WHAT PROGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REFORM?
WHY SO LIMITED?

Stephany Griffith-Jones and José Antonio Ocampo *

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The recent wave of currency and banking crises that began in 1997 in East Asia generated a broad consensus that fundamental reforms were required in the international financial system to adapt it to the requirements of the 21st century. The rationing of poor countries from private financing even during periods of booming capital flows, as well as the significant contraction of private financing to all developing countries since the Asian crisis implies, in turn, that, besides the objective of achieving international financial stability, an equally important objective is the provision of adequate capital flows to different categories of developing economies. Thus, the goals of a new international financial architecture from a developmental perspective are twofold: to prevent currency and banking crises and better manage them when they occur, and to support the adequate provision of net private and public flows to developing countries, including in particular low-income ones. In this paper, we attempt to assess progress on international financial reform in relation to these two goals.

To fulfil these objectives, the international financial architecture must provide five different services: a) guarantee the consistency of national macroeconomic policies with stability of growth at the global level as a central objective; b) appropriate transparency and regulation of international financial loan and capital markets, and adequate regulation of domestic financial systems and cross-border capital account flows; c) provision of sufficient international official liquidity in crisis conditions, d) accepted mechanisms for standstill and orderly debt workouts at the international level, and e) appropriate mechanisms for development finance.

The first two mechanisms are essential for preventing crises, which have proven to be developmentally, socially and financially very costly. The third and fourth mechanisms would help manage crises better to make them less costly, but can also have preventive effects, as a system better suited to manage crises is less prone to destabilising capital flows. Finally, development finance is essential to channel flows to countries, especially low-income ones, that do not have sufficient access to private flows. It is also essential to guarantee an adequate supply of funds to middle-income countries during periods of insufficient private capital flows, and can also provide other essential developmental functions.

Progress so far has suffered four serious problems. First, there has been no agreed international reform agenda. Furthermore, the process has responded to priorities set by a few industrialised countries that have not been always explicit and have varied through time. The United Nations Conference on Financing for Development held at Monterrey on March 2002 provided for the first time a full international agenda, which must thus become the guide to future developments in this area. Second, progress made has been uneven and asymmetrical in several key aspects. The focus of reforms has been largely on strengthening macroeconomic policies and financial regulation in developing countries —i.e., on the national component of the architecture—, while far less progress has been made on the international and, particularly, the regional components. Another set of asymmetries relates to the excessive focus of the reform effort on crisis prevention and management, mainly for middle-income countries. Important as this is, it may have led to neglect the equally —if not more important— issues of appropriate liquidity and development finance for low-income countries. Third, some advances in the international financial architecture run the risk of reversal. Fourth, the reform process has been characterised by an insufficient representation of developing countries in key institutions —such as the IMF, the World Bank and the Bank for International Settlements—and their exclusion from others —the Financial Stability Forum and the G-10 Basle Committees—.
This paper evaluates progress on international reform at a disaggregated level, differentiating three groups of areas according to the level of progress in reforms. A first group, where there has been progress, includes the development of codes and standards for crisis prevention in capital recipient countries, by far the area that has been the focus of most attention. Advance has been particularly important in data dissemination, monetary and fiscal policy transparency, and banking supervision. Nonetheless, institutional, legislative and human resource constraints in implementing these policies have proven to be high, particularly for small and poor countries, and participation of developing countries in developing codes and standards has been low.

The design of new IMF financial facilities, particularly the Supplementary Reserve Facility and the Contingency Credit Line, should also be included as an advance, though the latter has not yet been used, reflecting fears of how this would be interpreted by private markets. The Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, launched in 1996 and the enhanced HIPC approved in 1999, are also major steps at bringing external debts of low-income countries to sustainable levels. Nonetheless, its degree of implementation has been considered to be slow by many poor countries and several analysts, and the scenarios for debt sustainability too optimistic.

A second group, where partial progress has been made, includes macroeconomic surveillance and mechanisms to guarantee the coherence of macroeconomic policies. It is, indeed, peculiar that macroeconomic policy coordination by major industrialised countries is not even recognised as part of the required reforms of the international financial architecture. Progress has been important in this area in relation to preventive surveillance of emerging economies, the development of vulnerability and early warning systems, more regular analyses of financial markets and the design of mechanisms of consultation between the Bretton Woods institutions and private financial actors.

An additional area of progress has been the creation of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) to identify vulnerabilities and sources of systemic risk, to fill gaps in regulations and to develop consistent financial regulations across all types of financial institutions. Nonetheless, this advance has been partial due to the limited capacity of the FSF to influence decisions taken by national regulators in capital source countries, and by the lack of participation of developing economies the main body of the FSF. The proposed modification of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord may represent an advance in aligning banks' regulatory capital with actual risks but is likely to exacerbate pro-cyclical tendencies within the banking system and could further ration lending to developing countries, particularly those (the large majority) that do not enjoy investment grades.

The agreement on the principle of "ownership" of macroeconomic and development policies as a guide to international financial cooperation, as well as the agreement on streamlining IMF conditionality should also be seen as advances. Nonetheless, the implications of "ownership" have been limited in terms of increasing the effective choices faced by developing countries. This reflects the fact that alternative reform packages are not provided by the Bretton Woods institutions to developing countries that want to diverge from traditional macroeconomic and structural adjustment packages. This highlights the fact that effective "ownership" requires international financial institutions embracing intellectual diversity as a major goal, thus becoming more representative of the heterogeneous views that exist on macroeconomic and development policies.
A third group, where no important progress has been made, includes the use of special drawing rights (SDRs) as an instrument of IMF financing. Indeed, in recent years, there have been several proposals to issue SDRs, either as a counter-cyclical mechanism to meet the large demand for IMF emergency financing during crises, or on a permanent base to guarantee, through a multilateral instrument, the increasing demand for international reserve assets. Nonetheless, both types of proposals have led to no action. The debate on the design of international debt standstills and workout procedures has advanced, particularly with respect to the use of collective action clauses in bond contracts, but there are still significant differences of opinion on the need for a complementary sovereign debt restructuring mechanism. Also, the tendency to interpret debt workouts as an alternative rather than a complement to emergency financing, and the lack of proposals (such as guarantee funds) aimed at facilitating reinsertion into private capital markets after restructuring, implies that developing countries continue to see the partial approach to this issue as a source of additional risks—that it could further reduce already limited access of developing countries to private capital markets.

Commitments made at Monterrey with respect to ODA will hopefully lead to a reversal of the adverse trend experienced by bilateral aid in recent decades but represent only a fraction of the resources needed to halve extreme poverty by 2015. Also, only limited or no commitments have been made on enhancing the role of multilateral development banks in financing low-income countries; providing partial counter-cyclical financing to middle income countries; acting as catalysts for new forms of private investment; and supporting capacity building, institutional development, and the provision of global and regional public goods. Finally, the recognition of the essential role that regional institutions can play in all areas of the international financial system continues to be one of the most prominent items missing from mainstream discussions and agendas on international financial reform.

To correct the slow pace of reform, the paper suggests that developing countries could attempt to design and offer a “grand bargain” on international and national financial reform that would be attractive to a whole range of actors in developed countries. Such a grand bargain would have two sets of elements. Developing countries could indicate that they would be more keen to implement initiatives of interest to developed economies if, and only if, those countries agreed to reform the global financial system in ways that would facilitate more and more stable capital flows to developing countries, and make costly crises in these countries less likely. Such a bargain would provide incentives for developed countries to make necessary international changes, as they would know that these would ensure the changes they desired to take place in developing countries, and vice versa.

Finally, the paper argues that the asymmetries in the international financial reform process reflect certain political and political economy characteristics of the world. The most powerful governments, the G-7—and especially their financial authorities—have not thrown their weight consistently behind a deep international reform. Thus, we claim that one of the best ways to support progress on an international financial reform that is more supportive of development and poverty reduction is to strengthen the voice of developing countries in that discussion. To do that, it is important not just to increase participation of developing countries in the key fora, but also to enhance their technical knowledge of increasingly complex issues. In this regard, we recommend that a fund or resource centre could be created that would provide systematic, timely and independent support to representatives of developing countries in the boards and fora where the international financial reform agenda is being discussed.
I. WHAT PROGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE?

1. Aims of reform of the International Financial Architecture (IFA): their links to development and growth

The wave of currency and banking crises that began in 1997 in East Asia, then spread to Russia and other emerging markets, and even threatened to spill over to the US, generated a broad consensus that fundamental reforms were required in the international financial system. Particularly during 1997 and 1998, the view became dominant that existing institutions and mechanisms, based on a design made in the mid 1940s, were inadequate for preventing and managing crises, in the dramatically changed world of the 21st Century, and that a significant reform—as well as strengthening—of global financial governance was urgent.

Besides the objective of achieving international financial stability, an equally important objective, to which insufficient attention has been given, is the provision of adequate capital flows, both private and public, to different categories of developing economies. These flows can complement domestic savings, and provide additional foreign exchange and technology to these economies. This does not imply a return to the excessive levels of easily reversible private lending that characterised the first half of the 1990s, but sufficient levels of stable private and official flows that contribute to higher growth of both low and middle-income countries.

The two major goals for a new international financial architecture from a developmental perspective are thus: a) to prevent currency and banking crises and better manage them when they occur, and b) to support the adequate provision of net private and public flows to developing countries, including in particular low-income ones. In this paper, we attempt to assess progress on international financial reform, in relation to these two goals. In this sense, our paper is broader than most of the literature on the subject, which has focussed on achieving international financial stability and avoiding contagion.
It should be stressed that such a development oriented international financial architecture would not only benefit developing countries. Stable growth in these countries provides growing markets for developed country exporters and profitable opportunities for developed country investors. More generally, avoidance of crises in developing countries reduces the risk of such crises spilling over to the developed countries. Although small, this risk is significant, as the Latin American debt crises of the 1980s, and the combined effect of the Asian and Russian crises of 1997-1998 have shown.

Though changes have taken place, the fact that deep crises have continued to happen, most recently in Turkey and Argentina, indicate that the international financial system in place clearly needs further changes in the area of crisis prevention and management, in parallel with further improvements in domestic economic policies in developing countries. On top of these issues, the availability of sufficient external finance has emerged as a particularly urgent issue in recent years, given that net private capital flows both to emerging economies and to low-income countries have fallen very sharply since 1997. To the extent that private capital flows do not recover sufficiently (either spontaneously or encouraged by government policies), a greater role would need to be played by official liquidity and development finance. A particular source of concern is that an important part of this decline may be due to structural reasons, and not just to cyclical ones (see Griffith-Jones, 2001, and IMF, 2001a). This would imply that net private flows to developing countries could remain very low for a fairly long time period.

2. **Broad overview of progress so far**

Almost five years after the Asian crisis and with new crises still unfolding, it is time to evaluate progress achieved on reforming the international financial system. Some progress has been made, but it is clearly insufficient. The mechanisms that existed previously and the adaptations made in recent years clearly do not fully meet the demands created by financial globalisation.

The extensive debates that have been going on in recent years indicates that the international financial architecture must provide five different services: a) guarantee the
consistency of national macroeconomic policies (now regional in the case of European monetary
and exchange rate policy), with stability of global economic growth as the central objective; b)
appropriate transparency and regulation of international financial loan and capital markets, as
well as adequate regulation of domestic financial systems and cross-border capital account flows;
c) provision of sufficient international official liquidity during crises; d) accepted mechanisms
for standstill and orderly debt workouts at the international level; and e) appropriate levels and
instruments of development finance.

