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COMMENTS ON  
SOCIAL STRUCTURAL CHANGE  
IN THE  
ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN  
by  
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**A REVIEW**

It may be useful to view the Beckford report (Volume One) within the context of the ECMA terms of reference as set out at pages i-iv of the report.

In this context, the report has served its immediate purpose of providing information and interpretation concerning social structural change in the English-speaking Caribbean. It has met its long-term purpose of developing hypotheses concerning relations between social, economic and political change, and it has covered:

- 1) Historical evolution of plantation society and economy,
- 2) Implications of recent economic, political, social and demographic changes and continuing constraints, and
- 3) Hypotheses or conclusions concerning the predominant directions of societal change.

The areas not covered in Volume One, namely:

- 1) concrete proposals concerning research priorities and methods,
- 2) similarities and differences in relation to the Latin American republics, and
- 3) evaluation of information now available; priorities for research; proposal for means of improving information,

are dealt with in Volume Two. No reference will be made to these points.

The report is built up around two main sets of concepts related to the economic and to the social layers of the region:

- a) at the economic level, it is postulated at the beginning that the plantation is the key institution. Then all political and ideological phenomena are described as geared to this outward-oriented nucleus.
- b) At the social level, distinction between different strata is facilitated by high correlations between race or colour, and occupational status.

And as the analysis proceeds, reflections on plantation system and social stratification are crossed, resulting in the diagnosis of the dependent character of the economic system, and the powerlessness of local elites, a combination that lets open for the "masses" of Black people, the way to the politics of "Dread".

The following comments wish to stress that different theoretical frameworks and levels of analysis are mixed up, giving rise to certain relevant inconsistencies. Namely, the structural approach to the economic organization of the region is dropped for a highly empiricist and descriptive approach when the time comes for depicting the social structure in the Commonwealth Caribbean, particularly the present situation. This explains why the political elites are perceived as powerless, for powerlessness is built into the theory backing the analysis of social stratification.

The intention, taking into account as pointed out by the author that the report deals with too many and too challenging issues, is primarily to raise questions that might lead to further analysis of social change in the area, and secondly, to challenge social theories supporting the last chapters.

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#### Chapter II: The Social Framework

This chapter starts with an identification of the plantation

as the principal economic organization and postulates the derivation of any relevant social phenomena from this nucleus. Race is introduced to describe empirically observable social categories and leads to some stratification in three ladders: Whites, Browns and Blacks. But this embryonic scale is immediately reduced to its main components when social structure is referred to. This structure is seen as a relation between two basic classes: planters and slaves. All institutions are perceived as serving the interests of the planters.

So from the overwhelmingly important economic organization, social classes are derived, as well as the framework for social intercourse. In this setting, Africans are "re-socialized". mullatos are created and afforded better opportunities for assimilation. Social pyramid is taking its shape, with race as an important symbol of prestige and channel of mobility.

After emancipation, the former slaves are supposed to possess such power that forces the Crown to some sort of mediation between workers and planters. No reference is made as to how this sudden increase in their bargaining power comes about. Furthermore, if conflicts between slaves and planters were so acute that they could not be settled by the parties, it is clear that the internal equilibrium of power was leaning in favour of the slaves and that it could only be restored in the opposite direction through direct intervention. Since these conflicts tended to destroy the plantation system and not to reinforce it, one is authorized to infer that "re-socialization" of Africans was not so perfect. Is that a common feature during all the colonial period, or is it accidental? In any case, this fact seems to show something quite specific in the social framework of the area. the arrangement of internal social forces is - perhaps constantly - affected by external intervention. An open needed, legitimized intervention, accepted by some classes, and which lasted until independence. Such social and political

arrangement differs from what can be observed in other Latin American countries during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century, for instance in Brazil and Mexico, where the internal structure of power seems to have been able to cope with any demands coming from the plantation (or mining) workers.

The methodological approach used so far, that would have been so fruitful in discovering the uniqueness of the region, is forgotten as soon as the author leaves the pre-emancipation period. From page 2 to page 82, the dichotomous grouping of social classes and the determination (in the last instance) of characteristics and contents of institutions by the relations of production are dropped and replaced by an approach where economic, social and political spheres are seen in isolation and with equal weight. Social classes become strata or statistical aggregates. Variables like "race, colour and class have equal prominence in the social order" (p.3).

