,3	24 823,6	22 457,4	16 590,2	10 143,5	18 165,6
Paraguay	99,3	188,0	84,2	9,3	90,8	80,0
Uruguay	137,5	187,2	271,0	174,6	274,6	230,0
c) Andean						
Community	3 262,1	10 746,7	9 387,8	7 004,3	7 504,1	6 225,5
Bolivia	136,5	780,2	705,8	676,6	166,8	137,0
Colombia	843,3	3 081,1	2 524,9	2 114,5	1 746,2	2 352,0
Ecuador	327,8	692,4	1 329,8	1 275,3	1 554,7	1 200,0
Peru	1 093,6	2 000,8	1 144,3	2 155,8	1 377,3	1 392,5
Venezuela (Boliv. Rep. of)	861,0	4 192,2	3 683,0	782,0	2 659,0	1 144,0
2. Mexico and the Caribbean Basin	7 628,1	17 421,4	32 229,4	19 620,9	15 707,8	22 273,9
a) Mexico	6 112,8	12 873,1	27 634,7	15 129,1	11 372,7	16 601,9
b) Central America	633,5	2 340,2	1 932,3	1 699,9	1 987,1	2 022,0
Costa Rica	241,4	495,2	453,6	662,0	576,8	585,0
El Salvador	19,4	309,5	278,9	470,0	103,7	389,0
Guatemala	85,9	243,7	455,5	110,6	115,8	125,0
Honduras	42,5	166,1	189,5	175,5	198,0	195,0
Nicaragua	47,4	229,2	150,2	203,9	201,3	261,0
Panama	197,1	896,5	404,6	77,9	791,5	467,0
c) Caribbean	881,8	2 208,0	2 662,4	2 792,0	2 348,0	3 650,1
Jamaica	128,1	349,6	613,9	481,1	720,7	605,2
Dominican Rep.	211,3	701,5	1 079,1	916,8	309,9	463,0
Trinidad and Tobago	275,2	681,5	834,9	790,7	616,0	1 826,0
Other	267,2	475,4	134,5	603,4	701,4	755,9
3. Latin America and the Caribbean	18 312,4	70 595,0	70 795,7	47 042,2	39 126,6	56 377,8

Source: ECLAC, based on statistics from the International Monetary Fund. *Balance of Payments Statistics* [CD ROM], November 2004, and official information through 1 March 2005.

a/ Net FDI inflows are defined as inflows of foreign direct investment received by the receiving economy, minus capital outflows generated by the same transnational companies. It does not include resources corresponding to financial centres. b/ Annual average. c/ ECLAC estimates, except for Brazil.

DEVELOPMENT BANKS AND FINANCING FOR PRODUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT

DANIEL TITELMAN

Despite the Latin American and Caribbean countries' significant efforts to improve and deepen their financial markets, in most of the countries these markets are still underdeveloped and unstable, offer a narrow range of financial intermediation instruments and are characterized by heavy dependence on bank credit, limited use of stock and equity markets, a strong concentration in short-term financing and segmented credit markets. Because of these features, many production sectors have trouble gaining access to financing.

The reforms introduced in the 1990s helped to deepen financial systems by liberalizing interest rates, instituting new standards of financial regulation and supervision and opening these systems to participation by foreign banks and, in general, to capital flows from abroad. Nonetheless, growth in the size of financial systems did not necessarily translate into further development of financial intermediation instruments, and this has limited opportunities for financing investment.

Small and medium-sized enterprises affected

The difficulties involved in promoting financial development stem from macroeconomic problems, the volatility of economic growth and system-specific factors arising from the information asymmetries that occur when borrowers and lenders do not have the same information^{a/}. This has hampered financial intermediation for investment, primarily affecting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), agricultural smallholders and technologically innovative firms, since these are the sectors that tend to have the highest financial risks and transaction costs.

There is growing recognition of the need to preserve and protect financial stability and solvency through appropriate supervision and regulation of financial institutions. The new role that development banks could play in boosting financial intermediation oriented towards

long-term projects and higher-risk sectors has also been identified. In this context, development banks, through different operating arrangements, can foster productive development by facilitating access to financing and/or catalyzing and encouraging new forms of financial intermediation.

Administrative and performance problems

The role of multilateral and national development banks has been a subject of intense debate, particularly in terms of their usefulness as financial intermediaries in fostering productive development. This questioning reflects the administrative and performance problems experienced in the past.

The financial difficulties experienced by development banks arose from serious failings in resource management. The lack of an explicit institutional framework and mandate led these banks to manage resources under short-term criteria. Credit allocation typically reflected poor risk management, which, combined with inadequate collection policies, kept loan recovery rates much lower than those of commercial banks. Financing based on fiscal sources and multilateral institutions, combined with a lack of budget transparency, generated a high opportunity cost for these resources.

