DEVELOPMENT: IMAGES, CONCEPTIONS, CRITERIA, AGENTS, CHOICES

1. Images of development

During more than a quarter century the political leaders of most of the human race have endorsed "development" as a central theme of public policy and have affirmed that all peoples have a right as well as a capacity to "develop". Theorists and practitioners from the most diverse backgrounds have explored the bases and implications of this position and it has been popularized through many channels. Thousands of specialists have come to derive their livelihood from "development" and have a vested interest in keeping it in the centre of the world stage. This prolonged preoccupation with development has not brought the world closer to a definitive consensus as to what it is and how it is to be attained, and it is striking that different conceptions and approaches continue to coexist and interpenetrate each other, unaffected by demonstrations, in an extensive critical and polemical literature, of their mutual incompatibility or their incongruity with experience. Hardly any of the ideas about development current twenty-five years ago have been definitively discredited, to judge from their recurrence in policy declarations, but quite different ideas have emerged alongside them, many of the latter deriving from interpretations of societal change current long before the term "development" came to the fore. The circumstances in which the international discussion of development is carried on, as well as the traits of the political process in most countries, make for eclecticism, receptivity to superficial novelties, evasion of clear choices, and forgetfulness toward past experience. In fact, the discussion consists in large part of ritual affirmations or of a dialogue of the deaf.

Several radically different conceptions of and approaches to development can be deduced from the discussion. The differences centre on the following questions: a) images of the international order and its role in national development; b) images of existing national societal structures and power relationships; c) value-based images of the future society expected to emerge from the development process; d) nature of the agents relied on to direct or impel development; e) choices open to the agents in trying to move from the
unsatisfactory present to the preferred future. Logically, the conceptions and approaches adopted in relation to the latter questions should derive from those adopted in relation to the former. In practice, the correspondence may not be very close.

The first question suggests three alternative images of international "developmental" relationships: as a procession, as a living pyramid, and as a race toward a bottomless pit.

The first image has informed the activities of the international machinery of bureaucratic and research bodies; professional advisers and promoters; reports, resolutions and recommendations dedicated to the proposition that Governments are rational, benevolent and coherent entities, anxious to advance toward "development", "modernization", and "social justice" if only they are told how; and that somewhere there is a One Right Path that can be pointed out to them. If the guidebooks turned out by the international machinery do not seem to have brought them to this Path as yet, some essential instruction must have been missing. Developmental guidebooks thus become continually more complicated and "comprehensive". "Planning" comes to be reified as a mystical entity that will solve all problems once rightly conceived: "planning must pay greater attention to ..."; "planning must be comprehensive ..."; "planning establishes ..., permits ..., provides ...", as the formulas in international reports have it. The supposition of actual or potential Governmental rationality and benevolence links the high-income to the low-income countries in the quest for development. If the former have not yet done enough to uplift the latter, they will do so as soon as it is convincingly demonstrated that this is their duty as well as their interest.

The conception of development is lineal. It is summed up in the slogan of "closing the gap". One can imagine a straggling procession of countries. The leaders are forging ahead confidently and comfortably, already within the frontiers of the Promised Land. A few countries in the middle are marching rapidly, trying to subdue fatigue and ignore hunger and sore feet, seeing the gap between themselves and the leaders beginning to narrow. A larger number of countries, smaller and weaker, are falling ever farther behind the leaders, while sending frantic messages up the line - "Do your duty: help us to march faster!" Some of them are screaming and tearing their own flesh in frustration; a few have stopped in despairing apathy. The
apathy. The guidebooks are commonly critical of some of the steps taken by the leaders in the past; the "human cost" was unnecessarily high. They suggest shortcuts based on this experience, but in the main they take it for granted not only that the direction taken by the leaders was the right one for their own interests, but also that it is desirable as well as attainable for the followers.

The second image is suggested by the views of many sociologists and political scientists and some economists who reject or disregard the demands for universally applicable development guidebooks and question the capacity of most national Governments, and of the international order itself, to generate processes justifying the hopes that have been invested in the term "development". From this point of view, the developmental processes followed by the present high-income countries in the past are not open to the rest of the world today, except possibly in a few very special cases. In fact, the high-income countries have been able to "develop" largely through their ability to exploit and dominate the others and, under changing guises, this remains true today. As long as their present economic and political structures persist, they are inherently incapable of helping the others to "catch up". The models they offer lure the rest of the world into an impasse, sapping national capacity to make the decisions needed for authentic and autonomous development.