By doing so, the role of the plantation postulated earlier completely disappears, and it will be easy to observe that what is said from this point on for the Commonwealth Caribbean, as far as social "structure" is concerned, is applicable to Australia, or Canada, not to speak of Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia ..... with regard to their respective "indigenous" populations. This is even more evident in Brazil, where white migrants during this Twentieth Century have had and still have by and large more opportunities than Brazilians who descended from slaves. Race-biased scale of stratification can be observed all over the world. And all over the world "whites" are dominating some "black" version of mankind.

So, "social structure" is seen as roughly the same as before (p.3) and as a matter of fact, it becomes the same everywhere, whence that "structure" is focussed as a continuum of prestigious occupations correlated to prestigious races.

## Chapter II: Evolution and Structure of W.I. Economy

In this chapter relevant proofs are given on the dependent character of regional economy and of distortions derived from this fact. Nonetheless, we are moving from a rather simple plantation economy to a more complex system. Even though the external dependent features are maintained, it seems important in a study on structural social change to look for how social formations live this evolution. These economies are not receptive and passive entities. Some dominant groups formed during the flourishing of the plantation system, will enact policies facilitating the conversions implied in the demands of external focal economies, others might oppose even successfully some of these demands, and the labour force will probably carry its claims from one period to another.

For instance, mining, tourism, manufactures, banking are now present in the transaction matrix. New alliances must have taken place among planters, or ex-planters and MNC; on the one hand; while on the other, former slaves and former indentured labourers are selling their labour force in new conditions and are bargaining for better wages within new institutions, borne from the evolution of previous demands and bargaining habits.

If the dependent and inarticulate character of the regional economy is stressed without paying attention to the internal processes, it is not possible to find out what makes the difference with other underdeveloped areas, and this will impair the analysis of social structures.

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## Chapter III: Economic change and consequence

In this respect, economic structure looks like something external to the region or something created from outside, while it is primarily a set of relations between people living in the region, permissive of external domination.

1. Agriculture: Opposition between planters and peasants is of the utmost importance. It may look like a common fact in all Latin America. Nonetheless, contrary to what happens in Amerindian regions, here plantation is older than peasant economy. The rural proletariat does not come originally from the desegregation of small-scale farming, but the other way around. There are therefore two important developments that seem to point out a certain specificity in the rural areas: Firstly, the creation of a group of African peasants while indentured labourers were being absorbed by the plantations, and secondly, the settlement of East Indian peasants. Economic cycles during the life of the plantation system must be translated into some sort of social mobility or re-accommodation which must be focussed according to the evolution of the other economic sectors or branches (mining, manufactures....).

Seeing the plantation economy as a "labour surplus economy" is also very relevant, (even though the fact is formulated by the author as a deliberate strategy, while it is a result of an internal mechanism of the system), but once more the specificity of the West Indian plantations must be looked for, since any capitalist unit tends to produce the same effect as it evolves. The intensity of the phenomenon must have varied from one period to another, and the alternative opportunities open to the dropped-out workers must be focussed in relation to their bargaining power, which in turn fluctuates in different stages of the economic history.

2. Minerals, manufacturing and tourism: This paragraph unlike the previous one does not give an insight on sectoral and intersectoral labour relations. Lack of transactions shown by an input/output matrix does not preclude reallocation of the labour force and principles governing some equalization of its price/cost. Something is stated in the following section - reference made to aristocracy of labour (p.47) - but more research might be needed to clarify these relations and to understand how the labour aristocracy influences or differentiates the bargaining power of



the working class. Emmanuel's theory might be of some help on this matter and on facilitating a switch from a class analysis to a stratification approach, if the author thinks this last one relevant.

3. Consequences of change - on overview: The author notes, in respect of the plantations, that expanding size, increasing capitalization and the modernization of technology have had adverse effects on the peasantry and the rural proletariat. Less land becomes available to the peasantry and less labour opportunities become available to the rural proletariat and some (part-time) peasants. The greatest pressure has been felt by the peasantry and its relative decline is seen as having far-reaching effects on inward-oriented economic processes.

These interesting remarks call for further research on rural social organizations and interest groups, leading to the clarification of patterns of social participation; for if peasants and rural workers are the most deprived groups, they may be a seed for structural change, if their demands are channelled institutionally.

Urban workers, including their "aristocracy" and white collars, have had their problems also. As a matter of fact, some discussion on the consequences of economic change on the urban "middle class" might have helped to bridge this chapter with the fourth and fifth ones.

