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TARGETING AND POVERTY: NEW TRENDS IN SOCIAL POLICY

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The following is a summary of the main suggestions and conclusions of a set of five national studies conducted in the region to evaluate the recent progress of a number of large-scale public programmes geared towards low-resource populations. The studies were prepared for the Third Regional Conference on Poverty, to be held in Santiago, Chile, in late November 1992.*

1. Modernization of State social policy and citizen management

The studies prepared for the Conference point to a dual necessity in regard to the reformulation of social policy, relating both to the State and to the poorer sectors' demands of it. With respect to the State, the studies stress the need for greater efficiency in the use of social expenditure, better coordination among different State social sectors, improved information for targeting, evaluating and dynamically correcting programmes to support the poorest groups, and faster action to halt social deterioration and shake off bureaucratic inertia. The modernization of State social policy largely consists of such measures. The aim is to combine a technically updated ideal of "social management" with an ideal of multi-sectoral integration or linkage revolving around funds or programmes that can act as catalyzing agents.

The idea of targeting is meant to respond in large measure to this imperative of modernizing and rationalizing State social policy, since it requires the State to streamline its system of social support for the poorest sectors, and thus to become more agile in its operations, more efficient in its use of resources (especially through reduced managerial and execution costs) and more technically sophisticated in its use of social information on the impact of expenditure on the beneficiaries' well-being.

* The countries and studies concerned are: Bolivia, Fondo Social de Emergencia (FSE) y Fondo de Inversión Social (FIS): Dos experiencias de focalización en Bolivia (Social emergency funds (SEF) and social investment funds (SIF): two targeting experiences in Bolivia) (LC/L.714(Conf.82/3)/Add.1); Chile, Un instrumento para la evaluación del impacto de los programas sociales. Encuesta de caracterización socioeconómica nacional (A tool for evaluating the impact of social programmes. National socio-economic profile survey) (LC/L.714(Conf.82/3)/Add.2); Ecuador, Red comunitaria de atención infantil en Ecuador: logros, problemas y perspectivas (Ecuador's community child care network: achievements, problems and prospects) (LC/L.714(Conf.82/3)/Add.3); Trinidad and Tobago, Social Programmes for Poverty Alleviation in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (LC/L.714(Conf.82/3)/Add.4); and Venezuela, Focalización de programas masivos: el caso venezolano de la Beca Alimentaria (Targeting of mass programmes: the case of Venezuela's Food Fellowship) (LC/L.714(Conf.82/3)/Add.5). Included herein, in addition to these five studies, is that of Costa Rica, Focalización y seguimiento de programas sociales en gran escala (Targeting and monitoring of large-scale social programmes) (LC/L.714(Conf.82/3)/Add.6).

As for the poor themselves, the studies stress the need for them to constitute a source of rationalized demands through the management of viable, affordable and sustainable projects which steadily increase the beneficiaries' productivity. The formation of rational demand involves developing the poorer sectors' capacity to present, manage and execute production projects. Social democracy becomes more of a reality in so far as this demand progressively represents the most pressing needs and the most needy populations. In such a context, the targeting of social policies is justified when it achieves a favourable redistributive effect and helps to prioritize actions in accordance with the urgency of the needs felt by the most disadvantaged social groups hardest hit by the crisis.

The purposes of allocating social expenditure according to rational demand are varied. In strictly technical terms, it facilitates management and execution for the State social system, since it assigns part of the work to the beneficiaries themselves, and encourages greater diligence and decentralization in decisions and actions. In political terms, it puts aside the clientage and paternalistic slants of traditional social support policies in favour of more democratic and participatory mechanisms.

The common thread running through the points presented below is this dual challenge of combining the modernization of State social policy with the democratization of social demand by stimulating citizen management. In this context, stress is laid on defining those groups with which the State must link itself to ensure that its targeted action reaches the poorest groups, and on the need for strategic information for use in selective policies, as another essential aspect of modernizing State social support. Reference is also made to social democratization, or the stimulation of poor groups to make rational demands on the State, and the promotion of their capacity to manage projects. The potential for strengthening the State's legitimacy in the eyes of the poor through the operation of selective policies is discussed, as is the need to integrate social policies among themselves in the process of modernizing the State and, at the same time, to mobilize the poorest groups to democratize citizens' demands on the State.