The first two mechanisms are essential for preventing crises, which have proven to be
developmentally, socially and financially very costly. The third and fourth mechanisms would
help manage crises better to make them less costly, but also have preventive effects, as a system
better suited to manage crises is less prone to destabilising capital flows. This has indeed been
the experience of national financial systems in relation to the lending of last resort by central
banks. Finally, development finance is essential to channel flows to countries, especially low-
income ones, that do not have sufficient access to private flows. It is also essential to guarantee
an adequate supply of funds to middle-income countries during periods of insufficient private
capital flows and, as we will see below, serve also other essential developmental functions. It
should be emphasised that these five services can be provided by different mixes of world,
regional and national institutions. Thus, the international financial architecture should be seen as
a network of institutions that provides such services rather than as a set of world institutions
specialised in each of them.

Progress so far has suffered four serious problems.

Firstly, there has been no agreed international reform agenda. Furthermore, the process
has responded to priorities set by a few industrialised countries that have not been always
explicit and have varied through time. In this regard, the “Monterrey Consensus” of the
International Conference on Financing for Development of the United Nations, held in March
2002 (see United Nations, 2002), provided, for the first time, an agreed comprehensive and
balanced international agenda, that should be used to guide and evaluate reform efforts. The
sections of the Consensus on increasing international financial and technical cooperation for
development (Par. 39-46), external debt (Par. 47-51) and systemic issues (especially Par. 52-63), are particularly relevant to reforming the IFA.

Secondly, progress made has been uneven and asymmetrical in several key aspects. The focus of reforms has been largely on strengthening macroeconomic policies and financial regulation in developing countries —i.e., on the national component of the architecture—, while far less progress has been made on the international and, particularly, the regional components. Indeed, there has actually been general disregard and, in some cases, open opposition to the regional dimension. These are major weaknesses, as crises have not just been caused by country problems (even though these have been obviously important) but also by imperfections in international capital markets, such as herding, that lead to rapid surges and reversals of massive private flows, and multiple equilibria, that may lead countries into self-fulfilling or deeper crises.

Another set of asymmetries relates to the excessive focus of the reform effort on crisis prevention and management, mainly for middle-income countries. Important as this is, it may have led to neglect the equally —if not more important— issues of appropriate liquidity and development finance for low-income countries. Moreover, the problem of availability of development finance has clearly moved to centre stage for all developing economies. Thus, although some of the reforms adopted will be crucial in the future to help prevent a new wave of crises, at present, and --most likely-- for several years, the problem is the opposite, of insufficient private flows. Therefore, an important task is also to design measures, which will both encourage higher levels of private flows (especially long-term ones) and will provide counter-cyclical official flows (both for liquidity and for development finance purposes) during the periods when private flows are insufficient. These important tasks have been relatively neglected in recent years, certainly in the policy field and even in the academic debate. They now require urgent attention.

Within the realm of crisis prevention and management, progress has also been uneven. In the area of crisis prevention, much work has been done in relation to strengthening domestic financial systems in developing countries and in drafting international codes and standards for macroeconomic and financial regulation. The review of the Basel accord on international
banking regulation has also concentrated much effort. On the contrary, aside from enhanced macroeconomic surveillance of developing country policies and a few *ad hoc* episodes of macroeconomic coordination among industrialised countries, few steps have been taken to guarantee a more coherent macroeconomic policy approach at the global level. Also, the drafting of new IMF financing facilities has received much more attention than international debt standstills and workout procedures. In the area of IMF financial facilities, frustration has been the characteristic of the design of the new facility to manage contagion, the Contingency Credit Line (CCL). Some advance has been made in redefining IMF conditionality. The IMF quota increase and the extension of the arrangements to borrow, which became effective in 1999, has also been an advance, but several proposals made on the more active use of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) as a mechanism of IMF financing have not led to action.

*Thirdly,* some of these advances in the international financial architecture run the risk of reversal. Recently, there has been growing reluctance by developed countries to support large IMF lending (or to contribute bilateral short-term lending) to manage crises better. The main arguments given have been that these large packages lead to excessive moral hazard, which implies that both borrowers and lenders behave more irresponsibly, knowing that they will be "bailed out", and that taxpayer money from industrialised countries should not, in any case, be risked in these operations. These arguments have been vastly overstated, as we will see below, but have been quite influential in recent international action.

*Fourthly,* as we will see in detail below, the reform process has been characterised by an insufficient participation of developing countries in key institutions and fora. As regards the international financial institutions (especially the IMF, World Bank and BIS) more balanced representation needs to be discussed in parallel with a redefinition of their functions. It is also urgent that developing countries be fully represented in the Financial Stability Forum, and in standard-setting bodies, like the Basel Banking Committee, as they will be asked to implement the standards there defined.

In what follows, we will evaluate progress at a more disaggregated level, distinguishing in different cases the three domains of action, the national, the regional and the international. The
discussion would differentiate according to the level of progress in reforms. Thus, in section II, we will focus on areas where there has been progress. Section III will deal with those where advance has been very partial, whereas section IV will deal with those where, although there are several proposals on the table, no significant progress has been made. The division is somewhat arbitrary, as some areas included in the first group have major weaknesses, whereas there has been some advance in some of the areas that are included in the second and even the third groups.

The first, where there has been progress, include: a) the development of codes and standards for crisis prevention in capital recipient countries, by far the area that has been the focus of most attention; b) the design of new IMF financial facilities; and c) the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative aimed at bringing external debts of low-income countries to sustainable levels. The group where partial progress has been made includes: a) macroeconomic surveillance and mechanisms to guarantee the coherence of macroeconomic policies; b) improvements in world-wide regulatory standards; and c) the redefinition of conditionality. Finally, the third group, where no important progress has been made, includes: a) the use of SDRs as an instrument of IMF financing; b) the design of international standstills and workout procedures; c) development finance; and d) regional schemes in all areas of the financial architecture. The lack of adequate participation of developing countries in global financial governance should be added to the latter group.

3. Representation of developing countries in international financing institutions and fora

Indeed, a very important reason for slow progress in reforming the international financial architecture and the inherent asymmetry in the measures taken has been the limited participation of developing countries in the fora where reform has been discussed, and —more generally— in the institutions of global financial governance. As a consequence, enhancing the participation of developing countries in these institutions would have one particularly important advantage. It would imply significantly greater impulse for necessary changes in the global financial architecture. These changes, and the resulting positive impact on global financial stability and
growth, would not just benefit developing countries; it would also have significant direct and indirect benefits for the developed world.

There are, naturally, other very important benefits from greater developing country participation in global financial governance. First, developing countries would enjoy a stronger voice. Second, international institutions would benefit from enhanced legitimacy; after all, developing countries represent 85 per cent of the world’s population and a significant proportion of global GDP, especially when measured using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) methodologies. Finally, greater participation by developing countries in global financial governance would ensure greater commitment by these countries to open markets, an aim shared by developed countries.

Since the Asian crisis, participation of developing countries has emerged as an important issue. However, actual progress on it has been very limited.

Two new fora have been created to support the process of international financial reform. One is the Financial Stability Forum (FSF). Unfortunately, the composition of the FSF is very problematic as developing countries are excluded (except major financial centres -- Hong Kong and Singapore), even though they have some ad-hoc participation (by invitation only) in the Working Parties. The FSF has also recently started to organise outreach regional activities, such as meetings in Asia and Latin America. However, full participation by some developing countries has not been granted, even though when it was established by the G-7, they stated that “while initially the FSF would be limited to G-7 countries, it is envisaged that other national authorities, including from emerging economies, will join the process at some stage.”

In contrast, the other forum, the G-20, was created to facilitate dialogue between a broader group of countries on international financial reform, partly as a response to criticism of the G-7 as an exclusive grouping. Its composition was carefully designed to include those developing and transition countries whose size or strategic significance gives them a particularly crucial role in the global economy. They include ten developing countries, nine industrial ones (including the G-7) plus Russia.
The existence of a forum where developed and major developing countries' most senior financial authorities can informally exchange views and explore policy responses is clearly a valuable one. Some concrete progress has also been made at the G-20 on specific modifications to the international financial architecture of interest to developing countries, such as changes to IMF and World Bank lending facilities. However, there are major limitations in the way this forum has operated until now. The main one is the fairly narrow orientation of its formal agenda, which should thus be broadened. It should ideally comprise key subjects on reform of the international financial system, including systemic issues, such as enhanced liquidity and development finance, as well as better co-ordination of macroeconomic management at the world level. A far more ambitious agenda could transform the G-20 from a body useful at a fairly basic level, to one with the potential to make a truly valuable contribution to the reform of the international financial system. Another important limitation is that small and low-income countries are not represented at all.

More broadly, for enhanced participation by developing countries it is firstly important to increase developing country influence in the institutions to which they belong, but where they are under-represented due to existing governance structures, such as the IMF and the World Bank Group. Second, it is essential to expand significantly the participation of developing countries in the Bank for International Settlements where important, but still insufficient progress has taken place in the second half of the 1990s. Third, and perhaps most importantly, developing countries should be included on a rotational basis in crucial fora from which they are currently excluded, including the Financial Stability Forum and the Basel Committees.

The governance problem at the heart of the IMF, namely the out-dated and complex quota system, has yet to be properly addressed. The Cooper Report on Fund quotas \(^1\) proposes a new quota calculation system that has positive aspects, but would increase the voting power of some of the already powerful countries and decrease that of many of the poorer countries. The basis of an alternative proposal could be based on elements such as the restoration of the importance of basic votes, and the use of PPP-based GDP estimates, as the combination of both

\(^1\) "Report to the IMF Executive Board of the Quota Formula Review Group", submitted in April 2000.
elements would help correct the under-representation of developing countries in the Executive Board, and therefore also in the International Monetary and Financial Committee.

The voting power of an IMF member has two components. As a symbolic recognition of the principle of the legal equality of states, and to help ensure participation of smaller and poorer countries, each member country has 250 basic votes. Each member also has one additional vote for every 100,000 SDRs of its quota. Because the number of basic votes has not increased as quotas grew, the ratio of basic votes fell from around 11% of the voting power of the 45 founding members in 1944 to less than 3% in the 1990s, even though the number of countries tripled. Restoring the share of basic votes to the original 11% would require a more than fivefold increase in the basic vote of every country. More ambitious solutions would assign a larger share of basic votes in total voting rights. Furthermore, the use of PPP based GDP estimates in the quota formulas, in order to avoid the current underestimation of the economic size and ability to contribute to quotas by developing economies would also enhance the role of developing countries in the IMF Board.\(^2\)

An additional measure that would improve Fund governance would be to reform the constituency representation on the Executive Board. For example, the number of Chairs allocated to the Sub-Saharan African countries, which are only two in total, could be increased to three. A similar analysis can be applied to the World Bank Board, where also basic votes could be increased and PPP GDP could play a larger role in calculating shares. It should be emphasised that in the case of the World Bank, it would be easier to change shares and representation, as there is no formal quota system. Also there is the relevant precedent of regional development banks like the Interamerican Development Bank, where developing country borrowers have slightly over 50% of the vote.

Also of grave concern is the clearly insufficient participation of developing countries in the Bank for International Settlements, an institution that is increasingly important, due both to its technical excellence and the growing significance of its main mandate, the pursuit of financial stability. Since the mid-1990s, there has been increased involvement of developing countries in

\(^2\) See, on these issues, Buira (1999).
this institution. However, it seems important and urgent to: a) ensure participation of developing
countries in the Board of the BIS; b) ensure greater --and more formalised-- participation of
developing countries in crucial meetings, for example in monthly meetings of Central Bank
Governors; c) increase the number of developing country staff in the BIS (including some LDC
participation); and d) expand the number and types of developing countries included in the BIS,
also including representation from low-income and small countries.