The world system is thus represented by a living pyramid rather than a procession: the countries on top are able to rise higher and higher because they rest on the shoulders of those under them. Since the pyramid is a living structure, it is continually in movement, with the units at the bottom trying to scramble up or to escape altogether, and with the units at the top trying to bind them in place by continually changing combinations of force and fraud, threats and inducements. The units at the top cling to each other for support, but at the same time try to raise themselves on each others' shoulders. From time to time, a great convulsion shakes the whole pyramid, as the competition at the top turns violent and the opportunities below for climbing or escape are enhanced. "Development", for the units now near the bottom, presupposes destruction of the whole pyramidal structure and its replacement by equalitarian and co-operative relationships between
relationships between units. This pyramidal image of the international system usually accompanies a similar image of power structures within the units. The conclusion may or may not be drawn that the consumption and production patterns of the countries now at the top of the pyramid are unattainable or undesirable for the remainder; in any case, a greater emphasis on public control of production, collective forms of consumption, and equitable distribution of goods and services are looked toward following transformation of the international and national pyramidal structures.

A third image is rapidly rising into prominence that negates basic premises shared by the first two concerning the feasibility and desirability of long-term expansion of production and consumption and the unlimited problem-solving capacity of technological innovation. Natural resources are finite; the tampering with the environment inseparable from any long-continued effort to raise production and consumption levels for an ever-increasing world population points to ecological disaster; the expectation that the low-income societies of the world will ever command sufficient resources and productive capacity to reach the present levels of material welfare of the high-income societies is absurd; the latter societies will perish and drag the rest of humanity with them if they do not transform their expectations and ways of life. This image, first put forward by demographers and ecologists, is entering into informed public opinion with remarkable speed, aided by the increasing prominence of unwanted by-products of economic growth and population growth. Elsewhere, particularly in the public opinion of the societies striving hardest to "close the gap" or scramble up the pyramid, it is naturally met with intense frustration and rejection.

Under this diagnosis, the procession is headed not toward the Promised Land but toward a bottomless pit. The pyramidal struggle is taking place on quicksand, in which all the contestants will be engulfed the more quickly the harder they struggle to climb. The only hope lies in halting the procession or the struggle, setting entirely different priorities for human endeavour, terminating population growth, husbanding resources, subordinating production and consumption to preservation of an ecological balance that will be viable over the long term.

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Each of these three images sums up a wide range of currents of opinion, many of them on far-from-friendly terms with one another. The first camp ranges from devout believers in econometric planning and maximization of "productive" investment to prophets and promoters of "human resource development", "community development", "achievement motivation", etc. The lowest common denominator is faith in the potential rationality and benevolence of national Governments and the international order. The second camp ranges from several schools of revolutionary Marxists, looking to simultaneous transformation of the international order and of national control over the means of production as prerequisites for equitable worldwide development, to "realists" preoccupied with national or class possibilities for survival, manoeuvre, and enhancement of bargaining power within structures of domination and dependency viewed as inherently and permanently cramping and inequitable. The lowest common denominator is concern with questions of power and with the identification of social forces capable of directing "development". The third camp ranges from believers that happier and more creative human societies can and will emerge from a transformation of existing values and expectations to prophets of unavoidable doom for the whole human race. The lowest common denominator is rejection of the viability and desirability of indefinitely continuing increases in population and production.

The first camp is still predominant in international discourse, but with many signs of declining self-confidence and of increasing contamination by preoccupations emanating from the second and third camps. The eclecticism and anxiety to satisfy all interests capable of making themselves heard in international meetings characteristic of this camp make it vulnerable to such contamination. Governments are increasingly urged to do different things and do them better than in the past. Official spokesmen denounce corruption, bureaucratism, inequitable distribution and external dependency, and vow that their respective Governments will mend their ways. Statements on the need to confront national and international power realities, to seek support on the basis of the interests of determined classes in determined development policies appear even in the preambles to economic development plans. However grudgingly, the indispensability of population limitation
and resource conservation, the dangers and futilities of production for the sake of production, begin to receive explicit official recognition.

There are obvious limits to the capacity of inter-governmental organizations or national Governments to work out logically and objectively the implications of the many variants of the three images and choose accordingly a coherent policy framework. It is hard enough for individual specialists in development studies, with their status dependent on the reality of something identifiable as "development", concerning which Governments can usefully be advised, and susceptible to policy-oriented research, to do so. It is even harder for political leaders and administrators. If the State, as now constituted in the rich countries and the poor, is inherently incapable of furthering the "development" of the latter through rational, benevolent, plannable action, or if what has hitherto been considered "development" is leading to disaster, what then? What function is left to the development theorist and adviser? If he is to give advice, to whom should it be directed? Can he hope to formulate conceptions of development or criteria for development that will correspond to real, feasible, desirable change processes; that will be susceptible to rational public intervention on behalf of human welfare; and that will be intelligible, at least as a basis for discussion of alternatives lines of action, to persons whose outlook is coloured by one or other of the three images?