2. The "who" and "what" of the targeting process

Selectivity is not a new element of social policy; there has always been a hierarchization of problems, priorities and social groups eligible for preferential support. However, the following trends explain why it is being emphasized today.

These trends are, first, increasing social fragmentation and differentiation as a result of the new modernization dynamics and their particular impact on the region; second, pressure on the State to conform, in its social actions, to efficiency criteria and to the new managerial practices which form part of the new wave of modernization; third, the requirement, imposed by the costs of adjustment, that social policy operate as a mechanism of social compensation; and fourth, the deficiencies in sectoral social action accumulated over time, which require new approaches to the social needs which the State plays an important role in fulfilling. These four phenomena are central to the current rethinking of social policy and programmes to combat poverty and its most destructive effects.

One problem encountered by selective anti-poverty policies is the determination of the groups defined a priori as potential beneficiaries of programmes. The Chilean and Bolivian studies, for example, stress the need to direct actions towards poor groups which have the capacity to turn such support into productive, sustained self-reliance; in other words, the need to ensure that support is not confined to welfare programmes for groups which subsequently continue to generate insufficient income to meet their basic needs. The new policies seek to break the vicious circle of welfare dependence so that social

spending effectively becomes social investment. In this regard, the Chilean study recognizes the importance of targeting specific age groups and low-income productive groups with development potential, and that these groups exert a pivotal effect on more backward ones.

The Trinidad and Tobago study shows that, since one of the most widespread effects of the crisis during the "lost" decade for development has been to increase the number of young people without jobs, and since multiple forms of exclusion (age-based, economic, labour-related, territorial, cultural) are concentrated among unemployed working-class youth, this group is one which selective anti-poverty policies might target.¹ The Venezuelan study presents an example of the problems encountered in reaching the poorest groups under a mass programme such as Venezuela's Food Fellowship, which selects poor schools geographically, discriminating among schools by area but not among the poor within each school.² Lastly, the experience evaluated in Ecuador with respect to the Community Child Care Network programme used a series of targeting criteria which also included geographical considerations, such as: reaching out to areas not covered by other State services; preferential action in provinces with infant mortality indicators higher than the national average; services in cantons with indicators of critical or absolute poverty, especially those with indicators of malnutrition; and, to the extent possible, placing service units in areas where integrated rural development projects are being executed.

Targeting-related dilemmas have cropped up not only in deciding on criteria for selecting target populations, but also in determining the policy areas to be emphasized. For example, the study on Bolivia's social emergency fund (SEF) shows that in practice, it is not always easy to decide, in critical situations, between allocating resources to employment-generating infrastructure projects or solely to actions having greater direct social impact on poor households.³ The Trinidad and Tobago study stresses the difficulties which that country's recent programmes have had in combining, within community projects, the creation of jobs and the provision of basic necessities.⁴ An interesting attempt to reconcile various objectives was made by Ecuador's Community Child Care Network. This programme sought to generate self-financing, self-managed jobs in its child care units by employing members of the community concerned in care and food preparation services. The study suggests that young people in the neighbourhoods covered could secure permanent employment by acquiring training for such services and then working with or without State support.⁵

The determination of priority areas for selective policies should also take into account the time-frame for which they are intended, i.e., as short-term social emergency measures and/or as medium- and long-term social investment. Depending on the time-frame concerned, the stress laid on the formation of citizen demand and on the modernization of the State social system will vary. The transition of Bolivia's social emergency fund to a social investment fund is a pioneering and paradigmatic example in this regard. The conclusions of the Venezuelan study also shed light on the main differences between short-term emergency social policy and medium- and long-term social policy aimed at structural change. While the former may emphasize direct transfers and compensatory, protective measures for the groups most affected by the crisis, the latter entails a reform of the operational and management structure of the institutions which manage social programmes, and the incorporation of the citizenry into decision-making processes.⁶

3. Strategic information for selective policies

To optimize the impact of social spending on poverty reduction, disaggregated information on populations deprived of basic needs has become increasingly necessary. Highly relevant in this regard is the overview presented in the study on the latest National Socio-economic Profile (CASEN) survey carried out in Chile. This survey, which is conducted nationwide, gathers detailed information on the population's housing, educational and working conditions, which can be used to compare the situation of poverty and indigence during different periods, and to evaluate the real impact, on each socio-economic stratum, of the various social programmes under way. With respect to the allocation of social expenditure, the survey compiles specific data on the programmes' features and objectives and on their coverage by household-income quintile; on programme quality and potential target populations; on the distribution of expenditure by household-income quintile; and on budgetary constraints in obtaining resources for programmes. An analysis of these factors indicates whether the allocation is appropriate and whether each programme is reaching the established target group. Thus, the survey contributes both to the redistributive impact of social spending and to accurate measurements of poverty.

