Development, institutional and policy aspects of international migration between Africa, Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean

Jorge Martínez Pizarro
Leandro Reboiras Finardi
Editors
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... 9
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 11
I. Africans in the Southern European countries: Italy, Spain and Portugal ............................. 15
   Andreu Domingo i Valls and Daniela Vono de Vilhena
   A. Introduction: The particularities of the African migration in the Southern Europe...... 15
   B. Africans in Italy, Portugal and Spain ............................................................................. 17
      1. Mediterranean fracture or something else? ............................................................ 17
      2. How many immigrants? Quantifying the African immigration ................................. 19
      3. Educational and labor characteristics ..................................................................... 25
      4. Territorial distribution .............................................................................................. 31
   C. African population in Spain ........................................................................................... 33
      1. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 33
      2. Demographic characteristics of the North African flows and population ................. 34
      3. Demographic characteristics of the sub-Saharan immigrants ................................. 38
      4. Demographic characteristics of sub-Saharan population ........................................ 40
      5. When the crisis came: African population in the Spanish labor market ................. 45
      6. Final considerations: Demographic enigmas of the sub-Saharan migration in Spain ................................................................................................... 50
   D. Conclusions ................................................................................................................... 50
Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 56
II. Migration patterns and immigrants characteristics in North-Western Europe ...................... 61
   Helga A. G. de Valk, Corina Huisman and Kris R. Noam
   A. Introduction: migration and migrants in North-Western Europe.............................. 61
   B. Immigration to North-Western Europe ........................................................................ 63
      1. Brief migration history .............................................................................................. 63
      2. Recent immigration patterns ................................................................................... 64
      3. Characteristics of immigrants: age, gender and origin ........................................... 69
      4. Reasons for acquiring residence ............................................................................. 72
   C. Settlement in North-Western Europe ............................................................................ 75
      1. Migrants: Origin and characteristics ....................................................................... 75
      2. Settlement patterns of selected origin groups ....................................................... 82
   D. Children of immigrant origin ..................................................................................... 87
      1. Age and generation ................................................................................................. 87
III. Recent African immigration to South America: The cases of Argentina and Brazil in the regional context

Pedro F. Marcelino and Marcela Cerrutti

A. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 107
B. Recent trends in African emigration ............................................................................ 109
  1. Types of migrants, motivations for and methods of migration .............................. 109
  2. Preferred destinations: Africa, Europe, and beyond ............................................. 114
  3. The “Fear of the boat”: Geopolitical puzzles and recent changes in destination .......................................................................................................................... 115
  4. The emergence of Argentina and Brazil as potential destinations ..................... 119
  5. Transit, invisibility and liminality.............................................................................. 121
C. Africans in Argentina ................................................................................................... 122
  1. Africans in Argentina in colonial times and beyond ............................................... 122
  2. African immigrants and Afro-descendents at the turn of the 20th century .......... 123
  3. Africans in numbers: What statistics say on African immigration to Argentina .... 125
  4. Argentina’s foreign policy towards Africa............................................................... 133
D. Legal conundrums: The regulation of migration and the situation of migrants ...... 135
  1. The legal framework in Argentina ......................................................................... 135
  2. Argentina’s legal provision on asylum seekers and refugees .............................. 135
  3. Similarities and differences with the Brazilian migratory framework in Brazil .... 137
E. Future prospects for immigration in Argentina .......................................................... 138
  1. Geopolitical and ideological mores ....................................................................... 138
  2. Expected trends in African immigration ................................................................ 138
  3. Inclusion, exclusion, and informal incorporation ................................................ 139
  4. Media coverage and public opinion ..................................................................... 139
  5. Multicultural nodes in the urban space: “Little Dakar” in Buenos Aires ............. 140
F. Policy implications ...................................................................................................... 141
  1. Broadening Argentina’s immigration policy ......................................................... 141
  2. Technical instruments for regional and African immigration ............................ 141
  3. Enacting effective border controls ..................................................................... 142
  4. Rooting out smuggling and trafficking networks ............................................... 142
  5. Migration as a human right: The Argentinean path ........................................... 142
  6. Refugee and asylum in the context of South American humanism .................... 142
  7. Capacity building of the immigration and police authorities ............................. 143
  8. Measuring and enhancing integration policies .................................................... 143

Bibliography ....................................................................................................................... 143

IV. International migration: Trends and institutional frameworks

from the African perspective ............................................................................................ 147

John O. Ouchu
A. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 147
  1. Nature and scope of the study ............................................................................. 148
  2. Typologies of international migration ................................................................... 148
  3. Limitations and gaps ............................................................................................. 149
B. Institutional policies and arrangements ................................................................. 149
  1. Origin-destination links of migration ............................................................... 149
  2. International instruments and human rights .................................................... 153
  3. International migration in the context of regional integration ....................... 154
  4. Migrant rights in gender and health ................................................................. 161
  5. Perspectives of migration and development ................................................... 162
  6. Bilateral and multilateral coordination and cooperation ................................ 171
C. Migrants’ attributes in migration policies ............................................................ 174
  1. Demographic attributes in migration policies .................................................. 174
  2. Socio-economic attributes in migration policies: Focus on gender ................. 176
D. Contemporary issues in migration policies .......................................................... 178
  1. Remittances in migrant origin-destination links ............................................. 178
  2. Policies on circular migration and transnationalism ....................................... 181
  3. Consequences of the global economic crisis for migration flows .................. 183
E. Some conclusions .................................................................................................. 183

Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 184

Annexes ....................................................................................................................... 189
  Annex 1 Report of the Interregional Workshop on International Migration .......... 190
  Annex 2 List of participants .................................................................................... 209
  Annex 3 Biosketch of participants ....................................................................... 212

Tables

Table I.1 Italy, Portugal and Spain, 2009: African immigrants by country
  of nationality and sex ............................................................................................... 23
Table I.2 Portugal, 2001: Immigrants’ employment and unemployment rates,
  by country of birth and sex ................................................................................... 26
Table I.3 Portugal, 2001: Immigrants’ qualification level, by country of birth and sex .. 26
Table I.4 Italy, December 31th, 2008: African workers by country
  of birth and activity sector ..................................................................................... 27
Table I.5 Spain and Italy, 2006-2007: Percentages of Algerians, Moroccans,
  and Tunisians by educational level ...................................................................... 27
Table I.6 Spain and Italy, 2008: Educational level distribution by nationality and sex .. 28
Table I.7 Spain and Italy, 2008: Labor participation, employment and unemployment
  rates, by nationality and sex .................................................................................. 29
Table I.8 Spain and Italy, 2008: Percentage of employed by activity sector,
  nationality and sex ................................................................................................ 30
Table I.9 Spain, France and Italy, 2008: Percentage of employed by occupational
  status, by nationality and sex ................................................................................ 31
Table I.10 Spain, 2010: Sub-Saharan nationalities with more than 1,000 citizens
  in the Spanish territory ......................................................................................... 41
Table I.11 Spain, 1999-2010: Male immigrants by region of birth, employment status
  and year of the survey ......................................................................................... 48
Table I.12 Spain, 1999-2010: Female immigrants by region of birth, employment
  status and year of the survey ............................................................................... 49
Table II.1 The Netherlands, 2009: Motives for immigration, by region of origin and gender . 73
Table II.2 The Netherlands, 2009: Motives for immigration, by selected countries
  of African and Latin American origin and gender ................................................ 74
Table II.3 Germany, 2009: Selected main reasons for acquiring legal entry,
  for Brazilian and Moroccan immigrants ............................................................ 75
Table II.4 Selected countries, 2008: Share of population which is foreign born or has a foreign nationality, per country of settlement .......................................................... 76
Table II.5 The Netherlands, Belgium, Great Britain and Germany, 2001: Population (15 years and over) by region of birth and gender .............................................................. 78
Table II.6 The Netherlands, 2011: Origins of African immigrants by gender ......................... 79
Table II.7 Children living in two parent families, by country of settlement and region of origin ........................................................................................................... 88
Table II.8 The Netherlands, 2006: Labor market position of fathers of second generation children of immigrants ...................................................................................... 90
Table II.9 The Netherlands, 2006: Mobility of second generation children of immigrants .......... 91
Table III.1 Argentina, 2001: African foreign-born population classified by country of birth .......... 126
Table III.2 Argentina, 2001: African foreign-born population aged 18 and older, classified by region of origin and level of education ................................................................. 128
Table III.3 Argentina, 2004-2009: Number of applications for permanent and/or temporary residency by country of origin .................................................................................. 130
Table IV.1 Estimates of migration within and outside of Africa, 2011 ........................................ 148
Table IV.2 Immigration and emigration views and policy perspectives of selected African countries, 2005 ............................................................................................................. 150
Table IV.3 Some bilateral and multilateral agreements on international migration involving African countries, circa 2010 .............................................................................. 152
Table IV.4 Distribution of African states parties to United Nations instruments on international migration, 2009 ..................................................................................................... 153
Table IV.5 African Regional Economic Communities by date of formation and Member States ................................................................. 158
Table IV.6 Phases of Free Movement of Persons (FMOP)/Facilitation of Movement of Persons (FOMP) protocols of SSA’s RECs .............................................................. 160
Table IV.7 Distribution of the African diaspora in the major European countries of residence by sub-Saharan African subregion and selected Northern African countries of origin and destination, circa 2000 ............... 165
Table IV.8 Inflow and value of remittances to Africa by subregion and country, 2008 .................. 166
Table IV.9 Typology of diaspora initiatives with SSA examples .................................................. 168
Table IV.10 Migration issues in the AU continental migration policy framework, 2006 .............. 172

Figures

Figure I.1 Portugal 1980-2006: evolution of the foreign population holding a valid residence permit, by main nationality groups .............................................................. 21
Figure I.2 Spain 1998-2009: foreign population flows, by region of nationality ....................... 22
Figure I.3 Spain, 1992-2009: Moroccan and Algerian flows by sex .......................................... 35
Figure I.4 Spain, 1998-2009: Moroccan and Algerian flows by sex and age ............................... 36
Figure I.5 Spain, 2009: population pyramid of the Moroccan and Algerian citizens ............... 37
Figure I.6 Spain, 1999-2009: sub-Saharan population flows ...................................................... 39
Figure I.7 Spain, 1998-2009: sub-Saharan population flows by sex .......................................... 40
Figure I.8 Spain, 1988-2009: sub-Saharan population flows by sex and age ............................ 40
Figure I.9 Spain, 2010: sub-Saharan nationalities with more than 1,000 citizens in the Spanish territory ................................................................. 41
Figure I.10 Spain, 2009: population pyramids of the main sub-Saharan citizens ................. 42
Figure I.11 Spain, 1999-2009: percentage of employed population by region of birth and sex over the total employed population ................................................................. 46
Figure I.12 Spain, 1999-2010: unemployment rates by region of birth and sex ...................... 47
Figure II.1 The Netherlands, 2000-2009: immigration by region of origin (country of birth) .......... 66
Figure II.2 Germany, 2000-2009: immigration by region of origin (nationality) ...................... 67
Figure II.3 United Kingdom, 2000-2009: immigration by region of origin (nationality) ............ 68
Figure II.4 Belgium, 2000-2007: immigration by region of origin (nationality) ...................... 69
Figure II.5 United Kingdom, 2009: age and sex structure of all immigrants arriving .................. 70
Figure II.6 The Netherlands, 2009: age and sex structure of all, Asian, African and Latin American immigrants arriving .......................................................... 71
Figure II.7 The Netherlands, 2011: age and gender pyramid for the native Dutch population of the total country, first generation, and second generation migrants .................................................. 80
Figure II.8 The Netherlands, 2011: age and gender pyramid for African and Latin American immigrants .............................................................................................. 81
Figure II.9 United Kingdom, 2003: age and gender pyramid for African and Latin American immigrants .............................................................................................. 81
Figure II.10 The Netherlands, 2006: intermarriages with a native Dutch spouse for the children of immigrants of different origin and generation .............................................. 89
Figure III.1 Argentina, 2001: foreign-born African population by sex ...................................... 126
Figure III.2 Argentina, 2001: foreign-born African population by region of origin ...................... 127
Figure III.3 Argentina, 2001: foreign-born African population by province of residence .......... 128
Figure III.4 Argentina, 2005-2009: trends in the number of refugee status petitioners, total number and by people under 21 years old ......................................................... 131
Figure A.1 Migrant stocks by major areas, 2010 ..................................................................... 193

Maps

Map I.1 European Union, 2010: population by citizenship ...................................................... 18
Map I.2 Distribution of African immigrants in European Union countries, 2010 ...................... 20
Map I.3 Spain, 2009: territorial distribution of Africans, by district of residence .................... 32
Map I.4 Italy, 2009: territorial distribution of Africans, by district of residence ...................... 32
Map I.5 Portugal, 2009: territorial distribution of Africans, by district of residence ............... 33
Map I.6 Germany, 2009: share of foreigners in the total population per region ....................... 83
Map II.2 The Netherlands, 2011: share of African and South American immigrants in the total population ........................................................................................................... 84
Map II.3 Belgium, 2001: share of African immigrants in the total population ......................... 85
Map II.4 Belgium, 2001: share of North-African and sub-Saharan immigrants in the total population .................................................................................................................. 86

Boxes

Box I.1 The European immigration policy towards extra-UE labour mobility flows: the latest news .............................................................. 52
Box I.2 Italian migration policy - towards a security - oriented model? ................................. 54
Abstract

The book includes four chapters related to studies on African and Latin American migration, at different and similar scales regarding some countries of Europe. The documents were presented by their authors at the workshop “Strengthening national capacities to deal with international migration: Maximizing development benefits and minimizing negative impacts”, jointly organized by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). The studies addressed African and Latin American migration to Europe; international migration in Africa and institutional frameworks; and recent African migration to South America and institutional frameworks. They are accompanied by a report on the workshop presented by their authors.
Introduction

This book contains four studies prepared and presented at the inter-regional workshop on International Migration, held at the Palais des Nations in Geneva on September 22nd and 23rd 2011. This workshop was an activity of the interregional project 'Strengthening national capacities to deal with international migration: Maximizing development benefits and minimizing negative impacts', jointly organized by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA).

The project has been jointly implemented since 2009 by the five United Nations Regional Commissions in collaboration with the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), under the coordination and the leadership of ECLAC through CELADE - Population Division.

The book includes four chapters related to studies on African and Latin American migration, at different and similar scales regarding some countries of Europe, accompanied by a report on the workshop they were presented by their authors. The main objective of the workshop was to contribute toward strengthening capacities of countries to design national migration policies, maximizing benefits and minimizing negative aspects for the origin, transit and destination countries and the migrants. The meeting aimed at promoting the exchange of national and regional experiences and good practices. It allowed participants to hold discussions on the emerging aspects of migration dynamics between the three regions, highlighting those with impact on development, and analyzing innovative, institutional, and regulatory aspects of interregional migration.

The meeting was attended by government delegates from selected countries of the three regions, experts on diverse migration issues and representatives from the civil society and international agencies (see annex with the report and list of participants). The topics addressed in the workshop were within the thematic framework of the project and the sessions were organized based on two main interrelated thematic areas:

- New and emerging aspects of migration dynamics between Africa, Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean and its relation to human rights and development, taking into consideration aspects such as: gender relations; the role of remittances; changes in labor insertion of migrants; migration of children and older persons; integration, entailment and rights of migrants; socio-economic and health conditions among migrant people; as well as an evaluation of the effects of the global crisis on interregional migration, including return migration and migrants’ socio-economic conditions.
Institutional and regulatory agreements in the field of development and international migration in selected countries from Africa, Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean, including topics such as social integration; anti-discrimination; regularization programs; transnational communities; the fight against trafficking and smuggling of persons and other relevant aspects within the framework of the obligations assumed by states that could be considered as good practices in terms of handling migration issues on the basis of the principles for human dignity and respect.

The workshop consisted of six work sessions and two round tables. The sessions included the presentations and discussions of the four background documents elaborated by the experts. A number of country delegates and civil society representatives presented and shared their ideas and experience. The roundtables provided additional opportunities for a wider debate and exchange of ideas.

The first two sessions addressed African and Latin American migration to Europe; the following two addressed international migration in Africa and institutional frameworks; and the last ones focused on recent African migration to South America and institutional frameworks.

Finally, the roundtables brought together representatives from international organizations and civil society, delegates from governments and one representative of a regional commission, to discuss about migration between Africa, Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean: challenges and opportunities —the first one—, and advances and gaps in institutional arrangements —the second one.

This document, which summarizes the main results and outputs of the workshop consists of four sections. They correspond to the reference documents discussed at the workshop and presented by their authors:

- **African and Latin American people in the Southern European Countries: Italy, Spain and Portugal** by Andreu Domingo (Universidad Autónoma, Barcelona, Spain) and Daniela Vono (Institute for Longitudinal Educational Research —INBIL—, Bamberg University, Germany).

- **Migration patterns and immigrant characteristics in North-western Europe**, by Helga A. G. de Valk (Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute - NIDI).


- **Recent African Immigration to South America: The cases of Argentina and Brasil in Regional Context**, by Pedro F. Marcelino (York University, Toronto, Canada) and Marcela Cerrutti (CENEP and CONICET, Argentina).

A report on the presentations, discussions and reflections that took place during the sessions and the roundtables are included in an annex. The report was prepared by the rapporteur of the workshop, Jérôme Elie (Programme for the Study of Global Migration at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva).

The need to respect and promote the human rights of migrants, providing the right to legal protection and access to justice for migrants regardless of status, was one of the main conclusions of the workshop. In this sense, the ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, the obligations assumed by States and the increasing realization of the potential of international human rights instruments to advocate for the rights of migrants was one of the most emphatic requests for countries from participants.

The overall conclusion was that the effort to jointly reflect, debate and work on pending migration issues between Regional Commissions was exemplary to jointly work on common migration issues. It was very fruitful and should be encouraged and strengthened in the future. It allowed the exchange of experiences and good practices among different stakeholders, countries and regions, and allowed reflecting on existing knowledge and resources.
For ECLAC, this book is a unique opportunity for spreading their ideas about international migration, human rights and development in the context of the work with regional commissions. The issues about migration must be understood as a matter of rights, freedom and cooperation in a world with a future of increasing mobility and eroding restrictions.
I. Africans in the Southern European countries: Italy, Spain and Portugal

Andreu Domingo i Valls and Daniela Vono de Vilhena

A. Introduction: The particularities of the African migration in the Southern Europe

The spectacular immigration growth experienced by the Southern European countries has by itself a special interest, both in the context of international migration, as for the singular role that Latin-American and African flows have had in the revolutionary transformation from senders to receivers of these countries. If this growth has been impressive, so have been the impact of the economic crisis and the consequent decrease of the flows, and even the return of some of the migrants who have arrived in recent years. Moreover, as we will try to explain, the experience of these three countries contains three vital lessons: firstly, the two faces of the integration of the immigrant population, in which the differences between Africans and Americans become even more evident. Secondly, they are good examples of the complex relationship between law and immigration. Thirdly, their migration history can be used as a good example to the currently emigration countries like the Latin-American and African countries, especially in the current days when the North African region is shaken by political changes that will undoubtedly have a significant impact on migration between these continental regions.

As in other European countries, the colonial past of the Mediterranean countries has played a substantial role in the generation of migration flows, policies that respond to the existence of these flows, and social spaces reserved for migrants. The comparison between Italy, Spain and Portugal enriches our understanding of the migratory phenomenon precisely because of the difference in each of them related to the colonial history and its impact on the immigration. For instance, in Italy although there is a presence of Libyans, Ethiopians and Eritreans, their participation among all Africans is very small. In Spain, the colonial relationship with Morocco, the major African country represented among immigrations has been reflected particularly in its negative side. It is observable in

---

1 Consultants from the Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) – Population Division of ECLAC.
the maintenance of prejudices and sensitivities between the two governments at the time to address the issue of immigration and between the immigrants and the Spanish population. This fact has indirectly benefited the better integration of the Latino immigrant population, even considering that the Moroccan population has arrived before (Izquierdo, 2004). In turn, the small size of the population from the Equatorial Guinea, independent since 1968, shows a limited potential for migration of this former Spanish colony in Africa.

At the other end, and to understand the ambiguity of the colonial past, in the Latin-American case the colonial past has resulted in a de facto affirmative action in the Spanish law (mainly in accessing the Spanish nationality). This fact, together with the experienced Spanish emigration during the last two centuries (similarly to the Italian case), explain both the unusual growth of these flows as its successful integration if it is measured in terms of upward social mobility (Vono, 2010). Last but not least, the role of immigration from Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique in the Portuguese immigration growth shows two particularities: firstly, in comparison to Spain the territories were decolonized relatively late in 1975 and, secondly, the role of the racial factor in the integration of the immigrant population.

The analysis of the evolution of migration from the African continent to the European Mediterranean countries is a fascinating exercise for understanding the relationship between legal and migration dynamics. In the same way, the demographic challenges are no less interesting, particularly the discussion on the importance of the population structure in the different countries involved as a determinant of migration between them. Was the relative scarcity of young people entering in the labor market in the three European countries the factor that has precipitated the migration boom? Secondly and clearly connected with the population structure, it appears as an explanatory variable both the drastic decline in fertility and the dramatic lengthening of life expectancy that preceded the transformation of emigration to immigration countries. From this perspective, we should question if the African migratory flows are a consequence of these changes or not. Can we talk about replacement migration in this context? Thirdly, the current economic situation in the southern European countries lead to the question whether the recent wave of immigration was an extraordinary closed parenthesis in history that has ended with the crisis, or if, in turn, it is a structural change and we can expect a future growth of the flows when the economic scenario improves.

Beyond the strictly demographic aspects, African immigration that has already occurred in the three countries will have undoubtedly an impact on both the European and African sides. Consequences of it are not deeply discussed here but are worthwhile to being mentioned. Among them, we highlight the change in the composition by origin of the migration flows, their contribution to the host society and the impact of the crisis in transnational networks and transnational marriage markets. Neither demographics nor the economic or cultural elements of both receiving and sending countries may be interpreted in the future without taking these consequences into account.

Considering the previous mentioned lines, this report will highlight the characteristics of the African immigration in Italy, Spain and Portugal. The analysis is limited by the scarcity of comparable statistical data in the three countries but for this same reason, it is an important contribution to the Southern European region. The report is organized in three chapters: the first one focuses on the comparison of immigrants in the three countries, its labor characteristics and its territorial distribution. The second chapter specifically examines the case of African immigration in Spain, the country with the higher volume of Africans and with the most detailed available data. Finally, some conclusions are presented. In addition to summarizing the main characteristics of African immigration in these three Mediterranean countries, they also offer some prospective reflections.
**B. Africans in Italy, Portugal and Spain**

1. Mediterranean fracture or something else?

The relatively low, disperse and heterogeneous statistical information on the Mediterranean countries results in its peripheral position and its political fragmentation. Information on aggregated data tends to be analyzed in different geo-political aggregations: the European Union, the countries of Maghreb and of Makhreb, sometimes studied as an African sub-region, sometimes as part of a Pan-Arabic region from Morocco to Iraq and the Gulf countries, sometimes as part of the Muslim world, with a geography that moves away from the Mediterranean. The same thing has happened with the Mediterranean European countries when they were not integrated into the European Union, and were considered within the diverse group of countries of Eastern Europe. The view towards the Mediterranean from an academic view point has been mostly a nostalgic approach of a displaced center, at least since the reference work of Ferdin and Braudel (1949). The volunteerism to create or to recreate a Mediterranean entity, clings to the framework of cooperation and development, part of the radical imbalance between the large blocks in which the uneven development divides the globe: North and South (Balta, 1992).

Nothing new so far, the Mediterranean geography and its political and demographic trends has been an area of conflicts and splits, more generally from the perspective of “security” and consequently “population planning” (Teitelbaum, 2001). The comparison between the border of Mexico and the United States has quickly become a model to study the Mediterranean as a frontier between North and South (Coleman, 2005). In our view, although we consider the specificity of the redefinition of boundaries such as in the Spanish case (and its symbolism given by history), on one hand, and the supra-national European Union (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2008), on the other, this comparison misused, driven by the prominence of migration on the international agenda, united more than ever by the discourse of security after September 11, 2001. Consequently, it can be affirmed that it would be a disruptive paradigm for understanding the demographic reality of the whole Mediterranean, and the particular issue of the international migration.

In the specific field of demography, the topics that have been highlighted as an image of the Mediterranean region are mostly based on stereotypes. Differentials in fertility behavior, the structure of population or population density have been presented as causes of the international migration flows. Ironically, demographer Joaquin Arango has called it the “hydraulic theory of population” (Arango, 1994). Unfortunately, and against all scientific evidence, these approaches seem to prevail after the popularization of the concept of “Replacement Migration” (United Nations, 2001). The structural deficit of young population as a product of the intensive and accelerated decline in fertility experienced in the Northern countries of the Mediterranean has become a kind of adaptation of the neoclassical theory of migration as a compensator wage differentials between regions to explain the migration from the other side.

From an academic perspective, demographers have strongly challenged the theoretical principle of this demographic osmosis (Coleman, 2001). Some authors have sought in the historical example to refuse the approach by making it clear that international migration is currently occurring between countries with similar fertility levels and population age structures. In this sense, most of the African regional migration in the Gulf of Guinea and Southern African countries is between high fertility and youth age structures countries. At the opposite pole, indicators of fertility in Eastern Europe, one of the main origins of the migration flows towards the European Union countries, also include values even lower than those of recipient countries and notably aged population pyramids (Weiner and Teitelbaum, 2001). Even more evident is the Spanish case: the country has become in the last years the first recipient of flows at the European Union. Spain has moved from the last to the first place in both relative and absolute numbers in the classification of foreign resident population (Map I.1). While it is true that Spain holds, along with Italy, Greece or Portugal, the smallest fertility rates.
and the highest life expectancy in Europe, the immigration boom has occurred when the baby boom Spanish generation was entering into the labor market (Domingo and Gil, 2007a).

The comparison of international flows received by Spain and Italy during the new millennium is very enlightening: Italy, that began their fertility decline earlier and reached lower levels faster than Spain, has received less immigration flows than Spain. But most important is the fact that in both countries the period of immigration and the age structure of immigrants was the same, showing that it has depended more on economic conditions rather than on population structure (Domingo and Gil, 2007b). The dramatic effects of the economic crisis since the second semester of 2008 are the best evidence on the prevalence of the importance of the economic context instead of the population demographic structure in order to explain the behaviors of the migration flows.

**MAP I.1**

**EUROPEAN UNION, 2010: POPULATION BY CITIZENSHIP**

![Map showing population by citizenship in the European Union, 2010.](image)

Source: Eurostat: Population by sex, age group and citizenship (migr_pop1ctz: extracted on 08.09.11).

Note: No data for 2010: Bulgaria, Austria and Romania (2009); Malta (2008); France (2005); United Kingdom (2004); Lithuania and Luxembourg (2001); Estonia (2000); Greece (1998); and Cyprus (not available). Latin-America includes North American data: Malta, France, United Kingdom, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Estonia and Greece. EU-27 includes Total European data: United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Estonia and Greece.

So why, despite of all the scientific evidence, this explanation has become so popular? The *siren song* of those who appeal to the replacement migration as an engine of migration in the Mediterranean region have found ears on both Mediterranean sides. In the north, mostly by NGO’s that expect to legitimize their supposedly humanitarian discourse about the southern region. In the south, by political and intellectual circles that have used the argument to claim the importance and the contribution of these citizens to create wealth in the north in order to make migration a source of political negotiation (Domingo and Esteve, 2009).

Definitely, it seems that for both Southern and Northern Mediterranean countries it is more convenient to move the discourse towards the demography than to assume that the problem is caused by the economy. Specifically, it is caused by the economic structural adjustments in the Southern countries, by the unequal distribution of wealth in these countries and their political responsibilities. Even among those scholars who seek to focus their reflection on the political and economic causes of
migration, demography is still listed as one of the phenomena that underlie the inequalities, in the form of “uncontrolled population boom” or “migration fever” in the south (Naïr, 2008).

Nobody doubts that human movements in the Mediterranean area are important (Fargues, 2005), both in volume and characteristics, in the same way that the evolution of other demographic phenomena that occur in these countries are. However, the interconnection between them is much more complex and richer than it has been suggested, especially due to the amazing speed at which changes are occurring on both sides of the Mediterranean coast. It is important to note that there is much we do not know, but also much more than we do might know, demographically speaking, because data already exist. The construction and analysis of statistics offered in this document is a necessary previous step in order to develop and maintain sustainable dialogue and the elaboration of policies.

Beyond the Mediterranean region itself, to understand the African migration to these countries we have to take into account the political framework of the European Union of which Spain, Italy and Portugal are part, and the migratory flows from sub-Saharan Africa, which —except for Portugal— have brought their own complexity to the migration framework although they are not as significant as the North African countries in terms of volume. Ex-colonial relations in the case of Portugal and the establishment of transnational migrant networks that transcend the three are some of the most important features of these flows. Finally, it is necessary to mention the impact of economic crisis, on the one hand, and political changes that are happening in North Africa, on the other: not only the political landscape, but also migration have changed radically.

2. How many immigrants? Quantifying the African immigration

The estimation of the number of Africans in the Southern European countries is not as accurate as it would be expected, mainly due to specific constrains of the available population registers. Besides that, it can be affirmed that the data available allows a good approximation to the reality by the end of 2009. The first limitation is that for Italy and Portugal, it is just possible to access the foreign population according to their nationality and not the country of birth or the last country residence. Secondly, the data for these two countries just considers the legal residents, being excluded all the undocumented immigrants. In the Spanish case, these constrains does not exists: it is possible to study the immigrants according to their country of birth and the data from the population register (in Spanish: Padrón Continuo) considers the entire population, independently of their residence status.

In this sense, and according to the most recent data available, there were more than 2 million African citizens living in Italy, Portugal and Spain by the beginning of 20102 (see table I.1). Italy and Spain are the main destination countries of these inflows, with 931,793 African residents (22% of the total 4,235,059 foreign population) and 1,059,164 (18% of the total 5,747,734 foreign population) respectively. Portugal is the country with the smallest number of Africans —121,852 inhabitants—, nonetheless this population represents the highest proportion of the total 454,191 foreigners in comparison to the other two destinations, a 27%.3 Spain shows the highest proportion of men among the African immigrants, 175 men for every 100 women. This proportion in Italy is 148 men for every 100 women. Again, Portugal shows a different pattern and the number of men is very similar to the number of women (108 men for every 100 women).

While the highest number of African immigrants in Italy (93%) and Spain (97%) come from West and North African countries, in Portugal the highest inflows have their origins in West, Southern and Central Africa, more specifically in the Portuguese-speaking countries that were its ex colonies. In this case, foreigners from Angola, Cape-Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Sao Tome and Principe account for 90% of all Africans in the country. Despite the proximity, immigrants from North African

---

2 For the Spanish case the data on country of birth is available and will be analyzed in detail in the next chapter. Nonetheless, for comparative concerns, in this section only the immigrants with foreign citizenship in Spain will be considered.

3 Nonetheless, Africans represent much less of the country’s total foreign population in comparison to ten years ago (Carrilho and Patricio, 2010).
countries represent a small proportion of the total Africans, 2%. However, in Italy and Spain they are the most represented ones, particularly Moroccans (see Map I.2).

What explains the dominant presence of immigrants from ex-colonies in Portugal? Joppke (2005) uses the concept of luso-tropicalism developed by Freyre (1940) to refer to the colonial relations in this country based on racial mixing between colonizers and the colonized. Although the supposed unity and cultural similarity between Portugal and its colonies have been challenged by various scholars, the idea has been constantly present in the discourse, goals and political actions in the country. Much of this is due to the high number of the emigrated Portuguese population in those countries, which was and remains well above the importance of immigrants.

Moreover, the country explicitly privileges citizens of Portuguese-speaking countries in its immigration law. For instance, the acquisition of Portuguese nationality is easier to children of immigrants from the former colonies. Portugal has increased the length of residence required for both parents and their children to acquire the Portuguese nationality from 6 to 10 years, except in the case of children of immigrants from Portuguese-speaking former colonies, who continue with the requirement of 6 years. Apart from the Nationality Law, Portugal has signed various bilateral preferential agreements with the Portuguese-speaking countries and in the regularization processes for undocumented immigrants this collective has been explicitly favored.

Portugal received the first significant immigration flow from Africa in the mid-sixties, most of them from Cape-Verde and until the end of the 1990’s they were the most represented foreign group (39,600 immigrants in 1996). Nonetheless, it was from the mid-nineties on that the number of Africans has increased substantially. Although another increase can be observed from the year 2000...
on, it can be stated that African immigration in Portugal has been a quite historical and moderate process in comparison to other groups, especially Brazilians and the foreigners from the Eastern and South-Eastern European countries (Abecasis, 2008) (see figure I.1).

FIGURE I.1
PORTUGAL 1980-2006: EVOLUTION OF THE FOREIGN POPULATION HOLDING A VALID RESIDENCE PERMIT, BY MAIN NATIONALITY GROUPS
(In thousands)

Source: Abecasis (2008), based on data provided by the National Statistical Institute (INE).
Note: Figures include all foreigners who hold a valid residence title (residence permits, stay permits and long-term visas (prolongations of long-term visas included after 2004)). PALOP countries are all the Portuguese-speaking countries (except Cape Verde and Brazil that have their own representation in this graph).

The importance of immigration from the ex-colonies in Italy is not relevant. Foreigners from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Somalia represent only a 3% of the African foreign population. Here, the geographical proximity seems to be much more relevant. Immigrants from Morocco (431,529 inhabitants, the third immigrant group in the country after Rumanians and Albanians), Tunisia (103,678) and Egypt (82,064) are the three principal African groups. West African nationals from Senegal (72,618), Nigeria (48,674) and Ghana (44,353) are the following most represented immigrants. With the exception of Nigerians, where the presence of women is higher than the presence of men (82 men for every 100 women), in all the groups the number of men is higher than that of women. The increase of the African population during the decade of 2000 was very moderate compared to other groups like Ukrainians, Romanians, and Albanians (Caruso and Venditto, 2008).

Spain is the destination of the majority of African immigration in Southern Europe and the country with best data regarding the phenomenon. For this reason, the next chapter is devoted to a deeper analysis of its particularities. Nonetheless, it is important to highlight some aspects in this chapter in order to stress some similarities and differences among the three countries. The first aspect to highlight is the importance of the migration from Morocco. Although the country has always been a source of international migrants in Spain, it is from the 1980’s on when the presence of Moroccan immigration in Spain begins to be notorious. According to the latest data available, in the beginning of 2010 there were 754,080 Moroccan living in Spain, representing a 71% of the Africans in the country.
African immigrants in Spain were the most represented group until mid-2000. The flows declined between 2000 and 2003, coinciding with the migratory boom in the country lead by Latin-Americans. Previously, these flows were the most numerous and were almost monopolized by Moroccan population. The experienced growth during the last years and until 2008 has been due to the recovery of the Moroccan flows, as well as the increase in the sub-Saharan countries flow, despite the Spanish economic crisis that has affected other groups like the Latin-American and the Eastern European. Nonetheless, data from 2009 show a decrease in the number of entries for all origins. Since 2000 the African migration has represented 15.4% (951,854 persons) of the total flow (see figure 1.2).

As in the Italian case, Moroccan is the most important African immigration to Spain. During the 1990’s there was a certain feminization of the group, mostly due to family reunification. Thus, it was possible to observe an increase in the participation of single, divorced and widowed women among those flows (Ramirez, 2004). Results from a survey conducted by Aparicio (2004) give us a clue about the stereotypical image of the Moroccan community. According to her findings, this is actually a very heterogeneous group in the country. Firstly, because of the stage of the migration process among the population that is very wide, ranging from those that are long-established until the recently arrived ones. Secondly, because of the cultural and demographic diversity that exists within the community. The second most represented African group is the Senegalese with 61,970 nationals in 2010. Following are the Algerians (58,743), Nigerians (44,176) and Gambians (22,168). In all of these cases, the presence of men is much higher than the presence of women (see Table I.1).
TABLE I.1
ITALY, PORTUGAL AND SPAIN, 2009: AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS BY COUNTRY OF NATIONALITY AND SEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Foreigners</td>
<td>4 235 059</td>
<td>2 063 407</td>
<td>2 171 652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Africa</td>
<td>931 793</td>
<td>554 659</td>
<td>377 134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>13 575</td>
<td>7 139</td>
<td>6 436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>9 175</td>
<td>4 875</td>
<td>4 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>3 758</td>
<td>1 907</td>
<td>1 851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Africa</td>
<td>38 540</td>
<td>19 022</td>
<td>19 518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Rep. of Congo</td>
<td>3 679</td>
<td>1 832</td>
<td>1 847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>8 350</td>
<td>3 342</td>
<td>5 008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>12 967</td>
<td>7 244</td>
<td>5 723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1 578</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>1 139</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>7 728</td>
<td>4 293</td>
<td>3 435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>647 226</td>
<td>388 347</td>
<td>258 879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>25 449</td>
<td>16 810</td>
<td>8 639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>82 064</td>
<td>56 834</td>
<td>25 230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan Arab Jamahiriya</td>
<td>1 468</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>431 529</td>
<td>245 198</td>
<td>186 331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2 436</td>
<td>2 032</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>103 678</td>
<td>66 153</td>
<td>37 525</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
Table I.1 (concluded)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>12,484</td>
<td>5,872</td>
<td>6,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1,704</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>9,413</td>
<td>4,363</td>
<td>5,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>219,968</td>
<td>134,279</td>
<td>85,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>11,784</td>
<td>7,589</td>
<td>4,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>2,387</td>
<td>1,414</td>
<td>973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>4,624</td>
<td>3,132</td>
<td>3,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>1,222</td>
<td>7,178</td>
<td>4,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>4,435</td>
<td>2,502</td>
<td>1,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>2,991</td>
<td>1,878</td>
<td>1,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>2,210</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1,198</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>48,674</td>
<td>21,900</td>
<td>26,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>72,618</td>
<td>55,693</td>
<td>16,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1,294</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>4,191</td>
<td>2,730</td>
<td>1,461</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: For Italy, Istituto Nazionale di Statistica - ISTAT (December 31th, 2009), for Portugal Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras (2009) and for Spain Padrón Continuo, Instituto Nacional de Estadística – INE (January 1st, 2010).
3. Educational and labor characteristics

The socio-demographic complementarity between the flows of immigrants and the national population has been, along with the economic expansion, the main reason for the immigration boom of the early XXI century. Improvements in the educational profile of the most recent generations of Portuguese, Italians and Spaniards, especially the female generations, and their expectations regarding the participation in a dual labor market are at the root of this unprecedented growth. Human capital investments made by the generations born in the last quarter of the last century in the three countries largely explain the attraction toward immigration. The immigrant population operates, in this context, as an offer that supplies the need of a qualified workforce in a labor market relatively inflexible (Piore, 1979). This fact highlights the importance of the socio-demographic complementarity between generations of nationals and foreigners. Finally, we must also consider that the massive influx of migrants occurred during the first years of the century, will increase even more the duality in the labor market. Therefore, it is important to understand the educational and occupational profiles that the African population has in each of these countries.

Regarding African labor and educational characteristics in Portugal, data from the Portuguese 2001 Census has shown that this population occupies the lowest non-qualified job categories and has a very low level of education in most of the cases, fact that is confirmed by the literature using different data sources (Barganha et al., 2002; OECD, 2007; Peixoto, 2008). Moreover, the number of Africans working in the informal labor market is very high, although it is a strong characteristic of the Portuguese labor market in general (Peixoto, 2008), and the upward labor mobility is very limited (Oliveira, 2006, for the Cabo Verde immigrants). Peixoto (2008) highlights that there are very few studies that deeply analyze the labor trajectories of immigrants from the PALOP countries in Portugal, nonetheless, the available data give us some clue about it.

Although the employment rates among African immigrants are very high, for men the value is smaller than the average of the total population and very similar to the natives’ values. In the case of women, Cape Verdeans show a high participation in the labor market but the percentage of women from other PALOP countries is much lower and the unemployment rates much higher in comparison to other origins (see table I.2). More than 90% of the women from Cape-Verde and almost 80% of women from the PALOP countries are working in elementary occupations or as service workers. Men are more represented in elementary and construction-related occupations —more than 90% of Cape-Verdeans and more than 80% of other immigrants from the PALOP countries. On the educational profile, Cape-Verdeans show a very low profile with more than 80% of the population holding a very low level of education. Other PALOP countries have a more heterogeneous profile, although almost 75% of the population holds a very low or a low level of education (see table I.3).

Data from the Istituto Nazionale per L’Assicurazione Contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro (Inail) is the most updated available data on immigrants in the Italian labor market, although it just considers regular workers. According to it, the participation of Africans in the regular working force has decreased since the beginning of the decade of 2000. If in 2002 they represented 28.2% of the foreign workers, the value for 2006 was a 20.7% and for 2008 a 17.6%. This decrease could be related mainly to the increase of other non-African nationalities but also to the migration to the informal labor market, to unemployment or to emigration. The participation of women is very low with the exception of the Cape Verdeans (72.6% are registered in the working force). Nanni (2010) attributes it both to the importance of informal work among women and to family decisions regarding the gender role. Considering the different activity areas, Africans are over-represented in the industry sector in comparison to the value for the total number of immigrants. The agriculture sector is particularly important in the case of Tunisians working as fishermen and peasants in the region of Sicilia. In the service sector, domestic service and hotels and restaurant sectors are important niches (see table I.4).

---

4 Data from the Labour Force Survey is much more complete, nonetheless the microdata is not available to explore detailed information on immigrants.
TABLE I.2
PORTUGAL, 2001: IMMIGRANTS’ EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATES, BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH AND SEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of birth</th>
<th>Employment rate</th>
<th>Unemployment rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>67.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other PALOP</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>65.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern and South-Eastern Europe</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>77.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-15</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total foreign-born foreigners</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>58.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native-born</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>55.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Abecasis (2008), based on the Portuguese 2001 Census data.

TABLE I.3
PORTUGAL, 2001: IMMIGRANTS’ QUALIFICATION LEVEL, BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH AND SEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of birth</th>
<th>Very low (ISCED 0-1)</th>
<th>Of which illiterate</th>
<th>Low (ISCED 2)</th>
<th>Medium (ISCED 3-4)</th>
<th>High (ISCED&gt;=5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other PALOP</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern and South-Eastern Europe</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-15</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native-born</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Abecasis (2008), based on the Portuguese 2001 Census data.
Note: ISCED: International Standard Classification of Education, UNESCO.

Gil, Domingo and Bayona (2009) have compared educational and labor characteristics of the Maghreb immigrants in Italy and Spain. Education levels of Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian immigrants in Spain and Italy are similar to those of the rest of the population in their countries of origin. Table I.5 shows that most immigrants have low education levels. However, it should be also stated that those with a university degree are over-represented, possibly because they are the most prepared to leave if they do not find job opportunities in their own country, and try luck in other ones where their preparation might possibly be better valued (Fergany, 2009). Maghreb immigrants in Italy, except Tunisians, also seem to have a better education level than in Spain, though differences are not that large. In fact, very few Tunisians live in Spain, and some of them probably have a particular profile (are students or senior managers or skilled workers). Generally speaking, Moroccan immigrants, and particularly those living in Spain (the majority of Maghrebi immigrants in this country), have the lowest education level out of those analysed, reflecting, therefore, their country’s situation in this field. Algerian and Tunisian immigrants, on their hand, it is somewhat higher. However, the lowest levels are found among Algerians living in Spain and Tunisians living in Italy.
TABLE I.4
ITALY, DECEMBER 31TH, 2008: AFRICAN WORKERS
BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH AND ACTIVITY SECTOR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of birth</th>
<th>Total workers</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total immigrants</td>
<td>2 998 462</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Africa</td>
<td>528.709</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>213 926</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>216 811</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>48 883</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>48 251</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>26 969</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>24 945</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>14 125</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>12 774</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>12 348</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan Arab Jamahiriya</td>
<td>9 271</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>6 229</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>5 783</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>5 159</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>5 095</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>3 837</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape-Verde</td>
<td>3 056</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nanni (2010), Dossier Statistico Immigrazione Caritas/Migrantes, based on data from the Istituto Nazionale per L’Assicurazione Contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro.

TABLE I.5
SPAIN AND ITALY, 2006-2007: PERCENTAGES OF ALGERIANS, MOROCCANS, AND TUNISIANS BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of residence</th>
<th>Educational level</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Algerian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Low education level (ISCED 0-2); medium education level (ISCED 3-4); high education level (ISCED 5-6).

2008 data from The European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) allow to compare characteristics from Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian immigrants with those of the Spanish and Italian populations, and those of foreigners and non EU citizens. It also permits to observe differences by sex. There is no data for Tunisians living in Spain because very few were included in the sample (see table I.6). The novelty here in comparison to the previous table is the high percentage of Algerian...
women holding a university degree and living in Spain and Italy. Though they are small populations which probably have a different profile from that of the rest of the Maghreb migrants (students and professionals would be overrepresented), it is worth underlining their existence, as this migration could be fed by the high educated female unemployment rates in their own countries as well as for the troubled recent history of the country of origin.

As for the comparison between the three nationalities analyzed and the local population, all foreigners and non EU citizens, it has also given interesting results. Foreigners in general, particularly non EU citizens, have a lower education level than Italian and Spanish nationals, except for women of the latter nationality, as more Spanish women than foreign ones have only attained primary education, but it should also be taken into account that most of them belong to elderly cohorts. However, the main point we would like to underline here is that, despite the above mentioned very specific and not very numerous exceptions of Algerian women in Spain and Italy both male and female immigrants from the Maghreb, but particularly the latter, have a lower education level than non EU citizens and foreigners in general.

| TABLE I.6 |
| SPAIN AND ITALY, 2008: EDUCATIONAL LEVEL DISTRIBUTION BY NATIONALITY AND SEX |
| (In percentages) |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Italy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natives</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Both sexes</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Both sexes</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non EU27</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Both sexes</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Both sexes</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Both sexes</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Both sexes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gil, Domingo and Bayona (2009), European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS), 2008 annual data.

Note: Education level defined as “highest level of education or training successfully completed” has been simplified as a three level variable HATLEV1D to improve comparability: Low – lower secondary (ISCED 0-2); Medium – upper secondary (ISCED 3-4); High – Third level (ISCED 5-6).

Regarding labor insertion in Italy and Spain, the authors presented the most detailed comparative analysis available (Gil et al., 2009). According to the EU-LFS annual data for 2008, Maghreb immigrants living in Spain and Italy have, in comparison to other immigrants, low female labor market integration, lower employment and much higher unemployment rates. While male
immigrants from the analyzed countries have similar or even higher participation rates than local male workers and other foreigners (except for Moroccan men living in Spain who have exceptionally low rates), women tend to have very low activity rates; much lower than local women and, of course, than other foreign women, who have the highest participation rates in Italy and Spain (see table I.7).

### TABLE I.7

**SPAIN AND ITALY, 2008: LABOR PARTICIPATION, EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATES, BY NATIONALITY AND SEX**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Italy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natives</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>80.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>61.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Both sexes</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>87.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>69.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Both sexes</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>78.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non EU27</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>81.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Both sexes</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>66.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>73.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Both sexes</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>61.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>88.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Both sexes</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>68.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Both sexes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gil, Domingo and Bayona (2009), based on data from the European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS), 2008 annual data.

Maghreb women living in Italy have had the lowest participation rates, while Moroccan women in Spain have had the highest ones, though only around 40%. Men, on the other hand, have had higher employment rates. Even though their activity rates were similar to those of local men, their employment rates are visibly lower, even lower than those of other foreigners in general, and than those of non EU citizens. Italy would be the exception, as Tunisians, Moroccans and Algerians have even higher employment rates than Italians themselves, although not higher than all foreigners together. However, the situation in Spain is worse for them, as only between one half and three quarters of Maghreb immigrants living there are employed. This obviously results in very high unemployment rates, much higher than those of local men and all foreigners. This is presently even more so if we keep in mind that LFS from 2008 data did not yet fully take into account the present global economic crisis. As female unemployment rates are higher than male ones, Moroccans have higher rates than the rest of nationalities, and Spain has the highest rates among the destination countries.

As we have observed, Maghreb immigrants are not well integrated in Spanish or Italian labour markets. However, the analysis by sector is even worse, as can be observed in Table I.8. This table combines the three Maghreb nationalities together to avoid reliability and confidentiality.
problems. As it has been able to observe in the former tables, Tunisians, Moroccans and Algerians have similar labour characteristics and they are quite different from those of other immigrants, therefore we consider that we have not lost any basic information by carrying out this aggregation. However, even then, some cells continue to be blank.

### TABLE I.8

**SPAIN AND ITALY, 2008: PERCENTAGE OF EMPLOYED BY ACTIVITY SECTOR, NATIONALITY AND SEX**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Activity sector</th>
<th>Natives Males</th>
<th>Natives Females</th>
<th>Foreigners Males</th>
<th>Foreigners Females</th>
<th>Non EU-27 Males</th>
<th>Non EU-27 Female</th>
<th>Maghreb Males</th>
<th>Maghreb Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Agriculture and fishing</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public admin., education and</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Industry, transport and mining</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial and real estate</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hotels, rest. And whol. And</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private home and personal</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Agriculture and fishing</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public admin., education and</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Industry, transport and mining</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial and real estate</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hotels, rest. And whol. And</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private home and personal</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gil, Domingo and Bayona (2009), based on data from the European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS), 2008 annual data.

Generally speaking, immigrants from the Maghreb are under-represented in the sectors with higher salaries and better working conditions like the public services (education, health) and the public administration. Their absence from the latter is relatively logical as some of its posts are reserved for nationals. However, Maghreb immigrants are over-represented in the hardest, more unstable, less prestigious, and generally worse paid jobs. Maghreb men are particularly working in the construction, the industrial sector, and in the low capital intensive but high labor intensive service sector such as hotels, restaurants, or trade. However, there are some specific characteristics of the destination countries, like the weight of construction in the Spanish economy or industry in the Italian one, which should also be taken into account. Although Maghreb immigrants share these characteristics with other immigrants, particularly non EU citizens, their excessive weight in the industrial sector in Italy or, as Cohen (1995: 293) already underlined more than a decade ago, in the Spanish agricultural sector, would indicate that they are in an inferior position than other immigrants.

Women, on their side, follow the same general trend. More than a third Maghreb female immigrants working in Spain and Italy do it in the domestic service while hotels, the trade sector, industry, and the financial-real estate sector would be, at a great distance, the next main employers. However, it should be reminded that only a very low percentage of them are economically active.

The last element of analysis related to labor market characteristics is the distribution of occupations by nationalities (Table I.9). In the two countries, Maghreb immigrant men basically work in elementary occupations or as craftworkers. In Spain they also work in trade and in Italy as plant and machine operators. However, very few of them work as managers, professionals, clerks or as technicians and researchers, even though foreigners as a whole and, obviously, local workers have a certain weight in these jobs.

---

5 When the sample is reduced to those employed and it is further de-composed by nationality, activity sector and sex, some nationality sub-samples end containing very few individuals. Therefore results are neither representative nor reliable or they are simply not published by Eurostat when they are under confidentiality limits.
### TABLE I.9

**SPAIN, FRANCE AND ITALY, 2008: PERCENTAGE OF EMPLOYED BY OCCUPATIONAL STATUS, BY NATIONALITY AND SEX**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Natives</th>
<th>Foreigners</th>
<th>Non EU-27</th>
<th>Maghreb</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Clerks</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Craft and related trade workers</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elementary occupations</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legislators, senior officers and</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plant and machine operators</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Service workers and shop and sales</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Skilled agriculture/fishery workers</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technicians and assoc. Professionals</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Clerks</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Craft and related trade workers</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elementary occupations</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legislators, senior officers and</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plant and machine operators</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Service workers and shop and sales</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Skilled agriculture/fishery workers</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technicians and assoc. Professionals</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gil, Domingo and Bayona (2009), based on data from the European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS), 2008 annual data.

Segregation is even stronger among women as they are concentrated in only two types of jobs: elementary occupations, which have, by far, the first position in both countries, and service workers and shop and sales workers. Yet, here again, certain differences between countries should be underlined. More of these women work as artisans or plant and machine operators in Italy than in Spain due to the weight of the manufacturing sector in the Italian economy.

In sum, Maghreb workers usually occupy low category jobs in sectors like domestic service, intensive agriculture, construction or tourism, with a considerable amount of insecure, precarious or/and temporary, low skilled and badly paid jobs. These high numbers of workers in elementary occupations undoubtedly have to do with their low average education level, particularly in women. Many of them do not even enter the labor market or present very high unemployment rates. Moreover, Maghreb immigrants in general endure really bad working conditions in their work, live in places that are in poor conditions and suffer discrimination (Awad, 2009). Although these factors are difficult to measure, they also affect (lack of) integration in the destination countries.

### 4. Territorial distribution

In Italy, Portugal and Spain African Immigrants are mostly concentrated in the more economically developed areas. Spain is the country where the population from Africa is more dispersed along the territory due to the importance and the old presence of Moroccans. Nonetheless, the regional distribution of this population follows the same pattern of the Africans in general. Barcelona (182,706 African residents) and Madrid (126,681) are the main receiving provinces, followed by Murcia (80,496), Gerona (56,166) and Almeria (55,915) (see map I.3). In most of the provinces, the number of Moroccan men is higher than women. The sex ratio for the whole country is around 1.4. The coastal provinces show values a little bit higher due to the concentration of men in the agricultural sector, especially in Almeria, Murcia and Alicante. Barcelona and Madrid, the provinces with the largest number of Moroccans have a sex ratio close to the national total, with a more diversified labor market offer.

The territorial distribution of immigrants in Italy shows that the majority of immigrants reside in the northern and central regions, particularly in the most economically dynamic and industrial
districts. Milano is the Italian district with the highest number of immigrants (90,301 African legal residents) followed by its neighbor Brescia (49,923) and Bergamo (42,298). In the Central region the most important district is Rome (43,479) and in the Northwest part, the district of Torino (43,946). However, Caruso and Venditto (2008) draw the attention to the fact that African immigrants are among the most represented groups in regions with small numbers of immigrants. For instance, in Calabria (13,362 African residents in the 5 Calabrian districts), Moroccans represent a quarter of all foreigner residents (see map I.4). In this sense, the labor market participation would be the main reason for this geographical distribution.

MAP I.3
SPAIN, 2009: TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICANS, BY DISTRICT OF RESIDENCE

Source: Authors’ elaboration with data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE), Spain.

MAP I.4
ITALY, 2009: TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICANS, BY DISTRICT OF RESIDENCE

Source: Authors’ elaboration with data from the Instituto Nazionale di Statistica – ISTAT, Italy.
Finally, the territorial distribution of Africans in Portugal is very similar to the territorial distribution of all the foreigners: most of them are concentrated in the southern region: the district of the capital Lisbon (77,809), and in Setubal (19,528) and Faro (7,839), which are the three areas with the highest economic activity in the country (see map I.5).

C. African population in Spain

1. Introduction

In this chapter we will focus the analysis on the African population in Spain, this population’s main receiving country among all Southern European countries. As it will be shown, the volume and characteristics of this population varies enormously according to the origins. For this reason, we will describe separately the characteristics of North African populations - Moroccans, the principal immigrant group from this region and Algerians, the second North Africans residents in Spain, and the sub-Saharan population that includes some relatively old flows as the Gambians and Senegalese and emerging new flows from other countries of the region. Nonetheless, in order to analyze their labor profile in Spain in comparison to other immigrant groups and with the Spaniards, we will study the group as a whole. This decision is due to two main reasons: firstly, labor insertion and labor characteristics of Africans are very similar regardless of the origins; secondly, because the sample size of the data source —the Labour Force Survey— is very small for most of the sub-Saharan groups.

The evolution of the African population in Spain is paradoxical for several reasons. Firstly, even if the first nationality on the Continuous Register until January 1st 2007 was the Moroccan (surpassed by the Romanians in 2008) and the generalized idea in the rest of the European countries of the overwhelming growth of the African flows due to the continent’s proximity, the empirical evidence of the migratory boom shows that Latin-American and Eastern European nationalities are the ones that have increased their participation in the Spanish population against the Africans, as it has been already shown. Several authors have pointed out the possibility of a positive discrimination to Latin-American and Eastern-European flows, in order to develop an ethnic substitution in Spanish migrations that gradually gained ground over the Moroccan flows (Izquierdo, 2004; Domingo and
Martínez, 2006; Vono, Domingo and Bedoya, 2008). This, more or less undercover, policy has received the support of the Spanish public opinion, that keeps a conflictive relationship with their Moroccan neighbors, not based on their cultural distance, but on a traumatic shared history that has determined the construction of both identities (Stallaert, 1998).

The second paradox could rely on the fact that this difficult relation with the Moroccan immigration could have partially benefited the sub-Saharan’s image, even through applying racist stereotypes based on certain paternalism. In any case, and against the dramatic image of the arrival of ships from the African coast, irregular migration was concentrated on the Latin-American population, and not on the African one. On the third place, and even when the weight and growth of the sub-Saharan population has been relatively scarce compared to other groups, we must point out the number and maturity of some of the still relevant flows, as well as the incorporation of new origins during the first years of the 21st century.

This process has coincided with the aggravation of the Gulf of Guinea countries’ regional crisis basically, as well as the application of restrictive measures on the immigration flows by the Spanish government.

2. Demographic characteristics of the North African flows and population

As seen in the previous chapter, immigrants from North Africa were the most represented non-EU flow until the beginning of the century, when Latin Americans first, and Eastern Europeans later, starred in the boom of international immigration in Spain. Among Africans, Moroccans were both the pioneers and the most represented ones. Along with the flows from Morocco, the only North African flow that has reached a significant volume is the one from Algeria. Although in absolute terms these flows are incomparably lower, entries of Algerians in Spain have been also important.

Between 1998 and 2009 there have been 985,342 entries from Africa, representing a 15.8% of the entire flow from abroad. Among them, Moroccans totalled 655,227 entries, a 66.5% of the entire African group of foreigners, and Algerians totalled 60,240 entries, a 6.1% of this group. Nonetheless, the primacy of Moroccans hides the emergence of sub-Saharan flows in recent years. Thus Moroccans monopolized the 80% of African flows in 1998; in 2009 this percentage had dropped to 62%. This decline in relative terms has been overwhelmingly in favor of sub-Saharan flows, but also for other North African countries, especially Algeria.

As a consequence, Moroccan immigrants are one of the most numerous immigrant groups in Spain and represented 1.6% of the total population stock in January of 2010. Although it is a historical flow, the strongest increase happened in the beginning of the new century: if in 2000 there were 236 thousand immigrants who had been born in Morocco living in the country, by the year 2010 the value was 760 thousand. Figure I.5 shows the evolution of Moroccan and Algerian flows according to sex composition. As it can be seen, during the 1990’s the arrival of men was slightly higher than the arrival of women in both cases. The increase of the flows from the beginning of the 2000’s was accompanied by a change in the sex distribution of them. The vicissitudes of the Spanish immigration policies have marked the evolution of these flows, especially from Morocco.

Thus, while the regularization processes from 2000 and 2001 meant for Latin Americans an opportunity, the announcement of the demand for Schengen visa had an obvious effect in attracting more immigrants, for the Moroccan migration it meant a period of stagnation. This stagnation was clear for the flows of men. In turn, it was observed a slight increase in female flows due to family reunification. The leap in 2004 had an effect on the improvement of data collection but also on the 2005 regularization process. A strong increase of men in comparison to women can be seen in this period until the year 2008, when the flows started to decrease due to the economic crisis. In just one year entries fell from 93,623 in 2008 to 61,766 in 2009, 34% less affecting men to a greater extent than women in the Moroccan example. For Algerians, the drop was less important from 8,014 to 6,376
entries, a 20% less (see figure I.3). It is relevant to mention an important increase in Algerian flows in the years 2000 and 2001. This fact could be related both to the regularization processes in Spain and the political situation in Algeria. Data on return migration indicates that, so far, there is no important return flows towards Morocco and Algeria (Colectivo IOÉ, 2010).