Equally important, developing countries should be represented in the crucial fora where
they currently have no voice, and where important decisions that affect them are being taken. As
mentioned, this would certainly include the Financial Stability Forum and the Basel Banking
Committee. Although efforts to increase ad-hoc consultation with developing and transition
economies, which these bodies have increasingly carried out in recent years, is clearly welcome,
it is no substitute for appropriate and formal representation. Developing countries could be
included in these fora on a rotational basis, without significantly increasing the size of these
groups and therefore not jeopardising their effective working methods. For example, there could
be two representatives per developing country region (Latin America, Asia and Africa), who
would be nominated for two years and then rotated.

Specifically on the Basel Banking Committee and its recent work on the New Basel
Accord, it would appear that the lack of systematic representation from developing countries has
impacted negatively on the nature of their analysis and their recommendations. The proposals in
the New Accord, particularly those related to the use of bank’s internal risk management
systems, would seem to be driven largely by major G-10 international banks. However, this is
not necessarily good for the stability of the international financial system in general, nor for the
developing world in particular. Many negative impacts on developing countries of these
proposals have not been properly addressed, due to lack of participation by developing countries.
II. AREAS OF PROGRESS

1. Codes and standards for macroeconomic policy and financial sector regulation in capital recipient countries

One of the aspects which the international community has stressed most for crisis prevention is the development of codes and standards for macroeconomic policy and financial sector regulation in capital recipient countries. As we will discuss in more detail below, there has been far less (and insufficient) emphasis on improvements in global regulations, especially regulations in source countries.

As regards implementing codes and standards (C and S) in developing and transition countries, the main targets are strengthening domestic financial systems and promoting international financial stability by "facilitating better-informed lending and investment decisions, improving market integrity, and reducing the risk of financial distress and contagion" (Financial Stability Forum, 2000). The content of the standards largely reflects concerns arising out of recent crises, though they often also build on past initiatives involving mainly developed countries. As Cornford (2001) has argued, the development of standards could be viewed as part of a process of "groping towards a set of globally accepted rules for policy which could provide one of the pre-requisites for provision of international financial support for countries experiencing currency crises". They would thus become an international analogue of national rules for financial sectors, compliance with which would facilitate the availability of lender of last resort financing. However, at present, there is no international lender of last resort, nor even automatic limited international liquidity in times of crisis. Indeed, developing countries' compliance with C and S would probably increase if counterpart actions were taken towards providing abundant and unconditional official liquidity during crises caused by contagion (see below).

As regards C and S, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) has compiled 65 of them, of these, the FSF has identified priority C and S in 12 subject areas. These are detailed in Table 1.
Table 1

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<tr>
<th>Subject Area</th>
<th>Key Standard</th>
<th>Issue by</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Macroeconomic Policy and Data Transparency</strong></td>
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<td>Monetary and financial policy transparency</td>
<td>Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies</td>
<td>IMF</td>
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<td>Fiscal policy transparency</td>
<td>Code of Good Practices in Fiscal Transparency</td>
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<td>Data dissemination</td>
<td>Special Data Dissemination Standard/General Data Dissemination Standard</td>
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<td>Insolvency</td>
<td>Principles and Guidelines on Effective Insolvency Systems</td>
<td>WB</td>
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<td>Corporate governance</td>
<td>Principles of Corporate Governance</td>
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<td>Payment and settlement</td>
<td>Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems</td>
<td>CPSS</td>
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<td>Market integrity</td>
<td>The Forty Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force</td>
<td>FATF</td>
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<td><strong>Financial Regulation and Supervision</strong></td>
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Source: FSF website [http://www.fsforum.org/Standards/KeyStds.html](http://www.fsforum.org/Standards/KeyStds.html)

In order to assess progress in the implementation of C and S, the IMF has been charged with preparing, with relevant authorities of countries, Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs). This process is a modular one with observance of the separate codes or standards assessed independently. As of December 2000, 83 ROSC modules had been produced for 32 countries, with 67 being published (see Table 2), with some 100 modules being added in 2001. As can be seen from Table 2, the greatest progress in the observance of codes and standards has been in four areas: data dissemination; fiscal transparency; monetary and fiscal policy transparency, and banking supervision. In some instances these reports represent free-standing processes; in others they have emerged as by-products of the Fund’s regular surveillance activities under Article IV or derived from the Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs) carried out by the Fund and the Bank. The FSAP is a vast and costly exercise (both financially and in terms of human resources), even on the current scale, which is providing only partial coverage (24 countries by 2001). If more countries and areas were included, the exercise would become far larger and costlier.
Table 2. ROSC modules completed and published by December 4, 2000

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<th>Data Dissemination</th>
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Developing and transition governments are broadly supportive of the activities concerning C and S, which they see as valuable in the long term. There are important differences in the degree of enthusiasm about implementing C and S. Paradoxically, the former Argentinean authorities were enthusiastic supporters and this country was thus one of the most active in implementing C and S, but this proved clearly insufficient in supporting domestic financial stability; obviously, major macroeconomic problems determined this result.

This confirms the serious concern expressed by many developing countries about the extent to which implementing C and S would be actually meaningfully in avoiding crises. A related concern accepted in recent IMF and World Bank documents is that C and S had on the whole too much of a “one size fits all” element, and that not enough account was taken of countries’ specific features, institutions and history. Another complex issue is that whilst countries —and increasingly IFIs— want a more nuanced and sensitive assessment of C and S, the

private markets have preference for simple (or simplistic) quantified assessments, that can be directly integrated into risk assessments systems and that can allow for cross-country comparisons and rankings.

It is also the view of the smaller and poorer countries, that while C and S are important, their rhythm of implementation required is very high, and that they face especially large institutional, legislative and --above all-- human resource constraints in implementing so many standards. This implies that technical assistance to them may be very helpful, though it will not by itself be able to overcome the problem.

Perhaps two of the main concerns of developing countries are that C and S should remain voluntary and that C and S are defined mainly in G-7 or G-10 fora, with insufficient participation and input of developing countries. However, more recently there has been some effort by these standard-setting bodies, and especially by the Fund and the World Bank, to consult more with developing countries through the process of defining standards and with respect to problems with their implementation. However, the issue of fuller participation of developing countries in standard setting remains very important.

2. **The design of new IMF financing facilities**

During the 1990s, capital account liberalisation and the large scale of private capital flows greatly increased the need for official liquidity to deal with sudden and large reversals of flows. As a result of the 1997-1998 Asian and Russian crises, IMF resources were significantly enhanced. This facilitated the provision of fairly large financial packages that helped in the management and containment of crises, though the conditionality applied was often problematic.

Particularly, two new facilities were designed as a result of these crises. The first was the Supplementary Reserve Facility (SRF), which facilitated the provision of fairly large, more expensive, relatively short-term loans to countries hit by crises. Indeed, the SRF provides financial assistance for exceptional balance of payments difficulties due to a large short-term financing needs resulting from a sudden and disruptive loss of market confidence reflected in
pressure on the capital account and the member's reserves. The SRF was useful in providing large loans to countries like South Korea and Brazil, once they were hit by major crises.

Contrary to the relative success with this new facility, several of the G-7 countries have recently expressed their wish to establish limits on the scale of lending through the SRF. Potential borrowers rightly do not wish such limits to be set up, as in a multiple equilibrium situation such limits could diminish the effectiveness of the SRF in restoring market confidence and could thus lead to deeper crises in individual countries, as well as more risk of contagion to other countries. Thus, delays in granting IMF support or loans of an insufficient size may well lead to a worse outcomes than more rapid IMF lending in adequate quantities. Recent events in Latin America can be interpreted in this light. Delays in IMF negotiations with Argentina is one of the factors that led to a hypersensitivity of financial markets to developments in South America and, therefore, to a stronger regional contagion during 2002 than was originally expected (ECLAC, 2002c). This seems to have led to a renewal of large scale IMF lending to South America in mid-2002, which, nonetheless, has been slow in restoring confidence.

The second facility created after the Asian and Russian crises was a preventive one, the Contingent Credit Line (CCL). As the IMF defined it, the CCL was created as “a precautionary line of defence readily available against future balance of payments problems that might arise from international financial contagion”. For a country to qualify to draw on it, the increased pressure on the recipient country's capital account and international reserves must thus result from a sudden loss of confidence among investors triggered by external factors (for a detailed description of the CCL and initial criticisms see Griffith-Jones, Ocampo with Cailloux, 1999).

The creation of the CCL was a potentially very important and positive step because it could significantly reduce the chances of a country entering into a crisis, by providing contingency lending agreed in advance. However the problem is that --at the time of writing, three years since its creation-- no country has applied to use it. This is the case, even though terms and conditions have been somewhat modified to make the CCL more attractive to borrowers. These include less demanding requisites for the country to meet when negotiating it, expeditions review of the country's policies when it seeks to activate the CCL (but a post
activation review, where future policies will be agreed), and a reduction in the commitment fee and of the surcharge for a drawing on the CCL (for more details, see Kenen, 2001). Clearly, these modifications have proven insufficient in generating a demand for this credit line.

The key problem is that countries with “good” policies, and who are perceived as such, fear that there could be a stigma attached by the markets if they applied for a CCL. In particular, countries fear to be the first to apply on their own for a CCL, as they are concerned that the application could be counter-productive, and reduce --rather than strengthen, as is the intention-- confidence of markets in that country.

To make this facility more attractive, and diminish or eliminate any potential stigma attached to it, some modification could be introduced. Particularly, it could be agreed that all countries that have been very favourably evaluated by the IMF in their annual Article IV consultations would automatically qualify for the CCL. Therefore, a country would have a right to draw on the CCL should the need arise. This would imply that quite a large number of countries --including the developed ones-- would qualify for the CCL (even though few would use it), thus eliminating the current stigma on its use. This proposal is quite similar to one being suggested by the UK Treasury, whereby after a positive evaluation in Article IV consultations a country would automatically become eligible for the CCL; in this latter variant, the country would still have to apply for the CCL, but it would make this step far easier, because it would already know it was eligible. The fact that countries would be named as eligible for the CCL by the IMF, would make it a sign of strength (indicator of good policies), rather than --as currently feared-- a request for a CCL being seen as a sign of possible future weakness. An important virtue of this type of approach is that both developed and developing countries could either be granted access to the CCL or be eligible to CCL loans, if the need arose in future. The fact that countries could have access to the CCL would hopefully diminish the likelihood of crises and therefore of the need for countries to draw on it.4/

4/ Reportedly an actual commitment to a CCL loan to developed countries is problematic in the sense that significant IMF resources would have to be reserved against possible use of such a CCL. This seems unjustified, as the possible use of the credit line would not be associated (in fact, it should be negatively associated) with the number of qualified countries. It is thus important to guarantee that qualification for the CCL (as we propose) or eligibility (the UK Treasury suggestion) would not require extra reserves from IMF funds.
Other complementary steps could be taken to encourage use of the CCL. One would be to persuade several developing and/or transition economies to apply simultaneously to eliminate the first applicant fear. Another possible step, also being evaluated by the UK Treasury, is that a target could be given to the IMF (e.g. certain number of countries joining CCL before end 2003). This would follow a similar targeted approach used for progress on HIPC programmes, which worked very well in that case. This seems also a constructive and interesting idea, and though in the CCL case, it may be more difficult for the IMF to implement it, as countries would be more reluctant to apply, whilst HIPC countries were keen to use the corresponding Initiative.

3. *The Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative*

The launching of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative in 1996 and the approval of the enhanced HIPC Initiative in September 1999, following the Cologne G-7 Summit, have been major steps in the solution of the debt overhang of poor countries. Advance in this area serves also as a contrast to the significant lag in the design of multilateral mechanisms to face debt overhangs of middle income countries (see section IV below).

