
Seminarios y conferencias

I nternational migration and development in the Americas

**Symposium on International Migration in the
Americas**

San José de Costa Rica, September 2000



**Economic Commission for Latin America and
the Caribbean (ECLAC)/ Population Division,
Latin American and Caribbean Demographic
Centre (CELADE)**

**International Organization for Migration (IOM)
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General contents

Abstract	5
Prologue	7
Introduction	9
Remarks by José Antonio Ocampo (Executive Secretary of ECLAC) at the inaugural session of the Symposium on International Migration in the Americas	13
Part 1: Migratory trends and patterns in the Americas ...	19
A. Trends and patterns in the Americas	21
A.1. International migration trends and patterns in Latin America and the Caribbean	21
A.2 Trends and patterns of migration to and from Caribbean countries	58
B. Migratory Information Systems	79
B.1 Migration information systems in Latin America: a challenge that is still to be faced at the beginning of the new millennium	79
B.2 SOPEMI. Continuous Reporting System on Migration	101
C. Comments on sessions A and B	121
C.1 Comments from Rosana Baeninger	121
C.2 Comments Re: a) Elizabeth Thomas-Hope Paper on "Trends and Patterns of Migration to and from Caribbean Countries." b) Diego López de Lera Paper on "SOPEMI. Sistema de Informacion Sobre Migracion." By: G. Edward Ebanks Population Studies Centre University of Western Ontario	127
D. Chapter conclusions	133

Part 2: Relations between migration and development	135
A. Impact of globalization and regional integration agreements in migrant origin and destination countries	137
A.1 Globalization, regional integration and migrations	137
A.2 International migrations and economic integration in the Southern Cone: notes for discussion	158
B. Economic and technological changes in labour markets of origin and destination countries	173
B.1 Migration and development the case of Mexico and United States	173
B.2 International migration, and economic integration and convergence	190
B.3 Economic and Technological Change, Labour Markets, and Migration: A Comment on Papers by Francisco Alba and Philip Martin	208
C. Migration of skilled workers	213
C.1 Thoughts on enhancing competitiveness through a judicious use of the immigration system: a (primarily) U.S. perspective	213
C.2 Brain drain, mobility and circulation: new forms of skilled migration	226
D. Social impact of migration	253
D.1 Confused borders: the social impact of migration	253
D.2 Social aspects of international migration: preliminary considerations	272
E. Comments on sessions C and D	289
E.1 Comments by Tomás Palau	289
E.2 Comments by Fernando Urrea Giraldo	291
F. Conclusions	297
Part 3: Governance of international migration and multilateral diplomacy	299
A. International migration and the summit of the Americas	301
A.1 The Summit of the Americas (Santiago, 1998). Migrant worker initiative put into effect ...	301
A.2 International Migration and the Summit of the Americas	319
A.3 Comment by Juan Martabit	324
A.4 Comment by Manuel Ángel Castillo	324
B. Multilateral consultation on international migration	327
B.1 Reflections on the "Puebla Group": in pursuit of an pending dialogue	327
B.2 The Lima Declaration of 1999, and its aftermath	337
C. The role of international agencies and non-governmental organization	341
C.1 Speech by the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of El Salvador	341
C.2 The role of non-governmental organizations: the experience of the Puebla Process	345
D. Comments on sessions B and C	349
D.1 Comment by Marguerite Rivera-Houze	349
D.2 Comment by Mary García Castro	350
E. Chapter conclusion	357
Part 4: The economic and social significance of migration	359
A. Migrant remittances and networks	361
A.1 Migration and remittances: a Caribbean case-study of the Caribbean	361
A.2 Productive use of remittances in Central America, the Dominican Republic and Mexico: recent experiences.	381
A.3 Comment by Pablo Serrano Calvo. Remittances: the economic and social counterpart of migration	393
B. Migrant communities	397
B.1 Transnational communities and migration in the age of globalization	397
B.2 Immigrant organizations and networks in Argentina	417
C. Chapter conclusions	431

Part 5: The human rights of migrants	433
A. Legal standards for the protection of migrant workers	435
B. Human Rights and Migrations in Light of the Inter-American Human Rights System	455
C. The Rights of Migrants and National Interests	463
D. Comments	469
D.1 Comments by Gabriela Rodríguez P.	469
D.2 Comments by Roberto Cuéllar	472
E. Chapter conclusions	477
Summary of proceeding at the final discussion panel on findings and conclusion of the symposium and of the forum of non governmental organizations	479
General agenda	489
The Forum agenda	491
List of participants	495
A. Member States of the Commission	495
B. Associate Members	502
C. Observers Countries	502
D. United Nations Secretariat	502
E. United Nations Bodies	503
F. Specialized Agencies	504
G. Other Intergovernmental Organizations	504
H. Non-governmental organizations	505
I. Special Guests	509
J. Secretariat	510
Issues published	512

Abstract

This publication contains the presentations, comments, conclusions and final panel review of the Symposium on International Migration in the Americas, held in September 2000 in San José, Costa Rica. The event attracted enthusiastic participation and contributions from government representatives, specialists in the study of international migration, delegates from civil society organizations and experts from international agencies. The book is structured to match the five broad topics into which the sessions were divided: (i) Migratory trends and patterns in the Americas; (ii) Relations between migration and development; (iii) Governance of migration and multilateral diplomacy; (iv) Economic and social importance of migration; and (v) Human rights of migrants. The introduction emphasizes the importance, originality and aims of the meeting, highlighting the characteristics of the papers presented and the wide ranging repercussions of migratory movements in the Americas. It also draws attention to the inclusion of migration issues in the Plan of Action of the Summit of the Americas, held in Quebec, Canada, in April 2001. The final panel review reflects the most important aspects of the symposium and concludes that holding such an event heralds major progress in addressing the many issues raised by international migration in the Americas. Looking to the twenty-first century, the meeting drew attention to the fact that international migration is a multi-faceted phenomenon, with potentially positive repercussions for the countries involved, provided dialogue is encouraged and mutual cooperation strengthened.

Prologue

In response to multiple concerns arising in the American community on the subject of international migration, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) – acting through its Population Division, the Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) – in conjunction with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) – acting through its Regional Office for Central America and Mexico – decided to organize a continent-wide meeting of stakeholders and specialists motivated by the common desire to debate various international migration issues at the threshold of the twenty-first century. This resulted in the Symposium on International Migration in the Americas, held in San José, Costa Rica, in September 2000.

The event was envisaged as an extension of ongoing activities in the field of international migration in the Americas being carried out jointly by ECLAC and IOM. Its general purpose was to foster an exchange of ideas and experiences on international migration in the hemisphere, encompassing government public-policy makers, together with experts and academics, representatives from civil society institutions and professionals from international bodies. Acknowledging the important role played by civil society in this field, a Civil Society Forum was organized alongside the symposium, to enable representatives working on behalf of individuals, families and migrant communities, to give voice to their views, problems and needs. The aim of the forum was to give a higher profile to the work they carry out and strengthen their relationships with governments, international organizations and the multilateral mechanisms of the inter-American system.

The organizers of the event are grateful for the valuable sponsorship and financial support provided by the United Nations Population

Fund (UNPFA) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) – through an agreement signed with ECLAC. The Government of the United States also provided financial support, and the Government of Costa Rica, the host country, also gave its wholehearted backing.

This document is the culmination of activities to disseminate the results of the symposium, aimed at establishing appropriate theoretical and empirical foundations for the treatment of international migration in the Americas in the years to come, based on dialogue, cooperation and continuous research. It is particularly noteworthy that the results were submitted for consideration by Heads of State and Government of the Americas at the Summit of the Americas held in Quebec, Canada, in April 2001, and they were included in the corresponding Plan of Action.

Daniel S. Blanchard
Director of CELADE

Roberto Kozak
Director, Regional Office for Central
America and Mexico, IOM

Introduction

This volume brings together the presentations, comments and conclusions on each of the topics addressed in the Symposium on International Migration in the Americas, held on 4-6 September 2000 in San José, Costa Rica, ending with a final panel review. Its publication forms part of the symposium's dissemination activities, alongside two other documents: *Informe de relatoría del Simposio sobre Migración Internacional en las Américas* (Santiago, Chile, Población y desarrollo series, No. 12, LC/L.1462-P, December 2000) and *Resumen y aspectos destacados del Simposio sobre Migración Internacional en las Américas* (Santiago, Chile, Población y desarrollo series, No. 14, April 2001).

Background and aims: the search for opportunities

The symposium has its origins in the widespread and growing concerns raised by international migration in the countries of the region. Although this phenomenon is by no means new in the Americas, but actually one of the most far-reaching historical events in the process of forming societies, it is an emerging priority among governments and civil societies, and one that has systematically been given attention by the organizers of this event. These renewed and emerging perceptions are clearly reflected in the set of issues addressed at the meeting and the wide range of participants it attracted.

International migration is currently arousing a wide range of concerns in the countries of the Americas, yet responses until recently have tended to be unilateral and administrative, and disconnected from

social and economic development goals in the widest sense. There is a need for better understanding of migration, in order to channel it effectively in today's changing world; and this requires a comprehensive approach involving all stakeholders, in order to absorb the acute tensions that are being generated as we move into the twenty-first century.

Against this backdrop, aware of the challenges posed by migration in today's world, and pursuant to their mandate, the organizers of the symposium set a general goal of fostering an exchange of ideas and experiences on international migration in the hemisphere. This drew participation not only from government delegates with responsibility for public policies, but also from experts and academics with a wide-ranging and renowned track record on this subject, representatives of civil society institutions and experts from international bodies. A civil society forum was also organized alongside the symposium, to give voice to the views, problems and needs of civil organizations working on behalf of migrants, their families and communities. The aim of the forum was to reinforce the work of such organizations and strengthen their relationships with governments, international bodies and the multilateral mechanisms of the inter-American system.

The specific objectives of the symposium were as follows:

- a) To expand available information and knowledge on the trends and patterns of international migration in the Americas, and to deepen understanding of its determining factors.
- b) To analyse the inter-relationships that exist between international migration and development, including the impact of globalization and new technologies.
- c) To analyse the economic, social and political consequences of migration, not only for migrants themselves but also for their countries of origin and destination, paying particular attention to the poverty in which most migrants live.
- d) To analyse and evaluate multilateral measures adopted in the diplomatic arena, in order to rationalize migratory currents and promote international cooperation in this field.

Significance of the event: the Summit of the Americas

Both the symposium and the forum were envisaged as opportunities for active participation by a wide spectrum of social and institutional stakeholders, with a view to expanding knowledge on international migration and highlighting the potential for dialogue and cooperation in tackling the many challenges it presents. The papers that were presented are testimony to the fact that international migration not only is present in the very origin of American nations, but remains very much alive today; and its changing manifestations – now viewed in terms of opportunities and risks – are increasingly being recognized as shared events in the collective life of individuals, communities and cultures. The outcome of the symposium helped consolidate the concept of international migration as a social process inexorably linked to development trends and interactions between labour markets in participating countries, thereby reflecting the most significant modalities of international relations in today's world.

For several reasons the symposium was a totally unprecedented initiative in the American continent. Firstly, it offered an rare opportunity to debate international migration's multiple issues, problems and perspectives from a variety of standpoints (in terms of nationalities, institutional affiliations and scientific specializations, given the origin of the participants). Secondly, it revealed the inadequacy of existing knowledge on migration in the Americas, thereby motivating research in a pluralistic framework of approaches and concepts with a variety of methodologies and data underlying rigorous analysis. There is a clear need to draw on the available stock of knowledge – with all its strengths and weaknesses – and focus on protecting and respecting the rights of individual migrants. The meeting represents an interactive component of an approach that strives for a multi-dimensional and multilateral treatment of international migration, placing it on the American agenda

for the twenty-first century; this is reflected in the flourishing of subregional cooperation initiatives on migration, the signing of integration agreements and inclusion of the topic in the Summit of the Americas process.

The conclusions of the Symposium on International Migration in the Americas were made available to the Summit of the Americas for its April 2001 meeting in Quebec, Canada. The Plan of Action of the Santiago summit in 1998, contained a section on the situation of migrant workers. This time, the Declaration of Quebec City, signed by Heads of State and Government from 33 American countries proclaims the following:

"We recognize the cultural and economic contributions made by migrants to receiving societies as well as to their communities of origin. We are committed to ensuring dignified, humane treatment with appropriate legal protections, defense of human rights, and safe and healthy labor conditions for migrants. We will strengthen mechanisms for hemispheric cooperation to address the legitimate needs of migrants and take effective measures against trafficking in human beings." (Declaration p. 4) (<http://www.summit-americas.org>).

The Plan of Action approved by Heads of State and Government in Quebec contains two sections explicitly focusing on international migration. The first, entitled *Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms*, argues that universal protection and promotion of human rights – including civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights, together with respect for the norms and principles of international humanitarian law, based on principles of universality, indivisibility and interdependence – are fundamental for the functioning of democratic society. On migration, it stresses the following:

Reaffirming the commitments made in 1998 at the Santiago Summit concerning the protection of the human rights of migrants, including migrant workers and their families [governments will]:

Strengthen cooperation among states to address, with a comprehensive, objective and long-term focus, the manifestations, origins and effects of migration in the region;

Promote recognition of the value of close cooperation among countries of origin, transit and destination in order to ensure protection of the human rights of migrants;

Establish an inter-American program within the OAS for the promotion and protection of the human rights of migrants, including migrant workers and their families, taking into account the activities of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and supporting the work of the IACHR Special Rapporteur on Migrant Workers and the UN Special Rapporteur on Migration;

Commit to undertake the widest possible cooperation and exchange of information among states concerning illegal trafficking networks, including developing preventative campaigns on the dangers and risks faced by migrants, particularly women and children who often can be victims of such trafficking, with a view to eradicating this crime;

Establish linkages with subregional processes, such as the Regional Conference on Migration and the South American Conference on Migration, which are dialogue fora, in order to exchange information on the migration phenomenon, as well as promote cooperation with specialized international organizations, such as the International Organization of Migration (IOM), in order to advance and coordinate implementation efforts of Summit mandates; (Plan of Action, p. 7) (www.summit-americas.org).

The section entitled *Growth with equity* posits the eradication of poverty and inequality as primary challenges facing sustained economic growth and political and social stability. The Plan of Action seeks to develop initiatives aimed at maximizing the benefits of organized migration, and states:

Recognizing the positive aspects and benefits of orderly migration in countries of origin, transit and destination as a factor contributing to economic growth and national and regional development [governments will]:

Support initiatives designed to strengthen linkages among migrant communities abroad and their places of origin and promote cooperative mechanisms that simplify and speed up the transfer of migrant remittances and substantially reduce the costs of sending them;

Support voluntary initiatives designed by communities or individuals for the use of funds in investment and productive projects benefitting the general welfare in communities of origin;

Promote the discussion of the migration phenomenon at the hemispheric level with due regard for its multi-dimensional nature and regional differences and, in so doing, consider the inclusion of the topic of migration in discussions on trade and economic integration;

Support programs of cooperation in immigration procedures for cross-border labor markets and the migration of workers, both in countries of origin and destination, as a means to enhance economic growth in full cognizance of the role that cooperation in education and training can play in mitigating any adverse consequences of the movement of human capital from smaller and less developed states;

Strive to ensure that migrants have access to basic social services, consistent with each country's internal legal framework;

Create and harmonize statistical information systems and foster the sharing of information and best practices through the use of new information and communications technologies, with the aim of promoting the modernization of migration management; (Plan of Action p.32) (www.summit-americas.org).

Comments on this book

The results of the symposium hold out the prospect of sustained progress in dialogue on international migration. With permanent evaluation, this new phase in the American community's understanding of the old but ever-present issue of international migration, ought to produce a highly active cooperation processes on a number levels.

The results make it possible to make good use of the event's presentations, comments and debates, whose technical rigour and depth shine through in this book. The organizers of the Symposium on International Migration in the Americas believe the event will lay the foundations for a genuinely comprehensive approach to this phenomenon.

This volume, which we offer to the American community, is divided into five sections, ending with a final panel review:

- (i) Migratory trends and patterns in the Americas
 - (ii) Relations between migration and development
 - (iii) Governance of migration and multilateral diplomacy
 - (iv) Economic and social importance of migration
 - (v) Human rights of migrants
- Final panel summary

Remarks by José Antonio Ocampo (Executive Secretary of ECLAC) at the inaugural session of the Symposium on International Migration in the Americas

San José, Costa Rica, 4 September 2000

I should like to begin these remarks by expressing our gratitude to his Excellency the President of Costa Rica for accompanying us at the opening session of this Symposium on International Migration in the Americas, the conclusions of which we hope will be considered at the Summit of the Americas to be held next year in Quebec, Canada. It is not by chance, Mr. President, that the International Organization for Migration and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean both chose Costa Rica as the site for this meeting. Apart from its exemplary democratic tradition, its history of respect for human rights and the progress made on social equity, Costa Rica has an outstanding record among the family of American nations as a country that has welcomed large numbers of people who have been forced to emigrate from other parts of the world, offering them a wide range of opportunities for their self-fulfilment.

The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean is particularly pleased to share responsibilities for organizing this symposium with the International Organization for Migration, an institution with which we have worked together fruitfully in several migration and development activities on behalf of the countries of the region. I would also like to place on record our acknowledgement of the contribution made to holding this symposium by the United Nations Population Fund, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Organization of American States and the Government of the United States.

The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean has maintained continuous interest in international migration issues in the region over many years, through its Population Division, CELADE. Thanks to fruitful collaboration with the countries concerned, since 1970 it has run the Research Project on International Migration in Latin America, which has become an obligatory point of reference for the study of international migration in the region. This experience, which we expect to maintain for the 2000 censuses, has been acknowledged as pioneering at world level. Study of its data, the inclusion of migration issues in training programmes and support for research activities on the subject in the different countries, together with collaborative work with governments and other international bodies and the availability of information in electronic media, are all indicative of the importance of this initiative and the need to keep it going. These elements have often served to introduce a note of realism in response to alarmist voices that tend to generate exaggerated, or plainly erroneous perceptions and images of international migration trends in our region.

International migration has been one of the key chapters in the economic and social development of Latin American and Caribbean countries, and everything suggests that it will remain so in the years to come. This is not strange, because the movement of people across national borders responds to factors that are deeply rooted in the very origins of the development process; nor should we be surprised at concern among governments and civil society organizations, because migration has repercussions on international relations, the behaviour of States and the daily life of communities and individuals.

A guiding principle underlying the work of ECLAC is the promotion of integrated development; as we have stressed on many occasions this has been the most valued and persistent *leitmotif* throughout the Commission's more than 50-year history. Integrated development, as a key objective, means enhancing the well-being of the population as a whole. Development, thus

understood, is inexorably linked with upholding economic, social and cultural rights, and hence the principles of equality, solidarity and non-discrimination, viewed as indivisible from, and interdependent with civil and political rights. The achievement of stable and competitive economic growth is a necessary, but insufficient condition for comprehensive development, because growth increasingly needs to go hand in hand with greater equity. Reducing social inequalities should be the fundamental yardstick of the quality of development in a context of democratic sustainability.

Dealing with the repercussions of international migration is indissolubly linked to the struggle for social equity, so including this in actions to reduce poverty and inequality in employment and social security, and in the domain of social assistance, involves the entire population of the region, regardless of origin or nationality.

International flows of workers, cultural interaction, acceptance of people displaced from their own countries – these are facts of life in each of the nations of the region, extending throughout the American continent. Although lack of data makes it impossible to calculate the exact number of people participating in the various migratory flows, their size is the most visible expression of international migration in our continent. Data from the 1990 census round showed that over 2 million Latin American and Caribbean people were living in the region but outside their country of birth in that year, with a further 8 million registered in the United States. Data from other sources suggest that these migratory patterns continued to intensify during the 1990s.

Unequal development levels have traditionally been recognized as the basis for international migration, the consequences and repercussions of which on the most sensitive areas of social, economic and cultural life in countries of origin and destination, arouse often controversial points of view. Among other things, ECLAC is concerned at the contrast between the increasing facilitation for flows of capital, goods and ideas throughout the world, and the persistence of restrictions on the movement of human resources; apart from anything else, this shows that the current globalization process is as yet incomplete.

Such observations raise a number of questions directly related to the issues to be addressed in this symposium: firstly, what is the nature of the relationships that exist between migration, economic globalization, integration processes and the construction of transnational communities? Conventional wisdom would hold that the forces driving globalization stimulate mobility among productive factors, human resources included. Despite the validity of this statement, the intervening mechanisms are complex because they do not speak in unison. Globalization promotes the propensity to migrate, insofar as work opportunities in traditional emigrant countries provide the wherewithal to finance migration to people who are better informed than in the past. Alternatively, the disruptive effects of productive restructuring on the worst affected origin communities may directly trigger decisions to emigrate. These two trends suggest it may be a long while before migration declines or stabilizes. Integration processes may also play a major role through their ability to create mechanisms for designing coordinated, harmonized and eventually unified policies on the factors that cause people to emigrate. Transnational communities, which help legitimize migration, provide mechanisms of support and identity and generate resources to help immigrants integrate into their destination societies. While there is no apparent reason to suppose migration will grow out of control over the next few years, we need to coordinate the means to ensure this.

What are the social and economic impacts of the various forms of geographical population mobility? Different forms of mobility have different social and economic consequences. This is possibly one of the most neglected issues in migration studies, apparently because of the tremendous difficulty in obtaining data for a detailed study of new forms of population movement. But let me suggest that one cannot state *a priori* that the consequences of such diversity are negative for origin, destination or transit countries. Such a statement, which does not lead to fruitful results, may have negative consequences for the overall image of receiving

countries. The best-known and most visible of the social and economic impacts of migration seems to occur in labour markets. The region's labour markets display segmentation with respect to immigrants, who tend to be concentrated in activities such as agriculture, construction and services in general. But this does not mean they are competing with local labour, since immigrants are always in a minority, as recent studies have shown. Unfair competition for jobs, based on the lack of protection for immigrant workers, is a negative consequence, and the first people to be harmed by this are migrants themselves.

How can one make sure that the exchange of skilled human resources benefits countries of both origin and destination, as well as the individual people involved? The interchange of skilled human resources is possibly one of the dimensions of international migration that has been studied most. When the "brain-drain" phenomenon in developed countries was first noticed in the 1960s, the prevailing attitude was one of pessimism based on the development loss implied by the emigration of professional people. Today, in our highly interdependent world, we know that these losses can be offset, at least in part, by taking advantage of the emigrants' experiences and the stimulus for recognition in their countries of origin, without the need for their definitive return or the imposition of restrictive measures that could undermine life projects. This is a line of work which ECLAC considers very important, especially since now more than ever skilled human resources are activators of technological innovation in developing countries, and will also continue to be in demand in the more competitive sectors of developed countries.

What contributions are made by the remittances sent by migrants to their families and communities of origin, and how can they be used to promote development in their countries? It has often been said that remittances represent one of the clearest positive expressions of migration. The most widespread indicator of the importance of remittances is probably their magnitude: estimates by ECLAC for Central America suggest a total of around US\$ 3.5 billion per year in 1998. At the national level, this is equivalent to 16% of GDP in El Salvador, 5% of GDP in Nicaragua, and figures within this range in several of the small Caribbean island states. In countries such as Colombia, while smaller in relation to GDP, total remittances are still equivalent to 50% of coffee export earnings. Remittances clearly provide families with additional resources for consumption, and thus to overcome situations of acute shortage. But, not everything seems to operate so smoothly; and it is worth looking at ways to promote the positive effects of remittance flows. This requires strengthening the most successful channels that exist for making such transfers and creating institutional frameworks to direct remittances into productive uses. There are several valuable experiences in a number of countries in the region that need to be shared. We need to understand that migration is not going to disappear over the next few years, so the resource potential of remittances needs to be exploited to the benefit of families and their communities, striving – with due respect for individual rights – to obtain effects that last beyond the short term.

What means should be used to achieve effective governance of migratory phenomena, in order to reconcile the fundamental principles of respect for the rights of individuals with those pertaining to States? These concerns converge in the urgent need to develop a migration agenda for our time, based on dialogue, co-operation and exchange of experiences between countries. This point of view stems from the valuable initiatives that emerged during the 1990s, which could be extended throughout the American continent. ECLAC believes the conditions are in place to start generating consensus mechanisms for regulating the migratory phenomena that form part of current reality. Thus, in the Americas unilateral approaches to the treatment of migration issues are increasingly giving way to a multilateral approach, without this meaning disdain for the potential of bilateral agreements.

The various issues addressed in this symposium will doubtless help strengthen dialogue between specialists, governments and civil society; and its conclusions will make it possible to

develop new forms of regional cooperation within ongoing hemispheric processes, such as the Summit of the Americas.

We are united in our desire to find mechanisms for dialogue and exchange of experiences enabling us to turn international migration into a process that strengthens good neighbourly relations and cooperation in our shared American land. This goal requires the broadest possible participation, and for that reason the symposium was conceived as a joint initiative by various sectors of the community, embracing government experts, migration specialists, representatives of numerous civil society organizations and professionals from international bodies. My thanks to every one of you for your collaboration and efforts, and I wish you success in your deliberations.

Part 1
**Migratory trends and patterns in
the Americas**

A. Trends and patterns in the Americas

A.1. International migration trends and patterns in Latin America and the Caribbean

Miguel Villa and Jorge Martínez Pizarro¹

Introduction

Appropriate, relevant and timely data are needed for the generation of information to explain migration and formulate policies. The shortcomings of other sources mean that population censuses are the main resource available to meet these requirements in the region. The IMILA project (Investigation of International Migration in Latin America) undertaken by the Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) –Population Division of ECLAC, brings together data collected in national censuses– which can be used to quantify migration and present a profile of the migrants. This information, although useful, has many limitations, as the data refer only to the accumulated stocks of migrants and not to the flows; nor is it possible to identify clearly undocumented migrants or those who move on a temporary basis.

¹ Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre, Population Division (CELADE-ECLAC).

Data from the IMILA Project can be used to identify three main migration patterns. The first is immigration from outside the region to Latin America, which has diminished over the last few decades: non-renewal of flows, return movements and the effects of mortality have reduced immigrant stocks. A second pattern is that of intra-regional migration, which is fed by structural factors—different levels of economic and social development—and short-term factors; the stock of these migrants doubled in the 1970s, and subsequently has tended to stabilize. Argentina and Venezuela, in South America, and Costa Rica, in Central America, have been the main destination countries for this migration; in the Caribbean there has been intense circulation of persons among the island countries. The third pattern is emigration from Latin America and the Caribbean, mainly towards the United States, where the stock of Latin American and Caribbean immigrants doubled between 1980 and 1990.

The information available in the IMILA Project shows the striking heterogeneity of migrant characteristics and suggests that factors associated with migration have become increasingly complex. This document only considers the breakdown of migration statistics by gender and the proportion of qualified persons among migrants. In connection with the general repercussions of migration, a counterpoint is established between the different effects that occur on the structural and individual scale.

The final section of the document includes some speculative thoughts on migration trends in the contemporary socioeconomic context. A brief look at the relationship between migration and development trends reveals the potential offered by efforts being made to achieve open regionalism and integration in the broader context of globalization. It is emphasized that migration policies need to involve consensus-building on an international scale. It is also shown that such policies will be more effective and efficient if they are designed as components of development strategies.

1. The weaknesses and potential of existing information

The complex problem of undocumented migrants. International migration is one of the most significant factors that have contributed to the development of the societies of Latin America and the Caribbean. Despite the deep-rooted nature of this phenomenon in the region—which is given due historical recognition—its persistence and successive variations over time do not appear to have encountered an equally sustained level of attention among public decision-makers in the region. The issue comes to light from time to time and as a response to the perception that one of its impacts or characteristics is affecting a social issue. Voices are therefore being raised with increasing frequency to express aspirations or critical views on the types of immigrants who are to be encouraged, accepted or rejected; this usually involves the drafting or reformulation of the rules that govern the movements of persons across borders.

The loss of skilled human resources, the formation of social networks and the role of remittances are some of the elements that arouse interest in emigration. Various episodes, sometimes dramatic, of populations displaced by force because of socio-political upheavals increase concern about migration and its repercussions for development.

Scientific information, however—and the actions based on it—, cannot be constructed only on the basis of perceptions, aspirations, anxieties and concerns, particularly if they do not have a clear empirical basis. The lack of a solid foundation inhibits the rigorous examination of behaviours and trends, the prediction of changes and the evaluation of the consequences of international migration. The lack of appropriate, timely and relevant information—which restricts our understanding of the extent of the problem and, hence our ability to control it—is mainly due to the limitations of the data sources, which are due precisely to the lack of documentation in this field. As recognized in a document of the United Nations Population Division, "running through all discussions of migration are three common threads, namely, the yawning lack of data on migration, the absence of a coherent theory to explain international migration, and the very weak understanding of the complex interrelationships between migration and sustainable development" (United Nations, 1997, p.7).

Although the majority of countries in the region have records of entries and departures via their international ports, there are serious problems with this source. As the aim of these records is to register border crossings, which may be very numerous, it is a difficult task to identify the actual migrants; the coverage of entries and departures may differ among the different check-points; the information received on the persons entering or departing from the countries is scarce and not very useful for analysis; the data collected are not always processed adequately and, when this does take place, publication is delayed. Also, despite the efforts made to establish comparable criteria, the methods of recording entries and departures are not the same in all countries. They also have the same limitations as those affecting other administrative records –such as those relating to passports, visas, foreigners present in the country or work permits.

An initiative for regional cooperation: the IMILA Project. In view of the acute deficiencies in alternative sources, the national population censuses are the main provider of information for the study of international migration. Moreover, they offer some unique advantages with respect to universality and the wide range of demographic and socio-economic data they provide. Nonetheless, the census information of a country is not suitable for estimating –at least not directly– the emigration of the natives of a country. It is here that the IMILA project on international migration in Latin America proves useful as, through the exchange of information between countries, it is possible to organize the data on persons covered by censuses in countries other than their country of birth.²

At the simplest level, the IMILA Project makes it possible to construct a typical matrix of the origin and destination of migrants between countries. The nature of the migration is specified –depending on the questions contained in the national censuses– according to the place of birth of the persons, the year of arrival in the country and the place of residence at a date prior to the census. Depending on the combination of data available, countries may have different estimates for immigration and emigration. The persons recorded as immigrants in the census of one country will also be emigrants in their countries of origin. If the information on migration is obtained from the question on the place of birth, it will be assumed that the phenomenon occurred just one time over the life of the individual; on the other hand, if there is a question on the year of arrival in the country –or relating to the place of residence at a fixed date prior to the census– the levels of migration in different periods may be studied.

When the census data on migration periods refer to the entire population covered, the return migration of natives to the country of which they were once emigrants (having had a period of residence abroad) can be calculated; this is done by identifying the natives according to the year of arrival or the country of residence at a fixed date prior to that of the census. The emigration of persons born abroad (immigrants) can be estimated by comparing the data on the country of birth in two successive censuses and discounting the effects of mortality (by using survival ratios) and the immigration of foreigners in the intercensal period.

In order to encourage a more intense use of the wealth of information provided by the censuses, the national statistical offices provide CELADE with the records of persons born abroad.³ These data

² The IMILA Project was started in the Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) at the beginning of the 1970s, and its implementation on a larger scale has been recommended by the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP) and the United Nations Population Division. Various international meetings have supported the development of this Project, which is a clear example of horizontal cooperation.

³ Although the IMILA Project concentrates on the census data of the Latin American countries, CELADE obtains figures on Latin Americans enumerated in the censuses of countries outside the region, especially the United States and Canada. Similarly, data is provided on persons born outside the region who are resident in the countries of Latin America. As IMILA relies on the exchange of information between countries, CELADE provides copies of the tables obtained with the national databases and provides background information on the natives of each country who have been included in the censuses of other countries. CELADE publishes some of these data on a regular basis in its Demographic Bulletin, which helps their dissemination; this information is also available from the CELADE Web site via the ECLAC Web page (www.eclac.cl).

are used to make special tabulations, including biodemographic characteristics (sex, age, fertility, infant mortality) and sociodemographic attributes (civil status, education and occupational category) of such persons. As well as providing inputs for the preparation of population projections, the information from the IMILA Project data bank is used in many studies on Latin American international migration, which cover both the possible determining factors and the possible consequences of migration (ECLAC-CELADE, 1999; Martinez, 2000, 1997 and 1992; Pellegrino, 2000, 1995 and 1993).⁴

Possible limitations of the IMILA data. The information collected in the IMILA Project data bank has the limitations inherent in the nature of its source. Firstly, many censuses have differential omissions –in quantity and quality– among the total of the population and international migrants. In countries which have large numbers of undocumented migrants (or in those where foreigners perceive a risk of discrimination), some migrants may elude the census or describe themselves as natives or transient residents (Jaspers-Faijer, 1987). This omission will tend to be more frequent among those who do not belong to a household, as in the case of immigrants who have left their family behind.

A second type of limitation refers to the comparability of the data at the international level. As well as the different interpretations of the concept of residence in *de facto* and *de jure* censuses –and the various degrees of coverage of the population– the census schedules of the countries do not always include the same questions. This affects both the description of the operative concept of migration (which requires time reference elements) as in the evaluation of the demographic and socio-economic characteristics. It is also known that the periodicity of the census operations does not follow a regular schedule as each country conducts them on different dates.

A third order of limitations affecting the census data is methodological and conceptual in nature. Any census covers the existing population in a country at a particular time, and thus can only offer a picture of the stock of migrants that has accumulated up to that time. Such a stock includes only the number of surviving migrants and also those who did not migrate again before the census date, and not the migrations that took place over time (Pellegrino, 2000), so that the concept of international migration as a process is lost from view. This restriction means that the census is not an appropriate instrument for recording seasonal and cyclical mobility of persons and makes it difficult to identify short-term movements. The fact that it is not possible to identify the persons participating in these short-term movements is a significant obstacle at a time of growing international economic liberalization and market integration, when there is an increasingly flexible use of labour (as shown by the different methods used in timing the use of manpower).

Despite the limitations referred to, the IMILA Project is clearly an initiative of great importance for gaining an approximate knowledge of the international migration of Latin Americans. Some of these limitations could be overcome as progress is made with census methodologies and practices in the countries, and other restrictions – such as those relating to particular aspects of migration or to its specific features at the local level –could be dealt with by using research strategies to complement the type of information gathered by the Project. It is also possible to compare the direct estimates that are obtained from the IMILA data with those deduced from indirect procedures, such as those designed to quantify emigration by using questions on the place of residence of relatives. The IMILA Project is then a valuable experience of regional cooperation which could be a good starting point for establishing permanent mechanisms for monitoring migration.

⁴ With the recent development of the WINR+ system, CELADE has made it possible for each researcher to operate directly with the census databases and process information –even at small geographical scales– in order to adapt it to individual research goals

2. The main patterns in the migration map of the region's population

A review of the international migration trends recorded in Latin America and the Caribbean over the second half of the 20th century shows that there are three main patterns: extra-regional immigration, intra-regional migration and emigration out of the region. These patterns have co-existed over time, with variations in their relative significance and characteristics.

Immigration from outside the region. In the period from the second half of the 19th century to the first half of the 20th century, there was quite a high, although fluctuating, level of immigration from overseas, and this had a strong quantitative and qualitative impact on the social configuration of various countries in the region, especially in the countries on the Atlantic side, where conditions were favourable for the social and economic integration of migrants, the majority of whom came from southern Europe. European immigration was closely related to the areas that were the best integrated in the international economic circuits, and which, owing to the availability of "empty spaces", went through a rapid process of production modernization (Pellegrino, 2000); the economic growth in these areas generated work opportunities and salaries that were better than those available in the countries of southern Europe, a fact which contributed to rapid upward social mobility.

During the years following the second world war, Europe was the setting for a rapid process of economic transformation, which began in the northern and western nations and later extended – through the integration mechanisms – to the countries in the south of that continent. These changes acted as an incentive for people to remain in their country of origin. At the same time, the gap widened between the degree of socio-economic development in the European nations and that of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. This all resulted in a substantial reduction in the migration flows to the region and also served as a stimulus for return migration to the old continent.

Since the 1970s, and owing to the lack of renewal of the flows, immigrants from outside the region are now much older; in this context, mortality and return migration resulted in a gradual decline in the stock of those immigrants, which fell from about 4 million persons in 1970 to less than two and a half million in 1990 (table I.1). Although immigration from outside the region did not stop entirely – as there were still lesser flows, mainly from Asia – there was a definite decline in intensity over the last few decades, when the rates of change in the stock became negative. As a result, persons from outside the region accounted for a smaller proportion of total immigrants registered in the censuses of Latin American countries; in 1970 they amounted to more than three quarters of total immigrants and in 1990 they were little more than one half. This declining trend indicates that in the second half of the 20th century Latin America was losing its traditional attraction for the population of other regions.

Intra-regional migration. The Latin American and Caribbean countries have a record of frequent human movements across national borders, a phenomenon that is deeply rooted in the historical economic and social heterogeneity of the territories of the region. Encouraged by geographical proximity and cultural similarity, intra-regional migration flows find their destination of choice in those countries whose production structures are generating more employment, and which usually have higher levels of social equity. In addition to the effect of structural factors, (trends in) this form of migration have been influenced both by short-term economic expansion or contraction and by socio-political circumstances (Pellegrino, 2000, 1995 and 1993). For example, the cases of breakdown and re-establishment of democratic forms of government have resulted in the formation of virtual waves of exiles and "returnees" between nations with common borders.

The motivation for studying migration flows originating and terminating within the region has been growing in recent years. The reduction in flows from outside the region, the increase in so-called border migration and the efforts for economic integration have contributed to this growing interest. It has been observed that the persistent nature of some intra-regional flows is connected with

the links that have been established between the labour markets of neighbouring countries, in which they are similar to migration on the intra-national scale. Other flows, with seasonal fluctuations, are related to shorter-term changes.

During the 1970s there was a significant increase in migration within Latin America; socio-political disturbances combined with deeply-entrenched structural factors bring the number of migrants to almost two million persons in 1980 double the previous count (table I.1). In contrast, over the 1980s the impact of the economic crisis and subsequent structural reform programmes – particularly on the main destination countries– and the re-establishment of peaceful coexistence in various countries, slowed the growth in migrant stock within Latin America: the accumulated total only increased by 2.2 million persons (tables A.1 to A.3 of the annex).⁵

Although the information from the 1990 round of censuses points to a stabilization in the absolute numbers of persons migrating within Latin America, there are some indications that in the past few years there has been an increasing trend towards partial replacement of traditional migration by other forms of mobility. The latter forms are reversible –as they include moves of varying duration and do not involve a transfer of the place of residence– and seem to offer broader horizons to a growing part of the population, a phenomenon consistent with the new models of territorial restructuring of the region's economies.

Despite the changes in the socio-economic and political situation, the origins and destinations of the migration flows within Latin America have not altered very much, which indicates that the territorial pattern of these flows has become entrenched. In 1990, almost two thirds of Latin Americans who were resident in countries other than their country of birth were concentrated in Argentina and Venezuela. Argentina has been the traditional destination for large numbers of Paraguayans, Chileans, Bolivians and Uruguayans; attracted by work opportunities in agriculture, manufacturing, construction and services, these immigrants became more visible as European immigration diminished. In Venezuela, with the economy stimulated by the oil boom, the main inflow of migrants in the 1970s consisted of Colombians, followed by persons from the Southern Cone who were forced to leave their countries of origin.

During the so-called "lost decade" of the 1980s, immigration levels in Argentina and Venezuela declined significantly; the census data from the 1990 round show a reduction in the total immigrant stock in both countries. Nevertheless, the number of persons from the rest of Latin America did increase slightly. An indirect estimate shows that in the 1980s, Argentina and Venezuela experienced a not insignificant level of net immigration from other Latin American countries.⁶ Over the same period, some countries that had traditionally been sources of emigrants experienced a significant level of return migration. The economic expansion of Paraguay in the 1970s, attributable to the large hydro-electric projects being carried out and to an intense settlement programme, led to the return of nationals who had emigrated to Argentina and to an increase in immigration from neighbouring countries. In recent years, Chile has experienced return migration as well as immigration of nationals from other Latin American countries (CEDLA and others, 2000; Martínez, 1997).

Not all of the migration within Latin America is destined for Argentina and Venezuela. As another example of the relative diversity of destination countries, the strong socio-political changes that affected the Central American subregion in the 1970s and 1980s-added to the historical structural inadequacies with regard to development– led to a considerable increase in Nicaraguan and Salvadoran immigrant stock in Costa Rica between 1973 and 1984. During the same period, Mexico became an important recipient of flows also originating from Central American countries, in particular Guatemala and El Salvador. The same applies, with qualifications, to Belize, where numbers were lower but effects in the economic, social and cultural spheres more far-reaching.

⁵ The picture seen around 1990 is the net result of a large number of movements which took place during the previous decade and which included episodes of emigration and return migration.

⁶ By using inter-censal survival ratios by sex and age, for the period 1980-1990, a net balance was obtained of 147,000 and 60,000 immigrants for Argentina and Venezuela, respectively.

With regard to total intra-regional emigration around 1990, Colombians accounted for the highest absolute numbers: a little over 600 thousand were recorded in the censuses of other Latin American countries (90% in Venezuela). Chilean and Paraguayan emigrants, with a total of close to 280,000 (over three quarters of them recorded in the census in Argentina), shared the second place among migrants within Latin America. Despite these high numbers, these figures represented –apart from Paraguay– less than 3% of the population of the countries of origin. Uruguayan emigration, directed mainly towards Argentina, is a special case as at the beginning of the 1970s, it almost matched mortality in the country of origin (Fortuna and Niedworok, 1985).

Migration in the English-speaking Caribbean Community has a special feature: the intense circulation of persons between the countries of the sub-region –which is possible because of the geographical proximity– consists of a relatively low proportion of changes of residence and a larger proportion of recurring movements (Simmons and Guengant, 1992). Some of these movements include a return to the countries of origin and others take place in stages, with intermediate destinations, as part of a process of moving to a destination outside the subregion.⁷ According to recent studies migration within the Community is reaching a new threshold of activity associated with the rise in standards of living and the growing demand for labour (encouraged, in part, by the significant expansion in tourism) in some countries and with the lower level of job opportunities in others. As a result, something over half of the immigration flows in the Community in 1990 were from the same subregion, and the total amounted to almost 4% of the community's population (table I.4A of the annex)(Mills, 1997).

The situation described is not shared by all the Caribbean countries. In Trinidad and Tobago, the United States Virgin Islands and Barbados –which are among the five with the highest levels of migrant stocks– there was a predominance of immigrants from the subregion; on the other hand, in Jamaica and the Bahamas –the other two countries of the group with the highest stocks– the majority of immigrants were from outside the subregion (figure I.1). The relative incidence of immigration was highest in the United States Virgin Islands, where this stock was equivalent to one third of the total population. On the other hand, it was estimated that emigrants represent about one fifth of the population born in Granada, Guyana and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. In these circumstances, international migration has a fundamental influence on the demographic dynamics of the Caribbean countries.

The extra-regional migration pattern. While immigration from outside the region has declined and the intra-regional pattern has become relatively stable, emigration out of the region has acquired a significant role. Although there are various destinations for this kind of emigration, including a growing number of natives of the region settling in Australia, various European countries and some Asian countries, the vast majority are in the United States, and, to a lesser extent, in Canada. Thus, in general terms, this pattern is a case of south-north emigration, which has many repercussions for the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, including the loss of skilled human resources and the risk for the emigrants of not integrating fully in their country of destination; this migration also implies the formation of transnational migrant communities –which may result in more migration– and the generation of an economic potential, in the form of remittances, sent by the emigrants to their countries of origin.⁸

Despite the fact that there has been emigration of natives of the region, especially from Mexico and the Caribbean, to the United States over a long period –with fluctuations associated with economic

⁷ The Bahamas, in addition to receiving a large number of immigrants for residence purposes, is a transit destination for a large number of persons from the rest of the Caribbean area, especially Haitians.

⁸ A review of these repercussions should consider that the emigrants are a heterogeneous group in terms of their characteristics and migrant status. For example, some reside legally in the host countries and others do not have the documents needed to establish residence or join the labour market; similarly, the emigrants covered in the censuses include temporary workers, refugees and displaced persons.

and socio-political factors as well as changes in United States migration legislation—the novel element is the strong increase in recent years; no less novel is the increasing number of countries of origin. This is demonstrated by the flows from Central America and South America, which began to intensify in the middle of the twentieth century (table I.2, figures I.2 and I.3 and tables I.1A to I.3A of the annex). The stock of Latin American and Caribbean migrants in the United States doubled between 1980 and 1990, reaching a total close to 8.4 million persons or 43% of the total foreign population recorded by that country's 1990 census.⁹ Just over half of these 8.4 million persons were from Mexico and one quarter from the Caribbean (mainly from Cuba, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic); the remaining quarter consisted of similar proportions of Central Americans and South Americans (table I.3).

Although there were more than 4 million Mexicans enumerated in the United States census in 1990—double the figure recorded ten years earlier and equivalent to more than one-fifth of the foreign population in that country—the highest growth rate was for Salvadorans, who numbered 470,000 persons, representing a five-fold increase since the beginning of the 1980s. Not much less significant was the relative increase in numbers of other Central Americans: the figures for Nicaraguans and Guatemalans increased more than threefold, whereas the number of Hondurans grew by a factor of 2.8; there was similar growth in the numbers of Peruvians and Guyanese. Similarly, the number of persons native to Haiti, Bolivia, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic and Brazil more than doubled. Unlike those cases, the increase in the number of those born in Cuba was small, although at 737,000 persons, they hold second place among those from the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean and represent the highest proportion of naturalized persons in the United States.

According to estimates based on the information provided in the Current Population Survey of the United States, the number of immigrants of Latin American and Caribbean origin increased to 13.1 million persons in 1997. This figure, equivalent to a little over one half of the total stock of immigrants in that country, shows that regional immigrants increased by about 40% between 1990 and 1997. This source indicates that Mexicans—at 7 million—represent 53% of Latin American and Caribbean immigrants. The main groups of persons native to other countries and present in the United States in 1997 also include the Cubans, Dominicans and Salvadorans, although their numbers are less than one million persons (Schmidley and Gibson, 1999).

These data seem to indicate that the region has been converted into a net exporter of population; however, this seems somewhat exaggerated. Although the majority of the countries have a negative migration balance, and in some—in particular El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua—migration has risen significantly since the 1970s, the estimates for the region as a whole indicate relatively smaller figures. In the 1980s, the average annual (negative) migration rate in Latin America was just under two per thousand only; subsequently, this indicator diminished slowly to stand at a (negative) value of close to one per thousand in the second half of the 1990s (ECLAC/CELADE, 1998).¹⁰

3. Heterogeneity of regional migration: characteristics and repercussions

According to the information on the country of birth provided by the 1990 round of censuses, the total of immigrants and emigrants involved in the three patterns referred to accounted for no more than 10% of the population of any country in Latin America and in the majority of countries was less than 3%. Although a fraction of the persons who are undocumented in the destination countries and

⁹ It should be noted that the strong increase in Latin American and Caribbean migrant stock in the United States during the 1980s was influenced by the amnesty granted under the Immigration Control and Reform Act of 1986.

¹⁰ The rates mentioned are less than one tenth of the natural growth of the regional population and are equivalent to an annual net loss of 560,000 persons over the period 1980-1995 (ECLAC/CELADE, 1998).

of those who participate in temporary movements are not covered by the censuses, it is probable that the relative incidence of "real" migration is not much higher than the figures given. The information collected by the IMILA Project shows that, in addition to the growth in absolute terms, international migration of Latin American and Caribbean nationals –both between countries of the region and to the United States and Canada– has gone through qualitative changes.

The factors that may have contributed to the diversification of the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean during the 1980s include the persistent economic tensions, aggravated by a serious and extended crisis and by the immediate effects of structural adjustment programmes, which have serious repercussions on the functioning of labour markets. No less important was the impact of serious socio-political upheavals which, in some cases, resulted in militarization, the breakdown of normal standards of coexistence in society, and persecution. Another significant factor is the change in regulations in destination countries, which affected –whether intentionally or otherwise– the qualitative pattern of migration flows.¹¹

Gender-specific aspects of international migration. Gender is a fundamental aspect of the social process of international migration. The gender-specific tables of origin and destination with gender specification constructed with the census information of the last three decades (1960, 1970 and 1980) can be used to estimate the sex ratios of the migrants of Latin American origin present in countries other than their country of birth (tables I.5A-I.7A of the annex). When these ratios are considered on the scale of the whole American continent, it is clear that there has been a change from the majority being predominantly feminine (in 1970 and 1980) to being predominantly masculine. Instead of "feminization" of the migrant stocks over the past years, the trend throughout the Americas has been for women's participation to decrease. On the other hand, if sex ratios are considered only from the point of view of migration between Latin American countries, a trend can be seen in the opposite direction; these ratios have been declining steadily over the three decades considered; this means that, contrary to what has been observed in the Americas as a whole, migration within Latin America is characterized by an increasing degree of "feminization". The apparent paradox that emerges from the contrast between the two scales of analysis is explained by the increasing trend towards male participation in the stock of Latin American immigrants in the United States, influenced to a great extent by the flow originating in Mexico.¹²

A detailed analysis of the sex ratios indicates a strong heterogeneity in the composition by gender of the different migration flows. It is difficult to relate this variability to any conventional discriminatory element, such as origin, destination or distance; it is not clear, for example, whether the participation of men and women in a particular flow is directly related to geographical proximity. The explanation has to be sought in other factors, such as the complementarity of the labour markets in the countries of origin and destination, as some migration circuits are affected by the labour demand in certain sectors of activity and occupations.

The flows involving Mexicans moving to the United States and Bolivians and Chileans to Argentina are predominantly male, presumably because of the high demand for workers for agro-industrial tasks in the destination countries. In contrast, the stocks of Colombians in Venezuela and Paraguayans in Argentina have a female majority, because of their involvement in services, including domestic work. In the case of migration within the Caribbean Community, the census data for the set of countries show a slight female predominance, perhaps associated with jobs in the tourist industry.

On the whole, it is inappropriate to assume that the pre-eminence of women in some flows is due to the form of integration into the labour force of the destination societies; it is also valid to assume that this integration represents an effective improvement in the social status of women (Lim, 1998).

¹¹ The strict enforcement of such regulations seems to have given greater visibility to the phenomenon of "undocumented persons" and led to an increase in family reunification; it also helped to convert some itinerant and recurring movements into permanent moves.

¹² This situation seems to be confirmed by data from the United States Current Population Survey of 1997 (Schmidley and Gibson, 1999).

Other factors, such as the circumstances that act as a catalyst in migration, the functioning of migrant networks and communities or the expectations for family reunification also affect sex ratios in migration.

Migration of skilled personnel. In the specialist literature international migration is frequently recognized as having essentially an economic basis, and being related to the unequal distribution of job opportunities, income and standards of living between countries. This not only operates in relation to the potential migrants but also on the level of what is offered by the host countries; both the continual technological innovation and the improvement of competitive conditions –for which labour flexibility is essential– affect the power to attract migrants (ECLAC, 1999; Excobar, 1998). Thus, in the more developed nations, there is a growing interest in importing human capital (Iredale, 1998).

Traditionally, the more skilled migrants tended to move to distant countries, outside the region, whereas the flows established between neighbouring countries included persons with lower levels of education. However this distinction is no longer clear-cut; it is probable that the massive of emigration movements –with a strong presence of family groups– to destinations outside the Latin American region in the 1980s changed the composition of such flows. The data collected by IMILA illustrate some general features of this participation and its trends between 1970 and 1990.

The number of professional, technical and other highly skilled workers within the total numbers for Latin American migration in the continent doubled between 1970 and 1980, reaching a total of 220,000 persons; however, this category showed a slower rate of increase between 1980 and 1990 to stand at just over 300,000 persons, (tables I.8A to I.10A of the annex). Also, the proportion of these persons among the economically active migrants declined from just over 8% in 1970 to less than 6% in 1990. This declining trend seems to be stronger in the case of Latin American migration to the United States. With regard to migration within Latin America, the trend is different, as the participation of skilled persons among the economically active migrants increased from 6% in 1970 to 8% in 1990.

The fact that highly skilled personnel constitute a growing proportion of the persons migrating between the countries of the Latin American region is an important issue. Although this proportion is still small, the fact that the absolute number of professional and technically skilled migrants tripled between 1970 and 1990 cannot be overlooked. In addition to indicating the value of this migration pattern and calling into question the perception that such migrants lack sufficient training, this trend could serve as a basis for designing regional cooperation efforts in the shared use of this type of human resources.¹³

As in the case of the gender dimension, the composition of specific migratory flows varies a great deal. In the case of Latin American immigrants to the United States, the percentages of professional and technically skilled persons among South Americans are twice as high as those for Mexicans and persons from the Caribbean and Central American countries. A similar distinction appears in Argentina and Venezuela when the proportion of skilled personnel in the flows from neighbouring countries is compared with that of the flows originating elsewhere in Latin America.

In general, the relative proportion of professional and technical persons tends to be less in the countries with high levels of emigration, with the exception of Cuba; in contrast, the Latin American nations with high levels of immigration (Argentina and Venezuela) show a high level of selectivity (in favour of skilled personnel) in their patterns of emigration. Migration to a destination in the Caribbean Community includes a high percentage of skilled personnel, in particular in the case of the flow to Jamaica, as just over half of these migrants are professionals and specialists (Mills, 1997).

¹³ A careful examination of the migration of professional and technical workers needs to take into account both their specialization and their integration in the job market in destination countries; it should also evaluate the impact of the migration of these persons on the stock of such human resources in the countries of origin.

Examining the repercussions of migration beyond the data. The brief description of the qualitative aspects of migratory patterns would be incomplete without reference to some of the more general repercussions of migration. In many countries of Latin America and the Caribbean emigration seems to have alleviated the impact of the tensions between demographic trends and the generation of employment, of those arising in socio-political, ethnic and religious conflicts, and those associated with acute forms of environmental degradation. On the individual level, emigration has become an option for seeking job opportunities and education outside of the country of birth. As a correlative, this emigration brings a source of foreign currency –in the form of remittances– for the communities of origin and also generates the possibility of establishing links which promote the incorporation of technology and productive investment.

Notwithstanding the above, emigration contributes to the erosion of human resources, which may have adverse consequences for the economic and social development of the countries of origin. In some cases, emigration may have meant an increase in economic dependency in respect of external saving (remittances). Similarly, on a more individual level, emigration may be a source of instability, frustration and discriminatory treatment.

The countries hosting immigration have faced problems such as the lack of documents of migrants, a situation resulting from the legal frameworks that govern their entry and period of residency; this can cause difficulties both for the individuals and for relations with the countries of origin of the immigrants. Furthermore, in some of the host countries, negative perceptions arise with regard to the costs of the immigrants' use of subsidized social services (health, education, social security). Even so, such countries derive various benefits from immigration, such as acquiring inexpensive labour or the employment of highly skilled persons without having had to make an investment in their training. In the United States, the immigration of undocumented Latin Americans and persons from the Caribbean seems to have contributed to achieving the greater labour flexibility that is needed to strengthen the competitiveness of the economy (Escobar, 1998; ECLAC/CELADE, 1999); the sustained demand for cheap labour, even in times of recession, has been interpreted as a sign of the usefulness of such immigration (Bustamente, 1994).

4. Speculation: uncertainty and possibilities

The general view presented summarizes the current migration situation in Latin America and the Caribbean up to the beginning of the 1990s. As the information available refers to movements of persons who have changed their usual country of residence (migrants in the true sense of the word), the data are not useful for identifying other forms of international mobility which may have appeared or grown in relative importance in the past few years. Together with the growing liberalization of national economies, the changes in transport and communication technology –with the consequent reduction in barriers posed by physical and cultural distance– have facilitated temporary, cyclical or circular types of movements, which do not involve a transfer of residence between countries. As the lack of appropriate empirical information makes it difficult to evaluate this trend, the reflections that follow are of a more speculative nature.

Although the long-term consequences of the liberalizing economic reforms –even in subregions with established integration schemes– are difficult to predict, there can be little doubt that as long as there are major inequalities in the level of relative development between countries, the migratory impulse will tend to increase (Tuirán, 1998).¹⁴ The greater intensity in economic interactions and communication density will heighten people's awareness of such inequalities and further encourage migration; within this context, the social networks established by the migrants may act to stimulate expectations of greater mobility and also help to realize them (Alba, 1998). In the longer term, as development lags decrease,

¹⁴ It is noted that, in the short term, the development of countries which have traditionally sent out their labour force will stimulate emigration and that even if trade helps to generate employment, this strategy will be insufficient –in itself– to reduce emigration (Rowlands and Weston, 1996).

migration will tend to decline; the underlying assumption is that economic convergence will act as a disincentive to long-term migration. Nevertheless, some specialists maintain that market integration schemes may be an incentive for migration, as the job opportunities that they bring will provide potential migrants with the resources to finance their move; also, if these integration schemes cause a breakdown in the labour-intensive production units, they will tend to encourage migratory tendencies (Working Group on International Migration, 1998).

As there are not yet any definite signs of a reduction in the sharp inequalities in the level of relative development between countries, and the migrant networks and communities are very active, all indications are that a possible increase in job opportunities (including better salaries) in a more informed world with better intercommunication will serve as a stimulus to migratory tendencies. Thus, the economic growth of the countries that have traditionally exported their labour force, may assisted by foreign direct investment, help to generate an environment favourable for emigration (Alba, 1998; Rowlands and Weston, 1996; Tuirán, 1998; Working Group on International Migration, 1998). The logical chain which relates greater development with more migration and then at a later stage culminates in a reduced level of immigration has been described for some time as a migration hump. This refers to the migration transition that would be generated whenever a country implements economic growth strategies that aim to incorporate technological change and combat low salaries and lack of labour protection (Ghosh, 1997; Stalker, 2000). One corollary to this is that, in the long term –and assuming that the development gaps are reduced– migration could reduce in intensity. This would be more clear-cut in the case of *south-north migration* than in the case of intra-regional movements; with regard to the latter, a more detailed analysis is required to understand the probable future trends, particularly with regard to the vast areas affected by subregional integration.

The preceding observations suggest that, at least in the short-term, migration will continue to increase. If this assumption is correct, it is important to recognize the inconsistency that exists between growing liberalization of the circulation of goods and services and the tight administrative restrictions imposed on the movement of persons; there is also the fact of a negative social environment with regard to migration. In the face of contemporary economic processes, various authors note that the traditional migration policies based on controls seem to be losing their legitimacy and effectiveness (Moulier-Boutang and Papdemetriou, 1994; Escobar, 1998; Pellegrino, 1995). By means of a review of the development of migration stocks, flows and systems, Tapinos and Delaunay (2000) conclude that the lack of globalization of migration in the contemporary world is the result of the restrictions (explicit and implicit) on mobility, which oppose the operation of market forces (which encourage migration). This inconsistency is particularly evident in the case of the migration of highly skilled human resources: even when the countries that have traditionally hosted migration establish provisions in favour of the entry of skilled persons (importing "human capital"), the efforts of powerful lobby groups to defend their interests lead to such an extreme application of the priority rule that the actual use of such human resources is prevented (Iredale, 1998).

The concerns evoked by migration, particularly in the developed nations, could inhibit the potential of market liberalization for promoting more equitable development at the global level. This same concern seems to account for the systematic omission, until recently, of the migration issue in negotiations leading to multinational market agreements; this omission constitutes a failure to recognize an established fact – the exchange of human resources– and engenders problems that could be dealt with jointly, especially through improvement of labour conditions. Migration, in contrast to its role in the past –when it was fundamental to the economic and social linkages between many nations– seems to have been excluded from globalization (Tapinos and Delaunay, 2000).

Owing to the expectations and uncertainties created by initiatives in favour of economic integration in the Americas, the experience accumulated with regard to subregional agreements and the recognition of the region's increasing openness in its interaction with the rest of the world, the proposals for open regionalism acquire greater force¹⁵ These proposals, which are gaining general acceptance among

¹⁵ Open regionalism is conceived as "a process of growing economic interdependence at the regional level, promoted both by preferential integration agreements and by other policies in a context of liberalization and deregulation, geared towards enhancing the competitiveness of the countries of the region" (ECLAC, 1994, p.8).

governments and civil society actors in the region, make it possible to deal explicitly with the problems and potentials of international migration. This possibility will be greater to the extent that the integration schemes, instead of limiting themselves to "a pro-market approach", come to use "all the economic, cultural and political" opportunities involved (Di Filippo, 1998). In addition to benefiting from the advantages of proximity –geographical, economic, cultural and political –and helping to strengthen democratic regimes, open regionalism could encourage the articulation of common interests vis-à-vis other regions, facilitating the signing of agreements in areas such as the transfer of skilled human resources, reducing the different forms of illegal immigration, the establishment of common information systems, the protection of human rights of migrants, the harmonization of migration policies, and in general, the conclusion of agreements on the treatment of migrants.

The formulation of policies regarding population mobility is still a pending task, and its importance is shown by the difficulty of recognizing and facing these realities which concern the international community. This task requires the cooperation and joint efforts of countries so that the migration processes can be appropriately considered in the broader context of social equity; such considerations should form part of the open regionalism schemes.¹⁶ Within the field of integration efforts, this work could be complemented by strengthening institutional mechanisms to favour the harmonization of national migration policies. One sign of progress in this area is the Regional Conference on Migration (established in Puebla, Mexico, in 1996), an official body for consultation and communication for the countries of North America and Central America; a similar initiative of the South American countries is being implemented.


If it is accepted, as a basic principle, that the right of each State to control the entry of foreigners is just one aspect of international migration, and that this right does not entirely go against the concept of common admission criteria for the countries of the region, then the feasibility of agreements on other migration issues can be considered, such as employment, social benefits and family reunification (ECLAC/CELADE, 1995). This will contribute to greater coherence among national regulations and economic and political guidelines in the contemporary international context and will make better use of the contributions of migration to economic growth and socially sustainable development.¹⁷ For this reason, in addition to the specific administrative area, migration policies should be part of the more general context of development strategies (Mármora, 1997).

¹⁶ The challenges posed to countries by migration include: the evaluation of its economic causes (contributing factors) and sociocultural causes (perpetuation factors); the identification of its externalities (transfer of skilled human resources, undocumented immigration, family reunification and remittance flows); the review of its various forms (traditional and more recent); the analysis of the various options for intervention (promoting settlement, channelling the flows, timing of movements); convergence, in the broader sense, of social policies.

¹⁷ For example, policies aimed at international transfers of human resources could be converted into a useful means for promoting the dissemination and absorption of technological change (a brain exchange instead of a brain drain). This would be more feasible if progress could be made in the definition of a common market in science and technology, with the participation of public and private agents and with international assistance (IOM, 1993).


Annex 1

Figure 1.1
CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY: PERCENTAGE OF MIGRANTS IN THE TOTAL POPULATION AND THE PERCENTAGE OF IMMIGRANTS FOR THE CARIBBEAN



Source: Mills (1997).


Figure 1.2
UNITED STATES: IMMIGRANT POPULATION BY REGION OF BIRTH 1960-1997



Source: Schmidley and Gibson (1999)

Figure I.3

UNITED STATES: RELATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF THE MIGRANT POPULATION BY REGION OF ORIGIN. 1850-1997



Source: Schmidley and Gibson (1999).

Table I.1

LATIN AMERICA: IMMIGRANT POPULATION BY ORIGIN. 1970, 1980 AND 1990 NATIONAL POPULATION CENSUSES^a

Origin	Census dates ^b			Annual growth rates	
	1970	1980	1990	1970-1980	1980-1990
Rest of the world (immigration from outside the region)	3873420	3411426	2350441	-1.27	-3.68
Percentage	76.1	63.1	51.2		
Latin America and the Caribbean (intra-regional migration)	1218990	1995149	2242268	4.83	1.17
Percentage	23.9	36.9	48.8		
Total	5092410	5406575	4592709	0.60	-1.63
Percentage	100.0	100.0	100.0		

Source: Estimates prepared using the IMILA data bank of CELADE.

^a: The number of countries included is 16 in 1970; 14 in 1980 and 13 in 1990.

^b: The dates indicate the years of the national census rounds.

Table I.2

**UNITED STATES: IMMIGRANT POPULATION OF LATIN AMERICAN
AND CARIBBEAN ORIGIN. 1970, 1980 AND 1990 POPULATION CENSUSES**

Origin	Census dates			Annual growth rates	
	1970	1980	1990	1970-1980	1980-1990
South America	234233	493950	871678	7.13	5.53
Percentage	13.6	11.3	10.4		
Meso-America	873624	2530440	5391943	9.73	7.22
Percentage	50.6	57.7	64.4		
Caribbean and other	617551	1358610	2107181	7.50	4.32
Percentage	35.8	31.0	25.2		
Total	1725408	4383000	8370802	8.70	6.25
Percentage	100.0	100.0	100.0		

Source: Estimates prepared using the IMILA data bank of CELADE.


Table I.3

**UNITED STATES: POPULATION BORN IN COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN REGISTERED IN THE 1970, 1980 AND 1990 CENSUSES**

Region and country of birth	1970		1980		1990		Annual inter-censal growth rate (%)	
	Population	Relative	Population	Relative	Population	Relative	1970-1980	1980-1990
		Distribution		Distribution		Distribution		
		%		%		%		
TOTAL REGION	1725408	100.0	4383000	100.0	8370802	100.0	8.7	6.3
LATIN AMERICA	1636159	94.8	3893746	88.8	7573843	90.5	8.2	6.4
SOUTH AMERICA	234233	13.6	493950	11.3	871678	10.4	7.1	5.5
Argentina	44803	2.6	68887	1.6	77986	0.9	4.2	1.2
Bolivia	6872	0.4	14468	0.3	29043	0.3	7.1	6.7
Brazil	27069	1.6	40919	0.9	82489	1.0	4.1	6.7
Colombia	63538	3.7	143508	3.3	286124	3.4	7.7	6.6
Chile	15393	0.9	35127	0.8	50322	0.6	7.8	3.6
Ecuador	36663	2.1	86128	2.0	143314	1.7	8.1	5.0
Paraguay	1792	0.1	2858	0.1	4776	0.1	4.6	5.0
Peru	21663	1.3	55496	1.3	144199	1.7	8.8	8.9
Uruguay	5092	0.3	13278	0.3	18211	0.2	8.9	3.1
Venezuela	11348	0.7	33281	0.8	35214	0.4	9.8	0.6
MESO-AMERICA	873624	50.6	2530440	57.7	5391943	64.4	9.7	7.2
Costa Rica	16691	1.0	29639	0.7	39438	0.5	5.6	2.8
El Salvador	15717	0.9	94447	2.2	465433	5.6	14.3	13.3
Guatemala	17356	1.0	63073	1.4	225739	2.7	11.4	11.3
Honduras	27978	1.6	39154	0.9	108923	1.3	3.3	9.4
Mexico	759711	44.0	2199221	50.2	4298014	51.3	9.7	6.5
Nicaragua	16125	0.9	44166	1.0	168659	2.0	9.3	11.7
Panama	20046	1.2	60740	1.4	85737	1.0	10.1	3.4
CARIBBEAN								
AND OTHERS	617551	35.8	1358610	31.0	2107181	25.2	7.5	4.3
Cuba	439048	25.4	607814	13.9	73697	18.8	3.2	1.9
Barbados	—	—	26847	0.6	43015	0.5		4.6
Guyana	—	—	48608	1.1	120698	1.4		8.5
Haiti	28026	1.6	92395	2.1	225393	2.7	10.7	8.4
Jamaica	68576	4.0	196811	4.5	334140	4.0	9.7	5.2
Dominican Republic	61228	3.5	169147	3.9	347858	4.2	9.4	6.9
Trinidad and Tobago	20673	1.2	65907	1.5	115710	1.4	10.4	5.5
Others	—	—	151081	3.4	183396	2.2		1.9



Source: CELADE, IMILA Project.

Map 1
THE AMERICAS: IMMIGRANTS STOCKS, CIRCA 1970





Source: CELADE , IMILA Project

Map 2
THE AMERICAS: IMMIGRANTS STOCKS, CIRCA 1980



Source: CELADE , IMILA Project

Map 3
THE AMERICAS: IMMIGRANTS STOCKS, CIRCA 1990



Source: CELADE , IMILA Project

Annex 2

Table 1
LATIN AMERICA: POPULATION OF BOTH SEXES BORN IN LATIN AMERICA
AND ENUMERATED IN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN COUNTRY OF BIRTH, CIRCA 1970

Country of enumeration	Year	Country of birth														Total									
		Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Cuba	Ecuador	El Salvador	Guatemala	Haiti	Honduras	Mexico	Nicaragua		Panama	Paraguay	Peru	Dominican Republ.	Uruguay	Venezuela			
Argentina	1970	101000	48600	142150	58300	...	580100	
Bolivia	1970	10712	930	1900	870	800	152	470	357	352	90	83	519	593	371	20025	2410	221	13582	989	71054	13582	989	71054	
Brazil	1970	7563	930	1900	800	101	101	245	967	109	52	122	319	56	216	290	3804	80	759	388	30137	759	388	30137	
Colombia	1973	87	92	670	1014	227	...	1107	272	1385	25	996	917	23331	4197	31	315	55	71	435	36054	71	435	36054	
Costa Rica	1970	354	105	...	227	22579	...	1201	551	...	546	25563	...	546	25563	
Ecuador	1971	85	17	37	141	114	422	114	44	3413	1	14290	636	784	5	19	50	26	22	30	20262	22	30	20262	
El Salvador	1973	240	60	98	375	430	805	430	97	14052	15	6231	3196	1098	217	...	144	35	...	110	27442	...	110	27442	
Guatemala	1971	9	4	11	23	1	1	1150	9	3	7	7	17	8	...	2	10	1659	...	7	2932	...	7	2932	
Haiti	1974
Honduras	1970	1585	...	538	845	998	998	4175	...	1213	...	941	...	3673	1183	...	804	805	24862	...	805	24862	
Mexico	1970	107	...	84	100	304	4693	2210	...	6919	703	590	87	16248	...	87	16248	
Nicaragua	1971	374	...	210	12128	1140	3825	...	1462	591	2582	527	324	23639	...	324	23639	
Panama	1970	27389	364	34276	359	646	763	63797	...	763	63797	
Paraguay	1972	4286	4115	3077	1528	310	2399	23240	23240	
Peru	1972	213	21	56	47	120	40	949	57	113	19065	32	161	15	19	4	345	...	33	114	21408	33	114	21408	
Dominican Republic	1975	19051	247	14315	1006	133	106	83	1593	173	100	36807	...	100	36807	
Uruguay	1971	4481	1166	2345	177973	1314	1314	10139	5292	342	353	165	1717	866	1079	186	2168	1886	793	...	215445	793	...	215445	
Venezuela	1971	89004	125461	104669	158454	196769	12351	20229	11062	19779	42180	29786	10706	33006	7877	252200	10750	4513	74323	3935	1218990	74323	3935	1218990	
Total Latin America	
Canada	1971	3145	...	3225	1455	4260	...	5380	855	...	1590	19910	...	1590	19910	
United States	1970	44803	6872	27069	15393	63538	16691	439048	36663	15717	28026	27978	759711	16125	20046	1792	21663	61228	5092	11348	1636159	5092	11348	1636159	
Total North America		47948	6872	30294	15393	63538	16691	440503	36663	15717	32286	27978	765091	16125	20046	1792	21663	62083	5092	12938	1656069	5092	12938	1656069	
Total		136952	132333	134963	173847	260307	29042	460732	47725	35496	74466	57764	775797	49131	27923	253992	32413	66596	79415	16873	2875059	79415	16873	2875059	

Source: IMILA, ECLAC/CELADE.

Table 2
**LATIN AMERICA: POPULATION OF BOTH SEXES BORN IN LATIN AMERICA AND ENUMERATED
 IN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN COUNTRY OF BIRTH, CIRCA 1980**

Country of enumeration	Year	Country of birth															Total					
		Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Cuba	Ecuador	El Salvador	Guatemala	Haiti	Honduras	Mexico	Nicaragua	Panama		Paraguay	Peru	Dominican Republ.	Uruguay	Venezuela
Argentina	1980	14669	115616	42134	207176	1864	771	966	259449	8002	...	109724	1401	747103	
Bolivia	1976	26633	12980	8492	7508	412	40	23	183	48	16	204	5176	18	70	972	4730	12	193	144	42929	
Brazil	1980	19733	6298	2076	17830	1490	327	574	758	176	127	207	853	608	641	17560	3789	169	21238	1262	107717	
Chile	1982	1069	191	179	1215	110	36	179	376	99	233	284	4308	73	989	942	38594	
Colombia	1985
Costa Rica	1984	702	189	191	1277	1673	...	3475	318	1428	30	1572	1276	45885	4788	39	1016	134	201	748	73683	
Cuba	1981
Ecuador	1982	1691	381	726	5747	39443	280	335	...	152	22	104	494	142	374	85	1887	102	458	1654	54309	
El Salvador	1981	303	65	76	263	411	733	267	119	16805	25	5326	2977	2133	235	...	204	57	...	110	30109	
Guatemala	1982
Haiti	1982
Honduras	1980	1106	3345	2778	1841	3767	...	4115	...	1500	...	2312	1708	...	2188	...	1553	1940	35687	
Mexico	1980	5479
Nicaragua	1980	561	162	451	1163	12583	3359	1209	1491	317	58	464	1060	3128	...	49	1201	257	144	325	29773	
Panama	1980	43670	500	98730	1560	3170	2310	149940
Paraguay	1982	5025	3210	2926	5976	1985	190	876	1739	641	...	308	527	812	24215	
Peru	1981
Dominican Republic	1981
Uruguay	1985	19669	211	12332	1439	227	199	251	1421	241	364	36354	
Venezuela	1981	11371	2253	3872	24703	494494	1713	12975	21091	469	1195	332	2681	2132	1333	448	19956	15745	6898	...	624736	
Total Latin America		149506	141865	173112	277987	558429	8674	23680	27884	6815	1509	9888	19921	56457	9690	280307	47522	16549	144235	9702	1995149	
Canada	1986	8365	1120	4995	17805	5660	660	1490	6595	4325	31955	865	13845	1270	500	4520	5900	1380	4235	2740	129470	
United States	1980	68887	14468	40919	35127	143508	29639	607814	86128	63073	92395	391542	2199221	44166	60740	2858	55496	169147	13278	33281	3893746	
Total North America		77252	15588	45914	52932	149168	30299	609304	92723	67398	124350	400192	2213066	45436	61240	7378	61396	170527	17513	36021	4023216	
Total		226768	157453	219026	330919	707597	38973	632984	120607	74213	125859	49907	2232987	101893	70930	287685	108918	187076	161748	45723	6018365	

Source: IMILA, ECLAC/CELADE.

Table 3
LATIN AMERICA: POPULATION OF BOTH SEXES BORN IN LATIN AMERICA AND ENUMERATED IN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN COUNTRY OF BIRTH, CIRCA 1990

Country of enumeration	Year	Country of birth														Total						
		Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Cuba	Ecuador	El Salvador	Guatemala	Haiti	Honduras	Mexico	Nicaragua		Panama	Paraguay	Peru	Dominican Republ.	Uruguay	Venezuela
Argentina	1991	143735	33543	218217	2638	451	1393	975	178	113	73	138	2277	142	367	251130	15977	259	133653	1934	807193	
Bolivia	1992	17829	8586	3909	529	83	85	243	46	119	5	189	6607	54	75	955	5805	36	327	300	45782	
Brazil	1991	25468	15691	20437	2076	357	492	605	364	121	141	300	660	329	981	19018	5633	178	22143	1226	115439	
Chile	1992	34415	7729	4610	1666	448	579	2267	228	147	37	220	827	168	366	683	7649	126	1599	2397	66161	
Colombia	1993	1953	390	1383	1496	452	617	9040	177	266	64	182	1465	307	1680	137	3182	47	316	43285	66439	
Costa Rica																						
Cuba	1990	1558	424	903	37553	313	302		175	154	22	111	612	161	409	90	2396	78	406	2379	52994	
El Salvador	1992	140	40	181	212	856	46	85	4524	4524	7	8666	1350	2139	308	20	135	21	66	142	19147	
Guatemala	1994	277	85	136	476	737	192	119	14425	14425	6	4634	5250	3621	245	9	266	82	68	140	30953	
Haiti																						
Honduras	1988
Mexico	1990	4635	1329	1293	4964	1521	2979	861	5215	46005	364	1997	...	2566	2169	160	2973	520	1097	1533	84682	
Nicaragua	1995	147	38	110	237	4727	711	78	2136	900	20	9473	734	351	351	10	176	52	...	116	20131	
Panama	1990	567	208	618	13644	3829	3191	1381	2340	367	119	623	1361	4447	37	37	1740	1440	144	476	37507	
Paraguay	1992	47846	766	107452	189	45	25	72	42	39	13	27	2974	24	36	194	1432	14	3029	91	166380	
Peru	1993	4165	3216	2523	2374	215	410	1801	89	124	15	111	723	135	280	194	...	104	399	1489	23019	
Dominican Republic	1993
Uruguay	1995	26256	376	13521	362	41	352	235	18	27	2	17	362	36	75	1512	528	37	...	737	46220	
Venezuela	1990	9070	1936	4223	528893	1494	10157	23370	897	531	1593	429	2756	2033	1216	494	27748	17140	5454	660221	...	
Total Latin America		174326	175963	179082	282421	595813	21531	41132	26330	53437	2481	27117	27958	16162	7577	274449	75840	20134	168701	56245	2242268	
Canada	1991
United States	1990	77986	29043	82489	286124	39438	736971	143314	465433	225739	225393	108923	4298014	168659	85737	4776	144199	347858	18211	35214	7573843	
Total North America		77986	29043	82489	286124	39438	736971	143314	465433	225739	225393	108923	4298014	168659	85737	4776	144199	347858	18211	35214	7573843	
Total		252312	205006	261571	332743	881937	55007	758502	184446	491763	227874	136040	4325972	184821	93314	279225	220039	367992	168912	91459	9816111	

Source: IMILA, ECLAC/CELADE.

Table 4
CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY: POPULATION OF BOTH SEXES BORN IN COUNTRIES OF THE SUBREGION AND ENUMERATED
IN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THEIR COUNTRY OF BIRTH. CIRCA 1990

Country of enumeration	Pais de nacimiento													Total			
	Antigua and Barbuda	Bahamas	Barbados	Dominica	Grenada	Guyana	British Virgin Island	United States Virgin Island	Jamaica	Montserrat	Saint Kitts and Nevis	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	Saint Lucia		Trinidad and Tobago	Total Caribbean	Others
Antigua and Barbuda	14	5	216	2580	122	1753	70	451	408	892	495	505	414	376	8287	4048	12335
Bahamas	...	54	245	37	30	438	5	5	2920	2	14	21	26	290	4047	22638	26685
Barbados	190	5	63	446	559	2529	615	3635	3279	1730	12847	8495	21342
Dominica	23	18	106	44	40	341	32	69	49	61	24	47	105	115	871	1821	2692
Grenada	6	4	173	14	60	341	8	7	69	6	9	342	97	1736	2806	1683	4489
Guyana	355	13	86	566	290	770	3	565	249	99	1422	957	251	189	5812	2258	8070
British Virgin Islands	4570	0	210	3110	540	150	2660	...	240	660	6100	560	2490	1990	23280	9577	32857
United States Virgin Islands	3317	25286	28603
Jamaica	171	0	20	409	23	357	22	19	24	...	175	45	31	66	1362	706	2068
Montserrat	179	3	42	89	25	343	109	271	64	190	...	76	48	114	1553	1726	3279
Saint Kitts and Nevis	32	0	262	70	279	386	29	13	80	20	24	...	119	1420	2734	1502	4236
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	80	7	406	142	130	1175	11	123	116	21	43	242	...	500	2996	2585	5581
Santa Lucia	2411	...	16589	5140	11625	1306	...	37071	13249	50320
Trinidad and Tobago	5620	109	4240	7507	18687	13453	2949	1524	4926	1958	8309	18169	8483	8735	107986	98277	206263

Source: Mills (1997).

Table 5
LATIN AMERICA SEX RATIOS OF THE POPULATION BORN IN LATIN AMERICA
AND ENUMERATED IN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THEIR COUNTRY OF BIRTH, CIRCA 1970
(males per 100 females)

Country of enumeration	Country of birth																	Total						
	Year	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Cuba	Ecuador	El Salvador	Guatemala	Haiti	Honduras	Mexico	Nicaragua	Panama	Paraguay		Peru	Dominican Republic	Uruguay	Venezuela		
Argentina	1970		142	93	134												102				85		113	
Bolivia	1970																							
Brazil	1970		98	115		67	124	86	127	132	144	148	122	89	195	140	97	98	105	106		97		94
Chile	1970																							
Colombia	1973																							
Costa Rica	1970		107	100	93	87		112	123	96	107	525	95	78	120	99	158	128	224	137		146		112
Cuba	1970																							
Ecuador	1971																							
El Salvador	1971		107	58	99	90	67	92	94	75		150	69	82	85	84		97	133			90		76
Guatemala	1973		300	83	71	156		72	29	200			133	55	100			43	57			75		63
Haiti	1971																							
Honduras	1974																							
Mexico	1970		105	90	83	101	114	86		99	97		117	78	112	119		114				105		100
Nicaragua	1971		91	50	104	104	87			138	112		95	76	136	105		177				81		97
Panama	1970		103	49	96	121	85	116	229					96							120		89	117
Paraguay	1972		92	110	101																			102
Peru	1972																							
Dominican Republic	1970		75	75	47	82	100	121	63	157			33	104	50	171		27		50		90		91
Uruguay	1975		123	63	95	75			83					80				111		66		113		66
Venezuela	1971		119	121	93	89	98	108	126	67	91	126	63	83	104	126	107	116	87	87				92
Total Latin America			138	94	132	91	88	101	137	84	99	138	84	83	118	107	102	104	74	85		105		104
Canada	1971																							
United States	1970																							
Total North America			83	87	85	85	75	89	90	68	77	90	83	96	55	67	99	102	79	97		89		91
Total			97	134	127	89	80	89	97	76	83	90	84	96	92	76	102	103	78	86		93		96

Source: IMILA, ECLAC/CELADE.

Table 6
LATIN AMERICA SEX RATIOS OF THE POPULATION BORN IN LATIN AMERICA
AND ENUMERATED IN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THEIR COUNTRY OF BIRTH, CIRCA 1980
(males per 100 females)

Country of enumeration	Country of birth																						
	Year	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Cuba	Ecuador	El Salvador	Guatemala	Haiti	Honduras	Mexico	Nicaragua	Panama	Paraguay	Peru	Dominican Republic	Uruguay	Venezuela	Total	
Argentina	1980								83														
Bolivia	1976	102	123	131	125	66	100	92	101	90	71	700											
Brazil	1980	101	124	99	122	119	142	99	128	180	155	131											
Chile	1982	91	87	99		74	110	124	93	115	124	112											
Colombia	1985																						
Costa Rica	1984	100	139	71	100	98		104	124	87	109	500											
Cuba	1981																						
Ecuador	1982	124	85	87	113	92	89	113		89	97	340											
El Salvador	1981	109	91	62	95	101	69	104	105	67		79											
Guatemala	1982																						
Haiti																							
Honduras																							
Mexico	1980	99		80	93	91	89	83		96	83												
Nicaragua																							
Panama	1980	105	116	70	104	108	81	148	184	141	91	100											
Paraguay	1982	96		113	168																		
Peru	1981	85	76	76	62	80	90	152	57														
Dominican Republic	1981																						
Uruguay	1985	75	82	64	92	89			99														
Venezuela	1981	108	112	113	108	89	81	101	101	79	79	145											
Total Latin America		95	120	101	109	90	85	102	101	79	90	146											
Canada	1986	100	75	81	105	75	45	106	98	112	112	80											
United States	1980	103	94	80	97	86	74	88	89	78	85	95											
Total North America		102	93	80	100	86	73	88	89	81	86	91											
Total		97	117	96	108	89	76	89	92	81	87	91											

Source: IMILA, ECLAC/CELADE.

Table 7
LATIN AMERICA SEX RATIOS OF THE POPULATION BORN IN LATIN AMERICA
AND ENUMERATED IN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THEIR COUNTRY OF BIRTH, CIRCA 1990
(males per 100 females)

Country of presence	Country of birth																Total				
	Year	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Cuba	Ecuador	El Salvador	Guatemala	Haiti	Honduras	Mexico	Nicaragua	Panama		Paraguay	Peru	Dominican Republic	Uruguay
Argentina	1991		108	78	111	80	94	79	104	96	414	711	94	109	182	79	147	93	96	74	96
Bolivia	1992	93		110	98	70	108	107	84	64	89	400	89	96	127	101	121	64	108	88	100
Brazil	1991	114	122		140	105	175	86	184	361	157	117	165	134	229	90	149	46	115	95	117
Chile	1992	97	91	89		79	93	98	88	100	149	208	96	97	104	82	102	80	102	92	95
Colombia	1993	118	99	64	106		79	116	109	75	102	276	96	96	86	88	129	68	136	93	97
Costa Rica																					
Cuba	1990	138	93	75	117	85	78	103	80	108	633	88	88	83	94	100	104	81	149	100	91
Ecuador	1992	126	186	62	82	71	94	109	81	82	250	77	77	80	88	100	121	91	164	73	81
El Salvador	1994	125	107	66	113	87	76	92	75	51	50	63	63	81	108	200	106	100	134	94	64
Guatemala																					
Haiti																					
Honduras	1988																				
Mexico	1990	100	171	77	93	111	58	85	105	100	112	271	92	97	120	105	122	95	113	83	107
Nicaragua	1995	130	153	62	188	91	93	145	123	128	104	300	95	73	94	150	129	93	132	84	99
Panama	1990	103	82	59	105	99	76	122	168	117	85	105	92	67	88	85	146	40	132	112	96
Paraguay	1992	98	106	114	123	80	114	178	89	75	86	1200	80	98	125	111	111	133	127	86	109
Peru	1993	75	65	71	60	70	78	115	61	65	103	88	73	77	76	78	127	58	115	103	71
Dominican Republic	1993																				
Uruguay	1995	83	79	70	95	91	58	112	124	125	93	133	70	87	97	52	87	85	109	98	79
Venezuela	1990	109	112	96	111	88	78	103	98	90	96	106	83	85	102	76	127	61	109	98	90
Total Latin America		98	107	99	111	88	83	102	101	73	109	157	83	90	91	79	128	61	99	93	95
Canada	1991																				
United States	1990	104	100		96	87	81	94	97	107	106	99	79	123	67	88	97	83	106	98	110
Total North America		104	100		96	87	81	94	97	107	106	99	79	123	67	88	97	83	106	98	110
Total		100	106	99	109	88	82	94	98	105	106	100	80	123	70	79	107	82	100	95	106

Source: IMILA, ECLAC/CELADE.

Table 8
LATIN AMERICA: PROFESSIONAL, TECHNICAL AND RELATED CATEGORIES AS PERCENTAGES OF THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION BORN IN LATIN AMERICA AND ENUMERATED IN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THEIR COUNTRY OF BIRTH, CIRCA 1970

Country of presence	Country of birth														Total									
	Year	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Cuba	Ecuador	El Salvador	Guatemala	Haiti	Honduras	Mexico		Nicaragua	Panama	Paraguay	Peru	Dominican Republic	Uruguay	Venezuela		
Argentina	1970		2.5	3.5	2.3												2.5				11.3		3.2	
Bolivia	1970																							
Brazil	1970	17.0	9.1	31.2	47.6	32.4	23.5	35.3	19.4	30.4	26.9	16.7	32.0	32.0	33.9	32.0	32.0	17.7	42.9	31.7	42.9	38.2	17.8	
Chile	1970																							
Colombia	1973																							
Costa Rica	1973																							
Cuba	1970																							
Ecuador	1970																							
El Salvador	1971																							
Guatemala	1973																							
Haiti	1971																							
Honduras	1974																							
Mexico	1970																							
Nicaragua	1971																							
Panama	1970																							
Paraguay	1972																							
Peru	1972																							
Dominican Republic	1970																							
Uruguay	1975																							
Venezuela	1971																							
Total Latin America		14.5	3.2	4.0	3.4	5.6	15.4	18.3	12.6	20.7	36.8	12.6	27.7	11.9	24.5	2.7	27.7	14.4	12.2	40.5	6.1	94.6		
Canada	1971																							
United States	1970																							
Total North America		24.7	27.0	25.8	25.1	15.4	11.3	9.3	7.9	10.3	25.9	12.6	4.3	9.7	16.6	26.8	20.1	6.2	17.9	27.1	9.7	8.8		
Total		20.7	4.5	9.2	5.3	8.1	13.7	11.0	10.2	12.8	26.1	12.6	4.5	11.1	18.2	2.9	21.9	6.8	12.8	28.9	8.3	8.3		

Source: IMILA, ECLAC/CELADE.

Table 9
LATIN AMERICA: PROFESSIONAL, TECHNICAL AND RELATED CATEGORIES AS PERCENTAGES OF THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION BORN IN LATIN AMERICA AND ENUMERATED IN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THEIR COUNTRY OF BIRTH, CIRCA 1980

Country of presence	Year	Country of birth																Total						
		Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Cuba	Ecuador	El Salvador	Guatemala	Haiti	Honduras	Mexico	Nicaragua	Panama	Paraguay		Peru	Dominican Republic	Uruguay	Venezuela		
Argentina	1980				3.3	33.4			38.0									3.4	39.6			8.3	20.4	4.7
Bolivia	1976	13.8	4.1	3.6	15.9	55.8			35.5	28.6	23.1	25.0	2.6	3.6	80.0	35.0	5.7	11.6				36.4	11.3	
Brazil	1980	24.9	24.8	4.8	27.3	36.4			35.7	24.2	100.0	18.2	36.9	32.9	39.4	46.0	9.3	35.2				15.1	23.5	21.6
Chile	1982	15.5	12.4	31.7		38.5			35.7	21.2	34.5	20.0	22.6	30.9	35.1	24.3	20.4	21.3					22.4	19.4
Colombia	1985																							
Costa Rica	1984	41.4	33.0	39.6	46.8	33.5			30.0	13.2	37.7	63.6	20.1	41.0	5.1	14.8	57.1	25.6				38.7	32.3	10.7
Cuba	1981																							
Ecuador	1982	44.0	49.3	53.8	37.6	12.6				37.6	37.5	75.0	35.9	61.0	36.1	39.0	62.9	25.0				36.7	39.9	19.1
El Salvador																								
Guatemala	1981	29.9	17.4	64.0	53.8	35.3			38.6	8.7		50.0	9.9	18.7	25.8	38.9		32.5					34.6	13.9
Haiti	1982																							
Honduras																								
Mexico	1980																							
Nicaragua																								
Panama	1980	36.0	27.4	20.4	31.7	7.4			14.4	13.6	31.1	17.4	16.6	40.5	11.9		32.0	18.8				20.3	18.6	13.4
Paraguay	1982	8.7		0.9	17.3									0.9										3.2
Peru	1981																							
Republica Dominicana	1981																							
Uruguay	1985	21.6	16.8	8.4	15.0	19.7			10.3					23.8			34.5	24.7					19.6	16.5
Venezuela	1981	29.8	34.1	14.3	23.0	4.5			7.1	15.1	17.1	12.6	28.7	34.6	19.1	31.6	25.2	19.0				18.6	7.1	
Total Latin America		19.6	7.1	3.2	7.9	5.3			9.6	11.1	36.6	14.6	14.7	18.9	7.2	23.2	4.0	23.9				6.4	10.5	7.6
Canada	1986	20.1	17.9	19.2	18.1	12.4			6.3	8.3	8.2		14.8	11.6	18.2	16.7	12.8	15.9				15.9	29.2	14.6
United States	1980	19.3	21.4	18.0	19.9	10.8			7.2	4.0	5.8	11.1	7.1	3.3	7.9	16.5	26.6	15.0				4.1	20.8	6.9
Total North America		19.4	21.2	18.2	19.3	10.9			7.1	4.3	5.9	11.1	7.2	3.3	8.1	16.5	17.6	15.1				4.2	11.8	7.1
Total		19.5	8.6	6.9	10.0	6.5			7.7	5.4	6.7	11.1	8.1	3.4	7.6	17.1	4.4	18.7				4.5	10.7	7.3

Source: IMILA, ECLAC/CELADE.

Table 10
LATIN AMERICA: PROFESSIONAL, TECHNICAL AND RELATED CATEGORIES AS PERCENTAGES OF THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION BORN IN LATIN AMERICA AND ENUMERATED IN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THEIR COUNTRY OF BIRTH, CIRCA 1990

Country of presence	Country of birth														Total							
	Year	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Cuba	Ecuador	El Salvador	Guatemala	Haiti	Honduras	Mexico		Nicaragua	Paraguay	Peru	Dominican Republic	Uruguay	Venezuela	
Argentina	1991		4.4	5.1	3.9	39.3	9.8	18.3	30.6	22.4	28.6	62.7	50.0	17.0	16.0	37.7	3.8	30.6	70.5	7.0	18.6	5.3
Bolivia	1992	18.5		12.5	29.5	47.0	59.1	48.9	42.4	50.0	23.6	100.0	11.0	3.8	38.9	54.2	12.7	25.6	50.0	22.3	48.5	17.6
Brazil	1991	25.4	30.8		24.4	27.6	32.7	40.4	34.4	61.4	30.0	39.5	37.7	33.5	68.4	38.0	11.7	33.8	38.8	14.7	39.7	23.3
Chile	1992	19.9	16.5	36.9		39.3	41.1	0.0	36.2	26.9	37.2	25.0	21.2	40.9	50.0	32.6	32.7	27.8	37.1	38.2	41.0	23.8
Colombia	1993																					
Costa Rica																						
Cuba																						
Ecuador	1990	33.4	31.5	48.0	27.0	9.3	34.5	29.4		26.1	33.3	80.0	35.7	43.5	42.4	25.8	36.4	21.5	48.6	27.1	21.1	14.5
El Salvador	1992	43.0	64.7	40.3	38.1	39.4	22.8	52.4	58.8		15.7	33.3	10.3	33.9	26.5	38.0	81.8	41.8	50.0	44.8	23.1	19.3
Guatemala	1994	28.9	24.1	42.9	41.5	27.4	32.5	21.3	29.8	7.3			9.4	19.3	20.1	32.6		26.1	31.4	41.7	35.6	13.3
Haiti																						
Honduras	1988																					
Mexico	1990	42.8	58.0	40.7	42.2	47.4	38.2	27.6	45.7	21.6	4.1	63.0	25.5		42.4	51.5	57.7	43.2	52.8	39.9	42.9	20.6
Nicaragua	1995	54.3	76.5	67.3	54.9	56.3	19.0	55.5	50.0	18.9	41.2	42.9	8.0	56.7		38.7	0.0	45.7	44.4	0.0	39.0	24.0
Panama	1990	35.5	26.0	33.6	32.2	8.9	18.6	16.6	16.1	10.3	23.5	10.8	18.1	39.9	14.2		35.3	19.1	10.0	22.9	27.5	14.5
Paraguay	1992	4.6	6.3	0.6	19.4	7.7	17.6	20.0	8.6	22.2	0.0	0.0	8.3	0.5	0.0	0.0		14.8	20.0	10.0	26.9	2.3
Peru	1993	33.4	23.1	25.2	23.9	30.2	38.3	31.7	19.3	17.5	44.9	62.5	25.0	43.7	35.6	41.0	22.2		18.2	32.9	20.8	27.6
Dominican Republic	1993																					
Uruguay	1995	11.1	10.8	6.4	15.4	25.9	25.0	8.5	16.7	12.5	21.4	100.0	0.0	13.8	20.0	4.8	14.6	11.3	31.3		12.2	10.2
Venezuela	1990	27.1	34.1	13.9	21.2	4.6	27.4	20.1	6.9	22.4	18.0	5.4	28.3	31.5	20.9	29.2	14.1	15.1	6.5	19.3		6.8
Total Latin America		17.1	8.1	3.9	7.9	5.6	23.8	21.6	8.6	14.0	6.3	16.7	12.4	16.3	24.8	30.7	4.4	22.2	8.9	8.9	10.3	8.1
Canada	1991																					
United States	1990	19.1	12.0		15.7	8.8	9.7	10.9	6.9	2.4	3.3	9.1	4.5	2.6	5.0	13.8	11.5	10.0	5.2	9.4	18.4	5.0
Total North America		19.1	12.0		15.7	8.8	9.7	10.9	6.9	2.4	3.3	9.1	4.5	2.6	5.0	13.8	11.5	10.0	5.2	9.4	18.4	5.0
Total		18.0	8.7	3.9	9.1	6.6	12.1	11.2	7.2	2.9	3.7	9.1	5.5	2.7	6.4	14.9	4.6	13.9	5.4	9.0	15.7	5.7

Source: IMILA, ECLAC/CELADE.

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A.2 Trends and patterns of migration to and from Caribbean countries

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Introduction

Migration has become deeply embedded in the psyche of Caribbean peoples over the past century and a half. It has evolved as the main avenue for upward mobility through the accumulation of capital – financial and social. Thus the propensity for migration is high and there is a general responsiveness to the opportunities for moving whenever they occur. At times these opportunities have come from within the region itself or the wider circum-Caribbean region, as in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; in more recent times from North America and Europe.

The migration dynamic reflects the interplay of international, national and highly personal circumstances. Global changes affect the international economic order and the division of labour and, as a consequence, legislative controls and inducements to the movement of labour across selective national borders. At the national level, economic, social, demographic and political factors influence the variable access of people to economic rewards and social opportunities. But migration is not a passive reaction to internal ‘pushes’ and external ‘pulls’. Within this wider international and national context, migration is part of a dynamic set of negotiations at all levels. For whether ‘free’ movement or refugee, there is a selective process that operates at the interface of the needs of the immigration country on the one hand and the potential for migration in the emigration country on the other. Besides, these are complex and not solely determined by simple economic forces. Pressure, based on the social and political implications of the migration, is sometimes greater than the need for labour in the economy. Within the sending country, there are pressures from high propensity migrants to seek migration opportunities; yet their departure in large numbers is likely to create deficits in the reservoir of human resources with potential negative implications for national development. There are, therefore, a number of conflicts of interest within both receiving countries and sending countries at the national and local levels between the costs and benefits of migration.

The compromise between these conflicts in the receiving country is manifest in the immigration regulations and recruitment drives that emerge. The compromise in the sending countries is reflected in the system of obligations, responsibilities and expectations that the migrants and non-migrants establish. The sending country has a relatively poor negotiating position at the national level, even though, in many instances, the labour force and other recruits (such as students) are highly valuable at the destination. Only in the contract labour schemes has the Jamaican government, for example, been able to enforce a requirement of saving and foreign currency remittance. By and large the sending country has simply to accept the spontaneous benefits that accrue through migration. It is in this regard that policy should focus upon the development of mechanisms to channel the benefits into national productivity so that as much as possible value-added may be derived.

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Types of Caribbean migration

Caribbean migration reflects variations on the basis of the purpose for the movement –work, education, accompanying persons - combined with length of stay at the destination – long-term or short-term. It is difficult to establish rigid time-frames for what constitutes a long-stay migrant and there are many variations in all these migration activities that characterize the pattern of the overall movement. However, a classification would include the following general types of migration: *long-stay residence* (for work, study or as accompanying persons); *short-stay* (including contract labour/guest worker schemes); *return migration*.

A single migrant may engage in all three of these types of migration in his or her life-time and certainly a single household may have members engaged in any combination of types at the same time. Further, even migrations that are long-term do not necessarily reflect a total displacement of the migrants from their household and community but rather, the establishment of a transnational network of interactions and linkages that are associated with movements of people, money, goods and ideas in support of the expectations and obligations of the transnational household or family (Schiller *et al*, 1995; Thomas-Hope, 1986, 1988, 1992). The various types of migration are therefore incorporated into intra-regional, extra-regional and return migration, around which Caribbean migration trends and patterns are here discussed.

In addition, there is considerable circulation of people that is not recorded either in the censuses or in any systematic way through other types of migration statistics. It is an important form of mobility that includes legal, informal commercial activities of various kinds, as well as organized trafficking in drugs and people. This type of population movement is outside of the scope of the present paper so is not elaborated upon here. However, it is important to note that they are not only significant in their societal impact in both source and destination countries but that they are also part of the wider phenomenon of population movement, directly or indirectly associated with the international linkages established by the formal migration process.

Data

Circularity in the pattern of movement and the complexity of who constitutes a migrant or what constitutes migration make the collection of, and consistency in the data difficult. The immigrant stock determined from population census statistics may record documented migrants involved in any one of these types of movement, though they principally record those that are long-stay residents.

Despite the difficulties in capturing all aspects of migration in official data, the CARICOM 1991 Census for Population and Housing (CCPHC) provides migration data for much of the region, excepting the Cayman Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands. There are also no intra-regional migration data for Haiti. Data for extra-regional movements are compiled by the respective destination countries. These data do not include those national groups that, due to their citizenship, require no visas for entry. For example, people from the French Antilles moving to France, British Commonwealth migrants to Britain, and Puerto Ricans to the United States.

Intra-regional Caribbean migration

On the basis of the 1991 CARICOM Census, the figure for the total migration stock or numbers of persons living in the region other than in their country of nationality, was 104,669. (The data exclude Jamaica, Cayman and the Turks and Caicos Islands). Of this total, Caribbean nationals accounted for the majority, other immigrants were chiefly from the United States and Canada, United Kingdom and India. For example, in Trinidad and Tobago, 25.5% of the non-national population were from outside the Caribbean. In the U.S. Virgin Islands, the non-Caribbean

migrants accounted for 27.6% of the migrant stock, for the British Virgin Islands, the figure was 27.5% and Antigua 32.7%. In the Bahamas, less than a quarter of the migrant stock was comprised of Caribbean nationals, the greater proportion (76%) having come from outside the region, chiefly North America and Europe. (Table 1).

The Caribbean countries with the largest concentrations of immigrants are Trinidad and Tobago, with 35.4 % of the total stock of Caribbean migrants in the region, the U.S. Virgin Islands with 22.2 %; and Barbados with 12.3 %. Antigua and Barbuda with 7.9%; and the British Virgin Islands with 5.5 % (Table 2). It is evident that the U.S. Virgin Islands, the British Virgin Islands and even Antigua are strongly supported by a high immigrant population, representing a heavy reliance on a non-national labour force.

The Caribbean countries representing the major sources of intra-regional migrants are Grenada, St Vincent and Guyana. The rate of emigration (calculated from the numbers of emigrants relative to the total population) gives an indication of the impact upon the sending countries. The out-migration rate was 19.1 for Grenada, 15.1 for St. Vincent relative to their population (1990). Emigrants from Guyana were third in the rank of intra-regional migrants but this represented a rate of only 1.9 in relation to Guyana's population, whereas the British Virgin Islands, contributing only 5,812 intra-regional migrants had an out-migration rate of 26.8. (Table 2).

With few exceptions, notably Antigua, the countries with the highest immigration rates are not those with the highest emigration rates, though it should be pointed out that the situation is highly dynamic. There are the possibilities of change in the migration pattern, depending upon any emerging foci of growth in any specific economic sector and the attendant need for an increased workforce of a particular type. An additional factor that underlines the migration dynamic is that any major environmental hazard could lead to out-migration. This is exemplified by the situation in Montserrat. The migration pattern changed dramatically in the second half of the 1990s due to the volcanic eruptions. In 1990, this island had an immigration rate of 13.7 and emigration rate of 18.6. Currently, although data are not available, it is known that the immigration has virtually ceased and the emigration rate has increased significantly.

Trends in the movement direction and timing

In the first three decades of the twentieth century there were significant movements from the Anglophone to the Hispanic Caribbean and the Netherlands Antilles. By mid-century, the intra-regional movements were largely to and from Anglophone countries as well as from Haiti to the Bahamas and the Dominican Republic. Most of the current immigrant stock had migrated prior to 1980 and much even before 1970. This was usually associated with specific development projects or periods of peak economic growth based on a particular industry – for example oil in Trinidad, tourism in the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Bahamas and Cayman Islands. In these situations, a specific kind of labour force was required and immigration of the relevant groups encouraged or facilitated. The intra-regional movements have subsequently continued at a steady rate with no recent major peaks in movement.

Characteristics of the migrants

Age and Sex. The age and sex distribution among intra-regional migrants reflects the varied reasons which conditioned their migration in the first place. As the nature of the migration streams show, many of the major movements in the region had occurred prior to 1980, indicating relatively stable and therefore mature migrant population profiles. The distribution by sex also varies from one country to another, depending on the initial occupational selectivity of the migrants and there is no major gender imbalance in any of the populations (CCPHC, 1994).

Education. The educational level of immigrants are, on average, higher than both the population that they leave and that which they enter, reflecting the selective nature of the migration process. In most cases there are significantly higher proportions of non-nationals with tertiary education than is the case for nationals. For example, in Antigua 16.5% of the non-national population have tertiary (pre-university or university) qualifications; only 5.5% of the nationals do. In the Bahamas, the figure is 19.4% of the non-nationals, 7.9% of nationals; in Barbados, 54.6% of non-nationals and 8.7% of nationals; the British Virgin Islands 17.4% of non-nationals and 7.5% of nationals (CCPHC, 1994). The exception, that indicates the significance of this particular trend, is the U.S. Virgin Islands where the situation is reversed: 18.1% of the non-national population have tertiary level education whereas 27.8% of the nationals are in this position. The significance lies in the fact that the U.S. Virgin Islands have relied to lesser extent on the in-migration of a highly qualified workforce (as this is mainly provided by the national population), and more on a semi-skilled immigrant labour force. This reflects the higher level of development in those islands relative to the region in general. This is further indicated by the occupational profiles of the regional migrants.

Occupation. Migrants invariably establish or move into niche occupations in response to the opportunities afforded by the economic and social structure of the host country. The distribution and concentrations of immigrants in specific occupational categories thus reflect the history of the economic growth sectors that encouraged immigration.

In the Bahamas and the British Virgin Islands, most non-nationals are involved in unskilled work. However, the second most significant category is professionals, followed by craft and service activities. This is a consequence of the thrust of the developments in tourism in which the migrants obtain work and indeed, have established a niche. Most of the non-nationals in Jamaica are in the professional (45.9%), managerial (16.3%) and technical (12.0%) categories. This is to large extent a replacement population for Jamaicans in these occupations who migrated to North America. (Table 3).

Extra-regional Caribbean migration

The migrations to countries outside of the Caribbean region were dominated in the 1950s and 1960s by movements to the United Kingdom and the Netherlands from their former colonies. The decline in movements to the United Kingdom after 1962 was accompanied by a sharp increase in the movements to Canada and the United States. This was a trend coincidentally triggered by increased opportunities in the immigration legislation of Canada in 1962 and the United States while, at the same time, Britain started to restrict the entry of Commonwealth Caribbean migrants. Thereafter, North America became the major destination of British Caribbean migrants, streams that added to the already high volume of Puerto Ricans to the United States and that accompanied the increase in numbers from the Dominican Republic and Haiti.

Caribbean migration to the United States of America

Trends in the movements

The immigrant stock is chiefly composed of migrants from Cuba, the Dominican Republic the British Commonwealth Caribbean and Haiti that had largely occurred between 1962 and 1981. In the decade of the 1990s, the streams from these countries have also been very large, with the Dominican Republic ranking first in numbers of migrants, Cuba second and Jamaica third. Most Caribbean countries have been represented in the overall migration streams to the United States in the 1990s, in particular Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados. Even those countries with only small numbers of migrants, the numbers are sometimes quite significant in relation to the small populations of the Caribbean states (Table 4).

Guest worker schemes

There have also been large numbers of short-stay migrants from the region, chiefly workers entering on contract for seasonal agricultural work or hotel services. Mexicans vastly outnumber those from the Caribbean, but the movement has, nevertheless, been important for the countries involved. An estimated 10,000 to 20,000 temporary workers (all male) entered the United States annually from the Caribbean (excluding Puerto Rico) in the 1980s on the guest worker scheme, chiefly to harvest sugar cane in Florida (McCoy and Wood, 1982). From Jamaica alone, the number each year from 1986 to 1990 ranged from 10,754 to 13,333 (data from the Government of Jamaica, Ministry of Labour, 1991). However, in the 1997 fiscal year the number of guest worker contracts to the United States was much reduced. There were only 137 agricultural contracts and 2,009 non-agricultural. Some 63% of these were issued to Jamaicans and 25% to nationals of the Dominican Republic (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1997).

Characteristics of the migrants

Age and Sex. The age and sex profile of the immigrant stock in 1990 demonstrated the predominance of persons in the 20 to 44 age group, except in the case of the Cuban migrants, for which the population was relatively old, with 56.4% aged 45 and over and only 34.5 % in the 25-34 age band. This was accounted for by the large waves of migration prior to 1980. By contrast, the 20-44 age-group accounts for 53.8% of the British Commonwealth Caribbean immigrant stock, 59.1% of the Dominican Republic and 60.6% of the Haitian (CCPH, 1994; ECLAC, 2000).

Education. There is a generally high level of education among Caribbean migrants to the United States. In 1990, 60.8% of those from the British Commonwealth Caribbean had been to a tertiary institution and a further 25.2% were high school graduates (CCPHS, 1994). Similar categories are not available for migrants from Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, but data for number of years of formal education show 54.1 % of the Cubans, 41.8% of the Dominicans and 57.6% of the Haitians over the age of 20, had completed 12 or more years of schooling (ECLAC, 2000). There was a very large discrepancy in the education of the average Caribbean emigrant as compared to the average for the national populations, as observed earlier, due to the highly selective nature of the migrations.

Occupation. Caribbean migrants in the US in 1990 were predominantly employed in the private sector, principally in service industries and sales. The second largest category of employed Cubans, Dominicans and Haitians was in commerce, followed by manufacturing (ECLAC, 2000). There were also significant numbers of Cubans in construction. Among British Commonwealth Caribbean migrants, many were also in technical and administrative jobs, as well as managerial and professional. (CCPHS, 1994). The immigration stream in 1997 shows that this occupational pattern was largely maintained throughout the 1990s. (Table 5).

Caribbean migration to Canada trends in the movement British Commonwealth Caribbean migrants in Canada, as already indicated, arrived in the period 1960-1981, when their entry was permitted following changes in Canadian immigration policy regarding the Caribbean as a desirable source of migrants. Even then, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, some 11-13% of the immigrants were on short-term (one year) visas, chiefly of females, for work in the domestic services and nursing. The great majority were from Jamaica, a trend that continued through the 1990s. Trinidad and Tobago and Haiti ranked second and third in terms of numbers and although all Caribbean countries of the region participated in the movement to Canada most were very small streams, in some cases only a few individuals each year. (Table 6). These were virtually all long-stay migrants but there have been small numbers each year of males from Jamaica as seasonal guest workers, chiefly working on fruit farms in the Province of Ontario.

Caribbean migration to the United Kingdom

Characteristics of the Migrants

Age and Sex. The age and sex of Caribbean immigrant stock in Canada (1981) showed a concentration in the 25-29 age cohort for all countries. Of the total Jamaica immigrant population, 59.3% were in this age group; Trinidad and Tobago, 67.8%; Barbados, 74%; Haiti, 64.2%. In the case of Jamaica, there was a broader age band with significant numbers also in the younger groups (ECLAC, 2000). The figure fell off significantly for the 60 and over age category, with 5.1% of the migrants from Jamaica, 3.5% of those from Trinidad and Tobago, 7.3% from Barbados and 6.5% from Haiti in this age-group. There is likely to have been an ageing of this migrant population since those data were recorded, a process that is likely to continue in the forthcoming two decades (unless there is a significant return movement, which at present appears unlikely).

In all the major groups of Caribbean nationals in Canada and for each decade of their arrival, females have been larger in number than males. The percentage male and female in the immigrant stock (1981) were for Jamaica, 43.7% male and 56.3% female; Trinidad and Tobago, 47% male, 53% female; Barbados, 44.7% male, 54.4% female; Haiti, 45.6% male, 54.4% female (ECLAC, 2000). This would be accounted for by the preponderance of females in clerical and service occupations and the opportunities for work in this sector among Caribbean migrants in Canada.

Education. Caribbean migrants in Canada demonstrate a high level of education as indicated by the fact that most persons enumerated in 1981 had received ten or more years of schooling. Besides, a large proportion of the migrants to Canada in the 1990s entered as students and thus engage in full-time or part-time study. Taking 1996 as an example, of the total of 3,275 from Jamaica only 47% were destined for the labour force, while 52.6% entered as students (the remaining 0.4% in miscellaneous categories). In the case of Trinidad, 2,199 entered, of which 55.7% were entering as workers 30% as students. From Haiti, 1,935 arrived, 45.3% for the labour force and 36% as students. The remaining persons entered included accompanying spouses and children and others not classified. (Statistics Canada, 1996).

Occupation. The great majority of the Caribbean immigrant stock in Canada (1981 Census) were in service occupations, followed by manufacturing. Within these areas, the majority were clerical workers, mechanical workers and physicians. (ECLAC,200).

Trends in the Movement

The movement of Caribbean people to the United Kingdom has been of a low volume since the 1970s following the removal in 1962 of open entry regulations for Caribbean Commonwealth citizens. Subsequently, specific categories of migrants have gained entry, in particular the dependants of previous migrants and those on work permits as specifically required or recruited workers, notably nurses. Students go for tertiary education, not only from the British Commonwealth Caribbean but also from other parts of the region.

The very high immigration of Commonwealth Caribbean citizens, at an average of 32,850 per annum between 1955 and 1962, fell to some 15,000 by 1966, thereafter to 5,000 in 1971 and approximately 3,000 by 1984. Numbers peaked slightly to approximately 6,000 in 1986 and then fell again in 1987 to approximately 4,000, an annual volume that has been maintained to the present time (data from the British Migration Census Division, cited in Thomas-Hope 1994).

Although the immigration streams are not currently of great volume, the importance of the migration trend lies in the fact that the decline in in-migration to Britain has been accompanied by an out-migration of Caribbean migrants, resulting in a net negative migration balance. Some of those leaving Britain moved to Canada and the United States but increasingly they went back to the Caribbean, establishing what has now become a significant movement of return migrants.

Immigrant stock

The migrants in the United Kingdom who were born in the Commonwealth Caribbean numbered approximately 500,000 in 1971; 625,000 in 1980 and 500,000 in 1991 (OPCS Labour Force Surveys and Census). In 1991, the Caribbean-born population constituted approximately 8% of the total United Kingdom population.

In sharp contrast to the Caribbean immigration stock in the United States and Canada, that in the United Kingdom is quite advanced in terms of ageing. Because of the early arrival of the majority and the negligible immigration since the 1960s, the immigration stock will disappear by the middle of the twenty-first century but a significant British-born, Caribbean ethnic population will remain.

Return Migration

It is common for migrants to return to their Caribbean country of origin for periodic or regular visits over a prolonged time before remaining indefinitely. Even then, many such persons continue to go back to the country of former residence for varying periods of time.

The return involves not just the movement of people but also the movement of remittances in the form of financial capital as well goods of various kinds (Thomas-Hope, 1999a). These are typically transferred back to the Caribbean country through formal and informal channels either prior to, along with or following the return of the migrants themselves. The period of remittance transfer invariably continues for many years and is directly or indirectly associated with the intention to return. Not all returning migrants remit their savings to the Caribbean country, many preferring other countries perceived by them to be safer for investment. Professionals returning to work in the home country are able to earn sufficient to maintain themselves and families without repatriating most, all or even any of their savings, whereas those persons returning to retire in the Caribbean typically repatriate savings. Besides, they also continue to be in receipt of pensions and social security payments and other retirement benefits for the rest of their lives. This means that in many cases, returnees receive pensions from abroad in excess of twenty years following their return.

The Returnees from the United Kingdom in particular, have formed a number of associations of returning residents which provides the returnees themselves with a social network of persons with whom they share a common experience. In some cases, they channel funds and materials from abroad to assist in various local social welfare projects, activities that serve to indicate their commitment to development in the local communities to which they return.

In the case of Jamaica, the realization on the part of the government that the returning population had a potentially major contribution to make, led to the establishment of a Returning Residents Programme. This was introduced to encourage the return of nationals from abroad through public information in the countries of major concentrations of Jamaicans, together with tax concessions on the importation of household goods. A Returning Residents Facilitation Unit was created within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, headed by a Chief Executive Officer at Ambassadorial level (Government of Jamaica, 1998). A further programme, the Return of Talent Programme, sponsored by the International Organization of Migration (IOM) in association with the Government of Jamaica, assisted the return of some 50 persons from 1996-98, to work in the public sector where there was a need for qualified persons (Williams, 1998). This was an attempt to reverse some of the perceived 'brain drain' that had occurred.

Trends in the Movement

The source of the returnees to Jamaica since statistics were recorded in 1992, was predominantly the United Kingdom. (Table 7). The second largest number was from the United States and third, Canada. In contrast, in Antigua as well as St Kitts/Nevis, the largest numbers of returnees were intra-regional, the British Virgin Islands being the major source (Byron, 1994).

In addition to the voluntary 'returnees', there are now similar numbers of nationals abroad who are returned by the authorities at the destination as 'deportees' having been convicted of criminal offences. In contrast to the mainstream returning residents, this group has a major negative impact on Jamaican society and places particular strain on the police and security services.

Characteristics of the Returnees

Age. Contrary to general assumptions, the return is not confined to the period of retirement, even though many do return permanently at that stage of their lives. The figures for Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Antigua and the British Virgin Islands show that in none was there as much as half the returning population aged 50 or over. In contrast to the outgoing migrants, the age profile was higher, as would be expected, but in each of these countries, considerably more than 50% of the population return to enter the labour force either as waged labour or as self-employed. (Table 8).

Occupation and employment status. The occupations of return migrants in the same five states – Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Antigua and the British Virgin Islands show a strong tendency for the return of high level occupational groups, again contradicting general assumptions about return migration. In the British Virgin Islands, the return population at the time of the 1990 Census was comprised of 54.6% in white collar occupations (legislators/managers, professionals, technicians and clerks); 27.8% were in high-level managerial and professional occupation categories. In Antigua, 42.7% were in white-collar occupations, in St. Lucia, 31.5% and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 32.7%. (CCPH, 1994). There were also considerable numbers of returnees who were unskilled workers as well as craft workers, agricultural workers and service workers. Overall, therefore, there is a wide range of occupations represented among the returnee populations that should have positive implications for the countries of the returnees.

Remittances associated with the return. Remittances to Jamaica rose dramatically in the 1990s. The foreign currency received by the Bank of Jamaica through personal transfers between 1991 and 1997 exceeded the foreign currency earned in some of the traditional economic sectors (Table 9). In addition to the transfers of capital from abroad through the formal banking system there is still an important informal system of money transfers. These involve a number of private arrangements of a reciprocal nature. Likewise, in the Eastern Caribbean countries, large sums relative to their GDP are remitted in association with the return and intention to return. By 1990, the transfers of pensions alone were estimated at approximately one million US dollars (North and Whitehead, 1991). The sums have greatly increased through the 1990s not only from the United States but also from the United Kingdom. Almost 6 million pounds sterling of pension payments were transferred to Barbados from Britain in 1997; more than two million to St. Lucia and almost two million to Grenada (United Kingdom Department of Social Security, Pensions and Overseas Benefits Directorate, 1999).

The return of short-term workers on contract in the United States and Canada provides a special case. Because their contracts are negotiated by their respective governments rather than by individuals, there has been the opportunity for the setting of conditions for those that engage in these contracts. For the Jamaican workers, who comprise the great majority, the agreement set by the Ministry of Labour with the workers stipulated that 23% of their earnings would be

automatically transferred in foreign currency to a bank in Jamaica and later received by the workers in local currency. McCoy estimated that for the 1980-81 sugar season in Florida alone, nearly \$19 million were earned by Caribbean (mostly Jamaican) contract workers, of which US\$7,764 were remitted through the mandatory savings plan, US\$6,669 were remitted otherwise and the rest spent in the US, much of it on consumer items that were then taken home by the workers on conclusion of the contract (McCoy, 1985).

Conclusion

Intra-regional and extra-regional migrants are neither the least educated of the society, nor the poorest and least employable, reinforcing the observation that international migration is a 'selection of the fittest' (Thomas-Hope, 1992). Migration is highly selective in all its aspects and at all its locations – the places of origin and destination. As a consequence, there is a tendency for Caribbean countries to lose a disproportionate number of educated and skilled persons through migration, with a potentially negative impact upon small, developing states. However, there is a compensatory set of movements, and this intrinsic dynamic of the migration process must not be underestimated (Maingot, 1999; Thomas-Hope, 1999b). The loss of skilled persons from any Caribbean country results in the need to fill high level occupational vacancies from other migrants, either from other parts of the region or outside. The pattern that emerges appears to reflect movement between countries in a developmental hierarchy to be sure, but this must not be interpreted in a simplistic way to suggest mono-causal explanations for the pattern of movement. The issue is whether the overall migration process produces a net loss or net gain for the countries affected.

The out-migration of skilled nationals need not be regarded as a net loss to the sending country if it can create space for the mobility of other people already in the system and an opportunity to encourage new in-migration. There is much to be gained from the fresh input of immigrants and the commitment of returning nationals, provided that they enter an environment within which they can effectively participate and to which they can usefully contribute.

Transnational Mobility

This is a situation whereby Caribbean people maintain a home base in two countries between which they move with varying frequency. The extent of this phenomenon has risen greatly since the 1980s with the increased facility for travel and it may well increase further. Such mobility reflects the importance of the migration linkages not only at the country or national level but at the level of the household and family as well.

The simultaneous impact of both countries upon the households, wider families and even communities are continual, and those involved constantly adapt their lives and livelihoods around the relative opportunities of each place for work, investment, education, social activity and recreation. In this way the household attempts to collectively minimize risks and maximize opportunities. Within this framework, there is a constant flow of information and ideas across national boundaries and the movement in one or other direction of money and material goods and also ideas, fashions and fads. Families re-unite at one or other location from time to time and children move back and forth for holidays, socializing in a transnational environment. This is of major significance in the consolidating of networks and experiences that are transferred from one generation to another. It has also conditioned the characteristics of the return migration process. For their contacts and patterns of mobility continue in varying degrees after the return has taken place, and while providing an insurance or safety valve for any future wish to re-migrate, they also provide numerous opportunities for enrichment at the personal level.