The lack of "correlation between wages, prices, exports and employment and the derived impossibility for government to plan" (p.49) is enacted by some sort of practices, or some general policy of change that explains it and to which some reference should have been made. The failure or shortcomings in planning is not inherent to the intervening variables and in the context of this report the interest is above all on the way those economic facts are lived, discussed and

negotiated, the way they are manipulated in concrete social life to suit vested interests, i.e. on social relations that make planning impossible or possible. The observed lack of correlation is but a clue to search for specific practices deterrent to planning. It is this "empty box" that gives to the reader the impression that "economic structures" are focussed in isolation from "social structures".

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#### Chapter IV: Demographic change and consequence

The author pointed out that emigration was instrumental in adjustments in the size and composition of the working force. For the region as a whole, the total working force declined by 12% between 1960 and 1970, and a direct correlation is drawn between net emigration and reduction in the male component of the working force. It would seem that the direct correlation is an overstatement of the case.

In the first place, emigration should perhaps be viewed in relation to the total labour force, and not the total working force. In the second place, the reduction in the working force would seem to be related more to reduction in the availability of jobs (and if this is the case, it should bear further investigation), rather than reduction in the number of people available for jobs. In other words, emigration is perhaps the consequence of unavailability of jobs rather than the reason for less people being employed.

Since in the report most phenomena are linked with the modus operandi of plantation system, it might have been useful to have some reflections on out-migration previous to the 1950's. Out-migration to Cuba, Panama or Costa Rica. The surplus of labour, held as typical of these societies, gives way probably to different forms of accommodation according to the main characteristics of internal and external socio-economic mechanisms.

Comparison between different out-migration trends might help to weigh the impact of demographic variables.

Remittances of migrants are impressive enough, but some basic reasons must help to assess them. Perhaps a discussion of these inflows of capital in Chapter II: Evolution and Structure of West Indian Economy might have led to some hypothesis on their characteristics and importance. It does not seem to be a problem of the survival of major dispossessed groups, perhaps not even primarily that. Some ideas are needed on how does this money circulate. It is not altogether impossible that this extra flow of money has a repercussion on the internal price systems, making life easier to merchants and more difficult to the apparent beneficiaries. We would have then: migrants reducing their level of living in the metropolitan countries to support an ever degrading life of their parents in the West Indies. That is to say a self-reinforcing vicious circle: remittances calling for larger ones, out-migration provoking more departures, and life becoming more unbearable precisely because of remittances.

It is then necessary to analyse the economic impact and possible social and demographic consequences due to those remittances. "In some of the smaller territories, remittances represent the only substantial inflow of capital from abroad" - and probably - I am inclined to think, a major catalyst for outflows of both capital and labour force .....

It would have been of some interest to amplify remarks on intra-Caribbean migration, particularly in the light of so interesting a hypothesis as Nassau Adams (p.62).

The historical legacy of slavery seems some sort of an easy and very popular answer to the traditional bias against agriculture. In any case some elaboration is needed. Since Emmanuel's theories have been quoted, it is not to be discarded

that the unequal exchange between agriculture and other economic sectors is a better or at least a complementary explanation.

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### Chapter V: Political situation and Change

A close look at the first section of this chapter: "Change and Continuity" will show that it is in fact divorced from the previous analysis. On the one hand, changes analysed up to now (in the economic and in the demographic aspects) may or may not be perceived by "individual actors". On the other hand, (prestige of) race, occupational status and (continuum of) class exist only as far as they are perceived. They have an impact on political behaviour because of their consistency with value-oriented definitions, and whenever political practices derive from such definitions, they are relatively consistent with social order. So any analysis starting from this set of perceptions will lead to a no-change situation, as excellently demonstrated by H. Brewster's observation: "(...) There is an agonizing period of discovery which shows up that, within the existing framework, virtually all the available instruments of policy are ineffectual" (p.79). "Deviation", "alienation" and "anomie" may be viewed as "omens" for change, as chaos may be a prelude to another order. But to diagnose these "anormalities", reference has to be made to previously accepted definitions of "normalities". However, an analyst of structural change is obliged to look for the seed of ideological frameworks conducive to change, that is to say, for this new equilibrium of power (political structural changes) that is calling for new definitions and new social order, and that is, for this very reason, not perceived by anyone and certainly not perceived by the sum of "individual actors".

These shortcomings in the theory of social change impair the author's analysis. In this chapter, concepts are mixed up and lead to complete confusion. Figure 2, p.75, with some minor

changes, could be applied to mostly any country in the Americas, such is its level of generality. It also seems rather inaccurate as the following examples will show.