2. Conceptions, values, criteria for styles of development

In the earlier years of international preoccupation with "development" its proponents almost universally took for granted, with many differing shades of emphasis and readiness to admit the relevance of other factors, that its central element consisted in the raising of production per capita, mainly through industrialization, and that this called for maximization of the rate of "productive" investment. This outlook carried with it the explicit or implicit understanding that the high-income industrialized countries of the world are "developed", that this is an enviable state of being, and that the rest of the world can attain it. The proponents of "development" might have their doubts about the capacity of the least-favoured countries to "develop" through industrialization, but since the only...
alternative seemed to be that they should remain poor and backward, these
doubts, in the climate of agreement on universal rights to develop, were
excluded from public intergovernmental discourse.

By now, this conception of development has been criticised so repeatedly
and from so many points of view that further attention to it might seem
equivalent to flogging a dead horse. Nevertheless, it remains stubbornly
alive in the outlook of many political leaders, planners, and entrepreneurial
groups, and belief in it as a real alternative to be refuted conditions the
ways in which other currents of opinion seek more satisfying conceptions of
development. Their argument runs that single-minded pursuit of an economic
growth objective has proved counter-productive. In fact, the past quarter-
century offers few convincing examples of countries that have been capable
of single-minded pursuit of economic growth over any length of time, although
there may have been a good many whose political leaders and planners thought
they were trying to do so. Such a single-minded pursuit requires an
exceptional combination of strength and continuity in the political regime,
resource endowment, and a favourable international conjuncture. In the
few instances in which these requisites have been present, single-minded
pursuit of economic growth has not been counter-productive in its own terms,
or in the interests of the groups controlling the process, although the
results are open to criticism in terms of human welfare and equity values
and in terms of probable non-viability over the long term.

In attacks on the identification of development with economic growth
several kinds of arguments are commonly mingled: the human costs are too
high, the results are inevitably inequitable, the kind of "consumer society"
to which it leads is inherently undesirable even if the inequities are
alleviated, the societal resistances and structural incompatibilities are
bound to hamper or disrupt economic growth itself unless societal change
is brought to the fore in the developmental model, international relationships
are incompatible with thoroughgoing industrialization of the countries now
lagging. Sometimes the proponents of different approaches to development
seem to be governed by value premises in rejecting the exclusive "economic
growth" approach, but to be trying to convince the political leaders and
planners in terms of practical arguments that it will not work. Sometimes
the planners themselves proceed from an attempt to understand and avoid the practical "social obstacles" supposed to be responsible for the frustration of their economic growth strategies, and then introduce value premises to strengthen their arguments for needed structural changes.

It may be suspected from recent international discussions that the arguments have penetrated only superficially into the thinking of the political leadership and into public opinion in most countries. The supposition lingers on that all countries face a real choice whether to "concentrate on economic growth" (imitating the earlier "stages" of the now "developed" countries) or to balance economic growth (assumed to be essential in any case) with considerable allocations of resources to social services and measures for income redistribution (imitating the later stages of the now "developed" countries). These suppositions are compatible with either of the first two images described above, although the agents and strategies would be different. They are, of course, radically incompatible with the third image, although a comparable division, embryonic as yet, can be detected between policy proposals emphasizing prevention of further economic growth and those emphasizing the distributional and welfare requirements of a society that dispenses with economic growth.

In the quest for more adequate conceptions of what development consists of and why it is wanted, it seems essential to insist on the making of a clear distinction between two legitimate uses of the term "development", but also to keep the interpretations deriving from these two uses in continual contact with each other:

a) "Development" consists of systematically inter-related growth and change processes in human societies, delimited by the boundaries of national states, but also highly inter-dependent on a world scale. These processes have many uniformities and predictable sequences, but also have unique characteristics in each country or society, deriving from historical patterns, cultural traits and values, territorial and population size, resource endowment, internal class structure and power relationships, place in the international system, etc. Each society has a more or less limited range of choices open to it and a more or less limited capacity to make choices.
At any given time the political capacity to make choices may or not be compatible with the real developmental alternatives that are open, and both the capacity to choose and the range of alternatives are continually changing. The only general alternative to "development" in this sense is stagnation or decay. "Development" may at different times become more or less spontaneous or subject to rational policy decisions and planning; more or less conflictive or peaceful; more or less equitable or inequitable; more or less investment-oriented or consumption-oriented; more or less autonomous or dependent at the national level. It can also be more or less susceptible to breakdown through internal contradictions or viable over the long term, but there seems to be no adequate reason to assume that any rational pattern of development can continue indefinitely without exhausting its potentialities and facing breakdown or transformation. Development in this sense is inescapably societal development; for analytical purposes economic, social, political and other aspects can be treated separately, but it is misleading to regard these as different kinds of development. The components of development as a system can, in principle, be determined empirically, through study of their inter-actions, although this may not be fully feasible in practice. In this sense, it might be justifiable to rule that certain things that happen in a given society, and certain public measures, fall outside the developmental system of inter-actions, or are not related to them in any way likely to affect significantly the future process of developmental change.