To become an effective instrument for productive development, the development banking system should overhaul its financial management and institutional structures. With respect to financial management, one of the most significant changes has been the growing use of second-tier banks as an operating mechanism. These banks channel resources into public and private commercial banks (first-tier banks), which are responsible for granting loans. Under this system, financial risk is shared between the two types of banks, with the first-tier banks taking responsibility for evaluating the end-users' risk levels and

INDICATORS

capacity to pay. While this arrangement promotes better financial risk management, it hampers efforts to target financing, which are an important component of activities to foster productive development.



More autonomy in taking decisions

To ensure that resources are allocated from a medium- and long-term perspective, steps should be taken to give institutions more autonomy in taking decisions and to minimize government intervention in the lending process. The necessary statutory and operating reforms should be governed by standards of good corporate governance. This means that the spheres of action in which development banks can and cannot be involved should be clearly defined, autonomous boards of directors should be established and the directors should be held legally accountable for the results of their management, and development banks' risk portfolios should be subject to periodic external audits.

In addition to improving their management and governance, development banks should play an important role in developing new financial instruments that make it easier to channel resources towards productive development and serve as a catalyst for financial development. Initiatives to introduce process and product standardization, electronic factoring, portfolio securitization, guarantee funds and venture capital, among others, are steps in this direction.

In short, the region's experience shows that financial development is not easy to achieve. Today, serious shortcomings are apparent in the functioning of most of the countries' financial markets. If development banks are to become effective agents of financial and productive development, they must substantially change their operating modalities to ensure greater transparency and accountability, achieve complementarity with commercial banks and promote the emergence of financial intermediation instruments that support productive investment.

a/ Information problems are one of the principal grounds for government intervention in these markets (Stiglitz, 1993). Information asymmetries can lead to problems such as moral hazard and adverse selection. "Moral hazard" refers to the possibility that once credit has been extended, the borrower may alter the risk structure of the project being financed, potentially reducing the lender's rate of return. "Adverse selection" refers to the concentration of financing in riskier projects, since borrowers are willing to pay a higher price to finance such projects.

The author is an economist with the ECLAC Special Studies Unit.


Capital Stock in Infrastructure, per Capita

	1980	1990	1995	2000
Electrical energy				
Latin America	0,28	0,38	0,41	0,48
Southeast Asia	0,29	0,53	0,68	0,80
Asia	0,24	0,40	0,48	0,54
Telecommunications				
Latin America	33,50	56,20	92,80	232,40
Southeast Asia	84,30	173,50	275,90	605,90
Asia	59,70	105,90	165,20	364,70
Transportation				
Latin America	1,10	1,18	0,93	1,22
Southeast Asia	0,58	0,87	0,95	1,04
Asia	0,73	1,08	1,44	1,71

Source: ECLAC, based on data from the World Development Indicators, World Bank.


Note: Electric power measured as generation capacity in Kw per capita. Telecommunications measured as number of fixed and mobile (since 1995) telephones per thousand people. Transportation measured as Km of paved highways per capita. Latin America includes: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. Southeast Asia includes: Korea, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore and Thailand. Asia includes: Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Korea, Hong Kong, Philippines, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand.

Public Investment in Countries of Latin America and Southeast Asia (1980-2002) (percentages of GDP)



Fuente: ECLAC.

Private Investment in Infrastructure. Latin America and the Caribbean



Source: World Bank. Private Project Investment (PPI)

The Gas Chain Country by Country

Argentina has some 763 billion cubic metres (m³) of reserves in five basins (Austral, Cuyana, San Jorge, Neuquén, Noroeste). It also has the region's most mature and diversified gas system. Its average urban per capita consumption of natural gas is 928m³/year, higher than the world average and second only to Venezuela (1,299m³/year).

However, the weight of its domestic market and the size of its reserves, combined with the lack of exploration investment, have endangered long-term supply and reduced its potential within the framework of gas integration in South America, according to the author.

As of January 2002, Bolivia's natural gas reserves stood at 1.9663 billion m³, up from just 161,2 million m³ in 1997. This significant growth in Bolivia's reserves, combined with low domestic consumption, allow it to develop an export market. In 2002, Bolivia exported 74% of its natural gas production, which totalled 5.4 billion m³.

Since late 1998, Bolivia has been exporting gas to Brazil although in 2002 it also placed small volumes in Argentina. Brazil and Bolivia are studying a possible connection, known as Gafin, which would cost about US\$5 billion and connect southern Bolivia with southern Paraguay, northern Argentina, Brazil's southern state of Santa Catarina and its capital city Brasilia.

