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  <rdf:Description>
        <dcterms:issued>1995</dcterms:issued>
        <dc:language>es</dc:language>
        <dc:creator>Corden, W. Max</dc:creator>
        <dc:contributor>Corden, W. Max</dc:contributor>
        <dcterms:title>Una zona de libre comercio en el Hemisferio Occidental: posibles implicancias para América Latina</dcterms:title>
        <dcterms:isPartOf>En: La liberalización del comercio en el Hemisferio Occidental - Washington, DC : BID/CEPAL, 1995 - p. 13-40</dcterms:isPartOf>
        <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2014-01-02T14:51:16Z</dcterms:available>
        <bibo:handle>hdl:11362/37641</bibo:handle>
        <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://repositorio.cepal.org"/>
<dcvalue rdf:element="bodyfulltext">
CELADE, Population Division of ECLAC

Number 2 - 2013

Turning Points in Brazil’s Ageing Future
2012: The end of the Youth Society
2013

70
60
50
40
30
End of Youth
Society, 0-19 no
longer largest age

20
10
0
1950

2022: Brazil becomes an Aged Economy

1975

2000

2025

2050

2075

2100

Consumption by Children and Seniors
Children (0-19)

2040

2013

50

Seniors (60+)

40
Percent of aggregate consumption

Brazil is expected to become an Aged Economy in 2022. In that
year, for the first time in the history of the country, older persons
will consume more (of all good and services, both public and
private) than youth2. Japan became the world’s first Aged
Economy in 1996. Currently, there are 19 Aged Economies, all
European economies with the exception of Japan. According
to the latest projections based on NTA, in 2040 there will be 73
Aged Economies, among them Brazil, Costa Rica, Chile, Cuba,
and Uruguay. By the end of this century, most of the world’s
economies will be Aged Economies, leading to an increased
demand for health care and other programs and services for
older persons. This will put pressure on governments as many
of these programs are provided by the public sector and on
families caring for older family members.

2040

Population by Age Group
80

Millions

Young people have dominated the Brazilian demographic scene
during the last century. At its peak in 1999, people under age 20
accounted for 41% of the population. But this percentage has
been declining, and the largest cohort of Brazilians has already
been born, around 1983. The year 2012 marked the end of the
youth society in Brazil: young people are no longer the largest
demographic group1. A large wave is moving through Brazil’s
population age structure as the large cohorts born when high
fertility was the norm advance through their life cycle and move
from youth to adulthood to old age. The size of the working age
groups will peak in 2021 for ages 20-39 and in 2041 for ages
40-59. The population of older persons will increase rapidly
until reaching its peak at about 74 million people in 2069 and
then beginning to decline as the large birth cohorts of the late
20th century are replaced by successively smaller cohorts.

Beginning of Aged
Economy, age
60+ consumes
more than 0-19.

30

20

10

0
1950

1975

2000

2025

2050

2075

2100

2024: Most productive population
2040

Support Ratio: Producers / Consumers
2013

1.1

Relative to 2013 using 1996 NTA weights

The age structure of a population affects the economy by
changing the distribution of people in ages of higher or
lower labour productivity relative to their consumption. If the
current age patterns of production and consumption persist,
the age distribution will continue to favour producers in
relation to consumers during the coming decades reflected
in the increase of the economic support ratio3 until 2024.
This situation represents a potential “demographic dividend”
– a surplus generated by the economy that, if invested in
health, education, and infrastructure, can move the economy
permanently to a path of higher production, consumption and
living standards. However, beginning in 2024, it is projected
that the economic support ratio will decline steadily as the
percentage of older persons in the population increases.
This new situation will pose increasing economic challenges
for Brazil.

Population age
distribution
concentrated at
ages of highest
labor productivity

1.0

Support
ratio
declines
by 4%

0.9

0.8

0.7
1950

1975

2000

2025

2050

2075

2100

2001: Fiscally-strongest population
2013

1.1

2040

Fiscal Support Ratio: Taxpayers / Beneficiaries

Relative to 2013 using 1996 NTA weights

During the last decades of the past century, changes in the age
structure of the population contributed positively to improve
the fiscal situation of Brazil. However, this favourable outlook
came to an end at the beginning of this century as a result
of growing fiscal pressures as the number of beneficiaries
of public programmes increased relative to the number of
taxpayers. The fiscal support ratio, the ratio of taxpayers to
beneficiaries, summarizes this trend4. This ratio reached its
peak in 2001 when the age structure most strongly favoured
taxpayers relative to beneficiaries. Since then the fiscal
support ratio has been falling and will reach its steepest rate
of decline in 2035. It is forecast to continue its decline until
2086 when it will level off at approximately 0.6 taxpayers for
every beneficiary, relative to a value of nearly 1 in the mid
—
­ to late— 20th century when many of the public programs
benefitting older persons were enacted. Demographic trends
in the coming decades will significantly contribute to the fiscal
challenges Brazil will face.

