Elusive Development

by

Marshall Wolfe

United Nations
Research Institute
for
Social Development

United Nations
Economic Commission
for
Latin America

Printed by  Hungary, 1981
Statistical Publishing House

Contents

Acknowledgements

The colleagues and friends who have contributed to the shaping of this book, at different stages and in many different ways, by setting me tasks, stimulating my pursuit of certain themes, discussing ideas, criticizing texts, or furnishing information, include the following:

Raymond Apthorpe, Manuel Balboa, Solon Barraclough, Jacques Baudot, Carlos Borsotti, Alfredo Eric Calcagno, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Jean Casimir, Julio Cotler, Serge Domicelj, Francisco Whitaker Ferreira, Luiz Alberto Gómez de Souza, Jorge Graciarena, Adolfo Guerrieri, Joseph Hodara, Enrique V. Iglesias, Henry Kirsch, Joost Kuitenbrouwer, Donald V. McGranahan, José Medina Echavarría, Lawrence Moore, Andrew Pearse, Cesar Pelaez, Aníbal Pinto, Raúl Prebisch, Aníbal Quijano, Germán Rama, Luis Ratinoff, Witold Rodzinski, Aldo Solari, Osvaldo Sunkel, Rubén Darío Utria, Oscar Varsavski, José Villamil and René Zavaleta.

Naturally, they are not responsible for the use I have made of their ideas and their help. Some of them would disagree fundamentally, from quite different theoretical positions, with my conclusions.

I owe very special thanks to Virginia A. Wolfe for constant encouragement, for many valuable suggestions deriving from her own experience in social policy, and for her efforts to weed out pretentiousness and vagueness from the text.

Marshall Wolfe
Vermont
July 1981

Preface

As the years pass and one Development Decade succeeds another, one is tempted to conclude that the literature already produced has covered every conceivable aspect of the subject. Is it possible today to write a book about development that will grip the imagination, offer new insights and open up new perspectives?

Elusive Development is not a book that teaches How to Develop, nor does it offer any grand theory of development. Its originality lies in its approach to the subject, in the relevance and pertinacity of the questions it poses rather than in the novelty of its answers. It looks at what has been said and what has been done in the name of development for almost four decades and seeks to identify those elements that, in various combinations, seem to offer the best hope of advancing human welfare and social justice, the most elusive dimensions of development efforts so far.

The author, Marshall Wolfe, is a former Chief of the Social Development Division of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). ECLA, ever since its creation in 1948, has tried to keep in balance several quite different functions and objectives: the explaining of Latin American development in ways helping governments and public opinion to accelerate and guide it; the provision of advisory services in a wide range of policy areas as called for by governments; objective research and reporting on the major economic and social trends of the region; the exploration of problems of development theory; the relating of Latin American trends and theories to the global context so as to combat exceptionalism and parochialism; and, lastly, the questioning of conventional wisdom on development – the function of the Socratic gadfly.

During 17 years of work in ECLA, following upon 15 years elsewhere in the United Nations Secretariat, Wolfe made a distinguished contribution to this effort, and ECLA particularly welcomed his performance of the last role.

At the beginning of the 1970s he entered into a joint venture of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), ECLA and the United Nations Headquarters Social Development Division, a team project seeking a *"unified approach to development analysis and planning"*, becoming editor and principal drafter of the project's Preliminary Report.

This project was mandated to bring all the different aspects of development together in a set of viable objectives and policy approaches; an over-ambitious and poorly defined notion, it seems today, but nevertheless one that encouraged serious questioning of ideas about development, of means and ends, myth and reality, and criteria by which to assess what had conventionally passed for "development" Many of the propositions and hypotheses that animate the development debate today were shaped by those, within and ouside the United Nations system, who participated in the project at one time or another.

This book is an outcome, assembled on the author's retirement from the United Nations Secretariat, of his work on the unified approach project and of his longer experience of Latin American development problems and polemics. He has pursued up to the present many of the questions raised by the project, seeking through masses of often conflicting materials from several disciplines coherent, intellectually satisfying and practically useful answers, stressing the permanent tension between the state and society, between technocratic and participationist visions of development, between the ideal of harmonious and rationalistic planning, and the reality of social forces in conflict, forces that use a bewildering variety of tactics to secure a bewildering variety of prizes. He sees parallels between social-justice-oriented discussions of development policy and the mice discussing how to bell the cat, or cats discussing how to promote the welfare of mice, but he does not stop there.

Elusive Development surveys the whole scene: Development Images, Agents and Choices... Approaches to Development... Social and Political Structures and Development Policy... Problems of Communication and Participation... Utopias Devised by Committees... Seeds of Change in Different Types of National Societies... Poverty as a Social Phenomenon and as a Central Issue for Development Policy... and Preconditions and Propositions for "Another Development".

In addition to an extensive knowledge of the subject matter, of the actors in the drama and of the intricacies of the development industry, what qualifies the author to write yet another book about development is a healthy scepticism of all the currently fashionable ideological or technological theories and prescriptions. But what perhaps best qualifies him for the task is the commonsense and clarity he brings to bear on the subject, in a spirit of honest inquiry.

What, he asks, can the various actors in the development drama do to bring real trends into closer correspondence with the values of human welfare and social justice? "I have assumed", he says, "that the making of any contribution to an honest answer is a task deserving dedication."

This book is the result of that dedication.

Enrique Iglesias
Executive Secretary, ECLA

Solon L. Barraclough
Director, UNRISD

CHAPTER ONE

Why *Elusive* Development?

Certain institutional imperatives and a personal reaction to the imperatives shaped this book. The institutional imperatives derived from the efforts of United Nations organs to secure for the "social" equal status with the "economic" in development policy; and, in the more recent stages on which the book focuses, to prescribe a "unified approach to development analysis and planning" or to point the way to alternative "styles of development", responding better to human needs than the processes heretofore passing for development. These efforts, through continual changes in terminology and emphasis, have assumed prior consensus on certain values of human welfare and social justice, on "development" as an identifiable phenomenon essential to the realization of these values, and on the rationality and benevolence of certain entities – the international organizations, national governments, voluntary associations, public opinion – jointly striving for development so conceived and capable of acting on developmental prescriptions.

I participated in these efforts during more than thirty years within the United Nations Secretariat, mainly through studies instructed to answer some variant of the questions: Are national societies approximating more closely to the professed values of human welfare and social justice? What can the entities named above prescribe or do to bring real trends into closer correspondence with the values? In my struggles with these questions I have assumed that the making of any contribution to an honest answer is a task deserving dedication. This conviction, however, has been only precariously reconcilable with the ritualism and evasiveness visible in the ways international discourse has commonly posed and answered the questions. The institutional imperatives to identify "progress" that take at face value the "national achievements" reported by governments, and which offer prescriptions based on the premise of rational and harmonious strivings for development, clashed with an observable reality. In this reality, "development" emerged from complex and confused struggles at the international, national and local levels; the strivings of the different centres of power and social forces had consequences different from what any of them wanted or expected, and the capacity of the institutions and individuals making up the state to exercise foresight or guide national change processes in any coherent direction was problematic.

The studies were addressed mainly to governmental participants in United Nations meetings, planners, social programme administrators and other presumed makers of development policy rather than to social scientists or the general public. In the minds of this intended audience, questions of values and broad objectives had been resolved already, through their formulation in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and numerous resolutions endorsed by the representatives of practically all states.

The same audience was unreceptive to explorations of questions of theory. It supposed that such questions had already been answered satisfactorily, or that the answers could wait, or that raising the questions would endanger the international consensus on the meaning of development. In formal terms, through instructions to the Secretariat, it requested factual information and practical prescriptions, although it made little use of either.

In the writings in which I was able to express a personal reaction to the institutional imperatives, I evaded making literal responses, and instead tried to distinguish, in terms meaningful to the intended audience, the full range of problems that must be faced in proposing relevant prescriptions. That is, I reformulated the questions posed above in the following terms:

If one really wants development responding to the values of human welfare and social justice, and *if* real national societies and the international order present quite different patterns and trends, what can be done and by whom? To whom does one address advice? Who is entitled to give advice?

Confrontation with such questions might well be unsettling to the more literal-minded believers in the developmental articles of faith, and also to the wider circles that depend for status and livelihood on perpetuation of the bureaucratic structures and ritualized meetings based on these articles. For the past three decades the promotion of development has been an industry in which supply has created its own continually diversifying demand for "experts", in which conferences beget conferences and declarations beget declarations, in which major "problem areas" incorporating different conceptions of developmental priorities continually hive off organizationally, receive symbolic recognition in "years", inflate themselves to cover all aspects of "development", and spawn infinitely ramifying co-ordinating mechanisms.

The same questions might well seem naive, lacking in theoretical grounding, and misleading as guides to action to social scientists and ideologists who have never taken seriously the suppositions of potential international harmony and compatible social class interests in development. From their point of view, why should anyone, for reasons other than mystification, expect existing states – instruments of dominant social classes or of transnational centres of power – to introduce styles of development oriented to human welfare and social justice? Can a valid response be anything other than the identification of social forces capable of transforming the society and the state? Does not the official machinery of development studies,

meetings and socially-oriented declarations deserve Tolstoy's taunt at ruling classes that would do anything for the people except get off their backs?

The eclecticism of international discourse, the heterogeneity of the regimes participating in it, the pervasive dissatisfaction with what has been done in the name of development and the quest for policy innovations have increasingly blurred the dividing line between developmentalist and revolutionary ideologies, and brought about an ambivalent receptivity to radical questioning of the articles of faith. The realities of the world, too harsh to be camouflaged by discrete reports, continually press the international organizations in this direction, while institutional continuity, vested interests in ongoing programmes, and governmental admonitions to be "practical" continually force them to try to pour the new wine into their old bottles, to assume that all states mean well, and that practically all ideological positions are ultimately reconcilable. Thus, forms of social action that have emerged painfully from revolutionary struggles in specific national societies are discussed as if they were promising prescriptions that might be adopted at the will of any regime along with a selection from the more conventional tools of social action. One outcome is the proliferation of what I have labelled "utopias devised by committees".

The explorer of development may find himself in an uneasily eclectic position for reasons other than this institutional bias. The state, in its real manifestations in the world today, is obviously far from the rational, benevolent, autonomous entity that international deliberations and development prescriptions, particularly in their earlier stages, have seemed to assume. "Development", under whatever interpretation, is not necessarily even a central preoccupation of the forces controlling the state. At the same time, in many national societies, the state is asserting a degree of autonomy and an apparent capacity to determine the direction of social and economic change that could not have been predicted from the previous balance of social forces or the country's place in the international order. This tendency has become more pronounced as the international order itself falls into crisis after crisis and the previous ties of dominance and dependence are broken or strained.

For better or worse, developmental voluntarism comes to the fore in widely differing national societies and under widely differing leadership. Various "agents of change" assert their right and duty to set their societies on new paths. Thus far, their choices, whatever the intentions behind them, have contributed very little to the realization of styles of development giving priority to human welfare and social justice. Techno-bureaucratic regimes that put off such objectives to a remote future or that simply compel the population to swallow the agents' assertions that they are being realized, are present realities. So are voluntarist miscalculations that have led to the further impoverishment and oppression of the masses who were supposed to benefit.

Must one conclude that the structural situations in which agents trying to manipulate the state find themselves ensure that whatever choices they make will turn

out badly from the standpoint of social justice? Can the state achieve a measure of autonomy and use it to do more good than harm? Under what circumstances? Can international interpretative and normative activities, linked to the formation of a confraternity of would-be agents of alternative styles of development, increase the likelihood of a positive outcome? Can the more cautious and realistic prescriptions for state action to satisfy basic needs and eliminate extreme poverty do more than foster conformity with systems of exploitation that must eventually perish? Do the more radical and egalitarian proposals, demanding, for example, the extirpation from poor countries of transnationalized consumer societies for minorities, risk giving fuel to "terrible simplifiers" who may replace a bad social order by a worse? I confess I am unable to answer these questions to my own satisfaction.

The alternative political approaches, subordinating action by the state to transformation of the structures of power controlling the state and of the consciousness of the masses exploited or excluded by current styles of development, are more attractive but no more verifiable as means to human welfare and social justice. From this standpoint, efforts over the past century to identify social classes capable of transforming their societies and to devise strategies for them have had no incontrovertible successes. It is not legitimate to contrast the real shortcomings and hypocrisies of existing states as agents of development with millenial post-revolutionary expectations. Moreover, the proponents of these approaches commonly go to the other extreme from the developmentalist prescription-mongers in disregarding the practical questions of how styles of development corresponding to their values might be constructed once power has come into the hands of social forces really wanting such development. Class struggles are real enough and the possibility that in certain conjunctures the classes whose interests conflict with the existing order will play the roles expected of them cannot be discounted. But the weight of evidence suggests that the capacity of these classes to act coherently will continue to be weaker and their dependence on the state greater than the ideologists aspiring to mobilize them would admit.

The following chapters turn repeatedly to the theme of creative popular participation as an essential component of any style of development serving the values of human welfare and social justice, but in practice such participation has remained elusive and ephemeral, both for the state-dominated development strategies and for the revolutionary counter-mobilizers.

The major influences on the content of this book have been my experiences since the early 1960s in the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, and my participation during the early 1970s in a research project centred in the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development and aiming at a "unified approach to development analysis and planning".

The former experience exposed me, first, to a clearcut advocacy position on development evolved by ECLA since the late 1940s. This position emphasized the planning of state action within a capitalist framework to accelerate economic growth

and influence the distribution of its fruits. The thinking behind it was primarily economic, preoccupied by capital accumulation and industrialization, but increasingly incorporated social concerns on its own terms, both as means to the end of higher productivity, and as human welfare justifications of the striving for development. Within this setting, economists challenged sociologists and specialists in sectoral social programmes to identify and prescribe for "social obstacles" to development.

The experience exposed me, second, to the radical questioning of "developmentalism", inspired by Marxist as well as religious ideologies, characteristic of the non-official intellectual climate of Latin America and increasingly represented within ECLA during the 1960s.

It exposed me, third, to the real processes of economic, social and political change in Latin America that have in the main confounded the hopes of developmentalists as well as revolutionaries, confronting both with the apparent consolidation in most of the region of a "peripheral capitalism" dominated by transnational enterprises, imitative, repressive, wasteful of human as well as natural resources, juxtaposing ostentatious consumerism and mass poverty.[1]

The latter experience gave me a different vantage point for observation of the variants of pragmatism, determinism and neo-utopianism that emerge when a multi-disciplinary and multinational team tackles the what, why, and how of development.

Chapter II describes this experience in some detail, with its genealogy in previous United Nations efforts to prescribe for development, and the different "approaches to a unified approach" that sought common ground during the course of the project. Chapters III and IV continue the discussion of the values, images of human society and action-orientations that persist in international discourse on development.

Chapters V and VI attempt to set out, in an objective and classificatory way, the heterogeneous social and political structures and conjunctures, and the links between national centre (or state) and social unit (or local group) that must be taken into account. These chapters were intended to demonstrate to seekers for technocratic or normative-utopian answers to the questions posed by the "unified approach" project the intractability of certain features of the real world that they might otherwise disregard. They are obviously vulnerable to criticism in their pretension to cover a very wide range of national and local phenomena, without sufficient digestion of the enormous body of theoretical literature and empirical studies of these questions, and without taking clear positions concerning basic causes.

The final chapters address themselves to the problems of viable strategies directed toward alternative styles of development for "semi-developed" countries

[1] The recent diagnoses of Dr. Raúl Prebisch, principal architect of the ECLA position and no friend to revolutionary socialist alternatives, support this picture. See "A critique of peripheral capitalism", *CEPAL Review*, 1, First Semester 1976; and "Socioeconomic structure and crisis of the system", *CEPAL Review*, 6, Second Semester 1978.

such as most of those of Latin America, and of possible agents of such strategies. These countries have a heavy material and psychological investment in certain patterns of industrialization, urbanization, and consumerism, along with complex links with world centres of power and transnational enterprises now themselves experiencing traumatic mutations and fears for the future. The patterns of dependent semi-development may become increasingly untenable even at the price of military-authoritarian defence of minority interests and marginalization of a large "superfluous" part of the population; yet the probable costs of transformation are higher than any combination of social forces now on the stage can meet.

Chapter VIII discusses recent proposals for a New International Economic Order and for "another development" and the discrepancies between them, with a view to their relevance to such semi-developed national societies. It then takes up the "seeds of change" visible in other types of national societies, in particular those of the central capitalist countries, and speculates on their implications for the consolidation, transformation, or disintegration of the patterns of dependent semi-development.

Chapter IX takes up one set of prescriptions for change in these patterns, by reallocating part of the resources that economic growth already *seems* to have generated in order to eliminate the extremes of poverty, make the poor more "productive", and help them to "participate". It concludes that this policy focus is unlikely to lead to major changes for the better in the patterns of production, distribution and consumption characteristic of semi-developed national societies. It finds in the terms in which national techno-bureaucracies and international sources of financing envisage anti-poverty measures parallels not only to the fabled mice discussing how to bell the cat, but also to cats discussing how to promote the welfare of mice.

Finally, Chapter X offers my own tentative propositions on the preconditions for "another development", eschewing utopianism but taking a fresh look at the well-worn themes of priority to the meeting of basic human needs, meaningful human activity, participation and self-reliance.

Here as elsewhere I have tried to purge my propositions of certain commonplaces of the social variants of international discourse on development. Since recent declarations that in other respects radically challenge the conventional developmental wisdom continue to fall back on these commonplaces, and since these are symptomatic of reluctance or institutional inability to face the full implications of the failure of the real processes of economic growth and social modernization to respond to the hopes invested in them, it may be well to point them out here, although some of them are discussed below in different contexts:

a) The "growing awareness" or "increasing recognition". These are among the most venerable and overworked formulas in documents on social questions, and are well represented in discussions of other aspects of development. They normally express the user's hope of lending an aura of consensus to his own conviction that

something ought to be done, while evading the identification of agents able and willing to act effectively.

b) Warnings of catastrophe for the international order or the national societies unless they transform themselves promptly. These formulas, closely related to the growing awarenesses, are directed to the centres of power and wealth to persuade them that it is in their own interests to lead or at least acquiesce in radical reforms and renunciation of privileges. The centres of power are by now quite accustomed to paying lip service to the importance of the warnings, but probably continue to feel in private that they can shift to others the price of whatever catastrophes may come and that the alternatives offered are neither convincing nor convenient. Experience indicates that national societies as well as the international order can continue to function, however irrationally and unjustly, modifying but not transforming structures whose imminent collapse has been predicted for many years, and even reconstitute these structures after real catastrophe has come upon them.

c) Use of the first person plural to indicate that the user arrogates to himself representation of all men of goodwill, or of the masses refusing to suffer any longer their poverty and exploitation. This use of "we" has become particularly prominent in the declarations of semi-official and unofficial international advisory groups and conferences, in which "we" (lumping together officialdom, social scientists, public opinion and the poor) are assumed to share awarenesses and demands that would in reality seem subversive to some of the parties spoken for, inadequate and ingenuous to others, and incomprehensible to the masses, who are preoccupied with survival rather than "development".

d) Personification of "countries" as actors, as in the assertion that "countries" have a right to "choose" autonomous and original styles of development. The structure of international organizations composed of formally sovereign states makes this an unavoidable fiction, but it obscures the reality that is sometimes made plain enough in other passages of the same declarations: if styles of development are chosen at all, the choices are made by organized social forces within countries that must try to impose their choices on the rest of the society by persuasion, neutralization or force, and that must manoeuvre within constraints imposed by the country's place in the international order.

e) Division of the personified countries into two groups – rich and poor, developed and developing, central and peripheric, etc. The division corresponds to certain real characteristics of the international order, and it has an instrumental utility in promoting joint action by the "developing" or "poor" countries, but it is misleading in at least three important respects:

(i) It has fostered a supposition that the countries of the first group have found the path to permanent gains in material well-being and social harmony, and that their evolution and the economic laws derived from it offer a model for the rest of the world. This supposition, one of the earlier articles of faith of developmentalism, has been too cruelly exposed during the 1970s, in "socialist" as well as "capitalist" countries, to serve even as an inspiring myth.

(ii) It has fostered a supposition that each group of countries is homogeneous in essential characteristics, with common interests and problems. In fact, both groups are extremely heterogeneous and are becoming more so in their power structures, ideologies, resource bases, population characteristics, and roles in the international order, at the same time that the processes of transnationalization of their economies and cultures are binding the first group more closely to the second. Formulas assuming that the "poor" countries and the "rich" countries can take uniform positions vis-à-vis each other, whether of cooperation or confrontation, aid or exploitation, obscure the real complexity of the alternatives for alignments and ties of domination or self-defence. This has been recognized, not very satisfactorily, in the attempts to identify a class of "very poor" or (in a particularly ungainly label) "relatively less well-developed" countries with special needs and rights to assistance. The preceding pages have identified another group as "semi-developed", with the proviso that semi-development does not imply the generation of ability to go the rest of the way to a blessed state of "development". (The alternative groupings of countries into a "First", "Second", "Third" and "Fourth" World are no more satisfactory, although this book sometime uses the term "Third World" for lack of a better.)

(iii) The dichotomization of countries, like the "we" formula, has fostered a supposition that in the "poor" countries the dominant social forces share in the poverty, or at least in a determination to do something about it. In fact, the spokesmen for most of the "poor" countries have no personal reason to envy the incomes and life-styles of their counterparts in the "rich" countries, and this, as press comments in the latter countries demonstrate, has weakened the credibility of their appeals for a new international economic order. The same international reports that personify the poor countries and attribute to their leaders a determination to eliminate poverty present evidence that increases in the wealth of these countries and in the operational capacity of their governments generally has no positive impact on the poverty of the masses and that other priorities are uppermost in the allocation of national gains in income.

The present exploration of approaches to development will encounter many different would-be agents acting within many different combinations of opportunities and constraints, in pursuit of an objective that is continually being redefined, falling back on verbal and organizational rituals for lack of ability to foresee and control the course of events, and sometimes violently rejecting reality for its failure to conform to their concepts and values. One finds, internationally and nationally, a chorus of affirmation of the need for different, more comprehensive, ideally "unified" approaches to development combined with real concentrations of power, resources and public attention on aims that are either irrelevant to such approaches or obviously incompatible with them.

The legitimacy and relevance of the present exploration depend on the supposition that the present international re-thinking of development is not altogether a mystification, condemned by the societal and institutional positions of its practitioners to offer solutions that will always be too little and too late, but that mystification is bound to creep in, through the conscious or unconscious need of the practitioners to *appear* to be facing challenges boldly while really evading them. If the exploration stimulates some of the would-be agents of development to think harder about what they are doing and wonder whether they should not be doing something else, the purpose is served.

The practitioner might well retort: "What positive, practical proposals do you have? Are you not really insinuating that the audience you address is irredeemably incapable of doing anything worthwhile?"

This book, of course, does not set out to demolish previous How to Develop prescriptions and then propose an infallible new one, nor to reject previous societal candidates for the honour of leading the way to development and then nominate different agents who can do the job. It really points to an existential approach to development, in which the would-be agents should come to terms with an awareness that theirs is a possibly Sisyphean task of trying to impose a measure of value-oriented rationality on realities that will remain permanently recalcitrant to such reality.

All societies that survive will have to strive to "develop", in the sense of enhancing their capacity to function over the long term for the well-being of their members. None will ever reach a safe terminal state of "being developed". Apparent success may, in the long term, lead into a trap of relative incapacity for further innovation. From this point of view all national societies at all points in time confront a certain range of accessible alternatives with different combinations of advantages and disadvantages. The capacity of their dominant forces to choose specific alternatives depends not only on objective conditions but also on their subjective appreciation of these conditions and the momentum of what has already been done. Choices or failures to choose are continually closing doors and opening different ones.

Ideally, the striving for development should embrace the whole human race, but the international community should attach a positive value to diversity in styles of development, if only for the sake of experimentation and cross-fertilization, as long as they do not diverge grossly from the international consensus on human rights and values. Within these limits, each society should be free to evolve its own style and to count on the cooperation it needs to do so. In practice, however, the agents trying to realize this ideal must pay careful attention to external constraints and the internal forces linked with these contraints, and try to manoeuvre within the limits of the practicable. The meeting of needs through international cooperation remains precarious, inhibiting, and in great part illusory. The agents cannot dispense with such cooperation, but neither can they lean on it, especially when they leave the

conventional paths. The sources of financing have straitjackets waiting for them if they are over-confident or unlucky.

Recognition of the legitimacy of alternative styles of development and of the possibility of value-oriented choice is a step forward from the previous conception of development as a process uniform for all countries, following its own laws, to be discovered and obeyed under penalty of permanent backwardness, but it raises more questions than it answers:

Who is entitled to choose a national style of development and adjudicate the gains and losses? Will styles of development corresponding to the international norms for social justice, within the limits of austerity and sacrifice set by national resources supplemented by problematic external cooperation, ever be acceptable to the articulate and organized social groups whose acquiescence will be essential, or even to the ideologists and planners who are calling for more equitable and autonomous styles? Will national societies in the real world be able to achieve the degree of consensus and rational organization called for except at a price that will distort each initiative into something quite different from the image of the just and free future society informing it at its beginning?

CHAPTER TWO

The Quest for a Unified Approach

1. Setting of the unified approach project

In February 1971 a team organized jointly by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, the Economic Commission for Latin America, and the Social Development Division of the UN Headquarters Secretariat met in Geneva to plan an exploration in search of a "unified approach to development analysis and planning", with a perspective of some 18 months for the exploration. Resolutions approved the previous year by the United Nations Economic and Social Council and General Assembly specified the kind of social-justice-oriented development to be sought.

It is hardly surprising that the team did not produce a unified approach meeting the specifications of the resolutions during its life span or that subsequent efforts by UNRISD staff have not been able to synthesize such an approach from the materials it left behind. The shortcomings of current development processes and policies were even more conspicuous at the end of the decade of the 1970s than at its beginning, and the range of contradictory attributes demanding "unification" has widened: the reconciliation of technocratic rationality with popular participation, of continually expanding production with protection of the human environment, of continually diversifying human wants with priority to the satisfaction of basic human needs poses questions that may be somewhat clearer than before, but that are far as ever from plausible answers.

The unified approach project has been one among many attempts to grapple with this recalcitrant reality. In some respects, it has been left behind by other explorations commanding larger resources and starting from more radical challenges to the conventional wisdom of development. Nevertheless, it helped to incubate ideas and slogans that continue to evolve and ramify in sometimes unexpected ways in the international organizations and in different regional and national settings.

The publication by the United Nations in 1952 of the *Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation* is a convenient starting point for a sketch of the pre-history of the unified approach. Naturally, such a sketch ignores many parallel or overlapping initiatives within and without the United Nations family of organizations.

The United Nations resolutions calling for the preparation of this Report assumed that the "world social situation" was a definable reality that could be studied and reported on like the "world economic situation", already the subject of annual UN reports.[1] However, the resolutions left implicit the content and boundaries of the "social situation".

The small Secretariat team charged with preparation of the Report could not start from a unifying concept of its subject; it confronted scanty and unreliable information for most of the world relating to an unmanageably wide range of questions that could be considered "social". It confronted political pitfalls deriving from the Cold War and the incipient processes of decolonialization. It also confronted bureaucratic pitfalls deriving from the compartmentalization of "social" activities between agencies and units within agencies that the UN system had already achieved.

The team sought a manageably modest interpretation of its terms of reference: the Report would focus on "existing social conditions", dealing only incidentally with "programmes to improve those conditions". The "social conditions" with which it would deal were to be practically synonymous with "standards of living"; it would assess these as far as practicable through quantitative indicators.

The subject matter was to be broken down into "social sectors", or "components" of the standard of living, in practice delimited by the jurisdictional boundaries of the United Nations bodies dealing with these sectors and generally contributing chapters on them. In order to compensate to some extent for the resulting compartmentalization by sectors and worldwide generalizations by sectors, in which the "social" unavoidably became divorced from reference to specific societies, the Report contained chapters on three of the world regions then beginning to be labelled "under-developed": Latin America, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia.

The United Nations organs that had requested the Report received it quite favourably. It dispelled previous doubts whether such a task could be carried to a coherent conclusion, achieved an outside reception unusual among United Nations publications, and originated a series in which successive attempts to go beyond the self-imposed limitations of the Preliminary Report can be traced.

These efforts had a good deal to do with the way in which the "unified approach" was eventually conceived and pursued. They were part of a conflictive evolution of ideas and organizational patterns in the United Nations Secretariat that reflected wider controversies under way in other international agencies, universities, research institutes, and national governments. Personalities, struggles for survival

[1] Resolutions on social questions have usually originated in the Social Commission (later renamed Commission for Social Development), an advisory body to the Economic and Social Council, and have then been confirmed, with or without modifications, in resolutions of ECOSOC and finally of the UN General Assembly.

and growth among bureaucratic entities, and stereotypes harboured by each of the parties concerning the others, to be sure, blurred or distorted the reflection. In very simplified terms, three main positions can be distinguished.

On the one side were the economists who dominated the authorized version of development thinking in the United Nations for many years, econometrically trained and wedded to quantifiable laws and models. Some of these economists saw no reason to take the "social" into account on any terms. Others saw allocations to consumption and to certain social services as important means of raising the productivity of the labour force. Still others were convinced that human welfare and equity, the values justifying the development effort, required some immediate attention to redistributive measures. However, they could come to terms with the social only through quantification of a kind compatible with their own techniques of drawing up national accounts, constructing models, analyzing costs and benefits, calculating production functions, etc. If the proponents of social policies wanted a hearing they must learn the same techniques and provide usable data for them. Sound development policies, made possible by quantification of all the relevant factors, would eventually benefit everyone; enlightened self-interest would make governments and other societal actors adhere to them.

On the other side were proponents of sectoral social activities, in the 1950s dominated by the experience of the United States, then at the height of self-confidence as dispenser of advice and aid to poor or war-devastated countries. The activities in question were directed to the relief of poverty, the universalization of the basic public social services found in the industrialized countries, the stimulation of community initiative, and the propagation of the norms and techniques of the "helping professions", in particular social work. These proponents took for granted that the forms of social action with which they identified were basic human rights and that the norms and techniques, with secondary adaptations, would be suitable to peoples everywhere. If local resources were insufficient, external aid and training could fill the gap. They were as oblivious as the economists to questions of social structural change and power relationships, but were particularly oblivious to one question central to the latter, that of criteria for allocation of scarce resources.

The team responsible for the Reports on the World Social Situation found itself in the middle, seeking to understand the preoccupations of the economic quantifiers and the social service specialists and to build bridges between them, increasingly sceptical concerning the pretensions of both, but inhibited in criticism by lack of an alternative frame of reference and by the Secretariat's distaste for internal polemics.

In their work, the term "social development" gradually pushed aside "social situation" with its static connotations, but did not receive a more precise definition. "Social development" became current as a counterpart to "economic development". Its users at this time identified it mainly with measurable improvement in standards or levels of living (the former term referring to norms, the latter to

realities) and with government actions directed to this end. Two International Surveys of Programmes of Social Development concentrating on government plans and policies were issued, in 1955 and 1959. Afterward, successive Reports on the World Social Situation were mandated to include "programmes to improve conditions".

The reports of the 1950s maintained a tone of qualified optimism. The "social situation" was continually improving according to the statistical indicators, although the improvement was unevenly distributed and "much remains to be done". Governments were continually introducing new and improved social programmes. Partically all governments, by different paths, were advancing toward similar social goals, differentially hampered by misinformation, scanty resources, and the shortcomings of the human agents of their purposes. The interests of "developed" and "underdeveloped" countries in a world future of rising levels of living were basically harmonious; aid by the former to the latter was an important reality, however poorly planned and inadequate in extent. The social policies of all countries offered "lessons" deserving study by their neighbours, although the flow of applicable lessons, and of experts to teach the lessons, might be mainly from the developed to the underdeveloped. The picture was of a predominantly rational and benevolent although highly imperfect world order.

By the early 1960s the reading of the statistical evidence and the evaluation of policies were changing significantly, although the conception of social development remained the same. The 1965 *Report on the World Social Situation* struck a note that was to be repeated with variations up to the present:

> A picture of painfully slow progress in the developing countries emerges at the mid-point of the Development Decade. While some sectors of development (especially education) have continued to fare better than others, and some countries (and parts of countries) have advanced faster than others, it seems clear that, for the most part, the recent effort at development has fallen far short of hopes and expectations. Possibly some of these expectations were unduly optimistic; a more pertinent question is whether the development efforts, both national and international, have been sufficient – and in the right direction.
>
> Progress has been limited both by external constraints and by internal political and social realities. Unfavourable trends in trade and problems of external financing have sharply limited the material resources for development in many of the poorer countries, while the implementation of development goals has been hampered in a number of these countries by political instability and dissensions, with frequent overthrow of governments amid charges of corruption; sometimes also by lack of the necessary political will for development, and frequently by persistence of administrative and social structures that fail to provide an organizational basis for change and development or to enlist popular motivation and participation. (p. vii)

In fact, the proponents of social development had begun to envisage development as a complex process of societal change and modernization, in which the "economic" and the "social" were separable only artificially and for purposes of analysis. However, their distrust of global theories and models (or their institutional inhibition against choosing any one theory of societal change), together with the kinds of information available to them and the intellectual habits generated by the sectoral organization of the reports and the negotiation of their contents with the bureaucratic guardians of the sectors, continually crowded them back into a narrower vision of social development – a vision made up of progress in separate components of levels of living, measurable through inescapably heterogeneous statistical indicators and promotable through equally heterogeneous social and economic programmes.

The social development proponents became sufficiently sensitive to the shakiness of the data base of the elaborate statistical manipulations and models of the economists not to be tempted to follow suit with equally shaky social statistics. They considered but rejected as impracticable the objective of unifying the concept of level of living and measuring "social development" through a composite statistical indicator comparable to the national income or gross national product. They made some use of the findings of sociological and anthropological field research but found in the theories then current in these disciplines no help toward an interpretation of social development matching the imposing structures built around economic development.

Call for Balance

Meanwhile, the idea of objective guidelines for allocations of public resources and better mutual support between economic and social programmes attracted the attention of national representatives in the UN deliberative bodies. During the 1950s various UN resolutions called for "balanced economic and social development" and asked the Secretariat for reports pointing the way to such development. The current debate among economists over "balanced" versus "unbalanced" growth strategies contributed to the popularity of the term, although the conceptions of what was to be "balanced" had little in common. The resolutions conveyed a vision of social and economic "fields" as distinct realities deserving equal shares of fertilizer. Some of the resolutions embroidered the imagery of "fields" by urging that action in the "two fields" should "go hand in hand".

The Secretariat team responsible for the Reports on the World Social Situation, after some years of speaking of "balance" as a desideratum, began to tackle the question systematically around 1957, and presented its conclusions in the 1961 Report, which began by stating:

From a governmental point of view, the question of balanced social and economic development is to an important extent a question of the pattern of public expenditure. There is no over-all conception or theory of balanced development applicable to the expenditure policy of the economically underdeveloped countries at the present time; there are only fragments of a theory and "common sense".

The treatment of the question in the 1961 Report maintained the cautiously empirical tone of the above quotation, summarizing a wide range of possible interactions between the "social" and the "economic" and of theories concerning such interactions. The Report concluded that "while it is theoretically not possible to state what levels of development in the various social components *should* go with given levels of economic development, it is quite possible to state what social levels *do* go with given economic levels", and that "studies of actual patterns of development can assist the practical process of decision-making . . . by providing evidence of social levels that can demonstrably be achieved at given levels of economic development [and] by providing evidence of imbalances". (p. 39)

Between 1957 and 1964, 13 "country case studies" were completed and issued as background documents for the "balanced development" project. Some of these studies were confident of the prospects for the national variant of planning; others exposed consistent failures on the part of political leaders and planners to foresee the resources that could be mobilized to achieve their purposes or the wider consequences of their efforts. The studies did not reveal any readily transferable techniques for balancing, and confirmed that juxtaposition of social and economic programmes in a development plan did not ensure either their integration or their implementation.

A good many of the studies confirmed implicitly that the size of allocations depended on some combination of bureaucratic inertia, the relative strength of organized pressures, the relative persuasiveness of advocates, or the hunches of political leaders, rather than on technical criteria. Moreover, in several of the countries political regimes and plans changed radically even before the Secretariat editors had time to issue the study.

Within the United Nations during the 1960s at least two distinct approaches proceeded, if not hand in hand, in juxtaposition with the attempts to bring the multifarious activities relating to human welfare under a roof of "social development", measure their progress, and balance them with economic activities. The more influential was the elaboration of norms for economic development of the Third World, shaped by the kind of economic thinking described above, and symbolized by the first Development Decade. Interest centred on goals for investment, financial and technical flows from "developed" to "developing" countries, terms of trade, and, as the expected result, rates of increase in the gross national product.

The second and more visionary approach was that of formulation of normative declarations on social and economic rights, which, undeterred by the chasm bet-

ween governmental votes for such rights and governmental capacity or will to honour them, reached its culmination in the Declaration on Social Progress and Development approved by the General Assembly in 1969 as Resolution 2542 (XXIV).

The approaches of development economists and proponents of social sectoral action evolved during the 1960s, although it is doubtful whether they came to understand each other much better. The economists became more inclined to recognize "social obstacles" to economic development, at least as excuses for frustrated economic plans and lagging dynamism, and to challenge sociologists for advice on how to insert missing ingredients and remove obstacles.[2] They became more interested in the contributions of education and health services to the upgrading of "human resources" and tried to devise methods of quantifying such contributions which, it was hoped, would permit their incorporation into models and plans. Moreover, the dominant econometricians had to take into account more fundamental criticisms of the conventional wisdom from within the economic camp, in particular from Gunnar Myrdal in *Asian Drama* (1968).

The disappointing results of the first Development Decade gave the proponents of the various social approaches, and of radical changes in the economic approaches, strong arguments for more adequate attention to their concerns in the Strategy to be prepared for a second Development Decade. Studies and meetings of various kinds began to revolve around this objective.

One manifestation, deriving from the pursuit of "balanced development" and leading directly to the unified approach, was the convening of a Meeting of Experts on Social Policy and Planning in Stockholm in September 1969. This meeting was an attempt by the proponents of a broad but pragmatic conception of social development to strengthen their position by a common front with critical economists. More than half of the 10 experts, selected by the usual criteria of geographical and political distribution, were economists who had already, in various ways, tried to incorporate non-economic factors into their thinking.

The central propositions of the report constitute an interesting demonstration of the ways in which the problem of rethinking development was generally conceived at the time, and shaped the terms of reference of the unified approach project.

"The purpose of the meeting was to clarify further the role of social factors in development with a view to ensuring their adequate inclusion in development plans

[2] The Economic Commission for Latin America was probably the first economically-oriented United Nations body to try to incorporate (from the early 1950s) a theoretical sociological approach into its thinking on economic development. This approach, under the intellectual leadership of José Medina Echavarría, gradually escaped from its ancillary role of diagnosing social aspects and obstacles and led to a quite different kind of development dialogue. See, in particular, José Medina Echavarría, *Consideraciones sociológicas sobre el desarrollo económico* (CEPAL, Santiago de Chile, 1963) and *Filosofía, educación y desarrollo* (Textos del ILPES, México, Siglo XXI, 1973).

and programmes." This proposition and the proposition that "the economic approach to development analysis and planning had to be integrated with a social approach that was different in nature and would be more relevant to the problems of developing countries in the coming decade", were juxtaposed to less simple formulas: "it is most necessary to view the development process as a complex whole, comprising economic elements *sensu stricto*, but also other social, as well as political and administrative elements. Any design for a development strategy, national or international, must cover all the above-mentioned fields if it is to be meaningful, internally consistent and capable of effective implementation." Governmental and United Nations compartmentalization should give way to a "more unified treatment", in which "the idea of a single social system in which development occurs" should be "taken seriously as its starting point".

Misleading dividing lines between economic and social phenomena, and between economic and social development, have been "due in part to the rather narrow approach to the development process characteristic of past thinking in economics, which relied heavily on simplistic econometric models with highly aggregated variables", and in part to governmental and UN bureaucratic compartmentalization. An "over-emphasis on economic growth rates of production has been based on the apparent ease of quantification in the concept of the national income or gross national product of developing countries". "The dominance of economists among the social scientists and the earlier development and easier quantification of their concepts, has meant that certain non-market aspects – those inappropriately labelled 'social' – have been neglected in approaches to development."

The experts recommended that those aspects should be dealt with as "neglected areas" rather than as "social factors", but did not follow this recommendation in the remainder of their report.

The report endorsed one version of the "dualist" label around which a great deal of ideological polemics and semantic confusion had focussed during the 1960s: "... a meaningful approach to development planning must take account of the dualist structure of many developing societies – dualist in terms of the difference between modern and traditional sectors, differences within those sectors and differences between those participating in development and those left behind or on the margin. ...The fact that development either leaves behind, or in some ways even creates, large areas of poverty, stagnation, marginality and actual exclusion from social and economic progress is too obvious and too urgent to be overlooked."

The report came down to earth by singling out one broad problem area as central to an acceptable development strategy: "The major problem for the Second Development Decade is likely to be unemployment and underemployment. ... In the absence of vigorously enforced employment policies, the grim prospect of the Second Development Decade is one of rising unemployment, accompanied by increasing concentration of the worst aspects of poverty in the cities ..."

The report juxtaposes the technocratic vision of development engineered from the top and the participationist vision of development emerging from popular initiative, but shous more affinity with the former: "policies could and should be devised so as to activate wider social strata to increase their participation in the development process". A major prerequisite for development is "peaceful radical social change, as rapidly as possible". "Peaceful domestic movements committed to rapid change should be permitted to flourish and, whenever possible, should be supported if they would help to promote a sense of participation and social engagement."

Finally, "to achieve effective development planning, all planners should think in terms of all goals".

Conceptual Problems

The above quotations, together with other formulations in the Report, suggest certain papered-over differences between "experts" as to the nature of the "social", but they also indicate a kind of compromise consensus on certain key suppositions that had already come under question during the 1960s. In miniature, they point to a number of conceptual problems that were to plague the later quest for a unified approach:

(i) The report assumes that a common process identifiable as "development" is under way in the so-called "developing" countries. This process is, almost by definition, good and necessary, although its present shortcomings, from the standpoint of human welfare, may be more easily demonstrable than its goodness. These shortcomings can be attributed in large part to deficiencies in government policies and these in turn to the dominance of economic planners with over-narrow conceptions and inappropriate tools. While the report voices many of the criticisms of current processes of economic growth and dependent modernization that were to became more insistent during the 1970s, it treats these as remediable defects.

(ii) The report places unlimited confidence in the potential capacity of planners to take everything into account in an integrated fashion and reveal to policy makers the one best way to do whatever they want to do. There is no trace of the various old and new disciplinary and theoretical positions that were questioning human capacity to plan comprehensively so as to reach predetermined ends.

(iii) The report does not entertain the possibility that the international organizations and governments to which it addresses itself, deriving from the power structures responsible for the iniquities to which it points, might be neither able nor willing to undertake radical changes; that, indeed, they might look on their own requests for such reports as a harmless ritual testifying to their good intentions. The report refers to the inadequacies of governments only in terms of Gunnar Myrdal's concept of the "soft state" with "insufficient power or will to carry out a number

of desirable policies", and implicitly supposes that a "hard state" could have such power and will.

The United Nations Economic and Social Council and General Assembly approved the report of the experts in 1970 and decanted it into instructions to the Secretariat for further work.[3] These resolutions affirmed "the need for a unified approach to development analysis and planning which would fully integrate the economic and social components in the formulation of policies and programmes at the national and international levels". They laid down specifications, deriving from the report of the experts, for the kind of "unified approach" wanted. It must "include components" designed:

"(a) To leave no section of the population outside the scope of change and development,

(b) To effect structural change which favours national development and to activate all sectors of the population to participate in the development process,

(c) To aim at social equity, including the achievement of an equitable distribution of income and wealth in the nation,

(d) To give high priority to the development of the human potentials, including vocational technical training and the provision of employment opportunities and meeting the needs of children."

The above components are to be "borne in mind in development analysis and planning processes, as well as in their implications, according to the particular developmental needs of each country". The Secretary-General is to submit a report on the unified approach at the "earliest possible date". The General Assembly resolution, more specifically, requests him to "evolve methods and techniques for the application of a unified approach to development, to be put at the disposal of Governments at their request".

During the same year, the General Assembly approved an International Development Strategy for the Second Development Decade, the 1970s. The Strategy was prepared mainly by the UN Committee for Development Planning, a permanent advisory body composed of eminent economists, set up in 1966, whose preliminary work for the Strategy had been criticized in the report of the social policy experts as insufficiently human-welfare-oriented.

The report of the "experts" was apparently not brought to the attention of the Committee for Development Planning, for whatever reason. Thus, the "unified approach" resolution and the Strategy reached and passed through the General Assembly by separate channels. The Strategy, like its predecessor, devoted most of its content to targets for economic growth, trade and financial transfers. However, the spirit of the times ensured that it would find room not only for a series of conventional and vague social sectoral recommendations ("developing countries will

[3] *The International Social Development Review*, 3, 1971, contains the text of these resolutions.

make vigorous efforts to improve . . ., will adopt suitable national policies . . ., will take steps to provide . . .", etc.) but also an affirmation of the need for a unified approach somewhat stronger than that of the resolutions deriving from the experts' report;

". . . qualitative and structural changes in the society must go hand in hand with rapid economic growth, and existing disparities – regional, sectoral and social – should be substantially reduced. These objectives are both determining factors and end-results of development; they should therefore be viewed as integrated parts of the same dynamic process, and would require a unified approach."

The "unified approach" had thus followed "balanced development" into the international repertoire of aspirations that might mean many things to different men.

2. Methodological and institutional constraints

Preceding pages have suggested certain methodological and institutional constraints in efforts by United Nations bodies to deal with the "social" or with "development". The problem to be studied was normally defined through a resolution deriving partly from past reports presented by the Secretariat, partly from the interests and points of view of the representatives of governments in the policy-making bodies. In practice, governments rarely tried to impose a coherent ideological formulation through their representatives; they were generally content to seek recognition of their own achievements, refute criticisms, and occasionally score off adversaries.

