



International Rivers and Lakes

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The editor encourages contributions of news items for an exchange of information with interested readers.

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I. Turkey to supply Israel's water needs?¹

An example of a possible water transfer scheme was provided by Turkey and Israel, under which Turkey may supply Israel's needs of water, according to Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit during Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak's visit to Turkey. In 1996, Israel and Turkey had signed an agreement in the framework of military cooperation. In this respect, the Turkish daily *Radikal* said on Monday that Barak's talks in Turkey centred on military issues and water.

The *Jerusalem Post* (27 October 1999) stated that Prime Minister Barak, on a visit to Turkey in late October, discussed the possibility of importing large quantities of water from that country. It is not the first time the idea has been raised, but until recently, it has always been seen as one of those futuristic 'New Middle East' ideas, rather than a practical solution.

In the past four years alone, no fewer than eight books have been published that focus on the importance of water in any attempts at conflict resolution in the region. Among the authors there are pessimists, who see the indivisibility of water as an obstacle to any final peace agreement, and optimists, who view future cooperation over water management as one of the means through which enemies will learn to work together because they will have no choice.

For its part, the international community wants Israel and the Palestinians, perhaps even Israel and Syria in the future, to create regional water management projects that would ensure a level of interdependency and cooperation that, in turn, would constitute a major factor preventing the renewed outbreak of hostilities.

Water is, or has been, an issue in all of Israel's peace negotiations except those with Egypt. One major item in the talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority concerns who will control the underground aquifer under the Green Line and how that water will be shared.

On the Syrian front, access to the water sources that flow into Israel and the Jordan River is the second most important issue to be negotiated after the strategic implications of partial or total withdrawal from the Golan Heights.

As for the Israel-Jordan peace accord, nearly half of the agreement deals with the issue of water, with Israel agreeing to transfer considerable amounts of this scarce resource to a country which has even less water at its disposal.

The *Post*, however points to the continuous failure to implement water savings and conservation measures, signaling a number of deficiencies including the use of subsidized agricultural water:

¹ From :<http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/991026/1999102646.html> and <http://www.jpost.com/com/Archive/27.Oct.1999/Opinion/Article-2.html>

“It is time for much larger amounts of water to be diverted out of the costly agricultural sector and into domestic usage.”

Importing water from Turkey would not be difficult. Pipes can be laid under the Mediterranean, or water can be imported in barges. However, the *Post* points out that:

“The government should implement infrastructure projects aimed at conserving, and increasing, the country's water supply.”

II. Transboundary Water Issues: Iraq asks for water from Turkey²

At the same time, Iraq asked for the implementation of the principle of equitable utilization, as enshrined in international law, regarding international watercourses between Turkey and Iraq. Iraq asked Turkey to grant it a proper share of the Degla and Euphrates Rivers water according to international norms.

Water issues have become a sensitive topic for Iraq because Turkey implemented a project that included the construction of dams and reservoirs on the basins of the Degla and Euphrates Rivers, which affected the volume of flowing water.

III. IDRC REPORTS: Laying a Foundation for Joint Management of the Israeli-Palestinian Mountain Aquifer³

Since 1993, Israelis and Palestinians from a range of disciplines—including law, economics, and hydrology -- have been developing a plan for joint management of the Mountain Aquifer, which provides about 50% of Israel's drinking water.

Scientists from Israel and Palestine have worked and made substantial progress in resolving one of the most controversial issues: the management of shared water resources.

The Mountain Aquifer is one of the largest natural freshwater sources in Israel and Palestine, making it highly protected. The geology of this mainly limestone aquifer is very complex. The water flows in

² From: <http://www.arabinews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/991026/1999102645.html>

³ Report by John Eberlee, from <http://www.idrc.ca/reports/read_article_english.cfm?article_num275>

several directions and is unusually rapid for an aquifer. However, in the main block of the aquifer, the flow is from east to west. This means that the sources are in Palestine and the outlets in Israel. About 90% of the catchment lies under Palestine and between 60% to 70% of the storage lies under Israel's pre-1976 borders.

