GOVERNABILITY, PARTICIPATION AND
SOCIAL ASPECTS OF PLANNING

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SUMMARY OF PROPOSITIONS

Proposition One: Planning is a main facet of the "capacity to govern", the term "governability" being misleading in many respects.

Proposition Two: Improvement of planning must take place within upgrading of the Central Mind of Government as a whole, in a "selective-radicalism" retrofitting-of-the state strategy.

Proposition Three: Much attention and efforts should be allocated to upgrading policy elites, including politicians.

Proposition Four: National Policy Colleges should be set up, as an integral part of planning upgrading efforts.

Proposition Five: Planning must be integrated into current decision-making, up to crisis decision-making.

Proposition Six: Planning must be detached from "current heat", at least in part.

Proposition Seven: To cope with the antinomy posed by propositions five and six, a set of "planning" units is essential, ranging from advisory units to rulers to Think Tanks. These units should constitute a network and an informal college.

*/ The views expressed in this work are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily coincide with those of the Organization.
**Proposition Eight:** At the core of planning a central "island of excellence", with special features, is essential.

**Proposition Nine:** The main task of central planning, and especially its core unit, is design and evaluation of grand-strategies for development.

**Proposition Ten:** Innovativeness and "policy-gambling" illustrate essential planning qualifications.

**Proposition Eleven:** Planning professionals need much upgrading.

**Proposition Twelve:** A quasi-corporative approach, with main economic social bodies participating in the planning process, is often preferable. But central decision-authority must be preserved.

**Proposition Thirteen:** Detailed planning and its implementation should be devolved, up to "grass-root" initiative encouragement and autonomy.

**Proposition Fourteen:** Tendencies to take over the market or trust it too much, with some oscillation between extremes, should be avoided.

**Proposition Fifteen:** Implementation of main "break-through" projects needs special consecrated organizations.

**Proposition Sixteen:** Building up public identification with the development strategies is a must. This involves (a) realistic visions; and (b) public enlightenment.

**Proposition Seventeen:** Social policies constitute an essential element of planning, both as a goal and as an instruments.

**Proposition Eighteen:** Political stability and containment of social violence are essential. This returns us to the necessity to take up planning improvement within a broad context of building up capacities to govern.
Preface

1. To facilitate its functions to stimulate discussion, this paper must be sharp and short. But this carries the dangers of surface-analysis, if not superficiality, in respect to a complex and serious set of issues in urgent need of deep analysis. The scarcity of literature adequately handling the problems of planning in mixed market economies under present and expectable Latin American and Caribbean conditions aggravates the danger of surface-analysis and of possible fixation on manifest symptoms and painful phenomena, instead of basic factors.

2. To try and reduce this danger without transgressing beyond the limits of a discussion paper, the following strategy is adopted:

   a) This discussion paper is kept succinct, short and sharp, with eighteen main propositions being presented and briefly explained. A few references to relevant literature are provided when points beyond usual planning literature are taken up.

   b) Three appendixes supplement the paper, provide some context and develop some of its underlying ideas, together with select references to salient literature (for a fuller treatment of some relevant theories and empiric findings, as well as proposals, see my book Policy-making Under Adversity, [New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1986]).

3. This paper is based on a mix of theoretic work and involvement in planning and its improvement in various countries, including some Latin American ones. Some of its underlying findings and ideas are developed in Appendix One: "National Planning for Development: Diagnosis and Prescription".
Eighteen Main Propositions

Proposition One: Planning is a main facet of the "capacity to govern", the term "governability" being misleading in many respects.

4. The term "governability", while quite fashionable, is very misleading in many respects. It implies that present difficulties result from societies and problems having become "ungovernable", with the consequent hint that it is up to societies and other facets of reality to become "governable". While it is true that many societal and other features pose serious challenges to governments, the variable which should be taken up is the "capacity to govern", which may include efforts to make society more governable, but puts the onus where it belongs. It is up to governments to upgrade themselves and to develop capacities which enable them to fulfill their tasks under more demanding conditions.