b) "Development" expresses an aspiration toward a better society. In this sense, it implies choices derived from value judgements concerning the content and characteristics of a better society. It also implies value judgements concerning the right of the existing society, through general consensus or through agents claiming to represent the best interests of the society, to make such choices and enforce them through developmental policies. It can be assumed also that the choices are envisaged as feasible rather than utopian; for each society, they must fall within limits set by "development" processes and capabilities in the first sense. The value-oriented sense of development as an aspiration offers a frame of reference for clarification of what each society wants to do, what it can do, and what the short, medium,
and long term implications and requisites for its choices may be. In this
sense also, development is societal and constitutes a system of inter-actions,
but the content of the system is determined by the values and preferences
of the society. Anything to which the society gives a high priority is
part of its preferred style of development, whether or not significant
inter-actions with other components of the style can be detected.

From an international point of view, one can proceed from the above
distinction between two uses of the term "development" to the following pro-
positions:  1) Different national styles of development are legitimate,
possible, and indeed inevitable.  2) All countries face a certain range of
choices of style, but the range of feasible choices differs for each country.
3) In terms of internationally accepted values, whatever style is chosen
should be compatible with a minimum criterion: enhancement of the capacity
of the society to function over the long term for the well-being of all its
members.  4) Each society faces a challenge to evolve a style of development
responding to this criterion through continued, increasingly realistic and
informed exploration of the choices open to it, and through the elaboration
of corresponding principles and techniques of decision-making.  5) The
definition of a style of societal development cannot be restricted to
supplementation of national income objectives by a set of conventional
quantified sectoral "social" objectives, although such objectives have a
legitimate place in the definition.  6) Choices leading to a style of
development need not strain to be "comprehensive", in the sense of allocating
a place to every conceivable form of public action and "taking into account"
the inter-relationships of everything with everything else; attainment of
a viable style of development may require a capacity to concentrate on
certain key objectives at each stage, minimizing the diversion of resources
and public attention to other objectives that are desirable in themselves.
These choices cannot be governed by universally applicable "rights."

7) The emphasis on increasing rationality in diagnosis and decision-making
does not imply that any society can expect to attain a completely harmonious
"technocratic" style of development; choice will always be a political process;
debate and conflict over choices have a legitimate place in any acceptable
style of development. The outcome may be a coherent style imposed by a single
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dominant group, or a semi-coherent style emerging from bargaining and compromise among groups whose objectives are basically compatible, or an impasse when no group is able to dominate and the positions are too far apart for a developmentally viable compromise.

A demonstration of the need to choose a coherent style of development and the advocacy of action strategies consonant with the style chosen supposes the presence of an agent or agents capable of understanding the demonstration and acting on the advice. In practice, one finds a multiplicity of prospective agents varyingly open to such demonstrations and advocacy on the basis of their values, preconceptions of development, and immediate interests, and varyingly capable of taking relevant action. These prospective agents have differing reasons for wanting "development", as they conceive it, and give "development" differing priorities within their whole range of objectives. A demonstration convincing to one prospective agent may be unintelligible to another and unacceptable to a third. The present notes have insisted on the absurdity of addressing developmental advice to a non-existent coherent, benevolent, rational and powerful entity, solely interested in the most effective way to impel development for the enhancement of human welfare.

A moment's thought concerning the interplay of different interests, rigidities, irrationalities, and propensities to evade choices and prefer ritual to effective action in whatever organized activity in which the reader may have participated should be enough to dispel this belief.

The quest for more authentic, desirable and feasible styles of national development can never be monopolized or controlled by social scientists and planners, but neither can these specialists restrict themselves to instrumental roles, accepting as given developmental directives emanating from the political leadership or from popular consensus. Such directives are never going to be coherent enough. During conjunctures relatively favourable to development, political leadership representing the more dynamic elements of a given society will hold the centre of the stage and will try to act on some explicit or implicit developmental strategy. This leadership, however, cannot be expected to preoccupy itself with development alone; its first preoccupation must be to insure its own survival and strengthen its hold on power, and this will require a combination of actions that are in
pert, from any strictly developmental viewpoint, irrelevant, wasteful or
damaging. It may be vulnerable to delusions of omnipotence and very poorly
informed concerning its real capabilities. Moreover, the political leader
and administrator face a constant series of limited choices, with the response
partly predetermined by precedent or by the strength of immediate pressures,
whose implications for a style of development, even if the main lines of
the preferred style have been defined, are obscure or ambiguous. The implica-
tions of such limited choices cannot be grasped adequately through experience
or intuition, and few choices meet with unanimous approval even within the
political leadership.