1.0
0.9
0.8

Population age
distribution favors
taxpayers over
beneficiaries.

Fiscal
support
ratio
declines
by 22%

0.7
0.6
0.5
1950

1975

2000

2025

2050

2075

2100

About the National Transfer Account (NTA) Network
The NTA Network brings together researchers from different regions of the world using a new methodology: National Transfer Accounts. NTAs
provide a new vision of economic relationships between groups in a national economy: between young and old, between men and women,
between rich and poor. For the first time, we can measure the complete set of economic flows between these population groups and determine
the roles played by the market (via labour and financial markets), the state (via taxes and benefits), and the family (via transfers within and
between households) in defining these economic relationships. The NTAs represent a disaggregation of National Accounts by age, gender,
and socioeconomic status. Applying the same NTA framework in all the countries in the NTA network allows for international comparisons of
consumption, labour earnings, taxation, savings and other economic flows by age, gender and socioeconomic status. CELADE – the Population
Division of ECLAC is responsible for the regional coordination of the NTA Network in Latin America and the Caribbean.
See [online] www.cepal.org/celade/NTA for more information about this document and the NTA network in the region, and www.ntaccounts.
org to learn about the global project.

Policy options for the ageing future
Although policy interventions aimed at
delaying population ageing by promoting
immigration or increasing fertility can
have some effect, their impact tends to
be very limited. In order to effectively
confront the economic challenges of
population ageing, policies should focus
mainly on economic and social factors.
Three illustrative scenarios that examine
policy options for Brazil’s ageing future
are presented in this section. The first
reviews the impact of extending working
lives, the second explores closing the
gender gap in labour earnings, and
the third examines raising taxes. The

scenarios are all population-driven in
that they reflect policies adopted to
respond to changes in population age
structure. Once the age structure of the
population completes its transformation
from a child-dominated population to a
senior-dominated population (towards the
end of the this century), the economic
impacts of these policy options also end.
The scenarios are based on several
simplifying assumptions in order to
assess the sustainability of current
policies and practices as measured
by the economic support ratio and
the fiscal support ratio. They assume

no changes in the levels of coverage
and benefits of public services. Each
scenario evaluates one policy option.
Logically, countries have an array of
different policy options available to
them. These options are not mutually
exclusive and usually a mix of options
form the basis of national policy. The
estimates generated in the context
of the NTA project which examine
economic activity by age, gender,
and socioeconomic status provide a
rich source of information for further
analysis of these and other national
policy options.

Delay retirement to maintain productivity
2013

2040

Years of Retirement Delay
10

Years of retirement delay to maintain 2013 support ratio

One way to counteract the effects of population ageing on
productivity is to induce people to extend their working lives
and delay retirement. In Brazil’s case, a modest increase
of 2 years in average age at retirement would mitigate the
effects of population ageing on the productivity through 20405.
Additionally, this delay in retirement would potentially help
government finances. The option to extend working lives may
be reasonable in a context of increasing healthy life expectancy
and social protection policies aimed at supporting those for
whom the delay in retirement would be an undue hardship.
Looking at a longer-term horizon, however, the impact of
population strengthens and the delays in retirement required
to counteract productivity losses are higher. It would require a
full 10 years of additional working years to maintain population
productivity at current levels if this were the only policy option
used. Over this same period, life expectancy at birth is projected
to increase by about 9 years.

8

6

By 2088, must
raise retirement
age by an average
of 10 years to
maintain 2013
productivity

Delay average
retirement by 2
years to maintain
2013 productivity
until 2040

4

2

0
2000

2025

2050

2075

2100

Labor Income Gender Gap
2040

2013

In Brazil, women in the most productive working ages (between
30 and 49) only bring home 54% of what men earn. This gap
reflects lower labour force participation of women, fewer hours
of work per week, and lower wages per hour worked. Many
women specialize in home production, performing unpaid work
that benefits the family and the productivity of other workers in the
family. From the perspective of the national economy, however,
overall productivity would increase if women’s participation in
the formal labour market were closer to that of men. Reducing
the 2013 gender gap in labour earnings by increasing labour
earnings of women from 54% to 89% of what men earn would
completely counteract the negative impact of population ageing
on economic productivity during this century6. Measures to
close the gender gap, such as (1) investing in women and
girls’ education, (2) instituting family leave policies that support
working mothers, and (3) fighting gender discrimination in the
workplace are a key set of policy options to maintain the support
ratio in the face of population ageing.