**FIGURE I.3**

**SPAIN, 1992-2009: MOROCCAN AND ALGERIAN FLOWS BY SEX**

The age and sex structure (see figure I.4) of the flows made evident, once more, the importance of young adult men migration among this population. The mean age of Moroccan men is 27 years old and for the women the value is 26.6. In the case of Algerians, men’s average age is 30.5 years old and women’s is 28.7. It is worthwhile to note the important participation of minors in the flows, particularly in the Moroccan case. Minors represented a 20.4% of all Moroccan inflow between 1988 and 2009. For Algerians, the value is 14.4%. The presence of women is also concentrated in
young adult ages and the total women inflow represents a 36.6% and a 28.8% of the total immigrant flow for Moroccans and Algerians respectively.

The results of the characteristics of these flows can be observed both in the Moroccan and Algerian population pyramids: although there is a prevalence of men among the stocks, much more accentuated in the Algerian case, the participation of women is also considerable as well as the presence of minors (see figure I.5). For instance, among the Moroccan group 61.8% are men and 38.2% of the population are women. The 181,613 Moroccan minors represent a 25.3% of all immigrants, a significant value that also indicates the importance of families among this group. In the Algerian case data show a profile that is closer to what has been classically identified as a worker migration pattern: the percentage of men is much higher than in the previous case, a 70.3%. In the same way, the population under 17 years is less represented in the group: in 2009 they were 11,108 and represented a 21% of all Algerian immigrants in Spain. Moroccans’ mean age is 28.8 for men and 25.8 for women. Algerian immigrants show a relatively older population structure for men: the mean age of this population is 32.4 years old. In the case of women, there are no differences in comparison to their Moroccan counterparts: the mean age is also 25.8 years old.
FIGURE I.5
SPAIN, 2009: POPULATION PYRAMID OF THE MOROCCAN AND ALGERIAN CITIZENS

Source: INE, Continuous Register 2009.
3. Demographic characteristics of the sub-Saharan immigrants

Although the flows from sub-Saharan Africa are much lower than the North African ones and did not grow until the second half of the 2000’s, we find among them relatively old flows and flows with a very recent and rapid growth. Immigrants from the former Spanish colony of Equatorial Guinea have a historical presence in the country. In the same direction, migration of Gambian and Senegalese workers is relevant since the nineties. Much later flows from other sub-Saharan countries became significant, mainly from West African countries.

In this sense, among the 240,847 registered resident persons with a sub-Saharan nationality in January of 2010, we can find the resulting population of historic flows like the Equatoguinean (15,595 persons in 2010), or the Gambian (22,168) and the Senegalese (61,970 persons) in extremely different conditions and migratory trajectories. For instance, Equatorial Guinea was a former colony and is legislatively positively discriminated, while Gambia and Senegal are not historically related. Between the new emergent nationalities that have arrived to Spain in the last years, whom can be truncated or definitely transformed by even more restrictive immigration policies, we can point out Nigerians (44,176 persons), Malians (24,228 persons) or Ghanaians (15,692 persons).

If the Eastern-European migration flows in Spain—specifically those from Romania—have been related to circularity; those from the principal sub-Saharan nationalities have been related to the transnationalism concept taking into account the previous paces of the migratory flows in other EU countries. In this case, we must emphasize Senegal, Gambia or Nigeria as sending countries, and France or the UK as receiving countries. The different economic, social and cultural structure of the Spanish context increases the specific interest referred to the socio-demographic characteristics of the sub-Saharan migration not only for the sending countries but also for the flows and the already settled immigrants.

The demographic literature about sub-Saharan population in Spain is scarce. However, the different descriptive approximations that have been developed in fields like anthropology, sociology or geography, have characterized the general socio-demographic profile of the most representative nationalities, frequently grouped or related to the African population, as a whole. Some pioneering works pretend to describe trajectories and profiles without taking demography into account. This is the case with the essays by Vi-Makomé (1990), Sepa (1993) for Catalonia, or the pioneering study on African women’s living conditions by Sipi (1997). We must point out that most of these studies were developed by immigrants from the studied region, but outside the academic field.

In relation to the scientific research framework, during the first years studies referred to sub-Saharan population as a set of the African population as a whole, considering only the main nationalities while including demography as a subsidiary instrument. We can find comparative or monographic studies related to the principal nationalities in González (1995) for Senegalese or Cebrían and Bihina (1998) for the sub-Saharan population as a whole. In this same field, we can find the 1995 qualitative study for the Barcelona’s Metropolitan Area directed by Andreu Domingo (Domingo et al., 1995).

Nevertheless, as we have mentioned before, the reproductive health and the family formation process—even in nuptiality as in fertility—are the demographic behaviors of the sub-Saharan population that have attracted the attention of the scientific community. In this sense, we can find an anthropologic approximation of the Senegambian population in Kaplan (1998) or—specifically referring to nuptiality—in Rodríguez (2004). The distinctive status of the sub-Saharan women has also been treated in Ribas (1999) and Sow (2004). From the demographic field, few works have studied the reproductive behavior on one hand, (Solsóna et al., 2003) and, on the other, the family formation process (Bledsoe, 2006; Bledsoe et al., 2007 and Bledsoe y Sow, 2008). Recently, and specifically for the Senegalese population, there have been some interesting studies
based on data from the MAFE project\(^6\) for Spain (González-Ferrer and Baizán, 2010; González-Ferrer et al., 2010). Even though doctoral thesis about specific nationalities or the sub-Saharan population as a whole set are not new (see Wabgou, 2000, directed by Lorenzo Chacón), there is none from a demographic perspective. Therefore, the first aim of this analysis is to give a panoramic evolution of the migratory flows of the sub-Saharan citizens, and at the second, to analyze their demographic characteristics in Spain.

As we have mentioned before, in the last years the sub-Saharan population in Spain has experienced a change in its composition, specifically in relation to the distribution of the most represented nationalities. Figure I.6 shows the increase of the Malian and the Nigerian population since 1999, being in some cases more numerous than some more settled nationalities. We must take into account that the peak between 2003 and 2004 is due to the flow increase but also to the inclusion of the “omitted registers” in the data source.

\[
\text{FIGURE I.6} \\
\text{SPAIN, 1999-2009: SUB-SAHARAN POPULATION FLOWS}
\]


Sub-Saharan population in Spain has a high masculine component—a 75% of the flows between 1998 and 2009 has been of men (see figure I.7)—and as the rest of origins it has experienced a notorious growth since the end of the nineties. This increase could be directly related to the positive effect on migration incentives generated by the economic growth and the increase in labor demand. Related to the distribution by age during the period 1988-2009 (see figure I.8), the sub-Saharan male population is concentrated at working ages, specifically between 15 and 45 years old (a 90.5% of all men). This can support the theory about economic migration for this specific group, as Cebrián and Cebrián, J. and S. Bihina (1998) suggested in their paper. In the female case, the concentration is even higher for ages between 17 and 37 (70% of all women). Even if those are also working ages that could suggest an economic motivation, it could also prove the existence of a differential migration project taking into account not only the age but also the gender perspective.

\(^6\) The MAFE Project (Migrations between Africa and Europe) is conducted by the Institut National d’Etudes Demographiques (INED-Paris) and focuses on migration flows between Europe (Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, The Netherlands and the UK) and Africa (Senegal, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Ghana) which together account for over a quarter of all African migration to the EU.
4. Demographic characteristics of sub-Saharan population

The 240,847 sub-Saharan residents in Spain on 1 January 2010 represented a 4% of the total foreign population and a 7% of non-EU immigrants. The distribution by nationalities and their characteristics by sex and age are substantially different; the fifteen most represented nationalities account for 96.6% of the total sub-Saharan population. Just the top four, composed by Senegal, Nigeria, Mali and Gambia, concentrate more than a half of them with 63.3% (see Table I.10). Senegal, with almost 62 thousand citizens is the second African nationality in Spain although far from the Moroccan, the first African and the second of the total foreign population. This concentration is correspondent with an unequal sex and age distribution, as we can see in figure I.9 and the population pyramids (figure I.10).
### TABLE I.10
SPAIN, 2010: SUB-SAHARAN NATIONALITIES WITH MORE THAN 1,000 CITIZENS IN THE SPANISH TERRITORY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>61 970</td>
<td>51 230</td>
<td>10 740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>44 176</td>
<td>26 714</td>
<td>17 462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>24 228</td>
<td>22 112</td>
<td>2 116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>22 168</td>
<td>16 935</td>
<td>5 233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>15 692</td>
<td>12 999</td>
<td>2 693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>15 595</td>
<td>5 726</td>
<td>9 869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>12 553</td>
<td>8 987</td>
<td>3 566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>11 803</td>
<td>9 369</td>
<td>2 434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>5 919</td>
<td>3 734</td>
<td>2 185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>5 875</td>
<td>4 568</td>
<td>1 307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape-Verde</td>
<td>3 428</td>
<td>1 483</td>
<td>1 945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>2 969</td>
<td>2 315</td>
<td>654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>2 240</td>
<td>1 406</td>
<td>834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>2 183</td>
<td>1 221</td>
<td>962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Rep. of Congo</td>
<td>1 255</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INE, Continuous Register 2010.

### FIGURE I.9
SPAIN, 2010: SUB-SAHARAN NATIONALITIES WITH MORE THAN 1,000 CITIZENS IN THE SPANISH TERRITORY

Source: INE, Continuous Register 2010.
FIGURE I.10
SPAIN, 2009: POPULATION PYRAMIDS OF THE MAIN SUB-SAHARAN CITIZENS

Senegal

Nigeria

Mali

Gambia

Ghana

Guinea

(continued)
Figure I.10 (continued)
Figure I.10 (concluded)

Source: INE, Continuous Register 2009.

If we analyze the age and sex structure of the main 15 sub-Saharan nationalities in Spain, we will soon find out the heterogeneous distribution behind them. Even if the majority is characterized by a strong sex ratio imbalance in favor of males and their youth, just as expected in economic migrant flows, the contrasts between them are quite remarkable. Just to mention the first two nationalities, male proportion varies between the 83.4% of the Senegalese and the 61.4% of the Nigerians. We must point out how this structure reflects different migratory processes in these two cases, specifically in relation to the women’s role: basically subordinated to family reunion in the Senegalese case, but independent from family ties for Nigerians. The high presence of men is present not only in those populations formed by the older flows like the Senegalese but also in the new ones, like the Malians (92.5% masculine effective).

However, we can also find the opposite case in the Equatoguinean and Cape Verdean pyramids, which are characterized by a female majority with 36.5 and 44.2% male population respectively. Sex imbalance proves the existence of clearly differentiated migratory strategies. The exceptional situation of Equatorial Guinea is influenced by its former colony condition and the previous existence of highly differentiated migratory chains according to the ethnic group, Fang or Bubi, but with a strong female component that arrived as students (Sepa, 1993). Cape Verdean migration from its origins —mainly from Portugal— has counted with a strong feminine presence and independent migratory circuits with respect to the masculine (Domingo et al., 2008). This segregation has also arrived to the spatial distribution of Cape Verdeans: women are house workers in Madrid, while men were originally concentrated in Leon mining region but were later attracted to the Galician fishing industry (Prieto and López, 1993; López, 1996). Something similar could have happened to Angolans —former Portuguese colony— whose migratory flows are very evenly distributed, with 57.4% men.

Differences in sex structure indicate the diversity in sub-Saharan migratory flows for each considered nationality. As we have mentioned before, all of them are characterized by their youth with an average age between 25 years for Gambians and 33 years for Cape Verdeans. In this case, the Gambian population pyramid is more than eloquent: the weight of the population under 18 (maximum age for family reunion in the case of children) reaches 29% of the total, showing both the antiquity of the flows and the familiar settlement of their population. If we compare it against the Senegalese, minors only reach 12% of their population but we must take into account that 53% of them were born in Spain. The contrast between the Senegalese and the Gambian pyramids is quite significant in order to establish the necessary hypotheses related to the future behavior of the newest flows like Malians,
Ghanaians, Guineans, Mauritanians or Cameroonians. In that sense, the increased presence of women and minors in Guineans and Cameroonians may indicate a family strategy similar to the one of Gambians, clearly opposed to the rest of the nationalities whose profile is similar to the Senegalese.

5. When the crisis came: African population in the Spanish labor market

The evolution of employment of Africans in Spain that we present in this final section is a good example of the impact of the economic crisis on the African population in the Southern European countries. In order to analyze the data, we return to the aggregated data due to the lack of significant data on sub-Saharan population from the Labor Force Survey, and focus only on the evolution of employment to avoid repeating what has been said in the previous section in terms of distribution in sectors of activity. The African group was defined according to their country of birth, and considering men and women separately because of their specificities in the labor market.

It is necessary to consider the evolution of the labor characteristics over time in order to identify two main patterns. Firstly, apart from the volume and length of settlement, Africans show a very low percentage of employed population among all workers in the country, particularly among women. By the end of 2010, African men represented 2.7% of the total employed population in Spain. For women, the value is 1.2%. For instance, the participation of Latin-Americans among workers in Spain has grown in a much more pronounced way in comparison to all other immigrant groups. This extraordinary acceleration of Latin-Americans is due to an increase in the total volume of these inflows but also to the participation of women that is far more significant than among the rest of immigrants in the Spanish labor market.

Moreover, as it can be observed in figure I.11, the percentage of employed Africans over time is quite stable for both sexes, although in absolute numbers there was a significant evolution during these 10 years: if in 1999 there were 24 thousands occupied men from Africa, in the year 2010 the value was 278 thousands. For women the value was 24 thousand and 102 thousand respectively. In comparison to other immigrant groups, the number of African women in the labor market is relatively small when we look at the numbers: for instance, in the year 2010 there were 859 thousand Latin-Americans and 301 thousand non-EU Europeans occupied. In the case of men the difference is smaller, although still significant (see tables I.11 and I.12).

Secondly, Africans are the most affected by unemployment, particularly during the economic crisis (figure I.12). For men, unemployed Africans varied from 16.2% (17,343 individuals) in 1999 to 44% of the population in 2010 (218,010 individuals). For women, the variation was from 33% (11,906 women) to 51% (110,660 women) respectively. Eastern Europeans, the second most affected group had in 2010 unemployment rates much lower: 31.7% for men and 26.8% for women.

Regarding the distribution of Africans according to occupation categories, no substantial changes can be observed over the same period: the group is still concentrated in the lower occupational categories (Vono, 2010). Nonetheless, important changes have happened: it was observed between 2007 and 2010 a decrease in the number of temporary workers among Africans, especially in the agriculture sector. In turn, there was an important increase in the number of indefinite working contracts, most of them part-time jobs for African women in precarious working conditions. There is evidence that the participation of Moroccan women in the labor market has increased in the last years as a response from the households to the crisis: the activity rate has increased from 41% in 2007 to 50% in 2010 (Colectivo IOÊ, 2010 based on data from the Labour Force Survey). In this sense, the traditional role of these women as housewives has to be questioned and relativized.
FIGURE I.11

Men

Women

FIGURE I.12
SPAIN, 1999-2010: UNEMPLOYMENT RATES BY REGION OF BIRTH AND SEX

Men

Women

### TABLE I.11
SPANISH, 1999-2010: MALE IMMIGRANTS BY REGION OF BIRTH, EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND YEAR OF THE SURVEY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of birth</th>
<th>Employment status</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 085 905</td>
<td>964 927</td>
<td>736 572</td>
<td>793 263</td>
<td>826 014</td>
<td>820 873</td>
<td>745 496</td>
<td>630 260</td>
<td>576 125</td>
<td>842 523</td>
<td>1 579 950</td>
<td>1 802 520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td></td>
<td>9 023 232</td>
<td>9 288 828</td>
<td>9 477 844</td>
<td>9 571 207</td>
<td>9 636 632</td>
<td>9 673 919</td>
<td>9 985 430</td>
<td>9 986 267</td>
<td>9 107 232</td>
<td>9 818 233</td>
<td>8 919 305</td>
<td>8 722 750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EAP*</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 109 137</td>
<td>10 253 755</td>
<td>10 214 416</td>
<td>10 364 70</td>
<td>10 462 646</td>
<td>10 494 793</td>
<td>10 604 926</td>
<td>10 616 528</td>
<td>10 648 357</td>
<td>10 660 756</td>
<td>10 499 256</td>
<td>10 525 270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total foreigners</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td></td>
<td>41 031</td>
<td>54 538</td>
<td>66 285</td>
<td>83 588</td>
<td>118 959</td>
<td>150 455</td>
<td>143 558</td>
<td>163 604</td>
<td>202 912</td>
<td>325 923</td>
<td>690 279</td>
<td>735 390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td></td>
<td>310 587</td>
<td>415 252</td>
<td>576 484</td>
<td>716 006</td>
<td>925 900</td>
<td>1 134 234</td>
<td>1 366 852</td>
<td>1 690 780</td>
<td>1 842 719</td>
<td>1 911 863</td>
<td>1 669 672</td>
<td>1 611 180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EAP*</td>
<td></td>
<td>351 618</td>
<td>469 790</td>
<td>642 770</td>
<td>799 594</td>
<td>1 044 859</td>
<td>1 284 690</td>
<td>1 510 410</td>
<td>1 773 383</td>
<td>2 045 631</td>
<td>2 237 786</td>
<td>2 359 951</td>
<td>2 346 570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td></td>
<td>17 343</td>
<td>22 159</td>
<td>25 210</td>
<td>31 604</td>
<td>36 867</td>
<td>46 079</td>
<td>49 588</td>
<td>56 955</td>
<td>57 905</td>
<td>108 240</td>
<td>190 404</td>
<td>218 010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td></td>
<td>89 792</td>
<td>103 649</td>
<td>131 347</td>
<td>150 283</td>
<td>211 137</td>
<td>227 522</td>
<td>273 858</td>
<td>357 427</td>
<td>385 916</td>
<td>371 250</td>
<td>285 643</td>
<td>278 350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EAP*</td>
<td></td>
<td>107 135</td>
<td>125 808</td>
<td>156 556</td>
<td>181 887</td>
<td>248 004</td>
<td>273 601</td>
<td>323 446</td>
<td>414 382</td>
<td>443 821</td>
<td>479 490</td>
<td>476 046</td>
<td>496 360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 124</td>
<td>1 862</td>
<td>2 419</td>
<td>3 250</td>
<td>1 501</td>
<td>2 384</td>
<td>1 380</td>
<td>4 957</td>
<td>8 663</td>
<td>14 653</td>
<td>16 640</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td></td>
<td>18 215</td>
<td>25 265</td>
<td>36 226</td>
<td>24 331</td>
<td>24 210</td>
<td>43 904</td>
<td>42 074</td>
<td>48 644</td>
<td>57 068</td>
<td>84 637</td>
<td>86 445</td>
<td>94 770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EAP*</td>
<td></td>
<td>21 338</td>
<td>27 127</td>
<td>36 226</td>
<td>26 750</td>
<td>27 460</td>
<td>45 405</td>
<td>44 457</td>
<td>50 024</td>
<td>62 024</td>
<td>93 301</td>
<td>101 097</td>
<td>111 410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 286</td>
<td>13 657</td>
<td>9 721</td>
<td>13 330</td>
<td>12 936</td>
<td>21 065</td>
<td>17 579</td>
<td>16 018</td>
<td>23 975</td>
<td>21 447</td>
<td>46 145</td>
<td>67 910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td></td>
<td>110 982</td>
<td>145 052</td>
<td>163 334</td>
<td>181 647</td>
<td>186 021</td>
<td>206 086</td>
<td>197 591</td>
<td>216 236</td>
<td>259 203</td>
<td>261 266</td>
<td>243 983</td>
<td>259 910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EAP*</td>
<td></td>
<td>121 269</td>
<td>158 709</td>
<td>173 055</td>
<td>194 977</td>
<td>198 957</td>
<td>227 150</td>
<td>215 170</td>
<td>232 254</td>
<td>283 177</td>
<td>282 714</td>
<td>290 130</td>
<td>327 820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin-America</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td></td>
<td>8 421</td>
<td>12 530</td>
<td>28 397</td>
<td>27 725</td>
<td>52 327</td>
<td>57 223</td>
<td>54 996</td>
<td>61 882</td>
<td>75 126</td>
<td>130 371</td>
<td>311 015</td>
<td>296 770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td></td>
<td>75 959</td>
<td>111 731</td>
<td>181 629</td>
<td>269 454</td>
<td>342 513</td>
<td>470 549</td>
<td>596 762</td>
<td>710 302</td>
<td>789 835</td>
<td>844 816</td>
<td>732 604</td>
<td>680 860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EAP*</td>
<td></td>
<td>84 380</td>
<td>124 261</td>
<td>210 027</td>
<td>297 180</td>
<td>394 840</td>
<td>527 773</td>
<td>651 758</td>
<td>772 184</td>
<td>864 962</td>
<td>975 187</td>
<td>1 043 618</td>
<td>977 630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others Europe</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 190</td>
<td>3 352</td>
<td>2 845</td>
<td>8 365</td>
<td>13 053</td>
<td>23 993</td>
<td>20 170</td>
<td>26 773</td>
<td>39 078</td>
<td>68 849</td>
<td>127 556</td>
<td>135 080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td></td>
<td>11 128</td>
<td>24 184</td>
<td>60 957</td>
<td>79 537</td>
<td>150 456</td>
<td>181 684</td>
<td>251 963</td>
<td>271 386</td>
<td>340 649</td>
<td>369 971</td>
<td>314 796</td>
<td>291 160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EAP*</td>
<td></td>
<td>12 318</td>
<td>27 356</td>
<td>63 802</td>
<td>87 902</td>
<td>163 510</td>
<td>205 677</td>
<td>270 974</td>
<td>298 160</td>
<td>379 728</td>
<td>438 820</td>
<td>442 352</td>
<td>426 240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Economically Active Population.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>1 437 931</td>
<td>1 437 931</td>
<td>1 437 931</td>
<td>1 437 931</td>
<td>1 437 931</td>
<td>1 437 931</td>
<td>1 437 931</td>
<td>1 437 931</td>
<td>1 437 931</td>
<td>1 437 931</td>
<td>1 437 931</td>
<td>1 437 931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>5 177 018</td>
<td>5 177 018</td>
<td>5 177 018</td>
<td>5 177 018</td>
<td>5 177 018</td>
<td>5 177 018</td>
<td>5 177 018</td>
<td>5 177 018</td>
<td>5 177 018</td>
<td>5 177 018</td>
<td>5 177 018</td>
<td>5 177 018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EAPa</td>
<td>13 218 344</td>
<td>13 218 344</td>
<td>13 218 344</td>
<td>13 218 344</td>
<td>13 218 344</td>
<td>13 218 344</td>
<td>13 218 344</td>
<td>13 218 344</td>
<td>13 218 344</td>
<td>13 218 344</td>
<td>13 218 344</td>
<td>13 218 344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>1 467 429</td>
<td>1 467 429</td>
<td>1 467 429</td>
<td>1 467 429</td>
<td>1 467 429</td>
<td>1 467 429</td>
<td>1 467 429</td>
<td>1 467 429</td>
<td>1 467 429</td>
<td>1 467 429</td>
<td>1 467 429</td>
<td>1 467 429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total foreigners</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>6 793 918</td>
<td>6 793 918</td>
<td>6 793 918</td>
<td>6 793 918</td>
<td>6 793 918</td>
<td>6 793 918</td>
<td>6 793 918</td>
<td>6 793 918</td>
<td>6 793 918</td>
<td>6 793 918</td>
<td>6 793 918</td>
<td>6 793 918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EAPa</td>
<td>192 813</td>
<td>192 813</td>
<td>192 813</td>
<td>192 813</td>
<td>192 813</td>
<td>192 813</td>
<td>192 813</td>
<td>192 813</td>
<td>192 813</td>
<td>192 813</td>
<td>192 813</td>
<td>192 813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>26 684</td>
<td>26 684</td>
<td>26 684</td>
<td>26 684</td>
<td>26 684</td>
<td>26 684</td>
<td>26 684</td>
<td>26 684</td>
<td>26 684</td>
<td>26 684</td>
<td>26 684</td>
<td>26 684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>86 857</td>
<td>86 857</td>
<td>86 857</td>
<td>86 857</td>
<td>86 857</td>
<td>86 857</td>
<td>86 857</td>
<td>86 857</td>
<td>86 857</td>
<td>86 857</td>
<td>86 857</td>
<td>86 857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EAPa</td>
<td>1 491 610</td>
<td>1 491 610</td>
<td>1 491 610</td>
<td>1 491 610</td>
<td>1 491 610</td>
<td>1 491 610</td>
<td>1 491 609</td>
<td>1 491 610</td>
<td>1 491 610</td>
<td>1 491 610</td>
<td>1 491 610</td>
<td>1 491 610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin-America</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>20 180</td>
<td>20 180</td>
<td>20 180</td>
<td>20 180</td>
<td>20 180</td>
<td>20 180</td>
<td>20 180</td>
<td>20 180</td>
<td>20 180</td>
<td>20 180</td>
<td>20 180</td>
<td>20 180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>85 777</td>
<td>85 777</td>
<td>85 777</td>
<td>85 777</td>
<td>85 777</td>
<td>85 777</td>
<td>85 777</td>
<td>85 777</td>
<td>85 777</td>
<td>85 777</td>
<td>85 777</td>
<td>85 777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EAP</td>
<td>105 957</td>
<td>105 957</td>
<td>105 957</td>
<td>105 957</td>
<td>105 957</td>
<td>105 957</td>
<td>105 957</td>
<td>105 957</td>
<td>105 957</td>
<td>105 957</td>
<td>105 957</td>
<td>105 957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others Europe</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>3 133</td>
<td>3 133</td>
<td>3 133</td>
<td>3 133</td>
<td>3 133</td>
<td>3 133</td>
<td>3 133</td>
<td>3 133</td>
<td>3 133</td>
<td>3 133</td>
<td>3 133</td>
<td>3 133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>10 452</td>
<td>10 452</td>
<td>10 452</td>
<td>10 452</td>
<td>10 452</td>
<td>10 452</td>
<td>10 452</td>
<td>10 452</td>
<td>10 452</td>
<td>10 452</td>
<td>10 452</td>
<td>10 452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EAPa</td>
<td>4 977 177</td>
<td>4 977 177</td>
<td>4 977 177</td>
<td>4 977 177</td>
<td>4 977 177</td>
<td>4 977 177</td>
<td>4 977 177</td>
<td>4 977 177</td>
<td>4 977 177</td>
<td>4 977 177</td>
<td>4 977 177</td>
<td>4 977 177</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: North-America and Oceania is not mentioned for women due to the non representativeness of the sample size.

a Economically Active Population.
6. Final considerations: Demographic enigmas of the sub-Saharan migration in Spain

From the description of the African flows to Spain since 1988, the reasons behind their stagnation during the migratory boom remain unexplained. In that sense, the first question that raises the sub-Saharan migration refers to the direction and the effectiveness of the flow’s control and selection under the Spanish—but also the EU—and the African migration relationship. As we have mentioned before, our hypothesis is that African flows have experienced a higher control than the rest, especially those from Eastern Europe and Latin America. But if that is true, we should also explain the reactivation and the increase of the African flows since 2003.

The demographic approach to the migratory process and the settlement of sub-Saharan population in Spain has two clear limitations. On the first place, the statistical filter that provides the raw material for the demographic analysis is not sensitive to the reality beyond the national definitions. We specifically refer to the ethnic diversity that is not considered in official statistics and—as in the case of Gambians or Senegalese—are grouped under the same label. Their migration process, territorial distribution, economic activity or demographic behavior could significantly vary between them but we can just analyze the aggregated perspective. On the second place, the accumulation of bias generated due to population statistical coverage, demographic events or the report by itself, makes the interpretation of results extremely difficult. In that sense, a multidisciplinary approach that combines different methods and techniques with other qualitative disciplines like anthropology could be the best tool to understand the sub-Saharans reality in Spain.

D. Conclusions

African immigration in Italy, Spain and Portugal has responded to the same economic and demographic factors: a labor demand caused by an economic growth during the first years of the new millennium that has been abruptly cut due to the economic crisis. The roots of the special intensity that it has acquired are to be found in the improvements in educational attainment of the nationals of these countries, especially among younger generations, particularly among female generations. Such promotion due to human capital investments explains the specific demand for foreign low-skilled labor force. If we add to this the relative weakness of the Welfare State system in those countries (compared to their partners in the North and Centre of the EU), and the increase in life expectancy, it is also possible to understand the increase of the demand for low-skilled workers in a strongly dual labor market, evident in specific sectors as the domestic service to the extent that some authors have talked of the internationalization of the domestic work. This situation is at the basis of the growing presence of women in the international flows.

The African population present low levels of female participation in the labor market, except for the various sub-Saharan nationalities in Portugal. Generally, the population from Latin-America and the Eastern European countries has covered most of the demand in Spain and Italy. In any case, the more profound the changes between generations in the host countries, the more intense the arrival of migrants in general and Africans in particular. It can be added to this scenario the relative scarcity of labor force due to structural population deficits caused by the sudden and severe drop in fertility rates from the mid-seventies until the mid-nineties, although it was not the cause itself that has helped the rapid and massive labor integration of the newcomers.

Legislation has also had a role in the evolution of the flows from Africa and the settlement and living conditions of this population in each of the three countries. In this respect, the differences between the Africans in Portugal on the one hand, and in Spain and Italy, on the other, are paradigmatic. Similarly to what has happened in Spain with the Latin-American immigration, the belonging to a recognized historical community through the language, enhanced by the nationalist rhetoric during dictatorship periods (Franco in the Spanish case and Salazar in the Portuguese),
favored a pro-immigration legislation towards the ex colonies, when both Spain and Portugal remained as countries of emigration. This positive discrimination has been particularly important in order to access the local nationality. Furthermore, we should also consider the opportunities given to the descendants of former Portuguese, Spanish or Italian emigrants. If we add to this the social capital that language proficiency represents for these immigrants and the favorable prejudice by the native population, it is possible to understand the differing status of the Africans in Portugal on the one hand, and in Spain (and to a lesser extent in Italy), on the other.

Thus, sub-Saharan immigration in Portugal is much more numerous, with the specific presence of a few represented nationalities in Italy and Spain such as the nationals from Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde and Sao Tome. The demographic profile of this population does not show the gender imbalance that appears between the Senegalese and Gambian population in the other two host countries. Regarding the North Africans in Spain, it is necessary to consider the political context in order to understand their characteristics. Although Moroccans have been one of the oldest non-EU group in the country, they show worse characteristics in comparison to other foreigners who arrived later. In this sense it is particularly relevant to mention the Latin-American immigrants who have shifted and limited the upward social mobility of the Maghreb population in general and Moroccans in particular. To the negative discriminatory law (especially regarding the access to the Spanish nationality) we should add discrimination among the natives towards Africans, derived from a shared history rather than cultural differences (Stallaert, 1998), and what some authors believe to be a deliberate policy of replacement according to the origin of immigrants, favoring the Latin American and Eastern European nationals in detriment of Africans (Izquierdo et al., 2002; Domingo, 2005).

The spatial distribution of African immigration in the three countries highlights the role of labor supply in each of them above the characteristics of migrants themselves. The low level of education among the African population put them closer to the real requirements of the job offer in these countries, a low skill profile in agriculture, services and construction sectors in comparison to other immigrants. This factor could be interpreted as a comparative advantage in the integration of African population in the destination countries. Nonetheless, with the economic crisis this characteristic constitutes a hazard, both in short and long terms. In this sense, the improvement in the levels of education of the immigrant population is one of the biggest challenges for Africans today.

Although the data available so far for the three countries does not allow us to observe the facts, we could expect that the economic crisis may cause a significant shift in the landscape of African immigration. There are three main factors to be considered: (i) the depth of the crisis in each of the receiving countries; (ii) the characteristics of the African population settled in them; and, (iii) the political and socio-economic impact of the crisis in the African sending countries (see also box I.1). In the first case, the economic crisis in Portugal, which involves the rescue by its EU partners, implies a severe rise in unemployment and job insecurity that seriously affects African immigrants. The same is true of the other two countries in a greater or lesser extent. In the Spanish case, the country is under a strong restructuration process that is also characterized by the destruction of many jobs. This situation is more serious for men than for women, since labor demand in the domestic sector has not fallen with the same intensity in men-related occupations.

Although the available data for each of the countries in study does not allow us to estimate the impact of the crisis on the households considering the different nationalities, we cannot forget that one of the darkest sides of the economic crisis is precisely the deterioration of living conditions for both nationals and immigrants. In the three countries the number of home-owners is much higher than in other EU countries. The access to property among the immigrant population, especially from Africa has been associated to social status and upward mobility. With the crisis, the previous access to mortgages added to unemployment has led to many cases of insolvency, and an increasing space segregation.

As it has been shown, a significant number of the African immigrants work in the construction, agriculture and industrial sectors, the most affected economic sectors of the economy and where a higher competition among foreign groups and also with natives can be observed.
However, the economic impact of the crisis in the households may increase the participation of women in the labor market among those who have not opted for a return migration. Among the immigrant youth and the second generations looking for employment, the effect of the crisis can frustrate their expectations and have an impact on their integration process in general. Although the situation for each African nationality, despite everything, is also very heterogeneous in each of the countries we have studied, they have in common the challenge of improving their educational levels. Finally we must consider the impact of the crisis on the countries of origin. Despite geographical proximity, in the short-term return migration can be frustrated because of both the situation of uncertainty and insecurity in the countries of destination and the impact of the crisis itself and the social and political uncertainty generated in the sending countries.

BOX I.1
THE EUROPEAN IMMIGRATION POLICY TOWARDS EXTRA-UE LABOUR MOBILITY FLOWS: THE LATEST NEWS

The legal bases established by the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1999 should be considered as the first specific effort to adopt a common EU policy for managing workers immigration. In a policy-oriented labor market scenario, difficulties to elaborate a unified immigration policy just highlight the lack of a unified European labor market, either in its legal definition, or in the demographic and economic conditions. Nonetheless some important agreements have been elaborated on the issue. The last provisions that affect the policy on the admission of migrants for work are the following: 1) on conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the framework of an intra-corporate transfer (COM 2010 378 of July 13), 2) the conditions of entry of temporary workers (COM 2010 379, July 13), 3) the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment (following the North American model of “blue card” (Directive 2009/50/EC of the Council of May 25, 2009) and 4) specific procedures for admitting third-country nationals for the purposes of scientific research (Directive 2005/71/EC of October 12, 2005).

The migration crisis that has followed the riots in North Africa has apparently finished with the policy of no borders control inside the EU (Schengen Treaty). However, the reintroduction in exceptional circumstances of border controls is not due to labor flows. Instead, it is caused by an over-dimensioned perception of the arrival of refugees, combined with the impact of the economic recession in the political balance within the EU itself. Actually, the number of refugees who have turned to the Community borders is minimal in comparison to the total flows generated by the political instability that have been distributed mainly inside the North African region. In the first three months it was estimated around 30 thousand among the total of 700 thousand people mobilized in the various conflicts had been adopted by the EU member States (Fargues, 2011).

So far, it seems that despite the crisis raised by the North African political instability the direction of the EU immigration policy will stay in the same orientation as the previously mentioned normative, that is, restrictive towards the flows of unskilled workers from outside the EU, making them temporary. The tendency towards the adoption of bilateral agreements to promote specific flows and the parallel decision to encourage the flow of highly qualified personnel will be maintained in a context of increasing intra-European Union mobility.

The challenges facing African migration also remain, and unfortunately, the same as before the economic and political crisis. In fact, the crisis has only highlighted the deficit in the European policy regarding immigration and development cooperation with Africa. So far, there is no sign that the economies of North Africa are able to improve their economic situation or to absorb more youth in their own production system. In the context of an European Union also threatened by crisis in some of its members, substantial support for African countries seems as a more distant future than it would be desirable.

As Spanish demographer Fernández Cordón (2009) indicated, the times of demographic bomb have ended. Population aging is now the determinant demographic scenario in both Mediterranean shores. Consequences of fertility on the population structure and maximum differences between the two western Mediterranean shores in this field will be wiped up in the next fifteen years. The future development of this area will continue mostly to depend on whether the productive economy is capable of adapting to ageing and, more specifically, to how the number of elderly dependants grows and the age of cohorts entering the labour market decreases. However, the future will also depend on how wealth is redistributed in these Mediterranean societies, and on how much human capital, particularly in young female generations, improves.

Decreasing Spanish and Italian generations are reaching working age while economic recession is settling in. However, instead of there being an avalanche of immigrants to replace or complete the unborn individuals due to fertility decline, economic recession is reducing the numbers of immigrants entering these two countries (Domingo et al., 2009). In turn, and demographically speaking, the sub-Saharan region shows a different profile. The inertia of the young population structure in these countries will, for a long time, provide young potential emigrants if their labor markets are unable to absorb them. These candidates will encourage the diasporas from the sub-Saharan Africa to regions with a demand in the labor market and with previous migration networks, including the countries of North Africa.

The economic crisis has opened a disturbing uncertainty about the future evolution of international immigrant flows between African countries and the EU Mediterranean countries, but also about the living conditions of African people settled in these countries (see box I.2 for the Italian example). In the short term the severity of the crisis in the three countries, as we quoted in the introduction, opens the question if the high immigration period will become an exceptional parentheses in history or if the involution of the flows during the years marked by the crisis will be the exception. By now, it sounds reasonable to expect that in Portugal and Spain the migration balance will become null or even negative during the next five years. It is also expected that a significant amount of return migration and re-emigration to third countries of the foreigners arrived during the first decade of XXI century. But, at the same time and taking into account the political and economic scenario of the countries of origin, African migrants could have fewer propensities to return than other immigrants as the Latin-Americans and Eastern Europeans. In this scenario, it would not be out of context to expect an increase in the emigration flows of young Portuguese and Spaniards.

That gloomy economic future that could reverse the migration cycle does not act in the same way among the different groups of immigrant population. Africans seem to return to their home countries in a lesser extent than other continental origins. Different factors contribute to it: (i) The length of settlement for some nationalities, as seen with Moroccans, Gambians and Senegalese in Spain, Moroccans and Senegalese in Italy, or nationals of African ex-colonies in Portugal; (ii) Paradoxically, the undocumented status of many immigrants has an effect of retention, even during economic crisis; and (iii) The economic and social panorama in the countries of origin.

In this way, it could be argued that just as with the oil crisis of the mid-seventies, policies encouraging the return of the immigrant population adopted by the major immigrant destination countries in Europe (Germany, France, Switzerland and Belgium for example) were relatively successful in sending Spaniards, Italians and Portuguese back home. Nonetheless, it had a non-expected effect in attracting new inflows like the Turks, Moroccans and Algerians. In other words, immigrants who returned had a social space for it, they had savings that allowed the return, even in times of crisis, to a country where social conditions and economic policies had changed in a radical and positive way that made it possible a future project there. Instead, nationals of countries without economic growth stayed in the developed countries and increased the processes of family reunification, changing the composition of the stocks by sex and age, even with deteriorated living conditions due to the economic crisis. In the case of Italy and Spain family reunification processes are expected to be more frequent among families that were formed after the migratory movement. This would be true if in the next five years signs of economic recovery appear.
The current movements for democracy in the countries of North Africa have had an effect of population expulsion that is very clear in the African flows to Italy but in the mid term the scenario is not clear. Changes will depend on both the timing of democratization in each country and the evolution of the crisis in the region which, in contrast to what happens in Latin America, is not expected to have an immediate improvement. In any way, what can be stated is that the future of the EU Mediterranean countries and the African countries is strongly linked by the migration flows and by the transnational networks that immigrants are a part of.

**BOX I.2**

**ITALIAN MIGRATION POLICY - TOWARDS A SECURITY - ORIENTED MODEL?**

In Italy, as in Spain, the first immigration law was elaborated during the decade of 1980’s as an answer to the first arrival of labor immigrants, specifically in 1986. Since then, an increasingly articulated set of norms and principles on the regulation of new flows and on the integration of residents has been adopted. This set of norms is based on the principle of economic legitimation of immigrants: immigrants are seen primarily as economic subjects and with relatively little regard for social and humanitarian considerations.

This functional model, also known as the Italian guestworker system was consolidated in the year 2002 with the Bossi Fini Law (n.189/2002). In short, the Law regulated immigration in order to supply a demand for workers during specific peaks of productivity in the lowest paid economic sectors of a highly segmented labor market. It was characterized by giving immigrants a very fragile residence status through flexible working contracts not directly connected to social rights that reduce the possibilities of permanent settlement. According to the Bossi Fini Law, admission depends on the availability of a job proposal and the residence permit is linked to the duration of the contract. If the worker becomes unemployed, a period of six months is allowed for further job search (previously it was one year). Admissions are based on annual quotas and jobseeker residence permit was eliminated. In this sense, the link of the residence permit to the work contract satisfied the need for flexible labor while avoiding the social costs of immigrants’ unemployment. Regarding integration issues, the Bossi Fini Law introduced restrictions to family reunion processes. It also limited long-term residents and those holding a two-year minimum stay permit the right of accessing public housing.

In the year 2009 a new immigration law entered into force (Law n. 94/2009, adopted in July also known as the pacchetto sicurezza) and was specifically devoted to security issues, consolidating the link between migration and security in Italy. The most important innovations introduced by the law were related to irregular migration, access to residence permit and to citizenship, and labour recruitment and admission. Firstly, it criminalizes the irregular entrance in the country with a series of punishments that include the payment of fines, prison and expulsion. In the field of Italian nationality, restrictions on acquisition via marriage have been introduced. For long-term residence permits it was introduced the need of subscribing an integration agreement and to approve an Italian language test. On the other hand, the law simplified the hiring procedures from abroad for high-skilled immigrants and extended the job seeking permit for one year for foreign students who have obtained a Master or Ph.D. degree in Italy.

In sum, the recent Italian migration policy shows a selective evolution with differential integration possibilities that favour the high-skilled and specific low-skilled workers such as domestic helpers and caregivers (this last category through extraordinary amnesty processes). The access to citizenship through naturalization is extremely restricted and the access to social rights is uncertain for both irregular or regular immigrants.

The demographic consequences of the so called Second Demographic Transition theoretical framework, as well as the role of migrations in the 21st century demographic transformations, should be rethought in the Spanish and Italian immigration context. The Second Demographic Transition theory classical formulation was right in stating that the key element to understanding changes in fertility, marriages and families are the transformations in female cohorts (Van de Kaa, 1987). However, its attempts to explain regional differences did not really reach the right conclusions, as they abused of supposedly weberian interpretations, giving a key role to cultural norms and particularly religious ones (Lesthaeghe, 1991). These changes will not be understood if cultural aspects in general and the weight of Protestantism or Catholicism in particular become the focus of attention instead of economic trends.

The delay in Spanish and Italian fertility decline and the record low fertility levels which both these countries finally reached cannot be explained by the fact that the first two are catholic countries. Neither can couple formation changes be understood from this perspective. Instead major determinants have been an increase in Italian and Spanish young female generations’ education, their incorporation to the labor market and the pace of economic cycles. We should not forget that part of the 1970s and 1980s “delay” and “intensification” of demographic changes in Italy and Spain were due to economic crisis structural effects, basically huge unemployment levels. We should not commit the same mistake when interpreting present and future socio-demographic changes in the North African region.

Concerning the role of migrations in the 21st century demographic transformations Van de Kaa (1994) himself warned that migrations were ignored when building the Second Demographic Transition theory, but changes in developed counties since the 1960s cannot be understood without them. Unexpected immigration growth during this century in traditionally emigrant Mediterranean countries like Spain, Italy and Portugal can only, once again, be explained by focusing on women’s position and not on the relative labor market shortages due to changes in demographic structure (Domingo and Gil, 2007a). Demographer Anna Cabré calls “Complex reproduction systems” those societies in which immigration is no longer a basic part of demographic growth but a structural endogenous factor in their demographic evolution. And this is exactly what has happened during the first years of the 21st century.

It will not be long before the North African countries experience similar changes too. In fact, Spain and Italy received international immigration from the mid 1970s, as Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia are now doing, even though they are only receiving it because they are being used by sub-Saharan and Asian migrants to cross to Europe (Khachani, 2006). However, it should not be forgotten that emigration continues to be their main characteristic, as it was for Spain and Italy several decades ago. The high unemployment rates among those with the highest education level in Maghreb countries, especially women, would indicate that these countries’ economies are scarcely prepared to absorb education improvements and therefore it introduces doubts on whether they can really take advantage of the so called “demographic window of opportunity”, that is to say, of having high percentages of working age population due to fertility decline and a still scarce aging process. Emigration will paradoxically condemn part of these young Maghreb men and women to have unskilled jobs in their destination countries (Domíngo and Bayona, 2009). Even though specific analyses on Maghreb workers’ social mobility in the north Mediterranean countries have not been elaborated here, there seems to be a first phase in the migratory process in which workers would descend in the labor scale (Cachón, 2009).

The main lesson to be drawn from North Mediterranean experiences by South Mediterranean countries is not establishing a demographic development model linked to the “modernization” process for each country, but rather showing the major role of the economic cycle in intensifying demographic change. Indeed, the pace of socio-demographic transformations in each North African country will be determined by the economic situation and its impact on the labor market, combined with an increase in education levels in younger cohorts, particularly among women.
Bibliography


Cachón, L. (2009), *La “España inmigrante”: marco discriminatorio, mercado de trabajo y políticas de integración*, Barcelona, Anthropos.


Coleman, D. A. (2001), “Replacement migration, or why everyone is going to have to live in Korea: a fable for our times from the United Nations”, *The Royal Society*, 357: 583-598.


Domingo, A., F. Gil and F. Galizia (2009), De la expansión económica a la crisis: cambios en los factores demográficos de inserción laboral de la población extranjera en España e Italia, Congreso de la Inmigración en España, La Coruña, 24-26 September.
Ferré, G. (1940), O mundo que o português criou. Aspectos das relações sociais e de cultura do Brasil com Portugal e as colonias portuguesas, Coleção Documentos Brasileiros, Rio de Janeiro, Livraria José Olympio.


Kaplan, A. (1998), *De Senegambia a Cataluña: procesos de aculturación e integración social*, Barcelona, Fundación “la Caixa”.


II. Migration patterns and immigrants characteristics in North-Western Europe

*Helga A. G. de Valk, Corina Huisman and Kris R. Noam*

A. Introduction: migration and migrants in North-Western Europe

Migration to many countries in north-western Europe is not a new phenomenon. Although migration history and its characteristics differ between destination countries in the area, migration has a rather long tradition. Despite this, still relatively limited knowledge is available about certain origin groups. More comparative data on migration and migrants are also still missing from the literature to a large extent. This report aims to provide insight on migration and migrants in four north-western European countries: Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom. These countries are chosen as they host a substantial share of all immigrants in this part of the European Union. Furthermore the respective countries have different migration histories and clearly diverse immigrant populations. Whereas colonial links have been crucial elements of migration to the Netherlands and the United Kingdom this was less the case for the other two countries. Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands recruited migrants to carry out unskilled labor migration in the 60s. At the same time all four countries have received migrants seeking for refuge, mainly from the 1990s onwards. Given this diversity it is interesting to compare migration and migrant characteristics in these four countries in north-western Europe.

This report provides an overview of recent immigration and settlement patterns for the four study countries. The most recent available statistics are used and patterns over the past decade are described. Characteristics of the immigration flows (among other origin, age, and gender), as well as, other issues related to settlement (for example nationality and citizenship) are discussed. Different immigration flows, including asylum seekers and refugees, are presented. This part provides as much detail and comparability as possible by using different data sources. Special emphasis is put on migrants coming from Africa and Latin America. We make use of existing data and complement it with material specifically gathered and analyzed for the purpose of this study.

---

7 Consultants from the Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) – Population Division of ECLAC.
To get a better understanding of the situation of different immigrant groups in the study countries it is of importance to include a background on relevant policies and laws that affect migration and immigrants. Furthermore, it is relevant to pay attention to demographic behavior, including union formation and family formation, among immigrant groups as they are important indicators for their position in the four countries. This is covered by drawing from existing studies in these areas.

The migrant population in this part of Europe is nowadays not only determined by immigration but just as well by the children of immigrants. Although some children migrate alone or together with their parents, a substantial share is born in Europe to parents with a migration history. These children and young adults of the second generation are an increasingly important group in absolute and relative terms (Coleman, 2006). In the different countries around a fifth to a quarter of the school aged population is of immigrant origin. These levels vary by area of residence; nowadays in many European cities around half of the children in schools are of immigrant origin. The position and the demographic behavior of the second generation will be increasingly important for Europe’s population developments. It is therefore relevant to know more about children of immigrants within the frame of this study. In the subsequent section of the study we provide this overview again with a focus on children coming from African and Latin American immigrants. Existing data and studies on children of immigrants are used in this part.

The fact that children of immigrants are an increasingly important group in the population of many north-western European countries is very much related to the fact that ageing is one of the main challenges ahead for these countries. This refers to ageing of the native majority group now and in the near future. At the same time ageing of immigrant groups is still largely overlooked. Given the fact that immigration to many European countries started already in the 1960s, ageing of immigrant populations is increasingly important. Another section of the study will focus particularly on elderly immigrants, their characteristics, the role of transnational ties, health consequences, and intergenerational relations.

One final remark should be made on data and terminology. Hardly any subject is so difficult to study as migration and migrants and this complication is even larger when aiming at a comparison between countries. Migration statistics suffer first of all from a lack in completeness and coverage (Poulain and Perrin, 2008). In addition, migration as such is not so easily defined. The recommendation of the United Nations for the definition of an international long-term migrant is often taken as a starting point. The way this definition is, however, translated into registration rules at the national and local level differs substantially. Also at the European level comparative data or datasets are still relatively limited and despite efforts of harmonization, many statistics still mainly reflect the national view. Differences in data throughout Europe are the result of diverse legislation, levels of efficiency in registration and processing of gathered data (Kupiszewska and Nowok, 2008). Not only flow data (movements of people) but also stock data (residing migrants) are prone to this shortcomings in data availability and comparability (Fassmann, 2009). Different views exist on who is and should be counted as an immigrant. In some cases it includes only those who are foreign born (first generation), or those who have at least one foreign born parent (second generation) in other cases it covers all those with a nationality different from the country of residence. The latter criterion is also affected by different policies in citizenship acquisition and naturalization. Each of these different definitions used, clearly impacts the number of immigrants reported. For this study we had to draw from a range of data sources in order to get the information we needed. This also implies that different definitions can potentially be used. These data issues sometimes restrict the preferred level of detail and comparability or the recentness of available information. We will provide, however, as much detail as possible by using the latest data from different sources.
B. Immigration to North-Western Europe

1. Brief migration history

Contrary to the view often dominant in the public discourse migration to Europe is far from a new phenomenon (Lucassen and Lucassen, 2011). Nevertheless the size, type and distance of moves might well have changed over the decades (Fassmann, 2009). When looking at the past century we also find that in the first part of the century many people actually left Europe to settle in for example north-America or Australia. This emigration dominated the international migration from countries like the Netherlands and the UK shortly after the Second World War. The post-war migration in Europe was furthermore characterized by flight and expulsion of, among others, Germans and Poles (Fassmann, 2009).

Starting from the 1950s a new period of migration is emerging due to changes in colonial relations followed by independence of several countries previously colonized by the UK (e.g. India), the Netherlands (e.g. Suriname) and Belgium (e.g. Congo). Very often citizens of the former colonized countries were free to enter the colonizing country and in some cases also held citizenship. In the case of the UK many immigrants from the New Commonwealth started arriving in the United Kingdom in the late 1950s. Of this Commonwealth migration, different groups arrived at different times: In the late 1950s and early 1960s mostly Black Caribbeans whereas in the 1970s they were mainly Indians, African Asians, Pakistani and eventually Bangladeshis arriving (Dustmann and Fabbri, 2003). The migration history of the Netherlands is also characterized by colonial migration particularly from Indonesia, Suriname and the Dutch Antilles in the Caribbean.

Historically, three major types of migration to the four countries in this study can thus be distinguished: migration from former colonies, labor migration (e.g., Turks and Moroccans), and asylum migration. Regarding labor migration the UK differs from the others as this country never had an active labor recruitment policy like was the case in the other three countries; labor migrants arrived to the UK from the overseas colonies without any specific policy (Gemenne, 2009). Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, however, all had bi-lateral agreements with Southern European countries (like Spain and Italy) that were later extended to mainly Morocco and Turkey. The German government had for example different agreements with a range of countries in the 1955 to 1968 period; starting with Italy in 1955, Spain in 1960 and Turkey and Morocco in 1961 and 1963 respectively (Rühl, 2009). These (predominantly male) migrant workers were recruited to carry out unskilled labor in the European industries. Many migrants from Turkey and Morocco came from the rural areas within these countries (e.g., the Rif region). Although their stay was originally expected to be temporary, most of them eventually settled permanently. Family members who were left behind initially joined their partners and parents later on. Recruitment of labor migrants stopped mainly with the recession in the early 1970s. Nevertheless, due to family reunification and formation immigration from the countries of former labor migrants continued into the 1980s. Also today, many Turks and Moroccans still find a partner in their countries of origin (De Valk, Liefbroer, Esveldt, and Henkens, 2004; Huschek, De Valk and Liefbroer, 2011). Because of their recruitment as unskilled laborers, first-generation Turks and Moroccans for example are predominantly low educated, often have limited proficiency in the host country language and they find themselves in lower socio-economic positions. Although the position of the second generation is improving, they are still reported to be disadvantaged compared to the native majority group (Heath et al., 2008). This is reflected both in their educational position and achievement, the labor market and occupational attainment. Disadvantage is most pronounced for children of immigrants from less-developed regions. The study by Heath et al. (2008) shows that the moment and level of disadvantage differs between countries in Europe: within some countries cumulative disadvantage is in the school career, from school to work whereas in others disadvantage is concentrated in entering the labor market. Young adults of the second generation are more prone to unemployment and this is particularly the case for those of Turkish (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands), North African (Belgium, France, Netherlands), Caribbean and Pakistani (Netherlands, UK) descent. Other studies also indicate the
disadvantaged position in family income and housing as well as health for the families in which these children of immigrants are growing up (Hernandez et al., 2009).

Asylum is often referred to as the third main phase in migration history of the north-western European countries. In the early 1990s asylum migration sharply increased due to conflicts in several parts of the world. Peaks were highest around the mid-1990s related also to conflicts in the European region like the war in Yugoslavia. In Germany the asylum migration peaked in 1992 with 1.1 million people seeking asylum. In the subsequent years their number decreased: In 2003 around 50 thousand people applied for asylum and this fell to 27 thousand in 2009 with asylum applicants mainly coming from Turkey, Serbia/Montenegro, Iraq, and the Russian Federation (Oezcan, 2004; BMI, 2011). Since then the number of asylum seekers has never been as high and during the past decade fell even further. Also in the UK the number of asylum applications sharply decreased from around 85 thousand in 2002 to 25 thousand in 2008. Nevertheless, in the latter figure 40 percent of asylum applicants were of African origin (ONS, 2008). Similar patterns are observed in Belgium and the Netherlands: number of applications clearly decreased over the past decade with only a small and moderate increase in numbers again for the Netherlands and Belgium respectively in the most recent year for which data are available (2009). Contrary to the other migrant flows that were often from few particular countries, refugees have a wide variety of backgrounds. Despite the importance of asylum in the recent migration history, refugees still constitute a relatively small proportion of residing migrants in each of the studied countries.

For Germany we should mention the special position of the so called Aussiedler. As a result of the resettlement shortly after the war, many ethnic Germans were located mainly in Poland and the former Soviet Union. Many of them started to return to Germany in the 1990s as also special policies were developed for them (BMI, 2011). These Aussiedler, were not always considered migrants or foreigners because of their heritage and German citizenship (Oezcan, 2004). Because these migrants often are considered German they obtain citizenship rights based on the jus sanguinis principle. This implies that they have different rights than those with foreign nationality as they can for example migrate freely and have immediate access to the labor market and social benefits (Brubaker, 1989; Joppke, 1999). The immigration of these Aussiedler peaked in the mid-1990s, and although falling to lower levels afterwards it remained relatively high until around 2001 (around 98 thousand persons). In more recent years this number has dropped significantly and in 2009 only slightly over 3 thousand Aussiedler immigrated to Germany. In the public debate the position of the Aussiedler is still discussed as a substantial share of them were reported to have only limited German knowledge. And even though many have achieved their position in Germany, studies also show that Aussiedler still experience disadvantage both in school and on the labor market compared to the native majority group (Kogan et al., 2011).

2. Recent immigration patterns

Immigration to the four studied countries is analyzed for the past decade using the most recent available data up to 2009 (only for Belgium most recent detailed data are for 2007). For each of the countries we make use of the national available statistics and aim to define origin groups as similarly as possible for all countries. This is not always evident as, for example, the registration in the UK follows a totally different pattern and categories than is used by the countries in continental Europe. Nevertheless, Figures II.1-II.4 provide an overview of absolute numbers of immigration (a) and the share of different regional origins in the total immigrant flow (b) for the four study countries. Please note that colors do not refer to the same categories of origin in the figures.

The figures show clearly different immigration patterns in each of the countries. Absolute numbers of immigration are higher in Germany, followed by the UK, the Netherlands and Belgium. Of course these absolute numbers are hard to compare given the different country and population sizes. The development over time can be more easily compared and shows a small decrease in immigration to Germany from almost 900 thousand in 2001 to 700 thousand in 2009. Immigration to the UK and particularly to Belgium, on the contrary, continued to increase over the studied decade and
the eight year period respectively. In the Netherlands a U-shape pattern is observed with a steep decline in the mid-2000s and an increase after 2005 resulting in immigration levels in 2009 that were almost the same as in 2001. The increase in immigration to the UK, Belgium and the Netherlands is, as can be seen from part b of Figures II.1-II.4, mainly due to an increase in European migration. This relates to the fact that with the enlargement of the European Union in 2004 and 2007 immigration from several Central-Eastern European countries (like Poland and Bulgaria, Romania) has clearly risen. Since Brussels is the capital of Europe and the EU is having many offices in this city, the EU extension has had a clear impact on the immigration from these new member states resulting in even larger increase over time in Belgium than observed in the other countries. Also the most recent data for 2010 on the Netherlands indicate that immigration is still rising primarily as a result of increased European immigration (Nicolaas, 2011).

The importance of African migration to the different settlement countries is quite diverse. African migration refers in recent years to about 4% in the total immigration to Germany, around 6% in the UK and around 10% in the Netherlands. Belgium clearly has the largest share of African migrants in recent years as well as during the full period studied (Figures II.1-II.4b). African immigration to Belgium was and is an important share of the immigration ranging from 16 to 21 of the yearly arriving immigrants. This can on the one hand be related to the links between Belgium and several African countries. Congo and Morocco are the most numerous single countries of origin of immigrants. On the other hand the African migration is also related to language: The French speaking Walloon region of Belgium as well as the predominantly French speaking area of Brussels attracts many Francophone migrants from Africa.

The share of migrants from Africa to Germany has remained relatively stable and limited over time. For the Netherlands a slight decrease is observed over the study period and this pattern seems to continue also afterwards as suggested by the 2010 data (Nicolaas, 2011). This is mainly related to a decrease in asylum migration to the Netherlands combined with fewer marriage migrants arriving from Morocco. In the UK, African origin groups are partially captured under African commonwealth which refers to all countries that were part of the Commonwealth whereas other African origins are included in the group ‘other. The share of African Commonwealth has decreased over the past decade but since the group ‘other’ is not further specified it cannot be assessed to what extend this is compensated by immigration from other African origins to the UK.

Of course we should be aware that we only focus on immigration here. The net migration in each of the countries is positive and in particular the case for the UK. Nevertheless the migration surplus is decreasing and in the Netherlands is found to be negative in some of the recent years. Also in Germany the migration surplus is no longer as large as it used to be in previous years: In 2001 the net migration was around 188 thousand persons whereas in 2008 this was only 10 thousand persons arriving more than leaving Germany (BMI, 2011).