In Column 2, we have different proletariats, in Column 3, some bourgeoisies. The first row is separated from the other five by a double line. And the last row of lumpenproletariat is granted the bulk of unemployed. (Unemployed can be found anywhere from the second to the sixth row, i.e. among all potential employees).

Furthermore, this figure represents a continuum and implies some occupational mobility. If we assume a small peasant moving to town to find a job, his "occupational mobility" from an "upper lower class" would never lead him to a "lower middle class"; it would automatically drive him into the group of the "unskilled" or in the "lower class". Even though the scale of prestige is correct, it does not represent reconversions or "mobilities" taking place in real life. Urban and rural occupations cannot be intermingled. There is no skilled worker (lower middle) capable of becoming a big or middle peasant (upper middle), and if there were it would be irrelevant. Discontinuities and dichotomies can only disappear in abstract scales of prestige, but not in the functioning of a society, and certainly not in the Caribbean.

Distinctions of occupations in agriculture are not very clear; are middle and big peasants, farmers, as opposed to "independent peasants" or to "plantation owners"?

When the author is analysing colonial plantations, he would state things like: "The Crown governed on behalf of the planters who continued to monopolize property". But when it comes to contemporary life, he seems to view as political behaviour, practices during election times. Nowadays, a Black

peasant is likely to vote for a Black candidate, and a "Lebanese" medium businessman for a White politician. But one has to ask oneself: what does this situation have to do with politics? One has the impression that race plays a very important role in the marketing of a candidate, but not in the political structure. Previous chapters seemed to point out that politics can only mean guidance of the society toward a given direction, defence of property, standpoints on labour relations ..... but not the anthropological rites of advertising and voting.

This remark leads us to a third objection to this chapter. How can it be concluded that distinctions in constitutional form have no importance in fact (p.74)? The "degree of freedom" of social forces to enact policies conducive to the safeguard of their interests cannot possibly be the same in an independent state, in an associated one or in a colony. To focus politics as "the art of the possible" is to focus political practices. What is possible or impossible is a matter of political structure. When in p.2, the author writes: "The first modification (in social structure) came in response to the violently expressed demands of the ex-slaves for land and justice, The Crown intervened and the planters, etc...", he is making reference to a given political structure of a colony which allows and legitimizes intervention of the Crown. When he sees no differences between a colony and an independent country he is paying attention to political practices. In both colonial or independent states, one can find similar practices. But in an independent country "the possible" are far more numerous for local groups, while in a colonial one, they are more numerous for metropolitan groups.

These misinterpretations seem to come from the fact that the author's analysis is one-sided: "For the region as a whole, then the fundamental characteristic of the polity is that of dependency". This is part of the facts. Basics or structure in any political system is an internal equilibrium of power. Rescue from outside

does not change the structure, and less alone can replace it, even when it can strengthen one of the conflicting sources of power. The way the author uses the dependency theory consistently drives him away from internal conflicts and internal structural changes. The Crown can intervene in Anguilla, but in Jamaica or Trinidad it would be a different matter. Even though it is still "possible", the "costs" of an Anguillan type of intervention in these last countries would be rather different.

The paragraph on dependency syndrome is very important and interesting, but the inferences (Section III. Alienation and Change) are misleading because of what has been said about differences between practice and structure in politics.

Alienation and Change: Outline of a Model: The first paragraph under this title (p.82) is some sort of return to the dichotomy model of two classes, coloured now more clearly with the race problem. "White foreigners (sic) control the true wealth". "Black people provide the bulk of labour power". In between, Browns intermediate. This presentation is an aggregation of different ladders in the scale of stratification (p.75), where "certificated blacks" disturb the scheme and are forgotten.

It is not that race is not important, but this concept is so close to common-sense perceptions, that it must be introduced through a consistent analysis. History of the Caribbean countries is plagued with genocide and I doubt if anything has been solved that way. Since we feel this criticism rather serious, an addendum is presented to show how the author prepares the way to his conclusions.

The author made his several and legitimate demands of Blacks, but as he ruled out the thesis on plural societies on very mistaken grounds, and as he chooses stratification theories instead of class analysis, he just cannot cope with these demands

and cannot have an analysis where economics and politics are consistently linked. Hence, he misses the social structural changes underway in the region, even though he pointed out interesting trends.