The task of the social scientist and planner, then, is to help the
political leadership—and indeed all persons concerned with public policy—
toward more rational choices, taking into account all relevant factors, in
pursuit of a style of development that is feasible and desirable, in its main
lines, in the eyes of both parties, and to help decrease the proportion of
choices that are counter-productive in relation to the style, without aspiring
to an unrealistically rigid consistency. This task can hardly be accomplished
to any significant extent as long as it is monopolized by specialists communi-
cating through a technical jargon. It will progress to the extent that the
practice of thinking about styles of development, choices deriving from them,
and rational techniques of decision-making penetrate throughout the political
leadership, the public administration, and the population in general.

The techniques of economic development planning in use up to the
present have made significant contributions along these lines, but these
contributions have been smaller and more erratic than might have been expected
from the importance attributed to such planning during the 1950’s and 1960’s.
The reasons need not be discussed at this point, but they undoubtedly include
the general failure to explore the possibility of alternative styles of
development. In the absence of such an exploration, attempts to broaden the
content and procedures of planning, through the incorporation of "social
objectives", and through the setting up of participatory mechanisms and
local and sectoral planning bodies, complicated the planning process without
generating much authentic participation in decision-making or bringing the
plans closer to a consistent influence on what actually happened. More
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recently, several means of beginning an exploration of styles of development have been proposed and experimented with, although none of them has as yet attained a major influence on policy;

a) Deduction of the preferred style of development from what the society (or the State) actually does or claims to be trying to do, followed by demonstration of the degree of feasibility and consistency of the style, the advantages and risks implied, the requisites for its pursuit, and the contradictions or incompatibilities between elements.

b) Definition of several alternative styles of development, which may be deduced from actual trends in the national society or other societies, from declared objectives of the State, or from value-based preferences of the persons undertaking the experiment; quantification of the components and requisites of these styles; demonstration of their feasibility or otherwise over defined time-spans (in terms of resource requirements, skill requirements, financial requirements, import requirements, political support or consensus requirements, etc.); experimentation with variations in each style to enhance feasibility. The possibilities for experimentation with this technique depend on the availability of computers capable of making large numbers of complicated calculations cheaply and rapidly. This technique should be particularly effective in demonstrating quantitatively and convincingly what cannot be done; that certain styles of development attractive to official and popular opinion lead to an impasse or breakdown.

c) Assessment of national potential for development through typologies and "profiles" of national situations. This represents initially an attempt to penetrate beyond the simplistic identification of "level of development" with "level of per capita income", with the accompanying supposition that all countries, large and small, well-endowed and otherwise, are capable of developing economically through a series of predictable stages. The technique can lead to two quite different kinds of indications relevant to policy:

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1/ This is the path followed by J.P. Guillard, Rapport sur "La Planification du développement social" en Iran, Organisation du Plan, Tehran 1971.


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i) concerning the internal equilibrium or otherwise of levels and rates of
growth in production, welfare, and public actions in different sectors;
ii) concerning the feasibility of certain lines of development, in
particular industrialization, in relation to natural resources, human
resources, size of internal market, etc. The results of this technique can
be no more than indicative: they can suggest that a country should pay
more attention to certain sectors of public action or rule out certain lines
of development, and indicate questions that need exploration through other
techniques.1/

d) Evaluation of all projects calling for public resource allocations
or other public actions in terms of a weighted list of objectives supposed
to represent the preferred style of development, and priority ranking of
projects according to the importance and number of objectives to which they
contribute.2/ This technique permits alternative evaluations, giving
different weighting to the objectives, so as to help the political
decision-makers clarify what is most important to them. It helps them go
beyond the discredited traditional division between "economic" objectives
and actions and "social" objectives and actions. It assumes that all
projects are relevant to social as well as economic (and political) objectives
to the extent that these enter into the preferred style.

It must be recognized that any of the above techniques, or others
directed toward the same ends, if objectively applied, will lead to conclusions
profoundly disquieting to almost any national political leadership, as well
as the international vested interests in "development". Part of the art of
governing consists in not letting choices and limitations appear too nakedly.
A demonstration that certain policies to which the political leadership
is committed are incompatible with each other or with the overall priorities
suggested by the preferred style of development or the regime's sources of
political backing is unlikely to be welcomed. Still less is demonstration

1/ Work along these lines has been carried on by the United Nations Research
Institute for Social Development and by the Economic Projections Centre
of the Economic Commission for Latin America, among other bodies.

2/ Variations on this approach have been worked out by Benjamin Higgins in
advice to the Government of Malaysia and by Oscar Varavski in advice
to the Government of Chile.
that the preferred style of development, to which the leadership assumes its
country has as much right as any other country, is inherently non-viable,
given the characteristics of the country. The political leadership and
public opinion are likely to react by rejecting the whole line of reasoning
and insisting that the social scientist or planner produce "practical" advice
showing how to do whatever the political leadership wants to do.