From the perspective of the wider society, the transnational community creates countless opportunities for the Caribbean region in the export of culture and local products. Caribbean

populations in North America and Europe provide the main channels and disseminators of Caribbean culture and markets for its food and other 'ethnic' products. Caribbean groups launch art, drama and musical shows in the localities of their migrant communities. Carnival in Toronto and London promotes the market for Caribbean culture, especially music and drama, painting, sculpture and craft.

It must be emphasised that transnational households and return migration are not new to the Caribbean process, but they have recently become important trends because of increased opportunities for such activities in recent decades. So important are these trends that they require a different paradigm for the conceptualization of migration itself and a new perspective on the implication for policy than that which has traditionally pertained in the past.

Implications for Policy

On the basis of the trends and patterns of Caribbean in- and out-migration, an important issue for policy is the recognition of the potential value of the free movement of people, both to individuals and countries. A contradictory, therefore negative factor, could be the reinforcement of dependency of Caribbean countries, especially in relation to countries of the North. From the perspective of culture, there could be the danger of local traditions being lost as they become overwhelmed by the dominance of North American or European culture and tastes of all kinds, not least that for imported 'fast food' instead of local varieties.

Although there are dangers in this, the trends towards increasing globalization at the beginning of the twenty-first century make integration in global networks an imperative for development. Without the transnational communities, the alternative could be a total displacement of local cultures and traditions. The transnational community actually provides one of the most effective ways of counter-balancing the direction of cultural importation, by providing critical linkages for the strengthening of Caribbean culture and the reaping of some of its economic rewards. Migration has long been a means of extending the opportunities, and overcoming some of the limitations, of small, developing Caribbean states and, overall, has enriched the region in a variety of ways.

The trends have shown that Caribbean migration is highly responsive to occupational and educational opportunities in other countries, yet there is also a strong tendency to return to the native country later on. Strategies for harnessing the potential human capital at all points of the migration trajectory, as well as the financial and other material generated by and available through migration, are necessary so that these potential assets are not wasted.

With regard to the movement of human capital, an initiative for filling labour force needs throughout the Caribbean followed the West Indian Commission Report *Time for Action* (1992). The free movement of labour between countries of the Caribbean Community was proposed, with a view to establishing a single market for human resources, served by a common pool of workers at all levels of skill. The intention was to begin with opportunities for freer movement of professional and skilled persons, starting with graduates of the University of the West Indies, itself a regional institution. It is important that initiatives such as this be fully implemented and more effectively facilitated than is currently the case. Return migrants have demonstrated their propensity for leading and becoming involved in developmental projects. This is input and potential input in which national governments should be proactive, engaging in dialogue with migrant groups in order that efforts be sustainable in their effects.

In terms of financial capital, there are already strong indications of the potential flows back to the original source countries associated with the migration process. The transnational household and return migration are of particular value in the generation and direction of these flows. The creation and publicizing of incentives for investment are not only an imperative but must be of such a kind that they are sustainable in their impact. This is especially important given the uncertainty of the

period over which large remittances will be received, for they will only be sustained for as long as migrants continue to return to their countries of origin.

Specific programmes may be launched to capitalize on the benefits of migration, and these are important initiatives, but the trends show that there is much spontaneous positive feedback through the migration process and this too needs to be encouraged. For undoubtedly, in the long run, the existence of a social, economic and political environment conducive to productivity and social development is the essential prerequisite for a positive net impact of immigration and return migration.

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Annex 3

Table 1
PLACE OF BIRTH OF NONNATIONALS IN SELECT CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES 1990 AND 1991

Place of Birth	Antigua		Bahamas		British Virgin Islands		US Virgin Islands		Trinidad and Tobago	
	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent
Total	13,335	100.0	26754	100	8,035	100.0	30,407	100.0	49,820	95.2
Anguilla	1	0.0	899	3.0
Antigua	N/A	N/A	14	0.1	355	4.4	4,398	14.5
Bahamas	5	0.0	N/A	N/A	13	0.2
Belize	8	0.1	33	0.1	3	0.0
Bermudas	10	0.1	35	0.1	9	0.1
British Virgin Islands	70	0.6	5	0	N/A	N/A	2,665	8.8
Dominica	2,580	20.9	37	0.1	566	7.0	3,219	10.6
Grenada	122	1.0	30	0.1	290	3.6	16,589	33.3
Guyana	1,753	14.2	438	1.6	770	9.6	5,140	10.3
Jamaica	408	3.3	2,920	10.9	249	3.1
Montserrat	892	7.2	2	0	99	1.2	623	2.0
St. Kitts and Nevis	495	4.0	14	0.1	1,422	17.7	5,828	19.2
St. Lucía	414	3.4	26	0.1	251	3.1	2,533	8.3	1,306	2.6
Sn. Vincent	505	4.1	21	0.1	957	11.9	11,625	23.3
Trinidad and Tobago
Tobago	376	3.0	290	1.1	189	2.4	1,837	6.0	N/A	N/A
Turks and Caicos	4	0.0	2,173	8.1	2	0.0
US Virgin Islands	451	3.7	5	0	565	7.0	N/A	N/A
All others	4,025	32.7	20,466	76.5	2,209	27.5	8,405	27.6	12,749	25.5

Source: Based on data from, Caribbean Community Regional Census Office, 1994

N/A: Not Applicable

...: Denotes no Migrants or amalgamation in the category "All Others"

Table 2
REGIONAL MIGRATION RATES FOR SELECT CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES 1990 AND 1991

Selected Countries	Total population	Natives	Migrants		Migrant rates	
			In-migrants	Out-migrants	In-migrants	Out-migrants
Total	5,219,302	5,117,708	104,669	104,669
Antigua and Barbuda	59,104	55,056	8,287	5,620	15.1	10.7
Bahamas	233,228	210,590	4,047	109	1.9	0.1
Barbados	244,817	236,322	12,847	4,240	5.4	1.9
British Virgin Islands	16,105	13,847	5,812	2,949	42	26.8
Dominica	69,463	67,642	871	7,507	1.3	10.1
Grenada	83,838	82,155	2,806	18,687	3.4	19.1
Guyana	701,654	698,950	1,003	13,453	0.1	1.9
Jamaica	2,299,675	2,271,072	...	4,926	...	0.2
Montserrat	10,634	9,928	1,362	1,958	13.7	18.6
St. Kitts and Nevis	40,612	38,886	1,553	8,309	4	18.2
St. Lucia	133,308	130,723	2,996	8,483	2.3	6.2
St. Vincent	106,482	104,980	2,734	18,169	2.6	15.1
Trinidad and Tobago	1,118,574	1,105,325	37,071	8,735	3.4	0.8
US Virgin Islands	101,809	92,232	23,280	1,524	25.2	2.2

Source: Based on data from, Caribbean Community Regional Census Office, 1994.

... : Denotes that no data were available

Table 3

OCCUPATIONAL STATUS BY NATIONALITY IN SELECT CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES, 1990

Occupation	Bahamas				Jamaica				British Virgin Islands			
	Nationals		Non nationals		Nationals		Non nationals		Nationals		Non nationals	
	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent
Total	89,744	100.0	15,715	100.0	673,007	100.0	1,202	100.0	3,330	100.0	5,319	100.0
Legislator/ Manager	4,543	5.1	1,062	6.8	33,028	4.9	196	16.3	399	12.0	422	7.9
Hospitality	1	0.0	0	0.0
Professional	6,054	6.7	2,202	14.0	36,460	5.4	552	45.9	223	6.7	365	6.9
Technical/ Assoc. Prof.	8,043	9.0	906	5.8	33,478	5.0	144	12.0	439	13.2	445	8.4
Clerk	15,041	16.8	980	6.2	56,557	8.4	112	9.3	596	17.9	409	7.7
Services and Sales	20,705	23.1	1,211	7.7	89,501	13.3	44	3.7	431	12.9	1,133	21.3
Skilled agri. & fisheries	3,245	3.6	1,765	11.2	121,761	18.1	33	2.7	142	4.3	135	2.5
Craft & related	13,790	15.4	2,060	13.1	115,916	17.2	48	4.0	493	14.8	1,280	24.1
Plant/Machine operators	4,573	5.1	381	2.4	49,941	7.4	17	1.4	219	6.6	224	4.2
Elementary	13,750	15.3	5,148	32.8	136,365	20.3	56	4.7	387	11.6	10	17.0

Source: Based on data from Caribbean Community Regional Census Office, 1994.

... : Denotes that no data were available

OCCUPATIONAL AND CLASS OF WORKER IN THE US VIRGIN ISLANDS

Occupation	Nationals		Non nationals	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Employed persons 16 years and over	13,485	100.0	20,580	100.0
Executive /Managerial	1,530	11.3	1,691	8.2
Professional speciality	1,330	9.9	1,374	6.7
Technical, sales, and administrative support	4,753	35.2	5,668	27.5
Services	2,361	17.5	4,829	23.5
Farming, forestry, and fishing	235	1.7	364	1.8
Precision production, craft and repair services	1,513	11.2	3,602	17.5
Operators, fabricators and laborers	1,763	13.1	3,052	14.8

Source: Based on data from Caribbean Community Regional Census Office, 1994.

Table 4

**IMMIGRANTS ADMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES BY COUNTRY
OF BIRTH FISCAL YEARS 1987-1997**

Country of birth	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Anguilla	21	36	43	41	56	46	23	31	26	36	19
Antigua	874	837	979	1,319	944	619	554	438	374	406	393
Aruba	75	47	73	83	56	62	36	24	27	28	26
Bahamas	556	1,283	861	1,378	1,062	641	686	589	585	768	641
Barbados	1,665	1,455	1,616	1,745	1,460	1,091	1,184	897	734	1,043	829
Bermuda	154	166	182	203	146	153	156	118	111	103	75
British Virgin Islands	296	395	258	105	137	174	166	137	98	87	93
Cayman Islands	25	26	48	53	23	40	16	30	26	24	35
Cuba	28,916	17,558	10,046	10,645	10,349	11,791	13,666	14,727	17,937	26,466	33,587
Dominica	740	611	748	963	982	809	683	507	591	797	746
Dominican Republic	24,858	27,189	26,723	42,195	41,405	41,969	45,420	51,189	38,512	39,604	27,053
Grenada	1,098	842	1,046	1,294	979	848	827	595	583	787	755

(continues)

Table 4 (conclusion)

Country of birth	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Guadeloupe	37	54	38	54	34	50	49	41	48	52	52
Haiti	14,819	34,806	13,658	20,324	47,527	11,002	10,094	13,333	14,021	18,386	15,057
Jamaica	23,148	20,966	24,523	25,013	23,828	18,915	17,241	14,349	16,398	19,089	17,840
Martinique	34	25	30	32	25	25	17	20	11	23	20
Montserrat	104	104	124	172	143	104	102	69	83	99	99
Netherlands											
Antilles	81	62	65	80	40	37	65	48	58	76	43
St. Kitts and Nevis	589	660	795	896	830	626	544	370	360	357	377
St. Lucia	496	606	709	833	766	654	634	449	403	582	531
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	746	634	892	973	808	687	657	524	349	606	581
Trinidad and Tobago	3,543	3,947	5,394	6,740	8,407	7,008	6,577	6,292	5,424	7,344	6,409
Turks and Caicos	21	47	78	206	121	59	39	26	27	35	37
Unknown	3	1	3	4	11	3	2	1	2	3	1

Source: US Immigration and Naturalization Services Statistical Yearbook of Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1997

Table 5
IMMIGRANTS ADMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES BY MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP, 1997

Country of birth	Occupation									
	Total	Professional speciality and technical	Executive administrative and managerial	Sales	Administrative Support	Occupation Precision, Production craft and repair	Operator fabricator and labour	Farming forestry and fishing	Services	No occupation or no reported ¹
Caribbean	105,299	4,565		2,403	2,575	4,911	14,409	1,296	10,587	63,011
Cuba	33,587	1,198	347	1,156	673	2,243	8,272	165	2,696	16,837
Dominican Republic	27,053	1,271	401	387	672	1,099	3,227	462	1,326	18,208
Haiti	15,057	494	150	387	218	795	1,288	370	835	10,520
Jamaica	17,840	895	200	255	775	310	936	251	3,831	10,387
Trinidad and Tobago	6,409	383	137	110	261	257	361	10	860	4,030
Other Caribbean	5,353	324	125	108	158	207	325	38	1,039	3,029

Source: US Immigration and Naturalization Services Statistical Yearbook of Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1997
¹: Includes homemakers, students, unemployed or retired persons, and other not reporting or with unknown occupation.

Table 6
COUNTRY OF LAST PERMANENT RESIDENCE BY YEAR OF LANDING FOR CANADA, 1990-1996

Country of birth	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Total	13,865	20,001	20,063	15,751	9,737	8,027	9,246
Anguilla	-	2	2	-	-	-	4
Antigua	25	69	67	58	25	32	23
Aruba	1	-	4	2	-	1	-
Bahamas	27	32	23	21	32	28	32
Barbados	335	396	350	410	-	216	180
Bermudas	47	39	34	34	27	22	21
Cayman Islands	16	19	3	10	9	10	6
Cuba	146	165	237	385	372	443	512
Dominica	73	128	121	105	52	73	59
Dominican Republic	361	517	556	643	425	276	307
Grenada	166	273	434	493	231	359	359

(continues)

Table 6 (conclusion)

Country of birth	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Guadeloupe	18	14	6	9	6	10	4
Haiti	2,355	2,793	2,365	3,629	2,085	2,007	1,935
Jamaica	4,887	4,997	5,921	5,990	3,882	3,599	3,275
Martinique	10	35	15	15	5	3	7
Montserrat	16	9	12	6	6	4	6
Netherlands Antilles	15	9	11	13	8	9	7
Puerto Rico	3	6	7	3	-	1	5
St. Kitts and Nevis	38	33	56	35	17	22	16
St. Lucia	100	130	124	152	75	97	118
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	175	270	290	367	186	231	244
Trinidad and Tobago	2,851	2,969	4,304	4,171	2,347	2,607	2,199
Turks and Caicos Islands	-	1	1	1	2	1	1
British Virgin Islands	22	15	6	8	8	4	2
U.S.A Virgin Islands	2	1	3	3	2	1	-

Source: Statistics Canada, Information and Technologies Branch, 1999.

Table 7
SELECT COUNTRIES: PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF MIGRANTS BY COUNTRY LAST LIVED, 1990

Country from which migrants returned	Antigua	British Virgin Island	Grenada	St. Lucia	St. Vincente	Barbados	St. Kitts and Nevis	Jamaica
Antigua / Barbuda	----	2.89	0.34	1.62	1.14	----	0.00	0.00
Barbados	2.27	2.83	2.82	12.98	12.88	----	0.00	0.00
St. Lucia	1.04	0.40	1.08	----	2.01	----	0.00	0.00
Trinidad	3.07	1.21	38.25	2.59	35.60	----	0.00	0.00
St. Croix	15.09	2.36	0.25	7.51	0.96	----	0.00	0.00
St. Thomas	11.41	44.89	0.25	1.11	0.10	----	0.00	0.00
Aruba	6.47	0.20	3.47	0.43	2.90	----	0.00	0.00
Martinique	0.07	----	0.03	12.91	0.17	----	0.00	0.00
Canada	6.54	1.01	6.79	4.70	6.87	13.00	8.00	11.30
United Kingdom	10.70	3.16	22.08	18.86	14.73	60.00	34.00	43.80
USA	27.15	27.32	11.64	13.30	8.99	27.00	20.00	38.10
Venezuela	0.04	----	3.35	0.56	0.23	----	0.00	0.00
US Virgin Islands	----	----	----	----	----	----	38.00	0.00
Not stated	0.69	----	1.82	0.14	0.10	----	0.00	0.00
Other countries	21.63	13.73	7.84	20.23	13.32	----	0.00	6.80

Source: Based on data from, Caribbean Community Regional Census Office, 1994.

Table 8
AGE OF RETURNEES IN SELECTED CARIBBEAN ISLANDS

Country	Age range	TOTAL
Grenada	> 30	21.90
	30 - > 50	36.80
	50 +	41.20
St.Lucia	> 30	9.00
	30 - > 50	46.30
	50 +	44.70
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	> 30	24.10
	30 - > 50	39.80
	50 +	36.10
Antigua	> 30	28.40
	30 - > 50	40.60
	50 +	31.00
British Virgin Islands	> 30	34.90

Source: Based on data from, Caribbean Commonwealth Regional Census, 1994.

Table 9
MAYOR SECTORS OF THE JAMAICAN ECONOMY:
REVENUE AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT

Year	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Remittances as a percentage of GDP	4.1	7.8	8.1	11.5	11.7	10.7	9.8
Bauxite as percentage of GDP	3.1	2.8	2.2	1.8	1.5	1.4	1.2
Alumina as percentage of GDP	14.7	14.8	14.8	13.9	13.6	11	10.5
Sugar as percentage of GDP	2.4	2.6	2.6	1.8	2.1	2	1.6

Source: Based on data from the Bank of Jamaica, Planning Institute of Jamaica, Economic and Social Survey, 1996 and 1997.

B. Migratory Information Systems

B.1 Migration information systems in Latin America: a challenge that is still to be faced at the beginning of the new millennium

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Introduction

In view of the changes that have taken place in international population movements and in the regional and international socio-political and economic context, adequate, accessible and timely information is urgently needed for the formulation of migration policies and initiatives. This need is particularly important in the context of the sub-regional development and integration processes which are setting the scene for the Americas at the beginning of the new millennium.

Globalization, the increasing economic interdependence in the world economy and regional integration are creating socio-economic areas where there are movements of persons, in addition to the growing interchange of goods, technology and services.

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In this context, international migration has to be seen in a new way, and innovative methodologies and the joint and consensus-based efforts of the countries concerned are needed to deal with the different aspects of the phenomenon and its relationship to development. On the one hand, the advances made by the countries of the region in strengthening democracy and in respect for human rights have included consideration of the right of persons to migrate or to stay in their place of origin and to the guarantee of proper treatment for migrants in their countries of origin, transit and destination.

Although international migration has occurred throughout the history of Latin America, it has gone through profound changes in the last few decades, including a growing heterogeneity of the types of movements involved, which has resulted in a great diversity of international migrants. In addition to these aspects, there are other factors to consider which encourage continued migration, such as the role of networks formed by the migrants themselves, their family members and friends, and institutional networks ranging from humanitarian organizations to those that profit from trafficking in undocumented persons.

Quite apart from the long-standing deficiencies in the quality and availability of information, the increasingly complex dynamics of regional migration is making new demands with regard to the type, characteristics, accessibility and dissemination of the information required as input for decision-making.

The purpose of this study is to show that it is possible to meet the challenge of constructing migration information systems and ensuring their sustainability over time. Sufficient experience has been gained for this purpose and progress has been made in consolidating the national statistical systems, so that shared methodologies could be introduced to measure international migration and its characteristics. Another positive factor is the recognition by the governments in the region of the need for migration policies and measures to be implemented on the basis of an adequate knowledge of the phenomenon and its links with development and integration processes.

1. Recent migration movements² and the new information needs

The migration movements of the Latin American population are a complex social process that is historically linked to the development of the region's societies. These movements have expressed and continue to express economic, social and political imbalances between countries and regions. They have occurred throughout the history of the region, but in the last few decades have gone through such profound changes in terms of numbers, direction, characteristics and impacts on the countries of origin and destination, that migration is now very prominent as a regional issue that is closely linked to the countries' potential for change and development.

Until the mid-twentieth century, international population movements in Latin America consisted of immigration from outside the region, mainly from Europe, or traditional transboundary movements. From that time onward, two main migration patterns began to emerge which have become stronger over the past few decades: one relating to movements between countries in the region and another of an extra-regional nature, directed mainly towards the United States.

The census information provided by IMILA shows that intraregional migration increased significantly between 1970 and 1980, when the migrant stock doubled; then it began to stabilize, reaching 2.2 million at the beginning of the 1990s. However, as the censuses only cover migration that involves a change of residence for a certain length of time, this apparent stability may have been

² The review of these issues is based on the census information systematized by the IMILA Project (International Migration in Latin America) and published by ECLAC/CELADE (2000). The analysis of the situation in Central America is based on Maguid (1999).

offset by the appearance of other types of circular mobility, which involve returning to the place of origin, and are of variable duration (see Picouet and Domenach, 1990).

In those two decades, two thirds of the 2 million Latin Americans residing in countries of the region other than their country of birth were in Argentina and Venezuela, which have become the main receiving countries for intraregional migration. At the same time, Colombia, Chile, and Paraguay have continued to produce higher numbers of emigrants as well as, to a lesser extent, Uruguay, which has suffered the greatest loss in relation to the size of its population, to the point that the emigration rate reached values similar to the mortality rate.

Other flows which increased over the 1980s were of Nicaraguans and Salvadorans to Costa Rica and Honduras and of Guatemalans to Mexico, as a result of the socio-political changes in Central America.

The pattern of Latin American and Caribbean emigration to the north of the continent has been increasing since the end of the 1960s, and become more and more obvious. The countries close to the United States - especially Mexico and the countries of the Caribbean - have maintained their historical links, with emigrant numbers fluctuating with changing economic and political circumstances, and also with changes in United States immigration policies³.

In 1990 around 8.5 million Latin Americans and persons from the Caribbean were enumerated in the United States census, which is double the figure recorded in 1980. They amounted to 43% of foreigners, compared to only 18% in 1970. Over half of the total population from the region that was resident in the United States at the last census date was Mexican, one quarter was from the Caribbean, mainly Cubans, Jamaicans and Dominicans, 13% from Central America and 11% from South America.

Migration to outside the region has both negative and positive impacts: on the one hand there is the loss of professionals, and technical and skilled workers, whose education was provided by the societies of origin; on the other hand, there are the benefits of remittances, which are a growing source of income in many countries of the region. Intraregional migration may contribute to integration, by strengthening commercial, labour and cultural links.

The Central American region is a special case, as in the recent past, migration movements have increased and become much more complex owing to the effect of a combination of economic and socio-political factors. Thus, in addition to the historical labour migration flows between countries of the region - particularly between rural border areas - there are two new phenomenon which are not independent, but rather occur together and are superimposed:

- the forced movements of large sectors of the population as a direct result of armed conflicts, which increased in the 1980s, reinforcing the conditions of inequity that continue to act as an indirect factor of expulsion. These movements continued until the beginning of the last decade and then began to disappear as the peace agreements were established in Nicaragua (1990), El Salvador (1992) and Guatemala (1996). The census data do not indicate their true scale; UNHCR estimates that around two million persons had to leave their homes, moving elsewhere either within their home country or outside of it⁴.
- a marked increase in extra-regional migration, which is still continuing today, establishing a new pattern of migration to outside the region as a characteristic feature of the Central American situation. The loss of population as a result of emigration to the north, mainly to the United States and to a lesser extent to Canada and Mexico, increased to such a degree that at the beginning of the 1990s it was more than one million persons, which represents 4.5% of the total Central American population.

³ In November 1986 the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was passed, legislation which helped to regularize the immigration status of Latin Americans and to reunite families. This certainly played a role in the significant increase, recorded by the censuses, that occurred between 1980 and 1990

⁴ UNHCR (1994)..

In 1990 there were more than a million Central Americans resident in the United States; this is three times the figure recorded in the 1980 census and almost ten times the figure for 1970. El Salvador showed the greatest increases over both periods: by a factor of 6 between 1970 and 1980, and by a factor of 5 between 1980 and 1990. Emigration to Canada is at a much lower level, but has also been increasing steadily up to the present, mainly consisting of Salvadorans and Guatemalans.

It may be concluded from the IMILA data that over the past thirty years the migration patterns of Central America have been progressively changing from intraregional to extra-regional. In fact, the percentage of Central American migrants with a destination country in the same region declined from 50% to 7.5% between 1970 and 1990; the other side of the coin is the increase in the proportion aiming for the north of the continent.

Another special feature of the Central American migration map is the persistence of the flows of Nicaraguans to Costa Rica, although they are on a much smaller scale than the extra-regional currents. Between 1984 and 1997 they at least doubled, increasing their share of the foreign presence: those born in Nicaragua accounted for 52% in 1984 and rose to 73% in 1997, which gives them greater visibility in Costa Rican society. There are additional factors which contribute to a social image that tends to exaggerate the actual scale and numbers of undocumented Nicaraguans: the Multi-purpose Household Survey of 1997 shows that the numbers of these immigrants are increasing in the metropolitan area of San José, and that their participation in the labour market is changing as they enter non-agricultural activities, while an increasing proportion of them have a higher level of education⁵.

One way of estimating the scale of undocumented persons is the recent migration amnesty that the country offered, and which regularized the status of 165,300 persons from other countries in the subregion.

Lastly, a common problem facing the countries of Central America is how to receive and reintegrate effectively the undocumented migrants who are deported in growing numbers from the United States and Mexico, as a result of restrictions on the entry of Central Americans to those countries. The case of Guatemala is of particular concern as owing to its extensive border with Mexico, it has become a country for the transit, departure and return of migrants in irregular situations. To this is added the need to combat the unscrupulous trafficking in migrants and to make joint efforts to ensure the respect of the human rights of those who find themselves impelled to migrate in order to escape poverty and achieve better living conditions in other countries.

During the 1980s the large-scale, spontaneous and abrupt nature of the forced movements of refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons and repatriates posed serious challenges to the governments of the receiving and expelling countries, to international organizations and to civil society as a whole. They also highlighted the shortcomings of existing methods and sources for measuring the true scale and characteristics of these movements. These shortcomings are still of topical interest in view of the questions arising about future migration trends and their link with the processes of regional integration and reconstruction, questions which emerged with greater force, in the Central American case, in relation to the probable consequences of recent natural disasters, such as Hurricane Mitch, which devastated the region in October 1998.

As the principal cause of migration is economic, however, even in the absence of emergency situations caused by natural disasters or violent conflicts, population movements are predicted to continue because of the globalization of markets and the persistence of strong inequalities in development models.

⁵ A recent study on Nicaraguans based on the July 1999 Survey shows similar results with regard to their presence among foreigners and their characteristics. Although this survey shows a higher number of Central Americans of all nationalities, it is impossible to estimate the real scale of the increase owing to the changes made in the sample design in 1999, which probably improved the coverage of small population groups, including migrants (Pisoni, 2000).

Recent, current and future movements in the Americas take place within a changing international scenario from the economic, political and social point of view. The generalization of the market economy, the growing interdependence of the world economy, the strengthening of democratic regimes and the respect for human rights are bringing about a globalization of socioeconomic spaces at the global level and in Latin America, which is affecting not only the exchange of goods, technology and services, but also the movement of persons.

Analysing the migration issue in the context of the economic integration of North America, Simmons shows that, although the phenomena of the contemporary expansion of international trade, cultural links and migration flows are closely interlinked, they are not necessarily related in a harmonious fashion. During the process of adjustment to the new patterns, tensions may arise not only in connection with the vagaries of the labour markets but also with political and social conflicts: for example, the greater ease of communications helps unemployed workers or the victims of political and social conflicts to opt for migration as a solution to their problems; migrants encounter legal barriers to entering their destination countries, especially the poorest and least skilled migrants, who are part of the flows that are the most difficult to regulate; if there is a reduction in the demand for labour in the destination countries, conflicts may arise between the new arrivals from different ethnic groups as they compete to find employment (Simmons, 1996).

The growing complexity of the regional migration dynamic adds new demands to the shortcomings previously detected in the quality and availability of data. These demands are related to the type, characteristics, timeliness and dissemination of the data required as input for decision-making. Very little progress has been made with regard to systematizing migratory data in Latin America, with the unique exception of the IMILA project. There still remains the significant challenge of a thorough analysis of the real scale of international population movements, and their characteristics, causes and implications in the countries affected. This challenge means that a new look at this phenomenon is required, as well as incorporating innovative methodologies to achieve a broader understanding; some of the information requirements emerging from the new regional scenario are listed below:

- The requirements for updated information mean that alternative sources are needed to monitor trends during intercensal periods.
- The issue has to be considered on a broader level, taking into account the characteristics of migrant households and communities, as well as individual behaviour, in order to visualize the role of migration within the family's life strategies.
- Adequate policies can only be implemented if there is awareness of the many issues related to international migration, so that the effect is evaluated of not only migration policies and initiatives but also those that affect the regulation of the labour market, access to health, education and housing services, etc.;
- A study is needed of the role of migrant networks and institutional networks, which have been expanding in recent years;
- In addition to the knowledge gained on past trends by using traditional methods which identify the act of migration once it has occurred, it would be wise to explore other methods for investigating the emigration potential of different sectors of the population in those countries that have traditionally produced migrants, in order to have information which would help to predict future migration behaviour.
- Innovative methodologies are needed that could measure other forms of temporary and circular movements, which are reversible in nature as there is the expectation of return to the place of origin within a variable timeframe. Such movements are not measured by the censuses or surveys used in the national statistical systems.

- The methodologies used by existing sources to investigate the migration status of persons and their demographic, social and economic characteristics needs to be made compatible so that the data are comparable within and between countries.
- As records of international entries and departures constitute the only source that can measure the dynamics of this phenomenon, whereas other sources measure stocks of migrants, it would be advisable to find alternative methods to estimate flows of migrants.

It might seem over-ambitious to expect to achieve all of these objectives, especially as migration is more complex to measure than other factors affecting demographic dynamics, as the space and time dimension are part of its very definition. It is also the phenomenon which reacts most rapidly to socioeconomic and political changes, showing greater variability than birth and mortality rates over shorter time periods.

As the starting point is a very inadequate situation, there will have to be a gradual process of filling in the information gaps, without losing sight of the breadth of the objectives involved, in order to form a Migration Information System.

Various factors combine to support an optimistic view of the viability of achieving this goal: the recognition on the part of governments and the different subregional authorities of the Americas of the urgent need to have reliable information as a basis for migration policies and initiatives; the involvement of civil society in the migration issue through non-governmental organizations; the accumulation of sufficient experience in the region and the fact that the countries have data collection tools that have not yet been fully exploited in the study of migration.

2. The concern of governments and regional consultation organizations and the international recommendations

Recognition of the fact that the migration issue is closely linked to the potential for reconstruction, change and development in the region has been expressed many times by governments and emphasized at numerous international meetings. It is accepted that consensus agreements are needed between the sending and receiving countries in order to deal adequately with this issue.

In 1993, the United Nations Expert Group Meeting on Population Distribution and Migration, which was held at Santa Cruz, Bolivia, agreed, in recommendation No. 37, that the United Nations should promote the exchange of information on both trends and policies of international migration, thus recognizing the urgent need to create mechanisms to generate and allow the exchange of international migration information between the Latin American and Caribbean countries.

At the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD, held in Cairo in 1994) particular importance was attached to migration issues and their relationship to development, which is clearly expressed in chapter X of the Programme of Action. The Programme offers a series of measures, which include: "In cooperation with international and non-governmental organizations and research institutions, Governments should support the gathering of data on flows and stocks of international migrants and on factors causing migration..." (United Nations, 1995).

The Latin American and Caribbean Regional Conference on Population and Development, Mexico, 1993 and the Expert Group Meeting on International Migration Statistics, New York, 1995, also recognized the need to have information on migration.

More recently, in the framework of the United Nations ACC Task Force on Basic Social Services for All (BSSA) and the evaluation of the Programme of Action of the ICPD, a Working Group on International Migration was set up which organized the Technical Symposium on International Migration and Development (The Hague, July 1998). The Symposium emphasized the need to comply with the agreements adopted in Cairo and there was a clear consensus that the collection and analysis of information were prerequisite steps for formulating adequate policies.

The progress achieved at the level of economic and commercial integration in the subregional integration processes of Latin America has not included consideration of the migration factor; the theme of human resources circulation remains on a secondary level. Central America has taken a lead in this area, as it has set up various regional consultation authorities on the migration issue, as referred to below.

The Central American Commission of Directors of Migration was created in October 1990 and since then has been the regional authority where those responsible for the migration and foreign affairs departments in Central American countries discuss and agree on measures relating to migration and on issues relating to the recording tools used.

The Regional Conference on Migration, or Puebla Process, emerged as a specific result of the Summit of Presidents of Central America referred to as Tuxtla II, and there was a first meeting in Puebla, Mexico in March 1996. This Conference, which has been consolidating its achievements, is an open-ended multilateral dialogue mechanism for reflection and coordination in relation to migration policies between countries of origin, transit and destination. In addition to the Central American countries, the membership includes Mexico, Canada and the United States. The Conference's Regional Advisory Group on Migration has made significant progress and commitments have been made to obtain more information on international migration.

3. The experience gained in Latin America: IMILA, SIMICA and SIEMCA

Investigation of International migration in Latin America (IMILA)

IMILA, developed by CELADE since the early 1970s, is the most important example of horizontal cooperation for collecting and systematizing information on the population enumerated in censuses in Latin America in countries other than the country of birth. It has been in operation for almost 30 years and so far has been the only database available for analysing migration between countries of the Americas.

In view of the limitations of records of international population censuses are used to obtain data on external migration. A census is the most complete source for data on international migration and on migrant characteristics in relation to the sociodemographic and economic characteristics of the receiving population. Census information can be used to identify immigrants in each country where they are enumerated, although emigration cannot be measured directly. The main advantage of IMILA is thus that it offers a system that can use data on those born abroad in the different Latin American countries and in the main countries receiving Latin American immigrants, such as the United States and Canada, to reconstruct the number of emigrants from each country. This is done by calculating the number of persons born in each country who are resident and enumerated in the destination countries⁶.

The basic system consists of forming a matrix of origins and destinations to record migrants between countries. Each country can then estimate the numbers and characteristics of its immigrants and emigrants. This information measures absolute migration, which occurred at some time in the past; if there are data on the period of arrival or on the place of residence at a fixed date prior to the census, there is much greater potential for analysis as the migration that occurred over recent periods can be considered.

⁶ These figures estimate the numbers of emigrants who went to other countries of the Americas, which are the majority. If census data were available for all countries of the world, accurate totals for emigrants from each country could be obtained.

In addition to constructing this particular migration matrix, IMILA regularly produces a set of standard tables on the population born abroad by country of origin, taking into account the main sociodemographic and economic characteristics of the migrants: sex, age, period of arrival, civil status, level of education, employment status, branch of activity and occupation, and the number of children that women have had. This information is not usually published in the census results.

In order to feed the System, CELADE requests the national statistical offices of each country to provide records of the population born abroad, and its main characteristics. This means that IMILA relies on cooperation and exchange of information between the countries of the Americas. The results are sent to each of the countries and are also disseminated periodically in the Demographic Bulletin publications (ECLAC/CELADE, 1977, 1986, 1989 and 2000). The advantages and limitations of the census information for the purposes of studying migration are discussed later.

Migration information systems in Latin America: SIMICA and SIEMCA

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), in conjunction with CELADE, has been making significant efforts and has gained valuable experience in resolving problems relating to the lack of information on international migration in Latin America.

In 1993, IOM organized the Regional Seminar on Migration Policies, Integration and Sustainable Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, where a proposal was presented to representatives of the governments of the region to create a migration information system at the Latin American and Caribbean level (Maguid, 1993). In the following year, on the basis of this proposal, the two international organizations submitted to the countries a project for an information system in Latin America.

Subsequently, work started on the project "Information System on International Migration in Countries of the Andean Community" (SIMICA). IOM and CELADE were responsible for project implementation, which took place between 1996 and 1998; the countries of the Community participated: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. The project set up an integrated information system for the purpose of analysing migration trends and patterns in those countries. The SIMICA project was based on the regional-level project referred to previously. The project implemented in the Andean region was intended as a first phase, that would later be extended to the entire Latin American and Caribbean region. The experience gained during its implementation contributed to optimizing the design of a new project for the Central American region.

As mentioned above, during the successive meetings of the Regional Conference on Migration the governments of the Central American countries and of the main destination countries of the extra-regional flows recognized the urgent need to have information available for use in policy formulation. At the Fourth Regional Conference held in El Salvador in January 1999, the Central American Commission of Directors of Migration (OCAM) requested IOM to work on a project to set up a migration information system for Central America.

In order to respond to the requirements of the countries mentioned, IOM, with the participation of CELADE, developed the project "Statistical Information System on Migration in Central America" (SIEMCA) which was presented in the framework of the Puebla Process at the end of 1999. Its implementation is scheduled to begin in October of this year. The project has the following main objectives:


- To produce information for use in formulating policies and actions relating to migration, in the specific area of Central America and the countries which are the main receivers of extra-regional emigration, in order to contribute to strengthening the process of socioeconomic integration and change in the region.
- To improve the sources, collection methods and subsequent processing of migration information, as well as strengthening national capacities for generation, formulation, analysis and dissemination in order to have updated, accurate and timely information.

- To offer a greater understanding of the mutual effects of migration processes and the integration and globalization processes and to facilitate the subsequent adoption of consensus decisions between the countries concerned.

It is proposed that SIEMCA be implemented with the participation and coordinated action of the governments and the organizations producing migration information of the countries in the region and by establishing the necessary links with other integration organizations in the region, as well as with information systems of other regions and the main countries receiving Central American emigrants. The project will cover 7 countries: Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Belize.

In order to achieve the stated objectives an institutional framework has to be established which will allow permanent coordination between the Central Technical Team of the project and the national organizations producing migration statistics. For this an inter-agency committee will be formed, consisting of IOM, which will be responsible for project implementation, CELADE, OCAM and the Directors of Statistics. National coordinators will also be designated, as well as links in each organization involved (see diagram 1).

Diagram 1:
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF SIEMCA



The overall strategy of the project includes the implementation of actions agreed by consensus with the countries concerned. One priority component is support to the national organizations producing migration information, in order to improve their capacity for collecting data, to produce adequate and up-to-date statistics or to generate new data relating to various aspects of the migration issue.

For this purpose, the activities designed to improve the quality and timeliness of migration statistics and cover information gaps, aim to establish links between sources of different types, such as population censuses, household surveys and records of international movements. Also, specific sampling activities are planned at certain times during the intercensal period in order to study the phenomenon in greater depth and cover non-traditional types of movement.

One aspect which has been given special consideration is establishing mechanisms to guarantee the consolidation and sustainability of the system once the project has been completed, key elements being: active participation and commitment of the national organizations involved, training and enhancement of human resources and improvement of computer resources.

4. Feasibility of implementing an international migration information system: data sources and their potential for the study of international migration

4.1 What the system is expected to offer

In order to study migration as an aspect of the integration processes, an increasing level of coordination and consensus is needed between the countries concerned. This means that the availability of information on migration movements, the knowledge and analysis of trends and the forecast of future behaviour is a challenge that is shared by the countries of the region, irrespective of the differences in progress achieved by each country individually.

Not only information from the country itself is required, but also data at the regional and subregional level, both on movements that have taken place between the countries of the region and on movements out of the region, particularly to the United States, Mexico and Canada.

As mentioned above, the type of information needed for policy formulation relates to the demographic aspect - to the numbers, intensity and direction of the flows and the migrants' characteristics - but also to other social areas, such as labour markets, social security, and access to housing, health, education, etc. Information on migration legislation, the attitudes of society and the potential for integration in the receiving countries is also useful for the governments of the countries where the flows originate and for their potential emigrants.

Policies for stopping or regulating migration currents could hardly be imagined to be effective if they are not based on a knowledge of who the migrants are, the situation awaiting them, and the demographic, spatial, economic and socio-political consequences of their migration for the countries of origin and destination.

Lastly, although no less importantly, the information has to be readily available in a timely and continuous manner.

All of these aspects need to be considered when formulating the objectives, strategy and activities for establishing a migration information system.

4.2 The data sources and their potential for providing information and monitoring international migration

Apart from the population censuses, which provide data every 10 years, the limitations of the continuous records of international movements and the absence of systematic and comparable migration variables in the household surveys of the Latin American countries make it difficult to obtain information about migration. The feasibility of developing a migration information system which could satisfy the requirements mentioned would depend on the current situation and availability of existing sources in the region as well as the potential for improvement to maximize their analytical potential. It is also important to identify the national organizations that produce the information and to be aware of their requirements in terms of human and computer resources in order to feed the system, and to incorporate, if necessary, new data collection tools which would make it possible to gain greater knowledge of population movements; bearing all of these issues in mind, work can start with a knowledge of what is available and what is missing.

The sources which could make up a regional Migration Information System can be grouped in three categories according to the significance and periodicity of their input:

- *Population censuses, household surveys and entry and departure records* are the three basic pillars of the System in view of their potential for research on international migration and because these data sources are available in practically all the countries of Latin America. Their characteristics are reviewed in diagram 2, where the situation of Central America is also shown in order to illustrate the challenge facing SIEMCA.
- Other administrative records, such as those for visas and various categories of residence permits, migration amnesties, work permits and deportation records, which may provide complementary, although partial, information.
- Non-traditional sources using innovative methodologies may serve as a support to deal with other aspects of the phenomenon at particular times, such as to evaluate the quality and coverage of the sources that are used on a regular basis.
- Censuses and surveys provide information on the stock of migrants at a particular time whereas the records are indicative of migration flows. It is useful to recall the difference between the concepts of migration "flow" and migration "stock". The former expresses the dynamic aspect of the phenomenon, taking into account what happens over time; the second is a static photograph of the phenomenon at a fixed time, which is the result of the flows that occurred previously (the stock includes surviving immigrants who have not emigrated again). Both types of information are extremely useful, complementing each other as they show different aspects of the migration process.

Diagram 2:
BASIC SOURCES FOR AN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION INFORMATION SYSTEM

Source	Characteristics and variables included	Status in the Central American countries
Population censuses	<p>Characteristics:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Measure stocks and not flows; • Universality, simultaneity, and national coverage; • Should take place every 10 years. <p>Variables considered:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Place of birth • Habitual place of residence (if a de facto census) • Place of residence 5 years previously; • Year of arrival in the country for foreigners; • Nationality; • Place of residence of children (emigrants). 	<p>Year of the last census:</p> <p>Costa Rica: 1984 El Salvador: 1992 Guatemala: 1994 Honduras: 1988 Nicaragua: 1995 Panama: 1990 Belize: 1991</p>
Household surveys	<p>Characteristics:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Measure stocks and not flows; • Cover a representative sample of the population; • Take place at least once a year. <p>Variables considered in some surveys:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Place of birth and/or nationality; • Year of arrival in the country for foreigners; • Households that receive remittances, and the amount thereof (1) • Members of the household living abroad. 	<p>National coverage in all countries of the region. In Guatemala the last survey took place in 1989, and a survey is expected to take place this year. In the majority of countries the migration variables are not included in a systematic or permanent form.</p>
Register of international entries and departures	<p>Characteristics:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Measure flows. Are applied continuously; • Record entries and departures at different types of border crossings: air, river, sea and land; • Use different recording tools: individual forms and collective forms (for those travelling by public transport). <p>Variables considered (2):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Type, place and date of the movement; • Sex and age; • Country of birth and nationality; • Profession/occupation; • Country of origin and destination; • Purpose of journey; • Migration category. 	<p>Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras and Belize have data for all border crossings. Guatemala has complete data for air travel only.</p>

(1) Only in the Multi-purpose Survey of El Salvador.

(2) At the meeting of OCAM in November 1990, the use of a uniform migration control card was agreed for all the countries in the subregion.

In relation to population censuses, the gaps in the information from entry and departure records have led to widespread use of census information to calculate the stock of immigrants born abroad who are resident in each country; in order to know about changes in the composition of immigrants according to their time of arrival, the return of natives and the demographic, social and economic characteristics of international migrants and their differences compared to those of the population as a whole.

The question on the country of birth is essential for classifying the population as "native" or "foreign", as in the majority of Latin American countries nationality is defined according to "jus soli" (the right of birthplace). Nevertheless, when a significant proportion of those born abroad have been naturalized, it is advisable to include a census question on nationality, as citizenship guarantees immigrants the same rights as natives. If information is available on the place of residence at a prior fixed date, a much more detailed analysis of international migration is possible. Combining the two questions makes it possible to distinguish, for example, for country A:

Country of birth	Country of residence 5 years previously	
	Country A	Not country A
Country A	<i>Non-migrants</i>	<i>Return migrants</i> , natives who emigrated from A, and returned during the five years prior to the census date
Not country A	<i>Old immigrants</i> , arrived more than five years previously	<i>Recent immigrants</i> , arrived in A during the 5 years prior to the census

The censuses also provide information for estimating the international migration balances during intercensal periods, by applying indirect methods. These methods consist of applying a set of survival probabilities to the population born abroad enumerated in the first census, classified by sex and age, in order to estimate the expected population in the absence of migration; the difference between this estimated population and the actual one enumerated in the second census shows the migration balance or result for the period. This "prospective" version may be averaged with the inverse or retrospective variant in order to adjust the balances for the midpoint of the intercensal period. The limitation of indirect methods is that they cannot be used to identify immigrants and emigrants, but only the resulting balance.

Censuses can also be used to obtain information on the emigration of natives, either by including specific questions in the census of the country of emigration, or through information on the place of birth and time of arrival in the countries where the emigrants arrived, as was mentioned in relation to the potential use of IMILA. When emigrants are identified in the destination country, it is also possible to find out about their sociodemographic and economic characteristics.

In order to estimate, for example, the number of emigrants from the countries of Central America, information is needed on the country of birth of the Central Americans enumerated in the censuses of all the other countries of the world, or at least of the main destinations.

Then it would be possible to identify both inter-regional immigrants and extra-regional immigrants who went to the United States and Canada, and to find out about their sociodemographic and economic characteristics and their standard of living in the destination countries. It is nevertheless important to bear in mind that the censuses have limitations, and need to be complemented with other sources.

In the first place, when recording stocks of immigrants, it is difficult to cover seasonal or circular mobility or the forced displacements that occur owing to socio-political circumstances or natural disasters, unless the census happens to take place at a time immediately subsequent to such events.

A second type of limitation arises from the fact that not all the censuses have comparable characteristics. A first difference may be the de facto or de jure quality, which imply different

interpretations of the concept of residence. However, the comparability can be restored if the de facto censuses include a question on the habitual place of residence, and then it is possible to consider only habitual residents in order to identify international migrants. It is more difficult to achieve homogeneity with respect to the question on the period of arrival of those born in another country; in this case it is recommended that the censuses record the year of arrival, so that the information can be processed for the same time periods and standard tabulations will thus be obtained within the system.

The variables referring to employment status and occupational characteristics should also be compatible - for example, the starting age for measuring participation in the labour market, and the classification systems for the branch of activity and occupation.

Another limitation is that the degree of completeness of censuses cannot be the same in all countries, and at times, the level of omission with regard to those born in other countries may be higher than with regard to the rest of the population. In particular, in those countries where there are aggressive or discriminatory attitudes to foreigners, undocumented migrants may avoid being included, or describe themselves as natives or tourists⁷.

Lastly, if the censuses are to provide adequate input for a migration information system that allows international comparison, they should be carried out at similar dates; the budgetary difficulties that countries encounter in complying with the census schedule are well-known, and this situation is likely to re-occur in the 2000 round.

Table 1
QUESTION INCLUDED IN THE CENSUSES OF THE 1970s, AND 1990s

País	Question								
	Place of birth			Period of arrival			Residence 5 years earlier, or previous residence		
	1970	1980	1990	1970	1980	1990	1970	1980	1990
Argentina	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Bolivia	X	-	X	NA	-	X	X	-	X
Brazil	X	X	X	NA	NA	X	X	X	X
Chile	X	X	X	NA	NA	X	NA	X	X
Colombia	X	X	X	NA	X	NA	NA	X	X
Costa Rica	X	X	-	NA	X	-	X	X	-
Cuba	X	NA	-	NA	NA	-	NA	X	-
Ecuador	X	X	X	NA	NA	NA	X	X	X
El Salvador	X	-	X	NA	-	X	X	-	X
Guatemala	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Haiti	X	X	-	NA	NA	-	X	X	-
Honduras	X	X	-	X	X	-	NA	X	-
Mexico	X	X	X	NA	NA	NA	X	X	X
Nicaragua	X	-	X	X	-	X	X	-	X
Panama	X	X	X	NA	NA	X	X	X	X
Paraguay	X	X	X	NA	X	X	NA	X	X
Peru	X	X	X	NA	NA	NA	X	X	X
Dominican Republic	X	X	X	NA	X	NA	X	X	X
Uruguay	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Venezuela	X	X	X	NA	X	NA	X	X	X
Canada	X	X	---	X	X	---	X	X	---
United States	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	---

NA: Questions not asked

- Census not carried out in that decade

... Information not available at CELADE

⁷ This is the case with the population census of Argentina in 1980, carried out under the former military dictatorship, which had implemented a harsh policy of expelling foreigners.

Table 1 shows that the censuses of all countries of the American continent have incorporated the question on the place of birth in the last three surveys); there has been progress made in including the question on the place of residence five years previously or the previous place of residence. The most serious gaps relate to the time of arrival, as that variable was still missing from the censuses of 6 countries in the 1990 round. It is now a good time to work on making the census questions of countries in the region more homogeneous, as some will carry out their censuses during 2000 and others a year or two later.

The multi-purpose household surveys offer an alternative source that has been little used thus far, for follow-up of international migration trends during the intercensal periods and for enhancing the study of migrants' social and labour characteristics.

As these surveys are given to a representative sample of the universe, they are not appropriate for an accurate estimate of immigration numbers or rates, but can be used to detect the most significant trends during the intercensal period and thus to have updated information without having to wait for the next census in order to adjust policies or programmes relating to international migration.

As the censuses provide information once in every ten years, it is clearly very useful to take advantage of the surveys in order to have updated information between one census and the next. Another advantage of the household surveys is that, as they are based on the issue of employment and on economic variables relating to the labour force, they provide more detailed information than the censuses with regard to the employment characteristics of migrants and non-migrants.

As some years ago they were converted into multi-purpose surveys, with special sections on various issues such as poverty, employment stability, housing, health, and women, they offer greater potential for research on these aspects of international immigration.

For these surveys to serve as appropriate tools for observing international migration trends, they need to have national coverage and the forms have to include questions that identify immigrants, similar to those used in the censuses. In other words, the surveys and censuses should be comparable at the conceptual and operational level as well as at the spatial and temporal level.

It should be clear that the household surveys, which are not primarily intended for measuring migration, are useful for obtaining data on immigrants in those countries where the sample size is larger and where the foreign immigration currents are significant. Otherwise, a sample is unlikely to include a representative number of immigrants that would justify statistical and analytical processing.

In those countries that have produced many emigrants, the surveys can also be used to estimate the number of emigrants, in order to have information on the emigration expectations of the population, and in particular to evaluate the impact of the sending of remittances to the country of origin. Again, the surveys are useful if they meet the requirements for sample size and a significant number of emigrants.

In the case of emigration, the data collected in the country of origin can come from household informants who did not migrate, by defining the members of the household both on the date of the survey and on a previous fixed date. This is sufficient to ensure that when asking whether one or more members of the household are resident in another country, the persons who emigrated are declared by one household only. Otherwise there could be duplications, and thus an overestimate of the proportion of emigrants.

There are no such risks involved in studying the sending of remittances, as each household states whether or not it receives any, and the amount involved. The household survey of El Salvador has measured the receipt of remittances for several years and this information is very useful for finding out about their impact on the socioeconomic situation of the population. It has thus been shown that almost all households with members abroad receive remittances and that the latter contribute to alleviating the poverty of families in the country of origin: of the households which receive remittances, the percentage classified as poor according to income is much lower than for the family units which do not have this support (Maguid, 1999).

Another aspect of the surveys that has not been sufficiently exploited is research into the emigration expectations of the population. The estimation of various grades of probability of emigrating associated with the sociodemographic and economic characteristics of persons and households would be a very useful input to project future migration behaviour and to design preventive policies in the places of origin to facilitate the effective integration of potential emigrants.

Emigration can also be investigated on the basis of surveys conducted in the country of destination: this is the case of the United States Current Population Survey, which can be used to monitor trends and become acquainted with the characteristics of migrants originating from those Latin American countries which are sufficiently represented in the United States.

In some countries, the household surveys do not have national coverage, and take place only in urban areas; this is not a serious limitation in the cases of Argentina and Uruguay, for example, because they are countries with a high degree of urbanization. Another problem to resolve is that there is still a high degree of heterogeneity between the countries both in relation to the periodicity with which questions relating to migration are included - in some countries they are applied in all waves, while in others their inclusion is neither systematic nor permanent, and in some countries are simply not considered - and in relation to the type of variables investigated. Comparability could be achieved by including periodically, for example every *n* years, migration sections with very few questions, but the same ones in all surveys; moreover, in order to measure international immigration it would be sufficient to include the questions on place of birth and the year of arrival in the country⁸.

The advantage of these sources is that they are already used in almost all the countries of the region on a regular basis and at least once a year. In the case of Central America, there is national coverage in all the countries of the region, except in Guatemala, where the surveys were suspended during the 1990s but are expected to begin again in the current year.

Another important factor, in terms of the cost-benefit relationship, is that this type of survey can be used to take advantage of the existing logistical infrastructure and enhance the research into international migration, if necessary, by adding a special section to the basic questionnaire.

Various countries in the region - Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras and Venezuela - have evaluated the suitability of household surveys for measuring international migration, taking the censuses as a standard, and have achieved positive results.

The record of international entries and departures is the only continuous source that can report on the dynamics of international movements, as it picks up migration flows, and should provide information not only on immigration of foreigners but also the emigration of natives.

If there is a continuous record, all the movements across national borders can be counted, unlike the case of censuses and surveys, which record the number of migrants present at the time they are carried out. The status of these records is very heterogeneous in Latin America, but irrespective of the progress made in each country, there is a series of difficulties common to them all, which is inherent in the characteristics of these administrative records. In general, the emphasis is on the tasks of supervision and the administrative function rather than on statistics, which tends to lead to omissions and under-recording. It has been shown that entries of foreigners are recorded more accurately than their departures, which leads to an overestimation of the balance of foreigners. The contrary is the case for natives, as their departures are recorded more effectively than their entries, resulting in an overestimate of the emigration of nationals.

⁸ The absence of migration questions in the surveys is often due to the low priority given to the issue or to budgetary restrictions. The case of Argentina is an example: questions on migration were not included from 1985 to 1993. In 1993, thanks to the rise in unemployment and the associated questions that emerged concerning the role of immigration, the questions were re-introduced on a permanent basis in the two annual waves of the survey.

Other limitations relate to problems in defining the different migration categories used to qualify the foreigners who enter, as these categories relate to legal criteria which do not reflect the real purpose of the movement. There are also problems in defining "border transits", which should not be included in entry and departure statistics as they are circular movements which occur within a radius close to the border.

Data on the sociodemographic characteristics of persons that can be recorded with a certain degree of reliability are limited to age, sex, the country of birth and country of residence, whereas other data, such as occupation or the reason for the journey, are declaratory in nature and thus cannot meet the standard of rigour required for them to be useful.

These errors, together with the lack of uniform criteria to define the various categories of international migrants and the use of different national records systems make intra-regional comparisons very difficult. In Central America significant progress has been made through various consultation bodies (OCAM and the Puebla Process) and a migration control card has been established which is used in all countries of the region, collecting the same information.

The situation with regard to accurate and timely availability of statistical data from the records shows the greatest heterogeneity among countries and is one of the fundamental issues which has to be resolved in order to establish a single system. In the first place there are differences in the coverage of the records; in some countries the information available only covers movements that took place via airports. This is the case of Guatemala, where there are no estimates of land movements, although the latter would include movements occurring at very important crossing points, such as those on the border with Mexico. Secondly, different computer systems are used for data storage, which makes it impossible to have compatible databases at the regional level. The variables entered and the tables produced are different from country to country. Lastly, the timeliness and periodicity with which the results are made available are far from similar, as they depend on the mechanisms adopted in each country throughout the recording process, from data collection at the border posts to their statistical processing.

All of these elements make it difficult to have information comparable between the countries, and thus priority should be given to activities to improve and optimize all stages of the process, in order to ensure continuity and participation in a system.

In relation to other administrative records which could provide complementary information, the records of visas and residence permits issued to foreigners usually count the number of applications made, rather than the number of foreigners in each category, as they are not updated to take account of changes of category, departures from the country or deaths.

The recent phenomenon of deportation of Central Americans from North America illustrates the need for systematizing statistics on deported returnees in a homogenous manner.

With regard to exploring innovative methods for incorporating into the system sources specifically designed for the study of migration or for dealing with other forms of mobility, advantage may be taken of the experience gained in some countries of the Americas and Europe. Comprehensive studies on these experiences and on the design of surveys to investigate the determining factors and consequences of international migration have been carried out in the countries of both origin and destination (Bilsborrow, Oberai and Zlotnik, 1997).

In Latin America it is worth mentioning the survey of spatial mobility in the metropolitan area of Bogota (Dureau, 1992) and the substantial Mexican experience of research on migration from Mexico to the United States, which has been taking place since 1979, through numerous surveys, some of which focus on the issue of undocumented persons returning to Mexico. One of the most novel in terms of methodology is the survey of migration at the northern border of Mexico (EMIF) by the Colegio de la Frontera Norte. It counts migrants in flow, which is the target population is "the migration event". The EMIF methodology considers migrants as units in movement which are observed during their displacement, at specific moments of the day and in selected places according

to probabilistic methods, in such a way that they are grouped in sufficient numbers for counting, selection and interviews. This methodology assumes a broad prior knowledge of the direction of movements, the places of arrival or departure of the migrants (airports, bus or train stations) and on the time frequency of the movements (Corona Vázquez, 1997).

Logically, the inclusion of such specific sources in an information system at the Latin American or subregional level should take place gradually and when the phenomenon is better understood according to the sources available and field observation. In the SIEMCA project, for example, a specific survey is planned of population movements, in the countries with the greatest concentration of immigrants or potential emigrants at two moments in time: one coinciding with the censuses and the other halfway through the intercensal period.

5. Prospects for meeting immediate requirements

In order to make progress towards the formation of a Migration Information System, governments and organizations of the countries of the Latin American region, as well as the main receiving countries for extra-regional emigration (United States and Canada), need to make a commitment and take an active part in consensus initiatives, firstly to improve the sources that are already available and make them compatible, which requires the direct participation of the national organizations that produce migration information, in particular the offices of migration and the statistical offices or institutes.

The institutional strategy defined in SIEMCA is an example of the mechanisms that can be established in order to guarantee adequate inter-agency coordination between international organizations with expertise in this area, such as IOM and CELADE, the data-producing organizations of the countries of the continent and the regional integration authorities.

A decision to designate national links in the statistical offices and migration departments to participate in the tasks of enhancing the sources and making them comparable both within each country and between countries would help in moving forward with setting up a system, so that a project such as the one launched in Central America could be implemented.

Establishing links the different types of sources, enhancing compatibility and maximizing the use of the data already being produced is a challenge to be met at the level of immediate requirements. This activity involves the population censuses, the household surveys and administrative records of entries and departures.

With regard to future censuses, it would be advisable to make progress in making the questions more compatible as well as in the processing of migration variables and of those relating to the population's demographic, education and economic characteristics, in such a way as to ensure that tables are available with the same information for all countries.

It is especially important to make efforts to achieve the conceptual and operational homogenization of the migration variables and categories of the mechanisms for recording entries and departures from the country by air, land and river used in the countries, as well as making the information systems compatible, and producing standardized statistical tables to ensure comparability. The enhancement and optimization of procedures and mechanisms used in the different stages of the recording process, from the collection of the data at the checkpoints to their information and statistical treatment in the migration departments are a basic condition for providing the system with updated and compatible information.

The growing phenomenon of deportation of Latin Americans, mainly Mexicans and Central Americans, from the countries of North America and the consequent reintegration measures that are implemented in the countries of the region, means that updated information is needed on the numbers and socioeconomic characteristics of the deportees.

Another possible requirement is the use of comparable sections on migration in the household surveys that are conducted regularly by the countries, ensuring that they are used with a similar or at least comparable periodicity. In the context of the meetings held and the progress made in enhancing the comparability of the social and employment variables included in the countries' surveys, it would be useful and feasible to include the migration issue.

Lastly, in order to establish the scale and characteristics of Latin American emigration it is essential to obtain information from the population censuses, from some surveys - such as the Current Population Survey of the United States - and the registers of the principal destination countries.

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B.2 SOPEMI. Continuous Reporting System on Migration

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I. Description of the system

The Continuous Reporting System on Migration, for which the acronym SOPEMI has been used since 1983, is a statistical service of the Secretariat of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which provides data on international migration flows and on the foreign population present in almost all the member countries of that organization¹⁰.

The data are collected in each of the member countries by the System's national correspondents (33 in 1999¹¹). These correspondents are responsible for producing an annual report which contains the most recent data on entries, departures, and the immigration population present in the country, as well as analysis of flow trends and the situation of resident immigrants. The reports are collected by the Secretariat of the Organization, and are used to prepare a periodical publication: "Trends in international migration. Continuous Reporting System on Migration." The main themes covered in these reports are trends in immigration flows and changes in the immigrant population resident in the country (foreigners or non-natives); on the situation of immigrant workers in the labour market and on the immigration policies of their governments. The Secretary usually also chooses a specific issue each year for the correspondents to study in greater depth in their respective countries (the most recent being education, the family, and clandestine immigration).

The annual publication contains summaries of the national reports and, of course, a statistical annex which includes three main groups of data¹²:

Tables with national totals for the foreign population (or population born abroad), on:

- Annual migration flows (entries, departures and migration balance);
- Requests for asylum;
- Stocks at the end of the year;
- Nationality acquisitions.

Tables with national totals of foreign workers, on:

- Annual entry flows;
- Stocks at the end of the year.

Tables for each member country listed by nationality (or country of birth) on:

- Annual migration flows (entries, departures and migration balance), both of the foreign population and foreign workers. Includes asylum-seekers;
- Stocks at the end of the year, both of the foreign population and of foreign workers;
- Nationality acquisitions.

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¹⁰ Of the 29 member countries, information may not be available for Iceland, Greece, New Zealand, Poland and Turkey. Table 1 lists the member countries of the OECD.

¹¹ Originally they were non-governmental experts selected in each country, although they could include persons nominated by governments. At present only 40% of the correspondents are still officially independent.

¹² These data are currently available in computerized form (compact discs).

The data on immigration flows and population come from a wide variety of sources, which are different from country to country. Compatibility is hard to achieve, as the data reflect migration systems and national government policies which are the result of different situations, thus making it difficult to harmonize the data. This especially applies to the case of employment of the foreign and/or immigrant population. The correspondents therefore have to make a special effort to obtain data that are "compatible" with those of other countries or, otherwise, to identify the features which would help to interpret them within the system as a whole.

Although SOPEMI does not have the authority to impose changes in the procedures for data records in member countries, its task to seek enhanced harmonization of the information plays an important role in the definition of the basic minimum that these sources should include, so that in practice appropriate standards for data collection and processing will tend to be adopted. The independent correspondents, who are experts in the study of international migration, thus help to provide a more general and equitable perspective (incorporating both the views of the immigrants and those of the governments) for devising the standards.

In the chapter referring to immigration policies, there is information on the current situation and the most recent actions taken by the competent official organizations, either to control international migration flows, or relating to labour market access and the living conditions of the foreign population (housing, education, health, etc.).

"Illegal" immigration is a special case, which affects the international compatibility of migration statistics. Its measurement, or rather its estimation, tends to be viewed with much scepticism, and so it is not usually not explicitly included in publications on migration flows or on the foreign population. Despite this fact, the data of some countries do include them partially, and the correspondents monitor clandestine immigration and the undocumented foreign population on a continuous basis, including them in their reports in a timely manner.

II. Sources of information

Although in principle SOPEMI works on the basis of United Nations recommendations on the standardization of migration data collection (the first dates from 1976 and the most recent from 1989), the definition of migration and migrant population that it finally adopted includes all persons who cross international borders, without reference to their habitual place of residence, or a minimum duration of stay. This is why the statistics collected by SOPEMI include data (for some countries) on refugees and temporary workers, categories not considered as migrants by the United Nations.

A first division between member countries can be established with respect to the definition of immigrant population. The first and smaller group¹³ (see table 1) define it on the basis of the criterion of place of birth (natives or non-natives). The other countries define it on the basis of the nationality criterion (nationals or foreigners). Recently some countries have been changing this situation, trying to adopt a definition which incorporates the advantages of the two previous ones (France, in the 1990s, place of birth and nationality of origin). The time of residence is not expressly considered, although the distinction between long- or short-term migrants is considered important. Another distinction can be made according to the availability of a population reporting system. Only some European countries of the OECD have some type of continuous population reporting system, as well as the Republic of Korea and Japan (although their reporting only covers foreigners). The other countries use different statistical sources, mainly official permits (for residence or work) or censuses and surveys. Although some countries (such as Spain and Italy) have a continuous information reporting system, their coverage has not yet been sufficient to satisfy the minimum requirements of SOPEMI, and hence the published data generally refer to permits.

¹³ Australia, Canada and the United States.

Table 1

SOPEMI: STATISTICAL SOURCE ON IMMIGRATION AND DEFINITION USED FOR IMMIGRANT POPULATION

Countries	Immigrant population Flows/Stocks	Foreign workers Flows/Stocks	Definition of immigrant population	
			Non nationals	Non-natives
EUROPE				
European Union				
Germany	PR/PR	P/Others	X	
Austria	PR/PR	P/P	X	
Belgium	PR/PR	P/P	X	
Denmark	PR/PR	P/PR	X	
Spain	-/P	P/P	X	
France	P/C	P/S	X	X
Greece			X	
Ireland	-/S	P/S	X	
Italy	Otros	P/P	X	
Luxembourg	PR/PR	P/P	X	
Netherlands	PR/PR	Others/Others	X	
Norway	PR/PR	-/PR	X	
Portugal	-/P	-/P	X	
United Kingdom	P/S	P/S	X	
Sweden	PR/PR	-/P	X	
Others				
Finland	PR/PR		X	
Hungary	PR/PR	P/P	X	
Iceland			X	
Poland			X	
Czech Republic	-/PR		X	
Switzerland	PR/PR	P/P	X	
Turkey			X	
AMERICA				
Canada	P/C	P/C		X
United States	P/C	P/C		X
Mexico				
ASIA				
Republic of Korea	-/PR *		X	
Japan	PR/PR *	-/P	X	
OCEANÍA				
Australia	P/C	P/S		X
New Zealand				
Member countries of OECD (1999)				

Flows/Stocks PR: Population register *: Only foreigners
P: Official permits C: Censuses S: Surveys

The continuous population reporting system is the best known means of recording population migration movements. Its administrative basis is well-known: individuals have to declare their intention of residing in a country (arrival) or leaving a country (departure) in some local government department. By adding the local records, national data are obtained for all the migration currents (entries and departures, for both nationals and foreigners), as well as the totals for resident population, whether national or foreign. This statistical source can monitor the migration movements of the entire population, foreign or otherwise, by means of the requirement for residence certification, supplied by the local authorities. This certification is needed in order to use various services such as water, light, telephone, schools, etc., as well as to be included on the electoral rolls for the different electoral processes (at the national or community level). Other features of this source include:

- In many cases they allow actual migration movements to be counted, rather than just the migrant persons, as a migrant may move more than once in the period considered.
- Departures from the country are usually under-recorded to some degree.

- In general the European countries use the criterion of duration of less than one year recommended by the United Nations.

The migration statistics of countries which do have continuous population reporting are usually of better quality than of those which do not, especially with regard to migration flows.

Official residence or work permits are the source that is most used by the countries which do not have a continuous reporting system. The information in this case is more limited, as on the one hand it does not cover all the migration flows (minors, departures) and, on the other hand, it may reduce the estimate of the total number of immigrants and/or foreigners (as "current permits" are counted rather than persons ¹⁴).

In the case of work permits the variation of categories (specialized, professional, non-specialized, seasonal, temporary, border, etc.) and of how they are applied in different countries is even greater, which sometimes makes it difficult to distinguish between temporary and permanent.

The censuses and surveys are usually combined to obtain the national and foreign population totals for specific dates. The potential of censuses for analysing population subgroups is well-known, as well as their main limitation, which is the large intercensal period (5 to 10 years). Surveys, which at present are usually conducted on an annual basis, have serious limitations with regard to the statistical representation of minority groups, whose number are usually small.

Both sources also have limitations with regard to reporting migrants or non-natives who are beyond the scope of the census (asylum-seekers, etc.) or who do not live in private homes (guest houses, etc.).

2.1 Measurement of migration flows

With regard to the measurement of migration flows, SOPEMI uses data from population records or from official permits. The types of flows measured in this way are clearly different. The former can be used to obtain data on entries and departures of both nationals and foreigners, with the limitations referred to above (see figure 1). The latter source, which does not usually include departures from the country, provides the number of permits issued or granted ¹⁵ during a specific period to foreigners, and their significance depends on the characteristics of the types of permits (figure 2). A distinction can thus be made between the "permanent residence" permits on which the statistics of Australia, Canada and the United States are based, and the different types of permit (of limited duration, generally less than one year) which are used in other countries, such as France and Spain. Obviously, they do not report the flows of nationals, as they do not need any type of permit to reside in the country. The statistics on migration flows based on permits do not include all the existing currents, in particular in the area of the European Union, where the nationals of the member countries do not need "permits" in order to reside on a temporary basis and/or to work within any country in the community area.


Lastly, it should be recalled that statistics on "current permits" do not necessarily reflect the real flows of "persons". A permit may be valid although the person has decided to leave the country, or does not intend to make use of it. A permit may be requested by a person who has already been resident in the country for some time. In countries which issue different kinds of permits, the issuing of a new permit may reflect a change of status of a person who is already resident in the country, etc.

¹⁴ One person may apply for more than one permit in a particular period. A permit may be current although the person is not in the country.

¹⁵ To the extent that the official residence and/or work permits imply specific rights and obligations, they are only granted to those who comply with the necessary legal requirements. For this reason there is usually a difference between the number of requests and the number of permits granted, which increases when there are periods of higher immigration, and this is one of the main factors contributing to the numbers of "illegal" immigrants, together with undocumented entries.

To summarize, only some countries (those with continuous population reporting; see table 1) have statistics on the currents of migration flows, and in these countries the currents of departures (emigration) tend to be under-reported in relation to entries (immigration). The rest of the countries do not, strictly speaking, have data on migration flows (understanding as such the movement of persons across political-administrative spatial divisions, with the aim of establishing a habitual place of residence), but on the administrative statistics for a specific group of permits, which refer only indirectly to the entry (immigration) or residence of non-nationals in their territories. Immigration currents of nationals and all emigration are excluded.


Figure 1
SOPEMI. FOREIGN MIGRATION CURRENTS FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES
WITH CONTINUOUS POPULATION REGISTERS



Source: Continuous Reporting System on Migration (SOPEMI), Trends in International Migration: Annual Report 1999, Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 1999.

Figure 2

**SOPEMI. FOREIGN IMMIGRANTS CURRENTS FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES
WITH DATA BASED ON OFFICIAL PERMITS**




Source: Continuous Reporting System on Migration (SOPEMI), Trends in International Migration: Annual Report 1999, Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 1999.

2.2 Immigrant population

Together with the annual series of migration flows, the national reports usually contain time series of immigrant population totals, according to some socioeconomic characteristics which allow them to be compared with the native population. There exist, however, differences in the definitions of "immigrants" between member countries. The majority group of countries which provide data on the population of foreign nationals (European countries, Japan and the Republic of Korea), and the rest, which have data on the non-native population (Australia, Canada and the United States) (see annex A.2 and figures 3 and 4).


There are differences owing to the different legal criteria on the acquisition of nationality. Thus, countries whose nationality is granted by consanguinity, independently of the place of birth, usually provide data according to the criterion of legal nationality. On the other hand, countries whose nationality is obtained by territoriality (birth) provide data based on the criterion of place of birth.

Figure 3
OECD. FOREIGN POPULATION 1997, SELECTED COUNTRIES




Source: Continuous Reporting System on Migration (SOPEMI), *Trends in International Migration: Annual Report 1999*, Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 1999.

Figure 4
OECD. FOREIGN POPULATION 1996-97.
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION OF EACH COUNTRY



The non-native population may be considered as the first generation of immigrants (whether foreigners or not). The population of foreigners (non-nationals) include both the first and second generations (or more) of immigrants. But they do not include the immigration flow of nationals. For this reason the data on "non-native" population are usually greater than those referring to the "foreign" population, and thus direct comparison may distort the perception of the trend of these populations in each country, as well as differences between countries, as in some cases the data on the non-native population may be double that of the foreign population (figure 5), owing to factors that include a decline in the foreign population caused by the cumulative effect of naturalizations.

Figure 5
SOPEMI. DATA ON NON NATIVE AND FOREIGN POPULATION



Source: Continuous Reporting System on Migration (SOPEMI), Trends in International Migration: Annual Report 1999, Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 1999.

It is nevertheless clear that the "non-native population" includes exclusively immigrants, although not all immigrants (returned natives) and is not affected by naturalizations (table 2). On the other hand, the "foreign population" includes both immigrants, but not all immigrants (nationals), and non-immigrants (foreigners born in the country) and is affected by naturalizations. The combination of both criteria offers a better understanding of the situation of the immigrant population in the receiving countries (now provided to SOPEMI by a growing number of OECD countries). The debate that arose in France at the beginning of the 1990s should be understood in this context. Criticisms of the exclusive use of the criterion of nationality in the study of immigration¹⁶ led to a move to change this, after more than a century, to the place of birth and nationality of origin.

¹⁶ M. Tribalat has shown in various studies that the use of this criterion not only affected the numbers of the immigrant population, but also the characteristics of the populations thus defined (Tribalat, 1991; Tribalat, Garson and others, 1991). A recent summary of the situation can be seen in: Simon (1999).

2.3 Special cases

Refugees and asylees

These persons are not formally considered as migrants during the process of granting the status requested (asylee or refugee), as if it is not granted they have to leave the country (in the case of the European Union, the entire community area) and for administrative purposes "never migrated". The duration of stay can vary from several months to more than a year. In this situation, countries have different policies regarding the inclusion of those seeking asylee or refugee status in SOPEMI data. Some European countries which have continuous population reporting systems include them, either partially or totally, in the data on the resident foreign population, especially if they are living outside the reception centres.

Independently, there are statistics on requests for asylum or refugee status from other administrative sources, although with clear differences between the member countries. In some countries, only persons who have been granted the corresponding status (asylee or refugee) are counted, in which case they appear as immigrants in the data on flows, at the date of granting of the respective status (and not the date of arrival in the country). In some countries the data include those dependent on the main applicant, in others (such as France) the dependants have to apply for other types of permits.

The data in the tables on asylees and refugees can be added to those of immigrants, except for those countries where they are already included, a situation which is sometimes difficult to clarify.

Naturalized persons

Acquisitions of nationality (naturalizations) should be taken into account when analysing immigrant trends. In countries where the acquisition of nationality does not present major problems (France, Belgium), an increase in the foreign immigration current and in associated births leads within a few years to an increase in the national population. In other countries, where naturalization is more difficult (Germany, Switzerland), births associated with new foreign immigrants may result in large increases in the foreign population.

The cumulative effect of naturalizations also has a direct impact on the numbers of the foreign population. Thus, in countries with annual naturalization rates higher than 5% of its foreign population (see figures 6 and 7 and annex A3), the relative stability of the total number of foreigners indicates a substantial amount of hidden immigration due to the number of annual naturalizations.

Figure 6
SOPEMI 1996-97 NATURALIZATIONS





Figure 7
SOPEMI 1996-97 NATURALIZATION RATES



Source: Continuous Reporting System on Migration (SOPEMI), *Trends in International Migration: Annual Report 1999*, Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 1999.

2.4 Accounting

The variations in definitions, criteria and needs of statistical sources on migration between the countries of SOPEMI have a significant effect on the scale of the statistics on flows and on migrant populations. Briefly, prior to the comparison of SOPEMI data, the migration system ¹⁷ adopted by each country should be noted. There are three main groups:

- "Settling" immigration (Australia, Canada and the United States)
This is the most stable criterion, using the place of birth to define the immigrant population (non-natives or born abroad). There is usually no continuous population reporting system. The selection takes place at the time of admission (a "permanent" residence permit can be obtained on entering the country). There are immigration policies for admittance on the assumption that the immigrants will establish themselves in the country definitively. The data usually have an administrative basis, in terms of the number of "permanent" permits, so that the immigrant population does not usually include short-term immigrants.
- Temporary migration related to employment (Europe, Republic of Korea and Japan)
This is the most flexible criterion, but tends to become a mixed model of longer-term residence. It is characterized by the use of the nationality criterion to define the immigrant population (foreigners). They usually have continuous population reporting systems. Residence permits are temporary and a long period of residence (more than five years, with successive temporary permits) to obtain a permanent permit. The immigration policies are restrictive, with the expectation that immigrants return to their country once their assignment has been completed.
- Long-term non-permanent migration, a kind of intermediate situation with respect to the previous two (France, Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden).

As can be seen, the definition of immigrant population is directly related to the migration system:

- Nationality criterion: immigrant = foreigner (non-national)
- Includes different generations of immigrants;
- Does not include national immigrants;
- Not all those included are immigrants (see c);
- Includes legal and political criteria in its definition which is a serious restriction in terms of international comparability.
- Criterion of place of birth: immigrant = born abroad (non-native)
- Only includes the first generation of immigrants;
- The entire population included is immigrant;
- Includes naturalized foreigners;
- Includes nationals born abroad;
- Not affected by naturalization.

¹⁷ Migration system: particular combination of types of migration flows between countries of departure and countries of arrival with the laws and regulations which control these flows and the organizations responsible for applying them. Moulrier Boutang and Papademetriou, 1994, page 22.

Table 2

Nationality	Place of birth	
	Natives	Non-Natives
Nationals	(a)	(b) naturalized immigrants
Foreigners	(c) non-immigrants	(d) immigrants

Depending on which system is adopted, government action will vary with regard to the three main concerns of migration policies¹⁸:

- The entry of immigrants. Problems in control of the entry or departure flows (in quantity and quality);
- Access to the labour market. Problems of regulating the labour market in relation to the economically active foreign population.
- Social integration. Problems of integration of increasingly diverse categories of immigrants, including immigrant workers and their families (children born in the receiving country) and temporary migrants.

In principle, the countries with migration policies based on the granting of temporary residence permits might have more substantial immigration currents. In theory, the comparison between the systems based on population records and those based on official permits implies that the former would record less immigration, as some persons may not manage to register their stay and others may not manage to stay long enough to be registered. There are also the different characteristics of the two types of sources. Population records and official permits do not produce compatible statistics, for reasons which include the following:

- The official permits cannot be compared with the register of immigrants because the granting of a permit does not necessarily correspond to the initial "entry" in the register.
- The population records of different countries are not easily comparable owing to the different methods used for the records of each country.
- In areas where there is free movement of persons (European Union - Schengen) the sources based on official permits do not record movements of persons from the member countries.
- Naturalizations may affect a significant percentage of the foreign population.
- The differences in practices for recording asylee and refugee petitions can be a significant cause of incompatibility, especially when there is a higher number of petitions (as in the countries bordering Eastern Europe).

III. Clandestine immigration

As clandestine immigration, by definition, eludes statistical records, the first difficulty in studying it is how to define¹⁹ and measure it. The "clandestine" nature of this type of migration is

¹⁸ Migration policy: a subsystem of migration systems which includes, where there is rule of law, any action of central governments or local authorities which is based on international treaties, or national agreements, laws and associated circulars. The migration policy also includes administrative practices which define, apply and legitimize decisions concerning foreign populations, within a given institutional framework. Moulrier and Papdemetriou, 1994.

¹⁹ The ILO (1975 Conference, Agreement No. 143) defines clandestine or illegal immigration as movements in which the migrants are subjected "during their journey, on arrival or during their period of residence and employment to conditions contravening relevant international multilateral or bilateral instruments or agreements, or national laws or regulations".

the result of legal requirements (and their deficiencies) which regulate entry to and departure from countries and the regulations which control access to the labour market.

In countries such as the United States and Canada which are open to immigration, illegal immigration is an option for those who do not meet the necessary criteria to obtain a visa, for those who would have to wait longer than they would wish in order to obtain one and also for those for whom unauthorized entry is less "expensive" than obtaining a visa. In countries such as those in Europe, where entry to and residence in the country is strictly limited to certain types of immigrants, clandestine immigration is the only possible option for semi –or unskilled workers from non–community countries, except for family members and asylee²⁰. In both cases, the visas and residence permits have a maximum permitted duration, which depends on the type of visa or permit (tourist, student, temporary worker) or on the obligation to have them. When they expire, the immigrants are in an illegal situation.

Illegal immigration is thus made up of those who enter the country without papers, whereas the undocumented or illegal foreign population is made up of the latter plus those immigrants whose permits have expired.

In Europe, unlike the countries open to immigration such as the United States, the legal status of an immigrant terminates when a request for renewal of a residence permit is rejected, independently of the initial situation. A number of "undocumented" persons is thus generated (which is distinct from clandestine immigration) which usually come to light during the regularization drives which take place on a periodic basis, the most recent being as follow:

- Spain, July 2000, approximately 200,000 petitions (about 25% of the foreign population at the beginning of the year); .
- France, 1997-98, 77,800 regularized; .
- Greece, 1997-98, 374,800 regularized;
- Italy, 1996, 258,761 petitions (about 24% of the foreign population);
- Portugal, 1996 21,800 regularized (about 13% of the foreign population).

The scale of these data, as well as their trend to increase since the 1970s, and their "echo", the undocumented resident population, has led to the debate on immigration policies being reduced virtually to a debate on clandestine immigration. Preventing the entry of undocumented foreigners and control of foreigners present without current residence or work permits²¹ has become the main objective of immigration policies. In the 1990s debates have re-emerged, in particular in the European countries, on racism and xenophobia which indicate the effect that these political attitudes have on civil society.

The positive nature of migration is widely accepted, as shown by numerous studies from the most diverse fields of social sciences²². In the countries of emigration it acts as a kind of safety valve with regard to the imbalances in supply and demand in the labour market, moderating the decline in salaries. In the countries of immigration, these currents bring the contribution of a labour force whose training costs have been covered elsewhere and, in addition, a contribution to those areas or work that are relatively neglected by national workers, where businessmen would have to close their businesses if they could not rely on the greater wage flexibility of the immigrants. In addition, remittances of foreign currency, owing to their impact on the economy of the countries of origin of these immigrants, have become the most effective support for development. Apart from

²⁰ Tapinos, 1999, pp. 229-230.

²¹ These two permits are generally linked, as the lack or expiry of one leads to cancellation of the other.

²² Except in particular cases, such as the "brain drain".

the impact of this activity on the commercial balance, its direct impact on the distribution of income is much greater than the "guided" investments of the World Bank and bilateral cooperation ²³.

Clandestine migration is one aspect of the social phenomenon of international migration whose incidence depends to a great extent on the immigration policies of each country. The problem should not be centred on the immigrant who is seeking work but on the causes; it is not restricted to any particular migration regime. Neither the regimes that are open to migration such as in North America, nor those which close their borders such as the European countries, are able to guarantee the prevention of clandestine entries or of the illegal residence of foreigners.

²³ Conclusion of the Conference on Migration and International Cooperation, Madrid, March 1993. The importance of remittances, both in the domestic economies and in the national accounts of the countries of origin is emphasized in most monographic studies on this subject.

Annex

A. 1

MIGRATION FLOW OF FOREIGNERS AND FLOW OF ASYLUM-SEEKERS

SOPEMI. Migration flow of foreigners* (thousands)						Flow of asylum-seekers (thousands)					
Country	1983	1986	1991	1996	1997	1983	1986	1991	1996	1997	1998
Immigration						Immigration					
Data based on population registers											
Germany	(a) 273,2	478,3	929,5	708,0	615,3	19,7	99,7	256	116,4	104,1	98,7
Austria						5,9	8,6	27,3	7,0	6,7	13,8
Belgium	34,3	39,3	54,1	51,9	49,2	2,9	7,6	15,4	12,4	11,8	22,0
Denmark	(b) 17,0	26,6	17,5	24,7		0,3	9,3	4,6	5,9	5,1	5,7
Finland			12,4	7,5	8,1		0,1	2,1	0,7	1,0	1,3
Hungary			23,0	12,8	13,4					1,1	7,4
Japan			258,4	225,4	274,8						
Luxembourg	6,2	7,4	10,0	9,2	9,7			2,0	3,0	4,0	1,6
Norway	13,1	16,8	16,1	17,2	22,0	0,2	2,7	4,6	1,8	2,3	8,3
Netherlands	(c) 36,4	52,8	84,3	77,2	76,7	2	5,9	21,6	22,9	34,4	42,5
Sweden	(d) 22,3	34,0	43,9	29,3	33,4	44	14,6	27,4	5,8	9,6	13,0
Switzerland	(e) 58,3	66,8	109,8	74,3	72,8	7,9	8,5	41,6	18,0	24,0	41,2
Data based on permits											
Australia	93,2	92,4	121,7	99,1	85,8			17,0	6,0	9,3	7,80
Canada	89,2	99,2	230,8	226,1	216,0			32,2	25,7	22,6	22,60
Republic of Korea											
Spain	(f) 17,0	25,0	59,0	54,0	55,0	(f) 1,4	2,8	8,1	4,7	5,0	6,50
United States	559,8	601,7	1827,2	915,9	798,4			56,3	128,2	79,8	50,80
France	64,2	38,3	109,9	75,5	102,4	22,3	26,2	47,4	17,4	21,4	21,80
Greece						0,5	4,3	2,7	1,6	4,4	2,60
Ireland								0,1	1,2	3,9	4,60
Italy						3,1	6,5	31,7	0,7	1,9	4,70
Portugal						0,6	0,1	0,2	0,3	0,3	0,38
United Kingdom	53,5	47,8	203,9	216,3	236,9	4,3	5,7	73,4	37,0	41,5	57,70
Czech Republic								2,0	2,2	2,1	4,10
Emigration						Note: Does not include refugees					
Data based on population registers											
Germany	424,9	347,8	497,5	559,1	637,1	(f) Data on main petitioners, do not include family members.					
Austria											
Belgium	38,5	31,8	35,3	32,4	23,5						
Denmark	14,0	15,1	5,2	6,0							
Finland			1,1	3,0	1,6						
Hungary											
Japan			181,3	160,1	176,6						
Luxembourg	6,2	5,5	5,9	5,6	5,8						
Norway	8,0	8,4	8,4	10,0	10,0						
Netherlands	28,0	23,06	21,3	22,4	21,9						
Sweden	17,4	15,4	15,0	14,5	15,3						
Switzerland	61,7	52,8	66,4	67,7	63,4						
Net migration											
Data based on population registers											
Germany			423,0	148,9	-21,8						
Austria											
Belgium			18,8	19,5	25,7						
Denmark			12,3	18,7	0,0						
Finland			11,3	4,5	6,5						
Hungary											
Japan			77,1	65,3	98,2						
Luxembourg			4,1	3,6	3,9						
Norway			7,7	7,2	12,0						
Netherlands			63,0	54,8	54,8						
Sweden			28,9	14,8	18,1						
Switzerland			43,4	6,6	9,4						

Source: SOPEMI. Various years (most recent: 1999)

* The criteria for the register are different in different countries, so that the data are not entirely compatible.

(a) Until 1990, only West Germany. As of 1991, also include East Germany.

(b) Entries of foreigners who have been resident in the country for more than a year. Does not include asylum-seekers with temporary permits.

(c) Includes some asylum-seekers.

(d) Does not include permits for a period of less than one year.

(e) Entries of foreigners with residence permit who return after a temporary stay. Does not include border or seasonal workers.

(f) Estimates.

A. 2
OECD. FOREIGN POPULATION. 1983-1997

Country	Thousands					Foreign population				
	1983	1986	1991	1996	1997	1983	1986	1991	1996	1997
						% of total population				
Data based on population registers										
Germany (a)	4534,9	4512,7	5882,3	7314,0	7365,8	7,4	7,4	7,3	8,9	9,0
Austria	296,70	314,9	532,7	728,2	732,7	3,9	4,1	6,8	9,0	9,1
Belgium	890,9	853,2	922,5	911,9	903,2	9,0	8,6	9,2	9,0	8,9
Denmark	104,1	128,3	169,5	237,7	246,6	2,0	2,5	3,3	4,7	4,7
Finland	15,7	17,3	37,6	73,8	80,6	0,3	0,4	0,8	1,4	1,6
Hungary				142,2	143,8				1,4	1,4
Japan (b)	817,1	941,0	1218,9	1415,1	1482,7		0,8	1,0	1,1	1,2
Luxembourg	96,2	97,3	117,8	142,8	147,7	26,3	26,3	30,2	34,1	34,9
Norway (b)	94,7	135,9	147,8	157,5	158,0	2,3	2,6	3,5	3,6	3,6
Netherlands	552,4	568,0	732,9	679,9	678,1	3,8	3,9	4,8	4,4	
Sweden	397,1	390,8	493,8	596,6	522,0	4,8	4,7	5,7	6,0	6,0
Switzerland	925,6	956,0	1163,2	1337,6	1340,8	14,4	14,7	17,1	18,9	19,0
Data based on permits										
Republic of Korea (b)		45,1	51,0	148,7	176,9		0,1	0,1	0,3	
Spain (c)	210,4	293,2	360,7	539,0	609,8	0,5	0,8	0,9	1,3	1,5
France (e)	3714,2		3596,6					6,3		
Ireland (f)	83,00	77,00	87,70	118,00	114,40	2,4	2,2	2,5	3,2	3,1
Italy	381,30	450,20	863,00	1095,60	1240,70	0,7	0,8	1,5	2,0	
Portugal (b)		94,70	114,00	172,90	175,30		1,0	1,2	1,7	1,8
United Kingdom (g)	1601,0	1820,0	1750,0	1934,0	1066,0	2,8	3,2	3,1	3,4	3,6
Czech Republic (e)			41,2	198,6	209,8					
Data on the non-native population (x)										
Australia	3003,8	3247,4	3753,3	3908,3		20,6	20,8	22,3	21,1	
Canada	3843,3	3908,0	4342,9	4971,1		16,1	15,4	16,1	17,4	
United States	14019,9		19767,3	24600,0		6,2		7,9	9,3	

Source: SOPEMI. Various years (most recent: 1999)

Spain and Portugal –residence permits. Ireland and United Kingdom– survey of work force.

(a) As of 1991, includes East Germany.

(b) 1988.

(c) Does not include short-term permits (less than six months) or students.

(d) 1990.

(e) 1982 and 1990 censuses.

(f) Data estimated on the basis of the annual survey of the work force.

(g) 1984.

(x) Census data on those born abroad (non-natives). U.S.A 1980, 1990 and 1996. Australia and Canada 1981, 1986, 1991 and 1996.

A.3

OECD. ACQUISITION OF NATIONALITY

Country	1983	1986	1991	1996	1997	Rate of naturalization (*)				
						1983	1986	1991	1996	1997
			Thousands							
Countries using nationality criterion										
Germany		36,6	141,6	302,8	271,8		0,8	2,7	4,2	3,7
Austria			11,4	16,2	16,3			2,5	2,2	2,2
Belgium			8,5	24,6	31,7			0,9	2,7	3,5
Republic of Korea			0,5	1,4				1,1	1,3	
Denmark			5,5	7,3	5,5			3,4	3,3	2,3
Spain	(a)	9,1	3,8	8,4	10,3		3,1	1,3	1,7	1,9
Finland	(a)	1,2	1,2	1,0	1,4		6,8	4,7	1,4	2,0
France			95,5	109,8	116,2			2,7		
Hungary			5,9	12,3	8,7				8,8	6,1
Italy			4,50	7,00	9,20			0,60	0,70	0,80
Japan			7,8	14,5	15,1			0,7	1,1	1,1
Luxembourg			0,6	0,8	0,7			0,5	0,6	0,5
Norway			5,1	12,2	12,0			3,5	7,6	7,6
Netherlands		18,8	29,1	82,7	59,8		3,3	4,2	11,4	8,8
United Kingdom			58,6	43,1	37,0			3,4	2,2	1,9
Sweden			27,7	25,6	28,9			5,7	4,8	5,5
Switzerland			8,8	19,4	19,2			0,8	1,5	1,4
Countries using birth criterion										
Australia			118,5	111,6	108,3			3,2	2,9	
Canada	(b)		118,6	227,7				2,7	4,6	
United States			308,1	1044,7	600,0			1,6	4,2	

Source: SOPEMI. Various years (most recent: 1999)

(*) Data on all forms of nationality acquisition.

Includes standar procedures for naturalization according to age duration of residence, etc., as well as acquisitions of nationality by declaration, or by adaption (marriage and other family situations), recovery of nationality and other special forms of nationalization.

(a) data from 1987, 1991, 1996 and 1997.

(b) data from 1991 and 1995.

(*) Number of naturalizations during the year, divided by the foreign population at the beginning of the year, except for Australia, Canada, and the United States, where it is divided by the non-native population.

A.4

FOREIGN WORKERS OR WORKERS BORN ABROAD

SOPEMI. Foreign workers (*)

Country	1983	1986	1991	1996	1997	% of total work force				
						1983	1986	1991	1996	1997
			Thousands							
Data on workers with foreign nationality										
Germany	1983,5	1833,5	2179,1	2559,3	2521,9		7,0	7,5	9,1	9,1
Austria	154,80	155,0	277,2	328,0	326,3		5,4	8,7	10,0	9,9
Belgium	190,6	179,2		341,7	333,0				8,2	7,9
Denmark	51,9	60,1	71,2	88,0	88,0		2,2	2,4	3,1	3,1
Spain		53,8	171,0	166,5	176,0		0,4	1,1	1,0	1,1
France	1574,8	1555,7	1506,0	1604,7	1569,8		6,4	6,0	6,3	6,1
Hungary			33,4	18,8	20,4			0,8	0,5	0,5
Ireland	33,0	33,0	39,3	52,4	51,7		27,	2,9	3,5	3,4
Italy	(a)		285,3	332,2				1,3	1,7	
Japan	(b)		85,5	98,3	107,3			0,1	0,1	0,2
Luxembourg	53,8	57,7	92,6	117,8	124,8		39,9	47,5	53,8	55,1
Norway	(c)	49,5	46,3	54,8	59,9		2,3	2,3	2,6	2,8
Netherlands	174,0	169,0	214,0	218,0	208,0		3,0	3,3	3,1	2,9
Portugal		45,5	54,9	86,8	87,9		1,0	1,1	1,8	1,8
Sweden	222,0	215,0	241,0	218,0	220,0		4,9	5,3	5,1	5,2
Switzerland	529,3	566,9	702,5	709,1	692,8		16,7	17,8	17,9	17,5
United Kingdom	(d)	744,0	815,0	828,0	878,0	949,0		3,4	3,0	3,4
Data on workers born abroad										
Australia			2182,3	2238,8	2251,6			25,7	24,6	24,8
Canada			2681,0						18,5	
United States	(e)		11564,6						9,4	

Source: SOPEMI. Various years (most recent: 1999)

*Includes the unemployed, except for Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Australia: Annual survey. Canada and the United States: censuses. data for Germany, Austria and Luxembourg from the social security register.

Data for Denmark and Norway from the population and employment registers respectively. data for Spain, Italy, Portugal and Switzerland from work permits. Data for Japan and the Netherlands are estimates from the national statistical offices. Data for Australia from the annual survey of the work force. Canada and USA: censuses.

(a) 1995 (b) 1992 (c) 1988 (d) 1984 (e) 1990.

C. Comments on sessions A and B

C.1 Comments from Rosana Baeninger²⁴

Rosana Baeninger comments on the work of Miguel Villa and Jorge Martínez, "International migration trends and patterns in Latin America and the Caribbean". These comments are based both on the discussion of the patterns of international migration observed in Latin America and on an analysis of the Brazilian case. The studies based on the information collected by the IMILA project (Investigation of International Migration in Latin America) indicate that there are three main patterns of international migration. According to Villa and Martínez (2000), the international migration trends recorded in the region over the twentieth century consist of: (a) migration from overseas, mainly from Europe, which took place between the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century²⁵; (b) the intraregional migration displacements, or movements within Latin America, which predominated in the 1970s; and (c) migration to an external destination, or international migration to outside Latin America and the Caribbean, which has been increasing since the 1980s.

Some analyses of the first of these patterns in Latin America and the Caribbean²⁶ show that the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century²⁷ are a typical period of international migration movement originating outside the continent; it was a time of large-scale flows of migrants from Europe, especially of Spaniards, Portuguese and Italians who arrived in Argentina, Brazil

²⁴ National Commission on Population and Development, Brazil.

²⁵ Villa and Martínez (2000); Pellegrino (1989); Lattes and Lattes (1997); Maguid (2000).

²⁶ Villa and Martínez (2000); Pellegrino (1989); Lattes and Lattes (1997); and Maguid (2000).

²⁷ Lattes and Lattes (1997) refer to the period 1880-1930.

and Uruguay, and flows from China to Peru and from India to Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and other Caribbean colonies. It is estimated that between the beginning of the nineteenth century and 1970 almost 21 million immigrants entered the region from overseas (Lattes and Lattes, 1997).

Although a significant proportion of the immigrants who arrived –mainly at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century– have returned to their countries of origin (Alvim, 1986; Lattes and Lattes, 1997), net immigration to Latin America and the Caribbean reached 13.8 million persons in the period referred to, including over 11 million from Europe - Italians, Portuguese, Spaniards, Germans, Swiss, Irish, Austrians and French. Brazil and Argentina absorbed 73% of this international migration balance (35% and 38%, respectively, according to Lattes, 1985).

In the case of Brazil, international immigration has played an important role in the structure of its population²⁸ since the country was discovered. In distinct phases occurring during different economic stages, it contributed to the formation of Brazilian society²⁹; the Portuguese were the first immigrants to arrive in Brazil. In around 1550 –in view of the need for manpower to work with sugar cane– the slave trade began and between 1550 and 1850 almost 3 million Africans entered Brazil.

Coffee cultivation began at the beginning of the second half of the nineteenth century, and this led to large-scale European immigration. In the transition from an economic system based on slavery to a capitalist system, a large number migrants was needed to meet the demand for manpower. There was thus a change from one type of migration movement –the forced African migration, related to a particular stage of economic development (the sugar-cane monoculture)– to the migration of a free labour force of European origin³⁰, which is connected with the main exporting period of the Brazilian economy.

Between 1872 and 1950, a total of 4,554,646 foreigners entered Brazil, including 1.5 million of Italian origin (Levy, 1973). During the 1950s, a total of 583 068 immigrants entered, mainly originating from Portugal (41.4% of the total), Spain (16.2%), Italy (15.75%) and Japan (5.7%). Starting in the 1960s, international immigration from overseas³¹ declined quite significantly and this trend continued until the end of the 1970s.

Nevertheless, at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s significant economic, social, political, demographic and cultural changes occurred at the international level. Changes arising from the process of restructuring production³² were associated with a need for mobility of capital and of population in different parts of the world (Sassen, 1988). Brazil began to enter this new context of international migration, and, at the end of the twentieth century, foreign immigration from overseas began to increase. Although for Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole this migration pattern had practically ended by the 1950s, in the case of Brazil these flows, without establishing a clear pattern, brought a new form of international immigration movement, particularly as of the 1980s.

In the context of globalization, these new forms of migration drew attention to the need to re-evaluate the paradigms in order to gain a greater understanding of international migration. The new forms of migration are thus not significant only in terms of numbers.

The rapidity of technological change (Castells, 1999), the understanding of space and time (Harvey, 1993), the new structure of the international urban hierarchy (Sassen, 1988), the consolidation of networks of locations and locations of networks, the intensity and variety of population displacements –which define and redefine transnational areas (Glick and Schiller, 1997)– mean that

²⁸ The analyses of international migration to Brazil from the end of the nineteenth century to the mid-1950s are based on Patarra and Beninger (1995).

²⁹ There is an extensive bibliography on the subject. See the contributions of Graham and Holanda (1971).

³⁰ The economic conditions prevailing in Europe during this period encouraged the emigration of thousands of persons (Alvim, 1986; Bassanezi, 1997, *inter alia*).

³¹ Between 1960 and 1972, only 213 145 foreigners entered, mainly Portuguese and "other nationalities".

the importance of the international phenomenon of migration lies now more in its specific features, in its different intensities and geographical areas and in its differentiated impacts (particularly at the local level) and not the numbers of immigrants involved.

The diversity of geographical mobility of the population in the post-modern world (Harvey, 1993) brings a diversification of international migration movements, where the significance of these flows acquires importance in the context of the integration of each country of origin and destination in the current process of international economic restructuring.

One characteristic of foreign immigration in the context of globalization is the clandestine nature of the migrants (Sales, 1991; Patarra and Baeninger, 1995), which makes it even more difficult to measure the flows; it is thus difficult to observe and record the new flows of immigrants to Brazil.

The information available on foreign migrants³³ shows that the numbers of recent entries are unlikely to have an impact on the demographic structure, as the numbers are lower, thus corroborating the theory of a pattern that ended in the middle of the twentieth century.

From the census information on immigrants resident in Brazil in 1991 who claimed to have arrived during the period 1981-1991, the scale of the overseas flows can be measured in the context of the country's international migrations at the end of the twentieth century; these include the flows from Portugal and Japan.

The foreigners of European origin (including 41.7% of Portuguese origin) and from Asia (over half of Japanese or Korean origin) who entered³⁴ Brazil during the period 1981-1991, amounted to 41% of the total of foreign immigrants³⁵ over that period, and they added to the stock of foreigners from overseas; for this period the number of immigrants (28,257 persons) is close to the number of international migrants of Latin American and Caribbean origin (29,366 persons). The flows from Europe and Asia are reproducing the paths of the international flows of the previous overseas pattern in today's globalized world, owing partly to transnational investments (Sassen, 1988) and partly to the social networks that have been established (Tilly, 1990).

The information on work visas granted in Brazil (by the Ministry of Labour) reflects this trend³⁶. Between 1993 and 1996, 30.2% of the visas were granted to foreigners from the main European countries (Portugal, Italy, Germany, France, England and Spain); the total increased from 13,828 foreigners to 16,586 between 1997 and 1999; between this period and June 2000, 3,086 persons of these nationalities entered the country. Visas were granted to 2,659 Japanese immigrants between 1993 and 1996, and to another 2,100 between 1996 and 1999; there was then a declining trend and in the first six months of 2000 only 284 visas were granted.

In the case of Brazil it is important to consider the new phase of the overseas migration movements, although these flows are on a smaller scale than the pattern at the beginning of the century. This new perspective of international migrations has already been considered by experts and there has been substantial research on the recent flows of Portuguese, Koreans, Japanese, and African refugees (Ribeiro, 1996).

The population movements between the countries of Latin America are historical, rather complex and include intercontinental flows as well as those occurring between two or three

³² See Harvey (1993), Piori (1979) and Benko and Lipietz (1998).

³³ This is one of the basic data items collected by the IMILA project from the censuses of each country.

³⁴ This refers to those who entered, remained in the country and were alive at the date of the census.

³⁵ This refers only to persons born abroad and claiming previous residence in a foreign country; it thus does not include Brazilians with prior residence abroad (returned Brazilians).

³⁶ Although there is some difficulty with this source (it does not record the time of residence of the foreign immigrant in Brazil) it does reflect the new forms of international migration.

neighbouring countries. These migrations include various forms of population mobility in the Latin American and Caribbean area and have their origin in economic and political factors³⁷.

This intraregional migration pattern has been more visible since the 1970s. In fact, the stock of 1,218,990 persons from Latin America and the Caribbean residing (in 1970)³⁸ in countries of the region other than that of their birth increased to 1,995,149 in 1980, and 2,242,268 intraregional migrants in 1990 (Villa and Martínez, 2000). From the 1970s to the 1980s there was a slowdown in the increase in the stock of these migrants, with the levels remaining fairly stable for the two decades. Villa (1997: 109) notes that the depressive effects of the great crisis of the 1980s may have contributed to attenuating this pattern, especially as its repercussions were especially strong in the countries that had traditionally been destinations for intraregional migrants. The re-establishment of democratic government also alleviated migration tensions and made it possible for a significant number of persons to return. Another factor is the increase in types of movements which –without implying a change of residence– are reversible, itinerant, or circular in nature.

The ease of crossing the borders between Latin American countries, in a context of regional economic integration, contributes to the increase in transboundary displacements (Pellegrino, 1995; Patarra, 1997).

In the case of Latin American migration, it is more obvious that its significance as a phenomenon lies in the new situations arising from the intraregional migration processes, as the vast diversity and potential of migration areas in Latin America contribute to a lower concentration of migrant numbers.

In relation to migration to outside Latin America, Villa and Martínez (op. cit.) emphasize that this pattern is a case of South-North migration, which has many repercussions for the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, including the loss of qualified human resources and the exposure of migrants to the risk of not achieving integration at their place of destination; this migration involves the formation of transnational migrant communities –which may lead to further migration– and the generation of an economic potential in the form of remittances sent by the emigrants to their countries of origin.

The number of Latin American and Caribbean persons enumerated in the United States censuses increased from 1,725,408 persons (1970) to 4,231,919 (1980) and to 8,191,797 in 1990³⁹; in 1980 this set of international immigrants amounted to 30.1% of the foreigners in the United States and in 1990 to 41.4%: in the most recent census⁴⁰ they amounted to 3.3% of the population of the country and their growth rates were 8.8% between 1970 and 1980, and 6.3% between 1980 and 1990; the total population of the United States grew by 1.1% over the period 1970-1980, and 0.94% in the 1980s.

Mexico produces more than half of the emigrants from the region who are resident in the United States, followed at a great distance by Cuba and El Salvador. The number of Latin American and Caribbean residents in Canada reached 523,880 in 1996, which is 10.5% of the total population of the country. With an annual growth rate of 4.6% between 1981 and 1996, the population from Latin America and the Caribbean had a growth rate higher than that of the Canadian population (1.13%) over the same period. The structure of the emigrant population from the region who reside in Canada is different to that in the United States, with emigrants mainly from Jamaica, Belize, Trinidad and Tobago, and the "others" category, which includes emigrants from South America.

³⁷ See, *inter alia*, Pellegrino (1989), Villa (1997), Lattes and Lattes (1997), and Maguid (2000).

³⁸ In order to compare the census information from different countries, the IMILA project uses dates which correspond to years close to the national censuses (Villa and Martínez, 2000).

³⁹ The high increase in the stock is partly explained by the amnesty granted by the Immigration Reform and Control Act passed in 1986 (Villa and Martínez, 2000; Sales, 1999).

⁴⁰ This refers to the population born in countries of Latin America and the Caribbean resident in the United States; if the children born there of these immigrants are included (an indirect effect of migration), the rate would be much higher.

Analyzing the Latin American and Caribbean countries as a whole, the largest emigrant flows reflected in the demographic censuses of the countries are to the United States and Canada. In this pattern –as well as in others– the significance of the phenomenon lies not only in numbers. From the point of view of the receiving country, the most numerous flows are also the most obvious⁴¹; "invisible" immigration, however, in the country of destination (both because of its lower numbers and its illegal nature), reinforces this emigration pattern in different countries of Latin America. Countries such as Peru, Ecuador and Nicaragua were enumerated as the place of birth of more than 150,000 emigrants in each case.

Emigration from Mercosur countries contributed to increasing the stock of foreigners in those countries. Comparing the stocks of foreigners from Mercosur who were resident in the United States and Canada in 1980 and 1990, an increase is observed (independently of their scale) and the case of Bolivia stands out, as the stock of emigrants enumerated in the United States doubled (from 14,468 to 29,043) and in Canada tripled (from 780 in 1981, to 2,335 in 1996). Brazil also doubled its stock of foreigners which increased from 40,919 persons to 82,489. Although many of the immigrants resident in these countries are undocumented - and therefore not counted in official statistics - this information helps to see the general trends of international migration.

The South-North flow is the main international emigration movement and is a contributory factor to the stagnation in migration between Latin American and Caribbean countries.

From the perspective of the United States and Canada, as receiving countries, the numbers of migrants originating in the Southern Cone are insignificant (as recorded by the censuses); these international movements reflect the search for opportunities unavailable in the migrants' own countries, the loss of a young population with medium and higher levels of education and the need for these immigrants to exercise⁴² their rights as immigrants.

There are three main migration patterns in Latin America and the Caribbean:

(a) the historic immigration from overseas to Latin America, which occurred between the mid-nineteenth and the mid-twentieth century, consisting mainly of Southern Europeans; (b) intraregional migration, which is encouraged by short-term economic and especially structural factors, such as the different levels of economic and social development between countries; and (c) emigration of Latin American and Caribbean persons mainly to the United States, which has increased significantly in the past decade.

Prior to the 1990s, there was a growing trend of partial replacement of traditional migration by other forms of movements which are reversible - as they include temporary displacements of varying duration and do not imply a change in the place of residence - which seem to reflect an expansion of the living spaces of a growing part of the population, a constant phenomenon with the new models of territorial structure.

Emigration out of the region is a case of South-North migration, which has negative repercussions such as the loss of qualified human resources on the part of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, but also involves the formation of transnational migrant communities and the generation of an economic potential associated with remittances.

As for the characteristics of the migrants, the census information collected by the CELADE project Investigation of International Migration in Latin America (IMILA) indicates that in recent years the continental trend towards women's participation in the migration stocks has

⁴¹ Equally important in the disaggregation of this information on Latin American immigrants in the 1990 United States demographic census is the fact that a minimum limit has been established of at least 100,000 foreigners of a particular nationality; it is thus not possible to obtain information on the Brazilians resident in 1990, as only about 80,000 were reenumerated.

⁴² See Sales (1999).

been declining. If, however, only intraregional migration is considered, there is a growing process of feminization. Another relevant characteristic of those participating in international migration is the level of education, which is very diverse. Among the intra-Caribbean immigrants these levels are usually above average for the populations of the countries of both origin and destination, which reflects the selective nature of the migration process in this subregion. In the region as a whole, the levels of education tend to be very low for persons migrating between neighbouring countries.

With regard to information, the importance of the IMILA Project for obtaining knowledge of international migration is generally recognized, and there is unanimity with regard to the need to continue the initiative that CELADE has been supporting for more than thirty years. It is thus more important to make efforts to develop other sources of data, by achieving, for example, conceptual and operational standardization of the migration variables and categories in the tools for recording entries and departures by air, land and river from the countries of the region. Also, progress is needed towards compatibility in computer systems and in the production of standardized statistical tabulations, in order to ensure that migration information is comparable. It would then be possible to deal with the true lack of documentation of international migration.

With a view to establishing migration information systems in the Americas, it might be appropriate to take into account the experience of SOPEMI, where the information on migrant flows and population comes from a wide variety of sources, which vary between the countries. The difficulties with compatibility have not been resolved and the data reflect migration systems and government policies that are a response to different situations, and always difficult to harmonize. However, this experience has made it possible to establish an empirical basis which contributes to the knowledge and evaluation of actions taken in the field of international migration.

C.2 Comments Re: a) Elizabeth Thomas-Hope Paper on "Trends and Patterns of Migration to and from Caribbean Countries." b) Diego López de Lera Paper on "SOPEMI. Sistema de Informacion Sobre Migracion." By: G. Edward Ebanks Population Studies Centre University of Western Ontario

International migration is the third component which determines the size, rate of growth and the structure of the population. The paper by Thomas-Hope examines an important demographic issue in the Caribbean countries with special reference to the English speaking Caribbean. The paper by López de Lera looks at immigration to the OECD countries. Thomas-Hope's paper is mainly on emigration from the Caribbean Commonwealth countries and among the countries.

The Caribbean countries have been settled by emigrants from elsewhere and hence immigrant to the Caribbean, up to the 19th century. The 20th century was one of emigration, mainly outside the region to Europe, United States and Canada and some migration among the Caribbean countries themselves.

The OCED countries in the last 25 years has been one of immigration. The European OECD countries had emigration in the first 75 years of the 20th century.

Emigration and immigration are partly determined by the rate of growth of the population. High rate of growth acts as a push for emigration. Low rate of growth motivates a pull for immigration.

The two papers are macro level analyses of the two sets of countries. The Caribbean paper obtained the data from the census of Caribbean countries and data compiled by the destination countries, Caribbean, North America and Europe. The OECD paper uses a "Continuous Reporting System on Migration" (SOPEMI). SOPEMI obtains its data from different systems of recording immigration and emigration data, such as population register, administrative permits of residence and work, census and surveys. The data are from different sources and they are excellent. They are mainly on immigration. These countries pay much less attention to emigration.

A major problem in international migration surrounds the definition and the various categories defining the types and the source of data. All these aspects are part of the two papers. The authors have painstakingly attempted to handle issues of migration. There is much work to be done in standardizing definitions, source of the data and the different categories of international migration. The two papers, one mainly on emigration and the other on immigration, can be used to help pay some attention to these problems.

Undocumented migrants exist in the major receiving countries. Their numbers are difficult to obtain. Refugees are increasing in numbers. They are mainly from the developing countries but there are some from Eastern Europe. Economic refugees are not recognized. But many of the refugees are in fact economic ones from the very poor countries. This is manifested in the Caribbean in the case of Haiti. In the European OECD countries, they are from Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe. This is more recognized in the Diego López de Lera paper than the one by Thomas-Hope, with good reasons.

The OECD paper does not pay any attention to North America. But Canada and the United States have refugees from the developing countries and from Eastern Europe.

Remittances from migrants are recognized as an important source of foreign exchange in the Caribbean. The extractions of these sums are not a concern in the OECD paper. These remittances partly compensate for the loss in human resources. The Caribbean countries lose their professionals and highly skilled workers. These migrants from the Caribbean fall into two types. The first gained their tertiary education abroad where they remain or changed to another OECD country. The second are trained in the Caribbean and have migrated. The first enter easily in their professions, the other

is invariably downgraded to lower level occupations. They both will sponsor their dependents and send remittances to their native country.

These two papers highlighted the problems of studying international migration. They are concerned with the types of international migration, the data sources currently available and some concern for policy issues. The contribution of migrants to the society they join and to the ones they leave are recognized. The migrants, the origins and destinations societies are involved. We assume the migrants are better off economically. The origin society loses some of their qualified people and these enter the labour force at the destination. Since employment is high at the origin and there is demand for labour at the destination, the international migration could be a win, win, win for all three parties.

Some comments on the Caribbean paper

The type of statistics on international migration recently produced by ECLAC would add further dimension to this paper. However, it presents a good picture of international migration in the 20th century for the English speaking Caribbean.

The intra-regional Caribbean migration identifies an area that is not known. It is unfortunate that the figures for Jamaica are not included since Jamaica is the largest of the countries. Montserrat has massive emigration during the volcanic eruption. Its population has been significantly reduced.

The age and sex distribution of all migrants are treated briefly in this paper. The age distribution identifies the time of migration. Education and occupation of the migrants follow the usual pattern.

The extra-regional Caribbean migration is better known and has been of interest in the last half of the twentieth century. Migrants from the region have gone to the United States, Canada and Europe. Here the paper extends to the greater Caribbean. These data are obtained from the receiving countries.

In addition to the independent outmigration, refugee movements and guest worker schemes are recognized.

Not much is known of the undocumented migrants in the United States and Canada. We know it exists but the magnitude is not known.

The age, sex, education and occupation of the migrants are expected. These show that the Caribbean is losing some of its valued labour force.

Receiving some attention is the migration to Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, in the latter part of the twentieth century. Migration of Caribbean nationals among these three countries are missed when one uses the country of last residence; since some of the migrants last residence was not their native land. They could be from Jamaica, lived in England and then moved to Canada.

The United States and Canada are desired destinations for the population of the Caribbean region. The remittances from these countries are very significant. The United States and Canada received each year, farm workers for a limited time. In the past, Canada received domestic workers. These domestic workers had their own domestic help in the Caribbean, and the travel and expectation to remain in Canada, they give up jobs as nurses and teachers to become domestics for a year.

There has been return migration from all the destinations, but more so from the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada. These return migrants have been successful and return home to build large houses, buy cars and opening businesses. In addition to the globalization of information, these return migrants are windows on the quality of life in the developed societies.

The policy implications of this paper are quite informative.

This paper did not specifically look at the demographic consequences on these societies. The population of all these societies would have been much larger. We recognize that these societies have been in serious economic crisis. This could have been worse with an even larger population.

The OECD paper omitted migrants from the Dominican Republic to Puerto Rico and migrants to Barbados, Montserrat, the Virgin Islands, among others.

We should also realize the emigrants are subtracted from the total population and so too are their births which are born abroad. The relatively low fertility rate, is in part, due to emigrants who are in the childbearing age at the time of migration.

Extra-regional migration will continue to play a role in international migration but that between the Caribbean and North America will continue to be the main focus.

Comments on the Continuous Reporting System on Migration (SOPEMI)

This Continuous Reporting System on Migration gives a description of the system and the sources of data across the OECD countries. The OECD countries are an area of destination. The emigrants to the OECD countries cover all categories of international migration. The countries have their own sources of data. Comparison among the countries are problematic. However, López de Lera's paper is a good analysis of the issues of concern.

We see the reporting system and we have some of the data from the countries both graphically and in tables.

The immigrant population is given for each country but we do not know the origin of these migrants. It would have been important to look at the origin of these migrants. But the sources of data pay more attention to residence and labour force participation.

The immigration in each country is given and the rates. Germany, Australia, Canada and the United States are the major immigration countries. These migrants help to keep the population young and growing. Many of these countries will need immigrants to prevent a declining population.

Refugees and asylum seekers are possible from data obtained from the population registers in some countries. Data of those who have become naturalized citizens of certain countries are also available.

The paper has comparison among the countries in the way they collect and report data. They are significantly different. One would hope for a gradual movement towards the sources of data collection and reporting. The OECD countries could lead the way, by themselves standardizing their data sources.

The undocumented migrants in the OECD countries are significant. It is particularly true of North America and Southern European countries. These migrants are attracted to employment opportunities in the OECD countries. This aspect will continue to be a problem for these countries. Some of these undocumented migrants are migrant workers who entered the countries for a set time period with a visa and then remained illegally.

The SOPEMI is a good source of data. For comparison among the countries we would hope that the definition of international migrants could be standardized and the data sources more regularized.

Summary

The two papers give us a good picture of international migration. The Caribbean paper is on emigration and the OECD paper is on immigration. The Caribbean paper deals with a small total population, but a major source of emigration. The OECD paper covers most of the destination for all current international immigrants.

Policy implications are drawn, especially in the Caribbean paper. The two papers are good examples of the requirements of managed migration and they recognized that international migration is a major demographic force that will affect all countries, and especially in the Americas.

D. Chapter conclusions

There are three main migration patterns in Latin America and the Caribbean:

(a) the historic immigration from overseas to Latin America, which occurred between the mid-nineteenth and the mid-twentieth century, consisting mainly of Southern Europeans; (b) intraregional migration, which is encouraged by short-term economic and especially structural factors, such as the different levels of economic and social development between countries; and (c) emigration of Latin American and Caribbean persons mainly to the United States, which has increased significantly in the past decade.

Prior to the 1990s, there was a growing trend of partial replacement of traditional migration by other forms of movements which are reversible - as they include temporary displacements of varying duration and do not imply a change in the place of residence - which seem to reflect an expansion of the living spaces of a growing part of the population, a phenomenon which is consistent with the new models of territorial structure.

Emigration out of the region is a case of South-North migration, which has negative repercussions such as the loss of qualified human resources on the part of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, but also involves the formation of transnational migrant communities and the generation of an economic potential associated with remittances.

As for the characteristics of the migrants, the census information collected by the CELADE project Investigation of International Migration in Latin America (IMILA) indicates that in recent years the continental trend with regard to women's participation in the migration

stocks has been declining. If, however, only intraregional migration is considered, there is a growing process of feminization. Another relevant characteristic of those taking part in international migration is the level of education, which is very diverse. Among the intra-Caribbean immigrants these levels are usually above average for the populations of the countries of both origin and destination, which reflects the selective nature of the migration process in this subregion. In the region as a whole, the levels of education tend to be lower for persons migrating between neighbouring countries.

With regard to information, the importance of the IMILA Project for obtaining knowledge of international migration is generally recognized, and there is unanimity with regard to the need to continue the initiative that CELADE has supported for more than thirty years. It is thus more important to make efforts to develop other sources of data, by achieving, for example, conceptual and operational standardization of the migration variables and categories in the tools for recording entries and departures by air, land and river from the countries of the region. Progress is also needed in working towards greater compatibility in computer systems and in the production of standardized statistical tabulations, in order to ensure that migration information is comparable. This would make it possible to deal with the true “lack of documentation” of international migration.

With a view to establishing migration information systems in the Americas, it might be appropriate to take into account the experience of SOPEMI, where the information on migrant flows and population comes from a wide variety of sources, which vary between the countries. The difficulties with compatibility have not been resolved and the data reflect migration systems and government policies that are a response to different situations, and always difficult to harmonize. However, this experience has made it possible to establish an empirical starting point which contributes to the knowledge and evaluation of actions taken in the field of international migration.

Part 2:
**Relations between migration and
development**

A. Impact of globalization and regional integration agreements in migrant origin and destination countries

A.1 Globalization, regional integration and migrations¹

Armando Di Filippo²

Introduction

This study considers the impact of globalization and integration on international migration in the Americas. In particular, it focuses on two types of regional integration agreement – "type A" and "type B" – bearing in mind the contribution they can make to the issue of international migrations. The first type includes mainly preferential market agreements, inaccurately labelled "free-trade" agreements, which will culminate in the year 2005 with the signing of the agreement on

¹ This study is based largely on views and information presented in the text prepared jointly by Armando Di Filippo and Rolando Franco: *Integración Regional, Desarrollo y Equidad*, CEPAL/Siglo XXI Editores, Mexico, 2000. This version takes into account the comments made by Jorge Martínez Pizarro, Neide Patarra and Adela Pellegrino. Nevertheless, the views and approaches relating to the central issue are the responsibility of the authors.

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the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The agreements of the second type encompass the four subregional agreements – the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), Andean Community (CAN), Central American Common Market (CACM) and the Caribbean Community (Caricom), which will survive the signing of the FTAA and which seek to forge deeper forms of integration, such as the Customs Union and Common Markets. Type A agreements do not cover the issue of migration, whereas type B agreements do. The latter will have to address international migration between member countries because one of the long term proposals is the free mobility of labour inherent in the constitution of common markets. These agreements also explore ways of achieving far-reaching integration which will include convergence of public policies and, therefore, of the social policies required to facilitate the free movement of persons.