Female income as a percentage of male to maintain 2013 fiscal support ratio

Close the gender gap to maintain productivity

90

Raising womens
income from
54% of mens to
58% of mens
maintains the
2013 support
ratio until 2040

80

70

Bringing womens
income to 89% of
mens eliminates the
productivity impact of
population aging

60

50
2000

2025

2050

2075

2100

The fiscal support ratio forecast showed that, based on current
tax and benefit programs, population ageing will quickly strain
Brazil’s public finances. One way to solve this problem is to
raise taxes to meet the growing demand for public programs,
such as pensions and health care programs for older persons.
If the tax increase were the only policy change implemented,
a very large tax increase of 29% would be needed to maintain
the current fiscal balance through 20407. In the longer term, the
tax increase necessary to offset the full impact of populating
ageing on government budgets rises to 68%.
This document was prepared by Gretchen Donehower, consultant for the Latin

2040

Tax Increase
70

2013

Percent increase in taxes relative to 2013 to maintain 2013 fiscal support ratio

Increase taxes to maintain fiscal balance

60
Raise taxes by
29% to maintain
2013 fiscal
balance until
2040

50
40

Ultimately, taxes would
have to rise by 68%
relative to 2013 to
support public services
for the aged population

30
20
10
0
2000

2025

2050

2075

2100

Notes on Data and Methods:


1



2



3



4



5



6



7



Data for the analysis were taken from Cassio Turra and Bernardo Queiroz, “NTA Data for Brazil, 1996”, National
Transfer Accounts Project, 2012.
For detailed methodological information, see Gretchen Donehower (2013), “Methods used for estimations for Ageing
Futures Series”, NTA Project, [online] www.cepal.org/celade/NTA.
Population estimates and projections were obtained from United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2010
Revision, [online] http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Excel-Data/ population.htm.
We estimate and project aggregate consumption (public and private goods and services) by multiplying the NTA
estimate of average consumption by age for 1996 by the population age structure in each year over the period 19502100. Details on the NTA estimates for Brazil in 1996 are available in Cassio Turra and Bernardo Queiroz (2011),
“Idiosyncrasies of intergenerational transfers in Brazil”, Population Aging and the Generational Economy: A Global
Perspective, R. Lee and A. Mason, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, p. 283-496.
The economic support ratio is the ratio of the sum of the population by age, weighting each age by average labour
earnings estimated from the NTA, and the sum of the population by age, weighting each age by average consumption
estimated from the NTA. The calculation assumes that the patterns of labour income and consumption by age remain
fixed at their 1996 levels, and that only the size and age distribution of the population changes.
The fiscal support ratio is calculated in the same way as the economic support ratio (see note 3), but the numerator is
weighted by average taxes paid by age and the denominator is weighted by average benefits received by age. This is a
useful and easy to calculate indicator. Using data derived from the NTA, it is possible to obtain more realistic long-term
budget forecasts.
The analysis is based on calculating the economic support ratio. If the support ratio falls below the 2013 level, the labour
income schedule by age is shifted to the right, from the point of peak labour income, representing a delay in average
retirement by one year, until the support ratio is at or above the 2013 level.
The gender gap is measured using data on labour force participation, hours worked and average wage by gender from
Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEDLAS and The World Bank), (see [online] http://
sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar/eng/statistics-by-gender.php access in December 2012). The analysis involves calculating the
reduction in the gender gap necessary to maintain the economic support ratio at its 2013 level.
The tax rate increase necessary to maintain the fiscal support ratio at 2013 levels is the inverse of the fiscal support ratio.

American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) – Population Division of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), under
the supervision of Paulo Saad, Chief of the Population and Development Section, and Tim Miller, Population Affairs Officer of the same division. The study was
developed as part of the project on “Population aging and development: National Transfer Accounts in Latin America and the Caribbean”, funded by the International
Research Centre (IDRC) of Canada. Additional funding was provided by the Centre for Economics and Demography Aging, University of California, Berkeley.
The opinions expressed in this document, which has been reproduced without formal editing, are solely the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect those of the Organization


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