Definition of the problem normally preceded a request to the Secretary-General, as ultimately responsible for the work of the social units of the Secretariat, to produce a report containing "practical" recommendations within a fixed period.

The practical recommendations were to be addressed to governments, on the supposition that they would be willing and able to act on prescriptions couched in very general and qualified terms.

The conventions of the exercises permitted considerable latitude in criticism of "some governments", "many governments", etc. as inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted, or compartmentalized, as long as these traits were treated as shortcomings remediable through good advice, and countries were not identified. Hypotheses that the problems addressed were not of a nature to be solved by the planning and actions of governments of whatever kind, or that typical existing governments would be unable to act on them because of the character and the objectives of the forces dominating these governments, were ruled out *a priori*.

Research techniques, beyond the compilation and synthesis of available published information, followed a limited range of paths, usually specified in the governing resolution:

(a) A questionnaire might be circulated to governments asking for their views on the problem and their methods of dealing with it. The use of questionnaires distanced the Secretariat from responsibility for producing solutions to the more controversial questions, but had the disadvantage of eliciting incorrigibly heterogeneous materials (generally from a small minority of member governments) that had somehow to be "taken into account" in reports.

(b) "Country case studies" might be prepared through national institutions, individual consultants, or members of the Secretarist. This technique offered a greater likelihood of obtaining fresh information and ideas in a relatively coherent form. However, the conventions demanded that the countries to be studied be selected for a maximum of geographical and political diversity, and selection depended on too many extraneous factors to permit clear definition of what the "cases" were supposed to demonstrate. Typically, the reports made only slight use of the country case studies because they were completed after the deadline, because changes in the circumstances of the country left them quickly out of date, or because they presented an unassimilable mass of detail.

(c) The governing resolution usually envisaged consultations with and contributions from appropriate specialized agencies and other units of the UN family having social responsibilities (ILO, FAO, UNESCO, UNICEF, etc.). The consultations might or might not be perfunctory, but overlapping jurisdictions and sensitivity to criticism of certain dogmas and programmes introduced additional inhibitions into the preparation of broad, ideally "unified" reports.

(d) At some stage in the response to requests for reports and recommendations, a "meeting of experts" was practically obligatory. The conventions demanded that the Secretariat select the experts, like the countries for case studies, for maximum diversity, within limits imposed by the Secretariat's contacts and information concerning their qualifications and availability. The role of "expert", supposed to evaluate and improve ideas presented by the Secretariat, was ambiguous. If the experts exercised it vigorously they exposed their own differences of background and viewpoint and complicated the Secretariat's task of producing a coherent "practical" report. The more deeply an expert was committed to a comprehensive theory or strategy of his own the less fitted he would be to enter into an unavoidably eclectic exercise.

In their combination, the instructions and techniques here outlined seemed to rule out the selection or construction of a single theory of social change on which to base an integrated strategy for social development. The instructions and techniques insured that heterogeneous, incomplete, and erratically selected information would have to be taken into account; that representatives of different points of view and different terminologies would have to reach a least common denominator; or that their report would have to incorporate all proposals not definitely unacceptable to other participants nor self-evidently incompatible.

It was decided in New York to centre the study of a "unified approach to development analysis and planning", once a grant from the Netherlands (later supplemented by grants from Canada and Sweden) made it possible to undertake such a study outside the routine of periodic world social reports, in UNRISD (the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development). UNRISD was less bound by constraints and conventions than the Secretariat itself, but had a work programme deriving historically from the concepts of level of living, social development and balanced development that had evolved in the Secretariat. It was accustomed to similar research methods, in particular the pursuit of information on broad topics through country case studies.

The First Task

The core of the research team that first met in February 1971 and engaged in discussions of preliminary drafts and conceptual papers during the greater part of that year, was made up of the Director of UNRISD, who had taken a leading part in the evolution of UN social thinking since the *Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation;* the Chief of the Social Development Division of the Economic Commission for Latin America, where more politically-oriented and conflict-oriented lines of thinking had been pursued for some time; an economist with experience in the plan organization of France and in the study of development indicators; a specialist in the study of decision-making processes; and an economist who had written extensively on development and served as policy and planning consultant in different parts of the world.

Other persons joined the team during the course of the year, contributed conceptual papers, or entered into discussions with the team: directors of national planning agencies, consultants on development planning, members of the United Nations Committee for Development Planning, and specialists in regional planning, in human geography, in econometric techniques, etc. expected to cover questions outside the competence of the core team but relevant to a "unified approach".

Even the core members of the team had other responsibilities in the Secretariat, in other UNRISD research projects, in academic institutions, and as national development planners and consultants. It was evident from the beginning that a team of this kind, with less than two years at its disposal, would not be able to reach a theoretical consensus nor produce a comprehensive set of prescriptions for unified development. The team entertained the more modest hope of reaching agreement on certain central concepts, of clarifying theoretical or disciplinary sources of divergence on others, of stimulating new ways of thinking about development, and of producing two kinds of report:

– *first,* a synthesis of central issues and unifying concepts, along with a few cautiously "practical" guidelines;

– *second,* a report covering in some detail all the aspects the team considered relevant and important, in chapters to be written by individual team members and consultants, reflecting their different points of view, but given a reasonable coherence through discussions with the team as a whole.

The deadline for the first report was October 1972; it was determined by the requirement of submitting a report to the next session of the Commission for Social Development. The deadline for the second report was relatively elastic, but it was hoped that this would be completed by the end of 1973.

In practice, budgetary limitations and other commitments of the team members made it impossible to continue beyond 1971 the dialogue that had begun, and the texts that emerged remained too diverse in their "approaches" as well as their styles to add up to a publishable second consolidated report. In later stages, a series of individuals struggled to impose order on a mounting accumulation of disparate materials.

The team devoted a good deal of attention during 1971 to plans and negotiations for a series of studies of national experience, and eight such studies were eventually completed by national institutions or consultants, although only one of them by the intended deadline of May 1972, so that they could be used only in a very limited way in preparation of the project's first or Preliminary Report. UNRISD eventually issued five of them in mimeographed texts.

The specifications for the studies gave the executors considerable flexibility in pursuing aspects they considered nationally important, but sought a measure of uniformity by asking them to discuss the relevance to their national situations of certain preliminary hypotheses of the project: in particular, on the emergence of a "triple crisis" in development planning: in its basic philosophy or final goals, in its links with policy formation and decision-taking, and in the adequacy of its techniques, mostly of economic origin. Half the studies were carried out by economists, often the only candidates prepared to take a global view of what was happening in their countries in the name of development.

Although the studies were small in number, the differences in their content and in the approaches of their executors deserve some attention as indicative of differences in the real world of national societies to which the quest for a unified approach addressed itself.

Two of the studies dealt with Asian countries (Philippines and Sri Lanka) having extensive and bureaucratized social programmes, formal planning mechanisms, and competitive party politics, with social service, consumption subsidy, job creation and public works accomplishments and promises critical to party suceess in periodic elections. These studies were carried out collectively by institutions – a university school of public administration and a private socio-economic research institute staffed largely by persons having previous experience in the national planning system.

The Asian studies documented in detail the functioning of programmes and the deficiencies of co-ordination and overall policy guidance. Under conditions of political competition for limited objectives, bureaucratic compartmentalization of social and economic activities, and diffuse dissatisfaction at the malfunctioning of the system but no immediate prospect of major changes in the distribution of power and the expectations of different interest-groups in the societies, these studies could make various practical suggestions for improvements in policy formation and execution, but offered no hope of a radically different "unified approach".

Both texts indicated that the contradictions in the functioning of the societies were likely to become more pronounced in the future but that the deterioration probably would not overcome their basic stability for a long time. Meanwhile, planners had to try to understand political realities, adapt their proposals to such realities, and help to educate political leaders and public opinion.

One study dealt with another Asian country, Iran, that was undergoing rapid modernization under autocratic leadership, with resources at its command vastly larger than those of most "developing" countries, with formal planning machinery, but without open channels for the competition of interest groups and political movements. This study was carried out by a political scientist in contact with the plan organization. Its dominant note was intense frustration of several kinds: first, at the high social costs and inequity of the modernization process; second, at the limited and erratic use made by the "patrimonial ruler" of the advice of technocrats and planners; third, at the precariousness of societal stability resting on minorities only "cynically committed" to the system and a majority excluded and resentful. Here a certain unification of policy was present at the top and bureaucratic, political, and financial constraints were less formidable, but the human welfare objectives of the unified approach did not have first priority, socially-oriented planning could not depend on a hearing, and transmission belts between the leadership and the society functioned poorly.

Two studies, carried out by individual economists, were of newly independent African countries, Kenya and Togo, with formal planning machinery inherited in part from the colonial past and in process of adaptation to new policy objectives, with political competition open but not intense. Here the note is one of cautious down-to-earth optimism: policy formation has been erratic and planning has not been very effective owing to poor information, faulty administrative machinery, and scanty resources. Gradual improvement in planning, adjusted to the capacities of the state, offers a good deal of hope as a means of making policy more coherent and more equitable. A radically different and ambitious unified approach, however, is hardly advisable and probably impracticable for its demands on information and scarce qualified human resources. A study, also carried out by an economist, of Trinidad and Tobago in the Caribbean sub-region, likewise focussed on the modest potentialities of planning as a force for rationalization in a very small country emerging from colonialism with an excess of bureaucracy, intense factionalism, and no clear political vision of the national future.

Two studies, carried out by individual political scientists, dealt with Latin American countries, Chile and Peru, that were then experiencing semi-revolutionary changes (since frustrated) within settings of considerable uncertainty concerning the real distribution of power and the capacity of the political regimes to transform the system of production and the distribution of incomes, wealth and consumption while simultaneously presiding over the emergence of new forms of political participation of the "marginalized" masses.

These studies described the national planning mechanisms and the current social and economic programmes, but their attention lay elsewhere. Unlike the other studies mentioned above, they could not treat the political and economic systems and the distribution of power as constant constraints on policy and planning, for better or worse. In Chile and Peru initiatives were under way (under the quite different auspices of a coalition mainly of Marxist-Socialist political parties and of a nationalist military government) to transform the systems and structures, against the opposition of other combinations of forces. Under these conditions, the problems of planners seeking to improve their methodologies and exert more influence over political leaders and sectoral bureaucracies receded into the background, although both regimes were favourably disposed toward planning.

The questions in the foreground were the character, degree of coherence and relative strength of the forces supporting and opposing structural changes in the control of land, industry and mineral resources; their tactics and ability to mobilize major sectors of the population for or against these changes; their ability to carry out the changes with a reasonable degree of efficiency under unavoidably conflictive circumstances; the possibilities for compromises or shifts in political alliances; the compatibility of the changes with open political processes and the observance of laws génerally weighted against them; the alternatives for future political regimes and forms of popular participation if the changes accomplished their immediate purpose; the finding of ways to enlist international support and neutralize the opposition of certain governments and transnational enterprises.

In the series of studies the differing preoccupations of the executing institutions and individuals seem to have coincided with real differences in the national situations confronted. If the project team had not dispersed by the time they were completed, their comparative examination could have provided a valuable corrective to the normative, universalistic and technocratic bias given the project by its terms of reference. They suggested that possibilities for human-welfare-oriented rationalization of policy were real but limited; for all their differences, none of the studies could envisage short-term removal of the stumbling-blocks to a unified approach; more likely, the problems would evolve through the interaction of political and economic factors into other problems, not necessarily less formidable. Would-be agents of human-welfare-oriented development had to seek opportunities within these processes, rather than devise ideal prescriptions.

3. Differing approaches to a unified approach

Two documents set forth the elements of consensus reached in the unified approach project while it retained a measure of interdisciplinary teamwork: (i) Report on a Unified Approach to Development Analysis and Planning: Preliminary Report of the Secretary-General, 25 October 1972; this report was prepared by one member of the team and revised on the basis of comments from other team members; (ii) Report of the Secretary-General on the Expert Group Meeting on a Unified Approach to Development Analysis and Planning held at Stockholm from 5 to 10 November, 1971. The majority of the team members participated in this meeting along with a small number of other economists, sociologists, planners and representatives of UN agencies.

Both documents were presented to a session of the Commission for Social Development in February 1973. Because of the Commission's deadline the Preliminary Report could not be further revised to take into account the comments of the 1972 Expert Group.

A unified approach, according to the Preliminary Report, "needs to make use of two complementary ways of looking at development: (i) development as a perceived advance toward specified ends based on societal values; (ii) development as the system of interrelated societal changes that underlies and conditions the feasibility of the advance.

"The first sense assumes human capability of shaping the future for human ends. It also implies that the existing society has the right and the ability through general consensus, or through agents claiming to represent the best interests of the society, to make choices and enforce sacrifices in the name of development.

". . .The second sense assumes that development is an intelligible phenomenon susceptible to diagnosis and to objective propositions concerning the interrelations of factors and the probable wider consequences of change in or action on key components of the 'system'.

"From the standpoint adopted here development is not a single uniform process or dimension of change and it cannot be assumed that 'development' means the transformation of the countries now labelled 'developing' into replicas of countries now labelled 'developed'. All national societies will be developing or trying to, during the foreseeable future, and at the same time will be trying to cope with the contradictions and disbenefits that arise from their development processes. There is no reason to expect their efforts to lead to uniform futures, or to final resolution of their struggles in a blessed state of 'being developed'."

The Preliminary Report distinguished between the "real style of development" ("what is actually happening in a given national society") and the "preferred style of development" ("what the national political leadership, the planning agency, or some other significant political actor wants or expects to happen"). It rejected the possibility of a "detailed universal set of specifications for development or parti-

cularized 'definition' ", but proposed a "minimum criterion" for assessment of styles of development: "the extent to which a style of development enables a society to function over the long term for the wellbeing of all its members". Assessed by this criterion, certain styles might be viable but not acceptable, and others acceptable but not viable.

The criterion implies choices, explicit or implicit, with regard to: "(i) The extent and nature of national *autonomy*. (ii) The extent and nature of popular *participation*. (iii) The emphasis given to *production* in general, to specific lines and techniques of production, incentives, and forms of control over the means of production. (iv) The *distribution* of the fruits of development and mechanisms for redistribution. (v) The encouragement or discouragement of specific forms of individual or collective *consumption* of goods and services. (vi) The extent and nature of protection of the human environment. (vii) The extent and nature of protection of human relationships contributing to solidarity, security, self-realization, and freedom. These choices are complexly interdependent. If they are mutually contradictory beyond a certain point, the style will not be viable. If the choices are made in isolation from one another the probability is that they will be mutually contradictory to a dangerous degree."

After elaborating on the implications of these areas of choice, the Preliminary Report proceeded to sketch a typology of real national styles of development, then to propose certain strategic orientations for policy and certain approaches to developmental decision-making diagnosis.

The differing approaches that we shall now discuss emerged not only during the period of team activity but also later. Although positions changed to some extent in the course of discussion, and new insights emerged, one might conclude that each member of the team ended with his own "unified approach", whose premises derived from his own ideology, discipline, and previous experience.

Meanwhile, the international scene continually threw up additional major problems, approaches and slogans. The 1970s saw, instead of progress toward consensus on a "unified approach", a continual diversification of interpretations of development, continually more ambitious international declarations aspiring to reconcile them, and also a mounting criticism of "development", from several quite different viewpoints, as an outworn and misleading myth.

The following pages do not try to reproduce the positions of participants in the unified approach project. Rather, the intention is to use these positions as a springboard toward a discussion of the different approaches that have continually confronted one another and entered into compromises in the international debate. All of them are, in one way or another, interventionist; the only influential approach to development not represented was laissez-faire or reliance on market forces.

(a) Development economics re-examined and broadened

This approach assumed the centrality and at the same time the insufficiency of economic development theories and tools for diagnosis and planning applied to market or mixed economies. Economics offered the closest approximation to a coherent view of development, but it had not yet "taken into account" all the relevant factors. The approach also assumed the centrality of economists as advisers to governments. The unified approach must therefore be presented to economists in terms they could accept, incorporate into their methodologies, and communicate to political leaders having their own preoccupations and limitations of vision.

The approach had several main components:

(i) An interest in sociological and psychological diagnoses of "social obstacles to development" or "social preconditions for development". The supposition was that "traditional" values, attitudes toward work and saving, class or caste barriers to mobility, child-rearing practices, extended family ties, etc. stood in the way of a development process requiring accelerated capital accumulation and investment, continual technolocal innovation, formation of a disciplined and qualified labour force, and predictable responsiveness of the population to market incentives. This development process could progress faster and more smoothly once the social experts diagnosed the obstacles and prescribed how to remove them.

(ii) An interest in educational, health, social security and other social sectoral programmes for their claims on public resources and their contribution to economic development through the improvement of "human resources". Quantification of this impact and calculation of the ideal size of allocations to social programmes were considered key desiderata in a unified approach, although difficult and perhaps impossible to achieve.

(iii) A preoccupation with the measurable aspects of social justice and improved levels of living as the legitimatc ends of development. The economists in question had already abandoned the expectation still current among many of their colleagues that these ends would eventually and more or less automatically derive from the maximization of investment and rates of increase in the national product. Employment policies, income redistribution policies, and agrarian reform policies were all affirmed as essential components of a unified approach.

(iv) A preoccupation with the improvement of quantitative methods for reconciling multiple objectives and guiding the selection of development projects. This was congenial not only to economists but also to most social sectoral specialists, in spite of their uneasiness at submitting to the predominance of economic justifications for social programmes. It gave them a means that they lacked of ordering coherently what they were doing and also a more sympathetic hearing from circles believed to have a decisive influence over the allocation of resources.

(b) Development planning rehabilitated and perfected

This approach derived from the preoccupations of planning practitioners in various "developed" countries with market or mixed economies and in a much larger number of developing countries. During the 1950s and early 1960s the number of countries possessing planning agencies and preparing fixed-term plans had increased dramatically. Even governments having no interest in such planning for themselves began to favour it for the "developing" countries, if only as a means toward more effective use of their "aid" to such countries: the support by the United States of 10-year economic and social development plans as a condition for aid under the Alliance for Progress is the most conspicuous example. The colonial powers had also left a heritage of "development plans" and some rudimentary planning machinery in many of the newly independent countries. Courses training "planners" to fill the posts opened in the new planning agencies proliferated, and a body of professional planners with a vested interest in the success of planning came into being.

While the proccupations of the planners coincided to a large extent with those of the development economists described above, they were more concerned with the legitimacy of their own function, their ties with politics, the nature and effectiveness of the transmission belts between planning and application. By 1970, experience had introduced a large measure of frustration and insecurity to mingle with the earlier claims for planning. The relevance of formal development plans was beginning to seem rather doubtful. The planners could not help seeing that their prescriptions were being followed only sporadically, and that the results of such partial planning deviated widely and unpredictably from their objectives and their projections. Planners and economic theorists had less influence on the allocation of public resources than did alliances of industrial and construction enterprises, engineers and politicians, all of whom, for differing reasons, were wedded to large capital-intensive, highly visible, technologically advanced projects, however disruptive these might be to the environment and the livelihood of the people they were supposed to benefit.

Moreover, in the context of radical challenges to power structures at the end of the 1960s, a good many planners could no longer accept the role of neutral technicians at the service of the state behind which they had sheltered themselves when planning first began to be institutionalized. Should they not serve the people rather than the state? But if so, how, since the state was their employer?

One reaction was to propose broader and more ambitious roles for planning. This approach, which dominated Part III of the *Preliminary Report*, seems to envisage a future social order in which planning becomes an activity and source of guidance as pervasive as religion in some other social orders, with professional planners functioning as teachers and prophets, but with the laity as well continually learning and applying more comprehensive planning techniques and resolving their unavoidable conflicts of interests and values ba integrating their plans.

Tte next two approaches to be discussed implicitly negate this vision of planning societies, although the vision itself might incorporate them as legitimate facets of the all-encompassing activity of planning.

(c) Pragmatic social and economic ameliorism

This approach gave priority to the identification of policies and measures that have worked, in the sense of demonstrably enhancing human welfare; to the consideration of how they might be made to work better; and to pragmatic criteria for their combination into mutually supportive packages.[4] The same approach dominated United Nations technical assistance in social questions, in which "experts" set forth to apply methods learned in their home countries, on the supposition that they would be able to adapt such methods to the political and social setting of the country to be advised. (In practice, as often as not, the experts really set forth to advocate methods that they had never been able to apply in their home countries.)

The approach of pragmatic social and economic ameliorism had met with harsh and obvious criticisms over the years, but its proponents had plausible arguments on their side. After all, throughout the world human-welfare-oriented and human-resource-oriented programmes of many kinds were continuing to appear and expand. By now they accounted for sizeable shares of public expenditures and the national product in most countries, irrespective of their structure and level of production, their political system, or their distribution of power. Presumably some of them worked better than others, and comparative study could throw light on the reasons and on ways of raising the general level of effectiveness.

The approach of pragmatic ameliorism was one of the two that persisted in later demands made by United Nations policy-making bodies for pursuit of a unified approach.

(d) Capacitation of national societies

This approach emphasized the building up of institutions for diagnosis and problem-solving, structural change, participatory mechanisms, and educational programmes enabling societies to function better through the informed and cooperative

[4] The approach derived naturally from the "programmes of social development" side of the Reports on the World Social Situation, which, in principle, identified programmes that were working in the expectation that they would provide "lessons" for the governments of other countries confronting similar problems. (In practice, the information available to the compilers of the Reports had been too scanty and the political constraints too confining for them to state with any confidence whether programmes they described, mainly summarizing official documents, really worked or not.)

action of their members. It did not figure in the initial research scheme of the project but emerged in the later stages as an alternative to comprehensive planning and as a complement to pragmatic social ameliorism; it was first given a name in a 1974 report prepared by UNRISD.[5]

According to this report, "development planning first arose in connection with material production . . . In the last few decades, planning has spread to more and more fields of development activity, including social fields, but in this process, objectives have become less amenable to direct measurement, causal relations have become more complex and obscure, and control of the future has taken on a different complexion". Moreover, "conventional planning tends to lead to an over-emphasis on capital investment in physical structures and equipment, especially in social fields, since these objectives are easier to handle under the methodology of planning (and are likely to be more in demand politically) than are various other kinds of activity that may be equally or more desirable for development and possibly also much cheaper".

Another kind of rational approach to development is therefore needed. "The doctor or the teacher does not make plans or blueprints of the future like the architect but is equally rational. Similarly, at the societal level, it is desirable to think in terms of a 'capacitating' operation which does not try so much to define or control the future as to establish present conditions or capacities which will permit a given society to meet its problems in the future. The emphasis in such an approach is not on setting future output targets but on diagnosing current weaknesses and potentials, finding appropriate policies, and constantly monitoring the course of development.

"An example of such a capacitation activity would be the undertaking of structural or institutional change, which conventional planning does not readily deal with through its technical methods."

The implications of a "capacitation approach" were not further pursued within the project, and in its bare bones it suggests a faith in the existence of some rational and benevolent entity qualified or qualifiable to direct the capacitating. However, it also suggest a conception of development policy-making as an educational experience, in which societal actors learn to cope by struggling with problems under conditions of limited rationality, an approach applicable to local groups and organizations as well as to national societies, and this relates it to the position of such economists as Albert O. Hirschman and such political scientists as Warren F. Ilchman, Norman Thomes Uphoff, Michel Crozier and Erhard Friedburg.[6]

[5] *Report on a Unified Approach to Development Analysis and Planning* (E/CN.5/519, 5 December 1974). This report will be discussed later in the present chapter.

[6] See Albert O. Hirschman, *Journeys toward Progress, Development Projects Observed,* and *A Bias for Hope.* Warren F. Ilchman and Norman Thomas Uphoff, *The Political Economy of Change* (1969), Michel Crozier and Erhard Friedburg, *L'acteur et le systeme* (1977).

(e) Informational enlightenment

Lines of thinking present in the Reports on the World Social Situation since the 1950s and in the UNRISD programme envisaged a transformation of the conditions for public action through improved methods of obtaining, disseminating, interpreting and integrating accurate and relevant information for diagnosis of social problems and evaluation of progress. The proponents of social development wanted to free their uses of data from domination by economic methodologies and construct methodologies better suited to their own purposes. They questioned the adequacy of income distribution studies to throw light on levels of living as well as the meaning of national aggregate indicators such as the GNP.

Several complementary suppositions backed up their emphasis on improvement of information: first, that one important reason why "development" was so little oriented to human welfare was that policy-makers were poorly informed of needs; second, that informational exposure could generate pressures forcing goverments to act – or make way for other regimes that would act. At a more modest level of expectation, timely information would strengthen the hand of forces within national governments (as well as international organizations) disposed to tackle social problems.

These suppositions were clearly legitimate, although they could be qualified by various observations: that governments often did nothing about problems that had become internationally notorious; that governments were often overwhelmed by informational exposure of problems demanding immediate solutions, rather than short of information; and that governments could use information as an aid to repression or a technique for evading action as easily as they could use it to promote the general welfare.

In any case, informational enlightenment was the sphere of action most accessible to the international proponents of social development. It would become an "approach" on the level of those discussed above only if it were considered a master key to development policy.

The treatment of information retained certain propositions common to the Reports on the World Social Situation that made the possibility of unified policy depend on the correct manipulation of information and the rejection of certain informational fallacies:

(i) Development had to be measured in a disaggregative way before being "unified" in policy. "Diagnosis for unified development involves first an attempt to see if the different factors of development are properly covered in proper proportions." ("Factors" are stated to include the conventional components – education, health, nutrition, housing, industry, conditions of work and employment, etc. – and subcomponents – higher education, secondary education, etc. – around which the Reports on the World Social Situation had been ordered.)

(ii) "Systems for collecting and analyzing information should be designed as far as possible to facilitate understanding of relationships between different phenomena ... one difficulty with most indicators is that they are used as national aggregates or averages and fail to reflect distribution. Another difficulty is that the indicators that seem to make sense at the national level may not make much sense when examined at the local level." "... to diagnose and understand the causal relationships between different developmental factors it is usually necessary to go to the level where the interaction actually takes place rather than deal with abstractions at the national level."

Development under informational analysis thus becomes a multi-dimensional jigsaw puzzle, its large pieces divisible into small pieces fitting into each other vertically as well as horizontally. A unified approach must aim at techniques expressing the full complexity of their relationships, but they remain pieces with distinct contours susceptible to meaningful quantitative description once sufficiently disaggregated and combinable by the well-informed governmental player into a coherent whole at the "national level".

(f) Institutionalized Marxist socialism and "far-reaching structural change"

This is the first in the series of approaches under discussion that questioned the possibility of development responding to the minimum criterion of acceptability and viability within the framework of market or mixed economies. It did so, however, in a peculiarly ambiguous and stereotyped fashion that derived from the role of the socialist bloc in the United Nations and the ways in which policy-making bodies and the Secretariat simultaneously paid respect to and evaded its ideological position.

In the United Nations debates, the representatives of the national societies identifying themselves as socialist, in which the state controlled the means of production and the sources of investment and exercised power in the name of the working class, asserted that these societies could offer lessons in a functioning unified approach to the rest of the world. The fruits of this unified approach were guaranteed full employment, a relatively even income distribution, and universalization of social security and access to the major social services. The preconditions for these achievements could be labelled "far-reaching structural changes", a formula covering many kinds of change, such as agrarian reform or popular participation in developmental decision-making, to which most governments had committed themselves through their votes in the United Nations.

It had to be assumed that governments could carry out such structural changes if they wanted to, and that they had recognized the duty of doing so. The question whether abolition of private ownership of the means of production was not the key structural change could be left unanswered. The traditional Marxist–Leninist hypo-

thesis on the necessity of destruction of the bourgeois state and seizing of power by the proletariat as a precondition for such structural change remained in the shade.

Its terms of reference and international setting inhibited the unified approach project from trying to decide whether socialism (under whatever definition) or any other comprehensive system of political and economic organization was a necessary condition for a unified approach.

(g) Neo-Marxist, participationist, self-reliant socialism

This approach, for which it is particularly hard to find an adequate label, entered the unified approach debate at a late stage, introducing a combination of propositions deriving from dependency theory, Maoism and other recent currents in Marxism, "conscientization" doctrines, etc., that had become current during the 1960s, mainly outside the inter-governmental framework of debate over development. The approach accepted the areas of choice deriving from the "minimum criterion" set forth in the Preliminary Report, but it brushed aside the legitimacy of different styles of development.

"Third world countries are faced with an alternative. Either they accept their dependence or they pursue the path of their own self-reliant autonomous development. In the first case, they are bound to increased polarization, inequality and mass poverty. They continue to accept the mobilization of their resources primarily in function of foreign requirements. The mobilization of the immense reservoir of dormant productive and creative potentialities of the mass of their people will remain unutilized or underutilized. . . . It is proposed that the countries of the third world can only overcome their poverty and stagnation if and when they decide to pursue a new alternative and original road to development which qualitatively differs from that followed by the industrially advanced countries."[7]

Since the dominant forces of the "industrially advanced" countries are responsible for the "under-development" of the rest of the world and depend on its exploitation, the latter cannot look to them for "aid" and still less take them as models for development. In fact, their style of development is morally indefensible and will become practically untenable once the Third World has taken another path; their real need for transformation is just as urgent and ineluctable as that of the Third World.

Market incentives cannot guide the transformation, nor can bureaucratic centrally-planned versions of socialism, in which objectives decided from above seek to

[7] *Premises and Implications of a Unified Approach to Development Analysis and Planning* (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok, 1975), a text originally submitted to the project after dispersal of the initial team. This approach is also presented in Joost B.W. Kuitenbrouwer, *Towards Self-Reliant Integrated Development*, Occasional Paper, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.

speed up capital accumulation by depressing levels of popular consumption and wringing a surplus from the peasantry. The arousing of the creativity and active participation of the masses of the people is both a central end and a central means of a unified approach to development.

In the version that entered into the unified approach debates this position, in spite of its redical challenge to more accommodating approaches, retained an ambiguity that was practically a condition for its entering at all. According to its premises, existing governments and the world system of states reflect relationships of domination and exploitation. For authentic development, the liberation of popular creativity must sweep away these relationships. Yet it suggests that "countries" represented by their governments can "choose" to do this and that the offering to them of detailed advice on how to do this is a legitimate activity. The nature of the catalytic force enabling the masses to change from objects of exploitation, cowed by repression and blinded by the lures of the consumer society, into creative participants in control of their own destiny remains obscure.

(h) Ecodevelopment

This approach centred attention on the objectives of bringing production, consumption and human settlement patterns into harmony with the carrying capacity of the earth and of reconciling this with an equitable distribution of resources among the world's peoples, implying a drastic lowering of the consumption levels of the richer countries. It had a relatively long history as an organized source of criticisms of policies oriented exclusively to economic growth, parallel to but interacting very little with the criticisms and prescriptions made in the name of social development.

The initiation of the unified approach project coincided with the posing by the Meadows Report to the Club of Rome of the problem of "limits to growth" and with the rapid intensification of international concern over the environmental disbenefits of technological innovations in production and of artificially stimulated consumption.

In the later stages of the project, theories of "ecodevelopment" were considered more positively for introduction as a "missing ingredient". Such theories, indentified in particular with the work of Ignacy Sachs at the Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement in Paris, emphasized planning for the management of the natural and social resources of specific "eco-regions", seeking technologies, settlement patterns, systems of production and distribution adapted to each "eco-region" and substituting as far as possible the use and husbanding of local renewable resources for non-renewable resources.[8]

[8] Ignacy Sachs, *Stratégies de l'écodéveloppement* (Paris, Les Editions Ouvrières, 1980). This approach obviously links with the quest for "appropriate technologies" and similar initiatives that have flourished during the 1970s.

(i) Analysis of political choices and styles

The preceding pages have indicated implicitly the author's preference for an approach different from any of the above, although not radically incompatible with most of them. Such an approach tries to identify and explain political and other factors that condition the character and limits of public intervention in societal change, the circumstances under which development policies approximating to the minimum criterion of acceptability and viability might emerge, and the identity of potential social agents for interventions furthering such "unified approaches". It rejects the eclectic supposition that national societies can pick and choose among "lessons" from abroad and put the fragments together as they please, as well as the supposition that there is only One Right Way to develop which national societies must find and adopt under penalty of catastrophe.

Each national society faces a certain limited range of choices, depending on its historically conditioned political, social and economic structures; its productive capacity; its natural and human resources; its dominant values; and its place in the international order. These factors imply differing advantages, degrees of equity or inequity, costs and dangers. Certain choices are either permanently outside the society's reach or feasible only through a revolutionary transformation that cannot be willed deliberately by a regime shaped by existing values and power relationships.

Such an approach cannot evade the search for a theoretical framework or set of hypotheses to order its analyses of national societies, but does not expect this quest ever to be more than partially and provisionally successful. In the version here described, the approach recognizes a permanent danger of becoming ridden by theory, selecting or interpreting facts to fit the theory, and universalizing phenomena that may be conjunctural or local. It finds conspicuous examples of this danger in many attempts to use Marxism as a framework for analysis and action.

The approach is open to the criticism that it led to the demoralizing conclusion that "nothing could be done". While the version that entered into the project affirmed that many things could and should be done by many kinds of social agents, it remained frankly sceptical about the unified approach conceived as a set of universally applicable prescriptions – whether prescriptions for the allocation of resources, for techniques of diagnosis and planning, or for transformation of societal structures and values.

Human institutions, from the international order to the local group, were engaged in games so complex and for such varied prizes that attempts to make sense of them and influence them in the name of development called for an exceptional combination of audacity and humility. The unified approach project might contribute something along these lines if it remained iconoclastic, aware of the ritualistic side of the activity in which it was engaged, and the ambivalences in all human endeavours. It could not take for granted either that national societies were potentially

perfectible, once their shortcomings were diagnosed correctly, nor that their irrationalities and inequities called for root-and-branch destruction and transformation.

Several alternative criteria for classifying "approaches" bring out other tensions and ambiguities in the quest for unified development prescriptions. In terms of polar positions one can distinguish:

Technocratic vs. *participationist* approaches. The former supposes that properly qualified specialists can find the one correct or optimal solution to each problem, adding up to the optimal style of development. Development policy can be unified to the extent to which such specialists can seek and apply the solutions without compromises to meet incompatible demands and resistances. Ideally, then, "participation" should mean indoctrination in the nature of the optimal solution and corresponding behaviour. The latter approach supposes either that the optimal solution can emerge only from the creativity of the people, in control of its own destiny, or that there is no one optimal solution but that various satisfactory solutions can emerge from democratic political competition. Technocratic imposition, or reliance on policies that do not require popular understanding, is inherently sterile.

Centrality of economic or sociological laws vs. *human-welfare-oriented voluntarism.* The laws looked to by the former approach might be those of the market, or of the psychological conditions for planned modification of human behaviour, or of the socio-economic conditions for transition to socialism. The supposition is that unified development depends on correct understanding of the laws and some combination of submission to and manipulation of the preconditions they impose.

The latter position denies either the binding nature of the laws or the possibility of their infallible interpretation. Social agents should therefore guide their efforts primarily by their values. The extent to which these values can be realized and human welfare enhanced will be revealed only in the course of struggle and innovation. While the former of these positions seems to have more affinity with the technocratic approach and the latter with the participationist, either can co-exist with a predominantly technocratic or participationist outlook.

Reliance on theoretical or methodological frames of reference vs. *pragmatic acceptance of whatever works.* This contrast resembles the preceding, but with both polar positions more modest. The frame of reference does not pretend to explain the laws of development or societal change, but those of planning under specified conditions and with specified tools. The pragmatism applies itself to the amplification and adaptation of social and economic techniques that seem to have proved their usefulness, without aspiring to a voluntarist "big push" toward the Good Society.

Universalist vs. *particularist* approaches. The former position supposes that development must mean approximately the same thing for all national societies, whatever that meaning may be: all societies must become predominantly industrialized, urban and market-oriented; or all societies must become democratically egalitarian;

or all societies must become collectivist and frugal in their life styles and use of resources. Universalism often combines with catastrophist all-or-nothing positions: unless mankind as a whole rapidly achieves certain objectives of productive capacity, technological restraint, social justice, disarmament, freedom, consumption austerity, or population limitation, mankind as a whole, or the "world", or "civilization" is doomed.

The variants of the particularist position suppose that national societies, or whatever forms of social organization replace them, will continue to develop along many different lines, some more "acceptable" for their values and some more "viable" for their internal coherence and efficiency than others. This inevitable diversity has its dangers, particularly of conflicts between national societies and exploitation of the weak by the strong, but also its advantages: the homogenization of mankind is neither possible nor desirable; the wider the range of styles of development, the greater the likelihood that a positive cross-fertilization will take place in the future.

The particularist as well as the universalist position can, of course, combine with a technocratic or a participationist bias, with a belief in iron laws of development or in voluntarism.

4. The changing international market for propositions on development during and since the unified approach project

The unified approach project, it has already been stated, was one manifestation, and a relatively modest one, of the divergence in interpretations of development and the multiplication of attributes of development that had gained momentum during the 1960s and that was to become more pronounced and complex at the beginning of the 1970s. "Development" must stand for something worth striving for, and the idea of increasing productive capacity, particularly industrial capacity, through capital accumulation, investment and technological innovation was still at the core of this something at the beginning of the 1970s.

Experience was making it harder to believe, however, that growth in production by itself, whether guided by the market or by central planning, would bring about equitably distributed gains in human welfare, or that sufficient growth to permit accomplishment of this end was within the reach of the poorer countries without major changes in their internal policies and their place in the world system. Advocates of a very wide range of objectives and policies were arguing that their concerns constituted essential attributes of authentic development, and also that achievement of other development objectives required priority to their concerns.

The unified approach project was instructed in its terms of reference to find out how to unify what was unifiable in these different positions from the standpoint of one of them: the composite of human welfare objectives and social secto-

ral programmes that had come to be labelled "social development". Before it could accomplish this, however, the range of positions to be unified had widened considerably. As noted above, the 1970s saw, instead of progress toward consensus on a "unified approach", a continual diversification of interpretations of development, continually more ambitious international declarations aspiring to reconcile them, and also a mounting criticism of "development", from several quite different viewpoints, as an outworn and misleading myth.

For the present, it will be enough to summarize certain features of the changing international market for propositions on development inside and outside the intergovernmental organizations. Within these organizations the main framework for debate was the Second Development Decade, to be governed by an International Development Strategy approved by the United Nations General Assembly in October 1970.

The Strategy juxtaposed two main kinds of propositions, the former clinging to the expectations of the first Development Decade, the latter responding to the criticisms of its focus on economic growth. During the Decade new propositions superseded both kinds:

(i) On international economic relations and on the duty of the richer countries to aid the development of the rest of the world through allocation of a minimum percentage of their national income and through fairer trade policies. The Strategy presented propositions of this kind in considerable detail but in compromise formulations that emerged from bargaining between representatives of governments that wanted binding commitments and representatives of governments that wanted to ward off such commitments without a flat rejection. As the decade progressed the struggle for and against commitments was repeated in forum after forum.

By 1974, the compromises reached in the Strategy were obviously inoperative and the Third World governments turned their attention to a Declaration and "Programme of Action" toward a New International Economic Order, for which most of the First World governments, now constituting a small minority in the United Nations, assumed no concrete responsibility.

(ii) On the content of development at the national level. By the mid-1970s, a series of detailed proposals for development approaches focussing on "redistribution with growth", elimination of extreme poverty and priority to satisfaction of basic needs, emanating mainly from the World Bank and the International Labour Organization, were disputing the world stage with the New International Economic Order (NIEO), replacing the innocuous juxtaposition of economie and social objectives by a new version of the old controversy over priorities.

The "basic needs" and related approaches treated policies for production, technological innovation, distribution and employment as central but subordinated their content to immediate human welfare ends. A good many proponents of the NIEO interpreted this as a tactic of the central capitalist countries, intended to justify inattention to trade and aid demands and restriction of the Third World to a

second-rate semi-development through labour-intensive technologies. In fact, the new approaches had several variants, some of them envisaging modest reallocations of resources to the poor and gains through aided self-help, others calling for the transformation of structures of production and distribution and an end to affluence for minorities.

Nongovernmental institutions were able to carry these ideas farther toward the construction of coherent alternatives for the human future, the most ambitious of these attempts being the proposal of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation for "another development", published in 1975.

An equally striking feature of the international treatment of development during the 1970s, however, was the successive bringing into the foreground of a series of "major problems" treated with what became a stereotyped ritual: population, the human environment, the status of women, habitat, employment and hunger were all taken up in this way.

The United Nations General Assembly might proclaim an International Year to recognize the importance of the problem. A world conference, preceded by regional conferences and meetings of "experts", would approve a Plan of Action, and more regional conferences and specialized meetings would discuss application of the Plan of Action. A temporary or permanent international secretariat would come into being and a fund to finance practical measures would be set up.

Recognition of the problem would go through several phases. Simple cause-and-effect interpretations and direct remedies would be intensively publicized and then subjected to criticism from many directions. Representatives of the Third World would indicate their suspicions of the First World origins of initial interpretations of the problem and their disposition to recognize the need for action only to the extent that this would not divert attention from economic development and from the duty of the rich countries to help such development. In any case, it could be demonstrated that the problem was complexly related to all other major problems; it could be solved only in the context of development. Thus, all roads led back to the unified approach.

But who was to do the unifying? Conceivably, any of the major problems might provide the starting point toward a comprehensive conception and strategy of development, around which the other problems and desiderata might be grouped, but they could not all occupy the centre at once. The gap between the capacity of governments and other human institutions in the real world to diagnose, choose and set priorities, and the demand that they advance toward multiple objectives in a unified way, was wide enough already, and each "major problem" threatened to widen it further. At the same time, it could be argued that, overwhelmed as they were, governments would not act on the major problems unless these were brought to their attention insistently, backed by organized popular pressures and warnings as to the indispensability of quick solutions to ward off catastrophe.

Outside Challenges

Meanwhile, outside the international bureaucratic and academic circles of obligatory faith in the benevolence and rationality of governments, several kinds of challenge to the whole structure of international development strategies, new international economic orders and plans of action, became more insistent. Each of these challenges included variants ranging from wholesale negation to qualified criticisms of the conventional wisdom:

(i) "Economic Development" was reduced to the status of a mobilizing myth even by some economists prominent in development policy-making, most eloquently by Celso Furtado: "Myths function as lamps that illuminate the field of perception of the social scientist, allowing him to have a clear vision of certain problems and to see nothing of others at the same time as they give him spiritual tranquility, since the value judgements that he makes appear to his spirit as a reflection of objective reality.

"Today we know irrefutably that the economies of the periphery will never be developed in the sense of becoming similar to the economies that form the present centre of the capitalist system. But how can one deny that this idea has been very useful, to mobilize the peoples of the periphery and induce them to accept enormous sacrifices, to legitimate the destruction of archaic forms of culture, to explain and make them understand the necessity of destroying their physical environment, to justify forms of dependency that reinforce the predatory character of the productive system? "

"It can thus be affirmed that the idea of economic development is simply a myth. Thanks to this it has been possible to divert attention from the basic tasks of identifying the fundamental needs of the collectivity and the possibilities that the progress of science opens to humanity, so as to concentrate attention on abstract objectives such as investment, exports and growth."[9]

Such a challenge knocked one leg out from under the declarations of meeting after meeting that wedded the "abstract objectives" of economic development to basic needs or major problems.

(ii) Faith in the market as arbiter of developmental choices, in the inexhaustibility of natural resources, and in the ability of human ingenuity (spurred by market incentives) to solve problems as they arose, persisted and became more aggressive during the 1970s as the shortcomings of governmental and intergovernmental interventionism became more glaring. According to the proponents of variants of this position, from Daniel Moynihan to Herman Kahn and Milton Friedman, the main danger for the human future lay in the zeal to bind it by regulations and

[9] Celso Furtado, *El Desarrollo Económico: Un Mito* (Siglo Veintiuno Editores, Mexico, D. F., 1975). (Author's translation).

the main stumbling block in the way of the development of poor countries lay in their hankering after welfare state policies and socialist planning.

The dominant forces in a good many Third World countries had clung to such views even during the years of rising prestige for planning and "social development" measures. During the 1970s the influence of neo-liberalism on government policies became more open and even doctrinaire, particularly in certain "semi-developed" countries of Latin America and Southeast Asia.

(iii) The penetration of transnational enterprises in the economies of the Third World, the emergence of "transnational elites" identified with these enterprises, and the mutation of national cultures and consumption patterns brought about by transnationally-manipulated mass communication media and advertising made the vision of autonomous and self-sustaining national development seem obsolescent. The relevant development strategies for the future might be those of the transnationals rather than those of the governments.

(iv) Two kinds of challenges emerged from alarm over the prospects for resource exhaustion, environmental contamination, potential destructiveness of new technologies, and over-population. The more direct challenge denied the possibility or desirability of anything identifiable with previous conceptions of development. Some variants of this position derived from it conclusions on the duty of the rich national societies to limit their consumption and assist the poorer countries in an equitable transition to "zero population growth" and "zero economic growth", thus approximating to one of the approaches to a unified approach described above.

Other variants concluded that the rich societies should set their own houses in order and help other societies only if the latter showed promise of viability. Still others concluded that the momentum of current trends and the limited capacity for foresight and rational action made the avoidance of catastrophe unlikely either for humanity as a whole or for the better-off societies.

Variants on the other challenge emerging from this diagnosis admitted the possibility of solutions to the resource, environmental and population problems, but insisted that these solutions would have to be comprehensive and "counterintuitive". Piecemeal "practical" responses to problems as they arose would only make matters worse through their impact on other systemically related areas. One variant then questioned the capacity of human institutions to devise and manage such comprehensive solutions; another reasoned that solutions guaranteeing human survival would require a high degree of regimentation and suppression of dissent.