1. Globalization and migration

(a) Globalization and globalism

Economic globalization as an empirically verifiable process is an expression of the inroads made by information technologies in the world economy and includes basically the spread of transnational corporations and the opening up of national economies. Spatial redistribution of economic activities, greater mobility of productive capital and technology and the reduction in international transaction costs are affecting international redistribution of economic opportunities and, thus, the dynamic of migratory trends³.

The *rules of the game of world markets* (economic globalism) include regulations governing open markets (multilateralism, national treatment, etc.) and the *free international movement of production factors, with the exception of international migrations*. At the national level, economic globalism transforms the role of States and the behaviour of Governments by promoting the allocation of resources internally following the logic of the market and of national and transnational corporations.

(b) Technological revolution, globalization and south-north migrations

The impact of information technologies is becoming evident in several areas with indirect effects on the intensity and direction of international migration flows. Firstly, the labour skills in demand in the developed countries are changing, with opportunities for low-skilled workers shrinking, while those for the most highly skilled are increasing. Secondly, in the developing countries, the reduction in international transaction costs result in a dispersal of value chains in the transnational production of goods and services. This leads to the generation of global products, whose parts and components are manufactured in different parts of the world and, through the advantages of telematics, are assembled or finished in determined countries.

The effects of these *economic* trends on the international migration of workers are of two types. Firstly, the loss of status of unskilled workers in the developed world has intensified the hostility of unions towards the arrival of migrants from the south, especially in cases where the latter enter as undocumented migrants. Such cases give rise simultaneously to two grave social problems. First, these migrants are prepared to work in conditions that would be unacceptable for their counterparts in the place of destination, which amounts to *illegal competition* both on the respective labour market and between firms that subscribe to such services and the rest, who will not or cannot do it. Second, this situation is not socially sustainable in view of the double standard that it sets as regards labour

³ It is clear, however, that international migrations are more than just a response to the distribution of economic opportunities and comparative levels of development between regions of origin and destination. They are also the result of processes and situations of a political and social nature, linked to the rights and guarantees relating to persons which, as a whole, shape the rules of the interaction of democracy and human rights projected into the international arena

rights and individual guarantees, the social discrimination that it involves and the latent conflicts that build up among local workers who consider that their rights have been impaired.

From a purely market-oriented viewpoint, both trends associated with economic globalization (loss of opportunities for the less skilled workers in the developed countries and transfer of production chains to developing regions) should reduce economic opportunities for migrants from the south in northern destinations and, in this way, weaken south-north flows. However, the objective differences in the standards of living, on the one hand, and the subjective aspirations of migrants in countries of origin, on the other, are so intense that migration flows are not diminishing with social and political conditions in places of destination. This is the case, for example, with Mexican migrants, who, legally or illegally, seek to enter the United States. Similarly, with other, Central American migrants who cross Mexican territory also bound for the United States.

(c) South-north migration: economic, political and social causes

The above-mentioned issues have been the subject of more formally rigorous studies aimed at working out migration policies appropriate to the interests of the developed countries. Straubhaar (1992) has identified two major groups of immigration impacts: allocational and distributional impacts.

The allocational impacts refer to efficiency in the allocation of the labour factor. In the marginalist, neo-classical language of perfect competition, global well-being increases with migration flows up to a point where marginal labour productivity throughout the world is in equilibrium. The distributional impacts imply a relationship with the use of public goods. According to this argument, if the allocational and distributional impacts are considered jointly, free immigration would only be permitted if the net balance of well-being is positive for the host society of the migrants.

From an allocational viewpoint, one can identify the winners and losers in the international immigration process. Those who have invested capital will be winners because, relatively speaking, manpower will be more readily available and wage levels will fall, with relative advantages for the recipients of capital inflows. The native-born labour force, which is complementary to the immigrant workforce will achieve higher levels of efficiency, productivity and wages, whereas a native replacement workforce for the immigrants would sustain greater competition and wages would fall. If there is no compensatory public intervention, these native-born workers will be the main victims of the immigrant inflows.

In terms of the distributional impact, an effort is made to balance the amount of taxes paid by migrants against the public goods that they consume. This may be further complicated by the argument that recent immigrants have not contributed in the past to the financing of the preexisting infrastructure of public goods, hence, it may be concluded that they should be subject to differential treatment compared with the nationals of the country, who have made such contributions. This type of reasoning is usually based on the analogy existing between being a citizen of one State and being a member of a club. From the point of view of the native citizens, immigrants are competing for scarce public goods that do not "belong" to them.

If the net outcome of the allocational and distributional impacts is negative for the country of destination, a restrictive immigration policy can be predicted. It should be stressed that this depends on the professional and educational qualifications of the migrants.

The perspective presented by Strauber reflects an excessively narrow economic outlook and is based on accounting of both private (allocational) and public (distributional) costs and benefits, instead of costs and benefits that are static, or in other words, limited to the short term. This outlook is applied explicitly to migrants from other countries of the world who seek to settle in the European Union. By contrast with this narrow approach, a more multi-dimensional approach may be envisaged that also takes into account the political and social rights and guarantees as well as the cultural contribution of migrants to the host country, their potential economic contribution to long-term

economic development and their demographic contribution to the rejuvenation of ageing societies. In particular, the distributional impacts associated with the use and disposal of public goods could be put forward in a more productive manner within a long-term structural perspective which takes into account the historical experiences of other areas which have experienced mass immigration flows, such as European flows into America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

(d) Policy options

Various immigration policy options may be considered. On the one hand, there are two extreme options: either complete freedom of movement, which, for example, the European Union applies to the citizens of its member States, but which it does not extend to "foreigners", or a complete ban on immigrants, which would reflect an improbable autarchical position and could hardly exist except within the framework of authoritarian international relationships, which have been deliberately excluded from our analysis.

Again with respect to Straubhaar, if we accept the need for a selective migration policy, the selection mechanisms may be based on the market or on mandatory government regulations: the selection modalities could include the following: payment of an entry quota (reminiscent of a club membership fee); the investment of a specific amount of capital; the payment of a higher tax on one's income (treatment as a non-national for tax purposes). Such administrative or government selection modalities could also include quotas by country, quotas by family, quotas based on the level of skills of the migrants, or international laws applicable on a multilateral or reciprocal basis.

From a broader perspective, a distinction should be made between economically motivated migrants and those impelled by other reasons. Among the first, policies would be applicable which to some degree respect market forces, with the award of immigrant visas being granted according to demand and supply by labour sector and level of skills. A tougher version of this same law would contemplate the expulsion of migrants who do not find work and punish those whose status is illegal.

Political asylum-seekers should be included among non-economical migrants. In such cases, the civil, economic and political rights of the native population must be weighed against the humanitarian grounds that justify the entry of political refugees. The issue takes on a clearly political stamp and the alternatives call for knowledge of the specific situations: for example, the extent of migration flows, and political or cultural differences with respect to the native population. Turning to the case of Europe, Straubhaar concludes that a significant role should be attributed to the political and social factors that lead to international migration and to the mechanisms that could help to regulate it. He claims that the best migration policy that the countries of Eastern Europe could follow is to seek to reduce the migration potential in the countries of origin. Efforts should be directed firstly towards achieving political stability and only later towards providing economic support. Promoting trade and direct investment is just one prerequisite but is not sufficient to reduce the number of potential migrants. More important are the political factors in the countries of emigration. What we can learn from the experience of the European Communities where internal migration (within the European Union) is relatively low is that with a accepted and highly stable democratic political system, the economic breach has to be very deep to promote a strong potential migratory pull. (Straubhaar 1992).

A comprehensive study of this type of migration is far from simple, above all because it involves a complex interweaving of approaches that are not necessarily compatible. On the one hand, there is the narrow economic approach, based on the estimation of allocational and distributional impacts in the relatively short term, on the other, the approach based on socio-political/human rights (including political, economic, social and cultural rights) which calls for greater respect for the dignity of migrants. An approach that combines the two *raison d'être* in a rational way must consider, on the one hand, the interests and rights of the native-born population, as well as the degree of social cohesion achieved and, on the other, the stimulating and creative impact arising from the blend of cultures in

numerous fields such as economic and human development or that of demographic rejuvenation which can derive from such flows.

Of course, one essential problem underlying this type of migratory movement is the sharp contrast between the high standards of living that prevail in destination regions in the north and the low standards of living in the regions of origin. Thus the basic structural factor at the source of the difficulties and frictions resulting from this type of migration is the international imbalance in standards of living.

The market-based logic of the neoclassical economic theory cannot reasonably grasp these international differences in living standards. Its static outlook foresees that an unrestricted opening up to migration would be bound to lead to wage equalization by reducing them in places of destination and increasing them in places of origin until a point of stable equilibrium is reached. This perspective, which is too "reductionist", is a cause for concern among the developed Western nations. Thus, migration should be studied in a long-term, multidimensional (economic, political, social and cultural) context, bearing in mind the contribution that such migratory flows can make to economic and human development.

It is in relation to this type of south-north flows (which are the most intense on the American continent and also highly prevalent from developing or transition areas on the outskirts of the European Union), that the suggestion has been made for the establishment of *minimum platforms* for humanitarian treatment of migrants and respect for their fundamental rights and guarantees:

"Moreover, consideration should be given to the establishment of a general agreement on migration policies, which, like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), could be a framework for achieving agreement on labour mobility. This type of institution would facilitate international coordination and harmonization of criteria and rules on entry and exit permits, the treatment of foreign workers, the political rights of migrants and other issues that require international consensus. In this way, progress will be made towards harmonizing unilateral migration policies, avoiding the ambivalence and constant fluctuations shown in national provisions governing the entry of persons and which, ultimately, are largely responsible for the illegal immigration with all the serious implications it can have for the situation of individual persons (see ECLAC/CELADE, 1993).

2. Hemispheric integration and south-north migration

(a) Two types of agreement and two types of migratory trends

At the same time, *economic integration*, as an empirically verifiable process, has increased commercial and investment ties within the hemisphere as a whole and in Latin America, in particular. It is the same trend towards the spread of transnational corporations and macroeconomic internationalization (opening up and interdependence of national economies) inherent in globalization, but is especially visible at the regional and subregional levels.

Nevertheless, the rules of the game governing hemispheric and Latin American integration tend to bifurcate into two alternatives that can have different effects on the relevant migration dynamics. At the hemispheric level, they seem to be confined to economic (market-oriented) rules associated with *open regionalism* (ECLAC, 1994), which refers to an intensification and acceleration throughout the continent of the same principles of globalism, while the rules of a more political and social bias, such as the defence of democratic principles, are debated in other spheres and hemispheric forums. In addition, at the Latin American level, subregional blocks seem to be emerging whose rules of the game imply a *multidimensional regionalism* which does not conflict with that of the hemispheric level, but which transcends it, embracing the political, social and cultural dimensions. This conviction is strengthened by the fact that subregional agreements impose on its members respect for the rules of democracy as one condition for continued membership in the group. In the interests of brevity,

the first option (unidimensional or market-based) may be termed regionalism or "type A" agreements and the second (multidimensional or integral), regionalism or "type B" agreements.

The regionalism (or type A) agreements do not address the issue of international migration which is dealt with in a different context; this is the case, for example, in the North-American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which is still in gestation. This fact, moreover, is consistent with the vertical nature of these agreements (linkage between developed and developing countries), with the south-north direction of the migration flows and with the stark differences in the levels of development and living conditions between countries involved, which necessarily exacerbate the political and social problems associated with migration.

This leads to specific migration policies between countries that are signatories of type A agreements. Since the United States is the main recipient of these south-north flows, the states bordering on Mexico are seeing an increase in their Hispanic population, especially people of Mexican origin and this gives rise to different policies, at both the federal and state levels, designed to reduce these flows, either through border controls and *refoulement* of illegal immigrants, restrictive control of social services for those who have managed to circumvent these controls, or lastly, through restrictions on the procedures for legal residence.

In other cases, political considerations combine with economic factors to encourage south-north migration. A number of examples at the hemispheric level come to mind: Cuban "boat-people", fugitives from the drug-war in Colombia, among others. Also from Central America, during the period of violence, which has now been overcome, large migration flows were generated which were due not only to poverty but also to lack of personal security and lack of individual guarantees. The higher degree of transparency and mass access to information flows brought about by the current technological revolution arouses the aspirations of potential migrants seeking better living conditions and greater respect for their fundamental rights.

The economic, cultural, legal and political aspects of international migration must be reexamined in the light of this headlong rush towards globalization. Along the south-north axis, migrants, irrespective of the legal status they hold in the countries of destination, usually remit substantial amounts of money to their countries of origin, which sometimes far exceed other sources of foreign exchange (exports, tourism) in these same countries. The reduction in international transaction costs facilitates and significantly speeds up these remittances. For example, as Carmelo Mesa Lago pointed out, in a television interview, income from remittances from Cubans in the United States exceed net inflows from tourism.

(b) Transnationalization of production, employment and migration

The transnationalization of production is expressed statistically in the significant growth in intra-industry and intra-firm trade of parts and components, particularly in the automobile, micro-electronic and clothing industries. The establishment of export processing (or in-bond processing) zones (EPZ) close to major developed consumer centres is a world-wide trend and there are numerous examples in the Americas with the EPZ in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. The relocation of subsidiaries of the major transnational firms in areas where labour, environmental, energy and other costs are lower is the result of advances in computer applications and telecommunications, which affords dramatic reductions in international transaction costs, thus allowing planning (at the intra-firm level) and coordination (at the intra-industry level) of transnational production in which many countries are involved in the manufacture of the same end product.

The decline in employment opportunities for unskilled workers in the United States is exacerbated by the relocation by transnational corporations of part of their production chains in those regions in the south where labour, pollution control and energy costs are lower. The long-term structural solution should include economic transformations in both the north and the south.

In the north, minimum labour skill levels should be raised to protect local workers against direct competition from unskilled workers from the south; moreover, new production sectors are needed to replace those that move to the south.

On the other hand, in the south, potential migrants should be retained by promoting economic development in the "sending" regions, one instrument already used being the creation of direct jobs in in-bond processing. The most important case is, of course, that of the "maquilas" located close to the frontier in the north of Mexico, which provide direct employment to over one million Mexicans and generate a development pole that provides indirect jobs geared to retaining would-be migrants.

In the short-term, however, less qualified workers from English-speaking North America are affected by both trends: on the one hand, the mass south-north migration movements already studied in the preceding section and, on the other, the transfer of their economic opportunities to developing regions (in-bond processing industries in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean). What the outcome of these opposing trends will be is not clear. In the countries of destination, social tensions increase when undocumented migrants affect the working rights and the patterns of inter-firm competition; and such tensions diminish when the growth dynamic in places of destination expand job opportunities and when, at the same time, retraining of local workers opens up for them local opportunities with which unskilled migrants cannot compete.

Few of the new jobs created in development poles or areas designed to retain migrants from the south in their places of origin are to be found in manufacturing. In both North and South America, new jobs are opening up in services. Hence, special attention should be paid to the growth of this type of activity, where an important amount of transnational capital is concentrated. In terms of retaining would-be migrants in the south, the advantage of these transnational activities is that they do not correspond to the relocation of tradable activities previously located in the north. Thus, workers in the north are not being deprived of potential jobs.

The clearest examples of the presence of transnationals in services activities can be seen in metropolitan areas and in other major cities in countries of the south. They include fast food, supermarkets, security companies, banking, insurance, tourism, telecommunications, and others. In the short term, they compete with traditional companies already existing in these areas, but in the long term, they can be net generators of employment in a growth dynamic that enhances productivity levels and implies a modernization of activities. Service activities include or may include the presence of independent small and medium-sized enterprises, as in the case of the franchising system often used in the fast-food industry. Alternatively, these service activities promoted by transnational capital and technology may be organized as chains of small businesses which are subsidiaries of a large corporation, as in the multi-branch strategies of the hotel industry, banking, multiplexes or insurance.

A promising option for reducing south-north migration within the hemisphere may be found in the connection between the presence of transnational producers, the creation of jobs in the south (that do not compete with those already existing in the north), the generation of modernization and development and the retention of potential migrants in their places of origin. This may apply especially in the highest areas of emigration, which include Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. Type A agreements for hemispheric integration can contribute to the consolidation of this transnational presence, not only in the above-mentioned regions (where most of north-bound migrants originate), but also in South America, where this type of transnational presence has proliferated.

In the case of South America, flows of migrants to the United States represent a smaller percentage of the total population and the principal issue is not to retain them (except perhaps in Colombia, for political reasons), but to contribute to the development which commitment to these agreements can bring about by creating the conditions for social and political stability and economic guarantees to investors (taxation, exchange-rate, etc.).

3. Latin American integration and migration

(a) Customs unions that aspire to common markets

The other major pattern of migration in the Americas is south-south migration between countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. These flows are not as significant numerically and, in the long term, may be regulated under type B agreements, insofar as they are moving towards the status of common markets. The obvious model is of course the European Union, where the right to migrate and settle is guaranteed for all citizens of any member country.

The watershed in terms of the sudden emergence of social issues in the regional integration process came with the commitments made and initiatives adopted for moving towards convergence of social policies with a view to the eventual establishment of common markets (or even more far-reaching agreements) which, in the final analysis, guarantee full freedom of movement within the expanded economic areas.

Since the four main subregional agreements in the integration of Latin America (Andean Community, Mercosur, Central American Common Market and the Caribbean Community) have assumed this type of commitment, it seems relevant to start by examining the implications of this type of decision.

The explicit inclusion of social issues in type B agreements increases as these agreements move into their fullest, binding phases. For purposes of comparison, these actions will be classified (table 1) taking as a reference the type of agreements, commitments and mechanisms adopted in the European Union (EU), which is the most far-reaching treaty and currently the one that is most advanced.

This classification includes the following types of bodies and mechanisms with a social content: (a) Bodies and mechanisms for consultation and cooperation on social issues (with special reference to educational and cultural issues); (b) economic and social representative bodies of a consultative nature; (c) Legislative consultative bodies; (d) Individual, social and political rights and guarantees, whether binding or non-binding; (e) Supranational bodies, mechanisms and recourses (of a legally binding nature). *Each of these categories includes agreements and mechanisms that affect international migrations under type B agreements to the extent that they explicitly move closer to the common market phase. These agreements and mechanisms enhance the viability of – and, on the social level, are complementary to – the economic issues involved in the integration of labour markets.*

Table 1
TYPE B AGREEMENTS, BODIES AND MECHANISMS WITH A SOCIAL FOCUS

Clauses bodies mechanisms, agreements	European Union	Andean community of Nations	Caribbean common market	Central American common market	Southern common Market
1. Consultative bodies and cooperation mechanisms on social issues with especial reference to education and culture	Socrates and Leonardo Programmes. European Centre for Development and Vocational Training. All the academic titles are valid at the community level	Simón Rodríguez Agreement on Social and Labour Policies, Andrés Bello Convention on Education and Culture. Hipólite Unanue Health Agreement. University of the Andes Simón Bolívar	Councils of Ministers of Health, Education, Labour, etc. University of Guyana University of the West Indies	Council for Social Integration Council of Ministers of Social Affairs. Secretariat for Social Integration	Meetings of Ministers of Health, Education, Labour, Social Welfare, etc. Three-year plan for the Education Sector Sub-working group no. 10 on Labour Relations
2. Representative consultative bodies for economic and social affairs	Economic and Social Committee	Corporate Consultative Council (CCEA) Consultative Labour Council (CCLA)		Consultative Committee of Treaty on Social Integration in Central (SICA) (made up of employers, peasants, workers and academics)	Consultative Forum on Economic and Social Issues
3. Consultative bodies on legislation		Andean Parliament	Parliamentary Assembly of the Caribbean Community (Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians)	Central American Parliament (PARLACEN)	Joint Parliamentary Commission
4. Rights and guarantees (individual, social, political) Binding and not binding	Social Charter and Social Protocol. Full liberty of movement. Multiple binding rules recognizing the social rights of migrants from EU member countries	Andean Social Security Instrument (Decision 113) Rules on migrant workers (Decision 116) Declaration of the Presidential Council on Democracy and integration (preparatory to a binding protocol currently being drafted)	Charter of Civil Society. Agreement on Social Security	Treaty on Social Integration in Central America (SICA). Treaty on Democratic Security	Protocols on Integration in the area of education and recognition of certificates, titles and studies (various levels). Multilateral Convention on Social Security. Social and Labour Commission
5. Bodies, mechanisms and recourse at the community level (binding)	Commission, European Parliament, Court of Justice, European Social Fund	Court of Justice	Settlement of Disputes: Ad Hoc tribunals	Court of Justice	Protocol of Brasilia for the Settlement of Disputes

Source: Di Filippo and Franco (2000)

(b) Migration within Latin America and Common Markets

In South America, the rules of the game that have been emerging recently with respect to international migration within the subcontinent can be outlined at two levels. On the one hand, the rules and commitments undertaken within type B agreements (Mercosur and CAN), which are directed explicitly towards the stage of common markets and, on the other, the migration agreements proposed or signed at the South American level.

Formal recognition of the freedom to migrate is not the only prerequisite for achieving a common markets. The establishment (and application) of a set of social and labour rights and socio-economic guarantees relating to health, education and social welfare is also essential. In this case, the study of migration regulations and policies cannot be separated from the broader objective, which is to integrate labour markets.

In the second case, which relates to migratory relationships between all South American countries, whether or not they belong to specific integration agreements, the goals are much more circumscribed by the issue of migration in itself. Hence, they tend to fall within the logic of type A agreements. In all other respects, this is effectively the case, since the Mercosur and CAN blocs are currently negotiating a type A free-trade agreement.

In the following section we take a brief look at some institutional advances with respect to these two points. Firstly, we will consider the Declarations of Lima and Buenos Aires, where the issue is dealt with jointly by all countries of South America, whether or not they adhere to a given agreement. These Declarations explicitly establish the leading institutional role of the subregional agreements in the treatment of migration. Secondly, we will look at the principal rules and commitments being agreed to within Mercosur and CAN, especially at the social level, which are likely to affect migratory flows between member countries of such agreements.

(c) Migration in South America: Declarations of Lima and Buenos Aires

South American countries, whether they are signatories or not of one or more of the type B agreements in South America, have initiated joint discussions on migration. The South American Meeting on Migration, Integration and Development, held in Lima in July 1999 was attended by representatives from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. As a follow-up to this first encounter, the South American Conference on Migration was held with the same participants in Buenos Aires on 18 and 19 May 2000. Let us take a brief look at the content of these two events.

Firstly, the Declaration of Lima is concise and to the point. It recognizes the close links between migration and the problems of economic and social development in the countries concerned. It highlights the joint and inter-active response through subregional integration processes, such as Mercosur and the Andean Community, within which significant advances are being made in dealing with migration flows. It underscores the role of migration movements as vectors for change and intercultural linkages and for stimulating development processes. It also stresses that respect for the human rights of migrants is a basic concern of the countries of the region.

On the basis of these considerations, the Declaration recommends increasing and deepening the analysis and exchange of information on migration, institution-building and modernization of the competent national bodies responsible for the issue and promoting technical and financial cooperation at the international level.

Lastly, they advocate monitoring migration processes in the region in order to analyse and exchange information, with a view to finding solutions consistent with the interests of the countries involved through dialogue and cooperation. To this end, the delegates present at the meeting agreed to maintain contact and to organize a Conference to follow up on the issue considered in the Lima Declaration.

Secondly, the Declaration of Buenos Aires, issued at the First South American Conference on Migration, referred, in its preambular paragraphs, to recent trends in migration in South America, which are related essentially to the processes of economic globalization and subregional integration. It emphasizes that the whole issue of migration in the region must be approached through mechanisms for open multilateral discussions to promote reflection and the coordination of policies and actions between countries that share this concern through the full exercise of regional cooperation in order to strengthen regional integration and development. The preambular paragraphs, on the basis of the

principle of protection of human rights, reaffirm that the programmes for disseminating the rights of migrants through Governments and civil society, the coordination between receiving and sending countries, the promotion of orderly, planned migration as the solution to irregular migration and the fight against trafficking in human beings emerge as responsible policies. Lastly, the preambular paragraphs reiterate, on the one hand, the need for greater efficiency in the management by the body involved and better training of its officers and, on the other, the importance of technical and financial international cooperation.

In follow-up to these two initial events, the representatives decided, as set out in the operative part of the declaration, to establish a forum for coordination and consultation on migration for the countries of South America, which will meet periodically at times and in places to be agreed by its members and which will have an Interim Secretariat appointed by the host country of the next conference. The objective of the forum will be to treat the issue of migration in a comprehensive manner without prejudice to other comparable mechanisms for subregional integration and bilateral coordination. Following a reaffirmation of the efforts to guarantee the protection, defence and promotion of the rights of migrants, the declaration proposes that regional cooperation should be intensified as a substantive instrument for achieving the objectives established and for preparing regional positions on migration. Lastly, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) will be entrusted with the preparation of studies for proposing criteria for orienting a plan of action to be submitted to Governments for their consideration and approval.

For the purposes of this study, two points formulated in both declarations are worth reconsidering. Firstly, an institutional framework now exists for addressing the issue of migration in South America, namely the periodic conferences and the Interim Secretariat, where it is recognized as exceeding the scope of demography and belonging specifically to the sphere of integration and development. Secondly, in referring to the connection between migration and integration, emphasis is placed on the importance of Mercosur and the Andean Community, where significant advances are being made in dealing with migration, and reinforcing this vision, the second declaration recalls that these Conferences are complementary to the subregional efforts for regional integration. Thus the mechanisms for dialogue, policy coordination and regional cooperation are considered valuable mechanisms for strengthening the current trends towards integration and development emerging in the region.

The following sections examine some of the explicit or implicit linkages between aspiration towards the achievement of a common market, the implications of this objective in terms of social policies and the obvious relevance of the issue of migration in the social rules and commitments being assumed within Mercosur and CAN.

(d) The Southern Common Market (Mercosur)

The treaty establishing Mercosur – Treaty of Asuncion – which was signed in 1991, did not contain commitments or mechanisms oriented towards promoting or regulating the social dimension of integration agreements. In May 1991, scarcely three months after it was signed, the ministers of labour of the member countries of Mercosur met in Montevideo. In the declaration they issued, the ministers accepted the possibility of studying the signing of an instrument within the framework of the Treaty of Asuncion, which contemplates the inevitable labour and social issues brought about by the implementation of the Southern Common Market. They also undertook to provide any cooperation necessary for the reciprocal knowledge of systems of employment, social security, professional training and individual and collective labour relationships. At the first meeting of labour ministers, they brought forward the establishment of the Sub-working group n°. 11 on labour relations, employment and social security, which was established formally in Las Leñas on 26 June 1992 and superseded in 1995 following the meeting in Ouro Preto by Sub-working group n°. 10 on Labour Issues, Employment and Social Security. This and successive meetings of ministers of labour, like those carried out by other secretaries of State (education, culture, justice, etc.) are, in theory, "actions

for consultation and cooperation", which may be preparatory actions for the creation of new bodies and institutional mechanisms of Mercosur.

The ministerial meetings, together with the above-mentioned sub-working groups were gradually setting up the conditions for convergence of social systems and policies. With respect to more specific social policies, mention should be made, in particular, of the Mercosur Declaration on Social and Labour Issues signed by the presidents of the respective countries in Rio de Janeiro in late 1998. The Declaration explicitly recognizes the individual rights to non-discriminatory treatment, promotion of equality, protection for migrant and frontier workers, elimination of forced labour, prohibition of child labour and the rights of employers as well as collective rights to freedom of association, freedom to join a union, collective bargaining, the right to strike and social dialogue; other social rights were also ratified such as promoting job creation, protection of the unemployed, professional training and the development of human resources, health and job security, working conditions and the work environment and social security.

In order to promote the application of the rights listed above, a social and labour committee is being created as an auxiliary, tripartite body of the Common Market Group (CMG), which will meet at least once in the year to draft a report for submission to the CMG. This report will be drafted on the basis of the annual reports that the ministry of labour of each member country will have to prepare in consultation with the most representative civil organizations. This social and labour committee articulates and integrates other policies that were being produced through the sub-working groups responsible for social issues, including the Multilateral Agreement on Social Security or the Protocols on Education.

The multilateral agreement on social security was drafted by Sub-working Group no. 10 on Labour Issues, Employment and Social Security. It espouses the principles of international law on social security, such as the application of the law of place of implementation or performance, equality, preservation of acquired rights, totalization and pro rata treatment.

The education protocols fall within the scope of the Three-year Plan for the Education Sector in the context of Mercosur (1993), which consists of three programmes for building citizen awareness for the process of integration, for training human resources for development and for harmonizing education systems. Under this Plan, a number of important protocols on education have been signed.

The first of these protocols, the Protocol on Integration in the area of Education and Recognition of Primary and Non-Technical Secondary Certificates, Diplomas and Studies (1994) is designed to recognize the studies completed at these levels in member countries and to grant equivalencies for higher education purposes. In this regard, article 3 of this protocol states as follows: "A regional technical committee will be established to establish the denominations equivalent to the levels of education of each of the States parties, harmonize administrative mechanisms that facilitate the implementation of what has been established, set up mechanisms to help students adapt to the receiving country, resolve those situations not contemplated in the equivalency tables and ensure the compliance with this protocol; this committee may meet whenever deemed necessary by at least two of the States parties."

Secondly, there are two other protocols on integration in education (1996), the protocol on the Pursuit of Post-graduate Studies at Universities in Mercosur Member Countries and the protocol on Human Resources Training at the Post-graduate Level between Mercosur member countries. The first of these two protocols establishes reciprocal recognition of graduate and post-graduate degrees for the sole purpose of the pursuit of academic activities; the second protocol concerns the training and upgrading of university teachers and researchers through the creation of a system of exchange between institutions, for fostering human resource training for specific projects. The two protocols are closely linked and are based on the principle of reciprocal recognition of legislations that allow for the advancement of coordinated social policies.

The above-mentioned Three-year Plan for the Education Sector also seeks to influence the cultural dimension of integration, especially through a programme for building public awareness of the integration process. Other initiatives include the introduction in the curriculum of the different levels of education, the teaching of Spanish and Portuguese, the preparation of alternative methodologies for teaching these subjects and the development of teacher-training programmes for teaching/learning of the official languages of Mercosur.

In the preambular paragraphs supporting this programme line, the authors of the Plan state as follows: "The countries of the Southern Cone express in their own cultural form, the links required and sufficient for a set of peoples that have a shared historical heritage and who can have a common destiny. Under these conditions and with these characteristics, these countries are shown to constitute a "natural" community, which stands out against other blocs that are established for economic, trade, strategic or geographic reasons". These considerations clearly strengthen significantly the multidimensional and profound vision of integration, over and above that of an open region with an exclusively market-oriented outlook. In this spirit, the Protocol for Cultural Integration within Mercosur (1996), which seeks to promote cooperation and exchange among cultural institutions and agents of the States parties through joint programmes and projects that define concrete actions. The initiative provides for exchanges between artists, writers and researchers, joint production and distribution in cinema, video, television, radio and multimedia activities and joint research on shared historic and cultural issues. Thus, binding agreements are continually being forged; these recognize what we have described, in our summing up of paragraph 2, as the Community Rights and Guarantees, which are indispensable for moving forward steadfastly along the path of labour market integration.

On the other hand, Mercosur has bodies, referred to in paragraph 2 as the Organs for Social Representation, whose purpose is to represent the interests of socio-economic groups in moving forward towards the process of integration. As an indication of the scant interest of the drafters of the Treaty of Asunción, the only organ of representation of socio-economic interests created was the Mercosur Council on Industry (CIM). The objective of this Council was to channel the dialogue among the industry business entities with respect to the common issues of integration, with special emphasis on aspects of industrial competitiveness. Following the meeting in Ouro Preto, the Council was subsumed by the Economic and Social Consultative Forum (FCES). This is the consultative body that represents the social and economic sectors and transmits recommendations for consideration by the Common Market Group.

There is also an Organ for Legislative Representation: the Joint Parliamentary Commission (JPC), which has a consultative, deliberative role and is responsible for formulating proposals. The subcommittees already established by the JPC include the Subcommittee on Labour Policies and the Subcommittee on Cultural Affairs. Both the Economic and Social Consultative Forum and the Joint Parliamentary Commission depend on the Common Market Group.

(e) The Andean Community of Nations

Practically since its adoption in 1969, the Cartagena Agreement, which has been the subject of several amendments, has had organs and mechanisms for dealing with social issues and problems in its member countries. Of the Organs for Social Representation established concurrently with the Agreement, mention should be made of the Economic and Social Advisory Committee and the Andean Parliament. Following the Trujillo Act (March 1996), the committees have been renamed (more appropriately) advisory boards.

The Trujillo Act refers to two advisory boards: the Business and the Labour Boards, whose members are elected directly by representatives organizations" of each of the member countries and accredited officially by them (article 44 amended by the Cartagena Agreement). They issue opinions for the main organs of the Argentine Board of Industry, may be convened to the Working Groups and participate with the right to vote in the meetings of the Commission.

The Trujillo Act, also ratifies the existence of the Andean Parliament, which was incorporated into the Agreement in 1979 and is currently defined as the decision-making body within the system. An additional protocol is being prepared so that its members may be elected by universal and direct suffrage. Meanwhile, the Andean Parliament is composed of representatives of the national congresses in accordance with national regulations and with its own Rules of Procedure. It monitors and follows up on the Andean integration processes and, among other functions, can: propose, to the organs and institutions of the System, measures or decisions designed for, or resulting in, the adoption of amendments, adjustments or new general guidelines relating to the programme objectives and the institutional structure of the System; participate in policy generation through proposals to the organs of the System to promote harmonization of the legislation of member countries, and promote ties of cooperation and coordination with parliaments in member countries (amended article 43 of the Cartagena Agreement, various sub-paragraphs).

On the one hand, the Andean Community has social conventions that may be included in the category of Consultative and Cooperation Action, as is the case with the Andrés Bello Agreement (education and culture) and the Hipólito Unanue Agreement (public health). Both agreements were established in early 1970.

The Andrés Bello Agreement (1970) seeks to ensure that signatories make joint efforts in education, science and culture through actions designed to foster mutual knowledge and the circulation of persons and cultural goods; to exchange experiences and cooperate in technical areas; and to harmonize their education systems. The Meeting of Ministers of Education is the highest body responsible for formulating general policy for implementation of the Agreement. The Permanent Executive Secretariat of the Andrés Bello Convention was founded to administer the Agreement. The concrete results of this Agreement in its original wording were limited. Since the meeting of the Andean Ministers of Foreign Affairs in April 1995 an effort has been made to ratify and revalidate its functions.

The Hipólito Unanue Agreement (1971) seeks primarily to improve human health conditions in Andean countries by prioritizing: the solution of problems that impinge on health: undernutrition, environmental health, maternal and child care, health education, environmental pollution and occupational health. Like the agreement on education, this agreement falls within the scope of the Meeting of Ministers of Health in the Andean Area, which formulates relevant guidelines, and is administered by an Executive Secretariat. Again, in this case the concrete results of the operation of the Agreement have been scant. This led the ministers of health of member countries to put forward in 1993 a "Strategic Proposal for Strengthening Andean Cooperation in the Area of Health". This covers the division of labour between countries (including Chile, which has not withdrawn from the Agreement) with respect to their responsibility in monitoring subsectors.

Although the demarcation line in this classification is questionable, the Simón Rodríguez on Social and Labour Integration (1973) could perhaps be considered as closer to what we have described as activities designed to protect Community Rights and Guarantees. Nevertheless, in view of its concrete results to date, it has not gone much further than to put forward measures for consultation and cooperation. Nevertheless, both the objectives of the Agreement and related decisions 113 and 116 give rise to this categorization geared towards formalizing more binding agreements.

The objectives of the Simón Rodríguez Agreement included harmonization of the legal standards for labour and social security; the coordination of policies and actions oriented towards a better use of human resources and the solution of the problems of unemployment and underemployment; the coordination of policies and actions in the field of social security; the improvement of professional training systems; the establishment of a regime that facilitates labour mobility and worker and management participation in the development of subregional integration.

In 1977, the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement adopted decision 113 entitled "An Andean Instrument on Social Security". One of its regulations is that every member country must extend to the persons of other member countries the same treatment as that given to its own nationals

in all areas of social security. Decision 113 dealt, in considerable detail, with the administrative and legal requirements for its fulfilment. Moreover, the ministers of labour agreed to establish the Andean Social Card which entitles them to receive health attention in any of the member countries.

In the same year, the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement adopted decision 116 governing the movement, hiring and treatment of skilled, border and temporary workers of Andean origin. Regulations were also included for the protection of undocumented migrants and their family members. The main point was that each member country should treat other Andean nationals on the same basis as its own citizens.

These two decisions in the spirit and the letter sought to proclaim Community Rights and Guarantees which, in their development, could be the seed for a "community citizenship". Its proclamation, however, was ill-timed. After the so-called lost decade of the 1980s, all the systems for the provision of social public services were in the throes of a complete overhaul.

For these and other reasons, political and economic support by member countries on fulfilment of Social Agreements and their resulting impact have been very unsatisfactory. Even so, at the Conference of Ministers of Labour in 1991, it was agreed to reactivate and recast the Simón Rodríguez Agreement and proceed with the implementation of decisions 113 and 116. More recently, with respect to the establishment of the Customs Union, the Council of Andean Ministers of Foreign Affairs once again highlighted the role of social agreements and the need to harmonize them with the new guidelines for Andean integration.

4. Convergence of policies and migration within Latin America

(a) South-south migration, common markets and human skills

As indicated in the foregoing section, full freedom to migrate within the European Union is already a reality and has not generated major social, institutional or legal difficulties. The stability and fluidity of this process are due to the following: (a) the asymmetries in economic and social development of member countries (and in subnational regions) are not very pronounced; (b) there are supranational resources (Structural funds) that are invested to promote social cohesion within the European Union and (c) the cultural tradition of the unskilled labour force (and linguistic differences) have moderated the massive shifts within the unified area.

In Latin America, (a) asymmetries between countries and subnational regions within a particular agreement are much more pronounced; (b) for the time being, no community resources have been provided to reduce them, and (c) there is a very strong propensity to migrate among unskilled labourers (due to compelling economic and even political factors, and to the relative ease with which they are assimilated culturally and linguistically in the places of destination). There is no doubt that these strong asymmetries can hinder the establishment of the full freedom to migrate inherent in the entry into a common market.

Of course, a decline in this type of asymmetry is a prerequisite for economic, political and social stability, irrespective of the degree of progress that may have been achieved in terms of integration. Policies for economic and social development of the Latin American countries are aimed, obviously, to achieve these objectives for cohesion proposed and implemented nationally. However, until these long-term actions bear fruit, there will continue to be obstacles and impediments to the freedom of workers to migrate within the wider economic area. The whole progress towards the common market phase could be impaired if such difficulties intensified.

The question of the advance towards common markets has been raised in academic literature, principally on the basis of the economic theory of integration, which emphasizes the efficient allocation of resources in a theoretic context based on the assumptions of the marginalist neoclassical economic static. In particular, broader theoretical formulations did not take into account the differences

in labour skills. Only more recently, the issue of human capital and the strategic role of training of human resources has underscored the need to distinguish between different educational levels. In fact, information technologies have highlighted the issue of the distribution of economic opportunities between skilled and unskilled workers as a crucial element in the new expression of social inequalities both in developed and in developing countries. A high and increasing correlation has been noted between middle-income levels and labour skills.

Thus, the issue of labour mobility can be considered more fruitfully if it is addressed in terms of skills and income levels. So as not to complicate these conclusions, a distinction must be made between three levels of skills and income in labour mobility: low, middle and high skills.

In view of the above, the establishment of common markets poses challenges for three sets of regimes and policies in which convergence must be achieved for the gradual integration of labour markets: (a) migration systems and policies; (b) social systems and policies which confer the right to work in another member country (c) systems and policies relating to human resources training.

Firstly, in the case of unskilled workers, their intense requirement for public goods and their limited contribution to the upkeep of such goods in places of destination can be detrimental to local workers with similar skills and income. It is also most probably at this level that mass movements can occur that are capable of unbalancing labour markets.

Secondly, the issue perhaps does not arise so starkly in the case of middle or highly-skilled workers, since their decisions to move are usually based on a more rational and better informed analysis of the costs and benefits of such a move within the broader region. Their higher skills and income suggest greater caution on their part in undertaking such moves. If such migrants have the capital to set up small and medium-sized businesses, they can contribute to productive investment or to hiring workers in the places of destination. It is also possible that their pressure on the public goods of places where they settle may be less massive and intensive than that exerted by low-skilled migrants.

Thirdly, when highly skilled, high-income persons decide to relocate, it is not usually as a result of negative economic factors in the country of origin but rather following a rational, better informed calculation of the economic opportunities in the country of destination. If they have their own capital, they can invest in businesses that generate employment. If they are senior executives, they can be a part of the senior staff in transnational corporations. In any case, the cost of their using public goods (health, education, etc.) is usually defrayed privately and, although they do make use of them, their tax contributions are usually sufficient to ensure that their presence in the country of destination yields a positive fiscal balance.

In short, it is at the level of low-skilled migrants who are at the bottom of the income ladder that national and subnational asymmetries in terms of living standards and conditions may pose the greatest challenges to the setting up of a common market.

This issue suggests the need for research to determine what role migration systems and policies can play within a community for setting up subregional common markets. The wider the asymmetries in income, health and education, the more migrants will tend to abandon the underprivileged regions for more developed ones, once freedom of movement – inherent to the very concept of common market – has been established. The direct establishment of unrestricted freedom to migrate can erode the credibility and desirability of progress towards a common market. Thus, consideration should be given to the possibility of introducing migration regulations, which, if only as a temporary measure, introduce exceptions to free labour mobility, for example by imposing safeguards (comparable to those proposed in the area of international trade) to cater for serious imbalances in some specific labour markets in places of destination. In the long term, the final solution to this type of risk is to promote development in the most underprivileged areas where (for reasons of proximity or population pressure, etc.), there is a high risk of mass migration by low-skilled workers, which is likely to perturb labour markets or access to public goods in places of destination. Convergence on this issue will

probably require the formulation of policies and systems that guarantee for all parties the fulfilment of criteria based on reciprocity and symmetry in the exceptions and safeguards that may be established to the principle of free mobility of labour.

(b) South-south migrations, common markets and socio-economic rights

However many migrants move within an integrated area, the establishment of the freedom to work in another member country implies a reciprocal recognition of social rights previously acquired by workers from other member countries. Unlike the tougher condition of harmonizing social regimes and policies in a centralized manner, the recognition of such rights (relating to social security, health, education and others) requires only the application of the criterion of mutual recognition. This is the chief lesson that can be drawn from the long experience of the European Union in establishing the Common Market. In other words, the social systems and policies do not need to be organized on the basis of common systems in order to be recognized as valid in another member country. The only requirement is that a specific set of guarantees and rights should be respected even if their form of implementation and management may not be the same.

If we breakdown each stratum further, we will see that, traditionally, low-skilled, low-income workers in Latin America have been covered by State-subsidized social security and health care systems under which, notwithstanding the contribution of employers and of the workers themselves, the State's contribution is usually decisive in ensuring the effective enjoyment of the rights to social security in the broad sense of the term (not only welfare and health, but also maternity benefits, unemployment benefits, family allowances, labour-related accidents and so forth). For this segment of workers, the reciprocal recognition (or coordination) of systems is, above all, a way of securing, in the short term, rights acquired in other member countries.

In terms of social security, progress in this direction will require the application of the principle of conservation of acquired rights on a total or pro-rata basis. The most recent example relates to the Multilateral Agreement on Social Security (Convenio Multilateral de Seguridad Social) which is being forged within Mercosur. The "total" basis includes all contribution periods irrespective of the member State where they were served while the pro-rata basis means that the costs of benefits are distributed among the different member countries in proportion to the time worked (and during which contributions were made by the beneficiary or principal) in each of them. This raises the issue of comparative research to determine the fiscal cost and operational viability of these methods of coordination. In this regard, one should also examine similar agreements that exist in the Andean Community, the Central American Common Market and Caricom.

Once again, the situation of high-skilled and high-income migrants is quite different in terms of their access to social security systems based on personal capitalization mechanisms. Experience acquired in Latin America seems to suggest that these mechanisms are efficient on the basis of a certain minimum per capita income level. Government regulations for these capitalization systems guarantee at the national level the right of contributors to transfer from one pension fund administrator (AFP) to another. In terms of an integration agreement, minimum administrative and financial conditions would have to be determined to ensure the reciprocal recognition of rights for contributors from another member State, probably on the basis of reciprocal recognition of regulatory systems existing in each country. This issue could also give rise to specific research studies.

(c) Common markets and convergence of educational policies

Commitments founded on the reciprocal recognition of regimes and policies can facilitate significant progress on both the supply and the demand side, especially in training highly skilled human capital. With respect to the supply of skills, modern information technologies allow economies of scale and specialization if every country can contribute to the training of persons from all the other member countries in those areas in which it excels. On the demand side, students will have wider

options in terms of where they wish to be trained, thus generating a competitiveness that can have a healthy impact on the quality and efficiency of the different education systems.

Clearly, permanent residence of migrants in one member country is neither feasible nor desirable without the freedom to migrate, settle, study and work in any other member country (accompanied by the appropriate safeguards). However, legislation may be passed relating to the reciprocal recognition of titles and certificates of studies quite independently of the regulations governing the freedoms indicated at the beginning of this paragraph. Such recognition may be used for an intensive flow of transient migrants from different member countries, who, once they have received their training, return to their countries of origin and obtain recognition for the studies thus obtained.

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A.2 International migrations and economic integration in the Southern Cone: notes for discussion⁴

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International migration flows – especially since the 1980s – are playing an increasingly important role on the world stage, where the major economic, social, cultural and ideological transformations underway are reflected in sharp regional inequalities, intensifying local conflicts and attempts to establish integrated markets, one of which – the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) – is of special interest in our discussions.

The spatial mobility of persons beyond national boundaries (and all that this implies) is one dimension of the relationship between population and development and a central part of any population policy.

Contemporary international migration has become the focus of increasing interest among population specialists and social analysts. Indeed, in the agreements emerging from the United Nations conferences in the 1990s – particularly the International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, 1994) – this issue is identified as a matter requiring action by countries. The commitments made by Governments attest to the need for specific treatment, since any action on international population movements will depend on bilateral or multilateral agreements between or among States. One characteristic of economic integration blocs is the existence of a jurisdiction which obstructs agreements among countries; in general, such agreements provide for the relaxation of regulations governing the circulation of goods and factors of production; the free movement of workers is just a result of treaties and, in practice, leads to tense and conflictual situations.

At all the recent conferences, countries expressed great concern at current patterns of international migration, bearing in mind the considerable tension between the characteristics of a competitive and globalized world dominated by labour-saving technologies and the advances made in securing human rights. Consensus documents conceal the antagonism between migrant-sending countries (which are generally poor) and receiving countries (generally rich) and treat the issue of legal migrants very differently from that of illegal migrants and political refugees, not to mention the question of foreign currency remittances to countries of origin, which, according to United Nations estimates, are second only to the oil trade transaction in terms of the value of foreign exchange transfers.

The specificity of situations existing in South America is reflected in the growing tendency for people to migrate to the first world; Brazil is starting to show a different pattern from the internal movements within the region. For specialists of the issue, the question is: To what extent have the Treaty of Asunción and the creation of Mercosur had a significant impact on the recent movements of persons across national boundaries and what are the implications of such movements for the social groups in question?

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1. International migrations in the Southern Cone: a brief summary

The Treaty of Mercosur, which dates from 1991, impinges on a group of countries in the Southern Cone of Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and, subsequently, Chile and Bolivia), nations which are geographically close and share similar historical and cultural backgrounds, but which also show considerable differences in various aspects of their social and economic life. On the basis of the legacy of their European colonial past (Portugal, in the case of Brazil, and Spain, in the case of the other countries), a number of factors – namely the way the land was carved up, cultural features, the pattern of urbanization, economic cycles, the relationship with their former mother countries, the independence process and the relationship with their indigenous populations, the presence of the descendents of African slaves (in the case of Brazil) – were forging similarities and differences which merged, in the twentieth century, in a general effort at industrialization of the former colonies, which only a century earlier, following conflicts of varying intensity, had emerged as independent nations.

The most obvious discrepancy lies in the surface area of their geographical units. In the case of Brazil, Portuguese colonial policy forged a territory that was unified geographically and linguistically, encompassing 8.5 million square kilometres and a population of approximately 170 million inhabitants. In the case of the Spanish colonization, territorial splits shaped countries which were quite small, for example, Paraguay, with an area of 407,000 square kilometres and a current population of approximately 5.5 million and Uruguay, with an area of barely 177,000 square kilometres and a population of approximately 3.2 million as well as countries, such as Argentina, a much vaster territory (2.8 million square kilometres) – with a higher level of industrialization, early urbanization and with a special European stamp – which joins the integration process today with a population of approximately 36 million inhabitants.

These countries emerged and consolidated their achievements through strong flows of international immigration, which gave them their own cultural peculiarities; from the colonial period up to the middle of the twentieth century, Latin America received vast numbers of foreign migrants, who, whether on account of the circumstances that led them to leave countries of origin, or owing to the attraction of the new lands, sought to settle permanently and to find a place in a new social setting and to help forge the history of a new country (Pellegrino, 1995).

In the eighteenth century, there were constant flows of international immigrants towards the region, originating for the most part in the colonial countries; the importation of African slaves was another important development, mainly for the Brazilian slave-based economy and led to specific cultural features in some parts of the country.

The political and social upheavals in Europe and the emancipation of the Latin American countries in the nineteenth century resulted in new migratory flows towards the region, the main destinations being Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Chile; Italians accounted for a large percentage of such immigrants (mainly towards the end of the century). Their significant cultural, social and economic influence stands out as one of the features of convergence among the countries of the Southern Cone (excepting Paraguay).

The last wave of European immigrants into Latin America occurred after the Second World War and the main countries of destination were Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela (Lattes and Lattes, 1996). Towards the 1970s, immigration was already starting to lose its appeal, while, at the same time, in socio-economic terms, the gap compared with the more developed countries was widening. During this period, social upheavals and dictatorial regimes in several Latin American countries, together with the economic and social development of the countries of the "first world" triggered another migratory movement, this time, the emigration of Latin Americans away from Latin America (Villa, 1996).

Efforts by countries in the Southern Cone to achieve industrialization had special features and setbacks, which complemented the historical diversity of their social structure. The Paraguayan economy has a broad agricultural base, with traditional models; Uruguay, where urbanization occurred early in its development and where school enrolment rates were high, shows barely incipient industrialization, which has prompted many, especially among its young people to emigrate; in Argentina and Brazil, industrialization has been more systematic, although it has been marked by various difficulties that have led to sharp social imbalances.

In recent years, all the countries striving to achieve economic integration have needed to take stock of their position in a new context and in the new international interplay of forces; at the same time, they have had to face changes on the domestic front and the early phases of productive restructuring, domestic and foreign borrowing, revitalizing of the State apparatus and, with special local peculiarities, a deterioration in living conditions for broad segments of its population.

Population growth in these countries and in Latin America as a whole has fallen sharply in the last few decades; between the early 1960s and the late 1980s, total fertility fell from 6 children to 3.4 children per woman, while life expectancy rose, on average, from 57 years to 67 years. After reaching a maximum value of almost 3%, the growth rate is currently at around 1.7% (ECLAC/CELADE, 1993). Compared with significantly different indicators in 1950, the countries now comprising Mercosur show considerably lower levels, notwithstanding relatively higher rates in countries such as Paraguay.

For the purposes of the debate on the reciprocal influences of the economic integration treaties and the labour market, it is important to highlight the effects of these changes on the structure of their respective populations, which represent the effects of different processes of demographic transition; Argentina and Uruguay underwent early transition, starting at the beginning of the twentieth century; Brazil and Paraguay are in a similar phase and are transition countries, with major repercussions, both in terms of the configuration of the labour market and in terms of the different profiles of the demand for social policies. In these four countries, the lower percentage of younger segments of the population can be an opportunity to improve educational standards and to improve professional training in the current context of globalization; on the other hand, unemployment and the difficulties for young people to find employment are pressing problems for national societies.

The importance of adult groups is also significant, that is, the economically active population, which accounts for a growing percentage of total population; this reflects the higher percentage of the population seeking employment on the labour market, whose numbers are swelled by the growing participation of women in the workforce. Moreover, the age group of persons sixty years and over account for an increasing percentage of the population, with serious implications for the social security and health systems, at a time when State contributions to social spending are on the decline.

Recent international migrations involving the countries of the southern cone fall into two basic categories, namely, migration to the industrialized countries – mainly the United States – and intra-regional migration (Chackiel and Villa, 1992). The first pattern, that is, migration to the developed countries has been growing in line with improvements in the education system in Latin American countries and growth of the middle classes. This underscores the difficulties in retaining skilled human resources and the sectors for whom education is a factor of upward social mobility. Globalization of consumption patterns and of the lifestyles of the developed countries through the mass media is generating aspirations that cannot be satisfied in the countries of origin and this is having an impact in terms of the numbers of would-be emigrants (Pellegrino, 1996); the selectivity of the developed countries has significant implications for intra-regional movements and for labour market changes in the context of economic integration.

Brazil, a country which traditionally held a strong appeal for migrants and which, in the 1960s and 1970s, was considered a closed nation in terms of population, has reversed this trend. Estimates for the period 1980-1991 show a negative international migration balance (of close to 1.4 million

persons); this fact has surprised even population specialists and embarrassed various civil society forums, which had boasted about Brazil as a host country and now saw this outflow of young people from the urban middle class and with secondary education as a failure of the national project for development (Patarra, 1995).

Intra-regional migration is nothing new in Latin America; the region has borders that were highly permeable to migrants. There was movement predominantly between regions with common historical and cultural roots; in fact, these were intra-regional movements and the existence of a political boundary turned them into international migrations. The imbalances in the development processes caused international migration movements that are virtually no more than an extension of internal migration in the respective countries, although the moves imply an extension of the same social processes across the border.

The recent processes of integration and economic globalization – and the ensuing opening-up of markets – have resulted in more dynamic and expressive forms of intra-regional migration in the Latin American subregions, where economic blocs are being formed and these regions are acting in closer coordination and are increasing their economic trade and population movements. In the Southern Cone, such movements have tended to change both between and within countries. In this regard, the recent economic integration and the increase in communication between the Mercosur countries have shaped binational areas with different dynamics, with on-going migration flows and with economic activities that act as integrated regional markets.

The recent socio-economic dynamic has deepened the existing imbalances and accentuated exclusion; movements of persons fall into this context, since they are no longer taking place within national boundaries but are categorized as cross-border movements and constitute migration flows between the metropolitan areas of Mercosur.

Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil, traditional recipients of European (and in the case of Brazil, Asian) immigration received the last such streams in the years following the Second World War; since then – and in some cases as far back as the 1930s – more substantial movements involved the internal redistribution of their own population and, in particular, rural-urban migration as a feature of urbanization.

Argentina has continued to be an important recipient of immigrants from bordering countries (Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay) and, at the same time, has become a population exporter (Maguid, 1993); this trend, which was starting to emerge ever since the 1970s, is attributable largely to political factors and involved an important number of professionals and technically skilled persons.

Uruguay has become a population exporter, with substantial flows towards its neighbour, Argentina; the scale of Uruguayan emigration, mainly in the 1970s, caused a decline in the population in absolute terms between 1974 and 1975. Political factors played a significant role in triggering this migration, as did the effects of an economic crisis that had been dragging on for several decades, with the tendency to migrate particularly strong among young people. While economic indicators point to a recovery, the feedback effects generated by the establishment of a considerable population outside the country tends to strengthen the tendency to migrate (Palau, 1997).

On par with its role as country of emigration to the first world, Brazil is, by order of importance, the third Latin American country receiving immigrant flows from within the region; nevertheless, it receives much fewer immigrants than Argentina from other Mercosur countries. The policies that the Brazilian State has promoted with respect to scientific and technological research and the development of modern industrial sectors have had specific effects on the composition of these flows.

In view of the difficulties in harmonizing and updating data, countries of the Southern Cone have to make a concerted effort to measure these trends and processes in order to understand the patterns and trends in international migration in South America and, in particular, in their subregion. In fact, the shortage of statistical data, the practice of undercounting and the time-lag in the production

of data are chronic problems for all researchers in this area. The implementation of a databank of the Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE), Population Division of ECLAC, on international migration (IMILA), whose overall results were recently divulged represents a major step forward in this direction.

Table 1 was taken from IMILA and shows migration flows between the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, Canada and the United States; the database was developed from census information from countries, which implies significant time variations; wherever possible, the coverage goes back to 1960. Although the census data from countries are of different quality and reflect undercounts, trends over the period can be analysed; they also give a general picture, identify flows together with some characteristics and contributes to a better understanding of population movements in the area.

Table 1A shows that Argentina, Brazil – to a larger extent – and Uruguay saw the size of their foreign population decline in the 1980s while, in Mercosur, Chile and Paraguay were the only countries to have recorded any appreciable increase. There has been a significant exchange of population between Chile and Argentina; the latter also registered higher numbers of Bolivians, Chileans and Uruguayans among the total of its foreign presence and a slight decline in the number of Brazilians; on the other hand, the presence of Argentines in all countries of the bloc is on the rise.

Whereas the 1991 census in Brazil showed a marked decline in the number of foreigners, there was actually an increase in the proportion of immigrants from the other Mercosur countries; on the other hand, there was a significant increase recently in the number of Brazilians in Chile and, to a lesser extent in Paraguay and Uruguay. In the last intercensal period, Chile recorded a considerable increase in the number of Argentines and smaller proportions of Bolivians, Brazilians, Paraguayans and Uruguayans. In its 1992 census, Paraguay recorded a larger number of foreigners, the majority of them, Brazilians, whose numbers increased in the 1980s. In Uruguay, there was a slight decrease in the number of foreigners, most of whom are Argentines or Brazilians. On the other hand, there was an increase in the number of Uruguayans living in Argentina and Brazil and, on a smaller scale, in Chile and Paraguay.

It is interesting to note that since the 1970s, the United States has been recording an increase in migrants from the Mercosur countries; the same trend, albeit on a lower scale, has been observed in Canada, although the data collected are incomplete.

These observations reaffirm, in a general way, the above-mentioned characteristics and trends in migration movements both among countries in the bloc and towards countries of the first world, especially the United States.

The IMILA international migration matrix, which covers up to the 1990 round of censuses, provides a general overview of migratory movements that occurred in the Southern Cone prior to the Treaty of Asunción (1991); the effects of economic integration on these movements will be studied once the results of the 2000 round of censuses are available.

Evidence from different sources, including local research, newspaper articles, diplomatic coverage and surveys carried out by non-governmental organizations, define the context and the limits of some concrete situations, which, while they do not reveal the magnitude of the trends allow us to trace the relationship between recurrent processes and emerging effects, as well as global economic changes and, more specifically, the effects of agreements and mechanisms established between Governments and Mercosur.

In the following section, some empirical evidence is provided on the social processes involved in cross-border movements between Brazil and the other countries in the bloc. Emphasis will be placed on border conditions, a factor identified as of particular importance in official Mercosur documents. Spatial proximity and the continuity of processes linked predominantly to agrarian issues will be described more specifically.

2. Migrations and borders

The Mercosur treaty on economic integration is part of a pre-existing socio-economic and cultural framework, marked by migration movements – predominantly agrarian in origin – and which has shifted the limits of tensions, conflicts and social stratification of the countries in question. These movements were, to a considerable extent, actually a reaction – with perverse effects – to existing agrarian and related policies. Special mention must be made of certain special features of cross-border population movements. From the point of view of Brazil, three patterns of movements can be identified involving countries of the Southern Cone: Brazil-Paraguay, Brazil-Argentina and Brazil-Uruguay.

2.1 Brazil-Paraguay

Recent cross-border movements between these two countries are closely linked to the setting up of their boundaries, mainly agricultural boundaries. Moreover, the consolidation of the political-administrative border that separates the two countries was marked by a series of fights and struggles, which involved not only the Governments but also the local populations and the major commercial corporations. This consolidation derives from the settlement of the frontier regions of the two nations, which was being promoted by the respective Governments.

The settlement of Brazilian frontier territories with Paraguay began in the 1930s with the so-called westward march (Sprandel, 1992), the purpose of which was to settle and demarcate national boundaries. During the second world war, the appropriation of frontier lands by foreigners was prohibited.

Government initiatives to encourage peasants to settle in these areas proved ineffectual owing to illegal land speculation by real estate companies and federal Governments. The border regions held great appeal, both because of the suitability of their soil for specific crops – such as the so-called red earth for coffee – and because of the proximity to roads and export markets, which facilitated agricultural trade. Nevertheless, the settlement of such areas was always fraught with violence and social exclusion; hence the attempt, since the 1960s, to cross the border in search of property and employment on Paraguayan soil.

The settlement of the border regions in Paraguay started with the sale of large latifundios to foreign agro-industrial concerns and Brazilian, Japanese and United States settlers. Paraguay also had its *eastward march* (Sprandel, 1992). The Paraguayan policy for settlement and modernization of the agricultural border, which emerged during the dictatorship, was drawn up for military and population purposes, in accordance with the doctrine on national security (Palau and Heikel, 1981 and 1987).

Brazilians moving to Paraguay found that the Paraguayan Government provided considerable advantages, including cheap land, discounts on the sale price of products, banking benefits and loans. Those with more capital, that is, those that had their own funds, reaped huge profits under these conditions, and this applied to farmers, merchandise producers and Brazilian tenants, who expanded their estates by speculating on the differential in the value of land between the two countries.

In the late 1970s, this reality started to change and the Brazilian migrants, without much capital, that is, small land-holders, tenants, owners or settlers started to encounter difficulties in establishing themselves. The lands to be settled were sold off to the large agricultural companies and the former tenants and occupants were expelled and forced to become temporary wage-earners.

Even so, Brazilian contingents in Paraguay remained high; the 1992 census recorded close to 108,000 Brazilians residing in this country. According to Palau (1996), this figure accounted for a mere 40% of total Brazilian migrants; in 1996, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil registered a total of 350,000 Brazilians resident in Paraguay and distributed as follows: Asunción, 107,035; Ciudad del Este, 190,070; Salto de Guaira, 40,000; Concepción, 6,112; Encarnación, 3,102 and Pedro Juan

Caballero, 3,618. The clearly rural character of this initial immigration of Brazilians into Paraguay has, undoubtedly, been compounded by other factors: on the one hand, the presence of other Brazilian immigrants in the capital, Asunción, which points to the development of non-agricultural, particularly financial, activities, dominated by Brazilians. On the other hand, the trinational area of Ciudad del Este, of high demographic growth and intensive binational population movements (of a temporary or circular nature) was the main springboard for activities linked to smuggling and drug-trafficking, which, together with tourist activity, shaped a mixture *sui generis*; the size of the Brazilian contingent is reflected even in internal contentions for positions of power at the local level.

An idea of the social complexity of this migration can be obtained from the meaning that the migrants themselves gave to the term *Brasiguayos*, a concept relating to three categories: foreigner, Brazilian and migrant. Foreigner, because this was the status of the small agricultural landholders entering Paraguayan territory; *Brazilian*, because this implied a consciousness of nationality, and *migrant* in terms of their legal status. In a recent study, it was established that the *Brasiguayos* settled in Paraguay showed two types of characteristics: one relating to their traditional relationship with the land – small land-owners, tenants and wage-earners – and the other relating to the degree of geographic penetration, those further inland, in other words, those living close the Paraguayan districts of the Department of Canindeyu, and those of the "international" zones, that is those residing close to the dry border of the Department of Canindeyu with Mato Grosso do Sul, on the Brazilian side.

In 1994, "roving consular missions" were appointed with the joint participation of the Brazilian and Paraguayan police. It is important to point out the presence of the Catholic Church, which guided immigrants in procuring documents. Several examples of illicit acts and inefficient or excessively bureaucratic procedures cast doubt on the credibility of these bodies (Palu, 1996).

Individuals and families faced other difficulties in their everyday life – insufficient education and health coverage, registration of land titles, smuggling and violence – which affected the living conditions of the *Brasiguayos*; these difficulties also affected the Brazilians and Paraguayans belonging to social groups that were dispossessed or marginalized.

2.2 Brazil-Argentina

Brazilians migrating to Argentina fell into two categories: migrants from rural areas, including farm labourers and small farm owners, bound mainly for the province of Misiones, and urban migrants –including senior managers of national and international corporations, whose main destination was the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area and whose migration was more clearly part of the recent trend towards economic globalization. Initially, Brazilian migrants would settle mainly in the city of Buenos Aires, but as from the 1970s, migratory movements to Misiones intensified; thus, in 1970, 50% of Brazilians enumerated in Argentina were located in this province; in 1991, more than half of them were living in Misiones and a little less than one-third in the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area.

Brazilian migrants to Buenos Aires presented quite a different profile to that of those settling in Misiones; in addition to the marked urban composition, economic and demographic differences are quite significant, as pointed out in the Hasenbalg study.

Most Brazilian immigrants in the province of Misiones belonged to a low socio-economic level; according to Arruñada (1997), three quarters of these immigrants had not completed primary schooling, were engaged mainly in agricultural activities and were relatively unskilled. Very few ever participated in the more dynamic sectors; half of the economically active population were wage-earners and only 20% of Brazilians were in this category.

Migrations of Brazilians to the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area intensified with the economic integration of the countries in the Southern Cone; since 1994, the number of technicians, executives, professionals and managers transferred by Brazilian-based corporations to Argentina has been on the rise. These migrants were of an economically high position. Some 40% of those living in the

Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area had completed or gone beyond secondary education and the younger ones have an even higher education levels. In this case, Brazilian workers are distributed more homogeneously among the groups of skilled or unskilled, as the activities of the different sectors call for more complex tasks. Flows of Brazilian migrants into Argentina were always less strong than into other Mercosur countries, no doubt owing to Argentine policies on migration, which since 1876, had swung between encouraging and restricting immigration. In 1940, there were no laws governing the entry of migrants; since then, the Government has started to be concerned at the rate of immigration and borders have been controlled. The 1940 Border Act prohibited the purchase of border lands by foreigners.

Currently, regulations governing foreign residents in Argentina are stricter than those applied in Paraguay and Uruguay, where the more flexible legislation (governing the purchase of land by foreigners) was always an incentive for agrarian-type movements. In the case of Argentina, any person wishing to migrate must obtain an entry and residence permit at the consulate in order to enter the country with the proper documentation; in the case of temporary or transitory migration, this can only be approved on Argentine soil through the so-called standard procedure or route, but is still subject to authorization by the National Bureau of Migration. Illegal and clandestine migrants can only obtain benefits when there are amnesties or other forms of regularization. Notwithstanding this law, since the 1970s, large numbers of Brazilians, mainly from Rio Grande do Sul, have migrated to Argentina. According to Baastian and Plata, many of them are small land-owners, for the most part landless peasants, unskilled workers, who have been unable to acquire land in Brazil and who have acquired land illegally in this country. Such flows are strongly marked by the valuation process and the land market; the sharp escalation in real estate prices in Brazil⁶ prompted large land-owners and/or Brazilian agricultural entrepreneurs to purchase land in neighbouring countries; according to estimates, by the middle of the 1990s, 250 of the 1,000 rice producers registered in Argentina were Brazilian (Sales, 1996).

Another point to be considered in the border areas is the impact on the region of the construction of major integration projects; the Garibaldi Hydroelectricity Plant, which will be owned by the Panambi-Roncador, Garabi and São Pedro corporations, located respectively in the municipalities of Porto Lacerda, São Borja and Uruguaiana, will be geared to the Argentine market (Corrientes and Misiones) and to the market of the west of Rio Grande do Sul. The gas pipeline project will be used to import natural gas from Argentina for use in thermo-electric plants with long cycle conversions; this will be combined with the joint production of electricity in gas-fired plants. The project for construction of the international bridge linking São Borja and San Tomé has been feasible since the 1989 Binational Agreement; the process started with the invitation to tender launched in 1995, and in December of the same year, construction started. The project consists of two stretches of highway linking the BR-285 in Brazil with Highway 14 in Argentina, with a bridge over the Uruguay river. the Mercosur Highway – which will link São Paulo with Buenos Aires – is still under study, but one probable route will be through Uruguaiana and will include the Colonia-Buenos Aires bridge.

2.3 Brazil-Uruguay

The main migratory movements by Brazilians into Uruguay started in the 1970s and were made up of small producers; in the following decades, these movements were made up essentially of large land-owners from Rio Grande do Sul and São Paulo. There are no estimates of the number of Brazilians who purchased land in Uruguay, but Reydon and Plata (1995) report that, according to the newspaper Brecha, at least 10% of Uruguayan land belonged to foreigners. The President of the Rural Federation of Uruguay stated that the number quoted by the newspaper was higher than official estimates; nevertheless, he felt that the purchase by foreigners of Uruguayan land – more accessible, inexpensive and more profitable – was still a very delicate matter in his country. It is important to point out that in Uruguay, the purchase of land by foreigners in Uruguay is not subject to any legislation. The agricultural crisis of the 1970s caused a fall in land prices in Uruguay; this attracted

Brazilian investors, eager to cash in on the significantly higher interest rates in Uruguay and bring into Uruguay their investments as well as large numbers of landless Brazilians, willing to accept lower wages (on account of their illegal status in that country). It would appear that the Brazilian entrepreneur were welcomed by the Uruguayan authorities, an unusual attitude towards speculators who, generally face a certain hostility.

Several factors marked Uruguay as a frontier territory, apart from its long consolidation process between the two colonial powers, which Brazil and Argentina, the two largest countries in Latin America, had become since their independence. One of the main migratory characteristics is the exchange of population; Uruguay has always had the highest emigration rates in Latin America, a direct outcome of its economic crises. This situation has contributed to a large extent to the formation of border towns, characterized by the coexistence of cultures: two currencies, two languages, two legislative systems, etc., the so-called binational cities. Some transnational areas, such as Santana do Livramento/Rivera and Chuí/Chuy, located respectively in Brazil and Uruguay are examples of towns of this kind.

The frontier towns of Santana do Livramento (Brazil) and Rivera (Uruguay) have a unique society, integrated, yet at the same time, different. Bermúdez stated that it was easy to find persons with dual nationality. In Rivera, many parents register their new-born children both in Santana do Livramento and in Rivera, which can imply a dual political role; for example, a citizen may at the same time hold the post of town councillor on one side and congressman on the other. It is important to highlight that this potential political role can extend beyond national frontiers. Another peculiarity of these cities is the fact that two different currencies are legal tender; today, with the macroeconomic changes and the formation of Mercosur, one can see that the major foreign exchange differences between Brazil and Uruguay have had an impact on the development of trade and on the expansion of industrial activities. It is common to find in the city of Rivera large commercial centres, called "free shops"; many Brazilians take advantage of the difference in the exchange rate to cross the border and shop in Uruguay.

The trade circuits and economic interests in this region overcome and transcend the realms of legality, and this can be observed in both urban and rural areas. In the major urban centres, it is common to see the development of illegal trade – practised by the so-called *camelôs* – free of taxes or duties. In agriculture, many ranchers purchase land and do not need to concern themselves with registration; they are seeking the maximum profit for the minimum investment.

According to Jardim (1999), another region similar to Santana/Rivera is the area of coverage of Chuí (along the border with Uruguay) at 500 kilometres from Porto Alegre and 340 kilometres from Montevideo. The urban core of Chuí (Brazil) and Chuy (Uruguay) is between the international customs offices, separated by two two-way avenues (Avenida Brasil and Avenida Uruguay). According to 1996 statistics, Chuí had 3,614 inhabitants.

In addition to all the features of the binational border town of Chuí/Chuy, which also apply to Santana do Livramento/Rivera, this region has one specificity: Arab migration, mainly on the Brazilian side. The influx of Arab immigrants along the Brazilian border is linked to its settlement policy and to the fact that these borders were always open to foreigners, unlike what occurred in Uruguay. Numerically, trading is much more intensive than in the Uruguayan section of Chuy, where the main activity is rice cultivation in large expanses of land known as "granjas". There is no direct relationship between Arab migration and the establishment of a strong trade on the Brazilian side, Chuí, although the oldest trading establishments are administered by families of Arab origin (Jardim, 1999).

3. Closing remarks

International migratory movements are an intrinsic and fundamental part of the relationship between population and development; internationalization of the economy under the influence of

financial capital and international flows of money and merchandise cannot occur without the free circulation of persons, although this may give rise to disagreements. The international movement of the economy implies – simultaneously and in a way that is fraught with tension – a strengthening and weakening of nation-states.

The formation of economic blocs, considered as strategies for facing the growing competitiveness, both nationally and internationally, strengthens the forces that draw people to and away from countries, and significant flows are occurring between poor and rich countries.

In South America, attempts to face up to international competition – through unification and identification with the effort to consolidate the Mercosur economic bloc – seem to be reminiscent of the process of formation of the European Common Market, although with marked regional specificities. In the almost ten years that have elapsed since the Treaty of Asunción was signed, Mercosur is stumbling forward and at each step, the requirements of the alliance come up against challenges and national interests. Along this difficult path, the agencies responsible for translating the commitments of countries into actual improvements in living conditions for their peoples have had to contend with delays, difficulties and conflicts and have been treated as of secondary importance .

It is still not possible to assess the scope of international migration, which in the 1990s, was directly subject to the Treaty of Asunción and its outcomes. Undoubtedly, productive restructuring and the international context have produced effects in this regard, to the extent that they may have triggered population moves (which are difficult to quantify). This new context has clearly influenced movements between the two regional metropolises – Buenos Aires and São Paulo – as well as between other smaller cities, whose geographic position and competitiveness have attracted new international industrial plants, which have set off the process of urban transformation and population mobility corresponding to the current phase of economic globalization.

The issue of borders and adjacent areas between the countries of Mercosur could be the counterweight to these urban movements, whose specificities are multiple: firstly, there may not be any significant increase in migratory movements as a result of commercial agreements. Nevertheless, the existing context is introducing recurrent trends that have other meanings and new implications. From a legal point of view, the direction of Mercosur should, sooner or later, redefine the situation of these population groups; indeed, it is a matter of making the transition from foreign (or immigrant) status to the status of citizen of the community (Mármora, 1999).

Moreover, these movements, which tend to be steadier, more circular and more diversified, have an impact on historical cases of binational (or, as in the case of Foz de Iguazú, trinational) coexistence, where the stratification of the society, inequalities and accumulated deficiencies have tended to become sharper, opening up a range of new demands for social policies in terms of access to health care and education; thus, harmonization of social security systems is a clear imperative.

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B. Economic and technological changes in labour markets of origin and destination countries

B.1 Migration and development the case of Mexico and United States⁷

Philip Martin⁸

Abstract

This paper explores economic and technological changes and the evolution of labour markets in sending and receiving countries, with the emphasis on developments in the major emigration country, Mexico, and the impact of migrants from Mexico and Latin America on the economies of Canada and the United States. There are three major conclusions:

- The United States has 10 percent foreign residents (26 million in 1997) and 12 percent foreign-born workers (16 million in 1997), including five million Mexican-born workers, but no major United States industry or occupation is dependent on foreign-born or Mexican-born workers.

⁷ Paper prepared for the Symposium on International Migration in the Americas, Costa Rica, September 4-6, 2000. The Symposium's purpose is to explore the relationship between migration and development in the region, including the impacts of migrants on sending and receiving societies.

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- Foreign-born workers are at the high and low ends of the education and income distribution scales. Mexican-born workers tend to be near the low end, often filling jobs that would be eliminated or modified by technology at higher wages—in labour markets such as agriculture and textiles, the flexibility is on the demand side of the labour market.
- Trade and investment are the fastest and surest proven paths to reduce economically motivated migration. However, their short- and long-run effects on migration may be very different, producing a migration hump in the short-term that should be dealt with in a manner that does not permit migration disputes to interfere with economic integration.

Mexico, the United States, and Canada are on a path toward closer economic integration that should reduce permanent or settler migration and increase temporary or sojourner migration for business and other purposes. This reduction in emigration pressure in Mexico may be noticeable sooner than is commonly realized. The policy challenge is to do no harm, to avoid policies that prolong Mexican-US migration.

Introduction

The world's population (six billion in 2000) and the world economy (\$30 trillion in 2000) are growing, and the world's 200 nation states are becoming more interdependent, meaning that flows of persons, goods, and capital across national borders are increasing constantly. There is a growing consensus that migration can no longer be managed unilaterally, and that tools for the successful management of bilateral migration can be incorporated into regional and eventually global migration regimes.

Most regional and international regimes—systems in which national governments yield at least some power to a supranational authority that grants member nations rights and imposes obligations on them—emerge from crisis (Massey, et. al, 1998). For example, at the end of a war, security regimes are often created to which member nations pledge mutual support to head off future armed conflicts. Similarly, after economic crises, trade and investment regimes may be established that require member nations to lower barriers to goods and investments from other member nations.⁹

This paper explores one part of the North American migration system, focusing on the employment of Mexican workers into the United States labour market. There are several ways of looking at the extent of Mexican migration to the United States:

- About 8 percent of the 108 million persons alive today who were born in Mexico live in the United States in 2000, and the Mexican-born population of the US, is increasing by about 300,000 a year.
- Some 4 to 5 million Mexican-born workers were employed in the United States labour market, equivalent to about one-third of the 12 to 13 million Mexicans employed in formal sector jobs in Mexico (enrolled in the pension system IMSS).

There are far smaller flows of Mexican workers into Canada, including the almost 8,000 Mexicans admitted as temporary farm workers in 1999.

Migration has been the major economic relationship between Mexico and the United States for most of the twentieth century, assuming unprecedented levels in the 1950s, when between 300,000 and 500,000 Mexicans were admitted each year for employment on farms in the United States (Craig, 1971; Congressional Research Service, 1980; Garcia and Griego, 1981). In 1955, when the United

⁹ The international trade regime is bolstered by an economic theory that concludes that freer trade means faster economic and job growth, i.e., countries that refuse to participate pay a price in the form of slower economic growth. To prevent national governments from giving in to special interests, the 143-member World Trade Organization sets and enforces rules that seek to promote free trade.

States admitted 455,000 *Braceros*, there were 31 million people in Mexico and about six million households, including four million in rural Mexico, so *Bracero* earnings directly affected over 10 percent of rural Mexican households.

Foreign-born Workers in the United States

Mexico and the United States are sometimes said to have a binational labour market, which suggests that at least some Mexican workers are more likely to seek jobs on the United States labour market than in their own country, and that some United States employers recruit more in Mexico than in the United States (Hinojosa-Ojeda and McCleery, 1992). Furthermore, it is often asserted that the United States or a state or city's economy, or a particular industry such as agriculture, would "collapse" without Mexican workers.

The United States labour market and economy are not "dependent" on foreign-born workers, although particular industries and occupations in some areas of the United States would face adjustment costs if their current foreign-born employees disappeared. Realistically, current foreign-born employees are not going to disappear: the underlying policy objective is to control the number of foreign-born employees entering the United States labour market each year. The United States labour force grows by 2 to 2.5 million workers a year, and as many as 600,000 to 800,000, or up to one third may be foreign-born. The United States labour market is so vast (138 million in 2000) that the 16 million foreign-born employees represent 12 percent of United States workers, and the 5 million Mexican-born workers in the United States labour market, less than four percent of United States workers.

In June 2000, there were 132 million employed United States workers, including 75 percent who were production workers earning an average of almost \$14 an hour. United States labour force data are commonly reported by industry, occupation, and area, and foreign-born workers generally and Mexican-born workers in particular play a relatively small role in most United States industries, occupations, and areas. The "Big Four" industrial sectors of the United States economy are not dependent on foreign-born or Mexican-born workers. For example, there were 122 million workers employed in nine major industry sectors in 1998, but the "Big Four" that accounted for 85 percent of total employment were:

- services, 35 million employed or 29 percent;
- wholesale and retail trade, 29 million or 24 percent;
- government, 19 million or 16 percent and
- manufacturing, 19 million or 16 percent.

The other major employment sectors included finance, insurance, and real estate (7 million) and transportation and public utilities and construction (6 million each).

The most recent data on foreign-born United States residents (released in August 1999) indicate that there were 26 million foreign-born persons in the United States in March 1997; half were from Latin America, including 7 million born in Mexico. Foreign-born United States residents are concentrated by geography. About 72 percent of the foreign-born residents lived in six states that each had more than one million foreign-born residents—California (8.1 million), New York (3.6 million), Florida (2.4 million), Texas (2.2 million), New Jersey (1.2 million), and Illinois (1.1 million).

Foreign-born United States residents are different from native born United States residents in factors that affect labour market performance. There were about 171 million United States residents 25 and older in 1997, including 150 million who were United States born and 20 million who were foreign-born. The Census records four categories of educational attainment:

- about 16 percent of native-born adults aged 25 years and older did not finish high school, compared to 35 percent of the foreign born;

- 35 percent of native-born adults had completed only high school, compared to 24 percent of foreign-born;
- 26 percent of native-born adults had some college education, compared to 17 percent for the foreign-born and
- 24 percent of both native- and foreign-born had a Bachelor's or higher degree.

The contrast in the educational profiles of foreign-born immigrants and United States-born nationals is even sharper if the focus is on (1) adults with less than nine years of education or a postgraduate degree and (2) recent arrivals from Mexico. About 24 percent of foreign-born adults 25 and older had less than nine years of schooling, compared to six percent of US-born adults. About nine percent of foreign-born adults had a postgraduate degree, compared to eight percent of US-born adults. For Mexican immigrants, 52 percent had less than nine years of schooling and one percent had postgraduate degrees. Overall, 69 percent of the Mexican immigrant adults who arrived in the United States after 1987 had not finished high school, and 5 percent had at least a bachelor's degree.

In 1997, the 16 million foreign-born workers accounted for 12 percent of the 135 million-strong United States labour force (persons employed or actively looking for work); about 66 percent of foreign-born persons were aged 16 years or over, and 67 percent of the United States born, were employed or looking for work. In March 1997, when the unemployment rate was 5.6 percent, the unemployment rate for foreign-born workers was 6.9 percent—6.5 percent for males and 7.4 percent for females.

More foreign-born males than native-born males were in the United States labour force, 79 percent compared to 74 percent, and the opposite was true for females (53 percent compared with 61 percent). The foreign-born male labour force participation rate (LFPR) was higher because more foreign-born males were in the prime working age group of 25 to 54 years of age—91 percent of both the foreign-born and native-born males in this age group were in the labour force. The foreign-born female LFPR was lower because, for example, 66 percent of foreign-born women aged 25 to 54 were in the labour force, compared to 78 percent of United States-born women. About 75 percent of Mexican-born immigrants 16 and older were in the labour force, compared to 82 percent of the comparable native-born age group. Mexican-born men aged 25 to 54 were more likely to be in the labour force than United States-born men in the same age group (94 percent) and Mexican-born women (52 percent) were less likely to be in the labour force than their United States counterparts

Occupational Differences

Occupational data were available on 128 million employed workers in March 1997—113 million native-born and 14.5 million foreign-born persons were assigned to an occupational category. The Census recognizes 501 occupations, and groups them into six summary categories. In March 1997, about 30 percent of employed persons born in the United States and 24 percent of the foreign born were in managerial and professional occupations.

The sharpest contrast among foreign and United States-born workers was in farming: five percent of foreign-born workers were in farming occupations, compared with two percent of United States-born workers. There was also a significant difference within farming occupations—about 50 percent of persons born in the United States and engaged in farming were farm operators or managers, compared to five percent of the foreign-born. Naturalization and time spent in the United States reduce the percentage of foreign-born persons in farming—six percent of the foreign-born population with less than 10 years in the United States were in farming. Mexican-born persons were most likely to be in farming occupations—13 percent or 500,000 of the 3.8 million employed Mexicans in 1997 were farm workers, 460,000 men and 40,000 women.

Occupations can be cross-tabbed with the industries in which they are located. For example, about 81 percent of the jobs in agriculture are farming occupations, while eight percent are professional and seven percent are technical and support jobs. By contrast, about 46 percent of the jobs in the services industry are professional occupations; 24 percent are support occupations; and 21 percent are service occupations.

Income and Poverty

Median money income for households with a foreign-born householder was \$30,000 in 1997, compared with \$36,100 for households with a native householder—this income measure excludes capital gains and the value of food stamps, Medicaid and public housing. About 35 percent of households with a United States householder had incomes below \$25,000, compared to 43 percent of foreign householder households.¹⁰

Household incomes tend to rise with time spent in the United States. Differences in median household incomes by origin reflect differences in average years of schooling as well as time spent in the United States—\$42,900 for Asian-headed households in 1997; \$31,300 when householders were from Europe; and \$24,100 when they were from Latin America, including \$22,400 for Mexican-headed households. There were 2.4 million households with Mexican-born householders, and they had an average 1.9 earners per household.

The United States had 90 million full-time, full-year workers in 1997; 80 million native-born and 10 million foreign-born. The median earnings of the US-born were \$29,000, versus \$23,000 for the foreign-born. Earnings rise with time in the US, so that the 3.3 million full-year workers who had been in the United States for at least 20 years had median earnings of \$30,000, about five percent more than native-born workers. There were 2.6 million Mexican-born full-year workers and their median annual earnings were \$16,000.

About 13 percent of United States-born residents (31 million) and 21 percent of foreign-born residents (5.4 million) lived in families whose income was below the poverty line, established at \$16,036 for a family of four in 1996. Poverty rates decline with the length of time spent in the United States—about 29 percent of those who had been in the United States for less than ten years, had incomes below the poverty line. Poverty rates varied according to the immigrants' area of origin. For example, in the case of Asian-born residents, about 15 percent of had incomes below the poverty line in 1996, for European-born residents, this was true for 13 percent; for Latin American-born residents: 28 percent, and Mexican-born: 34 percent—2.7 million of the seven million Mexican-born United States residents were poor. The percentage of persons living in poverty was very high among foreign-born children—39 percent of those under 18 years of age in foreign headed households were poor, compared to 20 percent of children with native-born householders. Many foreign householders have children born in the United States who are poor, e.g., about 75 percent of the 3.4 million children living in poverty in foreign-headed households were born in the United States.

¹⁰ There were 101 million United States households in 1997, of which 10 million included a foreign-born householder (the person in whose name the housing unit is owned or rented). If the householder is foreign-born, the entire household is classified as foreign-born, even if all other household members are United States born. Conversely, if the householder is native born, the household is classified as native born, even if the spouse and children are foreign born

Mexican-born workers in agriculture

According to 1998 data, the most recent available, there were 131 million employed United States workers who could be assigned to an occupation: these workers included 46 percent women, 11 percent Blacks, and 10 percent Hispanics. The Hispanic share of those employed in professional, managerial, and sales jobs was generally less than 10 percent.

The five occupations with the highest Hispanic shares included:

- Farm workers, 45 percent of 835,000 employees in 1998
 - Private household cleaners and servants, 37 percent of 549,000
 - Textile, apparel, and furnishings machine operators, 25 percent of 954,000
 - Cleaning and building services, 20 percent of 3.1 million
 - Cooks, 22 percent of 2.1 million
- These data refer to the percentage of Hispanics, and most Hispanics in the United States labour force are United States born.

It is sometimes said that United States labour force data severely under-report the number and share of foreign-born and Mexican-born workers in particular economic sectors, both by under-reporting employment in an occupation and by underestimating the percentage of foreign-born workers. For example, it is often asserted that on average 1.2 million hired workers are employed on farms, but that, because of turnover and seasonality, 2.5 million persons are employed for wages sometime during a typical year on United States farms. It is likely that the percentage of foreign-born and Mexican-born workers will be greater among the total 2.5 million persons employed sometime during the year for wages on farms than the average 1.2 million employees, since year-round workers loom larger in average employment.

The National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS) focuses on seasonal farm workers employed on crop farms, and it reported that 77 percent of such workers in 1997-98 were Mexican-born. NAWS worker characteristics data apply to about 1.7 million of the 2.5 million hired workers, those employed on crop farms. It is important to remember that, according to data from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), which were used by NAWS to estimate the total number of farm workers, farmers and their family members accounted for 69 percent of average employment on United States farms in 1999, and the 1997 Census of Agriculture found that 98 percent of United States farm operators were white, that is, the same data used by NAWS to determine the number of foreign-born and Mexican-born workers indicates that 70 percent of United States farm work is done by non-Hispanic whites.

Foreign-born and Mexican-born workers are very important to particular subsectors of United States agriculture. In 1997, when United States recorded GDP of \$7.6 trillion, farm sales were \$197 billion, or about 2.6 percent of GDP (Rural Migration News, 1999). Farm sales were divided 50-50 between crop and livestock products. The fruit vegetable and horticultural products (FVH commodities) most associated with foreign-born farm workers—fruits, nuts and berries, vegetables and melons, and horticultural specialties including nursery and greenhouse crops, Christmas trees, mushrooms and sod—were worth \$32 billion, so FVH commodities represented 16 percent of total farm sales and 1/2 of one percent of United States GDP. About 75 percent of the hired farm workers interviewed by the NAWS in 1997-98 were employed in FVH commodities, that is, the NAWS does not have much information on the workers who account for 84 percent of United States farm sales.

California is closely associated with the agriculture and the binational labour market with Mexico because: (1) California has led the United States in farm sales since 1950, largely because of the production of FVH commodities—California accounted for \$14 billion or 44 percent of FVH sales in 1997; (2) unlike the situation in other states of the Union, hired workers do about 70 percent of the work on California farms, and (3) in the mid-1990s, the NAWS found that 90 percent of FVH hired workers employed on California farms were born in Mexico.

California FVH sales of \$14 billion represent 1.4 percent of the state's \$1 trillion GDP. What would happen if foreign-born or Mexican-born workers disappeared from California FVH farms, FVH production ceased, and nothing was grown on the farm land now used to produce FVH commodities? In this case, \$14 billion in FVH sales would disappear, along with the multiplier effect associated with FVH production.¹¹ If we assume that each \$100,000 in FVH sales is associated with one "good" job, then \$14 billion in farm sales are associated with 14,000 "good jobs." California has been adding about 1,000 jobs a day for the past few years, so 14,000 represents about two weeks of job growth.¹²

But foreign-born or Mexican-born workers are not likely to disappear overnight. The policy issue is what would happen if there is slowdown in the rate at which Mexican workers join the California farm work force. The history of the United States and other industrial societies is that farm workers are pushed out of farm work by low wages and seasonal jobs, and drawn towards non-farm work by higher wages, better benefits, and year-round work, so that one short-hand measure of a country's level of development is the percentage of the work force employed in agriculture.

This means that a steady migration of labour out of agriculture and into factory and service jobs reflects economic growth, and that the flexibility in agricultural systems is on the demand – not the supply – side of the labour market. In other words, when farm wages rise as the labour force shrinks, the usual response is for farmers to find ways to produce more food and fiber with less labour, not to attract domestic workers into the farm labour market. The flexibility of the demand for farm labour to rising wages is often overlooked in discussions of "California agriculture's dependence on Mexican workers." It is easy to understand why, since farmers and many others in the debate over whether agriculture "needs" Mexican workers have an incentive to provide a "yes" answer.

There is more agreement in the United States on the facts than on the appropriate policy response. The facts are that: (1) 90 percent of the FVH hired workers in California are Mexican-born, and (2) over half of them are not authorized to work in the US—both percentages are rising over time. Do these facts suggest that the optimal policy response is to:

- Develop a guest worker program to legalize the employment that is occurring? or
- Restrict the entry and employment of Mexican immigrant workers to put upward pressure on farm wages?

Braceros and adjustments, 1960s

The United States faced exactly this additional foreign worker issue in the early 1960s, when 70 to 90 percent of the seasonal harvest workers in FVH commodities such as lettuce, citrus, and in processing tomatoes to make catsup were Mexican Bracero workers. Congressional hearings and studies in the early 1960s were filled with assertions very similar to those heard today—without Mexican workers to hand-pick the tomatoes, the United States tomato industry will have to follow its work force to Mexico, eliminating thousands of good United States jobs. There were also the other familiar arguments—American workers do not want to do seasonal farm work and, without Mexican Bracero workers, crops would rot in the fields and food prices would rise. Mexican government

¹¹ Not all FVH commodities produced in California depend on Mexican-born workers; some that do would find it easy to employ other workers, including the largely mechanized nut crops, processing tomatoes, and wine grapes. Thus, as much as one-third of FVH sales would likely remain even if all Mexican-born workers were to disappear suddenly.

¹² California has 34 million residents in 2000, and the labour force in May 2000 was 17 million, including 850,000 unemployed workers, or five percent. About 14.4 of the 16.1 million employed workers receive wages and salaries, 83 percent were in the "big four" sectors of employment : services, 4.5 million or 31 percent; wholesale and retail trade, 3.3 million or 23 percent; government, 2.3 million or 16 percent; and manufacturing, 1.9 million or 13 percent.

officials were circumspect in the debate over ending the Bracero program. On the one hand, they had condemned the abuses of Braceros in the US; on the other hand, they recognized that there would be adjustment costs in Mexico as several hundred thousand Braceros lost United States earnings.

What happened after the United States made a political decision to end the Bracero program in 1964? The simple answer is that the demand for farm labour proved to be very flexible in FVH agriculture:

- farmers mechanized the weeding and harvesting of some commodities, most notably processing tomatoes;
- farmers actively recruited United States workers, in some cases joining together to hire seasonal workers via organizations that were directed by professional personnel managers;
- farm worker unions including the United Farm Workers were able to persuade table grape grower Schenley in 1966 to raise grape-pickers' wages by 40 percent, from \$1.25 to \$1.75 an hour, largely because Braceros were not available.

There were many studies of farm labour markets in 1965, the year of transition for agriculture. The definitive study concluded that: "US agriculture is perfectly able to adjust to a situation without foreign labour without any major production decreases." (Martin, 1966, 1137; California Assembly, 1965). There were \$44 billion worth of farm commodities sold in 1965, and losses due to lack of labour for harvesting crops were estimated at \$17 million, or less than one half of one percent, with most of the losses in California strawberries.

The processing tomato example shows how wrong those closest to farm production can be when they predict what will happen if immigrant workers are not available. The director of the California Department of Agriculture testified that, without Braceros, "we could expect a 50 percent decrease in the production of tomatoes"—177,000 acres produced 3.2 million tons in 1962 (United States House of Representatives, 1963, 61). In 1999, California had 337,000 acres of processing tomatoes, and they produced a record 12 million tons of tomatoes. The processing tomato industry doubled acreage and quadrupled production in the four decades since the end of the Bracero program. As the real price of processed tomato products fell, helping to fuel the expansion of the fast food industry, per capita consumption of processed tomato products rose from the equivalent of 44 pounds per person in 1960 to 93 pounds per person in 1999.

Processing tomatoes shows just how flexible the demand for immigrant labour can be, as a mechanized system anchored by a uniformly ripening tomato and a machine that cuts the plant and shakes the tomatoes onto conveyor belts and into trucks that haul them to canneries was used on one percent of acreage in 1962, and 100 percent of commercial acreage in 1970. As a result of mechanization, the labour force used to pick tomatoes changed: local women paid hourly wages to sort machine-picked tomatoes replaced Bracero men who earned piece-rate wages to hand-pick tomatoes. (Martin, and Olmstead, 1985). According to one account, "Before the tomato harvester, tomatoes were harvested largely by Braceros...recruited from rural villages in Mexico ...[attracted by] unusually good wages." After mechanization, year-round tractor drivers and irrigators brought their wives to ride on the tomato-harvesting machines to sort machine-picked tomatoes, and the tomato harvest labour force changed from over 95 percent male in the early 1960s to over 80 percent female by the late 1960s (Friedland and Barton, 1975, 59-61).

CALIFORNIA PROCESSING TOMATOES: 1962-1999

Year	Acres	Production	Machine-Harvest-Percent
1962	100	100	1
1963	73	77	2
1964	81	93	4
1965	69	77	25
1966	92	97	66
1967	105	99	82
1968	131	152	95
1969	87	105	100
1970	80	105	100
1996	203	373	100
1999	190	375	100

In 1962, there were 177,200 acres and 3.2 million tons

In 1999, there were 337,000 acres and 12 million tons

Sources: Friedland and Barton, 1975.

Rural Migration News, <http://migration.ucdavis.edu>

Lessons for the twenty-first Century

What about other labour-intensive commodities? Should policy makers be thinking about how to develop more perfect guest worker programs for labour markets dependent on low-skilled foreign-born workers, or should they be supporting labour-saving mechanization on the assumption that there is flexibility in the demand for labour?

Each case has to be examined on its own merits, but another agricultural example illustrates the options. The single most labour-intensive agricultural activity in North America is the harvesting of about 175,000 raisin grapes around Fresno California each August-September. Some 40,000 to 60,000 workers are involved in the six-week harvest, cutting bunches of green grapes and laying them on paper trays to dry in the sun. Sun-dried raisins had a farm value of \$369 million in 1998, equivalent to less than one day of normal expansion of the United States economy.¹³ Pickers are believed to be about 75 percent unauthorized, and they earned \$0.20 to \$0.25 for each a tray of 25 pounds of green grapes cut and laid to dry in 1998; pickers average \$6 to \$9 per hour for 8 to 11 hour days.

Should the raisin pickers be converted into legal guest workers or should raisin-growers be encouraged to mechanize raisin-harvesting? There are about 3,700 raisin-growers, and they have an average 40 to 50 acres of raisin grapes. The average age of raisin-growers is reported to be 64, and many growers are worried about low-cost production overseas—imports of southern European raisins must meet the standards United States raisin growers set for United States raisins.

There are several harvest mechanization systems available, including a dried-on-the-vine (DOV) system developed by the major growers' cooperative, Sun Maid, which involves cutting the canes on which grapes grow by machine so that the grapes can dry into raisins while still in bunches on the vine. The raisins are then harvested after 2 to 3 weeks of drying on the vine by a machine outfitted with rotating fingers to shake them off the vines, and a catcher to collect the raisins in a bin. One machine can harvest about 15 acres a day, equivalent to what a crew of 35 to 40 workers can harvest by hand. The cost of retrofitting raisin vineyards for mechanical cane cutting and harvesting is about \$1,500 per acre, and farmers can repay this investment in harvest cost savings in 5 to 10 years. If the DOV system were used throughout the raisin industry, the peak number of harvest workers is projected to fall by 80 percent, from 50,000 to 10,000.

¹³ The United States GDP is about \$8 trillion; if growth is 3 percent, then the economy expands by \$240 billion a year, or \$660 million a day. At 4.5 percent growth, the United States GDP increases by about \$1 billion a day.

So why do raisin farmers, many of whom are members of the Neisi Farmers League, push for guest workers instead of mechanization? There are several reasons, including the average age of producers, the fact that United States raisin production is under increasing pressure from imports, and the natural tendency of growers to maximize their variable costs. Reconfiguring vineyards and buying harvesting machines are fixed costs—growers have to pay for them whether raisin prices are high or low. But harvest workers are variable costs—if prices are too low to justify picking the grapes, the workers do not have to be hired and paid. There are mechanical alternatives to immigrant workers for most United States fruit and vegetable commodities (Sarig, Thompson, and Brown, 1999).

Farmers, including raisin-growers, have been trying for most of the 1990s to secure Congressional approval for an alternative guest worker program. Their major goal is to avoid having the United States Department of Labour (DOL) certify their need for foreign farm workers—if a grower must first obtain certification that guest workers are needed, then the government controls the border gate through which foreign workers enter the US. The current agricultural guest worker program, the H-2A program, requires farmers to obtain DOL certification of their need for foreign guest workers, and certification is normally granted only after the United States employer attempts to recruit United States workers at a DOL-set wage and by offering them, *inter alia*, free housing while the workers are employed on their farm.

Despite certification, the number of H-2A workers certified by DOL as needed to fill vacant farm jobs has almost tripled between fiscal year 1995 and fiscal year 1999, from 15,117 to 41,827, largely because of the growth of H-2A workers (most of whom are from Mexico) in North Carolina and Georgia. California farmers have been in the forefront of those opposed to the H-2A program, arguing that the H-2A program is "unworkable" in the state because of the large number of perishable commodities. Critics assert that California farmers want to avoid certification for fear that United Farm Workers (UFW) might show up seeking jobs, and the grower would have to hire them before being certified to have H-2As admitted to fill remaining job vacancies. Few California farmers have free housing to offer farm workers, and building housing could be a major fixed expense for H-2A participants.

Legislation pending in Congress in summer 2000, the Agricultural Job Opportunity Benefits and Security Act or AgJOBS, would enable farm employers to obtain legal guest workers without certification, largely by shifting the burden of recruitment from farm employers to a new computer-based worker registry; farmers would also be allowed to provide a housing allowance to workers rather than housing. If enacted, each state Employment Service (ES) would be required to create a farm worker registry that would allow, but not require, legally authorized farm workers to register for farm jobs. Farm employers seeking guest workers would submit job offers to the ES registry in their state at least 28 days before workers are needed. The ES would verify that the job offers submitted paid prevailing wages before listing them in the registry, and then contact registered workers to determine if they wanted to accept jobs offered by employers. If the registry referred only 50 workers to satisfy a farmer's request for 100, the farmer would be deemed eligible to employ 50 guest workers, who would enter the United States and float from farm to farm as free agent workers (Rural Migration News, 2000).

There are many similarities between the farm labour market in the early 1980s, before the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 was approved, and the late 1990s. In both periods, the demand for farm labour was expanding with increased acreages and yields of labour-intensive crops, the percentage of workers who are unauthorized was increasing, and more farm workers were being brought to farms by farm labour contractors and other third-party intermediaries who act as "risk buffers" in farm employment by assuming liability for immigration and labour law violations. Indeed, the major farm labour stories of the past decade are:

- the continued expansion of labour-intensive agriculture at wages that hover around the minimum, and the conversion of some non-farm jobs into farm jobs to take advantage of lower farm wages and portable technologies, such as packing broccoli and melons in the field;

- the rising percentage of unauthorized workers, and the falling percentage of Special Agricultural Workers legalized under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA);
- the growing importance of hard-to-regulate middlemen such as labour contractors.

For most of the twentieth century, the goal of labour economists who studied the United States farm labour market was to make the farm labour market more like non-farm labour markets, with employers "investing in people, the most important resource" by recruiting them via written application forms, providing them with employee handbooks that spelled out their rights and responsibilities, and developing systems to identify and retain the best workers. Instead, non-farm labour markets have begun to feature century-old elements of the farm labour market, including the recruitment of crews or gangs of workers via bilingual middlemen in a manner that diffuses and distorts responsibility and pushes the risks inherent in precarious employment to the weakest link of the employment chain: newly-arrived immigrant workers.

Janitorial services provides an example. The 2.2 million United States janitors and cleaners in 1998 were 20 percent Hispanic (Statistical Abstract, 1999, 426), and their wages and working conditions have been the focus of a "justice for janitors" campaign spearheaded by the Service Employees International Union (SEIU). Until the mid-1980s, most major office buildings housing a single corporation and grocery stores hired janitors directly; janitors received lower wages than most of the other employees, but the same benefits as the other workers in the building. In the mid-1980s, many banks and insurance companies sold their buildings and leased back office space, and building owners as well as grocery stores began putting the job of cleaning out to bid, typically awarding the contract to the low-cost bidder, who included small cleaning contractors as well as large companies.

Houston-based Encompass Services Corp (ESR on the New York Stock Exchange) said in 2000 that it is the largest building maintenance contractor in the \$67-billion-a-year United States janitorial services business. However, janitors employed in buildings for which Encompass holds cleaning contracts are not Encompass employees; instead, they are employees of subcontractors that Encompass hires to satisfy its cleaning contracts. These subcontractors compete with each other to clean the buildings for which Encompass has the cleaning contracts, just as farm labour contractors compete with each other for the business of picking the raisin grapes in a particular vineyard. Some of the subcontractors complain that Encompass offers them the equivalent of \$7 an hour for janitors, which barely covers the minimum wage and required payroll taxes.

According to the California Economic Development Department's underground economy task force, janitorial services have joined garments and agriculture as industries in which labour and tax law violations are common. Janitorial services were added to the Targeted Industries Partnership Program in 1999, which has 45 investigators to focus on labour law violations in targeted industries. The regulatory system that is evolving to try to get janitorial contractors to abide by labour laws is similar to that used to police farm labour contractors. Under proposed legislation, janitorial contractors would have to be licensed by the state. If Encompass or a building owner hired an unlicensed janitorial contractor, Encompass or the building owner would be jointly liable with the contractor for any labour and tax law violations (Migration News, August, 2000)

There is no magic bullet policy that can convert illegal workers into legal guest workers and make everyone better off. Many of those who look at the presence of an estimated six million unauthorized foreigners in the US, including up to 5 million unauthorized workers in the United States labour force, think that there must be a better way, and they propose amnesties, guest worker programs, and stepped-up labour law enforcement. The lessons of history suggest caution. History suggests that it may be easier and wiser in the long run to encourage labour-saving mechanization rather than to try to upgrade and manage the wages and working conditions of low-skilled immigrant workers.

NAFTA and the migration hump

In 1990, Mexican President Salinas proposed a free trade agreement with the United States. Canada, which had entered into a free trade agreement with the United States in 1989, joined the negotiations for what became the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA went into effect on January 1, 1994,¹⁴ with the goal of lowering barriers to trade and investment and thus spurring job and wage growth in the three member countries. Although general agreements on migration were not part of NAFTA, the hope that NAFTA-led economic development would reduce the volume of unauthorized Mexico-United States migration was a major reason why some wavering United States Congressional representatives in the end voted for NAFTA.

NAFTA was the subject of an intense debate in the United States, perhaps best symbolized by Presidential candidate Ross Perot's prediction that NAFTA would effectuate a "giant sucking sound" of United States jobs moving to Mexico. Most economists agreed with Perot that NAFTA would increase job growth in Mexico, but they also asserted that (1) the United States jobs that moved to Mexico would typically be low-wage jobs and (2) United States job growth would on balance be higher as Mexicans with higher incomes purchased more United States imports. Furthermore, unwanted or unauthorized Mexico-United States migration should eventually decrease, since the major conclusion of the standard economics trade model is that migration and trade are substitutes in both the short and long run [Heckscher (1949), Ohlin (1933), Mundell (1957), Stolper and Samuelson (1949), Krauss, (1976)].

The major policy-relevant question was not what would happen in the long run, after the North American economies reached a new equilibrium, but what would happen during the adjustment period. The United States Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development, which embraced free trade as the best long run solution for unwanted migration said—"expanded trade between the sending countries and the United States is the single most important remedy." Nonetheless the Commission concluded that "the economic development process itself tends in the short to medium term to stimulate migration." (US Commission, 1990, p. xv).

In other words, the same economic and trade policies that reduce migration in the long run can increase migration in the short run, creating what the Commission called "a very real short-term versus long-term dilemma" for the United States, which was considering a free trade agreement as a means of curbing unauthorized immigration from Mexico (US Commission, 1990, p. xvi). This is the "migration hump." when migration flows are charted over time, migration first increases with closer economic integration and then decreases—in economic terms, migration and trade are complements in the short run and substitutes in the long run (Martin, 1993). The Commission concluded that the migration hump was a worthwhile price to pay for the adoption of policies in both Mexico and the United States that would reduce unwanted migration in the long run.

The solid line Figure 1 represents the status quo of unwanted international migration between sending and receiving areas without trade and economic reform. The status quo trajectory reflects demographic-driven emigration in a closed economy; it is based on the assumption that, without trade reforms, migration would continue rising because labour force growth would exceed job growth. The broken line depicts a migration hump. Trade reform occurs in year 0, and the dashed line shows the short-run complementarity of trade and migration in region A, as migration rises above the status quo trajectory. However, migration peaks after 5 years, when trade liberalization begins to speed up economic and job growth. At B, after 10 years, there is the same level of migration as there would have been without trade liberalization and, as trade continues to speed economic and job growth, migration continues falling, with the migration avoided by economic integration represented by area C. Finally, after 20 years, the country may turn from a labour exporter to a labour importer, with immigration into the previous emigration country represented by area D.

¹⁴ In 2001, the maquiladora will be incorporated into the Mexican economy and, under NAFTA, restrictions on Mexican sales and temporary imports from the United States and Canada will be no more. New Mexican laws passed in the last decade also stand to stimulate joint ventures and manufacturing employment.

The critical policy parameters in the migration hump are A, B, and C. Given a status quo trajectory, how much does emigration increase as a result of trade liberalization (A), how soon does this hump disappear at B, and then how much migration is "saved" by faster economic and job growth (C)? The size of A and C, and the time at which B is reached, depend on how trade, economic and job growth, and migration interact in the economy as a whole and in agriculture, the industry in many developing countries with workers who will have to migrate internally or externally.

Three factors must be present to produce a migration hump: a continued demand-pull for migrant labour in the destination country despite economic integration, an increased supply-push in the origin country as a result of economic integration, and pre-existing migration networks or social capital that can move workers across borders (Portes, 1998). Most economic analyses ignore the possibility of a migration hump because they tend to emphasize comparative statics – comparing before and after equilibrium points, thereby ignoring the *process* of adjustment to free trade. In neoclassical trade models, for example, the prediction that free trade in goods offers a substitute for migration is an example of a long-run comparative statics prediction. The migration hump, by contrast, is a short-run relationship between migration and economic adjustment to free trade.

Agricultural trends in the United States and Mexico show neatly how demand-pull, supply-push, and networks can interact in a manner that increases migration with economic integration. With Mexican workers readily available and willing to accommodate to seasonal labour demands in a United States farming system in which workers are paid only when seasonal work is available, United States labour-intensive agriculture expanded, creating a demand-pull for Mexican workers.

One key element of NAFTA was the freeing up of trade, including trade in farm commodities. Agriculture remains a major employer in Mexico; the 3 to 4 million farmers and their families may represent as many as 6 million of Mexico's 36 million strong labour force, and at least half of them are primarily corn farmers. Half of the man-days worked in Mexican agriculture in the mid-1990s were used to produce corn, so freeing up trade in corn thus eliminated millions of man-days of work in corn production, putting downward pressure on wages in rural areas and encouraging emigration.

The Mexican government in the 1990s changed its land tenure system, its farm support policies, and its farm input policies, accelerating the movement out of agriculture.¹⁵ The crisis in the Mexican countryside has been matched neatly by an expanding United States economy, which has been creating a net 10,000 new jobs per work day, including 1,000 a day in California. There is new job growth in Northern Mexico— about 40 percent of Mexico's 2.5 million manufacturing jobs are in the 3,000 maquiladoras that are usually located in border cities—but maquiladoras tend to hire young women with local addresses, not older ex-farmers from the interior of Mexico. As a result, many of the rural residents with long-term ties to United States farming regions are moving from rural Mexico to rural areas in the United States, creating what has been called "Latinization of rural America."

Conclusions

Migration of Mexicans to the United States may have peaked in the 1990s, and may now fall for demographic and economic reasons, so it is important to avoid policies that might increase rather than reduce migration over time. The Mexican population growth rate peaked at 3.3 percent in 1970, when 45 percent of Mexican residents were under 15 years of age. In 1974, the Mexican government launched a program to persuade families to have fewer children, and birth rates fell sharply in the 1980s and 1990s,¹⁶ which means that the number of new job seekers each year will be 500,000 to 550,000 per year by 2010, half the one million a year recorded in the mid-1990s. Declining fertility reduces migration directly, since there are fewer people, and indirectly, because households with fewer

¹⁵ The major changes included giving ejido members the right to sell or rent their land and "decoupling" farm production from government supports.


¹⁶ Mexican fertility dropped from seven children per woman in 1965 to 2.5 in 1998.

children tend to keep them in school longer, reducing the need for jobs for young people entering the labour market, and reducing the probability of emigration.

Economic and job growth should soon visibly reduce emigration pressures. Each 1.35 percent increment in economic growth in Mexico was associated with 1 percent job growth in Mexico between 1988 and 1995. If this economic growth/job creation ratio persists, then 5 percent economic growth should generate 3.7 percent job growth, or 1.1 million new jobs each year, enough to employ all new job seekers and, as their number falls, to begin to reduce both unemployment and underemployment.


This combination of declining fertility and faster job creation create an X in the Mexican fertility/jobs (Figure 2); the X marks the point in time when enough new jobs are created to employ new work force entrants. Figure 2 highlights two such points—the optimistic one already occurred in 1998, and the more pessimistic one will occur in 2006. This X-diagram emphasizes that the single most important task of policy makers is to do no harm, to avoid policies that would increase migration by Mexicans to the United States, at a time when the expected trend would be for it to decline.

Figure 1
THE MIGRATION HUMP WITH TRADE LIBERALIZATION



Source: Martin (1993)

Figure 2
LABOUR FORCE AND JOB GROWTH IN MEXICO: 1996-2010



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B.2 International migration, and economic integration and convergence

*Francisco Alba*¹⁷

I. The analytical context

The general consensus today seems to be that development is contingent on global economic integration. This consensus has found a resounding echo in the area of migration, at least in most of the developed countries, which are the destination of choice for migrants from the developing world (The Trilateral Commission, 1993). Prior to her appointment as Commissioner of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Doris Meissner wrote that the most successful strategy for development was economic integration (Meissner, 1992). This consensus position, similar to the Washington Consensus, rests implicitly on an international development perspective as a re-equilibrating process, since it is assumed that integration leads to "convergence". The main mechanism in this process which closes the gap between rich and poor countries is the accumulation of capital, the assumption being that under conditions of openness to world markets, investments will flow towards the migrant-sending countries

A similar perspective underlies the Asencio Commission's analysis of the relationships between development and migration in North America, whose aim is to promote the former as a means of slowing down the latter (US Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development, 1990). This Commission proposed to the migrant-exporting countries in the area, liberalization of the trade in goods and services and opening up foreign direct investment flows as a means of job creating and improving remuneration; which this, in terms would reduce the urge to migrate. Certainly, this Commission considered that development would cause more migration in the short term, but that in the long term, market mechanisms and economic opening would lead to convergence and would facilitate the reduction of migration pressures.

In the past, the tendency in Mexico was to assume that existing patterns of migration would simply be extended into the future. Ever since the years of the Seasonal Farm Worker Program and right up to the adoption of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), migratory trends have been perceived as something inevitable which would continue indefinitely (Alba, 1999a). With the entry into force of NAFTA, Mexico fell into line with the consensus outlook. During the years when NAFTA was being negotiated and on the assumption that the free movement of goods and capital can be a substitute for the mobility of the workforce, Mexico and the United States shared the view that this Agreement would generate jobs and lend to higher levels of remuneration, so much so that expectations of lower migration pressures resulting from trade liberalization helped to secure its approval (Alba, 1993a). The analytical framework of economic convergence is central to the argument of the relationships between integration, development and migration.

However, current adherence to world markets does not lead either automatically or inevitably – in the short, medium or long term – to convergence nor, for that reason, to any reduction in migratory flows. Criticisms against the former argument arise, in my view, from two main sources: studies on economic integration and development and studies on international migration.

One of the critical postures in the area of economic integration and development stems from the predominant framework of the economic discipline, with the introduction of the factor of technological change into the analysis. According to this posture, the technology-based division

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between the economies intervenes in the path towards convergence between a small portion of the world, which is technologically innovative and prosperous, another significant part, which is at least capable of adopting, absorbing or adapting modern technology and the rest of the world, which is capable of neither.

New theories on endogenous economic growth have been put forward to explain precisely these divergences between countries. This is due, among other hypotheses, to the fact that the models derived from these theories postulate that increasing returns will be derived from the factors and externalities associated with scientific and technological advance (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988). The growing economic integration in the world triggers processes of both convergence and divergence, whose end results are not easy to predict. Under conditions of very marked economic and technological asymmetries – between and within countries – the opening up of markets can produce a trend towards accumulative divergence, due to the predominance of effects of scale, agglomeration and self-sustained technological change, among others.

Within this same sphere of studies on integration and development, another analytical criticism in favour of convergence rests on the historical perspective of development as a process of economic and social change and transformation that tends to encourage rather than to discourage migration (Massey, 1988). Market expansion and the entry of capital-intensive production technologies in the regions of the periphery alters the existing social and economic conditions and causes individuals to change their traditional lifestyle, thus creating a mobile population of workers who seek new ways of obtaining income, managing risk and acquiring capital.¹⁸ In this perspective, migrations – whether international or internal – are a component of development itself (Skeldon, 1997).

The consensus argument is also criticized from the specialized area of studies on international migrations, which show the complexity and diversity of factors that lead to emigration – such as the demand for labour, the supply of workers and social networks between countries. Moreover, the cost of transport, the availability of communications and a cross-border culture facilitate more and more the international movement of persons and make them less costly. Segmented labour markets in developed countries attract immigrants, who, once they have accumulated a sound social capital reinforce the links that connect the areas of origin with the destination, which gives migration a continuity and regeneration (Massey and others, 1993; Castles and Miller, 1993), whereas these conjectures should be distrusted in the absence of a consensus theory on international migration (Portes, 1997).

Economic globalization and integration are the context within which all countries are currently developing. The result of this process is not predetermined either in terms of economic convergence or in terms of the type or character of migration flows. International development processes have specific migratory patterns. Generally speaking, the transitions to modernization – whether industrial and technological modernization, demographic, political modernization or modernization of values – would prompt migratory patterns associated with the transformation of economies of emigration from which surplus, low-paid workers move to economies of immigration, where workers are in short supply and wages, predominantly high. Nevertheless, this international migratory transition, the process towards convergence should not imply a clampdown on migration and mobility; the trend in any case would be towards different and particular patterns of patterns of migration and mobility.

¹⁸ Higher income than development provides would also prompt people to migrate.

II. Migration, convergence and imbalances in Mexico and Central America

In the last quarter of the twentieth century, migration systems in North America changed considerably. Mexican migrants heading for the United States have three characteristics that earlier migrants did not have or only in a minor way: their emigration is intended to be permanent; the geographic range of the places of origin and destination has expanded and their job experience is more diversified.

Flows have become less cyclical or circular and tend rather to be permanent. Currently, the indicator increasingly used to illustrate migration is the fact that the number of Mexicans taking up permanent residence in the United States increased from less than 30,000 migrants per year in the 1960s to over 300,000 in the 1990s. As a result, the number of Mexicans in the United States passed the 7 million mark in 1996, compared with less than 1 million in 1970 (SRE/CIR, 1997). At the same time, the number of Mexicans deported was over half a million per year in the earlier 1970s, close to 1 million at the end of that decade and one and a half million towards the mid-1980s, stabilizing at this level since then.

The pattern of geographic concentration of the phenomenon in the centre and north of the country has not disappeared nor perhaps declined much, but the number of migrants from the central and south-eastern states of Mexico now joining these flows is striking. A similar pattern is developing as regards the areas of destination in the United States, which have spread from the south-east towards the centre and east of the country.

Temporary migrants are still engaged predominantly in agricultural activities; nevertheless, there has been a constant progression in the job experience in Mexico and the type of job such migrants can command in the United States in industry-related activities and in services that absorb respectively approximately one third and one half of Mexicans resident there (SER/CIR, 1997).

Between Mexico and the United States, there have been increasing movements in the opposite direction. One indicator of more recent trends is the fact that in 1996 almost 100,000 persons entered temporarily, for business purposes, from the United States and Canada using the Nafta migration form (FMN visa) (National Institute for Migration, 1997).

Also in the last quarter of the century, Mexico's linkages with the world economy and with the United States economy, in particular have intensified. Financial integration was extremely rapid and far-reaching in the 1970s and since the second half of that decade, integration has deepened through the exploitation of oil resources. Nevertheless, a more significant factor was the abandonment of import substitution as a model for development, which was followed by accelerated economic liberalization since the mid-1980s. This integration process has been institutionalized solidly in the 1990s with the establishment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and other free trade agreements.

The 1980s and 1990s were marked by far-reaching economic restructuring programmes, which have caused persistent labour imbalances and disparities, while, regionally, there has been a sustained and consistent movement towards convergence both internationally and domestically. The elucidation of these trends exceeds the scope of this document, which will be confined to assumptions on recent migratory trends.

Labour trends. Economic liberalization implied an accelerated modernization of the production base, with modifications in the make-up of labour demand. The impact of restructuring is felt primarily on the labour market. A recent study on Mexican emigration sum up the main paths of restructuring, namely: a fall in job creation since 1982 which has never recovered and has produced an increase in unemployment, but, above all in insecure and informal jobs; a systematic reduction in wages due to economic instability, attempts to attract foreign investors, the need to cut back on public-sector

spending and the policy of increasing exports, thus increasing the wage gap between Mexico and the United States; deregulation of the rural economy has destabilized labour systems, labour organization and exhausted the survival strategies of a large number of families and rural and urban communities (Escobar, Bean and Weintraub, 1999, pp. 9-10).

Differential changes have clearly occurred in the labour demand dynamic according to the sector, occupational category and level of qualification. Thus, for example, demand is apparently more dynamic for given professionals and skilled workers, who are in short supply, as their wages seem to have improved overall. Nevertheless, at the aggregate level, there has been a trend towards convergence in wages – the key factor leading to migration according to the consensus theory approach. Wages in the manufacturing sector, which plummeted in 1982, are still, almost 20 years later at only 75% of the 1980 level. Clearly, it would be too simplistic to attribute this decline to integration.

For its part, NAFTA has intensified and deepened regional economic integration in the areas of trade, finance and investment with their communications technology components. The period that has transpired since NAFTA was launched – just over six years – is, however, too short to test the supposed effects of trade liberalization on economic convergence and migration trends. Moreover, there is no straightforward way of isolating the effects of this agreement from other factors, especially in the context of the strong demand for labour generated by sustained economic growth in the United States and by the deep recession arising from the Mexican crisis of 1995,¹⁹ and centuries-old tendency for Mexicans to migrate north of the border.

The fundamental supply and demand parameters of the Mexican labour market – and other institutional characteristics, such as the type of controlled unionism and the conditions for membership with exclusion – continue to make this a low-wage market. In any case, more than one decade after having reformulated economic liberalization and integration, there are no definite signs of economic convergence or of a decline in migration by Mexicans to the United States.

Still, it should be pointed out that the economy as a whole is highly heterogeneous, which explains the extremely different effects of liberalization. A small part of the production apparatus is linked to technological and organizational change; the vast majority – including economic units in the agricultural sector, micro-business, small businesses and personal services – have little capacity to absorb and to adapt to such change. Liberalization, especially since NAFTA, has wiped out thousands of micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises and forced many others to cut back on staff. At the same time, job creation in agriculture has stagnated and wages are low (Yúnez-Naude, 2000).