Here is a very clear example: According to the author, "Plural society thesis fails to recognize the vastly expanded mobility between the 'black lower' and the 'brown middle' strata, etc." (p.3-4), but he himself proves that this so-called mobility has nothing to do with "plural society thesis" when he insisted on using this "persistent" Caribbean language. It is not a matter of mobility, of learning standard English in schools and of possessing a symbol of prestige. Progress in literacy cannot even scratch the universality of local languages. Assuming no inheritance of status in a completely "literate" Caribbean, you will still have local languages flourishing all over the place.

By ruling out pluralism and as a consequence focussing only "creole culture", if there is a ground for revindication of "Blacks" (including East Indians in the concept), it will only be race in its crudest popular form. Now on this ground, it is impossible to find out what is meant by race, for race becomes the self-definition of individuals. How many East Indians think they are "Black" in a world where self-identification of "Africans" is more advanced? In the sociological theories of social stratification, race is just a variable to be taken into account as well as, say, "residential areas", among other "symbols" of prestige. Living in a given area is associated with political behaviour (as streets are with houses), but it cannot explain political behaviour (nor streets can explain houses). Practices that have produced social change and standpoints on the direction of foreseeable changes, cannot be explained by race. For some people, spectacles are essential for reading, but they do not read because they have spectacles. Likewise, it may be said that race is essential in political groupings in certain Caribbean countries, but you do not associate yourself with a party because of your race. As the author himself puts it: "What is and what people think is are different" (p.81). Just like this man who wanted to buy spectacles in order to



be able to read and write. "Ethnic politics" cannot be taken for its face value.

As far as social and political changes are concerned, it would be interesting, in the same way plantation has been treated at the beginning of the report, to deal with the more complex situation of the contemporary Caribbean searching for the economic nucleus or set of nuclei, playing a similar role; to show the evolution from plantation-dominated economy to the present setting; and to point out the basic social relations from which the consistency of all institutions can be built up. The author's report, on the contrary, proposes to find the consistency of Caribbean contemporary institutions in the dependent characteristic of the economic system. Obviously it cannot find what is specific to the Caribbean and distinguishes it from any other underdeveloped area.

So when social structural changes are under discussion, there is a lack of sharp distinctions between key-concepts: like class versus strata, racial versus ethnic or cultural groups, inter-personal relations versus class conflicts, internal versus external structures, unequal exchange between nations and ecological units (urban-rural) versus participation of social groups in economic and political power, metropolitan versus "creole" cultures, "creole" cultures versus minorities outlook  
.....

Therefore the "omen" does not seem consistent with the set of trends that can be derived from the analysis. It is a projection to every social formation in the area of one alternative (among others) that was chosen in given contexts of political practices.

In summary, economic analysis is excellent, but incomplete; sociological and political analyses are confusing and misleading.

ADDENDUM ON THE RACIAL ASPECTS

OF THE

BECKFORD REPORT

In the opening chapter, The Social Framework, the author states that "race was institutionalized from the very outset" of "slave society" in the Caribbean. While the statement is straightforward, whether factual or not, it is very significant in that the notion of race as the dominant determinant in the evolution of the West Indian social structure pervades the author's entire social and political analysis and leads inevitably to his conclusions and hypotheses for social structural change as outlined in the last two chapters (V and VI).

And it is important to observe, in the first place, that despite the pervasive presence of race (and colour) in the evolution of the West Indian social polity, race has been (and still is) incidental to the underlying class (economic) relations that existed from the very outset and subsequently developed during colonialism and up to the present, and it is these class relations that determine and influence the political and social structure; and in the second place, that analysis based on race, obscuring as it does the real economic and social relations in the society, leads inevitably to projections for social structural change that tend to distort the economic, political and social reality of the English-speaking Caribbean.

On page one of Chapter I, the author says "social structure typically reflects the distribution of economic power. In slave society the white people monopolized economic power". But surely the white people, so-called, monopolized economic power (and therefore the social structure reflected this) not because they were white, but because they owned and controlled the means of production. In a sense, the author recognizes this when he goes

on to say that "what was called "representative" government was a government representing the planters: the slaves had no representation".