The CASEN survey shows how a data-gathering and data-processing tool can play a decisive role in enhancing the efficiency and selectivity of social policies. Moreover, the survey facilitates the monitoring and evaluation of the various social programmes, as well as the design and elaboration of corrective measures for programmes under way. Its usefulness for programming social spending and selectively orienting certain basic support programmes towards the most vulnerable groups explains why States should have an information-gathering system which enables them to weight the redistributive impact of social spending, to quantify poverty with a high degree of disaggregation and to evaluate large-scale social programmes whose impact can be calculated in monetary terms. Such a system can become a basic tool for prioritizing the uses of social spending, correcting undesirable biases in the targeting of social policies and programmes and dynamically rectifying some of their substantive components.

Strategic information for the selectivity of support programmes for the poor is not collected exclusively through a central, nationwide instrument for regulating social spending and measuring the impact of large-scale programmes. Because of limitations of scale, national surveys often fail to provide data detailed enough to illustrate the specific impact of support programmes on poor sectors. It is therefore important for more specific programmes to likewise make provision for information-gathering, and especially for monitoring and evaluating their impact, so that the needed corrections can be made to progressively optimize the targeting of resources. For example, Trinidad and Tobago's main job training programme (Youth Training and Employment Partnership Programme, or YTEPP) uses a follow-up survey of its beneficiaries to evaluate the success of post-training job placement by branch of activity.

4. Social demand and citizen management: a new orientation for selective policies

Targeting does not consist solely of allocating resources to the poorest groups, but also of ensuring that the emergency resources granted are critically important to the recipients, through the handling of requests by a non-bureaucratic resource channeling agency. To date, the most illustrative case in this regard has probably been that of Bolivia's two funds —the social emergency fund (SEF) and the social investment fund (SIF)— which are evaluated in detail herein. However, as indicated in the case study, the experience of Bolivia's SEF shows that this centralized system of resource allocation according to stated demands does not effectively target the poorest groups, since the latter are not among the most

frequent and visible requesters of resources from the fund. Most SEF-financed projects were carried out in areas of greater wealth or less relative poverty, owing to the lack of demands on the fund from extremely needy areas. The SIF seeks to solve this problem by using an active promotional initiative as an instrument for stimulating demand from poorer areas.⁷ In another case presented in the studies —Trinidad and Tobago's job training programme (Youth Training and Employment Partnership Programme, or YTEPP)— the system of responding to demands from interested parties (i.e., giving courses in accordance with student requests and personal inclination) was replaced by one which was more attuned to real opportunities in the labour market, and which called upon the entrepreneurial community.

Another important element of targeting according to demand, which is highlighted by the Bolivian study, is the need to stimulate demand from small groups and projects, since the poorest groups often focus on small-scale initiatives. From an administrative viewpoint, it is simpler and more efficient to manage large-scale projects, i.e., those involving a social demand emanating from bigger, better organized groups that present larger-scale projects, which are easier to evaluate and promote. However, the Bolivian case shows that this tendency leads to less successful targeting of the poorest sectors. Thus, active promotion of social demand should also be directed towards smaller organizations, and should try to coordinate banks of small-scale projects presented by the poorest, most isolated sectors.

The building of a rationalized social demand to optimize the targeting effect of support programmes for the poorest groups, as suggested by the study on Bolivia's active promotion of its SIF, should be complemented by incentives for potential beneficiaries to receive training in project and programme management and execution. There is a growing need for citizen management in societies seeking to democratize their structures and, at the same time, to achieve a new type of modernization which emphasizes autonomous programming capacity among various social actors. The Ecuadorian study, for example, describes the efforts of that country's Community Child Care Network to move beyond the administration of care units in communities and local organizations, to reinforce cultural and community traditions in the care of children and to mobilize the community to improve the programme's performance in that regard.⁸

5. Selective policies and renewed legitimacy for the State social system

The efficient, speedy and selective action of the State social system —or of the State as a "social manager"— has been posited as a requirement if the poor are to "believe" in the State. In so far as the State social authority can optimize the impact of its use of resources, streamline and cut down on bureaucratic red tape in the management and execution of social support programmes and progressively direct expenditure towards the poorest sectors, it can build up its own legitimacy in the eyes of the most backward agents of development. The rethinking of social support also has a political connotation. The aim is to recover the legitimacy of State action, not by encouraging clientage but by an alternative route in which the modernization of "social management" is combined with the democratization of its structures.