Overall we thus find a small increase in immigration in three of the four countries, where Germany is the exception. European migration is the most important with around 50% or higher in the most recent years of the continental north-western European countries. European migration is still less important in the UK. African immigration to the study countries is again clearly related to colonial links and continuous immigration from the former labour recruitment countries like Morocco. Asylum migration seems to be a relatively small share in the immigration from the African continent but we will explore it further in the next section.
FIGURE II.1
THE NETHERLANDS, 2000-2009: IMMIGRATION BY REGION OF ORIGIN (COUNTRY OF BIRTH)
A. Absolute

Source: Own calculations based on Statistics Netherlands.
FIGURE II.2
GERMANY, 2000-2009: IMMIGRATION BY REGION OF ORIGIN (NATIONALITY)

A. Absolute

B. Relative share in total immigration by origin

Source: Own calculations based on Statistisches Bundesamt.
Source: Own calculations based on UK, International Passenger Survey.
3. Characteristics of immigrants: Age, gender and origin

Beside general levels of immigration by origin it is relevant to know more about the characteristics of the immigrants. Further analyses of the age and gender structure of the immigrants are crucial to get a more advanced idea of their background. Figures II.5 and II.6 provide this information for the UK and in more detail for the Netherlands. As shown in Figure II.5 for the UK, migrants are mainly young adults in the working ages as it is often suggested in the migration literature (Castles and Miller, 2009) and empirically found. Overall men outnumber women in immigration to the UK. Nevertheless, the gender balance is not as skewed as is sometimes suggested by economic labour market theories on
migration (Castles and Miller, 2009). In particular for the 15-24 year age category there is gender balance. Recent data on Belgium also show that immigration is no longer determined by men only. In recent years the gender balance has become more equal among those arriving in that country (CGKR, 2011). Similar patterns in immigration structure are found also in the other countries of study and are therefore not presented here. It is more useful to have a close look at the differences in age and sex composition between groups of different origin.

**FIGURE II.5**

UNITED KINGDOM, 2009: AGE AND SEX STRUCTURE OF ALL IMMIGRANTS ARRIVING

Source: Own calculations based on UK, International Passenger Survey.

Figures II.6a to II.6d show the age and sex structure of all immigrants arriving in the Netherlands. A similar pattern is found as in the UK: immigrants are in general young and are only slightly more often men. In the age group 15 to 20 years and in particular for those between 20 and 24 we see that women outnumbered men among immigrants to the Netherlands in 2009. Looking at the different age and sex compositions of selected regions of origin we find quite different patterns particularly regarding the gender balance. African migrants to the Netherlands are mainly between the ages of 25 and 30 and include overall more men among all age groups (except children) than women. For Belgium, however, it is recently shown that between 1990/1991 and 2006/2007 a clear feminization was observed for the African origin countries. From countries like Congo, Morocco and Rwanda mainly women migrated to Belgium in the recent years (CGKR, 2011).
Considering Latin American immigrants to the Netherlands a different pattern is found: here the majority of immigrants are female. Although again immigrants from this region are mainly concentrated in the ages between 20 and 30 years it is also clear that compared to African immigrants they are much more likely to be already older upon arrival in the Netherlands. This can be partially explained by the different reasons for migration to the Netherlands: many immigrants from Latin America come from Suriname and the Dutch Antilles. Given the historic colonial links with these countries immigration is not restricted to young people in search of job opportunities or fleeing their countries of origin as is the case of several groups of African origin. In addition, the Latin American countries of origin also include migrants, mainly females, coming to the Netherlands to marry a Dutch partner (see section on migration motives).

Up to now we have mainly made a distinction by region of origin. When going beyond this information on origin and focusing on African and Latin American migrants it is clear that migration histories as well as existing links between countries of origin and settlement are reflected in the migration numbers from selected individual countries. In Germany no African or Latin American countries of origin appear in the top 20 of immigrant origins. Over the past decade immigration from Africa to Germany reached its peak in 2003, with about 39 thousand people and dropped to 27 thousand in 2009. Eight origin countries dominate in the statistics on immigration over this period: Egypt, Algeria, Cameroon, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and Tunisia. Each of these origin countries are about equally important in immigration (around 1.7 to 2.4 thousand in 2009) only.
Morocco is numerically substantially larger (3.8 thousand, 2009). The reduction in number of immigrants from Africa is mainly due to a fall in migrants from Morocco which reduced by half between 2003 and 2009. Immigration from all other African origin groups remains rather stable with a small increase in numbers for Egyptians only (BMI, 2011). Interestingly enough emigration from Germany to the mentioned African countries is about as large as immigration (resulting in a net migration balance for African migration). This seems to imply that African migrants return to their home countries although information on emigrants by origin is not available to prove this. Latin American immigrants to Germany are mainly from Brazil (on average 7.5 thousand per year over the past decade). Whereas more men than women from Morocco came to Germany in 2009 (60 versus 40%) for Brazilian migrants the opposite pattern is found with more women than men (55 versus 45%) arriving (BMI, 2011).

For the Netherlands the absolute numbers of immigration are of course much smaller given the country size. In 2009 almost 15 thousand immigrants from Africa entered the Netherlands. The top five nationalities were (in numerical order from most to least important) Somalia, Morocco, South Africa, Ghana and Egypt. African immigration is dominated by men (55%). The gender balance is rather equal for Moroccan immigrants and are most skewed towards men for those coming from Egypt (62% men) and towards women from South Africa (58% women) (Statline, Statistics Netherlands). In Belgium, 15 thousand persons immigrated from Africa in 2007 with Morocco, followed (at a distance) by Congo, Algeria and Cameroon as the most numerous single countries in African migration. As already mentioned before, the gender balance in recent years shows more women than men immigrating. Migration from Latin America in Belgium is relatively unimportant with about 3 thousand immigrants in 2007. Brazil is the most important country of origin (around 1 thousand) from this continent and Brazilian immigration has clearly increased over the past decade (CGKR, 2010).

4. Reasons for acquiring residence

Economic theories of migration have often stressed that job opportunities in certain regions combined with a labor surplus in some other areas will result in migration (Castles and Miller 2009). The push and pull theory of Lee (1966) assumes that an evaluation of the push factors in the countries of origin combined with the pull factors in the potential country of settlement combined with an evaluation of potential obstacles, makes a person to decide to migrate or not. Although other reasons for migration (family related, or due to political circumstances) as well as the role of networks is emphasized in the academic discourse, in the public debate migration is often dominated by economic reasons. In the context of this study it is relevant to study the reasons for migration using the issued residence permits as proxies. This information shows the ways in which migrants from different origins acquire legal entry into a country. In addition it can show the differences in legal options for migrants in the settlement countries as different residence permits relate to diverse rights.

We studied the reasons for residence by region of origin and gender based on residence permits that were issued starting with recent data for the Netherlands. Overall the patterns for the period 2005-2009 show that immigration for reasons of labor is the largest single category, followed by family reasons. Study was the third most common reason for migration to the Netherlands, although in 2009 for the first time in the analyzed five year period, asylum migration was outnumbering study related migration to the Netherlands. Table II.1 gives more detailed insight in reasons for settlement in the Netherlands in 2009 for different regions of origin and by gender. It is obvious from this Table (II.1) that reasons for migration are clearly gendered. This conclusion, however, not only holds for African migrants but for all immigrant groups. Overall we find that men are more likely to enter the Netherlands to find work than women; although the absolute figures vary for different origin groups, the pattern is the same throughout. Women outnumber men in family related migration in all origin groups.

Looking at the differences between origin groups there is a striking difference for immigrants from Africa and all other groups in particular for African men: the latter are the only origin group for which labour related migration is not the first most common reason for migration to the Netherlands
(for all other immigrant men it is). Men from Africa are most likely to have arrived to seek asylum in the Netherlands or to join their families. For African women family related migration is also the most common reason for migration but this is not different from the other origin groups. Whereas for all other origins study reasons rank second in reasons for acquiring residence for African women it is asylum what brings them to the Netherlands. This clearly shows the current African migration to the Netherlands which is largely determined by people fleeing conflict regions in Africa to search a safe place. Of course this is also partially driven by immigration policies making this often the only option for migration. Immigration policies in many north-western European countries provided very limited options to enter the countries for work related reasons after the recruitment stop in 1973. This resulted in the fact that in these countries legal access was often primarily granted based on family reunification and —formation and asylum. In the past decade however, the issue of recruiting highly skilled migrants from outside the EU was raised in the debate about immigration. In light of the ageing societies in Europe and the shrinking labor force among native populations due to fewer young people, many perceived it as necessary to open the economic opportunities for migration. And although different countries in the meantime have created possibilities for highly skilled workers to gain more easily access to the labour market, it is still highly debated. Also Germany and The Netherlands for example now eased access to its labour market mainly to other EU citizens as well as high skilled knowledge workers from outside the EU. The immigration from Asian countries in this sense is more disperse as men migrate in almost equal shares for the different reasons.

<p>| TABLE II.1 |
| THE NETHERLANDS, 2009: MOTIVES FOR IMMIGRATION, BY REGION OF ORIGIN AND GENDER |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Asylum</th>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Au Pair / Stage</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All immigrants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>23,238</td>
<td>6,490</td>
<td>13,755</td>
<td>6,909</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>14,519</td>
<td>3,111</td>
<td>20,104</td>
<td>7,161</td>
<td>1,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>3,059</td>
<td>3,095</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>1,635</td>
<td>3,102</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>1,044</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1,437</td>
<td>999</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2,743</td>
<td>972</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>3,024</td>
<td>2,816</td>
<td>2,185</td>
<td>2,670</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>1,119</td>
<td>4,890</td>
<td>2,529</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>18,483</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>6,964</td>
<td>2,448</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>13,155</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>9,253</td>
<td>3,083</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>17,481</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>5,108</td>
<td>1,883</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>12,793</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6,848</td>
<td>2,257</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non EU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>1002</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>1,856</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>2,405</td>
<td>826</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations based on Statistics Netherlands.

The regional level still hides much of the diversity within each of the regions. Table II.2 therefore goes beyond this regional division and focuses on the five largest African and four largest Latin American countries of origin among all immigrants to the Netherlands in 2009 (for which this information is available). For the Latin American countries of origin we find that there is not much diversity among each of the different origins: family reunification/formation is the most common reason for immigration. Among those from Brazil and Colombia study and work for men and study and au-pair for women rank second in reasons for the move though they are far less important than family reasons. For those from the different African origins there is one big difference: immigrants from Somalia are by far the most likely to have come to the Netherlands to seek asylum. All other groups again are predominantly arriving in the Netherlands because of family reasons. This situation is again partially related to earlier migration histories as in the 1990s and early 2000s the main reason for immigration
from diverse African countries to the Netherlands was asylum. This is the case of Angolese and Congolese immigrants and still applies to Somalians (Ministry of Justice, 2006). In the meantime many of them have reunited with their families in the Netherlands. For other (north) African groups like the Moroccans, the majority of migrants arrived as labour migrants to the Netherlands in the 1960s and early 70s. Many of them had their partners and children joining them in the Netherlands afterwards. But still many young adults of the Moroccan second generation find their partner in their parent’s country of origin resulting in family related immigration to the Netherlands (Huschek et al., 2010).

### TABLE II.2
THE NETHERLANDS, 2009: MOTIVES FOR IMMIGRATION, BY SELECTED COUNTRIES OF AFRICAN AND LATIN AMERICAN ORIGIN AND GENDER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Asylum</th>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Au-pair/Stage</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil Men</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia Men</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic Men</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinam Men</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana Men</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco Men</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria Men</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia Men</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2037</td>
<td>798</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1108</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-Africa Men</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations based on Statistics Netherlands.

As mentioned before these data are a reflection of migration policy in the Netherlands as well as political situations in the countries of origin. What can be done however is to compare these data to for example those of Belgium and Germany. By far the most common reason to acquire residence in Belgium is family: 48% of all residence permits issued in 2009 were for this purpose, the majority (70%) of them for family reunification. Asylum and humanitarian permits cover about 30% and study and work with 12 and 9% are rather limited. Interestingly enough we again find clear differences in reasons for migration between origin groups: where 85% of the Moroccan immigrants entered Belgium for family reasons, this applied for about 40% of those from Congo and Cameroon. Among the latter groups humanitarian (40% for Congo) and study (35% for those from Cameroon) were the reasons for their move to Belgium (CGKR, 2011). The two Latin American groups for which information is available show that family reasons dominate among Brazilian migrants followed by study, work and humanitarian reasons. 60% of the Ecuadorian immigrants on the other hand were issued a permit based on humanitarian grounds followed by a fifth for family reasons and only small shares for labor and study reasons. Unfortunately these data are not available by gender as it might partially cover the different migration reasons for men and women.

For Germany only few data are available and comparable on this issue. Table II.3 provides the data for similar categories as analyzed for the Netherlands; note that rows do not sum to the total provided in the last column as German law also has other categories than those known for the Netherlands. Data are not available by gender only the total number of females over all categories is known and provided in Table II.3. In line with the findings for Belgium and the Netherlands, the Moroccan migrants to Germany predominantly came for family related reasons. Contrary to the
Belgian situation we found that Brazilian immigrants in Germany mainly acquire residence for study purposes with family reasons ranking second. With all these data, one should bear in mind that only documented migration is captured. The extent to which irregular migration has different patterns or involves persons with different characteristics is hard to assess.

| TABLE II.3 |
| GERMANY, 2009: SELECTED MAIN REASONS FOR ACQUIRING LEGAL ENTRY, FOR BRAZILIAN AND MOROCCAN IMMIGRANTS |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Brazil | Labour | Asylum | Family | Study | Other | Total |
| Total | 621 | 14 | 1,021 | 2,018 | 101 | 5,201 |
| Women | 2 | 899 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 2,899 |
| Morocco | Total | 17 | 34 | 1,281 | 479 | 5 | 3,063 |
| Women | 1 | 322 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 1,322 |


C. Settlement in North-Western Europe

1. Migrants: origin and characteristics

In addition, to the flows of immigrants and their origin it is important to study stock of residing migrants. Up to now we have mainly looked at immigration patterns in the different countries with a particular focus on African and Latin American immigrants. Of course this gives insight only in recent immigration and does not provide information on residing immigrants, which can be based on previous immigration flows including different groups and origins. We therefore continue with an overview of the immigrants residing in each of the four study countries. When aiming at comparing the number of residing migrants in each of these countries we may draw upon data collected by the OECD based on information from the census of around 2001 in all countries. Two definitions in this respect can be used: the population which is foreign born and the population that has foreign nationality. These two definitions do not necessarily refer to the same group of people. Overall the percentage of people who are born outside of the country where they currently live is higher than those holding a foreign nationality (Table II.4). This is due to the well known fact that some migrants already had the nationality of the country they moved to, like for example commonwealth citizens in the UK, colonial migrants in the Netherlands and Aussiedler in Germany. In addition, naturalization policies determine who is eligible to acquire citizenship. As it is obvious, also from Table II.4, naturalization is less common in Belgium and Germany compared to the other countries (column two and three). At the same time policy changes did have an effect on the naturalization levels in both countries. A new naturalization law came into effect in Germany in 2000 providing more options to acquire German nationality which was extremely difficult before due to the *jus sanguinis* principle (Rühl, 2009). Also by that time Belgium made changes in options to acquire Belgian citizenship which resulted in an increase of naturalizations (e.g. 1993 and early 2000s). In particular the Moroccan, followed by Turkish migrants used these options for naturalization (Gemenne, 2009).
TABLE II.4
SELECTED COUNTRIES, 2008: SHARE OF POPULATION WHICH IS FOREIGN BORN OR HAS A FOREIGN NATIONALITY, PER COUNTRY OF SETTLEMENT
(In percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Foreign born (%)</th>
<th>Foreign nationality (%)</th>
<th>Foreign born with citizenship of country of residence (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>65.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dumont and Lemaitre, 2008: 16.

In each of the countries about a tenth of the total population is foreign born (lowest in UK, highest in Germany). More recent figures also indicate that in each of the countries between 10 and 13% are foreign born (ONS, 2008; BMI, 2011; Statistics Netherlands, 2011). For comparative reasons we decided to present and compare the data from the OECD database (2008). When we, however, analyze the data based on nationality we find that around 8-9% has a different nationality in Belgium and Germany contrasted with around 4% in the Netherlands and the UK. In addition, to these figures we should realize that the second generation is not included in these data.

Table II.5 provides an overview on the absolute numbers of immigrants over 15 years of age by region of birth. As we want to have the most comparable data for the four countries these data are based on the 2001 census (drawn from the OECD database on immigrants). The upper part of Table II.5 refers to the Netherlands and Belgium whose populations are substantially smaller than the populations of the UK and Germany. This is also reflected in the number of immigrants in the country. In all studied countries, immigrants from other European countries are the largest group of residing migrants. Turning to the origins of residing immigrants in the Netherlands it is clear that the ranking of main regions of origin is Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean followed by Africa. For Belgium, however, the ranking is totally different: Africa is the largest region of origin, followed by Asia. Migrants from Latin America are only a rather small group in Belgium. This immediately reflects part of the migration histories of both countries: the ties with Latin America and the Caribbean in the Netherlands are linked to the colonial past in Suriname and the Dutch Antilles. For Belgium, the colonial ties were mainly with African countries. In addition, as French is one of the official languages of the country, ties with the French speaking countries in Africa are stronger than with the Netherlands. Furthermore, Belgium also recruited labor migrants from Morocco in the past to work in the industrial sector resulting in a still relatively large Moroccan community in the country.

The second part of Table II.5 presents the number of immigrants residing in the UK and Germany. For the UK the data show that Asia ranks first as region of origin of immigrants residing in the country, followed by Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. Again this order is no surprise given the historical links between the UK and some Asian (most obviously India) and African (for example South Africa) countries. These long established relations are still reflected in the number of residing migrants. For Germany it is clear that Turks are by far the largest immigrant origin group in the country. In recent years the number of Asian migrants has increased (due to refugees as well as high skilled labor migrants) but still they are clearly outnumbered by the Turkish group. Overall still few immigrants in Germany come from African and Latin American countries.

The gender balance of the residing immigrants is indicated by the sex ratio which is reported for all regions of origin and per country (Table II.5). The calculated sex ratio indicates that African immigrants in the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany are predominantly men. It is most pronounced for Germany where male almost double residents from Africa. So where recent immigration to, for example, Belgium includes many more women from Africa, we still find this gender imbalance towards men for the residing population. In the UK the sex ratio for African origin migrants is rather balanced and women slightly outnumber men. One of the explanations can be that due to the larger
established migration links with many African countries, gender distribution became more balanced over time. It is often assumed that when immigration starts the gender imbalance is large and skewed, but that this will reduce with constant migration to a specific country (Schoorl, 1995). The fact that we find less skewed gender balances for the UK is of course also related to the immigrants’ country of origin, where South Africa is one of the main areas of origin for African migrants in the UK, while in the German case most African migrants were those recently fleeing for violence in different parts of Africa. The balance in the Dutch and Belgian case is largely attributable to the fact that a large share of African migrants came from Morocco; again a more than 50 years of migration history make this group more gender balanced.

Contrary to the male dominance among African origin migrants, females are outnumbering males among migrants coming from Latin America and the Caribbean. Again the level of gender imbalance is the largest in the two countries with the least links and history with this region: Belgium and Germany. Nevertheless, also in the Netherlands and the UK there are many more women born in this region than men. Although women from Latin American countries are acquiring residence for work related reasons more often than is the case for women from other origins, family reasons are still by far the most important ones. The gender imbalance thus partially reflects migration from some Latin American countries which is characterized by a relatively high level of female intermarriage with a native partner in the European settlement country (De Valk et al., 2004).

Once more the largest regions of origin of residing migrants do not reveal national differences and diversity within these broader regions. We want to shed more detailed light, particularly on African migrants and thus include an overview of all countries from which African migrants residing in the Netherlands originate (Table II.6). These are very recent data based on the population register (January 2011; Statistics Netherlands Statline) including all origins with at least 200 people (of any age) residing in the country covering both first and second generation migrants. Of the total 577 thousand African migrants in the Netherlands in 2011, 52 percent are men. Morocco is by far the largest single country of origin for African migrants in the Netherlands with currently almost 356 thousand people. Somalia (31 thousand), Egypt, Ghana and Cape Verde (all around 21 thousand) follow at a long distance.

Despite the difference in absolute numbers of residing migrants, the population size in each of the mentioned groups has increased over the past decade (not in Table). This is partially due to new immigrants arriving but just as well as the result of the children born to these migrants in the Netherlands (second generation). Ghana, Cape Verde, and Kenya are origin groups in which females outnumber men, in almost all other groups we find more men than women. In several origin groups that are dominated by asylum migration to the Netherlands, like Sudan, Sierra Leone and Somalia, the sex ratios is most skewed towards larger shares of men.

Currently about 19% of the population of the Netherlands is born abroad themselves or has at least one parent born in another country. The age structure of immigrants is overall relatively young as we have seen in the previous section. As described before many immigrants arriving in the 1960s stayed in north-western Europe and return migration of these migrants is overall relatively low. For example, only Spanish and Portuguese in the Netherlands have been reported to have returned to their home countries to a larger extent. Of course this is facilitated by the fact that they are EU citizens, facing fewer restrictions regarding residence permits, rights and entitlements. Nevertheless, emigration figures have been rising in some of the north-western European countries like the Netherlands. Natives were more likely to leave the country in recent years. But also second generation young adults, for example from Turkish origin, are found to return to their parents’ country of origin due to, among other reasons, the more negative climate towards immigration and immigrants in the Netherlands.
### TABLE II.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of Country of birth</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Sex Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>3 9478</td>
<td>39 823</td>
<td>79 301</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>115 985</td>
<td>94 959</td>
<td>211 944</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>161 079</td>
<td>162 273</td>
<td>323 352</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>5 817 378</td>
<td>5 985 275</td>
<td>11 802 653</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- of which host country</td>
<td>5 570 569</td>
<td>5 702 605</td>
<td>11 273 174</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>7 068</td>
<td>7 054</td>
<td>14 122</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>3 600</td>
<td>5 061</td>
<td>8 661</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>133 822</td>
<td>157 550</td>
<td>291 372</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6 281 410</td>
<td>6 451 995</td>
<td>12 733 405</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>123 395</td>
<td>108 839</td>
<td>232 434</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>29 666</td>
<td>32 614</td>
<td>62 280</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>5 944 242</td>
<td>4 216 643</td>
<td>11 160 885</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- of which host country</td>
<td>5 622 801</td>
<td>3 848 901</td>
<td>9 471 702</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>6 581</td>
<td>7 560</td>
<td>14 141</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>1 259</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>8 008</td>
<td>11 984</td>
<td>19 992</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4 112 925</td>
<td>4 378 604</td>
<td>8 491 529</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>18 655</td>
<td>2 0621</td>
<td>39 726</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>374 619</td>
<td>387 956</td>
<td>762 575</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>722 485</td>
<td>752 890</td>
<td>1 475 375</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>21 472 993</td>
<td>23 260 030</td>
<td>44 733 023</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- of which host country B</td>
<td>20 789 477</td>
<td>22 391 541</td>
<td>43 181 018</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>80 235</td>
<td>105 100</td>
<td>193 335</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>71 193</td>
<td>85 611</td>
<td>156 804</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>143 802</td>
<td>180 294</td>
<td>324 096</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22 891 982</td>
<td>24 792 502</td>
<td>47 684 484</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>3 175 591</td>
<td>3 323 239</td>
<td>6 498 830</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>115 470</td>
<td>62 090</td>
<td>177 560</td>
<td>1.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>489 670</td>
<td>476 188</td>
<td>966 858</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>29 207 613</td>
<td>31 171 898</td>
<td>60 379 511</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- of which host country</td>
<td>26 527 578</td>
<td>28 481 713</td>
<td>55 009 291</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>24 270</td>
<td>14 810</td>
<td>39 080</td>
<td>1.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>17 890</td>
<td>34 870</td>
<td>52 760</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>33 030 504</td>
<td>35 083 095</td>
<td>68 113 599</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD database on immigrants.
TABLE II.6
THE NETHERLANDS, 2011: ORIGINS OF AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS BY GENDER
(Only groups with at least 200 residents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>4,407</td>
<td>3,428</td>
<td>7,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>4,870</td>
<td>3,979</td>
<td>8,849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1,736</td>
<td>1,696</td>
<td>3,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>843</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>1,619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (Democratic Republic)</td>
<td>4,091</td>
<td>3,954</td>
<td>8,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>12,983</td>
<td>8,090</td>
<td>21,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>1,628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>6,077</td>
<td>5,470</td>
<td>11,547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>10,620</td>
<td>10,756</td>
<td>21,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>2,319</td>
<td>1,393</td>
<td>3,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>948</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>1,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>10,262</td>
<td>10,956</td>
<td>21,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>1,306</td>
<td>1,368</td>
<td>2,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1,516</td>
<td>1,812</td>
<td>3,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1,820</td>
<td>1,308</td>
<td>3,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>1,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>183,349</td>
<td>172,534</td>
<td>355,883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>5,793</td>
<td>4,883</td>
<td>10,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruanda</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>1,486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tomé en Principe</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>947</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>1,613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>3,875</td>
<td>2,155</td>
<td>6,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>3,855</td>
<td>2,353</td>
<td>6,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>17,033</td>
<td>14,204</td>
<td>31,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1,011</td>
<td>1,023</td>
<td>2,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>1,066</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>1,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>5,049</td>
<td>3,641</td>
<td>8,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>1,624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>1,236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>926</td>
<td>965</td>
<td>1,891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>8,419</td>
<td>9,108</td>
<td>17,527</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations based on Statistics Netherlands.
Figure II.7 provides the age and gender pyramid for the Dutch population as well as first and second generation migrants in the Netherlands (2011). This allows for a comparison between the groups. It is clear that residing migrants have a much younger structure than that of the total Dutch population. First generation migrants are mainly represented in the ages between 35 and 50 whereas second generation migrants belong primarily to the youngest age groups. For the Dutch population there is hardly any pyramid shape in the population structure whereas this is clearly the case for the second generation. The Dutch population is ageing and this will even increase in the future. However, also first generation migrants have entered older ages already and many more will follow over the next two decades. The current elderly of immigrant origin primarily belong to those from former colonies (Indonesia and Suriname). The future elderly population will however also include many of the former labor migrants.

The young age structure is once again found when we zoom in on migrants of African origin (Figure II.8 left): many are still in their childhood or young adulthood and elderly are not very commonly found among this group yet. A slightly different picture is shown for the Latin American group of migrants in the Netherlands (Figure II.8 right). Although the share of elderly above 65 is still relatively limited many among this group are at least middle-aged or over. Women are more represented in all age groups than men and a substantial share of them is between 40 and 60 years of age. The basis of the pyramid is relatively small with a limited number of young adults in the younger age categories. The fact that those coming from Suriname are included in this group can explain the fact that we find a somewhat older age composition. A second explanation is that an important number of migrants, particularly women, arrive here to marry a native (e.g. Brazilians, Dominicans) resulting both in gender skewedness and a somewhat older age structure. All the data presented here are based on country of birth of the person and both parents. This implies that a person born in the Netherlands with one parent born in e.g. Suriname is included in the statistics as a second generation Surinamese and this appears in pyramid 8b as well as in the light blue line of Figure II.7. Many of these people, however, hold the Dutch citizenship and would appear in the statistics when they were based on the latter criterion.
When analyzing the age structure of the migrant population in the UK we should bear this definition issue in mind. Figures II.9 left and II.9 right provide information on the age and gender structure of respectively the African and the Latin American migrant populations in the UK. The African population in the UK is mainly concentrated in the active ages in the labour force. There are relatively few young and even less elderly among this group. As these data are provided by citizenship, however, we should be careful about drawing far reaching conclusions. As many young people of African origin are born in the UK they acquire British citizenship and thus disappear as Africans from this type of statistic. The same applies to the older people from Africa several of whom had British citizenship upon arrival due to the fact that they belonged to the Commonwealth.

Regarding the population composition of those from Latin American countries we find a similar pattern as just outlined for the African group. In particular since the majority of the Latin American residing population is original from the Caribbean again many of them had and have British nationality. In this respect figure II.9 primarily represents new migrants from this region to the UK. In any case it is clear that women dominate among this group and although they are mainly between 25 and 50 years of age, there are also some older migrants from this origin area residing in the UK.
2. Settlement patterns of selected origin groups

Migrants do not settle in a new country randomly. Very often migrants arrive in the larger urban areas where housing and work are more readily available (Zorlu and Mulder, 2008; De Valk et al., 2004). Networks of migrants from the same origin established at initial settlement may be continued over years where newly arrived immigrants are supported by those already in the country for example by providing housing for free (Castles and Miller, 2009). Settlement into certain areas in the country or to specific parts in cities can reinforce segregation between origin groups and is thus often perceived to be negative for social cohesion. Segregation is furthermore often reinforced due to native populations moving out of the areas. Recent work on Belgium however shows that beside ethnic compositions also the evaluation of the neighborhood is an important predictor for internal mobility of natives and migrant groups alike (De Valk and Willaert forthcoming). Although segregation is more and more a topic of debate in European cities, levels of segregation are still more limited than in the US.

In addition, those who arrive as asylum seekers face rather different housing rules than those arriving for other reasons. Policies regarding settlement and housing for asylum seekers are divergent between countries. In the Netherlands the state provides housing in reception centers and only after obtaining a permit the person can settle anywhere in the country. As a result those coming for asylum reasons to the Netherlands were originally much more dispersed over the country than is the case for other immigrants (De Valk et al., 2004). In Belgium, on the other hand, this is not the case: due to the overburden of the system many asylum seekers are supposed to find their own accommodation resulting in clustering in specific areas as well as in the cheapest housing strata (CGKR, 2011). Often in the same areas, in particular in the capital Brussels, many immigrants live there with reinforcing segregation.

The places where migrants predominantly live in a country can be easily represented by maps in which their concentration is indicated. We focus here on the regional level and start from a general overview before going into more detail with regard to African and Latin American migrants. The map for Germany (Map II.1) shows that the largest shares of foreigners live in the former western part of the country (the darker the color the higher the percentage of foreigners in the population). In particular the former mining and industrial regions in the west like Nordrhein-Westfalen and Baden-Württemberg have a quarter or more foreigners among their populations. Also the cities of Bremen, Hamburg and Berlin include substantial shares of foreigners. However the Länder around them and in particular close to Berlin only have few foreigners in their residing population. By far the majority of foreigners in these regions are of Turkish origin (the largest migrant group in Germany) and to a lesser extent of Italian origin.
In order to get a more detailed insight into the distribution of the African and Latin American origin groups in the total population we have produced two sets of maps for the Netherlands and Belgium (Maps II.2 and II.3) respectively. For the Netherlands we used data at the municipality level to indicate the share of African (II.2 left) and Latin American migrants (II.2 right). The percentages indicate the share these origin groups have in the total population in the specific municipality; the darker the color the larger their share is in the total population. African immigrants are clearly more dispersed over the country than is the case for the Latin American population. This is due to the fact that a large share of African migrants comes from Morocco. These immigrants primarily settled in the western part of the country and in the largest cities of that region: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, the Hague and Utrecht (the latter is more in the centre of the country). Many are still found there and also mobility among the second generation is still relatively limited (Zorlu and Mulder, 2008 and 2010). Other Africans came to the Netherlands for asylum reasons and were therefore assigned a place in the Netherlands where asylum seekers are hosted in housing provided by the government. Some of these places can be easily retrieved by the darker blue areas in the southern part of the country.

MAP II.2
THE NETHERLANDS, 2011: SHARE OF AFRICAN AND SOUTH AMERICAN IMMIGRANTS IN THE TOTAL POPULATION

Also Latin American migrants mainly find a home in the cities in the western part of the country (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and the Hague). By far the majority of these migrants are of Surinamese descent; many of them originally came for study related reasons and were attending higher education in these cities. More recently we find a higher level of social mobility among this group of Surinamese migrants resulting also in mobility out of the largest cities (Zorlu and Mulder, 2008). This is most clearly illustrated by the case of Amsterdam where many Surinamese left the inner city to move to residential areas close to, but outside of Amsterdam (for example Almere, Lelystad). This has resulted in a larger share of Latin American migrants in the areas around Amsterdam.

The same map is produced for African migrants in Belgium (Map II.3); since Latin American migrants are not a very numerous group of legal migrants in Belgium we did not produce the maps for this group here. This is not to say that no immigrants from Latin America are present, but as it has been suggested by work on this origin group many of them reside in Belgium undocumented and therefore do not show in the statistics (Seghers, 2009). First of all Map II.3 presents the share of all African immigrants in the total population of Belgium. Be aware that the colors here do not correspond to the same percentages as was the case for the Netherlands. Overall, it seems that African migrants are more likely to live in the southern (Walloon) part of the country than in the northern (Flemish) part. As it is clear from the map, African migrants in the northern (Flemish) part of Belgium mainly live in the larger cities of Antwerp, Mechelen and Leuven. A large concentration of African migrants is furthermore found in the capital Brussels (Circle in the middle of the map).
Belgium, 2001: Share of African Immigrants in the Total Population

Source: ADSEI; graph produced by Didier Willaert, Interface Demography Vrije Universiteit Brussel.

Maps II.3 directly distinguishes the African migrants in two regional origin groups. First, those from North Africa including Maghreb (Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Western Sahara and Mauretania) and from Egypt and Sudan. Second, those coming from countries in sub-Saharan Africa; numbers do not allow a more detailed distinction. Making this regional division of origin provides an additional level of detail which cannot be observed when just having the total Figure for the country. North Africans (Map II.3 left) mainly live in the larger cities of Flanders (Antwerp, Mechelen, Ghent, Leuven) as well as in the former mining industry areas in the southern Walloon part of the country. This clearly illustrates the settlement of the Moroccan labour migrants who were recruited in particular for the industries in these areas. Brussels clearly shows as an area of concentration; the city has some neighborhoods in particular in the west and north-west where large shares of Moroccan migrants have settled.

Sub-Saharan African migrants (Map II.3 right), on the contrary, mainly settled in Wallonia and in the capital Brussels. A substantial share of these migrants come from Congo and initially came to Belgium (in particular Brussels) for study purposes. These students settled in different parts of the city which still clearly show the presence of the community and attract migrants from the country as well as from other African origins. Recently some migrants from both north and sub-Saharan Africa migrated out of the city. Like in the Netherlands this seems to be related both to an improvement in the quality of housing as well as to the fact that inner city areas are no longer the places where cheap housing is found (de Valk and Willaert forthcoming). Complementary to the arguments given before settlement in the French speaking Walloon part of the country was also easier for many African migrants who already spoke French before migration. All in all these data show the relevance of initial settlement places for the places where migrants and their descendents continue to live.
MAP II.4
BELGIUM, 2001: SHARE OF NORTH AFRICAN AND SUB-SAHARAN IMMIGRANTS IN THE TOTAL POPULATION

North African immigrants

Sub-Saharan immigrants

Source: ADSEI; graph produced by Didier Willaert, Interface Demography Vrije Universiteit Brussel.
D. Children of immigrant origin

Children of migrant origin are an increasing share of European populations. Many of them are young not only due to the fact that many of them migrate at young ages with their parents but also because many of them are born after migration of their parents. Some migrants come from regions with higher fertility levels than the north-western European settlement countries, although in general this applies more to those from different African origins than for those from Latin America where fertility levels have dropped significantly. Some recent studies have shown that fertility behavior will be adapted to levels of the country of settlement rather rapidly (Milewski, 2010; Garssen and Nicolaas, 2008; De Valk, 2011). However, as a result of the young age of migration, many migrants will start their family formation either shortly before or after migration. This results in larger shares of children below the age of 18 in the migrant groups than in the native populations in north-western Europe where fertility levels in general are clearly below replacement. An already substantial, but growing share of children, have an immigrant background given the context of ageing societies and lower fertility levels in many European countries (Coleman, 2006). This is already more pronounced in the larger cities where many migrants settle.

In this part we pay special attention to migrant children and specific emphasis will be put on the background and position of the children of immigrant origin in north-western Europe. The position and the demographic behavior of the second generation will be increasingly important for Europe’s population development. It is therefore relevant to know more about children of immigrants within the frame of this study. The information for this part of the paper comes from a research project carried out by the first author for the UNICEF Innocenti Centre in Florence. In this unique project individual country experts collected detailed information on all kinds of indicators related to children of immigrants, their families as well as their position in society (see Hernandez et al., 2009; De Valk, 2010). The data gathered for the project were primarily derived from the latest census or population register data. Starting point of all data are the children between 0 and 18 years of age. As Belgium was not part of the study we restrict this part to the Netherlands, Germany and the UK.

1. Age and generation

Migrants in general are young populations. For the Netherlands for example 797 thousand children are of immigrant origin which is about 22 percent of the total under-18 population in the country. In Germany a quarter of the children have an immigrant origin and the same holds for 16 percent of all children in the UK (Hernandez et al., 2009). When looking at the origins of these children we find no African or Latin American country in the top ten largest origins in Germany. For the Netherlands the figures for the children reflect those of the total population with Morocco (123 thousand) as the only African country of origin and Suriname (89.5 thousand) and the Dutch Antilles (41 thousand) as the only Caribbean and Latin American countries of origin in the top ten. And although Pakistan, India and Bangladesh are the top three origins in the UK in the top ten of migrant children’s origin we also find Kenya (68 thousand), Nigeria (55 thousand), Jamaica (48 thousand) and South Africa (48 thousand).

By far the majority of children with an immigrant origin belong to the second generation; meaning that these children were born in the country of residence with at least one of their parents born elsewhere. The respective figures of the share of second generation in the total group of immigrant children for Germany, the Netherlands and the UK are 86, 84 and 79 per cent. This implies that many of the young with an immigrant origin did not have a migration experience themselves. The shares of second generation are relatively similar among the different origin groups in the Netherlands. Only for South Asia we found that 51% belongs to the second generation meaning that quite a substantial part of children from this region migrated to the Netherlands at a young age (either alone or with their parents). Also for the UK shares of second generation are high (not below two thirds) for all areas of origin. It shows that many immigrant groups are more established in the meantime: for example 94 percent of all children of Moroccan origin in the Netherlands belong to the second generation.
2. Characteristics of parents and parental home

The family situations in which children of immigrant origin grow up are very diverse. When for example looking at the extent to which these children are living with both parents we find a very mixed situation (Table II.7). Children of immigrants in Germany and the UK are more likely to live with two parents compared to the native population: the opposite is true for the Netherlands where 75 and 89 percent of native and immigrant children respectively live with both parents. When we look at the regions of origin of these children, it is clear that these lower percentages in the Netherlands are due to the specific situation among those of Latin American and Caribbean origin as well as for those coming from sub-Saharan Africa: among these groups just slightly over half of all children live with two parents. Although percentages are slightly higher in the UK we find similar patterns there for these two regions of origin. In the vast majority of cases these children live with their mother only.

Thus, data presented do not reveal potential differences by migrant generation. For the Netherlands we can make this distinction and it is relevant to mention it here. In some cases, among first generation children of migrant origin substantial shares do not live with at least one of their parents and this applies mainly for some African origin countries. For example, only 59 percent of first generation children from Angola lived with at least one of their parents in the Netherlands and also for first generation children from Ethiopia, Ghana, Congo, and Somalia about a fifth of them do not live with one of the parents. Among second generation children this is much less common: many more of them live with one of the parents irrespective of origin. This suggests that the figures we found are related to the migration process which is reinforced by still ongoing and unfinished migration. Nevertheless for the affected children this might have important consequences for their position in the host society as well as their individual well being.

Data in Table II.7 indirectly suggest that the percentages of single motherhood are particularly high among children from Latin America and the Caribbean with 58 and 34 percent respectively living with their mother only. Again this is in particular the case for some specific countries within these regions, like the Antilles and the Dominican Republic in the Caribbean. Overall these levels are lower for other origin groups but also for some African countries, like Angola, Cape Verde, Ghana and Somalia substantial shares are living in a single mother family. Again, part of this might be explained by unfinished migration processes of the family and (temporary) return of fathers to the countries of origin. However, since the patterns observed for the first and second generation are highly comparable, one may assume that certain prevailing traditions like the Caribbean family system (Shaw, 2003) are important also for family structures after migration (De Valk, 2010).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE II.7</th>
<th>CHILDREN LIVING IN TWO PARENT FAMILIES, BY COUNTRY OF SETTLEMENT AND REGION OF ORIGIN (In percentages)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native born families</td>
<td>78.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant families</td>
<td>86.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and pacific</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and central Asia</td>
<td>82.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle east and north Africa</td>
<td>82.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is very often suggested in the literature that intermarriage between different ethnic groups would diminish boundaries between those groups and enhance assimilation (Gordon 1964; Alba 2005; Kalmijn 1998). Looking at the percentage of children who have at least one native parent we find that this applies to only nine percent of all children of immigrants in the Netherlands in 2006. Nevertheless, there exist major differences between origin regions as well as between the migrant generations of the child (Figure II.10). Children coming from other EU countries relatively often have one Dutch parent, but this is much less the case for children from, for example, Africa (like Angola, Congo, and Morocco) or Asia (like Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq). However, for some countries intermarriage with natives are rather common but this applies to few African origins (only Nigeria and South Africa) and some Latin American countries (like Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico) only.

The overall levels of interethnic parentage are much higher for second generation than for first generation children: 42 versus 15 percent respectively. The reported country differences nevertheless remain similar for the second generation. Only for some origin groups we find very marked differences between the first and second generation children: in particular for children from Latin America the chances of having one native Dutch parent are much higher among the second than the first generation similar to some Asian countries. Of course one needs to realize that the extent to which parents came when they were young and single could potentially influence these findings as starting union and family formation in the Netherlands may increase the chances of an interethnic union. In addition, for some parents of the second generation children in our study, the migration move to the Netherlands is potentially motivated by the presence of the Dutch partner.

![Figure II.10](image)

**FIGURE II.10**

THE NETHERLANDS, 2006: INTERMARRIAGES WITH A NATIVE DUTCH SPOUSE FOR THE CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS OF DIFFERENT ORIGIN AND GENERATION

(In percentages)


The socio-economic position in which children of immigrants from non-western origins grow up, is in many cases disadvantaged compared to the total population in the study countries (Heath et al., 2008). Most parents have no or limited education and those who did attend higher education in
their countries of origin are often having problems with getting their degrees acknowledged in the country of settlement. Also legal restrictions on entering the labor market for some groups of migrants hamper their economic position in the short and longer run. Table II.8 presents the labor market situation of the fathers of second generation children living in the Netherlands. Overall we find that around 17 percent of all fathers of children of immigrants in the case of the Netherlands is unemployed. Around 80 percent of fathers are working, patterns which are highly comparable with the levels in Germany and the United Kingdom (Hernandez et al., 2009). In all countries unemployment levels are much higher for the fathers of immigrant children than for the native population. This reflects again the overall disadvantaged position of migrant populations in the labor market. In the Dutch case recent data show that between early 2009 and 2010 the unemployment levels of the non-western immigrants rose from 10 to 14% whereas the respective figures for the natives were 3.6 and 5.1%. Whereas men seem to be hit first by the economic crisis, the figures for 2010 reveal that the unemployment levels for women have also increased considerably and are now the same as those for men. In particular young adults entering the labour market are prone to the recession; a quarter of young adults of migrant origin aged 15 to 25 are unemployed early 2010 compared to 19% early 2009. The effects of the economic crisis seem thus to be reflected in the labour market figures for 2010 much more than was the case in 2009 and hit non-western migrants more than others.

The presented labour force figures again cover remarkable differences by origin: at least a third of fathers of first-generation immigrant children from several African and Asian countries (including, among others, Afghanistan, Iraq, Morocco, Somalia, and Sudan) are without work (not in table). This level is peaking with sometimes more than two thirds of the fathers of the first-generation children in some of the immigrant groups coming from the African and Asian countries mentioned above (not in figure). Among the fathers of second-generation children, the shares without work are generally smaller than the corresponding shares among fathers of children in the first generation, this seems to point to a positive effect of period of residence on the acquired labour force position. However, the results are persistent among fathers of children in both the first and second generations for those countries with the largest shares of unemployed fathers (De Valk, 2010).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE II.8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THE NETHERLANDS, 2006: LABOR MARKET POSITION OF FATHERS OF SECOND GENERATION CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(In percentages)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second generation children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: No father refers to having the father not living in the same household making it impossible to derive data on the labor market position.
3. Mobility

Finally we studied mobility among children of immigrants (Table II.9). In the previous section we showed the settlement patterns over the country. It is relevant to study mobility in more detail given that the effects of a move might relate to an improvement in housing status but can just as well be very disruptive, e.g. for educational careers of children. We just have data for the Netherlands at hand. The figures of mobility among the first generation children of immigrants show that more than three quarters have moved in the past five years. The highest percentage of movers are found among some African origins (Angola, Ghana, Nigeria, and Sudan) as well as for those from Brazil and Colombia (not in Table). Although these percentages partially reflect the high number of newly arriving first generation immigrant children, it cannot be fully accounted for by the newcomers. It also points to the rather high level of mobility after migration, partially related to relocation for those seeking asylum.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE II.9</th>
<th>THE NETHERLANDS, 2006: MOBILITY OF SECOND GENERATION CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS (In percentages)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One parent in country</td>
<td>Children 5-17 year who have moved in the past 5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total child population</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native born children</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second generation children</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe (excl. NL)</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-15</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-10 (selection)</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Europe (incl. Russia and Turkey)</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As the second generation is born in the country their moves will predominantly relate to internal mobility. In order to single out the effects of international migration moves it thus makes sense to study their pattern of mobility in more detail. However, levels of mobility among second-generation children remain high when compared to native children. This is especially the case of children with origins in the Caribbean and Latin America. At the same time this regional grouping covers part of the diversity, as in the five years prior to 2006 at least half of those from Angola, Sudan, the former Soviet Union and the Dominican Republic had moved (not in Table). Unfortunately our data do not reveal the reasons for these moves. Part of this resettlement might be related to the fact that in the Netherlands asylum seekers are housed in central housing and after receiving a refugee status have to move elsewhere into the regular housing market. In the meantime, children born in the Netherlands will then also have to resettle. In other cases it might be the result of the fact that many immigrant parents are in a vulnerable position on the labor market, and this may also result in an uncertainty on the housing market leading to more internal moves in the Netherlands.
E. Ageing immigrant populations

Ageing is one of the main challenges that north-western Europe is facing now and in the near future. Given the fact that immigration to many of these countries already started in the 1950s, ageing of immigrant populations is becoming increasingly relevant in these countries with a longer migration history. As mentioned before migrants mainly came from former colonies, as labor migrants to work in the growing industrial economies or as refugees. The first two groups of immigrants are now entering older ages whereas asylum migrants are still relatively young. For example a labor migrant coming to the Netherlands in 1965 at age 23 will soon be 70. The origins of the elderly are diverse as we have seen before (given the different recruitment areas and colonial links), but many of them come from Africa and Latin America as well. Substantial shares of migrants originally arriving to north-western Europe on a temporary basis have settled longer in the host country. The ageing process in the settlement country might thus have important consequences for these societies, the individual person and their families (both in the settlement and origin country). Besides these immigrants ageing in the host country some migrants also arrive at retirement age. This is of course most notable for the retirees from northern Europe to the southern countries of Europe. In the countries we studied here the number of elderly immigrants with a foreign nationality or born elsewhere is rather small. Those who do migrate at these later ages mainly have a European origin and we thus do not study them in detail here (Green et al., 2009; Warnes and Williams, 2006; Statistics Netherlands Statline, 2011).

Although ageing populations are highly debated in general in recent years, still limited and scattered information is available on immigrant elderly. Although the proportion of elderly of migrant origin is limited, in the UK already in 2000 a quarter of people from 60 years or over belonged to an ethnic minority group (Evandrou, 2000). And this share is going to increase substantially over the next decades. This part of the study provides an overview of elderly immigrants, their characteristics, the role of transnational ties, the consequences for health and intergenerational relations based on an extensive literature review. We make use of existing material for each of the study countries.

1. Characteristics of immigrant elderly

The age composition of the foreign born in each of the study countries is overall still younger than the native population. Despite the fact that the shares of 65+ are smaller among the foreign born than native born we also find that for the foreign born between 11% (the Netherlands) and 16.5% (Belgium) of the population over 15 belong to the oldest age category of 65 plus. Germany and the United Kingdom take an intermediate position with 12 and 16 % of the foreign born already belonging to this oldest category (OECD, 2008). We use the definition of foreign born here as this mainly refers to those of the first generation who are clearly older than the ones of the second generation in most cases (see previous section). In line with gender specific patterns found among the native groups in all countries, we also found for foreign born that women are more likely to belong to this elderly category than men. Larger gender gaps exist in the Netherlands and Belgium. Obviously when looking at the top five countries of origin among the elderly population it clearly reflects migration histories in each of the countries. The only northern African country appearing in the top five of largest elderly groups is Morocco: Around 7% in Belgium and 2% in the Netherlands of the population aged 15 and over belong to the 65+ age group. As these OECD comparative data do not include a further breakdown of the 25-64 year old, the fact that in the near future many immigrant elderly will become 65 (as they are currently between 55 and 64) is still hidden in these figures (OECD, 2008).

Former colonizing countries (like the Netherlands and the UK) have the oldest age composition of their foreign born population, which can of course be expected from their longer migration histories of settlement. Most existing studies in the Netherlands include therefore Surinamese, and Antilleans (beside Moroccans and Turks) as combined these four groups constitute nearly 80% of the non-Western elderly population in the country. In addition, in the Dutch case, 35% of the Indonesian born population over 15 has already reached 65 years or over. For the UK, migration
history is also reflected in the composition of the elderly foreign born: a fifth of the Indian born population over 15 is already beyond 64. In Germany labor migrants who have not returned to their country of origin are now reaching old age. In addition, the specific migration history of the Ethnic Germans do not have the typical young age structure which is found among many labor migrant groups. Almost 10 percent of the Aussiedler are already over 65 and another 25 percent is between the ages of 45 and 65 (BMI, 2011:57). Consequently, elderly migrants in Germany are a mixture of mostly aged former-labor migrants and Aussiedler. At the same time Aussiedler are not always included in studies and statistics as migrant groups given the fact that they have German nationality.

The future population of elderly with a migrant origin will also be partially determined by permanent settlement and return. In general, immigrants from lower income countries, those facing more stringent immigration policies, and arriving from countries with greater geographic distance, tend to stay longer (Rendall and Ball, 2004). Many of these elderly migrants will face the decision of returning with the chance of losing for example a residence permit or the rights and social entitlements which they acquired in the host country in the meantime. Immigrants from richer and geographically closer countries that face easier immigration policies, such as immigrants from Australia or Ireland, are more likely to leave within five years of their arrival, and are thus much less likely to be found among the ageing migrant population in the north-western European countries (Rendall and Ball, 2004).

2. Elderly migrants and health

In the 1985 study by Blakemore it is already pointed out that the heterogeneous background of elderly migrants in Britain yields challenges for local social services and health authorities. The concentration of elderly migrants in large cities —nearly half of all aged persons live in London and surrounding districts— has both advantages and disadvantages for social services and health authorities. On the one hand it is problematic to provide “adequate, ethnically appropriate residential care and other services for the elderly”, while on the other hand the concentration of elderly migrants “has the advantage of facilitating special services” (Blakemore, 1985: 89).

Most studies on immigrant elderly have focused on their socio-economic position, health, and usage of services (Bernard and Phillips, 2000). Ageing immigrants in the United Kingdom are, as ageing immigrants in other European nations, among one of the country’s most disadvantaged populations: They are underprivileged because of their ethnicity and because of their age (Cribier, 1980; Warnes et al., 2004; Warnes and Williams, 2006). Moreover, as Alison Norman (1985) argues in her book *Triple Jeopardy: growing old in a second homeland*, they have one more jeopardy: cultural differences which for example result in limited access to and use of services intended for the old (Norman, 1985). This could potentially result in a poorer physical health situation (Ebrahim, 1992b) which is intertwined with a number of other issues, such as mental health, family ties, and institutionalized care, and intergenerational solidarity. Limited language abilities and restricted knowledge of the health care system are put forward as the main reasons behind this (Ebrahim, 1992a; Ebrahim, 1992b; Johnson, 2004). All in all this suggests that the level of assimilation to the host country is an important determinant in the health situation of immigrant elderly. Interestingly, however, very little is known about the assimilation of elderly migrants in the UK and in other European countries. Whereas in the United States, scholars do focus on the assimilation of elderly immigrants (in particular those with Asian origins), such as their living arrangements (Kamo and Zhou, 1994; Koh and Bell, 1987; Wilmoth, 2001), psychological wellbeing (Casado and Leung, 2002; Kim, 1999; Lee et al., 1996), and social support and social welfare dependency (Hu 1998; Lee et al 1996) this is hardly the case of the UK and continental Europe. In the latter country most studies on elderly immigrants primarily focus on their physical and mental wellbeing (Adelman et al., 2009; Donaldson, 1986; Driedger, 1987; Ebrahim, 1992b; Ebrahim and Hillier, 1991; Livingston and Sembhi, 2003; Norman, 1985; Warnes et al., 2004; Warnes and Williams, 2006; White, 2006). And those studies that do so hardly cover immigrants from African and only partially take those from Caribbean origin into account.
Earlier research by Evandrou (2000) in the UK nevertheless, shows that health status of elderly varies by origin; those of Pakistani or Bangladeshi origin are more likely to have a poor health compared to other origin groups. This finding is also corroborated in recent work on newly arriving elderly migrants to the UK (Green et al., 2009). Research in mental illness shows a higher level of dementia among elderly migrants with e.g. African Caribbean origin (Livingston et al., 2001; Livingston and Sembhi, 2003). African-Caribbean migrants have a larger likelihood to dementia and have it diagnosed at a younger age. But whereas they go to see a general practitioner as often as the native-born population they receive less specialized care (Adelman et al., 2009; Shah, 2008). Different explanatory factors have been put forward ranging from language knowledge, socio-economic position, and educational level to more cultural explanations on the meaning of illness. Research is still inconclusive at this point.

A recent study comparing health care use among immigrants and native-born populations in 11 European countries showed that Germany had the largest proportion of immigrants that reported bad or very bad health (56%) (Solé-Auró et al., 2009). Given their high proportion of reported bad health it is not surprising that immigrant elderly in Germany more frequently visit physicians, general practitioners and even go to hospitals more often than native-born Germans. Elderly immigrants in Germany of the same gender and age as the native-born went 13% more often to see a GP; in the last 12 months they visited 15% more physicians; and they had 12% more expected hospital stays. But these differences vanish in Germany when controlled for health conditions while for the other European countries the differences between native-born and immigrants remain the same. (Solé-Auró et al., 2009). Controlled for a number of demographic and health factors, immigrant elderly seem to use health care facilities at the same rate as native-born elderly in the other countries.

These findings suggest that it is rather a composition effect and the result of worse socio-economic conditions that make migrant elderly more prone to be in worse health. Policies aimed at tackling bad socio-economic problems might thus be more important than migrant specific actions. In some studies it is even suggested that immigrant elderly are in fact relatively healthy and some even argue that they are more healthy than native-born. Their relatively healthy situation is described as the ‘healthy migrant effect’. As it is often put forward Razum et al. suggest that migrants are a selective group who are more likely to be in good physical shape at migration (Razum and Rohrmann, 2002; Razum et al., 1998; Razum et al., 2000). Whether this directly results in more healthy ageing is still subject to discussion. In particular many labor migrants, for example, had heavy jobs resulting in many physical problems. In addition it has been brought up that those who are healthy might return to their home countries when ageing whereas those encountering health issues might rely more on the facilities available in the country of settlement and make them additionally less mobile to return to their home country. When it comes to mortality, findings indicate diverse results for different origin groups in the UK: those from East- and West Africa, Bangladesh e.g. have higher all-cause mortality than the national averages whereas elderly from China and Hong Kong show lower all-cause mortality (Wild et al., 2007). Moreover, studies show that immigrants in Germany, as migrants elsewhere in Europe, also have a lower mortality rate than native-born Germans (Raymond et al., 1996; Razum and Twardella, 2002; Razum et al., 1998). For example, for breast cancer, Turkish and ethnic German (Aussiedler) migrant women have a lower incidence and mortality rate than native-born German women. Of course these findings still have to be tested with the coming generation of ageing adults of diverse origins as the level and type of health problems might be directly related to the reason for migration as well. At the same time it is clear that with ageing immigrant populations of diverse origins these questions will remain important in the decades to come.

Despite the existence of ethnically oriented elderly associations and organizations and activities for the elderly in general, studies for the Netherlands suggest that there is a large number of elderly migrants who feel lonely (De Valk and Van Droogenbroeck, 2010). Again large differences are found between origin groups: Schellingerhout (2004) finds that elderly Turks report the lowest
psychological wellbeing. These findings are echoed by Van der Wurf et al. (2004) who found that 62% of the Turkish elderly in their survey had symptoms of depression while this applies to 15% of the native-born Dutch elderly. Surinamese Hindu elderly, on the other hand, report very positively about their mental wellbeing. Again it remains largely unclear whether this is a difference in reporting, whether the measurement of loneliness is applicable to the same extent to all groups and has the same meaning for different origin groups or that these levels indeed reflect diversity in loneliness and mental health among the groups. Policies aimed at the elderly should consider the vulnerability to loneliness in general and for migrants in particular.

3. Intergenerational relations and social ties

Health is seen as a leading element in determining quality of life (Walker and Martimo, 2000) although this might not mean the same for elderly of different ethnic origin (Brockman, 2002). Family ties are a potentially important factor in determining the quality of life as well, and even more so for migrant elderly coming from more collectivistic oriented societies. Data from the “National Survey of Ethnic minorities of England and Wales” show that quality of life is influenced by both health and participation in networks. Nevertheless, for elderly migrants, especially those from Pakistan, subjective elements, such as family contacts were found to be more important than they are for the native majority population (Bajekal et al., 2004). Whereas there is not much known on this issue in Germany, research shows that former labor migrants that have reached old age prefer to have contact with co-ethnic “in their own cultural niches with their own religious institutions and migrant organizations” (Dietzel-Papakyriakou, 2005: 296). This is for example reflected in the fact that immigrants from Turkey have extensive ethnic social networks in many German cities.

The position of elderly migrants in different domains of life is, however, not just determined by conditions at that point in life but is just as much related to the earlier life course. One of the issues that has been pointed out in literature is that the plans immigrants have regarding their post-retirement period are important for their position in old age. In particular how these plans are related to their decisions and participation in their younger years as well (Cassarino, 2004). And although many migrants originally intended to stay temporarily, yet a large part of them ends up staying in the literature also referred to as the ‘myth of return’ (Ebrahim, 1992a). The social, economic, and cultural position elderly migrants have in the UK vis-à-vis their country of origin determines, to a large extent, their decision to stay or return (Cassarino, 2004). In this regard more attention should be given to the impact of different life course decisions and the links with migration.

The housing position of elderly migrants is related to both health and family issues. We have to draw mainly on studies from the UK where it is shown that elderly with an ethnic black origin are more likely to live in social rented housing. Homeownership is least common among this group compared to both native and other ethnic groups (like Asians and Chinese) (Green et al., 2009). Approximately 10% of the quarter of a million ethnic elderly in the UK live in a care home, a number that is expected to rise in the coming years (Mold et al., 2005). Care homes seem, however, not to be very popular among the aging migrants and both language and cultural barriers may separate migrant and native-born elderly. But more importantly, cultural differences can limit the service that is provided to elderly migrants (Askham, 1997; Milne and Chryssanthopoulou, 2005). In addition, given the importance attached to the family for care and support in more collectivistic oriented societies, handing over to professional services is found to be hard for elderly of migrant origins (Chiu and Yu, 2001; Heathcote, 2000).