And so he states on page 2 that following emancipation, the economically dominant white planter class continued to dominate the social structure. But he further adds that "race determined the economic well-being of individuals" and that "social status was determined by race and colour". This is perhaps true on the behaviouristic level. But it must be observed that race "determined" the economic well-being of individuals only to the extent that European planters and their descendants (supported by the Crown) continued to monopolize economic power following emancipation. The determination of social status by race and colour was a historical legacy of slavery and of its ideological justification as being the enslavement of an inferior people. But this was at the level of social practices. The fundamental factor influencing the social structure of the region continued to be what class, and not what race, owned and controlled.

It is this continuing "inversion" of the analysis which can lead the author to say shortly after: "thus elements of class entered the social matrix" after the system of education developed during Crown Colony rule provided new opportunities for the economic and social mobility of Africans and East Indians.

For it seems clear that class (in the economic sense) determined and influenced the social matrix from the very beginning. The race manifestations of the social matrix; then as now, were subordinate aspects which acquired larger and larger dimensions and came to obscure to a certain extent the fundamental class relations, because of the region's historical legacy. True, the class relations became more and more complex as "post-war diversification and growth of West Indian economies

involving the emergence of new activities like manufacturing, tourism, mining, etc.," gave rise to an urban working class, and so on. But, as has been previously shown, they were far from entering the social matrix for the first time.

But the continuing "inversion" leads the author to finally state that "race, colour and class now have equal prominence in the social order", and leads him to trace the "high correlation between colour and occupational status". And again, it can be observed that this is perhaps true on the behaviouristic level, i.e. at the level of social practices. But if the analysis of social structural change is to identify the evolution of the main trends in the social polity and to make future projections, it must be more incisive and must ascribe to each aspect its real prominence (or weight) in the social order.

Chapter V, Political Situation and Change, therefore reflects the author's emphasis on race, as demonstrated from Chapter I, The Social Framework. The basic themes of Chapter V are that:

- 1) "the common racial division in West Indian societies is between white (the imperial connection) and non-white (the colonial side of the interaction)", and
- 2) "for the region as a whole, [then] the fundamental characteristic of the polity is that of dependency. Dependency creates numerous problems at various levels of the social process and in different dimensions of social activity. It leads to alienation and generates the internal power for social change".

And in Section III of this Chapter, Alienation and Change: Outlines of a Model, where the author outlines his hypotheses for social structural change, he states that "social alienation in the West Indian case derives from the particular deep roots in the international capitalist system. White foreigners from Europe-USA capture and still control the basic resources of these societies -- i.e. the true wealth. Black people provide the bulk

of the labour power and brown people dominate the intermediary layer between the two groups. Small minority groups occupy the most powerful position, internally. Jews, Chinese, Portuguese, Lebanese, etc., control enough resources to exploit the labour of Black people. They and local whites are the internal agents of imperialism".

The analysis is now complete and interpretation unfolds against the background of race, with a "veneer" of class.

And the justification is that "the geo-historical origins of West Indian societies are critical in explaining their integration with the capitalist international. And the socio-psychological results of alienation of the majority of the population are the omens of structural change".

No organic connection is made between "the geo-historical origins of West Indian societies" and "the socio-psychological results of alienation". No concrete analytical distinction is made between class and race. "The socio-psychological results of alienation" is simply made the dominant aspect, and the recent social turbulence in the West Indies becomes the reflection of "the rumblings of the dynamic model".

"Rasta and black power ideology have gained an ascendancy in the process of reaction of Black people to the oppression of white imperialism. The Westminster-Washington "mother-type" imperialism which filtered out the geo-historical origins of the African people produced the ideology of Rasta and Black Power as a reaction".

And this seems to be exactly the case: reaction to oppression, perceived in terms of race, against the background of social (and political) alienation, with an overlying veneer of economic interpretation.

And so in Chapter VI, Omens, where Beckford chooses the politics of "dread" as a case study in his assertion that "contemporary rumblings in the West Indies today are a sign of future changes in the socio-structural basis of the society", he must on the one hand try to transform interpretation of "dread" into "politics of positive change", and on the other hand admit that "dread" can withdraw "to negativeness or to come back again".

The author has now reached the logical conclusion of the race bias of his entire social and political analysis.

In summary, it can be stated that race (and colour) is a clearly identifiable aspect in the evolution of the West Indian social polity. In making race (and colour) the main aspect, however, the author has, in the first place, been unable to make the organic connection between the economic and the social and political evolution of the English-speaking Caribbean, and has therefore been unable to trace the real trends in social structural change; and in the second place, he has been led to interpret Rasta and Black Power ideology as being focal in explaining "the rumblings of structural change which are now being clearly heard in different parts of the region".