(v) Diagnoses of the inherently exploitative character of the international capitalist order and of the structures of class and power in national states led to many variants of the conclusion that both must be destroyed as a precondition for the Good Society. These positions, through their links with the dominant forces in certain Third World countries, with organized terrorist movements, and with international political struggles, on the one hand, and with participationist and "another

development" visions, on the other, had complex and ambiguous relationships to the international discussions of prescriptions for development, but logically negated their relevance. The dominant forces in the central capitalist countries could not be committed to end their exploitation of the rest of the world, even if the governments they controlled entered into agreements to do so. The most that could be expected was an unacceptable "renegotiation of the terms of dependence", benefitting only the exploiting minorities in the dependent countries.

They only solution for the latter, once their own people gained control of them, would be to cut all economic and political ties, accept the consequences, and liquidate the minorities identified, through their economic roles and their consumption patterns, with the previous ties of dependency. Relations could then be reopened selectively, and mainly with national societies having similar genuinely revolutionary regimes.

The same revolutionary positions denied that existing national governments, whatever the intentions of individuals within them, had any ability to achieve an acceptable social and economic order. Even those labelling themselves "socialist" were really "bureaucratic capitalist". The weakness of their political leaders and bureaucracies in the face of the international order and the transnational enterprises, their inability to identify themselves with the people, and their consumerist aspirations ruled them out. A profound and creatively destructive uprising of the masses was called for; and the will of these masses rather than international prescriptions would govern the longer-term future.

5. The place of the unified approach project in the international rethinking of development

The term "unified approach to development" retained a certain currency in international circles during the 1970s, and a good many of the ideas put forward under this label in meetings or by development advisers can be traced to the project here discussed. Variants of these ideas, however, would have circulated in any case. The main feature that distinguished the partial consensus reached in the project has barely received a hearing.

The Preliminary Report, as has already been stated, did not pretend to offer either an original theory of development or a comprehensive set of practical prescriptions. Despite some internal inconsistencies, it tried to propose a flexible way of thinking about development, of confronting its minimum criterion of acceptability and viability with national situations and an international order in which nothing could be taken for granted, in which planning and formulation of norms tended to become ritual activities compensating for inability to influence real trends within the constraints under which social agents, inside and outside national governments, acted.

A study under intergovernmental auspices could not honestly do much more than say: if your society has such-and-such characteristics and the institutions or groups you represent want to achieve such-and-such objectives, you should take into account certain factors, and you may find certain methods more helpful than others.

The Commission for Social Development and the Economic and Social Council, to which the Preliminary Report was presented, naturally wanted more than this, and requested that a final report "be prepared in such a way as to be of the greatest possible practical use to planners, decision-makers, and administrators". Since the project team had already dispersed and its budget was exhausted, preparation of a final report on the scale originally envisaged was no longer practicable.

UNRISD responded to the request with a brief "final report" submitted to the 1975 session of the Commission for Social Development. This report spelled out in more detail some of the proposals on development analysis and planning contained in the Preliminary Report and introduced the idea of "capacitation".

The United Nations policy-making bodies did not allow this answer to be final. They next requested the Secretary-General to "prepare a report on the application by Governments of a unified approach to development analysis and planning", and also to prepare proposals for "pilot projects" demonstrating the practical application of a unified approach.

These requests, in fact, juxtaposed two very different visions of the unified approach that were advanced by representatives of different governments. The first derived from the thesis that "far-reaching structural changes" within national societies were the essential precondition for a unified approach. Certain governments felt they possessed the correct specifications for such changes; while they could not expect to obtain inter-governmental consensus on them, they could use the unified approach to keep them in the forefront of attention and demonstrate their own achievements.

The second derived from the conception of the unified approach as mainly a question of integrating social and economic programmes, and also from a supposition going back to the beginning of United Nations social activities that the concentration of advanced methods and integrated services on a local population would provide lessons and achievements that could then be duplicated on a wider scale. The unified approach project had harboured hopes of this kind, particularly in relation to the importance of localized information, but its main emphasis had been on the national level. A unified approach focussing on pilot projects might be expected to appeal to governments that had no intention of sponsoring far-reaching structural changes and preferred to direct attention to the potential of modest but better-administered incremental changes.

By this time, while UNRISD continued to struggle to bring the research aspect of the unified approach to a coherent conclusion, the responsibility for acting on the new request had fallen mainly to the UN Secretariat's Centre for Development

Planning, Projections and Policies, an economically-oriented body that in the past had been decidedly cool toward the unified approach. Since the Secretariat was not in a position to decide which governments, if any, were applying a unified approach, however defined, or to evaluate their efforts, it fell back on its traditional method of dealing with controversial mandates. It circulated a request for information to governments, sorted out the 20 countries that responded into "countries with centrally planned economies", "countries with developed market economies" and "countries with developing market economies", and summarized the information they provided, mainly on their planning systems. The conclusion offered was that "while many countries have introduced an integrated or unified approach to development planning, clearly there is no unique approach that can be considered applicable to all countries".[10]

The Secretariat also prepared proposals for pilot projects, but in spite of their cautious formulation these encountered resistance in the Economic and Social Council: "Several representatives expressed the view that the projects on the unified approach must take fully into consideration the imperatives of the sovereignty of Member States. They emphasized that full account must first be taken of the development goals set by each country for itself. Since each country had its own conception of the appropriate economic, social and political systems, development plans and policy measures adopted by Governments could be formulated and implemented only in the context of the actual conditions prevailing in individual countries. A project on integrated development planning should therefore neither seek a universal applicability of its findings nor be used to monitor and pass judgement, based on a single set of criteria, on the development objectives and performance of developing countries."[11]

ECOSOC requested reformulation of the proposals, but by this time the unified approach as a distinct line of inquiry had reached an impasse. Moreover, its consideration in the UN policy-making bodies was being submerged in that of several other kinds of normative approach. These were, first, the reformulations of international development policy, in particular the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, and the 1975 General Assembly Resolution on "Development and International Economic Co-operation"; second, the various crusades for attention to "major problems"; and, third, the proposals emanating from the International Labour Organization and the World Bank for development policies focussed on satisfaction of basic needs or elimination of extreme poverty. These last approaches were sometimes identified with the unified approach, and had, in fact, inherited some of the project's central propositions on policy choices.

[10] Application by Governments of a Unified Approach to Development Analysis and Planning, Report of the Secretary-General, (E/CN.540, 22 September 1976).

[11] *Projects on the Practical Application of a Unified Approach to Development Analysis and Planning, Report of the Secretary-General* (E/5974, 4 May, 1977).

The reformulated pilot project proposals of the Secretariat were limited to studies of changing priorities revealed by the national plans of developing countries, studies of national experiences in the implementation of plans, and training for officials of developing countries on the "main aspects of integrated development planning". The skeptical and radically revisionist attitude toward plans and planning that been prominent in the unified approach project seemed to have faded away.

Reciprocal Influence

The unified approach project exerted some influence in the regional commissions of the United Nations and was influenced by currents of thinking already present in them.

In Latin America, a region that was beginning to be labelled "semi-developed", questions of viable choices between styles of development and the relation of such choices to ideologies and to the distribution of political power were in the forefront of attention. Did capitalist "development" or modernization of peripheral countries such as those of Latin America unavoidably generate increasing dependence on the world centres, increasing inequalities in the distribution of consumption and wealth, increasing insecurity and relative if not absolute poverty for large parts of the population, and increasing repression of protests? How could the evident gains in productive capacity, economic and social infrastructure, qualifications of the labour force, and governmental administrative resources be converted into gains in human welfare and who would be the societal agents of such a conversion?

The experience of different countries of the region suggested that policies concentrated on rapid economic growth through governmental stimulation of market forces, or on structural transformation and social equality, could be successful on their own terms, at differing high costs, and if backed by sufficient power, but that the prospects for policies trying to reconcile multiple objectives of growth and welfare under conditions of open political competition were rather poor. Styles of development meeting the minimum criterion of the unified approach seemed to call for a transformation of values and expectations as well as power structures, but the circumstances of semi-development, in particular the penetration of transnational enterprises and the consumption aspirations of the "modern" sectors of the population, made the way to such a transformation hard to envisage.

The Economic Commission for Latin America had posed problems of this kind in several studies,[12] and contributed to the project the approach labelled above

[12] See, in particular, Raúl Prebisch, *Towards a Dynamic Development Policy for Latin America* (United Nations, New York, 1963), *Transformation and Development: The Great Task of Latin America* (Report presented to the Inter-American Development Bank by Raúl Prebisch, 1970) and *Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin America* (United Nations, New York, 1970).

"analysis of political choices". The ideas generated in the project in turn influenced further studies and polemics in the ECLA Secretariat on styles of development.[13]

Moreover, the ideas entered into a series of normative declarations approved by ECLA member governments at ECLA's 1973, 1975, 1977 and 1979 sessions, within the context of their periodic appraisals of progress under the Second Development Decade.[14] The propositions on "integrated development" in these declarations, while actively supported by a minority of governments, show a surprising degree of acquiescence by the majority in what amounted to a condemnation of what was visibly happening in the name of development.

Finally, an exhaustive study of development theories and their application in Latin America carried out by the Planning Institute associated with ECLA dismissed the unified approach and the intergovernmental normative declarations associated with it in the following terms:

"The unified approach is not only the clear expression of a technocratic utopia but also, in spite of its name, it is a utopia made by aggregation of objectives, whose validity by themselves hardly anyone can deny, accompanied by continual reserves to the effect that the particular situation can legitimate their not being achieved and even their being set aside for an indeterminate and interminable future. A unified approach to development worthy of the name supposes a unified social science, which does not exist at present and which could only be constructed on certain philosophical postulates, derived from a general theory, which in turn could not count on general support for a long time to come. At the same time, an international declaration of objectives can be possible only through evading philosophical-political differences, so that the only possible base of a unified approach, a common philosophy, is ruled out from the beginning. When such a declaration purports to be a unified approach, the only way to do it that is apparently legitimate is through the aggregation of objectives."[15]

In the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) the unified approach was seen mainly as a new attempt to tackle the previous concerns of the ESCAP committee on social development: better integration of government social and economic programmes, higher priority to the "social", and more adequate statistical indicators for the social objectives of development. However, the increasingly ominous incapacity of urban-industrially biased economic growth and social programmes to cope with mass poverty in mainly rural populations, together with the presence of China as a demonstration of the possibility of a radically

[13] See, in particular, the papers by Raúl Prebisch, Anibal Pinto, Jorge Graciarena and Marshall Wolfe in *CEPAL Review*, 1, First Semester 1976.

[14] Regional Appraisals of the International Development Strategy: Cuito, 1973; Chaguaramas, 1975; Guatemala, 1977.

[15] Aldo E. Solari, Rolando Franco, Joel Jutkowitz, *Teoría, Acción Social y Desarrollo en América Latina* (Textos del ILPES, Siglo Veintiuno Editores S. A., México, D. F. 1976).

different style, brought about an openness, in ESCAP papers and in advisory missions, to the participationist self-reliant approach described above, in a variant deriving directly from the later stages of the unified approach project.[16]

In Africa, the unified approach entered into discussion mainly through a joint Economic Commission for Africa/UNRISD study presented to the Sixth Session of the Conference of African Planners in October 1976,[17] and through visits of ECA/UNRISD teams to seven African countries. The study analyzed all available African development plans currently in force in order to "determine the degree to which the plan documents represent a systematic attempt to deal with the problem of uneven development, insofar as this could be ascertained from the range and specification of plan objectives, from the type of planning information and procedures used, and from planned policies and projects relating to the provision of essential services, the composition of production, research and technology, institutional change, and external economic relations".[18] The visits to countries similarly concentrated on planning objectives and techniques.

The study and visits found, not unexpectedly, a certain correspondence between the objectives stated in the preambles to plans and the human-welfare-oriented terms of reference of the unified approach project, but also very nebulous relationships between these objectives and the projects and techniques contained in the body of the plans. "Several reasons were given to explain these divergences – lack of manpower and finance, inadequate political commitment, unavailability of relevant data, deliberate distortions by executing agencies. Another argument sometimes given was that projects on behalf of the 'little man' are extremely difficult to organize and manage, while big projects involving intensive capital investment can be set up and run much more effectively."[19]

The African study thus started by accepting provisionally the plans as valid expressions of national policy and the planners – the main interlocutors of the study team – as key social agents. By pointing to gaps and shortcomings the study then tried to suggest modest and incremental improvements rather than radically different styles and strategies. How could planners make better diagnoses, and influence policy more effectively toward human welfare objectives under conditions of rudimentary information, political instability, and very limited resources susceptible to allocation by the state? At the same time, the United Nations African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP) was diagnosing

[16] See Joost B.W. Kuitenbrouwer, *op. cit.*, and also reports of advisory missions to Indonesia, the Philippines, Pakistan and Papua New Guinea, ESCAP, Bangkok. Some of these reports have been published in modified form by the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.

[17] *Application of a Unified Approach to Development Analysis and Planning under African Conditions* (E/CN.14/CAP.6/4).

[18] *Report on Recent Progress and Current Status of Work on the Unified Approach and Related Projects* (UNRISD Internal paper, 1977), page 3.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

the existing styles of development of the African countries as neither acceptable nor viable and proposing variants of the self-reliant participationist approach; however, the contacts between this line of thinking within Africa and the unified approach project were slight.

The terms of reference of the unified approach project had focussed on the needs of the "developing" or "poor" countries. Its potential relevance to the countries that defined themselves as "developed" was never clearly specified. According to some of the approaches that entered into the project these countries figured mainly as sources of aid and of useful lessons for the "developing" countries; since they were "developed" it could be assumed that they already had a unified approach or did not need one.

According to other approaches to a unified approach, the "developed" countries were part of the problem, not part of the solution. Their people needed transformations in their style of development just as much as did the rest of the world, and might find such transformations even harder to achieve, in view of their material and psychological investments in existing patterns of production and consumption.

The contacts of the project with the Economic Commission for Europe, however, hardly touched on such questions. The facet of the unified approach of most interest here was that of informational enlightenment: the devising of development indicators and "social accounting" to supplement the partially discredited GNP and national accounts, in national situations in which statistics were abundant, relatively reliable, and capable of providing answers to new questions, presumably including the question of the relation between economic growth and human welfare.

6. The dilemmas of international policy-oriented research and lessons for the future

The preceding pages have focussed on a few manifestations of the international aspiration to shape the future that, over the past three decades, has generated hundreds of meetings and hundreds of thousands of pages of documentation. On the margins of the ceaseless activity generated by the cycles of meetings of the international agencies one finds an even more diverse and complex ferment of theorizing, empirical research, polemics, and ideological proselytizing whose practitioners interact with and contribute to the international normative-prescriptive efforts but scorn their ritualism, utopianism, evasiveness and lack of scientific rigour.

If the project did not manage to prescribe *a* "unified approach to development analysis and planning", and in fact concluded that this, taken literally, was not a meaningful objective, it did make more explicit than heretofore certain dilemmas that any international policy-oriented research project would have to face. It also

suggested that such dilemmas could not be avoided within the context of such a project. If policy-oriented research were to make any contribution to human welfare it would have to recognize a permanent tension and ambiguity in the demands made on it, and maintain a critical attitude toward its own terms of reference and the suppositions underlying them.

A mandate to reconcile the irreconcilable has at least the virtue of reproducing conditions somewhat similar to those of policy making in real national societies. The most likely outcome may be evasion, but this is not the only possible outcome. Presumably such an outcome can be guarded against by bringing contradictions out into the open and incorporating them into the hypotheses of the research, a course that should present fewer drawbacks and dangers for a team pursuing policy questions at the international level than for advisers to national political regimes.

What are the dilemmas and tensions that international policy-oriented research must learn to live with?

First, there is the tension between the ideal of explicit definition of basic concepts, hypotheses and value premises and the pressures toward a combined eclecticism and "consensualism" that the heterogeneity of the situations confronted seems to legitimate. It cannot be accidental that the interminable discussions of development have left intact the confusion between development conceived as empirically observable processes of change and growth within social systems and development as progress toward the observer's version of the Good Society. In the first sense development can be evaluated positively or negatively or judged inherently ambiguous in its implications for the human future. In the second sense development is by definition desirable.

Nor have the discussions overcome the confusion between development conceived as a process subject to uniform laws and development conceived as a wide range of possible real patterns and possible aspirations. Can the term "development" in the last analysis be anything more than a symbolic stamp of approval for changes that the user of the term considers unavoidable or desirable?

The unified approach project tried to delimit what was to be approached through the legitimation of different styles of development responding to a minimum criterion of acceptability and viability but this left room for argument that practically any combination of policies that any regime cared to defend would eventually meet the criterion.

International policy-oriented research will have to continue to struggle to define development along with other concepts more clearly in terms of its own needs, but in full awareness that no definition will satisfy all users or prevent overloading of the term as an expression at the same time of the real and of the desirable.

Second, there is the related tension between the ideal of arriving at a comprehensive and coherent theory explaining the phenomena the research confronts and aspires to change, and the pressures toward incongruous marriages of the pragmatic and the universal. Theories of development and social change have proliferated in

recent years, but the explanatory power and prestige of all of them has waned. The unified approach project was able neither to make a reasoned choice among the theories already current nor to construct an original theory. It confronted, in addition to the obvious hindrances of inadequate time and disciplinary and other divergences in the team, an inhibiting prejudice against theorizing in the institutional sponsors of the project.

Theoretical argument is divisive; also, according to oft-repeated views in UN policy-making bodies, it is a luxury that cannot be afforded in view of the urgency of the problems demanding solution. Theoretical explanations are already available or can be dispensed with. The recurrent superficiality or evasiveness of the generalizations in UN documents, seeking to stay within the limits of the permissible, confirms this evaluation. The policy-making bodies thus call for the "concrete" and the "practical", but with the proviso, implicit or explicit, that the concrete and practical prescriptions must refrain from judging specific national situations and policies. Thus the compilers of reports must aim at prescriptions that appear concrete but are general enough to be applicable by any government that chooses to listen.

The result has been a long series of secretariat responses to demands for "practical" solutions to urgent problems that were forgotten as soon as presented. This was true of the "practical application" proposals deriving from the unified approach project. However, as was noted above, the project resisted advancing very far along this path.

The well-worn retort that nothing is more practical than a good theory comes to mind, but does not take one far toward resolution of the tension. Probably international policy-oriented research will continue to be more a consumer than a producer of theories, and will have to open itself to the possible validity, under defined conditions, of a wide range of theoretical challenges to the relevance of the "practical".

Third, there is the tension between the ideal of searching criticism of the conventional wisdom on development and the insertion of the research into a complicated array of institutions and expectations deriving from this wisdom. Policy-oriented research is expected to come up with something new and to criticize the old. There would be no occasion for it if its sponsors thought that existing diagnoses and policies were satisfactory.

Criticism must thus apply itself to a contradictory mixture of conventional suppositions, particularly on the role of the state, of sweeping, and apparently radical "new" objectives – popular participation, elimination of poverty, satisfaction of basic needs, etc. – and of terminological innovations giving an air of novelty to policies that have long been current. The "unified approach" itself began mainly as a terminological innovation for a desideratum previously labelled "balanced social and economic development".

The most useful corrective will probably be the cultivation of historical awareness. The history of development as a mobilizing myth is short, but long enough for the observation that those who forget history are condemned to repeat it to have become very pertinent.

The quest for a unified approach to development in terms of norms and prescriptions has been carried as far as it profitably can be, if not farther. The most hopeful direction for the next stages of policy-oriented research lies at levels between the comprehensive theoretical or ideological explanations for societal change, and the local manifestations of change and policies designed to influence change. Comparative studies with a historical perspective focussed on the ways in which different social agents of change perceive their roles and act, and the confrontation between their perceptions and the specific settings on which they are trying to act, are still few.

Presumably, research in this direction will leave something intact in the aspiration for rationally planned action to bring social change and economic growth into closer correspondence with certain generally accepted values of human welfare, equity, and freedom. In all probability, however, it will replace the image of the state as a rational, coherent, and benevolent entity, capable of choosing and entitled to choose a style of development, so powerful but so unimaginative that it seeks generalized advice and then acts on it, by a more realistic frame of reference for policy-oriented interpretation of what the state does or evades doing, why, and how.

CHAPTER THREE

Development Images, Agents and Choices

1. Images of development

During more than a quarter century the political leaders of most of the human race have endorsed "development" as a central theme of public policy and have affirmed that all peoples have a right as well as a capacity to "develop". Theorists and practitioners from the most diverse backgrounds have explored the bases and implications of this position and it has been popularized through many channels. Thousands of specialists have come to derive their livelihood from "development"

This prolonged preoccupation with development has not brought the world closer to a definitive consensus as to what development is and how it is to be attained, and it is striking that different conceptions and approaches continue to coexist and interpenetrate each other, unaffected by demonstrations, in an extensive critical and polemical literature, of their mutual incompatability or their incongruity with experience.

Hardly any of the ideas about development current 25 years ago have been definitively discredited, to judge from their recurrence in policy declarations, but quite different ideas have emerged alongside them, many of the latter deriving from interpretations of societal change current long before the term "development" came to the fore.

The circumstances in which the international discussion of development is carried on make for eclecticism, receptivity to superficial novelties, evasion of clear choices and forgetfulness towards past experience. In fact, the discussion consists in large part of ritual affirmations or of a dialogue of the deaf.

Several radically different conceptions of and approaches to development can be deduced from the discussion. The differences centre on the following questions:

(a) images of the international order and its role in national development;

(b) images of existing national societal structures and power relationships;

(c) value-based images of the future society expected to emerge from the development process;

(d) nature of the agents relied on to direct or impel development;

(e) choices open to the agents in trying to move from the unsatisfactory present to the preferred future.

Logically, the conceptions and approaches adopted in relation to the latter questions should derive from those adopted in relation to the former. In practice, the correspondence may not be very close.

The first question suggests three alternative images of international "developmental" relationships: as a procession, as a living pyramid, and as a race towards a bottomless pit, a trap.

(i) Development as a Procession

The first image has informed the activities of the international machinery of bureaucratic and research bodies; professional advisers and promoters; reports, resolutions and recommendations dedicated to the proposition that Governments are rational, benevolent and coherent entities, anxious to advance towards "development", "modernization", and "social justice" if only they are told how; and that somewhere there is a One Right Path that can be pointed out to them.

If the guidebooks turned out by the international machinery do not seem to have brought them to this Path as yet, some essential instruction must have been missing. Developmental guidebooks thus become continually more complicated and "comprehensive". "Planning" comes to be reified as a mystical entity that will solve all problems once rightly conceived: "planning must pay greater attention to . . ."; planning must be comprehensive . . .", "planning establishes . . ., permits . . ., provides . . .", as the formulae in international reports have it.

The supposition of actual or potential Governmental rationality and benevolence links the high-income to the low-income countries in the quest for development. If the former have not yet done enough to uplift the latter, they will do so as soon as it is convincingly demonstrated that this is their duty as well as their interest.

The conception of development is lineal. It is summed up in the slogan of "closing the gap". One can imagine a straggling procession of countries. The leaders are forging ahead confidently and comfortably, already within the frontiers of the Promised Land. A few countries in the middle are marching rapidly, trying to subdue fatigue and ignore hunger and sore feet, seeing the gap between themselves and the leaders beginning to narrow. A larger number of countries, smaller and weaker, are falling ever farther behind the leaders, while sending frantic messages up the line – "Do your duty: help us to march faster!" Some of them are screaming and tearing their own flesh in frustration; a few have stopped in despairing apathy.

The guidebooks are commonly critical of some of the steps taken by the leaders in the past; the "human cost" was unneccessarily high. They suggest shortcuts based on this experience, but in the main they assume not only that the direction

taken by the leaders was the right one for their own interests, but also that it is desirable as well as attainable for the followers.

(ii) Development as a Living Pyramid

The second image is suggested by the views of many sociologists and political scientist and some economists who reject or disregard the demands for universally applicable development guidebooks and question the capacity of most national Governments, and of the international order itself, to generate processes justifying the hopes that have been invested in the term "development".

From this point of view, the developmental processes followed by the present high-income countries in the past are not open to the rest of the world today, except possibly in a few very special cases. In fact, the high-income countries have been able to "develop" largely through their ability to exploit and dominate the others and, under changing guises, this remains true today. As long as their present economic and political structures persist, they are inherently incapable of helping the others to "catch up". The models they offer lure the rest of the world into an impasse, sapping national capacity to make the decisions needed for authentic and autonomous development.

The world system is thus represented by a living pyramid rather than a procession: the countries on top are able to rise higher and higher because they rest on the shoulders of those under them. Since the pyramid is a living structure, it is continually in movement, with the units at the bottom trying to scramble up or to escape altogether, and with the units at the top trying to bind them in place by continually changing combinations of force and fraud, threats and inducements. The units at the top cling to each other for support, but at the same time try to raise themselves on each other's shoulders.

From time to time, a great convulsion shakes the whole pyramid, as the competition at the top turns violent and the opportunities below for climbing or escape are enchanced. "Development", for the units now near the bottom, presupposes destruction of the whole pyramidal structure and its replacement by equalitarian and co-operative relationships between units.

This pyramidal image of the international system usually accompanies a similar image of power structures within the units. The conclusion may or may not be drawn that the consumption and production patterns of the countries now at the top of the pyramid are unattainable or undersirable for the remainder; in any case, a greater emphasis on public control of production, collective forms of consumption, and equitable distribution of goods and services are expected following transformation of the international and national pyramidal structures.

(iii) Development as a trap

A third image rapidly rising into prominence negates basic premises shared by the first two concerning the feasibility and desirability of long-term expansion of production and consumption and the unlimited problem-solving capacity of technological innovation. Natural resources are finite; the tampering with the environment inseparable from any long-continued effort to raise production and consumption levels for an ever-increasing world population points to ecological disaster; the expectation that the low-income societies of the world will ever command sufficient resources and productive capacity to reach the present levels of material welfare of the high income societies is absurd; the latter societies will perish and drag the rest of humanity with them if they do not transform their own expectations and ways of life.

This image, first put forward by demographers and ecologists, is entering into informed public opinion with remarkable speed, aided by the increasing promimence of unwanted by-products of economic growth and population growth. Elsewhere, particularly in the public opinion of the societies striving hardest to "close the gap" or scramble up the pyramid, it is naturally met with intense frustration and rejection.

Under this diagnosis, the procession is headed not towards the Promised Land but towards a bottomless pit. The pyramidal struggle is taking place on quicksand, in which all the contestants will be engulfed, the more quickly the harder they struggle to climb. The only hope lies in halting the procession or the struggle, setting entirely different priorities for human endeavour, attaining zero population growth, husbanding resources, subordinating production and consumption to preservation of an ecological balance that will be viable over the long term.

Some questions for would-be agents of development

Each of these three images sums up a wide range of currents of opinion, many of them on far from friendly terms with one another.

The first camp ranges from devout believers in econometric planning and maximization of productive investment, to prophets and promoters of "human resource development", "community development", "achievement motivation", etc. The lowest common denominator is faith in the potential rationality and benevolence of national Governments and the international order.

The second camp ranges from several schools of revolutionary Marxists, who look to simultaneous transformation of the international order and of national control over the means of production as prerequisites for equitable worldwide development, to "realists" preoccupied with national or class possibilities for survival, manoeuvre, and enhancement of bargaining power within structures of domination and dependency that are viewed as inherently and permanently cramping and ineq-

uitable. The lowest common denominator is concern with questions of power and with the identification of social forces capable of directing "development".

The third camp ranges from believers that happier and more creative human societies can and will emerge from a transformation of existing values, to prophets of unavoidable doom for the whole human race. The lowest common denominator is rejection of the viability and desirability of indefinitely continuing increases in population and production.

The first camp is still predominant in international discourse, but with many signs of declining self-confidence and of increasing contamination by preoccupations emanating from the second and third camps. The eclecticism and anxiety to satisfy all intersts capable of making themselves heard in international meetings characteristic of this camp make it vulnerable to such contamination.

Governments are increasingly urged to do different things and do them better than in the past. Official spokesmen denounce corruption, bureaucratism, inequitable distribution and external dependency, and vow that their respective Governments will mend their ways. Statements on the need to confront national and international power realities, to seek support on the basis of the interests of determined classes in determined development policies appear even in the preambles to economic development plans.

However grudgingly, the indispensability of population limitation and resource conservation, the dangers and futilities of production for the sake of production, begin to receive explicit official recognition.

There are obvious limits to the capacity of inter-governmental organizations or national Governments to work out logically and objectively the implications of the many variants of the three images and choose accordingly a coherent policy framework.

It is hard enough for individual specialists in development studies, with their status dependent on the reality of something identifiable as "development" concerning which Governments can usefully be advised, and susceptible to policy-oriented research, to do so. It is even harder for political leaders and administrators.

If the State, as now constituted in the rich countries and the poor, is inherently incapable of furthering the "development" of the latter through rational, benevolent, plannable action, or if what has hitherto been considered "development" is leading to disaster, what then? What function is left to the development theorist and adviser? If he is to give advice, to whom should it be directed? Can he hope to formulate conceptions of development or criteria for development that will correspond to real, feasible, desirable change processes; that will be susceptible to rational public intervention on behalf of human welfare; and that will be intelligible, at least as a basis for discussion of alternative lines of action, to persons whose outlook is coloured by one or other of the three images?

2. Conceptions, values, criteria for styles of development

In the earlier years of international preoccupation with "development" its proponents almost universally took for granted, with many differing shades of emphasis and readiness to admit the relevance of other factors, that its central element consisted in the raising of production *per capita,* mainly through industrialization, and that this called for maximization of the rate of "productive" investment.

This outlook carried with it the explicit or implicit understanding that the high-income industrialized countries of the world are "developed", that this is an enviable state of being, and that the rest of the world can attain it. The proponents of "development" might have their doubts about the capacity of the least-favoured countries to "develop" through industrialization, but since the only alternative seemed to be that they should remain poor and backward, these doubts, in the climate of agreement on universal rights to develop, were excluded from public intergovernmental discourse.

By now, this conception of development has been criticized so repeatedly and from so many points of view that further attention to it might seem equivalent to flogging a dead horse. Nevertheless, it remains stubbornly alive in the outlook of many political leaders, planners, and entrepreneurial groups, and belief in it as a real alternative to be refuted conditions the ways in which other currents of opinion seek more satisfying conceptions of development.

Their argument runs that single-minded pursuit of an economic growth objective has proved counter-productive. In fact, the past quarter-century offers few convincing examples of countries that have been capable of single-minded pursuit of economic growth over any length of time, although there may have been a good many whose political leaders and planners thought they were trying to do so.

Such a single-minded pursuit requires an exceptional combination of strength and continuity in the political régime, resource endowment, and a favourable international conjuncture. In the few instances in which these requisites have been present, singleminded pursuit of economic growth has not been counter-productive in its own terms, or in the interests of the groups controlling the process, although the results are open to criticism in terms of human welfare and equity values and although long-term capacity to manage the resulting tensions may be doubted.

In attacks on the identification of development with economic growth several kinds of arguments are commonly mingled: the human costs are too high, the results are inevitably inequitable, the kind of "consumer society" to which it leads is inherently undesirable even if the inequities are alleviated, the societal resistances and structural incompatibilities are bound to hamper or disrupt economic growth itself unless societal change is brought to the fore in the developmental model, international relationships are incompatible with thoroughgoing industrialization of the countries now lagging.

Sometimes the proponents of alternative approaches to development seem to be governed by value premises in rejecting the exclusive "economic growth" approach, but to be trying to convince the political leaders and planners in terms of practical arguments that it will not work. Sometimes the planners themselves proceed from an attempt to understand and avoid the practical "social obstacles" supposed to be responsible for the frustration of their economic growth strategies, and then introduce value premises to strengthen their arguments for needed structural changes.

It may be suspected from recent international discussions that the arguments have penetrated only superficially into the thinking of the political leadership and into public opinion in most countries. The supposition lingers on that all countries face a real choice whether to "concentrate on economic growth" (imitating the earlier "stages" of the now "developed" countries) or to balance economic growth (assumed to be essential in any case) with considerable allocations of resources to social services and measures for income redistribution (imitating the later stages of the now "developed" countries).

These suppositions are compatible with either of the first two images described above, although the agents and strategies would be different. They are, of course, radically incompatible with the third image, although a division, embryonic as yet, can be detected between policy proposals emphasizing prevention of further economic growth and those emphasizing the distributional and welfare requirements of a society that dispenses with economic growth.

Two Interpretations

In the quest for more adequate conceptions of what development is and why it is wanted, it seems essential to insist on the making of a clear distinction between two legitimate uses of the term "development", but also to keep the interpretations deriving from these two uses in continual contact with each other.

According to *the first interpretation:*

"Development" consists of systematically inter-related growth and change processes in human societies, delimited by the boundaries of national states, but also highly interdependent on a world scale.

These processes have many uniformities and predictable sequences, but also have unique characteristics in each country or society, deriving from historical patterns, cultural traits and values, territorial and population size, resource endowment, internal class structure and power relationships, place in the international system, etc.

Each society has a more or less limited range of choices open to it and a more or less limited capacity to make choices. At any given time the political capacity to make choices may or may not be compatible with the real developmental alternatives that are open, and both the capacity to choose and the range of alternatives are continually changing. The only general alternative to "development" in this sense is stagnation or decay.

"Development" may at different times become more or less spontaneous or subject to rational policy decisions and planning; more or less conflictive or peaceful; more or less equitable or inequitable; more or less investment-oriented or consumption-oriented; more or less autonomous or dependent at the national level. It can also be more or less susceptible to breakdown through internal contradictions or viable over the long term, but there seems to be no adequate reason to assume that any national pattern of development can continue indefinitely without exhausting its potentialities and facing breakdown or transformation.

Development in this sense is inescapably *societal* development; for analytical purposes economic, social, political and other aspects can be treated separately, but it is misleading to regard these as different kinds of development.

The components of development as a system can, in principle, be determined empirically, through study of their interactions, although this may not be fully feasible in practice. In this sense, it might be justifiable to rule that certain things that happen in a given society, and certain public measures, fall outside the developmental system of interactions, or are not related to them in any way likely to affect significantly the future process of developmental change;

According to *the second interpretation:*

"Development" expresses an aspiration towards a better society. In this sense, it implies choices derived from value judgements concerning the content and characteristics of a better society.

It also implies value judgements concerning the right of the existing society, through general consensus or through agents claiming to represent the best interests of the society, to make such choices and enforce them through developmental policies.

It can be assumed also that the choices are envisaged as feasible rather than utopian; for each society, they must fall within limits set by "development" processes and capabilities in the first sense. The value-oriented sense of development as an aspiration offers a frame of reference for clarification of what each society wants to do, what it can do, and what the short-, medium- and long-term implications and requisites for its choices may be. In this sense also, development is societal and constitutes a system of interactions, but the content of the system is determined by the values and preferences of the dominant forces in the society. Anything to which these forces give a high priority is part of their preferred style of development, whether or not significant interactions with other components of the style can be detected.

From an international point of view, one can proceed from the above distinction between two uses of the term "development" to the following propositions:

(i) different national styles of development are legitimate, possible, and indeed inevitable;

(ii) all countries face a certain range of choices of style, but the range of feasible choices differs for each country;

(iii) in terms of internationally accepted values, whatever style is chosen should be compatible with a minimum criterion: enhancement of the capacity of the society to function over the long term for the well-being of all its members;

(iv) each society faces a challenge to evolve a style of development responding to this criterion through continued, increasingly realistic and informed exploration of the choices open to it, and through the elaboration of corresponding principles and techniques of decision-making;

(v) the definition of a style of *social* development cannot be restricted to supplementation of national income objectives by a set of conventional quantifed sectoral "social" objectives, although such objectives have a legitimate place in the definition;

(vi) choices leading to a style of development need not strain to be "comprehensive", in the sense of allocating a place to every conceivable form of public action and "taking into account" the inter-relationships of everything with everything else; attainment of a viable style of development may require a capacity to concentrate on certain key objectives at each stage, minimizing the diversion of resources and public attention to other objetives that are desirable in themselves. These choices cannot be governed by universally applicable "rights";

(vii) the emphasis on increasing rationality in diagnosis and decision-making does not imply that any society can expect to attain a completely harmonious "technocratic" style of development; choice will always be a political process; debate and conflict over choices have a legitimate place in any acceptable style of development. The outcome may be a coherent style imposed by a single dominant group, or a semi-coherent style emerging from bargaining and compromise among groups whose objectives are basically compatible, or an impasse when no group is able to dominate and the positions are too far apart for a developmentally viable compromise.

Rational Choices

A demonstration of the need to choose a coherent style of development and the advocacy of action strategies consonant with the style chosen supposes the presence of an agent or agents capable of understanding the demonstration and acting on the advice. In practice, one finds a multiplicity of prospective agents varyingly open to such demonstrations and advocacy on the basis of their values, preconceptions of development, and immediate interests, and varyingly capable of taking relevant action.

These prospective agents have differing reasons for wanting "development", as they conceive it, and give "development" differing priorities within their whole range of objectives. A demonstration convincing to one prospective agent may be unintelligible to another and unacceptable to a third. It is patently absurd to address developmental advice to a non-existent coherent, benevolent, rational and powerful

entity, solely interested in the most effective way to impel development for the enhancement of human welfare. A moment's thought concerning the interplay of different interests, rigidities, irrationalities, and propensities to evade choices and prefer ritual to effective action in whatever organized activity the reader may have entered should be enough to dispel this belief.

The quest for more authentic, value-oriented and viable styles of national development can never be monopolized or controlled by social scientists and planners, but neither can these specialists restrict themselves to instrumental roles, accepting as givens developmental directives emanating from the political leadership or from popular consensus. Such directives are never going to be coherent enough.

During conjunctures relatively favourable to development, political leadership representing the more dynamic elements of a given society will hold the centre of the stage and will try to act on some explicit or implicit developmental strategy. This leadership, however, cannot be expected to preoccupy itself with development alone; its first preoccupation must be to ensure its own survival and strengthen its hold on power, and this will require a combination of actions that are in part, from any strictly developmental viewpoint, irrelevant, wasteful or damaging. It may be vulnerable to delusions of omnipotence and very poorly informed concerning its real capabilities.

Moreover, the political leader and administrator face a succession of limited choices, with the response partly predetermined by precedent or by the strength of immediate pressures, whose implications for a style of development, even if the main lines of the preferred style have been defined, are obscure or ambiguous. The implications of such limited choices cannot be grasped adequately through experience or intuition, and few choices meet with unanimous approval even within the political leadership.

The task of the social scientist and planner, then, is to help the political leadership – and indeed all persons concerned with public policy – towards more rational choices, taking into account all relevant factors, in pursuit of a style of development that is viable and acceptable, in its main lines, in the eyes of both parties, and to help decrease the proportion of choices that are counter-productive in relation to the style, without aspiring to an unrealistically rigid consistency.

This task can hardly be accomplished to any significant extent as long as it is monopolized by specialists communicating through a technical jargon. It will progress to the extent that the practice of thinking about styles of development, choices deriving from them, and rational techniques of decision-making penetrate throughout the political leadership, the public administration, and the population in general.

The techniques of economic development planning in use up to the present have made significant contributions along these lines, but these contributions have been smaller and more erratic than might have been expected from the importance attributed to such planning during the 1950s and 1960s. The reasons need not be

discussed at this point, but they undoubtedly include the general failure to explore the possibility of alternative styles of development.

In the absence of such an exploration, attempts to broaden the content and procedures of planning, through the incorporation of "social objectives", and through the setting up of participatory mechanisms and local and sectoral planning bodies. complicated the planning process without generating much authentic participation in decision-making or bringing the plans closer to a consistent influence on what actually happened.

More recently, several means of beginning an exploration of styles of development have been proposed and experimented with, although none of them has as yet attained a major influence on policy:

(a) Deduction of the prefered style of development from what the society (or the State) actually does or claims to be trying to do, followed by demonstration of the degree of feasibility and consistency of the style, the advantages and risks implied, the requisites for its pursuit, and the contradictions or incompatibilities between elements;

(b) Definition of several alternative styles of development, which may be deduced from actual trends in the national society or other societies, from declared objectives of the State, or from value-based preferences of the persons undertaking the experiment; quantification of the components and requisites of these styles; demonstration of their feasibility or otherwise over defined time-spans (in terms of resource requirements, skill requirements, financial requirements, import requirements, political support or consensus requirements, etc.); experimentation with variations in each style to enhance feasibility.

The possibilities for experimentation with this technique depend on the availability of computers capable of making large numbers of complicated calculations cheaply and rapidly.[1] This technique should be particularly effective in demonstrating quantitatively and convincingly what *cannot* be done; that certain styles of development attractive to official and popular opinion lead to an impasse or breakdown;

(c) Assessment of national potential for development through typologies and "profiles" of national situations. This represents initially an attempt to penetrate beyond the simplistic identification of "level of development" with "level of per capita income", with the accompanying supposition that all countries, large and small, well-endowed and otherwise, are capable of developing economically through a series of predictable stages. The technique can lead to two quite different kinds of indications relevant to policy:

(i) concerning the internal equilibrium or otherwise of levels and rates of growth in production, welfare, and public actions in different sectors;

[1] See "Estilos de Desarrollo", Oscar Varsavski and others, *Modelos Matemáticos* (Santiago Editorial Universitaria, S.A., 1971).

(ii) concerning the feasibility of certain lines of development, in particular industrialization, in relation to natural resources, human resources, size of internal market, etc.

The results of this technique can be no more than indicative: they can *suggest* that a country should pay more attention to certain sectors of public action or rule out certain lines of development, and indicate questions that need exploration through other techniques.[2]

(d) Evaluation of all projects calling for public resource allocations or other public actions in terms of a weighted list of objectives supposed to represent the preferred style of development, and priority ranking of projects according to the importance and number of objectives to which they contribute.

This technique permits alternative evaluations, giving different weighting to the objectives, so as to help the political decision-makers clarify what is most important to them. It helps them go beyond the discredited traditional division between "economic" objectives and actions and "social" objectives and actions. It assumes that all projects are relevant to social as well as economic (and political) objectives to the extent that these enter into the preferred style.

It must be recognized that any of the above techniques, or others directed towards the same ends, if objectively applied, will lead to conclusions profoundly disquieting to almost any national political leadership, as well as the international vested interests in "development". Part of the art of governing consists in not letting choices and limitations appear too nakedly.

A demonstration that certain policies to which the political leadership is committed are incompatible with each other or with the over-all priorities suggested by the preferred style of development or the régime's sources of political backing is unlikely to be welcomed. Still less is demonstration that the preferred style of development, to which the leadership assumes its country has as much right as any other country, is inherently non-viable, given the characteristics of the country. The political leadership and public opinion are likely to react by rejecting the whole line of reasoning and insisting that the social scientist or planner produce "practical" advice showing how to do whatever the political leadership wants to do.

3. A digression on the "practical"

This insistence on "practical" proposals, frequently contrasted with "theorizing" as an activity of much lower priority, if not altogether a waste of time, has been one of the most recurrent themes in discussions of development in the inter-governmental bodies.

[2] Work along these lines has been carried out by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development and by the Economic Projections Centre of the Economic Commission for Latin America, among other bodies.

The demand for the "practical" has come from representatives of all types of countries, although presumably with different connotations attached to the "practical". In part it has reflected an understandable impatience with the even more recurrent discussions of universal "human rights" divorced from any "practical" consideration of human capacity and disposition to convert rights into realities. In some quarters, the underlying supposition seems to have been that certain countries already know what is "practical" on the basis of their own success and are ready to share "practical" How to Develop recipes. The problem, then, is simply to give the recipes an international stamp of approval and present them to the rest of the world for action under the guidance of appropriate "experts".

In other quarters, "practical" seems to be synonymous with "magical"; there is an underlying supposition that somewhere in the world cheap, simple, and infallible solutions to all problems are waiting to be discovered.

The results of this reiteration of the "practical" in the work of the international secretariats have been impressive in the bulk of documents purporting to offer practical advice, and in the range of programmes offered as solutions, but have been rather meagre precisely on the side of "practical" developmental results – leading to a chorus of new demands for "more practical" proposals, and a frantic running in circles by the functionaries addressed in order to demonstrate their practicality.

Great themes have emerged and inflated themselves and subsided into the background only to reappear under new names according to the cycles of hope and disillusionment in the giving of "practical" advice, each acquiring its own promotional apparatus and vested interests – balanced development, community development, fundamental education, co-operation, social welfare, employment policy, urbanization policy, population policy, science and technology, etc.[3]

The superficiality of concern with the "practical" is particularly evident in the fate of international studies with "practical" terms of reference. There is a consistent and striking disproportion between the importance formally attributed to their topics, the resources allocated to them, and the attention paid to their results.

An inter-governmental body requests a secretariat to prepare a report on how to satisfy all human needs for its next meeting; half a dozen functionaries strain to do

[3] The impact of this "practical" zeal at the national level is suggested by the following quotation: "Month by month, almost week by week, donors and international agencies are suggesting projects, sending experts, requiring information, meetings, facilities, tours and demonstrations which the local administration must somehow handle. The few top men are overwhelmed by a triple burden – to serve their Ministers in the constant series of political crises to which new governments are prone; to deal with international contacts and visitors; and, somehow, to direct and keep moving the routine tasks of a Department which will have a programme far larger than its top staff can manage. Delays, mistakes, and ill-considered projects are not merely a reflection of poor supporting staff in the middle layers: they reflect a government machine grossly overloaded with its own programme and the additions which well-meaning donors press upon it." (Guy Hunter, *Modernizing Peasant Societies* (London, Oxford University Press, 1969).)

so; and the result, which might be expected to have a reception equivalent to that of the great documentary landmarks of human history, is tepidly approved or criticized, and disappears into Government archives and the storerooms of the issuing organization without a trace, rarely remembered even by other specialists preparing subsequent "practical" reports. It may receive a brief mention in the more conscientious newspapers when it appears, but scholarly journals do not trouble to review it; only if it contains new statistics is it likely to be quoted.

If the study of a "unified approach to development analysis and planning" is to amount to anything more than another stage in this interminable pursuit of the "practical", it must incorporate a clear understanding that "practicality" depends on theoretical conceptions, value judgements and diagnostic understanding of the phenomena to which "practical" action is to be applied.