The views elderly migrants have towards health, support and care are closely related to the predominant more collective values of their countries of origin. These emphasize the group as a whole, rather than the individual in which interdependence, sociability, and family integrity are central. This implies, for example, that children are expected to live with their parents until marriage and that parents move in with their children at old age (Triandis, 1994; Triandis, 2001; De Valk and Saad, 2008). The importance of family and family ties is found to be even more prominent for some groups of elderly migrants, as family resources are often used for care, counselling, and other practical help (Chen and
Silverstein, 2000; Harrison et al., 1994). Asian elderly immigrants in Britain rely on family support more than the native-born for example (Sin, 2006). A study by Chiu and Yu (2001) also shows that many Chinese adult immigrants in the UK believe that elderly Chinese should live with their son, a belief which is shared across older and younger generations. Nevertheless, adult children do not always have the means to take care of their parents. Despite intergenerational solidarity is stronger among these groups, Willis (2008) shows that African Caribbean migrants have a much lower sense of filial obligations and weaker family ties. Among this latter origin group, extended family households are rather uncommon (Barker, 1984) and over a third of the African Caribbean migrants live alone (Bhalla and Blakemore, 1981). Already in the 1980s, Fenton (1987) concluded that overall African Caribbean elderly migrants are relatively unsupported by other contiguous family members. One reason behind the differential level of family support is the disruptive effect the migration process itself has for families (Atkin and Rollings, 1992; Fenton, 1987).

Among elderly migrants from different origins in the Netherlands strong family values remain important too. A recent study shows that 50% of the Turkish and Moroccan parents agree that children that live close by should visit their parents at least once a week, 36% of the Surinamese and only 16% of the Antillean parents think so too. Also regarding taking care of sick parents, more than half of the Turkish and Moroccan migrants agree that children should do so, while this is the case for only 11% of the native-born. The Surinamese and Antillean migrants fall in between, respectively 27% and 19% agree that children should take care of sick parents (De Valk and Schans, 2008).

4. Ageing and return

By definition the elderly migrants living in the studied north-western European countries is a selected group as they remained and did nor return to their country of origin. Whereas many migrants themselves, as well as the host societies, expected the migration move to Europe to be temporary, large variations exist in the levels of return migration. A study by the Office of National statistics in the UK shows that around half to two-thirds of the immigrants from the EU, North America and Oceania emigrate again within five years whereas of immigrants born in the Indian subcontinent only about 15 per cent moves back to the country of origin (Rendall and Ball, 2004).

There are several reasons why immigrants decide to return or not. As noted above, family ties might be one reason. In that regard, as Cassarino (2004: 257) adequately points out “return is not only a personal issue, but above all a social and contextual one, affected by situational and structural factors”. It is a cost and benefit calculation between the opportunities that immigrants have in the host country and what they expect to find in their homeland. While these calculations can include elements such as human capital, income, and economic prospects, for elderly migrants they are more likely to encompass health benefits, care/support networks, and family ties in either place. Moreover, Byron (1999) shows that among Caribbean migrants return depends not only on wealth but also on time spent in the UK. Staying longer in the UK, he argues, dilutes the ties to the country of origin and thus chances for return decrease. A similar argument is made by Thomas-Hope (1999) with respect to the return of Jamaican migrants. She shows that return depends on a bond between the migrants and their home country, “especially at the level of the household and the family” (ibid: 183). But that it is mainly determined by “a combination of two factors the characteristics of the migrants who return in terms of their skills, experience and attitudes, and the conditions of the country itself” (ibid: 199) The elderly migrants that return to Jamaica are often still economically active after their return.

In her analysis of the return migration of Southern European guest-workers Brecht (1994) also finds that family network plays a determinant role in decisions regarding returning. Having family in the country of origin, increases the chances for return. Whereas Brecht does not control for health, it may be that frail elderly are more likely to return to their country of origin because they have family there to take care of them. However, just as the decision to migrate is not made by individuals alone, neither are the choices to return. The role of family in one’s life is very important, especially for elderly migrants. Family characteristics have therefore an important impact on the decision to return at different stages in the life course. Where the family is located, i.e. the geographic location of spouses,
children and parents, is the most important aspect. It may determine whether elderly migrants choose to move back or stay (Constant and Massey, 2002). This does however not imply that all those who have their primary residence in one of the studied countries remained there all the time, some commute back and forth several times throughout their life for longer or shorter periods (Faist, 2000) and also during old ages some travel back and forth, between their country of origin and the country of settlement, several times a year. All these decisions are of course also determined by options shaped by policies on residence. When there are strict conditions related to residence permits and entitlements that can not be easily transferred, return migration will be difficult to realize. In particular migrants from outside the EU are prone to these policies which are much less affecting EU migrants who move within the common EU area.

F. Conclusions

Migration to north-western Europe is and has been diverse and changing over the past decades. The migration histories in each of the countries and links with different parts of the world have resulted in migrant populations with a variety of characteristics. Also for the African and Latin American migrants enormous diversity exists both between origin groups from the two continents as well as within each of the groups. Migration from Africa to this part of Europe reflects on the one hand the colonial links and on the other the labor recruitment in the 1960s (mainly northern Africa). In all countries these flows and resulting stocks of (African) immigrants are directly related to legislation with regard to entry and stay. These rules define the options for entry, the living conditions and welfare state entitlements for each of the groups. In this respect the difference between African immigrants in Belgium and the Netherlands versus those in the UK are exemplary. North African (mainly Moroccan) migrants, that are still the majority in the two continental countries, were recruited for unskilled work and even though asylum migrants arrived from other parts of the African continent, their share in the population is still substantially smaller. The socio economic characteristics of the North African migrants are given by the very selective labor recruitment in the sixties and their residence was directly based on their activity in the lowest segments of the labor market. Although their stay originally was seen as temporary and as an asset to the economic growth in this part of Europe, this has changed substantially over the years. Social and political right and entitlement only developed over time and are still not always the same as those for the native majority population. In this respect many of the African immigrants in the UK are characterized by a different history with many having the right to reside in the UK based on citizenship before migration and most of them originate from sub-Saharan Africa as well. African migrant to Germany is limited and those who reside have a diverse origin. For comparison: the absolute numbers of residing migrants from Africa are almost the same in Germany and Belgium despite the huge difference in total population size of both countries (11 versus 82 million inhabitants).

The spatial distribution of migrants in general reflects the role of the labor market and social networks in settlement patterns. This is also the case for the African immigrants in the studied countries although again language barriers are shaping boundaries too: despite worse economic conditions in the Walloon region more African migrants have settled in this part of Belgium. The overall lower level of education of some migrant origins, among many of African descent, make them more prone to economic fluctuations: they often have jobs in the lower strata of the labor market, less secure contracts, and higher probabilities of unemployment. Also for those who are more educated (as is the case among others for some refugee groups) finding a position which reflects their capacities is not a given due to both acknowledgements of educational credentials, entry problems to the labor market and discrimination.

Furthermore, there are interesting differences between African migrants in the Netherlands and Belgium: Belgium having colonial relations with some sub-Saharan African countries as well as a joint language with many of the African countries in general resulted in a more favorable situation for these migrants compared to the Netherlands. The fact that both in the UK and Belgium many African
migrants already spoke the language before arriving to the country facilitated the first settlement. Language has been identified as a key element in participation in the host society in many studies and often is a prerequisite for naturalization. The level to which nationality is acquired in most countries also determines access to other social entitlements as well as political participation.

The position of the North African migrants seems to be still largely determined by their migration history with Moroccans having in many cases a worse socio-economic position than other migrants (also partially from Africa) arriving as asylum seekers later in time. In addition, to the selective migrant characteristics, discrimination, the public discourse and perception may have an effect. Furthermore, religious background has been emphasized in many of the north-western European countries where Muslims in particular are perceived as a threat. Religion also plays a role in the relatively few intermarriages among some immigrant groups including the Moroccan and Turkish. In this respect the position of Latin American migrants both in education and the labor market as well as in housing seems to be better. Intermarriages are more common and interethnic relations in general are more often also facilitated by fewer language barriers as many migrants already knew Dutch or English before arriving to the Netherlands and the UK for example. Nevertheless, despite the rather long links and history their position very often is still not the same as for the native majority group.

This more vulnerable position of migrants could be in times of economic crisis become even worse. The economic recession potentially affects both the immigration flows and the migrant stocks. Despite the economic crisis, however, the levels of immigration increased in three of the four studied countries and remained stable in the fourth (Germany) also in the most recent years. Of course it is possible that the effects of the crisis will only be reflected in more recent data (or even the years to come) which are not available yet. At the same time it is clear that migration includes not only those primarily seeking a job but also includes family related migration and asylum seekers. These latter two are important reasons for acquiring residence in the studied countries as it is shown. Both of them are potentially less prone to the economic crisis than is the case for labor migration (see also Beets and Willekens, 2009). In addition, in particular in the current situation of recession, many may search for other ways to acquire residence as labor migration is a more difficult option. The already existing links between countries of origin of migrants and receiving societies might very well increase further in importance. So although economic fluctuations have an impact on migration patterns, it does not imply immigration will stop in times of recession. Both policy and the situation in the origin countries of migrants are relevant (De Beer, 2011). The impact of the crisis in the origin countries is in this sense often overlooked. It is however relevant to know more about this latter impact in order to realistically assess the factors at play in decisions migrants take about remittances, return or migration of family members. The reduced economic prospect of migrant households can in this sense lead to fewer remittances send to the home countries and in this way affect the economic situation over and beyond their direct economic position.

Of course one has to realize that migrants from among other African countries seeking employment will be undocumented and thus not appear in statistics. At the same time in all four countries the recent debates about undocumented labor are much more focused on the Eastern European countries, some of which recently joined the EU. As a result of the EU enlargement part of this labor migration is no longer undocumented but adds to the increase in EU migrants in the study countries. In each of the countries, the traditional sectors where many migrants find work, like agriculture and construction, are now to a large extent dominated by Eastern European migrants. In the care sector (both documented as well as undocumented private care) on the other hand both African as well as Latin American migrants are still found.

Despite the fact that asylum migration is still one of the major reasons of migration for some origins as seen before, the figures generally dropped in north-western Europe since the mid-2000s and this is also clear from migration reasons to the different countries. We generally observe a downward trend in the studied countries not necessarily implying that asylum migration to Europe gets less important. It mainly suggests that as a result of policy changes as well as expansion of the European Union different countries in Europe are now preferred entry countries for higher numbers of asylum
migrants. The recent crisis and related refugee movements in northern Africa and the Middle East for example are mainly entering in the Southern EU countries. The extent to which this will have impacts on the north-western EU countries is still hard to assess also because reliable data are not available yet.

The economic crisis is just as relevant for the position of immigrants. As many migrants work in labor market sectors that are mostly affected by business cycle fluctuations, the effects of the crisis are potentially stronger for them. In addition, many of the migrants do have less secure jobs making them more prone to the economic crisis. Data already showed that even in times of economic prospect (mid 2000s) many migrants did not have a paid employment. This number can be expected to rise and recent figures indeed suggest this is the case. And although due to the crisis primarily the labor market changes, also policies and political sentiments may be changing: with anti immigrant feelings getting more public support. On the one hand this is potentially reflected in more strict immigration policies but on the other hand it can just as well affect immigrants entering the labor market in search for jobs. As figures for the Netherlands already showed potentially immigrant young adults from the second generation are confronted with reduced job opportunities. The difficulty they have with finding a job may impact the financial situation but also their outlooks for the future. Housing conditions may for example deteriorate as due to the crises banks are much stricter in providing loans for buying homes, resulting in less access to homeownership in particular for those who are vulnerable on the labor market.

At the same time the welfare states in many countries of north-western Europe will depend more and more on migrants and their descendents. Although immigration has become a structural part in society, relatively little attention has been paid to the effects migration might have in the long run. The demographic composition in north-western Europe will radically change in the years to come. Two emerging issues in the changing demographic composition of north-western Europe have been pointed out in this report: the ethnic composition of both children/ young adults as well as the elderly population will be more ethnically diverse than was the case before. The second generation, who has no migration experience themselves, are in many respects still disadvantaged. Even when they reach much higher levels of education than their parents they are still mainly finding positions in the lower strata of the labor force which will have major implications. Among the first generation percentages of migrants out of the labor market are relatively high for specific groups. And although this is the case for both men and women, levels of female participation in the labor market are even lower than for men in some African origin groups. Latin-American and the Eastern European migrants have much higher levels of participation particularly for women. With increasing educational attainment, in which women outperform men also among those of immigrant origin, it is expected that young women of migrant origin will participate at much higher rates in the labor force. This has, however, many important consequences both for their families (support for children and elderly) but also for society at large. In times of recession welfare state provisions both for childcare and elderly care which are prone to budget cuts and make the informal care network often even more important. The economic crisis and expanded life expectancy have fuelled the discussion about the future of welfare state arrangements, with many entitlements already being reduced. Whether this will have the same impact on all ethnic groups is hard to say but one can expect migrants to be more hit by these changes. At household level the effects of the economic crisis can result in less labor market participation as governments no longer provide care facilities or reduce them. At the same time labor force participation of all household members is needed in order to supply sufficient income to the household. The economic crisis in this way directly impacts both the young and elderly of the family as well.

Elderly migrants will be an increasingly important share of the population in north-western European societies. In addition to the ageing among the native majority group, a larger share of the elderly will have a migrant background. The decision whether or not to return to their home countries in old age is, however, at least partially dependent on policy and family. Given the fact that most entitlements gathered through labor market participation as well as welfare state arrangements are not directly transferable when living elsewhere combined with the fact that many of them have their children living in the country of settlement, makes it rather unlikely to expect that many of these elderly will return to their home country in the near future.

99
The group of elderly again is heterogeneous and with the exception of Moroccan migrants, the majority of African migrants in the study countries are still relatively young. Ageing is thus less pronounced for the African groups and much more important already for, among others, the Latin American origin groups. Up to now, however, return migration also among Latin-Americans is relatively limited. Again this is often linked to residence permits, rights, and welfare state entitlements. Eastern Europeans, for example, have been more inclined to return to their home countries.

The economic crisis may have important consequences for those elderly who have had their working life in north-western Europe as pension rights are more and more discussed and not so secure in the current economic situation. This might imply that also in the future they will be in a vulnerable economic position, where their children can not necessarily support them. Co-residence is less common in this region of Europe also reflected in fewer family housing options. The care giving the children of these immigrants are expected to receive is thus not so easily facilitated. At the same time welfare state arrangements are likely to be reduced in line with already ongoing cost reductions.

The effects of the current developments in the North African region for the north-western EU countries are uncertain. The asylum influx in the mid-1990s to northern European countries is now mainly hitting the southern European states which are already in a worse economic position. The future will depend on the extent to which common immigration and reception policies will be developed in the EU.

Migration is and will be a factor of influence for each of the studied countries. Immigration flows and the demographic behavior of the residing immigrants will be important aspects of population change in the near future. In this sense it can be expected that the role of women will continue to change (both in immigration and position after migration). The future of migration to north-western Europe will further be determined by established links between different parts of the world as history has shown. At the same time the role of both legislation and economic development is clearly of importance for both immigration and residing immigrants. The challenge many north-western European countries face for the near future is to provide equal opportunities to the children of immigrants. Only by creating prospects for the young, while paying sufficient attention to diversity in different life course stages, social cohesion in society can be maintained.

Bibliography


Ministry of Justice (2006), Afrikanen uit Angola, DR Congo, Ethiopië, Eritrea, Nigeria en Sudan in Nederland: een profiel, Den Haag, Ministerie van Justitie


III. Recent African immigration to South America: The cases of Argentina and Brazil in the regional context

Pedro F. Marcelino and Marcela Cerrutti

A. Introduction

1. Brief presentation of the problem

During the last years, the presence of recently arrived Africans to Argentina became more noticeable, particularly in Buenos Aires City. Even though, compared to any other immigrant community it is a small population, these immigrants are marked by their race. The sudden emergence of this new immigrant group raised all sorts of speculations. ¿Who are they? ¿What are they doing in Argentina? ¿Why did they choose to come here? Local reactions to their presence varied, from more sympathetic and humanistic ones to less friendly and even racist. Yet there is no doubt that their presence has contributed to ‘visibilize’ Africa in Argentina in many respects, but particularly on two grounds, it has stimulated the debate on the African heritage and afro-descendants in Argentina, and on the human rights regard that is involved in international migration.

It should be emphasized that Argentina is not the only country of destination for African immigrants in South America, since there is also a sizable population in Brazil and other countries. Irrespective of their particularities, in both cases these flows constitute a marginal expression of a dreadful situation: the reality of people escaping from violence, persecution and hunger with no places to go. Some of them, in face of a developed world that has increasingly closed their doors and rejected their presence; and neighbor countries that have become more hostile to regional immigrants, have decided for alternative countries of destination. Consequently, recent African immigration to Argentina and Brazil are both expressions of a broader geopolitical situation.

9 Consultants from the Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) – Population Division of ECLAC.
Despite having initiated this decade amid a crippling financial crisis, Argentina has seen a steady, if residual migratory inflow of both regular and irregular migrants from the African continent. They are mostly young and male, predominantly West Africans, a minority of whom are asylum-seekers, while others might fall under the category of *de facto* refugees. Most come from Senegal, but the list includes Nigerians, Ghanaian, Liberian, Guinean, Malian, Cameroonian, and a score of other nationals.

Existing studies (this one included) overwhelmingly mention Senegalese migrants—and, to a lesser extent, Nigerian—as the focus of attention. This is as perhaps virtue of their number. Yet, the common Argentinean might be constructing an “otherized” subject no more than the scholar or the policy analyst. By default, this study, as the academic publications that preceded it, constructs the subject primarily as Senegalese, male, and young, possibly accepting discrepancies between the reality on the ground and the reality articulated on paper. In the absence of extensive footwork it is important, thus, to perhaps recognize the academic bias that pervades any such analysis.

In any case, this inflow that started in the late nineties, increased in the post-9/11 period, in which severe migratory policy shifts in consolidated destinations (EU, US) enhanced the risks and costs, and reduced the rewards of migrating there. Simultaneously, the externalization of migratory policies, particularly by the European Union, transferred migration pressure from the EU borders to a number of buffer nations in the immediate vicinity of the Union.

The neighbors quickly became frontier destinations, transit and transhipment centers where informal incorporation has been normalized. In some cases, the legal limbo and the impossibility of leaving created a permanent state of transience, resulting in actual settlement and liminality. The difficulties along the African/European border are now severely compounded by an unprecedented political upheaval, leading to a situation of further uncertainty insofar as migrants are concerned. Although this crisis and the emergence of Argentina as a destination for African immigrants is not straightforward, it is relevant to question how EU immigration policies will emerge from the crisis, and how migrant networks might respond.

Argentina’s relatively remote geographic position (far removed from Africa and from preferred destination countries) might insinuate it is an unlikely candidate to intervene in this process. Yet, a decade of sustained arrivals suggests otherwise. Motivational hypotheses put forward a variety of factors, possibly acting together to feed this flow: the growing impossibility to enter wealthier countries; Argentina’s relatively open migratory policy; a normative that currently recognizes the right to migrate as a basic human right; the extension and porosity of both maritime and land borders; the lack of state capacity to monitor irregular migrants and visa overstayers; and relatively receptive and fairly affluent communities that provide safe haven for the informal commercial activity in which many migrants eventually end up working. Argentina, and in particular the city of Buenos Aires, has thus become a likely destination for a very visible minority, which is for the time being regarded with more curiosity than concern. While an extensive study on this community and its motivations is yet to be done, this document characterizes the different dimensions of the migratory corridor, evaluating its sustainability nexus and suggesting a direct geopolitical link with extemporaneous events and global migratory policy trends.

### 2. Objectives of the report

This report intends to systematize the available information to date from a variety of sources about African migrants in Argentina. Given the lack of substantive and sufficient studies on the theme, it does not presume to be an extensive survey-based work, rather resorting to a smaller sample and re-analyzing the conclusions reached in light of independent ethnographic field work, combined with previous studies, and measured against demographic, econometric and discursive data.

It is the intention of the authors to contribute to the academic furthering of a subject that is only now surging as pertinent, in academia, institutions, the media, and public opinion. It is also intended to that institutional debate, possibly leading to policy intervention—where necessary—
might be forthcoming, particularly regarding the regularization of the migratory situation and the process of integration and participation in receiving countries.

The report rehearses social, economic, and geopolitical hypotheses that might justify the appearance of this new migration corridor, utilizing a phenomenological approach combined with extensive historic and demographic overviews. It also proposes an aggregation and systematized analysis of past studies, thus conflating ethnographic observation, demographic data, and geopolitical analysis of the Argentinean case study. Where relevant, the Brazilian case study shall be used as a term of comparison.

The different sections will shed light on—as far as it is known—who the migrants are; paint an up-to-date socio-demographic portrait; categorize Africans arriving in Argentina; consider how they may be impacting identity policies and, broadly speaking, migration policy making; establish ties between this particular migratory corridor and wider geopolitical concerns that condition it. The final two sections propose trends and policy recommendations for further analysis.

**B. Recent trends in African emigration**

**1. Types of migrants, motivations for and methods of migration**

Setting out to determine the socio-demographic outfit of Argentina’s new African migration, a number of evident and fundamental questions require clarification. Where do these migrants come from? What type of migrants are they? Why do they leave Africa? Finally how do they pick, arrive in and enter Argentina?

A significant number of Senegalese have been identified among African-born migrants across Argentina, most particularly in Greater Buenos Aires, but also in some of the other major cities, namely the key harbor city of Rosario, Córdoba, La Plata and, seasonally, the province’s beachfront towns. There are, however, migrants from many other Africa countries. Despite some coincidence, their regions of origin do not appear to directly correlate to areas that historically supplied slave labor to the Río de La Plata. The absence of such link immediately suggests the existence of a contemporary migratory corridor. The descriptor “African”, on the other hand, does not provide sufficient distinction to a community that is both regionally and typologically inchoate. Irrespective of the country of origin, important distinctions are necessary vis-à-vis the motivations for migration, and the methods used to enter the country, or the region.

The principal point of entry categories appear to be economic migrants, asylum seekers, status refugees, and to a much lesser extent, transnationals/cosmopolitans. A further distinction should be made between documented and undocumented migrants—also known as irregular, illegal, unauthorized, or clandestine. These terms are interchangeably used at policy level, and framed as categories requiring special management, notably through immigration control instruments. The category of irregular migrant, however, often encapsulates individuals arriving for different reasons. Thus, an irregular migrant may simultaneously be an asylum seeker, or a *de facto* refugee, and still be categorized as an economic migrant. This overlap demonstrates the complexity and informality prevalent in this migratory corridor, as in others, and makes evident that what is at stake is what has been loosely defined as *“mixed migratory flows”*. It complicates access and, consequently, leads to attempts of bypassing overly bureaucratic immigration processes, which are often unequipped to interpret the full spectrum of migrant experiences and narratives. Thus, while irregular migrants constitute the “norm”, by no means do they paint a complete picture.

---

10 A category which includes diplomats, investors, business leaders, researchers and other high income, high mobility African citizens entering Argentina on specialty visas.
UNHCR reflected this complexity by operationalizing the category of “mixed” migrants, recognizing variable and often overlapping motives for migration (UNHCR, 2007). Yet, this category appears to obfuscate concrete aspirations under a blanket statement with limited administrative gravitas, sheltering countries where the existing legal instruments fail to fully address the real needs of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, although, theoretically, it offers enhanced instruments for migrant protection.

In fact, it is aspirations that better distinguish migrants leaving Africa, and why they choose Argentina, of all places. As many studies have shown, and continue to show, the motivations for migration are as diverse as the individuals who depart from or arrive in a specific country. Individual migratory projects may search a state offering political stability, economic and social opportunity (education, employment, healthcare, welfare), or a safe haven from gratuitous physical or psychological violence, including civil war and state warfare. Simply put: human security.

Migration and mobility are thus, perhaps better conceptualized adopting Amartya Sen’s capabilities framework for human development. In Sen’s view, migration tends to be reactive, identifying socio-economic gaps, and responding to them (Sen, 2000). In much of Africa, Structural Adjustment Programs, deficient agricultural reform, and in some cases the sudden implementation of a market economy have left many stranded in the fight for resources. In other cases, political instability and weak democratic institutions—when not open conflict—embolden citizen disenchantment, leading to what Clause Aké called “democracy of the disenfranchised” (Aké, 1995). Better access to telecommunications and information sources, better means of travel, and increased contact with tourists may also be contributing to an understanding about income disparities, altering aspirations across the continent, as it has around the world. Migration could, thus, be understood as a personal development strategy, “a reaction to relative, rather than absolute poverty” (De Haas, 2008:40).

Sen’s statement points in the direction of what is a problematic concept: the image of the poor, destitute economic migrant looking for a better life for him/her and his/her family. Grappling with the financial capacity of migrants is stepping into a complex, and fairly uncharted territory. Many migrants depart from a position of “relative” poverty, having access to just about enough funds to initiate a migratory journey, whether it is through a legitimate process or using smuggling networks. Others struggled to accumulate the necessary funds to initiate and maintain journeys that are becoming longer and more expensive. Access to funds, in fact, would seem to growingly be the one main obstacle to migration from much of Africa, as the cost of the migratory journey shoots up in tandem with heightened border security and stringent immigration procedures. International evidence denounces an internal class dynamic within diasporic Africa, clearly reinstating Van Hear’s “considerations of class into analyses of forced migration” (Van Hear, 2004). It is becoming almost impossible for the poorest of the poor to leave Africa. An obvious consequence is that Africa is slowly being bled of its most valuable and most entrepreneurial individuals, often leaving behind largely feminine—thus distorted and incomplete—communities.

11 See, for example, the two following projects at IMI (Oxford) and PRIO (Oslo): ‘The Determinants of International Migration (DEMIG)’, International Migration Institute, Oxford University (ongoing, 2010-2014), directed by Hein de Haas (http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/research-projects/demig/demig-the-determinants-of-international-migration); or ‘Security Threat: Migration-Based Threat’, Peace Research Institute of Oslo, directed Jørgen Carling, http://www.prio.no/Research-and-Publications/Project/?oid=64826. See also J Carling, Aspiration and Ability in International Migration: Cape Verdean Experiences of Mobility and Immobility, Dissertations / Theses No. 5/2001, Oslo: Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo.

12 Rounds 1 through 5 of Afrobarometer’s surveys on democracy in Africa reveal worryingly dismissive attitudes toward democratic processes across much of the continent. See: http://www.afrobarometer.org.

Differences can also be detected among those that manage to leave. Longer transit periods in frontier places (vis-à-vis the European Union) such as Cyprus, Malta, the Canaries or Sicily, or in “buffer” countries such as Turkey, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco or in the Cape Verde Islands are making the journey more expensive. Those with just about enough to get by are gradually forced to make lengthier stops, adding to the risk of an already risky endeavor. Most of these class dynamics of the migratory process were detected among Africans in Argentina, attesting to the heterogeneous nature of the phenomenon.

This heterogeneity reflects the complex and multi-dimensional dynamics between migration and development. The liberal vision would have it that development has a long-term effect in decreasing the motivations for migration, seen in this context as a personal/societal response to absolute destitution. This stance has been adopted with varying degrees of commitment by institutions such as the European Union. However, it is important to note that alternate views suggest that not only higher mobility leads to development, but also that development results in higher mobility. The UNDP, among other institutions, postulates flexible mobility—including circular migration—as a possible solution for development (UNDP, 2009). On the ground, competing visions of migration-development nexuses become politicized by events. One such example is the North African crisis of 2010-2011, occurring just as this report is concluded, and in which a contrast between the UN’s position and that of the EU—Italy and France in particular—clashed.

Hein De Haas has conducted a review of a range of studies, regional and global in scope, establishing that “the process of social and economic development in its broadest sense tends to be associated with generally higher levels of mobility and more migration at least in the short to medium term” (De Haas, 2007:18). In the case of Africa, it is crucial to remember an ancient tradition of mobility where political and economic considerations became obfuscating factors in the macro-migratory nexus that fail to register as dissuading factors at the level of the individual migration project. Migration as self-development, thus, follows macro-economic orientations, but does not entirely rely on them as an aspirational factor. As posited by the capability approach to migration, it is part of a phenomenological nexus in which migration is not only a response to poverty, but also a quest for personal growth, success, and overall happiness, challenging the sedentary bias prevalent in much of the literature (Bakewell, 2008), and certainly contrasting with the mobility of much of the continent.

Other motivations may be more abstract. In many of the source communities across the African continent mobility has attained the highest social status. Such is true particularly in parts of Islamic West Africa, where the migratory journey often takes on the role of a pilgrimage of sorts, a vaguely spiritual path, or even a rite of passage into manhood. In these regions shaped by profound ideologies of migration, the experience of being in transit, and the network of pan-African solidarities developed during the journey represents a web of complex and multi-layered realities not best described by the fixed institutional categories listed above. Instead, African migrant narratives cite families as a primary reason for migrating, highlighting it as a response to family and community aspirations, status acquisition, and the fulfillment of social responsibilities. The importance of conforming to social expectation affects the image of the journey portrayed to the home community, in which migrants often maintain a positive narrative, despite the hardship most face.14 The perceptions of the risk entailed in a migratory project of this type are rarely articulated, ultimately promoting the dissemination of a migration ideology back home, which, combined with migration pressure increases aspiration and (perceived) capability. But these narratives also perpetuate hope, a more intangible trait found on the discourse of many migrants in the streets of Buenos Aires—if often disguised by the despair tacitly displayed by many, or inferred by the researchers, a despair that they dare not transmit to those who expect them to excel.

---

Understanding the internal dynamics of migration processes may also refer to Appadurai and Nederveen Pieterse’s concepts of modernity, multiculturalism and cultural globalization, implicitly influencing the motivations of potential migrants through the creation of personal ethnoscpes that mobilize individuals and social groups to dream beyond their traditional “imagined worlds” (Appadurai, 1996, and Pietersee, 2007). These new imagined communities, which overcome essentialist mores of old, imagined communities (Anderson, 1983), also bypass political structures and insert an element of utopia into the rationality behind the migration project equation. Social, economic, and political aspirations are highly intangible elements of this migrant narrative, and best described by it. Migrants’ ability to navigate through malleable structures, of being agents of change in their own lives, is a fundamental premise of the human development approach, which assumes personal aspirations as a strong enough motivation for migration. Migrants, however, do not exist in a political vacuum, and are subject to existing structures strongly influencing and constraining available means and modes of action (Marcelino and Farahi, 2010). In many African nations, the structural limitations on agency are often so severely limiting, that migrants’ option to depart may be a “bare life” strategy. According to de Haas, “the extents to which migrants are really capable of shaping their own lives (i.e. acting as free agents) is extremely contingent on the wider institutional and natural environment in which people live” (Collyer and De Haas, 2009:23).

A final note on the methods of arrival is necessary (more on 2.4.). Although solid public data is largely absent, the Argentinean immigration authorities have implied that irregular African migrants may be entering the country as polizones (stowaways, or clandestine passengers in cargo ships), and perhaps subjected to people trafficking networks (redes de trata de personas).15 This requires two fundamental remarks. Firstly, considering the significant amount of Africans presumed to be either regularly or irregularly residing in Argentina, and the fact that this particular migration corridor did not open until after 9/11, it appears very unlikely that more than a few dozens might have actually entered in this manner. The contrary would be to assume that hundreds of migrants would have entered Argentina as stowaways in large cargo ships calling at the ports of Rosario and Ensenada, in less than a decade. Alternatively, they would have hypothetically arrived by boat to any given location along the extensive Argentinean coast. Both hypotheses seem highly doubtful. Secondly, it is important to carefully distinguish trafficking networks from smuggling networks. While it is possible that some trafficking networks might be exploiting African migrants (a thesis that requires factual verification), it is more likely that migrants might be resorting to smuggling networks (redes de tráfico). This could be the case for those who do indeed enter as stowaways, but also for those who enter through other means. Either way, this version attributes a degree of agency to migrants themselves, versus the victimhood narrative implied by the assumption of trafficking as a major path into Argentina.

A rather more logical explanation —based on whatever scarce information there is, and on interviews to both migrants and academic/institutional specialists on Argentinean migration/refugee issues— is that migrants have for the last decade taken advantage of fairly sophisticated diasporic networks, using the loopholes in Argentinean border control and immigration law. Despite the difficulty in ascertaining the veracity of the data, preliminary information points toward a large inflow of migrants using two different methods: by cargo ship (either as stowaways, or with the crews’ knowledge and complicity) to the port of Santos, Brazil, the largest and busiest in Latin America, and a major port of call to many of Africa’s convenience flags; and, until recently, by airplane from Dakar to a number of major Brazilian airports, taking advantage of a special protocol between Brazil and Senegal.

According to the current migrant narrative, from Brazil, and for reasons that are yet to be fully determined, many migrants typically continued by land toward Argentina, crossing the country by bus or train and arriving at one of the many remote border outposts between Brazil and Argentina, Brazil

15 Interview to Federico Augusti, Dirección Nacional de Migraciones, in “African Immigrants Turn to Argentina for Opportunity”, posted by The VJ Movement in YouTube, accessed 13 March 2011 ‹http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xPh_iASSw30›.
and Bolivia, or Brazil and Paraguay. The extension and porosity of these borders make the crossing a fairly simple endeavor. It might be done by car, at regular border outposts where control is known to be scarcer or avoidable, in some days or times; it might also very likely be done in unmarked locations (e.g., anywhere in the Paraná/Misiones jungle). Both alternatives possibly require access and payment to local smuggling networks. One of the most common narratives, however, describes how entrance is done through the Triple Border (Triple Frontera), a location in which the cliffs along the Iguazú River are the only obstacle between Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina. Crossing attempts appear to be done by boat, possibly fast Zodiac units, very likely during the night, when border patrols are best avoided. There appears to have been, however, reinforcements on border patrolling in this area, from all sides.

In Argentina, random equipment advancements and random road check-points in the vicinity of the Uruguayan (Brazil), and La Quiaca (Bolivia) attempt to reduce the permeability of the region. Some migrants have claimed to have been controlled much further south in National Road 9 (Ruta 9), in the provinces of Jujuy and Salta. Yet, it is unmistakable that the sheer extension and remoteness of these land borders makes it nearly impossible for authorities to fully patrol. Inherently, resources are being allocated in a reactive manner, leaving it to migrants to simply adapt and find new pathways to complete one more stage in their migratory project.

What this reality reveals is Argentina’s (and Brazil’s) integration in a broader migratory nexus stretching all the way from across the Atlantic, but in which both countries are possibly only secondary/ultra-peripheral nodes, at least for the time being. Although this might be slowly changing, migrants seemed to consider either country as a pit stop in a project that envisaged the United States or Canada as final destinations. This forcibly assigned role of transit or transshipment country is, in and of itself, as problematic as talking about “transit migrants”. A variety of nations have been bundled up and qualified as “transit countries” in an inchoate class of countries branded as “transit states”, a label that encompasses nations with extreme differences. This terminology, which largely took hold in post 9/11 migratory nexus, reflects the consequences of European and U.S. borders’ securitization process. It has induced a funneling up of migration flows, and the accumulation of migrants in countries qualified, according to their role in the migration process, as “transshipment centers”, in other words migrant warehouses where the opportunity to migrate is awaited. While transit is admittedly —and growingly— a fixture of the migration process, the use of this term lacks in accuracy when describing the diversity, textures, and interconnectedness of today’s migratory experience. African migrants have become a common view in many of Argentina’s major urban areas and, if other “transit” countries are any example, they won’t be going anywhere anytime soon. They are part of a new and fluid ethnoscape facilitated by a changing geopolitical paradigm that encompasses Europe, North America, the Mediterranean basin, the Maghreb and West Africa, and in which Argentina plays second fiddle.

16 In numerous interviews conducted in Buenos Aires with scholars and professionals working with migrants (UNHCR Southern Cone, FCCAM, CAREF, among other institutions) there was solid agreement that this was the major point of entry in Argentina. From the interviews conducted personally by the authors with migrants, one admitted this route in vague terms, while others avoided responding. Informal statements by some migrants seem to confirm this understanding. See, for example: ‘Migration: From Africa to South America’, posted by France24 on YouTube, accessed 13 March 2011. Only a large-scale enquiry to migrants themselves, based on researcher-subject trust can confirm or deny what appears to be the going narrative.

17 Widely reported in the Brazilian media, see for example: “Ministro anuncia reforço em fronteira com o Paraguai para aumentar combate ao tráfico de armas”, Zero Hora, 15 April 2011; “Governo amplia reforço policial na fronteira”, ParanaOnline, 29 April 2011; “Fronteira terá policiamento reforçado”, Diário dos Campos, 29 April 2011. The border reinforcements appear to respond to a mixed basket of threats including people smuggling and trafficking, traffic of weapons, and traffic of counterfeit goods.

18 Enhanced border controls in Argentina appear to be motivated primarily by illegal merchandise smuggling, but there is a strong coincidence between border crossings where this is a normal occurrence, and those reported to have been used by African migrants to cross from Esther Bolivia or Brazil. See for example: “Preocupa la debilidad de los controles en La Quiaca”, ElTribuno.com.ar, 21 January 2011.
Migrants and asylum seekers should not be rendered as “victims” by default. At one stage or another most require the services of smugglers for logistically challenging sections of their journeys, but “the vast majority migrate on their own initiative” (de Haas, 2008), and are far from being “scruffy, dirty victims”, rather being active agents in the attempted change of their own socio-economic condition, even if those are limitations to their free agency (Rotschild, 2009). Most importantly, migrants are often (and increasingly) put in “transit” countries, a permanence that is perhaps one of the notable realities bypassed by the term “transit”. It is important, thus, to rescue back the migrants’ own experiences from the flat narratives conflating them, essentializing them, and depriving them of agency and free-will (of which the debate between victimhood in trafficking vs. agency in smuggling is a testament). As pointed out throughout this report, however, agency does not detract from a number of limitations to their choices and actions, as it does not from the overarching vulnerability that characterizes many migrant experiences, but in particular that of Africans.

2. Preferred destinations: Africa, Europe, and beyond

According to the UNDP’s Human Development Report 2009, and following its conservative figures, the largest portion of the world’s migrants is internal (within the same state). That would account for roughly 740 million people, or four times more than those who move outside of their countries. Out of those who moved internationally, only 70 million did so between a developing state and a developed state, whereas 200 million international migrants thickened the lines of south-south migrations (UNDP, 2009). Africans are no exception. Although most African migrants in 2000 went to Europe, the second largest chunk traveled within the continent. Those who left to North America, Asia and the Middle East each represent less than a sixth of the intra-African flow. South America did not even register. And then there was 9/11.

For Africans, the traditional destination is Europe, and has always been Europe. It was thus during the slaving era, it remained thus prior to and during the waves of independences, and it continues to be thus today. It is the closest continent, with a few bottlenecks —Gibraltar, Lampedusa, Malta— technically keeping the two just a few kilometers apart. It is, for that reason, the cheapest to access, and was until recently perhaps the easiest way out of Africa. Additionally, strong historical, political, and geographical ties (as well as some legal exceptions) bind specific European countries to African nations: England to Egypt, Somalia, Madagascar, South Africa and the Commonwealth member states; France to much of the Maghreb, the Sudan, and the Sahel; Portugal to five Portuguese-speaking states, including Angola and Mozambique; Spain the Equatorial Guinea; Italy to Libya, Ethiopia and Eritrea; Belgium to the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi; Germany to Tanzania and Namibia; and the Netherlands to South Africa.

This cultural, political, historical, and linguistic familiarity justifies Africans’ migratory preferences, and explains the existence of important communities of each of these nationalities in the respective former colonial power. Such close relationships have lead to the maintenance and encouragement of close diaspora-homeland ties, often practiced as high intensity transnationalism (Góis, 2005). In some cases, the history of migration to the metropolis is so entangled that it is difficult to distinguish where Africa halts and Europe starts, or vice versa. A few countries—particularly Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands— also appear to have received cosmopolitan migrants and political refugees from around the African continent, creating yet another layer of inter-continental connectedness. Finally, with the advent of the European Union, the economic attraction of the single market and, subsequently, the Schengen Agreement, Africa-Europe migration gained a whole new dimension. And then there was 9/11. And yet again, there was a paradigm-shifting crisis that spread across the Maghreb, with results that are as unpredictable as they are volatile.

As in Europe, North America’s history of migration dates back to the slaving era, with interesting episodes of return migrations (freed American slaves settled in Freetown, or Nova Scotia’s

19 Note: Victims of trafficking, clearly, should be understood in a completely different context.
former slaves settled in the same region). US immigration and racial laws prevented any significant migrant inflows from Africa for much of its history, with notable exceptions such as the Cape Verdean diaspora settled all over New England, constituting the earliest significant non-European migrant group in the US. Only much later did others arrive: South Africans, Nigerians, Senegalese, Ghanaian, and gradually a kaleidoscope of African identities, lost in the diversity of America, and diluted among a large Afro-American population. In Canada, humanist traditions meant that the first substantial contacts with blackness was through freed American slaves arriving through the Underground Railroad. Until recently, the country was receiving large numbers of migrants and asylum seekers from the continent, concentrating in Greater Toronto and in other large cities.20 However, asylum claims in Canada now tacitly require the applicant to seek to apply prior to arriving in Canada, a policy change that fails to recognize the increasingly blurry line between economic migrants and de facto refugees, while also not recognizing agency to individual applicants.21 Since the inception of the official policy of multiculturalism in the 1970s, Québec also received significant numbers of Francophone Africans, who can “integrate” locally. And then there was 9/11.

3. The “Fear of the boat”: Geopolitical puzzles and recent changes in destination

Signed in Luxembourg in 1985, and mainstreamed into the acquis communautaire—the main corpus of European law—by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, the Schengen Agreement (now Schengen Acquis) and the ancillary Schengen Information System (SIS) were cornerstones of the European project. On a technical level, its ratification, while enforcing stricter rules along the external borders of the EU, namely by creating a mandate for joint patrols on vulnerable external borders, also obliged member states to restrict and control the entrance of non-EU nationals, and to consult with fellow members in cases that raised doubt. The strengthening of external borders strongly impacted Europe’s expansive and permeable hotspots in the Mediterranean coast and the vast territorial waters surrounding Spanish and Portuguese Atlantic possessions off the African coast. Under the banner of enhanced cooperation, the instruments later proposed and ratified by some of the EU members under Schengen II (2001) and III (2005) predicted the “continued harmonization on issues such as the management of visa policy [and] immigration policy (on both legal and irregular immigration)” (Gelatt, 2005) clearly defining a path to eventually be followed across the EU, particularly in the area of migration. These, however, would already be coated by a game-changing event: the September 11\textsuperscript{th} bombings in New York.

The security measures following the terrorist attacks impacted travel and migration around the globe in an unprecedented fashion. Within hours, North American borders were all closed. The following months and years would bring a crescendo of border and immigration control mechanisms implemented both in the US and in Canada. Across the Atlantic, 9/11 accelerated the implementation of already restrictive laws on immigration, inversely proportional to the deregulation of internal European borders. Never as then was the idea of “Fortress Europe” so clear. A complex legislative web took over European immigration policy, slowly “pushing back the link of the chain” —that is, gradually but effectively externalizing European immigration policies, attempting to solve migratory pressures in the source countries, both by discouraging and curtailing emigration, and by promoting local development. The assumption was that less poverty in Africa would inevitably result in less pressure along the European borders. Yet, this strategy was to be combined with stringent land, sea,

---


21 While the overall numbers in the past five years present a modest increase, overall numbers since 1995 have decreased. The quota for asylum seekers applying for immigration settlement after their arrival to Canada decreased under the current government to 9,000 to 12,000, down from 22,500 to 28,800 under the previous Liberal government. According to Immigration Canada (http://www.cic.gc.ca), the overall annual quota for migrants currently sits at 240,000 to 265,000.
and air controls in the borderlands of the EU, in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Malta, Greece, and Cyprus; and with bold EU proxy measures in “buffer” or “transit” countries in the immediate vicinity of the EU, such as Turkey, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, the Cape Verde Islands and other countries in West Africa. By and large, the virtual map of Europe appeared to soar, and the de facto Mediterranean border appeared to stretch all the way down to Dakar, where European navies nowadays patrol foreign territorial waters (Marcelino and Farahi, 2011).

The creation of Frontex, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, was followed by the joint operations HERA 2008 (to tackle illegal migration flows from West Africa to the Canaries) and NAUTILUS 2008 (border control reinforcements in the Central Mediterranean, to curtail undocumented migration to Italy and Malta); operation Hermes 2010 (an initiative to acquire a clear image of illegal migration and organized human trafficking in the EU); and Rabit 2010 (emergency control of Greece’s external borders with Turkey, the FYROM and Albania, by then the most vulnerable in the EU). On occasion, NATO was also partly co-opted into this new geopolitical outfit.

Closer military and immigration cooperation following special agreements between several European countries and neighboring states intended to neutralize the growing human disaster of precarious boats taking off the African continent’s northern and western shores to attempt what were becoming suicidal crossings. When the boats did arrive, dozens, sometimes hundreds of undocumented migrants swarmed the shores of Lampedusa, Malta, Sicily, the Canaries and, more recently, the Cape Verde islands, an outpost for Europe’s externalization strategies.

Libya’s cooperation in particular, following its bilateral agreement with Italy, seemed to have resulted “in a partial westward shift of Trans-Saharan migration routes” towards the Maghreb, particularly to Morocco (De Haas, 2008), and in an eastward shift toward the Greek border, and toward Cyprus. This was, however, done at the expense of migrants’ rights, some of which found themselves trapped in Libya and used by al-Qaddafi as geopolitical leverage. In any case, the arrival of more migrants to the western coasts of Africa demonstrated that migrant networks across the continent were reasonably aware of, up-to-date on, and reactive toward fast-changing immigration policies.

The Northern African case is all the more relevant when considered as a conceptual conduit to what is going on elsewhere around the world, particularly in Latin America. Recent studies compare Morocco with an unlikely country, Mexico, by virtue of newly imposed statuses as buffer countries, but admitting also that both share migrant narratives revealing heavy-handed authorities and the absence of legal codes or practices. Other studies have established that constructing cushions around key borders in the North (EU, US) is part of a wider nexus in which migration became a political instrument, and weaker states accept dubious intermediary roles (Marcelino and Farahi, 2011; Kabunda, 2011).

Undeniably, the key patterns of African migration were affected by radical immigration policy changes imposed from remote decision centers in Europe and North America, particularly since 9/11. In Europe, this required active and passive collaboration of states in pivotal geographical locations to control some of the most sensitive border crossings in the continent. This new doctrine gradually resulted in the dislocation of migration pressure back to North Africa and other peripheral regions, with the tacit consent of local authorities. But all across the continent, the crackdown on

---

22 Similar claims on the ‘bufferization’ of frontier states such as Argentina, Mexico, or Morocco, have recently been presented in Buenos Aires by Dr. Mbuyi Kabunda (2011).


irregular migration was accompanied by aggressive measures challenged by many human right advocates: the tentative practice of forced returns (which Italy is now threatening to fully implement, in the aftermath of the Libyan crisis), following a variety of models (not all of which successful);25 the increasing habit of turning back vessels in territorial waters, practiced by Italian border patrols in the Central Mediterranean; the return of circular migration agreements; and the increasingly common occurrence of detention centers delocalized to peripheral regions of the EU, and to buffer zones in its vicinity, where migrants were forced to live in transit limbo and legal voids, undocumented and unacknowledged, for years at length (Morice and Rodier, 2010). This latter strategy, however, eventually backfired, in light of the severe North African crisis of early 2011.

The political crisis in across the Maghreb and parts of the Middle East poses unheard challenges to regional stability, at a moment when Europe faces a variety of other challenges, both financial and political. It cannot be said, however, that this crisis was a surprise. Not only were there plentiful indicators showing that social tensions were simmering in many of the region’s countries, but also the migrant situation had reached untenable levels. Too little, too late. The cacophony of voices in EU foreign policy sadly slowed down action, partially causing the unspeakable migrant crisis currently underway.26

In late September 2005, Europe woke up to unsettling nocturnal images of its furthest frontier, with “black people hanging from barbed wire, laying down with broken arms and legs, bleeding and desperately asking for help” (Galdon Clavell, 2005; Drago, 2005), following a hopeless run for the militarized border of Melilla, a strategic Spanish enclave in northern Morocco. Over several weeks, thousands of distressed sub-Saharan and North African migrants ran for the 3-6 m high fence in successive waves. On several occasions, Spanish authorities are rumored to have opened fire. Witness reports and documental evidence speak at least of mass police brutality. The days that followed, when Spain demanded that Morocco accepted the migrants back, as per a 1992 bilateral agreement, shocked the world: Morocco was found to have abandoned dozens of undocumented migrants to their luck in the confines of the Sahara, close to the Algerian border, without food or water, until denounced by international advocacy groups. Political opportunism quickly grabbed the headlines, utilizing the rhetoric of “invasion” to describe this humanitarian disaster.

A couple of other minor episodes should have ringed alarm bells in the Frontex Situation Room in Warsaw, and across the European capitals. The temporary arrest of Muammar al-Qaddafi’s son by Swiss authorities (2008) and the referendum eventually resulting on the ban of minarets in the country (2009) conducted Switzerland to a serious —if anecdotal— falling out with Libya, with al-Qaddafi going as far as pledging an anti-Swiss jihad, and threatening to sever ties with all Schengen Space member states. Italy’s Premier Silvio Berlusconi, concerned with maintaining close ties, sizeable investments, and invaluable immigration cooperation agreements that had managed to reduce the bleeding of African migrants from the Libyan coasts to Italy, further added to the baroque set of circumstances by publicly chastising Switzerland, getting involved in a three-way war of words.27 Although mostly inconsequential, the episodes denounced the degree of European vulnerability and nervousness regarding its neighbors, as was made widely apparent at the beginning of the 2011 crisis. At this juncture, once again Silvio Berlusconi repeatedly intervened, first confessing he was unable to

25 As implied by P. F. Marcelino and H. Farahi, op cit; M. Kabunda, op cit; H. de Haas, “Time to Temper the Faith”, op cit.
26 Since the inception of the war in Libya, too many tragic incidents occurred. However, the authors close this report a mere two days after an overcrowded ship with African migrants (and de facto refugees) desperate to leave Libya sunk off shore, with an estimated 600 victims. Following on the tragic incident, UNHCR ramped up fundraising to supply rescue equipment to the coastal regions between Libya/Tunisia and Italy/Malta. See for example: Associated Press, “Witnesses: Ship with 600 migrants sinks off Libya”, 9 May 2011, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iHiFZ-kQ3VEf5J5PBTjElb1fKnoOw?docId=d73f403483a64348d8cde9564088916d4.
actively join his European partners in the bombing of al-Qaddafi’s positions in Libya, then demanding that the EU (in particular France) accepted part of the burden caused by African refugees escaping the conflict, and finally by symbolically “liberating” the island of Lampedusa, where the migrant crisis reached its highest point.

Commonly, the view towards migration has been one of ambivalence in the context of the interventionist development approaches commonly applied across the African continent (Bakewell, 2008), and as a “problem” needing to be “managed” by policymakers (De Haas, 2008). According to many European leaders and media reports, the ways to stop the influx of “unwanted” migrant populations reported to be increasingly gathering at the shores of North African “transit” countries waiting for an opportunity to enter Europe, is to tackle the “root causes” of migration, while also increasing border controls. With Tunisia and Libya’s cooperation, Italy had introduced aggressive interception-at-sea tactics, systematically turning away precarious boats with dozens —asylum seekers and economic migrants alike— aboard, in direct contravention of asylum processing guidelines and laws of the sea. The Spanish-Moroccan repatriation agreement, as it was implemented, also appeared to be in contravention of asylum guidelines, by doing collectively what should be done on a case by case basis, that is, enforcing group expulsions which deny asylum claimants rights to have their claims independently evaluated through due process.

European policy is achieving a degree of control of its external borders, but not without consequence: in blindly applying aggressive methodologies, Europe has been feeding a time bomb in its own doorstep, as overwhelmed Malta and Italy presently attest. In fact, in the height of the crisis, the UN appealed to EU leaders to open its arms to asylum seekers first and process them later, in precisely the same day Italy’s Foreign Minister Franco Fratini alerted Europeans of the looming invasion of a quarter of a million Africans stranded across the Mediterranean, while a few days later the country’s Interior Minister, Roberto Maroni, wondered “if it makes sense to stay in the European Union [if the EU does not collectively react against the perceived threat to Italy].” It is perhaps because of these extreme events and extreme positions that the terms “asylum seeker” and “refugee” are losing currency in Europe. Requests to stop repatriation processes are being overruled, and de facto refugees are being sent back to “safe” places like Iraq, even as EU delegations wear bullet proof vests and surround themselves with armed convoys in their visits to the country.

28 Although he has since changed Italy’s stance, Berlusconi’s government resisted as long as possible to an intervention in Libya, a country with which Italy spent years strengthening a relationship. See for example C. Abadi, “A Regime We Can Trust: How did the West get Qaddafi so wrong?”, Foreign Policy, 22 February, 2011 (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/a_regime_we_can_trust?page=0,0).


31 The North African crisis is 2011 suggests it might be too late for this.

32 “Acuerdo de 13 de Febrero de 1992 entre el Reino de España y el Reino de Marruecos relativo a la circulación de personas, el tránsito y la readmisión de extranjeros entrados ilegalmente, firmado en Madrid. Aplicación provisional” (BOE núm. 100, 25 April 1992, and BOE Núm. 130, 30 May 1992 (also available online: http://www.mir.es/SGACAVT/derecho/ae/ac13021992.html)). The agreement refers to ‘foreigners’ without determination of their status. During the crisis, thus, many of the foreigners who were de facto refugees appear to have been regarded as irregular migrants.


The difficulties of crossing African/European borders, now compounded by the political and military crisis, resulted in new, semi-permanent livelihood strategies of elongated liminality among migrant populations in these geographic transit nodes —somewhat like the strategies of “invisibility” found in Argentina. The situation in North Africa, of course, is of a different degree of severity and it remains to be seen where it will lead. What will happen to EU immigration policy in the aftermath of this crisis? And how will migrant networks respond? What consequences, if any, will be felt across the Atlantic in Argentina and Brazil? These questions will remain unanswered for some time.

4. The emergence of Argentina and Brazil as potential destinations

The geopolitical causal shifts described above demonstrate not only the versatility but also the interconnectedness and reactive immediacy of migratory dynamics in the region. Although a complete change in patterns and routes of migration possibly takes years to accomplish, the effects of policy shifts may indeed start to trickle down fairly soon after implementation. There is, thus, a quasi-permanent disconnection between policy-making and the reactions among migrant networks, which adapt as quickly as possible but may require time and repeated experience to ascertain the extent to which the changes affect them (Marcelino, 2010).

It should be unsurprising, then, that African migrants started to appear in considerable numbers at the Argentinean coasts (as in other receptive countries) right after 9/11, and particularly after 2006. At that moment, a combination of a lenient immigration law in Argentina, and a stringent regime in the EU compounded push and pull factors into a window of opportunity that thousands of migrants knew to take advantage of. In spite of the difficulty in getting to and making a living in Argentina, migrants appear convinced that the immigration legislation and a more accepting public opinion still makes it worthwhile.

But how do Argentina and Brazil fit in the global migratory flows of Africans, and how are the two countries co-opting—or distorting—a migratory corridor so far away? Ostensibly, as ultra-peripheral geographical nodes with diffuse/frontier interest to at least some migrants, offering up an alternative to saturated and more challenging, if preferable, destinations. The attractiveness of Argentina is inversely proportional to the heightened security measures in the European continent.

African citizens have entered the country using different strategies and constitute presently a diverse and complex legal situation. Some of the processes identified are indicative of strategies encapsulated in a nexus of migration by stages. In that context, the Triple Border with Paraguay and Brazil would be one of the earliest phases of the migratory journey, possibly using irregular access methods. The present study has allowed the preliminary conclusions that the selection of Argentina as a destination in African migratory projects is part of a wider Atlantic geopolitical context in which Argentina is likely currently an outpost. Although further in-depth studies of the motivations for migration at the source are necessary, it is suggested here that the strengthening, tightening up and closure of borders in the EU and in the United States, as well as the systematic persecution of African migrants within their borders (racial profiling; enhanced land controls, such as those currently practiced by France along its border with Italy) might be pushing migrants to furthest, but as of yet supposedly “amicable” countries such as Argentina.

In this wider geographical nexus, Brazil and Argentina, despite the distance, can be configured as major transit options and, perhaps final destinations, due to their symbolic capital, their socio-economic stability, the perception of economic opportunity, and the perception of a migratory normative that is less aggressive (and less active) than in other countries. In reality, the dire situations faced daily by migrants in Argentina do not necessarily confirm these findings. In many cases, migrants from outside South America end up in a legal vacuum, forced to accept a de facto status of “permanently temporary”. It is, nonetheless, possible to preview the signs of a growing transnational activity amidst the immigrated African community, pointing toward a consolidation process of this

35 Studies such as those directed by Carling or De Haas.
specific migratory corridor. Perhaps this is an indication that—barring stringent measures in the national immigration normative—Africans are staying, as they did in other transit nodes.

There are hard reasons and soft reasons for the choice of either country. Firstly, both are traditionally receptive to immigration, from the legislative and the societal point of view. The immigration normative also allows migrants some room to seek temporary or permanent settlement (see 4.1.). The principle of non-refoulement is followed in both countries, and Argentina in particular does not practice repatriations (even when they are sometimes ordered). Secondly, there are strong symbolic elements that may be easy to dismiss but could be attractive for migrants (at least in their own narratives): both Argentina and Brazil have a long history of humanism, independence, and defiance. Both countries have famous football teams, a fact that should not be underestimated in a football-obsessed continent, particularly when most of the migrants correspond to the football-crazy demographic group. Finally, Argentina has a reputation of being a rather cultured, “European-style” country. For migrants locked out of Europe, it might prove to be one of those tiny coins that tip the scale. As to Brazil, with 65-million afro-descendants, it is, after Nigeria, the largest African nation. Surely, this can constitute an incentive. Interestingly, the labor market does not appear to bear particular influence in the choice of destination, in stark contrast with comparable contexts. Instead, informality seems to dominate this particular migratory flow, itself creating the trope with which African migrants came to be associated in Buenos Aires: that of trinket sellers (*vendedor de baratillas*).36

But are Argentina and Brazil nothing but transit nodes, in a route that migrants expect will take them north to the United States? The answer is, “maybe”. Yet, past evidence demonstrates that the migratory project often changes after departure. Despite the difficulties found in Argentina and Brazil, there is some likelihood that the respective governments will eventually fill in the gaps and address the needs of African migrants—at least those already there—in a way that European and North American governments could not or would not do.

The slow development in Argentina of a legal corpus addressing the novel realities of migration suggests a hesitation to tackle the current challenges head on. In other transit countries, typically African frontier nations, which were themselves until recently net senders of migrants, legislation approval has been haphazard, ad hoc and mostly reactive. Legislative voids have often been tacitly co-opted by European policies that respond to the EU’s own interests. As a historically significant net receiver of migrants, however, Argentina is in a completely different situation, being well equipped with legal instruments, doctrine and plentiful precedents. And yet, the process of legislative updating is surprisingly slow, as is the creation of regulations to supplement and monitor existing laws. Although this is clearly rooted in the state’s limited capacity, it can also partially be explained by a deficit in national identity tropes.