Regional trends. Liberalization is reshaping the production map and causing major relocations in industry – so much so that opportunities for development are greatest along the northern frontier, in certain areas in the centre and in some cities along the coast, while investment and employment opportunities in modern sectors have tended to lag behind in other high plateau regions and in the south as have local prospects for economic and social mobility (Alba, 1999b). Concretely, given the prevailing disparities in the region since the start of the 1990s, the former situation has resulted in productive investment being concentrated first and foremost in the regions of the north and centre of the country and lastly in those of the south, since this gradient generally reflects the conditions of physical and human infrastructure and geopolitical advantages.

As an approximation to the regional trend with respect to productive investment in Mexico, a brief analysis of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the period 1994-1998 reveals that its distribution among the states reflects fairly accurately some of the indicators generally used to measure state differences in terms of economic conditions, human resources and infrastructure. All the variables considered were significantly associated with FDI, including the North Zone variable, which seeks

¹⁹ The decline in GDP in Mexico in 1995 (down 6.2 %) has a decisive influence on the performance of the years following the entry into force of NAFTA. Moreover, it was thanks to this agreement that Mexico was able to recover so rapidly from that recession.

to capture explicitly the effect of the gap between the north and the rest of the country, with the exception of the per capita gross state product. It is clear from this exercise that the major policy of trade openness and economic integration has the effect of a regressive regional policy, since it favours those regions with greater or more abundant resources and lower transaction and information costs.

In general, two clearly differentiated phases may be identified in the process of regional convergence: the first of these, between 1940 and 1960 was characterized by a relatively rapid convergence; this ceased and even showed a reversal in the second phase, which took place between 1960-1995. There are such wide regional disparities that experts are surprised at the insensitivity of migration between states to differential income levels (Esquivel, 1999), even in contrast to the high international mobility of Mexican workers (OECD, 1998).

The economic restructuring concomitant with the opening up of the economy and integration of world investment and capital markets have shaped reorganized internal and international migratory patterns. On the one hand, the capacity of the traditional urban centres in Mexico to absorb labour has changed, while the potential for absorption in rural areas has dried up. On the other, urbanization (concentration of the population) has continued with a more mobile population having to live with unprecedentedly high levels of job insecurity.

It is not so much a matter of economic stagnation; on the contrary, the economy has picked up with Mexico establishing itself as an "extension of the central core" of the regional economic area of North America. However, restructuring was not only rushed and ill-prepared, but it was also accompanied by buffer policies, so that the proverbial social inequalities and regional disparities in the country, as illustrated above have been maintained and intensified. These tendencies could explain both the changes in internal migration patterns and the emerging characteristics of international migration flows. From this perspective, whatever mobility there is takes the form of emigration and immigration.

The future of migration will depend, not only on the transformations linked to economic and technological restructuring but also on the transitions to demographic, social and political modernization in the country. These transformations and transitions are both still to be completed. In general, all the earlier transformations are associated with migratory pressures of greater or lesser importance, something observed historically, which suggests that Mexican migration to the United States will continue for a long time to come.

With the start of the twenty-first century, Mexico is half-way through the numerous transformations and transitions of economic and technological, social and political modernization. The demographic-urban transition is well advanced, but has not been completed and the scenarios for its future development – which have been fully modeled – indicate, with a high degree of reliability, that population growth will continue at a more moderate pace, while entries to the labour market (cohort of 15-44 years), although still substantial for one more generation, will start to diminish in 2010. The Mexican population is already predominantly urban, but around one third is still rural. The transition to a technologically advanced industrial economy is moving forward and is extending, but its course is still uncertain and there are differing opinions as to the pattern that it should follow in the future; no spectacular progress can be expected given the poor educational conditions and limited prospects with respect to science and technology. A major step forward in terms of the political transition was achieved on 2 July 2000, but the future institutions and the establishment of a democratic culture, with forums for plural representation and accountability (not only by public, but also by private agents) are still to be designed, established and consolidated.

All of these transitions will take time and all imply, given the tensions that they generate, potentially important internal and international migration. Under these conditions, the intensification and multiplication of the exchanges and economic, labour and social relations with the United States will continue to boost and encourage migration to this country in the short, medium and long terms (Tuirán, 2000).

With reference to Central America, within a couple of decades, massive migration flows to the United States have occurred. The statistics of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) show few records of Central Americans prior to 1970; the United States census for 1970, itself, accounts for 114,000. Twenty years later, the 1990 census recorded a Central American migrant stock ten times higher at 1,134,000.

Migration flows by Central Americans to the United States are attributable to a combination of the causes listed in the note convening this symposium, namely, major economic crises, socio-political upheavals, transformations of ecosystems and devastating natural disasters. All of these factors have helped to increase the movements from within these countries to others in the region or to other foreign countries, with United States emerging plainly as the principal destination. Until the 1970s, movements were above all temporary and within short distances. In the two following decades, migratory patterns changed radically. The process of urbanization speeded up, flows increased between countries within the region as well as to external destinations, a wider cross-section of the society became involved and political motives merged with economic ones. With internal markets stagnating, their integration with global markets limited to the role of suppliers of primary products and with industrialization at the regional level restricted, Central American labour markets have failed to absorb the growing wave of new cohorts on the labour market (Castillo García and Palma Calderón, 1999).

These conditions have meant that the Central American economies have become suppliers of manpower within the North American economic area. Emigration flows are not balanced by any significant immigration flows from other countries in the area. The functionality of this role shows up in the important role that remittances now play in these economies. From almost zero in the early 1980s, they rose, in 1988, to 19% of GDP in El Salvador and 9% in Nicaragua and are equivalent to approximately half and one third respectively of the exports of these two countries and approximately one third and one eighth of imports (ECLAC, 2000).²⁰

The Central American migration system is going through a phase of growth and consolidation. Migration pressures may continue to be intense in the short and medium term, since the transitions of modernization and restructuring of their integration on world markets are still incipient and promise to increase the mobility of the population.

III. Political dilemmas: a controlled and selective integration

NAFTA has triggered a debate in the region, especially in Mexico, on the parallelism, or lack of it, between trade policies and migratory policies in the project and process of economic integration. According to one viewpoint, trade liberalization should be accompanied by liberalization in labour flows;²¹ according to another, once greater economic integration is accepted in the region, this will lead to a more open attitude vis-à-vis the free movement of labour (Alba 1993b).

However, the different – indeed, contrasting – objectives of the host countries and countries of origin show the complexity of bringing migration policies in line with trade policies within the economic areas created under free trade agreements. In general, receiving countries, which are prosperous and advanced, hope that trade liberalization will accelerate the development of countries of emigration and diminish migration flows; sending countries also hope that economic restructuring will accelerate their development with these policies without the reduction of these flows appearing as one of their main objectives.

²⁰ In 1999, remittances flowing into Mexico were estimated at approximately US\$ 6 billion. This is an important item in absolute terms and is comparable to other headings, such as tourism, foreign direct investment or oil. However, in the economy as a whole, it accounts for only just over 1%. In states and regions that generate high numbers of migrants, the economic weight of remittances is significantly higher.

²¹ This seems to have been the Mexican position at the start of negotiations.

A review of different cases of regional integration reveals, on the one hand, that there is a wide diversity of agreements and conditions with respect to the harmonization of policies on trade liberalization and investment with policies on liberalization of migration and, on the other, that the prerequisite for economic convergence is generally placed in the way of liberalization of the movement of persons and labour (Alba, Garson and Mouhoud, 1998). The general trend is to not associate the two policies. Countries are concluding more and more agreements and establishing more free trade zones but only in rare cases do they establish single labour market zones or areas. Mexico is no exception; none of its free trade treaties, with neighbouring or distant countries are geared to liberalization of the movement of persons and labour.

As in other sensitive national spheres, the creation of single labour markets requires shared visions and a firm political will, which only seem to come together in exceptional circumstances, such as in the case of the European Union, as it now stands. In such cases, major accompanying policies are usually established to accelerate the economic convergence between member countries or regions. In the absence of such exceptional circumstances, the question of the free mobility of labour is postponed until "an appropriate level of economic convergence" has been achieved to prevent such massive flows from taking place.

In the context of North America, the entry into force of NAFTA prompted both the Government of Mexico and Mexican society to openly accept emigration and demanded greater mobility of labour in the interests of the emerging spirit of NAFTA (Alba, at press; Vereza, 1997). On the part of the United States, on the other hand, determined efforts have been made to implement legal measures and dedicate major resources to control migration from Mexico.

Since 1993, the Frontier Patrol has more than doubled its facilities; meanwhile, its control operatives have intensified their patrols along the busiest border crossing points between the Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico. Utility vehicles, electronic sensors, night vision systems, powerful searchlights and impenetrable fences make up a new panorama along the border, with all the highest technology placed in the service of migration control, which clearly indicates that the emphasis has been placed on the terms of the facilitation and control strategy. The declared goal is to make border crossing as difficult as possible so as to deter would-be migrants from even making the attempt. The number of detentions in the areas and sectors where the resources are concentrated suggests that there has been success in disrupting the traditional routes used by unauthorized Mexican migrants. Nevertheless, the increased difficulty in entering does not seem to have discouraged the flow to the United States (General Accounting Office, 1997; Suro, 1998). The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) entered into force in 1996 and its aim is to make it more difficult for immigrants in general and unauthorized immigrants, in particular from entering the United States.²²

In the United States there is a deep-seated ambivalence regarding migration in general and Mexican migration in particular. The demand for immigrant workers lies not only in the requirements associated with the growth phases of the economic cycle but has also assumed a structural character. Nevertheless, its migration policy would seem to be geared above all towards immigration control, as occurs in almost all the prosperous and advanced countries, although it has become almost impossible to achieve (Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield, 1994).

Globalization at the end of the twentieth century and at the dawn of the twenty-first century is not the same as in the nineteenth century, when economic – wage – convergence among the transatlantic countries of origin and destination was supported, to a large extent, by free trade and the free movement of labour (Williamson, 1996). In the early twenty-first century, the former is accepted but not the latter, at least not to the extent experienced in the nineteenth century. Certainly,

²² The other pieces of legislation are the Death Penalty and Anti-terrorism Act and the Personal Responsibility and Job Opportunity Reconciliation Act (legislation for social welfare reform).

the circumstances differ; on the one hand, there are virtually no open spaces left and, on the other, transport, communications, information and integration make the world a single place.

Migration dilemmas in the region are a difficult puzzle to piece together. In order to do it correctly, one needs to adopt a generous perspective on international integration as the deliberate process for obtaining economic convergence through other means than the purely commercial. If this convergence were to occur, then perhaps it would be valid to maintain that "If the sending country is ultimately integrated into the international market as a developed, urbanized economy, net migration ceases and the former sending country may itself become a net importer of migrant labor" (Massey and others, 1994, p. 741). For one thing, the current context of economic integration among countries – globalization – seems to be increasing the mobility of workers beyond national frontiers, rather than restricting it (Stalker, 2000). In the long term, even economic convergence will find it hard to eliminate the issue on economic integration modalities and mobility patterns; nevertheless, perhaps, in these circumstances, the patterns will be less conflictive than at present.

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Annex

Table 1
MEXICAN POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1960-1996

years	mexican-born (thousands of persons)	mexican origin* (thousands of persons)
1996	6,679	18,039
1990	4,298	13,393
1980	2,199	8,740
1970	759	4,532
1960	576	1,736

Source: Secretariat for foreign affairs/ Commission on Immigration Reform
Binational Mexican-United States study on migration, Mexico, 1997.

* Includes the population born in Mexico as well persons of Mexican descent born in the United States.

Table 2
NET EMIGRATION OF MEXICANS, 1960-1996

Period	Net annual average emigration
1990-96	277,000 - 315,000
1980-90	219,000 - 260,000
1970-80	120,000 - 155,000
1960-70	27,000 - 29,000

Source: Secretariat for foreign affairs/ Commission on Immigration Reform
Binational Mexican-United States study on migration, Mexico, 1997.

Table 3
**TEN MAIN STATES OF ORIGIN OF MEXICAN MIGRANTS BOUND
FOR THE UNITED STATES**

years 1968-1970		Years 1993-1994*	
States of residence	Percentage	States of residence	Percentage
Chihuahua	18.5	Guanajuato	12.9
Durango	9.9	Michoacán	10.8
Michoacán	8	Chihuahua	
Guanajuato	8	Jalisco	8
Jalisco	8	Zacatecas	7
San Luis Potosí	7	Coahuila	5.4
Zacatecas	7	Durango	5.3
Nuevo León	6	Sinaloa	4.7
Tamaulipas	5.10	Tamaulipas	4.00
Coahuila	4.90	Oaxaca	3.80
Other	17.20	Other	28.40

Source: 1993-1994: Secretariat of Labour and Social Insurance/National Population Council

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* Migrants 12 years over

Table 4
OFFICIAL ESTIMATES OF POVERTY IN MEXICO DURING RESTRUCTURING
 (millions of persons and percentages)

	1984	1989	1992
Extreme poverty			
Persons	11 (15.4)	14.9 (18.8)	13.6 (18.1)
Household	1.6 (11.4)	2.3 (14.1)	2.1 (18.1)
Poverty*			
Persons	30.4 (42.5)	37.8 (47.7)	37.2 (44.0)
Household	4.7 (34.2)	6.3 (39.4)	6.4 (35.9)

Source ECLAC/National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics (INEGI), 1993: 110-111. Taken from Escobar Latapi, Agustín, Frank D. Bean and Sidney Weintraub, *La dinámica de la emigración mexicana*, CIESAS, Mexico, 1999.

* Includes extreme and moderate poverty..

Table 5
SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS BY STATES

	FDI , 1994-1998 (a)		GSP , 1993 (b)		EAP Manufacturing, 1990		Population having completed primary education,1990 (c)		Telephone lines,1993	
	Per capita annual average US\$	Rank	Per capita	Rank	Percentage	Rank	Percentage	Rank	Per 1000 habitants	Rank
Ags	35.24	13	61.03	14	24.18	8	66.15	13	94.27	13
BC	239.46	3	70.53	9	22.68	10	75.99	5	148.76	3
BCS	67.06	6	76.56	7	8.52	28	94.61	1	130.64	4
Camp	1.37	29	212.04	1	9.05	26	55.20	23	52.82	25
Coah	51.11	9	79.26	5	24.83	4	71.82	7	116.34	6
Col	46.76	10	76.00	8	9.75	25	63.98	16	106.99	10
Chis	0.12	32	29.78	32	5.79	32	37.92	32	24.76	32
Chih	169.48	4	62.42	13	25.59	3	69.14	10	115.47	7
DF	592.03	1	156.63	2	20.72	11	83.23	3	241.38	1
Dgo	10.21	21	49.30	19	16.37	15	60.51	20	57.83	21
Gto	2.70	27	45.88	23	24.19	7	83.43	2	58.82	19
Gro	4.50	25	39.79	27	8.85	27	73.13	6	50.59	26
Hgo	6.13	23	44.87	24	14.95	19	54.27	26	44.16	28
Jal	27.28	15	65.57	12	23.45	9	64.08	15	120.02	5
Mex	37.16	12	54.91	17	27.52	2	71.26	8	78.94	15
Mich	3.33	26	34.45	30	14.77	20	51.44	29	54.70	23
Mor	30.62	14	68.38	11	15.67	16	66.02	14	103.07	11
Nay	4.64	24	47.70	21	9.76	24	58.33	21	67.75	18
NL	253.25	2	108.19	4	28.99	1	76.82	4	169.65	2
Oax	0.28	31	30.46	31	9.79	23	43.30	31	25.60	31
Pue	20.34	16	41.06	26	17.35	13	55.10	24	55.64	22
Qro	54.96	8	68.73	10	24.58	5	63.40	17	76.14	17
QRoo	40.91	11	128.65	3	6.21	31	61.20	19	94.60	12
SLP	15.31	19	48.20	20	16.90	14	55.49	22	58.22	20
Sin	16.74	18	53.25	18	10.42	22	62.60	18	85.56	14
Son	61.38	7	77.25	6	15.67	17	70.82	9	113.84	8
Tab	0.72	30	57.18	16	8.17	30	55.06	25	47.09	27
Tamps	132.35	5	58.27	15	18.28	12	67.85	11	107.87	9
Tlax	11.43	20	37.64	28	24.58	6	66.40	12	39.85	29
Ver	2.40	28	42.91	25	11.17	21	52.44	27	53.23	24
Yuc	17.72	17	47.29	22	15.23	18	52.18	28	78.35	16
Zac	9.62	22	35.64	29	8.48	29	50.87	30	35.07	30

Sources: FDI Foring direct investment, Ministry of commerce and Industrial Development (SECOFI), National Commission on Foring

GSP: Gross States Product, INEGI, System of National Account of Mexico. Taken from Crescencio Ruiz Chiapetto:

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EAP: Economically active population, INEGI, Element general Population and Housing Censing. Mexico, 1990.

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Notes: (a) Data reported is the National Registry of Foring Investment (RNIE) and imports of fixed asset by in bond processing companies.

Re 1995 Population Count was used calculate the per capita annual average (1994-1998)

(b) Gross state product in 1980 prices.

(c) population 15 years and over

Table 6
PEARSON r CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (a)

	per capita/ FDI	per capita/ GSP	EAP in manufacturing	Population with primary education completed	North Zone (b)	Telephone line per 1000 inhabitants
per capita FDI	1.000					
Significance						
N						
capita/GSP	0.237	1.000				
Significance	0.199					
N	31					
EAP in Manufacturing	0.504**	-0.037	1.000			
Signif.	0.004	0.841				
N	31	31				
Population with primary education completed	0.493**	0.204	0.455*	1.000		
Significance	0.005	0.270	0.010			
N	31	31	31			
North Zone	0.659**	0.140	0.262	0.521**	1.000	
Significance	0.000	0.453	0.155	0.003		
N	31	31	31	31		
Telephone Line per thousand inhabitants	0.802**	0,361*	0.459**	0.688**	0.650**	1.000
Significance	0.000	0.046	0.009	0.000	0.000	
N	31	31	31	31	31	

Source: see Table 1

Notes: (a) The Federal district is not included in calculations.

(b) North Zone: Baja California, Baja California Sur, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Durango, Nuevo Leon, Sinaloa, Sonora and Tamaulipas.

** Significant correlators at 1%

* Significant correlators at 5%

B.3 Economic and Technological Change, Labour Markets, and Migration: A Comment on Papers by Francisco Alba and Philip Martin*

*by Dane Rowlands***

The papers by Professor Alba and by Professor Martin present two different but very useful approaches to understanding the linkages between economic integration, technological development, and international migration. Both papers focus largely on the phenomenon of migrant flows from Mexico to the United States. Despite this apparent limitation to one single –though clearly very important– part of South-to-North migration flows in the Americas, the papers provide insight into a wider range of issues of importance to academics and policy makers in the field of international migration.

Both authors appear to start off with a similar view of the consensus about how economic development and migration are linked. Focusing on the issues identified by the authors, the associated heuristic model might be characterized as follows. In the first relationship, the process of economic integration is linked to the process of economic development. Economic development, in turn, is generally presumed to lead to economic convergence and a diminution of migration pressure in the long term. In the short term, however, both authors acknowledge that development may lead to temporary increases in migration pressure due to factors such as economic and social dislocation. The contributions of the two papers may be examined using this basic approach to migration, though in neither case do they necessarily agree with all of its elements, nor would such a portrait be considered complete. Several other factors and backward linkages are omitted in this simple portrait, though the authors themselves are clearly cognizant of such refinements.

If we take this simple model of migration and development as a common starting point, however, what is interesting is that the authors reach conclusions that can be crudely characterized as diametrically opposed. On the one hand, Alba's paper leaves the impression that migration pressures will likely accelerate. On the other hand, Martin, while not underestimating the magnitude of migration forces, concludes that such pressures will likely decline more quickly than is generally thought. On the policy side, Alba emphasizes the need for international cooperation to overcome the emerging policy dilemmas that separate sending and receiving countries. Martin's policy conclusion is more unilateral in nature, suggesting that the "best" policy for the U.S. may be to tighten its migration regime and thereby encourage technological innovation in the industries that employ foreign migrant workers. While this simple portrait exaggerates the differences in the papers, it is interesting to contrast their positions and determine why they arrive at them despite a reasonably similar view of the connections between migration and development.

There are two reasons why their conclusions differ. The authors examine the questions using very different prisms. Alba comes to the analysis from the sending country context, and relies on an aggregate level of analysis to develop his position. Martin examines the problem from a receiving country perspective, and adopts a more microeconomic or sectoral level of analysis. At each stage of the basic model these different approaches affect the analysis in important ways.

* These papers were prepared for the Symposium on international migration in the Americas, San José, Costa Rica, September 4-6, 2000. Thanks to Laura Chrabalowksy for assistance with translation.

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The first relationship in the model identifies increasing economic integration as a factor that contributes to economic development, which in turn affects migration. I will leave aside the question as to the nature of the relationship between integration and development, noting simply that the recent protests in Seattle and Washington and elsewhere are indicative of views that the relationship is not necessarily a benevolent one. While both authors essentially accept that development is the key intermediating variable linking integration and migration, Martin suggests that there is a direct link between integration and migration, citing the traditional trade theory that indicates that trade in goods and services is a substitute for labour and other factor flows between countries. This raises a challenge for us: to what extent do we need to examine the relationship between integration and migration separately from the development process, and can such a separation be made? Martin raises this issue without coming to terms with it in a satisfactory manner. Specifically, Martin does not seem to fully reconcile the short-term substitution of trade and migration in the trade literature with the empirical evidence suggesting that there is at least a transitory complementarity. This is not a particularly serious shortcoming for Martin's overall argument, but it nonetheless needs to be more clearly dealt with in the literature.

The second step in the simple model's logic is the connection between development and convergence. Martin appears comfortable with the idea that development will eventually lead to convergence, and there are solid neoclassical grounds for doing so. In contrast, Alba sites the endogenous growth theory to challenge the presumption of convergence. Viewed from an aggregate level he has an important point, with good theory and evidence to support such an argument being present in the literature. He also provides some micro-level evidence to reinforce his argument. One point of evidence is the declining real wages in Mexican industry that has been observed over much of the last two decades. He is careful not to rely too heavily on this evidence, and it is indeed very problematic given the accumulation of debt and real wage increases prior to the 1982 debt crisis, as well as the presence of numerous economic, social and political shocks faced by Mexico since then. His second point is to claim that many Mexican industries lag well behind their competitors in the adoption of new technology. This is a good point, but it begs the question of why they lag. It seems reasonable to begin this analysis with an examination of deficiencies in the policy environment that have discouraged innovation. Viewed in this way we might be more hesitant to consider whether this deficiency in Mexican industry is a necessary feature of development and possibly integration, or if it can be corrected by policy reform. In this regard Alba's compelling evidence of investment concentration in the Northern regions of Mexico could be consistent with longer term spatial divergence or convergence depending on how enduring this pattern is. In the absence of more compelling micro-level evidence, the big question of whether convergence will occur remains understandably difficult to answer. It is also useful to note here that innovation may also be linked directly and positively to migration through remittances and return migration.

The third stage of the model separates the short-term and long-term effects of development on migration. The traditional position is that development leads to short-term increases in migration, but that these flows decline as development proceeds. Both authors accept this contradictory temporal effect, with Martin calling it the "migration hump". There is a lot of compelling evidence about the presence of this phenomenon, though it is usually linked to the development process directly rather than to integration as Martin seems to do. The work by Stark and Taylor using micro-level survey data from Mexican villages is compelling in and of itself, but also receives support from the aggregate level of analysis that I have done (Stark and Taylor, 1991; Rowlands, 1999). Two points arise from Martin's paper, however. First, as noted earlier, trade and migration can be seen as substitutes in both the short-term and long-term, which needs to be reconciled with the presence of the "migration hump". This is likely related to the other point regarding the need to examine integration and migration linkages separately from the intermediating effect of development. In addition, Martin's illustration of the process by which migration pressures first increase and then decrease also need elaboration before it can be used for policy purposes. How much confidence can we have in both the model and the associated time line projections? While the illustration is useful, policy makers will need more

detail. It is also worth noting that the model is driven by demographic and labour market conditions on the supply side. It may also be worth examining in more detail the labour market conditions on the demand side that may lead to greater migration pressure in the future.

On the policy side, Alba stresses the different concerns of source and destination countries and notes that overcoming these differences will require international cooperation on a wide range of issues. In particular Alba notes the importance of linking migration policy to other matters of integration matters such as trade policy. The inherent conflict between sender and receiver, however, makes it difficult to identify specific policy options that would be Pareto improving.

In contrast, Martin is quite specific in his policy conclusions. Having demonstrated that the United States economy is not "dependent" on foreign migrant workers either in aggregate or sectorally, he suggests that a reasonable policy might be to restrict the migration of workers into the U.S. to promote innovation in labour intensive industries. Leaving aside the contentious issue of defining "dependence" of the U.S. Economy or its key sectors, Martin's provocative suggestion has considerable value. After all, the process of economic development has been one of labour-saving technological innovation. Indeed, if we consider that there are externalities that may unduly inhibit technological innovation, Martin's policy would be an appealing way of subsidizing or encouraging it.

But there are also some problems that need to be addressed. First of all, from what perspective can we define a "best" policy in the area of migration. A neoclassical standard of efficiency is one approach that makes sense (though not to everyone), and Martin seems to adopt it. But it is applied only in a partial sense. It may not be beneficial to the migrant sending countries at all, bringing us back to the political dimensions of defining policy perspectives. It is not apparent that restricting migration will generate a more efficient solution even if we are in a second best world. There is, after all, a neoclassical presumption against further restrictions. So the real efficient solution might be somewhat different from the story presented in detail and with solid argument by Martin. Citing evidence from previous cases of restricting migrant workers, Martin suggests that the worst affected industries adopted new technology and became even more efficient. I would note that these innovations may not have occurred in the absence of trade restrictions. Thus the best solution, and certainly the one most consistent with neoclassical economic theory, would be to eliminate the restrictions on both migration and trade flows, as is hinted at by Alba.

There is a lot of detail that also needs to be examined in determining the efficiency effects of restricting migration. Martin's paper is very useful for bringing these to light. The question of the differential effects of migration and technology on traded and non-traded sectors seem important, as highlighted by Martin's identification of migrant worker concentrations in the provision of janitorial and construction services (non-traded sector) on the one hand, and textile and agricultural labour (traded sector) on the other. Other important issues such as the feminization of migration are clearly related to the traded versus non-traded sector distinctions.

Being well-versed in the migration literature, and being cognizant of the important economic, technological, social, and demographic dimensions of migration, these authors offer profound challenges to the academic and policy communities. Defining the long term equilibrium that would emerge from a fully integrated and market-oriented global economy, and the associated distribution of capital, labour, and technology, is still incredibly difficult. How will integration and development evolve and affect these distributions? Will we observe convergence or divergence? These are complex but central problems for aggregate level analysis that Alba focuses on. Micro-level analysis is also crucial, however, as Martin demonstrates. Drawing policy conclusions is difficult, however, as past evidence reflects the presence of multiple restrictions on the flows of people, goods and even capital and technology. Will these historical relationships be preserved or destroyed by this nebulous force that has been termed globalization? The authors ultimately, and understandably, fail to answer these questions. But these papers have moved us further along in our understanding of migration phenomena by forcing us to consider some very fundamental deficiencies in our knowledge, and by developing valuable avenues for further analysis.

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C. Migration of skilled workers

C.1 Thoughts on enhancing competitiveness through a judicious use of the immigration system: a (primarily) U.S. perspective

Demetrios G. Papademetriou July, 2000*

Paper prepared for the "Symposium on International Migration in the Americas" sponsored by CEPAL. Costa Rica, September 4-6, 2000. The economic analysis is based loosely on the author's earlier work, *Balancing Interests: Rethinking U.S. Selection of Skilled Immigrants* (principal author, with Stephen Yale-Loehr, 1996).

Introduction

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, most advanced industrial societies are rethinking the way they conduct themselves in a variety of contexts and policy domains. Among the issues that have required much additional (and "new") thinking have been the very nature of competitiveness in a world where barriers of all types are falling *at the same time that* the hue and cry from many quarters about maintaining (and even enhancing) many of a state's traditional "social compact"

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roles is at times deafening. Few issues have provided more opportunities for an argument than international migration.

This short essay is written primarily from a U.S. perspective. The analytical framework, the examples, the criticisms, and the "recommendations" are very much a product of analytical, policy, and political debates that are firmly rooted in the US context. Yet, whenever possible, I have tried to stretch the analysis and "homogenize" the language in ways that it also applies, to *differing degrees*, to several other advanced industrial societies, such as Canada and several of the member states of the European Union (EU). (In some instances, such as when I discuss how "we" emerged out of WWII, or the role of the corporation in the 1950s and 1960s, the text is particularly U.S.-centric.) I am aware that this violates one of the cardinal rules of comparative inquiry. Yet, I thought that for the purposes of this discussion, putting this rule temporarily aside—with all its implications for strict accuracy—might actually enrich, rather than sidetrack, the discourse.

The essay goes to the heart of the assignment, at least as I understand it. Namely, it looks at where the thinking about "high end" immigration stands among advanced industrial societies beyond just those built through immigration and at some of the key variables responsible for the increasing interest in high "quality" immigrants. Specifically, it looks at how skilled and educated immigrants fit into and are being relied upon increasingly to enhance the competitiveness of receiving societies (typically, in ways whereby the immigrants themselves are also obtaining some of the greatest returns on their investments in their own human capital). The essay's basic premise is that in a world that is becoming so interdependent that relatively small differences in competitiveness can translate into large gains in market share, each society's economic (and social) logic and rules are undergoing as fundamental a reexamination as any undertaken in the last 30 years. Reviewing one's attitudes and policies toward immigration—initially toward skilled immigration but gradually toward all forms of it—is an increasingly essential part of that re-evaluation and has begun in earnest in several developed states.

I have organized the essay as follows. In the first two parts, I examine briefly the evolution of large corporations into global firms and the forms of economic activities advanced industrial societies¹ are likely to attempt to retain as their "own" in the next two or so decades. I also discuss, if briefly, what such societies will need to do in order to retain them. In the last section, I argue that thoughtful immigration policies will be among the "competitiveness" avenues these societies will explore with increasing vigor and suggest one way of identifying and selecting the "best" immigrants from two completely interrelated perspectives: the receiver's long-term competitiveness and the immigrant's long-term economic success.

By necessity, the nature of the assignment makes the analysis one-sided and incomplete. For instance, it virtually ignores a number of important, if perhaps only emerging (or, in some ways, re-emerging?), changes in the international migration system that will likely complicate the policy and political calculus that underlies some receiving society decisions about immigration today. For instance, it avoids such facts as that the immigration system now embraces virtually all states and that most states now both send and receive immigrants. These developments make clear that the neat analytical lines that have traditionally distinguished sending from receiving countries have now become blurred.

Such blurring probably complicates both the policy and political calculations of all principals in the immigration system. For instance, most traditional sending countries now have to contend with and manage increasing pressure from, and popular reaction to, illegal immigration as they are being targeted as transit or destination countries by would-be immigrants from less well-off states. (This rather new set of concerns is in addition to ongoing concerns about the treatment of their own nationals

¹ In this essay, I use the terms "receiving societies," "advanced industrial societies," "industrial" or "advanced" democracies, "West" and "industrial" or "advanced" North, interchangeably to denote the more developed societies toward which most migrants gravitate.

abroad.) And the traditional receiving countries of the industrial North (see footnote 1), must manage not only the contentiousness of large-scale immigration (which is a political constant) but also such "new" immigration-centered political issues as dual nationality (the resolution of which has potentially severe implications because of reciprocity concerns) or the immigration implications of trade liberalization or skewed demographics (see discussion below). Finally, the migrants themselves—depending on one's perspective, either the pawns or the protagonists of the process—confront a maddening array of challenges that makes most immigration routes administrative nightmares at best and expensive (and dangerous) gambles at worst.

In another example, increasing numbers (and categories) of immigrants seem to be constantly on the move. Most notable among these categories for *this essay* are talented and well-educated immigrants. An emerging "competition" for such immigrants has the potential to empower them more than ever before and, if handled properly, it might even re-balance somewhat the power equation between sending and receiving societies by forcing a conversation between the two about what might constitute appropriate conduct in gaining access to and in the treatment of such human capital-rich individuals. (Other categories of would-be immigrants, such as asylum seekers and clandestine immigrants, are in a different sort of orbit. These latter groups are likely to continue to confront an increasingly united front of targeted countries sparing little effort to prevent them from gaining entry.)

A third example comes from the cold rationality of demographic analysis. Aging and below-replacement fertility rates are forcing most advanced democracies to begin to understand that they will have to come to terms with the fact that they will likely need to admit much larger numbers of migrants in a variety of admission categories in the next decade or two than they took in the last 30 or 40 years (see Papademetriou, 2000). If this comes to pass, and demographic imperatives make as open-and-shut a case *for* greater immigration as an increasing number of analysts predict, immigrants along all levels of talent and educational preparation, as well as their countries of origin, may indeed gain a stronger hand in discussions for more appropriate (that is, "better") labor market and associated social rights. This could bring about unprecedented power shifts in the immigration system and could force a fundamental re-examination of what, over the course of the last three decades, has become orthodox—and thus completely unexamined—thinking on this issue.

Immigration under attack

In the 1990s, the very institution of immigration came under strong and sustained attack in most of the advanced industrial world. In addition to strong concerns about illegal immigration², the attack, at least in the United States, initially focused on immigrants' (presumably "unfair") competition with and displacement of "domestic" workers, that is, workers who for a variety of reasons have legal access to and priority in a labor market. Critics argued that the number of unskilled and semi-skilled jobs, while often rising, had not kept pace with the growing ranks of low-skilled workers who were already in the North—especially in the inner cities, where minorities, immigrants, and other disadvantaged populations are concentrated. They questioned the wisdom of admitting low-skilled immigrants, presumably (ostensibly ?) out of concern about crowding further low-wage sectors. Some also questioned whether it was in a country's long-term interest to "subsidize" through immigration and other policy instruments (such as lax enforcement of labor and tax laws) the maintenance and expansion of low-wage, low-value-added activities, such as garment-making, which cannot compete in the long run with imported items produced much more cheaply abroad than the same goods can be produced domestically—and with far fewer arguments about the social costs associated with such activities.

² I am including here Europeans' concerns about the high number of asylum requests, most of which are thought to be fraudulent.

The overall argument was much more complex than the standard displacement-by-immigrants argument—a perspective whose resonance intensifies exponentially during bad economic times. It was also enmeshed in the ruthless economic restructuring, consolidation, and downsizing that affected even such heretofore relatively "recession proof" sectors as financial services, high technology, and defense. The resulting layoffs had created (and in some instances continue to create) a pronounced sense of anxiety and vulnerability among social and economic classes that had never had to worry much about economic security. Nowhere were these forces felt more acutely than in California, which, at least (*although not only*) for the United States, has been the birthplace of the latest (*as well as of most earlier*) anti-immigration movements and continues to be a fount of anti-immigrant agitation.³

The next mutation of the anti-immigration debate focused on immigrant access to social programs not specifically intended for them. Lurking in the background were a host of other social and cultural integration issues⁴—including language and education, even ethnicity and race—which are growing in intensity even as concerted attempts are made to marginalize politically those who raise these issues.

Furthermore, the more the line between antagonism toward *illegal or clandestine* immigration blurred with general dissatisfaction with various (or all) aspects of *legal* immigration, the less manageable both issues became and the less likely it was that rhetoric and actions on legal immigration would meet even a modest "thoughtfulness" test. This blurring became a *deus ex machina* for those who wanted to minimize immigration intakes (e.g., Europe's rhetorical dance with "zero immigration") or make deep cuts in legal immigration "unstoppable" by attaching them to discussions about illegal immigration controls—an effort centered in the United States that, although unsuccessful, nonetheless attracted significant political support.⁵

Finally, underlying and energizing many of these concerns was the perception that several of the immigration system's processes can easily be circumvented by non-qualifying individuals and subverted by special interests. The system's unusual number of internal contradictions seemed to be exploited as much by those who were trying to take advantage of the system as by those who sought to destroy it. Two of the system's components—the employment-based and refugee/asylum ones—were singled out for the most criticism in this regard, but several aspects of the temporary, or what in the United States is called the "non-immigrant," formula also came under attack. Furthermore, and more significantly for this essay, policy analysts and others came to the conclusion that certain components of the immigration system may no longer serve broader receiving society interests as well as they should, or, for that matter, the interests of many of those who participate in it, including immigrants and their sponsors.

³ By 1990, California's nearly twenty-year long economic expansion and prosperity gave way to large-scale job losses throughout the economy, severe budgetary shortfalls, cuts in social programs, and, for a period of time in the early 1990s, a flight of human and physical capital—as well as to a widespread state of mind that can only be described as fearful and pessimistic.

⁴ The integration process is the "ground zero" of all immigration policy and the ultimate test of success or failure in any immigration system. No immigration regime can be successful in the long run unless it solves the puzzles of integrating newcomers, of building community out of diversity, and of creating a legal/institutional and sociopolitical environment in which the second generation can achieve success. However, this problem cannot be solved in the absence of good inter-group relations in general and inter-*minority* relations in particular. The broader challenge for immigrant-receiving societies is thus clear: Unless they can succeed in combating apathy, despair, and inter-group antagonism in their inner cities, they cannot be successful societies in the next century. And considering the U.S. record of the 1990s, the U.S. cannot succeed in that quest unless it begins to reinvest in the social infrastructure of its cities (particularly in the education and training areas), to value more the efforts of the working poor, to strengthen the social safety net even further, and to denounce those who incite taxpayers to revolt (and then use the resulting anger as an excuse for cutting programs further).

⁵ That effort, however, brought fruit in other places, such as Australia.

How advanced economies and immigration needs have changed

In order to understand the place of economic-stream immigration in advanced economies, we must first understand the radical changes that, over the past two decades, have turned the world economy into the extremely dynamic and completely interdependent global marketplace of today. Specifically, we must understand explicitly (a) the global economy and its requirements, particularly what it values most as it moves toward a state of full integration; (b) how most advanced industrial economies are organized; (c) how those economies' firms and their employees fit into the international marketplace; and (d) the worker characteristics that are most useful to those firms⁶ (and, by extension, to "each" advanced economy) in safeguarding and enhancing their position in that marketplace.

Western economies in the 1950s and 1960s

In the 1950s and early 1960s, most industrial democracies were completing the conversion to peacetime economies, having redirected manufacturing industries toward the production of consumer goods. Manufacturing and agriculture—and large capital investments in physical infrastructure—created enormous employment opportunities in what were essentially domestically-focused economies.⁷

At about the same time, international markets began to become more important for the industries of the West. An influx of U.S. capital into the war-torn economies in Europe and elsewhere had already created opportunities for U.S. firms to build significant product beachheads overseas and broader trade relationships. Combined with startling advances in productivity,⁸ these factors had resulted in a booming U.S. economy that led to a near doubling of U.S. per capita income between the end of World War II and the early 1970s.

At the center of this postwar economic explosion, managing its growth and guaranteeing its stability, was the large corporation, which soon became the core of the economic life for most industrial societies.⁹ Its role extended far beyond simply organizing capital and labor into the production of goods and services. By tying continued growth to a large and growing internal market, stable jobs and career paths, and stable labor relations, the corporation became the nucleus in a cycle of production and consumption that transformed both the West's economies and its attendant social order.

Corporations could play this central role largely because they were able to craft and maintain a "bargain" between labor and management that guaranteed continued growth by fostering agreement on what Robert Reich has called the "division of the spoils." In this bargain, and in the US at least, workers essentially "relinquished" the option of seeking to exert influence over broad institutional

⁶ Human capital is a large and increasing component of a state's economic success in the world economy. Hence the importance of designing skills'-based immigrant selection formulas which allow firms to gain access to key immigrant personnel.

⁷ Manufacturing and agriculture received most of the attention and produced the overwhelming majority of the measurable gross domestic product (GDP). In terms of *total U.S. employment*, however, the goods-producing sector (manufacturing, farming, mining, and construction) has been employing a smaller share of all workers than it is often assumed. Since 1940, fewer than half of all U.S. workers were employed in the production of goods.

⁸ Two key reasons for such productivity gains were continuous developments in the science of management and the technology of high volume mass production—both essentially pioneered by U.S. industry.

⁹ The discussion about the role of the corporation and the bargain between management and labor is primarily heuristic value. It abstracts and generalizes from a set of relationships that apply primarily to that period's large U.S. oligopolies and regulated monopolies, such as utilities. The reality was much more complex than this model suggests. For instance, this discussion ignores the role of women workers. Moreover, most smaller and less stable companies (where most women worked) did not offer the opportunities this model suggests.

policy issues¹⁰ in exchange for job security (virtually *de facto* lifetime employment), seniority-based advancement, adequate compensation to support a family, and access to generous benefits—i.e., the key ingredients for a middle-class existence. In return, the corporation expected¹¹ production workers and middle managers to learn how to work within large and vertically integrated bureaucratic organizations, be reliable, work hard, and follow orders—and rarely sought their input on product development or process innovation.

All of the corporation's constituent elements—stockholders, executives, managers, and production workers—shared in the growing profits generated by this system. They in turn spent their rising income on goods made by other large domestic corporations with similar structures, thus further supporting the lifestyles of their neighbors and creating more jobs for their children. They also saved enough of their income to underwrite investments in technological innovations that boosted productivity and further enhanced broader economic growth.¹²

Typically, and especially in the United States, new technologies and products—the key to an industry's success—were developed over long periods of time almost exclusively by research and development shops within the corporation itself or with allies in academia, not by eliciting worker input. To be sure, training mattered; and some societies invested heavily in the technical preparation of the workers in the form of formal apprenticeship systems and the like. Furthermore, technological progress required workers to learn new skills all the time. However, many of these skills could be learned on the job or in short periods of employer-sponsored training, and they were generally adequate for workers to share in the gains of the country's growth without expensive investments in their own continuing education or training. In fact, even the most advanced industrial equipment in the 1950s and 1960s was operable by someone with a twelfth-grade reading level and a modest amount of on-the-job training.

Clearly, the availability of capital and natural resources, and the economies of scale associated with mass production, were among the most crucial elements of economic success. But there was still another factor: a supportive public sector and, more broadly, public institutions. The public sector's role was essential in several respects: (a) in supporting and reinforcing each country's labor/management bargain; (b) in making the results of defense-related research and development available to firms, thus expanding the knowledge-intensity of their products (this is primarily relevant for the US case); and (c) in maintaining a system of public education that taught good work habits, the importance of following rules, and the basic reasoning skills (reading, writing, and arithmetic) necessary for modern factory jobs. It also promoted the selection of the nation's brightest youth for post-secondary education, and made public funds available not only to universities but also to students, thus ensuring a steady supply of researchers, managers, and technicians. (Many European countries placed greater emphasis on formal skills-training than on the widest possible access to higher education.)

Immigration played a significant role in the spectacular postwar economic miracles both of Europe and of the United States. Although such "immigration" took many different forms (in Europe, guestworker programs were the rule and permanent immigration the exception, while the US played in both fields), all such forms exhibited a common thrust: enhancing economic growth while

¹⁰ It is worth noting that this path differs sharply from the one followed by worker organizations in most European countries, some of whom chose to emphasize a policy of "co-determination" on institutional policy issues while others opted for a policy of confrontation. In neither instance did European workers surrender any of the "benefits" that this bargain bestowed on American workers.

¹¹ The reification is typical of writings about the period, with "the corporation" often assuming certain concrete, even anthropomorphic, characteristics. Some authors have in fact gone so far as to reduce the life of the nation to that of the corporation. Reich (1991:43), for instance, writes that "[b]y the 1950s, the well-being of individual citizens, the prosperity of the nation, and the success of the nation's corporations seemed inextricably connected."

¹² In most instances, the advance of technology itself was adequate to raise productivity enough to further drive the engine of growth.

preserving (or at least not undermining measurably) the bargain between labor and management on which postwar prosperity—and social stability—rested.

As a result, the admission of economic-stream immigrants was pegged primarily to filling jobs for which no domestic workers were available, while domestic workers were presumed to be "protected" from declines in their wages and working conditions through union contracts (where available) and the provisions of each country's labor market test.

Western economies since the early 1970s

By the late 1960s, the edifice of the postwar economic order—and the U.S. economy's dominant place in it—had begun to crumble. There were many reasons for this breakdown, many of them resulting from U.S. actions.

Although the lack of serious *international* competition noted earlier had contributed to U.S. economic success, this very advantage gradually turned into a disadvantage. Lack of significant competition had lulled U.S. industry into focusing primarily, if not exclusively, on domestic production and had made it inattentive to the importance of protecting and expanding its market share abroad, looking for an extra edge, or, most consequentially, investing systematically in new technologies or in the skills and cognitive capacities of its workforce.

Furthermore, many U.S. firms and entire industries had failed to adapt their organizational cultures quickly or fully enough to shorter product development cycles, more efficient and quality-conscious manufacturing, and more targeted and aggressive marketing. They had also failed to emphasize and reward flexibility, process innovation, ideas, skills, and knowledge to the degree they should have—shortcomings that, by the late 1980s, seemed to have spread to many continental European industries.

A second set of reasons for this breakdown was external and gradually affected many sectors of the economies of the North. It included the revival of other postwar economies (particularly in East Asia), the superior quality and price competitiveness of many foreign, and particularly Japanese, products (often aided by government subsidies and protectionist policies), and the increasing marketing savvy and aggressiveness of many foreign firms. Systematically falling trade barriers, most of them coming down as a result of U.S. initiatives,¹³ accelerated many of these processes. The combination of such acts of omission and commission—and, in no small part, the earlier policy inattentiveness and miscalculations of our public sectors—has made nearly unfettered competition a defining characteristic of the new world economy.

Trade liberalization and the reality of full economic interdependence are, of course, inescapable facts, and international sales account for large and growing shares of corporate revenue for tens of thousands of firms. In fact, French, or German, or US—"owned" firms are now competing with foreign-owned firms not only abroad *but also in their own countries*. In the most competitive sectors, as a result, it is as difficult—and in many respects much less useful—to distinguish an "American" from a "foreign" firm as it is to separate "domestic" from "foreign" markets for one's products.

This "de-nationalization" of economic activity (Reich, 1991) has effected significant changes in Western economic institutions and the social organization that undergirds them. The bargain between labor and management is faring no better than so many other products of the immediate post-WWII era do, as access to cheaper labor overseas has eroded the bargaining power of workers

¹³ It is not always fully appreciated that one reason for the single-mindedness with which successive U.S. governments have pursued trade liberalization is the need to regain through "hard-nosed" negotiations ground lost in earlier days, when the United States granted access to its market without securing fully reciprocal access for U.S. companies and products.

and their organizations.¹⁴ The "American" or "German" corporation has become less and less so as firms move operations to other countries and foreign capital pours into Northern countries.¹⁵ Relentless foreign competition forces corporations to be more cost-conscious than ever before and accelerates the pace of product and process innovation, increases the speed of technological progress, and intensifies interest in flexible staffing.

More important for this essay, globalization has placed a premium on a better educated and trained workforce. A firm's productivity and competitiveness depend increasingly on its products' *knowledge content* (as distinct from its content of capital and other physical resources), on the innovativeness of its processes, on "first-to-market" corporate strategies, and on the ability to develop and exploit global connections by what Moss Kanter (1995b:153) calls "managing the intersections at the crossroads of cultures." The constantly shifting need for specific (rather than generic) expertise means that firms can obtain the needed talent more easily, if not necessarily more cheaply, from outside—in effect adopting a "just-in-time" approach to the composition of the workforce. Flexible staffing, as some call this, has in turn lessened interest in investing in the training of one's workers, particularly when worker mobility encourages "predatory" staffing strategies.

The resulting policy dilemma has been extraordinary and is aggravated further by radical changes in the capacity of public institutions to safeguard some level of social coherence while promoting broader economic growth. More and more governments now realize that their role as legitimizers and overseers of the labor/management bargain may have lost much of its relevance—primarily because neither of the parties have themselves to the bargain exist any longer in their previous form, while their own actions in many other policy domains have undermined the bargain.

A failure to fully comprehend how radically our nations' basic economic and related social and labor market institutions have changed in the past two decades may well be at the heart of our failure to diagnose and treat more effectively the implications of the broader economic changes. By continuing to look at the same few indicators (e.g., unemployment or industrial orders and output) as measures of an economy's performance, one may miss a crucial insight: In this age of economic interdependence, *what* an economy produces, or even *how* it produces it (in technical terms), may be less important than the structure of and interrelationships among the *institutions* that organize people toward a common economic purpose. Thus, we must shift our attention to how the organization of production in a knowledge-intensive economy melds human resources and production processes into production "systems" that stress high-performance, high-quality, and high-productivity outcomes. Such outcomes thrive in large part on decision structures that are participatory and reward continuing education and training. These attributes are increasingly the backbone of competitiveness. They are also at the heart of good jobs at good wages and, by extension, successful economies and societies.

¹⁴ The effect of trade accords on domestic workers is extremely complicated and controversial. On the one hand, trade accords force open foreign markets and separate acceptable from unacceptable behavior in international economic conduct. A panoply of rules regulates such conduct, while regimes of often severe sanctions are intended to deter unfair trading practices. In this form, trade accords clearly benefit the West's workers. On the other hand, by providing more open access to the West's markets, trade accords put extreme pressure on those industries and firms that are either marginal or otherwise non-competitive—but that nonetheless employ substantial numbers of workers. While good for consumers (who benefit from the ensuing competition), such situations point up the trade-offs between competitiveness and efficiency, on the one side, and the social implications of lower wages, higher inequality, and unemployment, on the other. (The precise relationship between trade and inequality is ambiguous. Clearly, trade liberalization does contribute to inequality by placing a higher value on products and services that have higher, rather than lower, knowledge content. Hence, higher-skilled workers benefit while lower-skilled ones often lose.) It is in this latter form that trade accords can contribute to job dislocation (but not necessarily to net job losses in the aggregate) and may adversely affect social coherence—at least in the short to medium term.

¹⁵ Between 1980 and 1992, U.S. overseas investments more than doubled, from \$215 billion to \$487 billion. At the same time, however, foreign investment in the United States more than quintupled, from \$83 billion to \$420 billion (see U.S. Bureau of the Census 1994:808, 811).

The workers advanced economies need now and must have in the twenty- first century

Because globalization makes some of its most difficult demands on human institutions, its effects have been felt most intensely in the labor force. The twin realities of intense international competition and the lure of well-prepared and "disciplined," yet inexpensive, labor overseas—when taken together with such factors as the attraction of becoming established early in emerging markets (as Japan is doing so effectively throughout East and Southeast Asia—see Papademetriou and Hamilton, 2000), the political stability in many important developing countries, and the reductions in transportation costs—have removed much of the remaining incentive for management to remain committed to the labor-management bargain. The consequences, particularly though not exclusively for some low-skilled domestic workers have been nothing less than devastating¹⁶.

This realization has led to increasingly earnest discussions across the advanced industrial world about improving economic opportunities for workers by improving their levels of education and vocational skills. Filling good jobs and enticing businesses to invest in the creation of more good jobs requires an adequately prepared workforce or a nation's economic and social progress will be undermined. In fact, the more other things become equal,¹⁷ the greater the weight of such intangibles as a business-friendly environment and, more appropriately for our discussion, a "world-class" workforce becomes.

Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1995a, b) provides a much fuller picture along these lines in her discussion of the criteria for success in the global economy. She focuses on the three intangible assets she believes successful firms look for in making their locational decisions: access to "concepts," "competence," and "connections." Three types of workers correspond to these assets. "Thinkers" specialize in concepts, the "leading-edge ideas, designs, or formulations for products or services that create value for customers;" through their technological creativity, they are the key to successful knowledge-based industries and products.¹⁸ The strength of "makers," Moss Kanter's second class of workers, is competence, the ability to "translate ideas into applications" for customers and execute them to the "highest standards." (A local economy that excels in makers meets an indispensable criterion for world-class production; when matched with an appropriate infrastructure and a business-friendly environment, it can become extremely attractive for the location of competitive firms.) Moss Kanter's final criterion for success is a class of "traders." Traders, she argues, "sit at the crossroads of cultures, managing the intersections," making deals and leveraging "core capabilities," creating more value for customers, or opening doors, widening horizons, and moving goods and services across borders (1995b: 152-54).

¹⁶ In the United States, wage earnings differentials between college and high school graduates increased from about 33 percent to nearly 56 percent between 1979 and 1989 and have nearly doubled in the last 10 years. Instructively, until the mid-1990s, both groups experienced losses in real wages since 1979: young male high school graduates by 30 percent, college graduates by 8 percent.

¹⁷ Increasingly, tangible things such as advanced physical infrastructure (including the availability and cost of capital), relative social and political stability, a growing class of consumers, and a basically sound macroeconomic foundation, are becoming "more equal" across most advanced industrial and even some industrializing countries. These are the attributes that capital (and footloose companies) value most as they seek the most advantageous returns on investment.

¹⁸ "Thinkers" are not unlike the "symbolic analysts" who are Robert Reich's candidates for continued economic success. Such analysts "solve, identify, and broker problems by manipulating symbols. They simplify reality into abstract images that can be rearranged, juggled, experimented with, communicated to other specialists, and then, eventually, transformed back into reality" (Reich 1991:178). For Reich, with his strikingly binary view of the world, "symbolic analysts" will also be the crucial source of wealth in the only truly "American economy" left: the *sum total of the capacities of Americans to contribute value to the world economy* (1991:219-224).

In addition to its value as an insight into the types of "skills" competitive firms value, *and societies must have in large numbers if they are to be successful in the long run*, the preceding discussion makes clear that, increasingly, no *single* measure of skill or education level can accurately predict one's ability to climb into *and remain* in the class of workers who will experience sustained success. The bundle of skills that the twenty-first century's most successful workers will need goes far beyond reading ability, arithmetic skills, and most of the other skills taught in many of the North's high schools, and even the technological adeptness that can be learned on the job or in training programs. Successful workers will need to be adept in communication *per se*—effectively developing, analyzing, and transmitting *concepts and ideas* and translating them into high-quality products and sales in the world economy.

Conclusion: back to immigration

If this analysis is even partially sound, one of the most important "qualities" a world-class worker can have is *adaptability*. In an era and an economic system where firms—even industries—are born, move, or die at an unprecedented pace and technologies always change, successful workers ("thinkers," "traders," but also "makers") must be ready at all times to "pack up their skills" and move to new pursuits. Upward occupational mobility may now be attainable more easily *across* rather than *within* firms. *The most successful workers may thus be those constantly on the lookout for a more productive use of the unique bundle of skills and talents they possess*. Hence the need for educational reforms that impact not only the "basics" of building analytical skills and encouraging original, creative thinking, but also the skills for effective transitions from school to work and from one job or industry to another. Only by giving workers the tools and the opportunity to extract real value from applying what they have learned in the education system will our societies be able to maximize our returns on our educational investments. This analysis also requires that the foundations on which the North's economic immigration stream rests—in both the permanent and temporary admissions systems—also be re-thought. The essential question is how to promote an economy's competitive interests by facilitating access to key foreign-born personnel without unnecessary procedures, while simultaneously not undermining the broader social policy goals that advance the interests of domestic workers overall.

Pursuing immigrants with the higher-level skills that competitive economies need now and from which they can benefit well into the future should be *just one part of a broad competitiveness strategy*. Failure to pursue diligently the other elements in such a strategic plan of action (particularly in education, training, and broader social policy areas) or relying on immigration in a way that acts as a disincentive for the market to make the adjustments it would otherwise make¹⁹ in response to tighter supplies of highly qualified workers, might make broader national priorities less likely to be achieved.

First and foremost, globalization prods all advanced industrial societies to make an unequivocal commitment to lifetime education and training. A thoughtful and well-managed immigration policy will neither be in conflict with nor passively undermine that effort. Rather, it would offer an opportunity for engaging each country's business community in a dialogue about investing more intelligently and comprehensively in the preparation of domestic workers. Such a policy would place immigration within the larger framework of a national competitiveness strategy that chooses and facilitates the admission of the best qualified immigrants while investing systematically in increasing labor market self-reliance.

¹⁹ These might include offering higher wages in a manner consistent with gains in productivity, improving working conditions, and making additional investments in technology, organizational innovation, and *worker training and retraining*. Such initiatives enhance worker productivity and pay handsome long-term dividends in terms of both social development and global competitiveness.

Most northern societies, however, are still struggling with a fundamental failure of imagination in this regard. By most measures, neither business nor government have been doing a nearly adequate job in training and retraining, while efforts to create a synergy that would at least help young people make more effective transitions from school to work have yet to bear fruit. Even if some of these efforts gradually begin to pay off, however, the relatively few workers who will receive generic training under such programs may not meet the specialized needs of firms that now hire foreign professionals. It is in this context that immigration has and must continue to be relied upon to provide increments of the skilled and educated workers advanced economies need. In the absence of flexible and well-managed economic immigration selection mechanisms, many of the West's most competitive firms with global operations have been reconsidering their investments in additional capacity in their "home" countries. Firms whose products are primarily knowledge-based, such as software developers, can choose to expand anywhere where the main intangible asset they need—"knowledge workers"—are in ample supply. "Real-time" satellite communications that bridge distances instantly and lower labor costs, together with incentive packages from other countries for locating there, make the temptation to move and/or expand their operations abroad ever more enticing.

Manufacturers of tangible products are confronted with similar calculations. When Intel, Inc., the computer chips giant, announced in 1996 its intent to expand its manufacturing capacity, more than \$3 billion of the investment, expected to create about 3,500 jobs, went to places other than the United States.²⁰ The lesson? Globalization means that firms must be "convinced" that investing in one place rather than another is in their stockholders' interest. With knowledge having become so diffuse, and with competition among countries for attracting strong corporations intensifying (Israel committed \$608 million in "grants" to attract the \$1.6 billion Intel investment), global firms increasingly look for such assets as an excellent workforce, a modern infrastructure, a strong consumer base, and a business-friendly environment. *Immigration policy—no less than policies to improve the quality of a country's human resources, maintain an excellent infrastructure, and provide a business-friendly regulatory environment—must thus support rather than undermine efforts to convince firms that they can remain and expand their operations in "our" countries and still be competitive in the global marketplace.* Hence the greater interest in skilled and talented foreigners and the projections of increasing competition for such foreigners I made earlier in this essay.

Does this "new" environment open a new chapter in how we will think about and act on international migration more generally? Only time will tell.

²⁰ These were in addition to expanding Intel's manufacturing operations in the United States. Most of Intel's new foreign investment went to Israel and Ireland.

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C.2 Brain drain, mobility and circulation: new forms of skilled migration

Adela Pellegrino²

Introduction

The acceptance of highly skilled human resources is a policy of those countries that traditionally receive migrants. This is the case of the United States, Canada, Australia and, more recently, Japan, whose immigration policies have become progressively more selective as regards the educational and professional profiles of the individuals granted residence. European countries have closed their doors to immigration, although they have shown greater flexibility in accepting immigrants with special or outstanding professional skills. In several countries the current policy is to admit immigrants whose professions are in particular demand, such as information technology specialists.³

In developed countries, the demand for trained individuals in specialized sectors sometimes surpasses the supply from local training systems. This problem is exacerbated by the aging of the population and the consequent decline in the number of youths entering the labour market every year.

From the viewpoint of the countries of origin, the emigration of skilled individuals is a serious obstacle to the consolidation of modern sectors in systems and technology and, more generally, in the areas where the capacity for innovation is crucial to closing the gap between developing countries and the developed world.

The debate on the brain drain has been gradually replaced by proposals to stimulate brain circulation and brain exchange, with a view to overcoming or offsetting losses arising from emigration. These proposals emphasize the circulation and exchange of highly qualified people between the countries of origin and the developed countries. The aim is to convert the migrants into links between local networks and global networks of scientific and technological development, into individual or group agents of the transfer of know-how and technology.

The aim of this study is to review the background to this issue in Latin America, and to offer information on the migration of the region's professional and technical workers.

1. Background

The link between migration and development has prompted debate in the specialized literature. Various authors and schools of thought have differed in their views of how migration affects the source countries, although there has been less empirical work on this issue than on the consequences of migration for recipient countries. There has been little effort to assess losses, or to simulate processes that would have happened if there had been no emigration, and the utility of such studies is deemed questionable.

Appraising the matter, Papademetriou and Martin (1991) analyzed studies on various regions and concluded that the link between migration and development should be considered "unsettled",

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³ In Germany, for example, a special programme was set up in 2000 to hire 10,000 specialists in this discipline from other countries.

that it was difficult to infer general principles and that, in their opinion, the weight of positive and negative factors varied greatly depending on the cases studied.

The most marked and tangible impact of international migration on the source countries consists of migrants' remittances. Although hard to estimate, the value of such transfers is very substantial⁴ and normally amounts to a significant share of the gross domestic product of the source countries. Recent studies underline the direct and indirect multiplier effects of these remittances on local communities (Durand, Parrado and Massey, 1996; Taylor, 1996; Massey *et al.*, 1996).

Rarer and more difficult to assess are references to the repercussions of emigration on labour markets in the source countries. However, there is agreement that emigration is intrinsically selective and that its selectivity largely determines the nature of demand in the recipient countries: jobless or surplus workers do not emigrate, but rather those more qualified to compete in the target country.

Concern about the loss of skilled human resources is hardly new in human history⁵ but it was in the 1950s and 1960s, following the end of the Second World War and in parallel with the process of decolonization in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, that the migration of qualified people acquired greater importance in the academic sphere and in discussions within international organizations.

A series of studies published at the end of the 1960s and in the 1970s shaped the debate between "internationalists" and "nationalists", both of which were opposed by advocates of the structuralist school that was beginning to prevail in Latin American academic and political thinking.

Important in this regard was a meeting on the "brain drain" in Lausanne in 1967; the conference papers were published in Adams (1968). It was here that the dispute over the impact of the brain drain found formal expression, a debate that was also echoed in international negotiations. Hence, in various United Nations organizations and in the International Organization for Migration, "reverse technology transfer" was the central issue in conferences and resolutions geared to policy-making. Country- and region-specific case studies were undertaken. Within UNCTAD, interest in the matter was manifest in the various endeavours to include it in the north-south debate.⁶ UNCTAD made great efforts to determine the human capital involved in intellectual migration. This undertaking was linked to proposals to establish tax systems that might offset the losses caused by the migration of qualified individuals.

In Latin America there was a spate of studies on the emigration of highly qualified people in the 1960s and early 1970s, and case studies were conducted in some countries. Concern for the issue was consistent with the prevailing model of endogenous economic development and the promotion of national industrial growth. In the 1950s, structural conceptions of development originated in the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), which adopted a systemic or over-arching outlook that emphasized the pattern of the world economy and the worsening terms of trade between the centre and the periphery.

In that period the theoretical focus of most studies on international migration sought to rebut the propositions of neoclassical thinking, which posited the view that emigration was rational conduct on the part of migrants and that it amounted to a mediating mechanism between the forces of supply and demand. Thinkers in the various strands of Marxism and dependency theory, who then held ideological sway in the region's academic circles, proposed conceptual frameworks based on the notion of imperialism and its links with subordinate countries, or on the view that the world was divided between the centre and the periphery. In this view the emigration of highly qualified people

⁴ According to Russell and Teitelbaum (1992), the value of the remittances increased in nominal terms from US\$ 43.3 billion dollars in 1980 to US\$ 65.6 billion in 1990. The authors maintain that remittances rank second only to crude oil in international trade.

⁵ Summaries of the migration of qualified people in human history are presented in Dedijer (1968), Gaillard and Gaillard (1998), and Oteiza (1998).

⁶ D'Oliveira and Sousa (1987) offers a synthesis of these activities.

was an expression of the power imbalances between developed and underdeveloped nations, and such emigration made it difficult to surmount the inequalities between the centre and the periphery.

The issue commanded particular authority in Argentine academia. The pioneering work of Morris Horowitz (1962) and Bernardo Houssay (1966) was complemented by a series of studies by Enrique Oteiza (1965; 1966; 1967; 1969; 1971) on the emigration of Argentine professionals, technical personnel and specialized workers. In addition, studies by Sitio and Stuhlman (1968) and Oszlak and Caputo (1973) focused on the emigration of doctors. As educational systems improved in the region, concern about the loss of skilled human resources extended to other countries: Uruguay (Filgueira, 1976), Chile, Colombia, and more recently Venezuela (Valecillos, 1990; Garbi, 1991) and Brazil (Aleixo, 1974).⁷

Fernando Chaparro (1971) was entrusted by the Organization of American States with drawing up a summary of the situation in Latin America. It is also worth recalling CELADE's contribution in setting up the IMILA database, and a series of studies grounded in that database (Torrado, 1980; Martínez Pizarro, 1989; Pellegrino, 1993).

In terms of migration, Latin America reached a turning point in the 1970s. The crisis of the "import substitution" development model spurred an increase in social disquiet and outbursts of violence. In several countries this led to the establishment of highly repressive military regimes, which in turn prompted further migration from the region. Migrants in this period included highly-trained individuals from national elites that were opposed to the military regimes.

Because such migration flows were triggered by violence, analysis of them gave primacy to such issues as human rights, refugees and exiles. These issues would occupy the countries of South America in the 1970s, and those of Central America in the following decade.

With the return to democracy by the mid-1980s, several Argentine and Uruguayan studies on emigrant and exile communities offered data on the number of nationals resident overseas and the scale of the skilled resources abroad (Lattes-Bertoncello, 1986; Fortuna and Niedworok, 1989).

Such research underpinned policies to encourage the return of emigrants and exiles, which were applied immediately following the end of the military dictatorships. This process of return was then also subject to appraisal (Mármora, 1997).

2. The contemporary context

It is a commonplace to say that economic internationalization is one of the dominant features of the final decades of the twentieth century. The extent to which the scale of the phenomenon surpasses that of stages prior to free trade dominance is debatable (O'Connell, 1996). There can be no denying, however, that the changes of the final decades of the last century amounted to a revolution of global scope in the areas of communications and the transmission of information, and that this had a substantial impact on migration, especially flows of skilled migrants.

The internationalization of economic activities and capital mobility was sweeping. One direct corollary might have been the consolidation of a global labour market, but the fact remains that the mobility of people is constrained by cultural and institutional factors (restrictive policies). As Manuel Castells says (1996, p. 232): "While capital moves freely in the electronic circuits of local financial networks, the workforce is highly constrained (and will remain so in the foreseeable future) by institutions, culture, borders, the police and xenophobia". These factors serve to explain why, although international migration is now politically significant, between 1965 and 1990 the share of the world

⁷ This list does not seek to be exhaustive.

population living outside their home country remained between 2.1% and 2.3% (Zlotnik, 1998). More than half of that percentage was accounted for by movements between developing countries, and in most cases those movements had little direct connection to the globalization of labour markets.

In the case of highly qualified workers, the consolidation of global labour markets was much more defined. International organizations and multinational companies have been important in this respect, very largely because of those professional and technical personnel that are gradually forming an internationalized sector. Companies do not only uproot people: their technical staff increasingly seek to establish transnational "living spaces".⁸

Academic and research circles are different in this regard, since universality is intrinsic to them. The internationalization of academia is not new, although the development of communications has fostered exchanges, the completion of international projects, and the establishment of research networks. Post-graduate studies usually provide the initial link between the research and development activities of universities in industrialized countries and those in the students' home countries. In many cases this first link culminates in emigration.

After the surge in studies on the brain drain the issue lost prominence in academia and political discourse. In recent years, the perception that knowledge is important as a basic input for development, as well as the mounting interest of governments in securing strong science and technology sectors, have reawakened interest in the matter. The economic growth of Southeast Asian countries, and their success in scientific and technological development, made them examples to be studied. The South Korean case illustrated the positive benefits of policies of return. The return to the country of emigrant engineers and scientists was motivated by the substantial improvement in the economy, but also by concerted policy to foster and protect highly qualified human resources. This policy was pursued by the State with the support of the private sector. By hiring individuals living outside the country, business played a crucial role in this regard (Hyaeweol Choi, 1995).

The collapse of socialist governments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union spurred an outflux of qualified people to Western Europe and the United States, thereby giving rise to new academic diasporas that are now subject to specific policies and analysis (UNESCO, 1993).

In terms of conceptual frameworks, greater mobility raised questions about the brain drain concept; other notions emerged, such as brain exchange or brain circulation. The negative vision of loss gave ground to another view that stresses the positive aspects of mobility, since circular or pendular migration involving the migrants' temporary return helps develop and consolidate local labour markets. The notion of a diaspora⁹ has arisen. This assumes that there is a dispersed community throughout the world whose members, without wishing to return, seek to forge closer links by cultivating feelings of national or community belonging. Migrants interact with their counterparts in their home country in projects with common goals, irrespective of their place of residence. If those in the diaspora identify with projects in their home country this stimulates scientific or economic development by means of remote cooperation or periodic returns.

Policies are geared mainly to "re-linking" projects. These entail establishing networks and mechanisms for interaction between emigrants and their home communities (although the former

⁸ The concept of "living spaces" was first used by Daniel Courgeau (1975 and 1980), who defines them as those spaces in which an individual conducts all his or her activities, including various kinds of displacement. In his opinion, migration occurs when the "living space" moves.

⁹ Gaillard and Gaillard (1998, p. 41) point out that the word "diaspora" (from the Greek), originally referred to the dispersal of Hellenic sages around the Mediterranean for the purposes of disseminating their culture. In its biblical sense, the term was used to denote the dispersal of the Jews and, later, of other landless peoples such as the Palestinians and the Kurds. In the 1980s geographers began to use the term to describe national migrant communities interacting with their home countries.

do not truly return). Such strategies seek to complement return policies or act as an alternative to them.¹⁰ According to Meyer and Brown (1999), there are 41 knowledge-exchange projects in the world, involving expatriates from 30 countries (which in some cases have more than one network).

There are several such networks in Latin America. Seven of them feature on the list presented by Meyer and Brown (1999), and are centred in Argentina, Colombia, El Salvador, Uruguay, Peru and Venezuela.

In 1996 a meeting in Bogotá on "International Academic Migration Today. A New Issue" (Charum and Meyer, 1998) advanced conceptual propositions and case studies on academic communities grouped together in networks. Particular attention was paid to Colombia's Caldas Network, the fruit of one of the first initiatives in Latin America to bring together the "diaspora".

3. The emigration of qualified human resources from Latin America and the Caribbean: an attempt at quantification and categorization

Before addressing the issue of quantification it is necessary to define what is meant by qualified resources, since typologies of migration can be fashioned from different perspectives.

A first type of classification gives primacy to the motivations for migration. There is a general distinction between forced migration (attributable to violence or political repression) and migration for economic or labour reasons. Violence has been a significant cause of migration in Latin America, particularly of professionals, academics and intellectuals who are normally among those offering active opposition to political and military violence (Kreimer, 1998).

A second classification is based on the length of time spent outside the country. In this case, movements can be considered as irreversible if they involve new living arrangements and the intention to establish permanent residence; the other category involves temporary, seasonal transfers or pendular movements of varying length (Domenach and Picouet, 1987). Highly qualified migrants are usually resident abroad for widely varying periods of time. This is the case for scientists and intellectuals from academia, as well as for professionals in transnational companies or international organizations.

The expressions generally used in studies on skilled migrants should also be clarified.

This paper inter-changeably uses the terms qualified human resources, "brains", professionals and technical personnel. The literature in the field sometimes applies restricted definitions that comprise scientists and engineers, while broader categorizations cover all professionals and technical personnel and, in some cases, include skilled workers. The choice of definition depends on the aims of the analysis and on the information available.

Aside from these alternatives, quantification and categorization is not easy. Statistics on the issue are scant, and often cannot be used for a disaggregated analysis of particular topics. Specific field studies on the issue are few, and most of them are case studies of limited insight.

The countries generally have data on absolute numbers of migrants, obtained from national censuses or from continuous household surveys. These data provide a picture of the accumulated volume of skilled immigrants on a certain date, but they do not lend themselves to an analysis of the patterns of mobility. Moreover, there are usually substantial omissions in the censuses of recipient countries, especially those in which there is illegal immigration.

Only very rarely are flow data available. In the United States, for example, the annual statistics of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) provide very useful and detailed information,

¹⁰ The International Organization for Migration (IOM) promotes programmes of both return and re-linking, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) supports the "Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals" (TOKTEN) programme, which fosters visits by qualified migrants to their home countries in order to transmit skills and know-how.

but it refers to visas granted and not to the real number of immigrants entering each year. Visas are often granted to migrants who have been resident in the country for years, and the variation in the numbers largely reflects the effects of the preference categories established in the immigration laws.

This paper uses the definition applied in Latin American national censuses to classify the economically active population, specifically employment in the first group of "professional and technical" occupations. It also uses information on educational levels used to identify migrants with higher schooling or university education, as they were classified in the IMILA database. Additionally, information is drawn from the United States National Science Foundation, which uses the category "scientists and engineers".

As Gaillard and Gaillard point out (1998), the available statistics are insufficient to draw a reliable general picture of such migration. While the statistical constraints cannot be disregarded, the IMILA database and CELADE's efforts at harmonization put Latin America on a much better footing as regards the availability of information on the migration of the region's inhabitants. The information in the database is derived from national censuses in Latin America, the United States and Canada.¹¹ An additional effort should serve to provide information on the European countries, Australia and Japan, which have also attracted migrants from the region in recent decades. In the case of Europe, much Latin American immigration effected through the recovery of citizenship by the descendants of Europeans who migrated to Latin America in earlier periods. This makes it yet more difficult to identify Latin American migrants, since the European countries tend to classify immigrants by citizenship rather than by birthplace.

The question posed by many researchers and policy-makers, therefore, is: what is the scale of the brain drain?. Carrington and Detragiache (1998; 1999) sought to assess the magnitude of the phenomenon (in the 1990s) for 61 countries that, according to their estimates, account for 70% of the developing world's population. They concluded that a significant share of Asian and African migrants in the United States have completed tertiary schooling (75% of Indians, 53% of Koreans, 50% of Chinese). Among nationals of Egypt, Ghana and South Africa (the sources of most African immigrants in the United States), more than 60% have tertiary schooling (Carrington and Detragiache, 1999). The authors also found that migrants to the United States tend to be more educated than the national average in their home countries, and that the highest emigration rates are among those with a tertiary education.

Using the SESTAT database of the United States National Science Foundation, Meyer and Brown (1999) estimate that of the 12 million people with diplomas in science and engineering, or who are engaged in such activities, 1,434,000 (12%) were born abroad and more than 70% of these were born in a developing country. The Foundation report (1998) cited by the authors argues that the higher the diploma obtained, the higher the share of foreigners, and that 23% of those with doctorates are foreign-born. This share reaches 40% in the case of engineering and computer sciences.

There are no similar data on other developed regions that receive significant numbers of migrants, but Meyer and Brown estimate that in the triad comprising the United States, Japan and the European Union there are some 400,000 engineers and scientists from developing countries working in research and development, in comparison to a total of 1,224,000 living in the source countries.

International migration was a growing phenomenon in Latin America during the second half of the twentieth century, but in that period the profile and direction of the flows changed. Until the start of the 1960s, 67% of migrants moved between countries in the region, especially in border areas. In the 1990 censuses, the proportion of intra-regional migrants had fallen to 31%, excluding Mexican migrants to the United States (Pellegrino, 2000). Emigration to developed countries, particularly the United States, predominated.

¹¹ There are data on the total number of migrants to Canada in 1990, but not on their socio-economic profile.

In the last four decades, the number of Latin Americans recorded in US censuses increased from about 1 million in 1960 to almost 8.5 million in 1990. According to estimates by the US Immigration and Naturalization Service (1993) there are at least 3,380,000 illegal immigrants, of which 1,300,000 are Mexicans, 327,000 are Salvadoreans, and 129,000 are Guatemalans. The highest average growth rate of the numbers of migrants was recorded in the inter-census period 1970-1980, but that figure masks differences between the various Latin communities in the United States during the reference period.

Migration between countries in the region, particularly between neighbours, increased until the 1970s. Historically, crossborder movements were strongly determined by seasonal migration to work on harvests or in other temporary agricultural activities, but these were gradually transformed into migration to towns, where industry and services expanded.

In the 1970s, migration between the countries of the region was largely conditioned by the attraction of the oil-producing countries. This was especially true in Venezuela, where the increase in employment surpassed the growth of the active population, and where the government and the private sector implemented selective immigration policies that led to the recruitment of professionals and specialized workers.

The 1980s, dubbed "the lost decade for development" by ECLAC, affected international migration. In Argentina and Venezuela, the region's traditional recipients of labour-oriented migration, the growth rate of crossborder and regional immigration slowed. International migration from the region was oriented more to developed countries, chiefly the United States, and also diversified toward other regions of the world (Canada, Europe, Australia and Japan).

In the inter-census period 1980-1990 the accumulated number of professionals and technical personnel increased, although it did so at a slower pace than in the previous decade and than international migration in general, at least as regards flows to the United States. In other Latin American countries the situation varied, although average growth was much slower than migration to the United States; many countries even experienced negative growth (see table 1).

If the various kinds of Latin American migration flows are ranked according to the number of professionals and technical involved, 14 of such flows in which this number exceeds 5,000 went to the United States. In the case of those moving between countries in the region, Colombians in Venezuela comprise the most numerous group of professional emigrants. The numbers of Uruguayans, Chileans and Paraguayans in Argentina are also significant in this regard (see table 2).

The average educational level of Latin American migrants to the United States is below the average of US nationals. It has been pointed out (Sassen, 1988) that the profile of migrants tends to polarize between the highly qualified in upper management sectors or in academia and research, and labour-oriented migrants with lower qualifications. In broad terms, most Asian and African migrants to the United States are highly qualified, while Latin American migrants are engaged in less skilled activities.

The foregoing is coloured by two observations. First, the profile of Latin American migrants is wide-ranging and varies substantially according to the country of origin. Flows from Argentina, Venezuela, Bolivia, Chile and Paraguay include a higher share of economically active individuals who have completed postgraduate studies than the average for the foreign population. This group also includes Cuba, Uruguay, Peru and Panama if the comparison is with the average for the native population of the United States (see figure 1).

Second, although there are greater absolute numbers of less qualified people, in many cases the number of qualified emigrants is very substantial relative to the number of people with similar educational levels in the various home countries. Figure 2 compares the percentage of Latin American-born professionals in the active population of the United States and the source countries. It shows that Latin American migrants in the United States comprise two groups. In one group the level is

highly selective and the share of professionals is greater than among the active population resident in the countries; in the other group the contrary is the case.¹²

In the categories of senior managers and officials, only for Mexico and the Central American countries is the proportion lower among migrants than among those living in the source countries (see figure 3).

According to the National Science Foundation (Johnson and Regets, 1998), in 1993 some 12.8% of the total number of people engaged in research and development in the United States were (foreign-born) immigrants; if only those with a doctorate are considered, the percentage rises to 29.3%. According to the National Science Foundation data on the annual income of scientists and engineers going to the United States, in 1993 some 65% of those admitted came from Asia and only 13% from Latin America. Of these latter, the greatest number came from Mexico (165), followed by Peru, Argentina and Colombia (with about 140 each) (see table 3).

4. Permanent of temporary migration?

There is little evidence to show the extent to which Latin American immigration in developed countries, for the migrants themselves, is temporary or permanent. The National Science Foundation (Johnson and Regets, 1998) conducted a study on scientists and engineers from Europe, Asia and North America (Mexico is the only Latin American country included). This found that the brain drain (understood as permanent migration) and brain circulation (temporary migration that generally involves a period of study followed by some work experience) coexist among qualified migrants in the United States, and that the primacy of one or the other depends on the characteristics of the source countries and their policies on qualified human resources. The authors argue that temporary movement predominates for those from South Korea and Taiwan, while most Indian and Chinese migrants are permanent.

There are no specific studies on Latin Americans to underpin a similar analysis. The annual figures on individuals admitted temporarily to the United States give some impression of the situation in 1995. The data suggest that seasonal movements are mainly from Europe and Asia, prompting the conclusion that circulation prevails among developed countries. European and Asians account for between 75% and 80% of all visas granted in the categories of temporary workers (those with special skills and qualities, industrial training, company transfers and exchange visitors). Nationals of Latin American countries rank markedly lower, accounting for less than 10% of the total, which is inconsistent with overall trends in emigration to the United States (see table 4).

A significant entry point for emigration to the United States, and to developed countries in general, consists of higher education.

In 1995, of 420,000 students on postgraduate courses, 100,000 were foreign, as were 39% of those who obtained diplomas in natural sciences, 50% in mathematics and computer sciences and 58% in engineering. Of the 55,444 foreign doctoral students, 63% planned to remain in the United States and 39.3% had "firm plans". These percentages stood at 85% and 79% respectively for Chinese and Indian nationals, while for those born in Mexico the percentage was one of the lowest at 37% (Johnson, 1998). Meyer and Brown (1999) maintain that over 50% of foreign students in France and Japan planned to stay.

According to the same study by Johnson (1998), the ability to attract and keep students stemmed mainly from the capacity of the higher education institutions to guarantee students financing for their studies.¹³

¹² It should be noted that the data are not wholly comparable. In Latin American countries the information usually includes professionals and technical personnel, while in the United States it includes only professionals.

¹³ For 75% of 10,000 foreign doctoral students examined, their own universities were their main source of income.

The number of foreign students in the United States has increased substantially, from under 50,000 in the school year 1959/1960 to about 500,000 (precisely 490,933) in 1998/1999 (Institute for International Education, 2000). Latin American students number more than 50,000, half of whom are from South America. This is in sharp contrast to the proportion of all of those who enter, the bulk of whom are from Mexico and Central America (see tables 5 and 6). As with professionals and technical personnel, the overwhelming majority of foreign students in the United States come from Asia (58%); only 11% are of Latin American origin. This is striking in view of the high cultural profile of the United States in the countries of the region. Less than the half of all foreign students (48%) follow degree courses and almost 40% are postgraduates. Unlike South American nationals, whose shares in this respect are similar to the total average, most students from the Caribbean and Central America are in the first level of higher education (Institute for International Education, 2000). A quarter part of the foreigners are studying business and 15% are studying engineering. About 16% do courses in basic sciences (mathematics, computing, physics and biology), while some 11% are in the social sciences and the humanities. Some 25% of Latin Americans too are studying business, while in engineering and basic sciences their share is below that of the percentage for all foreign students.

5. Current policy determinants and proposals

The determinants of qualified migration are usually linked to wage differentials and the prospects for professional development. Although this is true in a very general sense, precise determinants are substantially more complex.

Studies on the causes of qualified migration customarily disregard other factors that have been very important in conditioning migration flows in Latin America. Political and social violence, authoritarianism and instability were central to triggering several flows. In many cases the emigration of elites opposed to authoritarian governments was the original core that later gave rise to the transformation of the exiles into immigrant communities with more diverse motivations.

The countries that have been foremost in losing professionals and technical personnel include some (like Bolivia) where the proportion of such individuals in the active population is low, and others (like Argentina) where the proportion is considerable. This suggests that the emigration of professionals and technical personnel does not necessarily spring from "oversupply", but rather that it is determined by factors specific to each source country, the opportunities offered by the recipient countries, and the kind of networks established between the migrants, which allow migration to be self-sustaining.

According to the arguments of neoclassical theory, migrants should seek to be in places where they will receive a greater economic return on their educational qualifications. In the case of professionals and technical personnel, it is not clear in all cases that the rewards (economic, social status and so forth) for their qualifications are greater in the United States than could be obtained in their own countries, where the relative shortage of highly qualified people might mean a greater return in real terms.

The link between the tendency to migrate and the rank of professionals and technical personnel in the salary scales of their home countries does not lead to any firm conclusion that the rewards are the main reason for migration. This issue merits specific studies to clarify the phenomenon's complexity, for which purpose the perceptions of the migrants themselves would have to be ascertained.

According to some authors, in many developing countries the expansion of education and the concomitant inability to absorb graduates incites emigration (Rowlands and Weston, 1996). Other writers, like Borjas (1990), suggest that the emigration of the most qualified sectors is induced by more equitable income distribution, since they seek labour markets in which their skills levels are better rewarded.

Aside from the comparative advantages of the developed world in terms of wages and the prospects of professional development in a range of specialized areas, it should be noted that for vast sectors of the regional population, the United States (in particular) has been a centre of gravity, a powerful pole of attraction, because of the prospects for personal development that it offers.

The globalization of the mass media has not only expanded access to information but has also given rise to an homogenization of aspirations and values by raising expectations of lifestyles and consumption patterns that are typical of developed societies. The dissatisfaction arising from the gap between expectations and realities underpins decisions to migrate.

Experience suggests that the prospect of some spontaneous reversal of migration flows is remote, particularly as regards the return of qualified human resources. Such reversal demands, at the least, political action in the source countries to change decisions to migrate by creating stimuli and conditions that would encourage people to stay. This is the lesson of the examples mentioned above, such as South Korea and other countries of Southeast Asia. On a much smaller scale, some cases in Latin America suggest that such signals from source countries are quickly understood.

Beyond these basic measures, without which no effective action could be taken in practice, it is plain that in the modern world there is a need to redesign strategies geared to retaining highly qualified people. The proposed methods encouraging return, and even more so UNCTAD's call for specific tax systems to compensate the source countries for the losses they suffer from the emigration of qualified human resources, have been shown to be inefficient or very difficult (not to say impossible) to implement.

In recent decades, traditional initiatives to reverse emigration have been displaced by others that support re-linking processes and that stimulate existing networks as a means of turning losses into possible gains.

Some authors have even proposed that the negative view of scientists' emigration should be revised. They argue that the presence of emigrants in strategic sectors who act in the interests of their places of origin offers substantial potential. Gaillard and Gaillard (1998, p. 26) maintain that "today there is increasing acceptance of the proposition that the brain drain should not be viewed as a cause of impoverishment but as a source of development". According to Meyer and Brown (1999), "qualified expatriates can be deemed a potential advantage rather than a definitive loss".

Devising linkage policies demands that the characteristics of the various groups of qualified migrants be identified.

A first group consists of professionals working in transnational companies. These migrants would find it difficult to collaborate with their home countries, since the firms demand a company loyalty that prevents their employees from engaging in activities that might entail a transfer of skills or technology.

According to John Salt (1989), there is evidence that the exchange of highly qualified personal as part of multinational companies' relocation strategies give rise to very little technology transfer for developing countries. This is chiefly because these corporations (albeit with some variations by country and company) are reluctant to allow developing country nationals to reach senior administrative and technical posts. The system, Salt concludes, "militates against capacity-building and the management training of native employees in developing country plants".

The implementation of policies on the role of transnational companies, technology transfer, intellectual property and patents is subject to complex international negotiations. The relocation of investment and the installation of production or assembly plants are among the most hotly debated issues in discussions of the impact and transfer of technical know-how. For migrants working in such companies, re-linking strategies geared to transferring experience and expertise usually run counter to company practice.

A second group consists of migrants who move to another country independently, often for an initial period of university study. This group comprises basic and social scientists and, more generally, researchers and teachers in academia, as well as professionals engaged in overseas projects of varying duration.

Scientists and academics are a strategic good for the source countries, since the training of new generations depends on them. They also constitute the indispensable critical mass necessary to create other innovations in their societies. Re-linking networks can bring about conditions that are conducive to national development, but this will only happen if there is strong local momentum and drive.¹⁴

This issue prompts consideration of the prospects of undertaking research and innovation activities outside the main knowledge centres. Certain questions arise. Is there a greater tendency for knowledge to be concentrated in the developed countries? Is there, or might there be, a "relocation of investment" to retain highly qualified resources in their places of origin while they work in the interests of the main centers?

In the age of communications it is possible to envisage the democratization of knowledge, undoubtedly encouraged by the Internet, and to foresee a greater concentration of knowledge in developed countries as a corollary to the concentration of wealth and the scale of investment in science and development.

At the same time, scientists' membership of "global science" might mean that a successful career is determined by goals that are in the interests of power centers. The assessment mechanisms used in the main centers of science and technology are adopted as universal models of evaluation: publishing articles in international journals, participating in international conferences, carrying out projects in cooperation with research centers. Adherence to these rules can militate against local scientific development, since they demand attention to certain issues and the adoption of certain models that are not necessarily coincident with national priorities.

This raises the complex issue of the "relevance" of the research and the role of scientific communities in national development processes. It is not a question of defending self-enclosed scientific communities, nor of prioritizing self-sufficient projects. The matter is highly delicate and complex, particularly given the prevailing view that a nationalist view of scientific development should be shunned. In the current international context, however, would it not be useful to analyze the internal brain drain? Fortunately, the media now allow international activities to be undertaken the need to emigrate or even to move temporarily. How can a "*maquila*" culture be avoided in scientific research, or at least how can we ensure that its aims do not wholly dominate the research agenda? (Pellegrino and Cabella, 1995).

Devising programmes to retrieve lost scientific assets, to re-link them to local communities and to restore mobility with a view to increasing national critical masses is a feasible endeavour that has proved to be effective. It is also a crucial means of overcoming the limitations of local academic sectors. Its effectiveness, however, will hinge largely on the impetus and support provided by each country's policies. National stimuli founded on a sense of common goals have been very important at certain initial moments (such as at the end of the military dictatorships), but activities characterized

¹⁴ One case of linkage between emigrant communities and the national scientific community was the emergence of a network of Uruguayans abroad in the early post-dictatorship period. Advanced science and technology groups were set up as a result of joint efforts by emigrants and residents in the country. Democratization triggered the initial impetus for scientists and academics to return and encouraged re-linking projects, but this momentum dissipated and the network's strength and aims waned to the point that it practically disappeared. There remain some smaller and more informal networks that help strengthen certain specific specializations. Another example is the Caldas Network, which links migrant communities with others in the country. This initiative was better organized and had strong backing from universities and the Colombian Government, but there are no recent assessments of it.

by good intentions dissipate over time and can only be invigorated through well-established local activities.

Scientific cooperation programmes gradually tend to stimulate exchanges and the creation of networks. These are clearly useful and make it possible to "broaden the outlook" of the researchers, which in many cases is limited by the shortage of critical masses. If such activities are unmatched by local counterpart action, however, there is a real risk that researchers' careers might develop along lines that are not of their choosing or that might be inconsistent with national research priorities. Science is universal, although the degree of universality varies greatly by discipline. In the social sciences, local studies are usually of little general interest but, at the same time, they have national relevance.

Creating conditions that allow professionals and technical personnel to feel part of a national or regional project, and establishing a context for innovation, participation and for broadening their social role, serve to transform the productive system, and to change a culture whose mechanisms for dissemination are complex and varied. Hence the prospects of some success in reversing migration, either in terms of return or of re-linking, depend on activities that cover broad sectors of the societies involved.

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Annex

Figure 1
PEOPLE BORN IN THE REGION WITH POSGRADUATE QUALIFICATIONS (PROFESSIONALS, MASTERS, DOCTORATES), REGISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1990
(those aged 25 and above)




Figure 2
PROFESSIONALS BORN IN THE REGION AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN, AROUND 1990




Figure 3
PEOPLE IN EXECUTIVE, MANAGERIAL AND PROFESSIONAL POSITION AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN, AROUND 1990




Table 1
PROFESSIONALS AND TECHNICAL WORKERS BORN IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN AND REGISTERED IN CENSUSES IN COUNTRIES OF THE REGION OTHER THAN THEIR HOME COUNTRY AND THE UNITED STATES, CENSUSES OF 1980 AND 1990^{a/}
(number and percentage growth)

Country of birth	In countries of the region				In the United States			
	Percentage growth				Percentage growth			
	1980	1990	1980-1990	1970	1980	1990	1970-1980	1980-1990
Argentina	8786	7431	-15.4	4882	7766	9614	59.0	23.7
Bolivia	5398	7926	46.8	999	1809	2187	81.0	20.8
Brazil	2163	2495	15.3	2138	3474	a/		
Chile	10872	11969	10.0	1984	4405	5067	122.0	15.02
Colombia	16572	17523	5.7	5240	8724	15518	66.4	77.8
Costa Rica	550	494	-10.1	1110	1773	a/		
Cuba	1860	1849	-0.5	26195	42066	46792	60.5	11.2
Ecuador	1465	1639	11.8	1901	3436	6066	80.7	76.5
El Salvador	1252	802	-35.9	686	2202	6678	220.9	203.2
Guatemala	383	828	116.1	1008	2058	4381	104.1	112.8
Haiti	149	223	49.6	2654	5832	12455	119.7	113.5
Jamaica	a/	a/		a/	15899	28020		76.2
Mexico	1230	782	-36.4	12689	34937	60965	175.3	74.4
Nicaragua	1769	906	-48.7	813	1696	4449	108.6	162.3
Panama	698	596	-14.6	1859	5335	6671	186.9	25.0
Paraguay	5878	7238	23.1	a/	444	361		-18.6
Peru	5889	8412	42.8	276	4853	9051	1658.3	86.5
Dominican Republic	707	925	30.8	1520	3373	8584	121.	154.4
Trinidad and Tobago	a/	279		a/	5372	9550		77.7
Uruguay	7202	9314	29.3	488	919	1133	88.3	23.2
Venezuela	368	687	86.6	631	1773	3471	180.9	95.7
Honduras	447	a/		a/	1481	2656		79.3
Guyana	a/	a/		a/	4117	8327		102.2
	73638	82318	11.7	67073	163744	251996	144.1	53.8

Source: Drawn up on the basis of CELADE's IMILA database.

^{a/} For Latin America, data was drawn from 11 censuses in 1980 and 7 in 1990. For both dates the main recipient countries are included (Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela).

Table 2
MIGRANT FLOWS FROM LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN TO THE UNITED STATES AND BETWEEN COUNTRIES OF THE REGION THAT INVOLVE MORE THAN 5,000 PROFESSIONALS AND TECHNICAL WORKERS

Country of birth (origin)	Country residence (destination)	Total immigrants	Total immigrant EAP ^{a/}	Professionals and technical workers	Professionals and technical workers per 1,000 active immigrants
Mexico	United States	4298014	2333781	60965	26.1
Cuba	United States	736971	428257	46792	109.3
Jamaica	United States	334140	212993	28020	131.6
Colombia	United States	286124	176696	15518	87.8
Colombia	Venezuela	528893	324287	15001	46.3
Haiti	United States	225393	137427	12455	90.6
Argentina	United States	92563	50228	9614	191.4
Trinidad and Tobago	United States	115710	74018	9550	129.0
Peru	United States	144199	90337	9051	100.2
Dominican Republic	United States	347858	165478	8584	51.9
Guyana	United States	120698	71718	8327	116.1
El Salvador	United States	465433	276345	6678	24.2
Panamá	United States	85737	48313	6671	138.1
Ecuador	United States	143314	88540	6066	68.5
Uruguay	Argentina	133653	84478	5890	69.7
Paraguay	Argentina	251130	150034	5751	38.3
Chile	Argentina	218217	144019	5562	38.6
Chile	United States	50322	32300	5067	156.9

Source: Drawn up on the basis of CELADE's IMILA database.

^{a/} Note that the figures are not wholly comparable, since in the United States the category used covers "Professionals" and in the countries of the region it covers "Professionals and Technical Workers"; the classifications within each group do not strictly coincide.

Table 3

**SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS ADMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES,
BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH, 1993**

Region of birth	Total		Engineers		Natural scientists		Mathematicians and computing specialists		Social scientists	
All countries	23 534	14 497	3 901	4 157	979					
Western Europe	2 540	1 599	463	390	88					
Eastern Europe	2 937	1 785	468	213	471					
Asia	14 957	2 558	3 061	162						
Africa	689	418	100	25						
Central and										
North America	1 432	968	150	174	140					
Canada	507	300	80	103	24					
Mexico	165	121	20	15	9					
Others	760	547	50	56	107					
South America	817	479	120	136	82					
Argentina	138	72	34	22	10					
Bolivia	18	10	1	5	2					
Brazil	118	55	18	34	11					
Chile	34	9	16	6	3					
Colombia	137	73	19	19	26					
Ecuador	43	28	5	3	7					
Peru	141	97	12	19	13					
Venezuela	106	73	10	18	5					
Others	82	62	5	10	5					
Other areas	161	72	41	37	11					

Source: United States National Science Foundation, on the basis of unpublished figures from the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice of the United States.

Table 4

**PERSONS ADMITTED IN THE UNITED STATES AS TEMPORARY WORKERS,
EXCHANGE VISITORS AND COMPANY TRANSFERS**

	Specialized occupations		Industrial Training		Company transfers	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Total	118898	100	2782	100	112529	100
Mexico	3655	3.1	188	6.8	3280	2.9
Central						
America	1060	0.9	20	0.7	724	0.6
Caribe	1602	1.3		0.0	660	0.6
Cuba, Dominican	402	0.3	15	0.5	193	0.2
Republic y Haiti						
English-speaking	1200	1.0	34	1.2	467	
Caribbean and others	0.4					
South America	10437	8.8	123	4.4	8192	7.3
Canada	3431	2.9	81	2.9	7054	6.3
Europe	42722	35.9	1097	39.4	53094	47.2
Asia	47619	40.1	1139	40.9	33772	30.0
Africa	3309	2.8	42	1.5	974	0.9
Oceania	3461	2.9	43	1.5	4119	3.7
Unspecified	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0

Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of the Justice of United States, *Statistical Yearbook, 1993*, 1993, p. 118.

Table 5
FOREIGN STUDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, BY AREAS OF STUDY AND REGIONS OF ORIGIN, 1997/1998
(in percentages)

Region	Agriculture	Business	Education	Engineering	Arts ^{a/}	Health	Humanities	Mathematics and computing sciences	Physical and life sciences	Social sciences	Others	1997/1998 Surveys	1997/1998 Students
Africa	2.9	20.9	3.2	13.6	2.7	7.0	5.0	8.4	8.4	8.9	18.8	11 955	23 162
Asia	1.4	20.7	2.5	18.0	7.4	3.5	2.5	10.4	8.1	7.4	18.0	137 441	277 508
Europe	1.2	21.8	1.7	8.8	6.8	2.9	5.8	6.4	9.3	11.4	23.7	37 623	71 616
North America	1.4	13.1	9.4	5.8	7.5	14.2	5.2	3.1	7.6	13.5	19.2	12 882	22 613
Oceania	1.1	21.5	3.8	4.9	7.8	3.4	7.6	7.1	6.3	15.2	21.3	2 085	3 893
Latin America	3.3	25.3	2.5	12.5	5.8	3.3	2.9	4.8	6.0	8.7	24.7	27 947	51 368
Middle East	1.7	20.3	2.1	27.2	3.7	4.5	1.7	7.4	5.7	7.0	18.7	16 339	30 962
TOTAL	1.7	20.9	2.8	15.6	6.6	4.2	3.3	8.5	7.8	8.6	20.1	247 595	481 280

Source: Institute of International Education, *Open Doors Report, 1998/1999*, New York, 1999.

^{a/} fine arts and applied arts.

Table 6
FOREIGN, LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN STUDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, BY AREAS OF STUDY AND COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN, 1997/1998
(in percentages)

Region	Agri-culture	Business	Education	Engineering	Arts ^{a/}	Health	Humanities	Mathematics and compu-ting	Physical and life sciences	Social sciences	Others	1997/1998 Surveys	1997/1998 Students
Caribbean	1.7	26.9	4.1	9.9	4.5	5.3	2.3	6.5	7.1	8.7	22.9	5 855	10 855
Anguilla	8.0	32.0	0.0	0.0	12.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	12.0	4.0	12.0	25	20
Antigua	0.9	43.0	3.7	8.4	2.8	3.7	1.9	5.6	8.4	2.8	18.7	107	225
Aruba	0.0	56.8	0.0	2.7	2.7	8.1	5.4	0.0	10.8	2.7	10.8	37	52
Bahamas	1.2	24.0	6.1	9.8	6.5	5.5	3.3	8.8	7.9	8.0	19.7	1 157	1 917
Barbados	2.9	26.6	4.7	15.5	6.5	4.7	1.8	6.8	7.9	5.8	16.9	278	523
British Virgin Islands	1.0	15.5	4.1	17.5	4.1	6.2	2.1	7.2	9.3	13.4	19.5	97	77
British Virgin Islands	0.9	34.8	6.1	4.3	9.6	1.7	1.7	7.8	2.6	9.6	20.9	115	202
Cayman Islands	0.0	15.0	7.5	5.0	10.0	0.0	10.0	2.5	7.5	2.5	40.0	40	89
Cuba	4.9	25.4	4.1	11.5	0.8	8.2	0.8	4.1	11.5	14.8	14.0	122	174
Dominica	3.7	25.5	1.9	12.1	16.2	1.9	2.8	2.8	2.4	6.5	24.2	463	823
Dominican Republic	1.8	44.5	0.0	4.5	0.9	7.3	1.8	3.6	10.9	10.9	13.6	110	237
Grenada	0.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	2	6
Guadeloupe	0.0	21.6	3.3	4.6	4.2	5.5	4.0	4.8	4.4	10.1	35.5	454	867
Haiti	1.5	29.8	4.8	9.0	2.5	5.8	2.0	5.3	5.0	10.3	24.2	1 383	2 694
Jamaica	0.0	14.3	0.0	0.0	14.3	28.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	42.9	7	7
Martinique	0.0	38.1	0.0	14.3	14.3	9.5	0.0	0.0	4.0	9.5	9.5	21	33
Montserrat	0.0	36.2	1.1	16.7	5.2	5.2	1.1	6.9	4.8	7.5	16.1	174	362
Netherlands Antilles	7.1	25.0	3.6	7.1	3.6	0.0	7.1	10.7	10.7	14.3	10.7	28	89
Saint Kitts and Nevis	1.2	32.1	4.8	14.3	2.4	3.6	1.2	9.5	8.3	2.4	20.3	84	202
St. Lucia	1.8	36.8	1.8	26.3	0.0	7.0	0.0	5.3	3.5	5.3	12.3	57	140
the Grenadines	1.2	23.3	3.5	10.2	2.3	6.6	1.4	8.1	9.2	9.3	25.0	1 053	1 927
Trinidad and Tobago	0.0	46.7	0.0	0.0	13.3	0.0	0.0	20.0	13.3	0.0	6.7	15	25
Turks and Caicos Islands	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	12.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	62.5	24	14
Windward Islands	4.9	25.9	2.3	15.8	5.4	2.3	2.9	4.1	5.1	8.5	22.8	8 613	15 211
Central America and Mexico	3.7	27.0	3.7	3.7	3.1	4.3	2.5	11.7	15.3	9.8	15.4	163	345
Belize	6.7	20.7	2.7	12.7	7.8	3.1	4.5	2.7	7.6	10.9	20.7	449	815
Costa Rica	3.1	30.4	1.6	14.1	6.1	1.6	2.1	3.3	4.0	7.5	26.2	425	765
El Salvador	8.4	26.2	1.5	15.5	4.8	2.3	2.9	2.7	6.1	7.5	22.1	522	928
Guatemala	6.3	30.8	2.4	17.1	4.7	2.2	1.2	2.8	4.3	6.1	22.2	509	912
Honduras	5.0	24.8	2.5	15.9	5.3	2.0	3.3	4.4	4.9	8.9	22.8	5 430	9 559
Mexico	2.7	26.5	2.1	19.0	2.7	2.4	1.2	4.4	3.6	11.3	25.6	336	601
Nicaragua	1.8	30.2	1.2	18.7	6.2	3.2	1.5	4.4	4.5	5.1	23.2	779	1 286
Panama	2.9	24.2	2.0	11.5	6.6	3.2	3.2	4.6	6.1	8.9	26.7	13 479	25 302
South America	3.9	22.4	2.0	9.8	8.0	2.6	5.3	4.6	7.6	12.8	21.7	1 333	2 473
Argentina	5.7	26.2	1.5	15.3	4.5	1.7	2.7	4.2	4.0	15.1	19.1	404	719
Bolivia	2.9	23.8	2.2	9.1	8.3	3.9	3.0	5.0	5.9	8.6	27.1	3 598	6 982
Brazil	3.2	17.7	1.6	18.2	5.5	2.2	3.4	5.7	11.8	9.5	21.2	803	1 156
Chile	2.2	26.4	2.3	11.7	5.6	3.1	2.9	3.8	5.6	6.9	29.7	2 208	4 345
Colombia	5.0	31.3	1.4	9.5	6.8	1.7	2.4	4.2	4.5	8.8	24.5	841	1 643
Ecuador	0.0	33.3	0.0	33.3	2.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3	5
French Guiana	2.2	19.6	3.6	10.1	2.2	8.0	5.1	5.1	7.2	6.5	30.4	138	388

(continues)

Table 6 (Conclusion)

Region	Agri-culture	Business	Education	Engineering	Arts ^{a)}	Health	Humanities	Mathematics and computing	Physical and life sciences	Social sciences	Others	1997/1998 Surveys	1997/1998 Students
Paraguay	2.5	29.5	4.9	5.7	4.1	0.8	6.6	4.1	5.7	7.4	28.7	122	268
Peru	2.5	23.1	2.2	12.1	4.1	3.4	3.7	4.4	6.7	11.2	26.7	1 183	2 127
Suriname	7.7	19.2	1.9	17.3	5.8	1.9	3.8	7.7	9.6	1.9	23.1	52	104
Uruguay	8.0	20.0	2.0	5.0	10.5	2.5	5.5	4.5	8.5	14.0	19.5	200	356
Venezuela	1.7	24.3	1.5	14.0	6.4	3.4	2.5	4.6	4.5	6.8	30.2	2 593	4 731

Source: Institute of International Education, *Open Doors Report, 1998/1999*, New York, 1999.
^{a)} fine arts and applied arts.

D. Social impact of migration

D.1 Confused borders: the social impact of migration

*Luis Ricardo Dávila*¹⁵

Introduction

It is abundantly clear that the end of the twentieth century was marked by humanity's capacity for displacement. Capital, goods, images, sounds, habits and customs all travel. But people too continue to travel, and at unprecedented rates. International migration has never been on such a scale. It is estimated that some 120 million people live outside their home countries (United Nations, 1998).¹⁶ As these migration flows implacably increase, however, the barriers to them also proliferate. The reasons for leaving remain the same: differences in living standards between countries, poverty, the search for better economic and social conditions, political instability, religious persecution, war, natural disasters (Straubhaar, 1993). However, it is evident that the destination or recipient countries are ever less willing

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¹⁶ Which represents about 2.5% the world's population (United Nations, 1998).

to welcome immigrant workers. Borders close and the security forces intervene more rigorously. Often, growing unemployment or a poor social outlook serve as a pretext. But migrancy (*homo migrans*) remains a human characteristic.

From a broader perspective, the Americas – as an historical phenomenon – are located within the human phenomenon of migration. This is a continent of immigrants, because here there was no hominization. The Indians came, then the Europeans as immigrants and the Africans as slaves, and they built this vast region. The societies of the Americas have become a complex ethnic mosaic built during five centuries of immigration (Portes and Rumbaut, 1990). Despite this highly significant circumstance, the migration issue is beset by false images, stereotypes induced by perverse mechanisms. In the Americas, as in so many other parts of the world, it is usually the case that a justification of internal deficiencies demands a scapegoat – a role that the immigrant, the different and vulnerable foreigner, embodies to perfection. Large-scale migrations, however, occur daily. Countless families, men, women and children, move from one place to another in conditions of great misery and, in some cases, of great pain. The impact of these flows on the social structure of recipient countries is the aim of this paper.

A. The integration of the immigrant

One of the basic assumptions about the social consequences of migration concerns the immigrant's capacity and conditions for integration in the recipient society. And the capacity for reception will be conditioned by the policies adopted. The sometimes confused dividing line between migration policies and social policies remains to be defined. In other words, to what extent do current migration policies that foster the immigrant's integration¹⁷ entail or demand broader and complementary social and demographic policies? If there is a set of policies to integrate immigrants, their impact on the structure of recipient societies will be more rational – that is, better adapted to their possibilities. The most important thing here is that integration is not limited to official policies but is connected to a broad array of social processes: 1) inclusion in the economic, political and social structure; 2) the nature and scope of the migrant's participation in social institutions; 3) the emergence of several forms of inequality and exclusion spurred by integration itself.

From this perspective it is important to examine the social conditions that facilitate or hinder the complete inclusion of immigrants in the social process. The outcome of this process might not be their complete absorption but the formation of ethnic groups or immigrant ghettos (Rex and Mason, 1986). According to Castles, it is possible to distinguish between four different approaches to the incorporation of immigrants, each of which has different results:

Assimilation:

This is viewed as a process of individual adaptation to prevailing values, norms and forms of behaviour. It presupposes goodwill and the ability of immigrants to leave aside their distinctive features, and the willingness of national groups to accept the new members.

Integration:

This is a process of mutual accommodation involving the immigrants and most of the population.¹⁸

¹⁷ This term refers to those processes whereby immigrants are integrated in the societies of the recipient countries. However, some authors (Castles, 1998: 247ss) think it more correct to speak of diverse forms of immigrant inclusion, of which integration is only one possible form.

¹⁸ The integrationist approach responds to three basic matters: 1) the perception that immigrants not only failed to assimilate as individuals but that they tended to form political, social and cultural associations, and to retain the habits and behavioural patterns of their country of origin; 2) it became clear that immigrants tended to concentrate in particular occupations and residential areas, thereby forging a link between cultural and classist factors; 3) the immigrant groups and associations became critical of the marginal nature of their cultures and conduct.

Exclusion:

This occurs when immigrants are only included in certain areas of society – the labour market – but are denied access to others – citizenship, political participation, social security.¹⁹

Multiculturalism:

This is the development of immigrant communities within ethnic communities that differ from most of the population in terms of language, culture and social conduct.

B. Socio-economic problems of migration

The aim here is to consider the issue from an Americas-wide perspective, although Venezuela's experience as a country that has received large migrant flows comprises the substance of the analysis. The relatively long period covered (1950-1990) makes it possible to look more closely, and from an historical perspective, at the impact that new economic conditions have had on migration and on the country's economic and social development. It should be stressed, however, that it is difficult for a researcher to make a realistic assessment of the impact of migration on social structures in recipient countries. Certain variables can be identified, such as educational and labour demands, the pressure on housing and public services, as can certain psychosocial factors (social dislocation, the absence of juridical and social security, feelings of abandonment). However, it is difficult to assess these precisely because of the absence of statistics or disaggregated information. This examination presents certain qualitative trends, with particular emphasis on the need for an adequate set of indices to measure effects.

The analysis considered various migration patterns evident since the 1950s and the changes in each from 1974 onwards, when the nature and composition of migration altered. The importance of including immigrants in recipient societies (an significant component of public policies)²⁰ has not been disregarded. This inclusion has had significant effects on variables like the labour market, the provision of housing, education and social security, as well as on political institutions and those cultural institutions linked to such issues as national identity.

Recent widespread migration between the various countries of the Americas has been stimulated largely by economic factors and/or has been a response to the dangers posed by political conflict, including war or human rights violations (Mármora, 1990; CELAM, 1994). The situations to which such migration gives rise require intervention and oversight at the national and international levels. Such action is also required because migrants might induce political, social and economic difficulties in recipient countries. The following are among the problems that affect the social structures of recipient countries:

- population growth, with consequent adverse effects on existing social institutions;
- increased demand for goods and services;
- the displacement of nationals' jobs;
- growth of the informal sector;
- deterioration of wage structures in the informal, rural and urban sectors;

¹⁹ Exclusion can be brought about through legal mechanisms (rejection of naturalization or distinctions between the rights of nationals and non-nationals) or through informal practices (xenophobia and discrimination). In this sense immigrants become minorities with no rights, part of society but excluded from the State and the nation. This makes them vulnerable. Some employers exploit that weakness and even foster exclusion.

²⁰ Including international policy, as pointed out in a significant meeting of immigration experts sponsored by the American Assembly in early 1996: "International migration is rising to the top of the foreign policy agenda" (Teitlebaum and Weiner, 1996: 299).

- pressure caused by the entry of immigrants' children into the school system; (Bello Isaias, 1989: 225-226 ; Ohndorf, 1989).²¹

Migration gives rise to a set of patterns that are specific to the migrants' relations and interactions, and which are distinct from those prevailing in their home countries. The abrupt shift from one social and cultural milieu to another poses serious challenges to migrants' individual and collective capacity for adaptation. Research on the social problems caused by migration reveals that the integration measures adopted by recipient countries are crucial. But the results of such measures will vary in line with circumstances in each country and with the scale and kind of the migration: whether the flows comprise males or females, whether migration is temporary or permanent, legal or illegal, labour-related or otherwise.

This paper argues that migration, whether for the purposes of seasonal employment or permanent residence, has complex and sometimes contradictory repercussions for the social structure of the source and recipient countries. An assessment of the social impact of migration on source countries must distinguish between permanent and temporary migration. Similarly, the effect of returning migrants varies substantially according to the period spent abroad; the nature of the general contact with the cultural and political life of the recipient country; and working conditions, including whether the migrant lived with compatriots or was wholly integrated in the culture of the recipient country.

C. Migration patterns in Venezuela

In line with the foregoing criteria, an examination of the factors that determine migration, including its social impact, demands attention to the historical context of each situation. As Zolberg *et al* have suggested (1989), identifiable social forces must be seen as structured events stemming from a wider historical process, especially since in many respects the region's migration patterns have been highly complex and diverse. Hence the need to establish how the economic, political, demographic and cultural structure of migration has developed in Venezuela to date.

The legacy of migration

Venezuela has always been open to immigration. Since the start of the republican period, and throughout the entire twentieth century, it has been a permeable society. Waves of immigration were never a social problem while they were subject to and controlled by a coherent policy. Some 13 immigration laws were enacted between 1810 and 1936, accompanied by their respective regulations and contracts to bring in immigrants; immigration policy commissions were set up (Berglund, 1982: 951). Venezuela is a large country and had a small population. It was thought that all the country's ills could be solved through immigration. But even with these goals, matched by frequent laws and edicts, immigrants were few. Uslar Pietri, one of the ideologues of the country's modern immigration, pointed out in 1944 that between 1852 and 1888 some 26,090 immigrants entered the country; another 29,000 arrived between 1904 and 1935. This was equivalent to 1.5% of the total population. He optimistically concluded: "immigration is one of keys to the destiny of the Venezuelan nation. Only immigration can cover our human capital deficit" (Uslar Pietri, 1944).

Only since the decade between 1949 and 1958 has there been massive legal immigration. Since then, and for the first time, the entry of foreigners has been a significant demographic

²¹ Some authors (Bello Isaias, 1989: 226) consider other social problems caused by immigrants, some of them cultural (changes in the customs and traditions of local populations) and others health-related (the appearance of endemic illnesses, an issue not addressed in this study because of problems related to definition and measurement).

and social factor (for the study of this period see Páez Celis, 1973: 41ss; Chi-Yi-Chen, 1973; Kritz, 1975; Pellegrino, 1989). Until the end of the 1950s, the country had an open immigration policy, termed the "open door policy". It was very easy for foreigners to enter, acquire a permanent resident's and work permit, and legalize their status if they had entered illegally. The social impact of such migration was minimized by the policies in force. In 1956 migration inflows were intense and the number of foreigners who naturalized reached a peak. According to the 1953 constitution, the right to be Venezuelan by naturalization was extended to: 1) those born abroad, "if they are domiciled in the country and express their desire to be Venezuelan"; 2) nationals of Spain or Latin American countries "that are domiciled in the country, that express their desire to be Venezuelan and whose desire to be so is accepted"; 3) foreigners that secure a letter of naturalization (Brewer Carías, 1985: 939). With regard to "individual and social rights and duties" the constitution gave the same duties and rights to Venezuelans and foreigners. The legality conferred on foreign immigrants, and the facilities afforded them, minimized the social impact of immigration on national structures.

The 1949-1958 phase of mass immigration was followed by a stage of negative migration in the first half of the 1960s. Immigration waned with the end of the Pérez Jiménez military dictatorship at the beginning of 1958, and there was a new surge from 1973 onwards (Venezuela: Departamento Nacional de Estadística y Censos Nacionales, IV: 93-95; Sassen-Koob, 1980: 65ss; Berglund and Hernández, 1985: 47ss; Pellegrino, 1989: 241ss).

Migration in the 1960s

The new government, dominated by a coalition between democratic elements and the popular movement, curbed immigration in a policy that lasted throughout the 1960s. The reasons were two-fold. One was political; the government opposed the "open door" strategy pursued by the dictatorship in the 1950s and restricted access by foreigners, who had received substantial political and social privileges (such as the right to vote in the 1957 referendum or their juridical equalization with nationals). Another was economic; the post-1958 recession prompted high unemployment, obliging the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (CTV), which grouped the country's labour force, to ask then-President Rómulo Betancourt to close the borders to immigrants, mainly from Europe. Given the pressure that foreign labour exerted on the domestic labour market, the President described the national labour situation in 1959 in terms that reveal impact of the open door policy: "the country is suffering widespread unemployment and the number of people without work is very high" (Mensajes Presidenciales, V, 1971: 358).

The 1961 constitution reflected the restrictions that foreigners faced in securing naturalization. Unlike the 1953 constitution, which granted nationality almost automatically to nationals of Spain or any Latin American country, the 1961 charter signalled that such nationals would only "enjoy special facilities for securing the letter of naturalization" (Brewer Carías, 1985: 967). While the rights and duties of nationals and foreigners remained the same, the new constitution deprived the latter of one of the most important political rights: the right to vote. Article 111 stated: "voters are all Venezuelans above eighteen years of age" (Brewer Carías, 1985: 974); this right was extended to foreigners only for municipal elections.

Consequently, the new democratic government's immigration policy was geared to the selective entry of qualified and necessary labour in order to reduce the pressure of migration on the labour market. This spurred a fall in the number of people entering the country, from 150,361 in 1957 to 103,876 in 1963. Net migration declined from 75,542 in 1955 to a deficit of -1,433 in 1963 (Venezuela: Consejo Nacional de Recursos Humanos, 1977; Berglund and Hernández, 1977: 50). However, restrictions on the access of foreigners, as could be expected, led to an increase in the illegal immigration and employment of foreign labour, with their consequent social repercussions.

Migration in the 1970s and 1980s

At the end of the 1960s, since Venezuela was the region's leading recipient country of legal (and illegal) workers, the irregular employment of immigrants assumed special importance. This aggravated the social impact of migration, while at the same time the pattern changed. From an historical perspective, the policy that curbed Spanish, Italian and Portuguese immigrants eased access for those from neighbouring Latin American countries, especially from Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and the Dominican Republic, which were facing critical economic and social conditions.²² Immigrants from the latter countries were later joined by Chileans, Argentines and Uruguayans fleeing political persecution in their countries. In other words, the legal entry of about 200,000 Europeans was obviated, and instead the country received in subsequent years (1970-1980), both legally and illegally, between 600,000 and 1 million immigrants (Chi-Yi-Chen and Picouet, M., 1980: 51, 61; Pellegrino, 1989: 371).²³

This wave of immigration began faintly but increased in the second half of the 1960s and in the 1970s. At the end of that period, foreign immigration was on such a scale that it became a serious national problem. To tackle it the government had just two legal instruments: the 1936 Law on Immigration and Colonization²⁴ and the 1937 Law on Foreigners, with their ordinance of 1942. The latter cannot be regarded as an immigration law because it has no stipulations on migration policy. Basically, the Law on Foreigners is control legislation establishing the rights and duties of all foreigners in the country; in general terms these did not differ greatly from those of Venezuelans, with the exception of some political rights.

Under both laws, immigration policy had been conceived in three-fold terms: 1) as a contributing factor to population growth, especially in rural areas; 2) as a means of improving cultural values and social organization by introducing European immigrants; 3) as a stimulus to economic growth, mainly in the agricultural sector, by populating certain areas of the country with Portuguese, Spaniards and Italians (Kritz, 1975: 517-519; Chi-Yi-Chen and Urquijo: 1974; Sassen-Koob, 1980: 63-65; Berglund and Hernández, 1985).

In the late-1970s Venezuela experienced the "second shock wave" of international migration (Torrealba and Oropeza, 1988:110ss; Pellegrino, 1989: 241ss). What distinguished the immigration process in this period – particularly after 1973 – was not so much the scale, although this was significant, but the redefinition of official policy on the immigrant as a *factor of production*. In this context, immigration was seen by the government and by various private interests in industry and agriculture as the import of manpower. In this decade the growth of agricultural output and the high rate of urbanization gave rise to a labour shortage, especially in the agricultural sector, with a consequent need for foreign workers either legal or not.

²² In the Colombian case, for example, the economic motivations for emigration were evident. Research findings on illegal migration presented to the CIM's Sixth Seminar in 1983 showed that "that the main factor determining migration was a decline in incomes in the country of origin *vis-à-vis* the attraction of a stronger currency in the country of destination", (Cely Martínez, 1989: 203).

²³ Estimating the real number of immigrants in the country faces two main difficulties: 1) illegal immigration; 2) the contextual nature of immigration in this decade: "there have been all kinds of speculations and estimates on this matter, fluctuating between one million and four million ..." (Pellegrino, 1989: 251). The latter figure is from an IDB report of 1985.

²⁴ The first article of the Law states: "The Federal Executive shall seek, by all possible direct and indirect means, to foster immigration and colonization in Venezuela" (Venezuela, 1942: 2004).

D. The features of immigration

Most migration was labour-oriented. Initially it was seasonal, to meet the needs of agricultural manpower. The presence of immigrants, even when they were illegal, was accepted by the various national sectors, including employers, because of their skills and capacity for work. Their employment was also stimulated by those bosses who viewed illegal migrants' precarious legal situation as being in their own economic interests. Later, however, such migration began to be permanent. The different labour migrants, mainly Colombian, moved from the countryside to urban areas where they found better working conditions and wages. By the first half of the 1970s the illegal entry and employment of immigrants was having a critical impact on social institutions.

One of the officially recognized aspects of the problem was the pressure exerted on internal social structures. But there was no adequate appraisal of the political, economic and cultural effects of the presence of foreigners (the vast majority of them Latin Americans), who entered the country and/or installed themselves outside migration laws and policies. By the mid-1980s, according to some authors they accounted for not less than 10% of the total population (of 13 million; Didoné, 1983: 407).²⁵

The composition of immigration and its social pressure

As to composition, data from some studies on deportations, written at the time of the clandestine demographic explosion (between 1974 and 1982), reveal some features of this immigration that are relevant to the matter at hand.