5. "Planning" is a multisense term. But, however defined for different purposes and in various worlds of discourse, "planning" implies longer-range views, interrelated sets of decisions and actions, and a high quality of professional reasoning. It should be added that the idea of planning is not wedged to dirigisme, different mixes of state and market roles serving themselves as options for "planning" and permitting, and often requiring, various forms and modes of planning.

6. Correctly understood, various forms and modes of planning constitute and important dimension of the capacity to govern. This is all the more so the case when the tasks faced by society require sustained and long-range efforts, as is the case with development ambitions. In respect to development, and the roles of the state in it, planning is essential, inter alia, to counterbalance political propensities to prefer short-term views. Similarly the professional reasoning elements of planning are important for supplying adequate elements of "development rationality". Therefore, one of the recommended "frames" for considering planning within the context of the colloquium is planning as an essential dimension of capacities to govern in general and of "development capacities" in the face of adverse conditions, in particular.
Proposition Two: Improvement of planning must take place within upgrading of the Central Mind of Government as a whole, in a "selective-radicalism" retrofitting of the state strategy.

7. Especially pertinent for planning is the metaphoric concept of "Central Mind of Government", which covers the main central governmental decision-making cluster. To be effective, planning must influence main decision-making and decision implementation processes. Such influence on decision-making can take a variety of forms, ranging from educating top decision-makers as well as policy publics in general and reshaping their cognitive maps and attribution theories, to direct transformation of planning recommendations into authoritative "command decisions". But all forms of influence by planning depend on interaction with main decision-making and decision-implementation centers and staffs. Therefore, planning must be viewed within the policymaking and policy-implementing systems as a whole, upgrading of the utility of planning depending *inter alia* on suitable changes in other systems components and the systems as a whole, in ways making them more receptive to planning inputs.

8. Hence, the proposition that improvement of planning should take place within improvement of the Central Mind of Government as a whole. It follows, that issues of planning upgrading must be considered within broader issues of retrofitting governance in general and retrofitting of central policymaking and policy-implementing systems in particular, otherwise the difficulties subsumed under the term "un-governability" cannot be coped with.

9. Relevant is the idea of a selective-radical reform strategy, which goes beyond incremental improvements, which usually are quite worthless, and rejects presumptions to transform all of the machinery of government, which is usually impossible and often unnecessary. Instead, a selective-radical reform strategy focuses on radical improvement of a small number of critical components, with a number of such improvements being combined in a modular cluster, so as to achieve significant impact on the performance of the system as a whole with the help of a limited, and therefore more feasible, reform set.

10. The selective-radicalism reform strategy relates to upgrading of planning in two main ways: First, if our starting point would be the upgrading of Central Minds of Governments, this route also brings us to the necessity to improve planning, because planning is an essential mode of policymaking aiming at development, as already indicated.
This is important because it justifies efforts to improve planning not only from an internal view of planning, which axiomatically regards it as important, but also from an external view of planning, which allocates to it importance because of essential functions fulfilled by within the capacity to develop as a whole.

11. Second, the selective-radicalism reform strategy poses the question what is the minimum set of interdependent improvements which are essential for upgrading planning. As indicated above, improving planning by itself may be useless and even counterproductive unless the Central Mind of Government is willing and able to utilize correctly planning inputs. Therefore, some concomitant changes in other components of the Central Mind of Government are essential, in addition to upgradings the planning activity itself. But, changes related to upgrading of planning in other dimensions of Central Minds of Governments should be kept to an essential minimum when the postulated mission is to improve planning, so as to keep the task feasible.

12. Within such an approach, a number of components of Central Mind of Government must be upgraded to improve planning. These include, for instance, qualification of political decision-makers, modes of decision-making management, policy analysis units to top decision-makers and more, up to interfaces between planning and crisis management. The following propositions elaborate some such needs, which are integral to upgrading planning within the perspectives of capacity to govern and capacity to engage in accelerated development.