As of January 2002, 24 out of the 42 highly indebted poor countries had reached the “decision point” of the Initiative, at which interim relief begins and eligible countries commit to adopt a Poverty Reduction Strategy through a participatory process, the basic condition to advance to the “completion point”. As of then, only four countries (Bolivia, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda) had reached that stage, at which debt relief is irrevocably committed. For the 24 countries, debt relief in net present value terms represents $22 billion, nearly half of their total debt. Together with more traditional debt relief mechanisms, it is expected that these countries will experience a 62% reduction of external indebtedness in net present value terms. With respect to debt service effectively paid, debt relief is less substantial: $2.0 billion a year in 2001-2003 vs. $2.9 billion in 1998-1999 (World Bank, 2002).
Aside from the complex issues associated to the conditionalities involved (see section III below), several criticisms have been levied on this Initiative, which relate to the characteristics of the debt relief mechanisms, its inadequate financing, and its long term effects on access to financial markets. With respect to the first of these problems, it has been claimed that the three year period between decision and completion points is too long. More importantly, it has been argued that scenarios for debt sustainability (average GDP growth of 5.5% and average export growth of 8.6% over the next decade) are too optimistic and do not take into account external shocks and uncertainties that low-income countries face. Also, there are no binding arrangements for non-Paris Club (particularly commercial) creditors to ensure adherence to the HIPC Initiative terms, and the cutting point for liabilities eligible for reduction (the first Paris Club re-negotiation) excludes a significant amount of debts in some countries. For all these reasons, even the enhanced HIPC Initiative may not provide sufficient debt relief to enable countries to permanently eliminate their debt overhang and to achieve the development goals agreed in the United Nations Millennium Declaration (particularly, halving extreme poverty by 2015). Additionally, it has been argued that eligibility criteria are too stringent and have resulted in exclusion of countries whose economic and social conditions are very similar to HIPC countries.

Inadequate financing has led to developing, including many poor and middle-income nations, having borne a large share of the costs of the Initiative, either directly (when they are creditors to HIPC countries) or indirectly (through higher spreads of World Bank loans, or reduction of technical assistance from multilateral development banks). Also, many regional and sub-regional bank have heavy costs which have been inadequately funded from the HIPC trust account, seriously affecting their financing and technical assistance activities.

Finally, the Initiative is paradoxical in terms of the history of debt rescheduling mechanisms. Indeed, a traditional assumption of debt rescheduling is that it should facilitate renewed access to financial markets, by bringing debt service to manageable levels. Although this assumption is not always fulfilled, the HIPC Initiative explicitly forbids countries from accessing private markets for a long time period (up to two decades). This reflects the fragile

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external and fiscal sustainability position of most HIPC countries, and the concern of the official creditors that they do not enter into an unsustainable debt situation again, as well as the potential for moral hazard on the side of both private lenders and HIPC countries. However, this condition may also be seen as the counterpart of what is effectively an insufficient debt relief, which may thus reduce the positive impact of the Initiative on growth and development in HIPC countries. An additional implication is also that these countries will be subject to an equally long period of conditionality. This stresses the importance of how the PRSP process is managed, guaranteeing an effective respect for ownership and diversity of development strategies.

III. AREAS OF PARTIAL PROGRESS

1. Macroeconomic surveillance and mechanisms to guarantee the coherence of macroeconomic policies

The emphasis on the need to strengthen the regulatory environment in which financial markets operate has not been matched by a similar focus of attention on the coherence of macroeconomic policies worldwide. The major issue in this regard is guaranteeing that the externalities that macroeconomic policies generate on other parts of the world economy are adequately internalised by policy makers in the industrialised world. Expressing it in the terms of the Group of 24 (2000b), there is an “imperative need for better coordination, coherence, and mutual reinforcement of macroeconomic and structural policies among the three major economies in order to reduce the risks and uncertainties in the global economy”. From the point of view of developing countries, the risks associated with the movement in the exchange rates of major currencies are a major problem and reflect a paradoxical feature of current arrangements: the fact that the value of international monies is determined by national policies.6/7

In this area, actions have been limited to the regular meetings of finance ministers and central bank governors of the Group of Seven. The meetings of the IMF International Monetary and Financial Committee and of central bank governors in the BIS also provide opportunities to

6/7 See also Group of 24 (2000a) and a different point of view in Council on Foreign Relations (1999).
jointly review events in the world economy. Consultations have led to some positive co-ordinated policies, such as the interest rate reductions in 1998 following the Russian crisis, and similar moves following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the United States. Nonetheless, major exchange rate misalignments among the dollar and the euro have been the feature of the international economy in recent years and lags in interest rate reductions by the European Central Bank have been viewed by the IMF and many other institutions as an ingredient in the worldwide recession of 2001.

In any case, the absence of macroeconomic coordination among the major economies in the regular reports by the IMF on reforms of the international financial architecture indicates that this issue is not viewed as an ingredient of the required reforms. Nonetheless, the IMF provides regular reports on the major economies based on Article IV consultations, as well as regular publications of the World Economic Outlook, where events in these economies are a major focus of attention. The most important advance in this area has been the more regular analyses of financial markets and new mechanisms of consultation with private financial actors. The excellent quarterly review of emerging financial markets, which started to be published in the second semester of 2000, is a case in point.

The surveillance of developing country policies is, of course, a regular practice of the IMF, both as part of the Article IV consultations as well as the review of financing arrangements with specific countries. Probably the most important advance in this area has been the more preventive focus that has been placed on Article IV consultations. Countries have also pressured to release the reports of these consultations, and many have followed this guideline. The design of the CCL includes a more direct link between Article IV consultations and access to this facility. This may serve, once the CCL becomes an active facility, to correct the asymmetric features of IMF macroeconomic surveillance during booms and busts, particularly the limited relevance of surveillance during booms.

As part of the design of codes and standards, some have been adopted in the areas of fiscal and monetary policies (see above), as well as guidelines on management of international reserves and foreign debt policies. An interesting element in this process has been the
widespread use of new indicators of vulnerability, particularly the ratio of short-term external
debt to foreign exchange reserves. This is the result of work on vulnerability indices and early
warning systems, on which important progress has also been made.

2. Strengthening world regulatory standards

As pointed out above, one of the key functions to be met so that a globalized financial
system works effectively to sustain both stability and growth, is that of appropriate transparency
and regulation of international financial loan and capital markets.

Capital and credit markets have become increasingly integrated between countries, in
what is becoming an increasingly internationalised market; these markets have also become more
integrated amongst each other, as big financial conglomerates combine activities in banking,
securities, insurance and other financial fields.

For regulation to be efficient, it is essential that the domain of the regulator is the same as
the domain of the market that is regulated. Ideally, this would imply the need to create a world
regulatory authority, as Kaufmann (1998), and Eatwell and Taylor (2000) have suggested.
However, this seems at present unlikely, both because of the complexity of the task, and because
of the unwillingness of national governments and regulators to give up sovereignty on this issue.

A second best alternative to creating a global regulatory authority is to significantly
improve exchange of information and coordination amongst regulators, both across countries and
across financial sectors. In the last two decades, there had been initial steps in this field, mainly
via the three Basel Committees, of which the main one is the Banking Committee, which started
to generate, via soft law, common regulatory standards that are initially applied by the regulatory
authorities of the countries participating in the Committees, and then --either by peer
encouragement, by pressure from the IMF and the World Bank and/or from the markets--are
implemented by developing and transition regulatory authorities.
As it was pointed out, the 1997-1998 crises in emerging markets led to a very important institutional innovation: the creation of the Financial Stability Forum to identify vulnerabilities and sources of systemic risk, to fill gaps in regulations and to develop consistent financial regulations across all types of financial institutions. Through its Working Parties, the FSF has produced high quality reports, such as the one on capital flows, and the one on highly leveraged institutions (HLIs). The former had numerous recommendations for measures to be applied by developing countries, many of which have begun to be implemented. The latter had important proposals to be implemented by source countries, though in an initial stage it did not suggest applying a system of direct regulation of currently unregulated institutions. However, the FSF Working Party did recommend important improvements on far greater transparency of hedge funds and other HLIs. Even these rather modest, but important steps, have not been implemented, because in the US—the major country where HLIs operate—, Congress rejected two bills for improved transparency (White, 2000).

This outcome illustrated two significant weaknesses in the operation of the FSF. One is its limited ability to influence decisions to be taken by national regulators, especially in source countries. The second is the total lack of participation of developing and transition economies in the main body of the FSF. This poses not just problems of legitimacy, but also of efficiency, as it accentuates the types of asymmetries in the international financial system. It is also disappointing that even through key figures have supported developing country membership in the FSF, this has not been implemented; a far less satisfactory, though obviously positive step has been to increase outreach activities of the FSF, including regional meetings (see above).

The potentially most important regulatory development since the 1997-1998 crises in emerging markets is the proposed modification of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord which could have profound impact both on international bank lending (its level, cost and cyclicality) to developing countries and on bank lending (its cyclicality and distribution), within developing countries.

Whilst the effects on developing countries are not central to the new Basel Capital Accord (both because its aim is to try to align banks' regulatory capital requirements with actual...
risk, and because developing countries have no representation in the Basel Banking Committee) very significant effects of the new accord would be felt on developing countries. This is particularly problematic given the fact that bank lending to developing countries has become negative since the Asian crisis (BIS, 2001). Serious concerns existed that the January 2001 proposal could have large net negative effects on developing countries. Later modifications, especially those introduced in November 2001, have dealt with some of the problems, and somewhat diminished others. This is encouraging. Nonetheless, the possibility that the proposed new Basel Capital Accord could further discourage lending to developing countries is still a matter of great concern.

The key proposed changes relates to the measurement of credit risk. In the proposed Accord, there would be two basic approaches, the standardised and the internal rating based (IRB) ones. The new standardised approach addresses several previous concerns raised by developing countries, for example by reducing the incentive towards short term lending. However, the IRB approach, if implemented in its current form, could have important negative implications.

The first problematic aspect is that the proposed IRB approach could further reduce international bank lending and increase costs of such lending to developing countries, particularly those (the large majority) that do not have investment grades. Both effects would institutionalise increased perceived risk.

Secondly, and equally serious, the proposed IRB approach would exacerbate pro-cyclical tendencies within the banking systems. The drive for risk-weights that more accurately reflect the probability of default (PD) is inherently pro-cyclical; during an upturn, average PD falls, and the IRB approach, based on banks' internal risk model, would reflect lower capital requirements; during a downturn or recession, average PD will increase, as deteriorating economic conditions cause existing loans to "migrate" to higher risk categories, therefore raising overall capital

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7/ For a more detailed discussion of these issues see Griffith-Jones, Spratt and Segoviano (2002). See also the Proceeding of Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank Conference on "Enhancing Private Capital Flows to Developing Countries", July 2002, for views of the Basel Committee and the Bank of England
8/ For different estimates of potential cost increases, see Reisen (2001), and Powell (2001).
requirements. As it is difficult to raise capital in a recession, this may lead to a credit crunch, which would further deepen the downturn. Concerns with increased pro-cyclicality of the proposed new Capital Accord are widespread (see, for example, Goodhart, 2002).

Increasing pro-cyclicality would go against what is increasingly accepted as best practice, which is to introduce a neutral or counter-cyclical elements into regulation, so as to counteract the natural pro-cyclicality of banking and capital markets (BIS, 2001; Borio, Furine and Lowe, 2001; Ocampo, 2002; Ocampo and Chiappe, 2002). For developing countries, increased pro-cyclicality of bank lending is particularly damaging, given that this increases the likelihood of crises, as well as their development and financial cost.

The Basel Committee seems to have accepted this criticism, and is reportedly planning to include measures to combat pro-cyclicality in the next consultative proposal.