3. A digression on the "practical"

This insistence on "practical" proposals, frequently contrasted
with "theorizing" as an activity of much lower priority, if not altogether
a waste of time, has been one of the most recurrent themes in discussions
of development in the inter-governmental bodies. The demand for the
"practical" has come from representatives of all types of countries, although
presumably with different connotations attached to the "practical". In part
it has reflected an understandable impatience with the even more recurrent
discussions of universal "human rights" divorced from any "practical" consid­
eration of human capacity and disposition to convert rights into realities.
In some quarters, the underlying supposition seems to have been that certain
countries already know what is "practical" on the basis of their own success
and are ready to share "practical" How to Develop recipes. The problem, then,
is simply to give the recipes an international stamp of approval and present
them to the rest of the world, for action under the guidance of appropriate
"experts". In other quarters, "practical" seems to be synonymous with
"magical"; there is an underlying supposition that somewhere in the world
cheap, simple, and infallible solutions to all problems are waiting to be
discovered.

The results of this reiteration of the "practical" in the work of
the international secretariats have been impressive in the bulk of documents
purporting to offer practical advice, and in the range of programmes offered
as panaceas, but have been rather meagre precisely on the side of "practical"
developmental results — leading to a chorus of new demands for "more practical"
proposals, and a frantic running in circles by the functionaries addressed
in order to demonstrate their practicality. Great themes have emerged and
inflated themselves and subsided into the background only to reappear under
new names according to the cycles of hope and disillusionment in the giving
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of "practical" advice, each acquiring its own promotional apparatus and vested interests—balanced development, community development, fundamental education, co-operation, social welfare, employment policy, urbanization policy, population policy, science and technology, etc. 

The superficiality of concern with the "practical" is particularly evident in the fate of international studies with "practical" terms of reference. There is a consistent and striking disproportion between the importance formally attributed to their topics, the resources allocated to them, and the attention paid to their results. An inter-governmental body requests a secretariat to prepare a report on how to satisfy all human needs for its next meeting; half a dozen functionaries strain to do so; and the result, which might be expected to have a reception equivalent to that of the great documentary landmarks of human history, is tepidly approved or criticized, and disappears into Government archives and the storerooms of the issuing organization without a trace, rarely remembered even by other specialists preparing subsequent "practical" reports. It may receive a brief mention in the more conscientious newspapers when it appears, but scholarly journals do not trouble to review it; only if it contains new statistics is it likely to be quoted.

1/ The impact of this "practical" zeal at the national level is suggested by the following quotation: "Month by month, almost week by week, donors and international agencies are suggesting projects, sending experts, requiring information, meetings, facilities, tours and demonstrations which the local administration must somehow handle. The few top men are overwhelmed by a triple burden—to serve their Ministers in the constant series of political crises to which new governments are prone; to deal with international contacts and visitors; and, somehow, to direct and keep moving the routine tasks of a Department which will have a programme far larger than its top staff can manage. Delays, mistakes, and ill-considered projects are not merely a reflection of poor supporting staff in the middle layers: they reflect a government machine grossly overloaded with its own programme and the additions which well-meaning donors press upon it" (Guy Hunter, Modernizing Peasant Societies (London, Oxford University Press, 1969)).
If the study of a "unified approach to development analysis and planning" is to amount to anything more than another stage in this interminable pursuit of the "practical", it must incorporate a clear understanding that "practicality" depends on theoretical conceptions, value judgements and diagnostic understanding of the phenomena to which "practical" action is to be applied. In relation to a theme as confused and controversial as "development" there can be no practicality in the issuing of universally applicable recipes. Under some circumstances, allegedly "practical" solutions can be irrelevant or self-defeating; even more commonly, they are inapplicable in the absence of changes in the societal structure, power relationships, and real values that are evaded or timidly hinted at in the "practical" international advisory efforts. The themes listed above all represent areas of choice and decision-making that must enter into any acceptable and viable style of development, and it might even be possible to arrive at such a style of development by pursuing the full implications of any one of them. An ironic view of their international ups and downs does not imply negation of their basic importance. As long, however, as they are viewed as collections of "practical" recipes this potential importance will not be realized — and ritual recognitions that everything is inter-related with everything else will not help either.

4. **Choices leading toward an acceptable and viable style of development**

The main interdependent areas of choice making up a style of development concern autonomy, participation, production, consumption and distribution. If the choices made in these areas are mutually contradictory the style will not be viable; if the choices are made in isolation from one another the probability is that they will be mutually contradictory. This, unfortunately, is what seems to be happening in various countries whose leadership is now deliberately seeking to evolve original styles of development.