13. Going beyond the scope of this discussion paper are broader issues of planning and capacity to govern, which often are critical. Elementary needs of political stability and containment of social violence are taken up in the concluding proposition eighteen; and some relevant issues are discussed in other of the propositions. But, useful planning depends on some essential aspects of the capacity to govern which go beyond this paper, such as adequate governmental power and a lot of societal consensus. Satisfying such requisites must receive priority over upgrading of planning, otherwise the latter is irrelevant. Accordingly, in a number of countries upgrading of planning should be taken up within a broader approach to "reform of the state" and the latter should receive priority.
Proposition Three: Much attention and efforts should be allocated to upgrading policy elites, including politicians.

14. The interrelations between improvement of planning and upgrading policy elites, including politicians, poses crucial issues. These are hard to deal with because of their unconventional nature and the taboos surrounding them. To put the matter briefly: a main way for planning to exert influence is to fulfill didactic functions in respect to policy elites, including politicians on one extreme and the public at large on the other. More difficult, in order for planning to affect reality for the better, policy elites, including top level politicians, must be "planning-friendly" in their policy behavior (as distinct from symbolic declarations) and at least somewhat "planning-sophisticated" in their intellectual equipment.

15. Therefore, planning should regard "education" of policy elites, and especially top decision-makers, as one of its main tasks. This has many of operational implications, such as the need for "planning briefing rooms" which can present complex issues and multiple options in ways comprehensible to politicians and indirectly "educating" them.

16. A different and more demanding conclusion is, that inventions are needed on upgrading the qualifications of policy elites. This is important and unconventional a requirement, which needs operationalization to clarify its implications and feasibility. Accordingly, the next proposition presents a concrete proposal to set up National Policy Colleges. Let me add that there is no contradiction whatsoever between correct democratic theory and efforts to upgrade the quality of policy elites, including politicians. Indeed, in many developing countries intensive efforts to try to improve policy elites are essential, starting with modes of motivation of bright young persons to move into politics and policy-related activities, up to adjustments of electoral procedures to improve the quality of successful candidates. Within the limited scope of this colloquium, I limit my proposal to National Policy Colleges, which are particularly pertinent to planning and relatively more feasible and faster in producing results than other approaches. But needs for a broader approach to upgrading policy elites as essential for development should be kept in mind.
Proposition Four: National Policy Colleges should be set up, as an integral part of planning upgrading efforts.

17. The idea of National Policy Colleges is simple, though implementation is difficult. Selected groups of various policy-makers and policy-influencers should spend together a period of four to six weeks working, full time, on deep analysis of major national policy issues, with professional inputs to be provided by experts. Participants should include a mixture of politicians, civil servants, planners and other policy professionals, military officers, trade union and employer organization leaders, intellectuals, mass media commentators, etc. Products of the proposed National Policy College include upgrading of knowledge of participants, as well as better consensus.

18. The subjects to be dealt with at the National Policy College overlap main planning concerns; and methods to be presented at the National Policy College overlap advanced planning methodology. Also, conclusions from projects at the National Policy College can serve as inputs into planning.

19. Details of structure, staffing, location and contents of National Policy Colleges depend on particular country situations. But, in principle, I regard National Policy Colleges as essential in many countries for building up the political culture infrastructure essential for planning, as well as for high-quality policy-making and capacities to govern in general.

Proposition Five: Planning must be integrated into current decision-making, up to crisis decision-making.