In this regard, the study on Bolivia's social funds indicates the positive impact they have had on the credibility of State action in the view of sectors most economically depressed or hardest hit by the crisis. The study contends that the SEF bolstered legitimacy because it operated efficiently and rapidly as an emergency programme: it responded to demand at a time of crisis and disillusionment with State

action; offered projects and employment to sectors which the State did not reach; and opened the supply of government resources to the spontaneous demand of social actors themselves. Also contributing to the fund's legitimizing effect was its demonstrated capacity to reach low-resource populations without going through the labyrinth of traditional large-scale programmes, making use instead of small-scale projects and uncomplicated inputs (such as the labour supply in sectors requiring little training, and the supply of basic services and regulation by the market).⁹

However, there remains the risk that a targeted mass programme of support for the poorest sectors may become permanent if the deeper causes of poverty are not overcome. This is the situation, for example, of Venezuela's Food Fellowship programme, currently the country's largest programme of direct transfers of subsidies to the poorest groups. Its suspension could also have high political costs, since the direct transfers it provides have been "internalized" by an enormous beneficiary population which now includes them as part of its regular income.

On the other hand, if social policy operates with rationalized selectivity criteria, it may revert to the clientage bias of "populist" social policies. In the case of the aforementioned Venezuelan programme, the study prepared for the Conference notes a significant decline in clientage owing to the application of non-discretionary criteria in selecting beneficiaries and the centralized issuance and provision of payment receipts. The programme's selectivity criteria, which "map" schools in economically depressed areas of the country and do not discriminate within the schools selected, prevent any manipulation of the beneficiaries as political constituents.

As indicated in the Venezuelan study, today's mass social programmes require political bases of support. Various factors contribute to this need to broaden, within the context of social intervention, ways of handling transactions, negotiations and the processing of the poorer sectors' demands: the weakness of the social policy and planning system, competition for scarce resources, the absence of a social executive, the manipulative role attributed to many social programmes, and the exclusion of the beneficiaries from the design and execution of such programmes. In the case of the Food Fellowship, the programme's capacity to meet a massive and urgent demand, to use its resources efficiently and to mobilize multiple agents to help it achieve its established objectives have given it legitimacy in the eyes of society and of the political system. The current phase, therefore, requires a belief in distribution mechanisms and in the usefulness of the resources they provide.

Social policy can have an effect of political renewal in so far as it promotes new relations between the State and the poor. The case of Ecuador's Community Child Care Network offers some positive lessons in this regard. The programme has established a school for members of grass-roots organizations to teach them the necessary skills for social participation and negotiation with the State. In more developed organizations, as indicated in the Ecuadorian study, an internal dynamic is calling for a review of the legitimacy of representatives and for the recognition of new modes of popular expression, such as women's groups, grass-roots Christian communities and groups of migrants with a strong ethnic and cultural identity. An educational effect has also been generated for the State agents in charge of the Network's actions, which in some cases has changed the deep-rooted culture of bureaucracy and clientage.¹⁰

6. Integrating effects of new social policy modalities

The experience of social funds demonstrates the possibility of linking the social support system to poor sectors by means of a central mechanism which, at the same time, decentralizes social policy. The fund should act as a catalyst, in the sense of strengthening efficiency in the use of resources, streamlining support actions and attuning State social policy to the demands of the citizenry itself (especially the poor). However, the catalyzing effect should be understood primarily as the mobilization of various institutional and social agents in social support and promotion activities.