The decision to seek an autonomous style of development conditions the possibility of making choices in all the other areas. If the country simply accepts its place in the existing international order it may, under favourable circumstances, experience a kind of dependent "development" over an extended period, but decisions on the main lines of production and consumption will be out of its hands, and it will be unable to tolerate forms of participation
of participation that might threaten the distribution patterns associated with these lines of production and consumption. At the same time, no country can realistically choose complete autonomy. It must manoeuvre on the basis of its real situation within the international system and be prepared to sacrifice some concrete advantages if it wishes to enhance its autonomy. If it tries to combine a high degree of autonomy, a high degree of reliance on external financing, and a high degree of openness to external cultural and consumption models its style of development will probably not be viable.

Participation is one of the most complex areas of choice. It raises the questions - very hard for political leaders and planners to face frankly - of who is doing the choosing, how choices are enforced, and whether the style of development treats participation mainly as a means or mainly as an end, an essential component of the style. When participation is willed from above, it becomes mobilization, a means of getting things done. When it arises from below it usually focusses on distribution, becoming also a means, from the standpoint of the groups able to participate, of obtaining a larger immediate share of the fruits of development. Authentic creative participation, heightening the participants' consciousness of values, issues, and the possibility of making choices, influencing the content of development, generating new ways of doing things, and also safeguarding the participants' right to an equitable share in the fruits of development, remains an elusive aspiration - but the conversion of this aspiration into reality may well in the end prove the most essential requisite for a style of development enhancing the capacity of the society to function over the long term for the well-being of all its members.

Up to the present, developmental preoccupations have centred heavily on production. The proposition that maximum production of goods and services is equivalent to development, interpreted as a worthy human aspiration, no matter what is produced or how it is used, seems preposterous when stated baldly. Yet the underlying assumption in most developmental thinking about choices, expressed in the yardstick of per capita product and bolstered by faith in market mechanisms to guarantee an eventual happy ending, has not been
very far from this. Even before the environmentalists began to demonstrate that such an approach can lead to disaster for the whole human race, it had come under attack from several points of view, as was indicated above. Consequently, questions of distribution and consumption have become more prominent even in the more traditional approaches to economic development.

Choices as to what will be produced imply a need for consistent choices as to how it will be distributed and who will consume it. In countries that have chosen to concentrate on production of capital goods and have been able to enforce the choice, the other choices have been relatively simple, or could be postponed: private consumption had to be kept low and relatively equalitarian, with a partially compensating expansion of some public services, particularly those expected to enhance productive capacity of the population. In most countries striving to develop, however, the choices have not been consistent, and the contradictions have become more acute as import-substitution industrialization has proceeded and as overt income redistributional policies have become more prominent. Redistribution affecting the masses of the population has proved incompatible with the character of the goods and services being produced and with the present functioning of the societies and economies. The contradictions have appeared most acutely in relation to durable consumer goods, housing and education, although they affect the whole range of goods and services, and it may be worthwhile at this point to look more closely at these three examples.

It is well-known that import-substitution industrialization in many countries has been aimed at an upper-income market previously satisfied by imports of durable goods and luxury products. To the extent that industries producing automobiles and electrical appliances for this market become established, pressures mount for maintenance of an income distribution preserving the market for these products. This market can be expanded to some extent by bringing down production costs (usually several times higher, than in the industrialized countries), producing smaller and simpler models, offering generous credits and facilities for installment buying, etc. It can also be expanded by raising the incomes of the middle strata and the better organized workers, but, with the possible exceptions of countries with small populations and high petroleum output, there is no foreseeable possibility of expanding
of expanding the market for the more expensive durable goods to include the mass of the population. Meanwhile, particularly in the case of the automobile, governmental capacity to control allocation of foreign exchange and domestic public resources is diminished by demands for a rising flow of imported inputs for the industries and for rising expenditures on highways. To the extent that a serious effort is made to remedy the environmental deterioration, urban air pollution and highway carnage associated with mass automobile use, the claim on public resources will rise still higher. The resulting dilemma is particularly acute for regimes relying on popular support and striving for a style of development that emphasizes equitable distribution. Their sources of support include precisely the urban strata now clamoring to enter the market for durable consumer goods — and among these are the organized workers who produce the goods, whose livelihood would be threatened by any radical change in consumption patterns.¹

Moreover, the political leaders and planners themselves, however clearly they may see the issue, are usually themselves wedded to a "modern" style of life that includes the automobile and harpers them in imposing austerity. The population strata that might benefit from a shift in the pattern of production (cheap bicycles instead of automobiles, cheap electrical appliances instead of refrigerators and air conditioning equipment) are relatively unorganized and unaware of the issues.