“The result is an aquifer that would be a political problem if it lay under the border of Ontario or Quebec,” notes David Brooks, Research Manager at the International Development Research Centre. “In Israel and Palestine, the situation is that much worse because of a history that is evident to everyone, but that was complicated by the isolation of researchers from one another in the years after 1967.” According to Dr. Brooks, Israelis living inside the nation's 1967 boundaries consume about three times as much water per person for household uses as Palestinians. (Settlers living outside the 1967 boundaries consume about five times as much water.) Water allocation is even more inequitable, with almost 50% of Israeli farms under irrigation compared with less than 10% of farms on the West Bank. “But the real issue over water is not whether the Palestinian will get more water,” he says. “Israelis will gradually release more water to them. The question is whether Palestinians will share management of the water and particularly of the Mountain Aquifer.”

In December 1992, almost a year before the Oslo Peace Accord, the First International Israeli-Palestinian Academic Conference on Water was held in Zurich. “It was engineered by a couple of courageous Israelis and Palestinians and coordinated by a joint Israeli-Palestinian NGO,” said Dr. Brooks, who was the keynote speaker at the conference. After the meeting, Israelis and Palestinians from a range of disciplines -- including law, economics, and hydrology -- came together and proposed a study. The study would examine the potential for joint management of the Mountain Aquifer. Both the IDRC and the Charles R. Bronfman Foundation (CRB) agreed to fund the project.

“At first we were working on this very cautiously and gingerly, but once the peace process got started, it gave us a kind of legitimacy,” said Dr. Brooks. The work was constructed as an “...academic or third track activity complementing more formal political bilateral and technical multilateral tracks.” Some of the experts who participated in the diplomatic negotiations, especially on the Palestinian side, served as analysts in this study.

The key participants on the project team are the Truman Institute of the Hebrew University Jerusalem and the Palestine Consultancy Group, which includes representatives from An-Najah National University.

Since 1993, almost all of the leading Israeli and Palestinian hydrologists and water management experts have been involved in the project in some way, says Dr. Brooks. In addition to the experts, the project has also had guidance from “... a large number of international experts on water management and international law officials.”

Almost from the start, the Israeli-Palestinian team rejected two management options. The first was to separate management activities between the two parties, because it would be ‘physically impossible’. They also rejected the second option, which the domination of one side. This was rejected “... because

it is ethically and politically unacceptable.” The only option was joint management. Workshops in the following weeks and months, would help the teams understand what their duties would entail and how it would work. “There is very little history of true joint management of aquifers, so they are breaking new ground,” stressed Dr. Brooks. “ Various water management arrangements have been worked out in the past [between neighbouring counties], but they did not involve joint management.”

So far, the team has identified which tasks are essential in the joint management and what the proper order is to complete them. As Dr. Brooks points out, “ what do you do first, what has to go together, what can be separated, and what can be left for later. This is all on the social- political-institutional side.” Since then the researchers have also developed steps towards water quality management.

In their most recent report, the team discusses how to deal with severe droughts caused by several successive years of low rainfall and other important issues such as water rights. Current work is exploring the possibility of producing on-line scenario building that will demonstrate the potential for various forms of collaboration. These forms of collaboration depend on varying political, economic, and climactic conditions.

One of the teams has come to the conclusion that, “... the most controversial issues are sectoral, not national. If Israeli farmers suffer, so too will Palestinian farmers,” explains Dr. Brooks. “Both sides face bigger battles over how much water should go to different sectors than how much should go to Israelis versus Palestinians.”

Because of the team’s expertise and tremendous influence, Dr. Brooks believes that its recommendations on joint management will go “... right to the Prime Minister level.” Although the plan may be rejected because of bad political timing, “It will not be forgotten. Indeed, with the likely resumption of the peace negotiations as a result of the elections in Israel, it is more likely that their report will get widely distributed and receive a lot of attention.”