While Argentina has a consolidated identity, it does not fully recognize and embrace the different ethnic elements that compose it. Thus, the arrival of a small group of “exotic” migrants assumes a disproportionate weight in the imaginary of a “white nation”, a national identity that is “is always in the state of becoming”, in the words of Cecil Foster. He further suggests that “[e]ach time an immigrant arrives […] [s]he seeks to re-open and even restructure the compact that is the

---

36 Differently from many other cases, the labor market appears to be in focus for its irrelevance in this case. Interviews with MyRAR representatives, for instance, reveal that only a minimal number of African migrants achieve a job placement through the institution every year, despite its best efforts. On several instances, Argentinean informants noted that support to migrants was always carefully monitored and balanced against the realities of the country’s own vulnerable populations. Brazilian researcher Andrea Pacheco Pacifico posited the same for Brazil (see: A Pacheco Pacifico and PF Marcelino ‘The Quest for Refugee Integration in Multicultural Brazil’, paper presented at the XXIX Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Toronto, October 6-9, 2010). Informality and invisibility are strong markers of this type of vulnerable migration. In this particular corridor, invisibility appears to be part of a strategy of survival. The downside, of course, goes beyond issues of race: selling trinkets in the street launches the migrants into a vicious cycle from which they can hardly find an autonomous exit.
existing social order,’ so that '[c]onsensus, no matter how long it had taken to achieve, is threatened’ (Foster, 2010).

5. Transit, invisibility and liminality

Some African informants have remarked during unstructured interviews that they have, on occasion, been mistaken for or presumed to be other black residents —most frequently Haitian, but also Afro migrants from neighboring countries. While this anecdotal evidence does little more than confusing the subjects, it also provides a degree of invisibility to this community by masking its numbers. Strangely, despite Brazil’s recent economic and political approximation to Africa, and despite it being easier to “disappear” there, many migrants surprisingly still opt for Argentina. This appears to be the case, notably, of Senegalese —the largest African group in the country— ignoring a bilateral agreement between Senegal and Brazil that gave them tourist-visa access to the latter.

It is necessary to illuminate aspects of “invisibility” (Polzer and Hammond, 2008) and “liminality” in migrant life. This approach zooms in on the everyday experience of the subject, as opposed to the prevalent discourse in most inherently policy-oriented studies. The study of the experiential and relational “process” of migrant “illegality”, incorporating broader “processes of social transformation”, allows for the elaboration of life-worlds, intimate understandings, and gets closer to the heart of what anthropologist Clifford Geertz referred to as “thick-description” (Geertz, 1973). Phenomenological studies of migrant illegality must necessarily include the recognition of the effects of juridical status —as a socio-political condition of being “illegal”— where the lack of a legal status evidently results in social exclusion, ostracizing, invisibility, and suffering. Invisibility may, however, extend beyond being merely a relational concept, to be utilized by migrants as an adaptive strategy.

To be or not to be recognized, categorized, identified and/or accounted for, through formal means, institutions, or institutional actors, becomes a rational choice informed by something akin to Scott’s “weapons of the weak” (Scott, 1985). In this case, referring to ways in which vulnerable individuals attempt to stay invisible to the “powers that be” by hiding and obscuring identities and activities that the state or other powerful institutions prohibit (Kibreab, 1999). Invisibility is therefore a survival resource, and refers to the utilization of informal sectors for sustenance. The informal incorporation in society becomes a survivalist strategy of interaction with local populations as well as authorities, taking place in a social context largely autonomous of laws and policies of the state, although agents of the state may be involved in the process. So, while Africans are highly visible in a largely white Argentinean society, they can also rely on the existence of other “Afro” elements to be utilized as identity vehicles. This liminality results in a variety of “in-betwixt and in-between” states, where the notion of “embodied liminality” as a phenomenological lived-experience of the everyday life is coupled with the in-betweenness of being in transit, that is, neither here nor there, neither home nor a guest.

The term “transit” migration, finally, does not fully recognize the dynamic nature of the migration experience, nor the change and adaptation processes that permeate it. While recognizing liminality as part of the process, it also attempts to understand migration as fixed aspirations, choices, and decisions, ignoring the fact that some migrants change their goal of further migration.

There is today a continuum of mobility whereby not every migrant is —either voluntarily or involuntarily— just passing by; many are indeed staying “in transit” for increasing periods of time, laying bare the multiple realities of sending countries, “transit” countries, and destination countries, as well as the “imagined worlds” (Appadurai, 1996) of migrants themselves —their borderless lives in an increasingly bordered world— that characterize contemporary migration flows in Africa. How this is

37 Evidence of this is limited to multiple statements made during the authors’ interviews with professionals working with African migrants and refugees in Buenos Aires, who claim to have had hints from migrants in this respect. This particular case was also specifically articulated by the leader of a migrant advocacy group with significant reach. Direct migrant narratives are absent in our sample.
affecting conceptions about migration and processes of integration and exclusion is as yet undefined. Geopolitical changes have altered the focus of migration pressures, by limiting the prospective migrant’s access to traditional, geographically closer, and easier destination countries as a consequence of stricter immigration policies. African migrants are crossing permeable borders, one by one, testing different frontiers, and ostensibly attempting to reach farther. The conflict between their aspirations and the political and economic realities of a fenced up world creates a social vacuum and a geopolitical challenge of unprecedented might, and with unforeseen consequences.

C. Africans in Argentina

The recent arrival of Africans in Argentina takes place in a particular context: that of a society that has historically denied the significant presence of Africans and Afro-descendants in its territory, and consequently their cultural influence. Mirroring the exiguous role given to the African population in Argentina, foreign relations with African nations have traditionally been marginal. In contrast to the policies followed by neighboring Brazil, Argentina’s bilateral relations with Africa—particularly sub-Saharan countries—have been erratic and unpredictable.

However, the recent arrival of black immigrants from that continent coincides with a renewed interest in Africa from several groups fighting to promote its visibility and heritage not only in academic terms but also from a socio-political point of view. In this context, the purpose of this section is twofold: on the one hand, to briefly depict the study of Africans and Afro-descendants in Argentina, both from a historical point of view and based on the current situation; and, on the other hand, a political perspective depicting relations between Argentina and African countries.

1. Africans in Argentina in colonial times and beyond

The presence of black Africans in Argentina has been historically neglected by an unfortunate numeric argument, its low incidence in Argentina’s population. The fact that the number of slaves in Argentina was much smaller than in other Latin American regions (such as Brazil, Peru, or the Caribbean), on the one hand, and that the population was severely downsized as a result of both wars and epidemics, as well as miscegenation (mestizage), were often provided as arguments for the little relevance given by the Argentinean official discourse in the past. However, as many authors point out, despite the fact that these are real causes, they are not adequate reasons to explain the seeming disappearance of Africans from the territory. These reasons should be found in the influence of “civilizing” models of thought that have purposefully denied their presence (Piccotti, 2001).

The arrival of Africans started just a few years after the second foundation of Buenos Aires and extended first to the most developed and commercially relevant region of Tucumán. Florencia Guzman points that the relationships with Africa were not direct and that very little is known about the places of origin of the slaves brought over to Argentina. The period of most intense slave trade was circa 1792, continuing on till the abolition of traffic in 1813 (Guzmán, 2006).

Gladys Perri clearly states that several myths crosscut Argentinean historiography, and have unfortunately been extended to education. “The idea that in Buenos Aires there were no black people—and much less slaves—has endured in national history” (Perri, 2006).

Marta Goldberg, in 1976, and years later Reid Andrews, in 1989, put in evidence and quantified the presence of black Africans in Argentinean territory. In Buenos Aires in 1810, black and mulatto population constituted 29.5 per cent of the population and in 1838 23.7 per cent. Perri, using findings from José Luis Moreno and Carlo Mayo, shows that the presence of blacks in the countryside was also significant (Perri, 2006). In 1744 they were about 15.4 per cent of the population and in 1815 about 7.8 per cent (although in absolute numbers the registered slave population increased from 303 (in 1744) to 3346 (in 1815).
Florencia Guzman also shows that the presence of black population was even more intense in the northeast region: the 1778 General Census indicated that the number of black, mulattos, brown, and zambos represented 44.5 per cent of the total population, while the indigenous people were 35.5% and whites 19%) (Guzmán, 2006).

However, in later counts, the percentages significantly decreased, stimulating controversies regarding the actual evolution of the population and the way it was portrayed. Alejandro Frigerio considers that the dominant narrative emphasizing the whiteness of the Nation has conditioned the way we have explained the evolution and the role of Afroamericans (Frigerio, 2008). In contrast to many other Latin American countries, Argentina does not glorify its “mestizaje”, but it does its “whiteness”. An ideal image of how Argentina is and how it should have been works as a structure that strongly conditions the way studies have been carried out. This dominant narrative characterizes Argentina’s society as white, European, modern, rational and Catholic. This narrative oversees processes of racial and ethnic mixture and cultural hybridization and emphasizes on the early disappearance and the irrelevance of Afro-Argentines to the local culture. He also considers that there is another contextual factor that has contributed to the disappearance of black population in Argentinean society: the system of racial classification. Using one of Reid Andrews’s findings, Frigerio illustrates how a change from a three category to a two category (white and black) system of racial classification had a significant effect on the percentage of black population in Buenos Aires: whereas that percentage was 23.7 per cent in 1838, it decreased to 1.8 per cent in 1887.

Since the mid-1980s, studies of Africa, Africans and Afro-argentinians, particularly regarding Africans in the XIX and XX centuries, have gained significant impulse.

2. African immigrants and Afro-descendents at the turn of the 20th century

The recent arrival of Africans to Argentina has been studied mainly by anthropologists. According to Frigerio the intense social and cultural militancy carried out by immigrants and increasingly numerous local followers drew the attention of anthropologists. “The new black presence in the city stimulated the production of papers for congresses and masters thesis not only on every modality (of African participation) but also on their interactions, synergies and conflicts among them” (Frigerio, 2008:134). This impulse was mounted on a growing interest in the historical, anthropological and cultural studies on Afro-Argentines that resulted from both changes in theoretical point of view (the emergence of a multicultural narrative) and the upsurge of a new social movement (Afro-Argentine militant groups, cultural activism, participation in transnational black movements) (Lecchini, 2008).

The academic production on these immigrations from Africa points out that one of the main limitations is the lack of representative information. As it will be further argued, data on African population from the 2001 census is outdated and the only additional quantitative, but incomplete, sources of data come from the immigrants requests for any type of residency (including refugee) status. Due to this important limitation, most of the research has to rely on data of this kind, completed by ethnographic information collected from interviews with migrants themselves, and/or public officials and NGOs’ staff.

Argentina received an inflow of sub-Saharan Africans, particularly from Cape Verde and South Africa, at the end of the 19th Century and the beginning of the 20th Century. Marta Maffia consistently studied the Cape Veredian immigration which first was linked to the whale hunting industry in the southern seas, and later gained relevance, particularly from the 1920s onwards, when one of the worst famines devastated that country. A third flow entered Argentina in 1946, when two other famines hit the islands, but around the 1960s this flow decreased, coinciding with the beginning of Cape Veredian migration to Europe (Maffia, 2010a).

Research carried out by Maffia showed that Cape Verdeans in Argentina, unlike their counterparts in the United States and in Portugal, did not form closed groups, and refused to maintain traditional practices. She found that this was partly due to the fact that many have traumatic memories.
of their places of origin and did not want to remember; others denied their African, black, Cape Verdean origin (calling themselves Portuguese); and a third group who experienced upward social mobility and did not want to have contact with those from lower statuses. The Argentinization of Cape Verdeans is interpreted as part of the imperative of the Argentinean state to nationalize and civilize immigrants and their children. “At this point, we can conceptualize invisibleness as a strategy born partly from the historical process in Cape Verde, linked to African and black denial” (Maffia, 2010a:172-173).

According to Frigerio, the high invisibility of Afro-Argentines during the 20th Century started to crack at the turn of this new millennium, with the constitution of some black Afro-descendant militant groups (Frigerio, 2008). He states, for example, that two black activists arrived in 1996, both international consultants for the Inter American Development Bank, both women—one a slave descendant and the other a first generation Argentine-Cape Verdean—and founded Africa Vive. This NGO had the purpose to put an end to the invisibility of the black population in Argentina, helping to promote their congeners and, generally speaking, reclaiming the role of black people in history and in Argentina’s society.

Regarding the context in which sub-Saharan immigration to Argentina occurs, Marta Maffia points out that this late arrival of black African immigrants originates in a historical and political milieu significantly different from those of previous migrations (Maffia, 2010b).

She points out that recent sub-Saharan immigration is heterogeneous in many regards, such as countries of origin, religion, migratory status, educational profiles, social networks, access to information, or access to communication and transportation. Even though violence and political unrest in their countries of origin may have triggered migration, the main migratory reason for immigrants from Senegal, Cameroon, Nigeria, Mali, Ghana, and Ivory Coast to come to Argentina is economic, particularly the lack of labor opportunities at home. Most migrants can be found in densely populated areas where informal labor opportunities abound: primarily Buenos Aires, but increasingly also La Plata, Morón, Avellaneda, or Villa Gesell.

a) The Senegalese population: `Little Dakkar´ in Buenos Aires

The single most studied group of recently arrived Africans in Argentina is the Senegalese community. These immigrants have lower levels of education compared to other groups, but also present various particularities. Traoré, in his ethnographic study identifies two ethnic groups residing in Argentina: Wolof and Diola, one from the North of Senegal, principally from Diourbel, and the other from the province of Ziguinchor (Traoré, 2006). They came from rural areas, have low levels of education, and live in different neighborhoods in Buenos Aires. Members of one group work mainly in street vending, whereas members of the other group work as wage workers in small scale enterprises.

According to Zubrzycki and Angelli nowadays they are mainly coming from the regions of Thies, Diourbel, and Dakar, and are all Muslims (Zubrzycki and Afgnelli, 2009). These authors conducted a series of interviews and found that they arrived over the last two years, traveling alone and entering Argentina through Brazil. The most common trip detected has been Dakar-Fortaleza (Brazil), or alternatively Dakar-Cape Verde-Fortaleza, by air, then on to Sao Paulo by bus, continuing to Argentina crossing the Uruguayan border. Most of them have friends or relatives in Argentina and make use of migratory networks both to leave their country of origin and to get established once they are in Argentina. According to their interviewees, there is an organized network in Senegal facilitating migrants’ access to visas to enter Brazil, and providing contacts at arrival, and at the border crossing. Once they arrive, kin lend them merchandize to sell and provide company during their first street experiences.

Cicogna explains the political and economic reasons that triggered immigration from Senegal and the recent increase in the number of asylum seekers (Cicognia, 2009). She points out that since the attenuation of the conflict in Casamance, in 2006, there seems to have been a shift in the motivations of asylum seekers. Afterwards, only isolated cases should be coming as asylum seekers from that
region, but on the contrary, the number of petitions grew significantly. The fact that many of these petitioners were using exactly the same argument in their applications called the attention of the National Migration Office. Nowadays, it is presumed that most recent applicants are part of a movement of human smuggling.

Many others arrived in a less organized, more chaotic way, fleeing from violence or war, some of them even without knowing their destination. Blanco, in his article “Contingency, catastrophe and subjectivity in the African stowaways arriving to Argentina”, points out that many people from Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, among other countries, who had to flee from their countries did not know very much about the conflicts, and never intervened in direct combat but needed to escape at any cost, sometimes even taking boats with unknown destinations (Blanco, 2007).

3. Africans in numbers: What statistics say on African immigration to Argentina

Currently, the number of African born people in Argentina is unknown. There are several data sources to partially account for this population: census data; migration related registries; data on refugees and asylum seekers; and data from African consulates or Embassies. Even though the vast majority of immigrants from Africa need to get a visa in order to enter Argentina, this type of data is not a good indicator of the presence of a particular immigrant group in a receiving country. In this section we compile all the available data in order to describe their countries of origin, their socio-demographic profiles and their geographical distribution. Despite the fact that these sources present some limitations (particularly regarding coverage or because data has been collected several years ago) they are the only ones that allow an empirical depiction of this migrant group.

a) African population in Argentina by the 2001 National Population Census

According to the 2001 census data, the African born population in Argentina was small, about 1883 people. Even though they came from a variety of countries, four origins concentrate almost sixty percent of the African population in Argentina: Egypt, Morocco, South Africa, and Algeria (Table III.1).

Immigrants from Africa are predominately male (Figure III.1), although the percentage of women varies significantly by country of origin, ranging from 22 per cent in the case of the Senegalese population to 52 per cent in the case of Moroccan and Angolan populations.

At the beginning of the millennium, immigrants from Northern Africa were more numerous than those coming from sub-Saharan countries (Figure III.2). It should be emphasized that among sub-Saharan Africans, the proportion of women is significantly smaller (42 % vs. 48 %).

Age profiles of this population, particularly the incidence of an older population, can be a proxy of time of arrival. There are five groups with a significant proportion of people who are 65 and older, indicating that they are old migrations: Cape Verde (59%), Tunisia (38%), Egypt (36%), Morocco (32%), and Algeria (31%). In contrast, groups with a large proportion of young population are those from Senegal, Nigeria, Congo, Angola, Ghana, and Sierra Leone.

---

38 The only countries that are exempted from this requirement are Morocco, South Africa, Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria.
### TABLE III.1  
**ARGENTINA, 2001: AFRICAN FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION CLASSIFIED BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of birth</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Percentage distribution by country</th>
<th>Cumulative percentage distribution</th>
<th>Percentage female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argelia</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>48.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lybia</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>50.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country not specified</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1 883</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### FIGURE III.1  
**ARGENTINA, 2001: FOREIGN-BORN AFRICAN POPULATION BY SEX**

- **Males**: 55%
- **Females**: 45%

FIGURE III.2
ARGENTINA, 2001: FOREIGN-BORN AFRICAN POPULATION BY REGION OF ORIGIN

Largely coinciding with this portrait, the presence of a high proportion of young immigrants is indicative of their recent arrival. The percentage of recent migrants—that is, those who lived in a different country five years prior the Census—is significantly high among those from Nigeria (100%), Sierra Leone (93%), Congo (59%), and Senegal (56%). Despite the fact that immigrants from Ghana and Angola are young, the percentage of those who arrived recently is much lower. In the case of Angolans, that might be explained by a parallel corridor from Angola to Brazil, already in the 1990s, in the height of the civil war. It is possible that part of that migrant flow might have spilled over to Argentina (Pacheco Pacifico, 2010; Pacheco Pacifico and Marcelino, 2010).

Regarding their current place of residence, most of the immigrants from Africa (three out of four) live either in Buenos Aires City or in the province of Buenos Aires (Figure III.3). The vast majority of those who live elsewhere reside in other large urban areas such as Córdoba, Mendoza, or Santa Fe.

Another trait of the African immigrant population in Argentina is their high educational attainment, significantly higher than Argentina’s population (and clearly higher than any African country). About four out of ten African immigrants aged 18 and older have attained some tertiary or university education.39 There are no significant differences between immigrants from sub-Saharan countries and those from other countries in Africa (mainly from North Africa).

Still, some specific groups, particularly those that have arrived more recently have significantly lower educational attainment. That is the case of the Senegalese population: only 35 per cent have a high school or higher education diploma, compared to 69 per cent of sub-Saharan as a whole. Others immigrant groups with low levels of education are those from Guinea-Conakry, Sierra Leone, and Tunisia. Cape Verdians share the same profile, but mainly because it is an old population that arrived in Argentina many decades ago.

39 In 2001, and also according to census data, only 9.5 per cent of Argentina’s population aged 18 and older have a tertiary or university degree
ARGENTINA, 2001: FOREIGN - BORN AFRICAN POPULATION BY PROVINCE OF RESIDENCE


TABLE III.2
ARGENTINA, 2001: AFRICAN FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION AGED 18 AND OLDER, CLASSIFIED BY REGION OF ORIGIN AND LEVEL OF EDUCATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan countries</th>
<th>Rest of Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than complete Primary Education</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete Primary or Incomplete High School</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Degree</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terciary or University Incomplete</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terciary or University Degree</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A note on African foreign born population in Brazil by the 2000 Census

Even though Brazil was in the past an immigration country, nowadays the proportion of foreign born population is relatively small, reaching close to 700,000 in 2005 (Milessi, 2010), that is about 0.4% of the country’s total population. Among the foreign born population, more than half of them arrived several decades ago from countries such as Portugal, Japan, Italy, and Spain. At the turn of the millennium, immigrants from Africa were a minority, although in absolute numbers they represent a significantly larger population than in Argentina (15,679).

Roughly 40 per cent of African immigrants in Brazil are nationals from Angola; 22 per cent from Egypt and 9 per cent from Mozambique. Most Egyptians arrived during the first half of the XX century and one out of two immigrants from Angola arrived between 1960 and 1979 (one third arrived since 1990). The arrival of Angolans to Brazil since the 1960’s coincides with independence wars. Throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s guerrilla groups actively engaged against the colonial power, although different factions were also fighting among each other. Anti-colonial war was, thus, accompanied by a civil war. Throughout those years, and even after Angola’s independence in 1975,
the climate of war and violence fueled out-migration, and many people fled to Brazil, where their adaptation was not overly difficult given the cultural and linguistic commonalities.

Regarding other traits of the African immigrants in Brazil as portrayed by the 2000 census, they are predominately men, with the only exception of Egyptians. Similarly to what has been showed for Argentina, only 43 per cent of African immigrants in Brazil are women.

b) Applications for permanent and temporary residency in Argentina

Another source of data on African immigrant population in Argentina comes from the National Office of Migration, Ministry of Internal Affairs (Dirección Nacional de Migraciones, Ministerio del Interior). A report published by this office presents the number of requests for permanent and temporary residency by country of origin. This data shows that even though the number of African applications is relatively small (in comparison to other origins, particularly from South America), it is large on account of the size of the African population counted by the 2001 Census.

Table III.3 shows that between 2004 and 2009, 356 applications for temporary residency and 296 for permanent residency were filled by Africans. Since it is not known how many people have applied for both during this period, it would be wrong to add up both numbers. However, the lowest estimate of the number of Africans who have applied is 353 (about 20 per cent of the African population in 2001) and the largest is 652 (about 35 per cent).

These applicants come from 35 countries, but a handful concentrate almost 80 per cent of all applications for permanent residency (Senegal, Nigeria, South Africa, Morocco, Algeria, Cameroon, Egypt, and Sierra Leone). On the other hand, the same proportion of temporary applications was filled by people from Senegal, Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa, Cameroon, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Ivory Coast.

c) Asylum seekers and refugees

According to data from UNHCR, by July 2010, there were in Argentina 3,233 refugees, whereas the number of asylum seekers was 329. The acceptance rate by December 2009 (tasa de reconocimiento) was 14 per cent. Data provided by Fundación Comisión Católica Argentina de Migraciones—the agency acting on behalf of UNHCR with the mission of assisting and providing support services for refugees and asylum seekers—shows that the number of refugees reached a peak in 2008, decreasing sharply in 2009. The countries of origin of petitioners were mainly Senegal (28%) and Colombia (22%), followed, among others, by Peru (9%), Cuba (5%), Haiti (5%), the Dominican Republic (4%), and Nigeria (3%).

The presence of Africans was much more considerable among those petitioners younger than 21 years old. Petitions made by children and very young people account for less than 10 per cent of the total number of petitions. However, almost half of these were by youngsters from Senegal (16%), Nigeria (10%), Ivory Coast (10%), Guinea-Conakry (6%), and Ghana (6%).

The number of petitioners from Senegal and Sierra Leone has increased overtime. The 2004 and 2005 UNHCR Statistical Yearbooks show that petitions from Senegalese increased from zero in 1996 to nine in 1997, to twenty in 2001, and to 59 in 2005. In the case of people from Sierra Leone, it started with one in 1998 and reached 71 in 2004.

According to Zubrzycki and Angelli (2009), using official data from CEPARE, between 2000 and 2006, 501 petitions for refugee status by sub-Saharan Africans were filled: 18 from Guinea, 23 from Ghana, 23 from Cameroon, 26 from Liberia, 29 from the Democratic Republic of Congo, 58 de Nigeria, 87 de Sierra Leone and 182 from Senegal. This number increased significantly in the following years; between 2006 and mid 2008 petitions increased to 594 (438 from Senegalese).

Several informants interviewed for this report, as well as Cicogna (2009), have stated that the significant increase in refuge petitions by Senegalese coincides with the adoption of a strategy to obtain a regular residency in Argentina.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Permanent</th>
<th>Temporary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-Africa</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruanda</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Verde</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigerina</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenia</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea Ec.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>296</strong></td>
<td><strong>356</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To our knowledge, there are no empirical studies that have analyzed the reasons given in the petitions. It has been suggested, however, that conflicts in West Africa—particularly the Casamance conflict, involving Senegal, The Gambia, and at times Guinea-Bissau—were a common reason given in many asylum requests, with stories often coinciding word by word.40


**A note on African refugees in Brazil**

As will be further described, Brazilian legislation broadens the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol definition of “refugee” to the individuals whose human rights have been seriously violated forcing him/her to leave his/her country of citizenship to look for refuge in another country. According to Milessi (2010) Brazil is known as having one the largest approval rates of refuge petitions. In her report, she shows that according to CONARE, the total number of refugees in Brazil by December 2009 was 4,261. For the vast majority—that is nine out of ten—Brazil is the first country of asylum. About 65 per cent of refugees in Brazil (that is 2,760 individuals) are from Africa.

Regarding the country of origin of these refugees, the vast majority of them (39.6%, that is 1688 refugees) are Angolan, followed by Colombian (14.2%), and Liberian (9.4%), Iraqi (4.6%), from Sierra Leone (3.2%) and Cuban (3.0%). Pacheco Pacifico and Marcelino point out that in 1992, in the height of the Angolan civil war, about 1200 refugees arrived in Brazil and claimed refuge. “This is the moment when Brazil widens the net and extends the definition of refugee to meet guidelines set forth by the declaration of Cartagena of 1984. As of then, also those escaping credible widespread violations of human rights are eligible to seek refuge in Brazil” (Pacheco Pacifico and Marcelino, 2010).

---

40 The peak of asylum claimants was registered in 2006, as the conflict in Casamance wind down and then exploded again in several minor army clashes. The Argentinian government appears to have reacted with growing skepticism to these claims. Unfortunately it is difficult to pinpoint which, if any, are justified.
d) Africans portrayal by the media

A few years ago, the most important newspapers in Argentina started publishing articles on Africans in Buenos Aires. If this population was already noticeable on the streets, they became more visible with the attention paid by the media. Investigative reports described why they were coming, their modes of entry, their demographics, countries of origin, and legal statuses. They showed concern with their situation from a humanitarian point of view, particularly for those petitioning for refugee status.

A few headlines illustrate how they portray the new immigrants:

- A new immigration: one African and one Asian arrive in Argentina every day (Clarín, 1 November, 2006).
- The number of children who arrive to the country petitioning for asylum and refuge grows. They are already 13 and 900 more applicants are expected. Many are Africans. They run away from miseries. They travel by themselves, are younger than 19, and seek to adapt rapidly (Clarín, 26 November, 2008).
- Africa in Buenos Aires. Every year hundreds of young men from the black continent arrive in Argentina escaping from wars and misery: Where do they come from? What are their dreams? What do the bijou street vendors that took over downtown think about Argentina? (La Nación, 25 April, 2009).
- Buenos Aires: A destiny for Africans. In the last two years the number of asylum petitioners grew 142%; most of them come from Senegal (La Nación, 7 September, 2009).
- Once [a Buenos Aires neighborhood]: The Little Dakar of new African immigrants. In the neighborhood there is a numerous Senegalese community. They come to escape from poverty in their country (La Nación, 21 October, 2009).

African immigrants were depicted by the media as mostly refugees or asylum seekers that are running away from conflicts over land, religion or racial/ethnic persecution. According to their data (quoted from UNHCR sources) in 2008 a high record of asylum petitions (859) were filled, 38 per cent of them by people from Senegal. They also pointed out that a smaller group of immigrants were coming just searching to improve their standard of living, entering illegally through the Argentina-Brazil border.

NGOs officials describe the ordeal of African asylum seekers in Argentina until some of them are able to obtain the status of refugee. Both refugees and those who have filled the petitions receive six months of food and housing support, as well as medical and psychological assistance if needed, and they could also take Spanish lessons. Those who obtain the refugee status are able to get their ID and therefore get a formal job. Meanwhile if their application is rejected they will stop receiving help.

In terms of their demographics, these African immigrants are described as mainly young men (younger than 40 years old) who have arrived in Argentina with no family. They are mainly street vendors, and reside and work in only a few neighborhoods. In the holidays they travel to seasonal cities in order to sell their wares.

On the rare televised pieces, the debate tended to focus on refugees and on the contentious issue of polizones (stowaways). A couple of years ago televised statements made by high government immigration officials revealed a discourse of concern about the rights and possible exploitation of African migrants, particularly children. There was an implication of the government’s obligation to assist.41 Admittedly, the government continued to support refugees, but was unwilling to condone irregular entries. Soon after the steep increase in requests for asylum from African nationals, the nuances of this discourse were slightly altered to more frequent and frontal cautioning about such

41 Federico Augusti in video interview, op cit.
entries, based on the presumed (and as of yet unproven) involvement of human trafficking networks that had to be rooted out, and on alleged waves of stowaways.

An official from UNHCR in Argentina explains this trend: “[as] a consequence of the toughening of migration policies in European countries, Argentina turned into one of the favorite destinations for people escaping ethnic conflict, or simply hunger.” Since not everybody who gets here has been persecuted, only about 25 per cent of those are recognized as refugees. A public official from the Migration Office in Argentina points out that those who have been rejected as refugees either start an appeal at the judicial system (which can last for several years) or ask to be recognized as residents.

In 2008, 62 minors entered Argentina seeking refugee status, and 130 were already living with that status. They would have come mainly from Senegal, Ivory Coast, and Guinea-Conakry. A significant number would have arrived as stowaways in ships. A public official from the Ombudsman National Office stated that the situation had surpassed their capacity to provide proper assistance.

It is worth noting that one of the longest and more elaborated articles started with this enlightened and meaningful sentence: “It will be a mistake to say that, almost as if it were a 21st Century discovery, suddenly Buenos Aires became filled with black immigrants, when two hundred years ago, at that historical 1810, 33% of Argentina’s population had black blood” (La Nación, April 25, 2009).

Thus, some writers were making use of the arrival of Africans to communicate to a broader audience a significant part of Argentina’s history that has been systematically hidden and denied. In other words, the arrival of Africans in the 21st Century is not only meaningful in itself, but also because it serves to reconsider and re-evaluate the historical presence of a black African population in the country.

The overwhelming fact about media coverage of new African migration to Argentina, however, is the absence of frequent references. In a few cases, reactions to more critical articles were met with reader’s backlash. Likewise, online comment boards on Argentinean newspapers are abreast—as is often the case—with extreme comments for and against Africa migration. As of yet, there appears to be little impact of any of the above on public opinion. Africans are often conceptually aggregated to other black members of the Argentinean ethnoscape, which contributes to their invisibility. Public opinion appears to be puzzled by Africans as “exotic” elements of society that are seen but not really interacted with. Assuming the trend for African migration is to maintain a modestly active corridor, the authors see no evident rationale for negative public outlash, other than the occasional incident. This does not, however, absolve authorities of alleged institutional racism, nor does it absolve Argentinean society from seeking integration solutions for this and other newcomers. The growing influence and visibility of Afro societies in Argentina may, in the long run, provide a mitigating effect.

4. Argentina’s foreign policy towards Africa

Africa has never been a priority for Argentina’s foreign policy. Gladys Lecchini, an acknowledged authority on this matter, has stated that “[a] revision of the evolution of Argentine-African relationships throughout the last four decades, since the independence of the African States, shows that Sub-Saharan Africa has a low profile in the external priorities of Argentina, with a low density relationship, lack of continuity among different Argentinean governments both in the design of strategies and in the actions towards the region” (Lecchini, 2006). For Argentina, the place Africa has occupied can be appreciated in the context of its participation in the Non-Aligned Movement.

One crucial aspect to understand the policies towards Africa since 1960 onwards has been Argentina’s own political and institutional instability. The series of democratic and military governments resulted in fluctuations in its foreign policy that varied according to periods, governments and international integration projects (Lecchini, 2006). In clear contrast with the Brazilian policy towards Africa, Argentina’s policies were driven by ideological, political or commercial impulses depending on the necessities of specific governments, and the relevance given to South-South relationships.
This inconsistency was clearly reflected in the states chosen by Argentina to orientate its actions, sometimes Ethiopia -where the headquarters of the Organization of African Unity was located- and most of the times, South-Africa. In any case, policy impulses have much to do with the establishment of embassies, diplomatic and commercial missions, conventions and sudden variations in trade balances.

During the last military dictatorship Argentina’s foreign policy was oriented to defend territorial matters and West values adopting a National Security Doctrine (*Doctrina de la Seguridad Nacional*). In economic terms, the country was looking to find new markets for its exports. Yet, a few years later, all through the Malvinas War, Argentina tried to get African votes in the United Nations.

With the advent of democracy Argentina started a phase of bilateral and multilateral contacts with African countries. They tried to consolidate South-South alliances, by cooperation and commercial relations. According to Buffa (2008), the political will to incorporate sub-Saharan Africa in Argentina’s foreign policy agenda was evidenced by the creation in 1987 of the sub-Saharan Direction in the Office of Foreign Affairs. Together with Argentina’s breakdown of foreign relations with racist South-Africa and the establishment of a Peace Zone and the Cooperation of South Atlantic the level of dialogue with Africa improved substantially.

However, the situation changed in the early nineties, when a neoliberal government ruled the country, and defined different priorities in foreign policy. Its main traits were a strong and aligned relationship with the United States and the substantiation of the MERCOSUR. Argentina’s membership in the non-aligned movements was considered irrelevant and relationships with African countries were neglected. Argentina’s embassies in Tanzania, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Zaire (currently Democratic Republic of Congo) and Gabon were closed arguing budget restrictions.

More recently, since 2003, commercial relations with Africa intensified. According to Escudero (2008), in 2006 the largest commercial surplus came from Africa, particularly with countries such as South Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Angola. These types of relations were promoted from the Foreign Affairs Ministry with significant success. In fact, it is believed that trade with African countries is currently growing. Commercial trade is mainly of agricultural products. Yet, Argentina is paying more attention to North African than sub-Saharan Africa and keeps giving priority to commercial relations than to cooperation policies (Bologna, 2006).

Currently commercial and economic relations are prioritized. Last year, Argentina’s Chancellor, Héctor Timmerman, met with his peers from Angola, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa, and Tunisia, declaring that Argentina’s government is aspiring to deepen its cooperation with African countries in many areas, and for that reason “look[s] to expand and to widen the bases of an economic and commercial relationship.”

More recently, public officials from the agriculture sectors from fourteen sub-Saharan African countries gathered in Argentina with the Minister of Agriculture in order to strengthen bilateral initiatives to increase food staples production. The Minister stated: “Africa is the region in which much remains to be growing; FAO foresees that our regions (Africa and Latin America) will be the ones in providing a growing demand for food staples.”

---

42 Falklands War.
45 Ministers from Ghana, Nigeria, Angola, Congo, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Kenya and Uganda participated at the meeting.
D. Legal conundrums: the regulation of migration and the situation of migrants

1. The legal framework in Argentina

As it has been said, the migratory status of Africans residing in Argentina varies from those who have already obtained some kind of legal residency (either temporary or permanent) and those who are staying under different non-regular conditions. In order to evaluate their current situation it is important to provide a brief description of the legal migratory framework in Argentina, allowing immigrants to obtain a legal residence, particularly in reference to asylum seekers or refugees.

The Argentinean Migration Policy is defined by the Law 25871 and 16/2010. The law establishes several admission criteria for three broad statuses: permanent residency, temporary residency, or transitional residency. In accordance to the provisions of current legislation, the ways and requirements to obtain a residence is different according to whether the applicant is a native citizen of any MERCOSUR member country or associated states, or citizens of non-MERCOSUR countries.

Africans, as non-MERCOSUR citizens, can apply for permanent residency if: he/she is a relative (child, spouse, or parent) of an Argentine citizen; is a foreign-born child of an Argentinean parent; serves as diplomatic or consular staff at international organizations; or has refugee status. They could also apply for a temporary residency under any of these categories: as a labor migrant (with a contract); a person of independent means (rentista); a retiree with a considerable pension; an investor; scientific or specialized personnel with a labor contract; athletes and artists who have a contract in their area; clergy of cults or religions that are officially accepted in the country; patients under medical treatment; minors with special needs that will be cared for in specialized medical centers; regular students; asylum seekers or refugees that have been granted that status; humanitarian reasons; special reasons (not contemplated in the above categories). Finally, transitory residents can be admitted as: tourists; passengers in transit; international crew members; seasonal workers; academic personnel; for medical treatment; and special reasons.

Argentina has recently undergone a massive regularization program. This program was created by Decree No. 836/04 with the purpose of improving “the insertion and integration” of irregular foreign born people in the country by regularizing them. In accordance with the Residency Agreement signed by MERCOSUR countries in 2002, in 2005 Argentina’s National Direction of Migration was instructed by Decree Num. 578/05 to implement a specific program aimed at nationals from MERCOSUR and associate countries: Argentina’s National Program of Migratory Regularization.47 In contrast to previous regularization efforts, this initiative was not conceived as an amnesty. The program was considered a success; the total number of immigrants who initiated the process reached 423,697. Among them, almost one hundred thousand got their permanent residency and 126,385 a temporary residency; the rest were people who started the process but did not present the required information. The immigrant groups that got the most benefits were Paraguayans, followed by Bolivians and Peruvians.

2. Argentina’s legal provision on asylum seekers and refugees

Argentina is party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. In 1984, it also signed the Declaration of Cartagena, and in December of 2006, Argentina’s Congress passed the General Law of Refugee Recognition and Protection incorporating international instruments to its national corpus of law.

The 1951 Refugee Convention defines a refugee: “As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not

47 Dirección Nacional de Migraciones, Programa Nacional de Normalización Documentaria Migratoria.
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (UNHCR, 2011).

The Convention is both a status and rights-based instrument and is underpinned by a number of fundamental principles, most notably non-discrimination, non-penalization and non-refoulment.

The 1967 Protocol expands the field of application of the 1951 Refugee Convention, eliminating both the time frame established by the Convention and the geographical limitation in the definition of a refugee. The 1984 Declaration of Cartagena, a nonbinding international instrument, also extended the field of application including as refugee people who have fled their country because their life, security or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or any other circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order.

Argentina’s Law 26.165, passed in 2006, incorporates previous instruments to national law, establishing that their provisions should be interpreted and applied in accordance with the principles and norms of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the American Convention of Human Rights, The Geneva Convention of 1951 and the New York Protocol of 1967, and all other provisions or conventions applicable to the Human Rights and Refugees ratified by the Argentine Republic and or contained in the article 77, subsection 22 of the National Constitution. It defines the concept of refugee and its extension to family members, respects for the principle of non-refoulment, determines the juridical condition of the refugee and the body that is in charge of processing and conferring the refugee status.

In Argentina the office in charge of determining if an applicant will be granted the refugee status is the National Commission for Refugees (Comisión Nacional de Refugiados, CONARE). It depends on the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministerio del Interior) and is composed by members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the ministries of International Commerce and Cult, Justice, Security and Human Rights, Social Development, the National Institute Against Discrimination, Xenophobia and Racism (INADI), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR), by a well reputed and long standing NGO assisting and defending the rights of refugees.

The purposes of CONARE are: (i) to protect the rights of refugees and asylum seekers under the jurisdiction of the Argentine Republic; (ii) to solve at first instance both the recognition and the curtailment of the refugee status; (iii) to solve the authorization of applications related to family reunification and resettlement; (iv) to approve plans for voluntary repatriation, and resettlement of refugees to a third country: (v) to assemble national, provincial and municipal authorities in order to propose common actions to ensure the protection of refugee rights, to assist refugees and their relatives, and to promote their social and economic insertion.

To apply for refugee status a person has to present at the office of the competent authority (at any branch of the National Migration Office or any other national, provincial or municipal authority) a letter clearly detailing the reasons for the request, an ID (or a letter explaining why the person does not have an ID), two passport photographs and basic contact information. The process is free of charge.

Within twenty days, the authorities have to grant the applicant a provisional certificate of residence (known as precária), to be extended for as long of a period as it takes for the case to be decided. With that certificate in hand the applicant can seek lodge, work and travel legally within the national territory. With this provisional certificate it is possible to obtain a labor ID code and to work regularly, protected under Argentina’s labor regulations. The applicant must renew this certificate as long as he or she is under evaluation.

The applicant will be informed of CONARE’s decision by mail. If the response is positive, a refugee certificate will be granted in order to obtain a temporary residency (initially for two years, but renewable). Having the temporary residency he or she can obtain a National Identification Number (Documento Nacional de Identificación, or DNI) for foreigners. If the response is negative and the application has been refused, the candidate can appeal the decision to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
If the appeal is denied, and once all administrative instances are exhausted, the candidate may resort to a judicial instance.

3. Similarities and differences with the Brazilian migratory framework in Brazil

Law 6815, passed in 1980, defines the juridical situation of all foreign-born residents of Brazil. The provisions of the Foreigner Status (Estatuto do Estrangeiro) address all immigration and extradition procedures, as well as asylum and naturalization. The Brazilian regulatory framework recognizes full immigrant rights only for permanent residents, whereas rights for temporary residents are restricted.

In September of 2009 Brazilian government passed two important decrees. Decrees 6964/2009 and 6975/2009, which enacted a Residency Agreement for Nationals of MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay), Bolivia and Chile. Similarly to what Argentina accomplished a few years before, these decrees made possible for nationals of these countries to work and reside in Brazil by presenting a few documents (passport, birth certificate, and no-criminal background certificates in both the country of origin and in Brazil). According to these decrees, the immigrants and their families have the same civil rights as Brazilians, and equal treatment before the law. Family reunification is also promoted and there is a commitment with social security rights acquired in another country, the right to transfer resources, and the right to the nationalization of immigrant children.

In the same year Brazil adopted a system of regularization of migrants. Since the Estatuto do Estrangeiro passed in 1980, three regularization programs were carried out in Brazil, in 1981, 1988, and 1998. Irregular migrants were allowed to petition for a provisional residency. According to Millesi, the number of petitions was estimated at about 43,000 to 45,000. Immigrants from Bolivia constituted the largest group (5,492) followed by Peruvians (4,642).

A note on the legal framework regarding refugees

Despite the fact that the Brazilian refugee law was passed in 1997, the country had already ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol in 1989. The 1997 Federal Law (9474/97) created the National Committee for Refugees (CONARE). According to the representative of UNCHR in Brazil, this country has a significant experience with refugees, an advanced legislation, several “good practices” and is one of the most important countries in the Southern Cone regarding solidarity re-settlement.

Some of the most significant traits of the procedures to claim refugee status are: (i) the claimant has to be in the national territory and has to express the wish to be recognized as a refugee, irrelevant of the point or mode of entry; (ii) the process is free of charge; (iii) the refugee claimant cannot be deported; (iv) the claimant has to fill in a declaration in his/her mother tongue, stating motives, personal information, and information on dependants (Pacheco y Marcelino, 2010).

Until recently, the Brazilian Refugee regime stood out compared to all other countries in the region, since it adopted specific legislation for refugees, respected the principle of non-refoulment, did not establish a deadline for formalizing the request once in Brazil, had a straightforward and transparent process, and had in CONARE a hybrid composition.

Nowadays, Argentina has improved its standards, as shown in the previous section, by also passing a specific Law on Refugee Recognition and Protection, and establishing a specific office coincidently also called CONARE. However, it would appear that Brazil has larger experience and greater commitment regarding resettlement practices. In 2004, it joined a resettlement program for Latin American refugees, which “enabled any Latin American country, when adequate, to associate itself to the program and receive refugees from other Latin American countries, helping to reduce the

impact of the humanitarian situation faced in the region, and sharing the burden of those countries with more recognized refugees—such as Costa Rica and Ecuador” (Pacheco Pacífico and Marcelino, 2010:10). Argentina implemented the program in 2005.

E. Future prospects for immigration in Argentina

1. Geopolitical and ideological mores

A paradox affecting the African continent is the contrast between the liberal concept of development requiring and begetting greater mobility (as widely recommended by international organizations such as the United Nations Development Program, or the International Organization for Migration, among others) set against the current migratory policies of the preferred destination outside Africa: Europe. The EU precepts of migration are changing on a daily basis, and three key moments could perhaps be identified in the context of migration to Argentina: (a) the signature, implementation, and total enforcement of the Schengen Agreement; (b) the creation of FRONTEX, and its increasing influence in migration issues across Europe and in the borderlands; and (c) the doctrines rising out of the North African crisis of 2010-2011. The latter is still occurring as this report is finalized, for which reason the authors deem it necessary to be cautious. The trend appears to be, nonetheless, that enhanced barriers to mobility will be enforced proportionally to the political instability in the Southern Mediterranean.

Current trends appear to suggest a more heavy-handed use of migration prevention tools (legal barriers, enhanced coastal controls, walls in land borders, etc.), taking precedence, or at least equaling European development strategies and practices in Africa. In other words, the current crisis might be resulting in the most important backlash in public opinion in Europe, and therefore influencing the authority’s response. “Fortress Europe”, who for long favored development in Africa as a way to curb out-migration, is now overwhelmingly enhancing and enforcing effective barriers to mobility, including the suspension of the Schengen agreement (as posited by President Sarkozy) in cases of extreme need for specific national controls over the borders.

These changes in Europe do not go unnoticed to networks of African migrants. Invariably, as is always the case, migrants will find another way in, or another place to go. But they will go. It is in this context that Argentina appears to tangentially gain importance in African migration circuits. On the one hand, migrants’ networks, increasingly informed of the hardships tied to the European route will gradually consider alternative destinations as viable, interesting options. On the other hand, Argentina’s own migrant-friendly ideology, and its path toward qualifying the right to mobility as a basic human right suggests that, while a tangible institutional response should be forthcoming, an outright ban on African migration is not to be expected. The corridor should, thus, remain modestly active.

2. Expected trends in African immigration

From a demographic angle, the maintenance, erosion, or reinforcement of an active migratory corridor between Africa (especially West Africa) and Argentina/Brazil is currently determined by a complex combination of both endogenous and exogenous variables. Perhaps it is worth noting, first and foremost, that migration in and from Africa is far from being a new phenomenon. Instead, extensive anthropologic evidence suggests African out-migration is as old as humanity itself, making this an inherently exogenous continent. Nonetheless, in consonance with international migratory data, migration from Africa is mostly migration within Africa itself. The most significant corridors in the continent occur between neighboring states. This makes apparent one of the strongest paradoxes in migration generally, but most particularly —and tragically—in the African continent: while mobility keeps increasing, so do barriers to mobility. When only the last six post-independence decades are considered,49 the obvious

49 With the notable exception of Ethiopia, which was never colonized (but for a brief period of Italian occupation), and Liberia (1847), all other African states conquered their independence after 1951.
conclusion is that barriers to mobility among ancestral ethnic groups located across multiple national boundaries have increased. Simultaneously however, there have been added pressures for migration, including droughts and famines, civil wars, and multi-state wars. The current crisis in North Africa neatly illustrates multiple dimensions of this conundrum. As a tragic example, in Libya tens of thousands of sub-Saharan de facto refugees and economic migrants were forced to flee the country as they could, heading for the borders of Tunisia and Egypt, two nations from which other refugees and migrants had just fled weeks earlier... to Libya. These massive flows of people have occurred time and time again, with every new conflict in the continent. Only a small percentage, as dramatically evidenced during the Rwandese ethnic conflict of the 1990s, ever managed to leave Africa. Most mobile Africans, thus, move inside the continent, as they have done ancestrally (UNDP, 2009).

Africa’s population is the fastest growing in the world (United Nations, 2011), but resources continue to be among the most unevenly distributed. The expectation, thus, is that out-migration will continue to be a reality in decades to come, even as some bright spots of development surface across the continent. For these reasons, migration pressure —the differential between people’s wishes to leave and their capability to do so— appears to be increasing in the continent. Out-migration should, thus, continue to be a reality. With EU barriers consistently and increasingly shut, minor flows to alternative destinations are expected to consolidate. From this perspective only, some continuity in the flows to Brazil/Argentina is expected.

3. Inclusion, exclusion, and informal incorporation

Processes of inclusion and exclusion are subject to a variety of factors at any given time, including the sociological character of the host society, the size and origin of the migrant community, and others, such as ethnicity and perceived occupation and economic contribution of the newcomers. This report does not aim to clarify all the simultaneous and complex processes at play but rather underlines that this complexity has only began to be studied in Argentina. While a study of African integration in Argentina would warrant a wholly different approach, necessarily dwelling into Argentina’s unresolved Afro history, currently existing studies of ethnographic nature (focused overwhelmingly on Senegalese migrants) suggest that what is occurring in most cases is a process of increasing liminality, rather than inclusion or integration. Some important factors for this are briefly outlined in this section and the following one. However, it is at the confluence of them all that the integrative process focuses.

Currently, informal incorporation in Argentinean society appears to have become a survivalist strategy of interaction with a local population who is curious but at times cautious or suspicious about the newcomers, but also with the authorities and agents of the state, most notably the police, who deal with day-to-day societal control. Invisibility, in this manner, becomes a tool of a deformed integration: the migrant is here, but is not really here. This in-betweenness is becoming normalized in liminal micro-societies incorporated in larger communities dealing with complex change. It is suggested that this is the case in Argentina, now faced with a side of itself it had long forgotten. Times are different, nonetheless, and in consonance not only with other traditionally multicultural destinations of migrants across the Americas, but also with Argentina’s own history of incorporation, it is suggested that also in Argentina this new community will eventually become one more component of the urban ethnoscape. This transition comes with time, contact, and knowledge. Integration of Africans in Brazil does not appear to present particular challenges, but is subject to the same racial undertones already present in Brazilian society, and to the same resistance observed in any countries dominated by middle classes. However, in a context of a fast-growing Brazilian economy and a government with a strong social pennant, concerns are limited.

4. Media coverage and public opinion

The overwhelming fact about media coverage of new African migration to Argentina is the absence of frequent references to it. In the past, national and local newspapers have referred to it on occasion, mostly in the form of background “human interest” stories. Considering more recent media coverage, however, it becomes apparent that, at some point, there was a transition to an angle of mild concern,
as evidenced by recent reports in Buenos Aires newspapers. More than trying to understand who these migrants are, and why and how they appear in Argentina, newer pieces question the state’s response to their entry, their legal status, and their liminal positions as members of the informal sector (vendedores de baratillas). In a few cases, reactions to more critical articles were met with reader’s backlash. Likewise, online comment boards on Argentinean newspapers are abreast with extreme comments for and against Africa migration.

On TV, on the rare occasion this debate has been showcased, it has focused on two major aspects: refugees, and polizones (stowaways). Only a couple of years ago, televised statements by high government immigration officials revealed a discourse of concern with the rights and possible exploitation of African migrants, particularly minors. There was an implication of the government’s concern with their welfare.50 Admittedly, the government continued to support refugees, but was unwilling to condone irregular entries. Soon after the steep increase in requests for asylum from African nationals, however, the nuances of this discourse were slightly altered to more frequent and more frontal caution about African migration, based on the assumed involvement of human trafficking networks that had to be rooted out, and an alleged massive wave of stowaways.

As of yet, there appears to be little impact of any of the above on public opinion. Africans are conceptually aggregated to other black members of the Argentinean ethnoscape, which contributes to their invisibility. By contrast, the most evident signs of Africans in Buenos Aires—are the street sellers in the inner city and in out-of-town beach resorts. Public opinion, at the moment, appears to be puzzled by the African presence, referring to them as “exotic” elements of society that are seen, but not really interacted with. Assuming that the trend for African migration is to maintain the corridor modestly active, the authors see no evident rational for negative public reactions, other than the occasional incident. This does not, however, illibate the authorities of alleged institutional racism, nor does it illibate Argentinean society of the underlying racism that has existed since its inception. The growing influence and visibility of Afro societies in Argentina may, in the long run, mitigate this.

5. Multicultural nodes in the urban space:
“Little Dakar” in Buenos Aires

In most cities, urban voids—central spaces that remain empty and unused—tend to be assimilated by groups on the margins of society, with results effectively depending on a diversity of factors. Increasingly, however, urban planners, architects, and cultural programmers have considered this to be a source of cultural and artistic wealth and diversity. While unattended urban voids quickly become eyesores and a negative focus of public health and security issues, urban voids adopted by migrant communities have been shown to become thriving new centralities for an alternative side of the city.51 As urban life becomes more diverse, these new inner city centralities become multicultural nodes, catering to different nationalities and ethnicities in the city, and becoming important points of contact.

It is in urban voids turned into thriving centers for newcomer communities that cultural integration becomes possible by making contact available, and serving as a multicultural idea and business incubators. There is no doubt, in the opinion of the authors, that co-opting into the active urban fabric that is already the transitioning Buenos Aires district of Once/Plaza Misére, anecdotally known as Pequeña Dakar (Little Dakar), will bring benefits to multicultural understanding and to the diversity of the city.

50 Federico Augusti in video interview, op cit.
51 Urban voids were one of the main focuses of the 1st Lisbon Architecture Triennale in 2007, with dozens of internationally reknown architects and scholars presenting different solutions for these spaces, notably those undergoing cultural change. The blog archives are still available here: http://trienal.blogs.sapo.pt/. Similar ideas on gentrification and urban renewal have been recently explored in major conferences in London, England, and Philadelphia, as well as in a variety of smaller interventions
F. Policy implications

While this report makes no claim to have identified every single aspect of African migration in Argentina, and much less so its Brazilian offshoot, it presumes to have made apparent some of its most striking characteristics and paradoxes. In fact, there is admittedly a lack of warranted knowledge about a community that is as misunderstood as it is fascinating. In light of the reality on the ground, and the expected trends presented in the previous section, the following policy recommendations briefly sum up the paths suggested by the authors primarily to institutional actors.

1. Broadening Argentina’s immigration policy

Considering North American, Australian and European immigration legislation, both Argentina and Brazil’s current laws compare favorably, being less restrictive in a number of aspects. They consistently practice non-refoulement of asylum seekers. Brazil’s law and common practice are, nonetheless, more restrictive than Argentina’s and both on access and penalties (Brazil, as many other countries, routinely practices expulsions of irregular migrants, for example).

Foreigners in Argentina, on the other hand, are afforded most social rights regardless of their legal status. The main issue of concern, in the particular case of African migrants, is the process of settlement as permanent or even temporary residents (radicación). As non-MERCOSUR citizens, this process becomes a sequence of paperwork loops difficult to surmount for migrants that, all too often, entered the country irregularly, and may not be able to show proof of entry.

The question is, thus, how to facilitate the regularization of such migrants. An answer to this question would link back to asylum policies. It is the opinion of the authors that the absence of a settlement process designed to address the needs of this specific group has resulted in deceptive uses of asylum mechanisms (see 6.6.). Thus, what should be a fluid settlement process for those who are entitled to it, has instead all too often been replaced with a sequence of asylum claims evaluation, negative rulings and appeals. A final refusal leaves a significant group of migrants in a legal limbo, overstaying their welcome but staying nonetheless. This could be avoided by creating feasible access to proper settlement by African citizens, who are at the moment de facto, if not de jure, locked out of the system.

Once migration pressure in Africa is set to increase, and that the migratory realities in both Europe and in the United States will continue to push migrants to find alternative destinations such as Argentina and Brazil, it is suggested that, rather than creating an access labyrinth, Argentinian authorities may wish to consider paths for integration and formal incorporation that include settlement as a viable alternative for qualifying candidates.

2. Technical instruments for regional and African immigration

In an increasingly integrated region, it makes political sense to seek common ground in immigration and refuge policies. Thus, Argentina might benefit from seeking to align its own precepts to those of fellow MERCOSUR member states, in particular Brazil, given its role in this specific migratory corridor from Africa. Sharing resources in this manner might result in budget savings as well as enhanced controls. It is further suggested that, in the long run, Argentina and its regionally integrated partners might consider immigration agreements with its African counterparts, most notably with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), from which most African migrant currently come. Given the limited nature of Argentina-Africa ties, it is likely that this path could be initiated by way of bilateral or multilateral commercial integration agreements. This, in the opinion of the authors, should keep in mind the human aspects, considering migrants an asset, and thus aiming to incorporate them productively, in line with Argentina’s migration history.

---

3. Enacting effective border controls

As it was previously pointed out, there is little doubt that border controls are an important piece of the puzzle. Eliminating irregular entries in the country requires, on the one hand, the creation of an access to a feasible regular avenue; and on the other hand, an efficient and effective border control. Although air borders appear to be adequately controlled, the entrance of polizones suggests insufficient cargo control in some maritime borders. In the case of Argentina and Brazil, however, the major challenge is the vastness and remoteness of the land borders between the two countries, and with third countries such as Bolivia or Paraguay. Admittedly, the resources that would have to be allocated for an integral control are unfeasible. Nonetheless, an important reinforcement of air and river patrols, as well as human resources and technology in some of the key points of entry might be a necessary investment. Once again, state integration in matters of immigration would prove beneficial, and could potentially curb other irregular corridors, as well as illegal merchandise traffic.

4. Rooting out smuggling and trafficking networks

The authors of this report suggest there appears to be, as yet, little evidence of large scale trafficking of African migrants, although the resource to established local smuggling networks, for instance in the Triple Border region, indeed appears to be a commonplace. Moreover, the number of Africans presumed to be in Argentina could not have entered the country solely as stowaways. This discourse, thus, echoes others around the globe, whereby the “fear of the boat” becomes a trope representing an entire group, when in reality the group is using different methods. While in Brazil ships might be a convenient method of arrival, it is suggested that, in Argentina, land borders are probably the main points of entry. As recommended on 6.1., creating an avenue for regular migration might curb the need to resort to smuggling networks. By the same token, it is suggested that comprehensive investigation of currently existing smuggling networks might be necessary. Based on field interviews with migrants, and with professionals interacting with migrants daily, it is the opinion of the authors that most arrive in Argentina using smuggling networks, but not trafficking networks. Nonetheless, it is admitted that trafficking might be in existence, particularly in the case of minors. Dismantling such networks should be a priority, but requires extensive collaboration with African authorities, tackling the issue on the side of demand.

5. Migration as a human right: The Argentinean path

Given Argentina’s history, the process of arriving at a common charter of human rights has been remarkable and trendsetting by international standards. A long process of advocacy and consultation with numerous civil society institutions such as the Argentinean Commission for Refugees (CAREF) and the Center for Legal and Social Studies (CELS), both in Buenos Aires, has mainstreamed the debate on migration and mobility as a basic human right. Using a legal path to achieve this result has largely contributed to root out discriminatory practices and slowly build a path to full acceptance and implementation of this right. Even when, as these organizations admit, institutional bias, as well as legal and civil challenges may subsist, there is no doubt Argentina is in the right path. In Brazil, the process has taken a different path, based on rooting out discrimination, very particularly racial discrimination. This might have trickle-down effects on the immigration policy. Both countries appear to be on the right track.

6. Refugee and asylum in the context of South American humanism

It is of vital moral importance to resume a normal process of evaluation of asylum claims, as per Argentina’s international commitments. As in Europe, the fast increase in the number of claims may have resulted in an institutional knee-jerk reaction, making the words “asylum” and “refugee” almost indissociable from economic migration. Opening up a formal path for regular migration might defuse the instrumentalization of asylum as a step in the migratory process, a fact that is admitted by multiple
agencies acting on behalf of the Argentinean state. It should also reinstate asylum as a fundamental mechanism aimed at supporting those who are truly vulnerable and in need of assistance.

7. Capacity building of the immigration and police authorities

It has been repeatedly noted in interviews with migrants, migrant collectives, and officials in state-sanctioned agencies and organizations dealing with migrants, that one of the biggest challenges to refugees is the fact that police authorities, and civil society at large, often do not recognize the official refugee or asylum claimant documents. It is important, therefore, to act on two fronts: firstly, train immigration and police authorities to recognize such documents, and accordingly honor their value, recognizing also that their holders are often individuals in need of special social or linguistic support, requiring tactful approaches. This can only be achieved by mainstreaming training on the subject as part of other training activities; secondly, consider replacing the said documents with cards similar to national identity cards (DNI), which might more easily be recognized as official documents. The back of such document could also consider a brief list of rights entailed by it, such as the right to work in Argentina.