Among the current objectives of Bolivia's social investment fund is to operate as an executing agency for the policies designed by ministries in the social sector, and as a coordinator and intermediary for non-governmental organizations, so that it can become a catalyst of efforts which to date have remained sporadic. It also lays stress on its promotional role as a means of stimulating the poorest sectors' demand for support from the fund. Thus, the fund is being used as a mechanism for the integration of sectoral policy, the private philanthropic support network and mobilization of the beneficiaries themselves according to demand. As shown by the Bolivian study, it would be difficult for an emergency fund to assume this integrating role; such a function is best assigned to a medium-term, strategic investment fund. Sectoral coordination through a non-bureaucratic organization can help ensure, at least to some extent, that the projects and services financed have continuity and can incorporate sectoral development plans.¹¹

Ecuador's Community Child Care Network has sought to play a similar role, which under the former Government consisted of a "flagship" programme aimed at preschool children and their mothers living in poor areas, both rural and urban. The Network was designed to act as a focus for integrating social and institutional energies. To that end, its specific objectives include:

- i) Optimizing social mobilization networks for grass-roots organizations, parents' committees, cooperatives, special-interest groups, and young people's and women's organizations to foster participation and the integration of services, and to enhance child development.
- ii) Linking actions and programmes with other State and private organizations concerned with income raising, provision of basic services, literacy training and basic education, primary health care and provision of staple foods to improve the living conditions of families and communities.
- iii) Coordinating with local governments, provincial councils and town councils to link institutions and grass-roots organizations for the purpose of consolidating actions such as the diagnosis of the specific environments affecting children, the improvement of care units, the provision of facilities and the monitoring of activities.

In this way, Ecuador's Community Network has united the efforts of various State agencies: the Ministry of Social Welfare, the National Institute for Children and the Family, the Ecuadorian Professional Training Service and the other three social-sector ministries. This linkage not only increases the number of children covered, but also optimizes unused capacity and incorporates other non-traditional care programmes to build a national child care system around a central programme, the Community Network. The Network also utilizes the mechanism of subcontracting with citizen's organizations and participating local governments, to decentralize functions and mobilize agents.

Another example is provided by Venezuela's Food Fellowship programme, which has also had a catalyzing and integrating effect in that it takes advantage of existing infrastructure, relies on the private financial and commercial sector to execute transfers, incorporates the ministerial structure and, at the same time, addresses both nutritional and school attendance problems.¹² To assist over 2.5 million beneficiaries, the programme has used and mobilized the Ministry of Education's pre-existing organizational structure, thus avoiding the creation of another inflated government bureaucracy and reducing the costs of running the programme.¹³ Moreover, the use of the private sector's banking system and trade network in effecting transfers has eliminated not only the need to create additional organizational structures to pay beneficiaries in cash and in kind, but also the risks and operational costs involved in money management and in food storage, preservation and distribution. At the same time, the programme mobilizes police, firemen and civil defence forces, who make themselves available on days when payments and food are distributed to provide logistical, organizational and citizen protection assistance. This mobilization of various private and public agents in the programme's execution has clearly cut down on costs. This becomes evident when the steady increase in the programme's budget over its three years of operation is compared to its costs of execution, which have remained unchanged in bolívars, despite a notable increase in the number of beneficiaries (from 951,748 in 1989 to 2,518,573 in 1991). The cost/beneficiary percentage fell from 17.25 in 1989 to 1.50 in 1991. The main reason for this exponential increase in efficiency has been precisely this mobilization of the private sector, of various State sectors and of the citizenry itself in the programme's execution.

Thus, Venezuela's Food Fellowship programme is an example of positive synergy with multiple beneficial effects, such as a decrease in clientage and in the flight of resources, stabilization of cereal prices, improvement in the quality of food-basket products, refinement of the Ministry of Education's database and the introduction of a modernized social-information system, productive mobilization of idle capacity, schools' recovery of a leadership role as community centres, and strengthening of grass-roots organizations, among others.¹⁴

Notes

¹ According to the study, while the country's average overall unemployment rate in the 1980s was 16.4%, the rate for young people was 31.3%. Recently formulates social programmes focus on training and on creating jobs and self-employment opportunities for young, inexperienced entrants into the labour market, especially those between the ages of 15 and 24.

² However, this mechanism does obey the criterion of **positive discrimination**, under which selectivity operates without stigmatizing, since it excludes the analysis of individual situations; it consists, for example, of discriminating on a territorial basis, targeting schools located in especially needy areas and assisting them with special allocations from which all residents can benefit without having to demonstrate their degree of deprivation.