IV. Canadian Water, Canada’s Trade Obligations and B.C. Water Policy: Bulk water exports⁴

At the moment, there are strong pressures to consider water as an economic good. The following article helps contribute towards the clarification of the debate through the description of the limits, conditions and the extent of the economic status of water. The following excerpts are taken from an article written by Mr. Rolfe and reproduced in the Website indicated below.

⁴ From: <http://www.wcel.org/wcelpub/7512.html>: Canadian Water, Canada’s Trade Obligations and B.C. Water Policy, Christopher J.B. Rolfe, West Coast Environmental Law, 24 February 1999.

“Few legal interpretations have been as hot political issues or obscured in as much rhetoric [as the ‘good’ -- in the sense of a marketable commodity -- condition of water]. The question of whether Canadian trade obligations with the United States and more recently Mexico give the U.S. and Mexico access to Canadian water resources strikes a sensitive chord amongst Canadians. The spectre of a thirsty American or Mexican populace being given a right to drain Canada of its most plentiful resource has assured this issue remains current. Unfortunately, despite all the attention, the political nature of the issue has kept the water muddy.”

The debate carries over two issues. The first is whether or not water is ‘in’ or ‘out’ of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) and the second issue is disputing whether the United States can ‘force the tap open’. The answers really depend on the interpretation of relatively technical and sometimes obscure provisions. The goal of the article is to target these two issues and to try and clarify them.

As mentioned above, the first question is whether or not the two trade deals apply to water. There is really no definitive answer because it depends. The trade deal applies to goods. ‘Goods’ in the trade deals means the same thing as goods or ‘products’ under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Although GATT has usually been applied to goods that are commercially traded, there is no clear answer as to when something becomes a good. The issue of water as a good, for the purposes of the trade agreement, has been muddied because it is not clear whether all forms of water or only bottled water are covered in GATT’s commodity coding system.

However, the commodity coding system is generally seen by trade experts as being only a standard basis for negotiating tariff reductions on different goods, not as a basis for defining what is or is not a product or good.

It is clear that water in its natural state in (e.g. aquifers, lakes and rivers) is not a ‘good’ since it has not entered commerce. This was reiterated in the December 1993 ‘clarification’ of NAFTA signed by Canada, Mexico and the United States. Canadian Prime Minister Chretien insisted on this as a condition for implementing NAFTA.

Unfortunately, the clarification did little to resolve the more important question as to when water becomes a good under NAFTA or CUSFTA. One of the questions that remains unresolved is whether or not water is a good once it is dammed or diverted into the pipelines, canals or distribution systems. While the December 1993 clarification stated that water in its natural state in reservoirs was not a good, there is no reference as to whether water in a human-made reservoir or water which has been diverted is a good.

It is unresolved whether: water becomes a good if it is diverted for domestic, municipal or industrial use; if it only becomes a good if prices are charged for it; or if it only becomes a good once sold on a commercial basis.

The December 1993 clarification of NAFTA also failed to provide any clarification of what rights American have to Canadian water that is a good. For water that is a good, under NAFTA and

CUSFTA, any restrictions on export, including export quotas, export licenses, and minimum export prices, must comply with GATT Article XX (g). Moreover, NAFTA generally prohibits the use of export taxes (unless equal taxes are applied domestically).

While GATT Article XX (g) allows export restrictions relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, these measures are only allowable if they are "...made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption." GATT panels have stated that these provisions require at least some domestic restrictions on production or consumption.

Since diversions of water in British Columbia and other provinces require licenses under provincial legislation, it seems that Canada has some restrictions on domestic production of water as a product. However, the existence of some domestic regulation of water diversions does not mean that a water export ban will necessarily be acceptable under GATT and CUSFTA.

CUSFTA and GATT trade panels have said that restrictions on export must be those which Canada would be willing to impose on its own nationals for conservation purposes. The export restrictions must be primarily aimed at rendering the domestic restrictions effective.