20. Unless planning is integrated into current decision-making, its content may become "reality-distance" and its impacts on governmental behavior may approximate zero. This is well illustrated in the extreme situation of crisis decision-making. In quite a number of countries important decisions will be taken under conditions approximating crisis decision-making, such as economic and debt-handling crises. Unless planning provides a compass for such crisis decision-making it (a) does not fulfill its essential role as an important aid to decision-making; and (b) its impact on reality is much reduced. Therefore, planning inter alia must be integrated into crisis decision-making. This can be done in various ways, such as pre-allocation of
appropriate roles to top planning officials in crisis staffs; participation of planning officials in designing and running-in crisis decision-making systems; preparation of contingency plans for crisis scenarios in the planning units and with their participation; and more. But, first, the principle that planning must help in crisis decision-making and influence it needs recognition.

21. Crisis decision-making is an important but special case of integration of planning into crisis decision-making. More regular modes of inputting planning into policymaking require opportunities for planning to comment on important decisions on the agenda of governments and top decision-makers; interlocking of the budgeting process with the planning process, without losing the distinct nature of each one of them; suitable procedures for considering planning recommendations on the top level; etc. Details need fitting to particular circumstances, but in principle institutionalized modes for integrating planning into current decision-making are a must. Good informal interlocking is also desirable and often essential, but inadequate by itself.

Proposition Six: Planning must be detached from "current heat", at least in part.

22. Three of the basic causes of main policy-reasoning weaknesses are (a) ignorance in respect to relevant facts and knowledge; (b) inherent difficulties of reasoning on complex situations involving much uncertainty, value conflict, multiple variables, etc.; and (c) "motivated irrationality", that is the impact of strong emotions, hopes, feelings, ideologies and similar "hot" variables on reasoning. (See David Pears, Motivated Irrationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984; the matter is discussed at greater length in Yehezkel Dror, "Notes Towards a Philosophy of Policy-Reasoning", in work).

23. One of the main functions of planning is to counteract and overcome such prevalent weaknesses of policy-making. In particular, planning should be "cold", in the sense of detached handling of issues, however emotionally imposing, even while being strongly committed to national goals and development. To meet this requirements, at least some of planning must be detached from the "heat" characterizing Central Minds of Governments and corridors of powers.
Proposition Seven: To cope with the antinomy posed by propositions five and six, a set of "planning" units is essential, ranging from advisory units to rulers to Think Tanks. These units should constitute a network and an informal college.

24. Putting propositions six and seven together, planning must meet contradictory demands: it must be well integrated into the Central Mind of Government and share the heat of corridors of powers, system, while also "jumping out of the system". These antinomies cannot be coped with satisfactorily within any one unit and process. Therefore, "planning" must be divided between a range of units, each one of which has a double mission, which add up to an aggregated planning activity providing a good mix of contradictory processes. Therefore, a "planning cluster" rather than a single "planning center" is needed.

25. To illustrate the range of components of the needed planning cluster, let me discuss briefly two of its main elements which contrast in many features, but are both essential and complement one another: On one extreme "planning" requires high-quality advisory units to rulers; on the other extreme, "planning" requires detached policy R&D organizations of the "Think Tank" type. Also needed are various in-between entities, such as planning units in main ministries. But the advisory units to rulers on one extreme and the Think Tanks on the other, do serve to illustrate the multiple elements essential for a well-performing planning cluster.

26. A variety of planning units can be integrated within a central Ministry of Planning. But more is needed, even if a Ministry of Planning can serve as the center of the planning cluster. To achieve coherence, the various planning units and planning professionals should constitute a network and an informal college, in addition to various formal coordination and integration procedures and structures.

Proposition Eight: At the core of planning a central "island of excellence", with special features, is essential.

27. The planning cluster needs a core which constitutes an "island of excellence" and which serves as the central "Planning Brain". When a distinct Planing Ministry exist, the core planning unit should be
located in it; but it is not identical with the ministry as a whole, which engages usually also in many other necessary activities, such as detailed project programming and evaluation.