³ Bolivia's SEF was launched with an emphasis on rapid support and mass financing, and its redistributive mechanism consisted mainly of creating temporary jobs by financing projects of social interest. As the focus was on responding to demand, with less emphasis on where it came from than on its potential for job creation, the fund gave priority to fields where the job component was thought to be important. Initially, therefore, it stressed the infrastructure construction field. However, it subsequently gave more weight to the execution of projects having a social impact, and in the end the vast majority of projects approved were related to the provision of basic services to poor populations. Ultimately, the SEF was more effective in boosting income in the jobs generated than in employing the unemployed.

⁴ Such was the case for the ECHO (Each Community Helping Out) programme in Trinidad and Tobago. Originally launched with the dual objective of providing necessities to poor communities and generating some degree of employment through community projects, ECHO ended up focusing on a food programme for the poor, which was well targeted but which failed to activate the job component in community projects.

⁵ The Ecuadorian study notes in this regard that the Community Network programme should have standards requiring that most of its expenditures be made in poor areas (urban and rural) so that the purchase of housewares, dishes, furnishings, infrastructure, repairs, toys, uniforms and other inputs can help to create income and employment opportunities for the populations of those areas.

⁶ The Venezuelan study finds that the country's anti-poverty plan comprises two types of programmes: structural ones, which attack the causes of poverty (such as those on micro-enterprises, maternal and child care, day-care centres, local social investment, and preschool centres); and compensatory-circumstantial ones, aimed at satisfying basic needs, with an emphasis on assistance (including the school milk and school lunch programmes, soup kitchens, student snacks, some components of the Food Fellowship, etc.).

⁷ One of the top priorities of the SIF has been to strengthen the promotional area to stimulate demand in the poorest areas and sectors. In mid-1992, the SIF had already reversed the tendency inherited from the SEF; it now receives greater demand from priority 1 and 2 areas (the poorest), and it gives relative priority to the poorest areas in distributing funds. As of 7 July 1992, over 75% of SIF grants went to priority 1 and 2 areas; this figure is expected to reach 80% by the end of 1992, and 90% by the end of 1993.

⁸ According to an impact-evaluation study carried out in Ecuador to determine the level of active popular participation in the Network, a high level of participation was found among the indigenous population of the uplands (90%), compared to a rate of 37.5% in coastal areas. This is explained by the stronger tradition of community participation among indigenous groups, which historically have shown high levels of community management. This tradition, in turn, constitutes a heritage that should be reinforced to give the actor-beneficiaries themselves greater managerial responsibility and initiative. It clearly illustrates the existence of a cultural capital that should be taken into account in this area.

⁹ However, as indicated previously, the criteria for selectivity according to spontaneous demand are only valid for short-term programmes to address temporary needs; otherwise, they run the risk of perpetuating inequity.

¹⁰ However, the study notes that some officials still display positions and attitudes reflecting clientage, authoritarianism and paternalism in their relations with the community, and that they have difficulty accepting the criteria, interests and viewpoints of the beneficiaries.

¹¹ Nevertheless, there remain many coordination problems in the paradigmatic case of Bolivia's SIF.

¹² The Food Fellowship programme has three objectives: to improve the purchasing power and consumption capacity of families living in critical poverty; to remedy nutritional deficiencies in school-age children; and to ensure that pupils remain in school and improve their performance. Its effects on nutrition indexes for school-age children are favourable. The year before the programme was introduced (1988), the deficit was 17.1%, while in 1991, when the various components of the programme were in operation, it fell to 13.8%. Likewise, school drop-outs declined from 178,370 recorded cases in 1987-1988 to 89,336 recorded cases in 1989-1990. Although this achievement is not wholly attributable to the programme, the latter has unquestionably had an effect, since it represents the most massive action with the largest popular response.

¹³ This, in turn, has led to problems such as low salaries and few new jobs, as well as defects in internal communications, operational fragmentation, lack of leadership and little training for medium- and low-level managers.

¹⁴ Undoubtedly, adverse effects have also been unleashed. For example, there have been problems in the use of milk and cereal coupons because of specific cultural determinants in different regions, which were not provided for owing to the programme's excessive centralism at the time of its initiation. Also, there has been a mass movement of students from schools not selected to those chosen by the programme, causing disparities in teacher and administrative programming in both groups.