Also, even if Canadian water export restrictions are permissible as being in relation to conservation of natural resources, they will only be allowed under CUSFTA and NAFTA if the resulting percentage reduction in the amount of water available to Americans is equal to the percentage drop in the Canadian supply of the water commodity. This applies to water which has become a good because of its diversion or sale. In other words, once the tap is open it cannot be closed.

All of this suggests that, if Canada does not want to be locked into exporting bulk water to the United States the federal government should reintroduce legislation banning large scale diversions or shipping of water to the other countries, and tightly regulating smaller shipments. Once commercial exports begin, water is clearly a product and, at best, Canada will only be able to reduce export in conjunction with equal percentage reductions.

Restrictions on water exports may fail unless they are applied in the context of strong domestic restrictions on water diversions and use. Strong domestic restrictions will be an indication that the export restrictions are in relation to conservation and that they are needed to make the domestic restrictions effective in conserving water. Thus, the provinces should review water legislation to ensure that it would support a federal ban.

These prescriptions for action underline the need for reform of provincial water regulation. Under the current British Columbia Water Act, applications for water licenses are based on the availability of water, impact on other licensees, and instream fisheries and habitat requirements. Licenses define the purpose for which the water is to be used (thus, a license for irrigation of a B.C. farm would not allow a farmer from the area to sell to the United States).

The government of British Columbia has proposed that amendments to the Water Act be introduced which would highlight existing criteria as well as require compliance with approved water management plans and use of the best available conservation technology. The government has also proposed the use of water pricing as an incentive for conservation.

Other additional amendments include: bans on large scale diversions and tight regulation of smaller scale diversions; a ban on development of diversions for purposes of export; and also provision of explicit protection for instream use. These amendments thus enshrine the principle that water diversions should not reduce flow or quality of water to a level that interferes with instream uses such as fish habitat, recreation and maintenance of water tables.

All of these measures, even in the absence of federal legislation, could largely eliminate the practical effects of Canada having granted other nations rights to Canadian water under CUSFTA and NAFTA.

Moe Sihota, the Minister of Environment in British Columbia has stated that, "Water export is a major concern to the people of B.C. The December Clarification provides little comfort for the province." Sihota has also called for Canada's federal government to ban exports. The West Coast Environmental Law Association supports this proposal, but the B.C. government must also take what action it can to avoid being tied into water exports in the future.

The amendments to the Water Act, as mentioned above, are important if Canadians want to effectively ban the export of their water, defined as being the same as 'domestic goods' under GATT; however, the provisions relevant to water export do not use the phrase 'goods of a Party'.

It should also be noted that several commentators have said that CUSFTA promises of 'national treatment' give Americans access to Canadian water. This interpretation of provisions seems unlikely. First, under GATT and NAFTA 'national treatment' means countries are to give the same treatment to foreign goods and services in Canada; it does not mean that they are to give other nations equal access to Canadian goods and services. This interpretation is likely to be extended to CUSFTA. Secondly, CUSFTA only promises national treatment 'to the extent provided in this agreement'.

Article XX (g) also requires that export restrictions not be 'arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination'. This has been narrowly interpreted and would likely not be a problem as long as Canada's export restrictions applied to all other countries.

V. Litigation over international water exports: Corporations are Suing Canada⁵

Ever since the advent of free trade, Canadians have worried that trade rules would one day be used to challenge Canadian efforts to restrict bulk water exports. We needn't hold our breath any longer because a US-based company, Sun Belt Water Inc., has decided to do just that. While a yet-to-be-established ban on such water exports by the federal government (US) would help, the only certain way to head off similar claims is to amend NAFTA to explicitly preclude exports of bulk water. In fact, Sun Belt's claim follows the lead of other US corporations that have taken advantage of the powerful enforcement provisions in NAFTA's investment chapter to challenge other Canadian environmental laws.

Relying on these rules, Sun Belt is seeking more than \$US 200 million from Canada because of British Columbia's legislation banning bulk water exports. The company claims that BC's law violates several NAFTA-based investor rights including, in this case, its right to export BC water by tanker to California. Sun Belt argues that it is entitled to the same access to Canadian water as Canadians enjoy. Anything less is discriminatory and offends the principle of National Treatment, a cornerstone of free trade. Having been denied that access by BC's export ban, it now claims compensation for the profits it would have made, had free trade rules been observed.