In relation to a theme as confused and controversial as "development" there can be no practicality in the issuing of universally applicable recipes. Under some circumstances, allegedly "practical" solutions can be irrelevant or self-defeating; even more commonly, they are inapplicable in the absence of changes in the societal structure, power relationships, and real values that are evaded or timidly hinted at in the "practical" international advisory efforts.

The themes listed above all represent areas of choice and decision-making that must enter into any acceptable and viable style of development, and it might even be possible to arrive at such a style of development by pursuing the *full* implications of any one of them. An ironic view of their international ups and downs does not imply negation of their basic importance. As long, however, as they are viewed as collections of "practical" recipes this potential importance will not be realized – and ritual recognitions that everything is inter-related with everything else will not help either.

4. Choices leading towards an acceptable and viable style of development

The main interdependent areas of choice making up a style of development concern autonomy, participation, production, consumption and distribution. If the choices made in these areas are mutually contradictory the style will not be viable; if the choices are made in isolation from one another the probability is that they will be mutually contradictory. This, unfortunately, is what seems to be happening in various countries whose leadership is now deliberately seeking to evolve original styles of development.

The decision to seek an autonomous style of development conditions the possibility of making choices in all the other areas. If the country simply accepts its place in the existing international order it may, under favourable circumstances, experience a kind of dependent "development" over an extended period, but decisions on the main lines of production and consumption will be out of its

hands, and it will be unable to tolerate forms of participation that might threaten the distribution patterns associated with these lines of production and consumption.

At the same time, no country can realistically choose complete autonomy. It must manoeuvre on the basis of its real situation within the international system and be prepared to sacrifice some concrete advantages if it wishes to enhance its autonomy. If it tries to combine a high degree of autonomy, a high degree of reliance on external financing, and a high degree of openness to external cultural and consumption models its style of development will probably not be viable.

Participation is one of the most complex areas of choice. It raises the questions – very hard for political leaders and planners to face frankly – of *who* is doing the choosing, *how* choices are enforced, and *whether* the style of development treats participation mainly as a means or mainly as an end, an essential component of the style.

When participation is willed from above, it becomes mobilization, a means of getting things done. When it arises from below it usually focuses on distribution, becoming also a means, from the standpoint of the groups able to participate, of obtaining a larger immediate share of the fruits of development.

Authentic creative participation, heightening the participants' consciousness of values, issues, and the possibility of making choices, influencing the content of development, generating new ways of doing things, and also safeguarding the participants' right to an equitable share in the fruits of development, remains an elusive aspiration – but the conversion of this aspiration into reality may well in the end prove the most essential requisite for a style of development enhancing the capacity of the society to function over the long term for the well-being of all its members.

Up to the present, developmental preoccupations have centred heavily on production. The proposition that maximum production of goods and services is equivalent to development, interpreted as a worthy human aspiration, no matter what is produced or how it is used, seems preposterous when stated baldly. Yet the underlying assumption in most developmental thinking about choices, expressed in the yardstick of *per capita* product and bolstered by faith in market mechanisms to guarantee an eventual happy ending, has not been very far from this.

Contradictions

Choices as to what will be produced imply a need for consistent choices as to how it will be distributed and who will consume it. In countries that have chosen to concentrate on production of capital goods and have been able to enforce the choice, the other choices have been relatively simple, or could be postponed: private consumption had to be kept low and relatively equalitarian, with a partially compensating expansion of some public services, particularly those expected to enhance productive capacity of the population.

In most countries striving to develop, however, the choices have not been consistent, and the contradictions have become more acute as import substitution industrialization has proceeded and as overt income redistribution policies have become more prominent.

The aspiration to narrow the gap between the incomes of the masses of the population and those of the minorities previously benefitting from economic growth has proved incompatible with the character of the goods and services being produced and with the present functioning of the societies and economies. The contradictions have appeared most acutely in relation to durable consumer goods, housing and education, although they affect the whole range of goods and services, and it may be worthwhile at this point to look more closely at these three examples.

(i) in consumer durables

It is well known that the more recent stages of consumer goods industrialization in many countries (following an initial stage of production of previously imported textiles, processed foods, etc.) has been aimed at an upper-income market for durable goods and luxury products.[4] To the extent that industries producing automobiles and electrical appliances for this market become established, pressures mount for maintenance of an income distribution preserving the market for these products.

This market can be expanded to some extent by bringing down production costs (usually several times higher than in the industrialized countries), producing smaller and simpler models, offering generous credits and facilities for instalment buying, etc. It can also be expanded by raising the incomes of the middle strata and the better organized workers, but, with the possible exceptions of countries with small populations and high petroleum output, there is no foreseeable possibility of expanding the market for the more expensive durable goods to include the majority of the population.

Meanwhile, particularly in the case of the automobile, governmental capacity to control allocation of foreign exchange and domestic public resources is diminished by demands for a rising flow of imported inputs for the industries and for rising expenditures on highways. To the extent that a serious effort is made to remedy the environmental deterioration, urban air pollution and highway carnage associated with mass automobile use, the claim on public resources will rise still higher.

The resulting dilemma is particularly acute for regimes relying on popular support and striving for a style of development that emphasizes equitable distribution. Their sources of support include precisely the urban strata now clamouring to enter

[4] See Anibal Pinto, "El modelo de desarrollo reciente de América Latina", *Revista de Economia Latinoamericana*, 32, Caracas, 1971.

the market for durable consumer goods – and among these are the organized workers who produce the goods, whose livelihood would be threatened by any radical change in consumption patterns.

Moreover, the political leaders and planners themselves, however clearly they may see the issue, are themselves wedded to a "modern" style of life that includes the automobile and hampers them in imposing austerity. The population strata that might benefit from a shift in the pattern of production (cheap bicycles instead of automobiles, cheap electrical appliances instead of refrigerators and air conditioning equipment) are relatively unorganized and unaware of the issues.[5]

(ii) in housing

In the case of housing, the contradictions have been conspicuous over a longer period. The State has come under increasing pressure to combat the urban housing deficit and fill the gap between housing costs and the purchasing power of families seeking housing. Even régimes not otherwise strongly concerned over distributional inequities have responded to this pressure, justifying their policies by pointing to the housing plight of the low-income urban strata.

The State has also been under pressure to promote housing construction by awarding subsidies or contracts to construction firms using conventional building methods and following housing standards modeled on those of high-income countries, and by making available cheap credits to families capable of amortizing their housing costs over the long term.

In practice, however, it is impossible for the State to extend housing programmes of this type beyond the urban middle-income sectors. The whole population helps to subsidize the housing of these sectors, as well as the accompanying infrastructural costs. If housing programmes are also undertaken for the urban low-income population and the rural population, these programmes are aimed at vastly lower unit costs and usually consist merely of the provision of building lots, materials, minimum prefabricated dwellings, etc.

Any régime dependent on popular support that sets out to distribute resources for housing on the basis of need and at unit costs really permitting improvement in the level of housing of the majority of the population confronts the same dilemma as in the case of durable consumer goods: such a policy would clash with the expectations of its better-organized supporters and also with the immediate interests of the construction enterprises and their workers.

[5] This problem was the subject of a lively policy discussion in Chile under Allende. See Eugenio Silva and Eduardo Moyano, "Hacia donde nos conduce el automóvil?", *Panorama Económico*, 206, January–February 1972; and Sergio Bitar and Eduardo Moyano, "Redistribución del consumo y transición al socialismo". *Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional*, 11, January, 1972.

In the case of housing, the low-income urban population exerts a vigorous and fairly coherent demand that can become a source of effective counter-pressure toward more equitable policies. The promise of housing is one of the most effective means of mobilizing political support, but these factors make it all the harder for a political leadership to act in consonance with its preferred style of development and within the limits set by the resources it can command.

Even the location of new housing, for example, implies choices that will affect the long-term style of development: Is residential segregation, by income group or otherwise, to be tolerated? Is the indefinite growth of the great metropolitan agglomerations to be favoured? Are the suburban sprawl and central congestion associated with private automotive transport to be accepted?

Almost any political leadership prefers to evade choices of this kind.

(iii) in education

In education, the problems of distribution and the content of what is distributed are even more complexly and conflictively related to the preferred style of development, on the one hand, and to the existing structure of the society, on the other. Even the narrower conceptions of "economic development" envisage expansion of education as an essential means of bringing "human resources" into closer correspondence with developmental needs and as one of the most desirable ways of using the fruits of development to enhance welfare and equity.

Other conceptions of development place an even higher valuation on education as a means towards cultural change and enhanced creativity, and insist on much higher allocations to education versus non-essential private consumption.

The expansion of *existing* systems of education responds to the demands of consumers seeking to improve the position of their children within existing systems of rewards and status. The most vigorous demands come from the middle strata and from groups on the lower margin of ability to participate in the "modern" consumer society.

The results include a particularly rapid quantitative growth in secondary and higher education, a dilution of the quality of such education because of the insufficiency of qualified teachers and inability to meet costs, an economically unjustified expansion of the relevant occupational sectors, and the appearance of growing numbers of frustrated "educated unemployed".

This kind of educational expansion diminishes the possibility of an acceptable and viable style of development, both through the resources it absorbs and through the expectations it encourages. No matter how rapidly secondary and higher education are expanded along present lines, they cannot be extended to the masses of the population. The latter remain at as great an educational disadvantage as before, even if they do gain access to a low-quality elementary schooling; in some cases.

higher education alone eats up half the public resources allocated to education, and the *per capita* expenditures on children who do not go beyond elementary school are necessarily minute in comparison with *per capita* expenditures on the favoured minorities, inadequate as the latter expenditures may be for higher education of good quality.

An educational policy compatible with an acceptable and viable style of development, under these circumstances, implies a frontal clash with the population strata most strongly motivated to seek education and most capable of enforcing organized demands, in favour of strata lacking clearly defined educational objectives and possessing relatively little organized strength.

The internal contradictions of the present educational trends, as these affect the youth passing through the systems, are indeed generating demands for an educational revolution, but these demands do not translate readily into viable policy choices concerning content and distribution.

To sum up, the choices in production, distribution and consumption that follow logically from a preferred style of development can be defined without great difficulty.

For a style of development enhancing the long-term capacity of a society to function for the wellbeing of all its members, production choices should emphasize goods that can become accessible to the masses of the population at foreseeable income levels; consumption choices should emphasize collective goods and services; production and consumption choices should be designed to enhance participation and creativity rather than passive receptivity (e.g., new lines of education combined with work; new types of communities created physically as well as organizationally by their members).

Can any régime be expected to make such choices under conditions of unrestricted ingress of external influences and pressures, and internal participation that is very unevenly distributed and focussed on consumption?

CHAPTER FOUR

Approaches to Development: Who Is Approaching What?

1. Feasibility of national choice between alternative styles

International discourse since the 1940s has postulated that the term "development" refers to an intelligible process that can be furthered by rational action within the framework of nation-states – that is, by "planning".

The participants in the discourse have disagreed radically with one another concerning the nature of the national and international orders within which development is to take place, in their evaluations of what is happening, and in their prescriptions for action. Variants on the vision of linear progress, according to which the "developed" countries have both the capacity and the duty to help others follow in their own path, have continually clashed with variants on the vision of societal transformation, according to which the development of poor countries requires *inter alia* liberation from exploitative relationships that have made the "developed" countries rich and dominant.

Nevertheless, arguments have proceeded within an implicit consensus that there can be only one kind of development: a process with certain societal preconditions, going through predictable stages, requiring accelerated capital accumulation and technological-entrepreneurial innovation, leading to the formation of national societies and economies predominantly urban and industrial, imbued with "modern" attitudes towards the world and citizenship, capable of continually rising production of goods and services and, eventually, of ample satisfaction of the consumption demands of their members.

It follows that there can be only one optimal way to develop; the task, then, is to define it, diagnose the deviations from it of the society in question, and prescribe means of setting that society on the correct path.

At present, while the international machinery deriving from this interplay of conflict and consensus over development continues to ramify and the list of internationally accepted requisites for development continues to lengthen, the view of development as a uniform definable sequence to which all national societies must

conform under penalty of remaining poor and backward is being challenged from many different theoretical, ideological and valuative positions.

Some critics question whether "development" is a meaningful concept and trace it to an ethnocentric supposition of the duplicability of the experience of a few "Western" societies during a certain period of history, or to a misleading analogy, deeply rooted in "Western" thought, between change in societies and "development" in living organisms. For example:

"A fair amount of effort has been given to attempts at definition as well as to the argument that development 'in general' or 'as such' is a proper or sufficient goal of national and international activity. But it is insufficiently pondered how strange and remarkable is our use of the term. We proceed as though 'everyone knows' what it means. And, to be sure, at a common-sense level everyone does. . . .The commonsense meaning is clear: to be developed is to be Western. Or, if this seems ethnocentric, offensive, 'modern' . . . .The defining characteristics of modernity in the West have not been achieved by an effort, consciously and nominally, 'to develop". This is a post-hoc rationalization, a convenient fiction to give history 'meaning' . . . .We do not know, with anything approaching completeness and certainty, how to make a pre-modern State modern. . . . Even if we had such knowledge, it would not solve the problem of development if this is conceived as achievement of a certain set of now-known, defining characteristics which, if achieved, would make all nations 'developed'. For the most highly developed nations are in a period of rapid transformation. . . .When developing countries seek to become developed through the use of administrative means currently favoured in industrialized countries, they will, if successful, be re-creating 'vanished civilizations' . . . .The present enthusiasm for development is a wondrous thing: everyone is for it, but what it is – other than a transient pattern – is open-ended, baffling."[1]

"The more concrete, empirical, and behavioural our subject matter, the less the applicability to it of the theory of development and its several conceptual elements. It is tempting enough to apply these elements to the constructed entities which abound in Western social thought: to civilization as a whole, to mankind, to total society; to such entities as capitalism, democracy, and culture. . . . Having endowed one or other of these with life through the familiar process of reification, it is but a short step to further endowment with growth. . . . It is something else entirely, however, when we try, as much social theory at present is trying, to impose these concepts of developmentalism upon, *not* constructed entities but the kind of subject matter that has become basic in the social sciences today: *the social behaviour of human beings in specific areas and within finite limits of time.* . . .The model of Western Europe and its seeming direction of social change during the past

[1] Dwight Waldo, "Reflexions on Public Administration and National Development", *International Social Science Journal*, XXI, 2, 1969.

half-dozen centuries . . . is made the trend of social change for all human civilization and, as countless studies of the so-called modernizing nations suggest, the stereotype for their individual analysis – and also their reconstruction."[2]

The dismissal of "development" as an updated version of the "Western" myth of progress naturally cannot satisfy political leaders and ideologists who start from the premise that the present situation and future prospects of their societies are unacceptable, however congenial they may find the discrediting of "Western" models. Rational action based on a valid interpretation of the society in question and aimed at a preferable future must be possible.

If "development" as previously conceived is unattainable, undesirable, or meaningless for the society, then "true" development must mean something else. "Development" becomes a path to be chosen by each national society on the basis of its values rather than a mould to be imposed on it. The undercurrents of voluntarism in developmental discourse continually reappear in differing forms in response to political demands.

Several related questions then come to the fore:

– Can "development" mean anything anyone wants it to mean?

– Do all of the national societies now on the world stage have the capacity as well as the right to "develop"?

– Can a society or agents acting in the name of a society choose images of the future different from those hitherto current, unconstrained by the society's past and present, and convert these images into reality through rational action? Under what conditions?

– If it is granted that development can and should mean different things for different societies and that the attainment of a viable and acceptable national style of development[3] depends as much on political will as on economic and cultural preconditions, what is the relevance of international prescriptions laying down what "development" should be?

[2] Robert A. Nesbit, *Social Change and History: Aspects of the Western Theory of Development* (London, Oxford University Press, 1969).

[3] See *Report on a Unified Approach to Development Analysis and Planning. Preliminary Raport of the Secretary-General* (E/CN.5/477, 25 October 1972) which distinguishes between the "real style of development" of a national society (that is, what is actually happening, on the suppostion that no society is static), and "preferred styles" (that is, what certain forces in the society want to happen). It is assumed that several preferred styles will normally be competing for attention within a given society and that overt preferences can mask quite different real preferences.

The term "prevailing style" is used here as equivalent to "real style", and refers to the variants of dependent capitalism prevailing in most of Latin America. The terms "original", and "value-oriented" refer to preferred styles that correspond to the criteria for styles combining "acceptability" and "viability" set forth in the report on a unified approach. "Styles of development" emanate from social systems, as conceptualizations of their processes of growth and change, and may or may not give rise to explicit strategies.

Not Convincing

In the International Development Strategy adopted by the General Assembly in 1970 and in numerous other declarations within the framework of the United Nations, Governments have agreed on utopian-normative standards for development that have not been met convincingly anywhere in the world and have called for studies demonstrating how to bring development processes into closer correspondence with these standards. The international declarations juxtapose and try to reconcile propositions deriving from quite different conceptions of development.

The most authoritative and coherent formulation – in paragraph 18 of the International Development Strategy – contains at least three separable propositions:

(i) that "the ultimate purpose of development is to provide increasing opportunities to all people for a better life";

(ii) that the more specific objectives associated with this purpose (rapid growth, structural change, more equitable distribution of income and wealth, expansion of social services, safeguarding of the environment) are "parts of the same dynamic process", simultaneously ends and means;

(iii) that it is feasible as well as desirable to move toward all objectives at the *same time* and in a "unified" way.

The Strategy spells out the social objectives that are to be unified in a formidable list of commitments expressed in general terms; elsewhere it concentrates on the more traditional economic objective of a rate of growth in production of at least 6 per cent annually and (in relatively precise terms) on the economic requisites for attainment of this objective.

The above propositions are compatible with one another, but endorsement of any one of them does not require acceptance of all the others. The social objectives remain vulnerable to arguments that accomplishment of the "ultimate" purpose of development requires immediate concentration on rapid growth, that no society is capable of "unified" pursuit of all the other objectives set forth in the Strategy, and that governmental attempts to do so within existing political systems and resource limitations will simply paralyze the capacity – insufficient at best – to accelerate economic growth.

The economic target, for its part, is equally vulnerable to arguments that policy concentration on very high rates of economic growth unavoidably exacerbates societal tensions, heightens maldistribution of wealth and power, and distorts life styles in ways that will make the "ultimate purpose" ever harder to approach.

It is probable that international discourse concerning development will continue to vacillate between conceptions of development subject to the economic Kingdom

of Necessity (however this may be envisaged) and conceptions of development as at least potentially a variable embodiment of societal values and choices.[4]

Experiences up to the present strengthen the negative sides of both the arguments summarized above: the real processes of "development" are not incontrovertibly enhancing human welfare even in the high-income countries and their long-term viability is in doubt, while the attempts to formulate and apply original, autonomous, human-oriented styles of development continue to founder in their confrontations with reality or to survive at a price that leaves their promise unfulfilled.

In the following pages we will explore the value-oriented propositions in the more recent international declarations as elements for a coherent reconceptualization of development and for the definition of original styles of development compatible with real national situations within the real world order. The exploration will treat conceptions, aspirations and societal images as capable of exerting real influence on what happens and as not entirely predetermined by economic laws or class interests, but it will avoid reifying them, or treating "development" as an ideal reality existing apart from what societies actually do, and to which they can approximate to the extent that they broaden their understanding of what it "really" is.

We assume here that present international demands for a "unified approach to development", for "autonomous and original styles of development", etc., derive from a justified rejection of present trends and prospects, and present a challenge to all would-be analysts and agents of development that should not be ignored or evaded.

We also assume that the expressions of this challenge are susceptible to overgeneralization, evasion of the more formidable difficulties, contentment with ritualistic reiteration of good intentions, and delusions that infallible and painless solutions to all problems are somewhere waiting to be discovered.

These shortcomings are associated with the extremely varied and partly incompatible pressures and preoccupations that impinge on the demands for normative approaches to the problems of development, and that can be reconciled, at the level of international discourse, only through eclectic compromise formulas.

The main pressures and preoccupations can be set forth as follows:

(a) Since the beginning of international concern over development, certain currents of opinion have concentrated on the formulation of ever more inclusive formulations of human rights, including rights to defined levels of living and social services.

[4] Questions of this kind, of course, were debated in Latin America as well as other parts of the world long before the term "development" became current. Most of the present arguments were paralleled in Mexico, in particular, prior to and during the Revolution. See Arnaldo Cordova, *La ideologia de la Revolución mexicana: Formación del nuevo régimen* (Mexico, D.F., Ediciones Era, 1973).

The proponents of human rights have dealt in absolutes: rights are the same everywhere and should be enforceable immediately, whatever the specific circumstances of the society. It follows that only one style of development is acceptable – and that must be a style very different from any of those prevailing.

The standards for rights have derived mainly from the high-income industrialized countries, in which it can be assumed that material capacity for honouring of the rights is present, and in which strong political movements and pressure groups demand that they be honoured. In most of the rest of the world neither of these conditions has been present.

Governmental endorsement of rights requiring the commitment of important resources (e.g., universal education) has served partly as a symbolic substitute for action or promise of future action, and partly as a basis for demands on the high-income countries that they help finance observance of the rights they have endorsed.

Development analysts and planners, for the most part, have treated the "rights" as non-binding expressions of good intentions, even when, within their own production-oriented conceptions of development, they have given high priority to improvement of education, nutrition and public health.

Within national societies, arguments based on "rights" that are universal in principle become weapons of different classes or groups to strengthen their claims to a larger share of public resources that cannot be stretched thin enough to satisfy all the claims. The State confronts an incessant clamour from interest-groups and localities demanding that it "solve their problems" as a matter of right.

Meanwhile, movements in the high-income countries continue to generate and obtain international approval for new formulations of rights, particularly in regard to public social services.

The continuing confrontation of real development processes with "rights" that stand for international consensus on the content of a just social order is indispensable to the rethinking of development. However, permanent tension is to be expected between the universalistic pretensions of the rights formulations (with their derivation from certain types of societies and historical processes) and the quest for autonomous and viable styles of development under conditions in which no conceivable agents of development will be able to "take into account" all the desiderata that are thrust upon them.

(b) The high-income industrialized societies, in both the "capitalist" and the "socialist" variants, have encountered multiple crises – of values, of resources, of capacity of their dominant forces to accomplish their declared aims, of capacity to maintain high levels of employment and consumption except at the price of inflation and environmental degradition – that have shaken their self-confidence and partly discredited them as models for "development", "modernization", or the "welfare state". Their advances in planning, information systems and social science research have not saved them from drifting to the brink of such crises, then taking action in an atmosphere of improvisation and catastrophist publicity.

The question comes to the fore whether they are not as much in need of a rethinking of development as the rest of the world, and even more inhibited in making the needed changes by the expectations and institutional rigidities that derive from their past successes.

In the present context, it is worth emphasizing that their special preoccupations project themselves into the discussion of new styles of development for the rest of the world through the dominance of their academic and cultural institutions, and through the extent to which their shifts in resource use, consumption patterns, environmental standards, etc., affect what can actually be done elsewhere.

The problems of "post-industrial" or "post-modern" societies unavoidably become intertwined in the developmental thinking of societies that have experienced the process of "industrialization" and "modernization" only in partial and distorted forms.

(c) The "developing" countries that have attained high rates of economic growth and "modernization" have not been able to convert these processes into generalized enhancement of welfare and societal participation. The dominant forces in some of them remain convinced that they will eventually be able to do so and that there is no other practicable path to the "provision of increasing opportunities to all people for a better life"; consequently, they feel that the discussion of different styles of development is dangerous nonsense.

Their critics argue that their present patterns of growth and modernization are accompanied by increasing tensions that cannot be repressed or managed indefinitely, and point to certain countries previously held up as developmental good examples for their high rates of economic growth that have since undergone economic and political disasters.

There is no way of proving that either thesis is universally sound, but at best the path of rapid, concentrated economic growth seems open only to a minority among the developing countries, and for this minority its desirability and long-term viability seem less self-evident than a few years ago.

(d) The number of formally independent national units now on the world stage is much larger than at any time since the rise of the "modern" nation-state. Many of them are so lacking in what have been considered the basic preconditions for development, or even the basic preconditions for "national" independence, that they can only despair of matching up to the conventional development prescriptions. If they are not to resign themselves to permanent dependence on international aid combined with the proceeds of raw material exports (which may be real possibilities for some but not for others), they must seek original paths to the future.

They may rely on solidarity with societies in a like position, subordinating their "national" autonomy to the formation of units large enough to be economically and politically viable, or they may move toward a closed, austere, equalitarian national life-style, excluding stimuli toward consumption levels they cannot attain.

In either case, or in trying to combine the two strategies, their political leaders and ideologists find no dependable precedents or prescriptions for what they are trying to do.

(e) Both the rich and the poor societies have awakened quite suddenly to the implications of present levels and geographical distribution of natural resources, as they interact with population and consumption growth trends.

It is obvious, once the problem is stated, that the societies representing the overwhelming majority of the world's population will never be able to attain levels of per capita resource use remotely similar to those already attained by a few high-income societies in North America and in Europe. It is doubtful whether the latter societies will be able to maintain their present levels and patterns of resource use for much longer.

For most of the world a viable style of development must envisage relatively modest levels of consumption of non-renewable resources, substitution of renewable for non-renewable resources wherever feasible, and adequate ecological controls to ensure that the latter really are "renewable",

The probability emerges that the low-income countries will gradually shift from maximizing exports of their non-renewable resources to husbanding these resources for their own use, in the face of increasingly desperate demands for them from the high-income countries.

Paradoxically, the prospect also emerges that the low-income predominantly rural-agricultural countries will become increasingly dependent for food supplies on the high-income predominantly urban-industrial countries.

(f) The conventional international approaches have assumed that "countries" develop and that development is closely associated with processes labelled "modernization" and "nation-building". It has been postulated that planned action at the national level to further these processes is both feasible and essential, that countries should depend on mobilization of internal resources as far as possible, but that they can rightfully and realistically demand financial and technical "co-operation" from the high-income "developed" countries.

Enormous and labyrinthically complex international machinery has come into being on the basis of these suppositions. Factors such as those mentioned above, along with certain traits of the international co-operation machinery itself – the dubious applicability of many of the technical transfers, the failure of "planning" to respond to the hopes invested in it, the crippling indebtedness that has resulted from the conditions of financial transfers, etc. – have brought the basic suppositions into question.

Experience has given increased plausibility to an alternative viewpoint that has been argued (in several differing versions) since the beginning of the international development effort: that autonomous development at the national level is an illusion within the present world order, that the reality is an international market system that generates "development" (by the conventional economic criterion) at

one pole and "underdevelopment" or "dependent development" (in the more qualified versions) at the other, within which imitative modernization simply internalizes the patterns of dependence and "nation-building" can be no more than a facade.

Under such interpretations, the phenomenon is not simply one of exploitation of poor "countries" by rich "countries". The processes of polarization are not delimited by national frontiers, since "modernizing" interests in all countries identify themselves with the dominant centres and benefit from the system at the expense of the rest of the population.

It follows that the rich countries are inherently incapable of helping others to "develop", as long as both adhere to the market order. Some versions go farther and question whether relations between "socialist" non-market societies of the centre and the periphery could overcome polarization and dependency as long as prevailing tactics of modernization and technological transfers are perpetuated.

International technical and financial co-operation, then, unavoidably conforms to the traits of the dominant world order. It necessarily strengthens the ties of dependency and helps the dominant forces in the dependent societies evade the choices and sacrifices required for "authentic" development, whether or not it brings them short-term advantages.

Since the international co-operation movement represents a major intellectual and emotional investment as well as a source of livelihood for thousands of persons skilled in manipulating developmental symbols, and since there are very few societies where the dominant forces are prepared to renounce altogether the hopes and material advantages it has offered, its present crisis contributes another current to the quest for new conceptions of development. Like development itself, if international co-operation is judged futile or deceptive in the forms it has taken then it must mean something else.

Incompatible Viewpoints

The above pressures and preoccupations, taken together, suggest that the international debate over the meaning of "development" (or some other term designating hopes for a better future, if the term "development" falls into discredit) and the tension between determinist and voluntarist-normative views, between universalist views and culturally specific views, and between revolutionary-catastrophist views and evolutionary-linear-progress views will continue for the foreseeable future. The international impingement of basically incompatible viewpoints will continue to generate eclectic, compromise formulations of ends and means.

Each "country" by the fact of its formal independence has a recognized right to determine its own ends and means, but it cannot expect to do so with impunity if it defies the real constraints imposed by the international order and its own endowment of human and other resources. It *should* not expect to do so with impunity if

it disregards the values of social justice, human welfare, participation and freedom on which the international community has reached a consensus.

But are the "countries" real entities capable of making choices and claiming rights? Who speaks for them? Is "development", however conceived, really uppermost in the purposes of the spokesmen and of the masses of their populations?

If the quest for original styles of development oriented towards the "ultimate purpose" set forth in the 1970 International Development Strategy is to be more than a utopian exercise, it must not only seek to demonstrate the viability and desirability of such styles, but must identify potential agents of them and propose strategies in terms intelligible to these agents. In international discourse, this is the aspect most likely to be evaded.

Statements are either couched in the passive voice, or use the term "we" in a manner that suggests that their authors are certified spokesmen for public opinion in the societies striving to develop. One of the most explicit formulations in an international document up to the present affirms that: "To achieve the desired objective, more radical measures . . . have to be adopted. Whether they are feasible or not depends heavily on the balance of political forces in the country concerned. . . . Unless there is sufficient political commitment to the surmounting of these constraints, efforts to combat poverty are destined to fail[5]."

Formulations of this kind implicitly challenge the realism of most normative declarations. It is one thing to suppose that a well-meaning government is unaware of the things it ought to be doing, and quite another to suppose that it may be uninterested in or incapable of doing these things even after exhortation or scolding.

If the "balance of political forces" is such that a government cannot apply the "radical measures" required for a value-oriented development strategy, what follows? One can fall back on warnings of dire consequences if the advice is not followed, as does the Committee for Development Planning document quoted above: "In mustering the political will and in organizing the required national consensus . . . Governments need to recognize that failing to act – or making no more than token responses to mass poverty and unemployment problems – is likely to yield even more disruptive outcomes"[6].

[5] Committee for Development Planning, *Attack on Mass Poverty and Unemployment* (United Nations Publication, Sales N°: E. 72. II.A.11).

[6] The same point of view is expressed with particular clarity in an address delivered by Mr. Robert S. McNamara to the annual meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development *(Summary Proceedings,* Washington, D.C., 25 September 1972): "Governments exist to promote the welfare of all of their citizens – not just that of a privileged few . . . absolute human degradation – when it reaches the proportions of 30 to 40 per cent of an entire citizenry – cannot be ignored, cannot be suppressed, and cannot be tolerated for too long a time by any government hoping to preserve civil order". "To underprice capital for the wealthy and make credit expensive for the poor; to allow liberal access to scarce resources for the privileged, and price them out of reach of the deprived; to provide

These warnings have not proved convincing in the face of historical evidence that the deliberate organization of radical structural changes in societies is a path with unpredictable consequences for the leaders and social forces entering upon it, and that if the values and perceived immediate interests of the forces controlling the State do not require such changes, it is safer and cheaper for them to allocate resources to an effective repressive apparatus.

In some respects, the constraints set by the dominant world order now seem less rigid than they did a few years ago. At least, the present multifaceted crisis is changing their character in ways that make their future problematic. Nevertheless, certain elements in the world order remain so pervasive that no country can embark on a developmental path radically incompatible with them without the certainty of enormous difficulties and sacrifices.

The dominant life-styles and consumption aspirations may prove even harder to change than the centre-periphery patterns of political, financial, trade, and technological dependency to which so much attention has been devoted. Prescriptions such as that advanced by the Development Planning Committee for the elimination of mass poverty and unemployment may be viable only at the price of protracted social struggles with unpredictable results, involving the emergence of an entirely new power structure.

Under other circumstances, the quest for value-oriented autonomous styles of development may make real policies even more confused and self-contradictory than hitherto, and may terminate in disaster for regimes embarking on the quest without the will or the capacity to handle the consequences.

Value-oriented styles of development will require not only agents capable of setting the society in motion in the desired direction and mobilizing popular participation and support. They must also meet minimum performance standards in terms of resource mobilization and allocation, production and distribution of goods and services, enforcement of priorities, etc., without generating unmanageable societal resistance. The circumstances under which such styles become politically possible

subsidies for the powerful, and deny them to the powerless – these are wholly self-defeating approaches to development. Such policies lead a nation inevitably toward economic imbalance and social instability." The "powerful" and the "privileged" might answer that the State exists precisely to look after their welfare, that there is no infallible way of guaranteeing economic balance and social stability, but that they have in mind ways that are more likely to work for them than those demanded by Mr. McNamara . . . or they might see fit to agree with him publicly and follow their own counsel privately. A remark by Dudley Seers is apposite: "A familiar joke in the international scene today is the attempt by the 'progressive' economist, domestic or foreign, to sell land reform or industrialization, or more effective tax collection, or wider educational opportunity, or greater independence from a foreign power to a government whose *raison d'être* is precisely the *prevention* of such developments, or at least limiting them to the greatest extent possible." ("The Prevalence of Pseudo-Planning", in Mike Faber and Dudley Seers. Ed. *The Crisis in Planning* (Chatto and Windus for Sussex University Press, London, 1972).)

also ensure considerable inefficiency and cross-purposes during a transitional period of learning by experience.

There is no reason to expect existing interest-groups to take the virtues of the new styles for granted, and real shortcomings are bound to reinforce their scepticism or hostility. The proponents of a new style will be under continual temptation to fall back on propaganda, intolerance of criticism, exaggeration of achievements and concealment of mistakes, if they have a monopoly of power, and on compromises whose costs make the original objectives unattainable, if they do not.

If one assumes that nation-states will continue to be the basic framework within which processes identifiable as "development" will be attempted and will succeed or fail, the final question is whether and under what conditions social forces will become dominant that will make the required choices, accept the required sacrifices, and hold to the thread of rational purpose.

2. The setting within which developmental choices present themselves

(a) Central elements in the international consensus on value-oriented development

The most comprehensively normative-utopian among the many international formulations of criteria for development is the Declaration on Social Progress and Development approved by the United Nations General Assembly in 1969 as resolution 2542 (XXIV). The Declaration proposes, in considerable detail, the "elimination" of all the ills that afflict mankind and the provision of all the services that any sector of mankind might require, within a setting of freedom, equal rights, and participation of "all members of society".

This Declaration is the culmination of a series of attempts to define "social development" as a reality separate from "economic development" and hospitably includes such a wide range of the meanings that specialists in the different sectors of public social action have attached to the term that it is of little help towards distinguishing the central elements in the international consensus.

The unanimous approval of such a sweeping text, which if taken literally would call for transformation of the practices and priorities of all the organized societies of the world, and the minimal attention that has been paid to it since, even in the secretariats of the international agencies, are worthy of note.

The pursuit of universalist "social" standards for development could hardly go farther. Since then international efforts have taken a somewhat different direction, discussed in Chapter II above: towards the definition of a "unified approach" to development, conceived as a societal process in which "economic" means cannot be satisfactorily separated from "social" ends, and in which the meaning of what is done depends on the characteristics of the society in which it is done and the overall purposes of the dominant forces in the society.

The "Quito Appraisal" of the 1970 International Development Strategy, which the 15th session of the Economic Commission for Latin America in 1973 adopted as resolution 320 (XV) deserves extended quotation as one of the most ambitious inter-governmental formulations of such an approach. "Integrated" development, according to the Quito Appraisal, and practically identical texts adopted by the Commission up to 1979:

– Aims at a "new type of society", or "a social system that gives priority to the equality and dignity of man and respects and fosters the cultural expression of the population". "Social participation in all forms of the development process must be increased in order to achieve a juster society".

– Is incompatible with "traditional" social and economic structures and requires "qualitative and structural changes". The Appraisal does not define the "traditional" structures, but states that the needed changes "include the control and sovereign utilization of natural resources, the reform of land tenure systems . . ., the establishment of such forms of public or mixed ownership of property as each country may consider appropriate . . ., and any other type of substantive reform needed to secure that objective".

– "Cannot be achieved through partial efforts in particular sectors of the economy or the social system, but only through concerted progress in all aspects." "The very concept of development must be improved and the fragmentary approach to economic growth and human development discarded . . . it is necessary to take an integrated view of all the social, economic and political determinants."

– Should not be identified with economic growth, which "has frequently failed to bring with it qualitative changes of equal importance in human wellbeing and social justice" and has coincided with "the continued existence of serious problems such as mass poverty, the incapacity of the system of production to provide employment for the growing labour force, and the lack of economic and social participation of broad strata of the population". However, "accelerated, harmonious and independent growth is essential to the success of these qualitative and structural changes".

– Should be self-sustaining and independent at the national level. However, when "a country simultaneously tackles all aspects of development and promotes the structural reforms needed to achieve integrated development, experience indicates that imbalances occur in the initial stages which make it difficult to continue the process. The social injustices and tensions which have accumulated over the years manifest themselves in demands which domestic resources cannot meet. In order to correct these imbalances, the international co-operation received by such a country should not be subject to restrictions . . .".

The Appraisal assumes that endorsement of the above criteria for "integrated development" by the Latin American countries is compatible with "a high degree of heterogeneity in their economies and societies" and also with "different approaches to the development process, with each model having different options or

methods of implementation", and with the pursuit of "medium and long-term policies . . . whose basic principles, both political and economic, differ substantially. Hence, there is no single model to which the appraisal can refer".

Taken together, the above criteria and suppositions constitute elements for a conception of development that is both value-oriented and "structural", but compatible with diverse combinations of ends and means. They call implicitly for a considerable amplification of action by the State, informed and given coherence by values and the pursuit of structural change. They assume that such action is compatible with the character of the internal social forces controlling the State. They assume that full "participation" by all strata of the population is not merely compatible with "integrated development" oriented by the State, but is an essential component of such development.

The Appraisal states that "the developing countries have adopted internal policies and made efforts to attain the goals and objectives stipulated" in the International Development Strategy. However, "imbalances", "tensions", and "demands which domestic resources cannot meet" have endangered or frustrated the efforts of the countries embarking on structural changes, thus indicating a contradiction between the ideal of integrated policy and the ideal of full participation.

The Appraisal indicates that up to the present the role of the international order has on the whole been nagative: "the necessary co-operation has not been forthcoming from the developed countries to complement (internal) efforts"; "countries undertaking structural changes in conformity with the IDS sometimes have to face hostility and economic aggression from abroad".

Nevertheless, the Appraisal falls back on future international co-operation, governed by a "dynamic set of rules", to be achieved through united action of the developing countries, to resolve the contradictions between integrated policy aimed at structural change, limited resources, and the need for broader participation or at least reduce them to manageable proportions.

The criteria for integrated development advanced by the Quito Appraisal are more focussed and coherent as well as more flexible than those of earlier international declarations; they represent a clear advance over the conceptions of "economic development" as a process with its own inexorable laws and requirements, to be somehow tamed and humanized by "social development" governed by detailed universal norms derived from the social legislation and services of high-income countries.

Inevitably, considering the circumstances of its adoption, while the Appraisal calls for far-reaching changes in the role of the State and of national social forces, in the international order of relations between States, and in the relations between economic processes and human purposes, it does not face up to the questions of basic compatibility with the national and international order and of the capacities of these orders for self-transformation.

It is open to the criticism that it requires a *deus ex machina* at the national level to bring order out of the clash of purposes and strategies of different groups and the complex repercussions, not necessarily wanted or intended by any group, of the economic, social, political, and demographic processes that are now working themselves out in each national society.

Another *deus ex machina* would be needed at the international level to meet the needs that cannot be met nationally, or that can be met only at a price – in terms of privations and compulsion – incompatible with the criteria.

(b) Central elements in the previous international consensus on "development" as a process with uniform requirements

As was indicated above, the interminable international discussions on development during the past three decades never arrived at clear agreement on the meaning of development and how to attain it, but in spite of the continual confrontation of propositions deriving from Marx and from Keynes and of practices ranging between the extremes of "central planning" based on State ownership of the means of production and "market economies" restricting State intervention to a minimum of regulation and infrastructural investment, a partially explicit international consensus emerged on the requirements of "development" for societies labelled "underdeveloped" or "developing" or simply "poor".

It is these requirements that are now coming under question, in regard to their feasibility or their desirability or their meaningfulness, although even the most radical challenges can hardly reject them wholesale, or evade their central premise on the indispensability of much higher levels of productive capacity.

They can be summarized as follows:

(i) Accumulation. Development supposes high rates of capital investment so as to increase future capacity for production of goods and services. For most national societies, accumulation must come mainly from domestic resources; main reliance for their mobilization and allocation may be placed either on the State or on individuals responding to economic incentives.

(ii) Industrialization. No country can attain "development" as long as it remains predominantly rural-agricultural, although export-oriented agriculture may support considerable increases in per capita income and make accumulation possible. The literature often uses "industrialized" as a synonym for "developed".

(iii) Agricultural modernization. "Traditional" systems of land ownership and rural social relationships are associated with low productivity, immobilization of human resources, unresponsiveness to market incentives. According to different conceptions the changes may be limited to modernization of incentives and productive techniques, or may involve revolutionary changes in property and power.

(iv) Standardization of consumer demands. With many variations and qualifications it has been assumed that development requires the bringing of continually wider strata, and eventually the whole population, into a national market for consumer goods, in which the rewards of sacrifice in the early stages of accumulation will be increasing capacity to acquire a wider range of industrially-produced goods, with rising production and consumption continually stimulating each other. The culmination of development is then mass private ownership of automobiles, television receivers, and electrical appliances.

(v) Entrepreneurship. Development requires special kinds of responsiveness to economic incentives, capacity to organize large-scale production, innovate, and take risks. This function, according to different conceptions, may best be carried out by private entrepreneurs seeking profit, by managers acting on behalf of the State and compensated by power or pride in contributions to the good of society, or by a combination of the two.

(vi) Technological and scientific diffusion. Development requires continual technological innovation, based largely on scientific research. In view of the technological superiority of the rich countries over the poor and their vastly greater research capacities, the needs of the latter can be met mainly by selective borrowing. This requires "technical assistance" furnished by "experts" from the technologically advanced countries.

(vii) Universal education. Development requires many kinds of specialized "human resources" and a population capable of grasping and responding to "modern" incentives. This requisite can be attained only through the universalization of primary education and the expansion of many kinds of secondary, technical and higher education, along lines for which the "developed" countries offer models.

(viii) Provision of social services and social security. Modernization, urbanization, and associated changes accompanying development require a widening range of public services and protective mechanisms, in addition to education, to alleviate social tensions and enable individuals to function as "human resources", consumers and citizens. Views differ as to the priority to be given to such services and mechanisms, but even the most concentratedly economic conceptions of development admit their unavoidability. Once again, the "developed" countries offer models for the organization of social security, social welfare, public health, family planning, etc., that can be introduced and adapted to the extent that the stage of development permits.

(ix) Continually expanding participation in world trade. Development requires a high level of imports to meet the demands of industrialization and agricultural modernization, and rising incomes mean a demand for consumer goods that cannot be satisfied from domestic production. Thus exports must continually rise to pay for imports, the prices of exports must not undergo pronounced slumps, and, ideally, exports of manufactures must gradually gain in importance relative to raw

materials, although volume and prices of exports ot the latter will continue to be of crucial imporance.

(x) Rising net financial flows from "developed" (rich) countries to "developing" (poor) countries. Only in exceptional circumstances can the preceding requirements be met through the unaided mobilization of internal resources and through foreign exchange derived from exports. The development of poor countries requires some combination of financial grants, low-interest loans, and direct investments coming from the rich countries, with the needed proportions depending on the initial situation and development strategy of the poor country.

Different schools of thought have advanced many additional requirements for "development", ranging from the taking of power by a class capable of imposing determined modes of accumulation and production to the transformation of child-rearing practices in the family, as more basic than any of the above. Consensus on those listed, however, has been fairly general. Even the proponents of different priorities have had to argue, in order to get a hearing, that their proposals would contribute to the attainment of these requirements.

It was accepted that the future world, to the extent that more and more national societies conformed to these requirements, would become more homogeneous, less conflict-ridden, and more capable of supporting satisfactory levels of welfare for most of its population.

In the course of national and international efforts to meet the requirements, and as a result of unplanned social and economic processes pointing in the same direction, most human societies have changed enormously since the 1940s. A different world order has emerged, in many respects more interdependent, imposing more complex constraints on change in national societies than ever before. In other respects paradoxically, the possibilities for autonomous voluntarist action, for better or worse, have widened, and also the possibilities for societal changes or breakdowns escaping from the control of any power centre, national or international.

The deliberate political and economic constraints imposed by the world centres on the development of the periphery may be weakening, and the capacity of the centres to offer the periphery coherent and attractive models for change is weakening more incontrovertibly, but other constraints inherent in the partial and distorted attainment of the development requirements listed above are becoming more formidable.

The next stage in the present exploration will be to try to summarize certain central features of the world order that have emerged in the course of the struggle for development, to which declarations such as the IDS and the Quito Appraisal are reacting.

(c) Characteristics of the present world order in relation to the conventionally-defined requirements of development and the possibility of autonomous national choices of styles and strategies

An interpretative description of the world economic and political order in its present state of flux, in which the events of each year confound the expectations of the preceding one, would be a risky undertaking and beyond the pretensions of the present discussion. The most that can be done is to single out certain features that seem particularly relevant:

(i) Continual changes in the dominant preocupations in the world centres are generating corresponding changes and increasing diversity in the forms of control, advice and co-operation through which the government and interest groups of these centres try to deal with the peripheral societies.

A certain loss of confidence in previous prescriptions, or even of interest in the very theme of aided development, in the main centres coincides with increasing sympathy and support in certain smaller high-income countries for original and autonomous styles of development elsewhere. A kind of vicarious utopianism has appeared which, although it may under-estimate or misjudge the real difficulties of value-oriented development in poor and dependent countries, does something to widen the options open to them.

At the same time, the "visibility" of more specific developmental problems is shifting and dominant currents of opinion in the world centres continually urge, through the international organizations, new priorities on the peripheral societies. The most conspicuous examples are the rise of worldwide campaigns, backed by significant resources from the world centres, relating to "population" and the "environment".