1) More than 80% of clandestine immigrants were men of active age. Most of them (70%) were single and had a limited education. Some 60% of those interviewed were illiterate or had very limited primary schooling. 2) Most of them came to Venezuela alone. Some 90% had families in Colombia, which reduced the pressure on schools. 3) 80% of those interviewed mentioned unemployment and expectations of better wages as their reasons for emigrating. 4) 73% were waged workers. Some 70% were able to find a job in between one and eight days. Of these, 40% said they had found work through friends or relatives living legally or secretly in the country. 73% of those interviewed were working in small companies in the informal sector, as a means of more easily evading official controls. 5) The sectoral distribution of employment was as follows:

Construction	21.5%
Manufacturing industry	19.5%
Services	19.5%
Commerce	5.5%
Agriculture	15.0%

(For the above socio-occupational composition see Bermúdez, 1979; Murillo, 1979; Mansilla, 1980; Mármora, 1982; Delgado, 1982; Didoné, 1983; Torrealba, 1985; Pellegrino, 1989; Torrealba and Oropeza, 1988).

²⁵ In the 1980s Mateo Didoné was Director of Centre of Migration Studies in Caracas (CEPAM). Bidegain and Freitez, authors of one of the best studies on Colombians in Venezuela, refute the speculative figures that became accepted in official and media spheres. They argue that by 1986, and taking account of return migration, "these migrants do not surpass half a million" (Bidegain and Freitez, 1989: 105). The Colombian researcher Fernando Urrea, for his part, estimates that there were 619,926 Colombians in Venezuela in 1986 (Urrea, 1987: 43).

Most of these people were in urban areas, where their social impact was very significant. It was estimated in 1981 that 82.89% of Colombian immigrants lived in cities, while 15.80% did so in rural and urban areas on the border (OCEI., 1981; Bidegain and Freitez, 1989: 96). Wages might be weekly or fortnightly, or as part of a package that included wages, food and/or housing. The average monthly wage was US\$ 345 in 1982, with a maximum value of US\$ 408 among merchants and a minimum of US\$ 166 among agricultural labourers (Torrealba and Oropeza, 1988: 125-126; Bidegain and Freitez, 1989: 100-104).

The numerous and legal Colombian community (227,000 people by mid-1979) acted as a pole of attraction for immigrants seeking to "reunite families." A tourist flow of legal immigrants' relatives and friends, especially Colombians, was facilitated by the ease of travel between the two neighbouring countries. A high percentage of these latter came with the intention of remaining among the illegally-resident Colombians (*Resumen*, vol. XXV, No 309, 7.10.1979, p. 19). The scale of the problem exceeded the State's administrative capacities in immigration matters. A senior official, DIEX's Director of Control and Immigration, recognized this: "I feel impotent in the face of the problem of clandestine migration" (*Resumen*, vol. XXVI, No 330, 2.3.1980).

The immigrants' final destinations were generally the banana-growing areas of the southern coast of Lake Maracaibo, the cattle estates in the Perijá District of Zulia, the various sugar cane-producing regions, brothels in a variety of rural and urban areas, the coffee estates in Táchira, agrarian reform settlements, forest areas where they worked on timber, the informal economy in the main urban centres, or industrial areas where they worked as labourers. Others worked in the big cities as gardeners, chauffeurs or domestic employees in the homes of politicians and entrepreneurs: "99% of rich families have foreign maids who are mostly illegal" (*Resumen*, vol. XXV, No 306, 16.9.79, p. 35? Sylva, R. "Xenofobia' o un ¿basta ya?")

The social impact of migration will be analyzed in this context, so as to reveal some of the pressures on the labour market, the healthcare system and public services.

Labour market.

Those legal immigrants whom the government was willing to admit were joined by illegal immigrants attracted by oil fever and easy wealth, and who were escaping unstable economic and social conditions in their home countries. These flows exacerbated Venezuela's social problems and, even worse, the government lacked a coherent social and demographic policy to tackle them. The economic problems were matched by social consequences, the latter being aggravated by the large number of employers who were willing to hire illegal immigrants.²⁶ The pressure on the domestic labour market was inescapable. It was estimated that: "for every three foreigners in the country there are two illegals; for every seven Venezuelans there is an illegal alien" (Cárdenas, 1979a:19). All these illegal immigrants were among the economically active population. According to an ILO report on the labour integration of illegals, 91% of the 200 interviewed were aged between 16 and 35 (SIC, 1980: 153). Legal and illegal migrants were working in agricultural activities, construction, manufacturing and services. They were also active in the informal economy or as self-employed workers (Torrealba, 1987: 136)

National healthcare system.

This was another of the sectors that came under the greatest pressure. Some figures suggest that between 1978 and 1980 a high percentage of immigrants received treatment at health centers. According to the Ministry of Health and Social Assistance and the Office of Human Resources, 17% of the beds in an important Caracas hospital (Concepción Palacios Maternity) were occupied by

²⁶ It is estimated that in every restaurant in Caracas and the other main cities (Maracaibo, Barquisimeto, Valencia, San Cristóbal) there was at least one illegal immigrant worker. The hospitals and maternity clinics were very often used by groups of illegal immigrants. In some neighbourhoods in these cities there were ghettos of illegal immigrants where "of every ten people, eight are undocumented Colombians" (Cardona, 1980: 235). Almost all rich and middle class households employed one or two illegal aliens (Cárdenas, 1979a: 19).

immigrants. In other main cities (Maracaibo and Puerto Ordaz), the occupation rate was 39% in the same period (Pinto, 1981: 243). Bidegain and Freitez, however, aver that between 1981 and 1986 "there is nothing to sustain the view that Colombian migrants are responsible for congestion in Venezuelan maternity hospitals" (Bidegain and Freitez, 1989: 105).

Public services.

According to the sample household survey that records certain features of homes occupied by Colombians in urban areas, practically all of them had water. In 1981 some 87% of the Colombian population received the service and in 1986 the figure was 87.5% (OCEI., 1981, 1986). Access to water was not only available to apartments or neighbourhood houses; it was also extended to shanties, "where practically eight out of ten (78.7%) received it in 1986" (Bidegain and Freitez, 1989: 41).

But the greatest increase in access to services was in sewers or the elimination of human waste. In 1981, 74.6% had access to this service through sewers or septic tanks, and the figure had risen to 85.1% by 1986.

As to electric light, in 1986 only 5% of homes occupied by Colombians lacked this service. Of the shanties, moreover, "nine out of ten has electric light" (Bidegain and Freitez, 1989: 42). It is important to stress that in the period 1981-1986 there was a significant increase in the number of shanties. It is not clear if this stemmed from the pressure of international migration or from internal population movements, and it is difficult to gauge the matter with statistical instruments such as the Sample Household Survey; only a specific survey could shed light on this issue. These indicators give an impression of the pressure that immigrants exerted on public services.

Among these throngs of migrants, deep social pressures sprang from the fact that most of them were subject to hard working conditions: for their own maintenance, to recoup what had been paid to middlemen and to help their families, which normally remained in the source country. Wages were very low because the employers (landowners, factory owners, builders, owners of bars and brothels, homeowners) exploited the workers' illegality and their juridical defencelessness. They had nobody to whom they could complain because they feared deportation from the country. Once in the power of the "exploiter boss", they would begin to work "like slaves, for lower wages than Venezuelans", a classic exclusion mechanism. Then some employers would say, without qualm: "without illegal labour, agriculture would be paralyzed" (*Resumen*, Vol. XXVI, No 326, 3.2.80, p. 25). Additionally, the employers evaded taxes by not declaring illegal workers, and the latter had no social security or other social rights that the law grants to Venezuelan workers (Delgado, 1982: 58-59; Gómez and Díaz, 1983: 106ss).

The socio-economic conditions of such employment were thus precarious. Since it was irregular and unstable, it magnified the social impact of migration. In general it was piecework – that is, payment was for each task completed. This allowed Venezuelan farmers, builders, merchants and factory owners to ensure that the greatest possible amount of work was done. Moreover, they incurred no expenses on social security or other legal provisions under the Labour Law, thereby rendering the recipient countries' social integration mechanisms almost non-existent. In the 1979 ILO study mentioned earlier, a random 200 deported Colombians were interviewed. Some 83% worked in small companies, which by employing illegal migrants avoided paying overtime and social benefits (cited in Berglund and Hernández, 1985: 66).

The official position on migration

Following the swift increase in illegal immigration and employment during the 1970s, official concern over the problems associated with labour migration began to be voiced. The employment policy proposals of the Fourth National Plan (1970-1974) reflected the official position: "because of the acute social problems involved, an issue meriting special attention in employment policy is crossborder immigration". Existing employment problems would only worsen if there were a continuation of "the indiscriminate and uncontrolled increase" in immigration and the employment

of foreigners. Some of the social consequences were evident to the government: the displacement of national manpower, the fall in wage levels and the increase in unemployment and underemployment. Official policy would therefore seek to ensure that: "foreign workers will be able to join the country's labour market only to cover – through selective immigration – manpower needs that cannot be met by national human resources" (CORDIPLAN, 1971:190; Torrealba and Oropeza, 1988:112).

A selective and gradual migration policy was again adopted, but this was very swiftly affected (especially from 1974 onwards) by the rise in international oil prices. In this context there was a radical change in the way the national economic apparatus worked. Fiscal revenue increased from US\$ 3,821 million in 1973 to US\$ 9,961 million in 1974. State investment thus grew by 300% between 1973 and 1976. Of this, investment devoted to the industrial sector increased ten-fold in the same period, and more than four-fold in the agricultural sector (Venezuela. Dirección Nacional de Presupuesto, 1977; Banco Central de Venezuela, Informe Económico, 1977; Sassen-Koob, 1980: 70; Torrealba and Oropeza, 1988: 110).

One immediate consequence of this situation was a discussion between various government sectors on the economic and social problems caused by the illegal entry and employment of migrants. The outcome was the emergence of two schools of thought. One proposed taking immediate measures to control the mass influx, such as closing the borders, controlling access points to the country, taking action against corruption in the concession of visas, surveilling clandestine entry routes and regularizing illegal workers. In short, the aim was to devise and implement a restrictive migration policy in line with national development plans, and to apply the Law on Foreigners with full rigour.

The second school of thought favoured putting the problem of clandestine migration and employment on the agenda of international issues being discussed by Colombia and Venezuela (*El Universal*, 22.1.80; Motta and Antequera, 1983: 81; Torrealba and Oropeza, 1988: 172) The business sector believed that the labour shortage was one of the main obstacles to economic growth and capital expansion. Hence its support for immigration and for employing foreigners even if they were illegal, irrespective of the social impact. The trade unions viewed "selective immigration", which they had opposed in the 1960s, as an important element of economic growth and labour efficiency (Sassen-Koob, 1980: 71-72). The three sectors of government, business and labour formed the "Tripartite Commission on Selective Immigration", which was officially created in October 1976 (Torrealba and Oropeza, 1988: 114). The result was the imposition of some of the criteria of the first school of thought and the implementation of various restrictive measures.

In addition to those measures, between 1977 and 1979 the government approved some legal instruments directly related to the problem of immigration and the employment of foreign nationals, as well as to the latter's social protection. The first of these was the "Andean Social Security Instrument" (Decision 113 of the Board of the Cartagena Agreement, 14.2.1977), transposed into Venezuelan law in December of the same year. This sought to ensure that migrant workers and their families were wholly covered by the social security system, offering them "the benefits that a worker enjoys in his home country throughout the subregion. It is applied in cases of workplace accidents, professional sickness, maternity, benefits for disability, age and death, fully covering immigrant workers and their families" (Torrealba and Oropeza, 1988: 115; Pellegrino, 1989: 247; Sassen-Koob, 1980: 78-79).

The second measure, signed in 1977, was the "Andean Instrument on Labour Migration" (Decision 116 of the Board of the Cartagena Agreement), which was transposed into national law on 20 September 1978. This sought to define the regulations governing labour migration between the Andean countries. Three categories of migrant workers were established: "qualified workers", "border workers" and "temporary workers". In ratifying this instrument, the Venezuelan government pledged to create a labour migration office and to "to adopt measures to regularize illegal workers who prove they entered the country before the instrument entered into force" (Torrealba and Oropeza, 1988: 115; Pellegrino, 1989: 247; Sassen-Koob, 1980: 84).

The socio-economic situation of immigrants

As a result of the above agreement, the Venezuelan government was committed to regularizing illegal immigrants. In 1980, therefore, by means of a presidential decree and in line with the stipulations of the Law on Foreigners, the government decided to conduct a census of foreign nationals, better known as the "General Registration of Foreigners". That census provides some useful information for the purposes of this study (Van Roy, 1983).

The composition of the registered illegal population by sex indicates that males predominated. This was particularly true of Colombians (54.4% males and 45.6% females), since for other nationalities females prevailed (Ecuadorians 55.3%, Chileans 55.7%, Dominicans 58.4%). It was also a young population: 77.1% of all those registered were aged between 15 and 40 (DIEX, 1981).

As regards socio-economic indicators, note the following:

Education and employment:

16% of the registered population was illiterate, 65% had some primary schooling and 18% had some secondary education. Less than 1% were educated at technical level or above.

The working age population (older than 15) accounted for 86.2% of all those registered. This group's gross rate of labour participation was 63%, above that for those born abroad (59.1%) (Michelena *et al.*, 1984: 38). From the employment perspective, therefore, illegal immigrants were fundamentally geared towards work even though, among those registered, the economically active population was fairly young.

Legalized immigrants and the labour structure:

the degree of labour integration cannot be determined clearly from the information gathered by the Registration, although it is possible to establish the professions of those registered. Almost 300 different types of employment were declared. Five of them, the most common, accounted for 71.6% of the illegal, economically active population (Berglund and Hernández, 1985: 69-70). In order of importance, they were labourer, domestic service, agricultural worker, bricklayer and mechanic. The unemployment rate among illegal aliens was 1.5%, and was higher among women (2.0%) than among men (1.3%). These figures were lower than those for legal immigrants (2.1%) and nationals (6.1%) (figures for the second half of 1980, CORDIPLAN, 1983: 210; Torrealba and Oropeza, 1988: 128).

In sum, several observations are worth making: 1) a quarter of illegal immigrants in employment were independent workers or in domestic service; 2) some studies show that a fifth of illegal aliens were self-employed; more than three quarters of the rest worked in small companies with fewer than 20 employees (Michelena *et al.*, 1984: 41); 3) half of the self-employed lived in their workplace, and the same proportion neither received benefits nor were covered by social security. Almost a quarter had no fixed wage (Michelena, *et al.*, 1984: 41-42). Hence a high percentage of illegal aliens operated in the informal sector. This kind of work is safer for irregular workers, because small companies are subject to less stringent control and oversight by labour and safety organizations, but this circumstance simultaneously makes it more difficult to determine the precise social impact of such migration. Additionally, small companies have a greater tendency to hire illegal workers under precarious conditions – with the consequent social consequences – as a way of cutting labour costs (Torrealba, 1985: 29).

E. The recent social impact of international migration

The issue of migration and its social impact in Venezuela was in no way resolved by the various institutional mechanisms adopted between 1976 and 1983 (administrative processes, partial reforms to migration policy, changes to legal norms, and the effort to register and legalize immigrants). The importance and participation of immigrants in the country's development is undeniable, despite the

problems spurred by their presence, especially the social effects. In employment terms, the almost 300,000 illegal aliens legalized at the beginning of 1980 were entitled to claim equality with Venezuelans: fair wages, social benefits, social security. Besides the obvious competition for ever scarcer jobs, this put pressure on the education system and on the provision of housing, which led to a concentration of migrants in certain regions or in urban suburbs. The result was an increase in social marginalization and greater pressure on various (and sometimes scant) public services such as electricity, water, transport, street-sweeping, and telephones.

This trend (at least for legal immigration) was negative in the second half of the 1980s and early-1990s, when migrants returned to their home countries. Between 1991 and 1995, net annual migration by foreign nationals (Colombian and Europeans) was negative. The tendency to return that began in the middle of the previous decade persists to this day.

Table 1

Foreign-born population (according to national censuses)	1971 5.5%		1981 7.4%		1990 5.7%	
Recorded migration balance	1990 - 1.987	1991 - 46.200	1992 - 11.752	1993 6.965	1994 - 90.670	1995 6.961

Source: Population..., OCEI, "Venezuela: Situación Demográfica", Caracas, 1994.
- Balances..., Department of Alien Status, Ministry of Internal Relations, 1995.

This decline in immigration, and thus the diminishing social impact, is related to two factors: 1) the recent crisis in the national economy, high unemployment rates and the gradual devaluation of the national currency; 2) the recovery of the Colombian economy, which makes it less attractive to emigrate to Venezuela for economic reasons. Although Colombians are still the leading immigrants, those from the Dominican Republic, Peru and Ecuador have increased.²⁷ Immigrants from the Southern Cone began to return to their countries at the end of the 1980s with the onset of democratization in Chile, Uruguay and Argentina. The same is true of those Europeans with the greatest presence in the country (Spaniards, Italians and Portuguese), whose return is explained by the better conditions in their home countries, which are members of the European Union.

The vicious circle of illegality

In Venezuela the social impact of migration in the periods discussed must be examined in terms of illegal migration. The main effect of this was on the labour market and employment, as well as on key social systems (education, housing, social security, healthcare) and public services. From the 1980s onwards the cycle of two legal and illegal "waves of migration" waned. The persistent economic downturn and the patent deterioration in the quality of life, coupled to political developments in the country since December 1998, spawned a contraction in illegal immigration and employment. The social effects persist to this day. Many of the immigrants have become emigrants, although the large numbers of illegal aliens – and their social impact – remains a subject for discussion among some opinion formers and the media. The migration authorities themselves point out that it is impossible to quantify illegal immigration in Venezuela. According to Delia Da Silva, former Director of the National Office of Identification and Alien Status (ONI-DEX), "there is no way to determine how many illegal

²⁷ According to the Venezuelan Foreign Minister, speaking in a conference on international policy: "Venezuela's migration problem does not only relate to Colombia. There are masses of Peruvians, Dominicans and Ecuadorians who either work illegally or use the country as a stepping stone to the United States" (*Frontera*, 28.1.98, p. 2-B).

aliens live and work in Venezuela” (*El Globo*, 1.3.98: 3). It is very difficult to quantify and specify the social impact of immigrants while this obstacle remains.

Notwithstanding the impossibility of precisely determining the number of illegal workers, it should be recalled that illegal immigration usually follows the overall pattern of migration. If this has lessened in Venezuela during the last decade because the country has lost its attraction, the same effect can be expected in terms of the social impact of illegal immigration and employment (*SIC*, Year LX, No 600, December 1997: 477). Today, therefore, foreigners are still working in Venezuela’s labour market but their social impact is markedly less than in the past. This has helped mitigate some undesirable effects of migration but does not attenuate the social pressure that spawns illegal immigration.

Migration’s social impact is not only felt in the recipient country. Rather, there is an interaction of social effects between recipient and source countries: in economic terms, for example, through remittances or reduced pressure on the land in source regions; in social terms, through demographic relief or pressure in some regions, depending on whether the population leaves or returns.²⁸

General social aspects of immigration in Venezuela

By this point it is clear that although Venezuela has always needed qualified foreign manpower to fulfil its development programmes, in fact the immigrants have been unskilled workers hired irregularly. This is the outcome of an immigration policy that lacked a strategy and defined objectives, which distorted the essence of the healthy immigration policy required and instead gave rise to undesirable social effects. The great problem, therefore, is that immigration has not been planned. Instead of real mechanisms (and not only in the spirit of the required policies, like the "selective immigration" policy of the 1960s) that admit the specialized manpower needed for the country’s economic activities, the streets of the main cities are full of immigrants (Colombians, Ecuadorians, Peruvians, Haitians and Trinidadians) engaged in the informal sector. These immigrants, in turn, compete with Venezuelans for limited employment, healthcare, education and services, especially in border areas.

This circumstance has been officially recognized. In March 1992, in a Forum sponsored by the National Academy of Economic Sciences and attended by national political figures, Pompeyo Márquez, President of the Senate’s Commission on Border Affairs, began his intervention by saying: "Migration has become a huge national problem ... We have come to this through neglect, through the irresponsible way in which for decades the whole migration issue has been addressed, as well as its social, and employment consequences, especially as regards Colombia and the Andean countries" (Sequera and Crazut, 1992: 29). From this perspective, the answer to the question posed by the title of that session of the forum ("Is there an immigration policy?") was a resounding NO. Of course, it is the migration spurred by strictly economic and social motivations that has become "a huge national problem".

The crux of the matter is that the entire juridical structure governing migration responds to circumstances now past. All the prevailing legal norms form a juridical framework that is inconsistent with Venezuela’s present, and with regional and international circumstances. While the Immigration and Colonization Law of 1936 obliges the executive to promote immigration by all means possible, especially in agriculture, the Law on Foreigners restricts their rights in the country. Although foreign human resources were to be geared towards agro-industry, the reality was different: the concentration of immigrants and Venezuelans in more populous urban centers, giving rise to the country’s current urban-regional profile with all its

²⁸ I am grateful to Fernando Urrea for drawing my attention to this "interaction" in his insightful comments on the first version of the text.

attendant economic and social problems. One of these is the creation and growth of misery belts around the main cities. Some indicators are illustrative.

- In 1971, the number of shanties in the marginal areas of the main cities numbered 169,000. In 1981, the figure had increased throughout the country to 1,300,000. And in 1991, according to the Foundation for Community Development (FUNDACOMUN, 1991), the number of shanties in marginal areas grew at an inter-annual rate of 1.65% – that is, by 136,000 a year.
- As a result of this marginal demographic explosion, there is unbearable pressure on the country's public services.
- Other consequences arise from the displacement of Venezuelan workers in rural areas, especially border regions, where there was a preference for immigrant and illegal manpower because of their levels of efficiency and the low salaries for which they worked.
- The demand in rural hospitals and health centres has exceeded their capacity to attend to the public.
- Some illnesses believed eradicated have returned, since those entering illegally neither undergo nor are subject to health controls.
- The increased demand for education and the growth of school enrolment.
- Illegal invasions of municipal and private lands.
- The uncontrolled and massive flight of foreign currency to the home countries – generally neighbouring countries – of the immigrants.
- The proliferation of various activities linked to the informal economy, to gambling and prostitution (a high percentage of female immigrants are engaged in prostitution), which contribute nothing to national development.
- An explosive increase in drugs trafficking and consumption.

Conclusion

Hence, in short, the paradox of the Venezuelan case: immigration and the employment of foreigners have been transformed from a panacea for the problems of development into an historically accumulated and unresolved problem, with all its attendant social effects. In the immediate future this circumstance will require greater effort and more seriousness in devising an overall population policy that can coherently integrate immigrants (in the sense of assimilating them without excluding them), as a means of attenuating the social impact of migration. Merging migration policy with a social policy that (without prejudice to the country), preserves migrants' contribution to Venezuela's economic and social development would be the basis of the foreigners' inclusion. Given the country's current economic, social and demographic circumstances, resolving the immigration problem will mean taking account of the need for economic growth and diversification, rationalizing the growth of the population and, above all, rectifying its marked tendency towards concentration in urban means. Such measures should be matched by efforts to address the problems associated with unemployment and social inequalities outlined in the preceding pages.

These endeavours will cover different fields. In the legal sphere there is a need to bring the prevailing legislation into line with the new situation, particularly as regards economic and social developments in the border region. Such developments should be located in the context of regional integration – more specifically, of Colombian-Venezuelan integration. A similar goal demands action in the institutional field, beginning with the reorganization of

the existing bodies. This would enable the authorities to monitor and regulate all foreigners entering the country. Absent such control, it is difficult to mitigate the social pressures created by immigration. Only by applying such a policy is it possible to discuss with the governments of countries that produce migrants – firstly Colombia – very clear agreements on services. For that reason the third field for action is the social sphere, wherein thought must be given to social laws that protect migrants and the rights extended to their families.

To date, however, Venezuela's efforts to exercise some control in channelling people across borders remain a dead letter. Although it is a recipient country, Venezuela has not developed coherent policies to integrate immigrants despite the fact that it could obtain (and in fact has) international assistance. In sum, and as already pointed out, international migration flows to Venezuela have been marked more by historical and contextual circumstances than by structural efforts (juridical, legislative and institutional) to regulate them (Bolivar Chollet, 1994: 217).

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D.2 Social aspects of international migration: preliminary considerations

George Martine, Ralph Hakkert and José Miguel Guzmán ²⁹

Introduction

World demographic trends have shifted markedly over the last century and thus different policies have been adopted at different times. At the start of the twentieth century the main demographic trend was migration from Europe to the New World. Population policies were then relatively simple: they favoured the immigration of certain nationalities to the exclusion of other nationalities and ethnic groups. In subsequent years the population of developing countries increased sharply because of the overwhelming success of efforts to reduce the mortality rate. This trend has attracted much attention in the last 40 years of the century, leading to a concerted international effort to reduce the fertility rate in poor countries through family planning programmes.

The 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) gave rise to a significant shift in focus – from demographic targets to reproductive healthcare and the empowerment of women. These issues are likely to remain on the public agenda. However, the clear trend towards stabilizing the world population (see Martine, Hakkert and Guzmán, 2000) will also increase public concern for other emerging issues. Over the next few decades international migration is likely to become one of the most important demographic policy issues. Because of the globalized economy, factors of production are likely to be displaced more quickly and this will inevitably affect the movement of people. This movement will have significant social and economic repercussions, both positive and negative, forcing public bodies to develop new approaches. Because of the complexity of the phenomenon and its effects, however, the solutions will not be simple. Further study and analysis will be needed to underpin policy-making.

This study reviews some of the social aspects of international migration and represents an initial and modest effort by UNFPA's Latin America and Caribbean Technical Support Team to support policy-making in this area. The issues covered include: international migration and globalization; the relative importance of the demographic causes of migration; chain migration, remittances and the development of communities of origin; migration selectivity; xenophobia and discrimination; and the relationship between reproductive health, gender equity and international migration.

Migration and globalization

International migration patterns reflect economic and social changes in the affected countries. Except for armed conflict and natural disasters, globalization is what mainly activates and conditions migration between countries. "Studies consistently show that international migrants do not come from poor and isolated countries unconnected to world markets, but from regions and countries that are undergoing a process of rapid change and development as a result of their inclusion in world trade" (Massey *et al.*, 1998: 277).

Globalization is above all economic, the outcome of a significant increase in trade and capital flows in line with a development model promoted by the international development organizations.

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Globalization, which has accelerated since 1985, has made national borders increasingly irrelevant. In one way or another, and at different points in time, all countries are moving towards a new economic model. The neoliberal model is eliminating most state participation in the economy and mechanisms to protect national economies. All countries have to adopt the international rules of the game and submit themselves to international auditors. Any change in the price of any product in any part of the world has an immediate effect on domestic prices. Integration with the external market generally makes the export sector the most important.

Most Latin American countries still have weak links with the world economy. Only those with the strongest domestic markets, such as Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, are integrated in the world economy. Most still have weak export sectors and cannot meet the social needs of their populations. However, most countries of the region have been significantly affected by migration. It is interesting to note that the direction of population movements is matched by capital movements. While the multinationals invest in the poorest countries in their search for cheap labour, workers in the poorest countries move in the opposite direction in search of better wages and living standards.

For the purposes of developing international migration policies, it is important to note that human capital is the only factor of production that does not have formal freedom of movement. Decades before the rise of globalization, Oteiza (1965) noted that international labour markets are not "free" but are determined by the laws and policies of the recipient countries (cited in Massey *et al.*, 1998: 218). The principle of free trade suggests that world output would increase if borders were eliminated and all factors of production, including people, could move freely. According to neoclassical economic theory, policies that restrict the movement of workers result in a smaller world economy in aggregate terms (Borjas, 1996:11). If these restrictions persist, some countries are unlikely to develop. However, this premise does not reject the view that the effects of this process will vary by country. Leaving aside its possible negative social and cultural consequences, which will be discussed below, its strictly economic effects are likely to be undesirable for some countries. For example, the neoclassical theory of optimal equilibrium with total mobility of labour could condemn certain countries to becoming permanent producers of migrant labour with no indigenous industrial activity.

International migration and demographic changes

The link between international migration and other demographic issues – such as population size and growth, demographic structure and density, and spatial distribution – is neither simple nor deterministic. It is generally thought that high demographic growth is associated with emigration, while low rates attract immigration since high fertility rates are linked to poverty and labour market saturation. Low fertility rates also raise concerns about labour shortages. In rural societies there is growing concern about the availability of exploitable land in regions with low demographic density. This latter issue gained prominence with the armed conflict between Honduras and El Salvador at the end of the 1960s. This was the culmination of a gradual occupation of Honduran land by migrants from El Salvador, which had much higher demographic density (Durham, 1979).

Historically, the hypothesis of a demographic "push" for European migration to the United States has had its supporters. Easterlin (1961), Thomas (1973), and others have given empirical credibility to the idea that increases in birth rates generated waves of migration 15-20 years later because of congestion in the labour markets of the home countries. Kennedy (1996) has argued that the European demographic explosion in the nineteenth century was a prerequisite for the settlement of the Americas, and that a similar process is currently under way with the migration of Asians and Latin Americans to the United States. More specifically, Reynolds (1992) argues that the vegetative growth of the Mexican population requires annual economic growth of 7% in order for the country's labour force to be absorbed productively, while the United States requires continuous immigration in order to maintain its current economic growth rate. There is therefore a certain demographic complementarity between the two countries. Espenshade (1989) reached a similar conclusion in the case of the Caribbean and the United States.

These ideas have recently become more prominent with respect to the situation in Europe, which has been aggravated by the rapid aging of the population. According to forecasts from the UN Population Division (UN Population Division, 2000), European countries will need at least 3.23 million immigrants a year between 2000 and 2005 to maintain their working age population (15-64) at 1995 levels. Japan will need 647,000 people a year and the United States 359,000. Under the most radical scenario (to maintain a constant ratio between the working age population and those over 65), the need for replacement immigration is all the more urgent: 27.14 million for Europe, 10.47 million for Japan and 11.85 million for the United States.

The view that the movement of people is related to differences in demographic growth rates or density has some empirical support. Although there are exceptions (for example, migration between Colombia and Venezuela), Latin American countries with higher demographic growth or density account for most migration to countries with lower growth or density. It is no coincidence that of the 10 Mexican states with the largest share of migration to the United States, six are also among the 10 states with the highest fertility rates. This is significant in view of the fact that most of the states with high fertility rates are relatively far from the US border.

The specialist literature, however, rejects the determinism of demographic pressure. According to the IUSSP Committee on South-North Migration "demographic disparities *per se* are irrelevant; people do not migrate because they perceive demographic differences. Countries with the highest rate of fertility, economic growth and occupation densities do not account for the highest number of emigrants at world level. Similarly, the demographic conditions in the destination countries – especially low fertility and an aging population – have far less impact on migration than is commonly thought ... If there is current demand for foreign labour, it is likely to be just as much the result of the segmented structure of the advanced industrial economies as demographic conditions" (Massey *et al.*, 1998: 11). According to this view, demographic conditions in the home countries are important, not because of any contrast with the conditions in the destination countries but because of their impact on the home regions. That is, high fertility and accelerated demographic growth promote migration within a specific socio-economic context, since they put pressure on infrastructure, services and the labour market and they generally reduce the pace of social and economic progress.

Taking account of these reservations, and without exaggerating the importance or relevance of demographic factors, it remains useful to examine the impact of demographic trends in the region. As mentioned above, Latin America and the Caribbean are undergoing a process of significant demographic stabilization. The current intrinsic growth of the regional population is just 0.67% a year; this is likely to fall to 0.30% by the end of the decade. Although the actual growth rate is still 1.50% a year, more than half of this growth is inertial. According to the 1998 revision of projected population from the UN Population Division, actual growth rates are expected to fall sharply in the middle of this century, reaching 0.45% a year in 2040-2050.

One significant effect of this will be the temporary concentration of population in the economically active age groups. Unless output in the region expands sharply, the "demographic bulge" will provoke a new wave of extra-regional emigration. There is particular concern about the recent increase in open unemployment in some countries of the region, even among more educated sectors of the population, especially women. In Argentina (Greater Buenos Aires) open unemployment among women with 13 or more years of education was 9.1% in 1998. It was 8.8% in Chile, 11.5% in Colombia, 15.5% in Ecuador, 12.7% in Nicaragua, 15.8% in Panama, 19.5% in the Dominican Republic and 11.8% in Venezuela (CEPAL, 2000: table 13).

Table 1

ANNUAL GROWTH RATES (IN PERCENTAGES OF THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION (AGED 15-64) IN THE COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 1950-2050

Country	1950- 55	1995- 00	2020- 25	2040- 50
Argentina	1.74	1.56	0.42	0.16
Bolivia	1.95	2.65	0.98	0.74
Brazil	2.84	2.13	0.31	-0.04
Chile	1.62	1.47	0.25	0.33
Colombia	2.14	2.38	0.52	0.33
Costa Rica	2.81	3.08	0.54	0.35
Cuba	2.00	0.60	-0.12	-0.35
Ecuador	1.98	2.77	0.58	0.19
El Salvador	1.40	2.54	0.75	0.37
Guatemala	2.47	3.23	1.27	1.01
Guyana	1.46	1.45	0.25	0.06
Haiti	0.98	2.63	0.97	0.65
Honduras	3.01	3.51	1.01	0.65
Jamaica	1.50	1.71	0.39	0.11
Mexico	2.07	2.28	0.41	-0.06
Nicaragua	2.44	3.63	1.13	0.76
Panama	1.91	2.28	0.37	0.06
Paraguay	1.07	3.36	1.03	0.98
Peru	2.36	2.45	0.52	0.16
Puerto Rico	0.10	1.03	0.20	-0.19
Dominican Republic	2.75	2.16	0.34	-0.05
Trinidad and Tobago	1.83	2.09	0.05	-0.80
Uruguay	1.32	0.60	0.28	0.18
Venezuela	3.49	2.65	0.60	0.36
Average Rate	2.28	2.17	0.45	0.14
Variation coeff.	22.25	21.41	55.07	213.07

Source: Based on the 1998 Revision of the UN Population Division forecasts (mean projection).

One of the characteristics of the region's demographic transition is that it varies by country. In Cuba the demographic bulge will reach its maximum level in 2005-2010, while Bolivia, Guatemala and Nicaragua will reach this level only after 2040. Since the region's overall pace of growth is also falling, there is likely to be a greater differentiation between the rates of growth in the labour forces of the various countries. Table 1 shows the growth rates of the economically active population in the different countries of the region. The relative differences between these rates are widening, even when part of this growth stems from a decline in the average of the denominator. The impact of these differences are particularly significant in countries with high growth rates that share a border with countries with low or negative growth, such as Bolivia with Argentina and Brazil, or Guatemala with Mexico. The pull and push factors could be more or less intense depending on how regional economic integration proceeds, and these borders could be more or less susceptible to migration. Intra-regional migration has declined in recent years but, as table 1 shows, it could increase again in the coming decades because of the greater differences in the rates of demographic growth and the implications of that circumstance for the increase in the labour force.

Chain migration, remittances and the development of communities of origin

A notable fact in all the studies on international migration is that migrants from a particular region of origin move to the same destination region. This phenomenon (also evident in internal migration) is commonly referred to as "chain migration". The chains consist of successive movements of migrants over time who originate in a single location and who are moving to a certain destination.

The underlying mechanism of chain migration is very simple. The initial movement is made by individuals or families who leave their country because of a particular economic need or opportunity, war, political persecution, hunger and so forth. These people then establish themselves

with relative comfort and act as a bridge for other family members or friends who, in turn, involve other relatives or friends. This process gives rise to an increasingly complex chain of movement that always has the same points of origin and destination. The remittances sent to family members who remain in the place of origin increase the links between these points.³⁰ To some extent the institutional mechanisms of migration can also facilitate the process. For example, to qualify for a residence visa under the 1965 US Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments, a prospective migrant has to have a relative who is officially resident in the country. This criterion (which could be viewed as a means of ensuring that the country's ethnic composition is not significantly altered by international migration) subsequently became a mechanism whereby small communities of foreigners resident in the country could multiply by calling on members of their immediate family who, in turn, drew in their close relatives.

When applied to migration, Gunnar Myrdal's theory of "cumulative causation" explains why international migration tends to operate in chains (Myrdal, 1957 and Massey 1990, in Massey *et al.*, 1998: 45). The central idea is that each chain migration modifies the social context within which subsequent decisions on migration are taken. These changes always make it more likely that the same flow will be repeated. Each new migration reduces the costs and risks of future movements, and helps induce a change in cultural values and perspectives that increases the likelihood of migrating.

Migrants build complex networks to facilitate the migration and adaptation of their friends and relatives. More experienced migrants are a repository of knowledge about the other country, the labour market, available services and all other issues that shape a capacity to adapt to a new environment. This cultural capital can be passed on to other migrants, contributing to the formation of common values and social cohesion. Migrants' informal networks are supported by familial and communal relationships and these, in turn, create an ethic of mutual support. This phenomenon has even been evident among groups of people seeking to settle in other countries, especially in Europe, through the asylum mechanism. Asylum seekers, like economic migrants, use their contacts in the family, the mosque and the church to plan their strategies (The Economist, 2000).

This culture of solidarity extends to communities of origin. Aside from the remittances sent directly to families, the UN Population Division has also examined the impact of community associations in the United States that seek to promote the development of their home towns. According to the Division, "hometown associations" are an extension of chain migration (UN Population Division, 2000).

Family and community remittances are one of the most important mechanisms through which migrants maintain links with their home communities. Total official remittances included in the national accounts increased from US\$ 43 billion in 1980 to US\$ 70 billion in 1995 (Russell, 1992), making them the most important monetary component of international trade after oil payments. Although the national account figures are flawed, there is general agreement that remittances are important because of the significant cash sums brought back by migrants and intermediaries, and because of the high value of consumer goods sent back to families. Some estimates for Asian countries suggest that the value of these "informal" remittances can vary between 10%-40% of the official value included in the national accounts (Puri and Ritzema, 1999).

In Latin America and the Caribbean these official remittances account for a significant share of foreign currency inflows in various countries of the region: 36.8% in El Salvador, 13.1% in the

³⁰ An example of this type of migration occurred in Brazil in the 1980s. During the severe economic crisis at the start of the decade a group of migrants left the poor city of Governador Valadares in Minas Gerais for New York and Boston. Once this first group established itself economically they brought their relatives and friends, who in turn sent for their relatives and friends. Most of this migration was illegal. Nevertheless, within a few years they created a significant colony of migrants, especially in Boston. Their home city transformed itself from one of the poorest to one that enjoyed relative prosperity. New buildings have been constructed, trade is very dynamic, there is greater contention for political posts, etc. (Sales, 1991).

Dominican Republic, 10.5% in Guatemala, 10.4% in Honduras and 9.1% in Jamaica (United Nations, 1996). Recent estimates by Pritchard (2000) suggest that in Nicaragua remittances stand at US\$ 400-800 million (18%-36% of GDP). Even in Mexico, which has a larger and more diversified economy, remittances account for 7.6% of foreign currency inflows and almost 2 million people are members of households that live mainly on remittances from the United States (CONAPO, 1999).

Although remittances are economically important for a number of countries in the region, there are wide disparities in their impact on income distribution, poverty alleviation and, in particular, their multiplier effects on the economic development of migrants' home communities. There are only a few systematic studies on the different effects of remittances according to the income level of recipient households. Recent data from Mexico's National Household Survey on Income and Spending (INEGI, 1996) show that without remittances the income of recipient households would fall to half that of non-recipient households. With remittances, recipient households in small communities (under 2,500 people) have a slightly higher income than non-recipient households, while in larger communities they are below the average of non-recipient households, even with remittances (CONAPO, 1999). This suggests that remittances improve income distribution, even when it is not absolutely clear what the income level of recipient households would be if the family member that emigrated were to return to work locally. However, the data examined by Funkhouser (1999) show that remittances sent by Central American emigrants in the United States do not vary systematically by educational level. On the negative side, this shows that the "brain drain" does not have a corresponding benefit in terms of greater monetary returns to the country. On the positive side, the same data suggest that in relative terms remittances can benefit poorer families more than non-poor families.

Most studies on the productive impact of remittances reveal a relatively negative picture. This is mainly because of the low proportion of family remittances channelled into productive investment. Surveys carried out in Mexico in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s respectively show that 70.4%, 83.7% and 78.5% of remittances are channelled directly into basic consumption (CONAPO, 1999). Most of the rest is used for the purchase, construction or improvement of homes or the payment of debts, while less than 8% is channelled into productive investment. Community remittances, from local home communities and residents overseas, are generally used to organize festivities or other cultural activities that do not have direct productive effects. Studies in other contexts tend to confirm these results. For example, Dandler and Medeiros (1988) found that households' basic consumption accounted for 81% of remittances received by the migrants' families in Cochabamba, Bolivia.

Some authors have highlighted some negative effects. Ferán and Pessar (1991), for example, found that remittances sent to seven communities in the Dominican Republic induced agricultural families to reduce or abandon their productive activities. In the English-speaking Caribbean, studies on the impact of remittances also revealed such negative effects (Brana-Shute and Brana-Shute, 1982; Rubenstein, 1983). In a summary of the literature, Díaz-Briquets (1991) and Papademetriou and Martin (1991), among others, concluded that these remittances have generally had a negative impact on the region because they deter investment and create a dependency relationship. A more systematic review of this literature can be found in Meyers (1998), among others.

Studies on the impact that returning migrants have on the economies of their home countries are also generally pessimistic (see Bovenkerk, 1981, for the case of Suriname). Even when they bring in capital and experience, they usually lack the ability to become entrepreneurs in their home country. This circumstance is exacerbated by weak institutional arrangements, excessive and inefficient bureaucracy, and a lack of support for small businesses – although Asian countries have introduced training and support programmes for returning migrants to help them set up in business (see, for example, Rodrigo and Jayatissa, 1989).

In the most recent literature, however, this evidence is being re-examined, mainly in the case of the Asian economies. Massey *et al.* (1998 : 291), for example, show that remittances from emigrants have been important in helping some developing countries improve their national savings and foreign exchange situation. In an analysis of a rural area of Mexico, Conway and Cohen (1998) note that the

effects of direct consumption are not necessarily negative and can have indirect productive benefits. In a similar example from Mexico, Durand, Parrado and Massey (1996) assert that many of the positive effects of remittances have not been adequately examined, and might even have been erroneously analyzed in the literature. López and Seligson (1991) also highlight the importance of remittances for the survival of many small businesses in El Salvador. These examples illustrate the abiding level of disagreement on an issue of potentially great importance for the development of communities in the home region.

Selectivity, discrimination and xenophobia

Although they are necessary, migrants are often seen as undesirables. Rejection of them is a constant in nearly all resettlements, but is particularly acute in movements involving people whose ethnicity, language, religion and/or appearance are markedly different from those of the indigenous population. In Europe and parts of the United States, for example, a significant wave of anti-immigrant feeling is expressed through books such as Peter Brimelow's (1996). Recent immigrants are seen as competing with the indigenous population for employment, as imposing excessive costs on social services and infrastructure in the destination countries, and as a permanent threat to the social and political stability of the destination region.

These feelings often trigger popular xenophobic reactions and nationalist policies. Germany, for example, receives 350-400,000 immigrants a year. It needs them to continue its activities in various sectors but attitudes remain negative in terms of both public opinion and legislation (Martin, 1998). Even when migrants are admitted to satisfy certain needs of the destination country, the doors are only officially open to skilled migrants and political refugees. Germany's Chancellor Schröder recently launched an appeal for 20,000 software specialists from India and Eastern Europe to fill 75,000 vacant posts in the sector. However, the Indian specialists consulted appear to prefer to emigrate to the United States, probably because of the well-publicized mistreatment of immigrants in Germany (The Economist, 2000).

The claim that migrants compete in the labour market with the indigenous population, thereby lowering wages, should be qualified. Most unskilled migrants take jobs that the native population no longer wants because they are difficult or tedious, badly paid or of low social status. Many migrants are in fact over qualified for the jobs they take, and often make a greater contribution to economic productivity than the non-migrant population. They thus contribute to the reactivation of the economy and help boost employment. Although the presence of migrants is beneficial to overall economic performance, however, they can exacerbate conflicts with those sectors of the population with whom they are in direct competition for jobs, such as traditional blue collar workers.

Migrants' use of social services in the destination country is a motive for migration (people migrate because they know that in urban areas or in other countries they and their children will have greater access to healthcare, education and other services) and a burden for the destination country (it increases the cost of infrastructure and services). However, these costs are relative because as migrants become more productive they boost productivity and therefore improve local capacity to increase spending on infrastructure and services. This view, which has been advanced by Simon (1989) and others in the case of the United States, has been challenged by supporters of "new nativism" such as Brimelow (1996). The latter argue that the composition of immigration flows has changed in recent years and that current immigrants are less skilled and more dependent on public resources than the native US population.

The issue of whether migrants contribute to permanent political and social instability is a more delicate question. The presence of large numbers of disorientated, uninformed and harassed migrants undoubtedly causes disruption. The degree of disruption will be determined by the quality of policies to anticipate and prevent any problems caused by migration, but also by the degree of cultural difference between the migrants and the population of the destination country. A country that needs

migrant labour but refuses to define clear support policies for integrating the migrant population will undoubtedly face many more difficulties than one that introduces concrete policies on prior information, on streamlining procedures on goods brought in by migrants, on recognition of benefits and qualifications, and on support for housing, health and labour integration.

The ease with which migrants can be integrated also depends on their numbers, their cultural, ethnic and linguistic diversity, and their cultural distance from the native population. In many recipient societies there is a fear of being engulfed by a large number of foreigners who do not assimilate but who, because of their numbers, can exert political pressure on the social order and undermine some fundamental aspects of the recipient. The most frequent example is the demand for teaching in the immigrants' own language, an issue that has led to serious conflict both in the United States (mainly in California and Florida) and in various European countries. In some European countries conflict has arisen over the religious customs of immigrant communities when these are illegal in the host country, such as the ritual slaughter of animals and non-compliance with compulsory schooling for girls; the latter, according to religious Islamic codes, cannot frequent public spaces. Since Latin America and the Caribbean is relatively homogenous culturally and linguistically, such conflicts are not common although there are risks. In the Dominican Republic, for example, Haitian immigrants are culturally and linguistically different from the native population. However, they lack the strength to make social demands on the indigenous society or to receive publicly funded educational services, much less in their own language.

A significant factor in the assimilation of migrants in their new country is the socio-economic selectivity of a specific flow. This selectivity varies according to the type of migration. In the past, different types of migration could be identified according to the distance between the source and the destination. That is, better qualified migrants normally migrated to countries further away, while migration between bordering countries involved migrants with less schooling and fewer qualifications. According to CELADE studies, this distinction is disappearing: those who migrate are neither the poorest or most marginalized (since these lack the financial and social resources to move) nor the wealthiest, but workers with medium level qualifications (Villa, 1996).

The issue is important, since most social and economic consequences of migration depend directly on the type of migrant in terms of schooling, training, resources, etc. Even the level of xenophobia caused by the presence of migrants is affected by these characteristics. Recent data on the migration selectivity of Nicaraguans, based on Rosales's (1999) household studies in Nicaragua, are examined below.

Table 2
NICARAGUAN EMIGRANTS RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES
AND COSTA RICA, BY SEX AND LEVEL OF EDUCATION

Country of Destination and sex	Educational Level				Total (N=100%)
	None	Primary	Secondary	University	
United States					
Women	2.2	25.2	52.5	20.1	556
Men	1.6	20.9	52.9	24.6	512
Total	1.8	23.1	52.7	22.3	1068
Costa Rica					
Women	10.9	44.9	36.5	7.7	531
Men	12.7	53.1	27.0	7.2	667
Total	11.9	49.4	31.2	7.4	1198

Source: Jimmy Rosales, *Nicaragüenses en el exterior. Conferencia sobre Población del Istmo a Fin del Milenio*, Costa Rica, 1999, tables 2, 4 and 6.

The data in table 2 suggest that there are significant differences in the educational levels of Nicaraguan migrants according to their destination. Some 52.7% of all Nicaraguan migrants to the United States had 10 or more years of study, of which 22.3% were university educated. There is thus a clear "brain drain" from Nicaragua to the United States. Although the educational level of migrants to Costa Rica is lower (19.2% had 10 or more years of study and 7.4% were university educated), the flow is also selective of the more educated population. In total, 35.1% of Nicaraguan emigrants to the two countries had 10 or more years of study, while only 11.3% of the non-migrating population had reached this level of education (Rosales, 1999, tables 2, 4 and 6) These differences are consistent with the fact that migrants to the United States spend more time in school and are therefore older when they migrate.

Although these differences in the composition of the two flows show that those who move to the United States have significant advantages, it is worth noting that the groups that migrate to Costa Rica are also better educated and older than the non-migrating population. That is, selection of the most able people, in isolation, has a negative impact on the source country.

This conclusion, however, should be qualified. As regards the level of xenophobia in the place of destination, the positive selectivity of migrants in their home countries is less important than their educational level relative to Costa Ricans. Note that the educational levels of Nicaraguan migrants, although higher than the Nicaraguan average, are significantly below the Costa Rican average. For example, the 7.4% of migrants with university education compares favourably with the 4.2% in Nicaragua, but is below the 8.8% in Costa Rica. Similarly, 11.9% of migrants do not have a formal education, compared to 27.6% of Nicaraguans and 5.8% of Costa Ricans. The differences between the migrants and the Costa Ricans are relatively small and, in objective terms, fail to account for the xenophobia that has arisen.

The widespread view of international migration as a problem is not new. It is similar to the idea, prevalent over the last 30-40 years in Latin America, that rural-urban migration should be significantly reduced. It is now accepted that this migration has been a powerful engine of development in most countries. The challenge of international migration is to know how to maximize its benefits for all.

International migration, gender and reproductive health

The link between gender and migration raises various sub-issues that are examined briefly below: the scale of female migration, the invisibility of the gender issue, the effect of gender inequality on migration patterns, the impact of migration on changes in behaviour in relation to gender equity, the relationship between reproductive health, gender and migration and specific policies on the issue.

The proportion of women in the global stock of international migrants has remained stable at around 48% (UN Population Division, 2000a). In some regions, such as Asia, there is evidence of a clear trend towards the feminization of international migration and the autonomization of these movements – that is, women migrating alone and not as family dependents (Hugo, 1999). Villa and Martínez (2000) underline the fact that in Latin America women accounted for most international migrants in the 1970 and 1980s. With the recent trend towards the masculinization of migration, however, this situation is changing. According to the same authors this global trend, which is mainly reflected in emigration to the United States, is in contrast to the increasing feminization of migration within Latin America. These findings concur with those of the UN Population Division. The latter reveal a clear trend towards the feminization of the stocks of South American migrants, which account for a large share of this intra-regional migration (UN Population Division, 2000a).

Despite its significance and specificity, analysis of female migration has not been a priority. The migration debate has ignored gender and has tended to examine migration from a gender-neutral perspective. The role of women in the process has therefore become invisible, despite the fact that although women might not migrate they have a key role as the mothers, wives or daughters of migrant

men. Women sometimes even take charge of integrating the family in the place of destination. Cranshaw and Morales (1998) revealed that adolescent women who migrate from Nicaragua to Costa Rica often provide most of the family's economic support in the adaptation phase because they find it easier to insert themselves in the labour market, mainly as domestic servants. They also take responsibility for or participate in the family's decision to migrate, and for the new roles that emerge once the man emigrates (United Nations, 1993). Several authors have underscored the importance of this issue for understanding the scope, causes and effects of migration.

Gender roles are an integral part of the causal factors of migration. It has been found, for example, that gender relations, roles and hierarchies influence migration (especially the likelihood of men and women migrating), giving rise to different outcomes (Grieco and Boid, 1998). Gender can play a key role in the perceptions and conditions that facilitate or deter migration. These include considering migration as an option, the perception of possible destinations, the resources made available by families to enable members to migrate, and the capacity of women to participate actively in the decision to migrate, either alone or as part of a family. Recent studies show that in Asia these restrictions are being swept away by globalization (Hugo, 1999).

Migration can also affect gender roles and challenge cultural traits that underlie gender inequities. However, studies in this area reach no firm conclusions because the effects are influenced by many other factors, such as the circumstances in which individuals decide to migrate, the status prior to migration (United Nations, 1998) and the particular conditions of migrants' insertion in the place of destination, which substitutes one inequity for another (Hugo, 1999).³¹ In his review of studies on female migration, Szasz (1999) notes that the studies reveal no direct relationship between greater female autonomy and an increase in migration, nor between female migration and a relative improvement in their situation following migration. According to Hugo (1999), migration has a positive effect on gender equity in certain circumstances: 1) if migration is legal; 2) if women work outside the home and in the formal sector of the destination country; 3) if women migrate on their own and not as family dependents; and 4) if migration is permanent and not temporary. Gender equity is also undermined by other factors, such as linguistic constraints. These are a possible barrier to a change in the norms and values associated with greater equity between men and women since the latter might live in ghettos in the destination country. Migration policies, which are not gender-sensitive, can exacerbate such ghettoization by strengthening these patterns (United Nations, 1998).

As regards how gender roles change with migration, a study of two Mexican communities (the source community in western Mexico and the recipient community in Atlanta) found changes in the marital ideals of emigrant women (Hirsch, 1999). Elson and DeLaet (1999) carried out a more detailed analysis on whether international migration offers women an opportunity to free themselves from the gender roles that prevail in their home countries, whether they suffer from new forms of discrimination in the new societies, and the degree to which international migration is managed by actors who exploit women's social, economic and political vulnerability.

The conclusions of studies on non-migrating women also vary. Although they underline women's greater independence in decision-making when the husband or father emigrates, these studies also acknowledge the possibility of greater vulnerability, either in the initial period of migration (when the migrant is yet to find stable employment), or in a later phase (in cases in where the migrant does not send the expected remittances).

There is a consensus that migration, however large, affect men and women differently, especially when it is illegal. In many Asian countries, international female migrants are more

³¹ Most Latin Americans who migrate within the region and to Europe work as domestic servants (UN Population Division, 2000-a; Slotnik, 2000). Under these conditions it is more difficult to achieve greater gender equity.

vulnerable than internal female migrants at all stages of the process (recruitment, travel to and arrival in the destination county). They face greater risks of poorer working conditions, sexual abuse and so forth (Hugo, 1999). This circumstance poses a number of challenges: ensuring respect for the rights of migrant women; preventing and punishing the trafficking of women for sexual purposes; and improving their access to sexual and reproductive healthcare services, since they have specific needs that stem partly from their greater levels of risk.

Illegal women migrants (including those caught up in the trafficking of women), seasonal migrants and, especially, refugees and those without identity papers have particularly poor access to reproductive healthcare. This poses a series of added risks associated with rape, unwanted pregnancies and STD or HIV/AIDS. Both women and men have little or no access to services, and little use is made of preventative information. These problems arise in a context of family and cultural separation, which can lead to an increase in unprotected sexual relations. A qualitative study of Mexican male seasonal migrants to the United States concluded that "...among men there is an increase in the number of sexual partners as a result of loneliness, isolation, the lack of women, insertion into a more open society and less social and family control. This has led to an increase in relations with male partners... and/or prostitutes". Greater awareness of AIDS does not have a direct impact on changes in attitude (Bronfman and Minello, 1995). For many women, prostitution might be the only form of work available if they emigrate (IOM, 2000c).

As regards AIDS, migration increases the vulnerability of migrants, of the recipient population, and of the families they leave behind. Policies and strategies to reduce the vulnerability of migrants in all phases of the process is an issue that requires urgent attention.

The above analysis shows that the gender issue in international migration cannot be viewed as merely a formal question. Its absence from the debate affects the policies developed and implemented in this field. For example, the issue has been raised as to whether migration policies have been influenced by a stereotyped vision of male and female roles (Bilac, 1995). If female migration is to affect gender inequality, gender must be explicitly included in the relevant studies, policies and programmes. Female migrants should be viewed as a human group with specific characteristics, motivations and needs, not as mere followers of male migrants. According to the UN Population Division (UN Population Division, 2000a) progress in this respect has been slow. For example, the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families makes no specific recommendations on gender inequality. The General Assembly Resolution of December 1997 addresses violence against women migrant workers, but the limited reaction of governments to the requirement that they provide information on the issue suggests that the process will require greater promotion and consolidation.

In recent years the gender perspective has enriched the literature on Latin American migration and it is beginning to have a direct impact, at least on overall policies. In the Seminar on Female and Child Migration, held in El Salvador in February 2000 as part of the Action Plan of the Regional Conference on Migration (Puebla Process), specific recommendations were adopted to improve the situation of both groups by taking account of their particularities (IMO, 2000a). However, viewing women in this women-children binominal replicates their role as mothers and does not specifically recognize their role as individuals (IMO, 2000c). This is a journey that has just begun, since the inclusion of gender issues is linked to human rights and their relationship with development. This perspective faces the difficulties of applying a framework of rights when public opinion is insufficiently willing to acknowledge that such rights should be applied, for example, to illegal immigrants. In contrast to the progress made on gender issues in the Puebla Process, it is worth noting that the South American Meetings on Migration, Integration and Development, which resulted in the Declarations of Lima (1999) and Buenos Aires (2000), completely ignored the matter (or even consideration of differences according to sex) (IMO, 2000 b).

Conclusions

Most of the socio-economic consequences of migration are contradictory or double-edged. The mobility of a trained, professional or student workforce undoubtedly contributes to a brain drain. But migration also gives rise to significant remittances, promotes new links between countries, stimulates technology transfer and creates new types of communities. The impact of remittances has been widely debated: although they alleviate poverty and contribute to productive activity, economists claim they cannot promote productive activities in places of origin and even create new forms of inequity. At another level, migration can spur the disintegration of home communities, although it can also create new forms of solidarity that promote the social, cultural and economic development of those communities. The departure of individuals at the heart of the family causes serious problems for the family's social integrity and for the psychological well-being of its members. However, it can also improve not only the physical subsistence of the family but the psychological well-being of individuals and groups. In certain cases female migration can also improve gender equity, although it can also aggravate women's conditions by exposing them to greater vulnerability.

In short, migration has positive and negative effects both on the individual and on communities of origin and destination. It is therefore important to accept the ICPD recommendations on the need for formulas and policies to strengthen the positive effects of international migration and to lessen its negative consequences. Unfortunately, the international agenda is yet to give this issue the attention it deserves. It is important that population experts exploit the space that has been created by the imminent stabilization of demographic growth in the region, so as to make more concrete progress on international migration research. On that basis, experts should make a more effective contribution to the development of policy on population that will transform international migration into a true instrument of development.

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E. Comments on sessions C and D

E.1 Comments by Tomás Palau³²

The comments refer to the presentations by Demetrious Papademetriou and Adela Pellegrino. The two studies clearly reveal some central aspects of the new context within which highly qualified persons migrate.

First, recent transformations (inadequately referred to as globalization), especially in data transmission, have had an impact on skilled migration. The core of this impact is the increasing importance of knowledge as a basic input for development, or "small differences in competitiveness as determinants of market gains". Both Papademetriou and Pellegrino analyze this in detail, the former in a more conceptual manner and the latter through an excellent summary of the available information.

Second, the stimuli for migration and reception policies in the places of destination are also affected by and contribute to this new context. The emigration of technical workers and professionals is neither necessarily nor primarily a response to oversupply in the countries of origin but, as Pellegrino states, to "factors specific to each country", the opportunities they hope to find, and pre-established migrant networks. According to Papademetriou, migration policies in northern countries tend to (or should) promote the competitiveness of their economies by cutting red tape for key foreign personnel who want to immigrate, without undermining their countries' broader policy goal of defending the interests of national workers as a whole.

³² Base de Investigaciones Sociales, Paraguay.

Third, company employees (the main although not the only motors for the migration of qualified personnel) tend to be increasingly flexible since there is a growing demand for specific expertise which, according to Papademetriou, might be found more cheaply abroad. This leads to predatory and exclusionary practices in recruitment policies. From the viewpoint of the country of origin, Pellegrino describes this phenomenon in her comments on qualified migrants working in transnational firms. These, she says, "demand a level of company loyalty that prevents their employees from engaging in activities that might entail a transfer of skills or technology".

The greater salience of specialized knowledge as a reason for migrating, as well as policies on the reception of migrants and new recruitment practices, are important parts of the new context for skilled migration. According to Pellegrino, this context makes it necessary to rethink what the traditional literature on this issue refers to as the "brain drain", which should now be interpreted as brain circulation or a diaspora.

The authors also examine the new context of migration-related policies.

From the gains viewpoint of recipient countries in the north, Papademetriou's portrayal of migration policies is clear:

- such policies should be improved in order to make them instruments for greater competitiveness that simultaneously contribute to the migrants' economic success.
- the governments of northern countries are becoming aware that their role as legitimizers and supervisors of negotiations between capital and labour is diminishing, since the form of such negotiations is changing.
- these governments should note that, for some time yet, they will have to rely on the immigration of highly qualified workers to secure the increased competitiveness demanded by their economies and companies. This is essential if they are to maintain and expand operations in "their" countries (without having to relocate to other countries) and remain competitive in a global market.

From the viewpoint of the countries of origin, Pellegrino voices concern that Latin America will lose critical mass, and calls for more explicit and less "voluntary" re-linking policies to stimulate national development. Her concerns are related to issues on which there is broad discussion in the Latin American literature:

- to what extent can the increased concentration on knowledge in the developed north be offset by trends that make knowledge a good, one that facilitates access to a greater number of better educated Latin Americans?
- to what extent can a "non-migrating worker", who lives in a scientific or academic community in a developing country, be more than a worker in a scientific *maquiladora*, who assembles theoretical or technological parts produced in the north?

As Pellegrino asks, is there any capacity or interest among decision-makers in the countries of the south to exploit the repository of knowledge that has left, but that could return to each country in the form of greater experience and knowledge that has been adapted to reality? Can governments introduce effective policies to recover these national assets?

It is very rewarding to be presented with such precise descriptions of two sides of the same coin: the drain of talent from the south to the north, and the mechanisms deployed by capitalism in its most competitive phase to draw knowledge from the north to the south. This spinning coin is uncertainly balanced. Is it possible to re-link the assets that left with the knowledge that we need?

E.2 Comments by Fernando Urrea Giraldo³³

A necessary debate: the risk of analyzing the social impact of migration on the basis of questionable sources

Professor Dávila's presentation, "Confused Borders: The Social Impact of Migration", examines the socio-economic problems of migration by focusing on Venezuela, which historically has been a recipient country. The author concentrates on the 1950-1990 period, although he makes various references to the last decade.

From the outset he highlights his purpose and limitations: "certain variables can be identified, such as educational and labour demands, the pressure on housing, as can certain psychosocial factors [it would be useful to know which] ... but it is difficult to assess these precisely because of the absence of statistics or disaggregated information. This examination presents certain qualitative trends, with particular emphasis on the need for an adequate set of indices to measure effects.

According to Dávila, the main effects of immigration on the social structure of the recipient countries (in this case Venezuela) are: population growth, which has an adverse effect on existing social institutions; increased demand for goods and services; job losses for nationals; the growth of the informal sector; the deterioration of wage structures; changes in the customs and traditions of local populations; transculturization; pressure on the educational system caused by immigrants' children; and the introduction of endemic illnesses and other social problems.

The author's negative vision of immigration in Venezuela, especially from Colombia (as outlined in the previous paragraph) is founded on the following central argument: "...although Venezuela has always needed qualified foreign manpower to fulfil its development programmes, in fact the immigrants have been unskilled workers hired irregularly. This is the outcome of an immigration policy that lacked a strategy and defined objectives, which distorted the essence of the healthy immigration policy required and instead gave rise to undesirable social effects. The great problem, therefore, is that immigration has not been planned. Instead of real mechanisms (and not only in the spirit of the required policies, like the "selective immigration" policy of the 1960s) that admit the specialized manpower needed for the country's economic activities, the streets of the main cities are full of immigrants (Colombians, Ecuadorians, Peruvians, Haitians and Trinidadians) engaged in the informal sector. These immigrants, in turn, compete with Venezuelans for limited employment, healthcare, education and services, especially in border areas". The author's claims and the problems of managing the data to support them have serious implications.

One problem that Dávila acknowledges at the start of his presentation but fails to take responsibility for is the types of sources he uses. Many of these are debatable, and he has failed to take account of the findings of some of the authors he cites, thereby decontextualizing them. Strong assertions are supported by the least appropriate sources – those from public bodies whose claims are loaded with exaggerated xenophobic rhetoric. A prime example is the use of an "interview with the Director for Alien Status" to justify the astonishing claim of "two million illegal aliens" in Venezuela. This discredits Mateo Didoné, who was Director of the Caracas Centre for Migration Studies (CEPAM) in the 1980s, by claiming his estimates were conservative. However, Dávila also cites Bidegain and Freitez (1989), authors of the best study on Colombians in Venezuela (published by CEPAM), but fails to mention that these two note highlight among their main conclusions that "*for many years it has been accepted in various Venezuelan circles that there are millions of Colombians in the country. Previous studies, confirmed by this one, lead us to question this view. We can assert that at present (until 1986), there are no more than half a million of these migrants*" (1989:105).³⁴ It

³³ Del Valle University, Colombia. These comments are based on the original version presented by R. Dávila.

is interesting to note that this estimate is lower than that made by Urrea (1987:43) for that same year (619,926 immigrants³⁵).

In their study, Bidegain and Freitez also question the various assessments of the supposed negative socio-economic impact of Colombians in Venezuela in the 1980s: a) they show that the available data (source OCEI, Sample Household Survey, various years 1981-1986) "do not include substantive elements to support certain positions that blame Colombian migrants for overcrowding in maternity hospitals"; b) they demonstrate the heterogeneity of Colombian migration in Venezuela in terms of education, which improved the educational profile of migrants throughout the five years of the study. The authors affirm that "the information analyzed contradicts the view that Colombian migrants saturate educational services, since the number of Colombians attending educational centres has fallen both in absolute and relative terms" (p. 106); c) they show that the socio-occupational composition of Colombian migration is diversified. Their percentages differ from those presented by Dávila in Section D on the composition of Colombian immigration (which do not have a clear source or year and are not specific) in the mid-1980s. According to the authors there has been a significant increase in the Colombian employed EAP in manufacturing industry, while "there is little acknowledgment of the significant, and in the case of men increasing, number of Colombian professionals and technical workers over the last five years ..." (p. 107); d) the authors conclude that "another of the claims commonly made [see Dávila's speculative claim that in 1991 immigrants, mostly of course Colombians and other foreigners, were responsible for building 1.3 million shanty dwellings] is that Colombians live in shanties and inhabit the misery belts around the large cities. However, the finding of the present study is that most Colombians live in homes made from durable material or in apartments" (p. 106).

The risk inherent in the use of sources for analyzing the volume and impact of migrants in recipient countries, as we have seen in Professor Dávila's presentation, is complicated. It is true that few studies in the 1990s updated Bidegain and Freitez's work. However, I certainly do not believe that the problem of illegal immigration has evolved in the catastrophic manner outlined by the author in the case of Colombians. Below are some evident trends in Colombian migration to Venezuela.

According to estimates that provisionally update my 1980s work on the socio-demographic and socio-economic development and characterization of Colombian migration to the United States and Venezuela (Urrea, 1987: 39-69),³⁶ the number of Colombians abroad as of June 2000 (including second and third generation descendents) fluctuated between 4.8 and 5 million people. This is 11.4%-11.8% of the total Colombian population (42,299,301), an average net migration rate of 4 per 1,000 between 1995 and 2000, compared to 2 per 1,000 at the start of the 1990s (it reached its lowest level in the mid-1980s). If the growth rate of the Colombian population in Venezuela fell moderately from 0.53% (see Urrea, op cit.) to 0.5% between 1986 and the end of the 1990s, it can be estimated that there were some 750,000 Colombians in Venezuela in 2000. This group therefore accounts for only

³⁴ Unfortunately, Dávila is uncritical in his use of references. For example, on that same page he states: "a student on this issue, Norman Gall, affirmed that: 'immigration to Colombia has become the largest migration in the history of South America' (cited in Berglund and Hernández, 1985:63). The Speaker of the Venezuelan Congress at that time, Godofredo González, declared in this respect: 'Mass illegal immigration is our most pressing social problem' (*EL Nacional*, 11.4.1980)". By failing to refer to the socio-political context of these statements, and their challenge to serious demographic sources, the author decontextualizes the analysis. The results of Bidegain and Freitez's demographic analysis contradict these statements, which were made in the context of Venezuela's domestic political struggle.

³⁵ Estimates prior to the readjustment of the 1985 Colombian census, based on data adjusted by the 1993 census. With the readjustment the number of Colombians reaches 680,000 (including descendents) in 1986.

³⁶ Update of the data for this article, based on adjusted data from the 1993 population census and some preliminary data from the same survey on children living overseas by destination country. It is curious that Dávila does not cite any articles from the book in which this article appears (*Las Migraciones Laborales Colombo-Venezolanas*, edited by Gabriel Bidegain, ILDIS, Nueva Sociedad, UCAB, Caracas, 1987).

15%-15.6% of all Colombian migrants, compared to 47.8% in 1986 (and 59.7% in 1980, see Urrea, *op cit.*: 43). This sharp fall in Colombian migration to Venezuela has been offset by the significant increase in migration to the United States and, above all, to other countries (especially to Europe).³⁷

Additional problems for discussion

A second set of important observations on Professor Dávila's presentation on the social impact of migration concerns the following considerations:

- a) The economic cycle should be taken into account in all analyses of emigration and immigration trends, as a means of understanding the direction of flows and their intensity in both the country of origin and destination. True, Dávila makes various allusions to periods of prosperity and recession in the Venezuelan economy, but he fails to integrate these elements more fully into his analysis, and thus refers to the exaggerated presence of urban informality in Venezuelan cities without mentioning the severe recession that affected the Venezuelan economy. This is particularly important for understanding that in periods of high unemployment there is greater competition in the labour market between the migrant and indigenous population. There is, therefore, a rise in the native population's negative perceptions and in xenophobic behaviour towards immigrants, who are viewed as competitors for social programmes.
- b) More broadly, analyses of the social impact of migration in destination countries should take account of the persistence of exclusionary attitudes among the indigenous population (as outlined by Elias, 1997). Such attitudes almost always include xenophobic behaviour and discourses, which become more severe in line with the economic cycle and the political and social processes particular to those societies. Nationalist rhetoric plays a significant role in nourishing negative perceptions of "foreigners".
- c) Social impacts interact between countries of origin and destination. For example, Colombian migration to Venezuela in the 1960s and 1970s led to a significant decline in land pressure on Colombia's Caribbean coast until the mid-1980s. With the rise of return migration to that area, but above all because of a fall in flows, migration from rural and urban regions of the Caribbean coast led to an increase in demographic pressure in the coastal towns (Barranquilla, Cartagena, Santa Marta, Valledupar, Montería, etc.) and inland cities (Cúcuta, Bucaramanga, Barrancabermeja, Bogotá).
- d) Because of the above, there is a need to address the significance that a particular country has for migration flows from the perspective of the source society. In the 1980s there was a fall in the number of migrants to Venezuela from different parts of Colombia, despite a steady flow of pendular movements between Colombian migrants to Venezuela from the Caribbean coast and their families in Colombia (from the coastal cities and rural areas). Although Venezuela also received migrants from other regions of Colombia, including in the 1990s, most are accumulated cohorts of Colombian migrants from the Caribbean region and their Venezuelan-born descendants. This circumstance springs from geographical proximity and good road links through Cúcuta-San Antonio-Táchira and Maicao-Maracaibo.
- e) Remittances are affected by the characteristics of the labour market in the recipient country. In certain periods, cash remittances from Venezuelan migrants undoubtedly played a very important role in supporting the Colombian families of those migrants. This was especially true in the 1960s, 1970s and, to some extent, in the 1980s. However, because of the deterioration of the Venezuelan labour market, remittances have not played such a significant role over the last 15 years, although family exchanges are still important. These exchanges now take the

³⁷ The distribution of Colombian migrants overseas is as follows: 45% in the United States, 15% in Venezuela and 40% in other countries.

form of gifts, food and clothing (in both directions ³⁸) rather than remittances, and are particularly important between families in the cities and the rural areas of Colombia's Caribbean coast.

- f) The use of culturalist terms in an analysis of the social impact of migration ("changes to the customs and traditions of the local population", "transculturization") is problematic. More serious is the moralist and stigmatizing connotation of "the appearance of endemic illnesses and other social problems", given that the study examines very similar tropical regions.

The new social context in the country of origin

Two related factors have created a new context in the country of origin, Colombia. The first is the profound economic crisis, especially since 1998 (although signs of recession had been evident since 1996). This is the most serious crisis in the last 70 years and is likely to persist until 2001. The second is the intensification of armed conflict with its degrading and polarizing effects. These two factors have reversed previous trends and have hastened the flow of emigrants to an unprecedented level. As the armed conflict intensifies, neighbouring countries could be affected by the displacement of Colombian families, especially from among the rural peasantry. There is also migration among the urban population from all social classes (especially from the middle and upper classes) to countries such as the United States, Costa Rica, Spain, Italy and Canada – to cite the examples most often mentioned in the press. Such migration is more selective and involves people with patrimonial, cultural, educational and social capital. This phenomenon has, of course, not affected other longstanding migration of Colombian men and women from the lower middle classes to Europe and the United States.

³⁸ The Venezuelan economic crisis also affected Colombians who had settled in Venezuela. In many of these cases their families in Colombia have given them financial support.

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F. Conclusions

As the presentations in this chapter show, many factors frame the relationship between international migration and development. As one of these presentations demonstrates, the geographic redistribution of economic activities, the greater mobility of productive capital and technology, and the fall in international transaction costs are affecting the international redistribution of economic opportunities. It is likely that this will have a significant impact on migration trends.

Lower transport costs, improved communication and a transnational culture make the international movement of people increasingly easy and cheap. Segmented labour markets in developed countries attract immigrants who, once they accumulate social capital, strengthen the links between the areas of origin and destination. Migration therefore acquires a character of continuity and regeneration that can be strengthened through integration agreements. In general terms, this is how contemporary mobility and the prospects for it in the coming years should be understood.

The creation of economic blocs in the Americas is strengthening the forces of attraction and expulsion of people between countries, with flows that reflect the existing gap between rich and poor countries. The greater the asymmetries in terms of income, health, education and general opportunities, the higher the potential migration from poor regions to more developed ones. This will become all the more important if migration flows are liberalized in the context of a common market, an aspiration of some of the economic blocs. Recent economic integration and improved communications between the MERCOSUR countries has consolidated binational spaces with distinct characteristics, wherein migration is permanent and economic activities act as integrated regional markets. Some trans-border regions also have their own migration patterns.

It is important to note the transitory dimension of these circumstances. The short- and long-term effects of trade and investment on migration can be very different. In the short term they can lead to an increase in migration and therefore complement trade flows. This situation should be managed in such a way as to prevent the migration-associated problems of some countries from interfering with economic integration.

The foregoing prompts attention to the different goals of source and recipient countries. Reconciling migration and trade policies in free trade areas, especially in some regions of the Americas, is undoubtedly very complex. Recipient countries generally hope that trade liberalization will hasten the development of source countries and thus reduce migration. Source countries also hope to speed up their development through economic restructuring, but reducing the flows is not among their primary goals.

Limiting the need for migrant workers in some countries is one of the most hotly debated issues. To take the United States as an example, studies show that the poorest and least educated of migrant workers are not essential to certain economic sectors. This is not the case with better qualified migrants, who are in great demand because of their potential to increase the competitiveness of companies in a globalized world.

The direction of population mobility is linked to capital movements. While multinationals invest in less developed countries in search of cheap labour, workers from poor countries migrate in the opposite direction in search of better wages and higher living standards. Globalization, however, favours the mobility of more qualified and educated workers. The constant and growing need for specific expertise means that companies from developed countries find it easier to find the talent they need abroad, although not necessarily at a lower cost. In developed countries, the hiring of qualified personnel under flexible regimes has lessened interest in investing in human resource training, particularly when labour mobility leads to more aggressive hiring practices.

There is a wide-ranging and longstanding debate in Latin America on the "brain drain". This is gradually being replaced by proposals to stimulate "brain circulation" and "brain exchange" so as to offset the losses associated with emigration. These proposals have emphasized the mobility and exchange of highly qualified resources between the countries of origin and the developed world. The emigration of professionals and technical workers does not appear to stem from the "oversupply" of such workers in the countries of origin but to country-specific factors, such as the opportunities offered by the recipient countries and the type of migrant networks that continuously sustain migration.

Policy proposals on qualified emigrants largely focus on "re-linking" projects. In the past these activities were founded on good-will. The challenge today is to create networks and mechanisms to link emigrants with their home communities in order to complement or provide alternatives to policies of return that traditionally have had little impact.

Of particular interest for the migration of highly qualified people is the fact that the globalization of the mass media has not only improved access to information but has led to the homogenization of aspirations and values. This has created expectations of lifestyles and consumption patterns that are characteristic of the developed world. The dissatisfaction arising from the gap between expectation and reality underpins decisions to migrate.

Many unskilled immigrants are in jobs that the indigenous population does not want, either because the work is difficult or tedious, badly paid or of low social status. Many immigrants are overqualified for the jobs they occupy and often make a greater contribution to economic production than non-migrants. This contribution is often not recognized, while public opinion tends towards a negative view of the effect that migrants have on the social structure of the destination country.

Part 3:
**Governance of international
migration and multilateral
diplomacy**

A. International migration and the summit of the Americas

A.1 The Summit of the Americas (Santiago, 1998). Migrant worker initiative put into effect

Allan Jury¹

Introduction

At the 1998 Summit of the Americas (SOA) in Santiago, Chile, Heads of Government approved by consensus a multi-part Plan of Action,² including a new initiative not found in the 1994 Miami Summit: to promote the human rights of migrants, including migrant workers and their families. Subsequently the U.S. was designated as Responsible Coordinator for implementing this initiative with El Salvador and Mexico as Co-coordinators.

When viewed as a whole, the Migrant Worker section of the Santiago Summit Plan of Action reflects a commitment by Member States to undertake a number of activities, both general and specific. The consensus text is as follows:

¹ Director of the Office of Resources, Planning and Policy, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, U.S. Department of State, Washington D.C. (e-mail: a.jury@state.gov).

² There are 27 separate topics, or initiatives, included in the Plan of Action from the Santiago Summit.

"Governments will:

- Reaffirm that the promotion and protection of human rights and the fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction by reasons of race, gender, language, nationality, or religion, is a priority for the international community and is the responsibility of every state.
- Comply with the applicable international human rights instruments and, consistent with the legal framework of each country, guarantee the human rights of all migrants, including migrant workers and their families.
- Seek full compliance with, and protection of, the human rights of all migrants, including migrant workers, and their families, and adopt effective measures, including the strengthening of public awareness, to prevent and eradicate violations of human rights and eliminate all forms of discrimination against them, particularly racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance.
- Reaffirm the sovereign right of each State to formulate and apply its own legal framework and policies for migration, including the granting of permission to migrants to enter, stay, or exercise economic activity, in full conformity with applicable international instruments relating to human rights and in a spirit of cooperation.
- Seek full respect for, and compliance with, the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, especially as it relates to the right of nationals, regardless of their immigration status, to communicate with a consular officer of their own State in case of detention.
- Protect the rights of all migrant workers and their families, consistent, with each country's internal legal framework, by taking steps, in case they do not exist, to: 1) provide, with respect to working conditions, the same legal protection as for national workers; 2) facilitate, as appropriate, the payment of full wages owed when the worker has returned to his/her country, and allow them to arrange the transfer of their personal effects; 3) recognize the rights of citizenship and nationality of the children of all migrant workers who may be entitled to such rights, and any other rights they may have in each country; 4) encourage the negotiation of bilateral or multilateral agreements, regarding the remission of social security benefits accrued by migrant workers; 5) protect all migrant workers and their families, through law enforcement and information campaigns, from becoming victims of exploitation and abuse from alien smuggling; 6) prevent abuse and mistreatment of all migrant workers by employers or any authorities entrusted with the enforcement of migration policies and border control; and 7) encourage and promote respect for the cultural identity of all migrants.
- Support the activities of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights with regard to the protection of the rights of migrant workers and their families, particularly through the Special Rapporteur for Migrant Workers."

Implementation activities

On April 7th of this year, at the request of the Summit Implementation Review Group (SIRG),³ the U.S., as Responsible Coordinator, formally presented a detailed report on activities undertaken within the hemisphere to implement the Migrant Worker Initiative. The report ["Report to Summit Implementation Review Group (SIRG) on implementation of the Summit of the Americas Migrant Worker Initiative"], developed in coordination with El Salvador and

³ The SIRG is composed of National Coordinators from each SOA participant state and is the primary mechanism between Summits for overseeing implementation activities and planning for future Summits.

Mexico, was based on information voluntarily contributed by several (but not all) of the SOA participant states.

Since that document is readily available in its entirety on the official SOA website,⁴ the following are some brief general comments summarizing what the report examines in greater detail:

- There has been demonstrable progress towards implementation in a number of areas of this multi-faceted initiative. This has come about in two primary ways: through individual actions on the part of SOA participant countries; and collective actions by these countries in cooperation with international and non-governmental (i.e., civil society) organizations.
- Through bilateral as well as sub-regional labor agreements –those involving Argentina, Bolivia and Peru as examples of the former and the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) and MERCOSUR as examples of the latter– SOA participant countries have expanded the legal framework for affirming the human rights and employment opportunities of migrant workers in the Hemisphere.
- Also of particular importance in the implementation process, sub-regional dialogues and groupings have proven to be an effective means collectively to address issues and concerns relating to migrant workers and their families. The Regional Conference on Migration (RCM) is an excellent example of where such collective efforts have shared a common aim with, and have had a positive impact on, the SOA Migrant Worker Initiative. MERCOSUR and the NAALC are others. It is important to note that through dialogues such as the RCM and NAALC interaction with NGOs/civil society organizations has been consciously expanded.
- Many SOA participant countries are actively engaged in updating migration laws and streamlining existing procedures for migrant workers. This has been spurred on by the recognition that, given the rapidly changing dynamics of migration within the Hemisphere, a number of countries increasingly find themselves simultaneously sending, receiving, and facilitating the transit of migrants. Implicit in these actions as well is the recognition that much more needs to be done to address issues relating to this segment of the migrant population. The amnesty programs implemented by Costa Rica and Mexico (discussed more fully in the report) deserve special mention in this regard.
- There is general acknowledgement of the important role of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) in this process, confirmed most recently by the granting of official status to the IACHR during the Vth RCM Vice-Ministerial meeting in March of this year.
- The report on implementing the Migrant Worker Initiative also helps to confirm concentrated activity in several of the more specific action areas of the initiative by a number of countries, including the United States:
- additional steps to ensure equal legal protections for migrants with respect to working conditions;
- multilateral efforts to provide for remission of social security payments to migrant workers;
- efforts to combat alien smuggling;
- efforts to prevent abuses experienced by migrant workers at the hands of employers or at border crossings; and
- efforts to enhance consular coordination and notification.

⁴ Documents of the XVIII SIRG, found at the website address www.summit_americas.org or www.cumbre_americas.org established by the OAS Office of Summit Followup.

Between the time that report was presented last April and now, the United States has continued on with efforts to promote implementation of the SOA Migrant Worker Initiative. The Department of State, for example, undertook the following:

- On the domestic front, we arranged for the "Migration Dialogue" seminar project to convene a two- day workshop in Sacramento, California, in April just several weeks after the SIRG meeting. The workshop brought together a group of approximately forty U.S. experts from various sectors: public, private, advocacy, migrants, labor, and NGOs. Focusing on the action items of the SOA Migrant Worker initiative, the experts identified various existing programs and initiatives as suggested "best practices" that might be suitable for more extensive implementation within the U.S. (A spreadsheet summarizing these suggested "best practices" is found at Attachment 1.) A final report on this workshop has been posted and is easily accessible on the Migration Dialogue website.⁵
- The U.S. Department of State and IOM then held a companion workshop for Western Hemisphere non-governmental experts in June at the ECLAC/CELADE headquarters in Santiago, Chile. Again, implementing the Migrant Worker section of the SOA Plan of Action was the primary theme. Participating experts discussed selected programs and initiatives undertaken within the Americas and similarly developed sets of suggested "best practices" for possible replication within the Hemisphere. The workshop benefited additionally from IACHR's technical advice for this project, on the basis of a cooperative agreement between the Commission and IOM. (A spreadsheet summary for the international workshop is found at Attachment 2.)⁶

Preliminary considerations for the 2001 summit

In terms of the Santiago Summit, the present symposium, involving the participation of governments, international organizations and civil society, provides a most timely opportunity in several important ways: by stimulating greater awareness of the Migrant Worker Initiative on a hemisphere-wide basis; disseminating more widely information about activities undertaken; and by hopefully encouraging others to consider applying "best practices" that have proven effective elsewhere. Even more important, however, the symposium can help with respect to preparing for the next Summit, scheduled for April 2001 in Quebec City. Specifically, it can suggest how best to frame the issue of migration in our hemisphere at the onset of the new millennium; it can also assist in identifying specific action items for inclusion in the Quebec City SOA Plan of Action.

Experiences and insights gained as Responsible Coordinator in implementing the Santiago Migrant Worker Initiative prompt several observations –both in terms of the process itself and substance– as our collective focus increasingly centers in on preparations for Quebec City.

On the process:

- First, not all member states view this issue with the same degree of immediacy or national interest. Confirmation is provided in the disappointing level of response to the IACHR Special Rapporteur questionnaire sent to SOA participant states, as well as to our own invitation to provide voluntary submissions for implementation report. Further efforts will have to be made to gain a broader consensus on extending a higher priority to migration issues.
- Second, implementation necessarily has also had to be concerned with efforts to generate broader general awareness and recognition that, with the Santiago Summit, the theme of migration became an integral part of the Action Plan and is ongoing. This more than likely will also have to be a basic consideration following Quebec City.

⁵ The Migration Dialogue website address is www.migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/cfra.htm

⁶ The final report will be made available on a website set up by IOM.

- Third, mounting a coordinated implementation effort has an added element of complexity because issues concerning migrant workers cut across multiple lines of responsibility within each SOA participant country. In that sense, for future purposes it might be useful to consider the identification by each national coordinator of a single "migration/migrant worker" contact at the working level to facilitate communications and coordination.
- Fourth, again in terms of implementation, moreover, it might prove useful to consider establishing a more direct cooperative link between the Summit process and sub-regional dialogues –such as the Regional Conference on Migration and the incipient process developing in the Southern Cone– to ensure commonality of interest and greater coordination on action plans.

On the substance:

- Activities undertaken by states in the spirit of the Santiago SOA, working bilaterally and/or sub-regionally, give indication that a number of elements in the current migrant workers initiative will have been addressed satisfactorily by the time of the next summit. There appears to be sustained momentum, for example, in establishing multilateral legal frameworks enabling the movement and employment of migrant workers, and in securing for migrant workers portability of social security benefits and other services. This could allow for placing additional emphasis on other salient concerns, such as in the area of trafficking and smuggling of migrants, continuing discriminatory practices, and the special issues relating to migrant women and children.
- "Migration," in our view, deserves a meaningful place in the on-going work of the summit, but careful thought needs to be given to where the Summit process offers a "comparative advantage" in addressing on-going regional migration concerns. There are many fora for discussing migration bilaterally and sub-regionally. Where can the Summit process best offer a unique and significant additional contribution in this area?
- While consensus may result in continued focus on some aspects of the human rights of migrants, there would be benefits derived by examining this theme from other perspectives —from that of the relationship between "Migration and Development," for example— to help advance the migration debate at the next summit. The Summit of the Americas brings together senior economic and financial policy makers to a greater extent than other existing regional migration fora. This gives the Summit a potentially significant advantage in addressing the economic development issues that both give rise to migratory pressures and are themselves affected by migration-related financial flows, such as remittances.

In conclusion, it is my hope that this symposium will provide a set of focused recommendations that can help guide Summit of the Americas preparations as participating countries collectively decide in the coming months how to address migration issues when they gather for the summit in Quebec City next April.

Annex

Table 1
BEST PRACTICES FOR MIGRANT WORKERS: SANTIAGO SPREADSHEET SUMMARY

Managing Migration	Purpose	Best Practice	Note
Development that eliminates the need for migration	Promote market-oriented development that creates jobs and raises wages to provide opportunities at home	There were 20 trade agreements signed in the 1990s that aim to speed up economic and job growth in the Americas	Negotiations continue for a Free Trade Agreement of the Americans
Canadian seasonal farm worker program with Mexico and several Caribbean countries	Admit 15,000 seasonal farm workers a year to fill vacant jobs in Canadian agriculture	Admissions made under government-to-government agreements that spell out employer and worker rights and obligations in contracts; governments involved are very satisfied with the program	Canadian employers are institutionally involved in program administration
US seasonal farm worker program (H-2A)	Allow US farm employers anticipating vacant jobs to recruit foreign workers to fill them	US Dept of Labor and migrant groups seek to ensure that the program operates according to laws and regulations that protect US workers and the H-2A workers admitted	Legislation desired by US farm employers would relax current laws and regulations by e.g. substituting housing allowances for free employer-provided housing
Documenting Guatemalan migrant workers in southern Mexico	Mexican government seeks to provide documents to Guatemalans 14 and older who work in southern Mexico under the Formas Migratorias para Visitante Agricola.	Seasonal labor migration from Guatemala to southern Mexico has a long history. Documents help to prevent abuses of migrants at the hands of employers and authorities.	Mexico had to convince both employers and migrants on the virtues of documents. The Mexican government in 1999 concluded: "facilitating orderly migration maintains the circular flow of labor movement in specific geographic areas."
Anticipate and plan for immigrants via an immigration policy that satisfies the national interest	Canada has declared itself to be a country of immigration and a multicultural country that will (1) accept immigrants and (2) respect their cultures and traditions	Laws aim to reduce racism and xenophobia. by e.g allowing a higher penalty if the crime was committed for racist or xenophobic reasons	
Consular Notification	Purpose	Best Practice	Note
1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: US	Imposes an obligation on host nations to give foreigners arrested or detained abroad the right to notify their consulates to receive assistance, so they can get help to understand what may be a strange legal system	US Dept of State has developed educational materials for state and local enforcement agencies on the 1963 Vienna Convention; Washington State has developed programs to ensure that local prosecutors and jails notify foreigners arrested or detained	Inter-American Court of Human Rights has issued an advisory opinion that, inter alia, the failure to inform a third country national of the right to consular access affects the guarantees of due process.
1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: non-US	Gives foreigners arrested or detained abroad the right to notify their consulates to receive assistance	There is an increased sensitivity to the 1963 Vienna Convention throughout the Western Hemisphere	It appears that foreigners arrested are frequently not told about their consular rights. Special problem: children with no documents that country of origin does not recognize as nationals

(continues)

Table 1 (continued 1)

Return and Reintegration	Purpose	Best Practice	Note
Guatemalans from Mexico: long-run resettlement	Some 45,000 Guatemalans fled to Mexico during 1980s civil war; many returned (8,600 families) in 1998-99 under a voluntary IOM program carried out with the cooperation of the Mexican and the Guatemalan governments.	Women who had developed non-traditional handicraft activities continued them after return. At least 15,000 children were born in Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s, automatically acquiring Mexican nationality, and they were able to stay in Mexico if they wished.	Need to emphasize return and development that involves the returnees, so that both the migrants and those who stayed in Guatemala worked for economic improvement rather than resuming conflicts
Paisano program: short term information and complaint procedure	Launched in 1990 to assist Mexican migrants in their different needs when returning to Mexico. Provides returning Mexicans with a complaint procedure if they suffer abuses at the hands of Mexican authorities	Program is changing its orientation to reflect the fact that many returning Mexicans are coming as tourists who intend to return to the US, not as migrants intending to stay in Mexico.	An estimated one million Mexicans return to Mexico in December each year; they receive information on their rights and responsibilities.
Welcome home in El Salvador: short-term reintegration services	Provide services under an IOM-administered program to migrants returning permanently from the US and other countries	Returning migrants can call their families and offer them transportation to their home areas or up to 3 days lodging in San Salvador	Of the first 5,000 migrants assisted, about 15 percent were returned criminal aliens. Need to provide development assistance in the migrants areas of origin
Migrant Protection, Anti-Discrimination	Purpose	Best Practice	Note
Protection for migrants on the Mexico-US border	Develop an entirely new protection group in Mexico drawn from federal, state, and local agencies to avoid corruption and ensure migrant safety without interfering with migrant efforts to reach the US	Grupo Beta launched in Tijuana Mexico in 1990 to protect migrants in the border area from criminals. Has spread to most of Mexico's border areas to prevent crime against migrants without interfering with their attempts to leave Mexico for the US, and attempts to detect and arrest abusive smugglers.	US Border Patrol also conducts search and rescue missions in summer for migrants stranded in mountains and deserts
Mexico-Guatemala border	Guatemalans and other Central Americans as well other foreigners are often secured on the Mexico-Guatemala border and returned to Guatemala	Guatemalans living near the Mexican border can obtain documents to enter Mexico for up to 30km for 72 hours. NGOs in Tecun Uman and other border cities provide services to them.	Mexico returns several hundred foreigners apprehended every day on the Mexican-Guatemala border; 105,063 in 1995. Private Mexican citizens sometimes detain migrants without documents.
Anti-Racism and Xenophobia efforts	Acknowledge that racism and xenophobia can impede migrant integration.	Allow migrants to participate in conferences so they can explain the existence and costs of racism and xenophobia	World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance in South Africa in 2001. Racism and xenophobia can also lead to emigration from migrants' countries of origin

(continues)

Table 1 (continued 2)

Migrant Protection, Anti-Discrimination	Purpose	Best Practice	Note
Integrate Nicaraguans in Costa Rica	Promote acceptance and limit exploitation of up to 200,000 Nicaraguans who settled in the northern part of Costa Rica	Education and mediation used to highlight the importance of migrants and reduce tensions by dispelling myths about the migrants.	Catholic church and NGOs work to ensure that migrants earn at least minimum wage
Women migrants	Women are the majority of refugees, sometimes join husbands abroad, and are increasingly pioneer migrants	Many nations are developing more data on female migrants, programs to detect and protect women who have been the victims of sexual exploitation or exploitation of maids in private households. Some countries are giving women who migrate to join their husbands abroad an independent immigration right so they can escape abusive relationships	More countries need to recognize (1) the growing importance of female migrants by regularly collecting and reporting data on migrants by sex and (2) vulnerabilities of female migrants, including maids and women trapped in abusive relationships
Temporary Protection and Regularization	Purpose	Best Practice	Note
Temporary Protection	Permit persons fleeing civil conflict, natural disaster, and other emergencies that lead to mass emigrations	Enactment of national laws that offer temporary protection, provide protection in areas near the migrants' area of origin to facilitate returns; embrace burden sharing, so that one country or area does not bear full costs of providing temporary protection	Planning for return should begin as soon as the migrants needing protection arrive. US provided TP for 106,000 Hondurans and Nicaraguans in the US on December 31, 1998, extended until July 5, 2001
Integrate persons who cannot return after temporary protection was provided: Costa Rica	Costa Rica permitted 152,000 Nicaraguans to obtain one-year renewable residence and work permits between February and July 1999	Costa Rica is using foreign and local funds and IOM technical assistance to build and refurbish schools to benefit both migrant and local children	Providing integration assistance that benefits both migrants and local residents reduces tensions
Regularize migrants: Argentina	Argentina had legalization programs in 1958, 1964, 1986, and 1994—the 1994 legalization regularized 230,000 persons. By some estimates, over 800,000 foreigners were legalized since 1958	Legalization improves migrant status, but the benefits of legalization must be clear to migrants and their employers, and the costs of legalization must be low. NGOs should be involved to increase migrant trust in the process	Most migrants enter with 90-day tourist visas; they can stay in Argentina if they find formal sector employment. Regularization that does not change the structural conditions for migrants can renew exploitative working conditions.
Smuggling and Trafficking 3 P's - Prevention, Prosecution, and Protection	Purpose Minimize dangers and prevent exploitation of migrants by educating migrants to avoid smugglers and the dangers associated with them, raising penalties and cooperating to prosecute smugglers, protect migrants who cooperate with enforcement agencies from retaliation.	Best Practice Mexico and the US operate joint information campaigns in border areas to warn of the dangers of illegal entry. US is considering adding a T-visa category to permit migrants who cooperate with law enforcement agencies to receive a visa which leads to immigrant status	Note

(continues)

Table 1 (continued 3)

Smuggling and Trafficking	Purpose	Best Practice	Note
Offer legal channels for entry	Make immigration policy sensitive to e.g. long waiting lists for family unification and desire of migrants to earn high wages	Offer family members who will eventually be permitted to immigrate definite entry dates	There is a discussion over whether legal guest workers can be a substitute for unauthorized migrants who use smugglers and traffickers
NGO services for persons apprehended and trafficked	Provide services to Central Americans detained in Mexico and street children in cities; work with local governments on information campaigns that warn migrants of the dangers of smugglers.	NGOs have more flexibility to provide services to detainees and street children; their reintegration is most successful if conditions at home change to make emigration less necessary	Stronger families and more economic opportunities near home prevent the need for emigration and the perils of smugglers
Integration and Culture	Purpose	Best Practice	Note
Integrate migrants and their families in the host society: Canada	Help migrants to learn the host country language and understand its laws and customs. Teach tolerance; integration involves change by both migrants and already settled.	Involve migrants in the design and operation of one-stop integration programs, which ensures that the materials and programs are useful to the migrants and sensitive to migrants' cultural origins	Canada has found that involving migrants in program design and administration, making services fully accessible to migrants, and provide long-term funding to stabilize programs and agencies
Celebrate the migrants' home culture: Brazil	Migrants abroad take an interest in and want to maintain ties to their home countries while abroad	Migrants in Brazil celebrate their national holidays while in Brazil; laws that e.g. prevented migrant children from attending school in San Pablo have been eliminated	There have been three legalization programs in Brazil: 27,000 persons were legalized in 1981, 30,000 in 1988, and 39,131 in 1998
IOM-assisted integration of Nicaraguans in Costa Rica	Some 152,000 Nicaraguans received one-year renewable residence permits in 1999	"United we do more" integration program in Costa Rica is improving schools and other infrastructure to enhance educational facilities for both migrants and local residents.	Use of local mediators to resolve conflicts; special programs for illiterate parents and difficult cases, including Nicaraguan children who are old for their grade level
Hometown clubs: Mexicans in the US	Hometown clubs or associations are nonprofit organizations created by Mexicans in the US to maintain links to areas of origin	Many hometown clubs invest in the migrants' area of origin, and local governments in Mexico sometimes match hometown club remittance investments to create jobs in migrants' areas of origin	There are about 1,500 Mexican hometown clubs in the United States in June 2000—up from 750 in 1990.
Dual nationality and bilingual education	Help persons maintain ties to two countries	Many countries are acknowledging dual nationality and developing programs that strengthen the language ability of both newcomers and established residents	
Legalization	Catholic Church supports legalization of unauthorized Colombians in Ecuador	Church participates in an NGO network that advocates human rights for migrants	Migrants also leave Ecuador; 480,000 left in 1999, 110,000 did not return from the US and Spain

(continues)

Table 1 (continued 4)

Integration and Culture	Purpose	Best Practice	Note
Network of NGOs to prevent the scapegoating and exploitation of migrants	Influx of migrants into Argentina at a time of high unemployment led to an anti-immigrant backlash.	In January, 1999, Argentine President Carlos Menem said that unemployment and rising crime in Buenos Aires were "closely connected to illegal immigration." An Argentinean bishop said the government was falling into an "anti-immigrant psychosis." A network of human rights organizations advocates on behalf of migrants, pointing out that restrictive legislation can increase the number or unauthorized.	Argentina is a net immigration country; skilled out and unskilled in. Immigrant origins shifted from Europe to neighboring South American countries, especially Bolivia, Peru, and Paraguay. Children can be legalized only through their parents, so if parents do not legalize, their children can't go to school.
Migrant rights	Catholic Church works for rights of migrant workers	Operates houses for migrant assistance that served 200,000 persons in 1990s, including 127,000 in Mexican border cities, followed by 40,000 in San Paulo, Brazil. Brazil's last amnesty was in 1988, when 35,000 migrants were legalized.	There is a "Migrant Day" in most Latin American countries to raise awareness of migrant contributions and problems.
Regional Processes	Purpose	Best Practice	Note
Regional Conference on Migration (Puebla Process)	Promote regional cooperation in migration related issues; enhance capacities in migration management; develop regional mechanisms to protect human rights of migrants and cooperate to fight trafficking	Develop and implement a plan of action to improve conditions for migrants and cooperate to better manage migration	Member countries are committed to promote full respect for the human rights of migrants, "regardless of their immigration status"
South American Encounter on Migration, Integration and Development	Nine countries met in Lima in July 1999, with a follow up in Buenos Aires in May 2000.	Countries asserted that "respect for the human rights of migrants constitutes a basic concern of the countries of the region."	Participating governments have promised to modernize and strengthen their migration agencies, and cooperate technically and financially to better manage migration.
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)	Went into effect January 1, 1994 to lower trade and investment barriers in North America	Aims to speed up economic and job growth in member countries. The migration provisions in Chapter 16 permit relatively free movement for persons with a BA or more who have a job offer in another NAFTA country	Mexico is limited to 5,500 TN visas a year until 2003; there were 27,000 TN admissions into the US in FY96
Caribbean Community (CARICOM)	Free trade between 15 Caribbean countries	Since January 1996, there has been freedom of movement for graduates of accredited universities in some professions	CARICOM is working on permitting passport-free travel by nationals within the region, and harmonizing social security benefits

continues

Table 1 (conclusion)

Regional Processes	Purpose	Best Practice	Note
Central American Common Market (CACM)	Four countries— El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua—allow 90-day visa free entry for CACM nationals	CACM is making progress toward freedom of movement within the region that protects migrant rights	
Andean Community	Aims for free trade between Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela by 2005	Declaration 116, Andean Document on Labor Migration, envisions eventual freedom of movement that protects migrants	
Southern Common Market (Mercosur)	Mercosur announced plans for a Mercosur passport in 1997. In 1998, an MOU was signed that called for the mutual recognition of university degrees to facilitate the free movement of professionals between the six countries	Member countries aim for free trade and investment as well as eventual freedom of movement, and countries met several times to lay the framework for labor mobility and protecting migrants' human rights.	December 1998 Declaration of Worker Rights calls for the protection of workers' rights throughout Mercosur but makes no reference to freedom of movement within Mercosur.

Table 2
BEST PRACTICES FOR MIGRANT WORKERS: SPREADSHEET SUMMARY 6/7/00
ATTACHMENT 1: U.C. DAVIS BEST PRACTICES WORKSHOP APRIL 26 – 28, 2000 FULL REPORT: HTTP://MIGRATION.UCDAVIS.EDU/RMN/CFRA.HTM

Anti-Discrimination	Purpose	Best Practice	Note
Office of the Special Counsel	Prevent and remedy hiring discrimination	Educate small businesses and immigrants about their rights and responsibilities;	Make grants to NGOs to educate small employers and immigrants
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission	Prevent and remedy employment and other discrimination	Educate small businesses and immigrants about their rights and responsibilities; make unauthorized workers eligible for most remedies	Cooperate and coordinate education and enforcement with NGOs and community groups
Employee Handbooks	Employers lay out policies	Constrains employers and employees to follow employment policies	Mutually beneficial to employers and migrants
Mediation Services	Resolve disputes informally but fairly	Mediation and binding agreements are confidential, low cost, and quick way to resolve disputes between employers and workers.	Oregon has sponsored mediation since 1990, and is achieving a 95 percent success rate
Employer Personnel Management Education	Educate employers about effective management of their workers	Dispel myths about workers as target earners; educate employers so that they are not surprised by the variance in piece rate earnings, i.e., faster pickers can earn 4-5 times more	Many migrants are "exotic" to employers; many employers do not spend the time to understand their employees
Protect Human Rights			
Safety in Border Areas	Deter unauthorized migration rather than allow entries and aim to maximize apprehensions; keep the border a safe place	Regular consultations between INS and Mexican consuls and between INS and Mexican units that deter crime in border areas; joint warnings about the dangers of unauthorized entry via mountains and deserts	INS has toll-free numbers to report missing persons, air patrols, and mounts joint search and rescue efforts with Mexican authorities
Professional immigration officers	Minimize abuses against vulnerable migrants	Have an effective complaint procedure under which an independent body considers complaints and proposes remedies	Helps to encourage consistent application of laws
INS Workplace Enforcement	Deter employment of unauthorized workers	Subpoena I-9 forms before work place inspections, ask workers to clear up discrepancies before INS interviews, and interview only those with discrepancies	Avoids work place raids that disrupt production, inconvenience legal workers, and put workers who flee in danger

(continues)

Table 2 (continued 1)

Protect Human Rights			
Adherence to 1963 Vienna Convention	Allow foreigners arrested to contact their consular representatives	Many states and cities have policies that instruct police to inform apparent foreigners arrested of their Vienna Convention rights	Court decisions say INS officers in border areas cannot stop and check people solely based on their race or ethnicity.
Labor Rights			
Migrant capacity for self-enforcement	Help workers to ensure that employers obey labor laws voluntarily	Minimize illegal immigration so that employers are required to pay minimum wages and abide by other labor laws in order to obtain workers	
Equal labor law rights	All workers, regardless of legal status, have the right to join or form unions and to engage in union activities	Under CA ALRA, union elections are quick, so that migrants can vote before they must move on to another job; labor contractors cannot be employers for bargaining purposes	
Equal remedies for migrants	Restore workers to the economic status they would have had without the violation, and deter violations of worker rights	Under federal and state labor laws, employers who violate worker union rights by e.g. firing them must normally provide them with back pay; lawful migrants must be reinstated	
Interagency coordination of enforcement agencies	Encourage employers to abide by labor laws	TIPP in CA uses teams of federal and state inspectors to deal with multiple problems at one time	More inspections and fewer violations found in CA
INS-DOL-MOU of November 23, 1998	Redefines cooperation between federal labor and INS work place inspectors	DOL inspectors end practice of reporting suspected immigration violations to INS IF the DOL investigation was triggered by worker complaints	Meant to encourage unauthorized migrants to report violations of labor laws
So. CA Worker Exploitation Task Force (part of National inter-agency Worker Exploitation Task Force)	Identify and prosecute employers who exploit employees	Enforcement agencies meet quarterly to deal with combinations of criminal activity and labor and tax law violations	Fulmer Cattle—100 migrants paid in cash and housed in poor conditions; Van Essen Egg —fire in worker housing killed one worker and prompted investigation
Providing Legal Services	Ensure that migrants receive equal protection under US laws	Develop specialized network of lawyers that can represent migrants	Providers want the opportunity to represent migrants abroad

(continues)

Table 2 (continued 2)

Labor Rights					
Transportation Safety	Ensure that migrants without cars are transported safely to and from work in areas without public transportation	Increased regulation of private raiteros, the van services that provide rides to and from farm work for \$4 to \$6 daily. Use games to teach migrants driving rules/customs	California enacted new laws and stepped up enforcement after 15 workers in a farm labor van were killed in August 1999		
Annual Migrant Labor/Services Meeting	Inform migrants and employers of laws and obligations, and promote coordination within and between agencies providing services to migrants	Each agency protecting or providing services to migrants explains its mission, and answers questions from migrants and their employers	Held in the evening to maximize migrant participation		
Worker Safety	Protect workers in often dangerous occupations	Train the trainer approach to make migrants familiar with dangers in US work places; develop mechanical aids with worker input to reduce injuries			
Benefits and Services Portable Benefits	Maintain eligibility for earned benefits in social security; provide benefits to families outside US	Have earnings reported correctly to Social Security; get SS benefits abroad. Have payments for health insurance for families abroad deducted from US earnings			
Health Services	Ensure that migrants and their families have access to health care	In addition to publicly funded migrant clinics, private clinics with flexibility can help migrants to use public and private insurance to cover their health care costs	Blue Shield of CA in June 2000 became the first HMO licensed to provide health services to workers on both sides of the border; benefits the 40,000 Mexicans who commute from Tijuana to San Diego daily		
Coordinating Migrant Services	Coordinate the efforts of MSFW assistance organizations to provide services to migrants and their families	Persuade agencies to cooperate to more effectively provide migrants with a range of services; jointly apply for funds to increase services available			
Savings	Facilitate ability of migrants to achieve US goals, including home ownership	Develop credit unions for migrants; encourage banks to establish programs to teach migrants about savings and mortgages			Savings programs can benefit all parties involved—migrants who get houses, employers who get more stable employees, and banks
Remittances	Minimize costs and maximize development impacts of remittances	Lawsuit forces transfer companies to fully disclose costs and provides funds to NGOs to educate migrants; remittances can be matched by local governments in Mexico to maximize development impacts			Hometown associations can be the vehicle in the US for funneling migrant savings into job creating investments abroad

(continues)

Table 2 (conclusion)

Children, Communities			
Migrant Education	Maintain continuity in teaching for children who attend two or more schools each year	Develop a student transfer document that migrants can carry with them, or access via schools or consulates, so that new schools know where to place migrant children	New program in development to transmit school records between US and Mexican schools
Adult Education	Educate migrants about their rights and responsibilities in the US	Programs that are sensitive to low educational levels of migrants, their origins in areas with low levels of civic participation, and the desire of many migrants to be transnational	Programs that (1) involve migrants as teachers and (2) hold classes where migrants live, seem to be most successful
Family Unification	Permit US citizens and immigrants to sponsor their close relatives for admission	Flexible rules that avoid dependence on public assistance but permit admission and permit e.g. poor children to receive health care	INS has declared that participation in programs such as the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) (Healthy Families in CA) will not be considered evidence that a migrant is likely to be a "public charge"
Smuggling	Deter migrants from using the services of smugglers	Prevention, Prosecution, and Protection: Educate migrants to avoid smugglers, raise penalties on smuggling, protect migrants who testify against smugglers from retaliation	US is considering adding the T-visa to the current S-visa to permit migrants who testify against smugglers to become immigrants

A.2 International Migration and the Summit of the Americas

*By G.C.J. Van Kessel*⁷

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, Thank you for inviting me to speak to you about international migration and the Summit of the Americas. Canada will host the Third Summit next year and is a major country of immigration. It is, therefore, highly appropriate that, as Canada's representative, I address the topics of the migration issues and problems that accompany globalisation, the challenges that this poses for national and international migration management systems, and the opportunities that the Summit of Americas can provide to deal with rapidly evolving migration issues.

In Canada we consider immigration to be extremely important. Historically, immigration has strengthened our economy, our institutions, and society in general. It has contributed to forming our national identity as a multicultural country. Since the Second World War, Canada has accepted close to 7.8 million immigrants or almost 150,000 annually. Since 1990, our annual intake has been just under 230,000 or about 0.7% of our population. In proportion to our base population, Canada is among the nations that have accepted and integrated the highest number of immigrants and refugees in the world. Roughly 4.5 million people, some 15% of Canada's population of 30 million, are foreign-born. In the early twenty-first century, the impact of immigration is most apparent in Canada's urban areas. Our immigrants are a major constituent of the vibrant economic, social and cultural lives of our cities. Fifty-five per cent of Canada's foreign-born population live in the three largest cities of Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver. Fully 80% of all immigrants in Canada live in cities with populations of more than 250,000. In Canada, we believe that it makes economic and social sense to invest in well-managed legal immigration systems and programs, which contribute to the over-all development of Canada, but also to the communities and individuals that are the building blocks of our nation.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, Historically, most aspects of the global migration phenomenon have been summarized under three headings: first, forced migration, second, labour migration and third, family migration. Forced migration touches the lives of many millions caught in international wars and, increasingly today, in internal ethnic conflicts. It is difficult to estimate accurately how many people are forced to leave their homelands as a result of conflicts, but it seems likely that there are more than 30 million forced migrants in the world today. The international community's response through direct state action and through international organizations shows the importance of this issue. Labour migration is essentially economic in nature. Through it people move to other countries and often to other continents in order to increase their economic opportunities and better their lives. By migrating, they transfer their skills and contribute to the development of their new countries' economies. At the same time, by preserving family and social contacts with their homelands and by sending large remittances home they are contributing to the development of their home countries. Family migration is the social counterpart of labour migration, but also of forced migration. Through it family members join immigrants in their new homelands. Because family migration includes dependents who are often not destined to the labour market, it may have financial and social costs and requires sensitive policy and program approaches both by immigrant receiving and migrant sending countries.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, What is it about globalisation that is changing migration and our understanding of it?

⁷ Ph.D. Director General Refugees Branch Citizenship and Immigration Canada Symposium on International Migration in the Americas San José, Costa Rica, September 4-6, 2000

The central element of economic globalisation is the exponential growth in the global exchange in goods and services. This is in part caused by and in part accompanied by extremely rapid advances in information and transportation technologies. The migration counterpart of the growth of technologies and the global marketplace is the growth in labour mobility. With rapidly increasing needs for high-skilled labour, especially in the high technology sectors of developed countries, multilateral trade agreements such as NAFTA and the WTO are loosening existing controls on labour mobility between states. In the free trade area of the EU, these controls have already been removed.

Indications are that economic globalisation and global trade liberalisation will continue to grow for the foreseeable future. This implies that the need for high-skilled labour will also continue to grow and will be accompanied by further multilateral efforts to continue to liberalise international labour migration. However, this also implies that normal controls used by states to manage labour migration are being weakened. Traditional approaches to managing labour migration may be eroding. There are several questions that are on the table as a result of these developments. What will be the long-term impact on international labour mobility? How far can these tendencies continue? What is the role of national governments and what is the role of multilateral organisations to manage this process? Migration professionals, in co-operation with international trade and technology specialists, will need to collaborate in addressing these questions to ensure the continued ability of migration management systems to handle the migration challenges posed by economic globalisation.

A second aspect of globalisation affecting migration is transnationalism. Globalisation is accompanied by much higher international mobility with a greater number of people than ever before living outside their countries of birth or nationality and with many people frequently moving between several countries and having residences in several countries. This changes traditional patterns and poses a range of new questions about nationality, citizenship and residence. What do dual or multiple nationalities imply about the rights and obligations of people? How are issues like national military service, taxation, social benefits handled when people habitually live in more than one country and have more than one nationality? Again, these questions pose important challenges to states' management systems. Being transnational questions, they require bilateral and multilateral consultations.

A third area with an important impact on contemporary migration issues is demography. Our world is facing two very different demographic situations. Many developed countries have below replacement fertility rates, which will lead to declining populations. Developing countries have high fertility rates and rapidly growing populations, many of whom are being pushed to migrate. A critical issue for developed countries is whether immigration can be used to counter their declining populations. Increased immigration is no easy answer for the demographic dilemma. To maintain their populations at current levels, many developed countries would need very high immigration levels. This raises some basic questions, particularly for European countries, which do not regard themselves as countries of immigration. This is less the case for Canada: as a traditional country of immigration we do use immigration to moderate the effects of our low rate of fertility on our population. We know that immigration cannot by itself resolve either the problem of overpopulation in migrant sending countries or the problem of falling populations in immigrant receiving countries. But we have also learned that well-managed immigration can contribute to mitigating demographic problems and can act as a catalyst to development.

A fourth important contemporary trend that accompanies globalisation is the growth of migrant smuggling and trafficking. The numbers of people living outside their home countries are at their highest historical levels and are continuing to grow. Well over half of all countries in the world experience migration whether as sending, receiving or transit countries. It is estimated that at the present time some 150 million people are living outside their countries. Much of this enormous floating population is searching for new homes. Countries of immigration can accept through legal

immigration only a small fraction of them. This has led to the rise of large-scale illegal migration. States have taken countermeasures, exercising their sovereign right to manage their borders and stop the arrival of illegal migrants. But with the continuing pressure to migrate, small-scale smugglers, who previously smuggled migrants, have been replaced by organised transnational crime networks, which not only smuggle migrants, but traffic them into illegal activities in the target countries. Organised criminals, seeing a lucrative money making opportunity, are taking advantage of gullible, easily victimised people searching for new homes by any means. The global people smuggling and trafficking business has reached unprecedented levels and is continuing to grow. According to a recent rough estimate this is a 10 billion US dollar per year business. We know that Chinese nationals from Fukien are charged 50,000 US dollars each to be smuggled to North America. The trafficked migrant is a victim in bondage to the trafficker and his debt is usually paid off by years of illegal work, often in degrading, exploited occupations like the sex industry. The enormous profits and relatively low risks associated with people smuggling and trafficking are now in the hands of sophisticated international criminals, dealing in a range of profitable crimes. In addition to people smuggling and trafficking these include activities such as drug smuggling and money laundering. Trafficking in the most vulnerable human beings, especially women and children, keeping them in bondage and using them for illegal occupations, is one of the most vicious aspects of this clandestine international trade.

We must learn to control the activities of the people smugglers and traffickers. We need to do this both through our own national efforts and through international co-operation, including especially the negotiating of effective international legal instruments like the UN Convention on Transnational Organised Crime and its Protocols on Migrant Smuggling and Trafficking.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, Let me now turn my attention to migration in the context of the Summit of the Americas. Canada will be honoured to host the Western Hemisphere Heads of State at the Third Summit of the Americas next year. The Third Summit will build on successes of the previous two summits in the USA and Chile. We must keep in mind that the Summit is not a single event only, but a process. Over the next eight months, hemispheric governments will be involved in negotiating the text of the 2001 Summit Declaration and Plan of Action. In the area of international migration, we believe that the Summit provides a unique opportunity to look at all facets of the migration phenomenon, both positive and negative, and to focus attention on results-oriented and practical activities to be considered for inclusion in the Summit Plan of Action.

Regarding the positive aspects of international migration that we may consider for inclusion in the Summit's Plan of Action, I would like to highlight three approaches to the migration phenomenon that create prosperity and foster the realization of the human potential for both migrant sending and migrant receiving countries. First among these approaches is legal immigration; second, the investment effects of migrant remittances, especially investment in productive activities; and third, schemes to facilitate labour movement between countries such as temporary migrant worker programs.

Let me start by considering the last of these approaches. I know that there are several migrant workers arrangements in the hemisphere. Still, I would like to focus on Canada's initiative, since this is the one I know best. Our Seasonal Agricultural Workers' Program is a good example of a successful initiative for creating prosperity and fostering development. Since 1966, this program has enabled tens of thousands of foreign seasonal migrant workers to work in Canada in a controlled, legal manner, with the protections and rights enjoyed by Canadian workers. These workers receive fair wages and living conditions and Canadian farmers receive reliable and skillful temporary labour when they most need it.

Two seasonal worker accords are in effect, one with Mexico and the other with the Caribbean countries. Since its inception, this program has had a consistently positive impact on the migrant workers and on both sending and receiving countries. Based on our experience, we consider that the major advantage for the host countries of temporary migrant worker programs is the alleviation of

temporary and critical seasonal labour shortages. For the workers, the advantage is the receipt of well-paid, secure employment with guaranteed social benefits through which their dignity and human rights are fully protected. The major advantages for sending countries are the contributions brought by the migrant workers' earnings to development in the workers' regions of origin, but also the exposure of the migrants to different work and cultural settings, providing them with additional skills and raising their social and cultural awareness.

A second major positive impact immigration is the sending of remittances to the migrants' home countries and their effect on local economies. In many Latin American and Caribbean countries, remittances are one of the largest earners of foreign currency positively competing with major traditional exports in several Central American countries. Remittances play an extremely important role in economic development as major sources of investment and have income and employment multiplier effects which lead to significant increases in national income, finance imports, and make important contributions to the balance of payments. On the local community level, remittances provide a welcome source of income for family members of migrants remaining in the sending countries, substantively raising standards of living and providing much needed cash for food, clothing, and shelter, but also medical care and education. In many cases remittances provide a safety net for families during difficult economic times. Migrant groups living abroad often pool their resources to fund community projects in their homelands, thus affecting the lives of people outside of migrant families. As hard currency is being spent, demand is increased and unemployment is lowered.

Over all, remittances contribute significantly to the expansion of economic opportunities and the raising of living standards throughout Latin America and the Caribbean and assist in improving the quality of life for migrants and their families. The Summit of the Americas can further develop the use of remittances in productive, employment-creation sustainable activities by encouraging the involvement of financial institutions and specialized international agencies in this area.

Finally, I would like to focus on the role of well-managed legal immigration systems and their contribution to prosperity and the realization of human potential. In the Canadian experience, by investing in immigration policies and social integration programs, we are encouraging fair employment practices in our economy. Early on, immigrants have access to broad opportunities to increase their language and labour skill levels and cultural exposure to different patterns of living and working. This can provide their home countries with significant economic and social advantages if the immigrants return home. These formal and informal skill transfers and growth in cultural awareness are difficult to measure. Yet, these may be among the most important positive effects of immigration, especially in an age of globalization, and may contribute most to the development of the sending community.

We should also keep in mind that well-established immigrant communities in the receiving countries maintain cultural and trade links to their home countries. These links are extremely important contributors to the continued economic development of the sending countries, but they also contribute to social and cultural changes in receiving countries: witness the transformation of North America's cities by vibrant immigrant communities.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen Unfortunately, international migration also has its negative aspects, especially when it is unmanaged. Illegal migration is on the rise in the Western Hemisphere. Networks of organized international criminals smuggle migrants under dangerous conditions, often victimizing and exploiting them and trafficking them into degrading and illegal activities. International cooperation among the countries of the hemisphere is imperative to combat the serious increase in this phenomenon. As I stated previously, when discussing smuggling and trafficking in the context of globalisation, Canada believes that current negotiations on the development of the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols dealing with Migrant Smuggling and Trafficking are an important

international effort to remedy this situation. We encourage our partners in the hemisphere to actively support these protocols.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, In considering how to identify and negotiate results-oriented activities for consideration in the Summit of the Americas Plan of Action, we can benefit by examining an existing model. The Regional Conference on Migration of North and Central American countries and the Dominican Republic, also known as the Puebla Process, can serve as a good example of regional co-operation on migration.

The Puebla Process was established in 1996. It was created and continues to function with the support, participation, and cooperation of international organizations such as the IOM, the UNHCR, and ECLAC. Recently, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights also joined the group. Its founding principles are to promote dialogue, cooperation, consultation, respect for migrants' human rights and technical cooperation on migration, as well as to consider the links between migration and sustainable development in a regional context. The reconstruction and transformation efforts in Central America following Hurricane Mitch in October 1998 clearly demonstrated the relevance of this approach, as attention was focused on attacking vulnerabilities, whether social, political, environmental, or economic. It was also recognized that transformations should occur in a democratic setting. Thus, the Puebla Process has become an important regional mechanism for promoting the positive ties between migration and development. As such, it serves as a fine example of how multilateral dialogue and consultations can promote good governance and capacity building in the area of migration, while also establishing approaches to combat migrant smuggling and trafficking.