A new Basel Capital Accord proposal, that would overcome some of the problems listed above should include some of the following elements: a) possible postponement of the IRB approach, for further research and improvement of internal bank models; b) if the IRB approach is to be implemented, capital requirements should be lowered for low rated borrowers which include most developing countries; this would imply a significant flattening of the IRB curve; c) a special curve for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is being considered by the Basel Committee; if that is implemented, the possibility of a separate curve for developing countries should be seriously studied, to avoid excess discouragement of bank lending, and to more accurately reflect risk of lending to them, particularly the benefits of diversification; and d) serious attention given to counter-cyclical elements, to mitigate inherent pro-cyclicality of the IRB approach.

Possible negative effects of the proposed Basel Capital Accord could also take place within developing countries—unless sufficient modifications are introduced—as domestic bank lending could become more pro-cyclical, and as access to bank including by SMEs could become even more difficult (for the latter, see Lowe and Segoviano, 2002).
3. The redefinition of conditionality

One of the most important conclusions reached in recent debates on international financial issues is that conditionality is ineffective or at least an inefficient means to attain objectives that the international community wishes to attach to financial support. So long as there is no true “ownership” of the policies involved --i.e, so long as they are not backed by strong domestic support-- , they are unlikely to be sustained. This is strongly associated with the fact that “ownership” is essential to institution building, which is generally recognized today as the clue to successful development policies.

In the case of the IMF, conditionality has long been a central area of contention. However, in recent years --and even decades-- the issue has become increasingly troublesome for three different reasons. Firstly, the scope of conditionality has been gradually expanded to include domestic economic and social development strategies and institutions which, as the United Nations Task Force has indicated, “by their very nature should be decided by legitimate national authorities, based on broad social consensus”.

The broadening of conditionality to social policy, governance issues and private sector involvement in crisis resolution has been criticised by developing countries in the Group of 24. The need to restrict conditionality to macroeconomic policy and financial sector issues is shared by a broad group of analysts with quite different persuasions as to the future role of the IMF.

A similar view was expressed in the external evaluation of surveillance activities of the Fund.

It must be emphasised that similar issues have been raised in relation to development finance. With respect to this issue, a 1999 World Bank report that analyses the success of structural lending, according to its own evaluation, comes to the conclusion that conditionality does not influence the success or failure of such programs. Nonetheless, according to the same

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9/ United Nations Executive Committee on Economic and Social Affairs (1999), Section 5.
13/ See World Bank (1999), Chapter 2 and Appendix 2. See also Gilbert, Powell and Vines (1999) and Stiglitz (1999).
report, aid effectiveness is not independent of the economic policies that countries follow. In particular, the effects of aid on growth are higher for countries that adopt “good” policies, which, according to their definition, include stable macroeconomic environments, open trade regimes, adequate protection of property rights and efficient public bureaucracies that can deliver good-quality social services. Curiously, the study draws the conclusion that conditionality “still has a role --to allow government to commit to reform and to signal the seriousness of reform-- but to be effective in this it must focus on a small number of truly important measures". This statement is certainly paradoxical if the conclusions of the report are taken at face value.

These arguments and controversies have been instrumental to the acceptance of "ownership" as a central feature of ODA (OECD/DAC, 1996) and, more recently, of IMF and World Bank programs (Köhler and Wolfensohn, 2000). They also led to the agreement that IMF conditionality should be streamlined, a subject which was discussed in the IMF Board in 2001, based on an internal evaluation of experience with conditionality (IMF, 2001b). Such evaluation recognised that structural conditionality had indeed been overextended, particularly in relation to the reform processes of transition economies and during the Asian crisis. Moreover, it accepted that ownership of adjustment programs is essential for IMF emergency financing to function properly and, therefore, that conditionality should "not intend to infringe on national sovereignty" (Par. 2). However, it also clearly stated that an essential element of IMF policies should be to safeguard the Fund's resources, for which conditionality was required (Par. 9).

A major weakness of both reports is a lack a clear understanding of the way conditionality effectively works to reduce, eliminate or distort "ownership". The mechanism is not --or, at least, not always, or not mainly-- imposition by the IMF or World Bank staff or the Boards of these institutions. Rather, four additional channels are crucial: a) the conditions on which financing is available severely constrain the choices countries face; b) under crises conditions, possible World Bank or IMF support affect internal discussions within governments.

15/ See IMF International Monetary and Financial Committee (2000) and Köhler (2000). The difficulties are associated to the fact that, although the IMF is expected to focus on macroeconomic and financial issues, it should also look at “their associated institutional and structural aspects”. Such a broad definition led to the increasing scope of conditionality over the past two decades.
increasing the negotiating power of groups that are inclined to the points of view of those institutions; c) the technical support that the institutions provide to countries also biases internal discussions; and d) involvement by the staff of these institutions in internal discussions has a similar effect.

A major issue in this regard is the considerable confusion on the term "structural reforms". Indeed, there are at least two meanings of the term that are relevant to the debate on conditionality. The first one refers to institutional factors that directly affect macroeconomic balances, i.e., balance of payments equilibria (e.g., inconsistent exchange rate regimes, or a capital account that has been liberalized without adequate prudential provisions) or public or private sector deficits (e.g., problems in the design of decentralisation, a poorly regulated domestic financial system, etc.). The other are institutional factors that may be important for the functioning of the economies but have a more indirect effect on macroeconomic balances: in the terminology of the IMF paper on conditionality, factors that determine the "efficiency and resilience of the economy". World Bank and IMF structural reforms have a particular understanding of what is desirable in this regard: liberalised economies are more "efficient" and "resilient".

The discussion thus critically hinges on this distinction. Structural macroeconomic balances can be produced, and in fact have been produced in the past in economies with high degrees of public sector intervention. Also, considerable academic debate still goes on whether more liberalised economies are superior in terms of their resilience, their efficiency and their ability to grow. We know that vulnerability may, in fact, increase with liberalisation, particularly vulnerability to capital account shocks; without adequate correction for market failures, efficiency is not guaranteed; and liberalised economies do not necessarily grow faster. A well-known paper by Rodríguez and Rodrik (2001) makes this point clear: macroeconomic stability is essential for growth but more liberalised economies (particularly in relation to trade) do not necessarily grow faster. Furthermore, this paper shows that traditional measures of opening that have been extensively used in IMF analysis are clearly inadequate.
This implies that "ownership" requires meeting several additional conditions: effective alternatives reform packages should be available to countries; such alternatives should be provided by the Bretton Woods institutions with the same technical rigor as traditional reform programs; these institutions should be ready to provide such support when asked to do so; for that purpose, the composition of IMF and World Bank staff should be representative of the heterogeneous views that exist on structural and macroeconomic adjustment, and these institutions should be ready to call organisations or economists who think differently to support the design of alternative programs. This clearly means that IMF conditionality should be restricted to macroeconomic policies, and that a strong negative presumption should be established against any form of structural conditionality that goes beyond factors that directly hinge on macroeconomic balances. It also means that "ownership" can only be promoted by an effective plural discussion on the virtues of alternative types of "structural reforms" (i.e., alternative to the traditional liberalisation packages), explicitly promoted by both institutions.

Some of the problems outlined above, and the need for an alternative understanding of policy "ownership", are reflected in the recent history of the Poverty Reduction Strategic Framework for HIPC and other low income countries. This process, and the papers (PRSPs) that materialise countries' strategies within this framework, undoubtedly represents important advances in international cooperation, as frameworks for co-ordinating donors under the leadership of recipient countries, and for promoting national dialogues in these countries. In this regard, they follow principles that are now widely accepted for the relations between donor and recipient countries (see the analysis of development finance in section IV). On the other hand, PRSPs have been also viewed as a mechanism by which an additional layer of conditionality associated to a complex process (indeed, a case in which not only content but processes are subject to conditionality), which simply "repackages" structural conditionality, thus in fact providing very limited degrees of freedom for poor countries to adopt alternative development strategies. This mechanism has also been seen as generating additional risks of micro management by multilateral institutions and bilateral donors.

These problems are underscored in a recent UNCTAD (2002) report on Africa, which concludes that: "The emphasis on ownership and participation appears to aim at granting
considerable autonomy to countries in the design of safety nets and targeted anti-poverty spending programmes. However, freedom of action of recipient governments in the determination of the nature and content of macroeconomic stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes, or more generally of their development strategies, continues to be severely constrained by conditionalities. In fact, new governance-related conditionalities have been added to those traditionally considered as pertaining to the core competences of the Bretton Woods institutions” (p. 58). It is thus essential to closely review progress in the implementation of PRSPs to guarantee ownership, diversity and effective recipient country control.

Finally, it should be added that the inclusion of social criteria in the design of IMF and World Bank programs, particularly the focus on poverty reduction, represents a significant improvement in the programs of both institutions. However, this should not be understood either as an argument for increased conditionality. Furthermore, in this regard, there is the risk that conditionality will end up spreading one particular set of views of how to organise social programs in the developing world, and not necessarily the most adequate one. In particular, the question of how to take social issues seriously into account in adjustment programs is not only a question of designing adequate safety nets; indeed, this compensatory view of the role of social programs has been seriously questioned. It is, even more importantly, a question of mainstreaming the social implications in the design of macroeconomic policy and structural reforms.

IV. AREAS OF INADEQUATE PROGRESS

1. The active use of SDRs

The creation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) in 1969 was a major result of international financial debates in the 1960s, both those associated to the North-South negotiations as well as controversies among industrialised countries about the international role of the US dollar. Two series of allocations were made since 1970, the last of which was finalised in 1981. A proposal for a one-time allocation of 21.4 billion SDRs was made in September, 1997. The United States has veto power over such allocations.

16/ See United Nations, Executive Committee on Economic and Social Affairs (2001).
The creation of SDRs was a major advance in the design of the international financial system. Particularly, it created a truly world money, to be used exclusively as a reserve asset, thus generating a more balanced distribution of seignorage powers. In a world characterised by the use of the national currencies of major industrialised countries as international monies, the accumulation of international reserves generates, in fact, a redistribution of income from developing countries to the major industrialised countries. Despite the move towards floating, the accumulation of international reserves by developing countries has experienced large-scale growth in recent years, largely associated to the demands created by increasing international financial volatility. Paradoxically, SDRs allocations were suspended when the demand for reserves by developing countries grew. This adverse distributive factor has thus become increasingly important.

Also, over the past two decades, the increasing need for IMF funds to finance its services has been satisfied with increases in quotas and arrangements to borrow. As these funds have been clearly insufficient, major rescue packages have involved additional bilateral contributions from major industrialised countries. This has two major weaknesses. First, it makes such rescue operations dependent on decisions by a specific set of countries, a fact that reduces the multilateral character of IMF support and introduces discretionary elements in an area which should certainly be rules based. Secondly, it reduces the stabilising effect of rescue packages if the market deems that the intervening authorities (the IMF plus the additional bilateral support) are unable or unwilling to supply funds in the quantities required (see the analysis on IMF financing facilities in section II).

Proposals to renew SDRs allocations have been increasing in recent years. They follow two different models. The first is the temporary issue of SDRs during episodes of world financial stress, which would be destroyed once financial conditions normalise (see, United Nations Executive Committee on Economic and Social Affairs, 1999; Council on Foreign Relations, 1999; Ocampo, 1999 and 2002; and Camdessus, 2000).\footnote{See, also, for similar proposals, Ezekiel (1998), Ahluwalia (1999) and Meltzer et al. (2000).} This procedure would develop a counter-cyclical element in world liquidity management, as a reduction in private lending would...
be partly compensated by increased official liquidity. At the same time, it would avoid creating additional long-term liquidity at the world level, since the normalisation of private lending would be reflected in repayment of extraordinary IMF loans, which would lead to a parallel destruction of SDRs through which they were financed. Therefore, this proposal would solve the problems of adequately financing extraordinary IMF requirements, but not the distributive issues associated to the uneven distribution of seignorage powers.