28. To meet the needs of planning for development, such as methodological sophistication and multi-disciplinary knowledge and perspectives, as discussed in some of the following propositions, the core planning "island of excellence" must be of top quality and of really interdisciplinary a composition. Its own planning processes need constant monitoring and improvement. The quality of the core planning central "island of excellence" is critical in determining the quality and utility of the planning process as a whole and needs, therefore, much attention. This is all the more true in view of the empirical finding by the author that existing planning ministries usually do not meet requirements of a core central planning "island of excellence".

**Proposition Nine:** The main task of central planning, and especially its core unit, is design and evaluation of grand-strategies for development.

29. Many planning activities engage in efforts to optimize what are sinking curves, while what is often needed are novel development grand-strategies which can mutate present declining trends and break-out of decaying situations. Therefore, the main task of central planning is design and evaluation of grand-strategies for development.

30. The substantive contents of development grand-strategies are outside the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, let me at least illustrate some of their facets, which need handling and innovative design by central planning:

* The proper role of free markets and their limitations;
* Shock strategies versus balanced development approaches;
* National large projects, yes or no and what;
* Sectoral priorities and its instruments;
* External economic relations and debt-managing strategies;
* Employment and social policies and their relation to economic policies, as further discussed later on;
* Long-range infrastructure policies;
* Cultural aspects of "development", "productivity", etc., as further mentioned later on;
* Innovation encouragement policies;
* Regional markets and other forms of multi-national co-operation.

31. Experiences in Japan, in the New Industrial Nations, in France and more show that design of suitable development grand-strategies, in principle, is not impossible. But the challenge is very demanding. Therefore planning, as a main mode for successfully handling the development challenge, must be of very high quality, or it may do much more harm than good. Especially, when trends are on declining curves, as they are now -- planning must concentrate on trend-mutating breakthrough development grand-strategies, and not incremental improvisation. This most difficult assignment, involving as it sometimes does intervention with negative deep processes, up to "throwing surprises at history", reinforces the requirement for outstanding core-planning "islands of excellence", as already presented.

Proposition Ten: Innovativeness and "policy-gambling" illustrate essential planning qualifications.

32. The need for outstanding quality of planning as a condition of its usefulness for development can be further illustrated by two requirements, namely innovativeness and "policy-gambling".

33. Applying a modern philosophy-of-knowledge approach (see, for instance, Peter Munz, Our Knowledge of the Growth of Knowledge: Popper or Wittgenstein?, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985, esp. ch. 6), two different phases of development policy-making can be distinguished: (a) invention of new options; and (b) screening of the options and their "confirmation" or "refutation" by reality. The present situation of many developing countries, including in Latin America and the Caribbean, requires first of all invention and design of new development grand-strategic options, all known ones being of doubtful usefulness at best. Therefore, "innovativeness" must be a main feature of adequate planning. But this is a hard requirement going beyond conventional professional knowledge and depending on unusual persons and innovation-encouraging organizational climates and social conditions.
34. Different, but not less demanding, is the "policy-gambling" aspect of planning. Because of environmental turbulence and ultra-change (that is, change in the patterns of change itself), planning must cope with much uncertainty, including both "hard" uncertainty which is inherent in the processes and therefore cannot be reduced, and "far-going" uncertainty, on the very shape of possible futures and not only their probabilities. Consequently, all decisions are in essence in part "fuzzy gambles" and planning is largely a policy-gambling and policy-gambling-aiding activity. This view of planning has fargoing implications for its methods, its relations with politicians, its educational functions and its very nature. Therefore, this matter is further detailed in Appendix Two: "Planning as Fuzzy Gambling: A Radical Perspective on Coping with Uncertainty" (as well as in Addendum B of Appendix Three).

Proposition Eleven: Planning professionals need much upgrading.

35. The requirements for innovativeness and the view of planning as policy-gambling are but two illustrations out of many of required retooling of planning professionals. Despite some pioneering efforts, also in Latin America (e.g., the experimental program of the Escuela de Ciencias y Técnicas de Gobierno in Caracas), present training of planners does not prepare them adequately for their real tasks lacking essential knowledge and methods. Therefore, upgrading the knowledge and revising "professional reflection-in-action" (see Donald A. Schon, The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action, New York: Basic Books, 1983) of planners are essential, together with adjustment in expectations from planning by main policymakers and relevant publics.