In the case of housing, the contradictions have been conspicuous over a longer period. The State has come under increasing pressure to combat the urban housing deficit and fill the gap between housing costs and the purchasing power of families seeking housing. Even regimes not otherwise strongly concerned over distributional inequities have responded and have justified their policies in terms of the housing plight of the low-income urban strata. The State has also been under pressure to conduct its housing activities through subsidies to or employment of contractors using conventional

¹/ This problem is now the subject of a lively policy discussion in Chile. See Eugenio Silva and Eduardo Loyano; "¿Hacia donde nos conduce el automóvil?", Panorama Económico, 206, enero-febrero de 1972; and Sergio Bitar and Eduardo Loyano, "Redistribución del consumo y transición al socialismo", Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional, 11, enero de 1972.
building methods and following housing standards modeled on those of high-income countries, and through cheap credits to families capable of amortizing their housing costs over the long term. In practice, the State is incapable of broadening housing programmes of this type beyond the urban middle-income sectors. The whole population contributes to subsidization of the housing of these sectors, in addition to the accompanying infrastructural costs. To the extent that housing programmes are also undertaken for the urban low-income population and the rural population, it is at vastly lower costs per unit, usually consisting of provision of building lots, materials, minimum prefabricated dwellings, etc. Any regime dependent on popular support that sets out to distribute resources for housing on the basis of need and at unit costs really permitting improvement in the housing of the majority of the population, confronts the same dilemma as in the case of durable consumer goods: such a policy would clash with the expectations of its better-organized supporters and also with the immediate interests of the construction enterprise and their workers. In the case of housing, the low-income urban population exerts a vigorous and fairly coherent demand that can become a source of effective counter-pressure toward more equitable policies. The promise of housing is one of the most effective means of mobilizing political support. This, however, makes it all the harder for a political leadership to act in consonance with its preferred style of development and within the limits set by the resources it can command. The location of new housing, by itself, implies choices that will affect the long-term style of development: Is residential segregation, by income group or otherwise, to be tolerated? Is the indefinite growth of the great metropolitan agglomerations to be favoured? Are the suburban sprawl and central congestion associated with private automotive transport to be accepted? Almost any political leadership prefers to evade choices of this kind.

In education, the problems of distribution and the content of what is distributed are even more complexly and conflictively related to the preferred style of development, on the one hand, and to the existing structure of the society, on the other. Even the narrower conceptions of "economic development" envisage expansion of education as an essential means of bringing "human resources" into closer correspondence with developmental needs and as on
of the most desirable ways of using the fruits of development to enhance welfare and equity. Other conceptions of development place an even higher valuation on education as a means toward cultural change and enhanced creativity, and insist on much higher allocations to education versus non-essential private consumption. The expansion of existing systems of education responds to the demands of consumers seeking to improve the position of their children within existing systems of rewards and status. The most vigorous demands come from the middle strata and from groups on the lower margin of ability to participate in the "modern" consumer society. The results include a particularly rapid quantitative growth in secondary and higher education, a dilution of the quality of such education because of the insufficiency of qualified teachers and inability to meet costs, an economically unjustified expansion of the relevant occupational sectors, and the appearance of growing numbers of frustrated "educated unemployed". This kind of educational expansion diminishes the possibility of an acceptable and viable style of development, both through the resources it absorbs and through the expectations it encourages. No matter how rapidly secondary and higher education are expanded along present lines, they cannot be extended to the masses of the population. The latter remain at as great an educational disadvantage as before, even if they do gain access to a low-quality elementary schooling; in some cases, higher education alone eats up half the public resources allocated to education, and the per capita expenditures on children who do not go beyond elementary school are necessarily minute in comparison with per capita expenditures on the favoured minorities, inadequate as the latter expenditures may be for higher education of good quality. An educational policy compatible with an acceptable and viable style of development, under these circumstances, implies a frontal clash with the population strata most strongly motivated to seek education and most capable of enforcing organized demands, in favour of strata lacking clearly defined educational objectives and possessing relatively little organized strength. The internal contradictions of the present educational trends, as these affect the youth passing through the systems, are indeed generating demands for an educational revolution, but these demands do not translate readily into viable policy choices concerning content and distribution. /To sum
To sum up, the choices in production, distribution and consumption that follow logically from a preferred style of development can be defined without great difficulty. For a style of development enhancing the long-term capacity of a society to function for the well-being of all its members, production choices should emphasize goods that can become accessible to the masses of the population at foreseeable income levels; consumption choices should emphasize collective goods and services; production and consumption choices should be designed to enhance participation and creativity rather than passive receptivity (e.g., new lines of education combined with work; new types of communities created physically as well as organizationally by their members). Can any regime be expected to make such choices under conditions of unrestricted ingress of external influences and pressures, and internal participation that is very unevenly distributed and focussed on consumption?