Institutional change and political conflict in a structuralist model

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cepal.bibLevelDocumento Completo
cepal.callNumberLC/TS.2020/55
cepal.divisionEngProduction, Productivity and Management Division
cepal.divisionSpaDivisión de Desarrollo Productivo y Empresarial
cepal.docTypeSeries
cepal.jobNumberS2000351_es
cepal.sdg1
cepal.topicEngDEMOCRACY
cepal.topicEngINDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
cepal.topicEngPUBLIC POLICIES
cepal.topicEngSTRUCTURAL CHANGE
cepal.topicSpaCAMBIO ESTRUCTURAL
cepal.topicSpaDEMOCRACIA
cepal.topicSpaDESARROLLO INDUSTRIAL
cepal.topicSpaPOLÍTICAS PÚBLICAS
cepal.workareaEngPRODUCTION, PRODUCTIVITY AND MANAGEMENT
cepal.workareaSpaDESARROLLO PRODUCTIVO Y EMPRESARIAL
dc.contributor.authorPorcile, Gabriel
dc.contributor.authorSánchez-Ancochea, Diego
dc.coverage.spatialEngLATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
dc.coverage.spatialSpaAMERICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE
dc.date.accessioned2020-07-01T16:53:05Z
dc.date.available2020-07-01T16:53:05Z
dc.date.issued2020-07-01
dc.description.abstractThe article presents a theoretical model of political conflict and democratic stability in a small open developing economy, using as the basis a structuralist macroeconomic model. Political institutions are given in the medium run, but they vary in the long run as the result of political conflict between capitalists, formal workers, and informal workers excluded from the benefits of social protection conquered by the formal workers. The model suggests that a democratic breakdown is more likely the larger the informal sector, the lower the non-price competitiveness of the economy, and the weaker the country’s democratic traditions. Coups and democratization process can be both triggered by an external shock. The article claims that combining industrial and technological policies —which ease the balance-of-payments constraint— with the strengthening of social protection is key for the consolidation and stability of political democracy in developing economies.
dc.description.tableOfContentsAbstract .-- Introduction .-- I. Conflicting claims in the labor market and external constraints: explaining the medium run equilibrium .-- II. Economic and political power and the stability of democracy: introducing institutional change in the structuralist model .-- III. A typology of political outcomes in the SMI when there is no structural change .-- IV. When politics go South: political instability and coups .-- V. Opening space for positive-sum games: the role of structural change .-- VI. Conclusion.
dc.formatTexto
dc.format.extent40 páginas.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.unSymbolLC/TS.2020/55
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11362/45733
dc.language.isoeng
dc.physicalDescription40 p.
dc.publisherECLAC
dc.publisher.placeSantiago
dc.relation.isPartOfSeriesSerie Desarrollo Productivo
dc.relation.isPartOfSeriesNo224
dc.rights.coarDisponible
dc.subject.unbisEngECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
dc.subject.unbisEngECONOMIC ASPECTS
dc.subject.unbisEngPOLITICAL ASPECTS
dc.subject.unbisEngDEMOCRACY
dc.subject.unbisEngEMPLOYMENT
dc.subject.unbisEngPOLITICAL CONDITIONS
dc.subject.unbisEngSTRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
dc.subject.unbisSpaDESARROLLO ECONOMICO
dc.subject.unbisSpaASPECTOS ECONOMICOS
dc.subject.unbisSpaASPECTOS POLITICOS
dc.subject.unbisSpaDEMOCRACIA
dc.subject.unbisSpaEMPLEO
dc.subject.unbisSpaCONDICIONES POLITICAS
dc.subject.unbisSpaAJUSTE ESTRUCTURAL
dc.titleInstitutional change and political conflict in a structuralist model
dc.type.coarlibro
dspace.entity.typePublication
relation.isAuthorOfPublication04acca58-e081-4af2-9488-22daac1be743
relation.isAuthorOfPublication0662e515-4557-425b-9fe2-c0d9a39d1805
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery04acca58-e081-4af2-9488-22daac1be743
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