36. In the longer run, novel Public Policy and Planning Schools are essential, perhaps on a regional basis. But, to provide urgently required knowledge and skills, crash-programs are needed which rapidly retool available professionals and provide some insights to main policy-makers. A modular approach of intense training by sets of workshops with in-between active learning may provide a solution which rapidly upgrades planners in feasible a way. Because of the practical importance of meeting this need, some modes for doing so based on actual experiences, in part within UN and UNDP projects, are detailed in Appendix Three: "Advanced Workshops and Training in Planning and Policy Analysis: Lessons from Experience".
Proposition Twelve: A quasi-corporative approach, with main economic-social bodies participating in the planning process, is often preferable. But central decision-authority must be preserved.

37. Moving on from "capacity to govern" and related planning issues to "participation", the inadequacies of any "command" approach need recognition. Without disparaging the importance and often essentiality of state guidance in many developing countries, still once quite primitive conditions are overcome and autonomous social and economic institutions do exist, a co-operative approach involving all main actors is essential for development planning that is to have positive effects on reality.

38. Therefore, some variation of quasi-corporative an approach is recommended. Quite a number of illuminating models are available, such as in France, the Netherlands, Austria, Japan, the East-Asian New Industrial Nations, and also in a different form some projects in the USA. The quasi-corporative structure must be fitted to the particularities of each country. But, as a minimum, it should include an integrating mechanism covering main social and economic actors on the political level; and a professional network of planning and similar units in main social and economic organizations on the operational level.

39. But care must be taken for government not to become a captive of social and economic interests, which often are inertia-prone (relevant, with suitable adjustments to Latin American and Caribbean conditions, is Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nation: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities, New Haven, Co: Yale University Press, 1982). Reliance on market processes together with corporate arrangements must be balanced by preserving and upgrading the autonomy of the state, including its planning process. This subject requires separate consideration, but should be kept in mind when various forms of "participation" and their expansion are considered.

Proposition Thirteen: Detailed planning and its implementation should be devolved, up to "grass-root" initiative encouragement and autonomy.

40. To upgrade "participation", while also reducing overloads on central planning and assuring a better fit with local conditions, detailed planning and its implementation should be devolved to regional and local units, subjects to safeguards against exaggerated "localism"
and decay of essential central controls. Proliferation of innovativeness also requires encouragement of grass-root entrepreneurship. These principles also well fit and supplement a mixed market-government development strategy, in which many functions are left to a semi-autonomous market.

41. To move in such directions, a number of steps are essential beyond formal decisions and symbolic declarations. In particular, required are:

(a) Actual transfer of power and resources to autonomous actors;

(b) Readiness to tolerate and even encourage risk-taking and mistakes, as long as some "red lines" are preserved;

(c) Determined action to cut intervention-capacities of central units, otherwise they will hinder local initiatives, never mind formal policies.

42. Implementation of such a meta-planning (i.e., planning of planning) policy is difficult, as interestingly illustrated under the different, but still relevant, conditions of the People’s Republic of China. A strong political will is essential to actually move in the direction of planning devolution.

**Proposition Fourteen:** Tendencies to take over the market or trust it too much, with some oscillation between extremes, should be avoided.

43. In continuation of proposition thirteen, the need for persistent a policy on the role of the market needs underlining, all the more so because of tendencies to swing between reducing the role of the market and intervening in its details on one hand and elimination of needed controls on the other hand, as a result of various pressures, short-range considerations and also panic-decision-making. Predictability and some stability are essential prerequisites of adequate market operations. This all the more makes essential a persistent policy on the roles of the market. Possible prejudices of planners in either of the extreme directions must be counteracted and any change in market roles be very carefully evaluated before approval.
Proposition Fifteen: Implementation of main "break-through" projects needs special consecrated organizations.