There is some irony, however, in the fact that Sun Belt's claim for 'equitable treatment' is being made under NAFTA's investor-state suit provisions, which are not available to Canadian companies. Moreover, the point is unlikely to be lost on those Canadian companies currently seeking water export approvals in other provinces, which may now wonder whether they should restructure as US corporations to gain similar access to NAFTA's enforcement machinery.

As long as no company succeeds in getting export approval, Canada may argue that NAFTA rules simply do not apply to bulk water exports. But as soon as any export permit is issued, water would undeniably become a tradeable good and, therefore, subject to the full array of free trade rules.

This explains why several groups have recently renewed their calls for federal legislation similar to BC's ban on bulk water exports. After promising to enact such legislation, the federal government now seems to be retreating from that commitment, choosing instead to refer the matter for further discussion to the International Joint Commission or the North American Commission on Environmental Cooperation. Unfortunately, neither institution has the authority to rewrite or influence the enforcement of NAFTA trade rules.

⁵ From http://www.wcel.org/4976/22/22_04.htTITLE>NEWS from West Coast Environmental Law: Opening the Floodgates, 29 March 1999.

VI. Indigenous Concerns over Large Scale Water Works and Development⁶

Below is an open letter from leaders of indigenous and river bank communities regarding the impacts of the Araguaia-Tocantins Hidrovias and large dams on their communities. The Hidrovia is a project consisting of a staircase of large dams planned for the Tocantins River in Brazil. It was made possible by construction of the north-south transmission line; to date no studies have been undertaken on the cumulative impacts of these projects. In the letter the names of specific companies have not been used, as the conflict is still unresolved. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations.

Luziânia, Goiás state, Brazil, 21 October 1999

We, Leaders and Chiefs representing the indigenous groups: Apinajé, Xerente, Karajá, Javaé, Tapirapé and Krahô affected by the Araguaia-Tocantins Hidrovia, by the construction of large dams, of which Lajeado Dam is an example, and by the others planned for the basin – such as Serra Quebrada, Peixe, Ipueiras and others -- met in Luziânia, Goiás, on 18 October 1999 to discuss the environmental, social, and cultural impacts these projects will cause for indigenous, river bank, and farming communities.

The Araguaia and Tocantins Rivers form one of the largest basins of drinkable water in our country. If these projects are carried out, the waters will be polluted, directly affecting the entire ecosystem of the region, compromising the survival of thousands of families that directly depend on these rivers.

The Araguaia-Tocantins Hidrovia, besides affecting the indigenous ethnic groups taking part in this meeting, will also affect the Gavião, Avá-Canoeiro, Gavião/Parkatejê, Parakanã, Aikewar/Surui, Assurini and Xikrin. Also affected will be the protected areas Araguaia National Park; the Extreme North of Tocantins, Ciriaco, and Mata Grande Extractive Reserves; the Lajeado state reserve; the Tapirapé-Aquiri National Forest; The Tapirapé Biological Reserve; the Igarapé Gelado and Serra Azul Environmental Protection Areas; and the Serra Azul state park.

The principal objective of this project is to implement commercial navigation on the Araguaia, Tocantins and das Mortes Rivers, to transport fertilizers, fuels, and the grain harvest from the Central-western and Amazon regions of the country. We know that these rivers are not navigable for large barges, and that to make them navigable, it will be necessary to dynamite the river bed, and to dredge, which will cause the death of the rivers, and the fish and animals that depend on them. It is a project that will mean the death of thousands of families, among them the inhabitants of 35 indigenous communities that depend completely upon them, since the river is the source of our lives.