Equitable income distribution and full employment have similarly come to the fore, although without a comparable disposition in the world centres to allocate resources to their attainment. With increasingly coherent tactics, the spokesmen of the peripheral societies seek to adapt the campaigns and resource availabilities deriving from the changing visibility of problems to their own conceptions of needs, *especially* for more favourable terms of trade and aid.

(ii) While the disproportion in per capita wealth and in power between the world centres and the periphery is certainly not diminishing, the forms of dominance and dependency are changing and becoming in some respects ambivalent. The spread of industrialization and its increasing dominance by transnational corporations whose national affiliates are capable of self-financing transforms the previous patterns of exchange of raw materials for manufactured goods; it also renders obsolete the previous conceptions of "foreign investment".

The latest technological innovations in the centres are increasingly remote from the needs and capacities of the peripheral societies, or possibly even from those of

the centres (as in the case of supersonic transport) but the search for technological alternatives progresses very little.

The low-income predominantly rural countries find themselves increasingly dependent on the high-income urbanized countries for food supplies, but the latter countries rather suddenly find that their own life-styles, with their reliance on automotive transport and high consumption of electrical energy, have led them into a trap of dependence on peripheral societies as well as an environmental nightmare.

Economic aggression has become a more diversified as well as a more menacing weapon than heretofore, and some of the peripheral societies are becoming able to use it as effectively as the centres. Both have the capacity of making "normal" functioning in other countries impossible by withholding supplies.

(iii) The processes of "development" or "modernization" in the peripheral countries, to the extent that they have taken place, and the rather compartmentalized economic and social programmes undertaken in their name, have invariably been characterized by polarization between groups able to "modernize" and benefit materially, and larger groups that do so only "marginally" or suffer absolute deprivation.

In one way or another, all of the programmes counted on to enhance welfare and generalize development – from industrialization and agricultural modernization to education, public health and social security – seem to contribute to this polarization, or "structural heterogeneity". Policies proposed specifically to improve the relative positions of the more marginal groups, such as community development, regional development, and agrarian reform, conform to the same pattern of polarized gains, or remain puny and impotent, or encounter structural resistance that destroys them.

The problem is not simply that some parts of the national populations progress while others stagnate. The forms of "progress" impinge on the latter groups in ways that prevent them from "stagnating". The momentum of what has been done, the expectations of all social groups, and the differential access to power of the modernized groups make basic changes in the pattern of polarized growth problematic, conflictive and costly, even if dominant political forces have a clear strategy for change, which is rarely the case.

(iv) As polarization emerges more clearly as a key characteristic of "developing" societies, and to some extent even of societies previously identified as "developed", and as wider strata of the population "participate", at least to the extent of becoming conscious of the impact of change processes and seeking means of defending themselves, the compatibility of "development" and "participation" and the viability of democratic institutions and processes comes under question.

Whether the aim is to maintain the prevailing polarized style of development – if it is judged the only viable style – or to transform it, authoritarian and technocratic solutions come to seem unavoidable. The national armed forces, preferably guided by social scientists and planners, are measured for the role of *deus ex machina*,

whether they want it or not, and even by sectors of opinion with no stomach for authoritarian rule.

In the minds of groups seeking means of implanting a preferred style of development, it comes to seem more practicable to apply Disraeli's saying, "We must educate our masters", to the armed forces than to the people. Within the present world order, military leaders are trying to impose an extraordinarily wide range of styles of development in different countries, as a consequence of the failure of previous régimes to reconcile "development" and "participation". Such régimes present the likelihood of more coherent and original policy choices – sometimes to the point of arbitrariness – than the régimes dependent on open political bargaining and compromise, but it remains to be seen whether such choices will be more consistently enforceable than the previous ones.

Within the pattern of partial frustration of development, or unsatisfying "dependent development", the long-term trend may be cyclical rather than consistently in the direction of military-authoritarian solutions: the failure of political compromise leads to military takeovers, but the inability of the military and their technocratic-ideological advisers to cope with the complexity of the processes leads back to open political competition.

(v) The identification of the "modern" sectors of the populations of the peripheral societies with the standards of their counterparts in the advanced societies becomes more complex and ambiguous as this identification clashes with the crises of standards in their countries of origin. Interest-groups or organizations (from chambers of commerce to trade unions), political parties, academic structures, transnational corporations, bureaucracies, brands of manufactured consumer goods, mass media content: all these experience world standardization and simultaneous reactions against standardization.

The polarized peripheral societies import ideological "antibodies" along with the traits of the "affluent" societies and also develop their own antibodies that are re-exported to the high-income societies and enter into their cultural-political conflicts. In this sense, a world society is taking shape, characterized not by the harmonious incorporation of standardized high production and high consumption previously looked to as a consequence of "development", but by a self-contradictory combination of increasing assimilation of this pattern and increasing rejection of or frustration with it.

In the *peripheral* societies the non-incorporation or marginalization of part of the population exacerbates this contradictory process in two ways: by heightening the defensiveness of the "modernized" strata towards their privileged position, and by heightening the ideological rejection of dependent development. The two reactions can, of course, coexist conflictively in the same individual or the same policy formulation.

3. Policy approaches to the challenge of "unified", "original", and "value-oriented" or "human-oriented" styles of development

Our argument makes two major suppositions. The first – with reservations – is that development is a legitimately identifiable process subject to certain uniformities and preconditions, but that these uniformities and preconditions are not rigidly binding nor a satisfactory basis for prediction of the future. The second is that human reason and human values can and should try to shape the future into national styles different from those prevailing up to the present[7]. "Development" cannot mean anything anyone wants it to mean, but, if it is to continue to serve as a focus for human aspirations, it must embrace a certain range of differing combinations of ends and means.

Three main kinds of approach to the definition of these ends and means can be distinguished: the utopian-normative, the technocratic-rationalistic and the socio-political. Up to a point, these are complementary.

The pursuit of more acceptable and viable styles of development must be referred to images of the future social order – in other words, to a "utopia" – and to norms setting limits on the means to be used. The quest for more rational and efficient techniques for mobilization and allocation of resources, provision of services, and accomplishment of whatever objectives the society sets itself is unavoidable, whatever caveats may be entertained as to the lengths to which this quest should be followed and the virtues of the market or of participatory democracy.

Finally, social and political forces, however these may be defined, must choose the utopias and norms and create and apply the technocratic-rationalistic planning and administrative mechanisms.

For obvious reasons, the utopian-normative and technocratic-rationalistic approaches have received a good deal more attention in official and semi-official international discourse than the socio-political. The fact that such discourse is conducted by government representatives or by "experts" addressing themselves to governments, as pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, promotes the supposition that the governments stand for rational, benevolent and coherent entities preoccupied with development and the welfare of all their people, anxiously seeking advice on how to accomplish these ends, and capable of acting on the advice.

If their behaviour does not correspond to this image, they deserve scolding for corruption, for the pursuit of irrelevant objectives such as military power, for slackness and evasiveness in pursuing their declared policies (in Gunnar Myrdal's words for being "soft States"), but the supposition remains that the "government"

[7] This position is set forth in the *Report on a Unified Approach to Development Analysis and Planning*, quoted in Chapter II.

or the "State" has sufficient autonomy to do better if "it" wants to, or if "it" is sufficiently alarmed at the dire consequences of not doing better.

Non-official academic and ideological discourse, particularly in the "developing" countries, shows a different world, in which external domination and internal distribution of power determine what governments can do, in which the governments are commonly incoherent aggregates of diverse personalistic, bureaucratic and other purposes, and in which it is naive or intellectually dishonest to expect them to act differently on the basis of moral exhortations or rational arguments.

The utopian-normative and the technocratic-rationalistic approaches have to a large extent been pursued separately, by different groups in the national governments and the intergovernmental organizations, but the advocates of each have tried to borrow strength from the other. The proponents of universalistic social norms have aspired to guide the technocratic planners and administrators, and have commonly exaggerated the power of the planners and the results to be expected from "convincing" them of the importance of social justice or placing spokesmen for the "social" point of view in planning bodies. The planners and administrators have commonly tried to justify their techniques and enlist wider support by hinting at eventual contributions to the attainment of social justice.

In recent years both of these approaches – although numerous institutions continue to elaborate and teach them along previous lines – have been increasingly frustrated by confrontation with socio-political realities and increasingly complicated or adulterated by attempts to adjust them to these realities or adjust the realities to them. Apologies for both approaches fall back continually on what might be labelled the "bureaucratic passive voice" or on the wistful assertion of a "growing awareness" in order to evade the obligations to identify the socio-political agents to whom they are addressed.

Enough has already been said about the utopian-normative approach. Its shortcomings when pursued in isolation (or its illegitimate uses as an evasion of reality) are cruelly exposed in a world in which the dimensions of injustice, insecurity and violence continue to grow while the list of "rights" to which all human beings are entitled by the votes of their governments continues to lengthen. The confrontation of the technocratic-rationalistic approach with recalcitrant realities is more complex, since its practitioners are more intimately involved in the machinery of the State, the demands of classes and groups, and the need of the political leadership for "solutions" to "problems".

One result has been an extensive literature on the "crisis in planning"[8]. As in the case of "development" itself, if the meaning previously attached to planning is discredited, it is assumed that "planning" must mean something else, and the alter-

[8] See, in particular, Mike Faber and Dudley Seers, Ed., *The Crisis in Planning* (Chatto and Windus for Sussex University Press, two volumes. London, 1972). See also section III of "Report on a Unified Approach to Development Analysis and Planning", *op. cit.*

natives proposed range from a continuous, diffused rationalizing activity in which the whole society participates, to the formulation of operational guidelines for short-term choices between projects.

Public administration as a "discipline" shows a similar loss of confidence and diversification of prescriptions, combined with a similar clinging to faith that it must mean *something* generalizable and applicable to the rationalization of what the State does in the name of society. One critic has retorted: "If planning is everything, maybe it's nothing"[9]

Blind Alley

From the standpoint of the present discussion, the utopian-normative and technocratic-rationalistic approaches can escape from the blind alley of verbalism and ritual action only to the extent that their proponents relate them to socio-political approaches that identify agents and propose strategies consonant with the values,

[9] "Despite intermittent disaffection with planning – the contrast between the plan and the nation mocked the planners – it was difficult for national élites to lose sight of the promised land. They so wanted an easy way out of their troubles. Besides, they soon discovered that the non-operational quality of planning could be helpful. . . . Formal planning may be useful as an escape from the insurmountable problems of the day . . . If groups cannot be indulged in the present, they can be shown the larger places they occupy in future plans. Formal planning can also be a way of buying off the apostles of rationality by involving them in tasks that take them away from the real decisions. . . . If formal planning fails not merely in one nation at one time but in virtually all nations most of the time, the defects are unlikely to be found in maladroit or untalented planners. Nor can a failure be argued rationally by saying that the countries in question are not prepared to behave rationally or to accept the advice of rational men called planners. That is only a way of saying that formal planning, after innumerable iterations, is still badly adapted to its surroundings. It cannot be rational to fail. To err is human, to sancify the perpetuation of mistakes is something else. If governments persevere in national planning, it must be because their will to believe triumphs over their experience. Planning is not so much a subject for the social scientist as for the theologian". (Aaron Wildawsky, "If Planning is Everything, Maybe It's Nothing", *Policy Sciences*, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 4, 1973.) A similar conclusion was foreshadowed several years before in Albert O. Hirschman's well-known comment on the planning activities of CEPAL: ". . . CEPAL's design has a utopian ring for societies where simple ministerial changes frequently mean total reversals of policies and where the policy makers themselves take pride in being unpredictable . . . CEPAL's detailed projections where all economic sectors are made to mesh harmoniously are in a sense the twentieth century equivalent of Latin America's nineteenth century constitutions – and are as far removed from the real world. They are a protest, both pathetic and subtle, against a reality where politicians relying on brilliant or disastrous improvisations hold sway, where decisions are taken under multiple pressures rather than in advance of crisis and emergency situations, and where conflicts are resolved on the basis of personal considerations after the contending parties have revealed their strength in more or less open battle rather than in accordance with objective principles and scientific criteria". ("Ideologies of Economic Development in Latin America", in A.O. Hirschman, Ed., *Latin American Issues: Essays and Comments* (New York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1961.)

interests, and capabilities of these agents. This position, however, is vulnerable to criticism from several directions; it certainly does not offer any straightforward or universally "applicable" "solution" to the problem of advancing towards original and value-oriented styles of development.

The kinds of agent of development that are sought and the range of choice attributed to them in the shaping of a style of development naturally depend on the conception of development and the interpretation of the nature and functioning of human societies. There is no *a priori* reason to assume that the agents "needed" for an acceptable and viable style of development will emerge in any given society, or that, if they do emerge, they will be able to accomplish their "historic mission", or that if they do accomplish such a mission, the society will be unequivocally and permanently better off than before.

Nor does it seem necessary to assume *a priori* that the same kind of agent, whether collective and acting out a predetermined role, or individual and with a large measure of free will, must play *deus ex machina* in all societies, as most schools of theory and ideology assert. The would-be intellectual agents of development – the last of the five categories distinguished below – might well assume that any of the categories can be decisive in certain conjunctures but marginal or even illusory in others.

The five categories are as follows:

(i) Social classes and groups that fill key roles in the "working out" of a conventionally-defined style of development, on the basis of their relations to production and their collective views of their own *interests:* entrepreneurs, investors, technological innovators, technicians, "middle classes", workers, etc.

Collective agents such as these can fill their roles more or less adequately, or can find that the economic and social structure or the terms of dependency are incompatible with the adequate discharge of such roles, but the associated conceptions of development do not allow for major creativeness or voluntarism in changing the style, whether the underlying conception is Marxian or non-Marxian.

(ii) Individuals or small groups that articulate the demands of larger groups or classes, act as brokers, and mould public opinion: politicians, leaders of trade unions and other interest-group organizations, journalists, religious leaders, etc.

In view of the relative lack of coherence of the larger groups or classes, agents of this kind are able to play relatively autonomous roles, but at the price of limited and precarious real capacity to enforce demands and influence change processes. Their apparent importance is likely to be suddenly inflated and deflated, as in the case of populist leaders elected to the presidency with large popular votes and then easily forced out of office.

Their influence may depend more on their ties with the kinds of agents next to be discussed than on the groups they aspire to represent. As "agents of development" their effectiveness is limited not only by these factors but also by the importance of brokerage and manoeuvering in their roles. They are likely to view

the advocacy of a "style of development" as an additional tactic either to lend plausibility to the role or to reinforce more concrete objectives, rather than as an overriding purpose.

(iii) Individuals or small groups holding power deriving from control of armed forces, ownership of capital, or representation of one of the dominant world centres. Since the power of these potential agents does not depend on ability to mobilize support from part of the population and build coalitions, they might be expected to be in a position to act more coherently (or arbitrarily) in pursuit of a style of development than the agents in the second group.

Their *applicable* power, however, is limited by several aspects of their own situations.

(a) Their primary power rests on a specific conjuncture and can suddenly disappear; the military leader can be ousted by his subordinates, the capitalist can be crippled by a financial crisis, the world centre may be diverted by internal problems or its overall political strategy may shift so as to undermine the position of its representative.

(b) The power holders' values and conceptions of their own roles do not usually extend to the implantation of an original style of development; they are more concerned with the preservation of existing order and warding off threats to their privileged position.

(c) Their detachment from the representation of large classes or groups limits their capacity to induce the population to act in accordance with their objectives. Once they set themselves the task of implanting a coherent style of development, they must enlist the aid of agents of the second type, attempt to fill these roles themselves, or find effective means of isolating the population from political appeals and interest-group *representation.*

(iv) The chief of state or national executive: the individual or collective entity formally responsible for public decision-making, appointment of public functionaries, broad choices concerning allocation of resources, formulation of guidelines for development. This entity is the conventional target for developmental advice, the modern successor of Machiavelli's Prince.

Utopian normative and technocratic-rational prescriptions are formally addressed to the Prince; a good deal of the more recent socio-political discussion addresses the question: How to give him advice that he can use, on the assumption that he is playing a difficult game with limited "political resources" and inadequate information? In practice, the Prince may turn out to be elusive, even in authoritarian settings; his formal representation decides very little and absorbs hardly any

of the advice showered on him; the real sources of decisions are dispersed and hidden.[10]

(v) Individuals or small groups aspiring to explain the functioning of a society, articulate images of preferable future societies based on their values and on their diagnosis of the existing situation, formulate corresponding strategies, and enlist support from one or more of the preceding types of agents.

A well-known remark by John Maynard Keynes summed up 40 years ago the potentialities, shortcomings, and dangers of their influence on the other agents: "... the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas. Not, indeed, immediately, but after a certain interval; for in the field of economic and political philosophy there are not many who are influenced by new theories after they are 25 or 30 years of age, so that the ideas which civil servants and politicians and even agitators apply to current events are not likely to be the newest[11].

These last named "agents of development" include the proponents of the utopian-normative and technocratic-rationalistic approaches discussed above, to the extent that these try to confront the socio-political application of their prescriptions. They notoriously offer a bewilderingly wide range of prescriptions, none of which have as yet been incontrovertibly successful in their contacts with reality. They fall into three roughly distinguishable groups: the planners, the reformist-meliorists, and the revolutionaries.

The planners, as the most conspicuous representatives of the technocratic-rationalistic approach, have already been discussed. For a brief period the impression gained ground in circles concerned with development that neutral techniques had been devised or were on the point of being devised that could be "applied" by any government taking them seriously so as to bring forth a predictable product – "development". This impression has gone by the board, and the planners have been

[10] "There is, as a rule, no single and invariant 'locus of sovereignty'. Sovereignty is shared among various groups in different constellations at different times. ...The existence of a cabinet (or a junta) may conceal the extent to which the decision-making process is, in fact, dispersed". (Colin Leys, "A New Conception of Planning? " *Crisis in Planning, op. cit.*, Vol.1, p. 60.)

[11] John Maynard Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (New York, Harcourt Brace and Co., 1936, p. 383 -4).

scolded repeatedly – and have scolded themselves – for their isolation from political realities and the inadequacy of their techniques.[12]

They have tried to define their relationships to political agents, to associate themselves with "participation", to find means of transforming rather than furthering the prevailing style of economic development.

The question then arises, as Wildawsky suggests in the quotation above, whether they retain any plausible case for remaining a "discipline" with common techniques, offering definable services to public policy, whether they are not merging into the other categories of intellectual agents of development. To the extent that the planning approach remains distinct, and its practitioners do not resign themselves to ornamental roles and academic exercises, it supposes the possibility of completely rational management of human affairs in pursuit of quantified goals . . . if only the correct prescription can be discovered and the right agents convinced of its correctness and marshalled to apply it.[13]

Distrust of Utopias

The reformist-meliorists have in common a distrust of utopias, infallible technocratic prescriptions, and catastrophist demonstrations that a prevailing pattern of growth and change cannot continue because it functions unjustly and inefficiently. They aspire to understand socio-economico-political structures so as to work within them for value-oriented ends, on the supposition that these structures are never

[12] The following remarks by Dudley Seers are representative: ". . . his approach is likely to be static. The planner's university education is not likely to have provided him with much help in thiking abbout how economies operate at different levels of development (and with different institutions). He is hardly prepared, therefore, to look at the economic, let alone the social, realities and ask how the resources of the country might be mobilized for change – as some politicians would really like him to do . . . It is especially likely . . . that the planner will fail to understand the extent to which political realities determine the geographical patterns of government expenditures or the sources of foreign aid. . . . His social life brings him into contact with the (usually articulate) residents of the capital; so indeed does his official life. . . .Yet the population of the capital is very different in income, occupation, etc., not merely from that of the countryside, but also from the public in other cities. . . . The planner will tend to incorporate in his model the myths prevalent in the capital about the consumption and production functions of the rest of the country. . . . Perhaps most significant of all is the planner's attitude to the quality of the statistics he is using . . . the economics student is taught to handle numbers as if they were objective facts, instead of being, as they usually are, nothing more than enlightened guesses". ("The Prevalence of Pseudo-Planning", *The Crisis in Planning, op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 25–28.).

[13] "If planning is a universal tool, planners find it reasonable to ask why their countries cannot live up to the requirements of rational decision-making. If planning is valid, they feel, nations should adjust to its demands rather than the other way round. To save planning, planners may actually accept the blame. For if better behaviour on their part would make planning work, the solution is not to abandon plans but to hire more talented planners." (Aaron Wildawsky, *op. cit.*).

going to be perfectly rational and oriented to human welfare, on the one hand, nor irremediably oppressive and incompatible with value-oriented development, on the other. National consensus on societal goals is not to be expected.[14]

Uncertainty is a permanently unavoidable concomitant of human affairs, and development is an open-ended process calling for flexible tactics to take advantage of opportunities as they present themselves. The reformist-meliorists prefer to act in societies with open political competition and articulate interest-groups, but they are not surprised nor moved to withdraw from attempts to influence policy if these conditions are not present. They do not see revolution as a precondition to an acceptable style of development, but if revolutions occur they view them as new concatenations of challenges and opportunities, to be studied sympathetically.

The reformist-meliorist outlook permits a subtle appreciation of the complexities of policy-making and the ambiguities of most change processes in terms of their impact on human welfare, but it also supports a certain Panglossian smugness, a predisposition to find reasons for affirming that all is for the best, if not in the best of all possible worlds, at least in as good a world as humanity has any reason to expect, and that incremental reforms combined with human genius for muddling through will gradually make it a little better.[15]

In practice, reforms and spontaneous developmental processes that have been hailed as shining examples have so often later collapsed or stagnated that the reformist-meliorist approaches, like the technocratic planning approaches, are less credible than a few years ago. At best, they offer no comfort to the international demands for an immediate end to poverty and injustice. Nevertheless, no convincing real alternative is at hand for the international organizations and the "experts" aspiring to influence policy within concrete national situations – however much intellectual allegiance they may owe to utopian-normative and technocratic-rationalistic schemes.

[14] "There is no such thing as a collective national 'objective function'. There is rather a complicated mix of goals, which may be understood partly in terms of a limited number of themes around which there is something like consensus or for which there is at least a substantial majority support, but which for most of the time is fluid and changing. At different moments, different groups have priority and different perception of self-interest and collective interest dominate. The planner's problem is to be able to build plans around a limited number of goals, isolated from the rest, for which a necessary minimum of support appears to be assurable during a necessary minimum period." (Colin Leys, "A New Conception of Planning? ", *Crisis in Planning, op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 72.)

[15] Albert O. Hirschman has labelled this approach "reform-mongering", and has been one of its most avowed and ingenious practitioners. See, in particular, *A Bias for Hope: Essays on Development and Latin America* (New Haven and London; Yale University Press, 1971). The writings of Aaron Wildawsky, John Friedman, and Albert Waterston, along with most of the contributions to *Crisis in Planning, op, cit.*, offer variants on the approach. The most explicit formulations of it come from the English-speaking countries. Elsewhere, there seems to be more reluctance on the part of persons concerned with development policy to acknowledge it as a guiding principle and as a virtue, although their practical tactics cannot help following it.

The revolutionary or "counterplanning" outlook – to the extent that it is not contaminated by technocratic or reformist-meliorist hopes – starts from the premise that the existing socio-political order is radically incompatible with a value-oriented style of development, or with full unfolding of the human potential. Therefore – depending on the diagnosis of the stage this order has reached, the way it functions, and the constraints imposed on national action by the world order – the primary task is either to demolish it or to promote its ripening to a point at which demolition will become feasible.

The agents that have been previously assessed – classes and groups, their mobilizers and spokesmen, holders of primary power, the personified State or national executive – and the policies advanced by technocrats and reformist-meliorists are then assessed in terms of their potential contributions to demolition, the accomplishment of stages of "development" leading to ripeness for demolition, or the strengthening of the existing order against demolition.

The place of the agents in an eventual value-oriented style of development and the concrete policies required recede to a secondary level of speculation or become confused with the immediate instrumental role of agents and policies. In relation to national societies undergoing polarized and dependent "development", the revolutionary outlook is bolstered by the obvious and persisting lack of correspondence of the existing situation with human values, and the abundant evidence that the best-intentioned technocratic and reformist-meliorist schemes are either ineffectual or contribute to the polarization between classes and groups.

At the same time, the outlook is fragmented and frustrated by the failure of the societies to meet the preconditions for revolution set by the theories underlying the revolutionary outlook. The "proletarian" class that schould be the grave-digger of the existing order is not growing markedly in relative size nor organizational coherence and seems more disposed to uphold the order than to overturn it. The "marginalized" or "sub-proletarian" strata whose wellbeing seems most incompatible with perpetuation of the existing order, in their ambiguous relations to the systems of production and employment and to the State, respond poorly to coherent revolutionary appeals.

Moreover, the pervasiveness and complexity of present economic, political and cultural interdependence with the world centres suggests that demolition of the existing order at the national level will either be altogether impracticable or will imply costs in terms of societal disruption, repression or enforced closure of the society that would make posterior value-oriented development problematic.

To the extent that this last constraint is acknowledged the national revolutionary must take into account international as well as national "ripeness" for change.

The revolutionary rejection of the existing order as a framework or starting point toward a style of development deserving support can obviously lead to a wide

range of different tactical conclusions. The revolutionary can concentrate on the task of immediate demolition, or at least of making the existing order unworkable, on the assumption that this will help generate the preconditions for transformation.

Or he can try to redefine the preconditions, experiment with tactical alliances, and await favourable conjunctures in a manner indistinguishable from the reformist-meliorist approach except in the underlying suppositions.

Or he can try to create and mobilize support for a utopia so compelling that its appeal will outweigh unfavourable objective conditions.

And the reformist-meliorist tactics may, in the end, even find some variants of the revolutionary outlook positive in their capacity to generate a dynamism that their own views of needed changes require but cannot muster[16].

[16] "... there is a special justification for the direct search for novelty, creativity, and uniqueness: without these attributes change, at least large-scale social change, may not be possible at all. For, in the first place, the powerful social forces opposed to change will be quite proficient at blocking off those paths to change that have already been trod. Secondly, revolutionaries or radical reformers are unlikely to generate the extraordinary social energy they need to achieve change unless they are exhilaratingly conscious of writing an entirely new page of human history". (Albert O. Hirschman, *A. Bias for Hope, op. cit.*, p. 28.).

CHAPTER FIVE

Social and Political Structures and Development Policy

The State unavoidably constitutes the principal frame of reference within which development objectives are defined and policies applied, and this frame of reference presents some of the most intractable problems. The "modern" State, with its internationally recognized attributes, sources of legitimacy, and identification with the conception of "nation", emerged from a specific conjuncture of political, economic and cultural factors in one of the major world regions, Europe. It has been linked throughout its historical evolution with two mutually contradictory but equally conflict-engendering drives: toward imperialist expansion and dominance over weaker peoples, and toward assertion of "national" identity in defiance of existing boundaries and claims of sovereignty.

Over the past two centuries the formal institutions of the nation-state have been transplanted throughout the world, among peoples having quite different pre-existing systems of political organization and conceptions concerning the sources and functions of authority, or in some cases no power structure or tradition of allegiance wider than the tribe, local community or family.

Direct imposition by the empire-building States and the borrowing by local élites of political conceptions and institutions that offered hope of more effective resistance to such imposition have both contributed to the process. Since the 1940s it has taken on new dimensions, as unprecedented numbers of newly-independent States have tried to adapt the only available models for political organization within the world system of interdependence. The transplantation has involved not only institutions and conceptions directly concerned with the functioning of the State, but also a formidable intellectual baggage concerning the nature of social classes, the roles of political movements, the determinants of economic growth, etc.

"Nation-building" and "modernization" have been advanced, by local élites as well as social scientists of the dominant or "developed" countries, as self-evident and nearly synonymous desiderata or requisites for "development", although the latter have admitted to a good deal of difficulty in defining these desiderata.

Present change processes as well as future potentialities are obviously very different in the countries of the so-called Third World from the past and present of

the countries that offer themselves as models for "nation-building" or "modernization". It is no wonder if the transplanted institutions sometimes do not take root, or take on characteristics quite different from those expected.

The newer States face nearly simultaneously a series of challenges that the older nation-states could cope with successively (and largely without deliberate intention of becoming "nation-states") over several centuries: the initial consolidation of a national territory under the control of a power-élite, the incorporation of the masses first as subjects, then as active participants in the political process, the assumption by the State of complex welfare and developmental responsibilities. The very fact that some of the latter States have come to exercise such pervasive economic, political and cultural domination over the rest of the world, have become so highly visible as models, and have evolved systems so demanding of varied resources and advanced technologies, means that certain paths are now closed to other societies.

At the same time, other paths that could not have been followed only a few years ago may now be open to them.

Several trends in the dominant countries themselves complicate the drawing of conclusions concerning the future of the transplanted conceptions and institutions and the possibility of finding more viable paths to the future:

(a) These countries, and the lines of their impact on the rest of the world, are continuing to change at such a rate that it is hard for their own national political leadership to understand the trends and intervene effectively.

(b) In its region of origin, Europe, the inadequacy of the nation-state as a frame for further development or for the resolution of conflicts of interests has stimulated well-known initiatives for supernational groupings, on the one hand, and for the sharing of the State's developmental and resource allocation responsibilities with internal regional bodies, on the other. Decisions stemming from the former of these initiatives affect Europe's relations with the Third World in many ways, and have stimulated similar initiatives, of a partly imitative and partly defensive character.

(c) The development patterns of the dominant countries as well as their systems of political participation are being subjected to increasingly radical questioning of their future viability and desirability. The rest of the world is absorbing and reacting to the currents of criticism, reform and rejection of the patterns of the dominant countries at the same time as it is absorbing and reacting to the patterns themselves.

The ability of a national political leadership to select a viable developmental path and then follow it consistently depends in part on the social forces it represents, but it also depends in part on its understanding of the national situation and the country's specific form of insertion into the international pattern of interdependence.

In this chapter we try to construct a frame of reference for the enhancement of understanding of the social and political structural aspects of national situations. It

starts with a summary classification and description of the main factors that go to make up differing national situations and the contradictions that emerge from attempts to force these situations into uniform molds as to objectives and instruments of nation-building, modernization and development. It then tries to draw some lessons concerning social and political structural requisites for more effective policy and planning.

In this endeavour, the chapter will have to touch briefly and superficially on a wide range of complex and controversial topics. It will have to describe situations and change processes that have generally been taken for granted or ignored in development policy discussions, trying to place them in a light that can stimulate thinking about their inter-relationships and incongruities. It will try to derive general principles from diverse and very imperfectly understood national patterns. Such an attempt carries obvious risks of over-simplification, distortion and faulty weighting of factors at different levels of importance. *Caveat Lector.*

2. National situations: a classification of revelant factors

(a) Historical, geographic-demographic and economic settings

Social and political stuctures do not depend in any direct of consistent fashion on national historical experience, the geographic and demographic setting, or the economic structure. The correspondences that might be expected in more slowly and autonomously evolving situations are blurred by the processes of transplantation and adaptation referred to above. Nevertheless, the historical experience and the present setting do impose certain limitations and imply differing potentialities for the evolution of social and political structures.

The present chapter is only peripherally concerned with these questions, and it would be beyond its scope to set up a typology of national situations, but a brief initial discussion of the factors that differentiate or establish similarities between Third World countries may be helpful:

(i) *Historical.* The countries in question include:

(a) Countries that attained formal independence in the early 19th Century after a long period of colonial rule by European powers, in which a relatively protracted process of national identification and adaptation of imported political institutions has led to systems with some degree of internal consistency, however wide the gap between their formal character and their real functioning. This group includes most of the Latin American countries.

(b) Countries with a long independent history, never subjected to colonial rule except for brief periods of military occupation, in which traditional monarchical political institutions have gradually adapted to the circumstances of incorporation into the world system. A few countries in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East are in this position.

(c) Countries with a long history as centres of advanced culture and of organization as States or empires (not necessarily corresponding to present boundaries, subjected to colonial domination since the 18th and 19th Centuries, newly independent since the 1940s. Such countries account for the greater part of southern Asia and parts of Africa and the Middle East.

(d) Countries originating in colonial territories embracing peoples without previous political ties or cultural identification, or peoples introduced by the colonial power as a labour force, newly independent since the 1950s or 1960s. Such countries embrace the greater part of Africa, the Caribbean, and parts of the Pacific island region.

If the objective of "nation-building" is accepted as a requisite for development, it is obvious that the different groups of countries face quite different tasks. In the first three groups, the objective might be called "nation-changing", or the transformation of pre-existing social and political structures so that the masses of the population can become active participants rather than passive subjects. In the last group the "building" of nations must be undertaken in circumstances without historical precedent; the masses of the population are already involved to some degree in the political process, but national identification and the social and political structures that must be strengthened or transformed are precarious.

(ii) *Geographic-demographic and economic.* For present purposes, these factors can best be treated in conjunction. The countries in question include:

(a) Countries with densely settled peasant populations (although usually also with internal regions that are sparsely occupied), with rates of population increase not exceptionally high but formidable in terms of the huge absolute increases they imply, the declining capacity of peasant agriculture to absorb more population, and the scarcity of capital and other requisites for absorption of labour in "modern" non-agricultural activities. The urban population and the population employed in modern productive sectors may be of considerable size in absolute terms (although the latter is always much smaller than the former), in comparison with the other types of country to be described below, but include only small fractions of the population. This pattern is found mainly in Asia.

(b) Countries with moderate to low overall population density, with very uneven spatial distribution of population and very high rates of population increase. The relationships of the rural population to the land are diverse, but the importance of wage labour in comparison with traditional forms of smallholding peasant cultivation or semi-servile labour relationships is greater than in the first group, and much of the rural population is spatially mobile, responsive to migration stimuli. The urban proportion of the population is fairly high and rapidly growing, with much of the growth concentrated in the largest cities. The main economic activities are modernizing rapidly, but unevenly and imitatively. Manufacturing is gaining in relative importance. The modern economic activities absorb a higher proportion of the working age population than in the first group, but their demand for labour is

rising more slowly than the supply. Countries of this type are subjected most acutely to a double process that has been called "marginalization" and "dependent insertion" in the international system. The pattern is found mainly in Latin America and in a few countries of Asia.

(c) Countries with sparse, unevenly distributed and predominantly rural populations, generally growing and urbanizing rapidly. The economy is highly dependent on specialized exploitation and export of minerals. These provide abundant funds for the public sector, permitting a rapid expansion of services and infrastructural investments, but offer direct economic opportunities to only a very small fraction of the population. This pattern is found mainly in the Middle East.

(d) Countries with sparse and unevenly distributed rural population, little urbanization, moderate rates of population growth deriving from a continuing combination of high fertility and high mortality, traditional forms of peasant smallholding predominant as sources of livelihood, with little production for the market except in limited zones of plantations or modernized peasant agriculture specializing in export products. In some national situations approximating to this type, the main source of cash income consists of remittances from migrant labourers working abroad. Capacity to support a modern State apparatus and services is correspondingly limited. This pattern is found mainly in Africa.

(e) Territorially small countries, mainly islands, with densely settled and rapidly growing rural populations, largely dependent on wage labour. Plantation agriculture specializing in tropical export crops dominates the economy except in a few cases in which mineral exploitation or tourism has recently come to the fore. Urbanization is on a limited scale but rapidly increasing, and open unemployment is high unless relieved by emigration. This pattern is found mainly in the Caribbean, Pacific, and Indian Ocean regions.

(f) Countries with a concentrated and modernized urban majority, with moderate overall population growth rates, with some highly productive zones of commercial agriculture or cattle-raising, with other rural zones constituting relatively impoverished and economically stagnant reservoirs of peasant smallholders or traditional large estates, with modern urban occupational sectors predominant in the labour force and in production, but with production and occupational growth both slow and irregular. This pattern is found in a few countries of Latin America.

(g) Territorially small and highly urbanized countries with moderate population growth, dependent on highly specialized roles within the international system, as centres of commerce, financial transactions, light industry, and tourism. A few examples of this pattern are found in Southeast Asia, the Caribbean, and the Middle East.

The above listings do not exhaust the combinations to be found in reality, and except for territorial size, none of the factors is static. In very recent times, for example, expanding exploitation of minerals has shifted several countries from pattern (d) to pattern (c). Some countries may also be shifting from pattern (b) to pattern (f), or from pattern (e) to pattern (g).

(b) Social classes, élites, distribution of power

It has commonly been assumed that "nation-building", "modernization", "development", or "industrialization" in the Third World countries would be accompanied by – or would even depend upon – the emergence of social class structures similar to those of the countries previously "developed" or industrialized, with the classes playing equivalent roles. This supposition has had numerous Marxian as well as non-Marxian variants, has been associated with many attempts to identify strategic classes or élites capable of bringing about the transformation of the societies and economies, and has naturally influenced the strategies of political movements aspiring to represent the vanguard elements.

Trends in the Third World countries have provided some supporting evidence for interpretations of this kind, but it is evident by now that the interaction between pre-existing structures and the external as well as internal economic, technological, cultural and ideological forces that set the conditions for economic growth and societal change mean that the characteristics, forms of consciousness and real developmental roles of different classes and élites cannot safely be deduced from the past of other countries.

The following societal actors can be identified in most of the Third World countries; their specific characteristics and relative importance, of course, vary widely, and in present national settings some of them may be lacking altogether, or may have been removed from the scene in the course of recent political and economic struggles:

(i) Elite groups and classes

Almost everywhere, a small, privileged, relatively highly educated élite can be distinguished that "represents" the country in its relations with the rest of the world. More often that not, such élites derive their position from land ownership and are largely hereditary, but some are much more fluid and open to new recruits than others; in some cases they are recruited in part from relatively new commercial-entrepreneurial interests, and in some of the more newly independent countries their position is based almost entirely on first-generation political-bureaucratic roles, with access obtained through the educational system of the former colonial administration.

Whatever the origin of these élites, they have in common a predominantly urban-cosmopolitan outlook, an increasing reliance on manipulation of the State apparatus for enhancement of privileges and income (whether as political leaders and administrators or as landowners and businessmen relying on favourable credit and price policies) and an increasing reliance on higher education as a means of passing on privileged status to the next generation.

Such élites do not necessarily dominate the national political power structure or the economy. In a good many countries they have been dislodged from positions of power (although not from their role as models for cultural and consumption patterns) in the course of political upheavals. They have often salvaged a measure of influence, after the deterioration of their previous political and economic base, by associating themselves, as bureaucrats and diplomats, with military regimes, or, as managers and professionals, with foreign enterprises. Whatever their importance in the power structure, they rarely constitute a unified force. In many cases, national politics is structured around conflicts between groups and families within such an élite. At the same time, members of the élite act as spokesmen and introducers from abroad of a wide range of ideologies.

Secondary élites, predominantly rural and local in their interests, less concerned with education as a source of status, can also be distinguished, particularly in the countries in which traditional forms of land tenure and local power structures still predominate. Depending on local circumstances, such an élite can derive its position from landownership, moneylending and commerce, hereditary chieftainships, or extra-legal political dominance fostered or tolerated by the central authorities as a means of local control.

Such groups have shown considerable resilience in the course of social, economic and political change; even when they are weakened or destroyed, new claimants emerge to play roughly similar roles.

Industrial-financial-commercial entrepreneurial élites have attained considerable importance in a few of the larger countries of the Third World, but for the most part élites of this kind have not assumed the strategic role expected of them on the analogy of European and North American experience. In most countries such élites have remained heavily dependent either on special protection from the State or on association with foreign enterprises. Whether these entrepreneurs have emerged mainly from a traditional landowning-commercial upper class or from immigrant groups and cultural minorities, they have usually had neither the disposition nor the ability to assume political leadership in bringing about the structural reforms needed to make the societies fully compatible with dynamic industrial development along "national capitalist" lines.

For many reasons, bureaucratic and military élites, deriving their roles directly from the State, are assuming an importance for the shaping of development that their counterparts rarely held in the past. In some cases, as indicated above, such élites came to the fore simultaneously with national independence, in the absence of serious internal competitors. In many others, the relative weakness, conservatism, or dependence on external interests of the other élite groups, and the widespread inability of national political processes to derive viable strategies from the struggles of the many groups contending for a share in power, has impelled groups within the higher bureaucracy and the military, increasingly imbued with international developmental ideologies and a sense of urgency, to take the lead.

(ii) The middle strata

The social structures of most Third World countries no longer consist of a tiny "upper class" or combination of élite groups confronting a very large and mainly rural "lower class", with not much in between. Intermediate strata have grown and diversified until they are, in at least some respects (recruitment to positions of power, control of major political movements) dominant. In almost all countries, however, the "middle strata" remain minorities (sometimes very small minorities), and have not attained sufficient homogeneity of characteristics and interests to entitle them to the label of "class". The key differences between the middle strata of these countries and the middle classes in the past of the countries that are now industrialized or "developed" seem to be:

(a) the much greater importance of formal education in giving access to middle (as well as upper) status;

(b) the much greater importance of salaried employment in relation to self-employment in the professions or in small businesses;

(c) the presence of the "demonstration effect" from the high-income countries continually tending to stretch consumption aspirations beyond income capacity.

Independent, frugal, entrepreneurially-minded middle groups, endowed with sufficient"achievement motivation", can still be identified, but many factors in the situations in which they find themselves – technological dependency, the dominance of large-scale enterprises, the bureaucratization of the "rules of the game" – hinder them from assuming a decisive developmental role. Their educational aspirations for their children are likely to divert most of these into bureaucratic or professional roles. Moreover, in many cases they belong to cultural minorities or alien immigrant groups encountering resistance when they become economically dominant.

In fact, the characteristics and roles of the middle strata in the Third World countries are influenced in so many ways by trends among their counterparts in the high-income countries that it would be quite unrealistic to expect them to resemble the middle classes of the past of these countries. In the high-income countries also the salaried middle groups have steadily gained in importance at the expense of the self-employed; the economic relevance of small entrepreneurs has dwindled; the importance of formal educational qualifications has risen concomitantly; and pressures to consume rather than invest have become continually more elaborate and insistent.

The introduction of patterns of this kind into countries at much lower income levels, unavoidable under dependent styles of development, requires an enormous diversion of resources from ideal developmental objectives, whether these stress raising of production or enhancement of social justice.

The growth of the middle strata is associated, at one and the same time, with the building up of a stock of indispensable human resources, in terms of formal quali-

fications and capacity to exercise informed leadership, and with disinvestment and instability. Once educational expansion at secondary and higher levels has acquired a certain momentum, it becomes increasingly difficult for the economy to support the expected occupational and status rewards of education, and increasingly difficult for the political leadership to confront the demand for ever more education of the same kind.

The consequence is likely to be the intensification of two kinds of social struggle:

(a) a struggle between different groups, cliques and individual families to improve the differential educational advantages of their children and to safeguard preferential access to certain sources of income and status;

(b) a struggle against the existing political and economic order as incapable of meeting such demands, or, more radically, a rejection of the demands themselves as incompatible with social justice. The former kind of struggle is more characteristic of the majority of adults in the middle strata; the latter of the educated youth not yet incorporated into the occupational structure, along with many professionals.

The contradictory roles and attitudes of the middle strata are particularly evident in the bureaucracies. The characteristics of these bureaucracies differ in many ways, depending in their origins in colonial civil services, revolutionary nationalist movements, or national adaptations of 19th Century European administrative structures, but their evolution shows a number of common traits.

On the one hand, a higher technocratically-minded bureaucracy takes shape, aspiring to direct the development process, claiming appropriate rewards for doing so, and attracting the more capable educated youth of the middle strata. On the other hand, the combination of continually amplifying State responsibilities and educational output generates an enormous lower bureaucracy, preoccupied with job security and status, averse to initiative, vulnerable to petty corruption, inclined to conservatism and acceptance of prevailing values like the lower middle strata in general, but chronically discontented with the inability of the system to satisfy status and security aspirations.

At the higher levels, the bureaucracy becomes the most important channel through which members of the middle strata can participate in the making and application of development decisions. At all levels, it compensates for the inability of other occupational sectors to absorb the growth of middle strata generated through the educational systems.

(iii) Wage workers in modern economic activities

The great majority of the Third World countries now have some "modern" economic enterprises – in mining, petroleum production, transport and power production, as well as manufacturing industries – that require a skilled and dependable

labour force and that have the capacity to pay wages far above the national average. Even with such wages, wage costs may represent only a small part of their costs of operation. The same countries usually have larger numbers of enterprises at intermediate technological and productivity levels, comparable to those of the industrialized countries several decades ago; the growth of these has been stimulated and their survival assured by import-substitution policies.

In both types of enterprise a working class has taken shape that has adopted forms of trade unionism, and frequently political orientations, very similar to those of the industrialized countries and subject to continuing interchange of influence with the working-class movements of these countries.

Except in a few of the most urbanized and industrialized of the Third World countries, the working class of this kind constitutes only a very small part of the economically active population. Its concentration and organization give it a strategic importance out of proportion to its numbers, but in most of the countries it seems questionable whether it will ever attain the kind of influence in societal change and economic organization that it has had in most of the previously industrialized countries, let alone the vanguard role in revolutionary transformation assigned to it by some ideologics.

As long as industrialization follows the dependent patterns now prevailing, with the continual introduction of new labour-saving technologies, it is possible to increase production almost indefinitely with only small increases in the industrial and allied labour force, and to strengthen the privileged position of the industrial workers in relation to the rest of the labour force. A deliberate policy to spread employment through labour-intensive technologies would, if practicable at all in the more "modern" industrial lines of production, require far-reaching changes in the roles and demands of the working-class organizations, as well as in the control of the industries themselves.

At the same time, the fact that the modern industries and other high-productivity employers of labour are either publicly financed or dependent on public development policies, export-import policies, and labour protection (minimum wage, job security, etc.) policies means that influence with the State is often more important to the organized labour movement than its strength vis-à-vis the employers, and that the two can find common ground in strengthening their position in relation to the rest of the society through pressure on the State.

(iv) Other urban workers

The workers described above co-exist with larger numbers of workers in small labour-intensive enterprises and of self-employed artisans. These predominate in food processing, tailoring, manufacture of furniture and domestic utensils, repair of automotive and electrical equipment, and many other activities. Urban public trans-

port and freight trucking are also commonly in the hands of many small enterprises and individual operators.