8. Measuring and enhancing integration policies

On a wider societal level, national campaigns for integration are necessary, educating citizens about the rights of migrants and refugees, and about the fact that the temporary residence document (residencia temporaria) in fact has legal tender, granting the holder the right to access the job market or to rent a house. Although this does not solve issues of racial discrimination that have been identified, it would be a step in the right direction. Sustained campaigns of this kind have shown positive results in other countries.53

As widely noted throughout this report, it is of fundamental importance to promote, at the earliest possible moment, a widespread, anonymous, and state-backed quantitative and qualitative study that traces all information about migrants, identifying needs, and promoting integration policies to match them. Most importantly, it is necessary to identify those problematic issues in Argentinean society that might also need to be tackled. It is suggested that a broad study on migrant integration in Argentina might be an invaluable tool to assess and measure the real situation on the ground. This might be based on the European Migrant Integration Index (MIPEX), which has provided EU member states not only with useful statistical tools, but also with a vital barometer of the real effects of policy-making.

Bibliography


53 The MIPEX (Migrant Integration Index) results in 2011 show that, despite continued problems, countries in which pro-integration policies and campaigns were underway registered higher scores (interactive charts available here: http://www.mipex.eu/). An example of these campaigns is that currently underway in Portugal, under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior and ACIDI (High Commissioner for Immigration and Intercultural Dialogue), available here: http://imigrante.mai-gov.info/. Immigrant rights have recently been approved in parliament, and upgraded from regulations to law.


_____ (2006), *Argentina y África en el espejo de Brasil: ¿Política por impulsos o construcción de una política exterior?*, Buenos Aires, CLACSO (own translation).


IV. International migration: Trends and institutional frameworks from the African perspective

John O. Ouchö

A. Introduction

In Africa, the discourse on international migration has become the point of reference in global and regional cooperation whether from the perspective of trade, international relations or security in terms of development and human rights. Over the last decade, the African Union (AU) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) have paid special attention to migration from different perspectives, putting the topic at the centre stage of regional as well as sub-regional development (AU, 2006; ECA, 2006). Increasingly, countries are becoming more conscious of the implications of international migration for not only national development but also regional and sub-regional concerns of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to which different states belong. To this end, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has developed the Regional Migration Policy Framework (IGAD-RMPF) and certain sub-Saharan African countries have either developed or are in the process of developing National Migration Policies (NMPs).

This study sheds light on African international migration trends and institutional frameworks intended to manage migration for the benefit of the countries of both origin and destination. The first part introduces the subject that has dominated discourse at national, regional and global levels and in which there is a constant search for durable solutions for all countries involved. Different types of migration discussed rationalize equally diverse institutional frameworks for migration management through globally binding initiatives as well as bilateral and multilateral arrangements. Subsequently, the study delves into institutional frameworks which guide international migration into and from African countries, including those guiding regional migration in the context of the African Union (AU) and different Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in the region. The study also explores demographic and socio-economic attributes of migrants in migration policies; the first set includes age and sex, while the second comprises gender, educational and economic standing of the migrants that policies often address. In addition, the study concentrates on contemporary issues in migration policies

54 Consultant from the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA).
55 Nigeria, Rwanda and Zimbabwe have already formulated national migration policies addressing issues they consider pertinent on the basis of the migration situation and management of various migration types; and Uganda’s policy-formulation process is currently underway.
that African RECs and individual countries grapple with in migration management for the desired development, such as remittances as an indication of migrant origin-destination links; policies pertaining to circulation migration and transnationalism that are fast replacing longer-stay movements; and the consequences of the global economic crisis for migration flows. The final section consists of both conclusion and recommendations.

1. Nature and scope of the study

This study draws heavily from the experience of selected African countries from the region’s five sub-regions, simply to elaborate certain issues in which the countries provide useful examples. The countries mentioned numerous times represent Africa’s linguistic blocs —Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone as well as Arabic— whose policies are founded on their evolution and development challenges since independence. Although ranking as origin, transit and destination countries of international migration, African countries are largely origin and destination countries of intra-African and extra-African migration. The study adopts the United Nations categorisation of African sub-regions as Eastern Africa (19 countries), Middle (9 countries), Northern (7 countries), Southern (5 countries) and Western (17 countries), or a total of 57 countries.

2. Typologies of international migration

There is no single unanimously accepted typology of international migration. Bilsborrow et al. (1997) suggest an elaborated typology whose main characteristics are included below:

- Permanent settlers: permanent residence status (South African whites, East Africa’s Asiatic people; naturalisation on acquiring citizenship; amnesty beneficiaries (black workers in post-apartheid South Africa).
- Labour migration: unskilled/semi-skilled workers (domestic and menial workers); skilled/professional workers (brain drain and brain circulation).
- Refugees and asylum seekers: within and outside of Africa; beneficiaries of third country settlement.
- Undocumented/illegal/clandestine/unauthorised: often undocumented in any official records and changing residence to avoid being detected by national authorities.
- Irregular migration: Dominated by victims of trafficking and smuggling.
- Itinerant traders and business persons: Dominated women in Western Africa, Zimbabwean women since economic difficulties hit Zimbabwe; trans-nationals.

| TABLE IV.1 ESTIMATES OF MIGRATION WITHIN AND OUTSIDE OF AFRICA, 2011 | As percent of all emigrants |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Origin sub-region | Central Africa | East Africa | North Africa | Southern Africa | West Africa | Out of Africa |
| All Africa | 3 | 13 | 2 | 11 | 21 | 50 |
| Central Africa | 23 | 26 | 0 | 3 | 9 | 39 |
| East Africa | 1 | 52 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 41 |
| North Africa | 0 | 0 | 6 | 6 | 0 | 93 |
| Southern Africa | 0 | 7 | 0 | 66 | 0 | 28 |
| West Africa | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 71 | 24 |
| Other regions | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100 |

Note: Includes only identified sources and destinations. Rows may not sum to 100 because of rounding errors.
Intra-sub-regional migration is dominant, heaviest in Western Africa, followed by Southern Africa and Eastern Africa in descending order. Outside of Africa, Northern Africa contributes by far the highest percentage of emigrants, followed by Eastern Africa and Central (Middle) Africa in descending order. It would appear that Northern Africa’s proximity to Europe and previous political upheavals in Central (Middle) Africa might be some of the drivers of emigration from the sub-regions.

3. Limitations and gaps

This study has limitations on the subject of data availability. For example, population censuses in most African countries have not captured data on emigration whether the destinations of emigrants are within Africa itself or outside of the region. Moreover, national migration surveys have been sporadic, with the few undertaken limited to labour force surveys and clearly falling short of different types of migration and migrants. Lack of data constrains efforts to proffer meaningful migration policies and institute relevant programmes. Another limitation is the recent engagement of the AU with the EU, IOM and other organisations in matters pertaining to migration management. As it is too early to expect African countries and the RECs to which they belong, to initiate migration policy development and relevant institutions with adequate capacity to institutionalise migration management, information is lacking on virtually all aspects of the topic of this study. A third limitation is the lack of research and researchers studying migration as providing opportunities and posing challenges for development in Africa. Many arguments on either perspective amount to anecdotal evidence which cannot hold where empirical evidence is necessary for dependable solutions. Migration research has been starving of resources and migration researchers tend to stay within their disciplinary pigeon holes, hardly embracing multi-disciplinary research on a multi-dimensional subject.

B. Institutional policies and arrangements

There are five main issues: origin-destination links in terms of policy and legislative measures in the two settings and bilateral arrangements; international instruments and migrants’ rights; international migration in the context of regional integration: Africa’s Regional Economic Communities (RECs); migrants’ rights in health and gender; and perspectives of migration and development.

1. Origin-destination links of migration

a) Emigration without policy prescriptions in countries of origin

Most African countries lack explicit policies relating to emigration of their nationals. Biennial enquiries of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) of The Population Division of the United Nations provide useful insights of the country views and policies on international migration, distinguishing between immigration and emigration. The overwhelming response of African countries is ‘satisfactory’ view and ‘non-intervention policy’, suspiciously indeterminate responses due to either lack of reliable information or absence of explicit migration policies and strategies. Table IV.2 provides some useful insights.
### TABLE IV.2
**IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION VIEWS AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES OF SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES, 2005**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Immigration View</th>
<th>Immigration Policy</th>
<th>Emigration View</th>
<th>Emigration Policy</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>NI</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>NI</td>
<td>Probably not clear of emigration and immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>NI</td>
<td>Emigration prone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.R. Congo</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>NI</td>
<td>Emigration prone; just settling after decades of instability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Too low</td>
<td>Maintain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>NI</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>NI</td>
<td>Emigration prone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Too high</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Too high</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Emigration prone; immigration prone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>NI</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>NI</td>
<td>Emigration prone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>NI</td>
<td>Emigration prone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Too high</td>
<td>NI</td>
<td>Too high</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Emigration prone; immigration prone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Too high</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Too low</td>
<td>Maintain</td>
<td>Emigration prone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Maintain</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>NI</td>
<td>Emigration prone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Maintain</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Maintain</td>
<td>Emigration prone; encourages skilled immigrant labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Africa</td>
<td>Too high</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Too high</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Emigration and immigration prone, the latter fuelling xenophobia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>NI</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Raise</td>
<td>Emigration prone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Maintain</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>NI</td>
<td>Emigration prone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>NI</td>
<td>Too high</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Emigration prone</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


NI = No intervention.

In all sixteen African countries but South Africa and Tunisia, which consider immigration too high, the dominant view on immigration is that it is satisfactory but policy responses vary from no intervention (NI) in Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi and Zimbabwe and to maintaining (Nigeria, Rwanda and Uganda) and lowering in Egypt and Morocco. The dominant view on emigration also pertains to satisfactory, though traditional emigration countries like Ghana, Mali and South Africa consider it too high. Policy response is predominantly no intervention; Ghana, Mali, South Africa and Zimbabwe consider lowering it; Egypt and Morocco (which consider emigration too low) and Rwanda wish to maintain it; and Tunisia is the only country wishing to raise emigration It is likely that migration scenarios in respective countries correlate with these diverse views and policies propagated. Yet, in the absence of migration policy, the responses reflect the position of national governments and fail to capture perspectives of individuals and the households with varying perceptions of immigration and emigration.56

Before the AU galvanised the support of Member States to adopt the AU Migration Policy Framework of June 2006, the debate on international migration featured only in RECs, with their Member States sharply divided in their responses to and handling of an issue which lies at the core of national, regional and global development agenda. The AU stewardship has stimulated migration policy development in Africa, with some countries already having national migration policies.

---

56 Calls for national migration surveys in Africa in the mould of Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) have been made, but the calls have been ignored, even by international organisations working on migration issues. This reflects the reluctance of world nations to address international migration in the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in 1994, instead favouring partial initiatives such as the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM), annual meetings of the Global Forum for Migration and Development (GFMD), the Global Dialogue on International Migration (2006) and so on, which are no means binding. Moreover, all these address global, regional and national perspectives of migration at the expense of migrants’ and migrant households’ dynamics.
b) Policy and legislative measures in countries of destination

In the absence of a blanked policy and a raft of legislative measures, the countries of destination adopt these as they best suit their needs and meet their citizens’ comfort. As most immigration involves labour, IOM’s (2008) highlights of policy and legislative issues in the countries of destination are instructive. The countries of destination need to: satisfy their labour market needs and better manage the labour migration process; prevent or reduce irregular migration by affording regular migration opportunities; make use of bilateral labour agreements to promote and support broader economic relations with countries of origin; and preserve or strengthen ties between countries sharing historical (sometimes post-colonial) and cultural links (IOM, 2008:372-3). Thus, apart from Northern Africa from which large numbers of emigrants are to Europe, the rest of Africa experiences widespread intra-regional and inter-sub-regional migration.

c) Bilateral and multilateral agreements

In the context of labour migration, the IOM’s World Migration 2008 recognizes three different forms of bilateral arrangements in migration management, namely legal status, the comprehensiveness or specificity of the migratory issues addressed and the categories of workers covered (IOM, 2008: 377-380), identifying impediments to bilateral arrangements such as preference for a unilateral/universal approach and problems relating to negotiation and implementation of arrangements made. However, developments worth acknowledging include the Euro-Mediterranean basin initiatives; the co-development between France and its former colonies; the Commonwealth Teacher Recruitment Protocol (adopted in 2004) and the Commonwealth Code of Practice for the International Recruitment of Health Workers; and IOM’s Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA). Table IV.3 gives information on some of the current bilateral and multilateral agreements.

The Mediterranean basin has witnessed Euro-African agreements involving the European countries of destination along the Mediterranean Sea and their African neighbours—the Maghreb states and Egypt—producing migrants or featuring as transit countries of clandestine irregular migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. It has been noted that November 1995 marked the starting point of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (the Barcelona Process), a wide framework of political, economic and cultural cooperation between the Member States of the European Union and the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Basin countries. Official EU statistics indicate that France is home for 90% of Algerians, 72% of Tunisians and 45% of Moroccans; Spain and Italy host respectively 20 and 13% of Moroccans, and Italy receives 16% of the Tunisian migrants living in the EU (Gallina, 2006 b). Agreements in this partnership are meant to streamline migration management as well as eliminate undesirable outcomes of migration. Emigration from Western African countries, through the Maghreb states, dominates media reports and has necessitated these agreements.

Co-development is a partnership which France has been undertaking with its former colonies and has become a subject in postgraduate studies in Spanish and other European universities. The concept is attributed to a French scholar, Sami Naïr (1997), who, in an Inter-Ministerial Mission on Migration and Co-development, defined it as: ...a proposal for integrating immigration and development in a way that migration fluxes will benefit both the country of origin and the country of destination... a consensual relationship between two countries that will allow migration to the country of destination not to imply an equivalent loss in the country of origin.

The France-Mali partnership is frequently cited because it has enabled Malian migrants and migrant organisations in France to stimulate development in both settings in which they have adopted ambivalent lifestyles. The partnership receives support from the French Development Cooperation, which renders it a control mechanism by France and undermines its mutual benefits. It is an initiative likely to serve the rest of Africa as a fortress as Europe becomes increasingly impenetrable.

57 The term Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPC) has been adopted; it includes that are signatories of the Barcelona Agreement in 1995 with the EU launching the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Palestinian Authority, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Turkey.
TABLE IV.3
SOME BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION INVOLVING AFRICAN COUNTRIES, CIRCA 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bilateral/multilateral Agreement</th>
<th>Major Characteristics</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean</td>
<td>Partnership to facilitate the exchange of initiatives relating to migration workers for country of origin development</td>
<td>France-Mali</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Commonwealth initiatives:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Major Characteristics</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Recruitment Protocol</td>
<td>Ethical recruitment of teachers within the Commonwealth or the latter and non-Commonwealth countries</td>
<td>Many within the Commonwealth and between the Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code of Practice for the Recruitment of Health Workers</td>
<td>Ethical recruitment of health workers as applies to that of teachers</td>
<td>Many within similar arrangements as of teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA)</td>
<td>IOM’s capacity-building programme helping to mobilise competences required by African nationals abroad for the benefit of Africa’s development</td>
<td>Involves several interested African countries in terms of periodic or virtual return for specific undertakings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Readings from websites of institutions involved and publications on the topic.

The Commonwealth has been spearheading two forms of recruitment of professionals that dominate the brain drain of the countries of origin, the vast majority in Africa. The Commonwealth Teacher Recruitment Protocol specifies the rights and responsibilities of recruiting countries, the countries of origin and the recruited teacher; it also provides for monitoring and evaluation of its implementation. Reviewing the Commonwealth Protocol in the context of Africa, Keevy (2011) identifies seven critical matters for thorough consideration in the Protocol: context, teacher emigration, professionalization, advocacy, collaboration, data and oversight; recognises the role of African RECs (SADC, ECOWAS, COMESA) in invoking harmonisation of national education systems; and concludes that the Protocol is necessary to balance the right to teacher education to the integrity of national education systems and to prevent exploitation of this scarce human resource in Africa.

The Commonwealth Code of Practice for the International of Health Workers was adopted at the Pre-WHA Meeting of the Commonwealth Health Ministers held in Geneva on 18 May 2003. It recognises the most severe shortage of health workers in the small island states, remote and rural areas and some African countries, which affects these countries’ capacity to provide good quality health services to their populations. No wonder, African countries fall too far short of the WHO stipulated standards of health worker/population ratio, not to mention the weird doctor/population ratio. The Protocol aspires to transparency, fairness and mutuality of benefits, and recommends compensation, reparation or restitution where appropriate. In situations where health workers leave their countries without knowledge of the health ministries, it is not possible to observe these principles or to invoke the measures recommended.

As scanty information exists on the extent to which African countries adhere to both the Commonwealth Protocol and the Code of Practice, it is risky to pronounce on their performance in these countries of origin. The Ramphal Commission on Migration and Development, which has just completed

---

58 Details of the Protocol are contained in 7BDD 97OB-53AE-441D-81DB-1B64C37E992A- Commonwealth Code of Practice, downloaded on 08/08/11.
its two-year work, has made far-reaching recommendations that should attract the attention of not only Commonwealth countries but also those to which they relate in matters of migration and development.59

2. International instruments and human rights

Five Conventions/Protocols are singled out because they govern international migration through the lenses of refugee movements, labour migration in a family context and two forms of irregular migration involving human trafficking and smuggling, which are criminalised (Table IV.4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument and adoption year</th>
<th>Sub-regions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of countries</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951)</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (1967)</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (2000)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from International Migration 2009 wall chart (UN/DESA).

* Lesotho.


a) Refugee conventions and protocols

The status of refugees has entailed mutual arrangements of the countries of refugee outflows and the host countries, acting in conformity with internationally recognized instruments - the UN 1951 Convention and the UN 1967 Protocol. In the case of Africa, the 1969 OAU Protocol applies, as do the UN 1990 Convention and the two 2000 Protocols. Table IV.4 reveals how Africa’s sub-regions fare in the five United Nations Conventions pertaining to refugees and international labour as well as irregular migration. The vast majority of African countries have signed the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol on Refugees, but not necessarily ratified it and the same number has signed the OAU Protocol on the Status of Refugees in Africa, which the AU (the successor of the OAU) has inherited. These days, UNHCR statistics also capture ‘other persons of concern to UNHCR’ who are not conventionally considered refugees—for example, victims of the vagaries of climate (floods and drought) and other environmental hazards who eke out precarious living in the Sahel and much of the Horn of Africa.

59 Named after Sir Shridath Rampal, the eminent former Commonwealth Secretary-General in 1975-1990, the Commission comprised seven Commissioners: two former heads of State (a former Prime Minister of who chaired it and a former President of Republic of Cyprus; a former Chair of UK’s Sustainable Development Commission; a former Foreign Secretary of Bangladesh and current President of the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute; the current Executive of the Commonwealth Nurses Federation; and two Professors who are migration experts on South-East Asia and Africa. The report of the Commission will be presented to the meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government (CHOGM) due in Perth, Australia in October 2011.
b) **Migrant workers and members of their families**

Given the evolution of recognition of migrant rights, it is necessary to shed light on the latest version (the UN Convention 1990) which is more comprehensive than previous ILO Conventions - for instance, C97 on Migration for Employment (Revised) 1949 and the Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention (No. 143), 1975. Theoretically, the UN 1990 Convention on Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families would be expected to find strong support in African countries given the saliency of labour migration within and from the region. Yet, a minority of the countries has been party to it, which implies lack of attention to the protection and other interests of emigrant and immigrant workers. While nearly half of Western African countries have signed it, three Eastern African countries (Rwanda, Seychelles and Uganda) and only Lesotho in Southern Africa have joined the pack, and no country has done so in Middle Africa. Except for a dismal performance in Middle Africa, countries in all other sub-regions have responded well to the two aspects of the Convention on Transnational Crime.

Thus, conventions on refugees and irregular migration have the most appeal to African countries. This is presumably because the refugee menace has been a typical feature of the independent African state (Oucho, 2002) and because large numbers of Africans have been and are being trafficked or smuggled to the Middle East and across the Sahara to the Mediterranean basin in both the Magreb and southern European states.

The reluctance of African countries to sign United Nations Conventions pertaining to labour migration in particular is worrying given its centrality to the free facilitation of movements of persons (FMOP/FOMP) protocols which all RECs embrace. This poor response underscores the insignificance of claim of African countries to the benefits or costs of migrant labour, why the rights of migrant workers and their families are often violated in the countries of destination, why African countries of both origin and destination have no way of making mutual arrangements on this category of migrants and why xenophobia erupts from time to time in the countries of destination, particularly the three successful Southern African economies of Botswana, South Africa and Namibia (Crush and Pendleton, 2004).

c) **Conventions and protocols on irregular migration**

Two closely linked protocols adopted in 2000 relate to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Crime: Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Children and Women (HTP) and Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air ((MSP). In terms of the UN categorization of African sub-regions, both HTP and MSP have been signed by all Eastern African countries with the exception of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda and Zimbabwe; all Middle African countries except Angola, Gabon and Sao Tome and Principe; all Western African states with the exception of Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Sierra Leone, with Guinea Bissau, Niger and Togo signing HTP only; and all Southern African countries except Swaziland.

3. **International migration in the context of regional integration**

a) **Fee movement of flows: people, labour, goods, capital and services**

In the spirit of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), all sub-regions were encouraged to establish RECs as regional blocs to entrench economic cooperation among countries, expected ultimately to coalesce into the African Economic Community (AEC) by 2028. The result was a proliferation of RECs in which Member States belong to multiple RECs, constraining their loyalty and ability to cope with respective RECs’ varied requirements. To institute order where such chaotic development took place, the AU recognizes only eight RECs, seven of which are located in Africa,
even though their membership includes some countries in North Africa. Table IV.3 presents membership of the eight.

All these RECs are at different phases of the regional integration process as recognized by ECA from El Agra’s work: from Preferential Trade Area through Free Trade Area, Customs Union, Common Market, Economic Union, culminating in a Political Union, such as a federation currently being touted by the EAC Partner States. A characteristic feature of all Africa’s RECs is the domination of anyone country: Nigeria in ECOWAS, Kenya in EAC and South Africa in SADC.

As more detailed analyses of migration and regional integration in the context of regional integration appear elsewhere (Oucho, 1995, 1998, 2009; Adepoju, 2007b), this discussion merely highlights salient issues about respective RECs. Highlights of all the RECs except ECOWAS are attributed to the first three references, with information on ECOWAS attributed to the last reference.

**East African Community (EAC) I & II**

Three EAC Member States —Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania— have had much in common since the colonial period, with their union beginning in 1948; and their once politically troubled neighbours of Burundi and Rwanda joined them in 2007 to logically complete a geographically well-knit REC. East Africa has witnessed two versions of regional integration with the same name—the East African Community (EAC). The first version (EAC I) existed in the decade 1967-1977 and, after a two-decade lacuna, the second version was mooted to become EAC II from 2001. It saw two Great Lakes region countries, Burundi and Rwanda, become EAC II Partner States in 2007, and the Republic of South Sudan applied for membership before its emergence on 9 July 2011. The EAC II aims to promote and strengthen the balanced and sustainable integration of economic, social, cultural and political aspects of its partner states.

When the EAC adopted the Protocol on the Common Market in July 2009, it unleashed a comprehensive strategy for ‘five freedoms’ in movement: of people, labour, goods, capital and services in its area of jurisdiction. Free movement of Persons and Labour is provided for in six Articles: 7 on free movement of persons who are citizens of the Partner States; 8 on Standard Identification System through a common system of issuing national identification documents; 9 on Travel Documents recognised in Article 8; 10 on Free Movement of Workers; 11 on Harmonisation and Mutual Recognition of Academic and Professional Qualifications; and 12 on Harmonisation of Labour Policies, Laws and Programmes. Other aspects of free movement are detailed under all other four components. The Common Market is detailed and will require sustained interest and commitment of the Partner States to realise as envisaged in the timetable of implementation. Unfortunately, apart from the visa entry phase which operates with few hitches, if any, all other phases are controversial and might not clear the hurdles on the way, among them nationalist xenophobia and mistrust as well as economic inequality among and human resource capacities of the Partner States.

**Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)**

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), founded on May 28, 1975, is an African REC comprising fifteen Member States. Nwauche (n.d.: 322) argues that the REC’s good intentions were subsequently thwarted by military dictatorships in virtually all its Member States.

---

60 The unrecognised RECs are: the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA/WAEMU), the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries GEPELG, the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (CIRCGL/ICGLR), the Mano River Union (MRU), the Senegal River Basin Development Authority (OMVS) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).


That only Senegal has never fallen prey to military rule explains why peace-making has been a cardinal mission of ECOWAS through ECOMOG.63

Thorough analyses of development at ECOWAS have been made by Adepoju in several insightful articles. The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and the Right of Residence and Establishment, adopted in May 1979, formalised the free movement of ECOWAS citizens within the Member States, and which has been acclaimed as a trend-setter in migration policy development and management (Adepoju, 2007a). Its key milestones include: 90-day visa-free entry for ECOWAS citizens in possession of valid travel documentation (ECOWAS, 1999 and 2004), though Member States may nevertheless refuse admission to would-be immigrants deemed ‘inadmissible’ under their laws; the second phase (Right of Residence) which came into force in July 1986, and the revised Treaty of 1992, affirming the right of Community citizens to entry into, and residence in other Member States, with the expectation that ECOWAS biometrically viable passports would progressively replace national passports over a transitional period of ten years (Adepoju, 2002) and ECOWAS travellers’ cheques and a common currency eventually would facilitate cross-border movement (Adepoju, 2004b); and a third phase when national laws, employment and investment codes which restrict ‘foreigners’ from participating in certain economic activities were being harmonised with regional and sub-regional treaties to ensure the rights of migrant workers within host countries (United Nations, 2004) thereby granting the Right of Establishment.

**Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)**

The first expansive REC to cover Eastern and Southern African (ESA) countries was the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) which operated in 1982-1993, transforming into the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in 1994. COMESA drew membership of countries with diverse political, economic and social backgrounds, which probably creates tensions in the Common Market.

Above all, COMESA treaty aims to strengthen the REC’s relations with other organisations and cooperating partners as it matches steadily toward the African Economic Community (AEC), alongside its counterparts in Africa. COMESA has lost old and gained new members; it has lost Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania (the latter tending toward the south since the days of Frontline States) to SADC, and gained Egypt and Libya in North Africa. SADC has fifteen Member States compared to COMESA’s nineteen.64 The COMESA protocol observes the visa-free arrangement for citizens of its Member States, underlining bilateral, rather than multilateral arrangements, but nothing beyond that non-controversial phase. However, with the implementation of the “yellow certificate”, COMESA is implementing free movement of vehicles across, which only permits transit of the citizens involved.

**Southern African Development Community (SADC)**

In the late 1970s, the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) emerged to challenge South Africa’s apartheid policy and to safeguard citizens of its Member States from the country’s propaganda of deceptive diplomacy. The grouping was replaced by SADC at a time the PTA was already operational and transforming into COMESA. SADC was established in 1992, with South Africa joining at the onset of majority rule in 1994. The dominant country is South Africa which has been wielding a lot of power and demonstrating its superiority over all other Member States. Three SADC Member States —South Africa, Botswana and Namibia - enjoy sustained economic buoyancy that has attracted huge volumes of foreign migrant labour over the

---

63 ECONOMOG, in full, is the Economic Community for West African States Monitoring Group.

64 As of 2011, both SADC and COMESA shared eight Member States, namely D.R. Congo, Malawi, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe, more than half of membership of the former and slightly less than half of the latter.
years; this status makes them good neighbours in shaping the SADC Protocol which emphasizes ‘facilitation of movement’ in place of freedom of movement.

The SADC protocol remains the most controversial, more so because it has changed complexion several times and probably keeps the Member States wondering why it was drafted in the first place. Within the decade 1995-2005, the protocol changed from being a “free movement” of persons (FMOP) idea embroiled in a gridlock, giving way to the draft protocol on “facilitation of movement” of persons (FOMP), championed by South Africa which has received strong support from its economically buoyant neighbours, Botswana and Namibia. The SADC case deserves elaboration because although the REC seems to appeal most to the western world, it serves countries where xenophobia and lack of transparency and the overarching role of South Africa are frustrating regional integration efforts, if not holding the Member States hostage to the country’s whims (Oucho, 2009). Two contrasting reviews—one by a fervent proponent of South Africa’s disenchantment with freedom of movement or the FMOP protocol (Solomon, 1997 and 2000), the other critical of the country’s obsession with reliance on “unscientific evidence” (Oucho and Crush, 2001) — provide insightful information. Above all, they underline why the draft protocols on freedom/facilitation of movement have not made significant progress.

It was not until 2005 that the SADC Member States adopted the FOMP protocol when the requisite minimum number of signatories was attained, but since then the majority of Member States have not ratified it. Still the conclusions of the review of the SADC protocols drawn before signing the draft FOMP version remain valid (Oucho and Crush, 2001: 154-5), but with a caveat: SADC needs to take into consideration the findings of the decade-long Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) research on citizen attitudes to migration and migrants, actual and potential emigration, xenophobia and migrant remittances in some SADC Member States. The shadow of South Africa that looms over the entire region is inimical to liberalised movement within SADC where the Member States have to face the realities of the changing times. Take Zimbabwe, for example, which before the turn of the century was a vibrant economy but where political repression and economic crisis have sparked huge emigration of refugees and economic migrants, without SADC taking a punitive or corrective stance on the country’s leadership (Oucho, 2009).

**Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)**

Drought and incessant famine, which protracted civil war aggravated, brought together IGAD Member States that have made significant inroads in peace-building and reconstruction of some war-devastated economies. It is a specialised REC without a treaty but an agreement focusing on drought and conflict mitigation. A customs union is the one feature of regional cooperation towards which all RECs in Eastern and Southern Africa are resolutely moving. Highlights of the main RECs help to drive home this point.

As drought is a persistent feature of the Horn of Africa, IGAD began as the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), later dropping ‘drought’ and acquiring the name Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Its Member States are Djibouti (which hosts the headquarters), Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda; the Republic of South Sudan is expected to become the newest Member State. These countries have had oscillating relations over the years, most neighbouring states having uneasy co-existence. Wavering

---

65 The SAMP Migration Policy Series provides extremely useful facts on migration and development issues which the SADC secretariat has never committed its Member States to take on board their deliberations. The series are instructive for taking a fresh look at migration and regional integration in both SADC and COMESA.

66 The Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, signed on 26 March 1996 by Heads of State and Government and developed in the spirit of the COMESA Treaty, does not have any provision for free movement of persons, the nearest to this is Article 13A on Cooperation, paragraph (s), which aims to “facilitate repatriation and reintegration of refugees, returnees and displaced persons and demobilized soldiers in cooperation with relevant governmental and non-governmental organizations in accordance with the existing national, regional and international instruments”.

---

157
inter-state relations or persistent strife are inimical to IGAD’s performance and threaten peace and security which are important ingredients of regional integration.

IGAD has no protocol yet on free movement of persons. However, in June 2011, the IGAD Secretariat announced a positive move, calling on interested consultants to make bids for developing the protocol. It will most likely be similar to other RECs’ protocols on the ground.

b) The status and challenges of free movement Protocols in African RECs

All has not been well at the RECs in their efforts to foster free movement of persons within their areas of jurisdiction. Cushioned by theories of regional integration, the RECs have crafted phased processes of free movement, all but one extremely difficult to realize. Table IV.6 provides some insights of the processes relating to respective RECs in sub-Saharan Africa.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REC</th>
<th>Date of formation</th>
<th>Member States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECCAS (CEEAC in French)</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Benin, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: J. O. Oucho (1998), table 7.1, p. 266; updated from Wikipedia.

Some challenges facing RECs

On migration and the RECs, countries can forge bilateral relations among the various REC Member States within different sub-regions, as well as multilateral arrangements between the various RECs in Africa and in the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries, and so on (GCIM, 2005, quoted in Adepoju, 2008). At the national level, it is relevant collaboration between agencies of government dealing with migration matters and the need for dialogue among the various stakeholders on approaches to migration concerns, sharing of ideas and enhancing cooperation in migration management, ultimately to develop coherent policy frameworks for effective management of migration.
A recent study (Oucho, 2009) identifies other challenges. First, since the FMOP and FOMP protocols were drafted, they remain virtually stalled as neither of them has gone beyond visa-free entry for a specified period and multilateral arrangements in anyone REC are lacking. Nor are there strong bilateral arrangements even between neighbouring countries whose citizens have much affinity and where they could benefit from intra-REC migration; and individual countries cling so much to national legislation and policies that they have not taken due advantage of the trappings of globalisation that influence development worldwide, including African countries. A SAMP-sponsored study on SADC Member States (Klaaren and Rutinwa, 2004) deserves replication in all other African RECs. Finally, xenophobia, whether overt or covert, is killing well-intended efforts of RECs to fashion out effective regional integration, observing the treaties and protocols of all RECs. SADC countries have no excuse failing to take on board research findings on xenophobia, based on SAMP surveys in the SADC region. Similarly, other African RECs should carry out surveys on xenophobia to avoid pretending that the problem does not exist within their areas of jurisdiction. Tolerance should be the hallmark of observing the principles of regional integration and liberalised movement of persons in the true spirit of African goodwill enunciated in the AU and REC treaties (Oucho, 2009).

c) Marching towards the AEC and the ultimate protocol

The challenges raised in the previous paragraph should be instructive to the AU as it oversees moves by all RECs towards the African Economic Community (AEC) by 2028. The path towards the AEC has six phases: phases one through three (1997-2017) is envisaged to address purely economic integration matters; the fourth phase (2017-2019) envisions harmonisation of policies and programmes in trade and other sectors as a precursor to full liberation of the African Common Market and AEC, resulting in free movement of people, with rights of residence and establishment among the RECs (as stipulated in Article 43 of the AEC Treaty); the fifth phase (2019-2023) would usher in consolidation of the continent-wide AEC, an incremental development from the fourth phase; and the sixth and final phase (2023-2028) would sharpen the vision of the AEC, with complete economic, political, social and cultural integration and common institutions in the respective spheres of integration (ECA, 2004: 31). This is clearly a well-conceived programme and one with gradual integration measures before the free movement protocol takes effect.
### TABLE IV.6
**PHASES OF FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS (FMOP)/ FACILITATION OF MOVEMENT OF PERSONS (FOMP) PROTOCOLS OF SSA'S RECs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REC</th>
<th>Name of Protocol</th>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEN-SAD</td>
<td>Free movement of persons, capital and interests of nationals of Member States</td>
<td>Right of establishment, ownership and exercise of economic activity, subject to the laws and regulations of individual Member States.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Free Movement of Persons, Labour, Services, Right of Establishment and Residence</td>
<td>The complete timetable is as follows: 2000-2002: Gradual removal of visa requirements; 2002-2006: Movement of skilled labour and movement of services; 2006-2010: Right of establishment; and 2014: Right of residence (20 years from date of entry of COMESA Treaty)</td>
<td>Right to enter all Member States for up to 90 days; No visa required; Member States to harmonize their national laws, rules and regulations having regard to the need to grant the right of residence to COMESA citizens. Protocol adopted at the Sixth Summit of the COMESA Authority held in Cairo, Egypt in 2001.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>Gives provision for: the right to enter the territory of a Partner State without a visa; the right to move freely within the territory of a Partner State; and the right to full protection by the laws of a Partner State.</td>
<td>Protocol on the EAC Common Market signed by Partner States in October 2009, spelling out “five freedoms” of movement; Right to cross borders with the EAC passport, duly allowing for multiple entries over a 6-month period.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Freedom of movement and Rights of Establishment of nationals of Member States</td>
<td>Right to enter all Member States; identity card, passport or health document required; Visa is required; Right to reside freely within the Community but with residence permit required.</td>
<td>Little progress though movement between counties is fluid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Free Movement of Persons, Settlement and Establishment</td>
<td>Right to enter all Member States with a valid travel document and an international health certificate; no visa required for a period of 90 days (ECOWAS passport available); right of residence for the purpose of seeking and carrying out income-earning employment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Protocol yet to be developed as IGAD Secretariat only recently (in July 2011) called for bids for a consultancy on the issue</td>
<td>Reciprocal visa-free entry for limited stays is granted bilaterally by some member States.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Facilitation of movement of people</td>
<td>1) 90-day visa entry per year for bona fide visit and in accordance with the laws of the State Party concerned; 2) permanent and temporary residence in the territory of another State with an application for a residence permit, subject to national laws; and 3) establishment of oneself and working in the territory of another State Party.</td>
<td>Signed by member states in March 2005; specifies handling of travel documents; urges harmonisation of existing immigration practices; introduces a population register; provides for expulsion of undesirable elements; makes provision for asylum seekers and refugees; and underlines relationship with other African RECs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: For detailed discussions, see N. Harris, M. Ugur, Adepoju and S. Peberdy and J. Crush, in Pecoud and Guhteneire; and Oucho and Crush (2001).
4. Migrant rights in gender and health

a) Migrant Rights through the Gender Perspective

United Nations (1995) book, *International Migration Policies and the Status of Women* opened a new chapter in shedding light on female migration, paving the way for considering the rights of female migrants. A notable fact is the absence of a chapter on migration of African women. Lim’s (1995: 29) analysis of the status of women and international migration notes that: “In so far as women’s status is a socially constructed rather than a biologically dictated concept...international migration, more than any demographic phenomenon, has major implications for changing women’s status, since migrant women move from one social context to another” [...] “the interactions of forces generated by markets, nation States and social networks, all of which shape international migration flows... are of special relevance for the study of female migration”.

Yet this is but one side of the coin as both females and males migrate, in the process becoming exposed to violation of their rights from a gender perspective. Lim (1995: 39) proposes a diagrammatic representation of macro-structure, women’s status and international migration, which depicts the following relations: socio-cultural environmental systems influence the family functions and structure, as well as individual characteristics, all of them determining women’s multiple roles; women’s roles in turn shape both women and men’s positions and women’s status indicators, both of these affecting family and individual decision-making, ultimately resulting in either “associational migration” or “autonomous migration”.

Some of the issues countering observance of female migrants’ rights include stereotyping female migrants as unskilled migrants; linking ageing in Western societies to feminised care labour; and restrictions imposed by family immigration policies (e.g. income requirements for family reunification and women being confined to informal work. These challenges stand in the way of African female migrants who then become victims of immigration policies and legislation in African countries of destination as well as in the developed world. In the Middle East, there are incidents of unspeakable treatment of migrant African domestic workers who often dub it ‘modern slavery’ without governments of the countries of origin intervening, let alone comprehending the situation. The solution lies partially on OSCE’s (2009) call for a ‘two-way’ approach encompassing general migrant protection provisions (especially for female migrant workers) to empower them with choices, to access resources and to claim rights; it is partially a subject of research to investigate the process of recruiting migrants and the situation of migrants at the destinations before prescribing any plausible solutions.

b) Migrant rights in health access

Migrants’ rights are often violated in access to health services in the countries of destination. A good example is Botswana which, despite impressive health facilities, denies immigrants and refugees unrestricted access to health services. An empirical study on the issue reveals worrying findings. The majority of the healthcare providers indicated that the most important reproductive health needs of the immigrants and refugees, namely pregnancy-related services (prenatal, obstetrics, postnatal conditions), treatment for sexually transmitted infections (STIs), HIV/AIDS treatment and counselling and family planning were not different from those of the locals. The major differences between the local population and the foreigners were found to be: (i) antiretroviral (ARV) treatment and prevention of mother-to-child-transmission (PMTCT) programmes were never accessible to the non-citizens; and (ii) while treatments and other health services were free to Botswana, a fee was charged to non-citizens. Although 86% of the 21 studied reproductive health services were available in the healthcare system more than half of the time, only 62% of them were accessible to the immigrants and refugees. Immigrants’ reasons for inability to access these services were: (i) the immigrants and refugees have to pay higher fees to access the reproductive health services; (ii) once an immigrant or refugee is identified as HIV positive, he/she does not qualify for further follow-ups, for instance to detecting the immune status through CD4 count or testing the viral load; (iii) the
immigrants and refugees do not have referral rights to referral clinics/hospitals for follow-ups in case of certain health conditions; and (iv) both immigrants and refugees are required to join a medical aid scheme to help offset part of the costs for the desired services. The study recommends that the government of Botswana should improve the availability of reproductive health services to immigrants and refugees, and expunge those laws and practices that make it difficult for immigrants and refugees to access the available reproductive health services (Oucho and Ama, 2009). Poor access of immigrants to the available health facilities makes them susceptible to disease which might spread to locals despite their receipt of health attention.

5. Perspectives of migration and development

a) Brain drain, brain circulation and brain gain

Education and skill training have produced increasing numbers of Africans who fuel the brain drain stream. Initially, emigration of highly educated nationals of developing countries to the developed world was considered a loss given the extent to which the countries of origin had invested in them (Bhorat et al., 2002; Collier et al., 2004) and more recently, it is considered beneficial to the countries of origin. Some authors—for example, Glaser (1978) considered it a “safety valve” to leverage unemployment. As the developed countries tightened immigration regulations, brain drain changed to ‘brain circulation’ - back and forth movement —Saxenian (2002) and many others. The current emphasis is on both brain drain and brain circulation as ‘brain gain’ (Kuznetsov, 2006) whereby the returning former emigrants apply their knowledge and skills in their countries of origin. African countries put premium on this last perspective of international migration, even where there is no evidence of it actually happening (Oucho, 2008).

Public expressions of the African situation attest to the magnitude and effects of brain drain in Africa (http://images.derstandard.at/20080615/factsandfigures.pdf):

- The position of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) is that “emigration of African professionals to the West is one of the greatest obstacles to Africa’s development;”
- The Deputy Executive-Secretary, ECA, Dr. Lalla Ben Barka, contends that “African governments have a great responsibility to ensure that brains remain in the continent, otherwise, in 25 years’ time, Africa will be empty of brains;
- Professor Edward Ofori-Sarpong, Pro-Vice Chancellor, University of Ghana at Legon warns that “[by] failing to offer greener pastures for its own intelligentsia, [Africa] is committing suicide.”
- South African President Thabo Mbeki, in his 1998 “African Renaissance” speech, underlined the nature and significance of brain drain.

Viewed in the African context, brain drain has affected virtually all African countries that, since independence, have trained large numbers of their nationals at tertiary level. African brain drain statistics indicate that the region loses to the developed world the cream of its highly educated and skilled persons, among them teachers and university lecturers, doctors and nurses, engineers and so on. Some startling statistics by Shinn (2008) tell the whole story: it is estimated that over 300,000 African professionals work outside the continent, over 20,000 leaving every year; over one-third (over

---

67 Some migration scholars prefer different nomenclature: McDonald and Crush (2002: 6-7) prefer “skilled migration” because “skilled” includes people who have worked their way up the corporate ladder, those with their own successful businesses and those who play a critical role in the public sector; Iredale (1999), on the other hand, underlines that the term “skilled migration” encompasses brain drain, transitory or permanent movements of professionals, and job transfers; and the OECD-SOPEMI (1997: 21) uses the term “highly skilled workers”, which includes degree holders or those with extensive experience in a given field or its equivalent.
3,000 every year) of Kenyan skilled professionals and 10 per cent of South African IT and finance executives have emigrated; over 30,000 PhD holders from SSA live outside Africa; in 2007 alone, 150 professional Ethiopians left Ethiopian Airlines staff for the Gulf States; some 70-90 per cent Zimbabwean university graduates work outside their country; over 21,000 Nigerian doctors practise in the United States; and there are more Malawian doctors in Manchester, United Kingdom than in Malawi itself. Shifting immigration policies, legislation and regulations in the countries of destination in the developed North have resulted in “brain drain” turning into “brain waste”, a condition in which a migrant takes up employment and receive remuneration that is grossly incommensurable with one’s qualifications or skills. Africans leave their countries of origin and end up as drivers, cooks, security, guards; health workers become mere home-carers at the destinations. The “fortress” North now dictates that African migrants engage in “brain circulation”, movement back and forth from an origin to a destination with little prospects for longer stay or permanent residence.

In 2008, an editorial of a Nigerian daily gave the sad tale of brain drain in every African country: 1 out of every 5 black doctors in Britain and 1 in every 10 black doctors in the United States was Nigerian; about 50% of Ghanaian doctors were practising in the United States; South Africa is losing between 70 to 100 of its doctors every year for greener pastures elsewhere; a report indicated that about 18,000 nurses from one particular African country were working abroad, while in another, an entire graduating nursing class was recruited to work in one European country; and Malawi, despite its small size, had more of its doctors working in the English city of Manchester alone than those practising at home where the country was being devastated by AIDS scourge, malaria and cholera (Nigerian Newsday, March 31, 2008). These are by no means isolated cases of how deeply the developed world has extracted Africa’s human resources, notably health professionals, engineers and teachers.

Frechi (2010) on the other hand, identifies four ways in which brain drain is a good thing: migrants themselves gain from it; there are gains to families from which the migrants originate; it often results in ‘brain circulation’ which occurs between origin and destination; and it stimulates skill accumulation, better known as ‘brain gain’. Brain drain, therefore, provides scope for a balancing equation or a cost-benefit analysis. Unfortunately, the conceptual terrain has not been explored well enough to provide empirical evidence of these brain-based states. Estimates of the African brain drain reflect startling statistics. Easterly and Nyarko (2005:3-4) argue that although Africa is a continent with small aggregate outflows of highly educated human capital, it has high flows as a percentage of existing stocks of human capital. Migrants with tertiary education going to the United States constitute large percentages of their home country stocks of tertiary educated citizens: 60% for Gambia, 20% for Ghana, 15% for Uganda); they cite Docquier and Marfouk’s (2005) data which suggest that the rate of skilled migration (defined as the college-educated emigration stocks as percent of the total college educated number of people born in the source country) exceeds 50 percent in five African countries: 67.5% in Cape Verde, 63.3% in Gambia, 55.9% in Seychelles, 56.2% in Mauritius, 52.5% in Sierra Leone. For African countries with population above 5 million, the rates are: Ghana (46.9%), Mozambique (45.1%), Kenya (38.4%), Uganda (35.6%), Angola (33%) and Somalia (32.7%). These statistics, taken more than five years ago, speak volumes of the African brain drain.

b) The African diaspora and homeland development

The African Diaspora has been defined through different epochs underlining varying standpoints. It is not only often misunderstood, but is also too complex to interpret without exploring its nature, dimensions and changing configuration. Indeed, the notion that the African Diaspora is homogeneous it is both simplistic and unrealistic given both the temporal and spatial dimensions of African emigration to the rest of the world. To the Old World of Asia went a large slave traffic which analysts have been unable to account for successfully and to the New World was a much larger traffic of slaves who settled Latin America and the Caribbean, currently the largest African diaspora but with more remote links to Africa than the Diaspora in the United States. Then a new wave of the African diaspora came with independence. As Africa looked to the developed North for educational opportunities of its citizens to attain high qualifications and skilled training necessary for the continent’s development in the wake of colonialism, huge numbers of Africans remained overseas,
some of them remaining to form yet another category of diaspora. Another category consists of those who relocated overseas as workers, refugees and asylum seekers as winners of the US green card and similar opportunities. The first-generation immigrants’ children and grandchildren augmented the numbers as younger generations of Africans migrated overseas for education, work and security from repressive African regimes that have left in their wake untold political and economic crises.

The African diaspora is therefore a heterogeneous group of people of African descent spanning much of Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean. There are people of African descent who constitute diasporas of African countries which they identify with, others who are of the Caribbean diaspora with no links whatsoever with the African continent and still others who are transnational, being footloose given the trappings of globalisation which have invalidated formerly restrictive geographical boundaries. African migrants are part of the diaspora who may be temporary in the countries of destination, may join the existing diaspora to stay permanently or may be transnational whenever they engage in circular migration. In this study, the term diaspora is used generically to denote people of African descent residing outside Africa or in countries other than their own within Africa as citizens and permanent or temporary residents engaging in circulation as well as transnational lifestyles. Simply stated, the “African Diaspora” denotes people from Africa (circumstances or reasons notwithstanding) in non-African countries who look to and identify with Africa as the homeland. Realistically, against the backdrop of the Berlin Conference of 1884, which balkanised Africa into territorial dependencies that subsequently went their separate ways as nation-states, we have seen the emergence of “nationalist diasporas”: Nigerian, Senegalese, South African, Kenyan, Ugandan, and so on. Most Africans out there think first of their countries of origin before the continent. People from sub-Saharan Africa, including many Africans, number at least 800 million in Africa and over 140 million in the Western Hemisphere, representing around 14% of the world's population (Wikipedia). Different categories of the diaspora play roles by committing their skills and knowledge to homeland development and by sending remittances which stimulate development as well as influence poverty reduction (Oucho, 2010: 139).

Size and geographical distribution

Three Maghreb countries underline the significance of Northern Africa in the European migration system (Table IV.7). The European Mediterranean countries — France, Spain, Italy and Belgium — stand out as by far the most important immigration countries for Northern Africans. Not surprisingly, the European and African Mediterranean belt has witnessed a flurry of activities in migration management in recent years.

It is difficult to know the exact size of the African Diaspora though the OECD countries have good data by immigrants’ citizenship and/or country of birth. Estimates vary widely. For example, the American Christian Monitor of February 26, 2002 estimated that 15 million Nigerians (more than 1 in 10 Nigerians) lived outside Nigeria (Nworah, 2008). With the appointment of a Special Assistant to the President on Nigerians in Diaspora and sponsoring of the Nigerians in the Diaspora Organisation (NIDO), the Federal Government of Nigeria has given impetus to the Nigerians in Diaspora to participate more effectively in homeland development. However, sustainability of such dramatic developments in the absence of law enforcement and policy support has been African countries’ greatest undoing.
TABLE IV.7
DISTRIBUTION OF THE AFRICAN DIASPORA IN THE MAJOR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES OF RESIDENCE BY SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN SUB-REGION AND SELECTED NORTHERN AFRICAN COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN AND DESTINATION, CIRCA 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SSA sub-region</th>
<th>European country of destination</th>
<th>Western</th>
<th>Eastern</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>Southern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>209 447</td>
<td>162 897</td>
<td>102 405</td>
<td>79 810</td>
<td>68 957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
<td>104 922</td>
<td>34 534</td>
<td>34 532</td>
<td>29 120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>36 450</td>
<td>32 061</td>
<td>31 978</td>
<td>12 213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>79 810</td>
<td>31 978</td>
<td>12 213</td>
<td>10 088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>68 957</td>
<td>31 978</td>
<td>12 213</td>
<td>10 088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>50 093</td>
<td>10 088</td>
<td>3 087</td>
<td>2 067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>20 278</td>
<td>3 087</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                | UK                              | France  | Belgium | Germany | Spain   | Switzerland | Netherlands | Portugal | Switzerland |
|                | 202 665                         | 104 922 | 34 534  | 34 532  | 29 120  | 23 135      | 20 703     | 3 087    | 3 087       |
|                | France                          | 102 405 | 32 061  | 31 978  | 12 213  | 10 088      | 3 087      |          |             |
|                | Germany                         | 79 810  | 31 978  | 12 213  | 10 088  | 3 087       |            |          |             |
|                | Italy                           | 68 957  | 31 978  | 12 213  | 10 088  | 3 087       |            |          |             |
|                | Norway                          | 50 093  | 10 088  | 3 087   | 2 067   |             |            |          |             |
|                | Denmark                         | 20 278  | 3 087   |         |         |             |            |          |             |
|                | Sweden                          | 20 703  | 3 087   |         |         |             |            |          |             |
|                | Morocco (2004)                  | France  | Spain   | Nether-lands | Italy   | Belgium | Germany | UK |
|                | 1 113 176                      | 423 933 | 300 332 | 298 949  | 293 097 | 102 000 | 35 000 |   |
|                | Algeria (2003)                  | France  | Spain   | Belgium | Germany | UK | Italy | Scandinavia |
|                | 1 101 235                      | 45 791  | 19 095  | 17 641  | 14 152  | 13 000 | 10 000 |   |
|                | Tunisia (2001-2003)             | France  | Italy   | Germany | Belgium | Other | Nether-lands | Switzerland |
|                | 493 028                        | 101 042 | 53 925  | 17 084  | 16 719  | 7 058 | 6 909 |   |


Diaspora remittances: destinations, volume and value

Diaspora remittances have become Africa’s coveted source of household livelihoods, communal projects and investment capital. Highlights of the destinations, volume and value of remittances to Africa provide informative insights (Table IV.8).

With a huge Diaspora in Europe and the rich Gulf States, Northern Africa receives a substantial amount of remittances, with Egypt and Morocco always ranking among the world’s top ten recipients. The IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook 2001 ranked Egypt and Morocco fourth and eighth respectively among the top ten in 1994, Egypt alone ranked eighth in 1997 and the two countries followed each other as seventh and eighth respectively in 2000 (Ramamurthy, 2006:73). In sub-Saharan Africa, Western Africa receives nearly double the remittances to the entire block, with Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal, in descending order, dominating the pack. Eastern Africa is topped by Kenya, followed by Somalia (despite having no recognised government in place since 1991), Uganda and Ethiopia. Apart from Kenya, the rest are countries that have had political problems which left conflict in their wake, the last two attracting remittances as an important resource for national construction. Central African countries of Angola and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) lead the pack in receiving remittances. Finally, in Southern Africa, South Africa is by far the main recipient, with Lesotho second, the latter a well-known remittance- and deferred payment- dependent economy (Oucho, 2010:143-44).

Yet remittance flows are both volatile and unpredictable, depending on political and economic conditions of both their sources and destinations. Two examples illustrate these conditions: remittances to Burkina Faso declined radically since the late nineties following political disturbances and economic crisis in Cote d’Ivoire where most Burkinabes had migrated and settled permanently for decades; conversely, remittances to Zimbabwe have increased over the years, albeit through unofficial sources, as Zimbabwe experienced a similar fate (Mutume, 2005, quoted in Oucho, 2010: 144).
### TABLE IV.8
**INFLOW AND VALUE OF REMITTANCES TO AFRICA BY SUBREGION AND COUNTRY, 2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-region and Country</th>
<th>Remittances</th>
<th>US$ million</th>
<th>Percentage of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 929</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>790</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UC Tanzania</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central (Middle) Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 690</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA Republic</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eq. Guinea</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 399</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>5 397</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
Table IV.8 (concluded)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-region and Country</th>
<th>Remittances</th>
<th>USD million</th>
<th>Percentage of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Africa</td>
<td>17,614</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>5,399</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>3,637</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>6,116</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>1,979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1,489</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The place of social remittances

Much of the literature and research on remittances to Africa has dwelt on financial remittances, leaving social remittances crying for research. Yet many African countries receive social remittances without recognising them as such. Peggy Levitt (1996) identifies three types of social remittances. First, there are “normative structures” consisting of ideas, values and beliefs as well as norms for behaviour, notions about family responsibility, principles of neighbourliness and community participation and aspirations for social mobility. The second type consists of “systems of practice” which are actions by normative structures relating to how individuals delegate household tasks—for example religious rituals that they engage in; it includes how much individuals in this category participate in political and civic groups through organisational structures which recruit and socialise new members, goal setting and strategising and establishment of leadership roles and formation of inter-agency ties. Finally, the two categories can become “social capital” with social remittance exchanges occurring when migrants return to live in or visit their communities of origin; when non-migrants visit their migrant relations in the countries of destination; or through exchanges of letters, videos, cassettes, emails and telephone calls. Often, social and political leaders harness the status they acquire in the country of destination to advance their cause in their homeland.68

Insights of a survey of social remittances of the African diasporas in the Netherlands and Portugal are instructive for African countries (North-South Centre, 2006). In Portugal, Cape Verdean, Guinea Bissau and Senegal Diaspora constitute social capital for collective action for wellbeing but with varying approaches to realise their ambitions (North-South Centre, 2006: 14, quoted in Oucho, 2010: 151).

Pathways by which the African diasporas transfer social remittances vary a great deal. The North-South Centre (2006:17-20, quoted in Oucho, 2010: 152) study found that the pathways include return, either permanently or temporarily for holidays and family visits; social affiliations whenever in

---

contact with key political and social figures in the home countries; facilitation of transnational networks to mediate and smooth the connection of overseas and African businesses; and influencing the political climate by infusing democratic political habits, sometimes acting as pressure groups. Unfortunately, African diasporas transmit social remittances to their home countries irregularly and unsystematically as these remittances do not go well with African governments. Indeed, a number of challenges confront social remittances in African countries. The North-South Centre (2006: 23-4, quoted in Oucho, 2010: 152) found these to be: poor governance and the lack of an enabling environment, such as personal freedom, basic civil rights, democracy and the rule of law which are often violated; unwillingness of the governing elite in most countries to seek the assistance of skilled and professional Diaspora for national development initiatives; and the lack of national strategies and policies that specifically target Diaspora interests to participate in homeland development. Even a direct policy approach such as dual citizenship —already formalised in Eritrea and Ghana, for instance— seems too tall an order for African countries to adopt.

Networks of the African diaspora defy treating the group as homogeneous and all inclined to play uniform roles in homeland development (Table IV.9). They range from business networks to professional and scientific categories to community-based initiatives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of initiative</th>
<th>SSA examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business networks</td>
<td>Nigerian, Ghanian and Senegalese entrepreneurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chambers of Commerce</td>
<td>Sierra Leonean Diasporas Council with representatives in countries of destination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional networks</td>
<td>Ethiopian North American Health Professionals Association (ENAHPA), Ethiopians’ Action for Health, Education and Development (AHEAD), Ethiopians’ Association for Higher Education and Development (AHEAD), Ghanaian Doctors and Dentists Association (GDDA) in the UK, Association of Nigerian Physicians in Americas, South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific networks</td>
<td>African Scientific and Academic Network (ASAN), African Women Scientific Academic Network (ASN), Ethiopian Knowledge and Technology Transfer Society (EKKTS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Initiatives</td>
<td>Many African Hometown (including ethnic) Associations in diaspora by nationals of different SSA countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration and development associations</td>
<td>Association Migrations Solidarités et Exchanges pour le Développement (AMSED) in France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender and development</td>
<td>Many SSA women-only diaspora associations in the UK and France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umbrella organizations</td>
<td>Many national and ethnic associations of African diaspora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diaspora networking</td>
<td>Zimbabwean diaspora’s online discussion groups and newspapers, Ghanaians Abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-development initiatives</td>
<td>Developed between France on the one hand and Senegalese, Malian and Comorian diasporas on the other, Dutch-African diaspora organizations, AfroNeth Foundation (platform for African diaspora organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finances</td>
<td>Somalis Xawilaad, microfinance institutions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


a Rejects the term “brain drain” and adopts “brain mismanagement” and rejects “African diaspora”, stating that Africa is where Africans are.
outcomes. Both the Return of Qualified African Nationals (RQAN) sponsored by the European Union and implemented by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the UNDP’s Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) performed below expectations. It was one of the programmes implemented without prior research. When the IOM (2000) evaluated RQAN, it was not surprising that it lacked African governments’ ‘ownership’ despite the governments’ appreciation and welcoming of its benefits. Nonetheless, a study of the impact of RQAN in a sample of African countries (among them Ghana, Cape Verde, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe) suggests clearly positive outcomes of returnees’ utilisation of skills in both management and technical fields; contribution to financial growth of organisations through income generation and cost-saving measures; and making better performance of organisations (ACTS, 2000). Against the lukewarm efficacy of RQAN, the IOM initiated the Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA), which embraces both placements and periodic physical and virtual returns. The IOM’s (2007) initiation of MIDA — among other things to evolve collaborative ventures with the countries of both destination and origin, Diaspora organisations, local authorities and the private sector — has not gone far either.