⁶ From Glenn Switkes, Director, Latin America Program, International Rivers Network, <http://www.irn.org>
email: <glen@cba.zaz.com.br>

We are concerned with the threat that the construction of the Araguaia-Tocantins Hidrovia represents. Its impacts on animals and plants can cause various problems affecting our survival. The rivers and lakes are the place where various beings that help the Karajá people in our ceremonies, and with food are found. The rivers and lakes are also the place from which our history and our myths spring forth. For this reason, the destruction of the river will not only affect our food sources, but also will mean the end of our culture. It will mean genocide for the Karajá people. We are against the construction of this Hidrovia because, after 500 years of resistance, struggle, and having to confront violence, this will be genocide.

Other large-scale projects also are placing our survival at risk – these are the large dams. We are already suffering the impacts caused by the construction of Lajeado Dam. There are thousands of families and Xerente communities that are affected. The dam is being constructed, and the compensation measures indicated in the Basic Environmental Projects (PBAs) are not being carried out by [the company] which is responsible for the project. We wish to denounce the following facts:

1. Lajeado Dam is bringing disease, prostitution, hunger, and alcohol to the Xerente people, and causing disrespect for our culture and an increase in violence on our lands. [The company] did not meet its promises. The ethno-environmental diagnostic should have been carried out before beginning construction, but it has yet to be presented to the community. We demand that agricultural, health, and education programs be permanent, because the dam will be in operation for 35 years. We do not accept the fact that we will have to suffer impacts that will threaten the continuity of the Xerente people.
2. [The company] is violating the economic and food rights by appropriating the production methods of the affected populations, taking their lands for ridiculously low prices, and refusing to comply with the proposal in the PBA for collective rural resettlements, which could restructure the community and its means of production in productive lots varying from 32 to 100 ha (PBA rural pp. 33-38).
3. The company does not consider the production means of communities such as Vila Graciosa, where most of the population survives through agriculture, or are rural landowners (PBA urban pp. 21-24). The Lajeado population was forced to move to nearby towns.
4. [The company] has been pushing urban and rural dam-affected populations to sell their properties at prices below the cost of setting up a new life in other places, in order to maintain the same conditions of survival. The most fertile lands (floodplain land and river islands) will be flooded by the dam.
5. Today, after various discussions, meetings, seminars, and hearings dating from the beginning of the bidding process for construction of Lajeado Dam, families are still awaiting concrete answers and they are calling for placing into effect the proposals in the PBAs, such as collective resettlement in productive lots, and a study of the water table in the municipalities of Palmas, Porto Nacional, and in the communities of Pinheirópolis and São Francisco.

6. [The company] only included 70% of the population in its census, designating the rest as ‘landowners not located’. As many do not have formal definitive land title, this makes it difficult to recognize all dam-affected.

7. [The company], even before completing the Environmental Impact Studies contracted [another company], which used threats and bad faith to acquire land, paying very low prices, and forcing land owners to continue on the land as leasers. Today, they do not know where to go, and most of the money they received has been spent.

8. The Community Association of Small Farmers of Palmas (ACUP), consisting of 41 families of small farmers, calls for collective resettlement in productive lots as indicated in the PBA rural (pp. 33 -39).

The construction of large dams on the Tocantins River, in the same way as Tucuruí dam and Serra da Mesa dam, have caused serious impacts on animals, plants, and people -- river bank dwellers, indigenous people, farmers and farm workers -- people that depend completely on the river, and whose lives are now threatened.

The project to construct Serra Quebrada Dam on the Tocantins River, which will flood more than 5% of the land of the Apinajé indigenous people, places the survival of our children and the future of our nation and our land, already too small for us, at risk. We Apinajé people have the river as our source, because our culture is the mother earth, the river, nature, and animals. We do not accept this dam. We will fight to the death so that our children may live in peace. We do not accept Serra Quebrada Dam. Our will must be respected.

We the Karajá-Javaé people still suffer as a result of the failure to demarcate our lands. Studies carried out in 1988 proved our traditional occupation of the Boto Velho indigenous area (Ina - WeboHana) on the Bananal Island by our people, but the process was only filed by FUNAI at the beginning of this year. We are very concerned with the slowness by which this process is moving forward. We demand the immediate demarcation of our land in the next 30 days, because IBAMA and ranchers are threatening us.