As the dependent modernization of the cities proceeds, some of these activities decline in relative importance and ability to compete with larger establishments, but others (particularly repair and servicing of equipment) rise. Even among the more traditional handicraft activities, while some lines of production suffer, others find a new and more lucrative market among tourists. A good many such activities, inefficiently managed, with little capital and antiquated equipment, can survive only by evading the labour regulations that govern larger enterprises.

The occupational situations merge into the marginal situations to be described below. The workers are, on the one hand, closer in outlook to their employers than in the larger enterprises, and have more hope of becoming employers or independent operators. On the other hand, they are much more subject to job competition from the marginal labour force than are the workers in the larger enterprises. Thus, their attitudes can be expected to show a good deal of ambivalence and resentment toward the organized workers, toward the more marginal strata, and also toward the State. The enterprises along with their workers are able to exert only relatively weak pressures on the State for protection of their immediate interests, and since they produce mainly goods and services for direct consumption by the masses of the urban population they are adversely affected by public efforts to control prices and quality.

(v) Peasants and rural workers

In most of the Third World countries, the rural-agricultural population constitutes a majority or a large minority, although almost everywhere it is declining as a proportion of total population. In fact, the relative size of the rural population is commonly used as a rough indicator of under-development.

Almost everywhere today it would be misleading to envisage the rural population as an undifferentiated mass of "peasants" confronting "landlords", or as uniformly traditional and resistant to change. Almost everywhere, although in differing ways and at differing rates, the rural areas are being penetrated by market forces, mass communications, political appeals, etc. of urban origin or from abroad. These influences, combined with population increase and land deterioration, are undermining pre-existing local power structures and relations of production, and are bringing about new types of social stratification and new conflicts of interests.

It deserves note that what seem to be traditional cleavages and forms of social control (tribal or caste divisions, community organizations) sometimes take on new functions and become more prominent as means by which different groups try to cope with change and advance their own interests.

In large parts of the world, particularly in southern Asia, rural inertia and subjection to traditional controls continue to predominate over the forces making for change, but in relation to the national power structures, even the beginning of a rural awakening, with the accompanying demands for opportunities, rights and services equivalent to the urban minorities, presents particularly unmanageable problems. Isolation of the rural population and preservation of the status quo are no longer practicable, and neither is a development strategy based on the squeezing of investment surpluses from agriculture, controlled industrial recruitment of cheap rural labour, and rural absorption of unemployment during periods of economic depression.

The rural population, although more slowly and irregularly than the urban, is becoming increasingly conscious of the State as source of services and arbiter of the rules of the game, and of the possibilities of exerting pressure for favourable responses to needs. This trend is particularly evident in the peasant movements of several Latin American countries.

Under certain conditions, in countries where the rural population is already in a minority and landowning interests are no longer dominant, the groups controlling the State have been able to satisfy the rural demands in part, and even make use of the peasant movements as a source of support and counterweight to the pressures from urban working class movements. Where the rural population is in the majority, however, such a strategy is more likely to escape from control or to encounter impregnable resistance from within the existing power structure.

(vi) Marginalization and the marginal population

Economic growth and societal change in the Third World countries are failing to make room for a large part of the population that is being irreversibly drawn into these processes. The extent and future implications of this failure are now the subject of unresolved controversies.

In very simplified terms, two main interpretations of marginalization can be distinguished, corresponding to two of the "unifying conceptions" to be discussed later in this chapter:

(a) The phenomena of mass poverty, under-employment, under-utilization of human resources, and incapacity to participate meaningfully in the social order are unavoidable concomitants of stages in the development process that can be superseded, or remediable consequences of certain distortions and inefficiencies in the development process: these can be overcome by speeding up the rate of economic growth, by depressing the rate of population growth, by expanding and reforming education, by controlling the "demonstration effect" and slowing down urbanization, etc.

(b) These phenomena are generated by the nature of present patterns of dependent development and will continue to grow, whatever the rate of economic growth or the rate of population growth, until the style of development and the power structures determining it change radically. For present purposes, this basic issue can be set aside while the characteristics of the strata labelled "marginal" are summarily examined.

Attempts to define the "marginal population" as a distinct class or stratum and to draw a consistent dividing line between it and the "non-marginal" population have not led to convincing results. It is more satisfactory to think in terms of pressures toward marginalization as they affect different population strata in different national settings and lead to differing forms and degress of "marginal" integration into the social order. In this sense, marginalization is by no means equivalent to exclusion. The marginalized population groups participate in the social, economic and political order at least intermittently, as income-earners, consumers, recipients of services, voters, and demonstrators, but are unable to obtain a reasonable level of material satisfactions and psychological security through this "participation."

It is noteworthy that only a few decades ago one of the main problems of economic development was perceived as the recruitment of reluctant peasants into wage labour in mines, plantations and urban industries. In colonial regimes as well as some independent States various compulsory or semi-compulsory devices (such as head taxes) were introduced to accomplish this, and many studies of the motivational requisites for commitment to wage labour were undertaken. At present, while there remains a good deal of concern over the inadequate motivations, discipline, and quality of the industrial labour force, it is taken for granted that the supply of persons anxious to work for wages is in excess of demand.

In a few national settings, the marginalization of part of the potential labour force is now manifesting itself in visible unemployment on a large scale. This is happening mainly in countries that have experienced fairly rapid economic growth based on industrialization or mineral exploitation, in which a majority of the population is now urban and the rural minority no longer capable of absorbing the unemployed of rural origin, and in which urban income levels and public resources are high enough to offer the unemployed some hope of subsistence.

Elsewhere, particularly in settings in which the extended family remains strong among the poorer strata and traditional forms of peasant cultivation and artisanal occupations still predominate, there may be a spreading of employment and acceptance of minimal living standards, so that the marginalized groups eke out an existence with a minimum of effort and of livelihood, without the emergence of unemployment identifiable and quantifiable through the techniques of measurement current in the industrialized countries.

Marginalization can affect whole occupational groups, in particular artisans and small shopkeepers, whose incomes and opportunities for activity may be declining

in relative or absolute terms, but who stay in the same occupations for lack of any alternative.

In still other settings, the main feature of marginalization may be neither unemployment or underemployment in terms of the duration and intensity of the work effort, but an unending and arduous quest for a minimum livelihood through multiple makeshift occuptions.

It was indicated above that the middle strata, the stable workers in modern enterprises, and even to some extent the rural masses, rely consciously on State action for meeting their claims to a greater extent than in most earlier development processes. This is even truer of the marginalized strata, which do not confront directly any easily identifiable class of exploiters or social rivals, such as employers or landlords. (Their identifiable exploiters are usually petty shopkeepers, moneylenders, political intermediaries, and criminals, who are themselves in a marginal position.)

To the extent that the marginalized strata are becoming conscious of distinct interests and of strength in numbers, they confront the State as the only likely source of jobs, social services, grants of houses or building lots, doles of food, etc. At the same time, they confront the State as a repressive apparatus likely to be applied unsparingly against them if they threaten the property of the dominant groups in the society.

(vii) Youth

The proportion of young people who pass through a prolonged period of adjustment between childhood and adulthood, during which choices must be made concerning future livelihood and life style, has greatly increased in recent years, and the range of visible (whether or not really accessible) alternatives has widened.

Almost everywhere small minorities of the youth are attributing to themselves catalytic roles in societal transformation, and large numbers are frustrated in their attempts to insert themselves into the social and economic order due to the maladjustments between educational supply and occupational demand mentioned above. Among peasant, urban working class, and marginal families, young people pass rather rapidly from childhood to full adult responsibilities, but even in these strata the currents of dissatisfaction with traditional rural life, cityward migration, and marginalization mean that the stage of transition is longer and more traumatic than was common in these strata in the past.

Family status and family expectations continue to be of great importance, particularly for the kind of formal educational opportunities received, but socialization and training within the family become less and less important in all strata for employment, formation of new families, and attitudes toward the society. Peer groups gain in influence, both in relation to the family and in relation to the schools.

Formal educational qualifications of the youth in all social strata are generally higher than the averages for the older age groups already in employment and in positions of authority, and the ways in which the youth absorb and react to the many facets of "modernity" that impinge on them differ from the reactions of their elders.

It would be absurd to look on the "youth" as a homogeneous group imbued with idealism and desire for societal change, or to equate the size of the age group with its potentialities as a force for change. "Youth" as a cultural phenomenon is more prominent in the high-income countries, in which the age group is relatively small as a percentage of total population, than in the Third World countries where it is very large. However, the unprecedented size of this age group, deriving from the trends of rapid population increase during the past two decades, and the unprecedented situations in which youth of all strata now find themselves, suggest that the capability exists for equally unprecedented influences on the political evolution of the countries.

The phenomenon of organized minorities of educated youth aspiring to mobilize the more disadvantaged strata for rapid and violent transformation of the existing order has suddenly become prominent in several countries, sometimes taking by surprise even the political movements theoretically committed to such transformation.

(c) National integration and plural societies

Historically, the strengthening of the nation-state has proceeded *pari passu* with the subordination of localistic, linguistic, religious and family allegiances dividing the national population. Sometimes this has taken place through gradual erosion of the bases of divisiveness (e.g., the falling into disuse of local languages and dialects), sometimes through suppression or expulsion of minorities. More often, the latter, in the course of protracted conflict and bargaining, have received and have come to accept certain reserved domains within public policy (e.g., control over education of their children), or a recognized share in power at the national level.

In some of the older industrialized States today, as well as in the Third World countries to be discussed below, it appears that the very processes of development and technological change, accompanied as they are by increasing population mobility, increasing State intervention in many aspects of life, increasing standardization of mass education, and increasing sensitivity over the local consequences of national policies for allocation of investments, employment, etc., are upsetting the delicate balances previously established and reopening old issues of national integration vs. separatism.

It may be that discussions of these problems have commonly exaggerated the difference between the older States as true nations, with universal acceptance of the

State as final arbiter, and the newer States at the beginning of a quest for such nationhood. It is undeniable, however, that many of the Third World countries face extremely complicated problems of this kind without an equivalent historical background of gradual adjustment.

The problem is intimately related to all of the other questions discussed in this chapter. The combined processes of economic growth, population growth and redistribution, penetration of external cultural and consumption patterns, ideological borrowings and drives toward national self-assertion exacerbate sources of conflict that were latent under previous conditions of foreign political control (or unchallenged control by local oligarchies), predominance of local markets or subsistence production, limited population movement, rudimentary formal education, and absence of modern mass communications. In some cases, it may be suspected that political and ideological conflicts are mainly a modernized disguise for pre-existing localistic, linguistic or other rivalries; in other cases the reverse may be true.

The following facets of the problem deserve particular mention as constraints upon policy: (It hardly needs repetition that these problems take on quite different forms and degrees of importance in the major world regions and in individual countries.)

(i) For historical or other reasons certain ethnic or religious minorities come to dominate commercial activity, the bureaucracy, the professions, etc. These groups are sometimes migrants or children of migrants, sometimes indigenous peoples that have traditionally filled similar roles, sometimes indigenous peoples that have revealed an exceptional degree of aptitude or initiative once new roles have appeared or have ceased to be monopolized by aliens, as in parts of Africa.

The more important these roles become in the course of economic growth and amplification of State functions the more their monopolization is resented by the rest of the population. A pattern that has been labelled "pariah entrepreneurship" can then emerge, in which the minorities have to devote a good part of their abilities and resources to the obtaining of protection, and the public authorities encounter corrupting opportunities to profit from the situation. The capacity of both private enterprise and the State to contribute to viable long-term development is correspondingly diminished.

(ii) The extended family often remains the principal focus for allegiance and mutual aid. The various new occupational roles, the educational system, and the public services are viewed almost entirely in terms of their contribution to family advancement. The State as well as private enterprise are unable to count on any internalization by the individual of the values of efficiency, honesty, and equity applying to the general public or to the overt purposes of the enterprises and public services.

(iii) The earlier stages of economic growth as well as political participation are unavoidably concentrated in a few localities of a national territory or in the capital city alone, with the specific characteristics of the concentration determined by

dependent economic and political relationships with the world centres. In these stages, the rest of the national territory gains nothing and usually loses as the hinterland becomes an "internal colony" supplying raw materials and cheap labour to the dominant localities, and faces the ruin of local markets and productive activities in the face of their competition.

If the populations of the dominant and the exploited or neglected internal regions differ in ethnic or other traits, the widening inequalities between regions are bound to be attributed to deliberate discrimination and to stimulate a separatist response. (In an extreme variant of "internal colonialism", still important in several countries, the expanding exploitation of land and other resources impinges on tribal populations whose economies, cultures, and political systems are incompatible with such expansion. The result is usually the disintegration of the tribal system and incorporation of the tribal population into the most marginalized strata of the national population, if it survives at all, but in a few cases a stubborn and protracted resistance to penetration is maintained.)

The radio exposes most of the population to a wide range of appeals, supranational and localistic or separatist as well as national, that the national authorities can hardly exclude. National policies for the use of education to inculcate unifying national symbols and a common language are then likely to clash with the awakening local consciousness, and language of instruction becomes one of the most controversial political issues. (In many of the Third World countries, this problem has been avoided or postponed through use of a foreign language of instruction – neutral in relation to the internal groupings but associated with previous colonial rule – and an educational content practically ignoring national problems and cultural traits.)

At the same time, inequalities in distribution of education generally coincide with inequalities in economic growth and political participation, and are just as susceptible to interpretation in terms of discrimination by the population of the neglected regions.

As formal education becomes the main avenue for advancement into the more coveted occupations, particularly the bureaucracy, the fact that some ethnic or comparable groups have been able to gain access to secondary and higher education before others becomes an additional source of potential conflict; even if the disadvantaged groups later catch up educationally, they find the occupational prizes already taken.

(iv) As economic growth proceeds, the people of the depressed regions try to relieve their plight by out-migration to the more dynamic regions and the principal cities. Ethnic or comparable divisions then introduce two new kinds of tensions: the migrants may compete over-successfully with the previous populations of the zones to which they move, coming to dominate preferred economic roles (this situation has been prominent in parts of Africa); or, more often, they may be able to enter only the least advantageous occupations, coming to form a marginalized and insecure sub-proletariat.

In many cases, their migrations carry them across national frontiers, where their disadvantages are multiplied: they are subject to intensified exploitation, lacking whatever legal protections and services are available to national workers, and are subject to expulsion at the will of the host country, whenever jobs become scarce or their competition stirs xenophobia.

(v) In some parts of the world, internal conflicts or international wars have generated enormous masses of refugees, sometimes fleeing to the cities from rural insecurity, sometimes crossing national frontiers. The unsolved problems of resettlement and employment are too well-known to require comment here.

Such refugees are commonly, although not always, ethnically or otherwise distinct from the dominant groups in their countries of origin, whether or not this was a causative factor in the events that led to their becoming refugees.

(vi) The expansion of education and the penetration of rural areas by modern mass communications (particularly the transistor radio) have diverse and mutually contradictory consequences when ethnic and comparable divisions are present. On the one hand, mass education and mass communications offer a promising means of promoting national integration, and national authorities have commonly tried to adapt them to this purpose. On the other hand, the spread of literacy in peasant or tribal cultures is likely to awaken a dormant sentiment of separate linguistic identity, as occurred in much of Central Europe in the 19th Century.

(vii) The presence of ethnic and comparable divisions complicates the question of reaching a workable combination of central controls and decentralized responsibilities in public administration and provision of services. In some cases, the national authorities rely on rigid centralization as the only means of keeping local and sectoral government functions from being captured by divisive groups or becoming a bone of contention between them. In other cases, many such functions are relinquished to groups, nationally or locally, as the best means of preserving peace and acceptance of the performance of other functions by a national Government.

The groupings themselves are normally far from homogeneous internally and their members are subject to allegiances pulling in different directions: to family, local community, tribe, social class, occupational group, religion, etc. In such cases, the competition for control of local government and other institutions may become extremely complicated, with the predominant allegiances of the contenders concealed behind political and ideological facades.

(d) Unifying policy conceptions[1]

Long before the recent decades of rapid expansion in numbers of independent States and of universal endorsement of "development" as a central theme in State

[1] This term is used here to cover the whole range of development theories, strategies deriving from them, value systems invoked to justify a given approach to development, and political ideologies.

activities, rulers, dominant classes, intellectuals and political movements were trying to answer the question: What should the State do (or refrain from doing) to promote national power and prosperity? Or (in the case of colonies) to increase their value to the administering power? Or (in the case of countries threatened by imperialist domination) to protect national economic and political autonomy?

During the 19th and early 20th Centuries, the political leadership in a good many low-income, "traditional", predominantly agricultural countries formulated coherent and fairly comprehensive "development" objectives and policies.

The stimulus to formulation of such policies came from the industrialization and aggressive territorial and commercial expansion of the European and North American States. All societies in the rest of the world that had not already fallen under colonial rule faced the challenge of entering the new international network of trade and political relationships without becoming helplessly dependent. In trying to face this challenge, they naturally borrowed theories and ideologies from the world centres and sought to adapt them to their own needs.

Most of the earlier conceptions are still current in one form or another, and a rich variety of newer ones have appeared. Recent studies and polemics have enriched the conceptual bases for alternative development policies and have helped to clarify the range of choices. It is hardly surprising, however, that the conceptions influencing policy or presented as justifications for policy show unresolved contradictions or incongruities with national situations. Nineteenth century interpretations of the role of the State co-exist uneasily with the newer doctrines, and neither the older nor the newer conceptions correspond to the ways in which most of the States actually function.

Guiding national policy formulations usually consist of "packages" whose components have different sources and justifications, different degrees of importance in the eyes of the various participants in the political process, and different degrees of congruence with one another.

The main conceptions that combine with or combat each other in the formulation of policy can be summarized thus: (Their claims for explicativeness and applicability are, of course, at quite different levels, and the amount of space devoted to them below does not necessarily correspond to their relative prominence.)

(i) *Nationalism:* affirmation of the enhanced power of the nation-state as a central value and objective; insistence on universal acceptance of the nation-state as final arbiter and focus for allegiance; reliance on national symbols and traditions for the mobilization of popular support for developmental objectives. As was indicated above, different variants of nationalism or "nationbuilding" enter to some degree into the "packages" of conceptions that govern development policy in practically all countries.

(ii) *Economic liberalism:* affirmation of the superior efficiency of the market mechanism and private enterprise for the furthering of development and welfare; systematic rejection of State intervention in the economy, tempered by some

degree of endorsement of certain State responsibilities where the market cannot be relied on: principally maintenance of public order, infra-structural investment, and education. Reversion to modified economic liberal policies continues as a permanent alternative in the face of crises and disillusionment with deliberately interventionist development policies. In some countries, the changes in policy emphasis have taken on a cyclical character, as the shortcomings of economic controls lead to abandonment and the crises generated by the "free" economy lead to their reimposition.

(iii) *Neo-traditionalism:* attribution of high importance to the preservation of existing values, cultural traits, family and community ties, and power relationships, in the course of controlled modernization. While traditionalism by itself would be simply a defensive and static ideology, having no place among the conceptions here discussed, neo-traditionalism is often wedded to other policy conceptions as a means rather that an end.

It is assumed that development depends on the undisturbed opportunities for enrichment of an economic elite, that the masses of the population cannot be incorporated into the development process in the short term, and that their continued allegiance to traditional values and power structures is essential to keep them from disrupting it. For this purpose, if traditions that are really current do not serve, neo-tradionalism can represent a deliberate attempt to revive from the historical past or to invent traditions suiting its needs.

(iv) *Modernism* and (v) *Indigenism.* Both of these diametrically opposed approaches are found in association with nationalism, either in combination or successively. Modernism calls for the systematic adoption of the institutions, cultural traits, and material attributes of the industrialized countries as a means of competing with them; in some countries this approach has gone to the extreme of prohibiting indigenous costumes and prescribing European styles of clothing. Indigenism constitutes a systematic rejection of such borrowing and a determination to adapt indigenous institutions and life-styles for a similar end of national autonomy. Both approaches differ from traditionalism or simple imitativeness in that they conceive of the transplanted or indigenous elements as means to a nationalist, autonomous style of development.

Both have been influenced by social sciences originating mainly in the industrialized countries: indigenism by anthropology with its insistence on the equal rights of differing cultures to respect and freedom to develop their own potentials; modernism by sociology and social psychology with their insistence that "development" requires certain definable changes in values, motivations, institutions, forms of social mobility, family structures, etc. in order to make them compatible with a societal model adapted to continuing change and absorption of innovations. Some cenceptions of "modernization" have a socio-psychological emphasis on the role of child-rearing practices in "achievement motivation"; others are more concerned

with institutions and the opening of institutionalized stimuli toward mobility, entrepreneurship and innovation.

(vi) *Dualism.* "Dualistic" conceptions are really special applications of the "modernization" approaches, focussing on the obvious fact that some components of the societies and economies are modernizing rapidly, while others seem to be lagging or static. The term "dualism" has been used in several different senses by various analysts of development, but for present purposes it assumes that the typical "under-developed" country contains two quite different societies and economies, with only limited inter-communication: the one modern, innovative, reasonably productive, governed by market incentives, in close contact with the world centres, predominantly urban; the other, traditional, resistant to change, low in productivity, participating little in market relationships, predominantly rural, physically and psychologically isolated from the "modern" world.

Dualistic conceptions carry the implication that the main task for development policy is to break down the isolation and raise the productivity of the traditional sector, meanwhile expanding the modern sector at its expense, until all of it is absorbed into the modern sector.

(vii) *Populism.* The term "populist" is used to identify certain types of political movements as well as the body of conceptions, rarely very explicit or coherent, that govern such movements. The latter, in fact, are rationalizations for certain approaches to the conquest of political power more than conceptions of development, although they proclaim development as a central objective. They include affirmation of support by the masses of the population, obtained by responses to their felt needs, as the source of political legitimacy, rejection of tutelage by existing élites combined with faith in the ability of a charismatic leader to solve all problems, explicit or implicit acceptance of the compatibility of immediate redistributionist measures with the preservation of the main features of existing political structures and systems of production and property ownership.

Populist approaches typically assume the compatibility of the interests of all social classes and interest groups with the exception of certain "oligarchs" or "exploiters", against whom the rest of the population is to be mobilized. In national situations in which the State has at its disposal relatively ample resources, populist approaches can be combined for a time with developmentalist or even with economic liberal policies. There seems to be no case, however, in which such combinations have proved viable for very long.

(viii) *Messianism and millenialism.* These beliefs, quite different in origins and preconceptions from the others discussed here, can nevertheless be viewed as rational attempts to interpret social change and act on the interpretation for "developmental" purposes, in groups lacking the experience and educational tools needed for a more conventional approach. The beliefs typically arise among peasants, tribes recently brought into oppressive contact with the modern world, and rural or urban marginalized groups faced by deepening insecurity. "Develop-

ment", along with the destruction of an unjust social order, is expected through the miraculous intervention of divinities or ancestors, sometimes to restore a legendary golden age, sometimes, as in the cargo cults of Melanesia, to bestow on the disadvantaged group the wealth and sources of power of the "modern" world. This result is usually to be obtained through the performance of rituals or mass acts rejecting the old order and demonstrating faith in the miraculous intervention.

(ix) *Welfare-stateism.* Conceptions of this kind are closely associated with, populism and have attained a great deal of formal influence, particularly at the level of international and national policy declarations. They concentrate attention on the elaboration and embodiment in legislation and public institutions of various universal rights' to education, health, social security, employment, minimum level of living, etc. It is assumed either that these rights are applicable irrespective of the level and structure of production, and the power relationships in a given society, or that all societies have the obligation and the ability to transform themselves so as convert the rights into realities..

(x) *Populationism.* Two opposed points of view concentrate attention on population as a central problem of development: (a) Rapid population growth and larger national populations are asserted to be desirable or essential for the sake of national power, wider internal markets, and more adequate exploitation of the resources of the national territory (b) The attainment of low rates of population growth is asserted to be a requisite for the attainment of adequate rates of per capita income growth and for alleviation of disruptive social tensions. (Other points of view, while attributing less importance to population as a central problem, turn the above arguments upside down: rapid population growth is seen as a challenge forcing the society to undertake a more determined development effort and undergo structural reforms, or as a manifestation of internal contradictions helping to bring about the destruction of an undesirable societal order.)

A positive attitude toward rapid population growth prevailed in most countries until recently, as a corollary of nationalist doctrines, and is still influential, particularly in Latin America. The negative view goes back to the theories of Malthus in the early 19th century but exerted hardly any influence on public policy until the last two decades. Since then it has become extremely prominent in international developmentalist thinking and in the policy preoccupations of some States.

(xi) *Developmentalism.* The conceptions of development now current and their implications for policy are discussed elsewhere in the present study. The propositions here labelled "developmentalist" represent a distinct approach to the problem of development that came to the fore during the past two decades, and that has undergone continual evolution and broadening during this period. The distinction between "developmentalism", in all its variants, and the conceptions next to be discussed lies in its confidence that existing patterns of economic growth and economic relationships at the national and international level are susceptible to indefinite improvement, rationalization and reform, accompanied by major changes

in distribution of wealth, power and participation in the social order, that will not, however, *necessarily* call for basic transformations of societal values, ownership of the means of production, or nature of the classes dominating the development process.

(xii) *Communitarianism and socialism based on interpretations of religious and cultural values.* This family of conceptions is distinguished by equalitarianism, distrust of centralized State power, and rejection of the models for productive organization and individual consumption offered by the high-income industrialized countries. The objectives of industrialization and productivity increases may or may not be emphasized, but they are in any case subordinated to the objectives of equitable distribution and co-operation. Developmental stimulation of individual entrepreneurship and competition for material rewards are ruled out as incompatible with the kind of society aspired to.

The strengthening or creation of various kinds of intermediate bodies between the individual and the State, in which citizens can participate directly in managing their own affairs, receives high priority. Belief in the viability and desirability of co-operatively organized production and public services under local management is generally buttressed by reference to traits of community solidarity and mutual aid supposed to be present in pre-existing indigenous value systems and social structures.

The basic elements of such approaches can be traced back to social theorists of the 19th century and earlier. Influential modern variants have included Gandhism – reflected in the Indian community development movement – and several versions of "African socialism". The conceptions commonly exert a subordinate influence on the thinking of political leaders and on some lines of public policy in national settings in which they are quite incongruous with the main patterns of economic growth and social change, and with the developmental priorities that can be deduced from public resource allocations.

(xiii) *Neo-Marxism, revolutionary socialism, anti-imperialism.*

It is difficult to find a satisfactory label for the family of conceptions and policy approaches to be discussed next, because of the polemical uses of the terms available and the multiple meanings assigned to them by different currents of thought. Their common features include:

(a) assessment of development objectives and instruments in relation to determined power structures and class interests, not in terms of abstract desirability;

(b) affirmation that prevailing "dependent capitalist" styles of development in Third World countries whether or not viable in terms of increasing production, are inherently associated with increasing marginalization and inequality at both the national and the international level;

(c) affirmation that authentic development requires *both* a different combination of objectives *and* a strategy designed for a class or alliance of classes combining sufficient strength to impose its will with real interests, deriving from its objective situation, in the success of the strategy;

(d) emphasis on the dominant role, in present national processes of growth and change, of international economic and political relationships defined as "imperialist."

A number of radically different action strategies for specific national situations have been deduced by political movements and Governments from the above general propositions:

(a) It is reasoned that all countries must go through a process of industrialization and affirmation of national economic and political autonomy and must acquire a sizable industrial proletariat before becoming ripe for socialist transformation. The strengthening of a national bourgeoisie is needed for this purpose, even at the cost of extreme social inequalities and a pattern of development that will later need to be revolutionized. This reasoning suggests a medium-term strategy almost indistinguishable from "developmentalism".

(b) It is reasoned that the modern situation of worldwide financial and technological domination of development by a few countries means that national private entrepreneurs can play only a dependent role in the future. Dynamic industrialization can take place only through the efforts of a strong State, able to restrict consumption, maximize saving and investment from domestic sources, particularly the agricultural sectors, and channel such investment into basic industry. These conditions cannot be met without the coming to power of a revolutionary élite able to exert a strict control over popular participation so as to reconcile it with investment requirements and the need for disciplined effort.

(c) It is reasoned that the political and economic systems cannot be transformed in the desired directions by either of the first two strategies, nor by relying for leadership in the next stages on entrepreneurs, middle classes or organized industrial workers. Different sources of support must be sought, in the urban marginal populations, the rural masses, or the youth. The mobilization of such support requires a commitment to raise and equalize rapidly the consumption of the more disadvantaged strata, at the expense of investment objectives if need be, and to meet the most urgent popular demands for land, jobs, housing, etc. This line of reasoning has some affinity with the populist approach, but differs in its emphasis on use of redistributive policies to mobilize support for more far-reaching societal transformation.

(d) It is reasoned that the kind of new society wanted requires new motivations, interpersonal relations, and forms of participation in the running of the social order even more than it needs changes in power relationships and in ownership of the means of production. Progress toward these objectives should not be sacrificed to short-term considerations of productive efficiency or political control. Therefore, co-operative organization, workers' management, decentralization and local initiative should be relied on to the maximum extent feasible. All population strata, including political leaders and professionals, should perform their share of physical labour and undertake socially useful tasks previously of low status. Non-material

incentives (creativity, satisfaction in social usefulness and contribution to national aims) should be preferred to material incentives; superfluous private consumption should not be encouraged or used as a stimulus to increased production. This last line of reasoning, of course, reaches common ground with the conceptions of communitarianism and socialism based on indigenous traditions.

* * *

The various conceptions and ideological currents summarized above, in their many combinations, underlie national policy declarations throughout the world. Their degree of real influence on what happens, and the degree to which they have penetrated the consciousness of the masses of the population, are other matters, concerning which it is hardly possible to generalize. Developmental conceptions and ideological appeals interact with and sometimes camouflage interest-group pressures and bargaining, pragmatic or technocratic approaches, external pressures and constraints, and personalistic leadership; the contenders in a struggle for power or a charismatic leader seeking a ready-made justification for his role may take up ideological positions almost arbitrarily.

(e) External influences and constraints

It has already been emphasized that capabilities for guidance of economic growth and societal change at the national level are circumscribed by pervasive and complex manifestations of world interdependence. This is too obvious to require elaboration, and in any case is nothing new; for most of the countries in question the present external influences and constraints were preceded by even more inhibiting systems of colonial or semi-colonial domination. The mutually contradictory character of the influences and constraints at present, and the simultaneous internalization of interpretations and ideologies concerning them, do deserve some further attention. The countries striving to develop are faced not only by a practically uncontrollable influx of political, economic and cultural elements from other countries, but also by an influx of theories and advice on how to deal with these phenomena, most of the latter based either on the experience of the countries in which the phenomena originated or on a standardized and simplified model of "developing country". The external influences and constraints, in their newer manifestations, are discussed in other chapters.

The influences and constraints are not, of course, purely *external.* All of them are internalized to some degree, in that they become identified with the interests and outlooks of domestic classes and groups and act upon the national economy and society through them. This is obvious in the case of ideological influences and consumption standards. It is just as true af the power-political, economic, tech-

nological, and cultural influences. Contenders in politics rely on identification with certain international commitments and external models for political behaviour. The denationalization of control over the economy is accompanied by the recruitment of national managers and suppliers who identify themselves with the interests of the transnational enterprises. Professors identify themselves with and seek the approval of the international academic community. Professionals and technicians seek training abroad and later internalize foreign standards and preferences for certain lines of work. Scientific researchers concentrate on problems set by the world centres. If unable to modify the national environment in a way corresponding to such preferences, members of these groups are likely to abandon it altogether. The internalization of external influences can be seen even among the social scientists whose task it is to understand and explain the national societies.

At this point, however, a word of caution is necessary. Until recently external influences and constraints received scant attention in most analyses of development problems other than the Marxist. Now, in many parts of the world, the reverse is becoming true: "dependency", often vaguely defined, has come to be accepted as an all-sufficient explanation for the shortcomings of national development. Various authors have pointed out that apparently revolutionary attacks on dependency can serve as a rationalization for passivity and pessimism about national potentialities. It is assumed that nothing can be done until some international cataclysm removes the weight of external domination.

It is also evident that a pattern of systematic rejection of external influences can, in its own way, mask a real continued absorption of external influences of a different kind. This last situation is particularly evident among the educated youth, where patterns of rejection of the institutions and consumption norms of the world centres are borrowed wholesale from the youth of these very centres.

CHAPTER SIX

Problems of Communication and Participation

"Development" responding to the minimum criterion of enhancement of the capacity of the society to function over the long term for the well-being of all its members requires far-reaching changes in the ways in which people relate to each other and to the wider society, represented by the State. Ideally, these changes schould be in the direction of a more open, better integrated society, with freer choices and opportunities for voluntary associational ties and a voice for all in the composition and policy guidance of local as well as national authorities. The individual and the family become subject to a wider range of obligations to the State and make a wider range of demands on the State for services and protection. Institutional channels are needed, and eventually come into being in response to needs, for an increasingly complex interplay of informing, reasoning, bargaining, pressure, resistance and control between the local group and the national authorities.

It is obvious that present lines of change correspond only in a partial and distorted fashion, if at all, to this ideal picture. Amost everywhere one finds at the level of the national authorities dissatisfaction or alarm at the shortcomings of the transmission belts between them and the masses of the population, a dissatisfaction that is probably most pronounced in the countries whose political leaders have coherent developmental objectives and a sense of urgency in their attainment. At the level of the local population groups or primary social units one finds, in different national settings or in apparently incongruous combinations within a single setting:

– exaggerated faith in the ability of the State to meet local needs;

– pervasive scepticism concerning the goodwill and competence of the authorities who represent the State;

– apathy toward or apparent rejection of the life-styles and forms of mobilization that might be expected to contribute to development;

– outbursts of violence, commonly focussed on issues that seem irrelevant to development or the well-being of the people involved; or

– narrow concentration on certain lines of family or group advancement, accompanied by selective appropriation of the supposedly equalitarian services

offered by the State, to the neglect of what seem to be minimum requisites for the viability of the wider social order.

Attempts at diagnosis have followed several different but not necessarily incompatible directions:

(i) incompatibility of national and local power structures with more positive participation by the masses of the population;

(ii) incapacity of present lines of economic growth and societal change, with their traits of widening inequalities, dependency and marginalization, to open the way to such participation;

(iii) incongruity between the values and motivations dominant in the society and the kinds of participatory relationships needed;

(iv) unsuitability of present models for local institutions and for institutionalized relationships between local groups and the national centre to the circumstances of the countries that have borrowed them from abroad;

(v) inability of human beings and their institutions to cope with the continual readjustments called for by technological changes and the unprecedented widening in range of choice of possible life-styles, labelled "future shock".[1]

These lines of diagnosis were mentioned in a different context in the preceding chapter, which was essentially concerned with factors bearing upon policy at the national level. The present chapter starts with the supposition that national policy is meaningful only to the extent that it influences and is influenced by what happens within the "social units" of which the society is composed. It will examine briefly the kinds of institutions, organizations, and other channels through which the social unit communicates with the wider society and the State; then the kinds of changing local situation within which this communication takes place; then the tactics and forms of action available to the State and to the social unit in advancing their respective purposes.

This chapter is concerned with a dichotomy that can be expressed in several ways, each with differing connotations; between the "national" State and the "local" group or community; between the "centre" and the "periphery"; between power-holders at the national level and the ultimate primary groups or "social units" their power must reach to the extent that it is real.

The dichotomy has a spatial aspect: the State machinery and the power-holders are concentrated in one point of the national territory and the degree of physical remoteness is one factor complicating or weakening their ties with the social units. However, cultural distances and forms and degrees of insertion into national systems of production, marketing, employment and communications are more important for present purposes than geographical distance.

[1] Alvin Toffler, *Future Shock* (London, The Bodley Head, 1970).

On the "lower" side of the dichotomy, the following pages focus on situations in which direct interaction between individuals is possible, whether or not it is present, and on the organizations, institutions and informal groupings through which interaction between individuals and the national power centre takes place. These situations and groupings coincide in large part with geographical localities, but urbanization, increasing mobility of the rural as well as urban population, and the growth of national communication networks, make the correspondence less and less close. The term "social unit" is used in this chapter, for lack of a better, to avoid over-emphasis on the "local" character of the phenomena under discussion.[2]

Throughout, a double perspective will be attempted:

(a) It will be assumed that everywhere the State, with a greater or lesser degree of coherence and self-awareness, is striving to open and control channels of communication and mobilization, and at the same time to weaken or dominate institutions that threaten these purposes or constitute rival claimants to allegiance. It will also be assumed that everywhere this striving is complicated, diverted or paralyzed to some degree by the interplay at the national level of different centres of power or groups able to influence or veto State activities; by the inadequacy of information and understanding within the State concerning real local situations and the consequences of the lines of action it can undertake; and by the special characteristics of the bureaucratic agents of the State and other intermediaries (politicians, magnates, leaders of mass organizations) between the State and the primary social unit.

The national authorities need coherent local institutions and initiatives coming from the social units as a means of accomplishing objectives that they cannot reach by fiat or by direct allocation of resources; generally they have some awareness of this need. At the same time, they do not usually have a clear conception of what can be accomplished in this way and how, and they are inhibited to some extent by apprehension that local initiative will escape from control and present inconvenient demands.

(b) It will also be assumed that the members of any social unit, to the extent that they are conscious of the impingement of a higher power centre on their own

[2] The term "social unit", as used here, covers groups that are large, composed of sub-units, and physically dispersed (cities, national political parties, etc.) as long as they have some capacity to act self-consciously and collectively, as well as groups that are small, simple and capable of direct interaction (neighbourhoods, clubs, trade union branches, etc.). The present chapter is mainly concerned with the latter, but cannot avoid some attention to the large composite units. The individual normally belongs to several kinds of social units, the number and complexity of his relationships depending on his place in the system of social stratification and on his degree of integration into the national society. For an extended discussion of the meaning and kinds of "social units" see Amitai Etzioni, *The Active Society* (New York, The Free Press, 1968).

lives, make some effort to use its agents and resources for their own purposes – which may or may not be compatible with those of the State – and to protect themselves against State interventions that are seen as threatening or disadvantageous. This striving may be atomized, with each individual or family trying to obtain the favour of the power centre in competition with the others, or it may divide the unit into factions having different aims, or it may lead to a common front vis-à-vis the State.

In practice, some issues that involve contacts with higher power centres tend to divide the social unit and others to unite it; some are of interest to only a few members, others to the majority; mobilization of the entire unit around a given issue is bound to be infrequent and transitory.

The striving from below, like the efforts of the State from above, is in large part ineffective, misdirected or even self-defeating, in typical circumstances of cross-purposes within the social unit, of chains of intermediaries distorting the messages that are passed up or down, and of very limited local information and understanding concerning the resources at the disposal of the State, the power groups controlling the State, and the reasons behind the State activities that are confronted. The ability of different social units and elements within them to act purposively and collectively obviously differs widely, and in most national settings today the majority of the population are restricted to sporadic, poorly focussed, and individualistic attempts to deal with the State.

As economic growth and urbanization proceed, the social units able to act purposively and collectively normally increase in relative size and in range of interests represented; but the absolute size and relative disadvantage of the social units unable to do so may also increase. In any case, it should be kept in mind that the functions of any institution or organization impinging on the lives of the members of the primary social units, whether introduced from outside or created by the unit itself, will be seen quite differently by the parties concerned, all of whom will be striving in some way to manipulate the institution or organization and keep it from manipulating them.

1. "Local" institutions, organizations and channels for communication

(a) The "traditional" groupings: family, neighbourhood, community, tribe, religious congregation

Once "development" and "modernization" are posed as national objectives, the pre-existing historically determined social groupings come under examination instrumentally. Are they "obstacles"? Do they offer "opportunities"? Should they be eliminated, ignored, reformed, or strengthened? The answers to such questions have been determined more by the various "unifying conceptions" of development discussed in a previous chapter than by the nature of the groupings.

From an economic-liberal point of view, the "traditional" groupings are hindrances to a free market and to mobility of capital and labour. Since the 19th century, liberal regimes have sought through legislation to weaken the extended family, eliminate communal land tenure, etc. From a neo-traditionalist point of view, the same ties are indispensable means of braking and controlling social change, although they do not contribute positively to development. The policies of "indirect rule" followed by many colonial regimes derived logically from this position.

From a communitarian point of view, the same ties offer values and models of social organization that are indispensable components of the preferred style of development. From developmentalist or neo-Marxist points of view, the assessment of the "traditional" groupings would focus more on their specific characteristics in relation to short-term tactics and the feasibility of specific programmes.

It would be far beyond the scope of the present chapter to try to summarize even the main features of the enormous body of anthropological and sociological literature on primary social units, their trends of change, and their implications for development policy. For present purposes, the most that can be done is to single out a few features that seem particularly relevant. The list could be easily extended:

(i) The kinds of external forces to which the pre-existing groupings are now subjected tend to bring about, rather than a general weakening of "traditional" ties, an increasing differentiation in their functions and in the capacity of different social strata or sub-groups to make use of them. This is particularly evident in the extended family or kinship group, as the expansion of public employment, salaried employment in general, and education multiply the ways in which a kinship network can advance the interests of its members. Even the least influential elements in the society try to attach themselves to these networks through ceremonial kinship ties and patron-client relationships. For the latter elements, however, the nuclear family may become the last precarious source of mutual security. Differential ability to maintain extended kinship networks may become a significant factor in increasing social inequality and marginalization.

Locality-based community ties come under strains of many kinds. In a few cases. previous traits of solidarity and equalitarianism are maintained at the price of rigidity, isolation and resistance to innovation (e.g., the role of compulsory ceremonial expenditure in preventing community members from accumulating wealth). More often, if it does not disintegrate, the community organization becomes an instrument of the elements best able to adapt to change, seize market opportunities, and establish ties with national power centres. In the case of communities as in the case of kinship groups, differences in ability to establish helpful external ties (e.g. through well-organized migrants in the capital city) may be of decisive importance in increasing inequalities, whether within communities or between communities.

(ii) The apparent universality of the basic social groupings does not mean that they play roles of equivalent importance everywhere. In some societies, they may have enough vigour (or inertia) to shape a unique pattern of "development" (as in Japan) or to cripple the national capacity for any style of development (as in parts of southern Asia, in the view of Gunnar Myrdal). Elsewhere their cohesion may have been more apparent than real, even before the more recent decades of accelerated growth and change.[3]

(iii) "Recent" changes are not necessarily as recent as they appear at first sight and "traditional" social groupings can be quite recent, at least in the roles they play. Most parts of the world have experienced disruptive external as well as internal forces throughout modern history, although such forces were usually narrower in their impact and more widely spaced in time than those now operating. The policies of colonial regimes for land tenure, taxation, labour recruitment and local administration, and the traumatic processes of insertion of politically independent States into the world market system as primary producers, need only be mentioned. Various studies have pointed out that what seem to be static traditional local groupings are often in reality the product of defenses against external forces or even of direct imposition by such forces. Even the apparent total isolation and primitive ways of livelihood of certain tribal groups can be traced to a retreat and impoverishment imposed by external aggression.

(iv) The greater part of the rural population in most countries up to the present has lived in dominated or "captive" local groupings whose capacity to exert any initiative has been very restricted. This applies to widely varying local situations; not only to families of resident workers on large estates under systems equivalent to serfdom or peonage, and to families of renters or sharecroppers, but also to apparently self-governing landholding communities dominated by local urban cliques of officials, merchants and moneylenders. Under such circumstances the local power structure and the deliberate tactics of the power-holders insist on "vertical" communication – between the separate families of peasants or rural workers and the landlond, local official, merchant, or moneylender – and discourage "horizontal" communication –. for collective action among families at the same

[3] "North Africa doesn't even divide into institutions. The reason Maghrebi society is so hard to get into focus and keep there is that it is a vast collection of coteries. It is not blocked out into large well-organized permanent groupings – parties, classes, tribes, races – engaged in a long-term struggle for ascendancy. . . .These features, which loom so large elsewhere in the Third World, are, of course, present on the surface of life. But it is only surface. Anyone who takes them for more (as do most foreign observers, but hardly any domestic ones) finds the society constantly coming apart in his hands. Structure after structure – family, village, clan, class, sect, army, party, élite, state – turns out, when more narrowly looked at, to be an *ad hoc* constellation of miniature systems of power, a cloud of unstable micro-politics, which compete, ally, gather strength, and, very soon over-extended, fragment again". (Clifford Geertz, "In Search of North Africa", *New York Review of Books*, 16, 7, 22 April 1971).

economic and social level.[4] The individual or family seeks a patron offering a degree of security in exchange for homage and material rewards. He does so in competition with his fellows, and his expectations are conditioned by the outlook anthropologists have labelled the "limited good" – that is, that the amount of resources or benefits is fixed, and whatever is received by others diminishes his potential share. The unit engaged in the quest for protection may be the whole community as well as the nuclear or the extended family without altering essentially the vertical and competitive character of the communications.

In typical systems of this kind, the local power-holders have tried to monopolize the role of intermediaries; direct vertical communication between the local rural group and the higher power centres has been discouraged or prevented. Under present conditions this is no longer possible, and the rural individual or group begins to try to bypass the local power structure but carries over previous tactics in appealing for aid and protection to the State and its dependencies. Individual petitioners and delegations journey to the national capital, wait in the anterooms of the Chief of State and the ministers, bring gifts to potential intermediaries. Tours by national political leaders are seized on to present grievances. The relationships of rural groups with the various "modern" institutions and organizations discussed later in this chapter remain deeply coloured by the pre-existing systems of domination and vertical communication.