These apparent failures of involving the African diaspora in homeland development imply that the diaspora do not seem to have made significant contributions to poverty reduction in African countries. The World Bank (2007, quoted in Oucho, 2010: 147) expects to increase Diaspora activities in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), targeting in particular poverty reduction, access to education and health care. Yet it is only recently that the World Bank announced the call for commissioned surveys on migration and development in selected African countries after failing to include sub-Saharan Africa in its recent publication on international migration, economic development and policy (Özden and Schiff, 2007, quoted in Oucho, 2010: 147). This is a step in the right direction, providing hope for more focused assessment of the African diaspora’s involvement in their home countries’ development. A conference convened by the Institute of Social Studies (ISS) in The Hague with the support of Oxfam-NOVIB in 2006 on remittances and poverty reduction in Africa is a step in the right direction, one whose proceedings should of necessity find a place in the AU frameworks and national development programmes. In addition, organisations such as the Diaspora Openhouse in Washington, D.C., the Development Marketplace for African Diaspora in Europe and Africa Recruit and many more national and sub-national Diaspora organisations have such vital agendas that should attract African diasporas to sharpen their poverty-reduction undertakings in Africa. Potentially, these associations hold the key to poverty reduction in Africa but lack appropriate approaches to that end.

Le Goff (2008, quoted in Oucho, 2010: 47) examines how remittances contribute to poverty reduction (the first of the MDGs) as a stabilising force in 65 countries, arguing that: as co-insurance, remittances constitute an answer to the shocks of revenue which occur in migrants’ countries of origin, pushing the people affected in poverty traps; that by using the “poverty gap”, remittances have a negative effect on the depth of poverty; that remittances can promote growth in countries where the financial system is less developed; that the effect of remittances on growth would be better improved if the political situation is bad; and that remittances can play an essential role by allowing households living in developing countries to diversify their income sources. From econometric models run, the study concludes that remittances play a positive and effective role in reducing poverty headcount and the poverty gap in the migrants’ countries of origin, they influence poverty reduction in the migrant’s countries of origin with macroeconomic instability and they become necessary where households in these countries have incomes that are subject to frequent and important fluctuations (p. 22). The mixed hypotheses and empirical results of the study suggest both positive and negative impacts of remittances on poverty reduction, and require empirical research, especially in Africa, to corroborate or refute them. Indeed, as argued by De Haas (2003: 10), there is a clear danger of unrestrained optimism concerning the potential of remittances to reduce poverty and inequality because: (a) there is a tendency to overestimate the magnitude of migration and remittances (quoting Ratha, 2003:10) and (b) the observation that remittances significantly contribute to income stability and welfare in developing countries does not necessarily imply that they contribute to poverty alleviation. The author contends that as migration is a selective process, most direct benefits of remittances are also selective and tend not to flow to the poorest members of communities (Centre for Development Research 2002:2; Schiff 1994:15, quoted in De Haas, 2003:10) nor to the poorest countries (Kapur 2003:7–8,
quoted in De Haas, 2003: 10). These findings imply that the faith of African countries in remittances might be misplaced.

d) Return migration and of prospects of physical and virtual return

Return migration of their skilled and professional nationals in the diaspora is one option on which African countries pin their hopes and one tried by UNDP and the IOM without much success. In this age of IT technology, virtual return is gaining even more interest than physical return. Yet, as Skeldon (2005: 15, cited in Oucho, 2008 62) wonders, there has to be something for skilled migrants to return to. Building on the work of Bovernkerk (1974), King (2000: 80, cited in IOM, 2001: 18), defines return migration as a “process whereby people return to their country or place of origin after a significant period in another country or region” (Cerase, 1974, cited in IOM, 2001: 22) took the debate a step further by identifying four types of return the return of failure by migrants who failed to overcome the “traumatic hock” in the new abode or were unable to adjust to the new environment; the return of conservatism by migrants who migrate to pursue a specific objective and thus save a significant portion of their income to realise their plans back home; the return of motivation by migrants who stay in the host society long enough to start referring to its value system, but who eventually return home; and the return of retirement by migrants who have terminated their working lives and go back home to retire. This characterisation of return possibilities is never clear to African governments, not least the households and communities that benefit from diaspora support, including remittances.

Consideration of several return schemes point to why they have failed in Africa (Oucho, 2008). First, conditions that sparked emigration of professionals and highly trained Africans have deteriorated rather than improved in their countries of origin. Returning doctors and nurses find dilapidated health programmes with obsolete or irreparable equipment; teachers return to schools with poor learning environments or grossly lacking basic facilities; university lectures are confronted with unbearably large classes, lack of equipment and poor research facilities, including lack of research funds; and returning migrants with capital and entrepreneurial skills cannot afford to invest in a risky economic environment ravaged by crime, corruption and bad governance. Second, the public service (represented by national governments), which is supposed to benefit from return migrants, merely sign (and hardly adhere to the provisions of their) agreements with the IOM or other parties. Finally, even those returning home find a most shocking homecoming where relatives await gifts from them rather than collaborate with them in whatever initiatives they offer (Oucho, 2008: 225)

Ethiopia is one country whose diaspora has been keen on return, especially virtual return. But it is doubtful whether Ethiopians who underscore the need for virtual return would do so to a country with strict controls on the usage of the internet and mobile phones. Even countries with better IT facilities rarely maintain them well enough for sustained usage. There has been physical return by Nigerians and Ghanaians in diaspora but how sustainable these will be is open to question. On returning, the diaspora would most easily work with their professional or business colleagues who did not emigrate. But there have been stories of lost trust between the two parties and efforts by those who stayed behind to refuse re-entry of, or engagement with, their diaspora colleagues.

e) Dual citizenship: the balancing act at destination and origin

A growing number of African countries currently favour dual citizenship (also nationality) of their nationals, which would most likely enhance ambivalent residence and establishment in the countries of origin and destination. Currently, African countries are polarised between proponents and opponents of this status which promises to affect their perceptions of and attitudes toward the diaspora, dual citizens and trans-nationals. Policy options and programmes that relate to them will of necessity have to address the respective needs of migrants who have one thing in common: a place in Africa still regarded as home.
6. Bilateral and multilateral coordination and cooperation

The first decade of this century witnessed a flurry of conscious efforts by the African Union, different RECs and individual countries to develop policy frameworks on migration management.

a) The AU: African migration policy framework

Since its inception, the AU has shown strong commitment to take forward the development agenda in Africa from various perspectives. The AU attaches a lot of importance on migration, the bulk of which occurs within the African continent itself, though an increasing proportion of emigration from individual States or particular RECs is currently outside the continent. The last decade witnessed a flurry of frameworks on migration focusing on Africa, EU-AU relations and migration issues of interest to different parties. AU’s adoption of the Migration Policy Framework in Banjul in 2006 grew out of the OAU Council of Ministers’ adoption of Decision CM/Dec 614 (LXXIV) at the Ordinary Session in Lusaka, Zambia in July 2001. The Decision recommended the formulation of a Strategic Framework for a Policy on Migration in Africa which the Summit of the Heads of States approved. It aimed:

- To develop a strategic framework for migration policy in Africa that could contribute to addressing the challenges posed by migration and to ensure the integration of migration and related issues into the national and regional agenda for security, stability, development and co-operation;

- To work towards free movement of people and to strengthen intra-regional co-operation in matters concerning migration on the basis of the established processes of migration at the regional and sub-regional levels; and

- To create an environment conducive to facilitating the participation of migrants, in particular those in the diaspora, in the development of their own countries.

The starting point is recognition of migration issues in the African Migration Policy Framework which the AU Heads of State and Government adopted in Banjul, Gambia in July 2006. Table IV.10 highlights the issues and their basic elements, indicating special concerns where applicable.

b) Regional Consultative Processes (RPCs)

Despite the spirited interest in migration management in the continent, African RECs have not developed their own Regional Migration Policy Frameworks which address migration issues of concern to them. The Member States of several African RECs are part of Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs) on migration, which in essence, are platforms for continuous regional dialogue on migration leading to and by and large non-binding outcomes that, nonetheless, can be taken forward more concretely in the more formally constituted RECs. With the support of the IOM, SADC formed the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) established Migration Dialogue for Western Africa (MIDWA) that help sustain dialogue on regional migration and development issues. IGAD also has a Regional Consultative Process (MiGAD) even in the absence of a strong regional integration outlook as other RECs.

69 Other relevant AU Migration related decisions which should be recognised include: African Common Position on Migration and Development (Banjul); the Convention for the protection and assistance of internally displaced persons in Africa (Kampala Convention); the Ouagadougou Plan of Action to combat trafficking in Human Beings especially women and children; and the Social Policy Framework.
## TABLE IV.10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migration issue</th>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Specific concerns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategies for managing migration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration realities and trends.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for a comprehensive migration policy</td>
<td>National Labour Migration Policies, Structures and Legislation; Regional Co-operation and Harmonization of Labour Migration Policies; Labour Movement and Regional Economic Integration.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour migration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border management</td>
<td>Border management issues.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular migration</td>
<td>Migrant Smuggling; Human Trafficking; Return and Re-Admission; National and International Security and Stability.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced displacement</td>
<td>Refugees and Asylum-Seekers; Internally Displaced Persons; Protracted Displacement Situations; Crisis Prevention, Management and Conflict Resolution; Principles of Non-Discrimination; Integration and Re-integration; Stateless Persons.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal migration</td>
<td>Urbanization; Push-pull forces.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration data</td>
<td>Collection and Analysis of Migration Data; Regional Migration Data Exchange.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration and development</td>
<td>Collaboration with African Diaspora; Brain Drain; Remittance Transfers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-State and inter-regional cooperation</td>
<td>Cross-border “common language”; Exchanges, strife and tensions; Other forms of cooperation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other issues deserving special attention</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration, poverty and conflict</td>
<td>Conflict, insecurity, environmental degradation and poverty as root causes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration and health</td>
<td>Linkages with communicable diseases (HIV/AIDS, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration and environment and trade</td>
<td>Environmental degradation and disasters; WTO trade instruments (e.g. Doha Mode 4).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration and gender</td>
<td>Feminization of migration; skills, services Movements on own volition, smuggling and trafficking; Determinants and consequences.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration, children, adolescents and youth, Migration and the elderly.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upholding the humanitarian principles of migration</td>
<td>Human and Migrant’s Rights, Women’s Rights; Rights of the Child, etc., and their implementation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border management and security</td>
<td>Internal and external security arising from migration. It is imperative for countries to make border management a policy priority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of regular and labour migration</td>
<td>Migration brings efficiency in the labour market and skills and knowledge transfer, cultural diversity, stopping migrant trafficking and smuggling and strengthening the broader globalization process. Information, proper documentation necessary for various needs of migrants in the countries of destination and for educating host communities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of migrants in host communities</td>
<td>Successfully integrated migrants have a greater chance of feeling a sense of belonging in the host society, thus leading productive social and economic lives to the benefit of both their State of origin and host State.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration and development</td>
<td>The developmental impact of migration is the contribution of the Diaspora to their State of origin through remittance, stimulating trade and investment, skill and technology transfer, advocacy in host countries, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building</td>
<td>For strengthening the human and institutional capacities of Member States to properly handle migration and migration-related issues.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of policy-relevant research and capacity on migration</td>
<td>Policy makers need to base their decisions on well-informed and well-researched problem analysis: causes, determinants, consequences, advantages, disadvantages of different types of migration and migrants in a given country; and research on the effects of a particular policy on the different aspects of migration (security, health, integration, trafficking, labour migration, human rights etc).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c) The IGAD Regional Migration Policy Framework (IGAD-RMPF)

IGAD blazes the trail by being the first African REC to prepare a Regional Migration Policy Framework, hereafter IGAD-RMPF. Against the backdrop of two meetings of IGAD’s RCP in 2008 and 2010, the REC has a legitimate stance to foster a process aimed at an explicit migration policy for its Member States, ultimately for the latter to formulate national migration policies (NMPs) that streamline migration management regionally and nationally respectively. Ideally, the IGAD-RMPF is but a guide rather than a binding document which must be enforced at all cost; it is meant to be sensitive to regional commonalities and national peculiarities which translate into varying migration realities in the region. The IGAD-RMPF has borrowed largely from previous migration management initiatives with similar sentiments, notably the Berne Initiative on the International Agenda for Migration Management 70 and the AU’s Migration Policy Framework for Africa of June 2006. 71 The Berne Initiative calls for the “need for a comprehensive and balanced approach to migration taking into account migration realities and trends as well as linkages between migration and other key economic, social, political and humanitarian issues” (p. 18). It underlines the point that “positive developments in the field of international migration management have emerged through regional processes on migration” (p. 20). The AU document recognises diverse driving forces, dynamics and patterns of migration in various regions of Africa, mainly shaped by internal factors, and also by the globalization process which facilitates migration across the various regions through regional integration and to other regions outside the continent. It acknowledges that both countries of origin and destination do benefit from migration, problems often arise due to irregular and uncontrolled migration, jeopardizing the relations between countries and also the integration of migrants in the destination society.

The IGAD-RMPF is necessary as an expression of the Greater Horn of Africa (GHA) where certain regional imperatives—among them the Nile basin, climatic and environmental conditions and affinity of the peoples—rationalize the framework. 72 The policy framework serves to provide the necessary guidelines and principles to assist governments in the formulation of their own national migration policies as well as, their implementation in accordance with their own priorities and resources. IGAD Member States can borrow elements of the IGAD-RMPF as they deem fit, appropriate and applicable to their country-specific migration challenges and situations. It is now doing rounds in IGAD’s established organs before it is finally adopted. The IGAD-RMPF has useful lessons for other RECs intending to develop a similar framework.

d) National migration policies

The AU framework has provided impetus for formulation of (NMPs). To date, Rwanda, Nigeria and Zimbabwe have formulated NMPs, placing emphasis on aspects that are most relevant to national interest and in the context of regional integration.

The respective policies are: the Nigeria National Labour Migration Policy; Rwanda’s National Migration Policy and Strategies; and the Zimbabwe’s National Migration Management and Development Policy. Uganda is in the process of formulating its policy, the drafting of which is expected before the end of this year.


72 The African Migration and Development Policy Centre (AMADPOC), based in Nairobi, adopts the GHA concept which it borrowed from a USAID project which once defined the region thus. AMADPOC primarily serves the IGAD region and secondarily the rest of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).
C. Migrants’ attributes in migration policies

Migration policies in Africa began to take shape after independence was granted to several countries in the late 1950s and early 1960s. That period saw several countries develop their own migration policies as part of the process of establishing themselves as independent sovereign states from their neighbours specifically to control and monitor the movement of people within the region (Adepoju, 2005). It was a time when rural-urban migration was the order of the day and before inter-regional and international migration began picking up in the 1970s. The policies at the time were designed to control the movements of skilled labour migrants, a wide range of international migration policies identified by organisations such as the United Nations including the International Labour Organisation (ILO) relating to both developing and developed countries. These policies underscore the rights protecting labour migrants in destination countries and were a reaction to the type of migration taking place at the time. By the 1980s, conflict and turmoil were rampant in Africa, some of the most affected states being Sudan, Somalia and Rwanda, just to mention a few. These events began to reshape the policies regarding human rights which had already featured in the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, developed as the 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees. However, the conflict that plagued pre-independence African countries necessitated a new definition of refugee as befitted a region still struggling for independence. The OAU’s 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa defined a refugee as: every person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it...[and] every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality (OAU, 10 September 1969).

1. Demographic attributes in migration policies

a) Importance of age

The SSA scenario

Data on migration patterns from different countries have identified age of a migrant as an important demographic characteristic in the calculus of causes and consequences of and propensity to migration. Age is a variable phenomenon policy makers and planners acknowledge, especially in developing national and regional migration policies. Migration of youth in African countries tends to be dominated by rural-urban migration (Oucho and Gould, 1993; Oucho 1996), followed by intra-regional, then international migration (Adepoju, 2006, 2008). Indeed, data gathered by government officials, non-governmental organisations as well as international bodies such as the United Nations highlight the dominant age groups in a migration episode. The dominant age bracket of rural-urban-migrants is 20-29 years (Oucho and Gould, 1993; Oucho 1996), while international migrants are older, generally from the early thirties (Adepoju, 1998; Oucho, 1998). Comparison of international migrants in developed and developing countries reveals stark differences: international migrants’ median age in developed countries is 43 years, whereas that of their counterparts in developing countries is just 34; international migrants in the group of least developed countries tend to be still younger, with a median age of 29 years (United Nations, 2010). With Africa having the vast majority of the least developed countries, migration of the youth within and from the region is an important issue that must be incorporated in migration policy development.

Migration policies that take into account the age of migrants underline their rights by age, criminalising child migration which often features in human trafficking or smuggling. In addition, some policies target specific migrant categories — for example, victims of forced migration (e.g.
refugees) and voluntary migration (e.g. labour migration) and irregular migration, notably victims of trafficking, such as children (age bracket 0-14 years) and youth (15-29 years). Children involved in migration are highly vulnerable, especially when they happen to be the primary migrants. Research and data archives in Africa have shown that children are victims of migration as refugees, juvenile labour or human trafficking. A study of independent migration of children in Ghana (Anarfi and Kwankye, 2009) provides scarcely known insights into a problem that is rife in many African countries but which certain countries are reluctant to acknowledge.

Several international instruments have been developed since the birth of the United Nations to protect the rights of children from human trafficking, labour migration, refugees as well as other forms of migration where children are highly vulnerable. Relevant international instruments include the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the United Nations Convention against the Transnational Organised Crime with its two protocols: the Palermo Trafficking Protocol and the International Labour Organisation Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour. As mentioned earlier, these instruments were designed to give countries a set of guidelines to provide a basis for developing their own national as well as regional policies through bilateral or multilateral agreements.

The African Union’s Migration Policy Framework for Africa identifies specific categories of affected people, notably children (youth), men and women (adults) as well as the elderly. The beauty of the AU framework is its coverage of both internal and international forms of voluntary and forced migration. On child trafficking, the document observes that:

Child trafficking presents particular challenges in Africa, and special requirements should be considered to ensure protection and assistance to child victims of trafficking. An effective three-point strategy that reduces trafficking includes (i) prevention through revising and strengthening legislation; (ii) focusing training, capacity building and developing information campaigns for vulnerable groups; and (iii) providing material and legal protection for victims of trafficking including return and reintegration, as well as, the prosecution of traffickers and their accomplices (AU, 2006, 16).

The AU framework recommends that individual Member States adopt international instruments for formulating their national policies to deal with human trafficking. All the international instruments recommend punishment of perpetrators at all levels (internal, regional and international), guiding government officials to deal with the applicable forms of irregular migration and to formulate policies based on national research and data.

The policies regarding children and migration in different countries in Africa are similar in that they use the international instruments to design their national policies.

Other international instruments that cater to the needs of women and men commonly focus on either labour migrants or refugees. In the same way that children’s rights are outlined in the policies highlighted above, a range of international bodies have provided general definitions and developed policy guidelines to assist governments in national policy development.

**South Africa’s centrality in Southern Africa**

Southern Africa has been plagued by a host of events that have changed national as well as regional policies. South Africa had a long history of apartheid which ended in 1994, with its scars deeply embedded in the country’s social, economic and political systems. Zimbabwe has had a host of political, social, economic and environmental crises that have led to a surge of migrants across the region and internationally (Tevera and Crush, 2003). The Kingdom of Lesotho has traditionally supplied migrant labour to South African mines, Basotho migrants being the economic lifeblood of the

---

small country. In an interesting analogy, Gay (1997) likened Basotho miners’ permanent residence in South Africa to riding the tiger.

Post-apartheid South Africa remains a major country of destination for migrants from neighbouring African states, in particular the SADC Member States: from an immigration policy based on exclusive development of the European minority exploiting cheap black labour during the apartheid period, to ‘apartheid’s last act’ in the form of Aliens Control Act (1991) to adopt a policy that would accommodate the changing migratory climate (Crush and Williams, 2001), to the Immigration Act of 2002, which was subsequently revised in 2004 (Wa Kabwe-Segatti and Landau, 2008:33-4). These revised policies were designed to take into account the migration trends at the time, especially movement of persons from the neighbouring African states.

Age is important to consider in policies also because it helps the national government define the rights that an individual of a certain age group may have. In terms of children/minors, South Africa outlines the rights of children in the Children’s Act (2005) which takes cognizance of international instruments such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The four core principles of the Convention are non-discrimination; devotion to the best interests of the child; the right to life, survival and development; and respect for the views of the child (<http://www.unicef.org/crc/>).

The able-bodied migrants, categorised as migrant workers, have their rights and forms of behaviour stipulated in the 2002 Regulation of Admission of Persons to the Republic of South Africa. These policies outline who is allowed access to the country and outline rights as well as conditions in which they can be removed from the country. Crush et al. (2005) noted that South Africa received more labour migrants from a range of African countries, including a large stream of irregular migrants from Zimbabwe (2005:12). The authors are convinced that the policy discriminates against Zimbabweans (Crush and Williams, 2005) perhaps because a majority of the people who enter South Africa as refugees or as undocumented/illegal migrants happen to be Zimbabweans.

b) Migrants’ sex in migration policies

All demographic accounting often distinguishes between sex and gender, one a biological condition, the other a social construct. For a long time in much of Africa, males were preferred to females in migration as they were recruited for arduous tasks in both rural economic islands and urban areas during the colonial period, women were more enrolled for education than males; women were often left behind in traditional rural settings, waiting for the return of their migrant spouses. Bohning’s (1981) edited book on black migration to South Africa is a classical work reflecting the happenings during the peak of apartheid in that country where male labour shaped the country’s economic fortunes.

Since independence, the situation in much of SSA changed for the better when females acquired similar educational attainment as males, competed favourably in the world of work and as the ‘working couple’ became the norm rather than the exception. Such changes influenced gender roles and status, making both males and females migrate largely from a gender perspective rather than by virtue of sex.

2. Socio-economic attributes in migration policies: Focus on gender

Gender is a social construct that has an important bearing on migration policies, especially in view of changes in gender roles and status in the countries of origin and destination. The AU (2006) framework already referred to emphasizes the need to articulate the gender dimension of migration policies, especially to protect the rights of trafficked persons as well as labour rights. Yet, whenever gender features in migration discourse, women’s concerns tend to dominate, primarily because women are often considered recent migrants in a phenomenon fashionably dubbed ‘feminisation of migration’, and secondarily because they are more vulnerable and shamelessly subjected to excessive forms of abuse in migration, particularly as trafficked or smuggled migrants. Contemporary scholars and some organisations propagate the emergence of women as independent migrants who move for similar reasons as men’s. In view of discussions taking place nationally and regionally, it is necessary
to incorporate gender in migration policies given numerous cases of smuggling and trafficking of women as well as abuse of the rights of female labour migrants; many incidents of mistreatment of African female migrants in the Middle East speak volumes on the issue.

Reports of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) have put gender at the centre of global dialogue since the mid-1980s when the United Nations declared the Decade for Women in the 1985 Women’s Conference held in Nairobi where gender equality between men and women became incontestable. Several conventions and protocols that have been developed incorporating gender appear to take up a non-discriminatory position that aims to lead to gender neutrality as opposed to gender blindness. In migration policies in Africa, gender has been a challenging concept to integrate into internal and international migration policies. Some examples from Southern, Western and Eastern Africa are relevant at this stage.

**Southern Africa**

Southern Africa provides some useful perspectives. Before the end of apartheid, the most mobile migrants in southern Africa were men who migrated to work in the mines for long periods without a break, leading to the emergence of female-headed households in the migrants’ countries of origin around South Africa. The country’s migration policy during apartheid restricted the free movement of most black people in the country, with more stringent restrictions on women (Dodson, 2005). Yet, women were just as mobile as men as they, too, were employed as maids mostly in the white suburban neighbourhoods. From a gender perspective, Dodson (2001a) noted that policies adopted in post-apartheid South Africa failed to adopt a gender-neutral approach, let alone include gender in the policy. She suggests that policy makers and planners should understand and appreciate women’s migration experience by being aware of and sensitive to demographic and socio-economic variables in particular age, marital status and educational status) and by being aware of diverse economic, social and political reasons that differentiate women’s from men’s migration propensity. In the author’s view, “Migration should aim to increase rather than decrease the range of options available to women in the range of productive and reproductive responsibilities that they bear” (Dodson, 2001b:144). But Crush and Williams (2005) noted that the movements of women tend to be “complex and multi-motivational” (2005:15) as their reasons for migrating range from social to reproductive purposes and economic motives are normally for trade purposes, whereas men migrate mainly for employment in the formal sector; women would engage in migration for employment purposes when social and economic conditions in their countries of origin (such as poverty), force them to seek an alternative location for economic gains; and that the women who migrate to South Africa tend to be older and married, whereas the men are of all age groups. The stated distinctions underline the gender differential of migration patterns which policy makers and planners must of necessity take into consideration when designing migration policies.

**Western Africa**

In Western Africa, the situation appears to be different. In 2007, ECOWAS proposed actions and measures that its Member States should consider in their development of gender-sensitive migration policies: inclusion of gender in migration policies; strengthening and supporting institutions for female migrants; entrepreneurship; and removal of illegal trade barriers that stifle female migrants’ entrepreneurial activities (2007:10). Thus, ECOWAS focused on the economic development of women to eliminate barriers that once prohibited their economic activities.

**Eastern Africa**

In Eastern Africa, recruitment of female labour for domestic work and men for menial jobs in the Middle East has become an important aspect of emigration. A recent stakeholders meeting organised

---

jointly by the IOM and Kenya’s Ministry of Labour provided a forum for different private recruitment agencies to ventilate the recruitment process, working conditions of and problems experienced by their clients and other issues in the countries of destination. Among other things, the meeting identified areas that need strengthening between government and the private recruiting agencies, sustained worker-recruiter relations and a number of issues affecting contract work in the Middle East.

D. Contemporary issues in migration policies

1. Remittances in migrant origin-destination links

By 2003, there was very little focus on remittances within the African region because the amount received in the region was a mere 5% of the 15% of remittances sent to other developing countries in Asia and Latin America. In Africa, Northern Africa received 72% of the remittances, followed by East Africa (13%), Southern Africa (7%) and West Africa (5%); the proportion of remittances to Central (Middle) Africa was extremely insignificant (Sander, 2003:5). Plausible reasons for Africa’s low remittances rating included: fewer emigrants than intra-African migrants, remittances from abroad often higher than intra-regional contribution and the tendency of refugees to receive remittances in countries other than their countries of origin. Other reason was the identification of remittances sent through informal channels, making it difficult to trace and quantify remittances received (Sander, 2003:6). Informal channels include individuals (e.g. friends, family and oneself) carrying with them money when visiting home or on behalf of remitters. In order to understand policies that have been developed to manage and monitor remittances, it is important to have a grasp of policies in the countries of destination vis-à-vis the countries of origin, determining their symmetry and asymmetry.

The World Development Report 2011 indicates that the inflow of remittances to Africa quadrupled between 1990 and 2010 from 9.1 billion to 40 billion, increasing Africa’s gross domestic product (GDP) from 1.9 percent to 2.6 percent in the two years (World Bank, 2011). Since the 1990s, the modes of money transfers have changed, making it easier to transfer a large amount of money from the destination country to the country of origin, for instance through money transfer organisations (MTOs) such as the Western Union and Money Gram which reached agreements with African banks and post offices to facilitate easy transfer of money. More recently, there have been more innovative money transfer mechanisms —for example, using mobile phones through money transfer businesses. Nevertheless, the report reiterates that much of the remittances is geared towards household needs, with little evidence on utilisation of remittances in national development endeavours; that households receiving remittances are able to gain access to better facilities and services (such as quality health and education) than those not receiving any remittances; and that the location of the recipient is important because it determines the most appropriate mode(s) of money transfer between remitters and recipients. The report sheds light on the implications of migrant remittances from African migrants abroad to the receiving households, addresses the challenges and oppositions of remittance markets and makes policy recommendations for leveraging remittances to promote development in Africa (2011:47).

a) Policies in the countries of origin of migration

Policies developed from the perspective of the countries of origin often focus on attracting more remittances from abroad with the intention of using it towards development initiative. However, there is a problem with this approach as it is not as straightforward as it seems. In Ghana, for example, Sophism (2003) suggested that the country needs to formulate national policies that encourage migrants to use their remittances in national development, especially in their local

---

75 Courtesy of the Consultative Stakeholders Meeting to Enhance Foreign Employment Administration held in Nairobi on 28-29 April 2011. Among the worrying revelations were: lack of sustained recruiter-client contacts, inability of the recruited labour to report violations of contracts as well as other migrant rights, inhuman working conditions in the countries of destination and so on.
communities; he argued that economists, researchers and policy makers do not see the need for focusing on the uses of remittances because most remittances are for individual consumption rather than development. Yet this perception soon changed as successive World Bank reports and other studies have identified certain organised migrant groups established in the destination countries which target certain projects in their communities in Ghana.

One of the reasons for migrants leaving their countries of origin is the inability of the countries to develop the facilities providing decent living, emigration becoming an inevitable option. In such situations, governments of the countries of origin can only convince migrants abroad to invest in development in their countries as they may reject using government-preferred channels to transfer their remittances, indeed a daunting task in trying to build trust with the migrants abroad and/or underwrite assurance that the remittances will be directed towards development. Policies will be ineffective if the people it is targeting feel that their assets and individual interests are not being protected.

In Nigeria, a World Bank report, targeting remitters and recipients of remittances, development initiatives in Nigeria as well as meeting the financial requirements of the UK financial system. recommended that a policy bearing interests of both the country of origin (Nigeria) and destination country (UK) needs to improve relations between the two regarding transfer of remittances (Hernandez-Coss and Bun, 2007). The authors recognised that half of the remittances sent by the Nigerian diaspora, for family support in Nigeria in terms of educating children, purchasing housing or saving up for the remitters’ return to the country, was through informal channels despite there being formal institutions in place in both the UK and Nigeria. As in the case of Ghana, Nigerian migrants are concerned with individual or family needs as opposed to national development and articulate strong concern about the government’s inability to develop or improve facilities and structures in different parts of the country.

b) Policies in the countries of destination of migration

From the perspective of the destination country, policies have been designed with the intention of preventing criminal activities, such as money laundering activities or funds used towards terrorist activities. To this end, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) monitors activities relating to money transfer organisations (MTOs) in order to gain insights of regular remitters, tracing their remittances back to their countries of origin and identifying those engaged in clandestine activities with innocent customers. The destination countries develop policies on remittances to regulate, monitor and manage money transfers against the backdrop of the September 2001 bomb blast in the United States, which has dramatically revolutionised the migration regime. Thus, from the perspective of the countries of origin, national policies should of necessity target different ways for the migrants abroad to make more remittances through ‘safer’ channels and cheaper means on the assumption that remittances can in one way or another be used towards development initiatives. Maimbo and Passas (2005:218) observed that with money transfer operators (MTOs), there was very little paper trail or it was difficult to decipher anything as the representatives handling the transfers would use different codes or initials that, while familiar to them, were not the auditors. They also found it difficult to trace non-monetary remittances, such as commodity-based value transfers. There is a need to undertake research on the various informal channels and modes of making remittances for purposes of both designing and implementing the appropriate policies that cater to any changes.

In a global analysis of remittances, three kinds of remittance-sending intermediaries have been noted: the non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs); banks (including credit unions) with remittance sending services; and informal intermediaries, for example, family members (Orozco,

Sophism recommended that the policies that the Ghanaian government should adopt on remittances should focus on three issues: increase the flow of remittances that would be channelled through national financial institutions; increase the savings and investments in receiving households in the country of origin; promote development initiatives partially or totally financed by the collection of remittances. These moves would make the government motivate the migrants abroad to use national financial institutions (e.g. Ghanaian banks) to transfer funds and encourage households in the country to direct remittances to investment or development of their local communities.

179
In the case of the remittance exchanges between the UK and Nigeria, Hernandez-Coss and Bun’s report (2007) provided details of how the British government ensures the protection of its financial system. Any money transfer operator must register with Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) who would assess the legitimacy of the business and ensure that it adheres to the policies regarding anti-money laundering and combating financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) as well as bearing in mind the customer due diligence (CDD). As a result, the MTOs require certain documentation from the remitters such as a form of ID and proof of address, which can be used to also trace irregular migrants. For this reason, those who no longer hold a legal status in the country are less likely to use this channel because of the required documentation. These policies and regulations affect the way migrants from AFRICA remit back to their countries of origin, and explains why some remitters have resorted to more informal channels through the country of destination where authorities would not trace remittances.

Debates have taken place on developing viable policies that reduce or even eliminate reliance on informal channels for remittances both from the destination country to the country of origin. The debates are meant to encourage remitters to use formal means for their benefit, though it is difficult to convince them otherwise because of the high costs and the requirement of remitters’ personal identification documents, requirements that remitters generally detest, not to mention remitters’ mistrust and rampant corruption of their home-country governments. Three pertinent questions are relevant here.

The first question is, can policies dealing with remittances be linked to some form of bilateral or multilateral agreements between the destination country and the country of origin? Essentially, such a policy would have to accommodate to the needs of the remitters and recipients and help build trust with them as well as encourage the use of financial systems in the country of origin while abiding by the rules and regulations set by the destination country. This is a tough balancing act and would be challenging to design and implement.

Informal channels also pose a problem for policy makers as they are dynamic, making it difficult to establish a way of monitoring and managing this form of remittance transfer. Although the aim of the policies is to ensure that individuals’ assets are protected and the financial sector/systems in the destination country are protected and controlled, migrants are very sceptical of policies that control how much is transferred, especially the migrants without proper documentation. In essence, migrants are looking to ensure that they are able to transfer funds with fewer costs and less paperwork. The task for policy makers in the destination countries is to positively promote safer, easier and more controlled transfer of funds whereas the policy makers in the country of origin are trying to develop policies that channel migrant remittances towards development. This becomes a challenge as at both ends, with the destination country trying to control the migrant’s funds using the financial institutions and other affiliated bodies, not taking into consideration the nature of human behaviour.

Two additional questions are: How can the policies in a destination country and a country of origin be inter-linked to meet mutually reinforcing stances facilitating migrants’ remittances for development initiatives? And do origin-country governments work with destination-country governments on policies that safeguard them from criminal activities?

c) Inter-linkages of remittance policies

Hernandez-Coss and Bun (2007) report further that both the Nigerian and UK governments have taken steps towards establishing a remittance country partnership (RCP). The RCP helps to introduce new remittance packages available to the Nigerian diaspora in the UK and the relationship

---

The author notes that whereas the first two are subject to local, national and international laws related to remittances, the last one is also subject to laws but can be a means of averting the laws in place (e.g. avoiding high fees of sending via MTOs); the countries of destination regulate the institutions that allow for transfer of funds, prescribing the conditions by which this is possible; but the major concern, as mentioned earlier, is money laundering and funds that are geared toward terrorist activities.
permits gathering data to influence policy on remittance outflows from UK to Nigeria; the partnership entails utilising new technologies to help with the process such as the MTOs mentioned earlier. However, the authors caution that for the partnership to be successful, both sides have to remain committed to it (2007:20). On establishment of relations with the Nigerian diaspora in the UK regardless of their immigration status, Hernandez-Coss and Bun (2007:20) found that knowledge of the remitters’ characteristics and targeting those who prefer informal channels can be an arduous task, the two countries having to benchmark their RCP with best practice of the scheme elsewhere.

In June 2010, the World Bank had established the Future of African Remittances (FAR) programme with the aim of reducing the cost of sending remittances, increase the use of formal channels and increase financial products associated with remittances. An additional task was to promote “non-traditional remittance channels through microfinance institutions and mobile and non-bank correspondent agency networks to reach the rural areas” (Ratha et.al., 2011:86). This proposed programme suggests that the international community wants to establish remittance partnerships (bilateral and multilateral) and agreements that allow remitters to send money in a way that they can control and monitor their activities and to create awareness in the destination country. Yet, even as the programme operates, policies change to accommodate the changing environment. The African Development Bank has been active in engaging in discussions on remittances to the continent, developing reports to create an awareness of the process and making policy recommendations based on them.

2. Policies on circular migration and transnationalism

Circular migration in Africa has strong historical roots from the nomadic movements of African peoples within the continent to the present day when policies and regulations determine movement within and outside of the continent. Within Africa, national governments in their respective regions have been engaging in discussions on ways and means of harnessing free movement within Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to which they belong, namely ECOWAS, EAC, IGAD and SADC. This development encourages circular migration and trans-nationalism as it involves movement of citizens of neighbouring countries who share much in common. Inadvertently, it belies the second phases of free movement protocols that address residence and establishment that may be redundant as movers stay relatively close to their home areas.

ECOWAS, for instance, established the Protocol of Free Movement of Persons and the Right of Residence and Establishment in 1979, the Protocol coming into force in 1980. This protocol provided for the free movement of people using a common passport in the region, allowing the Community citizens to move freely within ECOWAS’ jurisdiction. The ECOWAS protocol provides for a multi-stage process: from visa-free entry currently in operation, to the right of residence (enforced in 1986) and the right of establishment (revised in 1992); the last two phases remain elusive as Member States, in conformity with citizen sentiments, resent them. Evidence of reneging includes replacement of ECOWAS passports with national passports but with improvements in the border-crossing procedures.

Improvements have been made on handling citizens of the region with the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) which has established national identity cards that can be used for crossing borders and plans of establishing a common currency for the Union by 2020.78

The East African Community (EAC) has also established a protocol on free movement very much similar to that of ECOWAS in terms of right of residence and establishment. In July 2009, the EAC adopted the Protocol on the Common Market which gives provision for “five freedoms” of flow phenomena movement: people, labour, goods, capital and services.

---

The thrust of SADC is ‘facilitation’, rather than freedom of movement. This is because the economic magnates in the Community —South Africa, Botswana and Namibia— resent freeing movement which would open immigration floodgates thereby frustrating national development goals.

Circular migration within the context of international movements has largely been unregulated and spontaneous. It lies at the core of EU-AU arrangements through co-development, EU-Africa Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development, Sirte, Libya on 22-23 November 2006, and, lately, the AU Regional Migration Framework for Africa (2006). These milestones imply the desire of the EU to establish a strong partnership with Africa to manage circular migration within a legal framework. The collaboration, according to the African-EU Partnership is meant to lead to a ‘triple win situation’, that is, the destination country would be able to respond to its own labour market needs, the countries of origin would be able to transfer excess human capital to other labour markets and individual migrants and their families would be able to get access to better conditions and prospects while maintaining their transnational links. The dialogue between African and EU representatives on fostering circular migration have been trying to tease out the issues and concerns faced from both ends. Circular migration as it has been presented from an EU context means allowing migrants to move to and from their country of origin and the destination country, taking away the idea of permanent settlement in the destination country. This is a solution to avoid attracting the best and brightest from the poor countries that need this human capital to build up the economy. This is also a solution for EU states that will be able to gain a source of human capital when there are shortages which would help to develop the skills and innovation of the migrants who they hope would return to their country of origin with a wealth of knowledge. It would also ensure that African countries would not lose out the important skills such as doctors to EU states and possibly discourage illegal migration by giving migrants this flexible option of movement (Brady, 2008:9).

Circular migration has been recently and closely associated with transnationalism. According to Vertorec (2007:2-3), transnational ties condition the migration process, meaning that the activities of transnational migrants continue to maintain links with their country of origin, for instance, through remittance practices as discussed in the previous section. This implies a change in migration patterns which are no longer temporary or permanent but circular in nature suggesting that a migrant resides in one country for income and contributes to the other for development.

Interestingly, the partnership resembles that of the ‘guest worker’ programme of the 1960s in which migrants abroad were allowed to move to countries with the programme to work in the industries that needed to be developed with the expectation that once the task was completed the migrants would voluntarily return to their countries of origin. The guest worker programme was a temporary solution to labour market shortages, for example in Germany which was unable to recruit locally the numbers needed for the industrialising economy, local labour then more costly than imported labour. The programme was recruitment of cheap labour without a strong contractual agreement between the employer and employee. As programmes of this nature do not usually turn out as planned, the workers who migrated to Germany ended up staying for a longer term than expected, forcing the country to consider a family reunification scheme that would allow family members of the primary migrants to join them in the destination country. In the context of policies around circular migration, schemes and policies have been developed to regulate the movement of people to discourage illegal migration or settlement in the EU states. Heckmann et al. (2009) drew a parallel between the guest worker programme in Germany and the Bracero Programme in the United States, detecting strong elements of circular migration which became as a possible solution for the United States, too.

Transnationalism is such a multi-faceted concept that is interpreted across disciplinary boundaries in economic, political and ‘flow phenomena’ terms. A seminal work on transnationalism identifies four main contemporary transnational flows, namely the globalisation of capitalism with its destabilising effects on developing countries; technological revolution in terms of transportation and communication; global political transformations, in particular decolonisation and universal human

rights; and the expansion of social networks that enhance transnational migration, economic organisation and politics (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998: 3). In its wake is recognition of the growing volume and dynamism of international migration and transnationalism in the contemporary world (Faist, 2000).

In the context of migration, transnationals have become a new breed of migrants who traverse different regions of the world irrespective of places that they identify with as home. It is gaining prominence among African migrants as the developed North solidifies its ‘fortress’ stance, forcing the migrants to either adopt circulation or trans-nationalism, or a combination of both.

a) Policies and partnerships: origin-destination links

As described in the previous section the partnership between Africa and the EU is one of the ways in which the two continents are developing effective strategies of collaboration to manage circular migration and trans-nationalism. Like any other partnerships, the African countries in particular need to understand how these activities function and affect their citizens.

3. Consequences of the global economic crisis for migration flows

The actual global economic crisis has dealt a massive blow to migration flows from Africa. The international crisis has created conditions within destination countries which have had to rethink their migration policies in relation to the needs and perceptions of their local population. Unemployment has risen globally which is putting a strain on the economic system in most developed countries, including those with long-term sustaining welfare systems. In some destination countries, for example the United Kingdom, the crisis has led the coalition government to reconsider the number of migrants accessing the country from both EU and non-EU countries. In terms of migrants from Africa, the government has imposed certain conditions whereby only a certain number will be permitted access per year. In addition, the United Kingdom has changed policies that relate to new international students, restricting their access to employment and ability to bring their family with them, depending on the courses that they are pursuing. For students who are already in the country and recent graduates, the UK government has begun phasing out graduate schemes such as ‘Tier 4’ which gave an international graduate student the right of abode to work in the country for two years. The purpose of this scheme, introduced by the Labour government, was to retain highly skilled migrant graduates to help develop the UK economy.

In Italy, there has been a debate on how to handle the flow of international migrants into the country, especially those who have accessed it illegally. Apart from Western Europe, Italy is a popular destination for West African migrants, which has given rise to the Mediterranean accord in EU-AU migration initiatives.

Some research has indicated that the countries of origin in Africa have not been as adversely affected by the global economic crisis as have the more powerful economies in the developed world, though conflict verdicts have been made. Where the global economic crisis has bitten deep, many African migrants to the developed world have returned to their countries of origin, return migration diminishing remittance flows as well as other benefits.

E. Some conclusions

This study has provided many perspectives of African international migration relating to the contemporary trends as well as institutional frameworks including policies aimed at governing international migration. The issues analysed lead to some important concluding remarks.

It should be appreciated that international migration within and out of Africa consists of several types which, though distinguished as voluntary and forced, is but a continuum of the phenomenon. While no single typology can be unanimously adopted, deliberate efforts have to be
made to identify the type of migration being addressed in order to grapple with its features, causes and consequences. A typology is therefore the first step in wading into the complex subject.

The problem of paucity of international migration data cannot be overstated if African countries have to grapple with the dynamics of migration, migration management and migration in the context of development in African countries. The strong lead of the AU and sustained involvement of the RECs in their Member States’ concerns on international migration is a boon to efforts in migration management in Africa. It is time for the AU Migration Framework for Africa to be adopted by all African RECs and for all their Member States to develop appropriate national migration policies that reflect national concerns as well as regional interests and commitments.

A major shortcoming is knowledge of citizen perceptions of and attitudes to the free movement of persons including other factors of production. Respective RECs’ protocols on free/facilitation of movement of persons mean little if not backed with citizens’ sentiments, concerns, fears and aspirations in their individual countries and in the entire RECs trying to institutionalise this protocol. Even some national governments renege on protocols and international instruments which they have signed and/or ratified, fearful of their citizens’ reactions. This is an issue crying for multilevel research to investigate it from governmental to community and individual levels.

It is most likely that citizens are generally unaware of international instruments which their governments have signed and/or ratified. This might reflect lack of domestication of international instruments that have been adopted, and much less ignorance of the likely reaction of the citizenry should the instruments be brought to their attention. The instruments are analogous to research findings sitting comfortably in universities as citadels of knowledge without recourse to disseminate appropriately for eliciting informed reaction.

National universities in ESA should work closely with governments, migration-based institutions, NGOs and the civil society to undertake relevant research, offer appropriate training, initiate sustained policy dialogue and cultivate viable networks which would foster regional integration-migration-tolerance linkages.

Diverse aspects of migration policies have been gaining significance in African countries. They call for proper research to yield baseline information which in turn would inform policy, leading to appropriate programmes which appeal to African countries individually and severally within their RECs and the AU system. Research should be the hallmark of the path towards proper understanding and appreciation of the African international migration, its implications for national and well regional development and Africa’s links to the rest of the world as the region anticipates a full-fledged African Economic Community (AEC) by 2028 and frees intra-regional migration.

**Bibliography**


ECLAC – Project Document collection

Development, institutional and policy aspects of international migration...


Crush, J. O. (2008), The Perfect Storm: The Realities of Xenophobia in Contemporary South Africa, Migration Policy Series No. 50, Cape Town, IDASA and Montreal, Ontario, Canada, Southern African Migration Project, Queen’s University.


Crush, J. and V. Williams (2001), Making up the numbers: measuring illegal immigration to South Africa, Southern African Migration Project, Migration Policy Brief No. 3.


Dodson, B. (2005), Women on the move: Gender and cross-border migration to South Africa, SAMP Migration Policy Series.


______ (2001b), Gender Concerns in South African Migration Policy, Migration Policy Brief 4, Southern African Migration Project. Cape Town: IDASA and Ontario, Canada.


Nwauche, E. S. (n.d.), “Regional economic communities and human rights in West Africa and the African Arabic countries”.


Tevera, D. S. and J. Crush (2003), The New Brain Drain from Zimbabwe, Migration Policy Series no. 29, Cape Town, IDASA; Kingston, Ontario, SAMP.


Annexes
Annex 1
Report of the Interregional Workshop on International Migration

Geneva, September 2011

A. Opening and welcome

The workshop was opened by Mr. Andres Vikat, Chief of the Social and Demographic Statistics Section at the ECE, who endorsed the need to tackle international migration at the UN level, despite the absence of a specific multilateral body on migration within the UN system. High-level processes, such as the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) or the Global Migration Group (GMG) are important mechanisms to stimulate the search for desirable policy options and contribute to a better understanding of the phenomenon. The most influential however, was the high-level dialogue of the General Assembly devoted to international migration and development in 2006 that called upon the UN system to enhance cooperation to improve statistical data and to make it internationally comparable in order to promote evidence-based policies. Nonetheless, there are still many challenges with regard to data on international migration and Mr. Vikat argued that it was up to UN organisations to assist member states in capacity-building in order to produce reliable migration statistics.

Mr. Hassan Yousif, Senior Population Affairs Officer at the ECA, on behalf of Ms. Thokozile Ruzvidzo, Director of Africa Centre for Gender and Development United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, emphasized that international migration was of major concern for all countries in Africa and hence reflected a priority of ECA. Since 2006, ECA has prepared three reports on international migration and development in Africa and organised a regional dialogue in Africa for increased coherence and the sharing of best practices. ECA had enhanced cooperation and dialogue between countries —bilaterally, regionally, multilaterally and globally. Yet despite the growing recognition of the need for cooperation and policy dialogue at all levels, progress had yet to be seen in the implementation of regional and international migration agendas and Conventions.

Mr. Paulo Saad, Chief of the Population and Development Area of CELADE–ECLAC Population Division, made some introductory remarks on the interregional project “Strengthening national capacities to deal with international migration: Examining development, institutional and policy aspects of migration between Africa, Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean” The project, led by ECLAC and funded by the United Nations Development Account, emerged within the context of the UN High-level Dialogue and aimed at a) providing countries with tools to enhance positive aspects of migration and reduce negative ones, b) strengthening institutional capacities, c) promoting cooperation for an interregional network for exchange, and d) introducing international migration policies into national development plans. Whereas workshops held in 2009 and 2010 have mostly been of regional nature, this workshop was of interregional nature.

B. Introductory session

Ms. Claire Menozzi, Population Affairs Officer in the Migration Section of the Population Division - DESA, opened the introductory session praising the timeliness of the workshop, given the gap in dialogue and exchange on South-South migration. In her presentation on “Setting the stage: levels, trends and policies on international migration and development” she recalled the different definitions of migrant stocks (as the number of foreign born or foreigners living in a specific country at a specific
point in time) and migration flows (as the event of moving from one country to another within a given period). She then presented the newest 2011 DESA data on levels and trends in international migrant stocks. Total international migration would add to 214 Mio migrants of which 69.8 Mio live in Europe, 19.3 Mio in Africa and 7.5 Mio in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). The area of origin of international migration was predominantly Europe with 28% (60.7 Mio), Africa with 15% (31.4 Mio) and LAC with 16%.

**FIGURE A.1**
MIGRANT STOCKS BY MAJOR AREAS, 2010


In Africa and Europe most international migration was intra-regional, whereas in LAC it was mainly extra-regional. Between 1990 and 2000 migration stocks increased, yet the share of refugees within that stock had declined, which indicated that migration for economic and social reasons had augmented. Although data on levels and trends in international migration flows was hardly available, the existing data exemplified that immigration from Europe to Europe was the predominant pattern. Generally speaking, immigration from Africa and LAC was only a small share of international migration flows and had remained constant in time. Against the common perception, African migration to Europe accounted for only 12% in 2008. The changing pattern though, was the composition of the countries of origin rather than the numbers, with a majority of African migrants coming from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Senegal and Nigeria.

In terms of the age and sex characteristics of international migration, she remarked that half of all international migrants were women, but the proportion of female migrants to all migrants was declining and hence total flows were less feminized. This statistics tends to contradict the often pronounced process of feminization of migration. However, there are certain regions such as Africa and the LAC, which experienced increased female migrant flows. International migrants in Africa were relatively young, whereas in LAC and Europe they would be older given that they had often aged in place, she explained.

In her last point, Ms. Menozzi found that immigration and emigration policies had generally become less restrictive since the 1990s, with the most drastic decline in Europe with 65% of restrictive policies in 1996 compared to only 9% in 2009. Only Africa was portrayed as an exceptional case, where governments had increasingly sought to limit migration due to the loss of highly skilled personnel.

**C. International migration in Africa and institutional frameworks (Session 1)**

Prof. John O. Oucho, Founder and Executive Director of the African Migration and Development Policy Centre (AMADPOC) in Nairobi, Kenya, presented his study on “African International Migration: trends and institutional framework from the perspective of selected countries”. At the
outset, he endorsed the necessity for selective coverage of African countries given their size and diversity and identified gaps and limitations in terms of data, in particular the lack of migration surveys, proper research institutions and explicit migration policies.

He then introduced several issues with regard to the institutional policies and structures of African international migration. Whereas the policy framework on origin-destination links would be characterised by the absence of policies and legislative measures on emigration of African nationals, he identified a solid legislative framework on migrants rights, derived from regional and international Conventions.81

He further analysed the framework on a regional level, emanating from the context of the ongoing integration process with the ultimate objective of the various African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) coalescing into the African Economic Community (AEC) by 2028. Despite the existence of different region-specific protocols on the free movement of persons and on the facilitation of movement of persons, they would unfortunately not go beyond visa-free entry. Several misconceptions and policy shortcomings were also identified in terms of the institutional framework on migrant health and gender, for example the restrictions imposed on family migration or the poor access of migrants to health services.

In his last point, Prof. Oucho analysed institutional policies for migration and development and called for a better understanding of migration configurations in Africa and a clear definition of the term Diaspora. Moreover, physical and virtual return migration would not always be a positive experience, which made it indispensable to recall Prof. Skeldon’s question: “Return to What?”. With regard to remittances, he pointed out the existing initiatives to reduce the costs and encourage formal channels, for example the Financial Action Task Force (FAFT), the UK-Nigeria Remittance Country Partnership (RCP) or the World Bank’s Future of African Remittances (FAR). Yet he reminded the audience not to consider only monetary, but also social remittances and stressed the need to develop further bilateral and multilateral remittance-based policies.

Ms. Susanne Melde, Research Officer of the African, Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) Observatory on Migration, demonstrated challenges and opportunities of South-South Migration between Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. Regardless of the importance and potential of South-South migration, it would often be marginalized in research, she argued. South-South migration was mostly intra-regional, with 80% of the movements happening between neighbouring countries in Africa and LAC. Some anecdotal evidence existed on inter-regional movements between West Africa and the Caribbean.

Ms. Melde then pointed out some regional and national frameworks in the South, such as the MERCOSUR regularization policies and the CARICOM agreement for social integration and security. She highlighted the lack of bilateral agreements on labour mobility in the South and the focus of Diaspora engagement on Europe and North America rather than on South-South movements. Noticeable irregular migration frameworks in the South were the different anti-trafficking-in-persons legislations as well as the cooperation between Brazil and Cape Verde. Yet although regional, bilateral or national frameworks on migration were in place, these would rarely focus on South-South migration in the absence of policies between Africa and LAC. Hence inter-regional and intra-regional South-South cooperation should be strengthened.

The lack of data and research on the impact of South-South migration on development, the high degree of informality in the labour markets and the limited access to social protection schemes for migrants were identified as challenges. Opportunities included the comparably lower costs of intra-

81 He mentioned Conventions such as the 1951 Refugee Convention and Protocols, the OAU Protocol on the Status of Refugees in Africa, the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and the Conventions and protocols on irregular migration, mainly the United Nations Convention against Transnational Crime, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Children and Women, and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air.
regional migration and the cultural and linguistic similarities as factors of better integration. Furthermore, South-South migration could be beneficial for development if included into national and regional development planning. Migration among developing countries and opportunities for development were often overlooked. Only evidence would fill that gap to inform policies and strengthen South-South cooperation. The ACP Observatory, she concluded, would take on important steps to achieve this aim through consolidating existing data, increasing information dissemination, creating a network of the different actors and reinforcing training and capacity for specialists and experts.

During the discussion, Mr. Mustapha Djemali from the International Centre for Migration and Development in the Maghreb Countries (ICMPD) raised the issue of irregular migration, the risks involved and the sad casualties resulting thereof. He lamented the lack of a specialised UN agency on migration and called to unite the efforts of different institutions in order to take common steps.

The representative from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) referred to Prof. Oucho’s comments on Diaspora and remarked that the definition of Diaspora originated in Trinidad Tobago and was hence intrinsically linked to people of African descent. He further called attention to the Diaspora summit in 2012 in Johannesburg to underpin the concept of Diaspora and how it could make a contribution for African development.

A representative from ECLAC raised the question of potential contributions of South-South migration for development. Ms. Melde answered that South-South remittances could be beneficial to more people and hence spread the potential for education and the increase of income. Promising were also the skills-training in the South and more frequent returns due to shorter distances between country of origin and destination.

Lastly, several participants insisted on the different frameworks, international instruments and bodies that existed despite the absence of a specific UN agency for migration.

D. International migration in Africa and institutional frameworks

(Session 2, continued)

The Tunisian Ambassador Ali Goutali initiated the second session with an overview of Tunisian Diaspora in Europe amounting to 1 Mio migrants, recalling that migration flows had not been unidirectional in history and that the “Mediterranean sea was not a dividing wall, but a connecting space of cultural cross-fertilisation”.

He then gave the audience an understanding of the Tunisian perspective on migration: it was marked by a more humane, comprehensive and integrated approach that took into account root causes and enhanced legal migration as a win-win strategy for the development of countries of origin and destination. Europe, he continued, needed to recognize that Tunisia was endowed with a highly trained labour force, suitable for the European labour market and that partnerships between European countries and Tunisia had to be arranged for regular labour migration. This would also contribute to reducing irregular migration, in conjunction with the creation of income generating activities and economic development in Tunisia.

Giving an overview of existing bilateral and international agreements, Amb. Goutali highlighted the new cooperation with the EU in order to assist the Tunisian authorities with capacity-building in border management and combating of trafficking networks. He further mentioned the bilateral agreements on irregular migration, return and readmission that Tunisia had signed with France and Italy. However, return should preferably be through assisted voluntary return schemes providing returning nationals with economic prospects, he argued.

Lastly, Amb. Goutali presented new strategies to streamline migration management in Tunisia: knowledge dissemination to potential migrants (on migrants rights, risks of irregular migration and investment opportunities), specific training coinciding with the labour market needs of destination countries and the establishment of networks of highly-skilled migrants for knowledge transfer.
Ms. Malika Benradi from the Association of Moroccans in Diaspora gave a review on characteristics of and policy responses to irregular migration in the Mediterranean area. Irregular migrants, she pointed out, had been predominantly sub-Saharan, male and aged 27 on average. However, recent trends showed an increase in women and children migrating through irregular channels and a rising level of education.

She then gave a perspective on irregular migration in Morocco. Given the closed borders in Europe, Morocco had changed from a country predominantly known as transit to a destination country of migration. In 2007, the Ministry of Interior estimated about 10 000 irregular migrants in Morocco, with an education level of 31.7% illiterate and 48.5% with primary education. They had lived in precarious conditions since departure —and thus also in Morocco— including a difficult relationship with the receiving society. 73% of irregular migrants aspired to move on to a third country. Although Morocco had envisaged the “global approach” towards migration and ratified the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, the government would still pursue a rigid strategy against irregular migration.

Ms. Benradi called on European countries to re-open their borders, since the precarious situation of increased migration flows would only be shifted towards the Southern border of the Mediterranean. Furthermore, different agencies should monitor the activities of FRONTEX, who used an ever more sophisticated technology to fight irregular migration. She reminded the audience of the high number of casualties, particularly in 2005, and identified poverty and unemployment, desertification, demographic pressure, salary differences as well as the faulty images of social success in Europe as the most important pushing factors for irregular migration. The dichotomy between the economic demand in the North and the concurrent judicial rejection of migrants opened the way for the “trade of illusions with irregular migration” (“le commerce des illusions”), as she termed it, and hence for human trafficking and smuggling.

In the discussion of Session 2, Mr. Pablo de la Vega from the Plataforma Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Democracia y Desarrollo (PIDHDD) complimented Tunisia on its policies and invited the government to constantly take on a human rights perspective, despite the current difficult and complex situation.

Amb. Goutali then endorsed Tunisia’s commitment to human rights standards and democracy after the crisis, and emphasized the “holistic approach with partnership” that the new European neighbourhood policy would develop regarding migration issues.

E. African and Latin-American migration to Europe (Session 3)

Mr. Andreu Domingo from the Centre for Demographic Studies (CED) at the Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB) and Ms. Daniela Vono from the Institute for Longitudinal Educational Research at Bamberg University presented their study “Africans and Latin-Americans in the Southern European Countries: Italy, Spain and Portugal”.

Their comparison revealed trends that tended to go against replacement migration theories. They identified socio-demographics as a complementary rather than a determining aspect of migration patterns. In Italy and Spain economic conditions were the most important reasons for immigration from LAC and Africa. Spain for example, attracted migrants due to its dual labour market as a response to a rising educational profile of the Spanish population and the feminization of the labour market. In Portugal, it was the colonial path that had substantially influenced immigration with over 90% of migrants coming from ex-colonial countries such as Angola, Cape Verde or Guinea-Bissau. The colonial ties were in many respects an important factor for the chosen destination, in particular because of the value of language as social capital: Spain hosted 58% of all migrants from LAC to Europe, whereas France hosted 31% of all African migrants to Europe. However, the authors also pointed to the fact that colonial ties could induce legal discrimination and social prejudices for some migrant groups, as for example in Spain where migrants from LAC were often positively discriminated.
Regarding migration characteristics, the authors found a differing migration strategy in terms of gender: whereas migration from LAC to Europe was predominantly female, migration from Africa was essentially male (with the exception of high numbers of Cape Verden women in Portugal). In terms of the educational profile, the authors recorded a segmented integration. In Portugal and Italy, the percentage of LAC and African migrants with high education was similar, whereas in Spain the African profile showed less highly-educated migrants in comparison to Latin-Americans. In Spain, the authors established the highest difference in the educational profile between natives (both men and women) and migrants. Further migrant characteristics included that male immigrants work mostly in construction and services in all three countries, most likely in the agricultural sector in Spain and the industry in Italy. Migrant women were mainly employed in the service sector — over 80% in care work — and the participation of women in the labour market was higher for LAC migrants than for African migrants (again with the exception of Cape Verden women in Portugal).