It should also be emphasized that the Puebla Process provides an important forum for government to civil society consultations. Thereby, the process allows grass roots social forces to have an input on governmental policy making on migration issues.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, Faced with the challenges that international migration presents, we must take steps to deal with them in a cooperative and collaborative manner. Using the Puebla Process Plan of Action as an example, we can build, strengthen, and harmonize our institutional capacities through cooperative approaches and information sharing in a hemispheric context. Regional approaches have a demonstrated capacity for fostering international cooperation and we should encourage regional migration initiatives within the hemisphere. In this context we welcome the recently inaugurated regional migration process of South American countries. We must encourage and promote well-managed legal immigration programs that foster development and human growth, and ensure that remittances continue to strengthen the economies of sending nations. The Summit of the Americas provides us with the opportunity to continue promoting dialogue, cooperation and information sharing regarding international migration in the Western Hemisphere. Through this process, we can work together to foster and nurture strong and viable economies through legal immigration, contributing to the development of our countries and respecting the human rights of migrants within healthy and prosperous societies and, at the same time, fight migrant smuggling and trafficking.

Thank you.

A.3 Comment by Juan Martabit³

Juan Martabit makes a number of suggestions for enhancing the Plan of Action of the Third Summit of the Americas, held in Canada in 2001. These include the following:

- a) *Local initiatives*: strengthen each country's institutional mechanisms for implementing or proposing migration policies, with participation from government bodies (customs; police; health, education and labour ministries; magistrates and municipalities), legislators, entrepreneurs and civil society generally.
- b) *Bilateral initiatives*: expand north-south cooperation on migration issues through more active dialogue — as occurred in the Puebla Process, for example; encourage cooperation among southern countries on topics such as temporary border crossing cards; social security arrangements; migratory regularization programs; cultural and social development programs, facilities for sending remittances; and specific rules and agreements for seasonal workers.
- c) *Hemispheric initiatives*: support for regional and multilateral organizations involved in migration issues; funding for specific studies on migration and related problems; approval of a "charter of rights and obligations for the migrant workers of the Americas", based on instruments currently in force and supported by new initiatives; and, lastly, assistance for countries in difficult economic situations that receive migrants from neighbouring countries in the wake of natural disasters, with all the social and economic consequences that this implies.

A.4 Comment by Manuel Ángel Castillo⁴

This comment refers to the presentations by Van Kessel and Jury, who draw attention to progress made on several aspects of the treatment and administration of international migration in the Americas, particularly since the Santiago Summit. The progress actually achieved is varied, however, in terms of design, instrumentation and application, and this needs to be analysed and evaluated.

The greater population mobility in the region needs to be measured not only in terms of the number of people on the move, but also by their diverse demographic and social composition. Moreover, the range of motivations for migration has become more complex, as has its impact on all spheres of society, in both origin and destination countries, and along migration routes.

Globalization clearly has a direct impact on population mobility, along with parallel processes such as economic integration or trade liberalization agreements. Nonetheless, economic activity, supported by agreements to facilitate the mobility of capital and goods, have proven more effective and efficient than measures to encourage mobility among the workforce needed to sustain productive structures, in decent conditions and with guarantees for workers' fundamental rights.

This is illustrated by the recent changes in recipient country migration policy aimed at attracting and absorbing highly skilled labour. Nonetheless, migration policies tend to ignore the secondary effects of expanding such specialized resources, which in turn require services that have to be provided by human resources that are often not available in sufficient quantity and quality in the places of immigration.

The emergence of "transnational" communities resulting from migration and the organization of migrants, has raised a series of new questions concerning the upholding of rights and the fulfilment

³ Ministry of Foreign Relations of Chile.

⁴ Research professor at the Centre for Economic and Demographic Studies, El Colegio de México.

of certain obligations. As such populations develop links and status in relation to more than one State, mechanisms are needed to guarantee and protect their rights — including political ones — and to safeguard the interests of the nations involved, through the fulfilment of obligations arising from being citizens or nationals of more than one country.

One of the most important political developments of recent years has been a decisive turn towards democracy. This has been a particular concern in the Americas, especially in countries that are currently the source of international migratory flows. In these cases, it has meant opening up participation to broad sectors of the citizenry, especially in terms of expression of interests and needs of the protagonists in social processes. Migrants, especially in the "unauthorized" category, face major difficulties in giving expression to their feelings, needs and interests, and in drawing attention to violations and restrictions of their rights — particularly in places of destination and transit, but also in terms of the basic causes of migration in their places of origin. Renewed efforts are needed to investigate and analyse the situation and opinions of migrant populations — both current and potential — to design and implement suitable policies.

Civil-society organizations have also clearly become more active in defending, protecting, and assisting migrant populations, and these have earned the respect and trust of people who migrate for a variety of motives. In general, migrants are exposed to a range of practices that exploit their vulnerability. Frequent reports of human rights violations have led to growing demands for protection, encouraging such organizations to publicize and denounce the problems faced by migrant populations in a variety of spheres.

Dr. Van Kessel acknowledges that the growth of migration, and the difficulties many migrants face in achieving success, have led to a proliferation of support mechanisms, including transnational criminal networks. Without wishing to ignore this extreme situation, I believe there is a very widespread tendency to stereotype such phenomena as "human trafficking or contraband", when in fact there are a number of mechanisms for supporting and channelling irregular migrants. In my opinion, the heterogeneous and complex world of clandestine population movements across borders and along migration routes calls for a variety of approaches and measures, including taking energetic steps against those who abuse people's rights and exploit their situation..

Not all the people and institutions involved support migratory movements for the same purpose or with the same objectives. The degree of criminality or delinquency varies from case to case, so the people involved require different treatment. Sometimes the migrants themselves become the target of maltreatment and sanctions by authorities that lump them together with those they hire to help evade controls. There is no precise assessment of the degree to which government policy measures spawn new ways of overcoming them, with a consequent cumulative effect on the search for irregular forms of assistance.

"Migrant trafficking" is nothing new; what is notable in today's world are the dimensions to which such practices have grown, the modalities adopted, and the effects of irresponsible actions on migrants' human condition. Nonetheless, the success of such illegal activities is largely facilitated by protection and collusion involving government agents linked to the networks and organizations that carry such activities out. In fact, control operations seem to focus on the network extremities, in other words at the operator level. There are very few effective actions aimed at dismantling such organizations and prosecuting their leaders, and even fewer arrests and sanctions aimed at the government agents that protect them. For that reason, the issue of impunity requires special attention if we want to act against such illegal practices.

From the standpoint of nation-states, the concept of migration that is "legal", "regular", "documented", or "authorized", implicitly invokes their notion of sovereignty. The definition of this concept varies in response to the interests and circumstances that recipient or transit countries are experiencing. Hence there is a need to strengthen dialogue between countries that are linked by migratory flows, in order to recognize the contribution made by migrants and the need to adapt regulations to different circumstances without undermining fundamental rights.

In the broader context of international relations, upholding the human rights of nationals from other countries tends to be a sensitive issue. Rules restricting the free movement or entry of foreigners in transit or destination countries are often administered arbitrarily and are usually afforded considerable discretion under the law. It is not unusual for such relatively lax administration to conceal discriminatory, xenophobic and racist attitudes; or worse still, they admit the presumption that migrants have ulterior motives for seeking authorization. In many cases, the evasive attitudes adopted by people requesting authorizations are precisely their way of responding to the arbitrary attitudes applied or encouraged in admission policies. In addition, there is still much to do among broad sectors of society in recipient and transit countries to raise awareness of the need to avoid rejection of people who are merely seeking to improve their standard of living, and often contribute to economic, social and cultural development in the countries that accept them.

Much has been said about the probable effects — in the family, community and macroeconomic domains — of remittances sent back by migrants to their communities of origin. It is desirable that such resources be used to stimulate productive activities with the potential to create jobs and, thus, in the long-term, help contain emigration. So far, however, experiences have been extremely limited and contrasting. Much remains to be done to extend the direct effects of remittances on family economies, and turn such funds into effective elements for development — broadly defined — in their countries of origin.

Both authors agree on the benefits of cooperation in the various modalities adopted in the Americas to tackle the challenges of international migration. These include forums and coordination mechanisms between countries, including the Summit of the Americas itself and the Regional Conference on Migration (also known as the Puebla Process). Both processes have attempted to foster dialogue and cooperation between the various government mechanisms, international agencies and civil society organizations. An exchange of views has thus been initiated aimed at raising awareness among decision makers — both executive and legislative — and among development institutions in order to channel resources in that direction. Ultimately, the challenge is to uphold the rights of populations that are currently forced — for one reason or another — to leave their places of origin and integrate into environments that offer the chance of better conditions and life opportunities, but without any guarantee that such goals will be attained and with the possibility of suffering violations of their fundamental rights and dignity.

B. Multilateral consultation on international migration

B.1 Reflections on the "Puebla Group": in pursuit of an pending dialogue

*Gustavo Mohar*⁵

Introductory clarification

When I received the invitation from ECLAC-CELADE and IOM to make a presentation at the panel on "Multilateral consultation on international migration", I decided my contribution to the Symposium on International Migration in the Americas could be to describe my personal experience in the creation and the initial steps of the Regional Conference on Migration (CRM), in which it was my pleasure and privilege to participate. My presentation should therefore be interpreted as a strictly personal appreciation and not as reflecting the opinion of the Mexican Government.

I will briefly describe the origins, creation, work carried out, and a number of ideas for the future of CRM, which is also known as the "Puebla Process" in reference to the Mexican city where this wide-ranging and diverse group of countries from the Americas met for the first time.⁶

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⁶ Member countries are Belize, Canada, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and the United States. In addition, Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador Peru and Jamaica attended as observers.

Origins

The migration of Mexican nationals to the United States is one of the most important social phenomena in Mexico's history. Migration affects, sometimes decisively, the economic and cultural life of millions of Mexican people and thousands of communities. For the Mexican government, protecting its citizens abroad, and particularly those located or residing in the United States, has always been a priority and a source of tension and disagreement with its counterpart.

Mexico sees migration to the United States as a social reality based on a labour market that transcends borders, driven and sustained by social and family networks built up over decades. In contrast, especially in recent years, the United States has seen Mexican immigration essentially as a problem of controlling its southern border, and in terms of infringements of its migration laws by people entering and settling in its territory without the necessary documents.

In addition, however, Mexico is also a migrant transit and destination country itself. Its own southern border is crossed daily by thousands of people intending to travel through Mexico to its northern border and then enter the United States. The Mexican migration authorities arrest and return to their country of origin over 100,000 people every year, most of whom come from the Central American isthmus. In recent years there has been a notable increase in undocumented migrants entering Mexico from other parts of the world, also heading for the United States.⁷

In addition, for several decades Guatemalan families have migrated on a seasonal basis to work on coffee plantations in the south east of Mexico, returning to their places of origin a few months later.

In 1994, a new cycle of anti-immigrant sentiment broke out in the United States, partly caused by the economic recession in certain regions of the country. This was mainly expressed through Proposition 187 — an initiative by a group of Californian citizens supported by the then Governor of California, Pete Wilson. The problem spread beyond California's borders to feature in the presidential debate of 1996, and culminated in what is generally considered to be the most wide-ranging and ambitious legislative reform in the long history of United States migration laws.⁸

The two governments already had a specific bilateral forum for dealing with migratory and consular affairs. During their deliberations, it became increasingly clear that there was a need for deeper understanding of the true scope, causes and effects of this phenomenon. They came to realize that the issue cannot merely be approached as a matter of enforcing the law, but requires a much broader interpretation that recognizes its multiple facets and multinational nature. This gave Mexico the idea of expanding the bilateral dialogue to embrace other countries in the region affected by migratory flows across their borders and through their territories.

From March 1996, when the Group first met, until today, when we are convened to attend the Symposium on International Migration in the Americas organized by ECLAC-CELADE and IOM, the work done by the Puebla Group can fairly be considered as a success, in defiance of widespread predictions that it would be shortlived. These were based on the inherent risks in a topic such as intraregional migration that takes place throughout the region from Panama to Canada.

⁷ Activities report. National Institute of Migration, Mexico, 1999.

⁸ Mohar, Gustavo, "Los Retos de la Migración a la Frontera Norte: ¿Cooperación o Conflicto?" Forthcoming

This vast territorial space, with its historical, political, social, economic and cultural differences, in itself represents enormous analytical and interpretive complexity, given the very different and particular ways of understanding, legislating and experiencing the transnational population movements that take place through these nations.

The United Nations Organization has reported that nearly 125 million people are currently living outside their countries of origin,⁹ migrating either temporarily or permanently for reasons that vary from armed, racial or ethnic conflict to the pursuit of better life chances. The Americas are no exception. Increasing migratory flows are visible today from Alaska, with its deeply rooted presence of Mexican workers in the salmon industry, to the countries of the southern cone, whose history is founded largely on European migration during the last century. Today, significant population movements between southern cone countries continue, as well as from other parts of South America, Africa and Europe. Similar examples can be found on the southern border of Mexico and throughout Central America.¹⁰

In retrospect, it was a major challenge to set up this Group just over four years ago, and the doubts, resistance and uncertainties at the outset arose naturally from the heterogeneity of the countries that were called upon to participate in it. In simple terms, the very origins of each country in the Group have been heavily influenced by the presence and history of international migration. Suffice it to mention the United States whose history is inextricably linked and explained by massive European, Asian and Latin inflows. Few issues continue to arouse such passion and heated debate as the role and place of the migrants that continue to arrive, and their integration into the United States economy and society.

As a result, the conversations and consultations held between governments gradually developed a consensus on the scope, commitments and general objectives to be pursued in convening the first meeting of this Group

A key issue in setting up the Group was to establish the importance of involving each country's foreign policy authorities, along with those in charge of migration policy. This yielded the following benefits:

- As a government forum, that did not aim to generate commitments but rather to share experiences and exchange information, the intention was to be part of the international representation of participating governments. Population movements have been a constant source of conflict and tension in each country's bilateral relations with its immediate or regional neighbours.
- In nearly all member countries, migration policy is associated with policies for protecting their respective borders, and hence forms part of the domestic national security and/or public-safety agenda. The enforcement of domestic laws on migration has an impact that transcends national borders; but this is seldom taken into consideration when drafting and passing legislation.
- In each country there is natural competition and overlap of jurisdictions. The viewpoints of civil servants responsible for international relations and those in charge of enforcing laws on migration are not always the same, despite the necessary interaction between them.
- The forum provided an opportunity for exchanging experiences with a view to tackling shared problems, comparing legislation and establishing a dialogue not only between member country delegations, but also within each one.

⁹ International Organization for Migration (IOM), "La migration en el continent Americana", document prepared for the First Regional Conference on Migration, 1995.

¹⁰ Final Report. International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, Egypt, 1997

- The thematic priorities and focus of foreign-policy makers had to be negotiated and balanced with those of the migration authorities. As a result, a balance of sectoral interests has been maintained from the first action plan adopted in 1997 in Panama, through to the latest vice-ministerial declaration signed in Washington D.C. in 1999.¹¹

There were many consultations and government visits in the months leading up to the Puebla meeting. This involved a delicate and confidential process aimed at overcoming resistance and generating a favourable climate to persuade delegates to this first meeting that participation would at least be a constructive experience.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)

Although the Puebla Group is a government forum, a variety of NGOs from member countries have participated from the outset. Like other multilateral forums that give civil society an increasingly important role in their tasks and work programmes, this was no exception. A large number of civil, community and religious organizations work on a daily basis with migrants in all the countries participating in the Group. It was therefore only natural that a forum of this type would be of interest to them.

Just as government representatives have developed modes of operation and organization along the way, NGOs had to start by identifying the organizations existing in the area, establish contact and then discuss and agree forms of coordination, in order to reach common understandings on their participation in the various meetings held to date.

Initially the presence of NGOs was questioned by some sectors of the governments participating in the Puebla Group. Not only were there doubts about the scope and objectives of the Group, but the governments involved had to weigh up the benefits and risks of NGO participation. Time has shown that their presence not only was not conflictive, but in fact was fully consistent with the objectives and guiding principles of the Puebla Group.

In the initial meetings, NGOs were limited to submitting written comments to delegates along with recommendations for the work of the Group and their attitude towards the regional issue.¹² During the meeting in Ottawa, Canada, CRM met with NGO representatives for the first time, and a respectful and fruitful exchange of ideas and opinions was held.

Since then, relations between the two parties have become closer, and during the final CRM meeting held in Washington in the spring of 2000, the NGO group made a valuable contribution by presenting a document on minimum standards for the detention and repatriation of migrants, which was warmly welcomed by the official delegates. It was agreed to analyse the proposals contained in their document and convene a special meeting to discuss them. Each government will have to decide on the best way to make use of this information.

As mentioned above, an additional positive effect arising from this forum is that it has stimulated contact between Canadian, United States, Mexican and Central American NGOs. Its communication network has expanded gradually but periodically, with opinions being exchanged and proposals being developed jointly for the Puebla Group. In short, the aim of educating public opinion and improving understanding of migration in the region is being fulfilled.

¹¹ See Internet page: www.crmsv.org/crm.

¹² Joint declaration of non-governmental organizations, Mexico City, March 1996. See www.mexicousadvocates.org.

International agencies

Ever since the first meeting in Puebla, member countries have received invaluable substantive and logistic support from several regional and international organizations. These include the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) acting through the Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE).

Both organizations have contributed expert studies and reports on the subject, which have helped to focus and structure the discussions that have taken place. A review of the recommendations made in the regional consultation groups and seminars held to date, proves how important the contribution of the invited international agencies has been to its deliberations.

Other organizations that have made important contributions include the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). These agencies have been invited to special sessions to relate their experiences and share available information in order to enrich the corresponding discussions.

The presentations made by financial organizations in the Seminar on Migration and Development, held in Mexico City, clearly revealed unexploited potential in their technical assistance programs, and even financing for development projects in the region, which could alleviate the causes of the unemployment, poverty and marginality that force their inhabitants to emigrate.

Another body that helped define the organization and working mode adopted by CRM in the past is the Inter-Governmental Consultations on Asylum, Refugee and Migration Policies in Europe, North America and Australia (the IGC Secretariat). This forum brings together experts and authorities responsible for enforcing laws and applying their countries' migration policies. On the principle that the best way of doing this, given the political sensitivity of the issue for all members, is to avoid signing formal agreements or making binding recommendations, it has achieved a climate that fosters a real and frank exchange of experiences.

The IGC Secretariat also operates with a tight budget and a minimal permanent staff, both of which have also been features of the Puebla Group.

Puebla

The general impression among those attending the technical discussions at vice-ministerial level has been positive from the outset, and the prejudices and doubts described above rapidly dissipated. A reading of the joint communiqué issued on that occasion faithfully reflects what delegates wished to express in their initial statement of consensus. It is a text that incorporates the various priorities and points of view expressed at the Puebla meeting. While setting out the objectives and principles justifying the meeting and laying down procedural norms for its future work, it also contains specific mandates governing its orientation and continuity. The following quote exemplifies this:

"Governments expressed their pleasure at the positive and cooperative spirit that characterized the debates ... they recognized the need to continue constructive dialogue on this important issue in order to strengthen regional cooperation on migration.

They agreed to monitor the agreements adopted in a technical meeting, and to hold a further political meeting next year in Panama."

Although the above now appears typical of a communiqué of this type, it was not a simple matter getting it adopted; on the contrary, it was the outcome of intense negotiations. Some delegates

considered that this conference should be the first and last of its kind. Others felt it required technical follow-up, and the advisability of a political meeting should be left pending. Nonetheless, to the credit of those responsible for the vice-ministerial meeting, there was consensus that the experience was worthwhile, that while there were risks, the issue and agenda were sufficiently relevant both domestically and in bilateral and regional terms, to fully justify making the additional effort to meet again.

From Panama to Washington

I do not intend that this document should give a detailed description of the evolution of the Puebla Group from its first meeting in 1996 to its latest vice-ministerial meeting held in Washington D.C. in March 2000.¹³

Nonetheless, the nine technical meetings (known as Groups for Consultation on Migration), together with the six specialist seminars and the five vice-ministerial conferences, show that this group of countries has succeeded in maintaining a regular pace of activity covering a wide variety of issues. They have shared the multiple focuses encompassed by this vast and complex social phenomenon. The list of meetings is as follows:

- First preparatory meeting and first Regional Conference on Migration. 13 and 14 March 1996, Puebla Mexico.
- Second Regional Conference on Migration, 13 and 14 March 1997, Panama City, Republic of Panama.
- Third Regional Conference on Migration. 26 and 27 February 1998, Ottawa, Canada.
- Fourth Regional Conference on Migration, 28 and 29 January 1999, San Salvador, El Salvador.
- Fifth Regional Conference on Migration, 21 to 24 March 2000, Washington D.C.

In addition to this list, the following thematic seminars were held during this period:

- Seminar on migrant trafficking, held in January 1998 in Managua, Nicaragua.
- Seminar on human rights and migrants, held in April 1998 in Washington D.C.
- Seminar on international migration and development in North and Central America, held in May 1998 in Mexico City, Mexico.
- Seminar on migration, return and re-integration, held in June 1999 in Tegucigalpa, Honduras.
- Seminar on consular protection and assistance for migrants, held in September 1999 in Guatemala City, Guatemala.
- Seminar on women and child migrants held in February 2000, in San Salvador, El Salvador.

As this list shows, the work done in these specialized meetings has gradually embraced the principles and objectives originally proposed by the Puebla Group countries. In their initial joint communiqué, delegates stated the following:

"Governments recognize that the origins, manifestations and effects of migration, including refugees, are important issues on the international agenda ... migration is a complex historical phenomenon ... governments acknowledged differences between perceptions in each country on the causes, dimensions and consequences of migration. They agreed that a comprehensive, objective and long-term approach to the origins, manifestations and effects of migration in the region would contribute to a better understanding of the phenomenon, help to counteract anti-immigrant attitudes and strengthen relations between participating States."

¹³ Idem. See the website of the virtual secretariat of the Regional Conference on Migration.

Part of the success of the multilateral negotiations stems from the fact that the texts approved embrace points of view, interests and approaches shared by all, or at least most of the delegations present in the negotiations. At the same time, clear language is needed to ensure that the objective agreed on any given occasion, is interpreted in the same way when it is put into practice or implemented. A detailed reading of the joint communiqué issued in Puebla and the action plan adopted in Panama are good examples of this.

The various priorities that each country in the Group brought to the discussion and analysis of international migration have all been fully addressed during these years. The topics discussed in the technical meetings and seminars have been approached by treating migration issues as a matter of enforcing the law and combating human trafficking. Other forums dealt with the issue by stressing the social and human effects of population mobility, especially undocumented migrants; there was also analysis of the economic advantages and disadvantages for migrants' countries of origin, relating migration to the wider issue of economic development in the countries of the region, especially those to the south of Río Bravo. In brief, it has faithfully reflected the comprehensive nature of the migration phenomenon, as mentioned above, and the inherent complexity of its origins, causes and effects.

Two cases are worth mentioning that exemplify the variety of tasks, approaches and purposes that have been invoked in these years.

1. Extraregional migrants

Since the initial meeting, the participants in this process have recognized that one of the most conflictive aspects of migration in the region is the arrival in some countries of migrants from other regions, from both the American continent and elsewhere. This is closely related to one of the most critical facets of international migration, namely human trafficking.

This phenomenon is clearly not exclusive to the region. On the contrary, trafficking in human beings is currently a universal reality, sustained by criminal organizations that profit from people who decide to leave their places of origin in search of better opportunities. The issue of human trafficking today is one of the priorities on the international agenda in nearly all of the multiple forums of regional and international organizations.

In the Panama Plan of Action, approved in 1997, the Puebla Group asked OIM to submit a proposal for a structured analysis of this activity, including some possible operational solutions taking into account experience gained by transit and final destination countries on migration from other parts of the world. Following the Ottawa meeting, countries received a draft proposal from IOM, which was considered a year later at the meeting in El Salvador.

This topic encapsulates the legal, political and social complexity that countries of the area face when migrants from other regions arrive in their territories. The vast majority are heading for the United States, which continues to be the pole of attraction for thousands of people intending to enter that country's labour market; and to achieve this aim, a wide variety of highly sophisticated ways to enter the United States, has been devised by air, land or sea.

For countries that act as staging posts in this migratory process, particularly Central America and Mexico, the presence of such migrants is not only costly in terms of their maintenance while attempting to send them back to their countries of origin, but also involves constant diplomatic and legal friction with the migrants themselves and their governments. There is also the high human cost that most migrants have to pay, by travelling in extremely unhealthy conditions, in which they risk their physical integrity and are subject to constant abuse by those who are supposedly providing them a service.

This is a good example of the sensitivity and complexity that discussion of this issue implies for the countries in the Group.

The IOM proposal provoked a lively exchange of opinions, information and experiences that facilitated multilateral dialogue, perhaps for the first time, on a reality that has existed in the region for many years. Governments had to talk to each other, taking full account of each other's sovereignty, the differences in their respective legal arrangements, and the different political realities faced both domestically and in their bilateral or subregional relations.

The work carried out, with active cooperation from IOM, made it possible to sustain a dialogue under shared premises, while respecting the freedom of each country to adopt the commitments that most suited their own interests. It is worth quoting the text of the recommendation adopted at the fourth meeting of CRM, when it asked IOM to

"... draw up a proposal for a general programme of cooperation in returning migrants from outside the region, based on the mandate of the Organization. Each government will decide with IOM the specific terms for implementing it, in accordance with its needs.

2. The Virtual Secretariat

One of the main objectives of the Puebla Process since its inception has been to promote better understanding of migratory phenomena, encouraging an exchange of information and experiences between member countries, but also taking advantage of the work of NGOs and other international forums involved in the topic. The general aim is to educate public opinion, our societies, on the importance of international population movements in the history of our countries and in the region at large.

In order to make progress on this, seminars were held, along with meetings of the consultation group on migration, and vice-ministerial conferences. All such meetings sought ways to monitor the commitments adopted, and at the same time achieve a more widespread dissemination of the work, conclusions and recommendations reached during this period.

There has always been a clear consensus that the work of the Group should minimize the expenses and costs inherent in any multinational exercise. Accordingly, in the search for a practical formula for sharing responsibility between participants, the experience and infrastructure of international organizations most closely connected to this issue resulted in the current CRM host country assuming temporary responsibility, sharing this with the country in charge of organizing the next meeting. This gave rise to the concept of Pro-Tem Secretariat.

The next step was a decision to create a Virtual Secretariat for CRM. This idea arose from experiences in Central American countries and in other intergovernmental consultation and cooperation groups — particularly IGC as mentioned above. A large number of opinion exchanges and technical meetings were held, which made it possible to define the characteristics and objectives, and the technical and financial requirements to make this informatics tool a reality.

The January 1999, the vice-ministerial meeting in El Salvador agreed to establish this virtual secretariat, instructing an *ad hoc* working group to be set up, open to all members, with support and participation from IOM, to propose a specific mechanism for putting the virtual secretariat into effect.

In fulfilling this instruction, technical experts from member countries worked together to find the best alternative to enable the virtual secretariat to adequately fulfil its objectives. In its latest meeting held in Washington, in March 2000, the fifth CRM inaugurated the virtual secretariat of the Puebla Process on the Internet (<http://www.crmsv.org>).

This website has two sections: one public and the other private. The first has open access, enabling any interested party to obtain the most relevant information on the work of CRM. The private section is restricted, since its purpose is to provide an opportunity for discussion, information exchange and dialogue between authorized users. The vice-ministers also approved guidelines and operating rules for the virtual secretariat to exploit information technology in order to reduce costs, facilitate

coordination, create accessible and effective databases and disseminate them, and establish a permanent discussion forum for people wishing to participate in the exercise.

3. Final thoughts: looking to the future

At its latest meeting held last March in Washington D.C., CRM adopted the Vice-Ministerial Declaration for Strengthening the Regional Conference on Migration. It is worth quoting some of the key concepts contained in this statement:

"At the start of the new millennium and on the occasion of the fifth meeting since inauguration in Puebla, the governments of the 11 member countries of the Regional Conference on Migration reiterate the importance of this forum as a mechanism for dialogue and for sharing experiences of migratory phenomena. This forum enables us to strengthen cooperation between member States and to suggest a comprehensive, objective and long-term approach for dealing with the manifestations, origins and effects of migration in the region."

With this introduction, the relevant authorities acknowledge the benefits of the process and reiterate its scope and boundaries: it aims to provide opportunities to facilitate dialogue, share experiences and strengthen cooperation on migration.

In addition, a number of principles were adopted that have arisen over the years, while others were reiterated having been adopted from the outset, such as:

"Immigration is a fundamental component of the societies of all CRM member countries. Our nations are composed of a fusion of cultures from the new and old worlds. We carry within us contributions from many peoples, and this makes us dynamic, optimistic and forward-looking societies."

"We reaffirm that a comprehensive, objective and long-term approach to migration is the most effective way to reduce any negative impact and to make the most of its multiple benefits."

Setting out the next steps to be taken, the vice-ministers stated:

"Our priority this year will be to evaluate activities undertaken to date, in order to consolidate progress and identify areas requiring additional effort. These actions are aimed at ensuring the permanency of CRM, regardless of any changes in government in our respective countries."

"We must develop better formulas for governmental action on migration issues."

In the light of the above, I would like to make a few final comments:

- The formation of the Puebla Group exemplifies the possibility of multilateral cooperation in one of the most complex and sensitive issues on the contemporary international agenda, namely international population mobility. The Groups' existence is testimony to the need for imaginative ways to enable governments to talk to each other, while respecting their sovereignty, on an issue that needs to be reappraised. In an increasingly globalized economy and culture, the adoption of unilateral policies is becoming less and less satisfactory.
- Given their eminently social and human impact, transnational migratory movements cut across the work of governments and increasingly involve civil society. The experience of the Puebla Group confirms that government and non-governmental organizations can provide mutual feedback based on their own experience and view of this issue, while respecting their differences.
- The Mexican initiative to convene the CRM countries provided an opportunity to develop a constructive dialogue on one of the most sensitive and complex social phenomena faced by

our societies for many decades. Intraregional migration has been a constant source of friction between neighbouring countries in the region, which are confronted by the dilemma of responding to domestic political pressures calling for strict application of migration laws and border control, and the reality of migrant flows driven by varied and profound structural causes of an economic, social, cultural and family nature.

- International population movements are not confined to the Americas, but represent one of the most complex challenges facing the community of nations today, with millions of people on the move from south to north, from east to west, from one continent to another and within them, challenging traditional concepts of national sovereignty. CRM members include origin, transit and final-destination countries in regional and extra-regional migration, but display large differences in development levels that create asymmetries which fuel the supply and demand factors characteristic of any labour market.

The challenges that faced the Puebla Group at its inception, stemming from the natural reluctance of governments to get involved in something that could easily have become a forum for recrimination, dispute, insurmountable differences or even requests for economic or technical assistance lacking either foundation or viability, were overcome by the decision to define CRM as a forum for consultation and exchange of information and experiences.

- The balance achieved in practice thanks to the presence of diplomats and national migration policymakers, explains why in its various political and technical meetings, the discussions and conclusions have been notable for their objectivity and balance. On many occasions, delegates have discovered that they are facing common problems in their daily life, in the interpretation of their regulations and in the solutions that experience has led them to adopt. The benefits are intangible but consistent with one of the goals of this group, namely achieving a deeper understanding of this social phenomenon.
- In a short space of time, the Puebla Group has attained a key position among international organizations and intergovernmental groups specializing in this field. The region's governments have received many requests from Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and South America for information about their experience with a view to adapting it to their regional needs.
- The joint communiqués issued by the vice-ministers, together with adaptation and adjustment of the plan of action, the recommendations and conclusions emanating from the six seminars on specific migration issues, contributions made by NGOs, and the working documents prepared by the various international regional organizations that have assisted in these tasks, jointly constitute an extremely valuable bibliography. Its dissemination and analysis needs to be encouraged. This document bank fills an information need concerning the magnitude, importance, variety and complexity of the causes and consequences of regional migration. It will be essential to keep the virtual secretariat permanently up to date and technically maintained, to enable it to fulfil its dual role as source of public information and privileged conduit for consultation and communication among civil servants working in this field.
- In recent years, every country from Canada to Panama has been discussing the modernization of migration laws and the institutions responsible for enforcing them. In this period, comprehensive legislative reforms have been introduced in several of these countries, including the United States and Canada. In Central America, the typification of migrant trafficking is a positive and much-needed step in the region. In Mexico, a new awareness has developed of the role of migrants in the United States and on the way it affects our society and economy. At the same time, a long-awaited dialogue has begun between Guatemala and Belize to find better ways of dealing with the migratory flows they generate. Inclusion of the Dominican Republic is a further manifestation of links with the Central American isthmus and the advantages of subregional cooperation.

- Although a thorough understanding of migration requires a holistic approach to the subject, the Puebla Group also needs to evaluate achievements so far and identify tasks for the future, in order to set an agenda that will maintain and indeed strengthen the support and interest of its members.

As mentioned above, achievements to date are on the whole positive. Nonetheless, it will be crucial to sustain an open dialogue, to specify the Group's objectives more precisely, and better define its profile, its possibilities, and hence the benefits that each of its members should expect.

The task set by vice-ministers for 2000, of evaluating the various programmes in the plan of action, should be carried out rigorously in order to keep them up to date, and maintain links with the priorities and problems facing member countries. The agenda should not be extended beyond what is feasible to undertake.

The Group should seek topics of common interest enabling it to act jointly viz-à-viz other regional organizations and/or financial bodies and international cooperation agencies. It needs to act as a bloc, with a common front, in obtaining financial, technical and human support to enable it to maintain progress and obtain additional results to the benefit of its members.

One final thought: in Mexico, and in other CRM countries, migration will not only continue, but will require greater attention and political will from both governments and civil society in the coming years. Regardless of the levels of development achieved by the region's economies, any restrictive or liberalizing laws that they may pass and the actions they take to defend their borders, the flow of people, including migrant workers from the region, is bound to continue. As mentioned above, these movements are sustained by very deep roots. The Puebla Group, it is true to say, has blazed a trail with considerable creativity. But it must be considered as an initial step.

Translating its deliberations and experiences into a better understanding of the tremendous importance of this topic for all member countries is a priority challenge. Total success will only be achieved when migrants, regardless of their origin, sex and migratory condition, are not only recognized and respected, but are also able to choose where to live their lives.

B.2 The Lima Declaration of 1999, and its aftermath

*Carlos Gamarra Mujica*¹⁴

Introduction

International migration, an ancient phenomenon that is forever reinventing itself in its multiple human and social, economic and political aspects, poses one of the major challenges of the rapid globalization and integration that the world is currently going through.

It is widely acknowledged that international migration is a key element in the development process, since the main social force driving this human phenomenon at the start of the new millennium is the search for employment, and better paid jobs. This is likely to remain the case for a long time to come.

The growth of migratory flows in recent years stems from the spread of the greatest scientific and technological revolution in the history of humanity, especially in relation to information and communications that have fostered the globalization of economies and markets and hence labour

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demand and supply. Migration today needs to be viewed in a new light as related to development and integration processes, instead of being seen exclusively as a phenomenon that is disruptive, undesired and damaging for the host country.

The complexity of the migration phenomenon means it has to be studied and approached comprehensively and objectively, from a long-term perspective, taking account of its multiple causes, manifestations and effects, in origin and destination societies alike.

Virtually no country or region is untouched by the dynamic of migration; and, as ECLAC aptly states, international migration is a key issue on countries' social and economic agendas at the start of the twenty-first century, attracting the attention of governments, civil societies, and international organizations.

This challenge facing the international system should be addressed through dialogue and cooperation between States.

South American Meeting on Migration, Integration and Development

In order to promote reflection on the role of migration in South American societies as we move into the new millennium, and given the profound and vertiginous transformations taking place regionally and internationally, the Government of Peru, with valuable support from the International Organization for Migration (IOM), organized the South American Meeting on Migration, Integration and Development in Lima in July 1999. The meeting was attended by Vice-Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Interior and responded to a belief that it was essential to construct a broad regional consensus for dealing with international migration.

This meeting brought together representatives from 10 South American nations for the first time to exchange ideas on the various modalities of migration in their respective countries, highlighting the need to find viable alternatives to confront this major challenge at the start of the new millennium.

The delegations addressed the following issues among others in their discussions:

- Migratory movements are on the increase, so it is increasingly important to extend analysis of them to the regional, continental and global level;
- These migratory processes are associated, among other things, with economic and social development problems in the countries that generate them;
- The countries of the region present at this meeting chose an associative and interactive response through subregional integration mechanisms such as Mercosur and the Andean Community, where significant progress is being made in dealing with migration.
- Migratory movements are vectors of change, of intra-cultural linkage, and engines of development processes; for this reason, migration could become a development factor in the medium and long run;
- Migration is of far-reaching importance; further and deeper analysis and information exchange is needed on migratory movements between the South America countries and other regions of the world;
- Respect for migrants' human rights is a basic concern for the countries of the region;
- To facilitate more effective treatment of migration issues, there is a need for institutional modernization and strengthening among national bodies with jurisdiction on this issue;
- International technical and financial cooperation is considered helpful for achieving better results on migration issues.

As a follow-up to the South American Meeting on Migration, Integration and Development, government representatives signed the "Lima Declaration", the text of which includes the following statement:

1. Migratory processes are so important in the region that they need to be monitored for the analysis and discussion of migration issues, in order to find solutions satisfying the interests of the countries involved via dialogue and consensus-building.
2. The delegates present in this meeting agree to hold further consultations with a view to organizing a conference to follow up on the issues analysed in the Lima Declaration;¹⁵ Argentina offered to host this.

South American Conference on Migration

As a follow-up to the process initiated in the South American Meeting on Migration, Integration and Development, held in Lima in 1999, in May this year the "South American Conference on Migration", was held in Buenos Aires, attended by representatives from 10 South American countries. After making statements and exchanging views on the migratory situation in their respective countries and regionwide, delegates signed a declaration, which included the following:

- International migration in South America has changed over the last two decades in terms of magnitude, quality and direction, related to socioeconomic circumstances in the region. New trends are currently emerging dominated by migration to the more developed countries and between the countries of the region. These trends are closely linked to economic globalization and subregional integration processes.
- This new situation requires the region's migratory problems to be addressed through open multilateral dialogue mechanisms that promote reflection and a coordination of policy actions between the countries that share these problems, through wholesale regional cooperation aimed at strengthening the integration and development processes currently taking place in the region.
- Protection of human rights remains a key concern for the countries of the region. Programmes to publicize migrant rights through governments and civil society, together with agreements between countries that receive and those that originate migrants, and promotion of ordered and planned migration as a solution to irregular migration and the fight against human trafficking, emerge as responsible policies.
- Appropriate treatment of migration issues requires a major effort of institutional modernization and strengthening among national agencies with jurisdiction on this subject, together with training for civil servants, updating of national legislation and development of coordination mechanisms between participating States.
- International technical and financial cooperation is a useful way to complement national efforts to achieve substantive progress on migration issues.

As a conclusion to the first South American Conference on Migration, delegations from the 10 South American countries present signed the following declaration:¹⁶

1. As a follow-up to the Lima meeting and the Buenos Aires conference, they agreed to establish a forum for coordination and consultation on migration issues for the countries of South America. This will meet periodically in places and dates to be decided among its members, and it will have a pro-tem secretariat provided by the country hosting the next conference.

¹⁵ "South American Meeting on Migration, Integration and Development", 14/07/99.

¹⁶ "South American Conference on Migration", Declaration. 18/05/00.

2. The objectives and activities to be carried out in this forum will aim to provide comprehensive treatment of migration issues, without prejudice to other analogous mechanisms of subregional integration and bilateral agreement.
3. Member countries will join forces to protect, defend and promote migrant rights.
4. Regional cooperation will be intensified as a substantive instrument for achieving the established objectives and for preparing regional positions on migration issues.
5. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) will be asked to prepare a diagnostic study of the migratory situation in South America, and report on progress made in the various subregional forums on migration, in close consultation and coordination with the South American countries. The aim of this will be to propose guidelines for an action plan to be presented for government consideration and approval.
6. The Governments of Suriname and Guyana will be invited to participate in this forum starting at the next conference.

As a sign of the interest shown by countries in the region, Chile has offered to host the next South American Conference on Migration.

Like their counterparts in the North and Central American Regional Conference on Migration, known as the Puebla Process, which is seen as the intergovernmental dialogue model for regional migration, the South American countries have also set up a coordination and consultation forum to tackle the phenomenon of migration, addressing the complexity of its intricate chain of cause and effect. This highly original and important initiative is based on comprehensive principles and has long-term objectives for addressing the origins and consequences of migration in that subregion.

C. The role of international agencies and non-governmental organization

C.1 Speech by the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of El Salvador

Héctor Dada Sánchez

I take this opportunity to extend warm greetings to colleagues and friends from the governments represented here, along with delegates from non-governmental organizations and members of civil society and, of course from the international organizations and cooperation agencies accompanying this forum.

I would like to start the 15 minutes allotted to me by briefly expressing my gratitude for this invitation, and mentioning what it means to El Salvador to be present in this extremely important event as coordinator of the next Summit of the Americas, attended by representatives from governments, NGOs and international cooperation agencies, to discuss and review migration mechanisms and see how we can meet the major challenges we face as countries of origin, transit and/or destination.

I would like to thank the Government and people of Costa Rica for hosting this event, which is so important for the region. We have been made to feel very much at home, thanks to this country's typical hospitality. I would also like to express my gratitude to the event's organizers and co-sponsors, especially IOM and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the United

Nations Population Fund (UNPFA), OAS, IDB, and of course the Government of the United States which makes it possible for all of us to be here and help make this event a success.

I have been asked to discuss the role of international organizations and NGOs in the Puebla Process thus far, and what we think their role should be in the future.

This is a complex issue to tackle because there is usually a perception, perhaps insufficiently and seldom expressed, that the work of NGOs, governments and international cooperation agencies coexists in a fragile equilibrium, underlain by continuing distrust, permeated by myths of opposition, and so forth, which impede collaboration. Governments tend to be uneasy about making space for NGOs to participate in certain projects, including those relating to migration. Secondly, as NGOs start to work more closely with governments, there is a perception often encouraged in the corridors of these large-scale forums, that they could risk losing their essential "non-governmental" status. And lastly, the recurrent complaint about international cooperation, concerning the speed with which it can respond to countries' specific needs, the bureaucratic red tape that obstructs effective relations between governments, NGOs and international cooperation agencies, and the scant attention paid in their agendas to countries' specific needs. These factors, among others, have turned this into a complex issue that is seldom properly discussed at international forums.

While acknowledging this, the uniqueness of the Puebla Process has been recognized by previous speakers. It has brought together origin, transit and destination countries for the first time, to discuss migration. The Puebla mechanism is also unique in having cut through many of the myths and taboos that still exist, and it has opened up discussion about what needs to be done, and how harmonized, consistent, respectful, and, if I may say so, creative activities should be carried out between governments, non-governmental organizations and other civil-society actors, and international cooperation agencies, each in their own space, respecting and assuming their responsibilities in a committed manner.

El Salvador comes here well informed and ready to collaborate. Migration is one of our top priorities, if not the top priority on the national agenda.

One out of every four Salvadoran citizens in the world lives outside our national borders, forming part of the international migration circuit. Nearly 13% of our gross national product (GNP) comes from family remittances sent back by Salvadorans living abroad; and this does not include the indirect effects they clearly can have in the purchase of consumer goods and consequent multiplier effects on investment and social projects, which would certainly increase the percentage effect on our economy.

Today, although the city of San Salvador holds the world's largest population of Salvadoran citizens, the cities with the second and third largest Salvadoran populations are no longer within national borders, but in other parts of the world where our nationals have settled.

In view of this, El Salvador has always had a special interest in migration, and we have seen the scope of the phenomenon evolve. To begin with perhaps we restricted our approach to the traditional function of assisting and providing consular services to our migrants. In the 1990s this developed into a more active defence of their rights, and an attempt to assist our compatriots abroad in regularizing their migratory status, the fruits of which we are seeing now. Lastly, we have set ourselves the ambitious target of developing more effective links between this population — with one in every four Salvadorans living abroad — and their country of origin. We aim to make sure they do not lose their identity, that they are integrated into the economic development process, into the social and local development process in communities that they represent, and so forth.

As a final and long-term goal, the government aims to create sufficient opportunities in our country to prevent the need to emigrate in the future; to enable our fellow citizens to find the opportunities they need in their own country in order to lead a decent life there with their families.

With this outlook, we have been participating intensively, actively and pro-actively in the Puebla Process. We have achieved much in collaboration with NGOs and international cooperation agencies, on each of the goals established in the Regional Conference on Migration.

In March 1996 when 10 countries from North and Central America and the Caribbean met in Puebla to inaugurate the Regional Conference on Migration, a consensus was established on the management of, and approach to what we have termed the "migration phenomenon". We also agreed on the need for a comprehensive approach with long-term objectives, to enable us to deal efficiently with its causes and manifestations. This seems to me to be the key point of the Puebla Process.

In contrast to the remarks to be made by the next speaker, who I understand will focus slightly more on the role of NGOs with international cooperation, ever since day-one of the Regional Conference on Migration we have provided constant support for the agenda that governments have established in the framework of this conference. Together with NGOs and other civil-society actors, we have steadily gained and learnt from each other through our participation in this mechanism, initially in Ottawa, then at the meeting in El Salvador and finally in Washington, where we had a productive exchange with NGOs and the people that run them.

I would like briefly to review what I believe we have achieved with cooperation agencies and NGOs in the framework of the Puebla mechanism. Any such achievements are not ours alone, but the product of mutual feedback and collaboration. From the outset we have received support from organizations such as IOM, UNHCR, ECLAC, and UNFPA which have undertaken a series of projects and studies in support of national efforts on this issue.

One of the most important activities over these last five years has been the pilot project to provide immediate assistance for Salvadoran returnees — widely publicized here as the "Welcome Home" programme. Those involved in this project include the Government of El Salvador acting through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Technical Secretariat of the Office of the President, together with NGOs such as CRS, ASDI, private enterprise, the academic sector and churches, with support from IOM. Its aim has been to provide emergency humanitarian and reintegration assistance. The project has already helped thousands of our compatriots who have returned home.

Gustavo Mohar has already commented on the Virtual Secretariat as an innovative mechanism that puts modern information and communications technology at the service of a shared objective, to enable governments and NGOs to interact to the benefit of the migrant population.

I should also mention the studies, reports and analysis that enhance government decision-making, including those by IOM on comparative migration legislation and other topics, the work done by ECLAC-CELADE on remittances and making use of them effectively, support from the United Nations High Commission in its studies, inventories, training, and so forth — all of which are useful to us and enrich our work in this forum, motivating us for the tasks that lie ahead.

As I mentioned, we have been working unilaterally to help Salvadorans abroad and establish a network of NGOs together with international cooperation agencies and other civil-society actors, to meet the needs of our compatriots abroad. We have been working alongside friendly governments to obtain amnesties and set up migratory status stabilization mechanisms — especially with the United States (via the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act - NACARA), together with Mexico and Belize on the question of returnees, and of course the CA-4 countries in making migration an issue of agreement rather than one of dispute. We have established toll-free 1-800 phone lines using new information technology tools to put all necessary information, communication strategies, and so on, at their disposal.

We have achieved common goals, not merely in rhetoric but also in practice, nationally, bilaterally and regionally. Nonetheless, we also believe that, while acknowledging the achievements of CRM, we are still far from achieving the potential of this Puebla mechanism in terms of collaboration between government, NGOs and international cooperation.

I would like now to briefly highlight four areas in which we believe major progress can be made, based on what we have achieved to date.

Firstly, of course, pressing ahead with efforts to gain a more thorough understanding of migration, in terms of data, relations, reports, and so on; this needs to be continued.

Secondly, everything to do with illegal migration — and I use this term deliberately, because there is usually a natural tendency to avoid referring to the phenomenon as illegal. This may be because anyone who helps one of our citizens to aspire to a better life perhaps ought to be looked upon favourably. We believe that this is applicable to the purpose of our deliberations here, namely migrants from El Salvador, Mexico, and all countries represented here, who emigrate in search of a better future; but not those who profit from our compatriots' needs and discomfort and put them at risk. Such traffic is increasingly linked to international criminal organizations that put migrants' lives in danger, along with their dignity and possessions. We believe these illegal migration networks should be more widely publicized; this does not mean doing the dirty work of countries that do not want to receive international migration, but on the contrary doing the noble work of defending our compatriots' rights and preventing them from being put at risk. Of course, consistent with this will be the defence of rights in terms of services, the whole question of improving mechanisms for the return and reintegration of our fellow citizens, who are sent back home when discovered to be without documents, or when they fail to comply with one of the immigration requirements of the friendly countries represented here.

In the case of El Salvador, last year alone over 4,500 of our citizens were deported from the United States. They returned overland through Mexico, and despite all efforts made with the "Welcome Home" programme, there is a tremendous amount still to do to successfully reintegrate them into national life. If we fail to do this immediately after their return, they are likely to renew contacts with illegal international migration networks and resume the cycle of putting their rights, their lives and their needs at risk.

I will now refer very briefly to the question of continuing to seek opportunities for orderly, legal and safe migration, in accordance with the needs of countries and migrants alike. Here, assistance, information and bilateral programmes are all relevant, along with everything to do with linkage, productive remittances, social remittances and repatriation of talent. In addition, a new area to explore is border integration, involving the spaces where international migration naturally takes place. Here I would like to mention what we are doing with our neighbours, especially Guatemala, in eliminating border infrastructure to facilitate migratory flows, registration and so forth. This will involve the major task of integrating border populations to turn them into meeting points rather than high walls that keep countries apart. Lastly, I would just mention the private-sector firms that are directly involved in migration and need to be included in the medium- to long term. Migrants often complain about these firms, and we must persuade them to improve the services they offer. But in the short term, instead of seeing them as our adversaries, we should view them as our natural allies: we should obtain what we need from them, and thus regain a portion of the profits they derive from migrants. Here I am referring to the airlines, phone companies, money transfer firms, courier businesses, which nowadays are perfectly willing to collaborate with us to provide better services to our migrants.

I would like to thank all participating organizations and international cooperation agencies for the process so far, and argue that collaboration will be especially necessary in the future, given the role of migration in globalization processes. While we may not know exactly what effect globalization will have on migration, we do know that migration is decisively marking the global mega-trends of today and the future; and the future is merely when tomorrow becomes today.

As Leonardo French, Director-General of Services for Expatriate Communities in Mexico has said: what we can achieve together on this quintessentially human issue is limited only by our imagination and creativity.

C.2 The role of non-governmental organizations: the experience of the Puebla Process

*Peter Duschinsky*¹⁷

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen,

I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today on the role of non-governmental organizations, with special emphasis on the Regional Conference on Migration or Puebla Process of Central and North American countries and the Dominican Republic. During the Fifth Regional Conference on Migration held in Washington D.C. this past spring, the non-governmental organizations participating in the conference proposed that they be referred to as civic society organizations or CSOs, to include a broader range of groups. Accordingly, I will use the terms NGOs and civil society organizations or CSOs interchangeably in this presentation.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen,

International migration is a complex phenomenon that takes many forms. Economic disparities between countries and regions, population pressures, civil unrest and violation of human rights and freedoms are among its most important causes. Natural disasters such as Hurricane Mitch also cause large numbers of people to leave their homelands. The rapid progress in communications and transportation technologies have made it easier for ever larger numbers of people to leave their countries in search of economic and social betterment elsewhere. Given these factors, governments have tried for many years to manage effectively the growing international migration challenge and to use it to the advantage of sending and receiving countries. They have attempted to ensure that immigrants contribute to the economic prosperity and the social and cultural well-being of their new societies. They have attempted to fulfill their international commitments to protect refugees. Yet, at the same time, governments have been forced by the growing illegal migration challenge to control their borders and enact laws to combat migrant smuggling and trafficking.

In the past, governments often viewed civil society organizations as too small and weak to deal with serious migration issues. At the same time, however, democratic states have come to recognize that some of the most important challenges posed by the migration phenomenon are social challenges at the grass roots level. Here, the NGOs' small size, their knowledge of local conditions, their understanding of the immediate, practical problems faced by migrants often give them advantages not possessed by larger, more impersonal government institutions.

Because they focus on the immediate problems of individual migrants and refugees, NGOs keep the human element at the centre of their concerns. Governments, however, have to balance a number of concerns in making their decisions and therefore cannot always go along with the NGOs' advice. It is inevitable that governments have to make some decisions that NGOs do not agree with. Nevertheless, because of their special view point, civil society organizations make a valuable contribution to the governmental decision making process.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentleman,

Canada has played a leading role in realizing the value of the views of civil society organizations on migration and refugee issues. The Canadian government has come to recognize that NGOs offer important insights regarding the realities of the causes of migration and have a great deal of locally based expertise in resolving social problems that accompany the settlement and integration of immigrants and refugees. Canada is a democratic country built by the economic, social and cultural contributions of immigrants and refugees from all parts of the world. Canadian civil society

¹⁷ Director International Liaison – Refugees Branch, Citizenship and Immigration Canada

organizations are often staffed by the children of immigrants and refugees or by Canadians who were once immigrants or refugees themselves. Therefore, Canadian NGOs have a good grasp of the realities of the immigrant and refugee settlement and integration processes and through consultations with government, they could contribute positively to the protection of refugees and the settlement of immigrants.

Canada is a major country of immigration and the Canadian government has a great deal of experience in the consultative process with civil society organizations. Through the NGO/Government Committee on the Private Sponsorship of Refugees formed in 1994, NGOs and the Canadian Government consult to identify and resolve problems of the private sponsorship program for refugees overseas. Overseas, NGOs, in cooperation with the UNHCR, make referrals of refugee cases to Canadian missions and often assist by providing orientation for refugees. The Canadian government provides support for NGOs to greet government-selected refugees arriving in Canada and to provide temporary shelter and immediate essentials to newly arrived refugees. In close cooperation with the government, civil society organizations are tasked with facilitating the smooth settlement and integration of immigrants in Canadian society. Many Canadian NGOs, representing various ethnic and religious groups, provide services to immigrants of their own background, making easier the process of cultural transition to the Canada's mainstream cultures. At the same time, NGOs help immigrants preserve their ethnic and religious identities and their ties to their old homelands. Multiculturalism is both Canadian government policy and an important part of Canada's identity. In 1998, Canada began to create a new Refugee Resettlement Model (RRM) to identify problems with specific aspects of refugee resettlement and recommend alternate approaches. Civil society organizations participate actively in the RRM, working with government officials in six working groups dealing with different aspects of refugee resettlement and integration. NGOs also participate in conferences and workshops and assist in the implementation of programs, policies and procedures.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen.

Based on our positive experience with civil society organizations, and taking into account similar experiences with international organizations such as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Canada took the lead in inviting NGOs to participate in the Puebla Process. As indicated, The Puebla Process is an ongoing regional forum on migration for the North, Central American countries and the Dominican Republic. We believed that if we could demonstrate to the other Puebla Group member states the positive contributions civil society organizations could make, there would be general agreement to provide a function for NGOs in the process. We also believed that this would contribute to resolving some of the serious social problems Puebla Group governments were facing in dealing with migration issues. Accordingly, with the concurrence of all other Puebla Group countries, Canada invited NGOs to an informal dialogue with Vice-Ministers under the auspices of the Third Regional Conference on Migration chaired by Canada in 1998 in Ottawa.

As a result of their participation in the Ottawa Vice-Ministerial Conference, the NGOs expressed in a joint declaration their desire to work with governments to address the causes of migration, to promote cooperation and dialogue between countries of origin and destination and to eliminate factors that contribute to forced migration. The NGOs also suggested that each Puebla Group country should hold national preparatory meetings prior to intergovernmental meetings to allow for the emergence of a reasoned NGO-government dialogue. Finally, the civil society organizations recommended greater NGO involvement in training government personnel, evaluating processes, and educating the public in participating countries, as well as preparation of studies and the search for viable solutions to problems of migration.

Following their successful participation in the Ottawa Conference, NGOs undertook a range of functions in the Puebla Process, including consultation with governments on a number of issues and the preparation and co-ordination of seminars. During the Fourth Regional Conference on Migration, held in El Salvador in 1999, the role of NGOs in the Puebla Process became solidly

entranced. Vice-ministers expressed their satisfaction with the NGO-government dialogue and welcomed meaningful contributions by NGOs to the activities outlined in the Puebla Plan of Action. The El Salvador conference continued the practice initiated in Ottawa of arranging NGO meetings parallel to government meetings, concluding with a dialogue between NGO representatives and the Vice-ministers.

During the El Salvador Vice Ministerial Conference, it was suggested to hold an NGO seminar on migrant women and children, jointly with the governments of El Salvador and Canada and the IOM. This seminar was held in San Salvador, in February 2000 and brought together a wide range of civil society organisations and governmental and academic participants. Some 32 Central and North American NGOs participated in the seminar. The consultative dialogue approach adopted by this event proved extremely useful in informing policy makers concerning the grass roots realities of the very difficult social problems facing migrant women and children. The information shared provoked a great deal of thought and discussion on the migratory problems of these social groups.

As a result of their close collaboration under the auspices of the Puebla Process, non-governmental organisations have organised to form the "Regional Network of Civic Organisations for Migration" (RNCOM); a network consisting of NGOs from Canada, the U.S., Mexico and the Central American countries. Collectively, these NGOs have co-ordinated their efforts to create their own Plan of Action which supports and fits into the framework of the Puebla Plan of Action. The NGO Plan of Action deals with subjects such as regulatory frameworks and protection, development and migration and monitoring the Plan of Action of the Puebla Process. During the Fifth Regional Conference on Migration, held in Washington, USA in March 2000, the Regional Network of Civic Organisations for Migration proposed a regional seminar on the principles of minimum standards and procedures for detention, deportation, and reception of migrants, a proposal which was accepted by the conference. In preparation for this seminar, now planned for late 2000 or early 2001, NGOs will carry out national and regional surveys in order to create a formal declaration to serve as a framework for minimum standards and procedures. The NGOs have proposed that this declaration be the result of the co-ordinated efforts of the RNCOM and of Puebla Group governments.

Since the Ottawa Vice-Ministerial Conference, over two years ago, the inclusion of civil society organisations in regional dialogue has become the rule rather than the exception. Information shared by grass roots organisations such as NGOs is imperative to making informed decisions and to establishing policies that will be most effective in addressing issues at hand.

It is important to note that NGOs co-operate with governments not only on policy-related issues but also on concrete grass roots projects. The joint co-operation made in the context of "Bienvenido a Casa", a national program in El Salvador that promotes the successful reinsertion of returned migrants is a fine example. This program was implemented with the support of the IOM and Catholic Relief Services (CRS), with financial support from the United States. There have been other successful co-operative efforts in Central America and Mexico between civil society organisations and government institutions, including the recently inaugurated "Centro de Atención al Migrante Hondureño Retornado" and the "Programa Paisano" in Mexico which has been in operation for several years.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen,

The evolution of NGO-government consultations in the regional context of the Puebla Group has been a major success. Through CSO-government dialogue, governments and CSOs have learned many lessons. The most important of these is that the collective efforts of governments and civil society organisations are often more effective in addressing specific grass roots problems related to the large migration issue, than independent efforts either by governments or NGOs. Consultations prior to, during, and after each Puebla meeting have enabled us to strengthen NGO-government relationships and to foster an environment that promotes mutual trust and respect. We can work together not only to establish common goals but also to attain those goals, while promoting the protection of the human

rights of migrants. Over the years, we have come to respect each others' differences and to build relationships where relationships did not exist in the past. Together we are able to inform each other on various issues and provide feedback to each other so as to promote transparency and trust. Working together we are able make a difference.

Thank you.

D. Comments on sessions B and C

D.1 Comment by Marguerite Rivera-Houze¹⁸

In her comments, Marguerite Rivera-Houze argues that the presentations by Gustavo Mohar and Carlos Gamarra Mujica provide a historical view of the creation and evolution of the Regional Conference on Migration (CRM), better known as the Puebla Process, and of the corresponding dialogue on migration in South American countries.

She points out that the United States government, as the incumbent CRM pro-tem secretariat, prepared a draft programme for returning extraregional migrants, for consideration by other member countries. She also reports on the economic contribution made by the United States Government to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), for the purpose of implementing the Statistical Information System on Migration in Central America (SIEMCA).

Rivera-Houze claims that the presence in each delegation of civil servants from the foreign relations and migration fields, contributes positively to the effective functioning of CRM, by affording a more balanced treatment of the topic. Lastly, she stresses that civil-society participation through NGOs is an essential part of the process.

¹⁸ U.S. Department of State.

D.2 Comment by Mary García Castro¹⁹

Before commenting on the presentations made in these sessions, I would like to congratulate the organizers of this symposium: ECLAC, CELADE and IOM, together with co-sponsors UNFPA, OAS and IDB, and the delegation from the host country, Costa Rica, on behalf of the National Population and Development Commission (CNPd) of Brazil, and its president Elsa Berquó, who, for reasons beyond her control, has been unable to attend this meeting.

The National Commission for Population and Development was established by Brazilian government decree in 1995, with a mission to contribute to policy-making and the implementation of comprehensive actions on population and development. It is also charged with monitoring, criticizing, evaluating and proposing amendments to State policies and practice on international agreements and commitments relating to the targets and recommendations contained in the 1994 Cairo Program of Action. The CNPD consists of 18 members. Eight are drawn from civil society (specialists in population studies and human rights activities for specific population groups, such as women, migrants of both sexes — members of religious organizations for example). The other 10 representatives come from a variety of ministries and government secretariats. The Commission receives institutional and technical support from the Ministry of Planning and Budget, and collaboration on specific programs from international organizations such as the United Nations Population Fund (UNPFA). In 1999, the Taskforce on International Migration, which I coordinate, was set up within CNPD. We are currently preparing a bilingual publication and organizing an international seminar entitled "Brazilians Abroad and Foreigners in Brazil: Debates, Subsidies for Policies", to be held in Brasilia on 6 and 7 December this year. On behalf of the CNPD president, I take this opportunity to invite everyone present to take part in this activity, and I will circulate material on it later. We are also proud to receive cooperation from the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

In view of my greater familiarity with relations between civil and political society, my comment will focus on this topic. Peter Duschinsky correctly highlights as one of the signs of the contemporary nature of the field of migration governance, the role of non-governmental organizations, agents of "civil society" in defence of human rights and in the provision of services. He also stresses the Regional Conference on Migration, or Puebla Process, involving countries from North and Central America together with the Dominican Republic, and the relation between such organizations and governments, including the provision of services and consultancy. It is important to underscore Mohar's observation on contacts between NGOs from different CRM member States, and their role in putting forward proposals and monitoring the work of CRM.

The role of NGOs in representing migrants is a significant contemporary advance, especially considering that migrants and refugees have less capacity for self-organization and self-representation, than other identity groupings such as ethnic minorities and women. This is largely because most countries have laws restricting foreigners' rights to union membership and association, often even for those who are properly documented.

Duschinsky refers primarily to Canada, but many of his considerations have a wider validity, such as the value of legal advice by NGOs and their viewpoint on this given their contacts with local groups. I would ask Duschinsky to provide further information on NGO activities in Canada on other areas of state-civil-society relations; not just in the provision of services, such as the critical monitoring of services provided by agencies related to migratory authorities, but also in defending

¹⁹ Coordinator of the Taskforce on International Migration, National Commission for Population and Development, Brazil. E-mail cnpd@ipea.gov.br.

migrants' rights, and how NGOs provide direct representation, and give voice to men and women migrants themselves.²⁰

On the other hand, it would also be interesting to have a better understanding of the role of NGOs in the Puebla Process — indeed not only NGOs, but also the position of other institutions related to the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. Currently there is a tendency to stress the importance of new mechanisms and international legislation governing the capital-labour nexus — specifically globalization of the former and restriction of the latter. There is also a tendency to create new and important mechanisms on human rights. Nonetheless, despite having been approved in December 1990 in the United Nations General Assembly, this Convention has so far been ratified by very few countries, and by virtually none of the leading industrialized countries that receive migrants (the minimum of 20 signatures/ratifications needed for the convention to enter into force has not yet been achieved).

Considering the experience of CNPD in Brazil, I would stress the importance of not losing the identity of each member, the autonomy and role of the organization concerned, in this association between State and non-governmental agencies (or in structures which, like CNPD, contain participants from different fields and institutional domains). CNPD consists of people who are not paid for membership; several belong to opposition parties and organizations invited to participate on their own merits, from different fields of knowledge — such as population studies — and as such are above party, although the primary interlocutor must be the government given its emphasis on policies.

Ensuring the above-party nature of advisory structures, while at the same time not rejecting parties, unions and social movements comprising the subjects themselves (i.e. migrants of both sexes) in favour of *ad hoc* agencies or partners that are often not very critical of the State, can promote dialogue, but it may also undermine what is intended as democratic activity.

What is civil society? This is a complex question particularly when globalization is subtly mixed with unipolar world governance. It is not by chance that we hear so much about economic globalization, much of it in positive terms, but so little about universal citizen rights — the right to mobility and to combine citizenship indicators (such as dual nationality) or the right to "*statis*" — to stay in a place, to settle. The countries of Central America and the Caribbean are making progress on debate and policies in this area. On the other hand, Mohar's final comment in favour of a long-term project in which migrants of different sex, age and origin become subjects of their history and places of residence, deserves further effort; especially now when it seems we are returning to the logic of intervention and the discourse of armed struggle in neighbouring geographic areas.

Returning to the topic of multi-institutional cooperation, those of us who work in the field of migration studies and move in the public-policy domain are concerned to encourage commitment from a wide variety of institutional representatives on the question of population mobility. In the ongoing survey, commissioned by CNPD for the publication and seminar mentioned above,²¹ we argue that commitment is still weak in the Brazilian Congress and unions, on issues affecting migration, the rights of Brazilians living abroad and foreigners living in Brazil. In contrast, interest is being aroused in communications media and among opinion leaders but it is still governed by stereotypes. This could encourage xenophobia on labour-market issues, for example; or towards the uncritical support for the tendency of foreign-owned firms to import

²⁰ Of particular interest here is the contribution made by NGOs in relation to female domestic servants, given the vulnerability of women migrants to abuse by their employers. Under the laws of Canada (please correct me if this information is wrong), employers control the rights of women brought from another country for domestic service purposes.

²¹ Dr. Marcia Spraendel - Senate, Brazil, for CNPD-Brazil.

skilled managers and technical experts — a trend that is increasing as a result of privatizations in the service sector (telecommunications, for example).

Opinion formation also requires a transnational take on State actions, to see how communications media in other countries represent their nationals in the light of growing anti-immigrant sentiment. It is worth highlighting the actions taken by Mexico and the Dominican Republic, among others, in protesting against growing public hostility towards migrants in the United States, and in implementing more effective services to support their nationals in the face of restrictive policies on access to social welfare services and actions by migration control agencies in that country.

In a 1993 study financed by the New York Times and CBS News, 61% of those interviewed were in favour of reducing immigrant flows into the United States. Another survey in 1996 (Wall Street Journal/NBC News) found that 52% were in favour of halting migration into the United States for a five-year period. Nonetheless, as David Rimers²² points out, United States citizens seem to be poorly informed on migration. Nearly 68% of those answering the 1993 Times/CBS survey stated that "most people migrating to the United States in recent years did so illegally," when the estimated flow of undocumented immigrants was actually under 25% of the total in that period. In his text, Mohar refers to the role of NGOs in "educating public opinion and improving understanding of migration in the region." It would be interesting to explore other experiences on this issue over the Internet, perhaps through the CRM virtual secretariat.

There are some highly creative examples of combining solidarities, the importance of networks, communication by Internet regarding global action by NGOs and new forms of organization. Transnational ubiquity itself demands another type of organization, trans-territorial, hybrid, that combines the struggle for the right to cultural identity with global citizenship. In other words, it is possible to combine solidarity through *jus sanguinis* in a territory (as Duschinsky correctly points out, it is not fortuitous that many activists in certain Canadian NGOs are the children and grandchildren of migrants) — commitment based on blood relationships, on original culture — with transnational solidarity between those who stay and those who leave. Mexicans and "Chicanos", along with Guatemalans and Salvadorans living in the United States, have developed a wealth of experience that has assisted return migration and provided mutual assistance for those who leave for communities in Mexico, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala, for example. They have also helped migrants of both sexes cope with the anxieties and difficulties of arrival, and deal with hostility and racism in the country of immigration. What is notable in all of this is the ingredient of solidarity, of moral commitment and human action. Here, however much one emphasizes the contemporary nature and expansion of the NGO model, an important role is played by a more traditional agency, namely religious institutions. The Brazilian Association of NGOs (ABONG) had 240 associations on its books in 1997; unofficial estimates at that time spoke of a universe of over 4,000 NGOs of varying size and purpose. Nonetheless, only faith-based organizations, such as churches, were involved in immigrant rights and assistance. This reflects a tendency in the church to show greater commitment towards the people.

On the other hand, in Latin America and Africa particularly, the celebratory discourse on NGOs needs to be treated with caution, particularly in the neoliberal scenario, where marginalization of the welfare state and the emphasis on associative mechanisms may be susceptible to co-option. Several analysts in Latin America and Africa are now warning that the third sector is not a model of governance in itself; it depends on the profile of civil and political society, and the identity of NGOs needs to be analysed on a case-by-case basis, in terms of their commitment to the State — and their role and composition. Whether they are advocacies, whether they are State pressure groups, or appendices thereof, or of some service-provider groups. These varied roles are valid in themselves, but also

²² David Rimers, "Unwelcome strangers: American identity and the turn against immigration", New York, Columbia University Press, 1998, *Contemporary US Immigration Policies in the Western Hemisphere*, with Special Reference to Source Nations such as Brazil, Mitchell Christopher, New York, New York University, Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies May 2000, unpublished.

relative unless one questions how the legitimacy of the NGOs has been established in the eyes of those they represent (in this case migrants), and the financial dependency of many organizations on international bodies.²³ In fact many so-called "non-governmental" organizations are really "neo-governmental" bodies attached to government. This can be positive, but there are potentially negative aspects such as the loss of critical power, autonomy, lobbying and representation of opposition groups.

When advocating participation by different institutions on an issue that ranges from human rights to national security, and involves the interests of people with low levels of representative power (such as foreigners) and institutions with high lobbying and control power (such as multinational firms, the armed forces and government), then I insist, holding meetings between States, while important, is not sufficient; nor is intermediation by NGOs or the creation of supranational forums. Three forces need to be stressed: (i) the power of the institution; (ii) its social legitimacy; and (iii) its social commitment towards human rights and the principles of social justice. It is no accident that in several Latin American countries, especially Brazil, and also in the United States, one of the most efficient advocacy agencies even in negotiations with States (associations in services but also in denouncing arbitrary action), have been churches and other faith-based organizations that combine these forces.²⁴

Of the texts most directly related to *multilateral consultation initiatives on international migration*, despite my lack of familiarity with the historical processes and practices underlying the cases analysed (particularly the Puebla Group Process), I would highlight what seem to me to be suggestions or stimuli. These are not evaluations, I repeat, but my personal appreciations of the texts.

Through his reflections on Mexican migration to the United States, Mohar aptly shows how migration in Latin American countries is related to history and cultural identity, and is therefore more complex than a matter of border control and infringement of laws. Few countries like Mexico — I would add Cuba — have this experience so directly; cumulative first-hand experience of existing between borders, of negotiating, without diluting their identity, and of defending their own nation-state project.

I lack the knowledge to make an in-depth analysis of the documentation of the Puebla Group and particularly its practice. I learnt a lot from Mohar's text. In particular I was impressed by the combined use of bilateral and multilateral dialogue, involving other partners from the region, considering common problems in emigration to the countries of North America, and also the issue of transit and intraregional integration. His paper raises many questions; for example, how to deal with risk in multilateral negotiations and regional forums? How to treat differences of interest, status, as regards the correlation of forces? Mohar aptly describes a series of strategies and formal instruments for these purposes. It would be interesting one day to have reports on experiences and situations. Secondly, in the case of emigration or transit countries, how would one negotiate the delegation of border control, the issue of human trafficking, in cases where border control was

²³ Mary Garcia Castro, "ONGS-quando o povo, poder e projetos fazem a diferença", *Análise de dados*, special issue on NGOs, vol. 7, No. 4, Salvador, Superintendency of Economic and Social Studies of Bahia, Special Secretariat for Information (SEI), March 1998, pp. 26-39.

²⁴ In terms of information for exchange, it would be more useful to know about the experience of civil society bodies in the United States, as well as the work of the Church, sanctuaries, and their conquest in terms of lobbies and transnational initiatives when organizations establish networks in different countries. Associative forms of organization such as the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), the Mexican-American Legal Defence and Educational Fund (MALDEF), the National Council on Race and the Farm Workers Federation, in other words not only the effectiveness of their lobbies, pressure and denunciation but also the capacity to set up self-help networks, at the transnational level. Despite universal aims it is well known that migration laws — I refer to the United States because I am more familiar with it — are not applicable to all Latin American or Caribbean people equally, because of the use made of migration in bilateral agreements of different types, and because of the force of specific collectivities by nationality, through NGOs, their capacity for alliances with other groups, such as descendants from Africa, and their links with parliamentarians.

also exercised by the countries of immigration? It would be interesting to have further details, if possible, on changes in the distribution of migration control tasks on the borders between immigration and emigration countries (such as between Mexico and the United States) following implementation of the Puebla Process.

By seeing migration policy as relating more to the national security agenda, as a domestic issue, when in fact it impacts other countries, my reading of Mohar leads indirectly to a very complex issue involving conflict between migration as an question of human rights or one of national security; in other words, the weak dividing lines between migration, drug trafficking and armed conflict, ambiguities that could erode people's right to mobility. The national security issue also raises others, such as the contradictions inherent in the "globalized" world, since the globalization discourse often coexists with protectionist trade practices and national security goals that are confined to the agenda of certain countries alone. These are other questions raised by reading Mohar's text.

Gamarra Mujica gives an account of the two forums recently organized for Vice-Ministers and high-ranking government officials, to promote dialogue among South American countries (the Lima meeting in 1999 and the one in Buenos Aires in May 2000). These meetings aimed to seek points of convergence and cooperation in dealing with migration. The positive thing, in my view, is that contributions to migration policies at the multilateral level demand a "long-term view" with attention to a variety of dimensions, and in particular a regionwide economic planning effort.

The concern for subregional forums, in the case of South American countries, suggests that a dialogue on migration among the Americas presupposes a debate in the Americas, at a subregional associative level, for countries to define their own interests. This was what happened in Mercosur and the Andean Community; as Gamarra Mujica correctly points out, defence of this autonomy — autonomy of part of our America, in the case of South America — and on the other hand, a combination of multilateral and bilateral agreements between countries.

The fight against human trafficking is one of the most important areas of consensus to emerge from the two events on migration in South America — the Lima and Buenos Aires meetings — and also in the CRM agenda, according to Mohar. Experiences need to be systemized and disseminated to a greater degree, with cooperation and instrumental efficiency mechanisms, involving the security agencies of various States along with NGOs and consular offices, and dealing also with trafficking in women, which takes various forms.

In short, as regards using the Puebla model for institutionalizing inter-State relations on migration, in the South America case I believe deeper discussion of its relation to regional institutions such as Mercosur and the Andean Group is needed. There is also a need to discuss how to maintain autonomy in dialogue and associations with countries from other areas, such as the United States, in any regional institutionalization. I think it is premature to get enthusiastic about applying the Puebla model to the Americas as a whole; participation by countries and organizations such as IOM is important — which has been giving stronger support to interaction between specialists, officials and governments — along with profound debate, before accepting the Puebla model as a whole. On the other hand, cases such as the recent Colombia Plan call the authority of regional forums into question, when a contract has been decided upon unilaterally or bilaterally, that is likely to affect several countries in terms of mobility across borders and their militarization, in addition to possible effects on the environment. Care is needed to avoid creating institutions that give an appearance of democracy or dialogue, but which in reality do not have much power to influence decisions that essentially serve the economic or political hegemony of supraregional powers.

To conclude, identities are at stake at all levels in migration, involving a variety of agencies and actors. Given that capital mobility is intertwined with the mobility of people, engaging a variety of interests that are not necessarily convergent or easy to reconcile, in particular when one moves out of the realm of conceptual abstraction and into processes, situations and moments, in which different agents, organizations and States take part and make use of their multiple powers (weapons,

capital, intervention, diplomacy, denunciation, associativity, recognition of the human rights of others, of those who are different, and so forth). Frequent reference is made to the relation between migration and the development model, and to the economy; and the presenters in this session have correctly underscored this. But considerations of the effects *of or on* migration, of a given economic investment, are often made *ex post facto*; they are not part of capital planning. I insist, in decisions concerning large-scale investments by one country in another that contribute to the militarization of conflicts in the latter, for example with the aim of controlling drug trafficking, or political-ideological control and intervention in conflicts in the territories of another nation, there is a lack of basic planning. When calculating the rationale of the plan, or the investment, what is the burden of cost in terms of human rights, or in terms of uprooting peasant populations, of border crossings by different population groups, even for other countries? In other words, it is not sufficient to acknowledge that human migration is related to other issues, such as the economy and national security or human rights, unless the representation of peoples' rights is discussed on a case-by-case basis and in concrete terms, through their own voice and under democratic models, together with the power of each State and each group in the negotiations. Nowadays at international forums there are frequent suggestions for mechanisms to achieve regional consensus, and the predominant discourse is one of consultation and integration. But this does not necessarily correspond to *a posteriori* practice, which suggests that one of the roles of regional mechanisms in the field of migration should be to lobby for other organizations — in Mercosur, for example, or in plans for military collaboration — to abandon the traditional view of population mobility and human rights as dependent variables or unexpected effects.

Once again I would like to congratulate the organizers of this symposium, both for the opportunity and for its format, which aptly illustrates the contemporary importance of rising to the challenge of breaking away from dichotomous analyses — such as models that emphasize push and pull factors — and uni-polar models of migration across borders and between territories. In other words, viewing migration, particularly among the Americas and between the countries of our America, holistically as a phenomenon combining economics, democracy, culture and politics transnationally, with both local and global features at one and the same time; but also individual-existential characteristics, since one does not pass through spaces, histories and cultures by immediate breakdown and amnesia, but through projects, including what is understood and intended in terms of nation-state.

E. Chapter conclusion

This chapter has argued that migration governance and multilateral diplomacy are key tasks in the Americas. The growth of technologies and global markets is generating increased labour mobility. With ever greater need for highly skilled labour, especially in high-tech sectors in developed countries, multilateral trade agreements, such as NAFTA and WTO in a general sense, are eroding existing controls on labour mobility between countries. This calls for new approaches, within the institutional framework of each country, involving participation by many stakeholders.

Everything suggests that economic globalization and the liberalization of world trade will continue to expand in the foreseeable future. This means that demand for highly skilled human resources will also continue to grow, and is likely to be accompanied by greater multilateral efforts to make the migrant labour force more mobile.

A critical issue for developed countries is whether immigration could be a means of counterbalancing their shrinking populations. Increased immigration is not seen as an easy answer to this dilemma, even though these countries would need large immigration flows to maintain current demographic levels.

Given increasing migratory pressures, transnational criminal networks have developed that not only traffic in migrants but also introduce them to illegal activities in their destination countries. The existence of such organizations is categorically rejected by all countries, and efforts to eradicate them need to be redoubled.

In 1998, the Summit of the Americas approved an initiative to promote the human rights of migrants, including migrant workers and their families. In general terms, the section on migrant workers contained

in the summit's action plan reflects the commitment by member States to take general and specific steps to guarantee respect for the human rights of migrants and their family members.

Because of its eminently social and human impact, transnational migration cuts across the work of governments and increasingly involves civil society. The Regional Conference on Migration, or Puebla Process, is a forum for multilateral dialogue and treatment of migration between the countries of North and Central America, based on the principle of cooperation. Despite being a government forum, from the outset it has included a variety of NGOs from member countries. This is seen as an attempt to fulfil the goal of civil-society participation, and thus educate public opinion and improve understanding of migration in the region.

The challenges that faced the Puebla Group at its inception, stemming from governments' natural reluctance to become involved in an exercise that could reveal insurmountable differences, were overcome by specifying that the forum would not aim to adopt common policies or collective commitments.

The South American Conference on Migration, meanwhile, recognizes that appropriate treatment of the issue of migration requires a major effort of management modernization, institutional strengthening among national organizations with jurisdiction on migratory issues, training for civil servants, updating of national legislation and the development of coordination mechanisms between States.

All these initiatives require an enduring commitment from governments, and they have made it possible to construct a cooperative relationship on international migration in the Americas that previously did not exist. The Summit of Americas process is one of the most suitable reference points for consolidating genuine migration governance, promoting orderly and safe migration for the migrants themselves.

Part 4:
**The economic and social
significance of migration**

A. Migrant remittances and networks

A.1 Migration and remittances: a Caribbean case-study of the Caribbean

Wendell Samuel¹

Introduction

Caribbean people have always had migratory instincts. The earliest inhabitants migrated to avoid their enemies but present day migration is largely motivated by economic reasons. In recent times there has been three distinct periods of migration. In the 1930's, there was a wave of migration to Central America to work on the construction of the Panama Canal. The 1950's and 1960's saw a shift in the focus of migrant workers to the United Kingdom to work mainly as nurses and in public transportation and the most recent wave of migration has been directed to the United States and to a lesser extent, Canada. While the waves of migration may have focussed on a particular geographical area at a given time, smaller flows of immigrants to other countries would have continued.

A logical consequence of the migration of workers is a reverse flow of remittances to support dependent relatives, repayment of loans,

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investment and other purposes. While it is usually asserted that migrant remittances have contributed in no small measure to the economic and social development of the Caribbean, much of the discussion is largely anecdotal. The accuracy of the estimates of migrant remittances is rather doubtful and very little empirical work has been done on the evaluation of contribution of remittances to economic development. Data on remittances are collected largely to estimate balance of payments flows and no attempt is usually made to relate such flows to income generation in the local economy. Thus there is usually no distinction between current and capital remittances.

The analysis of remittances, in the absence of a theoretical framework which relates remittances to household optimization, saving and investment will not fully explain the flow of remittances or give guidance on the factors which would influence sustained inflows necessary for development. This paper would attempt to outline a framework for analysis of remittances and identify some of the variables, which would determine sustained inflows for development purposes. The first section of the paper discusses the concept of remittances and examines the major factors that influence the level of remittances. Section II discusses recent trend in migration in the Caribbean, and Section III provides some information on the order of the magnitude of remittance flows to selected Caribbean Countries. The contribution of remittances to development is the subject of Section IV, and Section V identifies some measures, which would improve the level and consistency of remittances. The final section consists of some concluding remarks.

The concept of remittances

Remittances refer to transfers made from earnings or the accumulated stock of wealth by individual migrants to their country of origin. It can be viewed as a form of co-insurance payments, which arises from an implicit contract between the individual migrant and his family. Resources are remitted for support of dependents, repayment of loans, investment or other purpose. Given that a typical sum is transferred with a set of instructions about its disposition between various uses, it is extremely difficult to apportion these amounts into current and capital transfers.

A useful taxonomy of remittances is provided in Wahba (1991) who divides remittances into four types:

1. **Potential Remittances:** savings available to the migrant once all expenses in the host country have been met. These represent the maximum the migrant can transfer at any time.
2. **Fixed Remittances:** the minimum the migrant needs to transfer in order to satisfy her family's basic needs and other contractual obligations.
3. **Discretionary Remittances:** transfers in excess of fixed remittances. These together with fixed remittances constitute the level of actual remittances.
4. **Saved Remittances (or retained savings):** the difference between potential remittances and the amount remitted during the period. These flows are accumulated into a stock of resources, which can be used to supplement actual remittances at a later date. This stock of wealth is a result of a portfolio decision by the emigrant and she may be encouraged to make these resources available for the development of her country of origin.

This classification is extremely important for the analysis of remittances and the resulting policy actions since the different components are driven by completely different motivations. Some further insights may be uncovered by pursuing the implications of this classification a little further.

The concept of potential remittances is pretty straight forward and need not attract further comment. Fixed remittances arise from the basic motivation for migration, such as diversification of sources of income, household size and other contractual obligations. These will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.

The flow of discretionary remittances on the other hand is determined by the relative attractiveness of maintaining a store of value either in the host country or the country of origin. The relative attractiveness depends on the differential between real interest rates in the two countries, expected movements in exchange rates, general macroeconomic stability, the ease of conversion of one currency into the next and the efficiency of the payments mechanisms (especially money transfer facilities) between the two countries. In particular, higher real rates of interest and stable exchange rates would be conducive to an increase in the flow of discretionary remittances.

Saved remittances are the other side of the coin to discretionary remittances. An increase in the level of discretionary remittances, other things equal would reduce the flow of saved remittances and hence slow the rate of increase of the stock of retained earnings. It is this stock of wealth which has the greatest potential to assist in the development of the Caribbean countries if measures can be instituted to encourage the diaspora to maintain their stock of wealth or store of value in their country of origin.

Migration and Remittances

The issue of remittances arises only because there was a prior decision to migrate, thus the analysis of remittances cannot be divorced from an analysis of the factors which motivate migration. It is this analysis of migration that provides part of the rationale for fixed remittances. This brief section of the paper cannot do justice to the multi-faceted issue of migration and its motivating factors. Thus, rather than focus on the factors which determine migration for its own sake, this section of the paper would examine the influence of the motivating factors on the decision to remit.

In spite of the voluminous literature on migration and the importance of remittances to many developing countries, there are very few attempts to develop a systematic theory of remittances. The seminal works of Lucas and Stark (1985) and Stark (1991) are notable exceptions. Lucas and Stark (1985) divide theories of remittances into three groups, i.e., Pure Altruism, Pure Self-interest and Tempered Altruism or Enlightened Self-interest.

In the Pure Altruism model, the migrant derives utility from the utility of the rest of her household in the country of origin. The utility of the household depends on its per capita consumption. The migrant's utility function depends on her own consumption and on the weighted utility of the rest of the household in the country of origin. The migrant chooses the level of remittances that maximizes her utility function. This model yields two testable hypotheses, (1) remittances increase with the migrant's wage level; and (2) remittances decrease with the level of income of the household (i.e. remittances to less well-off households would be higher). The impact of household size on the level of remittances can be either positive or negative depending on presence of economies or diseconomies of scale in consumption, the rate of decline in marginal utility of home consumption and whether the migrant has a preference for a subset of the household in the home country.

Pure Self-interest generates three motives for remittances. The first arises from the belief that if she takes care of the family a larger portion of the family wealth would be bequeathed to her. This motive predicts larger remittances the larger the potential inheritance. The second motive is to build up assets at home such as land, houses and livestock, which would necessitate that family member act as an agent to purchase the assets and maintain them in good condition. The third motive may arise from an intent to return home at a later stage which would require investment in fixed assets, in a business or in community projects if the migrant has political aspirations. The last objective illustrates the difficulty of separating altruistic and self-interest motives.

Neither of the two theories above is sufficient to explain the extent and variability of remittances. Thus Lucas and Stark developed a theory that views remittances as part of an inter-temporal, mutually beneficial contractual arrangement between the migrant and the household in the country of origin. Such contractual arrangements are based on investment and risk. In the case of investment the family bears the cost of educating the migrant worker who is expected to repay the investment in the form

of remittances. This motive not only predicts that remittances could be higher for more educated workers but also that remittances from children of the head of the household would be higher than from in-laws and even spouses.

The risk motive gives rise to a much richer theoretical analysis which utilizes portfolio investment theory. In most developing countries both financial markets and insurance markets are not well developed. In addition, income, especially agricultural income is subject to a significant variability due to natural disasters, hurricanes, droughts etc. In these circumstances the decision to migrate is a rational decision to reduce risk by diversifying the household's stock of human wealth over activity and space. Provided that the shocks that affect the host country and the country of origin are not highly correlated positively, it would be mutually beneficial for the migrant and her family to enter a co-insurance contract. The migrant would remit relatively more when the home country is beset by natural disasters and similarly the family would take care of her obligations at home or even make transfers to the migrant if she becomes temporarily unemployed.

Such contractual arrangements are voluntary and hence, must be self-enforcing. The mechanism for self-enforcement could be mutual altruism, which explains why such arrangements are usually struck between members of a household. The aspiration to inherit, the desire to return home and the need to have reliable agent to assist in the accumulation and maintenance of assets are additional considerations for self-enforcement.

A number of well documented observations about migration and remittances can be explained by this theory of Enlightened Altruism. These include:

The Structure and Performance of the Economy

- (i) A high ratio of Agriculture to GDP is associated with higher rates of migration. Agricultural income is more variable and hence the greater need for coinsurance;
- (ii) The decline of an industry induces higher migration since income prospects in the home country would decline hence the need for spatial diversification;
- (iii) Economic downturn in the host country reduces the flow of remittances (insurance payments), but this may be moderated by drawing down the stock of accumulated wealth;
- (iv) Natural disasters in the country of origin induce a larger flow of remittances. This is also predicted by pure altruism but enlightened self-interest would predict that such flows would be higher for households with more assets;

Education

- (i) Migration would be higher among the more educated members of the household, not only would their job opportunities and income prospects be greater, they represent the stock of human capital which is part of the policy of diversification;
- (ii) The level of remittances from the more educated is greater, not only because their earning would be higher, but also because the remittances represent higher implicit loan repayments to the family, which has invested in their education.

Other

- (i) Remittances are positively related to the size of the family at home;
- (ii) Remittances are higher among the younger migrants because their income prospects are higher and have to repay the investment in their education;

- (iii) Remittances decline with the duration of time abroad but would not cease, even if they are reunited with their immediate family in the host country, as long as there is an inheritance motive or a desire to return home;
- (iv) Female migrants tend remit more for care of the family, but males in families with assets would tend to remit more to maintain their favoured status in the line of inheritance.

Trends in migration in the Caribbean

Recent trends in Caribbean migration have been reviewed in Guengant (1993) and Simmons and Guengant (1992). In his 1993 paper Guengant estimated that net migration from the Caribbean region amounted to 5.6 million during the period 1950 to 1990. This figure represents 16 percent of the region's population in 1990 or 32 percent of the 1950 population. Of this, 1.4 million occurred in the 1980's, slightly less than the 1.7 million net population loss in the 1970's.

Quite naturally the highest absolute loss of population occurred among the countries with the highest population. Jamaica and Haiti recorded losses in population of approximately one million each to top the region. Other countries that recorded significant losses were Puerto Rico (about 800,000), Cuba and the Dominican Republic (700,000 each) and Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago (300,000 each). However, some of the smaller Caribbean states experienced the highest rates of population losses. Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines experienced net migration losses equivalent to more than 80 per cent of their populations in 1950. For the CARICOM countries as a group, excluding the Bahamas, the weighted rate of migration loss was 62 per cent of their 1950 population vastly exceeding the 32 per cent average for the wider Caribbean Region.

The major host nations for Caribbean migrants are the United States and Canada. The European countries also received significant amounts of Caribbean migrants. The United States and Canada were the recipients of 2.7 million legal immigrants from all of the Caribbean countries. This figure excludes the approximately 800,000 migrants from Puerto Rico who have moved to the United States. However in contrast to the USA and Canada, European migration was largely determined by colonial ties. Thus the United Kingdom received migrants from the English speaking Caribbean, France from the Francophone Caribbean and the Netherlands from the Dutch speaking countries.

Intra-Caribbean migration has been minuscule compared with the volume of extra-regional migration. Simmons and Guengant (1992) estimated that in 1980 there were 307,000 intra-regional migrants in the Caribbean amounting to approximately 1 per cent of the total Caribbean population and 7 per cent of the region's loss of population during the period 1950 to 1980. They further noted three features of the intra-regional movement of people.

- (a) The bulk of intra-regional migrants originate in just a few countries. Some of these origin countries, such as Haiti, have very large base populations such that the outflow has had relatively little impact on the sending nation but major impacts on the receiving nations. Others, such as several small islands in the Eastern Caribbean, have small base populations such that the large outflow has had a major impact on them and an impact on the receiving countries in the region as well, since several of these tend also to be smaller countries.
- (b) Migrant flows tend to be directed toward a few principal destination countries. The bulk of intra-regional movers circa 1980 are found in the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago, the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Bahamas, French Guyana and Guadeloupe.
- (c) The migrants themselves have distinctive educational, income and occupational profiles which suggest they play unique roles in the in the economies of the destination countries.

According to Simmons and Guengant (1992), Intra-Caribbean migrants hail principally from Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Grenada and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. These account

for slightly more than 60 percent of all intra-Caribbean migrants, of which almost a third were born in Haiti. In absolute terms Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Cuba are significant contributors to intra-regional migration, but because of their huge populations relative to the rest of the Caribbean, the proportion of migration relative to their total population is quite small. The authors estimate that only 2.3 percent of the Haitian population are living in the region. By contrast the countries of Grenada and St. Vincent and the Grenadines which are among the top five contributors to intra-regional migration, approximately 21 per cent and 16 percent respectively of their populations are resident in other Caribbean countries. These two Windward Islands, together with St. Kitts-Nevis, the British Virgin Islands (BVI), Turks and Caicos Islands and Anguilla represent the countries that show a high propensity to migrate to other Caribbean countries. The proportion of their migrants within the region as a percentage of total population exceeds 15 per cent.

The major destinations for intra-Caribbean migration are (see Table 2 extracted from Simmons and Guengant (1992)):

The Bahamas with its higher standard of living based on tourism and off-shore financial services has been a major destination for migrants from Jamaica, Haiti and the Turks and Caicos Islands.

Migration to **Cuba** occurred prior to the Second World War to assist in the harvesting of sugar cane and also for professional and business reasons. These migrants hailed mainly from Jamaica and Haiti. These migrants are now elderly and are rapidly dying off.

The **Dominican Republic** is an important destination for Haitian agricultural workers.

Puerto Rico represents a major destination for migrants from the Dominican Republic and Cuba, where they work in industry and urban services.

In order to service its growing tourism industry and satisfy its demand for other professional and skilled workers, The **US Virgin Islands** has absorbed significant numbers of migrants from the British Virgin Islands and other Eastern Caribbean countries (Anguilla, St. Kitts-Nevis, Antigua, Dominica and St. Lucia). It also hosts a small number of Puerto Rican nationals.

Barbados is a preferred destination for migrants from St. Vincent and the Grenadines and St. Lucia but its position of host for a number of regional educational and commercial institutions has also attracted migrants from other CARICOM countries.

The boom and bust of the petroleum sector in **Trinidad and Tobago** and its consequent impact on employment opportunities creates incentives and disincentives for the inflow migrants particularly from Grenada, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Guyana. Trinidad and Tobago is probably the only Caribbean country which has experienced a large overall net population loss to Europe and North America while at the same time absorbing significant numbers of migrants from other Caribbean countries.

Guadeloupe with its relatively strong economy attracts migrants from the other Departments in the French West Indies in addition to Dominica and Haiti.

Data on the occupational status of intra-Caribbean migrants is sparse, but in general they occupy lower rounds of socio-economic ladder in their host countries. They are usually engaged in low paying manual labor in the leading sectors of their host countries. There are very few intra-regional migrants professional and managerial positions and even when they are they usually command salaries that are less remunerative than residents of the host countries.

There is significant diversity between Caribbean countries in terms of the preferred destination for their migrants. Jamaica, Suriname and Barbados tend to migrate extra-regionally. For example, of Jamaica's net migration representing 35 per cent of its 1980 population only about 2 per cent of the net loss migrated to Caribbean destinations. On the contrary, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, which have also experienced significant net migration, about 25 to 45 percent

of their net migration has been within the Caribbean. A similar pattern is observed for other OECS countries excluding Montserrat.

Several of the countries that have small intra-regional migration relative to total migration have strong links to 'mother' countries. For example Puerto Rico (United States) Guadeloupe (France) and Suriname (Netherlands). Other countries such as Barbados, Guyana, Trinidad and Jamaica have well-developed educational systems, which allowed them greater initial access to Europe and North America. This allowed them to build up kinship networks at an earlier stage than the other countries. The countries that have relatively more migrants in other Caribbean countries are the less developed countries with the least connection to patrons in the developed countries.

The magnitude of remittances

The data on remittances were obtained from the published Balance of Payments for the Caribbean Countries. In the case of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) member countries, the data were taken from the ECCB Balance of Payments 1999 and Barbados' data were taken from Barbados Balance of Payments 1994 and the International Monetary Fund Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook, 1999. Data for all of the other countries except the BVI were taken from various issues of the Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook, of the International Monetary Fund. In the case of the BVI the Ministry of Finance provided the data.

The figure for remittances comprises Worker Remittances, Migrant Transfers and Other Current Transfers. The last two categories include transactions of both cash and kind. The actual estimation of remittances differs from country to country depending on the peculiarities of the local situation. The coverage of the transactions is far from complete since many of the transactions do not go through the official channels. For example transfers of cash which are sent through the mail or with a friend or relative may not be recorded. Thus recorded remittances is likely to be an understatement of actual remittances. The uncertainty of coverage of the transactions that constitute remittances in addition to the usual errors of measurement and categorization suggests that the data should only be used as indicative of the magnitude of flows of remittances. Moreover, given the importance of remittances to some Caribbean countries and the potential importance for all of the countries consequent on the levels of net migration indicated in Section II and the potential financial flows they represent, countries should endeavour to improve the measurement of these flows.

Data on the magnitude of flows of remittances to selected Caribbean countries between 1989 and 1998 are reported in Tables 2 - 4. The general direction of flows of remittances accords with the theory of remittances developed in the previous and data on net migration discussed in Section II.

However, the magnitude of the flows does not accord with the phenomenal amount of migration which, has been experienced in the last thirty years. If remittances are viewed as the return on the export of human capital, it would be very low. This would suggest some under-recording or that Caribbean people are less likely to remit than their counterparts in other countries. There is some anecdotal evidence, which suggests that this is not the case.

Table 2 provides information on the absolute value of net remittances for 18 Caribbean countries. The table focuses on net remittances, the difference between inflows and outflows, for two reasons. Firstly, it is easier to relate net inflows to the discussion on net migration in Section II, and secondly it is net value of remittances, which is the measure of the injection of these flows into the economy.

Given the size of its population and absolute amount of net migration over the last 40 years, it is not surprising that the Dominican Republic has the highest level of remittances amounting to US\$ 1846 million in 1998. Similarly, in Jamaica which is among the leading countries in the region in terms of net migration remittances amounted to US\$ 600 million in 1998. Remittances to these two

countries seem to have increased rapidly since liberalization of the exchange control regimes, which suggests that more remittances are flowing through the official channels ².

Four countries recorded negative flows for most of the period, viz. The Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. The Bahamas case accords with the discussion on the magnitude of migration flows, since it is not included in the countries which has experienced significant net out-migration but has been the recipient of significant amounts of migration from the rest of the region. The other countries have recorded significant amounts of out-migration but the inflows seem to be small relative to their populations living abroad. For example Trinidad and Tobago lost about 300,000 compared with its receipt of about 47,000 migrants from the Caribbean yet inflows are minuscule compared with outflows. The same holds for the BVI and Suriname. This seems to suggest that countries are able to record outflows of remittances more efficiently than inflows. In fact there would be a natural tendency to do this, given the closer scrutiny on outgoing flows since the authorities tend to pay more attention to items which can have a negative impact on the balance of payments. In the cases of Guyana and Suriname the existence of a parallel foreign exchange markets during the earlier part of the period would have reduced recorded inflows.

For the other countries the direction of the remittances seems to accord with the level of net migration experienced. One observation that would be returned to later is the apparent variability of the flows. This is consistent with the theoretical proposition that remittances would vary with the developments in the country of origin and the performance of the host country. The OECS countries that were hit by hurricanes recorded increased flows in 1989, 1995 and 1997 and most countries showed a slowdown in the growth of remittances during the recession in the USA during 1990 to 1993.

Table 3 provides information on the on the ratio of remittances to the nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at market prices for the Caribbean countries. Among the countries with positive net remittances, the contribution of remittances to economic activity was highest in Montserrat Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Except for the statistical blip in 1989 associated with hurricane Hugo, remittances represented between 13 and 20 percent of GDP up to 1991 and then falls off and even turned negative as a result of the volcanic activity in that country as two-thirds of the population migrated. For the other OECS countries except Antigua and Barbuda and the BVI net remittances averaged between 5 to 8 per cent of GDP. From the discussion in Section II, these countries have experienced high levels of net migration thus, this observation is not surprising. In the case of Antigua and Barbuda remittances inflows are consistent with the other OECS countries but their level of outflows are also higher given that in recent years they have been the recipient of significant migratory flows from Dominica and the Dominican Republic.

Three of the countries (The Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname) which have negative flows of remittances have ratios of less that one per cent of GDP. In the case of the BVI the net outflows represented about 8 per cent of GDP up to the point where data are available. As noted earlier, although the BVI is host to significant quantities of workers mainly from the other OECS countries, significant amounts of migrants from this country are also abroad, but the coverage of these inflows may be less than required.

A pattern similar to that observed for the ratio of remittances to GDP emerges in Tables 4, which reports on the ratios of remittances to exports of goods and services. Table 4 indicates that, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and the OECS countries except Antigua and Barbuda, the BVI and St. Lucia have the highest ratios. In Montserrat the ratio peaked at 194 percent in 1989, averaged over 50 per cent up to 1991 and declines thereafter. The Dominican Republic also has a high ratio (averaging about 18 percent) given its lower ratio of trade to GDP. The ratio of remittances to export of goods and services has risen steadily in Jamaica since 1993 to about 15%. The percentage of net remittances

² An Increase in the level of recorded remittances does not necessarily mean that they have increased but that more is being captured in the statistics.

to merchandise trade was extremely exaggerated for the tourist-oriented economies. Given the high contribution of services in overall trade, the ratios seem to explode, particularly for Montserrat, Anguilla, and the BVI.

The contribution of remittances to development

The contribution of remittances to development depends on the uses to which the remittances are put. If the resources are used for conspicuous consumption there is very little contribution to economic development and given the high import content in the consumption pattern of the Caribbean countries, the impact on the balance of payments can be negative. On the other hand if the resources are used for investment and essential consumption to improve the health and productivity of the society, the development of the society may be enhanced. There are several ways in which remittances may contribute to the development of Caribbean economies both directly and indirectly. Some of these are discussed in this section of the paper.

The inflow of remittances can be viewed as an injection into a Keynesian type circular flow of income. Injections into the circular flow increases economic activity by increasing the level of aggregate expenditure, while withdrawals from the circular flow reduces economic activity. Outflows of remittances are withdrawals from the circular flow and hence reduce economic activity. Thus it is the net remittances that measures the effect on the level of real economic activity. Other things equal, positive net remittances increase real economic activity while negative net remittances have the opposite effect. However, economic development goes beyond increases in real economic activity related to injections into the economy. Economic development requires that the economy be transformed to permanently increase its capacity to produce real output. In addition, this should be supplemented by more equitable distribution of income and greater diversification of the economy. This would result in an improvement of the quality of life of the members of the society.

The most direct way in which remittances contribute to economic and social development is the improvement in the living standards of the recipient. As discussed in Section I, the decision to migrate may be conscious choice to improve the income prospects of the household and to reduce risk associated with income instability. To the extent that this decision is successful remittances would improve the living standard of the household enabling a higher level of consumption and increased educational opportunities for the rest of the household.

Consumption by itself is not a productive activity. However, to the extent that increased consumption by poor households improves their productivity by improving health or improves the capacity of young children in these households to learn and hence acquire better education it may contribute to development. On the contrary conspicuous consumption results in a depletion of the foreign exchange which came into the country when the funds are initially remitted. Remittances in kind, which are in the nature of conspicuous consumption goods can also have a negative effect to the extent that it creates an imitative demand by other members of the society for these goods. It also increases complementary demand by the receiving households for imported goods which are used jointly with the initial gift.

The improvement in educational opportunities for the rest of the household is beneficial both to the household and the country since this would create better job opportunities for the individual, and the country gets a more productive worker. One drawback is that with an existing kinship link in the developed country the likelihood that the more educated members of the household would also migrate is even greater. However, this may create a second-generation flow of remittances in later years.

A logical consequence of the flow of remittances to poor households is the improvement in the distribution of income in the society, if as the theory predicts remittances would be higher for poorer households. Moreover such resources can be invested in education and business to improve

the income prospects of the household even further. While the debate on the effect of migration and remittances on the distribution is far from settled in the literature, a number of studies internationally point to the favorable effects of remittances on the distribution of income (see Stark et al, 1988). Improvements in the distribution of income not only increase the welfare of the individual but has externalities which increases the social development of the society.

The investment of remittances in new businesses or into the expansion of existing family businesses is one of the ways that these flows contribute to economic development. These remittances need not be in the form of cash but may be in the form of capital goods, inventory or raw material. For many low income households access to credit is effectively closed, since formal credit markets do not recognize human wealth as collateral. Thus, the flow of remittances may be the only source of finance for investment in small businesses.

While the contribution of remittances to investment in new businesses is pretty straightforward in terms of the concept, the contribution to investment in existing family businesses has three aspects. The first can be related to inheritance motive, desire to return home for a comfortable retirement, altruism or profit motive. To satisfy these motives, resources in cash or kind are remitted for investment in the family business.

The second aspect is related to the co-insurance that the 'contract' with the migrant provides to his family. It allows the household to undertake risky investments, for example in the improvement in agricultural practices, which would not have been undertaken if the household depended solely on the farm income. These investments would be undertaken with the knowledge that if the venture went sour or the pay back period was longer than expected there would be income support from the migrant.

Assistance in disaster recovery provides a third aspect of remittances being invested in the family business. Although this is related to the co-insurance contract discussed in the preceding paragraph, the distinction here is that resources actually flow to assist in the rehabilitation of the business whereas resources need not flow in the second aspect. The security provided by the contract results in behavior modification, which leads to economic expansion.

Not all households are entrepreneurial by nature, but if a proportion of remittances is saved, it provides a pool of investible resources that the less risk-averse members of the society can use to develop the economy. Remittances in kind can contribute indirectly to the pool of savings if their consumption permits a higher level of saving by the receiving households. To contribute to development in this way, remittances must supplement domestic saving. It is quite possible that remittances can replace domestic saving by permitting a higher level of consumption. Because the flow remittances relaxes the household's liquidity constraint there is usually a strong temptation to undertake higher levels of consumption than is necessary.

At the level of the economy the flow of remittances eases the balance of payments constraints by either providing foreign exchange directly in the case of cash or by reducing the demand for imported goods where remittances are in kind. The caveat here is the demonstration effect on the consumption of the rest of the society associated with the receipt of such goods. As reported in Section IV, both the absolute level of remittances and the ratios relative to export earnings are quite significant to a number of Caribbean countries. Such flows give the economy command over real foreign resources, which can be used in the development effort.

The foreign exchange provided by flow of cash remittances (or saved by remittances in kind) permits the importation of capital goods and raw material necessary for economic development. None of the Caribbean countries have well developed capital goods sectors, thus most capital goods have to be imported. Similarly much of the raw material for industry and tourism have to be imported. The flow of remittances can play a critical role in the development process since the finance of expansion purely from domestic resources would run into the foreign exchange constraint.

While the flow of remittances back to the Caribbean contributes to the development of these countries in a narrow sense, a wider interpretation of the role of migrant resources in the development

process would include migrant investment in activities for expansion of the exports of the Caribbean in the host country. Such activities would include facilities for the distribution of Caribbean goods and, restaurants that use Caribbean products, the promotion of tourism and cultural services. This wider interpretation is posited by Henry (1990) who views the utilization of all migrant resources whether at home or in the host country as a potential contribution to economic development.

Measures to improve the flow of remittances

Any discussion on measures to improve the flow of remittances must take cognizance of the distinction between the various types of remittances discussed in Section I. There is not a lot that policy makers can do about fixed remittances as these are related motives and contractual obligations which are outside the control of the authorities. The same is not true for discretionary remittances, which are associated with the level of saved remittances. These two magnitudes are related to portfolio choices made by the migrants concerning the diversification of her wealth. Thus, measures aimed at influencing the flow of remittances must be aimed at influencing the factors that affect the portfolio choices of the migrant.

The way in which the data on remittances are captured seems to suggest that they have been largely current rather than capital flows. This may be a bit misleading. While in principle it is possible to separate out the major types of remittances, in practice it is extremely difficult. A typical sum of money may be remitted with the following instructions: from this \$500, one hundred for my insurance, \$50 to pay my Friendly Society book for the next six months, \$200 for the mortgage, \$100 for my account at NCB, \$20 for grand father's birthday and the rest just in case Junior needs anything urgently. The multiplicity of purposes (gift, saving, investment and precautionary) means that categorization of any observed figure is almost impossible. Fortunately it is not necessary to be able to categorize the flows. All that is required is that some aspect of the flows respond to the measures.

For flows of remittances to play a significant role in the development process they have to be systematic, predictable and consistent. Policy makers and business would need to be able to plan for these with some degree of predictability or they would continue to play a marginal role. The variability of net remittances can be observed in the in Table 2 and is consistent with the theoretical literature. The measures to increase the flow of remittances must also try to address the variability.

It is recognized that some amount of variability is associated with co-insurance and altruistic considerations but the portfolio choice considerations of discretionary remittances would react fairly predictably to the underlying variables. Some of these measures are identified below.

- (i) The efficiency of the money transfer mechanisms: The introduction of Western Union now makes it less costly, safer and more convenient to remit funds from the USA to the Caribbean and it is most likely to result in an increase in recorded remittances. It reduces some of problems with the existing money transfer services including the high costs, fraud, theft, timeliness, language difficulties and inconvenience.
- (ii) The exchange control regime: A more liberal exchange control regime would reduce the incentive to hoard foreign exchange and more will pass through the official channels.
- (iii) In order to attract more of the migrants saved remittances financial institutions in the Caribbean will have to offer more attractive rates of interest. If the rate of interest is less than the inflation rate the real return on remitted funds will be negative and there will be no incentive for additional funds to flow in. The abatement of inflation in the countries with fixed exchange rates in the 1990's and the liberalization of interest rates in Guyana and Jamaica have resulted in mildly positive real interest rates. In particular the liberalization of interest rates in Jamaica

along with the liberalization of exchange controls have resulted in a significant inflow of remittances and other capital inflows.

- (iv) Governments may wish to consider favorable tax treatment for migrant investment in securities and offer the same tax treatment offered to foreign investors for certain classes of investment.
- (v) The establishment of branches of regional financial institutions in the host countries can provide a way of tapping into the resources of migrants. Branches of commercial banks and insurance companies are avenues for reaching the lower income, less sophisticated members of the migrant population. Familiar institutions with good track records will help to engender the confidence of the usually suspicious migrant worker. The development of investment vehicles to mobilize the saved remittances of the more sophisticated migrant investors would be an additional mechanism to increase these flows. Such vehicles can either allow for the direct investment in the shares of Caribbean companies or be investment vehicles developed by financial intermediaries that lend to productive enterprises.
- (vi) The development of efficient domestic money and capital markets is required to attract significant amounts of portfolio investment through which international capital now moves. The development of efficient money and capital markets would also give the migrant sufficient flexibility to move funds around.
- (vii) The issuance US dollar denominated securities to complement foreign currency accounts would reduce exchange rate risks.
- (viii) Credible macro-policy is required to ensure low inflation and stable exchange rates. The major aim of macroeconomic policy would be to ensure that the domestic currency is as at least as good a store of value than the foreign currency, by avoiding inflation and devaluation. If the foreign currency is seen as a better store of value, there would be very little inflow of discretionary remittances.

Conclusion

This paper looks at issues related to migration and remittances in the Caribbean. It discusses various types of remittances with a view to develop a set of policy measures for affecting the level of remittances. The decision to remit is based on a prior decision to migrate, hence the paper discusses the relationship between migration and remittances and briefly reviews the main trends in Caribbean migration. This serves as a backdrop for the analysis of the data on remittances that is provided for eighteen Caribbean countries for the period 1989 to 1998.

The data reveal that in general the remittance flows accord qualitatively with the migration flows experienced by most of the Caribbean countries. However, the level of remittances appears to be low given the magnitude of net migration experienced by the countries. The recorded flows exhibit some level of variability which could be related to errors of measurement resulting from the coverage of the transactions which are classified as remittances. Based on the ratio of net remittances to GDP and to exports, remittances play a very significant role in the level of economic activity in the countries that have experienced high net migration, especially the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Haiti and the OECS countries (except the BVI and Antigua and Barbuda)

Notwithstanding the importance of remittances to some of the countries, the contribution of remittances can be improved by increasing the flow and consistency of remittances. Some of the ways in which remittances can contribute to the level of economic and social development are discussed and measures to improve the flow of remittances are identified. These include: improving the money transfer services; offering higher real interest rates, favourable tax treatment for investment by migrants, providing better vehicles for migrant investment in their home country and reducing exchange rate and inflation risks.

The saved remittances of migrants represent a potential pool of funds, which can be mobilized for the development of Caribbean countries. The countries need to develop creative ways to utilize both the financial and human resources of the diaspora. Our understanding of what motivates the portfolio choices of Caribbean migrants is extremely limited and the analysis is hindered by the paucity of information on the flow of remittances. Countries may need to systematically improve the volume and accuracy of the information available to undertake the analysis, which would inform policy action in this area.

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Annex

Table 1
MIGRATION BALANCES, CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES, 1950-1989

Country	Migration balances (000s)				Total
	1950-1959	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1950-1989
Cuba	-10.0	-475.0	-222.6	-19.9	-727.5
Dominican Republic	-54.0	-175.0	-220.0	-240.0	-689.0
Haiti	-70.0	-220.0	-350.0	-400.0	-1 040.0
Puerto Rico	-469.8	-211.9	-41.1	-110.1	-832.9
Jamaica	-165.1	-289.5	-270.8	-246.5	-971.9
Trinidad and Tobago	-0.4	-110.1	-94.7	-75.0	-280.2
Barbados	-20.2	-38.2	-14.7	-10.7	-83.8
Guyana	-4.3	-53.1	-129.5	-121.6	-308.5
Grenada	-12.4	-18.5	-21.4	-19.5	-71.8
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	-9.3	-20.0	-15.1	-13.1	-57.5
St. Lucia	-13.	-17.8	-18.5	-13.0	-62.7
Dominica	-5.5	-9.7	-12.5	-15.8	-43.5
Antigua and Barbuda	-2.7	-5.0	-7.1	-7.1	-21.9
St. Kitts-Nevis	-6.1	-16.9	-8.0	-7.4	-38.4
Montserrat	-4.5	-2.6	-0.8	-1.6	-9.5
Belize	-0.8	-7.1	-19.5	-14.7	-42.1
Bahamas	13.6	23.9	3.9	7.4	48.8
Bermuda	0.0	0.0	-2.3	-1.1	-3.4
U.S. Virgin Islands	-1.0	26.5	1.8	-13.1	14.2
Curacao	-4.5	-18.3	-16.9	-20.4	-60.1
Aruba	-13.0	-9.9	-5.5	-5.6	34.0
Suriname	-4.4	-27.8	-97.6	-33.5	-163.3
Guadalupe	-3.4	-25.3	-50.3	-14.0	-65.0
Martinique	-4.5	-30.9	-46.5	-4.3	-86.2
French Guiana	2.5	8.2	7.9	25.7	44.3
Caribbean Islands	-856.2	-1 644.2	-1 313.1	-1 202.8	-5 116.3
CARICOM countries	-231.1	-564.6	-608.7	-538.6	-1 943.0
Caribbean Region	-863.2	-1 724.0	-1 651.8	-1 346.9	-5 585.9

Table 2
NET REMITTANCES FOR SELECTED CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES

Country	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Anguila	NA	1.89	0.52	0.93	1.18	1.28	18.36	8.34	-0.40	-0.19
Antigua and Barbuda	15.25	12.27	5.05	2.34	0.65	3.55	72.32	34.16	84.26	84.09
British Virgin Islands	-11.12	-14.01	-13.26	-13.22	-18.54	-21.50	-24.60	-24.80	-28.01	-31.45
Dominica	10.10	9.95	10.77	11.09	12.36	9.71	11.69	12.94	11.75	11.96
Grenada	15.89	17.00	18.36	18.24	17.27	23.89	34.16	39.63	38.31	38.39
Montserrat	32.39	14.10	7.90	7.36	5.33	5.57	9.79	-9.93	2.71	-4.37
St Kitts-Nevis	13.93	10.41	10.77	11.37	10.92	14.11	21.85	54.65	19.67	34.14
St. Lucia	10.29	11.10	15.75	11.60	4.60	13.36	19.04	13.07	14.73	16.77
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	10.14	12.16	10.29	9.19	9.06	13.44	12.37	13.95	14.24	14.93
OECS		74.86	66.15	58.89	42.82	84.91	174.99	142.02	157.25	164.25
Bahamas	-17.90	-10.60	-7.80	-12.80	-12.60	-1.80	-1.10	-3.40	-3.80	-4.70
Barbados	35.20	39.25	34.15	41.25	26.15	40.90	34.90	41.70	50.20	56.80
Belize	20.70	16.30	15.40	17.70	15.40	14.50	16.80	20.60	25.00	26.60
Guyana	14.00	13.00	12.70	14.00	14.90	48.90	56.20	NA	NA	NA
Jamaica	135.20	155.40	153.30	248.20	306.40	481.60	565.40	592.90	594.90	600.60
Suriname	-5.70	-7.50	-7.40	-7.30	14.70	4.80	8.30			
Trinidad and Tobago	-19.00	-21.00	-15.90	-15.70	-6.70	3.30	-14.40	-5.90	3.50	15.90
Dominican Republic	300.50	314.80	329.50	346.60	361.80	911.50	928.70	1 098.90	1 284.50	1 846.00
Haiti	59.30	61.00	69.50	70.00	73.40	42.90	108.50	152.00	256.00	293.00

Source: ECCB Balance of Payments 1999. Central Bank of Barbados, Balance of Payments of Barbados 1994. IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook, various issues, Bank of Jamaica.

Table 3
NET REMITTANCES FOR SELECTED CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES

Country	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Anguilla	NA	3.6	1.0	1.6	1.8	1.8	30.06	12.62	-0.56	-0.25
Antigua and Barbuda	4.8	3.1	1.2	0.5	0.1	0.7	17.44	7.56	17.29	16.16
British Virgin Islands	-7.1	-8.3	-7.6	-7.4	-10.0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Dominica	6.6	6.0	5.9	5.7	6.1	4.6	6.19	6.43	5.61	5.39
Grenada	8.7	7.7	7.6	7.3	6.7	8.8	14.66	16.13	14.65	13.71
Montserrat	68.3	20.8	14.0	12.9	8.9	8.7	18.99	-23.70	8.33	-13.77
St. Kitts -Nevis	10.7	6.8	6.8	6.5	5.7	6.8	11.31	26.50	8.49	14.09
St. Lucia	3.4	2.8	3.7	2.4	0.9	2.6	3.72	2.72	2.96	3.16
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	5.8	6.2	4.9	4.0	3.8	5.6	5.54	5.93	5.77	5.59
Bahamas	-0.6	-0.3	-0.3	-0.4	-0.4	-0.06	-0.4	NA	NA	NA
Barbados	2.1	2.3	2.0	2.6	1.6	2.35	1.87	2.46	2.30	2.43
Belize	5.7	4.6	3.6	3.7	2.9	2.63	2.86	3.41	4.06	4.22
Guyana	3.7	3.3	3.6	3.7	3.3	9.24	8.95	NA	NA	NA
Jamaica	4.0	4.8	6.1	12.9	10.5	12.08	13.16	10.16	9.82	8.87
Suriname	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4	-0.3	0.0	NA	1.76	NA	NA	NA
Trinidad and Tobago	-0.4	-0.4	-0.3	-0.3	-0.1	0.07	-0.27	-0.11	0.06	0.54
Dominican Republic	4.5	5.5	4.2	3.9	3.8	8.68		8.44	8.60	12.06
Haiti	2.8	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.3	1.98		4.84	7.94	7.43

Source: ECCB Balance of Payments 1999. Central Bank of Barbados, Balance of Payments of Barbados 1994. IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook, various issues, Bank of Jamaica. IMF international Financial Statistics, various issues

Table 4
NET REMITTANCES AS A RATIO OF GOODS AND SERVICES FOR SELECTED CARIBBEAN COUNTRY

Country	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Anguilla	NA	7.3	2.3	5.2	4.9	4.3	8.46	4.18	-0.15	-0.07
Antigua and Barbuda	5.2	3.4	1.3	0.6	0.1	0.8	6.67	3.14	4.23	7.44
British Virgin Islands	-6.4	-7.3	-7.6	-6.6	-5.9	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Dominica	14.0	11.0	11.4	9.7	9.0	8.5	4.16	4.20	3.39	3.20
Grenada	18.5	18.1	18.5	18.2	15.5	18.5	10.23	11.14	10.25	8.65
Montserrat	193.6	73.4	39.3	33.4	20.3	18.2	7.11	-5.08	2.29	-3.93
St. Kitts-Nevis	17.6	12.6	11.1	10.1	9.4	11.7	5.44	13.49	4.25	6.54
St. Lucia	4.1	3.9	5.5	3.6	1.4	3.9	1.85	1.37	1.52	1.62
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	8.8	9.3	9.0	7.1	8.4	16.1	3.36	3.55	3.70	3.37
Bahamas	-0.7	-0.4	-0.4	-0.6	-0.6	-0.11	-0.06	-0.18	-0.20	-0.25
Barbados	3.8	4.4	4.0	4.9	2.9	4.07	3.01	3.34	4.02	4.43
Belize	9.5	7.1	6.1	6.2	5.1	5.23	5.64	6.67	7.55	8.16
Guyana	6.1	4.8	4.8	3.7	3.6	8.37	8.93	NA	NA	NA
Jamaica	7.2	7.0	9.3	11.2	13.4	15.82	16.59	17.72	17.42	17.75
Suriname	-1.0	-1.5	-2.0	-2.0	0.0	1.31	1.60	NA	NA	NA
Trinidad and Tobago	-1.0	-0.9	-0.7	-0.7	-0.4	0.16	-0.51	-0.21	0.12	0.54
Dominican Republic	14.5	21.2	17.7	18.0	16.6	17.39	16.20	17.74	18.19	24.67
Haiti	13.8	12.1	9.4	20.6	15.2	64.03	56.51	79.17	67.55	61.17

Source: ECCB Balance of Payments 1999. Central Bank of Barbados, Balance of Payments of Barbados 1994. IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook, various issues, Bank of Jamaica.