The second variant is focused on the latter issue, and thus regards SDRs allocations as a counterpart to the increasing demand for international reserve assets. Allocations would thus be permanent. It is interesting to note that several proposals of this type see such allocations as the means to finance other international objectives, particularly the provision of global public goods and international development cooperation. This is, indeed, the nature of the proposals made to the United Nations Conference on Financing for Development by the Zedillo Panel of Experts (Zedillo et al., 2001), as well as by George Soros and Joseph Stiglitz. Similar associations between SDRs allocations and international cooperation were made in the 1960s and 1970s and were rejected at the time. It must be emphasised, however, that the argument for permanent allocation is independent from proposals on the specific use of funds.

No formal negotiations have begun on the possible implementation of either of these two groups of proposals.

2. **International debt standstills and workout procedures**

Although no actions have been adopted, the extensive discussions on the need for international rules on debt standstills and orderly workout procedures seems to be leading to some agreements. As it is well known, such mechanisms are required to avoid the coordination problems implicit in chaotic capital flight, to guarantee an appropriate sharing of adjustments between lenders and borrowers, and to avoid "moral hazard" issues associated with emergency financing. In international discussions, UNCTAD (1998, 2001) has presented the most consistent and strongest defence of mechanisms of this sort. In turn, recent proposals by the IMF (Krueger, 2001 and 2002), and the discussions of this issue in the IMF Board, the International Monetary
and Financial Committee and in different country grouping, have speeded up the international
debate. In some proposals by developed countries, it has figured prominently as an explicit
alternative to large rescue packages. There is, however, opposition by developing countries, who
consider that this mechanism would impair the volume and conditions of their access to private
capital markets (Group of 24, 2002), as well as private sector opposition in industrialised
countries to non-voluntary arrangements (Institute of International Finance, 2002).

Furthermore, due to the practical difficulties involved in designing a mechanism of this
sort, there are considerable disagreements on its desirable features.\textsuperscript{18} As summarised by the
International Monetary and Financial Committee (2000) and Köhler (2000), these difficulties are
associated to the need to strike a balance between broad principles, needed to guide market
expectations, and the operational flexibility, which requires elements of a “case by case”
approach. The relative role of voluntary negotiations by the parties vs. the interventions required
to solve the collective action problems involved is also subject to heated debates. In any case, a
purely contractual approach is clearly insufficient, and thus a debt restructuring mechanism
(SDRM) of some sort is required to facilitate uniformity of interpretation, and to create an
international judicial entity that would verify creditors’ claims, the resolution of disputes, and the
supervision of voting (Krueger, 2002).

Among the issues involved, the first relates to the introduction of collective action clauses
in debt contracts in order to facilitate eventual renegotiations. The most delicate issue in this
regard is the possible discrimination against countries or group of countries that adopt them. For
this reason, such clauses should be \textit{universal}. Thus, the G-7 countries must actually lead the
process, as they suggested in October 1998, shortly following the Russian crisis (Group of
Seven, 1998). In this regard, recent support for this mechanism by the Group of Ten (2002),
although welcome, unfortunately focuses on emerging market debt rather than universal
provisions, thus generating the risks of adverse discrimination by private agents against
emerging economies. Some industrialised countries (such as the UK, Canada and, as it has been
announced, the European Union) have taken steps to introduce such clauses into their own bond

\textsuperscript{18} See a review of some of the controversies involved in IMF (1999, 2000a, 2000b), Boorman and Allen (2000) and
Fischer (1999).
issues, but important countries (especially the US) unfortunately have not. Exit consent clauses can also play an important role.

There is broad agreement that declaration of a standstill by the debtor country should be voluntary but, as already mentioned, there is still considerable disagreement on a SDRM that would give such standstills legitimacy and avoid disruptive legal processes. Although, due to the effect on their credit rating, debtor countries are unlikely to abuse a possible mechanism of this sort, its use should be subject to control to avoid moral hazard on the side of borrowers. The IMF seems to be best placed to play this role, particularly if provisions of Article VI of the Articles of Agreement are interpreted as providing the basis for such mechanism to be put in place.

It is also agreed that negotiations should be voluntary, and should include in an integral manner public and private sector debts. An international mediator or, eventually, arbitrator could facilitate negotiations. However, in this regard, the IMF is not the appropriate international agent as, due to its status as a lender, it fails to meet the “neutral mediator” requirement. So, a different institution would have to play that role, probably within the United Nations system. An alternative would be for the IMF to have the power to convene independent international panels to play such roles --following similar practices in the World Trade Organisation--, on the principle that it would accept their recommendations. In any case, as an international judicial entity would be required to play certain functions (see above), it might be easier to give the same institution the role of mediator/arbitrator, including the possibility of convening such panels.

Seniority should be granted to lenders who facilitate funds during crises and indeed such “bailing in” operations could be a requirement to benefit from restructuring, as it is typical in national bankruptcy procedures. Agreements that include automatic rescheduling provisions for likely events (e.g., a price collapse in a commodity-dependent country) could also be encouraged. A very controversial issue relates to whether IMF and multilateral bank lending should be included in renegotiations. In any case, lending by IFIs should be given automatic seniority, as these institutions are clearly involved in “bailing in” counter-cyclical operations.
There is also broad agreement that capital controls must be in place in debtor countries throughout the process and during the post-crisis period.\(^{19}\) Also, capital controls on inflows in developing countries facing a rapid build up of debt should be encouraged early on by the IMF as a result of its preventive surveillance activities.

The most controversial issue relates to the relation between this mechanism and rescue packages. Indeed, as already noted, some industrialised countries have supported this mechanism as an alternative to rescue packages. There is a clear case for this view when countries face solvency problems (i.e., unsustainable debt burdens), but it is more debatable when liquidity issues are involved.\(^{20}\) Indeed, due to the multiple equilibria considerations that characterise liquidity crises, emergency financing is essential for supporting “good equilibria” results. The most clear case is that in which liquidity constrains, by reducing investor confidence and forcing countries (or firms, in a national context) to pay excessively high interest rates, effectively lead into a solvency crisis. Alternatively, in order to avoid borrowing at high interest rates under a liquidity crisis, countries could adopt very restrictive macroeconomic policies that may lead equally to a loss of confidence by investors, as they perceive that dwindling domestic resources would be insufficient to service debt payments, or that political support would be lacking for full payment of the external debt. Although some domestic policy issues were certainly involved, the recent Argentinean crisis had some elements of these multiple equilibria issues.

It should be emphasised that there are alternatives to debt standstills for countries facing liquidity constraints. In particular, during both the Korean and the Brazilian crises, regulatory authorities in the industrialised countries strongly encouraged commercial banks to renew short term credit lines these emerging economies.

These considerations imply that, although an international orderly debt workout procedure would certainly help, adequate regulation of capital flows in the source countries and

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\(^{19}\) This covers only one possible case for capital controls. For a broader discussion of this issue, see Ocampo and Chiappe (2002).

\(^{20}\) This view is implicit in recent proposals by the IMF, which refer to “timely restructuring of unsustainable... debts” (Krueger, 2002; emphasis added). However, these proposals avoid analysing what is the adequate balance between debt workouts and emergency financing, including who judges what are unsustainable debt burdens.
Macroeconomic surveillance will continue to play the most important role in avoiding moral hazard by both lenders and borrowers. The basic complementary role that adequate regulation, lending of last resort and debt workouts play in preventing and managing crises has been accepted for decades in domestic policies. It is hard to understand why they still tend to be seen as substitutes in international financing.\footnote{There are obviously differences between domestic and possible international bankruptcy procedures. Particularly, in domestic crises, there is collateral, a fact that implies that capital owners are facing actual risks. This is unlikely to be as important in international bankruptcy procedures.}

Indeed, an alternative system would significantly increase market instability and/or “solve” moral hazard issues by increasing spreads or severely rationing financing to developing countries. The recent experience shows, indeed, that the large rescue packages of the 1990s have been serviced normally. This indicates that the problems faced by the emerging economies that led to large-scale emergency financing had an important (and, in some country experiences, a dominant) element of illiquidity rather than insolvency, a fact that argues for more rather than less emergency financing.\footnote{This does not mean that other structural issues were involved, but rather than liquidity issues were the major ingredient in sudden stop of external financing.} The case against emergency financing also underestimates the threat that developing country crises can pose for global financial stability, and greatly overestimate the risks involved in providing funds, as indeed no single cent has been lost by taxpayers of industrialised countries in such operations.

Finally, it must be argued that multilateral credit support mechanisms, particularly by multilateral development banks (MDBs), would be required during the period following debt renegotiation. As an essential role of such support should be to catalise the reinsertion of countries into private capital markets, a possible mechanism could be a guarantee fund managed by MDBs. This mechanism would guarantee private sector lending to private or public sector borrowers in the affected countries with adequate provisions (partial guarantees, higher in the initial years, at an appropriate cost). This issue has not been included in recent debates and should thus be added as an integral element of any international debt workout scheme.
This analysis implies that, aside from the debate on the complementarity between the contractual and statutory (SDRM) approaches, on which much of the recent debate has concentrated, it is necessary to adopt a broader framework to overcome the legitimate fears of developing countries that a partial solution to this problem would impair their access to financial markets. A broader solution would imply viewing debt workouts as a complement rather than a substitute for emergency financing, and the design of specific mechanisms that would facilitate reinsertion of developing countries into private capital markets after restructuring.

3. Development finance

The issues of volatility of private capital flows and contagion have been at the centre of discussion on the international financial architecture in recent years. However, they only capture some of the most problematic features of international finance. Another worrisome issue, the marginalisation of the poorest countries from private capital flows, is equally important. These countries depend on official development assistance, whose largest component, bilateral aid, has lagged behind.
The significant lag in official capital flows during the 1990s is shown in Figure 1. In particular, bilateral aid has fallen in real terms, leading to a strong relative reduction: from 0.35% of the GDP of industrialised countries in the mid-1980s to 0.22% in 1998-2000, i.e., one-third of the internationally agreed target of 0.7% of GDP. Trends are not uniform, however. Some countries --Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden-- meet that target. A few increased...
ODA in the 1990s, particularly the UK in the late 1990s. The overall trend and the low current level of ODA are thus largely determined by the evolution of aid flows from a few large countries, particularly the United States.

Figure 1 also shows the strong volatility of private capital flows, in particular short-term debt but also long-term debt and equity flows. These private flows experienced a strong decline during the Asian crisis and never recovered. Thus, although the initial reduction was viewed as a sign of volatility, it led to more permanent regime change in terms of the availability of private financing. This has been accompanied by deterioration in the conditions —spreads, maturities and options— under which such financing is provided. Therefore, the evolution of private financial flows may be viewed as characterised by two different cycles: a short-term one, associated to volatility in the strict sense of the term, and a medium-term cycle, in which phases of "risk appetite" are followed after some years by periods of strong risk aversion. The only steady source of private external financing has been foreign direct investment. Even in this case, however, the strong upward trend characteristic of the 1990s was interrupted at the end of the decade and has been followed by a moderate decline, particularly during the recent world recession.