(v) In most of the world until recently religious congregations have served as focal points for local solidarity and as links with the wider society, through shared beliefs and rituals and also through the unifying efforts of the priests or teachers of the sect in question. To varying degrees religious bodies served as agents of the State and the local élites but also as their rivals and as defenders of certain popular values and needs against the national and local power centres. At present, the more localistic and traditional manifestations of religion, such as attachment to local shrines and festivals, are declining in importance, although they remain tenacious. Two quite different phenomena are gaining in prominence:

1. new beliefs and rituals, or new variations of traditional beliefs and rituals claiming to cope with the forces of change, appear and gain numerous adherents (messianic sects, the Cargo Cult, etc.);

2. the hierarchies of the established religious bodies, particularly in their lower ranks, are becoming channels for the disssemination of messages quite different from the past, including many variants of nationalism, communitarianism, and socialism. In some societies, these shifts in religious allegiances and messages may be of minor importance in the face of a general decline in organized religious participation. In others, their future importance for relations between the national power

[4] See José Matos Mar and others, *Dominación y Cambios en el Perú Rural* (Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima, 1969).

centre and the primary social units may be at least as great as that of the "modern" national political parties and interest-group organizations.

(b) Institutions at the local level introduced or taken over by the State

In countries with overwhelmingly rural populations the State has usually tried to accomplish its objectives of collecting taxes, maintaining roads and other essential public works, preserving public order, and recruiting soldiers, mainly through non-bureaucratic intermediaries – landowners, traditional authorities of peasant communities, tribal chiefs, tax farmers, and priests. The systems of domination described above were accepted by the State as long as their beneficiaries did not challenge directly the national power holders. (In practice, their beneficiaries often *were* the national power holders.) Urban populations were subjected much earlier to direct administration by the State, often after protracted struggles by the State against traditions of municipal autonomy.

Recent times have seen two far-reaching and nearly universal changes in relationships between local population groups and the State:

1. The proportion of population in urban areas and the size of the urban agglomerations have increased enormously. The urban population is more readily subject to direct State controls, is more accessible to State services, and is more urgently in need of such services. At the same time, the urban population is much better able than the rural to exert concentrated pressures on the State. The circumstances of rapid and concentrated urbanization, however, commonly overstrain the capacity of the State to expand and reform pre-existing urban administration and services. Thus, the growth of the larger urban agglomerations is paradoxically accompanied by the appearance of new forms of "indirect rule" or dominance and vertical communication through local political bosses, and new forms of *de facto* local autonomy and horizontal communication through defensive neighbourhood organizations, particularly among urban squatters.

2. The State has undertaken to extend an increasingly wide range of administrative mechanisms, services, and reform programmes to the rural areas; this is only one aspect of a wider process of economic, cultural and political "urbanization" of the countryside, as the dominance of the urban population and urban life styles increases. In their formal structures, the new mechanisms and services have a high degree of uniformity throughout the world. As in the case of the national institutions on which they depend, they have been based mainly on the models offered by the previously urbanized and industrialized countries, disseminated through colonial administrations and international advisers.

They can be classified roughly as follows:

(i) *Local representatives of the general authority of the State* (governors, intendents, district officers, etc.) named by and responsible to the national exe-

cutive power. These representatives usually have as their main function the maintenance of public order and have at their disposal local detachments of a national police force. They usually also have a formal supervisory or co-ordinating role in relation to the local activities of sectoral public agencies and elected organs of local government, although these roles may not be well-defined or effective.

In most countries, such a system of local representation of the central authorities has a fairly long history, but the role of the local representatives has gradually changed, vis-à-vis the rural population in particular, from reinforcement of the extra-legal power of local magnates to more direct intervention in the affairs of the smaller population nuclei in support of national programmes and policies.

(ii) Local elected organs of self-goverment. Here the interplay between the national and the local, between the "modern" institutions based on conceptions of equalitarian citizen participation in public affairs and pre-existing power relationships, traditional allegiances, land tenure systems, etc. becomes particularly complicated and confused. In a good many countries elected local organs have experienced repeated vicissitudes deriving from political shifts at the national level.

Since their introduction responds more often to national policy than to a historical evolution of municipal institutions in the direction of democracy, they have little ability to survive when national policy changes. Any real extension of a share in power through the vote to the rural workers and small cultivators in general, or to locally subjugated castes or ethnic groups, has commonly been incompatible with the pre-existing power structure. The introduction of elected local organs of government may then simply give the locally dominant groups a better means of legitimating their rule in relation to the central authorities; the rural workers vote according to the instructions of the landlord. Or the benefits of local government are monopolized by the population of the more-or-less urban municipal centre; the rural majority is excluded.

For the most part, it would seem that the supposedly democratic procedures of local elections are less effective in defending the interests of disadvantaged strata than are the administrative structures directly controlled by the national authorities, when the latter have an interest in curbing local power structures and stimulating change. At the same time, when forces of change are at work locally, the introduction of local elections can have an important catalytic effect with various possible outcomes: a wider sharing of power and disposition to co-operate for the furtherance of community interests, a reversal of power relationships and the emergence of a new local *élite*, interminable struggles between factions seeking backing from the higher power centres, or renewed subjegation of the disadvantaged strata that have tried to take advantage of the vote.

In fact, the introduction of elected local organs of self-government can have diametrically opposed consequences, depending on the setting into which they are introduced and the circumstances of their introduction. One nearly universal aspect, however, is that the resources available to local organs of self-government are

much too small to enable them to carry out the functions with which they are formally entrusted. In most cases, the national authorities do not allocate to them significant taxing powers or, if they do, the locally dominant groups are able to prevent effective use of such powers (in particular, taxes on landed property). Thus, the energies of the local body are absorbed in an endless series of appeals and manoeuvres (sometimes including threats of disorders) intended to extract resources from the central authorities and their dependencies. Once again, vertical communication displaces horizontal communication, and there is often intense rivalry between municipalities for the favour of the State.

(iii) *Sectoral public service agencies* concerned with education, health, agricultural extension, marketing, credit, housing, social welfare, social security, etc. The policy aspiration to universalize the services provided by such agencies, the growth of armies of professionals and functionaries employed to this end, the introduction of the services into rural areas and urban slums, and the generation of some expectations concerning them in practically the whole population are among the most widespread modern trends.

The content of the services at the local level and their distribution among social units are the product of pressures from many directions, in which it does not follow that the expectations of any party will be met in full, in which it is probable that side-effects not expected or wanted by any party will be generated, and in which it is quite possible for the service to end up serving only its own functionaries.

(iv) *Mobilizing and participatory agencies or programmes* that set out deliberately to change local ways of life and attitudes in accordance with the values or developmental aspirations of the national authorities. The "community development" programmes have been the most prominent examples. Most of these programmes have not responded to the hopes invested in them, whether because of weak or ambivalent support at the national level, excessive concentration on short-term quantifiable changes (construction of local public works, adoption of new productive techniques), evasion of the problems presented by local power structures, or lack of understanding of the bases of the ways of life they have set out to change. Nevertheless, such programmes have contributed, along with the many other forms of State intervention, to bring about irreversible changes in local situations, in particular in local attitudes toward the State itself.

In a good many countries, programmes of this kind have either withered away or become routinized channels for distribution of public services and subsidies, no longer clearly differentiated from the local branches of sectoral public agencies. However, to the extent that the dominant elements in the State seriously envisage social structural change and popular mobilization as components of their development strategy they cannot avoid seeking more effective institutionalized means to these ends, replacing but also learning from the experience of the earlier localized and weakly supported efforts. These ends and the means adopted link with the range of "voluntary" organizations to be discussed below.

A few revolutionary regimes, committed not only to changing local ways of life and power relationships but also to transformation of the whole system of relationships between urban and rural in the direction of greater equity for the latter, have gone much farther in the introduction of change agents from outside, including the mass transfer of professionals and educated urban youth to the rural localities. The concluding section of this chapter will return to the choices open to the State, under specific circumstances, for directed mobilization and stimulation of change in social units.

(v) *Statistical, record-keeping and licensing agencies.* The functioning of a modern State depends heavily on the readiness of the population to provide information about itself and submit to registration and licensing of many activities and forms of property. The effort to obtain information about the rural population and to convince the rural population that State demands for information and registration are legitimate is thus an important component in the overall expansion of State relationships with the localities. It has hardly been one of the more successful. To both the dominant and the dominated local groups, information is a potential weapon that can be used against them, although some kinds of information (e.g., registered land titles) can also be a highly valued means of self-defense.

(c) Voluntary organizations for mobilization and aggregation of interests

Unofficial organizations with local branches intended to advance the interests of their members, and sometimes to resist dominant classes or the State itself, have a long history in some peasant as well as pre-industrial urban societies, as in China. In some other peasant or tribal societies, "factions" have attained a good deal of continuity and formalized status as channels for the structuring of conflicts within social units, with the immediate issues changing over time.[5] For the most part, however, secular voluntary organizations reaching into the masses of the population are a recent phenomenon, if present at all, and the capacity for such organization remains very unevenly distributed.

Membership and degree of activity in formal voluntary organizations almost always vary according to social status and income level. It is not surprising if, for the great majority of the rural population and the urban marginalized population, formal voluntary organizations are either non-existent or are controlled and manipulated by forces other than their members. For present purposes, one of the most interesting aspects is that several types of organizations which in the past of the countries of early industrialization sprang up locally, on the initiative of their members, confronting a hostile or indifferent State, and later organized nationally,

[5] See Ralph W. Nicholas, "Faction: A Comparative Analysis", in Michael Banton, Ed., *Political Systems and the Distribution of Power* (London, Tavistock, 1965).

partly for the sake of dealing with the State from positions of greater strength, are now being introduced or encouraged at the local level by the State and other national forces, relying on doctrines and organizational principles that took shape under the early circumstances of unsupported group initiative. The main types of organization with which we are here concerned are the following:

(i) *Political parties.* In many of the newer States and in some that have long been independent entities, a single political movement has arrogated to itself the function of making nationhood into a reality by mobilizing the whole population or certain classes behind a determined conception of development. This has required the setting up of a network of local branches through which the objectives of the leadership could be conveyed to the local population and, at least in principle. the aspirations of the latter could be conveyed back to the leadership.

It would seem that in most cases this interpenetration has been superficial, and that the difficulties encountered are rather similar to those of the State-sponsored programmes for local mobilization and participation. The local party apparatus becomes either an arm or a rival of the local agents of the State, or it is assimiliated by the local power structure, or newly emerging groups of intermediaries use it for their own purposes.[6]

In multiparty systems, the apparent effectiveness of the local party branches in opening two-way communications between the national centre and the social unit is sometimes greater, but in these cases also, the communication is likely to be narrow and superficial, taking on the "vertical" traits described above, and sometimes combining with or exacerbating other sources of local factional conflict.

(ii) *Unions and similar interest-group organizations.* Urban trade unions, in many of the Third World countries, have staked out an important but limited share in the distribution of power through the geographical concentration of their membership, the capacity of the "modern" occupations to provide incomes well above the national average, and the convenience to the political leadership of offering con-

[6] Two political movements of this kind have been assessed as follows: "The C.P.P. was a political chameleon taking on the coloration of any particular part of Ghana where it existed. In other words, the social structure of Gana tended to absorb the C.P.P. rather than be altered by it in any radical way .... Its membership regarded it, as far as they took it seriously, as a source of favours and promotion rather than as a mobilizing party. ... At the centre it suffered from bureaucratic elephantiasis and at the periphery it often disappeared into the local scene .... Insofar as it was anything it was a barrier to communication; it was noise in a system already sufficiently noisy." (Robert E. Dowse, "The Military and Political Development" in Colin Leys, Ed., *Politics and Change in Developing Countries* (Cambridge University Press, 1969). "There is only very indirect communication between levels in the party and little evidence of what political scientists have discerned in African parties as a 'mobilization function'; it is the sous-préfets rather than the general secretaries who are the active evangelizers of modernization and it is they who are habitually the most earnest about the political education of the masses". Martin Staniland, "Single-Party Regimes and Political Change", *Ibid.*

cessions to the unions in exchange for support; in many cases, the union leadership has a formally recognized place in the ruling political coalition of interest-groups.

Such unions frequently threaten the internal balance of power, but they are not basically incompatible with it, however revolutionary their overt ideology. Organization of the remainder of the urban lower strata would be much harder to cope with within the capacities of the existing systems, but such organization, where it occurs, is usually not based on occupational ties nor assimilated to the trade union groupings.

The implications of rural unions, in countries with rural majorities and wide gaps in incomes and opportunities for societal participation between urban and rural groups, are quite different. Several types of rural unions need to be distinguished:[7]

(a) unions of wage workers on modern farms and plantations, whose tactics and demands for better wages, working conditions, job security and social security may be quite similar to those of the urban workers;

(b) associations of small and medium farmers producing for the market and desirous of obtaining more advantageous conditions of marketing and credit;

(c) associations of cultivators of dwarf holdings, sharecroppers, and resident workers on traditional estates, whose basic demands are for equal rights and access to enough land to provide an adequate family livelihood.

The first and second types of organization are not radically incompatible with the status quo, although they imply important shifts in local power relationships, and although they make it harder to carry out policies, important to many developmentally-concerned national regimes, of capturing a larger share of the proceeds of export agriculture and of keeping urban food prices low. The third type of organization is potentially more revolutionary in character, since its demands can be met only through a direct assault on rural property as well as power structures. For most predominantly rural countries, even those with national regimes committed to agrarian reform and equal rights for the rural masses, the autonomous mobilization of the latter has been an alarming prospect. In practice, such mobilization has usually been strictly localized and easily repressed, except in cases in which other social forces (urban parties and unions, religious bodies, youth movements, local counter-élites such as schoolteachers and lawyers) see an advantage in alliance with the land-hungry peasants and help their movement to overcome local isolation.

At the same time, it is well-known that peasant movements whose minimum demands for land are satisfied can change from a revolutionary force to a relatively

[7] It deserves mention that in many countries, particularly in Latin America, the large landowners have been formally organized, locally as well as nationally, for many years. Such organizations have generally followed consistent and effective tactics of pressure on the national executive and on legislative bodies for measures preventing organization of rural workers, sometimes exchanging acceptance by their political representatives of measures favouring urban workers for guarantees of non-interference in the rural areas.

conservative or stabilizing one, loyal to the regime to which they attribute their gains.

(iii) *Co-operatives.* Local co-operatives have been promoted and organized in most of the predominantly rural low-income countries by international agencies, national Governments and national provate bodies with widely differing motives. Co-operativism in its industrialized countries of origin has become a powerful movement convinced of the universal applicability of its principles and techniques. Co-operativism appealed to the democratic and communitarian values of many religious as well as political movements. It offered a modern equivalent to decaying traditional forms of mutual aid on which some national regimes set a high value. It offered a prospect of peaceful localized social change and improvement in levels of living without direct confrontation with major vested interests or the mobilization of uncontrolable mass movements. It offered a way of getting done inexpensively things that the State could not afford to do otherwise; in particular, encouraging small cultivators to produce for a national or international market.

In many respects its appeal was similar to that of community development; in addition, it promised more immediate material gains to the economy. Consequently, many countries have adopted elaborate legislation designed to give special advantages to co-operative organizations and to regulate them for their own protection, and have established public agencies offering credit and technical assistance.

In the case of local co-operatives the paradox referred to above is particularly clearcut: A type of organization that originated among urban workers and independent farmers as a technique for mutual defence against exploiting middlemen has been transplanted among rural groups emerging from situations of isolation or dependency, with little or no experience of market relationships or of formal organizations. A movement that began locally with no expectation of aid from the State or other outside forces, and that later consolidated itself nationally so as to use its voting strength and other means of pressure to obtain from the State favourable legislation and other advantages, is being promoted and controlled from the top down. In spite of many attempts at innovation, the formal organizational structure of the new co-operatives has followed the original model rather closely.

The results have been disappointing to sponsors who expected a new and better social order, or a rapid improvement in the levels of living of large numbers of people, but the real achievements, particularly on the economic side, have been large enough to justify continued support of co-operatives as a component of development policy. In fact, the need for local organizations of this kind seems so compelling that the quest for effective co-operatives will survive any number of failures.

The problems of the co-operatives, when they are envisaged as something more than economic instruments, are basically those of the relations between specific kinds of national power centres and specific kinds of local power structures and

dominated social units with which this chapter is concerned.[8] The character of the national authorities and the paternalistic-authoritarian values and attitudes of the functionaries directly charged with co-operatives are barely compatible at best with the kind of autonomous initiatives that the earlier co-operatives represented. Where spontaneous initiatives do arise, they are more likely to be crippled than helped by the bureaucratic requirements they confront.

In many rural situations the co-operatives almost automatically fall under the dominance of the local power holders who best know how to manipulate the administrative machinery. In economic terms, these are often the most "successful" co-operatives. Elsewhere, co-operatives are tolerated by the local power-holders only as long as they confine themselves to marginal functions and refrain from inconveniencing the merchants and moneylenders. In still other cases (e.g. Peru in the early 1970s) the urgency with which the Government is determined to bring about controlled societal change, and the wholesale adoption of "co-operative" management for large-scale expropriated enterprises, results in co-operatives that are little more than a facade for centralized technocratic direction. Such a policy can have satisfactory economic results when the direction is competent and continuity is maintained, but in some national settings (e.g. Tunisia in the early 1960s) the mass imposition of "co-operation" followed by official disillusionment and abandonment of the policy has brought about the disintegration of peasant economies and enhanced opportunities for concentration of local power and wealth.

(iv) *Other urban organizations for advancement of group interests.* The kinds of "voluntary" organizations discussed above are mainly of urban origin, but the discussion has centred on their introduction and functioning in predominantly rural settings, characterized up to the present or the recent past by "indirect rule", communication with the national power centres through chains of intermediaries, and ways of life that make the very conception of specialized voluntary organization hard to grasp. In the cities, a wide variety of specialized organizations representing class interests, occupational interests, etc. can be expected to appear spontaneously and with greater capacity to form non-localized networks. An important part of the urban population can affiliate deliberately with several kinds of organized social units, that call for different and even conflicting communications with the national and local power centre, in roles as citizen, professional, worker, consumer, parent, religious believer, etc.

[8] These generalizations are supported by a series of case studies of rural co-operatives in Africa, Asia and Latin America carried out under the auspicies of UNRISD and published 1969–1972 in a series of monographs under the general heading, "Rural institutions and planned change". (Volume 1, Review of Rural Cooperation in Developing Areas. E.69.IV.6; Volume 2, *Estudios de la Realidad Campesina.* 70.IV.3; Volume 5, Rural Cooperatives and Planned Change in Africa: An Analytical Overview. 72.4; Volume 7, Cooperatives and Development in Asia. 72.7; Volume 8, Rural Cooperatives as Agents of Change: A Research Report and a Debate. 74.3.)

Another part of the typical urban population, particularly among the lower strata, has no deliberate and active organizational ties at all, and the relative size of this part is likely to be particularly large under conditions of rapid urbanization. To some extent, as in the rural social units, vertical ties and patron-client relationships substitute for horizontal solidarity, but the more marginalized parts of the urban population have few opportunities to form such ties, unless political competition motivates the party machines to seek them out.

Two relatively new forms of organized solidarity have appeared in the larger urban agglomerations. The first and more widespread is the defensive organization of urban neighbourhoods, particularly prominent in the peripheral settlements that originate in squatting or organized land seizure, but appearing even in middle-class suburbs as the physical expansion of the urban area makes defense of strictly local interests and competition for urban services vitally important to all classes. The second is the club of urban migrants with membership based on place of origin or tribal affiliation.

Both types of organization present difficulties as well as opportunities for national authorities trying to establish developmentally-positive links with primary social units. The neighbourhood-based organizations offer potential channels for aided self-help and for integration of marginalized groups into the urban society, and have thus received substantial support from various Governments as well as unofficial "community development" movements. To the extent that they are effective and autonomous, however, the local organizations compel the authorities to allocate more resources to urban infrastructure and housing than they would otherwise have done, to allocate these resources differently between urban zones, to ignore breaches of property rights by squatters, and to tolerate types of housing and patterns of settlement that clash with conventional building regulations and urban planning doctrines.

The expectations of the authorities and the local groups are often directly contradictory: the former hope that the organization will alleviate municipal budgetary problems by self-help; the latter hope that the organization will exert effective pressure to obtain more resources from the municipal budget.

The clubs of urban migrants in some countries have an important role in alleviating anomie and providing social services for their members. They can also contribute significantly to the modernization of their places of origin and to their capacity to cope with economic and social change; this includes, of course, enhancement of capacity to resist the State and to exert pressure on the State for favourable responses to needs.

For the most part, neither the neighbourhood associations nor the clubs of migrants contribute to collective action for solution of the wider problems of the urban environment. The former are often intensely competitive in their relations with the public authorities, and sometimes seem to reproduce in the city the feuds and prejudices typical of rural communities. Neighbourhood cohesion, like national

cohesion, is most readily forthcoming against a bordering neighbourhood. In some national settings, clubs of migrants have encouraged separatist tendencies, through the migrants' simultaneous exposure in the cities to competition with other ethnic and linguistic groups and to ideas of cultural nationalism.

(v) *Youth and youth movements.* The special position of young people within present processes of societal transformation, discussed briefly in the preceding chapter, gives them several different potential roles in the changing relationships between national power centre and social unit in predominantly rural socicties:

First, their propensity to migrate from small towns and rural areas to the cities is much greater than that of other age groups. The more formal education they have been able to obtain, the more likely they are to migrate, and the possibility of obtaining further education is one of the more important motives for migration. The results are likely to include a diminished capacity for innovation and autonomous organization in the locality of out-migration, as its more dynamic elements are continually drained away, and a severe strain on the absorptive capacity of the cities. The associated problems of "educated unemployment", unmanageable pressures on the public sector to absorb the youth into the kinds of jobs to which they feel their education entitles them, etc. are only too well known.

Some of the educated youth, however, return to their small town or rural places of origin, or at least maintain continuing close contacts with these localities; in some countries the proportion seems to be quite high, and the return of maintenance of contacts is not attributable solely to inability to find a secure place in the urban occupational structure. Under these circumstances, their ability to transmit inquietudes to their social units of origin, exercise leadership, introduce new organizational forms, and challenge pre-existing power relationships should be relatively high. In some countries rural conscripts returning from military service have assumed similar catalytic roles.

If the State is not prepared to come to terms with autonomous rural mobilization, such roles for the youth are highly inconvenient, and are likely to end in repression, or final abandonment by the youth of the unpropitious rural setting. If the State envisages such mobilization as part of its development strategy, however, the educated youth of rural origin can be seen as an essential (although hard to control) instrument, and it becomes logical to encourage their return on a larger scale.

Second, the national authorities of many countries are already enlisting important numbers of educated youth, mainly of urban origin, in programmes intended to further the national integration and welfare of local groups, while responding to the youths' own demands for meaningful employment. This may be done through paid employment in national programmes, as in the case of the Village Level Workers of India. It may be attempted through regulations requiring graduates to practice their professions for a certain period in the rural hinterland. It may also be attempted by mobilizing students to take part in promotional and welfare activities in villages and urban slums.

The participation of educated urban youth in programmes of this kind seems rarely to have profound results in the "target" group, although it may be useful on balance. Under official sponsorship it tends to become bureaucratized (the programme is seen mainly as a source of public employment) or paternalistic (the participating youth assume that they are entitled to direct and to "help" the social unit), or revolutionary (the participating youth find local power structures incompatible with their own values and mount an attack going beyond the intentions of the programme's official sponsors). In the last case, the programme usually comes to a sudden end, and some of the participants take on the role discussed below.

Third, part of the educated youth try to act directly and autonomously in furtherance of certain unifying conceptions of national needs. Although this is often the most conspicuous public role of youth, the activist groups involved are almost always very small competing minorities, able to enlist intermittent support or sympathy from wider circles of youth. Their guiding conceptions derive from pre-existing political ideologies, and their leaders are not necessarily young, although some groups deliberately reject "adult" influences. The activist groups include partisans of nationalism, neo-traditionalism, and economic liberalism as well as advocates of radical societal change. All of them are distinguished from the predominantly "adult" movements by their greater disposition to take their guiding conceptions literally and to further them through direct action involving personal danger. (In practice, this often results in a role of "shock troops", used but not trusted by the larger political movements.)

For present purposes, the most important characteristic of the activist groups committed to radical societal change is their common aspiration to proselytize and mobilize the more disadvantaged social units – the marginalized urban strata, peasants and rural workers, sometimes through tactics of legal mass organization, sometimes through guerrilla warfare or urban terrorist tactics. These efforts have frequently revealed an unbridgeable gap between doctrinaire insistence on rapid and violent transformation of society on the part of the militant youth groups, and preoccupation with limited practical demands and paternalistic protection on the side of the disadvantaged social groups the youth have aspired to lead.[9]

It is well known, however, that in a few cases movements starting among handfuls of militant youth have, after many frustrations and defeats, actually led to major societal transformations. More generally, it can be expected that movements of this kind will continue to seek contact with the disadvantaged social units, and that this will have an intermittent but sometimes crucial influence on the evolution of relationships between these units and the national power centre.

[9] José A. Silva Michelena, *The Illusion of Democracy in Dependent Nations* (The MIT Press Cambridge, Mass., 1971).

(d) Spatial mobility and channels for mass communication

The communications received by the social unit that respond to deliberate intentions, whether of the mobilizing State, counter-mobilizing movements or local élites, are accompanied by many influences and stimuli that do not correspond to any coherent purpose, although both the State and the other parties try to control and use them. The isolation of most rural localities today is more apparent than real, although both in these and in the semi-segregated low-income urban settlements many communications received by the more "modern" or "integrated" part of the population are screened out, and the communications that do enter do not necessarily elicit similar responses.

The spatial mobility of rural people has increased enormously with the extension of highway systems and cheap public transportation accompanied by rising felt needs for cash incomes as well as education and medical care. The typical rural locality now has residents who have worked in the cities, in distant plantations and mines, often in foreign countries, or who have relatives now doing so or studying in the cities. Remote settlements can have quite accurate information on opportunities abroad for migrant labour. In many parts of the world, agrarian struggles, guerrilla movememts, counter-insurgency and civil wars have raised the scale of spatial mobility. Millions of rural people have had to flee from their homes temporarily or permanently and find expedients for survival in strange environments.

At the same time, the transistor radio has brought the rural population of most countries into immediate contact with national affairs, knowledge of which previously trickled down slowly and very partially through local élites, officials, schoolteachers, and returned migrants. The transistor radio has made ability to receive information nearly independent of literacy, while television has a similar role in relation to the urban marginal population. The kinds of stimuli received come from outside as well as inside national boundaries, particularly in world regions in which several States share a common language; rural groups are exposed to the most varied political as well as consumption appeals, however small their ability to act on either.

What is actually absorbed from the external communications and contacts through travel probably varies too widely according to local cultural and other factors for any generalization to be possible. Some rural groups and urban minorities that have been in close contact with "modern" urban society over a long period have retained their own ways of life with all the more tenacity, while others have transformed themselves or disintegrated after a relatively short exposure. It can be surmised that in very many cases apparent apathy and conservatism in the disadvantaged social units do not derive from ignorance of alternatives or lack of interest, but from the absence of any realistic means of acting differently, given local power relationships and the typically low level of economic resources. Under prevailing circumstances, the peasant may be quite justified in feeling that any

change in the direction of economic modernization is more likely than not to bring about intensified exploitation, or even his exclusion from the productive process, and that any attempt on his part to participate autonomously in [illegible] decision-making would involve enormous personal and family risks and very little likelihood of real gains.

2. Some alternative outcomes and directions of change in local situations

In the interaction between national centre and primary social units, and between pre-existing and newly introduced institutions at the local level, several possible outcomes can be identified. None of these outcomes, of course, is final, and the outcome prevailing at any given time depends at least as much on what is happening at the national or even international level as it does on more localized factors. Most of the possible outcomes have already been mentioned, but it may be worthwhile to recapitulate them at this point, with particular reference to the rural scene:

(i) There may be a concentration of additional sources of power in the hands of pre-existing local élites. That is, they are able to capture and use for their own purposes even those activities of the State, political movements, and mutual aid organizations that have overt objectives of widening participation and redistributing incomes.[10]

(ii) Local counter-élites or aggressive individuals emerging from the lower strata may gain opportunities to challenge and replace pre-existing power holders (for example, local political party bosses, produce buyers, or moneylenders against traditional landlords) without any significant enhancement of opportunities for the majority.

(iii) Conflict may lead to the expulsion of pre-existing élites and to the acquisition of lasting sources of autonomous action – land holdings, voting rights, organizational capacity, arms – for the previously subjugated groups.

(iv) Conflict may lead to the imposition by the national centre of control backed by military force for the purpose of maintaining order and protecting existing property and power relationships, and to the abandonment of initiatives from the centre for the stimulation of developmental changes.

(v) The State may impose controls for the purpose of neutralizing all local sources of power that might hinder it from advancing a determined set of developmental or societal change objectives.

[10] ". . . there are parts of India where any genuine share of control by small men is virtually impossible, partly from general ignorance and poverty, but also because the big men have so many strings to their bow of domination – caste, land ownership, their position as both creditors and political bosses. In such cases the institution of cooperation may not even be progressive . . ." (Guy Hunter, *The Administration of Agricultural Development: Lessons from India*, London, Oxford University Press, 1970).

(vi) The efforts of the State to stimulate change in rural localities (through agrarian reform, schools, literacy campaigns, leadership training, etc.) may help to disintegrate the rural social unit and speed up cityward migration, if the local situation is unpropitious in terms of resource endowment or persisting power relationships and the more youthful and dynamic part of the population gains confidence in its ability to cope with the urban environment.

(vii) The rural social unit, or part of it, may gain the ability to participate freely and on reasonably equitable terms in the national economy and society. This is undoubtedly happening in many cases in which the combination of resource endowment, markets, motivations, power relationships, and State action is propitious. These cases, however, in most countries include only small fractions of the rural population, and it is exceptional for either the different social units or "communities" of a zone, or the whole of a single rural social unit, to be advanced at a common pace. Initial disparities between social units and families in opportunities and motivations, together with overall scarcity of land and credit, progressively differentiate groups able to make the transition to successful commercial farming and participation in public affairs from groups that become more deprived and insecure than before.

The alternative outcomes listed above are associated with differing lines of change in the patterns of human settlement. Previous patterns survive sometimes with great tenacity, because they offer possibilities for defence (whether for the social unit as a whole or for a local élite) against the disruptive forces represented by the market economy, national political currents, and the State. However, the very struggle for survival brings about important shifts in their real meaning. At the same time, increasing proportions of the population fall into settlement and organizational patterns that were previously insignificant, or that are altogether new.

The older patterns include the largely self-sufficient village community; the "senorial" landed estate; the group of shifting cultivators or nomads within a tribal system; the small town exercising some administrative and judicial functions and providing marketing, artesanal and recreational services to a rural hinterland; the capital city concentrating higher-level administrative and commercial functions, producing and selling luxury goods, and housing the more privileged classes. Specialized mining and plantation settlements, while "modern" in their economic organization and their capacity to generate class-consciousness in their labour force, also have a long history.

Some of the patterns that are now gaining importance respond positively to economic growth trends and development policies. These include several types of new industrial city (sites of steel mills or petrochemical industries, industrial complexes dependent on hydroelectric projects, centres of diversified light industries); agro-industrial, fishing-industrial, and lumbering-industrial complexes, combining primary and secondary production in an integrated urban-centred enterprise; agrarian reform settlements; and planned colonization settlements in newly acces-

sible lands. Other new patterns, however, are shaped by the trends of rapid population increase, spatial mobility, marginalization, and partial disintegration of pre-existing societal controls and ways of livelihood. These trends, in their differing combinations, often bring about a simultaneous concentration of population in very large agglomerations and a dispersion of population in very small social units or isolated families. The patterns include:

(i) Spontaneous squatter settlements in previously unoccupied or marginal lands. Here the settlers are usually thinly dispersed, with poor communications, and they often have sound reasons for avoiding contact with agents of the State. Their lack of clear titles to the land, the inaccessibility of markets and public services, and their destructive practices of land clearing and cultivation commonly hinder their settlements from attaining a degree of permanence sufficient to support strong community ties or satisfactory relationships with the wider society.

(ii) Groupings of landless, spatially mobile families of rural workers dependent on seasonal labour, living in improvised shelter along roadsides or on the fringes of towns. Here the possibilities for building up of community ties and participatory relationships with the national political and administrative system are just as poor, in spite of the greater physical accessibility of these groups. Even the nuclear family becomes fragile and irregular under the circumstances of frequent migration in search of work.

(iii) Groupings of families living in "irregular" settlements on the fringes of the larger urban agglomerations. The people living in such settlements are not always marginalized occupationally or organizationally, and many families that are so marginalized do not live in the peripheral settlements. However, the ecological characteristics of these settlements – their partial segregation from the rest of the city, their deficiencies of urban infrastructure, and the discrepancies between their housing solutions and "modern" urban standards – must have important consequences for the kinds of social units that appear and for the relations between these and the wider society.

(iv) Refugee settlements. In many parts of the world enormous refugee settlements, physically similar to those discussed under (iii), have appeared. Their social units are typically dependent on doles of aid, with no immediate prospect of reincorporation into any national economic, social, or political structure. In a few instances, such settlements have continued in being for more than a full generation.

The above phenomena, differing in their causes and specific characteristics, have in common that they place an increasing proportion of the population, urban as well as rural, outside the control of pre-existing local institutions without necessarily making them more susceptible to control, mobilization and provision of services by the newer national organizations and institutions, or more capable of autonomous group organization. Except for the first pattern mentioned above (rural squatter settlement) the newer groupings are in proximity to modern economic, political and administrative structures and depend on them for livelihood –

whether through intermittent employment, informal aid from the regularly employed population, or public subsidies. They are targets for mobilization efforts of various kinds, but the results are usually meagre.

As was stated above, throughout the world the groups in the lowest positions in the system of stratification have the least capacity for formal organization, and it is not surprizing that groupings such as those described here show little cohesion and little responsiveness to appeals going beyond their immediate practical needs. However, their direct exposure to the forces of change and their continual need to find new expedients for survival presumably give them a perspective quite different from the lower strata in more traditional and static rural environments, where subsistence and a degree of security can be expected by following well-understood routines for livelihood and for relations with local power-holders.

3. Tactics available to the different societal actors between the national centre and the social unit

It is an excessive over-simplification to think in terms of a State that adopts certain objectives for the control and mobilization of social units, deriving from its overall objectives for development and national integration; that devises certain instruments and allocates resources so as to reach the objectives; and that encounters a coherent response, positive or negative, from the social units concerned. On both sides, communications are channeled through intermediaries with objectives of their own. The social unit (or sub-groups within it) receives stimuli from the national level that clash with the predominant purposes of the State..

At all levels the conceptions and consciousness of what is at stake held by the different actors (political leaders, planners, administrators, security forces, social sectoral professionals, official and non-official community mobilizers, local politicians, traditional authorities, magnates, interest-group spokesmen, and the "ordinary" members of the social units) are at variance and overt attempts to advance a defined objective may camouflage quite different real objectives. Also, the actors at the level of the State, the social unit, and in between, are continually changing, and tactics at a given level are likely to be continually out of date in relation to changes at other levels.

Nevertheless, for present purposes, it may be worthwhile to accept the over-simplification and ask two questions: First, assuming that the dominant elements in the State are determined to pursue development, in a sense corresponding to the value premises and "systemic" interpretation used in the present study, how can they best cope with the problems of local institution-building, mobilization, participation, equitable resource allocation, and quality control of services? Second, assuming that it is both legitimate and advantageous for development purposes for local groups or social units to have a voice in determining their own future and

adapting the actions of the State to their own needs, how can they attain sufficient grasp of the issues, solidarity, and communication with the wider society to do so?

Certain general propositions can be advanced prior to a discussion of more specific tactics:

(i) For the State as well as the social unit the most baffling part of the problem may well be that of attaining a reasonable degree of consonance between their own values, objectives and preferred tactics and those of the intermediaries on whom they must both rely.

(ii) Satisfactory relationships between the State and the social unit depend on a reasonable degree of acceptance by the latter of the legitimacy of the State, and of belief in its capacity to function as an impartial arbiter; *and* on a reasonable degree of acceptance by the State of the legitimacy of autonomous decision-making by the social unit, and of belief in the capacity of existing social units to make realistic and equitable decisions. In the real world, acceptance of such propositions by either party cannot be more than conditional, and under widely prevailing circumstances neither party would have good reason to accept them at all. Their tactical choices would vary accordingly, with the proportion of conflict and coercion rising with the degree of mutual distrust.

(iii) The meaning of specific tactics depends on the nature of the parties using them, and on the situations in which these parties find themselves. It is futile to recommend tactics as desirable in the abstract.

The State can "choose" among the *following main approaches* to accomplishment of its purposes at the local level and vis-à-vis primary social units: Some of these are mutually incompatible alternatives; others can be combined and enter to some extent into most local development strategies. (In practice, the State's choice is largely predetermined by precedent and by its sources of support; the ability to choose radically new approaches is associated with revolutionary situations or crises demonstrably linked to the failure of previous approaches.)

(i) Reliance on *detailed central directives and controls,* continual *supervision* of the functioning of local institutions in relation to their centrally-determined objectives, *severe sanctions for non-observance.* This approach has been widely deplored as self-defeating. The State is likely to find itself able to paralyze local initiative, but not to keep the local social units moving in the desired direction, or even to control the performance of its own agents.[11]

The proliferation of controls actually prevents the State from furthering priority objectives, since the central authorities are forced to devote as much time to the

[11] "It is possible to try to modify this state of affairs [the monopolization of control and benefits of cooperatives by big farmers and village magnates] by injecting a good deal of *bureaucratic control*... But on balance, the result is to get more of the worst than of the best of both worlds. The bureaucratic element carries its own characteristic rigidity with it ... It does not in fact prevent domination by the powerful, though it may reduce their efficiency by interference." (Guy Hunter, *op. cit.*)

trivial as to the important questions, and cannot even keep themselves adequately informed as to what is going on locally. Nevertheless, a good many States, once the authorities become determined to force the pace of development, modernization and national integration, move in this direction from lack of ability to visualize any preferable alternative, and from a justified distrust of existing local institutions and power-holders. A high degree of centralization, whatever its disadvantages, may also seem the only practicable approach to an equitable distribution of public services and localized investments.

(ii) Reliance on local élites for the introduction of "modern" institutions and services. An approach of this kind can be adopted deliberately, on the assumption that economic growth and modernization can best be furthered by encouragement of the more dynamic local elements, whatever the cost in social justice. It can also be followed without a deliberate decision: the identity of interests between national and local power holders may be so close that the possibility of an alternative is simply not envisaged, or the national leadership may have no clear idea of the conflicts of interests within local groups and the capacity of local élites to capture "democratic" institutions and nationally financed public services for their own purposes.

This approach can be justified under certain circumstances as the least unsatisfactory alternative, if it is adopted in full awareness of its implications and combined with a system of incentives calculated to bring the interests and behaviour of the élites into a tolerable degree of correspondence with national objectives.

The élites in question differ widely, of course, and in many cases represent the best hope of securing rapid increases in production and vigorous entry of the local group into the market economy. However, in typical situations of overall scarcity of resources, large advantages to be gained from differential access to services provided by the State, and lines of economic growth that make for widening inequalities, it seems unlikely that approaches relying on local élites can lead smoothly to more democratic participation in local affairs and eventual equity in distribution of incomes and opportunities.

(iii) Training programmes for local leaders, on the assumption that "leadership" can be inculcated like a technical skill. The effectiveness of this approach is commonly limited by incompatibilities between the kind of leadership envisaged and the local situation, and between the motivations of the trained "leaders" and the expectations of the sponsors.

(iv) Reliance on local branches of nationally-directed political parties or interest-group organizations such as peasant unions to control or countervail both the direct bureaucratic agents of the State and the local élites. The effectiveness of this approach depends on the capacity of the national movement to maintain a network of local affiliates without their falling under the domination of the local agents of the State or the local élites, superseding the agents of the state, or generating excessively costly conflicts with other local power centres. As was indicated above, few

national political movements have sufficient organizational and ideological coherence to fill this difficult role at the local level.

(v) Deliberate mobilization of the groups that are most disadvantaged or most disposed to reject existing patterns (landless peasants and rural workers, urban marginalized strata, youth) to combat bureaucratization (of the parties as well as the State apparatus) and to overturn local power structures. The State can be expected to resort to tactics of this kind only under highly unusual circumstances, particularly in the aftermath of a revolution, when both the existing bureaucracy and the local élites represent entrenched enemies of the new order. It sometimes finds itself doing so unintentionally when mobilization campaigns with limited objectives bring unexpected results. The case of the Great Cultural Revolution in China, however, has demonstrated that an established national leadership previously relying on a disciplined party apparatus to accomplish its purposes at the local level can take this course, in full awareness of the costs in societal disruption and foregone production, when convinced that the dominance of the party and bureaucracy are threatening its own power or its hopes to transform human nature.

(vi) Reliance on the inculcation of new values, a "change of heart" within social units, through exhortations by political or religious leaders, and through intensive use of mass communication media, the educational system, local change agents, etc. This approach is compatible with any of those described above, but places its emphasis differently: on values and behaviour rather than on manipulation of organizations, institutions and power relationships. In principle, it should be an essential element in any strategy directed toward healthier developmental relationships between the national centre and the social units, but applications tend to be superficial, disregarding the real bases of the attitudes whose change is desired.[12]

[12] "One of the most familiar signs of a failure to conceptualize the problems of development at all adequately is the extent to which scarce resources are devoted to *exhorting* people to do things. There is no doubt that people do need to be encouraged to try new things, and to be informed of new opportunities; the radio and public meetings are potent instruments of change, and district officers, agricultural officers, block development officers and so on, the massive army of 'change agents' who constitute the most expensive part of the development effort in all developing countries cannot help spending a large part of their time making speeches, to large audiences or small ones. But there is no doubt that the means often becomes an end in itself: people are urged to 'work harder' for the sake of 'national unity' or 'progress' when there seems to be no good individual motive for doing so; they are told to sink their differences when these differences concern scarce resources – say land – which the government cannot make plentiful; they are urged to change their habits or ideas because it would be valuable to somebody *else* if they did so (perhaps it will indirectly benefit *them*, but habitual ideas are precisely ideas that result from and are maintained by our *direct* experiences). . . . At the bottom, this whole cast of mind is not so much failing to get 'beyond economics', as failing to begin from an analysis of the social forces determining the behaviour that has got to be changed." (Colin Leys and Peter Marris, "Planning and Development", in Dudley Seers and Leonard Joy, Ed., *Development in a Divided World* (Penguin Books, 1971).

(vii) Relocation and concentration of population and strengthening of communication, servicing, and control mechanisms. It has been suggested above that some of the pre-existing as well as newer patterns of settlement hinder communication between the centre and the social unit and also hinder the development of "community" institutions and organizations. In fact, this has often been the result of deliberate intention: landowners have preferred to keep their workers as isolated as possible from outside influences and sometimes from each other; small cultivators and squatters have scattered to avoid exactions from landowners and local agents of the State; and settlers in urban shanty-towns have found solid advantages in their impenetrability to rent collectors, tax collectors, and enforcers of building regulations.

Public policies for population transfer and concentration in nuclei of easier access and control are as old as the existence of organized States, and continue to be resorted to, from various motives and in association with any of the other tactics mentioned above. They usually comprise some combination of incentives for physical concentration of rural population in larger nuclei (housing, schools, water supply, electrification, etc.) with improvement of roads, communications and elementary services so that the population of a rural hinterland, whether living in hamlets or dispersed, can be reached from a semi-urban administrative, marketing and servicing centre.

In a good many instances in recent times, moreover, one of the main objectives in State policy has been to make it harder for revolutionary movements using guerrilla tacties to mobilize or draw supplies from the rural population, and for this purpose systematic compulsory population concentration and depopulation of the less controllable zones have been resorted to.

In the cities, difficulties of control and servicing are associated with dense rather than dispersed settlement. The relevant policy approaches include transfer of population from zones not suited to human settlement or needed for other purposes (industries, commercial centres, etc.); the opening up of slums and irregular settlements through street construction, provision of urban infrastructure, and establishment of local offices of State agencies; and various kinds of public housing programmes.

In principle, policies aimed at improvement of communications between the national centre and the social units cannot disregard the need for changes in settlement patterns making the social units more accessible. In practice, this is bound to be a conflictive policy area, in which the social units may have good reason to doubt the advantages to themselves of the kinds of resettlement pressed upon them, unless they have an effective voice in policy making.

The *approaches available to the social units* in dealing with higher power centres have been suggested above in different contexts. They can be recapitulated as follows, in rising order of participation in the national society:

(i) Withdrawal, non-co-operation, denial of information to agents of the State. This tactic is still followed, for lack of a convincing alternative, by an important proportion of the world's population. Its consistent use, however, requires that the social unit command its own sources of subsistence, so that it can survive with a minimum of contacts with the wider society. Ability to do this is rapidly becoming rarer, so that the tactic now more often manifests itself as a persistent but subordinate component in the dealings of disadvantaged social units with agents of the State as well as local power holders.

(ii) Escape from intractable local problems, generally through migration of part of the social unit to the larger urban centres. The role of cityward migration as a safety-valve for rural unrest has often been stressed. Under some circumstances this can lead to the disintegration or stagnation of the social unit; under others, it can be an eventual source of strength, through remittances from migrants and through the negotiating capacity gained from contacts of migrants with the wider society.

(iii) Reliance on personal, paternalistic ties with individuals higher in the national or local power structures, at the price of submission and reciprocal favours. As the local role of the State becomes wider, this quest for protection shifts from the local magnate to the State itself, in the personal form of the highest official to whom the social unit or individual can gain access. The proffering of votes in exchange for aid partially replaces the previous offers of personal services or produce.

(iv) "Representational violence" appears when consciousness of the possibility of influencing the State has penetrated, but local interest-group organizations and intermediary bodies between the social unit and the State remain rudimentary or ineffective.[13] It is assumed that the State can provide food, housing, employment, land, or stable prices for primary necessities if it wants to. If it does not, and if its repressive apparatus is not acutely feared, mass demonstrations, land seizures, and destruction of property (particularly public transport equipment) may be resorted to so as to prod the State into favourable action and obtain a higher priority for the needs of the group engaging in the violence. As urbanization proceeds this tactic becomes increasingly formidable, although by its nature and semi-spontaneous manifestations, participants can never be sure how far they can safely go. Various studies have pointed out that violent outbreaks of the urban marginal strata, when not crushed by force, have had the main result of gaining them some limited benefits, including a sense of accomplishment, and have been followed by a decline in politicization. The same thing seems to be true of successful peasant movements.