A.2 Productive use of remittances in Central America, the Dominican Republic and Mexico: recent experiences

*Federico Torres A.*³

1. Introduction

This paper describes some of the instruments and measures used recently to encourage the productive use of remittances. It focuses on five countries in which the author has worked on this subject over the last three years, namely Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico. These five countries between them account for 76% of Latin America's total family remittance inflows, which have been growing at an average annual rate of 12.4% over the last three years.

Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean comprise one of the regions most affected by labour-market globalization, especially as a result of the rapid growth of the United States economy, which has now enjoyed over 10 consecutive years' expansion that has absorbed large quantities of labour from neighbouring countries. It is no surprise that new measures and instruments aimed at making the most of remittances are being piloted in this area. Migrants themselves are pressing for more decisive action on this subject, through their associations in the United States and local counterparts in each country.

In what follows, we firstly outline a number of quantitative and conceptual issues (sections 2 to 4), in order to illustrate the setting in which the different experiences described unfold. The paper does not consider the macroeconomic implications of remittances, as these have been studied often in the past. Anyone interested in this topic can turn to a wide variety of sources.⁴ We thought it better to use this forum to discuss some of the more concrete issues facing governments (especially at local level) and also migrants and their organizations.

Section 5 sketches the recent evolution of migrant organizations, and sections 6 to 8 analyse various instruments associated with family remittances, migrant savings and collective remittances. A final section puts forward a number of conclusions.

2. Remittance inflows

In 1999, migrants from the Dominican Republic, Central America and Mexico sent back over US\$ 9.5 billion in remittances to their countries of origin. This is 50% more than total agricultural exports from these countries and equivalent to two-thirds of their tourism earnings.

The remittance figures for each country are shown in table 1. Labour migration trends in these countries have exceeded all expectations. The sustained growth of the United States economy over 10 consecutive years, and the large wage differentials between this economy and its neighbours, have recently exacerbated a trend that has been clearly visible for the last decade.

These five countries account for over three-quarters of total remittance inflows in Latin America, and the proportion is rising. In some countries, such as Dominican Republic and Honduras,

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⁵ Waller Meyers (2000), for example, provides many references.

total remittances have been growing faster than 15% per year over the last three years. Per capita remittances in El Salvador are the highest in the world.

Even if current trends slacken, over US\$ 120 billion in remittances can be expected to flow into these countries during the next ten years.

3. The productive use of remittances

Most remittance inflows are used for consumption purposes, and as a result their economic and social impact is often held in low esteem and sometimes even considered negative. This is one of the most controversial issues in the literature on migration and remittances. In this paper we will confine ourselves to three basic issues that need to be kept in mind.

Firstly, figures on the use of family remittances are far from clear and decisive, for there are no systematic records. In some countries, household income and expenditure surveys are useful references for comparing the structure of expenditure among households that receive remittances and those that do not. Such a comparison does not reveal significant differences.

Table 2 shows the structure of family expenditure in households receiving remittances, using estimates from a wide variety of sources. The figures for Dominican Republic and Mexico, which are the most recent and based on national surveys, suggest that between 15% and 23% of remittances get invested.

Taking the lower of these two figures, as representative of the five countries as a whole in 1999, suggests a very large overall volume of investment amounting to about US\$ 1.4 billion. This is similar to the sum destined for social infrastructure that year by the social investment funds of the various countries⁵.

Secondly, the costs of sending remittances remain high in the countries analysed, although they do vary greatly from country to country. It is generally accepted that reducing such costs would lead to better use of remittances by leaving migrants a larger margin for investment. Nonetheless, the problem is complex and is not analysed in detail in this paper. Solving it would require an in-depth review of various exchange-rate and financial regulations, both national and international.

Thirdly, better use of remittances will have more visible effects at the regional level. In Mexico, for example, at national level, remittances account for a mere 1.2% of GDP or US\$ 61 per capita (table 1), little over a quarter of the equivalent figure for El Salvador. But these inflows are concentrated in closely defined geographical areas that account for just 25% of the national population. These zones are not the poorest in the country but are among those of intermediate development. Nonetheless they are clearly rural areas where agricultural activities predominate.

In most of these zones, migration to the United States has been a tradition dating back more than 40 years. Unfortunately, there are no studies that systematically document the influence of remittances on the economies of these zones over an extended time frame.

Nonetheless, even in these zones, remittances from abroad have presumably only been a helpful factor or a trigger for economic development, rather than the sole or dominant factor, as excessive optimism sometimes would have one believe. This point is even more relevant nationwide.

Productive use of remittances is generally understood to involve saving and investment, although sometimes the concept is extended to other types of expenditure such as health and education. The term "investment" should not only be seen in terms of goods and services production, but generally speaking any type of investment in fixed assets, whether social or community infrastructure, housing, or the assets of a firm or business.

⁵ The comparison for Mexico considered expenditure by the Social Infrastructure Investment Fund (FAIS).

Having said that, sometimes a hierarchy comes into play, whereby an investment to strengthen or improve the economic base of a community, such as a dam, is ranked above a work of ornamentation, such as the embellishment of a public square.

Talk of improving the use of remittances normally means their economic and social impact can be expanded. This is likely to mean increasing the proportion of remittances destined for investment, or substantially enhancing the quality of the investment or other expenditure undertaken with them.

4. Different types of remittance

Until about five years ago, discussion of the productive use of remittances focused specifically on recipient family and ways to help them channel a larger proportion into investment.

Although this approach was legitimate, it was also partial and never gave the expected results. In recent years, the focus of attention has been shifting from the recipients of remittances to the people sending them, namely migrants in the United States.

It is not only family remittances that migrants send back to their country of origin. Sometimes, they invest their savings in their native country, and they also send donations to benefit their places of origin.

Shifting the focus of analysis from recipients to the senders of remittances has also highlighted other factors and institutions, such as migrant clubs, whose main characteristics are discussed in the next section.

The measures and instruments currently being piloted in the region reflect this diversity in remittance types and the factors involved. To facilitate the analysis, three types of remittance can be distinguished.

Firstly, there are family remittances that migrants send back to their families for sustenance purposes; these account for the bulk of the inflows shown in table 1. These. When used for investment, they are generally spent on:

- (a) Home improvement.
- (b) Land purchase.
- (c) Working capital and fixed assets for small family businesses or farms.

Secondly, migrants also send savings to be channelled into either personal or business investments. Strictly speaking, these should not be included in the concept of remittances, but it is highly likely that most of them are included the figures shown in table 1, because of the way they are carried out. No data or clear patterns have been detected in relation to such investments, but two main modalities are involved:

- (a) Entrepreneurial investments destined for businesses in the locality or region of origin (shops and restaurants especially).
- (b) Personal investments, predominantly purchase of homes or small farms.

Thirdly, there are collective remittances, based on collections made by migrants through their organizations in the United States, in order to sponsor an action or project in their places of origin. Three generic types can be distinguished:

- (a) Sponsorship of civic or religious festivals.
- (b) Community works.
- (c) Entrepreneurial-type projects.

The first of these categories is the most common, although nowadays there is a clear trend to concentrate efforts and resources in community works. Business-type projects are the least frequent, despite several examples that have been started recently.

Each of the remittance-types mentioned above responds to specific motivations that have not yet been studied in depth, and on which there is no consensus among researchers. Generally speaking, economic motives seem to predominate in family remittances and where investment of personal savings is concerned. Motivations for collective remittances tend to be linked to status and prestige, but patterns are not completely clear-cut in any category.

5. Migrant associations

One of the greatest influences on attitudes towards the productive use of remittances in recent years has been the emergence and development of Latin American migrant organizations in the United States. Although these organizations are not new (many of them date from the 1950s and 1960s), most of those in existence today are under 20 years old. Traditional organizations originally operated as informal groups or as social or sports clubs.

It was in the 1990s that Latin American migrant associations in United States really began to take off, partly because of the rapid growth of migrant flows in those years, but particularly as a response to the hardening of immigration laws in that country. "During the 1990s, the different types of association renewed and multiplied, and many of them applied for legal status under state law in the United States (...) The trend towards organization on more a technical and permanent basis took off in an unprecedented way. So far, most of the new groupings have been aimed at defending their members' human rights or providing them with advisory services and support to regularize their migratory status, although now there are also increasing numbers of organizations attempting to perform welfare or community activities, or shifting their emphasis in this direction." ⁶

No one knows how many Latin American migrant organizations there are altogether in the United States.⁷ Those from countries covered by this presentation number in the hundreds. In the case of Mexico alone, the Ministry of Foreign Relations had 446 associations of this type registered in its most recent December 1998 directory; spread throughout the United States. A recent ECLAC study estimates the number of Guatemalan associations in the United States at over 300.⁸

The predominant organization pattern, though not the only one, is based on specific communities of origin. Thus in the case of Guatemala, for example, there is a Coatepeque fraternity in Los Angeles, and a Retalteca association; there are also associations from Chinameca and Chirilagua in Washington, representing those Salvadoran communities; and there are various groupings from La Ceiba, Honduras, in New Orleans, and so on and so forth.

Of course there are also associations at the national or regional level; and there are second-tier organizations, such as GUIA from Guatemala, which operates in a number of United States cities, or the Association of Salvadoran Communities, which has similar characteristics.

In several regions of long-standing emigrant tradition, there are some truly outstanding examples of organizational networks, including the Zacatecan clubs, of which there are over 100 in various United States cities, grouped together in federations such as that of southern California, and in a Confederation of Zacatecan Clubs, which acts as a third-tier organization. ⁹

⁶ ECLAC (2000b), p. 50.

⁷ Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (1999).

⁸ ECLAC (2000a), p. 17.

⁹ Moctezuma (1999), pp. 71 – 85.

Although migrant nuclei and organizations in the United States have become one of the most important economic, social and political forces in Latin American civil society, they still have much room for development and many unexploited potentials. Many migrants, especially non-resident or temporary ones, never join such clubs, and their relations with national and local governments remain weak or unstable. With very few exceptions, no serious attempts have been made by the respective governments to promote the institutional development of their communities abroad; adequate and up-to-date information on their scope and diversity is also lacking, as their rapid growth has overtaken the isolated and occasional attempts that have been made to study them.

Other equally important phenomena that have arisen out of Latin American immigration into the United States are in a similar situation. For example, there is a wide and rapidly expanding business network, owned by small and medium-sized investors of Latin American origin. New York, for example, is home to hundreds of businesses run by Dominican, Mexican and Salvadoran entrepreneurs, especially in predominantly Hispanic areas of the city; and many of these have begun to look for investment opportunities in their countries of origin.

Another phenomenon that has not been analysed or fully exploited is the large market that is developing for Latin American products in several United States cities — especially typical meals or foods whether produced industrially or home-made, including cheeses, biscuits, cakes, etc. Large business and marketing chains have grown up around this market, with major repercussions on the economies of the countries from which such products originate.

As we shall see below, attempts to channel remittances into more productive uses have not been immune to these developments and the various foreign exchange flows they represent. The issue is no longer seen exclusively from the standpoint of family remittances, and the focus is no longer solely on the families that receive foreign exchange in the countries of origin.

6. Family remittances

Nonetheless, family remittances are still the most important category among all those mentioned, and also the one that has proven most impervious to the policies and instruments introduced by local and national governments. Several attempts have been made in Mexico and El Salvador to increase remittance capture and divert more into saving and investment, but the results have always been discouraging. Such efforts continue, however, as discussed below.

- (a) *Local investment funds.* A number of state governments in Mexico have recently revived initiatives and instruments previously used with varying results in other countries. The cases of Jalisco (FIDERAZA) and San Luis Potosí (Communities Support Fund) have attracted most attention because of their funding system based on contributions by financial intermediaries.

The basic idea here is the same in both cases: banks or other intermediaries donate to the fund a small percentage of the profits they earn from remittances sent to each state. The fund finances two types of project: social infrastructure works in emigrant municipios, and viable productive projects that help to slow down emigration.¹⁰

The rules of fund management and supervision are established in consultation with the migrant clubs, and the latter participate actively in the process of granting credits. State governments make additional contributions to the fund, or provide complementary technical assistance for putting together project technical files or facilitating project management.

No systematic assessment has yet been made of the operational results of such funds, but requests for project financing have not been very numerous. It is also unclear whether the credits extended have been effective in channelling a larger proportion of family remittances into the projects undertaken.

¹⁰ For further details on how this type of fund operates, see FIDERAZA (undated).

- (b) *Use of family remittances in general programmes.* In certain rural areas of high migration in Mexico, family remittances are used as counterpart funding to gain access to the benefits of certain agricultural and rural development programmes, such as *Alianza para el Campo*. In some states up to a quarter of all tractor, cattle and other asset purchases are largely financed through such inflows. People who have access to remittances find it easier to comply with the operating rules of the respective programmes, which generally require beneficiaries to present purchase invoices in order to receive the corresponding government subsidy.

In the Dominican Republic there are also signs that various programmes and instruments designed to encourage micro-entrepreneurs and small-scale community works are greatly sought after by families that receive remittances from abroad.¹¹

This has led government agencies to propose parallel efforts to promote their programmes — i.e. in defined areas of the home country and among migrants resident in the United States, using the latter's organizations as a pivot. Several actions of this type have been carried out in relation to *Alianza para el Campo* programmes in Mexico.

An interesting feature of recent policies towards family remittances is that these are no longer exclusively targeted on the recipients, and the design of new instruments now takes account of the viewpoints and problems of the senders. Migrants, either alone or through their clubs, now participate one way or another in setting rules for the management and supervision of the funds, or for promoting the programmes or implementing projects themselves.

This is a far-reaching change that speaks for itself about the current status of migrants as an economic and political force — something that is seen more clearly in the experiences discussed below.

7. Migrant savings

This category includes attempts to encourage more productive use of the savings that migrants accumulate in the United States, either as a result of their success as entrepreneurs in that country or at the end of their working life. The first case normally involves promoting opportunities for new businesses in the country of origin. In the second case, the most important motivations relate more to retirement or definitive return to the home country.

- A. *Business investments.* As mentioned above, a Latin American business class has developed in many United States cities, along with a market for a variety of products from migrants' countries of origin. The economic exchange that these developments foster has not been quantified, but governments in several countries have recognized its importance and have made efforts to promote it.

Nearly three years ago, the Government of El Salvador set in motion an innovative programme in this area, aimed at generating investment opportunities through exchanges of information and experiences among Salvadoran investors resident in national territory and those settled in the United States. Such exchanges kept residents abroad informed about business opportunities opening up in their home country, while investors living in El Salvador could also be made aware of the demand and business potential among their compatriot community in the United States.

This Ministry of Economic Affairs programme completed an initial pilot stage in New York, mainly targeting Salvadoran migrant organizations in that city. The actions carried out were well received in both countries, and prospects for future collaboration seem highly promising.

¹¹ For greater detail on the programmes and instruments referred to, see ECLAC (2000c), p.19

The Government of Guatemala implemented a similar programme (entitled PROGUAT) early last year. This "is closely linked to one-stop export shopping and aims to foster contacts with Guatemalans living abroad and encourage them to invest in their home country. The programme puts them in contact with local entrepreneurs with a view to stimulating trade and investment in both directions. Its rationale is based on the view that emigrants represent a huge market for Guatemalan exports to the United States, and that there is potential for Guatemalans living in that country to act as distributors of such products. As much as 70% of Guatemalan non-traditional exports go to the United States." ¹²

- B. Personal investments. Efforts in this field, whether old or recent, have been aimed at encouraging migrants to borrow to purchase homes in their countries of origin, given their desire to finally return there. Most promotions have been conducted by private firms, in the form of mortgage loans but with shorter payback periods than normally available on financial markets. No systematic monitoring of the results of these programmes has been undertaken, but demand seems to have been less than expected.

In the Dominican Republic, the Housing Institute implemented a government programme to offer loans to Dominican residents abroad for home purchase on national soil. The programme is currently only in its initial stage, with 500 homes on its books; it has been promoted mainly among Dominicans living in New York.

Other possibilities are also being explored in this field, such as affiliating migrants into pension or voluntary social security schemes in their countries of origin.

8. Collective or community remittances

The collective remittance category has spawned a much larger number and variety of initiatives than the other types of remittance analysed so far. Although there are no estimates of the total magnitude of collective remittances, they have clearly grown rapidly in recent years, as shown by various isolated pieces of evidence that it has been possible to document.

Regardless of size, however, collective remittances represent a highly flexible quality resource usually earmarked for investment, which is both participatory and representative of the community — characteristics that are hard to find in other types of contribution. Accordingly, it is no surprise that both national and local governments, especially the latter, have focused on this type of remittance in recent years, promoting programmes in which the resources and initiatives of migrant associations are complemented with public funds.

Before describing some of the leading programmes of this type, it is worth mentioning that autonomous initiatives by migrant clubs continue to proliferate in all Latin American countries. A recent ECLAC study provides abundant examples of such initiatives in Central America¹³, and Mexico also boasts many documented cases. Resident associations in the United States continue frequently to sponsor civic and religious festivals, but there is a clear and growing trend to channel collections into community works.

- A. *The 3 x 1 Zacatecas programme.* Funding for this programme is based on the principle that for every dollar contributed by Zacatecan migrant clubs, each of the three levels of government (federal, state and municipal) will contribute another dollar, thereby creating a fund for community investments and infrastructure in the clubs' places of origin. Investment decisions are taken jointly with representatives from the migrant associations, and project execution is coordinated or at least supervised by them.

¹² ECLAC (2000a), pp. 32-33.

¹³ ECLAC (2000 b), pp. 52-58.

In 1999, the 3 x 1 programme took in a total of around US\$ 1.3 million in contributions from Zacatecan clubs and made investments of over US\$ 5 million.¹⁴ Funding was provided for street and road paving, and for projects to supply potable water and electric power. Support for productive projects has been given on an exceptional basis.

This programme has now been operating for over seven years, becoming a sort of paradigm in Mexico because of its organization and results. It has been imitated by other local governments in this country with varying results. Recently, migrant clubs have suggested the need for the programme to move into support for projects that create permanent jobs and generate incomes in various localities.

- B. Programme to establish maquila businesses in Guanajuato. From the outset, this programme was aimed at promoting productive projects, and although it also has a number of social objectives such as job creation, the projects supported have a clearer business focus.

The programme has been promoted through Casas Guanajuato, which are non-profit organizations established in the United States, sponsored by Guanajuatan migrant clubs in that country and supported by the Government of Guanajuato itself. By May this year, 17 Casas Guanajuato had been established in a similar number of United States cities.¹⁵

In order to set up maquila businesses in their places of origin, migrants contribute US\$ 60,000 and the state government extends a credit for a further US\$ 60,000. With this joint amount a business is set up, managed by the respective club. The state government also provides support for training and technical assistance.

The programme began in 1996 with a promotion to set up 10 maquila factories. So far six have been established in five different municipios with high rates of international emigration. Although the tools are not available to make a thorough assessment of the results, most of these firms seem to have overcome their start-up problems.

9. Conclusions

- A. *Wide variety of initiatives.* An initial conclusion is that at the present time a wide variety of initiatives exist for channelling remittances or other similar funding into more productive uses. Attention is no longer focused only on family remittances and the recipients of this type of inflow, but also on other foreign-currency flows and other actors and institutions.
- B. *Predominance of local initiatives.* The variety referred to stems largely from the fact that most initiatives nowadays originate with governments or local groups, unlike the previous situation where the focus was mainly on measures or instruments of national scope. Remittances have gained greater projection and importance as tools of local and regional development, and their influence and impact are expected to grow rapidly in this domain.
- C. *Strategic role of migrant associations.* One way or another, migrant clubs are present in all the fields of action we have examined: either as key actors, or as focus points from which local decisions radiate, or as information and consultation sources. These clubs represent one of a few organized forces of civil society which have the credibility and resources to provide clear leadership in community or regional development initiatives, with or without support from local governments.
- D. *Difficulties in mobilizing family remittances.* In the field of family remittances it has proven impossible to develop efficient and attractive instruments for migrants and their families. There is also a lack of clear progress in mobilizing migrants' personal savings. Greater efforts are

¹⁴ Esparza (1999), pp. 61-62.

¹⁵ Consulado General de México en Atlanta (2000).

needed in these areas to develop suitable instruments and incentives, but the search needs to be undertaken jointly with the senders of remittances and their associations, to support their initiatives and exploit their skills and resources. In principle, the most promising path would seem to involve strengthening and improving general microenterprise and small business programmes, while adopting measures to promote or disseminate these among remittance senders and recipients alike.

- E. *Progress in other areas.* Clearer progress and results can be seen on collective remittances and migrants' business investments. In both cases, however, the scale of projects is still small and their economic impact limited. New instruments and incentives need to be designed to overcome these hurdles.
- F. *Technical, financial and organizational challenges.* Local governments and migrant organizations have not allocated sufficient resources to improve the design of their instruments and perform in-depth analyses of their technical, financial and organizational requirements. This is one of the reasons why it has proven impossible to use the institutions and instruments of collective contributions also to mobilize family remittances. Action in this area would have immediate positive effects.
- G. *Shortage of comprehensive programmes.* Despite the growing economic and social importance of remittances, along with their clear regional impact and the proliferation of local initiatives to encourage their productive use, no country has attempted a comprehensive strategy to support, exploit and disseminate new developments. No one has even undertaken a wide-ranging study to lay foundations for a programme of this type, through comparative analysis of the different practices currently in existence, and their economic and institutional foundations.
- H. *Need for a decentralized scheme.* A comprehensive policy or programme on remittances calls for a nationwide effort, under a decentralized operating and decision-making framework. The latter should encourage local initiatives by supporting and fostering best practices, and implementing pilot projects that can be replicated on a wider scale. The temptation to impose a centralized programme or rigid menu of incentives that inhibits or suffocates local initiatives is to be avoided, as its aggregate effect may eventually turn out negative, by reducing spontaneous and decentralized efforts.
- I. *Basic components of a decentralized scheme.* Technical assistance to improve the design of instruments at the regional level should be a priority component of any scheme. This should also encourage institutional strengthening among migrant associations and their local counterparts, or at least promote an exchange of information and experiences between them. National governments should also be able to contribute or mobilize complementary funds as seed capital for such institutional strengthening, and to finance pilot projects of special interest. Lastly, there is a need for better and more appropriate regulations to facilitate the process of sending remittances and cut the costs, and for diverting them into a system of intermediation that is more efficient and more open to competition.
- J. The countries discussed in this paper, namely Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico, all currently possess the conditions needed to design a strategy of this type, and they would achieve major gains from implementing it. These countries are likely to see significant growth in remittances over the next few years, and all of them have strong and well-organized migrant associations promoting local development projects in their places of origin. Each country also has a variety of programmes and instruments that could form the basis for empowering local development initiatives, through innovative adaptations making it possible to mobilize all remittance types.

Table 1
**DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO:
 REMITTANCE INFLOWS, 1999.**

Countries	Total remittances (millions of dollars)	Remittances per capita (dollars)	Annual average rate of growth 1996-1999 %
Mexico	5,910	61	11.8
Dominican Republic	1,519	179	18.5
El Salvador	1,374	218	8.1
Guatemala	448	39	7.3
Honduras	285	44	30.6
Subtotal	9,536	74	12.4
Total for Latin America	12,500	24	8.4

Sources: Remittance figures for each country are obtained from central bank websites, and the total for Latin America is estimated on the basis of the ECLAC balance of payments series for 1997. In calculating per-capita figures, population data were taken from ECLAC, Indicadores sociales básicos de la subregión norte de América Latina y el Caribe 1998-1999 (LC/MEX/L.387), Mexico City, August 1999.

Table 2
**DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO:
 STRUCTURE OF EXPENDITURE IN HOUSEHOLDS RECEIVING REMITTANCES.**
(Percentages)

Countries	Investment	Consumption	Total
Mexico (96)	23	77	100
Dominican Republic (97)	15	85	100
El Salvador (90)	7 *	—	—
Guatemala (90)	10 *	—	—

* In these cases, percentages indicate the proportion of households declaring investment expenditure as their main use of the remittances.

Sources: For Mexico, Consejo Nacional de Población (CONAPO), "Las remesas enviadas por los trabajadores migrantes en Estados Unidos", La situación demográfica de México, Mexico City, 1999, p. 175; for the Dominican Republic, Marina Ortiz, Microempresas, migración y remesas en la República Dominicana, 1996-1997, Santo Domingo, Microenterprise Development Fund (FONDOMICRO), 1997, p. 48; for El Salvador and Guatemala, ECLAC, Remesas y economía familiar en El Salvador, Guatemala y Nicaragua (LC/MEX/L.154/Rev 1), Mexico City, August 1993, p. 75.

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A.3 Comment by Pablo Serrano Calvo.¹⁶ Remittances: the economic and social counterpart of migration

The comments I would wish to make on these two challenging papers on remittances, presented by Federico Torres and Wendell Samuel, are based on the experience gained on this subject by the ECLAC subregional headquarters in Mexico. This office caters for the countries in the northern part of Latin America and the Caribbean, namely Mexico, the six countries of the Central American isthmus (excluding Belize), along with Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Haiti. Globalization has had clearly defined and specific effects in each of these economies, leading to rapid development of the maquila industry in so-called free zones, while also boosting tourism and inflows of monetary remittances from emigrants. As the two specialists have just pointed out (Federico Torres referring to Mexico and Central America, and Wendell Samuel dealing with the Caribbean), the significance of migrant remittances in both the economic and social domains is unquestionable, and not just because of their magnitude or because they have grown exceptionally fast during the last two decades.

Unlike maquila and tourism activities, which are usually promoted or developed with decisive support from governments, remittance incomes are the result of a spontaneous strategy by the population, or, to be more precise, the outcome of an infinity of individual atomized strategies that respond more to family interests than to individual ones. In the vast majority of cases such strategies have not sought government support — I refer to the management of remittances, which are highly individual. Instances of government support have actually been quite recent, in view of the vast potential these resources represent in terms of social or productive investment waiting to be exploited. People who emigrate are motivated mainly by a desire to achieve a better standard of living than is available to them in their place or country of birth, and at the same time provide their families, or the communities they leave behind, various avenues for improvement. Rationales for emigration are as varied as the circumstances migrants face, although there is usually an overarching desire to eventually reunite the family either abroad or back home in the country of origin.

Having said that, the remittances figures we have just heard are astonishing, both in absolute terms such as in Mexico — which apparently is the world's second-largest recipient of remittances after Portugal — and relatively, particularly in the case of El Salvador, although to a lesser extent Dominican Republic and the other Caribbean islands. Foreign-exchange inflows of this magnitude clearly bolster the international monetary reserves held by central banks, but they can also have distorting macroeconomic effects, especially on interest rates and the exchange rate, which harm other sectors of the economy, especially exporters

Is also significant that the bulk of the hemisphere's remittances are concentrated in this northern area of Latin America and the Caribbean, no doubt because of the magnetic attraction of the United States and to a lesser extent Canada. As already mentioned, the economic weight of the United States has proven more powerful than past colonial ties, usurping Caribbean "mother countries" such as the United Kingdom, France and Holland.

Undocumented status is often associated with these migratory flows and with low incomes for workers whose natural way in to the labour market is through the underground economy. This is clearly a matter for deep concern, among other things because informality underlies the source of a major part of these huge funds. A large proportion of all remittances are sent back by undocumented migrants who continue to swell the ranks of what are still referred to as "minorities". According to preliminary data from the most recent census, the sum total of all minority groups in the state of California, including Asians of course, now constitutes a majority — with all the implications that this new form of "globalize" society may entail. In any event, the burgeoning growth of the North American economy has encouraged this flow of immigrants in recent years, and it seems very likely to keep doing so for the foreseeable future.

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In addition to the low pay and generally unfavourable employment conditions that immigrants normally face, other forms of exploitation include not only human trafficking, but also, once emigrants have settled in their new country, the millions of dollars in commissions paid to have their savings sent home by wire transfer. Some progress has been made in this area, but even so migrants who send remittances in small amounts still face proportionately higher charges.

It is not usually the poorest of the poor that emigrate, because minimum capital and skills are needed to do so. But a high proportion of those who do venture forth from their own countries come from population strata living in poverty, motivated precisely by the desire to lift their families out of it. This is what household income and expenditure surveys show: the incidence of poverty is clearly much less in households that receive remittances. The figures suggest that around 85% of all remittances are used for consumption, mainly food. This figure alone reveals their underlying economic and social purpose. Moreover, it is mostly women who manage these funds — and rationally — in favour of their children. Expenditure on health and education can be seen as a long-term investment. But more specifically, this field of investment is dominated by home improvement and extensions, and even house or land purchase, as a crucial part of the rationale of the emigrant planning for his or her eventual return. Nonetheless, saving and productive investment (which effectively creates jobs and generates incomes) plays a marginal role — absorbing between 3% and 5% of total remittances received depending on the country.

As has been well pointed out, encouragement of the productive use of remittances has been a rising priority — repeatedly supported by ECLAC — in the sense that productive investment helps to permanently overcome the conditions of poverty in which recipient families live, thereby breaking their dependency on remittances from abroad, which normally tend to diminish over the years. Although there are successful cases of productive projects financed with remittances, progress to date has been small, largely because of a lack of public and private support for such investments. For that reason the recommendations we have just heard are highly relevant, with their variety of channels, especially bank and credit support, the nurturing of microenterprise and emphasis on education and training.

But, beyond these rationales concerning the nuclear family, which have been the subject of study in recent decades, a major qualitative leap has been made from a conceptual point of view. As Federico Torres points out, attention has recently shifted from the recipients of remittances to the emigrants themselves, as a potential source of local development in their communities of origin. Emigrants are the most capable and flexible of family members, because they have had to adapt to a new environment and may even have developed business skills. Many have become small-scale and even prosperous entrepreneurs in the United States

Latin American and Caribbean immigrant organizations in the United States, although originally set up to defend migrant and labour rights, have proven their solidarity with their communities of origin, not only by sending back money for popular festivals, but also by installing basic services, and equipping clinics, schools and libraries. It is a well-known fact that the remote communities with the best access roads in Guatemala are those that have seen their workers emigrate abroad; and computerized local libraries in El Salvador are the ones that have received funds from that country's huge diaspora. Far from supporting these private social investment flows, however, central or local governments have often tended to withdraw, assuming themselves freed of responsibility — an attitude that has been repeatedly criticized. Fortunately there are other instances of successful government programmes that are highly challenging and imaginative — such as the Mexican examples mentioned in Zacatecas, and those in El Salvador and the Dominican Republic. Nonetheless, in these community programmes the weakest link in the chain connecting migrants abroad and those remaining in the home country tends to be local institutions. There is a lot of work to be done here in most countries.

Collective remittances are still a small fraction of family remittances, but they have significant investment potential. Apart from funding community projects, they can also finance business-oriented ones. Trade in local products, both food and craftwork (so-called "nostalgia goods") initiates these

two-way flows that Latin American and Caribbean communities residing in the United States and Canada demand. The establishment of bank branches, and especially credit unions, is also emerging as a promising socially useful business opportunity.

Stronger domestic economies, with sufficient jobs and competitive wages, would be a necessary condition for reversing migrant flows, as occurred in Spain for example. Meanwhile, despite the fact that the duration of remittances is assumed limited — estimated at seven years on average — the continuation of emigration for the foreseeable future means that family and collective remittances will continue to grow, and greatly, over the next few years. This prospect calls for greater awareness among the various economic and social agents to develop programmes to efficiently exploit the potential of these inflows, which, as has often been reiterated, are strategic in many countries.

B. Migrant communities

B.1 Transnational communities and migration in the age of globalization

Alejandro I. Canales,¹⁷ Christian Zolniski¹⁸

1. Introduction

In the traditional literature on this subject, migration is usually analysed in two broad categories. Firstly, there is "permanent" migration, corresponding to people who change their community, region or country of normal residency on a permanent basis. Secondly, there is temporary or "circular" migration, which involves continual or recurrent moves, a constant coming and going while maintaining habitual residency in the place of origin. Moves in this case are temporary and do not alter the permanent nature of habitual residency.¹⁹

Since the early 1990s, this approach has been criticized by a growing number of international migration specialists. Several studies have shown that the traditional bi-polar framework is of limited

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¹⁹ A third type of migration is "diaspora". In this case, although the move may mean a definitive change in the migrant's country of residence, he or she does not fully integrate into the place of settlement. On the contrary, membership of communities or organizations operating on an international level is maintained and strengthened. Examples include missionaries, and Jewish people dispersed throughout the world. Historically, this mode of migration has not occurred in response to labour-market pressures, but as a result of political, religious or cultural persecution. For a more detailed analysis of contemporary diasporas, see Cohen, 1997.

use for understanding the characteristics and modalities of international migration since the closing decades of the twentieth century. In the case of Mexico-United States migration, a significant and sustained process of settlement has been taking place among the migrant population since the mid-1970s (Canales, 1999; Cornelius, 1992; Chávez, 1988), but this does not seem to be accompanied by any social, cultural or political assimilation and integration by Mexican migrants in United States society. On the contrary, the long-standing tradition of migration to the United States in certain regions of Mexico, seems to have spawned multi-local migratory circuits. These transcend the borders of both countries and are probably the true domain from which today's international migrants draw their economic subsistence and organize the social and cultural reproduction of their communities. Various authors have described this process as the establishment of *transnational communities* (Smith, 1995; Portes, 1997; Georges, 1990; Roberts, Frank and Lozano, 1999), because migration seems to activate a host of cultural, social and economic factors and processes that coordinate communities and social institutions that are geographically distant from one another. To continue to see migration in bipolar terms as a unilinear continuum is to distort the true nature of migration between countries in the present phase of economic globalization.

Although the transnational migration model does not yet represent an alternative paradigm with a clear research and analysis agenda, the approach has undoubtedly sparked great interest in the academic community, and also among many intellectuals and both civil and political institutions. In particular, the potential for resistance and opposition usually attributed to some of the members of such communities and their organizational forms, in their relations with the state and the with hegemonic forces emanating from the restructuring of global capitalism, partly explains the attractiveness of this model for many analysts — especially when the alternative and competitive paradigms that had traditionally fuelled the political confrontation and bargaining strategies of progressive and left-wing groups are in crisis. Thus, by seeing migration in terms of transnationalism, some analysts adopt a "celebratory" attitude towards it. In other words, they assume that through this migration model, the actors involved (migrants, families, communities) gain the ability to tackle and overcome the risks, costs and conditions of their economic, social and cultural reproduction.

Nonetheless, this approach has not been free from criticism and refutations, highlighting some of its key limitations and shortcomings (Mahler, 1998; Pries, 1997). This paper adopts a somewhat different position from the "celebratory" view, while acknowledging the analytical potential and collective action orientation that the approach could generate. Although there is significant underlying potential for organization and collective action in the composition of transnational communities, we argue that this does not necessarily constitute a strategy for escaping from poverty and from the economic and political precariousness and vulnerability that characterizes social reproduction among the agents involved. Instead, as we shall see below, it is a strategy for confronting such conditions that involves a contradictory and non-deterministic dynamic. Consequently, transnational communities cannot be seen merely as generalized solidarity and reciprocity networks that make it possible to withstand the negative effects of globalization; their dynamic also reproduces the tensions, conflicts and contradictions that arise within them, and which, as such, help recreate the framework of structural inequality that conditions the social reproduction of their members. Nonetheless, from the standpoint of this paper, the transnational migration model raises significant conceptual, methodological and especially political challenges, which require openness to new ways of understanding migration in today's globalized setting. One can no longer view migration, and still less continue defining laws, programmes and policies on the subject, on the basis of traditional paradigms that fail to capture the great diversity and heterogeneity of migrants' situations and migratory movements that characterize the contemporary life of our societies.

To sustain this thesis, the paper offers a conceptual reflection on certain key features of the transnational community model, identifying some of its challenges and theoretical-methodological implications for studying international migration in a context of globalization. Rather than merely offering an assessment of this model (see for example Guarnizo and Smith, 1998; Mahler, 1998), we have chosen a number of points from this approach that we consider important to study. The

analysis is based on Mexico-United States migration, although its conclusions may also be useful in other cases. In particular, it considers the relation between globalization and the formation of transnational communities, and on their potential for dealing with the economic, social and political consequences of globalization.

The study has been divided into four parts. To provide a contextual framework, the first part sets out the main differences that arise from taking a transnational approach to Mexican-United States migration, instead of analysing it via the bipolar, permanent-temporary migration model. The second part reflects on the way in which the processes of economic globalization, which intensified in the closing decades of the twentieth century, have been basic factors underlying the development and consolidation of multi-local transnational communities of international workers. The third section explains the key role played by social networks and social capital in the transnational migration model. The fourth part of the paper focuses on "transmigrant" organizations, i.e. clubs for migrants who come from the same community or municipio) and associations of compatriots from the same state. Through these, emigrants seek to improve living standards both in their native communities in Mexico and in their destination communities in the United States. Such associations are relatively new forms of political organization at the transnational level.²⁰ The concluding section reflects on the theoretical and methodological challenges posed by the transnational model for migration studies, and as regards public policies and the empowerment of international migrants.

2. The transnational approach to migration

The literature on population mobility usually distinguishes two broad categories or types of migration, namely permanent or definitive, and temporary or circular migration. Under this typology, the basic element used to classify migration is the relation it forges between the origin and destination community or region (Roberts, Frank and Lozano, 1999). In the case of permanent migration, the respective definitions are clear and simple, and also consistent with those traditionally used in demography to measure changes in domestic and international residency through censuses and surveys. The problem here is to define the time required for a change of residency to be considered definitive (Canales, 1999). In the second case, the definition of "origin" and "destination" is somewhat less precise, because the individual or family does not change its habitual residency. Instead temporary migration involves a migratory circuit, in which "destinations" are merely transitory and provisional.

These two categories were initially used to analyse international migration. For example, European migration to North and South America in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was typically seen as permanent or definitive. Although European emigrants maintained close contacts and relations with their communities of origin, these gradually faded over time, and within two or three generations migrant families would have become socially integrated into their respective destination regions (Portes and Rumbaut, 1996). Several frameworks have been proposed for understanding this process of integration and the tensions it generated, including the "sovereignty paradigm" (Smith, 1995), whereby the migrant ends up becoming a citizen through his or her assimilation or "Americanization" (Rumbaut, 1997).

The concept of temporary migration, on the other hand, seemed to be a key to understanding the continuous and permanent movements of Mexicans to and from the United States. Although many Mexicans settled permanently in the United States during the twentieth century, until the 1970s at least, most migration consisted of individuals that established circular and recurrent patterns of movement between their place of origin and various rural areas in the south of the United States (Canales, 1999; Cornelius, 1992). In this case, migration cannot be understood as a single episode, but as a migratory career in which the final destination would usually involve a definitive return to communities of origin in Mexico. In this case, the sovereignty or assimilation paradigm also seemed

²⁰ The authors are grateful to Dr. Rafael Alarcón for generously providing much of the bibliography used in this section.

to apply, but in the opposite sense to permanent migration: for the temporary and transitory nature of this type of migration was seen as hindering the assimilation and Americanization of migrant populations, who maintained a strong and powerful sense of belonging socially, culturally and politically to their communities, regions and countries of origin (Smith, 1995).

Starting in the early 1990s, however, a number of studies have suggested that this analytical framework is inappropriate for understanding the characteristics and forms of international migration as it has evolved in the final decades of the twentieth century. In the Mexico-United States case, the migrant population settlement process does not necessarily follow these patterns, but appears to acquire a demographic, social and cultural profile that diverges sharply from the model. Settlement by Mexican migrants seems to have attained a critical mass, whereby various migration spaces seem to be turning into multi-local social spaces based on networks and exchanges that link communities of origin and destination on a daily and permanent basis. This involves the formation and consolidation of social networks that turn migration into a deep-rooted social and cultural phenomenon (Massey and others, 1987). Thus, for example, regions and communities where this form of migration has been most intense have witnessed the gradual establishment of complex networks involving exchange and circulation of people, money, goods and information that tends to transform migrant settlements on both sides of the border into a single large and disperse community in multiple locations (Rouse, 1992).

Some authors refer to this process as the establishment of transnational communities (Smith, 1995; Portes, 1997; Georges, 1990; Roberts, Frank and Lozano, 1999). The process involves the dislocation and destructuring of the traditional concept of "community", particularly in its spatial and territorial dimensions (Kearney and Nagengast, 1989; Rouse, 1991). This virtual "de-territorialization" of communities is the outcome of the continuous flows and exchanges of people, goods and information that arise with and from migration, and causes the reproduction of origin communities to be directly and intrinsically linked to migrant settlements in urban neighbourhoods and rural towns of the United States (Alarcón, 1995; Hondagneu-Zotelo, 1994). This new socio-spatial form assumed by the migration process also means a dislocation and destructuring of the traditional concepts of migration and migrant. Migration no longer necessarily refers to the act of moving one's habitual residency, but becomes a state and way of life, the spatial expression of a new form of existence and social reproduction.

Regardless of the various criticisms made of the transnational migration model (see for example Mahler, 1998), this paper argues that one of its major contributions is that it views international migration from a broad and comprehensive perspective, as a phenomenon that can no longer be confined merely to flows of people or workers. To understand contemporary migration requires taking account of and integrating an equally important flow and exchange of material and symbolic goods — in other words economic, cultural, social and political resources. Migration is no longer seen as a one-way street, but a recurrent and circular pattern of movements, involving a continuous exchange of people, goods, symbols and information.

Various authors have proposed the concepts of "trans-migration" and "transmigrant" to refer to these new modalities and forms adopted by population mobility worldwide (Tilly, 1990; Smart, 1999; Portes, 1997; and Glick, Basch and Blanc-Szanton, 1992). Transmigration differs from the classic forms of migration by consolidating new social spaces that reach beyond origin and destination communities: it involves a transnational expansion of a community's space through social practices, artefacts and transnational symbol systems. Unlike temporary migration, transmigration is not a transitory situation, but involves the emergence of multi-local spaces and transnational communities, in which migrant status is also completely altered.

3. Transnational communities and globalization

"Transnationalism" and the formation of transnational communities are a major part of the globalization process in contemporary society.²¹ Various authors see globalization as a transition from an industrial society to one based on information, in which the foundations of the industrial economy are redesigned by incorporating knowledge and information into material production and distribution processes (Castells, 1998; Kumar, 1995). The information economy therefore involves a new spatial arrangement of economic relations in the world system, characterized by increasing globalization. In this framework, globalization and more flexible production systems form the pillars of capitalist restructuring, while also defining the new system of rules under which capital/labour relations operate in today's world (Lipietz, 1997). What usually gets highlighted in this context are changes affecting the employment and occupation structure, as they are seen as the basis for a new class structure and social stratification (Castells, 1998).

On this point, various authors draw attention to growing a polarization in the social structure of occupations, involving a segmentation of the labour market with stable and well-paid jobs coexisting with others of an essentially informal and occasional nature. Sassen and Smith (1992) refer to this as a process of "casualization", thereby emphasizing the precarious nature of the framework in which it operates. Although there are many types of jobs in the informal economy, most of them involve unskilled work carrying out repetitive tasks with no prospects of training. In many cases these are also occasional jobs in industries still governed by a "Fordist" organization of work processes. Casualization represents a strategy by firms to meet the challenges of competition without bearing the costs of technological innovation. Thus, the informal economy is not only a survival strategy for families that have been impoverished by productive restructuring, but also, and fundamentally, a result of changes taking place in formal economies and leading sectors of the United States economy (Canales, 2000a).

These casualized markets tend to be highly selective as to the origin of the labour force they employ. Fernández-Kelly (1991) shows that in the counties of Southern California and in New York, there is a heavy presence of Hispanics and other ethnic minorities in this type of activity, particularly in manufacturing segments, where they work as operators, on assembly lines or in other unskilled low-wage tasks. The same author goes on to mention that in most cases there are no unions, subcontracting practices are prevalent, and there is a high level of female participation.

In this setting, the labour flexibility and deregulation working conditions and hiring practices seems to be the basis of new job opportunities for migrants (Zlolski, 1994). For example, there has been a significant increase in the number of migrants working in activities such as office cleaning and maintenance, gardening, washing-up, waiting in restaurants, housecleaning, domestic service and other similar low-skilled jobs with precarious employment conditions. Migrant workers thus provide the demographic basis for a new post-industrial society proletariat (Rouse, 1991).

In this sense, labour-market segmentation forms the basis for dividing the population into differentiated economic, social and cultural strata. Although the different job segments (or compartments) are defined according to an economic rationale dictated by deregulated hiring and labour flexibility, the people working in each of these segments are not selected on strictly economic grounds, but on the basis of non-economic social differentiation processes, involving cultural, ethnic, demographic and gender differentiation, compounded by migratory status (Sassen, 1998). This results in population groups being formed with social disadvantages and varying degrees of vulnerability that prevent them from establishing other frameworks for regulating their conditions of life, work and social reproduction, in

²¹ One should be careful to avoid confusing the transnational nature of migrant communities with their globalization, however. We return to this point below.

a structural context where the mechanisms of political and social negotiation developed in industrial societies and enshrined in the welfare state seem no longer to operate. Thus, social and cultural minorities are formed (women, children, migrant and ethnic groups, among others), whose socially constructed vulnerability transfers to the labour market in terms of devalued working abilities and hence impoverished conditions of life and reproduction (Canales, 2000b).

In this structural framework, transnational communities and transmigration take on a special significance. Social networks based on reciprocity, trust and solidarity often operate also as a mechanism for addressing the problem of social and political vulnerability caused by the population's ethnic and migratory status, which classifies them as a social minority. Migrant workers, trapped in the inequality and precariousness generated by globalization, look for ways of responding to (but without withdrawing from) these processes, as actors within their own communities. Coordination through transnational communities offers opportunities for collective action to tackle situations of vulnerability. The risks of moving, the costs of settlement, the search for employment, social inclusion in destination communities, and the day-to-day reproduction of the family "back home", among other things, depend on the social networks and relations that transnational communities construct to facilitate migratory movements and labour-market participation.

In addition, migrants' social capital allows them to confront and create answers to (but not exits from) the precarious nature of their employment that stems from the labour flexibility and contractual deregulation characteristic of labour markets in this age of globalization. In fact, transnationalization of the labour force based on communities' social networks can also be seen as the counterpart of globalized capital, though not necessarily as the globalization of workers. The oft-cited dichotomy of globalized capital and localized labour would seem to be inappropriate here, although there is a need to distinguish between "labour" and "labour force". Labour, as a process and as an act, is just as globalized as capital, but the same is not true of the labour force. Globalization of the labour force means globalizing the worker; but this does not seem to be happening.

It is also necessary to distinguish globalization's forms, in other words, its ways in and out. Capital is globalized from above and, moreover, it is the logic of capital flows that conducts the globalization process; the labour force enters in subordinate fashion — in other words from below, with limited space to define its actions (Bauman, 1998). This, it is important not to confuse the transnational nature of labour migration with potential and hypothetical labour globalization. Labour becomes global not by joining a transnational community, but by being involved in globalized work processes. Conversely, transnational communities are not migrant workers' way in to globalization, but instead a response strategy they may develop to meet the costs of entering labour markets operating under a globalization logic.

Transnationalization is not the globalization of labour: on the contrary, it is a strategy developed by workers in response to the globalized features of their work. Transnational communities thus define a field of action, a structure of alternatives, which labour migrants can pursue to assume and distribute the costs of their globalization. Social networks and transnational communities play a dual role here: as response strategies, they are also a mechanism through which the social subordination generated by globalization is reproduced. But, as alternative fields of action, transnational communities may also form social environments from which it may be possible to escape from the restricted bargaining frameworks imposed by globalization.²²

²² Here the authors would like to distance themselves from those who adopt an optimistic and "celebratory" attitude to the ability of migrant communities to successfully tackle the conditions of their social reproduction. The fact that an alternative field of action is opened up, by no means ensures collective action will be successful. Instead, it defines a domain for confrontation, dispute and contradiction, which, instead of producing a result, defines the conditions in which collective and individual actions unfold. From this viewpoint, the transnational community, as a field of collective action, would then act as a mediation space in two ways: firstly, in terms of the real movement present in the action of its members; and secondly, in terms of methodological requirements to understand and analyse such social action.

In this age of globalization, the negotiation and integration spaces constructed around the welfare state and the modernization process are now being pulled apart and broken up, thereby strengthening social exclusion and differentiation processes. In this setting, one can understand the revival of basic and "primary" forms of solidarity, trust and reciprocity, such as those giving voice and sustenance to transnational communities. The migratory processes of today, unlike those seen in the early twentieth century, have created a social field of meanings and actions in which transnational communities can identify themselves as discrete units — as communities in their own right. In fact, the material and imaginary construction of such communities makes it possible to deal with disintegration of the social fabric, seen particularly in phenomena such as individualization and socioeconomic exclusion which are reaching alarming proportions among contemporary societies in this globalized age (García Canclini, 1999).

This is a good point to return to the meaning of belonging and the construction of transnational identities, as raised by Smith (1995). This sense belonging to imagined communities coexists with various other forms of belonging, residency and citizenship that are peculiar to the political communities created by the nation states between which migration takes place. Migrants develop social and cultural links, along with economic and labour relations, that lead many to see themselves as part of a community in the United States — not just any community, but a trans-located migrant community that reproduces and recreates the cultural patterns and symbolic forms of its origin communities (Chávez, 1994). This imaginary construction rests upon a set of relations and transactions of many types that unfold within a transnational system of social networks and cultural capital. These networks represent the interpersonal niche of the individual, contributing to people's self-recognition as individuals and their self-image as members of a community, as subjects in a basic social fabric (Enríquez, 2000). According to Goldring (1997), the difference between international migratory circuits and a transnational community is that the latter refers to a social field in which the density of social movements and ties enables migrants to build a relationship with the community and a sense of belonging to it.

In the case of transnational communities, belonging refers to a situation and status that are very different from those of citizenship. The transnational community defines and constructs a sense of belonging to and depending on it that is stronger and deeper than what exists between migrants and their respective origin and destination nation states. This involves nurturing a sense of belonging that takes precedence over citizenship, but also reaches beyond it. As Smith puts it, "belonging beyond citizenship" refers to the trans-nationalization of the sense of community, transcending national boundaries in both the origin and destination countries. Thus, Mexican migrants living in the United States maintain and increase the importance they attach to their original communities, and their links with them, even after legalized, stable and definitive settlement. When the possibility of United States citizenship arises, in other words a constructed sense of belonging to the destination country, this in no way interferes with migrants' sense of belonging to their original communities, which is deeper and more vital than anything constructed politically. In many cases, becoming a citizen is merely a way of defending and maintaining community links.

Belonging to transnational community, has a meaning and significance that is different from belonging to political communities. In this case belonging is defined by migrants themselves based on the territorial expansion of their social networks, structured transnationally through their practices (Smith, 1995). Belonging thus becomes substantive rather than merely declarative, by making it possible to replace the perception of physical and contiguous presences by imagined and symbolic ones. Here it is worth mentioning the practices, privileges and benefits that migrants retain in their original communities even after settling in the United States. An example of this is their capacity to exert influence and power in decision-making processes in their communities of origin. Physical "absence" is counteracted by imagined "presence" which is made real and concrete through flows of information and power channelled through the networks constructed by migrants — a phenomenon that is facilitated by the spread of telecommunications.

4. Transnational communities and social networks

To view migration as the formation of transnational communities means seeing it in terms of constructing social and community networks in transnationalized spaces. As Portes (1997) points out, transnational communities are founded upon a dense system of social networks that traverse political boundaries, which are created by migrants in their search for social recognition and economic advancement. Such networks depend on family and friendship links and relationships, and especially on community identity. They are based on relationships of trust, reciprocity and solidarity that define the nature of community ties (Enríquez, 2000).

The transnational nature of this social fabric stems from being based on practices, activities and exchanges that are continually traversing the political, geographical and cultural borders that have traditionally framed and separated origin communities and migrant settlements. Transnationalism is thus defined as the process by which migrants construct the social fields that unite their original communities and societies with those of settlement (Goldring, 1997; Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton, 1992).

Social networks serve to recreate the place of origin in places of settlement, albeit in transformed fashion, reproducing it in the context of its transnationalization. Origin communities also change, as the result of their close dependency on the dynamic of labour markets in the United States, and through close links with social and daily life in migrants' places of settlement. This involves continuous adaptation of life-styles and socioeconomic structures, which Alarcón (1992) refers to as the "northernization" of origin communities, not only because their social, cultural and economic reproduction is "north-oriented", but it is also increasingly disconnected from the "south", i.e. Mexico. The relations these communities maintain with places of migrant settlement in the north are stronger than those that unite them with neighbouring communities in their own country. The flow of material and symbolic goods from their twin communities on the other side of the border is more important for their reproduction than their dealings with the rest of Mexico.²³

These social networks operate at all levels and are present in all aspects of communities' social reproduction. In every social field, social and family networks are established and reconstructed through which community members interact and carry on their social, cultural, economic and political activities. Moreover, these actions and exchanges in transnational contexts strengthen networks and expand the territorial scope of the community's own reproduction. Thus, for example, the search for work and labour-market entry extends not only to the territorial confines of the origin community, but also includes, and in a significant way, work alternatives available in places of migrant settlement. Information on employment needs and vacancies in each territorial area flows in two directions through each transnational community's structure of social networks. In addition, support from such networks of family, friends and compatriots facilitates individual mobility from one place to another, by minimizing the risks of moving and reducing the costs of settlement and labour market entry (Sassen, 1995). In many cases, before making the journey to the United States, migrants already know how they will cross the border, where they will get to in each phase of migration, and what their job and wages are likely to be.

Similar processes operate in reproducing the domestic unit and family life. In this case, although a family, or members of a household, may be separated geographically, their membership of a transnational community enables them to reconstruct their domestic unity based on social networks that serve not only to transmit information but as ways of exercising intra-family power, domestic daily decision-making, and so forth (Delaunay and Lestage, 1998).

The reproduction of community relations and structures also takes on a transnationalized form. In fact, power structures, social differences and the general social, cultural and political structures that constitute each community are also transplanted from the origin country to places of settlement

²³ This is illustrated by the importance of remittances in the social and daily reproduction of migrant households.

(Smith, 1995). Yet, and this is important, "transnationalism" means more than just transplanting social relations and structures from origin communities to places of settlement, because the relations and structures are changed in the process (Tilly, 1990). For example, women's role expands in families where the household head has emigrated. The woman has to take on some of the tasks and responsibilities traditionally assigned to the male head of household, as provider of material resources for family reproduction, and as the individual controlling most of the power structure within the family. The modification of female roles as a result of prolonged absence by this male figure can cause family conflict at the time of reunification, either when the head of household returns or if the rest of the family migrates to the United States.

Meanwhile, increasing female and family migration has enabled women to gain access to social contexts, in which gender distinctions are based on social principles and relations that differ from those prevailing in their original communities. Generally speaking, this has changed power relations within both family and community in women's favour; but that does not mean the absence of daily conflicts and tensions (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994). A similar thing happens with intergenerational relations, i.e. changes in the roles and relative status of young people, adults and the elderly.²⁴

Social and community networks not only permit this reproduction and modification of community relations and structures, but also reproduce forms of social inequality (Tilly, 1990). Networks help reproduce and perpetuate social processes and relations, along with their forms and character. For example, inequality is created and reproduced as social networks lead not only to inclusion in and belonging to a transnational community, but also to forms of exclusion and non-belonging to national communities. Each form of inclusion is also a form of exclusion. While the social network permits access to certain flows of information, exchange and social positions, it also excludes in two ways. Firstly, it excludes and marginalizes individuals that do not belong to the social network or to the community, and secondly it prevents members of the community from joining other information and exchange networks. Social networks create several forms of inequality as they expand and develop.²⁵ Thus, for example, by searching for a job through social networks, migrants may not obtain the *optimal job*, according to objective market conditions and their own skills. The migrant only obtains a *possible job*, i.e. what is accessible to the social networks of which he or she is a member. Job search does not cover all theoretically available alternatives, only those that are accessible through family and compatriot contacts. Thus, the availability of jobs, and hence labour market entry, depends on the size of the network and its social and cultural capital.²⁶

Ultimately, social networks are a fundamental component of the social capital that permits the formation and reproduction of transnational communities. These networks form the basis of both solidarity relations and mutual assistance among their members, as well as reproducing and creating social inequalities based on class, gender and generation, which are often ignored in the more romantic and celebratory visions of the transnational migration model. Often, transnational

²⁴ On this point, Rouse (1991) argues that migrants end up becoming experienced exponents of a bifocal culture, immersed in daily tensions and conflicts between two very different ways of life. This situation is also addressed by Portes (1997), who states that through trans-local networks, migrants lead a dual life, often bilingual; and they move between two cultures, maintaining their home in both countries and participating in relations that require their physical and symbolic presence in both spaces.

²⁵ Reproduction of the network reproduces inequality, but it does not perpetuate its forms. As social relations and exchanges through the networks imply reproduction, extension and transformation of the networks themselves, they also are likely to allow the forms of inequality to change.

²⁶ A typical example is coordination of migrant social networks with the domain subcontractors, thereby affording migrants rapid and secure employment, but in a high flexible context in which the social network itself may serve as a labour control mechanism. Contractors often have family or friendship links with their employees, which generates tensions and conflict between the two social roles.

communities tend to reproduce the inequality structures and social conflicts of their original communities in places of settlement (Pries, 1997, p. 37).

5. Transmigrant associations of Mexican workers in the United States

One of the main characteristics of transnational communities is the emergence of new forms of organization and political action, devised by international workers who generally occupy a subordinate position in their countries of both origin and destination. These forms of transnational political organization are likely to give the members of such communities a capacity to resist and oppose not only hostile State forces, but structural forces stemming from economic globalization which turns them into international workers living in a situation of political, economic and cultural vulnerability. This section analyses one of the most important forms of transnational political organization developed by Mexican migrants in the United States, namely "hometown associations" popularly known as clubs.

These associations were originally set up to enable emigrants to help improve the living conditions of their compatriots, by keeping in touch with their home communities in Mexico. They represent one of the main forms of transnational political organization through which Mexican immigrants maintain active links with their original communities, transcending the political and geographical barriers that separate them. Generally speaking, they are formed by migrants from the same community in Mexico, and their purpose is to send remittances and other material resources to improve structural conditions in their place of origin through charitable public-works projects. Analysis of these associations illustrates the possibilities for undertaking collective actions within transnational communities, using their social networks and capital, as well as the social limits and inequalities that characterize such associations.

Immigrant associations are not a new phenomenon; in fact they were one of the most common features of international migration to countries such as the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and played a key role in the integration and economic mobility of immigrants in that country. Japanese migrants arriving in the United States in the early twentieth century, for example, formed hometown associations that made a fundamental contribution to the rapid economic mobility achieved by that group. Jewish associations in New York, established on the same basis, were also of crucial importance in giving cohesion to this community and encouraging new immigrants to join such groupings (Zabin and Escala, 1998).

Unlike these cases, however, Mexican immigrant associations have generally concentrated on charitable actions in their home communities. Usually they are formed by immigrants from rural areas mostly in the western states of Mexico, which have been traditional sources of emigration; although more recently major associations associated with other states, particularly Oaxaca, have emerged. A study of these associations by Zabin and Escala reports that Mexican consulates in the United States have around 170 immigrant clubs registered from 18 different Mexican states, but there are also many associations of a more informal nature that have no official contact with the consulates.²⁷

Not all associations have the same level of organization; Zabin and Escala identified three levels of complexity and institutionalization. The first involves informal associations, based on social networks linking immigrants from the same place in Mexico, through which compatriots help each other to find work and housing, and to satisfy other basic needs. At a second level of development there are official clubs founded by immigrants from the same community or from "sister communities" in Mexico. The third category involves "federations" of clubs from the same Mexican state, organized within a single framework. The oldest of these is *Federación de Clubes de Zacatecas* which embraces

²⁷ The states with the largest number of clubs are Zacatecas (51), Jalisco (49), Michoacán (11), Sinaloa (11), Nayarit (9), Oaxaca (8), Puebla (5) and Durango (4) (Zabin and Escala, 1998, p. 9).

associations of migrants from the state of Zacatecas, a region of traditional emigration to the United States; the federation was created in 1972 and currently has 51 member clubs (Zabin and Escala, 1998, p. 15). This case illustrates an important feature of the gestation of such federations, which has been mentioned by several authors, namely active promotion by the Mexican Government, through its consulates (Smith, 1995; Moctezuma, 1999; Alarcón, 2000; Zabin and Escala, 1998; Goldring, 1998). Although this is not the place to analyse the factors causing the Mexican Government to promote this type of federation, one major reason has been the growing economic and political power they have acquired, and their influence in local affairs back home. In many cases they have helped make up for the absence of government social and economic development programmes.²⁸

At the analytical level, it is necessary to distinguish between activities undertaken by these associations in their places of origin, and those that focus on destination communities in the United States. Most of their efforts of Mexican clubs are targeted on rural communities in the home country, where they normally undertake charitable projects related to public works and infrastructure (Alarcón, 2000; Zabin and Escala, 1998), such as building or repairing highways, bridges, parks, churches, schools, clinics, sports installations and streets. Their social projects mainly support the construction of clinics, childcare centres and retirement homes for the elderly. In addition, clubs regularly donate funds to purchase ambulances, medical equipment and material for schools, and to finance scholarships for children from poor families (Alarcón, 2000, pp. 4-5).

Federación de Clubes de Zacatecas has one of the most active and successful track records in promoting social-sector public works of this type by Mexican emigrants. In 1996 alone its members contributed hundreds of thousands of dollars to fund 60 public-works projects in the state of Zacatecas, including the construction and repair of highways, and the restoration of churches and village squares, as well as building schools, clinics and old peoples convalescent homes (Zabin and Escala, 1998, p. 16). The active role played by the federation inspired the creation of the "*Dos por uno*" programme in which local governments from the state of Zacatecas and the federal government each undertake to invest one dollar for every dollar the federation donates to community development projects.²⁹

Other associations have a more political profile, seeking to actively defend the economic, labour, human and political rights of their members on both sides of the border. Perhaps the most notable case are the migrant associations from the state of Oaxaca, which is one of the poorest in the south of Mexico and sends a large number of migrants both to the north of the country and to the United States, in search of better economic prospects and job opportunities. Although formed more recently than migrant clubs from states such as Zacatecas, Jalisco and Michoacán, the Oaxacan associations have achieved levels of coordination and politicization not seen in many associations from other regions. According to Rivera-Salgado (1999, pp. 1447-1450), the high degree of politicization in the Oaxacan case is the result of a number of factors, including the indigenous origin of many of their members, which makes them a minority within a minority in the United States. This status often attracts discrimination by native United States employers and also by mixed-race Mexican bosses, many of whom are immigrants themselves. Working as labourers in commercial farming both sides of the border, especially in Baja California in Mexico, and in the states of California, Oregon and Washington in the United States, has left indigenous migrants from Oaxaca in a particularly

²⁸ The other large-scale federation encompasses 49 clubs from the state of Jalisco, which was created in 1990 with direct participation and support from the Mexican consulate. Not all clubs from a given state form federations, however. Perhaps the clearest example are the migrants and clubs from Michoacán, neither of which, despite being numerous, have joined together in a federation. The main reason for not doing so have been the tense relations and political differences between these clubs and the Mexican consulate, which has followed the line of the until-recently ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) (Zabin and Escala, 1998).

²⁹ Later, in 1993, this programme was extended to clubs from other states at the initiative of the Mexican Ministry of Social Development (Alarcón, 2000, p. 7). The careful nurturing of relations with the Mexican Government and the government of the state of Zacatecas is thought to have been a key factor behind the success of public projects promoted by this organization (Zabin and Escala, 1998, p. 17).

vulnerable situation (Kearney and Nagengast, 1989). The rapid formation of Oaxacan migrant clubs can be interpreted as a response to this situation by indigenous Mixtecan and Zapotecans with their strong autochthonous political culture (Rivera-Salgado, 1999, pp. 1452-1453).³⁰

The second area of action for Mexican migrant clubs and federations are their destination communities in the United States. As mentioned above, such associations tend to be much less active here than in their places of origin. Nonetheless, like migrant groupings from other countries in the early twentieth century, Mexican clubs and federations do also play a major role in promoting the economic, labour and political rights of their members in the United States, helping them to integrate into that country. In addition, the fact that a broad segment of Mexican immigrants into the United States have settled there in recent decades has been a major reason why many associations have redirected their resources towards their destination communities, in areas such as housing, education and the formation of small businesses by Mexican immigrants (Alarcón, 2000, p. 21).

In general, the activity of clubs in resident communities in the United States takes two forms. The first involves actions directly organized and promoted by these associations. Examples include projects promoted by Michoacán clubs in Chicago, which include defending bilingual education programmes in public schools, improving housing and infrastructure in the neighbourhoods where immigrants and their families live, and combating problems such as drugs, gangs and violence that affect those areas (Espinosa, 1999, p. 22). Such projects are specially concerned for the welfare and future of the children of association members, aiming to help them integrate and get ahead in the United States through education.

The second type of activity involves coalitions with community organizations, labour unions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society associations that seek to defend the rights of immigrants and the Latin population generally in the United States. Thus, for example, the Mixteca-Zapoteca coalition and the "Frente", consisting of indigenous immigrants from Oaxaca, have formed alliances with labour unions (such as the United Farm Workers), NGOs, churches, student organizations and other groups to defend their labour and human rights in that country (Rivera-Salgado, 1999, p. 1448). Another example of the potential of this type of initiative is the coalition forged in 1992 between immigrants from the state of Guanajuato and the construction carpenters union in Los Angeles. The purpose of this was to promote unionization among construction workers specializing in wall plastering in southern California, most of whom are Mexican immigrants. In the early 1990s, the employment conditions of these workers had deteriorated considerably as a result of increasing use of subcontracting (Milkman and Wong, 2000). This caused a grassroots movement to emerge, which led to a group of immigrant workers organizing a strike for better employment conditions. As many of the workers in the sector originally came from a small community in the state of Guanajuato, their social networks played a major role in facilitating organization of the strike, which spread rapidly through Los Angeles and most cities in southern California except for San Diego (Milkman and Wong, 2000, p. 181; Zabin and Escala, 1998, p. 31).

To summaries, the activities carried out by Mexican immigrant associations in the United States help foster economic, social, and political links between these migrants and their places of origin, by maintaining an active presence in them, reflecting the transnational nature of these communities. They also help strengthen migrants' political power and promotion of their labour, political and human rights on both sides of the border. The financial and material resources channelled by Mexican

³⁰ The political nature of these associations is illustrated by the case of the "Frente", a coalition formed in 1991 encompassing about 2000 indigenous Mixtecan, Zapotecan and Trique migrants. Its aims are to promote and defend the human rights of indigenous migrants, and improve their employment and living conditions both sides of the border. For this purpose it maintains two main headquarters, one in California and the other in Oaxaca (Rivera-Salgado, 1999, pp. 1449-1450). Unlike federations from other states, where the Mexican Government has played a major role, Oaxacan federations have arisen out of the political actions and concerns of their leaders, who have been very successful in forming binational grassroots associations and in mobilizing the social, political and cultural resources of indigenous communities from Oaxaca (Rivera-Salgado, 1999, p. 1455).

immigrants in the United States into public works in their hometowns has made a powerful contribution to strengthening them as political actors with capacity to negotiate with the Mexican government, especially at state and local level. While generally ignored by officialdom, the activities of migrant associations and the magnitude of the remittances channelled through them, along with dis-investment by the Mexican government in rural areas in the wake of neoliberal restructuring policies, have given immigrants increasing weight in political affairs in their communities of origin.

Although transnational associations exert a major impact in migrants' original communities through their specific activities, their very nature and composition highlight their shortcomings as a means of responding to the structural problems created by transnational migration. In the first place, only a minority of Mexican migrants in the United States participate in or are members of associations of this type; most have no links with them.³¹ Secondly, it is somewhat naive to characterize migrant associations and their activities as fully democratic organizations driven by altruism. Instead, as pointed out in several studies, their memberships are usually dominated by immigrants of longer-standing who have achieved a greater degree of economic stability in the United States. Moreover, their leaders often use them as vehicles to promote their own social prestige and political power back home (Mahler 1998, pp. 88-89; Goldring, 1999, pp. 307-308).³² In addition, there is an important gender dimension that needs to be considered: generally speaking, it is men that participate most actively and run the associations, while women seem to have a more minor presence, and different ideas about the projects they ought to support (Mahler 1998, p. 83).

Often, these clubs and associations tend to reproduce the conflicts characteristic of any local community. Struggles for control of the organization and recognition by the community involve family disputes and neighbourhood conflicts, the origins of which often precede migration and settlement in the United States. Lastly, transnational associations are also riven by differences based on class, gender and political power characteristic of transnational communities and networks as such.³³ As Mahler points out, instead of taking the democratic, altruistic and liberating nature of the political processes and actions of transnational communities as given, comparative empirical studies need to be made of how these transnational processes and connections contribute to reproducing, reformulating or transforming power structures within the communities themselves and *viz-à-viz* other political forces and actors (Mahler, 1998, p. 92).

6. Conclusions: challenges and implications of the transnational communities approach

The transnational migration approach raises major theoretical and methodological challenges, both for studying migration and for understanding the organizational forms and the social, cultural and political actions of migrants in a context of globalization. Methodologically speaking, the transnational nature of migration requires the classic definitions of migrants and migratory status to be reformulated. The term "migrant" can no longer be defined exclusively on the basis of habitual residency on one or other side of the border. Migratory status needs to be defined more in terms of membership and participation in a transnational system of social and community networks. This way of viewing migration makes it possible to expand the space-time definition of the habitual residency criterion. Unlike the categories of settlers and sojourners, transnational communities do not have a single place of "habitual residency" that migration moves either temporarily or permanently. Transnational communities involve interaction between two or more places of residency simultaneously,

³¹ For an approach that seeks to determine the nature and scope of the activities of transnational associations, see Mahler (1998, pp. 81-87).

³² The fact that many of these associations have emerged under the auspices of the Mexican Government via its consulates, makes one doubt the "grassroots movement" nature that is often attributed to them.

³³ On this point, Goldring states specifically that transnational communities are hierarchical structures with their own gender, social, political and economic divisions and asymmetries (Goldring, 1997, p. 72).

and coordination between periods of physical absence and presence in each place. This implies a spatial expansion of the notion of habitual residency, to encompass places of residency in both the United States and in Mexico. It also involves a temporal expansion by including periods of absence from one or other side of the border. Clearly, thus expanded, the term "habitual residency", as traditionally used in demography, loses its previous meaning and relevance as an analytical category for practical purposes.

A person can be a "resident" of a transnational community even when they have migrated from one country to another; and, conversely, they can belong to a community of transmigrants even without moving. Belonging to a transnational community and, hence, participation in this transmigration process, does not necessarily mean continuous movement. It is sufficient to form part of a community whose territorial scope of social and economic reproduction has been expanded by transmigration. Not all members of a transnational community are transmigrants, but transmigration is a social practice that permeates the life of each and every one of them.

The formation of transnational communities also gives access to significant community-action potential to defend the rights of their members. As in the case of the Mexican migrant associations described in the previous section, mobilization of economic, material and political resources through transnational communities, enables migrants to maintain and renew their transnational links in both origin and destination communities, and also defend their human, labour, political and cultural rights. Although the remittances and other resources channelled to communities of origin through these associations should not be seen as an alternative to the State's proper role in development, it is important to bear in mind that public investment projects, such as "*Dos por uno*" and other similar schemes, gives immigrants in the United States significant power to negotiate with government bodies and make their voice heard in decision-making on issues that have direct repercussions in their communities.

A second sphere of action involves exploiting migrants' social networks in their destination communities to establish coalitions and alliances with civil organizations, labour unions, NGOs and other political actors interested in defending the labour, political and cultural rights of immigrants. For example, politicians of Latin origin and *Chicano* organizations in the United States have recently begun to develop contacts with Mexican migrant associations in cities such as Los Angeles, perceiving the huge mobilization potential offered by migrants' social networks (Alarcón, 2000, p. 21). The use of immigrant workers' networks and social capital for labour union mobilization purposes, in particular, is a field with huge potential that has so far been poorly exploited. At a time when the new unionism in the United States is working to attract low-income immigrant workers as a key element in their revival strategy (Milkman and Wong, 2000), coalitions between immigrant worker associations and labour unions in certain industries would seem to be particularly fertile ground.³⁴

Finally, in the context of transnational migration, the traditional migration and immigrant categories are insufficient, and often inadequate, when formulating plans, programmes, laws and relevant policy regulations in the countries that both receive and give rise to this migration. For example, concepts relating to the legal and juridical status of the migrant, as established in the migration laws and policies of Latin American and Caribbean countries, are rendered largely obsolete by the diverse, dynamic and flexible nature of residency in the case of transnational migrants. This

³⁴ To fully exploit the potential of these coalitions, however, it is necessary to overcome certain obstacles that so far have prevented these two types of organization coming closer together. Firstly, immigrant associations have to overcome the parochial approach that is a feature of many of them (Zabin and Escala, 1998, p. 35), and expand their agenda to be more actively concerned for the needs of the immigrant population living in the United States, as the Michoacán immigrant associations in Chicago have done. Secondly, United States politicians, labour unions and associations need to develop a greater awareness and understanding of the immigrant community itself, its forms of social organization and the importance not only of institutionalized associations but other groupings, which, although more informal, are nonetheless relevant to social coordination and cohesion in that community.

should not come as surprise, for current concepts, laws and policies in the region's countries are based on categories pertaining to the traditional model and paradigm through which migratory processes have historically been understood. Issues such as assimilation, and the stability, duration and legality of residency are based both conceptually and juridically on social categories that are clearly inadequate to explain migration in today's globalized world. The paradigm that underlies this type of legislation has little capacity to make sense of, regulate and direct the current migratory dynamic, or to confront and resolve the conflicts, tensions and sociopolitical problems associated with it.

Politicians and legislators are being challenged to update laws and policies, in order to take account of the transnationalism that is a crucial feature of much contemporary international migration. This means constructing and developing the right to trans-nationality, for example to enable migrants to exercise their labour, social and political rights in the various countries and localities embraced by their community. As Besserer (1999) points out, this means constructing the concept and juridical framework of transnational citizenship — a citizenship extending beyond a single national territory to encompass the trans-local living space in which the daily lives of thousands of migrant workers and families unfold.

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B.2 Immigrant organizations and networks in Argentina

*Mario Miguel Santillo*³⁵

Introduction

Argentina has been a country of immigration throughout its history, receiving over five million people in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most of them from European countries. While European immigration has now virtually ceased, flows from neighbouring countries continue to swell.

Today's modern societies are host to a variety of cultures which do not always live together peacefully. Most of the immigrant population in Argentina is concentrated in the federal capital and Greater Buenos Aires, which gives rise to a series of problems in the different structures of society.

Formal and informal migrant networks not only encourage emigration and direct flows towards certain geographic areas, but also tend to impede participation or integration in the host society. Some of these formal networks consist of foreign organizations. The aim of this paper is to list and describe the various organizations that support the ethnic groups living in Argentina. Although it is impossible to list all of them, at least we will be able to gain an understanding of the mechanisms and forms of organization available to immigrants on arrival; their need to meet together in spaces where they can practice their own culture, language and customs; and also the possibility over the years of being understood and appreciated by Argentines and their own children.

Demographic characteristics of immigrants from neighbouring countries living in the federal capital and Greater Buenos Aires

Migration from neighbouring countries is a long-standing tradition in Argentina, in patterns defined by border zones with shared cultural characteristics and continue. The most recent wave of immigration has been closely linked to economic and legislative factors, however. The largest number of applications for residency come from Bolivian, Paraguayan and Peruvian immigrants (although also from Asian people).

In the federal capital, immigrants from Paraguay generally live in the area encompassed by the Greater Buenos Aires belt and the neighbourhood of La Boca. Brazilians and Uruguayans on the other hand are more diversified, although most live in the San Telmo and La Boca areas. Peruvian immigrants prefer the Abasto neighbourhood and Greater Buenos Aires, while Koreans tend to set up home in lower Flores, Bolivians in Pompeya and Taiwanese in Belgrano.

According to the April 1996 Permanent Household Survey (EPH) conducted by the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC), 70.3% (2,101,302) of the city's nearly three million inhabitants are Buenos Aires natives (*porteños*), while 20% (597,000) are domestic migrants and 9.7% (282,642) were born abroad. This means that one in every 10 inhabitants of the federal capital is not Argentine born.

The most recent census (1991) shows that migration from neighbouring countries is heavily concentrated in the economically active age groups, in proportions slightly exceeding those of domestic migrants in the same age-group and sex classifications, between 20 and 49 years of age.

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International migration in Greater Buenos Aires

The Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area (AMBA), encompassing the federal capital and the 19 boroughs of the Buenos Aires conurbation, is the pole of attraction for foreign populations, especially those from neighbouring countries.

Between them the federal capital and Buenos Aires province account for 56% of all migrants from neighbouring countries (INDEC, 1997), with AMBA receiving over half of these.

Table 1
**AMBA: MIGRANTS FROM NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES
BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH, 1991**

	Individual country shares (%)					
	Immigrants from neighbouring countries	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Paraguay	Uruguay
Total in Argentina	841.697	17.8	4.2	30.3	31.1	16.6
Federal Capital	118.166	15.8	3.6	12.1	25.7	42.8
19 Boroughs	281.733	14.1	1.9	11.7	50.1	22.2
Rest of BA.	67.107	14.5	3.0	43.5	20.7	18.4

Source: INDEC, National Population and Housing Census 1991.

Of the 841,697 migrants from neighbouring countries living in Argentina, 33% are concentrated in the 19 boroughs of the Buenos Aires conurbation. Paraguayans are by far the largest immigrant group (50.1%), followed by Uruguayans (22.2%) and then Bolivians and Chileans.

Uruguayans account for 42.8% of total immigrants from neighbouring countries living in the federal capital, followed by Paraguayans, Bolivians, Chileans and lastly Brazilians, who account for just under 4%.

Chilean migrants form the largest group in the rest of Buenos Aires province (over 43.0%), followed by Paraguayans, Uruguayans, Bolivians and Brazilians.

The two most recent censuses (1980 and 1991) show that the settlement patterns of migrants from neighbouring countries did not change much from one decade to the next, although their concentration in the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area did increase. The proportion of immigrants from neighbouring and non-neighbouring countries living in AMBA grew respectively from 46.3% to 47.6% and from 67.9% to 69.1% (INDEC, 1997).

Children represent a small percentage of immigrant populations from neighbouring countries. This is probably because immigrants tend to be in economically active age groups and come essentially to work; consequently, many migrants enter the country initially without their family group, which usually moves later, when the immigrant has found a stable job.

Immigrant civil and religious associations

Ongoing research by Brenda Pereyra on the organizations supporting recent immigrants in Argentina, establishes an interesting typology of ways of grouping them by ethnicity. The classification can be based on a variety of criteria, including geographic unit, level of representation, objectives pursued and other subjective aspects.

a) By geographic unit

Most organizations of immigrants from neighbouring countries involve people of the same nationality, although a few Bolivian organizations are identified in terms of smaller geographic units (migrants from Cochabamba, La Paz, and so forth). Some organizations declare themselves to be Latin American, however, i.e. supra-national. While country of origin continues to be the main criterion, nationality is not a criterion for membership. In fact, in some cases the leaders of such organizations are Argentines, either because they are second-generation migrants or because they have foreign spouses.

b) By level of representation

Most are "grassroots" organizations representing or encompassing members or friends. Some also claim to "represent" or coordinate activities among a set of organizations. Three levels can be distinguished: federations or confederations covering several communities, federations of organizations from one community, and association or grassroots organizations.

Federations are essentially a novelty of the last decade; although the Federation of Community Associations (FAC) appeared in incipient fashion during the Alfonsín government, it only really established itself during the 1990s. In 1998, the Latin American Confederation of Collectivities and Communities (CLACC) emerged within FAC, with the aim of focusing attention on more contemporary problems and issues facing migrant communities. Whereas FAC exists to keep alive memories and the past, most of its representatives come from historical and European communities. They maintain community buildings, promote health and social assistance, fight against discrimination and help people settle.

At another level are individual community federations, which are also quite recent. The first of these to appear was Chilean, and that country also established a federation at the national level. Other community federations include: the Federation of Paraguayan Entities in Argentina (FEPARA); the Federation of Chilean Associations (FEDACH); the Federation of Bolivian Civil Associations (FACBOL) and the Federation of Bolivian Institutions (FIDEBOL). Not all organizations are represented by federations; some social, sports and cultural associations and clubs participate in them.

c) By main objectives

Another way of classifying migrant organizations is according to the main objective they pursue, which often is implicit in their name.

- Associations or clubs. Most organizations are defined as "social and/or sporting and/or cultural" organizations.
- Those with charity or mutual assistance objectives. Women play a major role in these organizations.
- Politics. Many organizations have links with a political party in the country of origin and work on behalf of electoral campaigns there. In some cases active membership of the political party is the organization's main aim.
- Religious. Each community's "pastoral" teams, such as EPACHI (the Chilean pastoral team from the 1980s); EPPA from Paraguay, EPB from Bolivia and EPP from Peru. Most of these are linked to the Catholic Church through the Argentine Catholic Commission on Migrations, attached to the Argentine Episcopal Conference.
- Communication. The communications media most frequently used are radio and newspapers, particularly in the case of the Bolivian and Paraguayan communities. Newspapers are also an important medium of communications within communities. They are usually published on a fortnightly basis, financed through the cover price and advertising revenue.

- Branches of economic activity. There are some organizations associated with specific branches of economic activity. Small-scale workshop owners, horticulturists, entrepreneurs, craft workers, and musicians sometimes join organizations for self-protection, or for the purpose of working together or even setting up cooperatives.

The first organization of Latin American foreigners in the city was "Club Oriental", which was established in 1898 as the Uruguayan cultural centre. It attracted personalities from that country, many of whom were in Buenos Aires as political refugees.

The first Chilean organization was "Amigos de Chile", which was formed in the 1930s with purely social aims. Well-known Chilean gentlemen belong to this body, meeting for lunch once a month. The organization lasted without a Board of Directors or social headquarters for over 50 years, with participants sharing the organization of events on a rota basis.

The first Bolivian organization was set up in 1933, as the Bolivian Association in Buenos Aires, consisting of exiled militants, deserters from the Chaco war. In 1935 the Argentine-Bolivian Cultural Institute was founded, as part of the Argentine social museum, by Argentines and Bolivians wishing to improve links between the two countries, which had deteriorated. This is also an eminently elite organization.

New less elitist organizations began to appear in the early 1940s, catering to the new migratory flows. Their precise moment of appearance, and their type, depended on the immigrant flow from the country concerned. Two phases can clearly be defined in the Chilean case: in the first, between the 1940s and 1960s, social, sporting and cultural organizations sprang up. These included the Manuel Rodríguez centre in the borough of San Martín, followed by the Gabriela Mistral Club and Chile Oriente. Some of these organizations rented or owned headquarters, with their own periods of splendour and decadence. In the 1970s, purely political organizations were established such as "Chile Libre", which fought from abroad for a return to democracy in Chile.

Large-scale Bolivian immigration took place later, intensifying after 1964 when Víctor Paz Estensoro left office. According to several political leaders interviewed, when power passed to landowners, rural workers fearing revenge fled en masse to Argentina that year.

The Association of Bolivians in Buenos Aires obtained legal status in 1959, but when rural Bolivian immigrants began to arrive it found it impossible to adapt to the new reality of the community in Buenos Aires, and it closed down in 1977. Other organizations arose to take its place, however, many of which are led by participants in the former Association.

Club Oriental remains the only Uruguayan association with its own headquarters, and it is the most respected. It too has been dogged by economic problems, however, and after buying its own headquarters it had to sell and move to smaller premises.

Many collectivities gained renewed strength from the return to democracy, and there was a policy to strengthen and support them. It was during the Menem administration, however, that immigrant organizations strengthened and expanded their actions in a more political direction. Political goals were pursued in a State that was hardening its position towards immigrants. There were also were media campaigns against immigration which strengthened them further and encouraged them to undertake protection actions.

Bolivian immigrants

The Bolivian community in Argentina displays a high degree of endogamy, with couples tending to be formed between compatriots. This is probably linked to the community's strong sense of sociocultural identity (Benencia and Karasik, 1994). These values get transmitted to children, but in a few cases this provokes denial and concealment of true identity, possibly caused by shyness and a

fear rejection by Argentine youth. In response to these attitudes, a number of Bolivian groups have been formed in Buenos Aires to promote their own cultural identity.

Generally speaking, Argentine society sees Bolivian immigrants as a culturally homogeneous group, even though there significant differences between people from different regions of Bolivia.

Few communities in Argentina have built such active and permanent social networks. Over the years, common spaces have been established in the sphere of employment, neighbourhood, and daily interaction with people (Benencia and Karasik, 1994). Marriages and religious celebrations, baptisms and wakes, family gatherings and dances are the most propitious environments for reproducing the basic elements of Bolivian culture in Greater Buenos Aires.

In the 1960s, the Bolivian Association was set up in the federal capital, in a property lent to them by the then Municipality of Buenos Aires. Its main activity involved typical dances held on weekends, but, due to strong personalities and vested interests, the organization disappeared in the 1980s, generating a climate of distrust among members of the Bolivian community.

In 1975, the Bolivian Association of Morón was established in the western zone of Greater Buenos Aires as a vehicle for religious expression by devotees of the Virgin of Copacabana. Every weekend it held dances and lunches to raise funds to purchase its own headquarters. Other associations with religious aims included Asociación Civil "Tukuy Kallpa" of Villa Celina and Asociación Boliviana de Gonzales Catán.

Recently, a neighbourhood development society has been created in the San Martín barrio of the federal capital, directed by Bolivian residents. The fact that the original leaders have remained in their posts has caused divisions in the community and especially in the local chapel.

Another means of bringing compatriots together were sports leagues. Initially these rented fields for practices, but starting in the 1990s they also rented premises to hold social activities and to teach arts and trades and run other short courses. The leading associations of this type included: Asociación Boliviana de Gregorio de Laferrere, Liga Deportiva Boliviana "LIDERBOL", Asociación Deportiva Altiplano "A.D.A" and Fraternidad Deportiva Boliviana "FRADEBOL"; all these have their own legal status.

As a result of the economic advancement achieved by many Bolivian immigrants, labour and commerce cooperatives were set up in the 1990s; these became markets after property had been purchased, especially in Escobar and la Plata — for example in the garment sector with the Urkupiña market in the locality of Lomas de Zamora. Other cooperatives, such as "Simón Bolívar" and "2 de agosto" started to market their own and regional products, typical foods, and so on.

In the early 1990s, several organizations, including Asociación Boliviana de Morón and Cooperativa Frutihortícola de Escobar, banded together to form the Federation of Bolivian Civil Associations (FACBOL). This association maintains contact with the Bolivian community by broadcasting through radio Urkupiña; it has played an important role in the community, even signing a healthcare agreement with the national government. Over the years, internal divisions have emerged, however, and several member associations decided to break away and form a new Federation of Bolivian Institutions (FIDEBOL).

Initially this new Federation provided help to those made homeless by the earthquake in Bolivia in 1998, organizing artistic and sporting mega-festivals. It then began to save money to buy a headquarters in the capital, but, after two years, internal problems caused it to fold up, and each member association returned to its own activities.

Communications media operating in the Bolivian community include the newspaper *Contacto Boliviano* which is published monthly, together with *Vocero Boliviano*, *Renacer Boliviano en la Argentina*, and *Enfoque Semanal 2000*. Bolivian radio stations are: Radio Urkupiña 1550 AM, Radio Bolivia A.M. 1630, Radio Onda Latina — with transmissions confined to Soldati — and Estación Latina FM 91.9.

In June 1983, the first information bulletin of the Bolivian Pastoral Team (EPB) appeared, with information on the plan to unite Bolivian immigrants living in the city. Its general objectives are: to evangelize all mankind, and specifically, to continue the mission of Jesus.

EPB consists of a chaplain and a group of lay persons. Its activities include weekly meetings, families visits, organising neighbourhood gatherings, pastoral missions, guidance on documentation, housing and work, information bulletins, "novenas", and so forth.

EPB was set up as an initiative to promote activities, festivals and religious devotions among Bolivian immigrants dispersed throughout the capital city and in the various barrios of Greater Buenos Aires. Over the years, it has developed an organization structure including units for coordination, education and evangelization of its members and devotees.

According to the chaplain, Father Claudino Balén, there are at least three different mechanisms for expressing one's faith. Firstly, there are groups based on the Church; these are considered "fixed devotions", because they hold their festival in the same place every year. Other devotions hold their festivals in locations that depend on the incumbent and the availability of his home. Lastly there are civil groups that have no relation whatsoever with the Church except to request a mass or blessing.

According to observations by the same chaplain in a message sent to the Bolivian pastoral team, "within the Bolivian migrant community in Argentina there is a disorganized but growing independent concern to use religious devotions for private or group interests (for competitive purposes, to make monetary gains, to show off).

When such groups become more organized they form civil, commerce, cultural and folklore associations." Similar observations have been made by the presidents of other associations. This is understandable in the context of Bolivian immigrants in Buenos Aires, who are not only concerned to maximize their economic status in order to move up the social scale, but have also sought recognition from their own ethnic community through leadership in the various fraternities and associations. This has led to a risk of generating divisions in many immigrant organizations, due to the personality cult and protagonism of their members.

Over the years, EPB has acquired a very clearly defined image, as a focal point for attracting and channelling popular manifestations. Two assemblies are held every year, where over 200 activists from Buenos Aires and other provinces evaluate and organize activities for the following year.

To give an idea of the scale of these festivals in EPB programming for 1996, the feast of the Virgin of Copacabana was held in 37 parishes in Buenos Aires province and in the federal capital; there were also 14 sites for Nuestra Señora de Urkupiña, five for Nuestra Señora del Socavón, three for Tata Laguna y Señor de la Exaltación; and two for El Señor de Maica, Santiago Apóstol, Nuestra Señora de Surumi, and so on.

Chilean immigrants

Chilean immigration into Argentina has been continuous throughout the twentieth century, but it grew sharply from the 1960s onwards: a community of 51,563 in 1947 had expanded to 142,150 in the 1970s, coinciding with the start of the Pinochet dictatorship. In the most recent census of 1991 the Chilean immigrant community amounted to 247,679 people.

A majority of Chilean immigrants (53%) live in the Patagonia region (the provinces of Río Negro, Neuquén, Chubut, Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego); a further 29.8% live in the federal capital and Buenos Aires, and 11.3% in the region comprising the provinces of Mendoza, San Juan and San Luis.

Chilean immigrants in Patagonia have worked in sheep shearing in Valle de Río Negro, and in apple and pear growing, while in southern Patagonia they have been involved in oil drilling, mining and construction work.

In the metropolitan area (federal capital and Greater Buenos Aires) 25.98% of the Chilean population works in manufacturing industry, 25.6% does community, social and personal work, 22.18% work in commerce, restaurants and hotels, and 10.91% are employed in construction (Castronuovo and Pereyra, 1996).

Chilean migrants arriving in Buenos Aires province in search of work begin their search in the capital city living in rented accommodation. Once they have accumulated some savings they generally move to the outskirts of the city where land is cheaper.

There are a number of Chilean community centres where immigrants organize their social, cultural and sporting lives. The most highly institutionalized of these have legal status and are grouped together under a federation that was set up with support from the embassy in 1995. Many of these centres operate only during the annual Chilean National Festival of 18 September, lying dormant at other times in the year. Others get involved in social work in children's canteens and schools in Greater Buenos Aires, as a way of integrating and gaining acceptance among the host society.

In November 1998, a national federation was created by amalgamating the Federation of Chilean Associations in Southern Argentina (FEDECHISA) and the Association of Chilean Centres in the Province of Santa Cruz.

Research on Chilean organizations and their mode of operation, carried out by Brenda Pereyra in 1999, discovered a national level federation encompassing 80 Chilean centres. Of these, four are located in the federal capital (Gabriela Mistral, Pablo Neruda, AGECHA and Lemu Milla), and a further 16 in Buenos Aires province.

Not all associations are members of the federation. Some have not joined by choice (as they did not feel represented by it), or else because they do not have legal status. In the federal capital, the associations Chile Oriente, Bernardo O'Higgins and Red Solidaria do not belong to FEDACH.

Recreational and cultural centres exist to strengthen links between compatriots, and to maintain cultural elements relating to national folklore. Although people from other countries do participate, the typically Chilean is central in all the activities they carry out. Music, food and Chilean traditional dance form the essence of their celebrations.

The Federation has clearly political objectives both in Argentina and in Chile. The central issue at association meetings involves citizens' rights. Ever since its inception it has fought for the right for Chileans abroad to be able to vote. It has previously held meetings in Santiago and is currently organising an international congress of associations worldwide to obtain support for this. In Buenos Aires, the Federation drafted a legislative bill for the automatic registration of foreigners which was then approved by the provincial congress.

The wives of Chilean businessmen working in Argentina have an organization called Asociación de Damas Chilenas (ADACHI). Members are mostly non-working wives who meet once a month for tea in a member's home. They also organize charity activities, concentrating mainly on a children's canteen run by the congregation of the Catholic Church in the city of San Martín. This women's group provides regular support to the organization every month. Their aims are to integrate into the Argentine community and to make a significant contribution in this field. Although the possibility of their helping the Chilean community has been proposed to them, they have not yet agreed to do so. Other similar groups include Amigos de Chile and Centro Ejecutivo de Chile, the latter basically consisting of men, with women only being accepted if they are also executives.

Grupo Cordillera began to operate at the start of the 1990s for Chilean entrepreneurs living in Buenos Aires. According to its president, its objectives are essentially social, while also seeking to

facilitate integration into the Argentine community. More indirectly it seeks to give advice to Chilean entrepreneurs on how to operate in Argentina.

There are also other centres that exist to help their members integrate into Argentine society: for example Centro Unión Chile Argentina, which helped rebuild the city of San Juan following an earthquake, and Centro Bernardo O'Higgins, which looks after a retirement home for Chilean and Argentine senior citizens.

In a seminar organized by the Chilean Consulate in Buenos Aires in 1996, the participants, representing various Chilean resident organizations, expressed worries about the continued life of such organizations, the ageing of their members, lack of renewal, scant participation by young people, strong personality cults, and so forth. Their proposals included forming microenterprises, creating solidarity networks to motivate young people and women, job exchanges, professional social action networks, among other things. Both the consulate and the associations themselves are worried about the continuity of their activities.

Paraguayan immigrants

The Paraguayan community is the largest immigrant group in Argentina, numbering 253,522 people in the most recent census. The metropolitan region is home to 70.6% of them. Migration from Paraguay began in the late 1950s, attracted by job opportunities in construction work and domestic service.

This immigration is also associated with agricultural labour such as harvesting cotton, tea and Paraguay tea (*yerba mate*) in the provinces of Chaco, Formosa, Corrientes and Misiones.

The main civil and religious associations, which today have their own headquarters, legal status and intense social activity, were created in the 1960s and 1970s.

The distinguishing characteristic of the Paraguayan community, compared to other immigrant groups from neighbouring or other Latin American countries, is municipal building. In the majority of provinces and also in the boroughs of Greater Buenos Aires, associations start out by acquiring a plot of land on which to build their headquarters. Formalization of the association type emerges in response to the need to preserve assets rather than as a civic functioning tool.

Today there are various types of association:

- *Religious type*: the Paraguayan Pastoral Team in Argentina (EPPA), was founded in 1970 by group of priests and lay people; it has central direction and area teams. It also has its own headquarters and has held weekly meetings ever since its foundation. Its mission is to support migration by helping its members in a comprehensive way; every year it undertakes a major popular mission with priests and bishops from Paraguay. Today they work in over 80 neighbourhoods in the capital city and in Greater Buenos Aires, and they have a three-year training plan catering for over 120 people. Other activities include: special programmes for domestic service workers, enabling young women to meet together for recreation and travel purposes; young people have been meeting since 1981 to programme activities and help the community. EPPA members also frequently visit the Sommer sanatorium which cares for more than 50 Paraguayan residents suffering from Hansen's disease.
- *Civil associations*: there are approximately 20 formally established top-level civil associations, most of which have their own headquarters. The most important include Club Atlético Deportivo Paraguayo, which was founded in the early 1960s and is the only Latin American immigrant group in Argentina with a football team participating in the official AFA tournament. It also carries out a wide range of activities in the cultural, social and sporting domains, and it owns a plot of land for building its own sports stadium.

Casa Paraguaya was founded in the 1950s, and is one of the Paraguayan community's oldest institutions. It has a solid institutional life, with activities mainly in the cultural domain.

The Hogar Paraguayo in Berazategui was also founded in the 1960s, and has an institutionalized social life. It runs social and cultural activities, and has worked with the education authorities on literacy campaigns on several occasions. Other organizations undertaking social and cultural activities include Ñande Roga in Pablo Podestá, Buenos Aires, Residentes Paraguayos in Florencio Varela, and Residentes Paraguayos de Presidente Derqui, in Partido de Pilar, Buenos Aires. There are also several other formally established organizations with a smaller number of members.

The Paraguayan community is currently in the process of establishing its federation on a formal basis, an incipient body having been operating for two years. Federación Paraguaya (FEPARA) embraces 40 organizations, including Casa Paraguaya and Deportivo Paraguayo. In addition there are at least 400 Paraguayan programmes and several radio stations that were set up in the 1990s. There is also at least one newspaper entitled Ñanereta. These communications media are gaining their own space not as an association, but as an institutionalized communication space.

There are also some permanent non-formal civil associations, which tend to be groupings that coalesce around an identity based on a birthplace, city, town or village. Meetings are held for events such as the hometown religious festivals, and to provide solidarity and assistance to the place concerned.

Uruguayan immigrants

The 1991 census reported 135,858 Uruguayans living in Argentina at that time. Until the 1950s, they formed the largest neighbouring country immigrant group, and have generally tended to settle in the federal capital and in Greater Buenos Aires, working in the service sector.

The only remaining Uruguayan cultural and social organization is Casa Oriental. The rest are headquarters for Uruguayan political parties such as Frente Amplio. Their leaders claim that Buenos Aires is one of the most important electoral districts of Uruguay. Uruguayan law states that a person who fails to vote for two years loses the right to vote, which, together with proximity to their place of origin, is partly responsible for the high percentage of Uruguayans who travel to their place of origin to vote in elections. The absence of cultural organizations is nearly always explained as follows: "Montevideo is closer than the centre of Buenos Aires. If an immigrant is nostalgic for his or her homeland, it is easier to cross the pond," as Shubert Flores commented in an interview with Brenda Pereyra.

Peruvian immigrants

The Peruvian community in Argentina is still small. The 1980 census registered 8,561 people, and this had grown to 16,634 by 1991. Today the number is estimated at over 50,000. This country's immigrant community is distributed 74% in the capital and Greater Buenos Aires, followed by 11% in La Plata (since the 1970s young people have tended to go there for university studies). The third largest concentration is in Mendoza which seems to be used as a staging post.

Peruvian immigration tends to be urban and come from middle-ranking social sectors; education levels are high, 40% having completed secondary school, 35% with technical education and 20% with university studies. Another feature is that women predominate, often leaving their partner and children in their country of origin. Women work in the domestic service sector, while men find employment in construction and services.

This migration has major capacity for organization and for self-help networks based on people's interests, in the fields of culture, social, dance academies, restaurants, peña clubs, press, radio programmes and salsa bars (Benza, 2000).

In 1999, the Centre for Legal and Social Studies ran a series of interviews aimed at identifying Bolivian and Peruvian organizations. The Peruvian ones are listed below:

- **Centro Cultural Peruano:** cultural diffusion and assistance for immigrants in situations of emergency, providing clothing and basic necessities.
- **Club Social Manco Capac:** functions as a social and sports club (football and volleyball), with more than 100 affiliates; also holds integration seminars. - **Kaymillajtay:** disseminates Peruvian culture; runs folklore and music activities, and a radio programme entitled "Con Alma Peruana".
- **Asociación de Residentes Peruanos Siglo XXI:** holds fortnightly meetings; runs conferences on Peruvian culture and activities aimed integration and non-discrimination.
- **Asociación de Damas Peruanas en la República Argentina:** helps immigrants in need; previously worked to collect money for the Peruvian Children's Hospital.
- **Asociación de Médicos Peruanos:** does not have a headquarters; meetings held in family homes or in the Faculty of Medicine; cultural and scientific activities; also works with Asociación Perú Club Privado.
- **"Somos Perú" and "Gaceta del Perú":** two newspapers owned by the community.

There is also the Peruvian Pastoral Team (EPP) in the sphere of the Catholic Church. Its primary goal is to act as a meeting place for humanistic and Christian education, and to provide social and legal assistance to Peruvian migrants. EPP was created in 1993 by a group of Peruvian migrants, with collaboration from Fr. Volmar Scaravelli. The team tries to cater to the needs of the new Peruvian migration, which faces barriers such as discrimination, maltreatment and all the other problems that migrants have to come to terms with, such as loneliness, family breakdown, and problems with documents. Their active members visit Peruvian families and prison inmates, and organize typical Peruvian dances such as: la marinera, la virgen del sol, negroide, hayno and haylah.

They also take responsibility for maintaining contacts with Peruvian newspapers, such as "Heraldo del Perú", "Gaceta del Perú", "Perú noticias", and radio stations "Nosotros los peruanos", "Con alma peruana" and the dance groups "Estampa peruana" and "Kaymillaitau".

The commission invites the consulate and other Peruvian groups such as Centro Cultural Peruano and the Señor de los Milagros brotherhood to the main EPP festivals, along with representatives from other migrant communities including those from Bolivia, Paraguay and Brazil. At the start of each year Olympic sports tournaments are organized along with a male mini-football championship.

In view of the difficulties faced by recent migrants, a solidarity network was set up by team participants to make collections of basic foodstuffs. The names of people looking for work are also noted and they are advised when job vacancies appear.

In addition, team members take part in the main Peruvian religious celebrations such as: the Cristo Morado pilgrimage, and the Virgen de Santa Rosa de Lima, and Señor de los Milagros festivals.

Brazilian immigrants

Brazilian immigrants have historically provided the smallest migratory flow from among Argentina's neighbouring countries. According to the 1991 census, there were 34,850 Brazilian nationals living in the country. A sizeable group is concentrated in the province of Misiones, consisting

of agricultural workers and small-scale farmers. Others go to Buenos Aires; many Brazilian women come to the city following an Argentine partner met while vacationing or working in Brazil. A large percentage of middle-class Brazilian immigrants work teaching Portuguese and doing translations, while others work tending Brazilian music bars.

The wives of Brazilian executives have set up an institution known as *Círculo de Damas Brasileñas*, and in 1994 they started to hold parties to help the needy. The poorest socialize in bars and exchange information on jobs and other activities. Another association is *Grupo Brasil*, which consists mostly of business people.

Women immigrants from the Dominican Republic

Dominican women immigrants are an interesting case, because they have established a prototype association, with a female president, that focuses strongly on women's rights and gender issues. The organization is highly politically active, signing agreements to run training and orientation campaigns (in the Dominican Republic and Argentina), and literacy drives as a way of preventing Dominican girls falling into prostitution. It is currently setting up a federation of Caribbean organizations that is expected to embrace all other Latin American associations.

Reflections on immigrant associations

Argentina has received immigration from all parts of the world throughout its history, and migrant associations have always accompanied the integration process among the different communities.

Reaffirmation of their identity as a group in the land of migration has been basic need for most immigrants on arrival from different parts of the hemisphere. One of the most effective links has been provided by fraternities or religious associations, as has been the case in the past with Italian immigrants and more recently with those from Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru. These mechanisms have helped to maintain real links between migrants and their hometowns, enabling immigrants to recreate the same codes — image, songs, prayers, processions, festivals, and so forth — in the destination country.

The re-creation of migrants' own cultural values has been an important factor in maintaining their identity. Immigrants have responded to their compatriots' various needs, forming organizations for protection, assistance, information, diffusion and liaison with other civil, religious and political organizations within their own governments and those of the host country.

Many groups have transposed the tensions and problems of their home countries to the community of, reconstructing the same political and social class divisions, as Chilean immigrants did in the 1970s and Uruguayans more recently. There always have been rival groups of supporters and opponents of the government of the day.

Curiously, most religious, cultural and social associations also suffer from the same problems. Inadequate renewal in their management structures has a number of consequences, including internal frictions in some cases leading to break up; there is no room for young people in the organization structure.

Some associations tend to advertise a great facade of structures and activities, but are actually only fanciful groups that benefit their few members alone. Others, in contrast, have worked hard at integration, involving their own children along with Argentines in the same activities.

One of the major challenges for immigrant associations is to strike a balance between integration in the host society and maintaining their own identity. Efforts to maintain their identity alone can lead to isolation, while focusing exclusively on integration may lead to identity being undermined.

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C. Chapter conclusions

Remittances and migrant communities are two of the most distinctive features of contemporary migration processes — a fact that justifies renewed consideration of their interpretation, meanings and social significance.

Conceptually, remittances form part of an open-ended mutually beneficial contractual arrangement between migrants and their households in the origin country — an investment involving risk and return. On the investment side, the family bears the cost of educating the future migrant, from whom a return will be expected in the form of remittances. From the risk standpoint, the decision to migrate is rational, as it reduces risk by diversifying the family's "human assets" in terms of both activities and spatial location.

One of most widely debated issues concerns the contribution remittances make to development. The first point that needs to be emphasized is that this depends on how they are used. If funds are used merely for consumption purposes — as suggested by the available data in most cases — their contribution to economic development may be negligible, especially in countries where consumption patterns have a high import component. In such cases remittances may even have a negative impact on the balance of payments. In contrast, if resources are used for investment and more productive consumption — such as improvements in health and education — then they can contribute to development.

The second point is that family remittances for consumption are still the largest category of funds sent back to migrants' countries of origin, but also the category that has proven most resistant to the policies and tools of local and national governments. Nonetheless, there is a wide variety of initiatives for channelling them towards more productive

uses. Attention nowadays is focused not only on family remittances and their recipients, but also on other foreign-exchange flows, such as

collective remittances, and on other actors and institutions, including migrant associations of national, regional or local scope. This reflects a desire to take account of the views and problems of the senders when designing new policy tools in this area.

Migrant communities seem to be displaying a new transnational dimension, resulting from the formation of multi-local migratory circuits. By transcending national borders, these are probably the real domain in which international migrants organize both their economic subsistence and their communities' social and cultural reproduction. This new social and spatial form assumed by the migratory process means a dis-location and destructuring of the traditional concepts of migration and migrant. Migration no longer refers to the act of moving one's habitual residence, but becomes a state and way of life, the spatial expression of a new form of existence and social reproduction.

To understand contemporary migration, one needs to consider the substantial flow and exchange of material and symbolic goods (economic, cultural, social and political resources), along with the people that move back and forth in recurrent and circular fashion. This can be seen as a spatial expansion of the notion of habitual residence, encompassing living spaces in both destination and origin countries. It is also reflected in a temporal expansion of this notion to include periods of residence on either side of the border.

In the context of transnational migration, the traditional categories of migration and immigrant are insufficient and, often, inadequate for formulating plans, programmes, laws and migration policy regulations, both in host countries and in those from which migration originates. The paradigm that underpins existing migration legislation is likely to be of little use in making sense of, regulating and directing current migratory patterns, or in tackling and resolving the conflicts, tensions, and sociopolitical problems associated with them.

Part 5:
The human rights of migrants

A. Legal standards for the protection of migrant workers

*Richard Perruchoud*¹

1. Introduction

Leaving one's own country to work abroad or to begin life anew elsewhere constitutes an undertaking often fraught with difficulties. Migration to another country may increase opportunities and contribute to an improvement in living standards, but undeniably it may also involve obstacles and hardships.

Migrant workers often face discrimination, collectively and individually, and can be subject to hostility and exploitation. Nowadays, the magnitude of problems connected with migration has resulted in migration increasingly becoming a subject for concern to many governments. Additionally, migration is often perceived negatively by host governments and local communities alike. Such perception sometimes triggers reactions resulting in the mistreatment of migrant workers which, in some cases, culminates in the denial of their human rights.

Increasing xenophobia in some countries, provoked by recession and unemployment, has exacerbated hostility against migrant workers and further amplified the difficulties they encounter. The consistent increase in the scale of incidents involving violations of the rights of migrant workers to just conditions of work continues to be a cause for concern in light of the standards established in national and international legal instruments intended to protect their rights.

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The international community is faced with a growing contradiction and gap. On the one hand, the international community has at its disposal an impressive and sophisticated machinery of instruments defining and protecting the human rights of migrant workers. On the other hand, migrant workers are often considered as different and exploitable, being treated as scapegoats for the domestic ills of our societies; there is ample evidence of discrimination in employment, education and other services.

In an effort to promote respect for the legal standards and rights of migrant workers, the content of these rights must be acknowledged by States. The aim of this paper is to present an overview of the relevant treaties and to identify rights of migrant workers by examining international instruments and customary international law. These are rights to which all migrant workers are entitled, irrespective of their legal status or length of stay. They comprise the very minimum standard to be accorded to migrant workers, and in all cases should be respected and promoted by States.

2. Terminology

Generally, the term migrant is thought to refer to a migrant worker or economic migrant. "Migrant worker" has been defined as *a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national.*²

Within the category of "migrant", irregular or undocumented migrants must be recognized too, irregular migration being a phenomenon that is growing into a global crisis. From the above definition, it follows that the terms "migrant" and "migrant worker" do not refer to refugees, exiles or others compelled to leave their homes.

A refugee has traditionally and universally been defined as a person who is outside his or her country of nationality "owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion".³ The definition does not encompass the millions of persons world-wide who have fled the countries of their nationality due to internal or international armed conflict, internal strife, aggression, poverty or natural or man-made disasters. It is in light of such phenomena, generating mass movement affecting the stability of States within entire regions, that States have adopted regional instruments designed to address the special circumstances triggering migration in regions such as Africa and Latin America.⁴ The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) considers persons who fall within these extended definitions as of concern to her Office.⁵

The term "displaced person" is also frequently used, and broadly refers to persons who have not necessarily been exposed individually to persecution but have been forced to leave their homes and communities as a result of generalized violence, armed-conflict situations, or other man-made disasters. This category includes persons who are externally and internally displaced.

² 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, Article 2.

³ This definition is taken from the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the subsequent Protocol of 1967 which are the major international instruments regulating the conduct of States in the treatment of refugees. UNHCR's mandate contains a definition of refugees which is substantially similar to the traditional definition.

⁴ *The OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa 1969* extends the traditional definition of refugee to apply to those who flee from external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order. In order to address the specific circumstances in Latin America, the *Cartagena Declaration on Refugees of 1984* was adopted: this declaration similarly extends the definition of refugee by considering other causes of forced dislocation such as massive violations of human rights. The criterion of crossing an international frontier is nevertheless maintained, as it is in the OAU convention.

⁵ *Alternative Approaches and Ways and Means Within the United Nations System for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.* UN Doc. E/CN.4/1993/35 at §68.

The distinction in the meaning of the terms discussed above is becoming increasingly blurred as the forces motivating migration change. The fact of the matter remains that, in many parts of the world, social and economic deprivation have become so severe as to compel individuals and groups of persons to abandon their homes and seek a livelihood in a different country. Yet should persons constrained by such deprivation be considered "migrants" or "migrant workers" despite the questionable nature of the voluntariness of the decision to migrate?⁶ The shortcomings contained within the definitions of various traditional concepts applicable in categorizing individuals outside their countries of nationality do not affect the importance of such categorization, given the protection regime which has been developed within their parameters.

3. Identification of migrant workers' rights

The fact that no single set of standards exists does not mean that there are no standards for the protection of persons who cross an international border. The international community has developed several conventions, instruments, agreements and other documents providing for the rights to which such persons are entitled. Although some of the rights contained in these texts apply to everyone by virtue of their fundamental nature, the application of some others largely depends on whether the person involved falls within one of the traditional categories discussed above, namely migrant, migrant worker, refugee or displaced person. For example, international conventions and instruments on the status of refugees accord certain rights to those persons falling within the legal definition of refugee. Conventions and instruments concerned with migrant workers provide for rights which should be enjoyed by all persons employed outside their State of nationality. In addition, the law of armed conflicts requires that the rights of civilians are to be safeguarded during both non-international and international armed conflicts. Overall, under international human rights law, certain fundamental rights constituting the basic minimum are to be guaranteed to everyone irrespective of whether the particular individual is inside or outside his/her country of nationality. The latter is a significant body of law, especially given the number of persons who do not fall within traditional categories of migration. In promoting respect for the rights of migrant workers, particular emphasis is to be placed on international human rights law. Therefore, in submitting an overview of the sources of international law providing legal standards for the protection of migrant workers, focus is placed on human rights law and the body of law which concerns itself specifically with the rights of migrant workers: migrant workers law.

3.1 Human rights

*"it is the recognition that all human beings differ from each other, and that each individual is unique, which underlies the concept of the integrity and dignity of the individual person which human rights law is primarily concerned to protect"*⁷

All migrant workers are human beings who possess fundamental and inalienable rights and freedoms. These rights have been universally acknowledged in international law instruments such as the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, the Declaration was intended as "a common standard of achievement for all peoples and nations". Its thirty articles cover a wide range of human rights including the following:

- right to life, liberty and security of person (art. 3);
- prohibition of slavery or servitude (art.4);
- prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (art. 5);

⁶ See further, Background Document in Report of IOM Round Table on The Movement of People: New Developments. San Remo, May 1990 at 3.

⁷ P. Sieghart, *The International Law of Human Rights* at s1.10 (1983)

- prohibition on retroactive penal legislation (art.11);
- right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence (art.12);
- right to leave any country and to return to one's own country (art.13);
- right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (art. 18);
- right to freedom of expression (art. 19).

Article 2 enunciates the fundamental principle of non-discrimination, which guarantees that every human being is entitled to the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration without distinction of sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or any other status.

In order to give legal force to the rights contained in the Declaration, the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (ICESR) and the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (ICCPR) were adopted in 1966. These two Covenants, together with the Declaration, constitute the International Bill of Human Rights and contain provisions addressing the fundamental rights to which all individuals are entitled.

The Covenants have been widely ratified⁸ and the States Parties are obliged to implement their contents at the national level. While some of the provisions of the Covenants can only be implemented gradually, others which concern for instance the minimum protection of the fundamental human rights of individuals must be enforced with respect to all persons present on the State Party's territory regardless of their status. Indeed, Article 2(2) of the ICCPR imposes upon a State Party the obligation to "guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status".

Article 4(1) of the ICCPR provides that in "time of emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties ... may take measures derogating from their obligations.... to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law." In practice, this would allow a distinction between nationals and aliens (although not on the basis of race, colour, sex, language or social origin). However, measures of derogation must be consistent with States' other obligations under international law.⁹ It is furthermore well recognized under international human rights law that there can be no derogation from certain fundamental human rights guarantees. The Covenant specifically provides under Article 4(2) the rights from which there can be non-derogability. They are: (i) the right to life absent a final judgement rendered by a competent court, (ii) the right to be free from torture which has attained the status of *jus cogens*, (iii) the right not to be held in slavery, (iv) the right of persons deprived of their liberty to be treated with humanity, (v) the right not to be prosecuted under retroactive legislations, (vi) the right to be recognized as a person under the law and (vii) the right to freedom of thought and conscience.

The ICESR also provides for derogations. Article 2(3) of the ICESR permits a State party to derogate from its obligation to enforce the rights contained under the treaty but "only to such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society." Unlike the ICCPR which contains provisions of such a fundamental nature that they must be guaranteed at all times, the ICESR concerns itself largely with rights which can be guaranteed only gradually. It is important to note that Article 2(3) of the ICCSR states that "developing countries may determine to what extent they would guarantee the economic rights recognized in the Covenant to non-nationals."

⁸ As at 31 May 1999, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights had been ratified by 141 States and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights had been ratified by 144 States.

⁹ Goodwin-Gill, Jenny and Perruchoud, "Basic Humanitarian Principles Applicable to Non-Nationals", 19 *International Migration Review* 556, n.10 at 558 (1985)

Most of the guarantees contained in the Covenants are applicable to persons living in their country of nationality as well as to migrants, migrant workers, refugees and displaced persons. It seems established that chief amongst the factors triggering the movement of individuals away from their country of nationality are violations of their basic human rights.¹⁰ Unfortunately, individuals involved in the process of abandoning their country of nationality tend to be subjected to further human rights violations during the journey and become victims to yet more violations in the receiving country.

Other international human rights treaties offering guarantees of relevance to migrant workers include the *Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment* (1984). This Convention promotes the end of torture and the infliction of other degrading treatment worldwide, and extends the principle of non-refoulement to apply to all cases where there are substantial reasons to believe that a person would be tortured if returned to his or her own country.

The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) is the most authoritative and complete source of international law principles on racial discrimination. Article 1(1) of the Convention defines racial discrimination as

*any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which has the effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms.*¹¹

Under subparagraph 2 of Article 1 of this Convention, States Parties are allowed to apply distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences between citizens and non-citizens. However, this provision cannot be interpreted as giving a State Party the authority to violate the rights of such persons. Subparagraph 3 of the same Article which concerns the domestic legislation of States Parties regarding nationality, citizenship or naturalization specifies that such legislation must not discriminate against any particular nationality. Article 5 of the Convention contains an enumeration of all the rights which must be enjoyed by all without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin. The Convention does not guarantee these rights as such, rather, it provides that as far as these rights exist at the national level, they are to be enjoyed without discrimination.

The regional human rights conventions, namely, the *European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms*, the *African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights* and the *American Convention on Human Rights* contain similar provisions to the ones discussed above, provide similar guarantees and apply to all persons equally within the territorial jurisdiction of the contracting States Parties.

In conclusion, human rights treaties provide many guarantees to all individuals whether present on or outside the territory of their State of nationality. However, since the human rights law treaties discussed above were not specifically adopted to protect the human rights of migrant workers, they do not contain provisions addressing the specific violations suffered by migrant workers in host countries. In an effort to afford additional protection to migrant workers, other international and regional instruments focusing exclusively on their human rights protection were developed and subsequently adopted.

¹⁰ At the IOM Round Table on the Movement of People held in San Remo, May 1990, the Representative of the United Nations Centre for Human Rights said that: "*Human rights are generally at issue in the country of origin ... where a lack of guarantees for the enjoyment of fundamental freedoms or acute economic or social inequalities may induce massive emigration.*"

¹¹ Article 1(1).

3.2 Migrant workers' rights

3.2.1 Universal Instruments

The adoption by the international community of Conventions and instruments focusing specifically on the rights of migrant workers reflects the identified necessity to establish appropriate standards for the treatment of persons within this group. Mandated to concern itself with fair labour practices, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has spearheaded various initiatives towards the establishment of international labour standards benefiting migrant workers. The ILO's efforts have resulted in the adoption of several conventions and instruments on the rights of migrant workers. The principal ones are: (i) The *Convention (No. 97) Concerning Migration for Employment* of 1949 accompanied by *Recommendation (No. 86) Concerning Migration for Employment* of 1949 and (ii) the *Convention (No. 143) Concerning Migration in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers* of 1975, accompanied by *Recommendation (No. 151) Concerning Migrant Workers* of 1975.

The *Migration for Employment Convention* of 1949 focuses primarily on (i) the standards applicable in the recruitment of migrants for employment and (ii) the conditions of labour of migrants recruited for employment. Article 6 of this Convention provides specifically for the equal treatment of nationals and migrant workers lawfully within the territory of a State Party. Under subparagraph 1(a) of Article 6, migrant workers are to receive a treatment no less favourable than nationals with regard to remuneration, membership in trade unions and accommodation "in so far as such matters are regulated by law or regulations, or are subject to the control of administrative authorities." Under subparagraph 1(b) of Article 6, migrant workers are entitled to various types of social security benefits including those relating to employment injury, sickness, maternity, old age and death. Although these benefits may be subject to "appropriate arrangements for the maintenance of acquired rights and rights in course of acquisition" and "national laws or regulations of immigration countries", the important factor remains that State Parties to this Convention are to allocate these rights to nationals and migrant workers without discrimination as to nationality, race religion or sex.¹²

The *Convention (No. 143) Concerning Migration in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers* of 1975 aims at the elimination of illegal migration and illegal employment. Article 3 of this Convention imposes upon State Parties the obligation to "adopt all necessary measures (a) to suppress clandestine movements of migrants for employment and illegal employment of migrants, and (b) against the organizers of illicit or clandestine movements of migrants for employment. Article 8, subparagraph (1) of the Convention protects migrant workers from being considered in an illegal or irregular situation and losing their authorization of residence by loss of employment. Accordingly, subparagraph (2) entitles the migrant worker who has lost his employment to the same treatment as nationals with respect to guarantees of security of employment including the provision of alternative employment, relief work and retraining.¹³

In addition to the provisions contained in the above mentioned ILO labour conventions concerning the equal entitlement of migrant workers to certain social security benefits, the ILO has elaborated a Convention specifically applicable to the inequality of treatment suffered by migrant workers compared to nationals with regard to their entitlement to these benefits. It is the *Convention (No. 118) concerning Equality of Treatment of Nationals and Non-Nationals in Social Security* of 1962. In the area of social benefits, migrant workers also benefit from *Convention (No. 157) concerning the Establishment of an International System for the Maintenance of Rights in Social*

¹² See also the *Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention 1958* (No. 111)

¹³ *Recommendation No. 100 Concerning Protection of Migrant Workers in Underdeveloped Countries 1955* designated some third world countries where free movement of migrants was to be encouraged and others where it was to be discouraged in the interest of the country. The Recommendation on Employment Policy 1964 was aimed at achieving recognition of the interests of developing countries.

Security of 1982. This second Convention is accompanied by *Recommendation (No. 167) concerning the Establishment of an International System for the Maintenance of Rights in Social Security* of 1982.

Article 2 of each of these two Conventions enumerates the specific social security benefits from which States Parties have to ensure that migrant workers benefit. The Convention for the Establishment of an International System for the Maintenance of Rights in Social Security specifically provides: (i) in Part II guidance for the implementation of the Convention at the domestic level with a view to avoiding conflict of laws, and (ii) in Part III for the participation of States Parties in schemes for the maintenance of rights in course of acquisition.