The strong concentration of private capital flows in middle-income countries is shown in Table 3. The share of low-income nations in private financing has been lower than their share in the total population of developing countries, but also lower than their share in developing countries' GDP. This fact is particularly striking in bond financing, commercial bank lending and portfolio flows, if India is excluded in the latter case. In all these cases, private financing to poor countries is minimal. A striking feature of FDI is its high concentration in China, which captures, on the contrary, a smaller proportion of financial flows. The high concentration of the most volatile flows in middle-income countries, excluding China, has implied, in turn, that issues of financial volatility and contagion have been particularly relevant to them.
### Table 3

**NET FLOW OF RESOURCES, 1990-1999**

(Annual averages, billions and percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Direct foreign investment</th>
<th>Portfolio equity flows</th>
<th>Grants</th>
<th>Bilateral Financing</th>
<th>Multilateral Financing (excluding IMF)</th>
<th>Bonds</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<td>75.4</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>99.0</td>
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<td>14.0</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<td>14.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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<th>Commercial bank Loans</th>
<th>Other loans</th>
<th>Net long-term resource flows</th>
<th>Short term debt net flows</th>
<th>Total net Resource flows</th>
<th>Memo: GDP</th>
<th>Population</th>
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<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Amount</td>
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<td>70.9</td>
<td>30.5</td>
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</table>


a/ The World Bank considered China as a low income country until 1998. Since 1999 it is included as middle income country. In this Table it is considered as a different category.

b/ The World Bank considers it as a high income country, but it is included as a middle income country in Global Development Finance 2001.
Low-income countries have thus been marginalised from private flows and have depended on declining official development assistance, particularly grants coming mostly in the form of bilateral aid. If we again exclude India, this is the only component of the net resource flows to developing countries that is highly progressive, in the sense that the share of low-income countries in net flows exceeds not only their share in developing countries’ GDP but also in population. This is also marginally true of multilateral financing, excluding the IMF.

Due to the importance of ODA in financing of low-income countries, this issue has received a significant attention in recent debates. Commitments made at the United Nations Conference on Financing for Development in March 2002 will lead to a reversal of the adverse trend experienced by bilateral aid in recent decades. Nonetheless, those commitments represent only a fourth of the $50 billion aid requirements estimated by the Secretary General of the United Nations (and similar estimations by the World Bank) to halve extreme poverty by 2015 and would remain equally below the target of 0.7% of GDP, which was reiterated at the Conference. The third United Nations Conference on Least Developed Countries, held in 2001, as well as the Monterrey Conference, also reconfirmed the specific target of 0.15-0.20% of GDP of industrialised countries to be provided as ODA to LDCs.

The principles on which aid should be given have also been subject to a significant discussion in recent years. In this regard, the 1996 OECD guidelines on ODA were a significant step forward. The Monterrey Consensus contains a set of agreements that summarise recent international debates (United Nations, 2002). If fully applied, they will certainly change the aid relationship in a significant manner. They are based on the principles of effective partnership between donors and recipients, national leadership and ownership of development plans, and a central focus on poverty reduction (Par. 40). Following this approach, the Consensus includes commitments on: harmonisation of operational procedures to reduce transaction costs and make disbursements and delivery more flexible; untying aid; designing budget, procurement and other support mechanisms to enhance the absorptive capacity of recipient countries and the effectiveness of aid; increasing the use of local technical assistance resources; using ODA to leverage additional financing for development; and strengthening South-South cooperation (Par. 43 of the "Monterrey Consensus"). It must be noted, however, that some of these objectives have
been part of the international agenda for a long time --e.g., untying aid and South-South cooperation--, with only modest progress having been made so far. Thus, the follow-up to these commitments within the annual review of commitments of the Conference will be essential to guarantee a significant advance in this area.

Contrary to the importance given to ODA, the role of multilateral development banks (MDBs) has been subject to less attention. In this regard, the most controversial proposal was made in 2000 by the Meltzer Commission of the United States Congress: to phase-out multilateral bank lending to developing countries with access to private capital markets, thus transforming the World Bank into a World Development Agency focused on low-income countries, with grants as the essential financing instrument (Meltzer et al, 2000). It furthermore suggested that finance should be provided directly to suppliers rather than governments. In response to this report, the United States Department of the Treasury (2000) strongly supported the role of MDBs. In this regard, it defended not only the essential responsibilities of these institutions vis-à-vis poor but also middle-income countries, associated in the latter case to their fragile access to private capital markets. The U.S. Treasury also defended the role of large scale lending by those institutions during crises, to support fiscal expenditure in critical social services and financial sector restructuring. It argued, in any case, for a focus of the MDBs on areas of high development priority, larger contributions to soft windows, more selective lending to emerging economies and eventual graduation of these countries from development assistance.

The Bush Administration has insisted on a larger component of grants in MDB financing and graduation of middle-income countries, and has pushed for raising productivity of developing countries as the central priority of these institutions, an important change in relation to the poverty-reduction focus that was the central feature of debates on MDBs in recent years (O'Neill, 2001). President Bush proposed that the World Bank should move to 50% grant financing to poorest countries (Bush, 2001). It must be emphasised, however, that this would require a strong commitment by the donor countries to transfer regularly at least a similar amount of resources to avoid de-capitalisation of the Bank.
Two recent independent reports on MDBs have underscored the essential role that these institutions will continue to play in the international financial system. The report by the Institute of Development Studies of the University of Sussex (2000) emphasised three essential roles of MDBs: financial resource mobilisation; capacity building, institutional development and knowledge brokering; and provision of global and regional public goods.\footnote{Similar views have been put forwards by Gilbert, Powell and Vines (1999).} It also emphasised the need for a more systemic approach, in which the World Bank and the regional and sub-regional development banks are viewed as a network providing common services to developing country shareholders. The report correctly underscored the need for MDBs to embrace intellectual diversity in their role as knowledge brokers. This was also emphasised by Stiglitz (1999), who has defended the need for an open debate in order to avoid the hegemony of a single view of economic development.

The report of the Commission led by Gurría and Volker (2001) focused on the financial role of MDBs vis-à-vis emerging market economies. It noticed, along similar lines to the United States Treasury response to the Meltzer report, that volatility of financial markets implies that access of emerging markets to private capital markets can be "unreliable, limited and costly". As crises hurt the poor, the counter-cyclical character of MDB financing is consistent with their poverty-reduction role. It suggested, nonetheless, that pricing of loans by MDBs should be established in a way to encourage graduation. It also emphasised the need to strengthen the relationship between MDBs and the private sector, particularly to encourage private infrastructure financing in developing countries. The catalytic role that MDBs can play in this regard should be based on guarantee schemes, through which MDBs help to cover the government and regulatory risks that private investors are likely to face.

A close look at the evolution of multilateral development bank lending in recent years (Figure 2) supports the view expressed by both the United States Treasury and the Gurría and Volker report. Indeed, it shows that, whereas financing to low-income countries is steadier, lending to middle-income countries is strongly counter-cyclical. It should be emphasised, in any case, that if multilateral development financing is not significantly expanded, this counter-cyclical role will necessarily be limited. This is underscored by the data from Table 3, which
indicate that multilateral financing in 1990-1999 represented only 15.5% of that provided by the private sector, excluding FDI, and only 8.4% in the case of middle-income countries. Thus, a useful counter-cyclical function vis-à-vis emerging economies would require a significant increase in resources available to MDBs or a more active use of co-financing and credit guarantees by these institutions. Interestingly, to the extent that MDB financing falls when there is an adequate supply of private capital to emerging economies, the controversy on graduation is largely irrelevant. Indeed, such pattern indicates that graduation will be automatic once countries have steady access to private capital flows.

Figure 2
The Counter-cyclical Character of Multilateral Development Bank Lending

MDBs will thus continue to play an essential role in five basic areas: financing low-income countries; providing (partial) counter-cyclical financing to middle-income countries; acting as catalysts for new forms of private investment; supporting capacity building and institutional development; and supporting the provision of global and regional public goods. The specific financial commitments that this implies from the international community have not received adequate attention.
4. Regional schemes

The role of regional institutions in the international financial system is one of the most prominent items missing from the mainstream discussion and agenda on international financial reform. It is absent from the main Northern reports and from the views on financial reform which come from the Bretton Woods institutions.

This is an important deficiency. There are, indeed, several arguments for a strong role for regional institutions in international finance. The first relate to the growth of macroeconomic linkages at the regional level, as a result of the growth of intra-regional trade and capital flows. This creates a demand for regional surveillance and consultation of macroeconomic policies, as well as for peer review of national prudential regulation and supervision of domestic financial systems. One advantage of regional surveillance is that asymmetries of information are smaller at this level.

The second are the classical risk-pooling arguments. Regional and sub-regional development banks, even those made up entirely of developing countries, are likely to face lower risks than individual members. This creates the potential for profitable financial intermediation. Also, contagion of crises often starts within regions; therefore, regional mechanisms for liquidity provision can provide a first line of defence in deterring contagion. This preventive line of defence is facilitated by the fact that, despite contagion, critical demands for funds do not coincide exactly in time, a fact that generates a useful role for regional reserve funds and swap arrangements. Moreover, the sense of “ownership” of regional and sub-regional development banks and reserve funds by developing countries creates a special relationship between them and member countries that helps to reduce the risks that these institutions face, further encouraging the virtues of risk pooling.

The third set of arguments relates to the virtues of an international order that combines world and regional institutions. Given the heterogeneity of the international community, world

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24/ See, for example, Council on Foreign Relations (1999), and Meltzer et al. (2000).
and regional institutions can play useful complementary roles, particularly in macroeconomic policy coordination, in the adaptation of international norms to the specific regulatory traditions, and in reducing learning costs and sharing experiences in institutional development. At the same time, for smaller countries, the access to a broader alternative set of institutions for crisis management and development finance, including regional ones, may be particularly valuable, as they have relatively less influence and bargaining power vis-à-vis global institutions. More generally, the creation and strengthening of regional developing institutions will help increase developing countries' ability to participate and influence the global financial architecture negotiations.

The history of regional financial cooperation has been particularly rich in post-war Western Europe, from the development of European Payments Union and the European Investment Bank, to a series of arrangements for macroeconomic coordination and cooperation, that eventually led to the current monetary union of most members of the European Union. To a lesser extent, financial cooperation has been present in the developing world over several decades. Two remarkable examples are the institutions designed in the context of Arab and Andean cooperation. The first includes the Arab Monetary Fund, which plays an essential role in financing intra-regional trade and structural adjustment; the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development, which support infrastructure projects, with a priority for regional projects; and the Arab Investment Guarantee Fund, which supports intra-regional investment. The second includes the Andean Development Corporation, which provides development finance to both public and private sectors in several Latin American countries, and the Latin American Reserve Fund, which includes Andean countries and Costa Rica, and has provided emergency liquidity financing to all Andean countries over the past decades. There are other institutions in the developing world, including several sub-regional development banks in the Latin American and Caribbean region.

The major advances in this area in recent years have taken place in Asia. They include, first, the May 2000 Chiang Mai Agreement between ASEAN countries, China, the Republic of Korea and Japan, to create a swap arrangement among central banks. This initiative followed

the Japanese suggestion to create an Asian Monetary Fund, which generated major opposition by the International Monetary Fund during its 1997 Hong Kong annual meetings. The second was the creation of the ASEAN Surveillance Process, for exchanging macroeconomic and financial information, and providing early warning signals and peer review among ASEAN countries. In Latin America and the Caribbean, there have been some steps towards developing mechanisms for macroeconomic coordination in the context of the four sub-regional integration schemes and initiatives to strengthen the Latin American Reserve Fund.

All these experiences indicate that regional bodies can be very effective in providing liquidity, facilitating development finance and sustaining trade links. They can also contribute to macroeconomic policy peer review and coordination. Nonetheless, these institutions remain limited in their scope so far, and are not recognised as central to the international financial architecture. This would require formal links between the International Monetary Fund and regional reserve funds and swap arrangements, which could eventually transform the former into a network or regional reserve funds. It also requires an explicit policy by the World Bank to support regional development banks, including new institutions exclusively owned by developing countries.

An institutional framework such as that suggested would have two positive features. First of all, it may bring more stability to the world economy by supplying essential services that can hardly be provided by a few global institutions, particularly in the face of a dynamic process of open regionalism. Secondly, from the point of view of the equilibrium of world relations, it would be more balanced than a system based on a few world organisations. This would increase the commitment of less powerful players to abide by rules that contribute to world and regional stability.