44. To balance reliance on participation and on market processes, it is necessary to take into account that main development projects and grand-strategies may require direct governmental action. Such action often cannot be left to existing bureaucratic structures, which may be quite unable to carry out innovative and large-scale development activities and projects.

45. Reform of public bureaucracies as a whole is at best a very slow process and often a hopeless one under real conditions. Therefore, setting up of "consecrated" organizations, with a strong value-commitment to novel development policies and projects is often essential for implementation of innovative plans. Such implementation tools should be carefully considered within the planning process itself.

Proposition Sixteen: Building up public identification with the development strategies is a must. This involves (a) realistic visions; and (b) public enlightenment.

46. In addition to semi-corporative cooperation with main social and economic institutions, mass-participation is essential for effective development. Unavoidable interim costs of necessary "constructive-destruction" make mobilization of mass-support all the more essential in many Latin American and Caribbean countries.

47. The requirements for "mass-participation" leads from planning into politics and raises the need for "sould-craft" and "visionary leadership" as essential for success in ambitious development endeavours. These go beyond the scope of this paper, but should be recognized as essential a political basis for effective planning and deserve separate consideration.

48. Within the narrower perspectives of planning, still some thing can be done: It should be recognized that planning should provide "realistic visions" and that planning should engage in enlightening activities directed at mobilizing broad support. The activities of the New Zealand Planning Council illustrate some possibilities for "planning" to serve public policy enlightenment.
Proposition Seventeen: Social policies constitute an essential element of planning, both as a goal and as an instrument.

49. Social policies, in a broad and comprehensive meaning of that term, must be included within development planning, because of at least three types of reasons:

(a) Value-wise, development aims ultimately at providing a "good society" and satisfying human individual and collective needs. Therefore, broad social aims should serve as a compass for much of development planning.


(c) Tactically, visible "social justice" and equitable sharing of development burdens are essential for mobilizing support, in addition to their inherent value justification.

50. Additional social requirements of development include human capital production, propensities to learn and to invest, and more. Taken together, the various considerations make social policy and integral and central dimension of planning for development. This, in turn, requires many changes in the professional composition and qualifications of planning units, reinforcing earlier propositions in this direction.
Proposition Eighteen: Political stability and containment of social violence are essential. This returns us to the necessity to take up planning improvement within a broad context of building up capacities to govern.

51. This last proposition returns to the beginning, putting planning improvement within the broad context of the capacity to govern. Unless much political stability is assured and social violence is contained—planning for development is largely in vain. Therefore, when necessary, efforts should first concentrate on increasing political stability and reducing social violence. These two in turn depend in part on successful development, as much political instability and social violence stems from economic backwardness, disappointments of aspirations and subjective deprivation. Here, a difficult "catch" is faced: improvement of political stability and containment of social violence depends on successful development; but successful development depends in turn on existence of much political stability and on containment of social violence.

52. In situations where political instability and social violence inhibit development, upbuilding of political stability and containment of social violence should constitute primary goals for planning, introducing additional dimensions and needed qualifications. Also in many Latin American and Caribbean countries where politics at present is stable and social violence is very limited, their spectre should be kept in mind and their prevention must serve as an important consideration in planning. This leads into important and sometimes crucial issues which require separate consideration.
Finale

53. The eighteen propositions presented above, however rudimentary, hopefully serve their purpose of posing some of the main issues of "governability, participation and social aspects of planning". As explained in the preface, their presentation is brief and sharp, to keep this paper short and to stimulate discussion. Many of the issues will surely also be touched upon in the other subjects of the Colloquium and some are further detailed in the three appendixes.

54. I hope to revise this paper and perhaps prepare it for wider distribution. Therefore, comments, critique and suggestions are all the more welcome by the author, both at the Colloquium and otherwise.