The most significant achievement in recent years with regard to the protection of the rights of migrant workers has been the adoption in 1990 by the General Assembly of the United Nations of the *International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families*. This Convention reaffirms the basic human rights guarantees to which migrant workers and their families are entitled. This Convention stands as evidence of the need to reinforce the system of human rights protection benefiting this group of people. This Convention also provides States with a legal tool facilitating the development of a uniform system of domestic legislation and mutual agreements with respect to clandestine movement and trafficking in workers. Unlike the aforementioned Conventions the underlying goal of this particular Convention is to ensure that there are treaty provisions binding State Parties to enforce basic human rights protection of migrant workers and members of their families who may be in an undocumented or irregular situation.

In Article 2 the Convention defines the various types of migrant workers to which it is intended to apply. They are: migrant worker (see definition above), frontier worker, seasonal worker, seafarer, worker on an offshore installation, itinerant worker, project-tied worker, specified-employment worker and self-employed worker. Article 5 of the Convention recognizes as migrant workers for purposes of the Convention those who are considered to be documented as well as those who are considered non-documented. Article 7 affirms that the rights enumerated in the Convention are to be respected without distinction of any kind. Moreover, these rights are to be respected and ensured "in accordance with the international instruments concerning human rights". Part III of the Convention, from Article 8 through 35, enumerates a comprehensive set of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights applicable to *all* migrant workers and members of their families irrespective of whether they are documented or non-documented. Although these provisions consist largely of restatements of those contained in the International Bill of Human Rights and other basic human rights instruments, they isolate those rights with regard to migrant workers and thereby render them more explicitly applicable. The human rights in question are listed as:

- right to leave any State, including their State of origin and the right to enter and remain in their country of origin (art. 8);
- right to life (art. 9);
- prohibition of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (art. 10);
- prohibition of slavery, servitude, forced or compulsory labour (art. 11); _ right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (art. 12);
- prohibition of arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, family, home, correspondence (art. 14);
- prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of property (art. 15);
- right to liberty and security of person and prohibition of arbitrary arrest or detention; in case of arrest, right to be informed in a language they understand of the reasons for their arrest (art. 16);
- prohibition of collective expulsion (art. 22).

Particular focus is placed on the principle of equality of treatment between all migrant

workers and nationals before the courts and tribunals (art. 18) and with respect to remuneration and other working conditions (art. 25). Equality is also to be respected in such fields as urgent medical assistance (art. 28) and access to education (art. 30). Upon termination of their stay, migrant workers have the right to transfer their earnings and savings, as well as their personal effects and belongings (art. 32).

Part IV of the Convention, from Article 36 through 56, enumerates additional rights to those migrants who are documented or in a regular situation. Documented migrant workers and members of their families are granted the right of liberty of movement in the territory of the host State (art. 39). They are also granted the right to form associations and trade unions (art. 40). In this part of the Convention the principle of equality of treatment with nationals is stressed in areas including access to education, housing, vocational and social services.

Part VI illustrates one of the major objectives of the Convention. In Articles 64 through 71 the Convention seeks to prevent and eliminate illegal entry and illegal employment of migrant workers, and calls upon States Parties to take measures to achieve this goal. Suggested measures include imposition of sanctions against persons who organize irregular movements and against employers of undocumented workers (Art. 68). In promoting "sound, equitable, humane and lawful conditions" for migrant workers, States are to consult and cooperate (Article 64). Appropriate services must be maintained by States to deal with questions related to migration by formulating migration policies, exchanging information, providing information to migrant workers, and facilitating the provision of consular services (Art. 65).

The Convention is a significant move by the international community in the recognition and promotion of the rights of all migrant workers. It reflects the emergence of a growing awareness of the problems and discriminatory treatment that many migrant workers face. The Convention also stands as an acknowledgment of the magnitude of the issue of irregular migration. Its implementation could result in a significant improvement in the effective protection of the basic human rights of all migrant workers. However, the number of ratifications is still disappointingly few.¹⁴ There seems to be a lack of dissemination of information about the existence of the Convention. In addition, many States may require more time to examine closely the bulk of the provisions contained in its 93 Articles before embarking onto the process of ratification. Moreover, some States could opt out of ratification altogether based of the misperception that by promoting respect for the basic human rights of all migrant workers, they would encourage the arrival of more migrant workers in an irregular situation. Furthermore, the recent resurgence in xenophobia and racism in many States has led to anti-migrant sentiment resulting in governments being exceedingly cautious as regards the adoption and implementation of policies and legislation concerning this particular group.¹⁵

3.2.2 Regional Instruments

In Europe, several human rights Conventions were adopted under the auspices of the Council of Europe, they are: the *European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950)*, the *European Social Charter (1961)* and its *Additional Protocol (1988)*. They contain numerous provisions relating to individuals living and working in countries of which they are not nationals. They cover *inter alia* the right to privacy, to family life, the right to engage in a gainful occupation in another member's territory, provision of information to migrant workers, facilitation of the migration process, equality of treatment of nationals and non-nationals in

¹⁴ Fourteen States (Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cape Verde, Colombia, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Mexico, Morocco, the Philippines, Senegal, Seychelles, Sri Lanka and Uganda) have ratified or acceded to the Convention. Bangladesh, Chile, Comoros, Guatemala, Paraguay, Tajikistan and Turkey have signed the Convention without ratifying it. Twenty States need to ratify the Convention for it to enter into force.

¹⁵ S. Hune, "Equality of Treatment and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families" in Cator and Niessen (ed.) Papers Presented at the Seminar on The Use of International Conventions To Protect the Rights of Migrants and Ethnic Minorities at 79, (1994)

employment. The European human rights Conventions specifically concerned with migrant workers include the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers (1977); the Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality (1963); and the Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at local Level (1992).

The Commission of the European Community has also developed a significant body of norms regulating intra-regional migratory flows and treatment of non-national workers. The focus of the European Community has been placed primarily on the economic aspects of migration and integration, although it has increasingly devoted more attention to its social aspects. Among the most important regulations are included: Regulation No. 1408/71/EEC relating to the application of social security regimes to employed persons and the self-employed and to members of their families who have moved within the Community (modified by Regulation No. 1606/98/EC, 29 June 1998). The basic document determining in more detail the treatment of non-nationals within the region is the *Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers* (1989). While this document has no legally binding effect, its importance lies in providing guiding principles for the treatment of nationals of the European Community in the field of employment. Directives emanating from the European Community cover such issues as freedom of movement and residence, right to remain in the territory of another Member State after employment has been terminated, education of children of migrant workers, issues of health and safety, and the right to vote and stand in elections of other Member States.

In Africa, the regional instruments can also be divided into two categories, those dealing with human rights in general and those having specific relevance to migrant workers. The African Charter of Human and People Rights (1981) is the most significant. It protects individuals from discrimination and prohibits the mass expulsion of non-nationals. Among the instruments relating to labour migration, most of the standards listed are primarily focused on economic integration, touching on social and cultural aspects of migration as secondary issues. At the sub-regional level, there are several instruments related mainly to intra-regional migration. In 1975 the *Economic Community of West African States* (ECOWAS) adopted the Treaty of Lagos which guarantees freedom of movement and residence, as well as equality of treatment in relation to cultural, religious, economic, professional and social activities between nationals of all participating States. The 1979 Protocol to this Treaty entitles all citizens of the ECOWAS to enter, reside and settle in the territory of Member States.

The Central African Customs and Economic Union adopted an agreement in 1973, which recognizes the principle of non-discrimination in employment based on nationality. This agreement was supplemented in 1985 with a Social Security Convention on Migrant Workers. In 1978 the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries adopted a Convention on Social Security concerning Community Nationals who have worked in another Member country. Finally, in 1985, a Convention on the Free Movement of People envisaged that such a process could be achieved over a period of up to 15 years.(?)

In the Arab world, the fundamental document relating to human rights, the *Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam*, was adopted by the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 1990. It guarantees freedom from discrimination based on various grounds for all individuals. In the field of migration specifically, the *Agreement of the Council of Arab Economic Unity* (1965) provides for freedom of movement, employment and residence and abolishes certain restrictions upon movement within the region. In 1968, the Arab Labour Organization developed the *Arab Labour Agreement*, intended to facilitate labour movement in the region and giving priority within the region to Arab workers. These same provisions were reiterated in the 1970s with the strengthening of measures to retain jobs for Arabic-speaking workers and to remove non-Arabic-speaking workers from the region.

This focus on reducing the participation of external migrants from the Arabic speaking labour market is apparent throughout the 1980s, with the adoption of the *Strategy for Joint Arab Economic Action and the Charter of National Economic Action*. The Strategy for Joint Arab Economic Action determines that "Arab manpower must be resorted to increasingly to reduce dependence on foreign labour", while the Charter of National Economic Action breaks down legal barriers between nationals

and migrants from other Arab-speaking States and provides for freedom of movement and equality of treatment. The Arab Declaration of Principles on the Movement of Manpower (1984) stresses also the need to give preference to Arab nationals, and simultaneously calls for the strengthening of regional bodies and intra-regional cooperation.

In Asia and the Pacific region, the countries have not yet established any regional agreements or institutions dealing with either human rights or migrant workers' rights. However, the subject has been broached in discussions of the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC).

In the Americas, the regional standards in the field of human rights in general are contained in the *American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man* (1948) and the 1969 *American Convention on Human Rights*. In Latin America, the *Southern Common Market* (MERCOSUR) Pact of 1995 is expected to formalize the current informal flow of workers across the internal borders of the region, while signatories to the Cartagena Agreement or Andean Pact approved in 1977 the creation of the Andean Migration for Employment Instrument and in 1996 the creation of the "Andean Migration Card" which aims to facilitate migration flows in the sub-region.

The *North American Free Trade Agreement* (NAFTA) deals only marginally with migration issues through the *North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation* and also in the body of NAFTA itself. NAFTA permits the entry of a certain quota of investors, highly qualified personnel and executives of multinational corporations between signatory States.

3.3 International humanitarian law

Migrant workers may find themselves stranded in a country where an armed conflict situation exists. In such circumstances they benefit from the protection afforded to civilians under international humanitarian law, in particular the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. Such migrant workers would also be protected under the provisions of the 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. More specifically, Part IV of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) contains numerous provisions concerning the protection of the civilian population which are to be observed in all circumstances. Article 1.2 of this Protocol stipulates that

in cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.

Recourse to this general principle is also found in the Preamble of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II). It is stated in the Preamble that "in cases not covered by the law in force, the human person remains under the protection of the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience."

The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1977 Protocols also set standards for the treatment of aliens on the territory of a party to the conflict. Articles 35 through 46 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (the Fourth Geneva Convention) concern specifically the protection of aliens. Article 17 of Protocol II prohibits the displacement of the civilian population unless imperative military reasons so require.

3.4 Law of aliens

The law of aliens is mainly customary law, derived in part from decisions of international and national tribunals. The two basic standards upheld by the law of aliens are the equality of treatment principle (providing that aliens should receive equal treatment with nationals, with some exceptions such as political rights), and the principle that certain minimum international standards for humane

treatment cannot be violated in relation to aliens.¹⁶ These concepts affirm the existence of basic rights to be enjoyed by all aliens. The principles and a number of other provisions in the law of aliens, concerning issues such as expulsion and conditions of admission, are applicable to migrant workers. The law of aliens, however, largely ignores the status of undocumented migrant workers, or those in an irregular situation, and thus does not fully apply to a large proportion of today's migrant workers.

3.5 Fundamental human rights of migrant workers

The body of human rights law and that of migrant workers law are comprehensive and well entrenched. There is a considerable number of conventions and instruments which specify State Parties' obligations and provide implementation mechanisms to promote compliance. However, a significant number of States have not yet adhered to many of the treaties and are not bound by the treaty obligations. Many States continue to fail to comply with their treaty obligations and have taken no effective steps towards ensuring that the basic human rights of migrant workers are protected. All migrant workers, but particularly those in irregular circumstances or outside traditional definitions, must be of concern to the international community. For effective protection, their rights need first to be identified and accordingly respected and promoted. It is therefore of use to establish whether there is a core of rights so fundamental that they must be adhered to by all States. This has been the subject of juristic debate and disagreement for a number of years.¹⁷ Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that a "hard core" of rights exists which constitutes the minimum guarantees to which all human beings are entitled. The following rights have been identified as being within this core:

- right to life;
- prohibition against slavery/slave trade and servitude;
- prohibition against torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment;
- prohibition against retroactive penal measures;
- right to recognition as a person before the law;
- right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.

In addition to the rights listed above, there are also a number of fundamental rights which have been defined as applicable to all migrant workers regardless of their status. They are:

- right to leave any country and return to one's own country;¹⁸
- right to hold opinions without interference;
- prohibition of arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, family, home, etc;
- right to protection of property;
- right to liberty and security of the person;
- right, if deprived of liberty, to be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person and for their cultural identity;
- right to equality with nationals before the courts;
- prohibition of measures of collective expulsion.

¹⁶ See in particular Roth A., *The Minimum Standard of International Law applied to Aliens*, Leiden, Sijthoff, 1949, and Schnitzer A., "Mindeststandard", in *Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts*, Strupp/Schlochauer (ed), vol. II, Berlin, 1961, pp. 537-538.

¹⁷ See O. Schachter, "International Law in Theory and Practice" at 336, (1991)

¹⁸ C. Mubanga-Chipoya, Analysis of the Current Trends and Developments Regarding the Right To Leave Any Country Including One's Own, and to Return to One's Own Country, and Some Other Consideration Arising Therefrom UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/10 at 7.

Evidently, States Parties to the Conventions such as those discussed above are bound by treaty provisions which, in practice, extends obligations toward migrants and migrant workers.

Despite the existence of many conventions, international instruments, and the acceptance by States of the need to enforce the protection of fundamental human rights, discrimination, abuse and unfair practices still abound. It is therefore imperative that national legislation be adopted, and effective implementation be secured by both the sending and receiving States, in order for the violations to be curbed.

4. Specific issues concerning human rights of migrant workers

Migration is a dynamic process, constantly subject to changing pressures and patterns, which call for new and dynamic responses. The growing phenomenon of migrant workers in an irregular situation and others who are not clearly protected by a legal regime, the sharp increase in trafficking, coupled with abuses of rights as a consequence of discrimination, indicate that the promotion of migrant workers' rights should be a priority concern for the international community. It is worth highlighting some of the specific issues relevant to migrant workers' rights, both in international law and modern day practice.

4.1 Freedom of movement

Although freedom of movement has long been accepted as a basic human right, it involves problematic aspects hindering its actual enjoyment.¹⁹ Inherent in the concept of migration, the right to freedom of movement can be exercised with respect to movement (i) within the territory of a country, (ii) to leave any country, and (iii) to return to his or her own country. The right had been recognized long before the advent of the current human rights regime. Socrates, for example, regarded the right to leave one's own country as an attribute of Athenian liberty; the English Magna Carta of 1215 guaranteed the freedom "to go out of our kingdom, and to return safely and securely, by land or water..."²⁰ Today, the right is enshrined in Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states:

- 1 *Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the border of each State.*
- 2 *Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.*
In addition, Article 12 of the ICCPR provides further information on the content of this right:
 1. *Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.*
 2. *Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.*
 3. *The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, law and order, public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.*
4. *No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.*

¹⁹ There is debate whether this right falls into the category of fundamental rights as it has been given slight recognition by States. For a discussion of this issue see Goodwin-Gill, Jenny and Perruchoud, ^{supra} note 9; see also C. Mubanga-Chipoya, *supra* n. 18, who states that this right is part of customary international law.

²⁰ H. Hannum, The Right to Leave and Return in International Law and Practice, at 3 (1987).

The first aspect of the right to freedom of movement is the freedom of residence within the border of a State and applies to all persons without distinction as to nationality. However, its application extends only to persons lawfully residing on the territory of a given State, and therefore, not to undocumented migrant workers or migrant workers in an irregular situation.

The second aspect of the right to freedom of movement is that of being able to leave any country including one's own. This too applies to all persons without distinction. The United Nations Human Rights Committee has submitted that while there is no right in the ICCPR to enter any country except one's own, the right to leave and return should be interpreted in an expansive manner. This right has thus been translated into a right to travel, and access to appropriate travel documents may be considered as an integral part of it.²¹ The major limitation on the right to freedom of movement is that, under international law, there is no corollary right to enter the territory of another country. Indeed, one of the most recognized principles of State sovereignty is the right for States to decide on conditions of entry.

The third aspect is the right to enter one's own country. The interpretation of this right has been the subject of lengthy debate on such issues as whether nationality is a requirement. It has also rendered problematic the enjoyment of the right in the absence of appropriate travel documentation or identification. The right is also linked to the issue of forced exiles or expulsions, which can deprive persons of their right to return.

It has also been argued that the right of freedom of movement necessarily implies a right not to move, or be displaced. International and internal armed conflicts, civil strife, the enforcement of certain discriminatory domestic policies, can all cause displacement, thus infringing the right of freedom of movement, not only because those displaced are invariably restricted in their movements (for example, when confined to camps or resettlement villages) but also because they cannot exercise their right to return to their home country or principal area.²² The right of persons to remain in peace, in their own homes, on their own lands, and in their own countries, has also been affirmed by the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.²³

4.2 Expulsion

Whether it is collective or individual, expulsion refers to "*an act, or a failure to act, by an authority of the State with the intention and with the effect of securing the removal of a person or persons against their will from the territory of that State*".²⁴

The ICCPR treats the issue of expulsion in Article 13 which states that: *An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the Present Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by, and be represented for the purpose before, the competent authority or a person or persons especially designated by the competent authority.*

This provision extends its guarantees only to aliens who are lawfully residing within the territory of a State, thus not protecting undocumented or irregular migrants. However, if the legality of an alien's entry or stay is in dispute, any decision leading to expulsion should be in conformity with Article 13.²⁵

²¹ Hannum *op. cit.*, p.20.

²² M. Stavropoulou, "The Right Not to Be Displaced" in 9 *American University Journal of International Law and Policy* 1994, at 739.

²³ At its 48th Session, Resolution 1996/9.

²⁴ G.J.L. Coles, "The Problem of Mass Expulsion" Background Paper prepared for the Working Group of Experts on the Problem of Mass Expulsion convened by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo, Italy (16-18 April 1983) at 2. See also R. Perruchoud, "*L'expulsion en masse d'étrangers*", *Annuaire Français de Droit International*, XXXIV, 677 (1988).

²⁵ R. Plender, *Basic Documents on International Migration Law* 2nd revised ed., at 34 (1997).

This universal prohibition of expulsions which are discriminatory or arbitrary applies equally to migrant workers, as can be seen from ILO conventions and recommendations, as well as various regional instruments and the 1990 UN Convention on migrant workers. Despite clear prohibition, however, expulsions whereby the rights of aliens are not protected or which are not subject to judicial review, continue to occur.

4.3 Trafficking

Trafficking is a form of irregular migration which has recently become a highly organized, highly lucrative "global business". The growth in trafficking is rapidly becoming of concern to the international community, not only because of the threat caused to orderly migration and national security, but also because of the exploitation, abuse and violations of rights suffered by the individual migrants.

Unabated demand for migration, coupled with stricter entry controls or requirements, have provided entrepreneurs with a potential for profit. The number of persons attempting to enter a country clandestinely has given rise to a market for services such as the provision of fraudulent travel documents, transportation, guided border crossings, accommodation and job brokering. Traffickers supply these services to would-be migrants for a fee.

The gravity of the potential consequences for the individual cannot be overstated. These migrant workers are in the grip of the traffickers and can suffer physical and mental abuse and violations of their human rights. In many cases, traffickers are linked with crime syndicates and are ruthless in their treatment of the migrants. In other cases, migrant workers are simply abandoned or put at risk because the traffickers fear being caught by the authorities. Often, the clandestine journeys are dangerous, with migrants being crammed into boats or trucks without enough air, water or food. Even at journey's end, these persons may remain at the mercy of traffickers; forced into a situation of slavery or indentured servitude, kept as hostages for ransom or, as is often the case for women, raped and forced into prostitution. The activity of trafficking poses grave threats to the rights, health and even the very lives of migrant workers.

The continued growth of migrant trafficking presents a challenge to the international community. It poses a very real threat to migrant workers around the world, who are being deceived, exploited and robbed of their basic human rights and dignity. Addressing the issue calls for a recognition of the gravity of trafficking at both the national and international levels. Importantly, it should be recognized that the persons involved are victims and should not be furthered punished by authorities. Indeed, States must work together, conscious that trafficking presents a serious obstacle to the effective protection of the human rights of migrant workers.

4.4 Employment and social security

*The question of access to employment is of crucial economic and social importance to migrant workers and their families. The connection between restrictions on access of foreign workers to employment and their continuing low occupational status in society has been identified as one aspect of the "systematic institutionalized discrimination" ingrained into the temporary migration system.*²⁶

The international protection of migrant workers has been an aim of the ILO since its foundation.²⁷ It has elaborated a number of standards embodied in conventions and recommendations, as referred to

²⁶ R. Cholewinski, *Migrant Workers in International Human Rights Law* at 290 (1997).

²⁷ The Treaty of Versailles which established the ILO in 1919 stated in article 427 that "the standard set by law in each country with respect to the conditions of labour should have due regard to the equitable economic treatment of all workers lawfully resident therein" and the Constitution enunciated among the priority aims of the ILO "the protection of the interest of workers when employed in countries other than their own". See further R. Zegers de Beijl, "Combating discrimination against migrant workers: International standards, national legislation and voluntary measures – the need for a multi-pronged strategy", background paper for the United Nations Seminar on Immigration, Racism and Racial Discrimination, Geneva, 5-9 May 1997.

above. The central principle of equality of treatment between nationals and non-nationals in the labour market covers recruitment, wages, social security and other working conditions. Yet, despite the existence of international standards against discrimination, and the equality of treatment principle enshrined in ILO and other international instruments, discrimination against migrant workers in the fields of employment and access to social security continues to be practiced in countries around the world. Exclusions or preferences concerning the types of jobs open to migrants, different standards applying to job tenure or contractual status, and inequalities in pay or grading, are some of the problems which migrant workers often face.

Such discrimination can also have negative impacts on the country of destination; access to, and equal treatment during, employment is the main avenue for integrating non-nationals. Thus employment, and the working relations between migrants and members of the receiving country, can have a decisive effect on the relations of migrants with the host country.

Often, discrimination is of an informal nature. Recruitment practices may exclude migrants through inappropriate selection criteria; they may be treated as "inferior" by their work colleagues and subject to prejudices and discriminatory attitudes. In these cases, the existence of international standards and legislation cannot effectively address the problem. Rather, training on equal opportunities and anti-discrimination is also needed.

Further, unabated demand for foreign labour, coupled with strict entry controls in many countries, has increased the level of illegal migrant workers. Such undocumented labourers are even more open to abuse, discrimination and exploitation. Without status, a migrant can be a target of exploitation, obliged to accept any kind of job, and any working and living conditions. At worst, the situation can be akin to slavery or forced labour. Undocumented migrant workers rarely seek justice or the enforcement of their rights for fear of exposure and expulsion.

5. Supervision and enforcement

A number of the treaties mentioned in this paper have their own enforcement regime. For example, the ICCPR and ICESR place obligations on State Parties to report periodically to international bodies on measures they have taken, on progress they have made and on any difficulties they have encountered in implementing the Covenants. Individuals claiming to be the victim of human rights violations are also able to complain to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, which will admit the complaint if there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Once that threshold is established the Sub-Commission may refer the case to the Human Rights Commission. Isolated instances may also be examined under the complaints procedure of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Complaints procedures for individuals have also been established under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

In terms of the rights of migrant workers in particular each member country of the ILO must periodically report on the measures taken to apply, in law and in practice, the Conventions which it has ratified. These reports are examined by the Committee of Experts on the Application of the Conventions and Recommendations, whose observations may be published in an annual report submitted to the International Labour Conference. Further, employers' and workers' organizations can lodge representations with the International Labour Office on a Member State's non-compliance with a Convention it has ratified. Complaints can also be lodged by a member country against non-compliance by another member country.

The 1990 UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families contains provisions for the establishment of a Committee on the

Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (Article 72). The Committee would examine reports on the application of the Convention submitted by States Parties, and it may also receive complaints from States and individuals. Under Article 72, States Parties are under an obligation to submit reports on the "*legislative, judicial, administrative and other measures they have taken to give effect to the provisions of the Convention*". Initially, these reports must be submitted once a year after the entry into force of the Convention and thereafter every 5 years and whenever the Committee so requests.

Article 76 opens the possibility for a State to submit a communication to another State if it considers that that State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the Convention. If the problem is not resolved within 6 months of the initial communication, either State may refer it to the Committee. The Committee is to make its good offices available to the State Parties concerned with a view to reaching a friendly settlement. This procedure is optional and only becomes operational if both States concerned have made a declaration accepting it and if 10 States Parties in total have made such a declaration.

Finally, Article 77 provides for an individual complaint procedure. The Committee is empowered to receive communications from or on behalf of individuals who allege that their rights as established by the Convention have been violated by a State Party. Communications must meet a set of admissibility requirements in order to be accepted, such as the exhaustion of local remedies. The Committee is required to bring any communication before it to the attention of the State Party concerned which is obliged, within 6 months, to submit to the Committee "written explanations or statements clarifying the matter and the remedy, if any, that may have been taken by the State". The Committee shall then forward its views to the State Party concerned and to the individual. This procedure is also optional. It applies only to those States Parties that have made a declaration to this effect under Article 77 and comes into force when 10 States Parties have made this declaration.

Various mechanisms are available at the international level, so that the situation looks rather encouraging. It looks even more encouraging if one takes into account national mechanisms which very often are the first ones to be set in motion. Respect for human rights is part an parcel of the Constitutions or some other fundamental laws of States : violation of migrant workers' rights constitutes a violation of national law, and not only – or not necessarily – of international law. National means of supervision and redress are thus available to migrant workers, and mechanisms of implementation and supervision of national laws do have an important role to play in ensuring respect for migrant workers' rights, as reflected in national legislation.

One may therefore be tempted to conclude that all these mechanisms of implementation and supervision are more than adequate. The reality, however, is different and we must ask ourselves what went wrong? what is missing? and, more importantly, how can we translate this legal world into a real world? An accurate and complete answer would require a thorough debate on social justice, development, and globalization. Looking only at mechanisms of implementation and supervision, it appears that all the mechanisms just listed are reactive, they come into play only once an alleged violation has taken place, they aim at redressing a wrongful situation. More attention has to be paid to preventative measures, to mechanisms which may ensure that rights and freedoms will be respected, and non-compliance prevented.

6. Conclusions

Under international law, the rights of migrant workers stem from a number of sources. There are several international instruments whose provisions are applicable to all human beings, and therefore, also to migrant workers; and others which are specifically aimed at migrant workers. In addition, many of the applicable rights are part of customary law, and must be observed by all States and guaranteed to all persons.

There is therefore no lack of international instruments and standards to guarantee the rights of migrant workers. Nevertheless, violations of such rights, abuse and exploitation of migrant workers is a daily occurrence around the world. The main challenge of the international human rights regime, therefore, is to ensure compliance by States. The following measures should be encouraged to promote effective respect :

- Information to migrant workers on their rights, preferably before they leave their country. Such information should include reference to the obligations of migrant workers vis-à-vis the host community.
- Information to potential migrant workers on the reality of migration, including the risks involved in irregular migration, such as falling victim to traffickers, ending up in slavery and/or prostitution.
- Training programmes for government officials, mainly but not exclusively migration officers : all too often, there is a lack of knowledge of the law, leading to violation prompted by unjustified ignorance.
- Greater involvement of and cooperation with reliable trade unions, institutions of civil society and NGOs : partnership instead of confrontation is generally conducive to better results.
- Bilateral and regional cooperation to ensure adequate treatment of migrant workers: the setting up of binational commissions on migration or of regional processes are good examples of such cooperation.
- Orderly management of migration, involving States of origin and destination, as well as international governmental organizations dealing with the matter, is key to ensuring respect for the human dignity and well-being of migrant workers.
- Governments can benefit from cooperation with international, governmental and non-governmental organizations, which can assist them in formulating policies and guidelines to address the situation of migrant workers, including specific needs of migrants in an irregular situation and victims of trafficking.

Finally, one of the most far-reaching and significant developments in the protection of non-nationals is the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. Compliance with its provisions by countries around the world will have a significant effect on the treatment of migrant workers and the furtherance of respect for their rights. The ratification by States of this Convention is an important step toward ensuring the effective respect for the rights of migrant workers.

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B. Human Rights and Migrations in Light of the Inter-American Human Rights System

*Helio Bicudo*¹

Introduction

On behalf of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, I would like to thank the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) through its Population Division - Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) for taking the initiative to organise this important symposium on international migration in the Americas.

My talk today will deal with the human rights of migrant workers and members of their families, in light of the multiple activities carried out by protective bodies within the inter-American human rights system, among them the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

In this context I will first analyse the experience and main activities carried out by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in its efforts to promote and protect the human rights of migrants. Then I will examine recent jurisprudence established by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights as it relates to migratory problems. Finally, I will formulate my conclusions.

¹ Helio Bicudo, President of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

I. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Migration

A. Background

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (from now on called "the Commission" or "IACHR"), the main body of the Organization of American States responsible for promoting and protecting human rights in this hemisphere, has recognized that the movement of persons across different countries' borders has generated growing conflicts in terms of respect for human rights.

In the experience of this Commission, migration poses many problems and challenges across the broadest spectrum of human rights issues, affecting civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights. From our perspective, the main cause of the constant flow of migrants in our hemisphere is poverty and exclusion from the benefits of economic development, which affect broad sectors within our societies. As the World Bank itself has recognized, this is moreover one of the results of neo-liberal practice and economic globalisation. Upon finding their needs constantly postponed in their own countries, these sectors set out to conquer new horizons, in an effort to find a more hopeful future for themselves and their families.

While seeking out these new horizons, migrant workers and their families are often the object of abuse and/or unawareness of their own fundamental rights, and once again, the genuine satisfaction of their basic needs is postponed.

Likewise, not only economic factors have influenced the massive movement of individuals in our hemisphere. Civil wars and persecution for political reasons have also affected broad sectors of our society, with natural disasters contributing to these movements. In this field, the problem of migration overlaps with the body of doctrines and state obligations clearly established in international law, among them refugee and asylum rights.

Migration can't simply be reduced to leaving one's country by crossing a border. Migration also has a clear bearing on internal displacement of persons, due to natural disasters or when they flee political violence or persecution. In this sense, the Commission has produced some studies and developed some interesting jurisprudence, which could be applicable in the case of international migrants.²

B. Commission Activities in This Area

At this point I would like to refer to the Special Rapporteurship on Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, created by this Commission, along with some cases or situations that we have discovered or ruled on.

1. Special Rapporteurship on Migrant Workers and Members of their Families

In order to pay special attention to the issue of migrant workers, the Commission created "the Special Rapporteurship on Migrant Workers and Members of their Families" (referred to from now on as the "Rapporteurship") to carry out a study on the issue from the perspective of human rights and follow up on different complaints in this sense. The Rapporteurship is currently headed by a Commission member, Dr. Juan Méndez, and has the full support of our Executive Secretariat.

This initiative by the Commission came about due to the growing importance of this issue on our regional agenda and the Commission's own observations, as described below.³

² See, for example, reports on human rights in Colombia, produced by the Commission.

To date, the Rapporteur has developed a "progress report" on the situation of migrant workers and the members of their families, which was recently included in the Annual Report that the Commission presented to the last General Assembly of the OAS. This progress report is based on replies from member OAS governments to a questionnaire that the Commission sent out, asking for both factual and legal information about migrant workers and their families.

Similarly, through the Rapporteur the Commission has started to make contact with multilateral bodies dealing with these issues on a more regular, ongoing basis, and, for example, a few months ago was accepted as an observer to the "Puebla Process". Similarly, we have signed an agreement with the International Organization for Migration to carry out ongoing exchanges on experiences in this area. This agreement is indeed what has made it possible for us to meet today, sharing experiences and cooperating within the framework of this important symposium.

Similarly, I would like to highlight the contribution of US\$50,000 that the Government of Mexico has made to facilitate the Rapporteur's many different activities.

2. Migration-Related Cases that the Commission has Considered and/or Passed Judgement on

The Commission has had the opportunity of hearing, analysing and taking a position on several concrete situations or cases that touch on the relationship between human rights regulations within the inter-American system and governments' practices regarding non-nationals within their borders.⁴ Cases or situations include:

- a) **Decision in the case of Riebe and others versus Mexico.** This case dealt with the expulsion of non-Mexican priests who were active in Chiapas, under Article 45 of the Mexican Constitution (which grants the President of the Republic sweeping powers to deport non-nationals). The Commission indicated that this summary deportation, without providing reasons attributable to the conduct of the man affected, constituted a violation, among others, of the regulations governing due process of law as contained in the American Convention on Human Rights, specifically Articles 8 and 25.⁵
- b) **Decision in the case of Haitians in transit in the United States.** At the time of the most recent mass exodus of Haitians during the Cedras dictatorship, the United States established a procedure for interdiction on the high seas, in which it expressly declared the 1951 Convention on Refugees and its Additional Protocol (1967) inapplicable, because those affected had not entered the jurisdiction of the United States. The Supreme Court of the United States validated this practice in the case of Haitian Refugee Centres versus Sale. In this regard, the IACHR

³ The Montrois Declaration, called "A New Vision of the OAS," approved during the OAS General Assembly in Haiti in 1995, states that as a result of the growing interdependency resulting from economic integration, it has become necessary to deal with the problems of migrant workers and their families using an approach based on solidarity among member states and full respect for the dignity and the rights of these people. For its part, at the Summit of the Americas, held in Santiago, Chile, in April 1998, governments and heads of state from the Americas stated in the Declaration of Santiago that "we will make a special effort to guarantee the human rights of all migrants, including migrant workers and their families." Similarly, among other points, the Plan of Action developed by this Summit commits governments to ensuring full compliance with and protection of the human rights of all migrant workers, as well as requiring that they take the necessary measures to eliminate and eradicate all forms of discrimination against them, preventing their abuse and mistreatment by employers, and providing them with the same legally enshrined working conditions provided to citizens of the country.

⁴ The Commission is constantly receiving complaints about racist or xenophobic actions or attitudes. Often, it has been difficult for the Commission to suitably deal with these situations, given that they arise from cultural attitudes and particular acts over which we have no authority.

⁵ See, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1998, Volume II, Report No 49/99 (case No 11,610 Mexico), pp 751 to 782.

prepared and published a report in which it concluded that this practice violated the United States' international obligations under the American Declaration of Human Rights and the Charter of the Organization of American States.⁶

- c) **Examination of the Marielitos case.** In the United States, Cubans considered deportable, who arrived as a result of the crisis in the port of Mariel in 1980, have been in lengthy detention in the United States after being found deportable. At the same time, the Cuban government refuses to receive them. The Commission received a report on this situation, which it is studying.
- d) **On site visit to Texas and California.** The Commission visited in situ the states of Texas (1999) and California (1998) to observe and gather information on migration and asylum trials in these regions. During its visit, the Commission met with representatives from different institutions that are involved in migration, and non-government organizations working with migrants. Similarly, the Commission visited some migrant detention centres and shipment ports, among others.⁷
- e) **Report on the human rights situation of people seeking asylum within the Canadian system.** The Commission visited Canada on site to evaluate the procedure for those applying for asylum in that country. After the visit, the Commission prepared a report analysing this situation and formulating a series of recommendations to the Canadian government. This report was recently released to the General Assembly of the OAS, along with the Commission's Annual Report.⁸
- f) **Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Dominican Republic** (Informe sobre la situación de los derechos humanos en República Dominicana). In 1996, the Commission visited the Dominican Republic in situ to examine the human rights situation in that country. One chapter of that report examines "the Situation of Haitian migrant workers and their families in the Dominican Republic."⁹
- g) **Request for Provisional Measures on behalf of Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Descent.** On 12 November 1999, the Commission received a complaint against the Dominican Republic, stating that this government was carrying out massive expulsions of Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian origin. The Commission adopted a provisional measure and requested that the Dominican Republic cease all "mass expulsions" and that in the event that these continued, due process of law should be followed in carrying them out. In December 1999, the Dominican government rejected the provisional measure. Later, the Commission asked that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights adopt provisional measures to deal with this situation, as reported below.¹⁰

II. Inter-American Court of Human Rights

At this time I would also like to refer to two recent and innovative decisions by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (from now on referred to as "the Court") that are directly related to the problem of migration and human rights, constituted by the Advisory opinion on "The Right to Information about Consular Assistance in the Framework of Guarantees of Due process of Law" and

⁶ See, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1996, Report No 51/96 (case No 10,675 United States), pp 295 to 358.

⁷ See, press releases Nos. 12/98 and 12/99, published in Annual Reports of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1998 and 1999.

⁸ See, "Report on the Situation of Human Rights of Asylum Seekers within the Canadian Refugee Determination System," OAS/Ser.LIVIII.106/Doc. 40 rev/ February 28, 2000.

⁹ See, "Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Dominican Republic" (Informe sobre la situación de los derechos humanos en República Dominicana) OAS/Ser.L/V/II.104/Doc. 49 rev./ 7 October 1999.

¹⁰ See, "Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1999," Volume I, pp 66 and 67.

provisional measures adopted in the case of the Dominican Republic expelling Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian origin.

a) Advisory opinion on "The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law."^{11 12}

In order to determine the jurisdiction of and relationships between consular assistance, protection, information, notification, and communication as recognised in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (from now on referred to as the Vienna Convention) and human rights regulations as recognised by different international instruments, the government of Mexico presented a request for an advisory opinion from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on 9 December 1997.

In general terms, the Mexican government presented this request for an advisory opinion due to a series of trials of Mexican citizens before the courts in the United States for crimes punishable by death, indicating that local authorities had not informed the detained foreigners of their rights under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. On this point, the Mexican state argued that this in compliance violates the rights of citizens to due process of law and an impartial trial.¹³

On 1 October 1999, the Court issued an opinion on "The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law." Some of the main considerations weighed by the Court are reported below.

In the first place, the Court indicated that international instruments whose main purpose is to protect human rights may not necessarily contain standards of this nature, whereas it is possible that international instruments created for purposes other than the protection of fundamental rights may also contain regulations that refer to the protection of same. In this sense, the Court indicated that while the Vienna Convention is a treaty whose purpose is to establish a balance among States, this doesn't prevent it from also being concerned with protecting the fundamental rights of persons in the Americas.¹⁴

The Court, upon analysing Article 36 (1) (a)¹⁵ of the Vienna Convention, indicated that this regulation enshrines the right to free communication for both consul officials and nationals of the country sending these officials, and with regard to these last, communication with one's consul is conceived of as a right corresponding to the detainee in the latest manifestations of international law. In this context, communication with one's consul has a double purpose: a) to recognize Governments' right to assist their nationals through the actions of consul staff; b) to recognize the associated right belonging to the national of the country sending the official to have access to this official in order to obtain said assistance.¹⁶

¹¹ See, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory opinion OC-16/99 "The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law," 11 October 1999.

¹² The Court has indicated that its consultative function is carried out in order to assist compliance with international obligations of American States in areas concerning the protection of human rights, as well as complying with the functions attributed to different bodies of the OAS in this area.

¹³ Articles 5 and 36 of the Vienna Convention refer to consular protection and indicate the specific rights of foreigners when they are deprived of their freedom. Specifically, Article 36 enshrines principles such as the right to information about consular assistance, the right to notify the consul of one's detention, the right to consular assistance, and the right to communicate with one's consul.

¹⁴ Op cit at 4, pp. 55 to 56.

¹⁵ Article 36 (1) (a): "With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of the sending State: (a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending State shall have the same freedom with respect to communication with and access to consular officers of the sending State."

Similarly, Article 36 (1) (b)¹⁷ enshrines the right of foreigners deprived of freedom to: a) request and ensure that the relevant authorities of the receiving country inform the competent consular office of their arrest, detention or preventive imprisonment; b) send any communication to the competent consular office and that this be transmitted without delay.¹⁸ The Court stated that, in this sense, Article 36 constitutes a notable exception with regard to the nature, essentially of states, of rights and obligations enshrined in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and represents, in the terms interpreted by this court in the present Advisory opinion, a noteworthy advance over traditional concepts of International Law in this area.¹⁹ Similarly, the Court stated that the expression "without delay" requires that receiver state authorities inform all foreign detainees of the rights bestowed upon them under this article at the time of their arrest and in any case before the detainee makes any statement or confession to judicial or police authorities.²⁰

These prerogatives for foreigners arise from the fact that they find themselves in a *de facto* situation of inequality compared to nationals of the country in which they find themselves. Given this inequality, compensatory measures are in order that contribute to reducing or eliminating the obstacles and deficiencies that hamper or reduce the effective defence of personal interests...²¹

In this sense, the Court explained that this is why those who do not speak the language in which the trial is conducted are provided with a translator, and for the same reason the foreigner has the right to be opportunely informed of her or his right to consular assistance. These are means by which the accused can make full use of the rights provided under the law to all persons. These rights are inseparably linked to each other, forming a set of trial guarantees and together constitute due process of law. Similarly, the Court indicated that the right to information on judicial assistance available must be recognized and considered in the framework of minimum guarantees to provide foreigners with the opportunity to suitably prepare their defence and enjoy a fair trial.²²

Finally, the Court said that inobservance or obstruction of the right to consular assistance constitutes a violation of the guarantees for due process of law and, in cases involving a death sentence, an arbitrary privation of the right to live.

b) Provisional Measures

On 30 May 2000, the Commission presented the court with a Request for Provisional Measures on behalf of Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Descent, documented or otherwise, living in the Dominican Republic who run the risk of being collectively expelled or deported.²³ On 13 June 2000,

¹⁶ *Idem.*

¹⁷ Article 36 (1) (b) "With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of the sending State: if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph."

¹⁸ These two rights have been expressly recognized by the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by the UN General Assembly, Resolution 43/173, 9 December 1988.

¹⁹ *Idem.*

²⁰ *Op. cit* at 4, paragraphs 98 to 101.

²¹ *Idem.*

²² *Op.cit* at 4, paragraphs 110 to 124.

the Commission presented to the Court an appendix to its request for provisional measures, informing it of the identity of some of the victims of expulsions.

According to the information that the Commission provided to the Court, these expulsions are carried out through collective round-ups, with no legal procedure that suitably identifies the nationality of those expelled, nor their immigration status, nor their family ties; they are simply separated from their homes, with no prior warning, and without being allowed to take their belongings. The immigration authorities select the people for deportation according to the colour of their skin.

On 8 August 2000, here in San José de Costa Rica, the Court held a hearing with the presence of the Commission and the Dominican government. On 18 August, the Court issued an opinion on the provisional measures.²⁴

Among the clauses introducing its resolution on this issue, the Court indicated that it is an attribute of the Dominican Republic to make sovereign decisions about its immigration policy, which must be compatible with regulations for the protection of human rights established in the American Convention on Human Rights. Similarly, the Court indicated that it is essential to correctly identify those persons who are in danger of suffering irreparable harm; otherwise, it is unfeasible to order provisional measures in an unspecified way to provide generic protection to those who are in a specific situation or may be affected by specific measures; however, it is possible to protect the duly identified members of a community.²⁵

In its resolution, the court ordered provisional measures be taken in favour of specific individuals. For example, the Dominican Republic was required to avoid deporting or expelling from the country specifically identified individuals; the return of others, duly identified, was required; as was the reunification of families in the Dominican Republic with others.

Conclusion

Today, the phenomenon of migration and its very nature involves important and difficult challenges for the effective protection of the human rights of migrant workers and the members of their families.

My presentation has provided an overview of how bodies within the Inter-American human rights system can serve as an effective tool for protecting the basic rights of migrants and their families.

The Commission itself will continue to support the "Special Rapporteurship on Migrant Workers and Members of their Families", will continue to receive complaints about alleged violations of the human rights of migrants and their families, and will continue to closely observe the situation this group faces throughout the hemisphere.

²³ Article 63.2 of the American Convention on Human Rights states that, "In cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons, the Court shall adopt such provisional measures as it deems pertinent in matters it has under consideration. With respect to a case not yet submitted to the Court, it may act at the request of the Commission."

²⁴ See, Resolution of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 18 August 2000 on Provisional Measures requested by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights with regard to the Dominican Republic.

²⁵ Ibid.

C. The Rights of Migrants and National Interests

Manolo I. Abella¹ International Labour Office

Observing that globalization and rapid technological change are combining to increase migration propensities while making many jobs in developed countries more precarious, this paper argues that the space for building an international regime on migrants' rights is narrowing. There is a need to widen that space by placing the ethical basis of migrants' rights on enlightened self-interest of nation states. This requires a better understanding of the consequences of immigration on the host populations and economies, for which more information and research are essential.

1. The progress made by the international community in defining the rights of workers to decent work and fair treatment has never followed a straight historical trajectory but has twisted and turned with political changes and popular perceptions, with major breakthroughs tending to occur at junctures of favourable economic developments. The ILO's landmark Convention 97 (Migration for Employment Convention) which defined for the first time the basic right of migrant workers to equal treatment in employment and to protection during the various stages of recruitment and deployment came into force in 1949, during the post-war recovery, when many countries were experiencing severe shortages of labour on account of the losses of their most able young men and women.

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2. The ILO's Migrant Workers' Convention (C.143) which for the first time called on Member States to take concrete measures to suppress clandestine migration, was adopted in 1975, at the onset of the economic recession triggered by the oil crisis and which led to the termination of the *guest worker* programmes adopted during the 1950s and 1960s by many western industrialized countries. The preamble to the Convention spoke of the need "...to avoid excessive and uncontrolled or unassisted increase of migratory movements..." which clearly reflected the worries over immigration pressures.
3. Our concern in this paper is how to assess the present environment for advancing the migrants' rights agenda. Do we now have an environment, a conjuncture of favourable economic and political developments, which would make it easy to promote the rights of migrant workers? Given the mounting problems of treatment of migrant workers, what strategies could be expected to work in pushing for new norms?
4. The space for generating international support for new norms and standards is being shaped in an important way by three significant developments. One is the increasing precariousness of traditional forms of employment due to heightened intensity of global competition in trade. The progressive integration of the world economy with the dismantling of barriers to the free flows of capital and goods has ushered in a period of more rapid economic growth globally but greater instability of jobs, especially for those employed in sectors where the developed regions have lost their comparative advantage.² Many more jobs than ever before are now being transferred to low-wage countries through foreign direct investments or the so-called "de-localization".³
5. In addition to heightened competition, another factor contributing to the precariousness of jobs is the increased vulnerability of economies to *external shocks*. During the last decade this had already manifested itself in two major financial crises, the one in Mexico and the other in Southeast Asia. Both crises had reverberated throughout the world's capital markets, causing severe downturns in the levels of economic activity in countries that have heretofore been very resilient like the Republic of Korea or Argentina.
6. A second important development is accelerating pace of technological change. We are, by most accounts, only at the threshold of technological changes that are creating a *new economy*. It is without precedence in history in the speed with which it is transforming the world of work. Services, which have long ago displaced manufacturing as the biggest provider of new jobs in the industrialized regions of the world, are expanding into areas and directions never foreseen before. The internet and e-commerce are revolutionizing how, when, and where the goods we daily consume are produced, transported and sold. These changes have inevitably led to changing the comparative advantages of nations in international trade, dislocating some industries, forcing agglomeration and restructuring of firms, reshaping jobs, and making many traditional skills obsolete.
7. A third important development is the growing apprehension about migration pressures, partly on account of the growth of illegal migration (recently estimated at some 30 million persons worldwide), but more so on account of the tendency of rightist political groups to use xenophobia effectively in building political support. This is most notable in Europe where the stock of immigrants has been rising at the rate of 2.6 percent yearly. The last decade did see a rise in the rate of migration most notably in Central America and West Asia.

² For a review of the evidence on the impact of globalization on migration, see Stalker, Peter(2000) *Workers without Frontiers*, International Labour Office (Geneva) and Lynn Reinner, Boulder.

³ In the United States total economy-wide employment has risen impressively over the past decade but there have been heavy job losses in some industries.

8. In my view, these developments are hostile to building a stronger support among states for the advancement of migrants' rights. Immigration and economic policies associated with globalization are, as Tapinos and Delauney have recently noted, paradoxically aimed at reducing mobility while the market mechanisms they try to re-establish are just as likely to increase rather than reduce migration flows.⁴ The frequently reported incidents of human smuggling have not helped advance the migrants' rights agenda in many destination countries, but has instead focused the debate on more effective means of defending borders. Newspapers have seized on the growing anti-immigrant sentiments in many countries to pay greater attention to the growth of clandestine migration and trafficking and the seeming loss by many states of control over their borders. The dislocation of people due to political conflict in the Balkans has not helped dispel the worries in western Europe, in particular, that tidal waves of immigrants would descend upon them with the slightest loosening of controls over their borders.
9. Although labour immigration has historically been associated with the opening of new land frontiers, the growth of industries, and development, the new perception is that today's migration generates undesirable social consequences and thus not compatible with national interest⁵. Migrants are increasingly being seen as threats to natives' job security, a burden on social services, and as harbingers of crime. These have led to narrowing the space for securing greater support for migrants' rights. Arguments for migrants' rights on grounds of basic individual human rights are not winning the day against those who cite the negative consequences of immigration.
10. This is well illustrated in the difficulties faced over the last ten years in getting twenty ratifications for the 1990 UN Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. The ethical principles that underpin the basic rights of migrant workers under the UN Convention are those drawn from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants, one on civic and political rights and the other on economic, social and cultural rights, the Convention and Protocol on Refugees, and the ILO Conventions (Nos. 97 and 143) and Recommendations. (Nos. 86 and 151). Since over 90 states are now signatories to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, over 100 to the 1951 Convention on Refugees, and over 40 have ratified ILO Convention 97, there should be, in principle, no reason why not more states are ratifying the UN Migrant Workers' Convention.
11. The reason is probably on account of changes in the perception of the consequences of immigration on the host countries. During periods when the consequences expected were favourable (i.e. faster income growth with immigration) state policies on migration were accommodating of greater rights for the migrants. When perceptions shifted towards a more negative view of the consequences of immigration there is much greater resistance to new rights initiatives.
12. The basic rights of migrants elaborated in the 1990 UN Convention are largely based on a philosophical argument that the rights of individuals precede those of the "good" of the community or the state. It places on States the moral responsibility to protect migrant workers because it is a matter of the latter's basic rights as individuals, and not because it is in the former's national interest to do so.
13. The international standards regarding migrant workers that are today already in force are those of the ILO, specifically Conventions 97 and 143. Convention 97 set forth the rights of migrants in the areas of remuneration, social security, taxation, access to trade unions, litigation, transfer of personal belongings and access to longer periods of residence. Convention 143 established

⁴ Tapinos, G. and Delauney, D. (2000) Can one really talk of the globalization of migration flows? in *Globalization, Migration and Development*, OECD Paris.

⁵ See Williamson, J. (1995) "The Evolution of Global Labour Markets Since 1830: Background Evidence and Hypotheses" *Explorations in Economic History* 32

the rights of migrants in an irregular situation and further specified the right of migrants to equal treatment and opportunity as with nationals, particularly with respect to geographical and occupational mobility, vocational training, recognition of qualifications acquired in the country of origin, and preservation of the culture of origin.

14. There are also the so-called "soft standards" or the ILO Recommendations which have accompanied these Conventions. One is Recommendation 86 of 1949 which already established the right to family reunification, continued residence in the host country in case of loss of employment, and legal guarantees in the event of involuntary return. It also contains a model agreement between countries reflecting and enumerating the principles laid out in the main provisions of the standards. Recommendation 100 of 1955 dealt with protection of migrant workers in underdeveloped countries. It established their rights as employees regarding wages, housing, access to more skilled jobs, trade union activities, the supply of consumer goods, social security, occupational health and safety, links with the country of origin, and material, intellectual and moral welfare.
15. These standards have been developed over the past 50 years and inspired national legislation, bilateral and multilateral treaties and Conventions including the 1990 UN Convention.⁶ However formal ratifications, which proceeded satisfactorily in until the end of the 1960's, started to slowdown thereafter. Because of concern over this declining ratification rate, the ILO Governing Body in 1996 asked the Office to undertake a "General Survey" of the Migrants Conventions (Nos. 97 and 143) and Recommendations. Not all Member States responded to the General Survey but it is already instructive in identifying those principles in these Conventions that Member States have found difficulty in accepting and have been cited as the reason for non-ratification.⁷
16. In both Conventions the most important principle is that a state should give migrant workers "treatment no less favourable than that which it applies to its own nationals" (C.97 Art 6; and Art. 10 of C.143). In these two ILO Conventions it is clear that the equality of opportunity and treatment applies only to migrant workers and members of their families *lawfully* within the territory. It is only once the worker has been admitted to a country of immigration for purposes of employment that he or she will become entitled to the protection provided for in the Conventions. The implication is that the rights of States to admit or refuse to admit a foreigner to its territory is not affected.
17. National legislation may also limit the application of the principle of equal treatment in some Member States. The Survey showed that limitation is often because national social security legislation would not allow perfectly equal treatment of non-nationals (particularly in the matter of pension rights), or because membership in trade unions is limited to nationals, or because priority is given to nationals in matters of employment. It is noteworthy that the principle of equal remuneration appears to be universally accepted in principle although not always honoured in practice.
18. The ILO Conventions allows restrictions on the equality of treatment principle as regards *free choice of employment*. Restrictions may be imposed during a prescribed period which may not exceed two years (Art.14 of C.143), or permanently with respect to access of non-nationals to limited categories of employment where this is necessary in the interest of the State.
19. ILO's experience with standard setting suggests that building an international regime on the rights of migrant workers cannot rest solely or even heavily on the acceptance of individual rights as opposed to communitarian or state rights. A compromise has to be stricken between

⁶ See Cholewinski, Ryszard (1997) *Migrant Workers in International Human Rights Law Their Protection in Countries of Employment* Clarendon Press Oxford.

⁷ ILO, *Migrant Workers*,(1999) Report to the 87th Session of the International Labour Conference, ILO Geneva.

- them which usually hangs on showing that there are positive consequences of immigration for the host society.
20. How compatible are some basic rights of migrant workers with the *national interest* of host states? In attempting to answer this question one runs against the problem of defining what is the "national interest". Admittedly, "national interest" has many dimensions including national security, preservation of democracy, peace and justice, preservation and enrichment of culture and social values, health, and material welfare. The degree of disagreement on immigration policy in many countries reflects the complexity of defining national interest even within the context of one country, let alone defining it for a general case.
 21. There is considerable ambiguity even in some of these definitions. For example, in Japan those opposed to more immigration argue that it is a threat to the cultural homogeneity of the nation, considered by many as the source of their social order and strength. However, countries like Canada and Australia have achieved consensus on the value of multiculturalism to their societies and adapted their immigration policies accordingly.
 22. There is less ambiguity, though not necessarily more agreement, where the benefits expected to ensue from a policy is some economic variable like national income. One could, for example ask the question: "Would granting such and such right for migrant workers and members of their families add to or reduce national income?" Since the typical case is one where there are *gainers* as well as *losers* the question is usually reduced to the question as to whether the former can bribe the latter to accept the negative consequences of a policy. In practice this often means that the winners from a more liberal regime of admitting unskilled foreign labour (usually the owners of capital) are taxed by the Government, which in turn passes the returns on to the losers (usually the unskilled labour). Unfortunately, research that allow quantification of such benefits and costs is not yet available in many countries, with a few notable exceptions like the United States.⁸
 23. In the following we lay out some of the main considerations needed in examining the economic consequences of granting some of the more important "rights" to migrant workers such as the right to equal remuneration, free choice of employment, right to organize and to bargain collectively, right to family reunification, and equal treatment with respect to social security and health services.
 - *Equal remuneration*: Employing migrant workers at wages lower than those of nationals would undermine existing collective agreements and encourage substitution of foreign for national workers, hence it is clearly not in the interest of the latter. It is however another question whether or not the host economy as a whole gains in the process. In principle, as long as the employment of foreign workers does not displace nationals, there should be an increase in national income, hence the national interest will be served. An income redistribution is however bound to result. The employers' share of the bigger national income would rise if average wages fall for all workers, national and foreigners alike.
 - *Free choice of employment* : An economy-driven labour immigration policy usually involves restrictions on free choice of employment. The effects of such restrictions on gains in national income as a result of importing foreign labour is probably negligible. However, by adding to the segmentation of labour markets, restrictions on free choice of employment would contribute to downward pressures on wages and could have a

⁸ For the most recent survey of the issues in the US see Borjas, G. *Heaven's Door : Immigration Policy and the American Economy*, Princeton University Press, 1999. Borjas found that the economic impact of immigration is essentially a distributional impact.

significant impact on income distribution. Moreover, the segmentation of the labour market has long-term social consequences such as creating negative attitudes towards certain occupations (for example, the 3-D jobs in Japan) and reducing labour market flexibility.

- *Right to join trade unions and to bargain collectively* : The argument for this right is again based on income distribution effects. Excluding migrant workers from union membership and from collective bargaining will probably lead to a decline in real wages. It can only weaken their ability to maintain their share of the larger national income that results from employing migrant labour.
- *Equal treatment in access to social and health services*: Health directly impacts on productivity and has strong externalities. There would be costs in terms of potential output foregone if the migrants are not given access to necessary social and health services. Also, the host community should have an interest in insuring that illnesses are diagnosed and treated to lessen the chances of spreading diseases. It is interesting to note that the provision of health care has not been a contentious issue in the immigration debate in many countries, unlike public services such as education and welfare benefits such as unemployment insurance and food stamps.
- *Family reunification* : The national interest in the matter of giving rights to family reunification is one of the most difficult to determine and quantify. Proponents argue that permitting family reunification minimizes the social problems that usually attends family separation such as prostitution, alcoholism, and gambling. Opponents argue on the other hand that the burden of providing social services for whole families is much heavier than the cost of allowing such consequences of a restrictive policy.

24. Given contemporary misgivings about the value of more liberal policies on immigration, it is very important that more facts are established on the consequences of immigration on the national interest of receiving states. Efforts to advance the migrants' rights agenda have floundered probably because these have not been adequately supported by solid research into the economic and social consequences of immigration and emigration on the receiving and sending states. This paper was only meant to call attention to the need to link national interests with the advancement of migrant workers' rights if one is to succeed in generating international consensus on the many sensitive issues raised by migration. It is evident that scholars of migration can play a major yeoman's role in this sphere.

D. Comments

D.1 Comments by Gabriela Rodríguez P.²

I would like to thank ECLAC and IOM for the invitation to participate in this Symposium on International Migration, and especially the opportunity to comment on the presentations about Human Rights of Migrants.

During the course of this event, we have analysed the phenomenon of migration from many perspectives, exploring its impacts at the individual, social and economic levels. The data provided has revealed that migration has risen in recent decades, leading to growing concern among governments, civil society and international bodies, given the repercussions for social and political relations between receiving countries and those from which the migrants come. There is a consensus that migration is the result of different processes coming together and, in the specific case of our continent, is primarily the result of a combination of economic factors, armed conflicts, economic contraction resulting from structural adjustment, and natural disasters, which always hurt the poorest sectors most.

Based on these considerations, I think it is important to emphasize that migration is not always a voluntary process and that often people are forced out of their homeland by serious levels of exclusion and situations that threaten their survival and hamper their ability to fully develop as human beings. As a result, it becomes necessary to affirm yet again the **right not to emigrate, the right to rootedness**.

Recent and massive migratory flows at the world level, often in precarious conditions, have led to the violation of migrants' human

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rights. In this context, the UN Economic and Social Council in its resolution 2000/48, as per the recommendations of the Working Group of Intergovernmental Experts on the Human Rights of Migrants, ratified the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, during session no. 62, 25 April 2000.

Given the importance of this event, I think it is worth mentioning some of the main aspects of this mandate:

- To study the design of policies and measures to overcome obstacles to the full and ensure effective protection of migrants' human rights. This mandate covers documented and undocumented migrants.
- The mandate requests that the rapporteur pay special attention to gender and cases of violence and discrimination against migrant women. Similarly, the rapporteur is asked to keep in mind the situation of the rights of migrant children.
- Moreover, the rapporteur is asked to link her work with that of the Preparatory Committee for the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance.
- The mandate also takes into consideration the need to keep studying ways to deal with the obstacles that prevent the full and effective protection of this vulnerable group's human rights, including obstacles and difficulties for returning undocumented or otherwise irregular migrants.
- To implement effective measures to protect migrants' human rights, the Commission asked that the special rapporteur request and receive information from all relevant sources, including migrants themselves, on violations of their human rights, formulating appropriate recommendations to prevent and remedy these violations.

The above together form the foundation of this mandate and I would like to comment on the documents presented to this panel from the perspective of this mandate.

Keeping in mind the rapporteur's mandate, whenever we refer to migrants the issue of migrant workers is a major one, because migrants are often undocumented and therefore lack access to the judicial tools that could afford them some protection of their rights.

As special rapporteur, I would like to express how profoundly disturbing it is to see the violations of migrants' human rights, particularly of those who are undocumented and therefore often receive lower wages than citizens, at the same time as they have no access to social security, health care, and full participation with dignity.

Of particular concern to this rapporteur is the illegal traffic in people in conditions that place their mental and physical integrity severely at risk. From time to time we hear in the media or relevant research reveals that hundreds of people have lost their lives during these shipments, migrants who dreamt of better opportunities for working and contributing to their families' survival. In cases where they have successfully reached their destination country, traffickers retain their papers, while their properties and families remain mortgaged to the hilt in favour of the traffickers. In this context, people are forced to accept working conditions akin to slavery, with no access whatsoever to judicial protection.

This situation is particularly harmful to women, who at times are deceived and, under the illusion that they are being offered a worthy economic alternative, are forced to become sexual workers.

Similarly, migrant children are particularly vulnerable, and are affected by the breakdown of the family, the lack of identification papers, and the fact they have no access to social security or education. All this damages the full exercise of the rights established in the Convention on the Rights of Children.

Another subject that greatly concerns this special rapporteur is the danger that applicants for asylum face when their request is not accepted by the receiving State, leaving the vast majority of them in the category of irregular migrants, exposed to situations that facilitate illegal trafficking.

Racial discrimination, xenophobia and exclusion are part of the daily life facing documented or undocumented migrants. We cannot forget this reality, despite the fact that it is often ignored or distorted by the media.

All these situations, suffered by migrants today, result from the closure of spaces for containing, providing lasting roots and fully respecting human rights in their countries of origin, particularly social, political, and cultural rights.

In this context, I consider it extremely important, if we are to really ensure the protection of migrants' human rights, to implement preventive policies. National and international protective instruments are an important resource, but they only operate once human rights violations have already occurred. Among these preventive measures, I would like to mention:

- Design informational campaigns in the countries generating the highest migration rates about the risks of irregular migration, and particularly its serious consequences for women and children.
- Distribute, in originating and receiving countries, the many regional and international Conventions signed and ratified by UN member states, dealing with the protection and defence of migrants' human rights, along with the judicial instruments that protect those rights.
- Implement campaigns against xenophobia, racism, and all forms of discrimination. The citizens of receiving countries should become more sensitive to and aware of the conditions affecting migrant women and children.
- Create opportunities for dialogue, reflection and consultation among governments, civil society and the international community about migratory processes and migrants' human rights from a gender perspective.
- Educate and train migration officials, border police, personnel at migrant detention centres in human rights, particularly those involving the human rights of migrants.
- Promote the use of informational and complaint mechanisms, using the instruments that countries have created for defending human rights at regional and national levels.
- Encourage legislation penalising trafficking in migrants and enshrining consular protection for nationals outside their country of origin.
- Promote among member states of the United Nations the ratification of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. The migrant population living in vulnerable conditions in receiving countries needs its states of origin to ratify the Convention, since implementation will permit the protection of basic human rights of documented and undocumented migrants, providing legal instruments covering the development of domestic legislation systems and mutual accords between States that prevent trafficking and clandestine movements of workers.

The interdependency of the migratory phenomenon requires that we strengthen binational and regional spaces among countries expelling and receiving migration, to implement the measures necessary to ensure real and effective protection of migrants' human rights. This phenomenon is a complex problem involving a context of social marginalisation and exclusion in the country of origin, combined with criminalisation of migration in receiving countries, which leads to the violation of migrants' human rights.

Finally, the special rapporteur, speaking from her experience as a Latin American woman, calls on everyone, governments and civil society to work together to ensure the proper exercise of this mandate that has been entrusted to me for the effective protection of the human rights of male and female migrants.

D.2 Comments by Roberto Cuéllar ²

Introduction

1. I would like to thank the organisers for inviting me to participate in this important symposium, which is dealing with one of the most outstanding issues facing the world today: that of international migration, which poses a major challenge to organisations involved in protecting, defending, assisting, educating, promoting and researching human rights. These are precisely the challenges that led the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights (IIDH) to create the program Refugee Populations, Migrations and Human Rights in 1988, which among other aspects deals with the dynamics of migrant labour. Similarly, we have been participating in instances and activities such as Humans Rights Watch and the Steering Committee for the signing of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, represented here today by our good friend, Patrick Taran, along with the campaign, supported this year by the resolution on this topic from the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, which requests that the Economic and Social Council consider recommending to the General Secretary that December 18 become International Migrant Day. Moreover, we are actively helping to organise the regional preparatory conference (to be held in Santiago, Chile, 2 December 2000) for the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, which will take place in September of next year and at which one of the issues to be dealt with is this one, of migration.
2. Before I carry out the task for which I have been invited here by the organisers of this important event, that is, commenting on this important

work on *The Rights of Migrants and National Interests*, by Manolo Abella, and *Legal Standards for Protecting Migrant Workers*, by Richard Perruchoud, which offer a serious analysis and an important contribution to knowledge of both subjects, please bear with me as I first mention some considerations affecting the outlook of migration. Today, there is not one single country in the Americas that can remove itself from the drama of these migrations. Situations of civil violence, political confrontations, poverty and extreme misery, and the search for better lives will continue to drive millions of people out of their places of origin, and this flow will have socio-cultural repercussions in receiving countries. The IOM calculates that there are over 80 million migrant workers around the world and a figure from the United Nations Population Fund estimates the migrant population at 125,000,000 people. These figures speak of the majority of citizens and children who migrate away from their places of origin in conditions of illegality.
3. This irregular flow of human mobility affects a majority and reaches from the countries of Central America toward the north, nourished particularly by people who are 25 years of age and older when, for many reasons – most due to major conflict and economic crisis – they decide to emigrate and dramatically change their destinies: they head toward the great North, that is to say, the world's most powerful economy, in search of the "American opportunity". They arrive to face a panorama of uncertainty, filled with fear, vulnerable and as a result, defenceless, potential victims of theft, mistreatment, arbitrary detention and rape. What is more, along some borders paramilitary groups have organised that practice hunting migrants, all of which means that this issue is also intimately linked with the question of the migrant population's human rights.
4. For those who emigrate "without papers", in irregular conditions, the journey often becomes an unimaginable odyssey through the peculiar characteristics of the painful reality of illegal

³ Inter-American Institute of Human Rights, Costa Rica.

trafficking in people. The fight against this criminal traffic will only become effective if it depends on a network of genuine cooperation among our countries, and not the practice of pursuing immigrants along borders. The question as a whole is an extremely thorny one, however. Because if there's one thing that is virtually impossible to stop, it is a migratory current that is on the rise and driven by people's profound longing for a better place to live. The figures speak for themselves: in 1998, 1,514,000 undocumented people were arrested on the Mexico-US border, while in 1999, 1,536,000 people were returned to Mexico. According to the California Legal Assistance Foundation, half of undocumented people have died of cold or heat and 175 drowned.⁴

5. We understand that, for the countries of North America, making their immigration policy more flexible may be a problem with incalculable consequences and complexity. Some days ago, the president elect of Mexico, Mr. Vicente Fox, was received with political honours for his feat of defeating the Partido Revolucionario Institucional - PRI, but in the political spheres of Canada and the United States, people reacted with suspicion to his surprising proposal to open the borders of the world's largest trade system: The North American Free Trade Treaty (Agreement). Despite this concern, undoubtedly at some point measures that aren't strictly police or repression-related will have to be adopted to organise this migratory flow, which to date has simply proven to be uncontainable and, moreover, necessary according to the latest information from specialised organisations, due to demographic and other kinds of variables, to serve as skilled labour in developed countries.⁵

I. Brief Commentaries on Work by Abella and Perruchoud

6. These two papers complement each other from the point of view that, for different reasons according to the criteria of each author, it is necessary to clarify the current situation with migrations and their impact on economies, as well as to develop the ethical basis for human rights. As Richard Perruchoud demonstrates, many international instruments are applicable to all human beings and, therefore, also to migrant workers and others who fall within this category and, many of the rights applicable are part of hereditary law and should be respected by all States and guaranteed to all people. These protective regulations are to be found in a range of conventions, agreements, pacts, and protocols within the universal human rights system, whether they be of European, African, Asian or Inter-American origin. Nonetheless, their applicability by competent state bodies is weak and tenuous for a variety of reasons, among them lack of knowledge, ignorance, xenophobia and discrimination. The main challenge for the international human rights regime therefore consists of ensuring compliance by states. Let me add that the lack of migratory policies or the existence of extremely restrictive policies regarding the rights of migrant workers are added factors affecting different spheres, such as access to justice, equality, non-discrimination, due process, freedom, safety, life, psychological and physical integrity, working conditions and access to social services, asylum, refuge, non-return, among others.
7. This can be explained, as Manolo Abella tells us, because the window of opportunity for building an international regime governing migrants' rights is closing. Similarly, there is also a clear need to broaden debate to include consideration of this issue among the interests of national states themselves, which requires better understanding of the consequences of migration for receiving populations and economies, which in turn makes further research essential. The author asks some challenging questions: Do we, today, face a climate, conditions

⁴ Del cruce al empleo. La guía del perfecto indocumentado (From the Crossroads to a Job). Electronic information. 20 August 2000.

⁵ The United Kingdom will open the door to 100,000 skilled immigrants annually. El País, Spain, 4/9/2000. Electronic version.

and policies for economic development that could facilitate the promotion of the human rights of migrants? What strategies should be developed that could lead to new regulations? What can we do, given the reinforcement of borders and the hardening of migratory and police measures? What to do given the influential role of the media in creating or increasing anti-emigrant sentiments and the perception that migration generates undesirable social consequences that are not compatible with "national interest", such as weighing heavily on social services, threatening the employment of nationals, etc.? How to avoid weighing individual rights of migrants against the national interest of States and their inhabitants (individual welfare versus common welfare)? How to reconcile the grave contradiction between the right to migrate and the right to stay? If we have argued that the main cause of migrations is the serious violation of human rights, be these civil or political, economic, social due to cultural reductions, which, from the perspective of integration and interdependence, are considered to be equally grave, even though they produce different migratory categories, as specific protective instruments and solutions that are also different, how do we reconcile the systemic relationship between human rights and peace or between democracy and sustainable development?

II. Globalization and Human Rights

8. A document recently prepared by the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, on implementing economic, social and cultural rights, includes a study of globalisation and its consequences for human rights.⁶ The study analyses the relationship between globalisation, equality, and non-discrimination, all concepts essential to the practice of human rights and in whose observance human rights allow no exceptions, not even in times of war, given that regulations banning discrimination are considered *jus cogens*. And even though globalisation is not considered the cause of inequality, it is perceived as having worsened conditions worldwide in terms of inequality and discrimination today. Both concepts are fundamental to the philosophy and practice of human rights, while the prohibition of different discriminatory practices constitutes *jus cogens* principles. This evident discrimination and inequality, the study adds, can be demonstrated using statistics that show how the circle of globalisation has left most of the world's inhabitants out, which means that not only has marginalisation increased but there is also more and more misery in a world in which abundance is increasingly ostentatious. If we ask about the colour, race or sex of those excluded, the relationship between globalisation and the forces of inequality and discrimination becomes patently clear. We must ask ourselves, therefore, if the international economic forces mobilised by both the State and private agents are to be allowed to show no humanity, and completely bypass international standards for human rights.⁷
9. The labour market has also been seriously affected by globalisation, which has caused a decline in the number of jobs that has forced men and women to seek work in the informal sector of the economy and, eventually, to seek work abroad, with all the consequences that has in terms of their human rights, and very particularly, the right to remain in their place of origin. We must underline that remittances from relatives abroad have kept several Latin American countries' economies afloat, even in the midst of wars, as occurred in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua. Now, for certain reasons, this has extended to the Dominican Republic and Haiti, along with other Caribbean countries.

⁶ United Nations. Economic and Social Council. The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of human rights. Preliminary Report presented by J. Oloka-Onyango and Deepika Idgama, as per resolution 1999/8 of the Sub-Commission. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13, 15 June 2000.

⁷ Idem. p. 14, 21

III. Progress in Protection and Other Concrete Proposals for Action

10. As we all know, on this difficult issue we must reconcile interests with reality. And here we must deal with the question of human dignity. If the economy continues as it has, with global capitalism the reference point for our era, Latin Americans will continue to head north to the United States or Canada any way they can, and pay any price, even risking their lives. North American authorities have the legitimate right to try to control all migration policy that goes beyond the bounds of their legality: a mechanical response, however, to deal with the imminent reality of irregular migration will not provide sufficient results: it must be accompanied by domestic socio-economic, psycho-social measures that respect human rights, so action is not reduced to a simple form of deportation and persecution that is repugnant and that is often encouraged by immigration authorities. US regulations and practices will have to become more flexible to the degree that globalisation fails to deal with political, rights and migration issues, despite the fact that this is a highly charged, emotional, political affair.
11. In recent years, we have seen progress in the sphere of international protection of human rights. I refer to the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990), the appointment of special rapporteurs for migration within the United Nations, today the responsibility of our good friend, Gabriela Rodríguez, the rapporteur on migrant workers and their families with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, a post held today by the former director of the IIDH, Juan Méndez, and other significant efforts. Another important advance, within the Inter-American system, has been Advisory Opinion 16 of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 1 October 1999, on the request for a decision by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on consular protection (OC-16), entitled "The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of Due Process of Law."
12. Among other decisions, the Court was unanimous in its opinion that, a) Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations recognises the individual rights of a detained foreigner, including the right to information about consular assistance, with the corresponding duties for the receiving State; b) this same article deals with the protection of the rights of the national of the sending State and is integrated into international regulations on human rights; c) Articles 2, 6, 14 and 50 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights deal with the protection of human rights in the countries of the Americas; d) international provisions affecting the protection of human rights in the countries of the Americas, including Article 36.1.6) in the Covenant mentioned above, must be respected by the signatory American states in their respective conventions, independently of their federal or unitary structure. In his concurrent vote, the President of the Court, Antonio Cancado T., stated that all international jurisprudence in the area of human rights has developed, in a convergent fashion over recent decades, a dynamic or evolutionary interpretation of treaties protecting human rights, and in this sense the emergence and consolidation of the corpus juris of international human rights law are the result of the universal juridical conscience's reaction to recurrent abuses committed against human beings, often validated by positive law: that is, the law has come out to meet the human being, the final beneficiary of all protective regulations...⁸
13. Afterward, in another significant advance in the sphere of protecting migrant workers within the Inter-American system, last 8 August, the Inter-American Court held a public audience to hear the points of view of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights - IACHR, and the government of the Dominican Republic, on the facts and circumstances that led to the request for provisional measures made by the IACHR, last 30 May, in favour of Haitians and

⁸ Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Advisory Opinion OC16/99, 1 October 1999, requested by the United States of Mexico. The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law. San José, Costa Rica, 1999. pg. 2

Dominicans of Haitian descent, subject to the jurisdiction of the Dominican Republic, because victims are the object of collective expulsions and deportations from the Dominican Republic, with no legal procedure used that would permit the suitable identification of the nationality or migratory status of those affected, or their family relationships. Nor have they been allowed to take their belongings or wages earned, and their children often being left behind, abandoned. Lawyers argued that around 20,000 people were expelled or deported in November 1999, although these are still going on, but in smaller numbers. The four categories of people affected by these deportations are: undocumented Haitians, documented Haitians, undocumented Dominicans of Haitian descent, and documented Dominicans of Haitian descent. On 22 November 1999, the IACHR ordered provisional measures only for individual cases and, on 8 May 2000, proceeded to open case 12,271 to examine the conditions of expulsion.

14. Despite these important advances, at the IIDH we believe that the activities involving education, training, promoting, distributing information and research proposed by our two speakers must be taken into account as an essential complement in the development of better forms of defending and protecting migrants' human rights. In this sense, and to finish, I would like to present to you an initiative that, together with Juan Mendez, we introduced for the first time in October 1997, for the creation of a regional centre of advanced planning, specialised research and training for preventing and dealing with migrations in the Americas, with an emphasis on the human rights of migrants. As we said then, "If our governments and societies are to face the challenges of these new waves of migration... without damaging their own democratic institutions or the sense of solidarity within their communities, or their relationships with friendly neighbours, they must be prepared to deal with dislocation and the disorganisation that these new waves will undoubtedly bring with them. A state of preparation means... essentially the capacity to learn the lessons of our experience taught in a systematic, rigorous fashion, and to translate these lessons into practical applications for those who are in a position to use them." ⁹

15. Some conditions for starting include:

- support from the governments of the Americas for this idea, by treating it from the start as an "advance alert" system that they can use;
- cooperation from inter-governmental organisations, in particular the OAS (Inter-American system), especially for the initial discussions in which the mission, agenda and priorities are established, along with identifying other organisations that should be consulted right from the start;
- consultations with highly respected migration specialists to share ideas, as well as inviting civil society organisations that can develop a plan of alliances to effectively organise documentation, research and planning.

For time reasons, we cannot speak at any length about this modest proposal, but we're willing to share it later with you. Many thanks for your attention.

⁹ Juan E. Méndez, "Una propuesta de acción sobre las migraciones forzadas repentinas" Conferencia sobre emergencias debido a migraciones forzadas repentinas en las Américas. Washington, D.C., (Organization of American States (OAS)/Inter-American Institute of Human Rights (IIDH)/International Sociological Association (ISA)/Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), September 30/October 1, 1997. p. 11.

E. Chapter conclusions

The persistence of situations that work against human dignity clearly seem to affect migrant persons. Workers or their dependents, and especially those who enter destination countries and remain undocumented, experience the violation of their human rights, abuse, exploitation, all of which constitute a common situation worldwide. This state of affairs has triggered the concern of many international organizations, which have resorted to international laws in their attempts to establish standards regarding the rights of migrants. There are several international instruments whose contents are applicable to all human beings and others that deal specifically with migrant workers. This allows us to conclude that there is no lack of instruments and international regulations to guarantee the rights of migrant workers, but rather there is a problem in that States do not effectively respect them.

This problem is rooted in the perception among developed countries of the undesirable social consequences of international migration, despite the fact that historically it has also brought positive consequences for societies. This has led to a sense that "national interests" – a concept whose complexity is evident, since it could include everything from national security, the preservation of democracy, peace and justice, through the conservation and enrichment of culture, social values, health care and material well being are incompatible with the rights of migrants, thus eliminating any chance of promoting the latter.

When they seek to improve living conditions in a country other than that of their birth or nationality, migrant workers and their families often suffer from abuse and lack of recognition of their fundamental rights, which contributes to making it impossible for them to satisfy their basic needs. If growing xenophobia in some countries, associated

with economic recession and unemployment, which have exacerbated hostility toward migrant workers, are added to this mixture, the outlook for many migrants has become increasingly grim, as they try to function within their receiving countries. This is where governments in no small number of cases have proven to be cautious in adopting and implementing policies and laws to protect migrants.

Despite the considerable number of conventions and international instruments that specify the obligations of each signatory State and that provide mechanisms for implementation and compliance, many countries have not yet ratified these treaties and, as a result, are not subject to the obligations that arise from them. As well, several States continue to neglect their obligations with respect to the commitments made and have not taken effective measures to ensure the protection of the basic human rights of migrants. In this context, innumerable unfair practices are common, as are discrimination and abuse of specific migrant groups, which makes them highly vulnerable.

In recent years, the traffic in persons is a form of irregular migration that has become a "global business", which is highly organised and extremely profitable for its promoters. The growth in this traffic has become a substantial part of the international scene today and concern is based on the threat that it represents to orderly migration and national security, as well as concern for the exploitation, abuse and rights violations of migrants, who are deceived, exploited and robbed of their fundamental human rights, and their dignity. The treatment of the problem demands recognition of its seriousness at both the national and the international levels. The fight against crime rings and organisations involved deserves the most energetic response from States and the real cooperation of the international community as a whole. In this perspective, it must be remembered that often those affected are the victims of this crime and should not be punished by the authorities of each country.

Crucial for development in the immediate future is the whole issue of education about human rights, which is important to create awareness among the population of human rights in general and those of migrants in particular.

On a more general level, it is important to promote respect for the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, since this is one of the most influential and important instruments for protecting non-nationals.

Summary of proceeding at the final discussion panel on findings and conclusion of the symposium and of the forum of non governmental organizations

This section summarizes the most salient substantive contributions made at the final panel of the Symposium, the objective being to highlight the most important ideas and discussions that came out of the moderators' presentations and the contributions of participants. It also includes references to the Forum of Non-governmental Organizations and contributions by its representatives. The specific conclusions that were set forth in each chapter are also helpful in providing an overview of the Symposium, but in this section the emphasis is on the debates that took place at the end of the event.¹

In the final panel, the moderators of each session of the Symposium were asked to summarize what had been discussed there. After these presentations, the meeting was thrown open to debate and contributions by the participants. Reynaldo Bajraj, Deputy Executive Secretary of ECLAC, acted as the panel moderator. The first part of the panel looked at the issues addressed in chapters I and II, and the second part at the remaining issues.

¹ Editor's note: this section should be read in conjunction with the *Report of the Rapporteur Symposium on International Migration in the Americas*, Población y desarrollo series, No. 12 (LC/L.1462-P), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), December 2000. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.00.II.G.144, and *Resumen y aspectos destacados del Simposio sobre Migración Internacional en las Américas*, Población y desarrollo series, No. 14 (LC/L.1529-P), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), April 2001. United Nations publication, Sales No. S.01.II.G.74.

1. First Part

The subjects of the first two chapters, "Migration trends and patterns in the Americas" and "The relationship between migration and development", were discussed in this part. Summaries were provided by the moderators, Joseph Chamie of the United Nations Population Division for the first chapter, and Andrew Morrison of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and Agustín Escobar of the University of Guadalajara for the second.

Chamie's remarks centred on population change and globalization, the importance of data, statistics and research, and some issues connected with demographic and migratory developments over the coming decades. He remarked that the population growth seen in the twentieth century had been unprecedented and was unlikely to be surpassed in future. Growth rates were declining rapidly in some regions, with population ageing, migration, urbanization and other demographic tendencies producing what he termed a "new international population order". Part of this was the growing importance of new subpopulations within countries. Chamie cited some examples of such changes: at the beginning of the twentieth century, the population of Europe was approximately three times as large as that of Africa, whereas the European and African populations were now roughly the same size. By 2050, Africa was expected to have three times the population of Europe.

The speaker pointed out that urbanization was another important factor for change, as most of the world's population growth was taking place in urban areas. He noted that thirty-five years before, two thirds of the world's people lived in rural areas, but that the proportion was now exactly the reverse. It was in this context that demographic tendencies, including migration, were interacting with globalization, giving rise to this "new world population order", which was having more and more profound social, economic and political consequences at the global, regional, national and subnational levels. It was thus essential for this phenomenon to be understood so that it could be managed effectively in today's changing world. The second item dealt with by the speaker was the importance of data, statistics and research. There was a need for comparable, accurate and well planned statistics on migration, and for comprehensible analytical studies on international migration, so that discussion and debate could take place within a common framework. When the time came, this would help with the formulation and development of appropriate policies and programmes. Chamie regarded data as being vitally important for this type of planning.

The third issue addressed by Chamie was forecasting: discerning where the world population was going, where it would be in ten years' time, or in twenty years, or fifty. The French demographer Alfred Sauvy uses the example of a clock: what visibly moves is the second hand, and this is what politicians are interested in, because it is the short term, the here and now, that catches their eye. The minute hand is what the politicians' advisors concern themselves with, they are watching a slower process. Demographic issues, lastly, have to be looked at over a longer period: demographers are concerned with the hour hand, which turns imperceptibly, but whose movement eventually means a difference as large as that between day and night.

The moderator of the final panel then asked Andrew Morrison to sum up what had happened at one of the chapter II sessions. Morrison explained that the presentations and discussions had not dealt with just one type of international migration. This led him to affirm that, from his perspective, there was no longer a uniform concept of "international migration"; rather, it was necessary to talk about "international migrations". In relation to the South-North migration of skilled labour, Morrison maintained that this had made a large contribution to sustained growth in the northern countries. He also referred to the suggestion by one of the speakers that there might in future be competition among developed countries to attract skilled migrants from the countries of the South. Concerns about the "draining" of these qualified human resources posed the latter with some crucial questions, such as what the impact of this emigration would be, how the education system would respond, and whether the southern countries were in some measure subsidizing growth in the northern ones. Where migration by unskilled labour was concerned, the most important issues had to do with remittances.

The speaker noted that South-South migration by skilled labour was a new phenomenon for the region. The clearly positive aspect of these flows was the contribution they made to the competitiveness of subregional integration blocs by allocating skilled labour more rationally. Morrison pointed to the cases of Brazil with Argentina, and Argentina with Chile, as examples of this. As for migration by unskilled labour, this was the most complex type of flow, as in many cases it was temporary, and it was not always undertaken in response to economic determinants.

When it came to meeting the social demands of these groups, Morrison observed that unskilled migrants and refugees were putting significant pressure on the social services infrastructure of destination countries, including housing, education services and labour market protection. He then raised concerns about how governments were going to respond to these demands and what role was going to be played by NGOs and the Church in protecting migrants' human rights.

Morrison concluded his remarks by arguing that international migration flows made a large contribution to the competitiveness of countries in both North and South, but that they also created very serious challenges in the form of the adjustment costs that had to be met by the host society and the social consequences that had to be mitigated.

The moderator of the panel then asked Agustín Escobar to present the conclusions of the second chapter II session. Escobar spoke of the tension between the interest of developing countries in seeing their unskilled workers have the opportunity to find employment in other countries, on the one hand, and the interest of advanced countries in securing skilled human resources, on the other. A second aspect of the tension to which the speaker referred was the perception in poor countries that investment in the training of professionals was a South-North subsidy. A third aspect of this tension had to do with what Escobar called "the new capital-labour divide". While demographic change was already a cause of polarization between North and South, the division between capital (in the North) and labour (in the South) would become even sharper in future.

Referring back to the issues discussed, Escobar focused on the subject of ethnicity and pointed to a resurgence of group identity, of ethnic identity as an engine and organizer of migratory flows, both within and between countries. He believed that migration was going to reinforce the difference between skilled and unskilled migrants, partly because if developed country policies continued to favour measures to attract skilled labour, poorer and less skilled workers would tend to become "more illegal" and "more undocumented"; in other words, they would have less opportunity to compete on an equal footing. Lastly, he pointed out that this increase in migration clearly appeared to be leading to racial diversification in the populations of a very wide range of countries, particularly in the North, and that this would result in the emergence of new perceptions of people and their differences. This would be associated, on the one hand, with xenophobia and discrimination while, on the other, it could also lead to the creation of new political structures in destination countries.

The next to speak was Rodolfo García Zamora. On behalf of the meeting of civil society organizations, he gave an overview of the discussions that had taken place and recognized the need to achieve greater levels of hemispheric coordination and linkage in this area. He also warned that migration was now taking place on too large a scale for governments to be able to deal with it comprehensively. The speaker summarized some of the hemispheric tendencies that civil society organizations had perceived through their work, including the continent-wide tendency for migration to increase owing to structural economic problems, social and political problems, and the absence of endogenous conditions for economic development in individual countries and the region. In view of this situation, García Zamora put forward a series of proposals, the main ones being:

- 1) To incorporate migration issues into the development policy framework.
- 2) To develop social inclusion and return policies on the basis of a multifaceted approach that took account of gender, childhood, race, culture, the environment and other relevant factors.
- 3) To do away with punitive laws and with measures that turned borders into regional barriers.
- 4) To implement public policies that brought in all sectors of society, including in particular local and regional development proposals that could relieve migration pressures in these regions over the medium term.

He concluded by remarking that the failure of States to meet their obligations could not be excused by regarding migration, or migrants' remittances, as a way of making up for the painful public spending cuts seen in the region in recent years.

The moderator of the final panel threw the discussion open, and the Netherlands Antilles Delegation came forward with a brief description of the islands' migratory situation, which is characterized by large flows of emigration, mainly to the Netherlands. One of the characteristics of these flows that concerned the authorities was the high percentage of skilled labour that they included, and the representative of the Netherlands Antilles expressed doubts as to whether what was happening in the particular case of his country could be described as a "brain circulation". He also remarked that remittances were virtually non-existent, as most emigrants left with their families. Another consequence of this migration was population ageing, as most of those leaving the country were under 45. The speaker maintained that this was placing a serious strain on the social security system of the Netherlands Antilles, as well as having a negative impact on the socio-economic situation.

The next to speak was Gustavo Mohar, who commented on an observation of Andrew Morrison's about the complete lack of recent studies on the contribution of migrants—in the United States, for example—to economic growth and stability. He noted that measuring this contribution was difficult owing to problems of interpretation and methodology. He then cited a binational study on migration carried out jointly by Mexico and the United States, which concluded that migration had made a positive contribution to the destination country. As evidence of this, Mohar mentioned the fact that a year and a half previously a special programme to issue visas to 60,000 foreign workers had been approved by the United States as a result of pressure from the information technology industry. The visas had all been taken up within a year, and this sector of the economy had experienced a substantial rise in productivity, largely thanks to migrant labour. Thus, Mohar concluded by stressing the need to move beyond the debate on whether the contribution of migrants was positive or negative and instead to begin to consider how the effects of migration could be maximized and optimized, both in the countries of origin and in the host countries.

Andrew Morrison replied to Mohar's analysis by agreeing that skilled and unskilled migration had indeed contributed to the sustained growth seen in the United States economy over recent years.

The Costa Rican Delegation then addressed the relationship between the quality of public spending and emigration, and asked whether there were any studies in this field linking emigration with the quantity and quality of social spending in the countries of origin.

The Cuban Delegation argued that the issue of migration should not be regarded just from the economic standpoint, but that a social and cultural approach needed to be taken as well. The Delegation noted that when an intellectual in any field emigrated, a musician, for example, or a painter, that was one cultural stimulus less for the people of that country. For the Cuban Delegation, then, not everything could be measured in economic terms, and the human aspect of the problem had to be taken into account.

The moderator of the final panel then came in to answer the question put by the Costa Rican Delegation. In relation to some ECLAC studies linking social spending with poverty levels that the Costa Rican Delegation had referred to, the moderator explained that these did not mean to assert a direct link between social spending and migration. What these studies did reveal was that in the 1980s poverty was rising in many countries at the same time as social spending and employment were falling. The main determinant of poverty was employment rather than social spending, and one piece of evidence for this was that social spending recovered in Latin America in the 1990s, but very weak growth meant that employment did not recover, and the result was a rise in poverty levels.

In response to Andrew Morrison's remarks, the Colombian Delegation explained that migration from Colombia to Venezuela and Ecuador had a long history, having gone on for virtually the whole of the twentieth century. Consequently, it was not a case of new international migration beginning because of internal displacement within Colombia.

The Haitian Delegation drew attention to the existence of very large South-South flows of low-skilled migrants among the English-speaking islands of the Caribbean and the West Indies, flows that particularly affected Hispaniola, with considerable emigration by Dominicans to Puerto Rico and of Haitians to the Dominican Republic.

In response to some observations by the Argentine Delegation regarding the direction that regional integration was now going in and its link to development processes, Andrew Morrison explained that there was no consensus as to whether these integration efforts were bringing about economic convergence between rich and poor countries. What was generally accepted, however, was that in the short term integration efforts would produce sectoral adjustments that would lead to more migration. The long-term question raised by Morrison was whether it would be possible to achieve such economic convergence and, if so, whether migration flows would tend to diminish. He also touched on the dangers of laying undue emphasis on social rights to the neglect of political rights, since this could result in a merely welfare-oriented approach that would be detrimental to the idea and practice of citizenship.

Armando Di Filippo talked of the need to emphasize the multifaceted nature of migration, with its economic, political, social and cultural connotations. This was essential, and could be related to the multifaceted nature of certain subregional agreements, such as Mercosur, the Andean Community, the Caribbean Community and the Central American Common Market, under which there was a limited and partial transfer of sovereignty by member countries. Di Filippo maintained that the political concept of sovereignty was linked with the political concept of citizenship; thus, setting out from the political integration of sovereignty, discussion could move on automatically to the question of citizenship, because of the correspondence that existed between these two political concepts. From the concept of citizenship it would thus be possible to move on to the issue of civil, individual, social, political and economic rights and joint citizenship.

Mary García Castro then came in on the subject of citizenship, remarking that in the historical context of the creation of the modern State, theories of political, economic and social citizenship also dealt with the relationship between the social classes. For this reason, the concept of social citizenship was not confined to access to health care or education but extended to the redistribution of accrued capital as well. In the light of this, García Castro argued that if social citizenship were what was at issue, the international distribution of wealth and resources would have to be called into question as well. She also warned that there was a risk, if not an unavowed intention in some quarters, that laying undue emphasis on the subject of civil society in the context of the prevailing neoliberalism might result in the State relinquishing responsibilities that naturally pertained to it and thus could not be delegated.

2. Second Part

In the second part of the final panel the issues discussed were those dealt with in chapters III, IV and V, "Governance of international migration and multilateral diplomacy", "Economic and social importance of migration" and "Human rights of migrants", respectively, which were presented at the other four sessions of the Symposium.

The moderator of the final panel reopened proceedings and Allan Jury, of the United States Department of State, summed up what had taken place at the fourth session. In relation to the Summit of the Americas and States' undertakings regarding migration issues, Jury suggested that migration should be viewed from a wider perspective that took account of social and economic development aspects.

The moderator of the panel then gave the floor to Donald Brice of the Jamaican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, so that he could summarize proceedings at the fifth session. Brice identified certain issues that required continuing attention from States and multilateral bodies, arguing that there was

a need for more studies and research on extra-regional migration (including undocumented migration and alien smuggling), on the reintegration of returnees into their societies of origin and on the protection of individuals' human rights. Greater civil society involvement needed to be fostered if representative organizations were to be invigorated and their ability to help deal with these problems improved.

Next, Fernando Urrea of Del Valle University in Colombia presented a summary of chapter IV, which had been dealt with at the sixth session of the Symposium. He began by pointing out that the remittance amounts sent back by Central American and Caribbean migrants were on a different scale to those sent to South America; the latter were much lower in comparative terms, although there was not much information about them. He argued that the use of remittances for consumption should not necessarily be regarded as negative, since it stimulated basic demand and increased the productivity of recipients. He also referred to what the reports had to say about the participation of new actors in these flows of resources, examples being migrant associations and clubs, and local markets created by migrant groups, which maintained a relationship with governments and local communities in the countries of origin. As regards migrant communities, Urrea argued that these should be viewed as consolidated social networks with identity components, since migration was not carried out just by individuals but was part of globalization, and the function of these communities was to defend migrants from the vulnerability and insecurity that threatened them at a time when labour markets were being deregulated and the welfare State was retreating. Lastly, he noted that the development potential of remittances depended first and foremost on the local or regional context. It was in the poorest areas that this potential was lowest as they had fewer opportunities to save, while poor migrants were not well represented in community organizations.

The moderator of the final panel then asked Lelio Mármora of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to give the conclusions of chapter V, which was presented at the seventh session of the Symposium, where the subject of "Human rights of migrants" was dealt with. Mármora approached the subject from four angles. The first was that of human rights and development. He argued that over the course of the Symposium it had been possible to appreciate the positive contribution that migration made to development, but that it was also clear that the widening gap between rich countries and poor countries was increasing inequity, and that this was proving detrimental to human rights, resulting in greater migration. Mármora suggested that to put an end to situations of this kind, there was a need for policies that provided for economic compensation between winners and losers in the international system.

The second angle from which Mármora approached the subject was that of human rights and the governance of migration. He argued that substantial progress had been made in that area, as international awareness of the idea of migrants' human rights had been increasingly steadily, which had led to progress in formulating policies and standards.

As regards the third angle, that of human rights and information, Mármora affirmed the importance of objective analysis and of training and information provision in this area, so that the myths and prejudices that underpinned xenophobia, discrimination and segregation could be dispelled. He mentioned the work of bodies such as ECLAC and CELADE and the Population Division of the United Nations, which years previously had demonstrated through serious analyses, uninfluenced by fashion, political pressure or financing facilities, that neo-Malthusian theories of a population explosion were unsupported by evidence and that the hypothesis of a migratory threat was flawed.

Lastly, Mármora addressed the angle of human rights and the migration business. He argued that the latter was not confined just to alien smuggling and organized crime, but was directly linked with restrictive migration policies in some countries, and he quoted an old adage: "the greater the restrictions, the greater the corruption". He ended by arguing that, in some cases, rather than there being a contradiction between migrants' human rights and national sovereignty, it was the subordination of national sovereignty to the migration business that was directly affecting the application and development of migrants' human rights.

The moderator of the final panel then asked Fernando Peña, representing the Centro Integral Pedagógico y Popular of the Dominican Republic, to present the conclusions arrived at in the non-governmental organization debates. Speaking on behalf of these organizations, Peña expressed concern about the negative consequences that the adoption and implementation of policies such as Plan Colombia would have in generating forced, large-scale migration movements, and the regional impact of these. He also warned of breaches and violations of migrants' human rights resulting from border operations, citing as an example the case of Operation Guardian on the frontier between Mexico and the United States, which had resulted in some three hundred and fifty fatalities to date.

Next, Melany Neger, representing Immigration and Refugees Services of America, presented some proposals and undertakings on behalf of the civil society organizations. They were:

- 1) That governments should sign and ratify the United Nations International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions 1-43 and 97, and the Protocol of San Salvador.
- 2) That the contributions of organized civil society should be taken into account by governments with a view to drawing up comprehensive migration policies that included full respect for human rights.
- 3) That governments and civil society should work together to develop mechanisms guaranteeing that effective sanctions would be applied against those who exploited migrants or were involved in alien smuggling. These sanctions should include measures to protect victims, especially women and children.
- 4) That the right to asylum which is a universal entitlement under international conventions should be guaranteed.
- 5) That governments, in cooperation with civil society organizations in countries of origin and transit, should provide information about legal requirements relating to entry, exit and employment for migrants in countries of transit and destination.
- 6) That governments and civil society organizations should develop and implement joint educational campaigns dealing with migration and with its causes and effects, updating education programmes as necessary.
- 7) That governments should commit themselves to ensuring unqualified respect for human rights in the different systems used to detain, expel, deport and receive migrants.

Neger then spoke of civil society organizations' commitment to creating new mechanisms and consolidating existing ones in order to achieve the following objectives:

- 1) Strengthening national and regional networks of civil society organizations working in the area of migration.
- 2) Maintaining and expanding mechanisms for dialogue with governments and intergovernmental organizations with the aim of guaranteeing the dignity of migrants.
- 3) Incorporating the commitments that came out of the Forum of Non-governmental Organizations into plans of action and follow-up mechanisms.
- 4) Strengthening and following up the links forged to enable civil society to participate in the Summit of the Americas process, particularly in Quebec, and to provide the basis for a comprehensive approach to the subject of migration in the hemisphere.

When the debate was thrown open to the participants, the Argentine Delegation spoke with reference to what had been said by Lelio Mármora, drawing attention to the computerization of border crossings in Argentina. The Delegation also pointed out that the possibility of implementing a programme to give illegal migrants official status was being studied at the highest level of the Argentine Government, as were possible measures to deepen the bilateral migration conventions signed with Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru.

The United States Delegation spoke about the balance between sovereignty and human rights. The Delegation drew attention to the need for countries to work together so that mechanisms to preserve that balance could be developed, and cited the example of the work done with Mexico to try to inform potential migrants about the dangers of clandestine border crossings.

The Peruvian Delegation argued that the smuggling of people was one of the most degrading of crimes and that governments should make every effort to tackle it head on and eradicate it. By the same token, the international community should deal with money laundering resulting from such

smuggling. The Delegation added that Peru had amended its penal code by introducing the concept of "migration crime", which was punishable by a "double penalty".

The Mexican Delegation drew attention to the ways in which remittances were sent, and argued that one problem in the region was the lack of standardized regulatory provisions in this area, something that was proving detrimental to migrants, their families and their opportunities for making use of these funds. The abuses committed by many remittance transfer companies meant there was a need for greater regulation and oversight by governments.

The Colombian Delegation commented on some remarks made about Plan Colombia and its possible implications for population movements. The Delegation pointed out that the Plan contained a very specific chapter on the protection of human rights, legal reform, democratization and social development. This chapter provided for some special assistance measures for victims of violence, the internally displaced, sustainable development and the creation of ties between local communities and municipalities. Besides this, the Colombian Delegation pointed out that in January 2000 the Government had signed a memorandum of intent with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to prevent the forced movement of people, and that a joint communiqué dealing with help for and prevention of internal displacement and smuggling in border areas had subsequently been signed by Colombia and Venezuela. A similar one had also been signed with the Government of Ecuador.

The Delegation of the United States Virgin Islands argued for the desirability of enlarging membership of the Summit of the Americas process to bring in countries that were not yet participating in it.

Elizabeth Odio Benito, Acting President of Costa Rica, then officially closed the Symposium on International Migration in the Americas with a few words in which she emphasized the enormous importance of the occasion.

To sum up, the final panel provided an opportunity to examine the most salient events of the Symposium and enabled the participants, particularly the delegates representing governments in the Americas and the representatives of civil society, to exchange points of view. By serving this purpose, it highlighted the importance of the meeting and provided a reminder of the need to give international migration a permanent place at the top of the social and economic agenda of the Americas in the twenty-first century.

Annexes

Annex 1

General agenda

Day one: September 4th

Participation by civil society organizations as observers in the Symposium on International Migration in the Americas.

8:00 – 9:00

Registration of participants from civil society, governments, and experts

9:00 – 10:30

Inaugural ceremony

Presentations by the following speakers:

- ECLAC: Mr. José A. Ocampo
- IOM: Mr. Brunson McKinley
- UNPF: Ms. Marisela Padrón
- OAS: Mr. César Gaviria
- IBD: Mr. Enrique Iglesias
- President of Costa Rica, H. E. Dr. Miguel Ángel Rodríguez

Coffee break

Topic I Migratory trends and patterns

11:00 - 13:00

- i) Migratory trends and patterns in the Americas
- ii) Information systems on international migration

Topic II Relationship between migration and development

14:30 – 16:30

- i) The impact of globalization and regional integration models in the countries of origin and destination of migratory flows
- ii) Economic and technological changes and job markets in countries of origin and destination

Coffee break

16:45 – 18:30

- iii) The migration of skilled workers
- iv) The social impact of migration

18:30 Welcome cocktail party

20:00 Presentation of civil society representatives

Day two: September 5th

Parallel forum: "Civil society: Towards new forms of hemispheric cooperation on migration issues"

The Forum agenda

Morning

8:00 – 8:30 Inaugural speech given by representative of El Productor R.L. welcoming participants

Topic I: Regional views, emerging topics, and the participation of civil society

FIRST SESSION

8:30 – 9:30 Central America

Speaker:

Lilliana Rojas, Caritas / Costa Rica

The Caribbean

Speaker:

Fernando Peña, IPEC / Dominican Republic

North America

Speaker:

Melanie Nezer, **IRSA United States**

9:30 – 10:15 Discussion

10:15 – 10:30 Coffee break

SECOND SESSION

10:30 – 11:10 Southern Cone

Speaker:

Alberto Gianotti, SEDHU / Uruguay

Andean Community

Speaker:

Teresa Polo, CETEM/ Bolivia

11:10 – 11:40 Discussion

11:40 – 12:15 Summary and conclusions

12:15 – 1:30 FREE TIME FOR LUNCH

Afternoon

1:30 – 1:50

Topic II Participation of civil society in mechanisms for effective and full protection of migrants' human rights

Speaker: Ms. Gabriela Rodríguez, UN Special Rapporteur on Migrants' Human Rights

1:50 – 2:50

Topic III Round table meeting: "The challenges facing civil society organizations, consolidation of regional networks, and drawing up of a common agenda"

2:50 – 3:05 Coffee break

3:05 – 4:40 General discussion and conclusions on Topics II and III

4:40 Appointment of a group of representatives for drawing up the conclusions and narratives on the forum.

Rapporteurs for Topics I, II, and III.

Day three: September 6th

Meeting of representatives from government and civil society, and experts

8:30 – 10:30

Discussion panel on the outcome and conclusions of the Symposium and the Forum of civil society organizations.

Part I

General discussion

Coffee break

10:45 – 12:45

Part II

General discussion

Closing session

Dr. Elizabeth Odio, Second Vice-President of Costa Rica

Cocktail

Note: Simultaneous interpretation into English and Spanish will be available.

Lista de participantes

List of participants

A. Estados miembros de la Comisión

Member States of the Commission

Etats Membres de la Commission

ANTIGUA Y BARBUDA

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

Representante/Representative:

- Austin M. Josiah, Labour Commissioner, Ministry of Labour, Home Affairs and Social Development

ARGENTINA

Representante/Representative:

- Noel Breard, Director Nacional, Dirección Nacional de Investigación, Políticas y Desarrollo Demográfico, Ministerio del Interior

BAHAMAS

Representante/Representative:

- Donald Symonette, Director, Department of Labour, Ministry of Labour

BELICE

BELIZE

Representante/Representative::

- Paulino Castellanos, Director of Immigration and National Service

BOLIVIA

Representante/Representative:

- Ramiro Melendres, Director de Organismos Regionales, Dirección General de Asuntos Multilaterales del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto

Miembros de la delegación/Delegation members:

- Rimac Zubieta, Segundo Secretario, Embajada de Bolivia en Costa Rica

BRASIL

BRAZIL

Representante/Representative:

- Arnaldo de Baena Fernandes, Tercer Secretario, División de Temas Sociales, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores

Miembros de la delegación/Delegation members:

- Sadi Assis Ribeiro Filho, Coordinador General de Inmigración, Ministerio del Trabajo y Empleo
- Mary García Castro, Coordinadora del Grupo de Trabajo en Migraciones Internacionales, Comisión Nacional de Población

CANADA

Representante/Representative:

- Michel Dorais, Associate Deputy Minister, Citizenship and Immigration

Miembros de la delegación/Delegation members:

- Denis Thibault, Ambassador, Embassy of Canada in Costa Rica
- Gerry Van Kessel, Director General, Refugees Branch, Citizenship and Immigration
- Peter Duschinsky, Director, International Liaison Division, Citizenship and Immigration
- Luis Monzon, Senior Policy Advisor, International Liaison Division, Citizenship and Immigration
- Nesta Scott, Counsellor (Immigration), Embassy of Canada, Guatemala

COLOMBIA

Representante/Representative:

- Ramiro Carranza Corronado, Director de Extranjería del Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad

Miembros de la delegación/Delegation members:

- Gustavo Adolfo Gómez Porras, Jefe, División de Asuntos Consulares, Dirección Consular, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores
- Manuel Solano Sossa, Coordinador de Visas, División de Visas, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores
- Dixon Orlando Moya Acosta, Segundo Secretario, División de Visas, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores

COSTA RICA

Representante/Representative:

- Elayne Whyte, Vicecanciller de la República

Miembros de la delegación/Delegation members:

- Noemí Baruch, Directora de Cooperación Internacional, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores
- Sergio Ugalde, Asesor, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores
- Gerardo Madriz, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores
- Eduardo Vilchez Hurtado, Director General, Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería
- Ana Virginia Lizano Cruz, Sub-Directora General, Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería
- José Joaquín Vargas, Sub-Jefe, Departamento de Planificación, Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería
- Marcela Vives Blanco, Directora de Desarrollo de la Salud, Ministerio de Salud

CUBA

Representante/Representative:

- Eliseo Zamora Hernández, Funcionario del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba

CHILE

Representante/Representative:

- Edmundo Harbin Rojas, Director de Política Consular, Dirección de Asuntos Consulares e Inmigración del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores

ECUADOR

Representante/Representative:

- Leonardo Carrión, Director General de Ecuatorianos Residentes en el Exterior, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores

Miembros de la delegación/Delegation members:

- María Fernanda Navas, Asesora en Cooperación y Relaciones Internacionales, Consejo Nacional de la Mujer

- Simón Pachano, Profesor FLACSO, miembro de la delegación de Ecuador

EL SALVADOR

Representantes/Representatives:

- Héctor Dada Sánchez, Viceministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores

Miembros de la delegación/Delegation members:

- Hugo Roberto Carrillo, Embajador de El Salvador en Costa Rica
- Roberto Machón, Director General de Migración y Extranjería
- Ana Elizabeth Cubias Medina, Directora de la Unidad Social y de Cultura, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores
- Milton José Colindres, Ministro Consejero de la Embajada de El Salvador en Costa Rica
- Carmen Edith Barriere Rivas de Campos, Jefa de Sección Trabajadoras Migrantes del Ministerio del Trabajo y Previsión Social

ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMERICA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Representante/Representative:

- Marguerite Rivera Houze, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, U.S. Department of State

Miembros de la delegación/Delegation members:

- Allan Jury, Director, Policy Resource Planning Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, U.S. Department of State
- Gerard Pascua, Coordinator for Santiago Migrant Workers Initiative, Bureau of Population Refugees and Migration, U.S. Department of State
- Marianne Kilgannon-Martz, Chief, Overseas Operations Branch, Office of International Affairs, United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice
- Hipolito Acosta, Regional Attaché, United States Immigration and Naturalization Service
- Herman Pardo, Sub-Director Adjunto, INS, Embajada de los Estados Unidos en México
- Melanie Nezer, Immigration Policy Director, Immigration and Refugee Services of America

GUATEMALA

Representante/Representative:

- Irma Esperanza Palma Rodríguez, Sub-Directora de Política Social, Secretaría de Planificación y Programación de la Presidencia

Miembros de la delegación/Delegation members:

- María Jimena Díaz, Subdirectora de América del Norte del Area Exterior Bilateral, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores

- Luis Alberto Mendizábal Barrutia, Director General de Migración, Ministerio de Gobernación

GUYANA

Representante/Representative:

- Barbara Haley, Senior Foreign Service Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

HAITI

Representante/Representative:

- Guy Lamothe, Encargado de Negocios a.i., Embajada de Haití en México

Miembros de la delegación/Delegation members:

- Delcarmise Napoleón, Abogada, Sección Consular, Embajada de Haití en República Dominicana

HONDURAS

Representante/Representative:

- Reyna Ochoa de Gaekel, Directora General, Dirección General de Población, Ministerio de Gobernación y Justicia

JAMAICA

Representante/Representative:

- Donald Brice, Ambassador and Special Envoy and Director General on Jamaican's Overseas Department, Jamaica, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade

MEXICO

Representante/Representative:

- Carlos Felix Corona, Director General de Protección y Asuntos Consulares, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores

Miembros de la delegación/Delegation members:

- Romeo Flores Caballero, Coordinador de Asesores del Comisionado del Instituto Nacional de Migración

- Alfredo Miranda, Director, Dirección Organismos y Mecanismos de Integración y Concertación Comunicacionales, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores

- Margarita Rosa Rosado, Delegada Regional de Migración en el Estado de Campeche, Instituto Nacional de Migración

- Saúl Ronquillo García, Subdirector de Asuntos Internacionales de la Coordinación de Relaciones Internacionales e Interinstitucionales del Instituto Nacional de Migración

- Carlos Fuentes Villalba, Subdirector de Estudios sobre Migración, Dirección de Estudios Socioeconómicos y Regionales, Consejo Nacional de Población (CONAPO)

NICARAGUA

Representante/Representative:

- Jorge Mayorga Jarquín, Jefe de la Dirección de Asesoría Legal, Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería

Miembros de la delegación/Delegation members:

- Eduardo Gaitán Rivera, Asesor Migratorio, Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería

PANAMA

Representante/Representative:

- Rodolfo Aguilera, Vice Ministro de Gobierno y Justicia

Miembros de la delegación/Delegation members:

- Miriam Vargas Vera, Directora de Relaciones Internacionales del Ministerio de la Juventud, la Mujer la Niñez y la Familia
- Jorge Alberto Barletta, Abogado de la Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos y Tratados del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores
- Eric Singares, Director Nacional de Migración y Naturalización
- Margarita Moreno Ríos, Asistente del Despacho Superior, Dirección Nacional de Migración y Naturalización

PARAGUAY

Representante/Representative:

- Antonio Leiva Duarte, Director General, Dirección General de Migraciones

Miembros de la delegación/Delegation members:

- Bernardo Esquivel, Director, Políticas Sociales y Ambientales, Secretaría Técnica de Planificación

PERU

Representante/Representative:

- Enrique Bustamante Llosa, Ministro Consejero, Director de Protección y Apoyo al Nacional y Secretario Ejecutivo de la Comisión Permanente Ad Hoc para los Refugiados del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores

Miembros de la delegación/Delegation members:

- Jorge Arturo Jarama, Jefe, Sección Consular, Embajada del Perú en Costa Rica

REPUBLICA DOMINICANA

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Representante/Representative:

- José Alejandro Ayuso, Subsecretario de Relaciones Exteriores sobre Asuntos Consulares, Secretaría de Estado de Relaciones Exteriores

Miembros de la delegación/Delegation members:

- Teresita Torres García, Embajadora de República Dominicana en Costa Rica

SAINT KITTS Y NEVIS

SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS

Representante/Representative:

- Lavern Louard, Social Development Planner, Ministry of Finance, Development and Planning

SANTA LUCIA

SAINT LUCIA

Representante/Representative:

- Velon John, Minister for Legal Affairs, Home Affairs and Labour

TRINIDAD Y TABAGO

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Representante/Representative:

- Dennis Williams, Senior Planning Officer, Research Planning and Implementation Division, Ministry of Social and Community Development

URUGUAY

Representante/Representative:

- Roberto Cáceres Moreno, Director Nacional de Migración

VENEZUELA

Representante/Representative:

- Noel García, Embajador de Venezuela en Costa Rica

Miembros de la delegación/Delegation members:

- Liliana Serrano, Directora de Migraciones Laborales, Ministerio del Trabajo
- María Cristina Pérez de Planchart, Consejero, Jefe, Unidad de Derechos Humanos en la Dirección de Asuntos Multilaterales, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores

B. Miembros Asociados
Associate Members
Etats membres associés

ANTILLAS NEERLANDESAS

NETHERLANDS ANTILLES

Representante/Representative:

- Jadira Schonenberg Hasselmeyer, Head of the Population Unit, Ministerio de Asuntos Generales

ISLAS VIRGENES DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS

UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS

Representante/Representative:

- Carlyle Corbin, Minister of State for External Affairs, Office of the Governor

C. Países observadores
Observers Countries
Pays Observateurs

FRANCIA

FRANCE

Representante/Representative:

- Bernard Monot, Premier Conseiller, Ambassade de France à Costa Rica

Miembros de la delegación/Delegation members:

- Jean Louis Sabatié, Conseiller régional de coopération et d'action culturelle

D. Secretaría de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas
United Nations Secretariat
Secrétariat de l'Organisation des Nations Unies

Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA)/Departamento de Asuntos Económicos y Sociales/Département des affaires économiques et sociales

- Joseph Chamie, Director, Population Division

E. Organismos de las Naciones Unidas

United Nations Bodies

Organisations rattachées à l'Organisation des Nations Unies

Oficina del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados (ACNUR)/Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)/Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés (HCR)

- Jaime Ruiz de Santiago, Jefe de Misión ACNUR, San José, Costa Rica
- Francisco Galindo, Deputy Regional Representative for Mexico, Central America and Cuba
- Carlos Maldonado, Asesor Jurídico Principal

Oficina del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos/Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights/Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les Droits de l'Homme

- Gabriela Rodríguez Pizarro, Special Rapporteur de los Derechos Humanos de los Migrantes

Fondo de Población de las Naciones Unidas (FNUAP)/United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)/Fonds des Nations Unies pour la population (FNUAP)

- Marisela Padrón, Directora, División de América Latina y el Caribe
- George Martine, Equipo de Apoyo Técnico
- Tomás Jiménez Araya, Representante de FNUAP en Nicaragua, Costa Rica y Panamá
- Patricia Salgado, Oficial Nacional de Programa

Instituto Latinoamericano de las Naciones Unidas para la Prevención del Delito y Tratamiento del Delincuente (ILANUD)/United Nations Latin American Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders

- Elías Carranza, Director

Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD)/United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)/Programme des Nations Unies pour le développement (PNUD)

- Virginia Trimarco, Residente Representative in Costa Rica
- Gioconda Ubeda, Consultora Jurídica, Oficina del Representante Residente

Fondo de las Naciones Unidas para la Infancia (UNICEF)/United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)/Fonds des Nations Unies pour l'enfance (FISE)

- Heimo Laakkonen, Assistant Representative in Costa Rica

F. Organismos especializados

Specialized Agencies

Institutions spécialisées

Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT)/International Labour Office (ILO)/Organisation internationale du travail (OIT)

- Manolo Abella, Chief, International Migration Branch

Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Agricultura y la Alimentación/Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)/Organisation des Nations Unies pour l'alimentation et l'agriculture

- Octavio José Ramírez Mixter, Oficial de Progamas, Representación de FAO en Costa Rica

G. Otras organizaciones intergubernamentales

Other Intergovernmental Organizations

Autres organisations intergouvernementales

Banco Centroamericano de Integración Económica (BCIE)/Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI)/Banque centraméricaine d'intégration économique (BCIE)

- José Donaldo Ochoa, Jefe del Departamento de Desarrollo Sostenible
- Roy Barboza, Analista de Proyectos

Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (IDB)/Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)/Banque interaméricaine de développement (IDB)

- James Spinner, Asesor Jurídico
- Andrew Morrison, Especialista en Desarrollo Social

Instituto Interamericano de Cooperación para la Agricultura (IICA)/Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture/Institut interaméricain de coopération pour l'agriculture

- Sary Montero, Especialista Género y Juventud Rural

Organización de los Estados Americanos (OEA)/Organization of American States (OAS)/Organisation des Etats américains

- Jaime Aparicio, Director, Oficina de Seguimiento de Cumbres

Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH)/Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACRH)/Commission interaméricaine des droits de l'homme (CIDH)

- Helio Bicudo
- Pablo Saavedra, Abogado

Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina

- Adolfo López Bustillo, Gerente, Proyecto Migraciones

H. Organizaciones no gubernamentales

Non-governmental organizations

Organisations non gouvernementales

- Julio Gabrielli, Asesor Legal, Departamento de Migraciones de la Arquidiócesis de Buenos Aires, y Fundación Comisión Católica Argentina
- Diego Ramón Morales, Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS), Argentina
- Violeta Adela Correa, Directora, Comisión Argentina de Refugiados (CAREF), Argentina
- María E. Gamero, Coordinadora Nacional, Human Rights Commission of Belize
- Teresa Polo Najera, Investigadora-Docente Universitario, Centro de Estudios para la Mujer (CETEM), Bolivia
- José Magalhaes de Sousa, Director Nacional de CARITAS, Brasil
- Marie José Dancoste, Action Canada for Population and Development
- Leticia Adair, Canadian Council for Refugees
- Francisco Rico-Martínez, Presidente, Canadian Council for Refugees, Canada
- Elsy Jetty Chakkalakal, Canadian Council for Refugees
- Francisco Bazo, Asociación de Peruanos por la Integración Latinoamericana (APILA), Chile
- Pedro Hernández, Encargado de Estudios, Instituto Católico Chileno de Migración (INCAMI), Chile
- Elisa Neumann García, Coordinadora, Centro Alternativas, Chile
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I. Invitados Especiales

Special Guests

Invités spéciaux

- Francisco Alba, Profesor, El Colegio de México, México
- Verónica Arruñada, Coordinadora Sistema de Indicadores Sociodemográficos, Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos, Argentina
- Rosana Baeninger, Investigador/Profesor, Núcleo de Estudios de Población, Brasil
- Eduardo Baumeister, Investigador, Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Rural, Universidad Libre de Amsterdam, Nicaragua
- Alejandro Canales, Profesor Investigador, Universidad de Guadalajara, México
- Manuel Angel Castillo, Profesor-Investigador, El Colegio de México, México
- Carlos Castro, Viceministro de Gobernación, Costa Rica
- Roberto Cuéllar, Director, Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos (IIDH) Inter-American Institute for Human Rights
- Luis Ricardo Dávila, Profesor Universitario, Análisis Político y Social, Universidad de los Andes, Venezuela
- Armando Di Filippo, Consultor
- Edward Ebanks, Discussant, Population Studies Centre, University of Western Ontario, Canada
- Agustín Escobar, Investigador, CIESAS Occidente, Universidad de Guadalajara, México
- Carlos Gamarra Mujica, Cónsul General de Perú en Toronto
- Mary García Castro, Comité Nacional de Población y Desarrollo, Brasil
- Diego López de Lera, Profesor Universitario, Universidad de La Coruña, España
- Juan Martabit, Embajador, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Chile
- Philip Martin, Professor, University of California Davis

- Gustavo Mohar, Ministro para Asuntos Políticos y Relaciones con el Congreso, Embajada de México en Washington DC, México
- Demetrios Papademetriou, Co-Director, International Migration, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Estados Unidos
- Neide Lopes Patarra, Professor, Universidad Estadual de Campinas, Brasil
- Adela Pellegrino, Coordinadora del Programa de Población, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República, Uruguay
- Dane Rowlands, Associate Professor, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Canada
- Wendell Samuel, Senior Director, Research and Information, Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, St. Kitts
- Mario Santillo, Director, Centro de Estudios Migratorios Latinoamericanos (CEMLA), Argentina
- Patrick Taran, Coordinator, Global Campaign for Migrants Rights/ Director of Migrants Rights International, Suiza
- Elizabeth Thomas-Hope, Professor of Environmental Management and Chair of the Department of Geography-Geology, University of West Indies, Jamaica
- Federico Torres Arroyo, Director Internacional, Grupo Consultor Independiente S.C., México
- Fernando Urrea-Giraldo, Profesor Titular, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales y Económicas, Universidad del Valle, Colombia
- Pedro Villegas, Comité de Asuntos Californianos con México, Estados Unidos
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