Brazil, Chile, Colombia

Brazil's gas supply comes from domestic (the Campos and Bahía basins) and external sources (Bolivia and Argentina). With the recent discovery of gas in the Santos basin, the outlook changed radically, since that basin's reserves rose from 70 billion to 400 billion m³.

Although Chile has gas reserves in the far south, it is a net importer, obtaining 72% of its natural gas from Argentina, its sole source of imports. The Chilean government is studying alternative sources of supply. A connection with gas from Camisea in Peru is possible but other options also exist, involving exporters from outside the region.

Colombia has gas reserves that go beyond projections for domestic consumption, although it has no export projects except

possibly to Ecuador, from Popayán. In the 1990s, it implemented a Gas Masification Plan, which brought the construction of an extensive network of gas pipelines to supply the country's main cities, although natural gas has not been adopted as quickly as expected.

Peru, Venezuela, Uruguay

In Peru, the 1984 discovery of Camisea changed energy reserve estimates. Proven natural gas reserves have reached 245 billion m³, 4.7 times crude oil reserves. Given the small size of the domestic market, the possibility of exporting liquid natural gas (LNG) for regasification in Mexico and the United States is under study.


Venezuela has the largest gas reserves in the region and the second largest in the western hemisphere, estimated at around 4.2 trillion m³, while production is just 40.5 billion m³, yielding a reserves/production ratio of over 100 years.

In April 2003, Colombia and Venezuela signed an agreement to build an export-import gas pipeline from La Guajira (Colombia) to the Lake Maracaibo basin, with a transportation capacity of from 4.2 to 6.6 million m³/day, which in principle would guarantee Colombia's supply.

Uruguay imports hydrocarbons given that it has no gas or oil reserves. It has a small market, suitable for Argentina's export capacity and strategic to starting a competition node in southern Brazil.

Obstacles to Integration

Roberto Kozulj indicates that there are few real interconnection points for natural gas integration. He warns that the kinds of interconnection implemented so far reflect private sector interests more than government decisions inspired by a shared vision and that growth in transportation and distribution infrastructure reflects no common criteria.

The region has a wide variety of market structures and price policies that reflect the stock of resources, historic trends and the appearance of new reserves that change the future prospects for the whole energy matrix. There is also a difference between domestic and export prices. Dissimilar regulatory models also affect the feasibility of natural gas integration. 

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The symbols used in this newsletter represent the various indigenous cultures of the Americas and some of the milestones in the region's history. The symbols are engraved on the outside of the conference rooms at ECLAC headquarters in Santiago, Chile.



Mining and Trade



Quetzalcoatl



A Mongolfiera



Herdsman and Llamas



Nahua Glyphs



POVERTY AND PRECARIOUS HOUSING IN LATIN AMERICAN CITIES

Three of every four Latin Americans live in cities, making Latin America the most urbanized continent on earth, surpassing even Europe. It is estimated that almost 44% of the region's urban population lives in slums or precarious neighbourhoods. But urban poverty is not just concentrated in highly precarious sectors and nor is everyone living in a slum poor.

An **ECLAC** study, *Pobreza y precariedad del hábitat en ciudades de América Latina y el Caribe* (Poverty and precariousness in the habitat of Latin American and Caribbean cities), by **Joan MacDonald**, published as *Manuales series N° 38*, analyzes this phenomenon in terms of its specific characteristics and within the broader context of world poverty. The report includes a statistical appendix with 66 tables based on information from household surveys, applied in 15 countries.

To improve urban quality

For the set of countries analyzed, just 24% of poor households live in housing free of problems with quality, services or secure tenure. Among non-poor families, this percentage is higher, but even so, less than half manage to live in adequate housing. This makes improvements to neighbourhoods and cities where the

poorest people live, combined with an effort to improve overall urban quality, urgent.

In the region's cities, the precariousness of the urban habitat varies from one country to the next and is expressed differently in large and small cities, or in households headed by men or women. Some countries have less precarious housing conditions, while in others 70% or more of their urban populations live in habitats with serious shortcomings.

In general, precarious urban conditions are less acute in metropolitan centres, since it is in the other cities of the region where poverty and precariousness concentrate, the number of badly built housing units have risen and shortage of basic services has worsened. The great challenge is to provide adequate sewage and other sanitary services to the almost half of urban households living in poverty.

Nor was there much progress in the past decade toward making tenure more secure, according to the report. Those experiencing this problem the most live in the large metropolises, which have advanced less than smaller cities. Comparatively speaking, in terms of precarious habitat conditions in Latin American cities, the report notes that metropolitan cities have seen "the material consolidation of informality", while other


urban centres have experienced the "formalization of precarious habitat."