In terms of the educational profile, the authors recorded a segmented integration. In Portugal and Italy, the percentage of LAC and African migrants with higher education was similar for men, whereas in Spain the African profile showed less highly-educated migrants in comparison to Latin-Americans. Women originating from LAC were better educated in all three countries than women of African descent. In Italy the percentage of highly educated migrants from LAC was even higher than that of native women. In Spain, the highest difference in the educational profile was documented between natives (both men and women) and migrants.

Analysing the impact of the economic crisis on migrants, Mr. Domingo and Ms. Vono found that it vastly affected migrants in all three countries. Africans are more likely to be unemployed than LAC migrants and unemployment has mostly affected men. However, recent trends show that female migrants are increasingly concerned as well. The chances to deal with the economic crisis would rise with the level of education. The impact of the economic crisis, the presenters concluded, called upon policy makers to prioritize social integration, since social cohesion depended highly on the integration of the migrants into the labour force for future recovering from the crisis.

The second input of Session 3 was given by Ms. Helga A.G. de Valk, senior researcher at the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI). She reported on Africans and Latin-Americans in the Northern European Countries and gave insight into recent migration patterns and immigrant characteristics, focusing on Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. Despite the diverse migration histories and different colonial ties, the countries showed common patterns such as the reception of asylum seekers, the labour recruitment of migrants and the determination of migration by job opportunities. Furthermore, most migration was family related and the share of foreign-born population was similar in all countries.

Migration trends showed an increase in total migration in the Netherlands, the UK and Belgium, with constant numbers in Germany. Against the common perception, most immigrants were of European descent. Migrants from Africa were predominantly young and male, whereas migrants from LAC tended to be older. However, the comparison of data between the four selected countries was delicate, since data was poorly harmonized, she added.

Ms. de Valk then gave insight into the understudied groups of children of immigrants and stressed the importance of looking at this group, given that 20 to 25% of the school-aged population was already of immigrant origin in the selected countries. They hence constituted an important factor of the future labour market in an ageing society. The family situation of these immigrant children was characterized by a high percentage of single-parent families (due to divorce or incomplete family migration). Furthermore, statistics showed that children from LAC were more likely to have a Dutch parent, whereas intermarriages between North-Western Europeans and migrants of African descent were rare. The socio-economic position was determined by the characteristics of the migrants and the country of settlement. The economic crisis had particularly impacted the young generation and hence also the second generation of immigrants.
The ageing immigrant population in the selected countries had arrived mainly prior to 1970 due to labour migration or colonial links. Data on that particular group was really scarce, she explained, yet the study of ageing migrants and their needs and expectations would be increasingly important in the future.

Acting as discussant, Mr. Iván Martín, Associate Fellow at the Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales in Madrid, re-emphasized the importance of studying immigrant children, which would reveal pivotal information on different migratory trajectories. He further underlined the necessity for systematic comparison of data, the need for common matrixes of analysis and the gaps in data and research on countries of origin, longer migrant trajectories and undocumented migration.

He lastly referred to a point raised in the paper of Mr. Andreu and Ms. de Vono on the replacement migration in Southern Europe and the shift from an emigration to an immigration region. He advised to be cautious when anticipating that Northern Africa would follow a similar path, given the large historical and political differences between the two regions.

During the discussion, Ms. Astrid Abecassis from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) remarked that the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families was mostly signed by developing countries and urged the state representatives to advocate for its increased ratification. She further stressed the importance to apply a human rights approach on migration policies and to monitor international human rights standards in migration management.

Other participants brought up that African countries should engage in outmigration policies more actively, for example through the signing of memoranda of understanding. The importance of language was highlighted once again, in particular regarding integration and the prevention of stigmatisation of migrants.

**F. African and Latin-American migration to Europe (Session 4, continued)**

Mr. Ivan Martin from the Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales in Madrid introduced his study carried out for the IOM and financed by the European Union on “Labour Market Information Systems and information on labour migration in six developing countries: the integration challenge”. In the selected case studies Colombia, Costa Rica, Ghana, Nicaragua, Senegal and Tunisia were examined in terms of the existence of Labour Market Information Systems (LMIS). The study aimed at comparing challenges and good practices and developing recommendations for improvement and reinforcement of these systems to better manage migration flows. Although the selected countries differed in geographical region and their development level, common features were the importance of migration as a factor of the economy in general and the labour market in particular, and the necessity of further developing efficient LMIS. LMIS, he explained, were complex information systems that reflected the different competences of the institutions concerned, the operative measures of inter-institutional cooperation, the mechanisms of the interactions between the different actors, the circular information flows (exchange of data, concepts, definitions, classifications etc.) and the components of a labour market information system that included the integration of information into the policy implementation process.

The comparative analysis of the countries in question displayed a disenchanting result: only Tunisia collected all the different data elements that were the precondition for a functioning LMIS, whereas Senegal and Ghana had no systematic data collection on labour migration. Mr. Martin hence concluded that information on labour migration was generally scarce, and if available, it was poorly disseminated and analysed. This again, would mean that none of the countries had a system in place that would generate all the data needed to guarantee an ongoing analysis of policy development. Countries would need a common framework and hence an integrated model for analysis and policy development.
Mr. Oscar Alejandro Jara Albán of the National Secretariat for Migrants in Ecuador presented figures and characteristics of “Ecuadorian Migration Dynamics to Europe”. Ecuador, as a country of origin, transit and destination, had experienced a pronounced wave of emigration between 1998 and 2004, with 11% (3 Mio) of its citizens currently living abroad. Yet having the dollar as its official currency had also made it an interesting destination for immigration. Most of Ecuadorians migrated to Spain—the numbers had quadrupled between 2000 and 2005. The language and visa free entry certainly constituted an advantage, yet over 55% of those migrating to Spain lived in irregular situation. The activity rates had been particularly high for female Ecuadorians in the service sector, whereas only few jobs were open to male migrants. Nevertheless, the economic crisis deteriorated this situation and approximately 27% of the Ecuadorian community in Spain had recently become unemployed.

The National Secretariat for Migrants (SENAMI) has tried to serve, support and protect the rights of migrants, not only in Ecuador, but also in its various offices across Europe. It has taken on a perspective of human rights and human dignity in the promotion of security and has tried to develop public policies through participatory processes with academia and civil society. Mr. Jara Albán concluded that it was up to countries of origin to challenge the restrictive migration policies in industrialized countries with migration policies that brought forward human values and the right to mobility.

The subsequent contribution showed the inverted perspective: “Policy trends in a new migration scenario” was the title of the presentation of Ms. Rosa Bravo Rodríguez from the Ministry of Labour and Immigration in Spain. Similar to other European countries, the newest figures of 2011 showed that 40% of migration in Spain originated from other European countries (EU/EFTA/AELC), 28.09% from LAC and only 20.98% from Africa. The total stock of immigrants increased since 2008, with a growing diversity of countries of origin. From LAC, more female immigrants lived in Spain, whereas African migrants were mostly young men. Both, migrants from LAC and Africa were mainly employed in the service and social security sector—LAC migrants principally worked in elderly care. Only 40% of immigrants stayed long-term.

Patterns such as rising unemployment and declining social security registration among migrants, the identification of new labour shortages in the labour market or the management of social diversity and complexity were particular challenges for the future, Ms. Bravo Rodríguez explained. The policy responses would constantly be adapted, in particular since the new strategic plan for 2011–2014 had taken on more social aspects and a clear human rights perspective. It now included a national strategy against racism and xenophobia, strengthened anti-discrimination bodies and acknowledged the importance of political participation for the integration of immigrants with the right to vote in local elections. Nevertheless, the human rights framework for migrants and foreigners had been part of the Constitution already before, as for example the right to family reunification, equal and non-discrimination principles or the right to education for all children irrespective of the migrant status.

The Spanish migration policy, she further elaborated, was in line with the EU global approach towards migration and would be based on the four pillars a) Management of migratory flows through legal migration channels, b) the fight against irregular immigration, c) social integration of legal immigrants, and d) cooperation with countries of origin and transit. The migration policy was consensus based and hence fostered the participation of different actors, including trade unions, employers’ organizations and NGOs.

In the following discussion, the question was raised whether Mr. Martín had found solutions to fill the gaps of LMIS in Africa and LAC. He answered that several workshops and training sessions were held on how to produce and maintain data bases, on how to develop common strategies and implement the recommendations made in the study.

Ms. Anja Klug from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) remarked a lack of reflection on forced migration in previous presentations and urged the presenters and the audience to look beyond labour migration. Some migrants might have moved not only due to
 labour migration purposes but also as part of a forced movement. She further suggested that it would be interesting to study how the various reasons for moving impact on issues such as integration.

**G. African migration in Latin-America and institutional frameworks (Session 5)**

Ms. Marcela Cerrutti, member of the Population Studies Centre (CENEP), in Buenos Aires, Argentina and researcher for the National Council for Scientific and Technical Research of Argentina (CONICET), was the first presenter of this session, giving insights into her study on “Recent African Immigration to South America: the Argentine Case in a Regional Context”, jointly elaborated with Pedro F. Marcelino researcher at the Centre for Research on Latin America and the Caribbean at York University in Toronto. Although a marginal phenomenon, Ms. Cerrutti examined elements such as socio-demographic trends, migration motives, modes of entry and the existing institutional framework of African migration to Argentina. The objective was to propose evidence on why this new migratory pattern came into existence and to stimulate an institutional debate.

The lack of reliable border crossing data left figures on the size of African migration to Argentina only vague —there was evidence, however, that it was a marginal trend that was growing, especially with migrants of various countries of origins seeking human security. Argentina was an attractive destination particularly due to its welcoming migration policies, fairly affluent communities open to informal activities, and the porosity of borders, Ms. Cerrutti explained.

African presence in Argentina was not new, she further elaborated. The recent trend of immigrants from African countries such as Senegal, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Congo and Angola merged with older types of migratory flows. However, these previous movements had not been acknowledged in Argentinean society, partly due to a “glorification of whiteness”, she added. The new migratory patterns had brought African and multicultural narratives back into academia and society and had contributed to an increased visibility of people of African descent in the major urban conurbations.

According to census data, there were 2738 Africans registered in 2010 (linked to both the above-mentioned migratory flows), of which 66.5% were men. Although migration policies would be welcoming, they were more open to immigrants of MERCOSUR countries than of African countries, she explained. Non-MERCOSUR nationals found a lengthy and tedious process to become a temporary or even permanent resident. This gave rise to a new pattern, whereby many African migrants petition for refuge as a strategy to obtain regular residency in Argentina. Between 2004 and 2009, the National Office for Migration received 296 applications for permanent residency and 353 for temporary residency from Africans, whereas the UNHCR registered 3233 refugees and 329 asylum seekers in the same time period, of whom the majority were Africans.

The migratory trajectory of Senegalese migrants —the community most studied in Argentina— would lead through Brazil due to an agreement between Senegal and Brazil that facilitated border crossing. They mainly worked as street vendors or wage-workers in the informal labour market. The growing African migration to Argentina, Ms. Cerrutti concluded, called for increased relations and agreements between African countries and Argentina, particularly considering the scarcity of African embassies and consulates in Argentina.

Pedro. F. Marcelino, gave a geopolitical interpretation to the above-mentioned migratory flows between Africa and Argentina and Brazil. He argued that the migratory path to Argentina with its inherent hardships such as lengthy journeys, higher travel prices and the resort to smuggling networks would be a repercussion of the clash between the micro and macro level of migration. Restrictive post-9/11 policies and concurrent migration pressures in Africa had limited the choices of migrants and pushed them to develop alternative routes. These escape routes had become what Mr. Marcelino called a “set of peripheral nodes of a novel global migration nexus”. Although costly and lengthy, Argentina was a more accessible destination than Europe or the United States. Migrants preferred Argentina as a first passage over the rejection at European or the US border, in particular given that they often shouldered the burden of family debt —money that had been collected to render
the rite of passage possible for these young African men. This did not change, however, that many aspired to move further to the United States. The hardships of the travel route characterised the migrants arriving in Argentina: they were often young men from the lower/middle classes who had completed secondary education. Besides the economic reasons for coming to Argentina, Mr. Marcelino would not exclude that some of them were also escaping violence.

With regard to future trends, he recognized that the popularization of Argentina as a destination country for African migration was only based on anecdotal evidence. It would most probably continue, yet remain modest given the high costs involved. In contrast, the influence of different geopolitical shifts on migrant strategies and patterns would certainly continue. The often “selective exclusion of migrants” would also persist and hence encourage informality rather than regular migration.

Argentinean migration policies, Mr. Marcelino anticipated, would probably undergo a shift from relatively welcoming to more restrictive measures. This was already reflected in the often polarised debates in current media discourses. His policy suggestions for Argentina were to enhance a path to settlement (temporary or permanent) for these migrants and foster the creation of legal migratory channels. Concurrently, border controls and policies to curb smuggling and trafficking should be established and integration policies for social cohesion implemented while maintaining a focus on human rights.

The discussant, Alejandro I. Canales from the University of Guadalajara in Mexico, commented on the previous presentations, reminding the audience of the complexity of South-South migration and asked to refrain from generalizing the particularities and individual situations of the different countries and regions in Africa and Latin America. He alluded to the point that despite the recent nature of the migratory phenomenon, African influence in Latin America was not new and suggested policy makers to increasingly investigate on the reverse migration flows from Latin America to Africa. Concluding, he raised questions concerning the capacity of Argentina to host African migrants, the ability of African migrants to go to Argentina and whether Africans would face similar stereotypes than in Spain.

The audience then asked the presenters to comment on the integration of Africans in terms of housing, education, employment and family migration from Africa to Argentina. The authors lamented that they were not able to give informed answers given the census data from 2011 was not available yet. However, women and children would certainly start to arrive in larger numbers, access to education was free in Argentina and the main characteristic of employment was informality.

Mr. Paolo Sergio de Almeida then brought forward the Brazilian case and endorsed the cultural, commercial and political exchange between Brazil and the Portuguese-speaking African countries. These worked as pulling factors for African migration to Brazil, in addition to scholarship programs and the presence of associations and religious and social leaders in Brazil. Commenting on that, Ms. Cerrutti suggested that this South-South relationship and exchange was way ahead of Argentina.

Following, Prof. Oucho made a case for the high number of young migrants, which indicated that this type of migration was primarily a response to unemployment. Mr. Marcelino countered that forced migration was an important phenomenon occurring in parallel to economic migration.

Ms. Rosa Bravo Rodríguez made one last comment arguing that the legal system in Spain would ensure equal treatment for any alien and that racial discrimination was absolutely prohibited. Every foreigner who felt discriminated against would have the opportunity to file a complaint. Ms. Bravo Rodríguez also advised Latin American policy makers to think about more long-term policies and strategies in case migration to Latin America scales up as fast as it had in Europe.
H. African migration in Latin-America and institutional frameworks
(Session 6 continued)

Ms. Nora Pérez Vichich from the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto from Argentina complemented the preceding presentation with insights on the institutional framework in Argentina. She presented new standards and policies for migration and argued that Argentina had applied a distinct perspective that emanated from a human rights perspective, taking root causes of migration into account.

The public policies on migration, she elaborated, were an expression of these principles and hence promoted social, labour and cultural integration and guaranteed fundamental migrants rights. The new law 25.871/2004 explicitly established the right to migrate and attested the contribution of migrants in the country. Furthermore, migrants benefit from equality of treatment in health, education, services and goods and one particular chapter was dedicated to the freedoms and rights of migrants.

Argentinean law equally enhanced the rights of migrants in irregular situation through holding employers liable and obliging the state to regularize those in irregular situations. Access to justice and to education (including tertiary education) was guaranteed regardless of migrant status and health authorities were obliged to establish a level of advice and guidance to help irregular migrants. All these mechanisms, Ms. Perez Vichich endorsed, were newly integrated into the amended law and complemented the already existing mechanisms against active discrimination, xenophobia etc.

Ms. Pérez Vichich was convinced of the need for non-discriminatory state policies and argued that keeping irregular migrants outside the law was itself discriminating and a segregation creating inequalities. This in turn, would only encourage society to feel legitimized for its own discriminatory patterns. Only speedy regularization processes could work against the violation of fundamental rights of irregular migrants and their increased criminalization. In this regard, she presented different regularization processes in Argentina, for MERCOSUR as well as non-MERCOSUR nationals, and noted that these mechanisms had had a demonstrated impact on the formalization of work for non-national workers. Concluding, she highlighted that this process was only viable in its regional context and possible through international, multilateral and regional cooperation with policies bringing forward a human rights approach.

Subsequent to the insight into the Argentinean features, Mr. Paolo Sergio de Almeida, General Coordinator for Immigration at the National Immigration Council of Brazil, illustrated the Brazilian institutional framework. A Tripartite Council of different government units, ministries and social partners (trade unions and employers) developed and enhanced immigration policies based on legislation 6.815/1980 on foreign citizens and the core principle of the protection of migrants’ human rights. The institutional framework included the main international migration agreements concerning the freedom of residence for nationals from MERCOSUR (including associated states such as Bolivia and Chile.), laws on refugee status and the different international instruments such as the Geneva Convention. Most recently, the Tripartite group had recommended the government of Brazil to ratify the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.

Mr. de Almeida then added a short review on migration history and migrant characteristics in Brazil. Brazil, a multicultural society, had experienced an important wave of immigration from Europe in the 19th century. From the 1980s onwards emigration defined Brazil’s migration process—a rather difficult experience from an economic viewpoint. Today, statistics recorded an estimate of about 1 Mio immigrants as of 2011, compared to the impressive number of 3 Mio Brazilian emigrants. Given that figures from the 2011 census had not yet been published, these newest numbers presented were from the Federal Police Office. The estimates further indicated that 56% of immigrants were of European origin, about 22% from Latin America, 18% from Asia and African migrants accounted for less than 1% of immigrants. The first African nationality was Angolan. Brazilian outmigration to Africa was also quite frequent with around 20 000 Brazilians living in Angola.
Concluding, Mr. de Almeida presented current trends and future prospects, predicting an increase of migration flows to Brazil linked to its economic development, the migration policy based on human rights, the intensification of the political and commercial relationships between Brazil and Africa, as well as the creation of the Portuguese Speaking Countries Community (CPLP). The immigrant flows, he added, were increasingly diversified due to different policies strengthening South-South cooperation and Brazilians increasingly returned from abroad.

The third presentation was given by Mr. Pablo de la Vega from PIDHDD, who wanted to share some concerns on migration from a human rights perspective, starting with a summary of existing legal mechanisms regulating international migration. Despite the absence of a global and universal body of law in favour of migrants rights, there were various legal mechanisms and instruments. The legal umbrella was given by the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. This body was strengthened through specific ILO Conventions (in particular 93/147 but also the recently adopted framework for domestic workers). Furthermore, a complex institutional system gave account on human rights of migrant workers such as the Human Rights Council or its new mechanism called the Universal Periodic Review. The Special Rapporteur, treaty bodies as well as case law were further mechanisms to defend the human rights of migrants, which should be increasingly put to use, Mr. de la Vega argued.

The second part of the presentation advanced some striking human rights reports identified by the PIDHDD. Concerns were expressed about standards for labour migrants in Arab and North African countries such as Qatar, the Emirates, Libya and South Arabia. The human rights situation in Libya was found to be particularly striking with the expulsion of about 145 000 African migrants between 2003 and 2005 for political reasons. In Europe, Mr. de la Vega found the Spanish policies on irregular migration in the two enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla alarming. Furthermore, the trend of externalizing control of migration flows to other countries was mentioned — it had been linked to the return of some 200 000 migrants to countries with questionable human rights records such as China, Egypt, Palestine, Eritrea or Somalia. These developments were a sign of the new paradigm of the securitization of migration that would gain momentum with the militarization of frontiers and controls of migratory flows. Most notably, Mr. de la Vega expressed concerns about FRONTEX. Only recently, he explained, had Italy requested the EU to turn FRONTEX into a more operational agency that acted according to the needs of Italians. Furthermore, FRONTEX would cultivate close links to European security agencies or the European Office to Combat Fraud. He re-endorsed the reference already made by Mr. Marcelino: the recently published Human Rights Watch Publication called “EU Dirty Hands and involvement with FRONTEX” and added that Europe’s compliance with human rights was put to the test with these recent developments. Lastly and most concerning, would be the various incidences of arbitrary detention and cases of mistreatment (and even killing) of people in detention.

The concluding recommendations touched upon the implementation of consular notifications for those detained and deprived of their liberty by another nation state. The notification was often jeopardized in Latin America, where many African countries were not represented with diplomatic commissions or consulates. He therefore called the states to open the doors for agreements, conventions and cooperation among these countries. Furthermore, he suggested designing migration policies to facilitate legal migration instead of providing disproportionate punishment for those without documents, to reform labour laws to broaden protection for migrant workers, to establish effective measures for supervision and mechanisms to submit complaints and to strengthen international cooperation in order to combat human trafficking, including support and rehabilitation for victims.

In the discussion more information on LAC migration to Africa was requested for better informed policy development. Moreover Ms. Bravo Rodriguez asked Mr. de la Vega for clarifications on human rights concerns in Ceuta and Melilla, given that Spain acknowledged any migrant for legal assistance irrespective of the administrative situation. A last comment endorsed that many countries
had implemented independent domestic legal and policy initiatives that should be credited and did not necessarily depend on international legal instruments.

I. Migration between Africa, Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean: challenges and opportunities (Roundtable 1)

The first person to present at the roundtable was Mr. Jason Schachter, Policy Affairs Officer at DESA, who launched the discussion with some challenges and opportunities regarding data collection. Mr. Schachter affirmed the need for more migration data but emphasized that it was equally important to think about the validity of the available data. Only a clear research question could link data and policies and hence contribute to develop evidence-based policies. Further, the effectiveness of policies should constantly be measured and monitored.

Following a reminder on definitions and classifications of international migrants, Mr. Schachter elaborated on the various sources of migration data. The census, although costly and conducted every 10 years, generated very detailed information on the entire population. The National Household Surveys in turn considers a smaller sample, it is more suited to measure the characteristics rather than the size of migration and data is collected more frequently and cost-effectively. The Population Registers—a register of legal residents or foreigners within a country—measures migration characteristics, as well as migrant stocks and migration flows. The identified disadvantages were linked to the costs and the difficulties of comparability because different countries might use varying criteria. Administrative sources such as residence and work permits, asylum applications and consular data are often used to measure migration flows, whereas border collection data could give information on irregular migration. However, the fact that they are not collected for migration purposes causes problems with regard to measurement and validity.

Mr. Schachter then alluded to some challenges of the data collection process such as data comparability between and within countries, data harmonization or data validity. The availability of data was mentioned as another challenge. Accessibility and timeliness are important issues and often linked to them is the lack of resources to improve the data quality. A last shortcoming referred to the fact that not all migration-types are measured, for example difficulties were noted with measuring emigration, irregular migration or circular migration. Yet all these challenges, he reiterated, could become opportunities: terms and definitions among regions and countries could be harmonized, existing data sources and data could be better put to use, new data sources developed and methodologies for the production of migration statistics improved. Furthermore, detailed tabulations and data should increasingly be shared, disseminated and exchanged between country stakeholders and neighbouring countries.

Upon conclusion, Mr. Schachter advanced an example of best practice: The Commission on International Migration Data for Development and Research Policy published a small publication titled “Migration Counts: 5 Steps Towards Better Migration Data”, that recommended to first, ask basic census questions and disseminate the results; second, compile and release existing administrative data sources; third, centralize labour force surveys; fourth, include standardized migration survey modules on existing household surveys; and fifth, open up public access to micro data.

The second input was given by Ms. Nora Pérez Vichich, who commented on the MERCOSUR process for free movement of people as a holistic and integrated model of regional integration. She explained that the policies on migration and freedom of movement within this MERCOSUR process made progress but also experienced setbacks depending on the political changes in the country. Given that the MERCOSUR specialised migration forum not only covered the four original and associated countries, but additionally involved countries such as Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela, the forum had become a whole-of-South America process that induced policy changes incorporating a human rights perspective. Instead of reducing migration to migration management, the policies of the group took into account the structural causes of migration and the potential to change human mobility through social and economic pressure. She further explained the
different bodies specialised on migration within the MERCOSUR—the migration forum, the social and labour bodies and the MERCOSUR policies. These bodies each faced different challenges and had to work following the MERCOSUR guidelines in order to jointly develop and implement policies. Despite the different realities involved, social and political premises would be similar, which made MERCOSUR the ideal body to overcome challenges across the region.

Amb. Goutali then commented on opportunities and challenges of regular and irregular migration. Tunisia, he reiterated, looked at migration from a positive perspective—as a win-win game—since particularly skilled labour migration contributed to the development of both, destination and origin country. It allowed for cultural cross-fertilisation and opened up the possibility for shared experiences and more solidarity. Amb. Goutali further endorsed that Europe would increasingly depend on foreign labour migration, which called for the streamlining of regular migration to reduce irregular migration. Also, national and regional efforts should concentrate on setting up a national strategy for migration management so as to make better use of it for social development schemes (through remittances, know-how transfer etc.). With respect to irregular migration, he appealed to policy makers to adopt a comprehensive rather than a security approach, while concurrently targeting networks of trafficking groups and facilitators. Root causes of irregular migration such as poverty and unemployment should be addressed and more opportunities for potential migrants in their country of origin developed to make it dispensable to cross the Mediterranean and risk lives.

Ms. Susanne Melde from the ACP Observatory brought forward various challenges and opportunities of migration policies and migration flows between the three regions. Besides the difficulty analysing, publishing and sharing existing data rather than only collecting it, she called for more reality-adapted policies. For example, sub-Saharan policies would focus too much on emigration rather than on immigration and inter-regional migration had no corresponding institutional framework. Moreover, policies should focus more on younger people, shattered economies and informality in the labour market to account for reality. Further challenges identified by Ms. Melde were external shocks, migrants’ lack of information and the myths circulating on countries of destination.

In terms of opportunities, Ms. Melde identified the potential of intra-regional migration for poverty reduction and the circulation of skills and human and social capital among the South. Hence, more research was needed thereon. Also, she highlighted informal remittances and well-developed informal remittances channels as an important opportunity that needed innovative measures to decrease costs (e.g. remittances through mobile phones in Kenya). Lastly, she considered existing development cooperation frameworks as opportunities, such as the African South American Cooperation Framework (ASACF). Yet, the integration of migration into development policy agendas should increasingly focus on evidence-based knowledge rather than on perceptions and be completed by impact analysis of migration on development.

In the last thematic input of the first Roundtable, Ms. Mirela Shuteriqi, Expert on Child Migration at Terre des Hommes Switzerland gave an insight into child migration. Ms. Shuteriqi brought forward the complexity of child migration, including the various causes (such as escape from conflict, natural disasters, better opportunities, the contribution to family incomes etc.). The consequences of child migration are many: it can improve the child’s standard of living and prospects, but can also draw the child into exploitative situations. Ms. Shuteriqi gave insight into possible dangerous trajectories for children migrating from countries such as the Ivory Coast, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq or Nigeria through Morocco to the European Union. During the risky trajectory, the children might be exposed to various forms of exploitation, particularly girls who are often sexually abused on the way. When these children get to Morocco, they are often confronted with the impossibility to move further and hence remain in a limbo situation where access to services and opportunities is lacking. Prostitution, she further explained, is often the only survival strategy for young migrant girls. In case the migrant child manages to continue further to Lampedusa, the precariousness continues with poor hygienic conditions and the lack of full protection. In the country of destination, the children often face xenophobia and discrimination, lack an initial social network.
and have difficulties creating a new one. At worst, they end up being detained and deported without a proper risk-assessment or best-interest determination.

The discussion started with an input by Ms. Christiane Kuptsch, Senior Specialist in Migration Policy at the International Labour Organization (ILO), who commented on the interventions by Ms. Melde and Amb. Goutali. She considered that although policies influence migration flows, one should not underestimate economic factors. The importance of economic fundamentals was clearly shown when migration flows halted in reaction to the financial and economic crisis in 2008, she argued. In such a way, new migration flows to emerging economies such as Brazil and Argentina could not solely be explained by restrictive policies elsewhere, but emerging economies were new global players that also attracted migrants because of the (economic) opportunities they offered. Ms. Kuptsch recommended new destination countries in various world regions to take this emerging phenomenon as an opportunity to learn from the mistakes of earlier immigration countries (for example as concerned guest workers and integration issues) and to put in place long-term integration programmes and policies.

Additionally, Ms. Kuptsch suggested including social partners, i.e. workers’ and employers’ representatives into policy-making, considering the importance of labour migration and their knowledge on realities at the workplace. Furthermore, Labour Ministries should increasingly be integrated into migration policies. Lastly, she pointed towards two texts elaborated by the ILO constituents that should be revisited: the ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration and the Model Bilateral Agreement in the Annex of ILO Recommendation 86 (on Migration for Employment).

Ms. Malika Benradi remarked a deficiency in research on the impact and added-value migration has on destination countries. Furthermore, she considered that the fact that many countries had not ratified the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families reflected a failure to see migrants in their holistic nature. Ms. Benradi also made reference to the readmission agreement between Morocco and Spain and remarked that the Moroccan civil society would under no circumstances accept the clause of the agreement that forced Morocco to also readmit sub-Saharan nationals who have previously travelled through Morocco. Ms. Benradi closed with an appeal to increased political will in order to organise co-development and solidarity for the management of migration flows.

Prof. Oucho referred to the presentation given by Mr. Schachter and reiterated that data had to be improved, new research developed and results to be disseminated in order to feed into a good policy dialogue. Yet, useful data and policy suggestions of the past should be revisited in order to improve data rather than reinventing the wheel, e.g. the International Migration Statistics or the International Migration Review.

Mr. Canales agreed on Ms. Benradi’s comment on the fact that the added-value of migration to countries of destination was only rarely revisited, which represented an ideological construction and called for a paradigm shift. Furthermore, destination countries tended to focus too much on remittances instead of insisting on the social and political rights of migrants. Mr. Canales further supported Prof. Oucho’s statement on the need for data improvement and elaborated that policy makers should foster data collection on the impact of migration on both country of origin and destination.

J. Migration between Africa, Europe and Latin American and the Caribbean: Advances and gaps in institutional arrangements (Roundtable 2)

Mr. Paul Tacon, Associate Social Affairs Officer at the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) reported on the workshop in June 2011 in Beirut. This workshop had been organised by ESCWA and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). It discussed South-South migration flows and
policies between the two regions, the defining pattern being labour migration from Asia and the Pacific to West Asia. These flows had been valuable for both regions in terms of remittances and as sources of employment, he explained. However, the fact that most migration was of temporary nature, i.e. temporal contractual work, resulted in challenges and obstacles for possible development impacts, in particular high migration costs, a pronounced lack of social protection for the migrant workers abroad and divided families due to the impossibility of settlement and family reunification. The countries of West Asia equally faced challenges in terms of these migrant flows. Despite the high level of unemployment for local workers, the private sector would almost exclusively employ migrants due to a segmentation of the labour market. Against the common perception, these countries would share the concern about migrants’ rights and the banning of abusive recruitment practices and hence envisage taking measures thereupon.

Apart from the discussion on key trends and challenges, the workshop aimed at sharing best practices and experiences between the countries. Moreover, national-level skills and capacities ought to be enhanced in order to design and implement relevant policies. It strongly focused on the protection of migrants and assessed migratory patterns from a gender perspective. The findings of the various sessions determined a considerable potential for development benefits that was hindered due to high economic, social and cultural vulnerabilities resulting from institutional gaps. Further shortcomings included the absence of integration policies since migrants were asked to leave upon expiry of their contract. Also, the situation of domestic workers was mentioned as being alarming: they are often employed in isolated contexts, cut off from social networks and their workplace is usually not being recognized as real.

Mr. Tacon then summarized the most important recommendations of the workshop. Migration should be increasingly mainstreamed, with a focus on the possibility of return and reintegration. The existing labour migration governance system ought to be reformed and institutional gaps in the protection of migrant workers better examined and addressed. Also, migrants should be instructed on their rights. The participants of the workshop further identified the need to better share data and to continue cooperation between the two regions with multilateral and multi-stakeholder interaction and dialogue. One path to follow was the collaboration manifested in the Abu Dhabi Dialogue in 2008, where countries of origin and destination came together discussing follow-up activities and signing memoranda of understanding. Mr. Tacon added that future collaboration should increasingly include civil society.

Ms. Anja Klug, Head of the Asylum/Migration Unit Division of International Protection at UNHCR, emphasized the importance of including forced migration into policy analysis, both as regards pure refugee outflows as well as in the context of mixed migration. The broader migratory movements are increasingly complex and it is unavoidable that migratory flows include people protected under the mandate of UNHCR (asylum seekers, refugees and stateless persons). Also, migrants have increasingly diversified profiles and their status might alternate during the journey. Ms. Klug thus indicated that states’ response to these mixed migration flows could have a negative influence on forced migrants, since they did not take into account the special needs of those under the mandate of UNHCR. Hence, only through joint forces could these migratory flows be addressed, the protection of migrants enhanced, and threats such as xenophobic attacks or racism in the destination countries counteracted. Ms. Klug hence recommended enhanced cooperation among the different actors in the field and sophisticated responses to mixed migration. In this regard, UNHCR has already developed a plan of action for refugee protection in mixed situations, the 10-Point Plan, which calls for comprehensive approaches and is geared to enhance cooperation between different actors and organisations. Also, with regard to research and data, Ms. Klug recommended enhancing comparative analysis between the various components of migration.

Following, Mr. Charles Kwenin, Senior Regional Advisor at the International Organization for Migration (IOM), gave a short global outlook on migration, arguing that the 21st century was the “century of megatrends”: 215 Mio people lived abroad, movement was facilitated through new communication technologies, women migrated increasingly in their own capacity and internal
migrants outnumbered international migrants. He then reiterated some aspects of African migration to Europe and LAC, recalling the different migratory routes, emphasizing the misconception of huge inflows of West African migrants to Europe and endorsing that migration was often a conscious choice by relatively well-off individuals. For Mr. Kwenin, one of the gaps in institutional agreements was the need for multi-conceptual and multi-organizational policy making in order to deal with the complex phenomenon of international migration. Furthermore, he called for a reinforcement of the strategic partnership between the EU and Africa and increased data sharing between different countries and ministries. Capacity building in Africa could be strengthened —a good practice being the recently opened African Capacity Building Centre in Moshi that trained local professionals.

Mr. Pablo de la Vega from the PIDHDD first suggested to be optimistic about the various treaties already in place, for example the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, which was reported to be signed by 20 countries. Nevertheless, he identified important gaps in institutional arrangements. Cooperation between member states and the UN agencies needed to be increased and institutionalised. He argued that technical assistance from the various experts might help to overcome the already discussed difficulties to harmonise domestic laws and international standards. This dialogue should be opened to include civil society organisations. Moreover, the decision-making process on migration should include the local economy with workers and trade unions, which had accumulated considerable knowledge to share. Lastly, Mr. de la Vega called for discussing and monitoring the paradigm of securitization that existed parallel to the paradigm of human rights and development. Also, he expressed concerns about the Global Forum on Migration and Development: despite its good intentions he doubted that the Second High Level Dialogue would be a success again.

Mr. Pedro Marcelino concluded the second roundtable with a moving speech, reminding the audience of personal migrant stories and hence the invisibility of the more personal and human dimension of migration policies in a macro-analysis dominated discussion. He alerted the audience to the instrumentalization of individuals for the sake of politics, showed Europe as a continent with many detention centres and called into question whether existing frameworks and categories of migrants could cover for the complexity of migrants’ stories and their changing experiences.

K. Conclusion

A variety of aspects and diversity of perspectives were covered in this workshop. New global trends and regional specificities were discussed and policy options considered. Challenges and opportunities of migration and the relevant institutional frameworks had been analysed in order to find ways to better collect, use and analyse data necessary to develop evidence-based policies. In turn, this should allow to better manage migration and to maximise its potential for development.

Four subjects constituted a common thread throughout the presentations: data collection and analysis; migrants’ contributions to development; immigration policies and restrictions; and human rights of migrants.

The different interventions revealed the newest data on migrant stocks and flows, on migrant characteristics such as the distribution according to origin, sex and age, but also the motives and reasons for the migratory trajectory. Most of the 214 Mio international migrants live in Europe, yet intra-regional (rather than inter-regional migration) is the predominant pattern. Migrant stocks have increased in total and tend to be less feminized, with migration due to economic and social reasons being the predominant pattern. However, many are still forced to migrate in search for human security. In this regard, several participants called for more attention on the special needs of forced migrants and called to join forces to address mixed flows. Furthermore, cultural aspects such as language or colonial ties have been identified as motivations for choosing a particular destination.

It was noted that the identified migrant characteristics should feed to a greater extent into reality-adapted policy-making. Policies should for instance take into account the impact of the economic crisis and target young migrants who are often most affected by unemployment. In the light
of current demographic trends, more focus should be put on the ageing migrant community and gender-sensitive policies developed.

Further, the participants agreed on the necessity for improved data collection with detailed information and statistics to fill the gaps in research. Investigations on South-South migration were noted to be particularly deficient in this regard. Priority was given to the enhancement of the harmonization of data between different countries and regions —it was identified as a common field for UN organisations and countries. Expert organisations should contribute to targeted capacity-building and collaboration and cooperation needed to be strengthened. Also, data should be increasingly shared and disseminated. Furthermore, comprehensive evaluation and monitoring of existing policies were identified as shortcomings, in particular with respect to the impact of migration on development. An important instrument to measure and manage migration flows was presented in the form of well-thought Labour Market Information Systems (LMIS), yet only sound collecting of the necessary information could guarantee an ongoing analysis and policy development.

The second common thread of the inputs, the impact of migrants’ contributions to development, was found to be hindered through missing policies and deficient institutional frameworks on South-South migration of both inter-regional and intra-regional migration. In Africa for instance, the lack of policies on emigration and on South-South remittances undermines the development potential of these flows. As outlined by the participants, intra-regional flows have a promising development impact in terms of remittances and skills transfer through lower migration costs, limited risks and facilitated integration in the host society. The regional integration processes in Africa and LAC have been identified as possible points of departure to promote the benefits of intra-regional migration for development. Participants further stressed that South-North migration dynamics and the potential for development in countries of origin was quite commonly discussed, the impact on the country of destination in turn, was found to be neglected and understudied.

Existing immigration policies and restrictions were the third common thread. It was noted that although geopolitical shifts such as 9/11 and the economic crisis induced restrictive measures, policies on migration have generally become less restrictive, with the exception of Africa. However, those restrictions were characterised by an ever-elaborated system, often leading to limbo situations and informality. European immigration policies have turned many former emigration countries into transit countries or final destination by default. A particularly sensitive issue in this regard that came up related to irregular migration: participants emphasized that restrictions should not undermine the rights of these migrants through securitization and policies should focus on fostering regular migration and addressing root causes instead.

Regardless of these restrictions, migrants tend to find creative and flexible ways to migrate. This gave rise to emerging trends and new migratory routes, for example migration from African countries to Brazil or Argentina. Those developments have been referred to as the result from a clash of the micro and macro level of migration, because the limited choices and the concurrent migration pressure in home countries had obliged migrants to choose alternative routes. Yet they still aspire to move further to the United States. Although a marginal event, presenters have called for increased research on the subject in order to determine whether these kinds of alternative migratory routes could become a bigger trend. It was noted that emerging countries with increased economic prosperity might also be targeted as future destinations and should hence focus on long-term policies taking the trends into account.

Despite the existing restrictions, the participants pointed out various new approaches, changing regulations and legal provisions that focus on human rights rather than on security. Many European countries have taken on the EU global approach on migration that fosters benefits of migration while limiting negative effects to encourage more human, integrated and comprehensive immigration policies. The principle of human dignity as basis of all policies in Tunisia was highlighted. New policies focusing on non-discrimination in Spain were mentioned as well as an explicit human right to migrate and equality of treatment in Argentina. In Brazil, a tripartite council that enhances immigration policies also involves social partners such as trade unions and employers
and the Ecuadorian representative established that it was the duty of countries of origin to counteract restrictive policies in European countries through fostering human values and the right to mobility.

The participants agreed on the need to respect and promote the human rights of migrants, providing the right to legal protection and access to justice for migrants regardless of status. Moreover, the participants called on countries to ratify the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and to increasingly realise the potential of international human rights instruments and bodies to advocate for the rights of migrants.

The overall conclusion was that the effort to jointly reflect, debate and work on pending migration issues between UN agencies was exemplary and should be strengthened and repeated. It brought value to the research and allowed drawing on existing knowledge and resources. It opened the way for comparisons and gave the debate policy relevance, although considerable work was still to be done.

In their closing remarks, Mr. Paulo Saad and Mr. Andres Viktat praised the interesting, stimulating and fruitful debates which made for a successful workshop. They assured that the findings and elements of discussion would feed into follow-up activities of the project. Finally, they recalled the coming challenges with the implementation of the project: a) the regional information systems had to be consolidated, b) the final report presented at a last interregional event, c) a strategy developed for the dissemination of the results, and d) networks promoted in order to continuously exchange information on regional and international policies. Lastly, they extended their sincerest thanks to the colleagues from the regional commissions, the presenters and all participants of the workshop.
Annex 2
List of participants

Interregional Workshop on Migration

“Strengthening capacities to deal with international migration:
Examining development, institutional and policy aspects of migration
between Africa, Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean”

22 - 23 September 2011, Geneva, Palais des Nations, Room V (1st floor)

- Mr. Paulo Cavalieri, Counselor, Permanent Mission of Argentina
- Ms. Marcela Cerrutti, Researcher, Center for Population Study, Argentina
- Ms. Nora Perez Vichich, Main Advisor, International Migration Directorate, Argentina
- Mr. Paulo Sérgio De Almeida, General Coordinator for Immigration, National Immigration Council, Brazil
- Mr. Oscar Jara Albán, Representative in Spain, National Secretariat for Migrants (SENAMI), Ecuador
- Ms. Anna Skornia, Doctoral Student, Institute of Latin American Studies, Free University of Berlin, Germany
- Mr. Maurits Ter Kuile, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of the Netherlands, Spain
- Ms. Rosa Maria Bravo, Senior Specialist, General Directorate for Immigration, Ministry of Labour and Immigration, Spain
- Mr. Burim Bilali, Permanent Mission of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
- Mr. Ali Goutali, Ambassador, Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tunisia
- Ms. Kristine Alsvik, Technical Officer, International Migration, International Labour Office
- Ms. Christiane Kuptsch, Senior Specialist in Migration Policy, International Migration Branch, International Labour Office
- Ms. Shadya Karawi, Intern, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
- Ms. Amal Medani, Associate Director, Governance Unit, United Nations Institute for Training and Research
- Ms. Orsolya Kizer, Legal attachée, International Committee of the Red Cross
- Mr. Charles Kwenin, Senior Regional Advisor- SSA, International Organisation for Migration
- Ms. Luisa Bernal, Specialist, Trade and Human Development Unit, United Nations Development Programme
- Mr. Paul Tacon, Associate Social Affairs Officer, United Nations Economic Commission for Western Asia
• Ms. Clare Menozzi, Migration Section, Population Division, UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs
• Mr. Jason Schachter, Policy Affairs Officer, Population Division, UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs
• Ms. Thokozile Ruzvidzo, Director, Africa Centre for Gender and Development, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
• Mr. Hassan Yousif, Senior Population Affairs Officer, ACGSD, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
• Ms. Vanessa Steinmayer, Social Affairs Officer, Social Development Division, United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and Pacific
• Ms. Anja Klug, Head of the Asylum/Migration Unit Division of International Protection, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
• Ms. Angela Li Rosi, Senior Policy Adviser, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
• Ms. Astrid Abecassis, Associate Human Rights Officer, United Nations Office for High Commissioner for Human Rights
• Ms. Federica Donati, Human Rights Officer, Special Procedures Division, United Nations Office for High Commissioner for Human Rights
• Ms. Katarina Mansson, Human Rights Officer, Special Procedures Branch, United Nations Office for High Commissioner for Human Rights
• Ms. Susanne Melde, Research Officer, ACP Observatory on Migration, Belgium
• Mr. John Oucho, Executive Director, African Migration and Development Policy Centre
• Mr. Andreu Domingo, Centre d’Estudis Demogràfics, Deputy Director, Center for Demographic Study, Autonomous University of Barcelona, Spain
• Ms. Daniela Vono De Vilhena, Academic researcher, Bamberg University, Germany
• Mr. Ivan Martin, Research Fellow, Complutense Institute of International Studies and CARIM, European University Institute
• Ms. Denise Boyle, Executive Director, Franciscans International, Switzerland
• Mr. Jerome Elie, Academic, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Switzerland
• Ms. Marina Irma Peterhans, Student/Academic, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Switzerland
• Mr. Mustapha Djemali, Regional Representative to the Maghreb countries, International Center for Migration Policy Development, Tunisia
• Ms. Malika Benradi, Professor, University Mohammed V Rabat Maroc, MAROC AMERM, Morocco
• Ms. Helga de Valk, Senior Researcher, Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute - NIDI, Netherlands
• Mr. Pablo de la Vega, Regional Coordinator, Plataforma Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Democracia y Desarrollo, Ecuador
• Ms. Eylah Kadjar-Hamouda, Head of International Secretariat, Terre des Hommes International Federation, Switzerland

• Ms. Mirela Shuteriqi, Resource Person anti-trafficking/exploitation, Terre des hommes International Federation, Switzerland

• Ms. Sophie Malatre, Intern, Terre des Hommes International Federation, France

• Mr. Alejandro Canales, Demographer, Uniiversity of Guadalajara, Mexico

• Mr. Pedro Marcelino, Consultant, York University, Canada

• Mr. Paulo Saad, Chief of Area, CELADE/ECLAC, Chile

• Ms. Claudia Guerrero, Team Assistant, CELADE/ECLAC, Chile

• Mr. Jorge Martinez Pizarro, Research Assistant, CELADE/ECLAC, Chile

• Mr. Leandro Diego Reboiras, Research Assistant, CELADE/ECLAC, Chile

• Ms. Magdalena Soffia, Consultant, CELADE/ECLAC, Chile

• Mr. Andres Vikat, Chief, Social and Demographic Statistics Section, Statistical Division, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Switzerland

• Ms. Ayima Okeeva, Statistician, Social and Demographic and Multi-Domain Statistics Section, Statistical Division, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Switzerland

• Mr. Paolo Valente, Statistician, Social and Demographic Statistics Section, Statistical Division, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Switzerland
Annex 3
Biosketch of participants

Opening Session

Andres Vikat
Chief of the Social and Demographic Statistics Section at the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) since 2010. In 2005-2010 he was Chief of the UNECE Population Unit where he organised policy discussion on population ageing and the Generations and Gender Programme of data collection and research. Prior to joining UNECE, he led research on fertility and family dynamics at the Max Plank Institute for Demographic Research in Germany. He had worked for several years with statistical agencies, research institutes and universities in his native Estonia, Finland and Sweden. He holds a PhD in Social Sciences from the University of Helsinki.

Hassan Yousif
Human and Social Development, ECA

Paulo Saad
Chief of the Population and Development Area of the Latin America and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) - Population Division of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Mr. Saad holds a PhD in Sociology from the University of Texas at Austin, a Master’s degree in Demography from El Colegio de México, and a Bachelor’s degree in Statistics from the University of São Paulo. Before joining CELADE/ECLAC in 2007, he served as Population Affairs Officer for eight years at the Population Division of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) in New York.

Introductory Session

Clare Menozzi
Population Affairs Officer in the Migration Section of the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), United Nations, since November 2010. She joined the Population Division in 2004 and worked in the Population Policy Section and the Fertility and Family Planning Section. Before joining the Division, Ms. Menozzi worked in the Statistics Division of UNDESA and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. She studied demographic and social statistics at the University of Bologna, Italy and is working on her Ph.D. dissertation at the London School of Economics. Ms. Menozzi’s area of particular interest is the interface between child, parental and state rights.

Session 1: African and Latin-American migration to Europe

Jorge Martínez
Geographer and demographer of the Centro Latinoamericano y Caribeño de Demografía (CELADE)-Population Division of ECLAC in Santiago of Chile. Has conducted studies about population and development in Latin America and the Caribbean, and has devoted to the field of international migration and human rights. He is author of numerous publications about the relationships between population and poverty, between migration, development, globalization and integration, migration of skilled labor, gender and women and national studies of international migration in several countries. He has also participated in various institutional CELADE-ECLAC documents and has conducted numerous technical assistance missions to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Population and Development Area, CELADE-ECLAC Population Division

Andreu Domingo
PhD in sociology, vice-director on the Centre for Demographics Studies (CED) at the Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB), where he has been researcher since 1984. Main research areas are: Demography, International Migration, Foreign Population, Marriage, Family and kinship.

Daniela Vono
Demographer. She works as a research scientist and post doc researcher in the project edulife "Education as a Lifelong Process – Comparing Educational Trajectories in Modern Societies" at Bamberg University. Along her academic trajectory she has worked in national and international research projects on international migration and integration of immigrants in Spain. She has also participated in many occasions as a consultant for the CELADE in Chile in projects related to Latin-American international migrants. In her dissertation, she focused on the pathways of settlement of immigrants in Spain from a demographic viewpoint.

Helga de Valk
PhD, Utrecht University, the Netherlands (2006). Senior researcher at the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (the Hague) and professor at the Free University Brussels. Her research focuses on migration and integration, the transition to adulthood of immigrant youth, educational inequality, union and family formation, the second generation and intergenerational relationships in immigrant families. In 2010 she was awarded an ERC starting grant on the project “Families of migrant origin: a life course perspective”. She has published articles in a range of leading journals and books in the field of demography and family sociology.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charles Kwenin</td>
<td>Senior Regional Advisor for Sub-Saharan Africa in the International Organization for Migration. Mr. Kwenin holds a Bachelor of Science in Development Economics from the University of Science and Technology in Ghana, a Postgraduate Degree Diploma in Development Policy and a Master of Science in Public Administration and Management from the State University of Antwerp in Belgium. He worked at the University of Science and Technology in Ghana, as well as in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning in Ghana. Since 1992 he worked for the International Organization for Migration on various issues in several locations, namely Belgium, Uganda, Kenya, as well as the IOM’s Chief of Mission and Representative to the African Union in the Special Liaison Mission in Ethiopia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susanne Melde</td>
<td>Senior Regional Advisor for Sub-Saharan Africa in the International Organization for Migration. Mr. Kwenin holds a Bachelor of Science in Development Economics from the University of Science and Technology in Ghana, a Postgraduate Degree Diploma in Development Policy and a Master of Science in Public Administration and Management from the State University of Antwerp in Belgium. He worked at the University of Science and Technology, as well as in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning in Ghana. Since 1992 he worked for the International Organization for Migration on various issues in several locations, namely Belgium, Uganda, Kenya, as well as the IOM’s Chief of Mission and Representative to the African Union in the Special Liaison Mission in Ethiopia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John O. Oucho</td>
<td>Senior Regional Advisor for Sub-Saharan Africa in the International Organization for Migration. Mr. Kwenin holds a Bachelor of Science in Development Economics from the University of Science and Technology in Ghana, a Postgraduate Degree Diploma in Development Policy and a Master of Science in Public Administration and Management from the State University of Antwerp in Belgium. He worked at the University of Science and Technology, as well as in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning in Ghana. Since 1992 he worked for the International Organization for Migration on various issues in several locations, namely Belgium, Uganda, Kenya, as well as the IOM’s Chief of Mission and Representative to the African Union in the Special Liaison Mission in Ethiopia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustapha Djemali</td>
<td>Senior Regional Advisor for Sub-Saharan Africa in the International Organization for Migration. Mr. Kwenin holds a Bachelor of Science in Development Economics from the University of Science and Technology in Ghana, a Postgraduate Degree Diploma in Development Policy and a Master of Science in Public Administration and Management from the State University of Antwerp in Belgium. He worked at the University of Science and Technology, as well as in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning in Ghana. Since 1992 he worked for the International Organization for Migration on various issues in several locations, namely Belgium, Uganda, Kenya, as well as the IOM’s Chief of Mission and Representative to the African Union in the Special Liaison Mission in Ethiopia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Goutali</td>
<td>Senior Regional Advisor for Sub-Saharan Africa in the International Organization for Migration. Mr. Kwenin holds a Bachelor of Science in Development Economics from the University of Science and Technology in Ghana, a Postgraduate Degree Diploma in Development Policy and a Master of Science in Public Administration and Management from the State University of Antwerp in Belgium. He worked at the University of Science and Technology, as well as in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning in Ghana. Since 1992 he worked for the International Organization for Migration on various issues in several locations, namely Belgium, Uganda, Kenya, as well as the IOM’s Chief of Mission and Representative to the African Union in the Special Liaison Mission in Ethiopia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paolo Valente</td>
<td>Economist. Currently works as an Associate Fellow at the Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales in Madrid (Spain). For the last fifteen years, he has conducted research and published on Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and economic relations, among them, the European Neighborhood Policy, employment, employment policies and migration in Arab Mediterranean countries. In 2009-2010, he worked as Project Coordinator in the European University Institute and managed the European Commission Study “Labour Markets Performance and Migration Flows in Arab Mediterranean Countries: Determinants and Effects”. In 2011, he has carried out a Comparative Study for the International Organization for Migration, on Labour Market Information Systems and Labour Migration Information in Six Developing Countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iván Martín</td>
<td>Economist. Currently works as an Associate Fellow at the Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales in Madrid (Spain). For the last fifteen years, he has conducted research and published on Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and economic relations, among them, the European Neighborhood Policy, employment, employment policies and migration in Arab Mediterranean countries. In 2009-2010, he worked as Project Coordinator in the European University Institute and managed the European Commission Study “Labour Markets Performance and Migration Flows in Arab Mediterranean Countries: Determinants and Effects”. In 2011, he has carried out a Comparative Study for the International Organization for Migration, on Labour Market Information Systems and Labour Migration Information in Six Developing Countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosa Bravo Rodríguez</td>
<td>Economist. Currently works as an Associate Fellow at the Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales in Madrid (Spain). For the last fifteen years, he has conducted research and published on Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and economic relations, among them, the European Neighborhood Policy, employment, employment policies and migration in Arab Mediterranean countries. In 2009-2010, he worked as Project Coordinator in the European University Institute and managed the European Commission Study “Labour Markets Performance and Migration Flows in Arab Mediterranean Countries: Determinants and Effects”. In 2011, he has carried out a Comparative Study for the International Organization for Migration, on Labour Market Information Systems and Labour Migration Information in Six Developing Countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanessa Steinmayer</td>
<td>Session 5: African migration in Latin-American and institutional frameworks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcela Cerrutti</td>
<td>Holds a PhD in Economics from Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany. She is currently working as a Social Affairs Officer in the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific where her work is mainly focused on international migration. She has also published extensively on international migration in Asia and the Pacific. Prior to joining ESCAP, she worked as an Economic Affairs Officer in the Economic Commission for Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedro Marcelino</td>
<td>Ph.D. in Sociology with specialization in Demography. She is a researcher for the National Council for Scientific and Technical Research of Argentina and professor at two national universities. She was the director of the Population Studies Center in Buenos Aires where she is currently affiliated to. She has served as consultant for several international organizations and has numerous publications in the area of migration studies, particularly on intra-regional migration in Latin America.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alejandro I. Canales</td>
<td>Associate Researcher with the Centre for Research on Latin America and the Caribbean, at York University, Canada. Was a Guest Researcher at the Centre for Population Study in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Was a Researcher and Docent at the Bolivian Centre for Multidisciplinary Studies, in the context of CKD - Cooperation, Knowledge and Development, A North South Initiative for Cooperation and Training, researching the triangle of migrations, development and remittances. Consultant on migration policy and remittance optimization strategies with the Institute for the Communities, Ministry of the Emigrated Communities, Cape Verde. Recently published the book The New Migratory Paradigm of Transitional African Countries, exploring the transition of source countries ‘to transit’ and even destination. Currently researching the juridical and demographic consequences of the refugee and migrant crisis following the Libyan crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nora Pérez Vichich</td>
<td>PhD in Social Sciences, El Colegio de Mexico. He is Professor and Researcher at Regional Studies Department, at Universidad de Guadalajara, Mexico, and Chair of Population Studies, at the same university. He was President of Latin American Population Association, and was Editor of Latinamerican Population Journal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulo Sérgio de Almeida</td>
<td>Lawyer, Master in Sociology, an international consulting in migration issues. Senior Adviser in the Directorate of International Migration of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship of the Argentine Republic. Professor at the Master's Degree in International Migration Policies - University of Buenos Aires.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pablo de la Vega</td>
<td>Labor’s Inspector since October 1995; holds a Bachelor degree in Juridical Sciences from Rio de Janeiro’s Federal University. He was Chief of Labor Inspection in the State of Rio de Janeiro between 2003 and 2005 and National Coordinator for port and maritime labour inspection from 2004 to 2005. Since 2005, he has been working as General Coordinator for Immigration. In addition to this coordination, in 2007 he was appointed President of the National Immigration Council. This Council—which is responsible for the Brazilian policy-making on Immigration—is under the Brazilian Minister of Labour and Employment cabinet, and is composed by representatives of nine ministries, five central unions, five employers’ confederations and one representative of the Scientific Community.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Round Table 1: Migration between Africa, Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean: challenges and opportunities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thokozile Ruzvidzo</td>
<td>Director, African Centre for Gender and Social Development, ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jason Schachter</td>
<td>Population Affairs Officer in the Policy Section of the United Nation’s Population Division and holds an Adjunct Professor position at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. He has worked in the fields of demography and statistics for over fifteen years, and has numerous publications on the topic of migration statistics. Earlier in his career, he was a demographer for the U.S. Census Bureau, a senior statistician for the ILO, and served as a consultant for international organizations like the World Bank and IOM. He most recently held the position of Director of Research for New York City's Division of Citywide Equal Employment Opportunity. He received his PhD in Rural Sociology and Demography from Pennsylvania State University, examining internal U.S. migration patterns and reasons for move of the poor and international migrants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Mirela Shuteriqi</td>
<td>Works since 2008 as Protection Advisor with Terre de Hommes, following mainly on organization’s programs on protecting children on the move against abuse, exploitation and trafficking. Before she worked as a legal officer in the anti-trafficking program of TDH in Albania. Ms. Mirela Shuteriqi holds an LLM degree from the university of Utrecht, the Netherlands and is author of various publications on human rights, international criminal law, media legislation, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Round Table 2: Migration between Africa, Europe and Latin American and the Caribbean: advances and gaps in institutional arrangements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paul Tacon</td>
<td>He is currently working as an Associate Social Affairs Officer in the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, working on population and development questions, with a particular focus on international migration. Before joining ESCWA, he worked at the International Organization for Migration in Geneva on migration and development questions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anja Kug</td>
<td>Head of the Asylum / Migration Unit Division of International Protection (UNHCR).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jérôme Elie</td>
<td>Ph.D. from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (Geneva), 2007. Since 2008, Dr. Elie acts as Researcher and Coordinator of Activities at the Program for the Study of Global Migration (Geneva). His main fields of research include historical perspectives on global migration issues, Global Migration Governance and Migration and Development issues. He has recently published articles in the Refugee Survey Quarterly, Global Governance, the International Development Policy series.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>