Given these facts we are against the carrying out of these projects --

1. We do not accept the Araguaia-Tocantins Hidrovia;
2. We reaffirm our right to public hearings on the Hidrovia in affected communities;
3. We demand the carrying out of a public hearing to discuss Lajeado Dam;
4. We are against construction of Serra Quebrada Dam;
5. We demand the demarcation of the Boto Velho indigenous land.

Sincerely,

Apinajé, Krahô, Xerente, Karajá, Karajá - Javaé and Tapirapé indigenous Peoples, River bank dwellers of the Tocantins and Araguaia Rivers

VII. Mexico-USA: Binational Water Challenges and Opportunities Conference Recommendations⁷

The San Diego Association of Governments' Committee on Binational Regional Opportunities and the Consul General of Mexico co-sponsored a day-long conference to discuss water needs and supply in the binational San Diego-Tijuana region. The following are the recommendations from the conference:

1. *Binational Convening Mechanism:* Establish a binational convening mechanism for regular transborder cooperation regarding political, technical, and management water-related issues.
2. *Sharing of Data and Technology:* Through the binational convening mechanism, facilitate the exchange of information and technology in various sub-areas, including:
 - Binational protocol issues;
 - Measurement and conversion issues;
 - Existing and projected supply, demand, and population growth rates in San Diego and Tijuana;
 - Existing and planned water infrastructure in San Diego and Tijuana;
 - Desalination, reclamation, and purification technologies;
 - Current uses of groundwater under the Tijuana River Valley Watershed and their effects on local ecosystems; and
 - Joint infrastructure projects and infrastructure management issues.
3. *Public Participation:* Assure an open public participation process on both sides of the border regarding the development of water infrastructure projects in the binational region.
4. *Development of New Water Sources:* Explore the potential of joint participation in a binational aqueduct to transport water from the Colorado River to both Tijuana and San Diego. Examine opportunities for binational storage projects at a regional level, such as joint reservoirs.
5. *Commodity Exchange/Recycling and Reuse of Water:* Promote all water as a commodity. Agree upon a tiered set of water quality standards based on various uses (e.g. landscaping, agriculture, industrial uses, human consumption, etc.) for treated water. Subsequently, develop a commodity exchange programme of credits and debits for wastewater and potable water to encourage water exchange and re-use between the two nations at a regional level.

⁷ The San Diego Association of Governments' Committee on Binational Regional Opportunities and the Consul General of Mexico co-sponsored a day-long conference to discuss water needs and supply in the binational San Diego-Tijuana region.

6. *Water Conservation Education and Projects*: Develop incentives and educational tools to motivate the general public and water-intensive entities to conserve water; Conduct conservation projects including drought-tolerant landscaping and water-saving plumbing projects, as well as projects that minimize water loss through the distribution network.

7. *Emergency Supply*: Develop contingency plans to provide water from San Diego to Tijuana and from Tijuana to San Diego in case of emergencies; Promote the sharing of information on both sides of the border, and the possibility of using infrastructure for mutual support in emergency situations.

8. *Watershed Approach*: Apply a watershed approach as an overriding principle to the above recommendation .

VIII. Nile Basin Initiative opens Secretariat⁸

On 3 September 1999, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) Secretariat was officially opened in Entebbe, Uganda. Launched in February 1999, the NBI is seen as a transitional arrangement until the member countries agree on a permanent legal and institutional framework for sustainable development of the Nile River Basin. Member countries are Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. The NBI is financed by several multilateral (World Bank, UNDP, FAO) and bilateral agencies (Italy, Netherlands, Finland, UK, Germany, Norway and Sweden).

⁸From: Nile Basin Initiative Secretariat, <mailto:nbisec@afsat.com>, <http://www.nilebasin.org/>
(NBI Press Release, 3 September 1999, <http://www.nilebasin.org/press.htm>)