Households headed by women

Figures from the 1990s show that households headed by women were at a considerable disadvantage compared to those headed by men, in terms of the physical aspects of habitat, but this faded as the decade progressed. In terms of secure tenure, however, indigent households headed by women became more vulnerable.

Families living in slums and poor quality housing do not necessarily owe their subsistence to informal sector employment, while many households depending on the informal sector enjoy good housing.

"Emergency" agendas

The study identifies a trend toward vigorous growth of urban centres, where poverty is already very high. For the first five years of this century, the population of the large cities will rise by more than 2% annually, and this figure rises to 3% in Bolivia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras and Paraguay. **Joan MacDonald** proposes creating "emergency" agendas for cities, in an effort to stop reproducing today's shortfalls and exclusions. 

1 *Los transgénicos en América Latina y el Caribe: un debate abierto* (*Transgenics in Latin America and the Caribbean: An Open Debate*), by Alicia Bárcena, Jorge Katz, César Morales and Marianne Schaper (LC/G.2227-P, *Libros de la CEPAL* series N° 78, June 2004, Spanish). Different points of view on this issue are provided, along with studies and an impact analysis examining experiences in Argentina and Mexico. [www](#)



2 *Gobernabilidad e integración financiera: ámbito global y regional* (*Financial Integration and Government: Global and Regional Spheres*), José Antonio Ocampo and Andras Uthoff, *Libros de la CEPAL* series, N° 80, October 2004, Spanish). This book offers seven articles about redesigning international financial architecture and ideas for implementing it. Its starting point is the

International Conference on Financing for Development, held in Monterrey, Mexico in 2002, a landmark in the history of the international community's cooperation for development. [www](#)

3 *La juventud en Iberoamérica: tendencias y urgencias* (*Youth in Ibero-America: Trends and Urgency*), (LC/L.2180, October 2004, Spanish),

published by ECLAC and the Ibero-American youth organization (*Organización Iberoamericana de la Juventud, OIJ*). A complete report on the social, economic and demographic conditions of young people. [www](#)

4 *Los sistemas de pensiones en América Latina: un análisis de género* (*Pension Systems in Latin America: A Gender Analysis*), coordinated by Flavia Marco, *Cuadernos de la CEPAL* N° 90 (LC/G.2262-P, October 2004, Spanish). This report includes case studies from Bolivia, Colombia and El Salvador. It argues that most reforms in pension regimes in the past twenty years negatively affected gender equity. [www](#)

5 *Comunidad Andina: un estudio de su competitividad exportadora* (*Andean Community: A Study of its Export Competitiveness*), by Martha Cordero

(LC/L.2253-P, January 2005, Spanish), Estudios y perspectivas series, ECLAC subregional headquarters, Mexico No. 25. This study analyzes exports from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela using competitiveness programs developed by ECLAC –Trade CAN and MAGIC– on four of their main export markets. The report is a contribution to increasing opportunities and dealing with challenges arising from increased openness to trade. [www](#)

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MONTH	EVENT	PLACE
MARCH		
1	Latin American and Caribbean regional consultation on the work of the International Task Force on Global Public Goods. ECLAC/IDB/ The International Task Force on Global Public Goods.	ECLAC headquarters Santiago, Chile
8 - 9	Working seminar on carbon markets in Latin America and the Caribbean. ECLAC	ECLAC
15	Presentation of the report <i>Foreign Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2004</i>	ECLAC
15-17	Training course on environmental economics and development policies. ECLAC	Oaxaca, Mexico
16 - 17	Commission on Social Determinants of Health. First meeting of the Commissioners Programme. ECLAC/World Health Organization/Chilean Ministry of Health	ECLAC
18	Launching of the Commission on Social Determinants of Health. ECLAC/World Health Organization/Chilean Ministry of Health	ECLAC
21 - 22	Workshop on business opinion surveys. ECLAC/OECD	ECLAC
22	Launching the environmental statistics and indicators data base, BADEIMA. ECLAC	ECLAC
APRIL		
4-8	Training seminar: Multilateral Negotiations, International trade and Sustainable Development. Current Challenges Facing Latin America and the Caribbean. ECLAC	Panama City, Panama
11 - 15	Latin American course on geothermics. <i>Circum Pacific Council for Energy and Mineral Resources / ECLAC</i>	ECLAC
27	Press conference to present copper reports. ECLAC/Chilean Copper Commission (<i>Comisión Chilena del Cobre, COCHILCO</i>)	
27 - 29	Indigenous People and African Descendants of Latin America and the Caribbean: Relevance and Pertinence of Socio-demographic Information for Policies and Programmes. ECLAC , Global Fund for Indigenous peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean/ Government of France and <i>Centre Population et Développement</i> (CEPED)	ECLAC