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28/ Agosin (2001) and ECLAC (2002a, ch. 2).
29/ United Nations Executive Committee on Economic and Social Affairs (1999), Section 9; Ocampo (1999, 2002).
V. POLITICAL ECONOMY

As we have seen in this paper, progress on international financial reform has been uneven and asymmetrical; more progress has been achieved in areas implemented nationally by developing countries (e.g. Codes and Standards) than in the equally important and complementary international measures (e.g. provision of sufficient official liquidity and development finance, and design of international debt workout procedures). What are the main reasons for this uneven progress? More importantly, what strategy and bargaining tactics could be most productive for achieving a more symmetrical process?

Clearly, the asymmetries in the international financial reform process reflect certain political and political economy characteristics of the world. The most powerful governments -- and especially their financial authorities-- have not thrown their weight consistently behind a deep international financial reform, even though they were more enthusiastic about it after the 1997-1998 Asian and Russian crises, largely due to the brief credit crunch they generated in the industrialised world.

An important reason for lack of consistent developed country support for the reform process may be that some powerful actors in those countries (e.g. major financial agents) do not see it in their interest to support or promote major changes in the international financial architecture. Another problem is that those who would benefit most from such changes in developed countries (e.g. shareholders and workers of companies trading and investing long-term in developing economies, or who support development in poor countries) are not represented properly in financial decision-making processes.

As a result, the main impulse for international financial reform could potentially come from developing countries. However, developing countries have their own restrictions. Firstly, and most important, they have relatively limited power, as reflected in their exclusion or limited participation in key bodies. Secondly, developing countries have seen their ability to generate strong coalitions weakened; this may be linked to the "policy competition" to attract foreign capital, and thus the resulting unwillingness to make or support proposals that could modify their
image as friendly to foreign investors. Finally, developing countries—especially but not only the poorest ones—may have insufficient technical capacity and resources to generate complex blueprints for international financial reform, and follow complex negotiation processes.

If conscious and deliberate efforts are not made to overcome the basic asymmetries in global power relations, and the technical as well as other difficulties to generate international coalitions to compensate for these power imbalances, the international financial agenda would continue to be biased towards the views of a limited set of actors in the industrialised countries, and the impact of this agenda and policies on the rest of the work— including in particular developing countries—will not be fully internalised.

A second reason restricting progress in international financial reform is the reluctance of most (especially industrialised, but also developing) countries to give up economic sovereignty to international organisations. In this sense, regional organisations and mechanisms may be very valuable, both in themselves and as stepping stones towards global organisations and mechanisms, and for improving the bargaining position of developing countries for a better financial architecture. A problem here is that countries (except in the case of the European Union) have been reluctant to give up sovereignty even to regional organisations.

There are however, two very positive elements that may be helpful in the process of genuine international financial reform. One is that all key actors involved share a common objective, which is that they are in favour of—and benefit from—sustained growth in developing countries. As seen in Table 4, for some actors this is more important than others, but all share this objective.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Developed country governments</th>
<th>Dominant objectives</th>
<th>Other objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Growth in their own economies</td>
<td>Growth in developing countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Profits for their financial sectors. Global financial stability.</td>
<td>No crises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed country governments</td>
<td>Growth in their own economies. Global financial stability.</td>
<td>Growth in developed countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking and Financial Markets</td>
<td>Maximize profits</td>
<td>Global financial stability. Growth in developed and developing economies</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 4: Objectives of key actors
A second potentially very positive element is the existence of a set of actors in developed countries, who are --and could become even more-- important allies of developing countries in building a better international financial system. These include the non-financial part of governments (e.g. Development Cooperation Ministries), NGOs, political parties and parliamentarians, as well as non-financial corporations. In different ways, and for different reasons, these actors are supportive of more rapid growth in developing countries, and therefore are or could become very supportive of an international financial reform that helps make growth possible. For this purpose, developing countries' governments need to have an active dialogue on international financial reform, not just with financial authorities in developed countries, with market actors and IFIs (who clearly are the main actors in the reform process) but also with other actors in the developed world.

Developing countries could attempt to design and offer a "grand bargain" on international and national financial reform that would be attractive to a whole range of actors in developed countries, both in the public and the private sector, as well as supportive of their own growth and development.

Such a bargain would have two sets of elements. Developing countries could say they would be keen to implement initiatives that are of particular interest to developed economies, such as Codes and Standards on financial regulation and a fuller liberalisation of their capital accounts, if, and only if, developed countries start reforming the global financial system in ways that would facilitate larger and more stable capital flows to developing countries, and that would make costly crises in these countries less likely. Whilst such a reformed international financial system would not exist, they would clearly be less able and less willing to open their capital accounts fully, as the potential risks of doing so could outweigh the benefits. Particularly, developing countries could argue that implementing Codes and Standards and a commitment to adopt proper domestic macroeconomic policies should be explicitly linked to some regulation of developed countries' financial markets to help avoid excessive surges of potentially reversible capital flows to developing countries; to mechanisms that encourage long-term flows; to the design of (low-conditionality) international liquidity mechanisms that would significantly protect
individual developing countries from crises and stop them from spreading to other countries; and to fair multilateral debt workout mechanisms that would be used to manage solvency crises (debt overhangs).

Thus, developing countries that followed good macro-economic policies and significantly improved their financial regulation (as certified, for example, in their annual Article IV IMF consultations) could have virtually automatic access to sufficient IMF lending if hit by a crises whose origin was not of its own making, but was due to unexpected changes in perceptions of international lenders on investors or due to large terms of trade shocks. Low-income countries that followed good macroeconomic policies and improved financial regulation would have sufficient access not just to international liquidity, but also to development finance. Debt workout mechanisms would only be used when crises faced by developing countries were due to unsustainable debt burdens (and would not be used when they are associated to insufficient international liquidity), and appropriate mechanisms would be designed to guarantee financing in the post-debt restructuring environment to facilitate reinsertion into private capital markets.

Such a bargain would provide incentives for developed countries to make necessary international changes, as they would know that they would ensure the desired changes in developing countries, and vice versa. Collective action problems could thus be overcome if genuine progress was made simultaneously by developed and developing countries. Most importantly, the result would be of great value, not just to developing countries, but also to developed ones.

Developing countries could draw here interesting lessons from both the bargaining tactics used and the vision presented by Keynes in negotiations that led, at Bretton Woods, to the creation of the post-war international financial order (see Skidelsky, 2001). As regards bargaining tactics, Keynes presented two clear alternatives: an "ideal" scheme, with key international elements --such as a large IMF-- and a "second best" case, wherein the UK would reluctantly follow a far more closed approach in trade and the capital account if the international financial system was not properly developed; there was, he argued, no middle way (though in practice he made some important concessions later).
Suitably adapted to the features of the early 21st Century world economy, developing countries can argue that the same two clear options remain:

a) An appropriate international financial system, that would support development and make crises far less likely and less costly, not just for them but particularly for the global economy. Developing countries could contribute to this new IFA by implementing regulatory standards, adopting good macro-policies and by gradually liberalising their capital accord.

or

b) An incomplete and lopsided international financial system that could not guarantee supporting developing country aims, and where they would not be able to open fully their capital accounts, as they would regretfully have to protect their interests by having, as a “second best solution”, more rather than less national policy autonomy. Similarly, they may be forced to rely on regional institutions and mechanisms even to perform functions that could be best performed globally, given vacuums in the existing global financial architecture.

Developing countries could draw lessons from Keynes’ preparation of a clear vision of the key elements, which would need to be included in a "first-best" international financial system, and by showing how such a superior system would benefit all involved; this system would be superior both because it would support more stable growth in developing countries –of benefit to many actors in the developed world-- but perhaps more importantly, because it would increase financial stability globally. There is here a clear parallel with Keynes' position at Bretton Woods, who in defending the interests of the relative weaker, debtor countries like the UK, was at the same time defending global prosperity. Furthermore, just as Keynes appealed then to United States internationalism and liberalism to help overcome opposition to his proposals, developing countries should appeal to current United States ideals of supporting and deepening the market economy globally; for this, they should stress how a "first-best" international financial system, that would facilitate growth and prosperity for them, would clearly increase their own commitment to the global market economy, and their ownership of policies to integrate further into this globalised market economy.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR AID

As we have seen above, one of the best ways to support progress on an international financial reform that promotes development and poverty reduction is to strengthen the voice of developing countries in that discussion. To do that, it is important not just to increase participation of developing countries in the key fora (along the lines discussed above), but also to enhance their technical knowledge of increasingly complex issues in relation to the reform of the international financial system, and to strengthen simultaneously their bargaining position.

Two crucial tasks need to be tackled in this field. Firstly, developing countries should develop and attempt to agree jointly clear and precise positions on the main areas outlined above, such as provision of sufficient official liquidity and development finance, appropriate regulation of financial markets and capital flows, international standstills and orderly debt workouts, and participation of developing countries in key institutions. Then, they could agree a strategy on how to best try to achieve such change; this would include preparing and taking specific initiatives to relevant bodies (e.g. IMF and World Bank, the Basel Committees, the G-20, etc.).

Secondly, much of the transformation in the international financial architecture is de facto taking place through a fairly large number of small incremental changes --through what Kenen (2001) has aptly called “galloping incrementalism”. Because a major overhaul of the international financial system (à la Bretton Woods) seems unfortunately unlikely in the short-term, changes in the international financial system are likely to continue to take place in an incremental way. Therefore, riding on this trend seems the best alternative.

In this context, it would be very valuable if a fund or resource centre could be created soon that would help provide systematic, timely and independent support to representatives of developing countries (in particular, but not only, the developing country Executive Directors in the IMF and World Bank Board). Such a resource centre would be particularly, but again not only, valuable to the two Sub-Saharan African Executive Directors who have very large constituencies, representing more than 20 countries each, which implies they have a very heavy
load of country work on the countries they represent. In discussions with Executive Directors and their Alternates (both from Africa and Latin America), it has become clear that they would value such an initiative, which they have themselves suggested given that they--and their governments--do not have sufficient time and resources to undertake detailed and timely analytical work, indispensable for their ability to influence policy debates. This limits both their capacity to analyse and respond to specific documents and initiatives being taken to the IMF and World Bank Boards, and even more, their ability to generate their own policy initiatives.

Such a fund or resource centre could have a small core technical secretariat (closely interacting with the G-24) and could draw on a virtual network of think-tanks, academics and other experts (in developed and, particularly, developing countries) for its work. A large part of its activities would imply preparing or helping prepare very brief, focussed papers or memos with reactions to documents on important issues going to the IMF and World Bank Board, where new or alternative proposals could be elaborated. This would have to be a quick response facility, as there is normally a very short period between distribution of policy papers and their discussion.

Because time would be so much of the essence in a large part of this work, the quick response work would require much and creative use of teleconferencing, emailing, etc. Small workshops or meetings (either in person or cybernetic) could play a very helpful role. Donors would fund the centre, but it is essential that its work be independent of donors, and that ownership and accountability of the work would belong clearly to developing countries. The independence of the resource centre would clearly benefit developing countries, but it could also be valuable to developed countries, keen to improve the quality of developing countries' position and dialogue.

Ideally, several donors would fund such a centre. One major donor is already evaluating the creation of such a centre. Further support from other donors (and in particular Sweden) would be extremely valuable to enlarge the scope of such an initiative. Given that the Monterrey Consensus specifically encourages the IMF and World Bank "to continue to enhance the role of
developing countries in their decision-making and deliberative bodies”, this proposal could be
launched as part of the initiatives to implement that Consensus.

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