(v) Strengthening and adaptation to new purposes of pre-existing community or tribal institutions. The availability of this tactic, of course, depends on the pre-existence of forms of local solidarity and participation in which the majority has

[13] The term is borrowed from Martin C. Needler, *Political Development in Latin America: Instability, Violence, and Evolutionary Change* (Random House, New York, 1968).

had a stake. This seems to be the exception rather than the rule, but instances can be found in many parts of the world in which such local institutions have retained sufficient vigour to constitute a significant restriction on the local options open to the State. Even here, however, their adaptability to new purposes is commonly limited by their requirement of a high degree of conformity and resistance to innovation among their members; by their exclusiveness in the face of increasing spatial population mobility, so that newcomers are unable to obtain participatory rights; and by their identification with certain forms of production and exchange, so that the introduction of new crops or market relationships may be enough to disrupt them.

(vi) Organization of co-operative systems of production, credit, marketing, construction and maintenance of public works. Use of this approach depends on some combination of co-operative traditions, a consciousness of common interests overriding local class or other divisions, a minimum level of education, and a certain amount of legal, technical and material support (unaccompanied by bureaucratic domination) from the State. If the other conditions are met, successful local co-operative action may require a reasoned rejection of dependency on the State, and this may be harder for the State to tolerate than occasional representational violence.[14]

(vii) Interest-group organization for collective bargaining backed by the threat of strikes, boycotts, etc. To the extent that different economic interests and different relationships to production are present, such organization is an essential element in developmental change. Two main difficulties have been pointed to in earlier sections of this and in the preceding chapter: the widely differing capacity for effective organization of different classes or groups in the societies with which we are here concerned, and the convergence of organized interest-group demands on the State,

[14] A recent study of a Peruvian rural community illustrates the transition from dependency to self-reliant co-operative action: A community leader is quoted as follows: "During fifteen years we sent to Lima delegation after delegation to get the Government to supply us with the materials and technical knowledge we needed for the project. This was a frustrating experience since they continually made us promises that were never carried out. Besides, when we came back to the community without having accemplished anything, some said we spent the money to have a good time in Lima. Finally after fifteen long years, the Government supplied the materials and the engineers we needed to finish the project. Then we calculated how much the trips to Lima had cost us over so many years, and we realized that we could have done the work much faster and at a lower cost if we had bought the materials and hired the engineers on our own account." As a result of this lesson, the community changed its policy and has since been buying its own materials and hiring its own technicians as needed. (William F. White, "Dos comunidades serranas", in José Matos Mar and others, *op.cit.*) Unfortunately, very few rural social units have learned this lesson, or would have the resources to act on it if they had.

as the State tries to assume a commanding role in production and marketing as well as in the provision of services.[15]

(viii) Participation in national electoral politics; choice between movements and candidates based on assessment of their programmes and their ability to carry out these programmes. This requires: (a) a reasonable degree of capacity in the primary social units to aggregate their aspirations and act collectively as a class or broad interest-group rather than as localized competitors for political favours; (b) a reasonable degree of openness and competitiveness in the national political system, so that different political movements can offer real alternatives; (c) a reasonable degree of ideological coherence and realistic appreciation of national capabilities in the political movements; (d) a reasonable degree of shared confidence in the possibility of deciding problems of resource allocation through democratic procedures; (e) voting mechanisms reasonably secure against manipulation by local power holders.

Even if some of these requisites are satisfied poorly or not at all, national elections can enable disadvantaged social units to call attention to their needs and force a realignment of national priorities. However, under typical circumstances of scarce and very unevenly distributed resources; intense competition for jobs, education, and central subsidies to localities; and entrenched vested interests at the local as well as national level, it is hard for any political movement relying on mass support to avoid falling into the populist trap: an escalation of promises combined with an evasion of the realities of power that rule out easy fulfillment of even modest promises.

Moreover, in political competition under such circumstances all issues tend to become politicized; the parties cannot afford to agree even on the meaning and validity of basic statistical indicators; unavowable motives are alleged against every administrative decision; and the individual voter or social unit is left with very little possibility of rational choice concerning intelligible issues.

(ix) Participation in national politics for the purpose of revolutionary transformation of the society. A social unit can become so convinced of the radical incompatibility between its aspirations and its place in the societal order that it collectively envisages revolutionary action leading to the construction of a new society as the only solution. Such a choice can only under exceptional circumstances be clear-cut and lasting, and the circumstances depend very little on the

[15] In West Africa, "although labour unions are often very loosely structured and fragile, [the] patterns of human ecology tend to facilitate rapid communication among the workers and enable them to act as visible mobs. It is relatively easy for them to make trouble for their employers; and since their employer often happens to be the state, their behaviour is politically threatening." Moreover, under the prevailing system of market controls for export products, "economic demands by farmers are necessarily political, much like wage demands for white-collar and industrial workers". (Aristide R. Zolberg, *Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa,* Rand McNally & Co., Chicago, 1966).

more disadvantaged social units. These units, even in urban settings, are normally more concerned with local power relationships and opportunities for livelihood than with the national scene.

To the extent that revolutionary leadership brings about satisfaction of immediate demands, a revolutionary posture tends to be replaced by a defensive one. If, as is more often the case, it brings about repression the social unit is likely to withdraw into apparent apathy. Moreover, the competing political movements that appeal to such social units for support are likely to inculcate a general impression that "revolution" is desirable without helping the social units to grasp its content and implications. In a given national setting, most of the competing political movements may claim to be "revolutionary"; "revolution" may be advanced as a populist slogan, or as an attribute of an official development policy, or as a tactic for the seizure of power, or as a strategy for rapid and thoroughgoing societal transformation.

4. Bridging the gap

The above discussion points to the conclusion that relations between national power centres and primary social units will remain conflictive, continually changing, fertile in mutual misunderstandings, and also in valid distrust of the intentions and capacities of the other party. Any expectation of uniform recipes for harmonious relations betrays a certain incomprehension of the nature of the problem. Conflicts of interests, shortages of resources, and growth processes that make for widening inequalities cannot be wished away or overcome simply by constructing better-functioning institutions and channels for communication.

The formulation of relevant principles for the quest for more satisfactory relationships between national centre and social units really depends on simultaneous definition of the style of development aimed at. If it can be assumed that the preferred style of development includes organized participation, embracing the greater part or the whole of the population and involving a high degree of self-determination, as a central value rather than as an instrument to be manipulated from the centre, the following principles can be advanced; these principles should be as relevant to unofficial "counterplanners" as to official policy makers and planners:

(i) Policies and institution-building measures that bear on relationships between the State and primary social units should start from an informed interpretation of the character and functions of existing social units, local power structures, intermediaries, and institutions used by the State to communicate with the social units.

(ii) It should not be taken for granted that the disadvantaged social units can or should be "integrated" into the existing social and economic order, which is likely to be inherently incompatible with such integration. Authentic participation and integration can advance only *pari-passu* with transformation of the national society and economy.

(iii) The borrowing from abroad of institutions and organizational techniques is legitimate and unavoidable; no country can expect to evolve totally original solutions. However, such borrowing should be governed by a deliberate search for institutions and techniques compatible with the preferred style of development and the character of existing social units rather than by external offers of aid and advice. Piecemeal borrowing and "pilot projects" based on external aid are more likely to contribute to the evasion than to the solution of the major problems.

(iv) Policy-makers and planners should struggle against the assumption natural to their roles that the social units or the "people" are objects that their superior rationality entitles them to manipulate.[16]

The social units often have good reason, based on past experience, to expect that submission to central directives will have disastrous results for them. Under many circumstances, it may be unavoidable for the State to undertake policies that will have disruptive consequences and be resisted by many social units, but it should be prepared for frank explanation of these policies, serious attention to the objections raised against them, and acceptance as legitimate of the social units' efforts to modify or evade them. The public authorities should resist the temptation to promise more than they can perform and to refuse to admit negative consequences of their actions that they know exist, although it would be utopian to expect even the most conscientious authorities to do so consistently.

(v) While "popular participation" is defined as a central component of the preferred style of development, it is not realistic to envisage as an objective the maximization of such participation concerning all issues and at all times. In times of rapid societal transformation, the demand for such participation may be very high and cover a very wide range of problems. At other times, most relationships between the State and the social unit may be routinized; each may be justified in leaving the other a wide range of discretion. In practically all national societies at present, whether they are attaining better integration or not, the range of State interventions and the range of issues in which important sectors of the population feel their interests or their values affected are both widening. However, the capacity of both the State and the social units to receive and assess communications has its limits. If participation becomes too inclusive, the possibility of effective action may disappear in endless meetings, plebiscites and opinion surveys.

[16] "The planners . . . tended to conceive of 'the people' as the only proper subject both of their own interventions and of the studies related to those interventions; they did not find it comfortable to think of 'the people' and themselves as parts of a single system which might be investigated. . . . While it is probably disagreeable to most people to think of themselves as subjects of study, it is probably particularly threatening for those who, like planners, exercise power in large part on the basis of authority derived from a role as technical experts. This rationale for authority tends to be undercut if the technician is viewed as one more actor on the social scene, with his own interests, beliefs, biases." (Lisa Peattie, "The Social Anthropologist in Planning", *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, July 1967.

(vi) Approximation to the above principles requires a major improvement in information concerning local situations and social units and, even more, in the disposition of the State and the social units themselves to use such information to enhance rational decision-making. The needs of the State for better local information, and the inadequate use made by most national authorities of the local information available to them, have often been discussed. It deserves equal emphasis, however, that the collection and analysis of information is a potentially important means of self-knowledge leading to more effective action for the social unit, and an important weapon in its dealings with agents of the State.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Utopias Devised by Committees

A new egalitarian world order for nation states or a new egalitarian world order for human beings?

In the extraordinary flowering of normative declarations on development in the mid-1970s one can distinguish two main strands.[1] One strand consists of relatively concrete demands for egalitarian reforms in the international economic order. The

[1] The production of declarations and reports along these lines gathered momentum in 1974 and reached a peak in 1975. Inter-governmental and international non-governmental formulations issued during these two years alone include: *Declaration and Action Programme on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order* (U. N. General Assembly Resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI), May 1974); *Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States* (U. N. General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX); *Cocoyoc Declaration*, issued by an International Symposium on Patterns of Resource Use, Environment and Development Strategies, Mexico, October 1974; Mihajlo Pesarovic and Eduard Pestel, *Mankind at the Turning Point: The Second Report to the Club of Rome* (New York, 1974); *What Now? Another Development*, the 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Report on International Development and Cooperation; *Reviewing the International Order* (RIO), Interim Report of the RIO Project, June 1975; *Report*, New International Economic Order Symposium organized by the Netherlands Government, May 1975; *The Planetary Bargain: Proposals for a New International Economic Order to Meet Human Needs*, Report of an International Workshop convened in Aspen, Colorado, July–August 1975; *Communique of the Third World Forum*, Karachi, 1975; *Proposals for a New World Order*, prepared by a Special Task Force of the Club of Rome, Guanajuato, Mexico, July 1975; *Situación de América Latina en la Actual Coyuntura Internacional*, Comunicado del Foro Latinoamericano, Caracas, Agosto 1975; *The Chaguaramas Appraisal*, Second Regional Appraisal of the International Development Strategy and Establishment of a New International Economic Order, approved at the sixteenth session of the Economic Commission for Latin America, May 1975; Saul H. Mendlovitz, Ed., *On the Creation of a Just World Order: Preferred Worlds for the 1990's*, A program of the World Order Models Project, sponsored by the Institute for World Order, Inc. (New York, 1975); *Development and International Economic Cooperation* (U. N. General Assembly Resolution 3262 (S-VII), September 1975. Since 1975, the flow has continued at a somewhat slower rate, and with considerable repetition of propositions and demands.

other strand consists of relatively diffuse appeals for "unified development", "integral development" or "another development" within countries, supported by a worldwide transformation of values and priorities. At first sight, the two strands complement each other, but the manner of their juxtaposition within the declarations suggests a series of compromises between quite different views of human societies and their "development", a new phase in the long-continued efforts to define this elusive concept, with the holders of different positions contributing additional utopian-normative elements and seeking common ground with each other under the impact of the multi-faceted international crisis of the mid-1970s. Although the dichotomy between "developed" countries and the Third World dominates the declarations, the differences in the preoccupations of their architects do not coincide with this dividing line.

The former demands envisage the achievement of equality by the Third World *countries* or by their *economic systems* within an international order continuing to derive its dynamism from production for export and from international flows of investment and technological innovation. They suppose that "development" for the Third World countries can continue to mean what it has meant for the countries now rich and industrialized – mass production and mass consumption continually stimulating each other to new heights – but with the cyclical crises, struggles for markets, exploitation of the weak by the strong, ravaging of the human environment, and other disbenefits of such development tamed by some combination of global planning, bargaining, and goodwill.

It may be questioned whether an international economic order reformed by intergovernmental agreements while retaining central mechanisms and motivations of the present order can really function in this way, or whether the forces that are likely to dominate during the foreseeable future will really be disposed to make the experiment. At least, however, these are demands on which *governments* can base strategies and seek united action among themselves. They respond to a supposition that countries have common and internally harmonious interests voiced by their governments; that overcoming the poverty of a *country* and gaining it an equal voice in the international order are equivalent to overcoming the poverty of its *people* and gaining them an equal voice. Such demands do not really require the conscious intervention of the masses of a national population, who figure, in their demonstrated poverty, as justifications for the demands of their governments, as performers of economic roles, and as eventual recipients of the benefits supposed to flow from the new order.

The appeals for "integral development" or "another development" within countries raise problems of a quite different nature that governments are hardly in a position to tackle and that even the non-official intellectuals offering themselves as

spokesmen for the Third World commonly evade when they seek consensus in declarations.[2]

The posing of equality and elimination of poverty as objectives of development is not new, but the linking of these objectives with autonomous participation by the masses in the making and carrying out of developmental decisions, with the curbing of superfluous consumption and husbanding of the human environmental patrimony for future generations, and with the transformation of societal values, make up a formidable agenda.

The indispensable precondition for "another development", in fact, is a worldwide conversion or change of heart, involving all the social forces that have a share of power along with the groups hitherto voiceless. The prizes for which classes and interest-groups have contended since the dawn of the capitalist order then become almost irrelevant. The mass of consumers in the rich countries and the rich in the poor countries must learn to live austerely. Political leaders, entrepreneurs, scientific-technological innovators, and the military must renounce the struggle for power and prestige in favour of cooperation and fostering of popular initiative. The centralized state with its bureaucratic and coercive mechanisms must everywhere give way to direct democracy and self-management at the level of the community and the enterprise. The groups controlling the transnational corporations must set them objectives of job creation and production of goods meeting basic human needs rather than maximization of profits. The impoverished masses must moderate their demands to what the national variant of "another development" can afford.

The declarations insist that the first steps in this direction must be taken immediately; human needs cannot wait. Their prescriptions for the future are in all-or-nothing terms; humanity is either to be saved or to be damned in its totality.

Sometimes the declarations refer to the need for "political will" and try to frighten the forces dominant nationally and internationally with warnings of catastrophe if they do not change their ways. Sometimes they shrink the enormous problems of planning for societal transformation into problems of devising correct methodologies and indicators of progress – problems whose solution can be entrusted to international experts and research projects. Even the declarations that try hardest to come to grips with the problems of power, values and national diversity – notably the 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Report – continually fall back on the passive voice in their recommendations through inability to identify a societal *deus ex machina* who might convert aspirations into action.

[2] The alternative terms emphasize different aspects of a common aspiration. "Another development", introduced by the 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Report, implies that what is wanted is something quite different from previous concepts of development, not only in welfare priorities but also in an open-ended experimental pursuit of equality, creativity, and self-reliance. "Integral development", "unified development", and similar terms that came into vogue toward the end of the 1960s convey the supposition that the pursuit can be planned and subjected to universalist norms.

In fact, the proposals combining norms for economic equality between countries with norms for "integral development" or "another development" have the earmarks of concrete utopias devised by committees. They are concrete in their aspiration to construct blueprints of an attainable future. They are utopian in the immediatism and universalism of their formulations. Their origin in committees and forums that intentionally bring together representatives of different regions, different disciplines and different ideologies bars them from any serious effort to subordinate their conclusions to a coherent theory of societal change.[3]

Also, such an origin conduces to an over-generous inclusion of objectives and prescriptions strongly supported by some participants and not seriously ojbectionable to the others. More important, it leads to an evasion of issues on which the views of participants or the organisms to which they belong are irreconcilably different – in particular, whether "another development" is to come about by the conversion of the mighty or their overthrow, and whether the basic supposition of "economic development", that increases in production of goods can and must outpace population growth throughout the foreseeable future, remains valid.

Under these constraints, the new proposals become attempts to devise a convincing new myth without altogether alienating the governmental devotees of the waning myth. They come at a time when the requirements for conviction and consensus are much more complex than the simple faith of the 1950s that correct economic policies will eventually enable all peoples to achieve the level of consumption of the industrialized countries.

While the appeals for "another development" now enter to a surprising degree into inter-governmental declarations, and while they are presented as demands of the dispossessed majority of the world's people, they are, to a much greater extent than the accompanying demands for economic equality between nation states, the brain children of circles of intellectuals and reformers meeting in differing combinations in one forum after another. They lack the dynamism of social movements fighting to advance the interests of their members and the discipline of coherent ideologies or theories of social change. The immense majority of the world's poor knows nothing of them nor of the international fora that endorse them, in spite of the reiterated attribution of authorship to these same poor. The world's middle classes hear just enough to make them uneasy.

[3] "In the search for a scheme of *global rationality*, we are severely handicapped by the lack of an integrative theory – or of rival integrative theories – which would be accepted by wide sections of the intelligentsia and the centres of power, and which would explain the more significant aspects of the behaviour of society, provide a minimum capacity to predict, and afford a reliable basis for the formulation of rules and the development of institutions. The erosion, or disintegration, of the major paradigms which had been used to elucidate as well as guide national development and international relations is an important factor of our present uncertainties." (Philippe de Seynes, "The 'Futures' Debate in the United Nations", *CEPAL Review*, 3, First half of 1977, p. 13).

While significant fractions of these middle classes may feel a certain guilt and may even harbour a conviction that "something must be done", the self-defensive reactions of the bulk of them to the crises that affect them directly indicate the unlikelihood of their voluntarily making sacrifices of the magnitude called for by "another development".

The world's rich and powerful keep their own counsel, or manoeuvre to make the proposals innocuous by embracing them.

Assorted Prizes

When one examines the writings since the 1960s of the participants in the present elaboration of prescriptions for "another development", one finds that the criticisms that can be levelled at their collective declarations have been made by many of them as individuals, naturally with differing emphases and from different theoretical approaches. The international and national relationships of domination and exploitation, the gap between pretensions and performance in international co-operation, the inhibitions on decision-making at the national level, the "soft state", the pervasively corrupt state, bureaucratic inertia, the delusions of technocratic planning, the distortions of formal education, the forces making for mystification and ambiguity in policies are in full view.

In other words, their diagnoses show: (i) a low degree of governmental rationality and capacity to plan confronting complex and continually changing challenges; (ii) adherence by the dominant forces in most national societies to elitist values, implying the enjoyment of privileges precisely because they are privileges outside the reach of the majority, and satisfaction with "nature's plan, that they shall take who have the power, and they shall keep who can"; (iii) susceptibility among the masses to mobilization and united effort in support of traditional parochial causes – national prestige, territorial aggrandizement, religious and ethnic quarrels.

Within each nation-state, large or small, simple or complex in its social and economic structures, political contests are under way for a bewilderingly varied assortment of prizes that absorb the participants to the practical exclusion of the great question posed by "another development", of human survival on terms making survival humanly meaningful.

Such diagnoses have left some of their authors profoundly pessimistic concerning the possibility of future realization of their own democratic and humanitarian values. Others, on the basis of their evaluations of present power structures and the characteristics of the classes benefitting from or exploited under them, opt reluctantly for essentially reformist approaches requiring enlightenment of the national elites and the dominant forces in the world centres, and assignation of leadership to strong states conceivably capable of representing the long-term interests of the national society. Still others conclude that a revolutionary democratization of soci-

eties throughout the world accompanying a transformation of values and of human nature itself must be possible because it is necessary.

Still others try to construct workable blueprints for the tranformation ot their own societies and to demonstrate the non-viability of other paths to the future, eschewing universalism and relying on the force of rational demonstration to recommend the blueprints to national elites or political forces able to take power and apply them.

Even the more optimistic explorers seem from time to time to be agonizingly aware of floundering in a bog as they try to move from the multiform absurdities and injustices of present human relationships and public actions to some firm path leading to national and international orders capable of giving priority to satisfaction of the basic needs of all human beings. Overt rejection of this priority has been muted to a degree that would have been unthinkable a few decades ago. The proliferation of declarations and "plans of action" demonstrates a consensus of respectable opinion: the world order is in crisis and must be transformed. But this consensus has the shifting nature of the bog rather than the firmness of a path supporting a vigorous advance in any one direction.

Economists have retained the central role in shaping the more recent proposals for "another development", as well as the proposals for a new international economic order, which they (or other economists) held in elaborating the earlier myth of economic development. Certain economists have, in fact, taken the lead in the chorus of criticism of the narrowness of the economic vision focussed on accumulation and investment for acceleration of growth in production; in some cases, abjuring their own earlier prescriptions as planners. One of them sets forth the reasons for their continuing central position as follows:

> In line with traditions that are now more than two centuries old, we economists have this slightly paranoid but socially useful bent of mind; we naturally accept the responsibility for taking a broad view of a whole country, and indeed of the whole world, and for thinking in dynamic terms of national and international policies. Place any economist in the capital city of an underdeveloped country and give him the necessary assistance and he will in no time make a plan. In this regard we are unique among the social scientists. No sociologist, psychologist or anthropologist would ever think of trying to do such a thing.[4]

This predisposition of economists meets the need of governments, international organizations and sectors of public opinion that have become sensitized to world crises to believe in the possibility of plannable, harmonious, universally applicable solutions. If the previous prescriptions for development have not worked satisfactorily, new and "more comprehensive" prescriptions must be needed.

[4] Gunnar Myrdal, *The Challenge of World Poverty: A World Anti-Poverty Programme in Outline* (Allen Lane The Penguin Press 1970, Pantheon Books New York, 1970).

Since the early stages of diagnoses and planning for "economic development", the dominant economists have invited the participation of other social scientists and specialists in social policies, but naturally on their own terms. The latter are now closer to the centre of developmental thinking than before, since the more innovative economists as well as political leaders have convinced themselves that the difficulties in the way of "another development" are not primarily economic.

Sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists and psychologists, however, cannot be much more at home in their new responsibilities than in the previous role assigned to them by economists of diagnosing and prescribing for "social obstacles" to "economic development". "Modernization", the main general concept advanced by a good many of these other social scientists to complement "economic development", has turned out to be as elusive and ambiguous in relation to human welfare as development itself. "Another development" calls for "another modernization". Social science theories that look to class conflict as the motor of societal change are still less assimilable to the demand for comprehensive plans governed by the norms of "another development".

Whether the observer's attention centres on the international order, national political structures, classes, interest groups, communities, families, or individuals whose responses are conditioned by these wider circles, he sees changes under way that will undoubtedly incorporate influences from the campaigns for egalitarian, basic needs-oriented and environment-oriented styles of development and that will influence these campaigns in return, but that are not susceptible to planning by any identifiable agents.

Contradictions

The demand for social and political prescriptions for the management of these changes leads back to contradictions in which development policies up to the present have recurrently been entangled whenever they have ventured beyond a narrowly economic focus: standardized spontaneity, popular initiative channeled to targets imposed from above, co-operative action expected between groups with conflicts of interests that their members perceive.

Social scientists in the Third World are somewhat more disposed than their counterparts in the "central" countries to view the state as a coherent entity rather than an aggregation of bureaucracies and interest groups, but they are even less inclined to attribute to the states now on the stage the degree of autonomy and benevolence

needed if they are to lead the way to "another development".[5] In most cases, the state, whatever aspirations its techno-bureaucracy might harbour, would be the agent of forces incompatible with any systematic move in such a direction

Assignment to the state of the task of constructing "another development" (or, in another current formulation, "exercising the right to choose a national style of development") in the real world may thus not bring about much more than an array of Potemkin villages masking the pursuit of group interests by the forces dominating the state. The greater the apparent autonomy of the state apparatus the greater the opportunities for counterfeiting of achievements, concealment of failures, and proliferation of corrupt practices and special privileges among the "servants" of the state.

Nor are the prospects for a withering away of the state through the coming to power of a social class destined to do away with exploitation, or through the generalized enlightenment of the population up to the achievement of ability to manage its own affairs co-operatively and non-bureaucratically, through direct democracy, much more promising. The present boom in construction of concrete utopias, in fact, has followed a withering away of the faith that flourished in important proportions of different social classes in the industrialized countries from the 19th century up to the 1940s. This faith was that the Good Society would be achieved shortly after the coming to power of the proletariat or of a democratic-socialist intellectual élite. During the 1950s various observers of social change evaluated this withering away optimistically in terms of the "end of ideology" and the clearing of the way for consensus on practical and incremental reforms.

At present, even in the national societies in which material conditions, political culture, and discontent with the capitalist consumerist style of development might seem most propitious, one now finds a predominant sentiment of the complexity and ambiguity of progress, in which each achievement brings new problems without fully overcoming the old ones, in which all the conceivable paths to a better future are round about, with the pitfalls along the way easier to foresee than the happy ending.

[5] In a 1972 conference of Latin American and United States social scientists it is striking that the former generally attribute coherent purposes to the state, whether as "the executive committee of the capitalist class" or as a semi-autonomous actor, while the latter see "bureaucratic policy-making", in which components of the state apparatus can, up to a point, pursue different objectives in alliance with different interest-groups in the society (e. g. the "military-industrial complex" and the ties of sectoral government agencies with organized labour, organized farmers, etc.), with an approach to unity to be expected only in the presence of a menace perceived as extraordinarily threatening to the interests of the whole society. (See Julio Cotler and Richard R. Fagen, Ed., *Latin America and the United States: The Changing Political Realities* (Stanford University Press, 1974). Fernando Henrique Cardoso has diagnosed the Brazilian state in terms rather similar to the second view. (*Autoritarismo e Democratização* (Paz e Terra, Rio de Janeiro 1975), especially p. 182).

There seems to be no plausible alternative to the conclusion that initiatives for deliberate modification of styles of development will have to continue to struggle through the bog of cross-purposes, ritual activities, evasions, and resistances, even if the preconditions for societal transformation become as favourable as can realistically be hoped for. Nor is it likely that whatever transformations occur will bring national societies any closer to uniformity, for better or worse. Some national societies may enhance their strength within the world order without enhancing the well-being of their members; others may do both; still others, unfortunately, may do neither. Some classes and groups within countries will lose present advantages, will be forced to change their ways of livelihood, will be left in or reduced to poverty whether or not the majority gains and whether or not the overall trend is toward equality.

There can be no guarantee to any of the societal actors that their struggles and sacrifices will have results that can be defined in advance. In spite of the internationalization of "plans of action", the transformations will continue to take place within the boundaries of nation states and states whose dominant forces are trying to make them into nations. In each state, the interplay of ideologies, strategies, power relationships, pressures and conflicts only tenuously related to "development" will point to different possible outcomes.

One of the most striking contradictions of the present situation is the simultaneous discrediting of the nation state as incapable of coping with the challenges it faces; the renewed insistence on self-reliance and the right of the nation state to choose its style of development free of external pressures; and the continued proliferation of new states whose capacity for self-determination is much more questionable than that of the states whose leaders are convinced that integration in larger units is the only viable option.

Such explorations of the future as the two reports to the Club of Rome insist that piecemeal, intuitive, or common-sense tactics to cope with the crises of the future will be worse than ineffective; they will contribute to the disasters they are supposed to ward off. If this is correct and if one can see no prospect for responses that are other than piecemeal and mutually contradictory, what then? Are the concrete utopias devised by committees with their universalism and immediatism, their hospitality to all kinds of worthy causes, anything more than another ritual recognition that the situation is desperate?

One might vary the exhortation common to these utopias, to the effect that "humanity must choose" between paths leading to survival and destruction, and urge their intellectual fathers to choose between the different conceptions of the human future that are now combined in their declarations. Do they envisage that a correct combination of "practical", "concrete" reforms negotiable between present governments can set humanity on the path to what they mean by "development"? Do they aim at images of the future that can inspire and mobilize social forces for

a transformation very different from the optimal results of reforms that are now negotiable?

The mixture of propositions based on different theories and aimed at different publics weakens the convincingness of the declarations both as negotiable packages of demands and as mobilizing myths. While individuals and political movements referring their actions back to a coherent theory can choose, however, it is of the essence of the debate over future international and national orders that the participants must fall back on formulas affirming that humanity can have its cake and eat it, that equality for nation states within a world order requiring economic growth dynamized by manipulated consumption demands and armaments expenditures can be reconciled with equality for human beings within societies requiring radically different incentives and human relationships.

Domination and Dependence

The international declarations and plans of action, in fact, reflect a real hybridization of policies, deriving from different conceptions of human needs and different conceptions of the economic Kingdom of Necessity, that is shaping the evolution of national societies and the international order itself. In the national societies most wedded to the necessity for rapid economic growth governed by the market, one finds the dynamism of this process increasingly entangled with elaborate and costly public services and regulations stemming from egalitarian, welfare and environmental preoccupations and from the power of interest groups disposed to tolerate the functioning of the system only to the extent that it incorporates their demands. In the United States as well as Europe these preoccupations and pressures are changing the functioning of the societies in ways that would have been inconceivable a few years ago, without, however, displacing the private stimulation of consumption and the public allocations of resources supposed to maintain the previous dynamism.

At the same time, the increasing numbers of national societies whose dominant forces strive or pretend to strive for socialist-egalitarian styles of development with completely different sources of dynamism remain enthralled by growth for the sake of growth – or for the sake of national power – and are continually tempted or pressed to the reintroduction of market mechanisms, consumerist incentives, and privileged lifestyles for the higher bureaucratic and military élites.

At the international level the hybridization of policies deriving from the two conceptions of development generates further contradictions, or at least a juxtaposition of objectives incompatible without a comprehensive rationality and global planning capacity that are not in sight. The one approach requires that the "rich" countries continue to expand their purchases of raw materials from the "poor" countries, at high and stable prices, and welcome imports of manufactures. The other approach requires that the "rich" countries use raw materials more sparingly

and leave a larger share for direct meeting of the needs of the "poor" countries; the latter should also expand their manufactures primarily to meet basic needs of their own people.

The one approach implies that the poor countries and the rich should become even more interdependent. The other implies that countries in *both* groups should become more self-reliant and views the resulting constriction of certain lines of economic growth as a gain rather than a disaster. The one approach implies that tourists should visit the poor countries in large numbers and spend freely. The other implies that visitors should live austerely and place their skills at the service of the people they visit. Under the one approach, the transnational enterprises, properly watched and regulated but retaining their present profit incentives, are an indispensable instrument of development. Under the other, the transnationals can be tolerated only on condition of a transformation of their incentives and their functioning that would practically convert them into philanthropic foundations.

The centre-periphery relationships of dominance and dependency and the national styles of development or underdevelopment deriving from them have revealed too many anomalies and dangers to be able to mobilize the indispensable minimum of consensus, but the alternatives must continue to contend with the powerful momentum of what has been done and with their own conceptual and practical weaknesses. The central countries may well reduce their rates of economic growth over the long term as the Bariloche Foundation's Latin American World Model, along with other guides to the future, demands. If they do, they will do so not because of altruism, but partly because of ecological constraints, partly because of inability to find adequate substitutes for sources of economic dynamism – armaments and the automobile – that for one reason or another have to be curbed, and partly because of growing dissensus over life styles and national objectives.[6]

It is unlikely that under such conditions their dominant forces, trying to cope with severe internal tensions, could or would pay much attention to the corollary demand that they compensate the Third World for past exploitation. Even if lower growth rates derive from harmonious changes in values, popular preferences to work less and live more simply, the producers would hardly go on striving to produce goods to benefit the rest of the world, and they might learn to do without many non-essential goods they now buy from the Third World.

[6] "The privileged sections of mankind, and especially those in developed countries, should reduce their rate of economic growth to alleviate the pressure on natural resources and the environment, as well as to counteract the alienation effects of excessive consumption. Part of the economic surplus of these countries should be channeled into helping the countries of the Third World overcome their current stagnation, which is largely the result of the exploitation to which they were (and, indeed, still largely are) subjected." (Fundación Bariloche, *Catastrophe or New Society; A Latin American World Model,* International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada, 1976, p. 25).

An end to the armaments race, by itself, would render obsolete the oft-repeated projections demonstrating the central countries' dependence on imports of minerals from the Third World. The dominant forces in the central countries are already beginning to take up the arguments for Third World self-reliance as a defence against the claims made on them by the advocates of a New International Economic Order.

Behind the present proliferation of utopias devised by committees lurks a recurrent fear: however irrational and unjust the combinations of carrots and sticks by which the modern capitalist and socialist economic systems have kept human beings innovating, producing, and squabbling over distribution, do not the alternatives all lead to bureaucratic compulsion and eventual stagnation?

From the point of view of the present exploration, the values and suppositions underlying the demand for "another development" are to be preferred to those underlying the demand for economic equality between nation states. It does not follow that "another development" will emerge harmoniously and predictably once the men of goodwill in the international fora hit upon the correct combination of planning and exhortation. The following excerpts from an essay by Alain Touraine point to the path to be followed in the next stage of this exploration:

> . . . an analysis conducted in terms of crisis suggests recourse to a rescue plan for the planet considered as a vast social system, at the heart of which a central authority or simply a coherent will might propose solutions that are reasonable – in other words, good for mankind as a whole and technically feasible. When you shout 'fire' you hope that the firemen will arrive. . . Conversely, to speak of mutation is to emphasize changes in culture and social relations, particularly power relations, and this can be meaningful only within real social systems – i. e., systems defined by institutions and powers.
>
> . . . The time has come to move beyond these interpretations of the present changes in terms of crisis. If it were merely a crisis that we were passing through, the only solution would lie in the emergence of a force for the integration of the community in crisis. . . This can only lead – and this is the major ideological function of the concept of crisis today – to the strengthening of a new ruling élite acting in the name of rationality and of the defence of the entire community. Some may think that this is to be welcomed, while others may desire another kind of change. First, however, it must be recognized that the concept of crisis forms part of the ideology of power: it implies a reorganization of society from above. . . To speak of crisis is to adopt the perspective of power; to speak of mutation implies examination of the formation of a new cultural field, new social relations and new social conflicts, thus directing attention towards the emergence both of new grass-roots movements and of new forms of power.[7]

[7] Alain Touraine, "Crise ou mutation?" in *Au-dela de la crise* (Aux Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1976), p. 24–25 and 53. (Author's translation.)

In the next chapter we will look at the mutations or "seeds of change" that can be detected in different kinds of "central" and "peripheral" national societies today, supposing that the firemen of a new international order are not about to arrive to resolve a crisis, but that the examination of seeds of change may tell us something about the prospects for a future susceptible to modification by movements oriented by the egalitarian and humanitarian values inspiring "another development".

CHAPTER EIGHT

Seeds of Change in Different Types of National Societies

Let us begin with an annotated listing of phenomena now visible in different types of national societies that throw light on future prospects for the international order and for "another development". The listing does not pretend to comprehensiveness; its main purpose is to demonstrate the diversity and apparent indeterminateness of present trends and the inadequacy of current stereotypes concerning the roles and the potential responsiveness to utopian-normative prescription of the different types of societies.[1] There follows a listing of phenomena characteristic of particular countries or groups of countries, leading into a consideration of implications for Latin America, as a region of dependent semi-development, open to the whole range of seeds of change identifiable in the rest of the world.

The phenomena described below are labelled "seeds of change" to suggest that their present visibility need not correspond to their future importance. Not all the "seeds" will germinate and some of them will grow into feeble or purely ornamental plants. Intellectual fashions, personal values and preferences unavoidably influence judgements concerning the future prospects of the "seeds".

The general propositions informing the presentation are the following:

1. The two dichotomies that have governed international discourse on "development" – (a) between "developed" (central, industrialized, rich, imperialist) countries and "developing" (peripheral, poor, dependent, exploited, non-industrialized) countries; (b) between "capitalist" (market economy) and "socialist" (centrally planned) countries – which were never entirely satisfactory simplifications of reality, are becoming more inadequate. This is not because of a generalized "convergence" between countries on the two sides of either dichotomy, but because of the emergence of an increasing number of intermediate, anomalous patterns. A few of the "devel-

[1] The chapter aspires to complement without duplicating the profound analysis carried out by José Medina Echavarría in "Latin America in the possible scenarios of détente", *CEPAL Review*, 2, Second Semester 1976; "Notes on the future of the western democracies", *CEPAL Review*, 4, Second Semester 1977; and "Las propuestas de un nuevo orden económico internacional en perspectiva", *Revista Paraguya de Sociologia*, 38, January-April, 1977.

oping" countries have become wealthier than the developed according to the conventional indicator of GNP per capita. Others have become highly industrialized and more wedded to the unrestricted operation of market forces than are most of the "developed" countries today.

At the same time, traits are coming to the fore in the "developed" countries that are incongruous with previously accepted images of "market economy" or "centrally planned economy", including traits previously singled out by their spokesmen as characteristic of "under-development".

2. In the different groups of countries – whether classified by region, income level, political system, or otherwise – internal social, cultural and political changes are interacting with the more strictly "economic" processes and policies (in production, technology, marketing, finance, etc.) and with foreign policy tactics in pursuit of governmental views of national interest. The former changes seem to be exceedingly self-contradictory and ambiguous; no clear dominant trend is visible.

The internal changes characteristic of each group of countries react on the internal changes of the rest through imposition, borrowing and deliberate rejection, further complicating the national patterns. They impose constraints on the capacity of governments in all types of national societies to adopt and apply coherent policies vis-à-vis the rest of the world.

3. The proliferating discussion of norms for a new international economic order and for ideal styles of development at the national level coincides with a dearth of intellectually compelling theories of social changes, of dynamic political leadership, and of wide popular support for any one development strategy. This applies to practically all countries at present, whatever their income level, their political-economic system, or their dominant ideology.

It is a moot question whether the shortcomings of leadership should be attributed to the nature of present challenges and the erosion of confidence in the conventional wisdom on development and modernization, or vice versa. In any case, the continuing elaboration of all-inclusive normative declarations and "plans of action" is in part a ritual substitute for real capacity to cope with change. Activities of this kind can be expected to exert some real influence on the directions of change and the ways in which men interpret change but, filtered through structures exerting greater resistance to some actions than to others and transforming the meaning of certain actions, may well have results as far from the intentions of their present sponsors as have all the great mobilizing myths of history.

4. The guidelines to "another development" vacillate between techno-bureaucratic solutions – a centrally planned world society corresponding to the image of "spaceship earth" – and participationist solutions – local self-management, subordination of "development" to local cultures and values, the withering away of the state – corresponding to Touraine's distinction between "crisis" and "mutations" approaches (see previous chapter).

A comparable ambiguity can be seen in the seeds of change that are going to be discussed. For better or worse, a continuing tension between the two approaches to the organization of society seems more probable than the triumph of a techno-bureaucratic utopia or a participationist utopia.

5. In such a listing of the seeds of change it may be permissible, although not entirely satisfactory, to leave in the background the framework of economic relationships and power politics which has received more attention in the debate over new international orders than the questions to be discussed in this chapter. Most of the problems and changes in attitudes to be discussed have emerged or become more pronounced during an unprecedently long period of economic growth and national and international political patterns which, although conflictive enough, have been stable in comparison with the preceding decades of depression and world war. Their future relevance depends only in part on whether the central countries recover high and stable growth rates and whether their relations with the rest of the world become more co-operative or more conflictive.

The terms of the listing, however, do reflect an expectation that the future will be a mixed one, of alternating growth generating inflation and recessions pushing up unemployment, of conflicts subsiding in some areas and springing up in others, of concessions by the centre to the periphery that the latter will continue to identify as too little and too late.

The governments may well continue to play power games not too different from those of the past, but with their capacity to mobilize internal support for such games dwindling or precarious, and their attention continually diverted by domestic contradictions. The degree and kind of attention that the leaders of the central countries can pay to the rest of the world may thus encounter narrower bounds, whatever the demands emanating from the latter and whatever the threats to hegemony presented by political changes in the periphery.

6. The industrialized countries with capitalist or mixed economic systems and electorally democratic political regimes can be divided roughly into several sub-groups: the United States, set apart by the size of its economy, the world permeation of its life-style, and the reactions deriving from its eroding world hegemony; the large Western European states; the smaller Northern and Western European states; the industrialized Commonwealth countries of North America and Oceania; Japan; and the Mediterranean "Latin" countries. Similar seeds of change can be identified in all these sub-groupings, but in widely differing combinations.

The following discussion focusses on phenomena that are general but particularly characteristic of the United States, and then comments on the other sub-groupings. The socialist countries, excluding the more recent non-industrialized Third World recruits, fall into two sub-groups: the USSR and East European associates, on the one hand, and China, on the other. In the Third World a grouping by geographical regions coincides in the main with other relevant traits, although not with the in-

creasingly important but persistently elusive distinction between national societies whose dominant forces identify them as "socialist" and those whose dominant forces prefer other identifications. This discussion leads into a consideration of the implications for Latin America.

(a) The industrialized "market-economy" countries: State and society

1. Disillusionment with the capacity of the welfare state to "solve problems" and with the capacity of political parties to change the conduct of the state for the better has been on the increase since the 1960s. Resentment of high taxes, bureaucratic controls and attempts by the state to regulate behaviour for social goals generates sporadic political backlashes and passive resistance, while the occasions for such resentment continue to mount under the pressures to be described below. Rising incomes and consumption over several decades have cushioned social conflict but have not left the state in a stronger position to set national priorities and assign resources once these trends are interrupted.

It becomes publicly evident that a wide range of policies supposedly devoted to national defence or human welfare have really become governed by objectives of propping up the economic system, but that the range of policies accessible to the state can neither stop inflation nor secure full employment. The pursuit of semi-autonomous policies and pressure group tactics by military and intelligence establishments, by sectoral bureaucracies, and by large corporations in the "planning system" (in J. K. Galbraith's term) becomes more widely known and resented.[2] Continual exposure through the mass media of corruption and illegal manipulations reinforce other sources of distrust of the state and politicians.

2. Warnings of many kinds that previous patterns of growth in incomes and consumption will not be viable in the future, supported by visible disbenefits of these patterns, intensify public insecurity. The most influential of these warnings up to the present have referred to ecological and demographic limits to growth. These warnings have been accompanied by prescriptions that suppose a high level of state capacity to plan and of public capacity to change life styles through some combination of mass conversion and technocratic regulation. However, these very capacities have quickly come under question in diagnoses of the social and political limits to

[2] The dominance of the "planning system" of large corporations in the United States over the "market system" in the rest of the economy, the symbiosis of this private planning system with the public bureaucracy, and the relative impoverishment and exploitation of the rest of the society, as interpreted by Galbraith, have much in common with the interpretations of dualistic or structurally heterogeneous development in Latin America. (John Kenneth Galbraith, *Economics and the Public Purpose*, Houghton, Mifflin Co., Boston, 1973.)

growth. The latter diagnoses, while their direct influence is relatively restricted, give intellectual justification for the popular distrust of the welfare state.[3]

3. Middle- and working-class life styles and consumption goals begin to change although the standards of the high-production, high-consumption society remain predominant. The unforeseen consequences of mass access to what have recently been labelled "positional goods" generate simultaneous disillusionment with these goods and more frantic striving for incomes guaranteeing access to goods still conferring special advantages.[4] The influence of the "work ethic" and the prestige of durable consumer goods begin to decline. Leisure, vacation travel, sexual contacts, and a wide range of "do-it-yourself" activities become more highly valued and socially acceptable. Alternative life-styles, some of them approximating to the ideals of "another development", take shape among minorities; an apparent widening of the range of choice contradicts the bureaucratization of the societies. Publications that, in many variants, predict doom for consumerism, argue for alternatives, and offer guidelines, reach a broad public.

At the same time, in certain medium-sized high-income countries in which the welfare state has reached its closest approximation to satisfaction of material needs and provision of abundant leisure to the whole population, the apathetic response of the majority to the apparent opportunities for creative life styles troubles social scientists and political ideologists.

4. Aggresively egalitarian and libertarian movements emerge among racial and linguistic minorities, women, youth, homosexuals, etc. The movements in question, particularly among the youth, either have a cyclical character, rising and falling rapidly in followings and militancy, or undergo continual metamorphoses in demands and tactics. The manner in which the mass communication media disseminate information on them and emphasize their more extreme or picturesque features exacerbates these latter traits. Descriptions and interpretations quickly become dated, as in the case of the identification by some social scientists in the late 1960s of a

[3] "... the most significant limits to growth ... are limits set by the already overstrained capacity of human beings to conceive, design, manage, support and adapt to extremely complex systems of human interdependence. In short, it is the political limits that are likely to constrain the continuity of physical growth well ahead of all other factors." (Rufus E. Miles, Jr., *Awakening from the American Dream: The Social and Political Limits to Growth* (Universe Books, New York, 1976, p. 2). "The core of the problem is that the market provides a full range of choice between alternative piecemeal, discrete, marginal adjustments, but no facility for choice between alternative states. ... By contrast, the political mechanism, through which preferences between alternative states could in principle be posed, has not yet developed a satisfactory system for such decision. ... Consequently, the capacity of both the market and the political system to meet expectations tends to be overestimated. They cannot deliver on what the public takes to be their promise." (Fred Hirsch, *Social Limits to Growth: A Twentieth Century Fund Study*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1976, p. 18).

[4] "Positional goods" are goods whose utility to the individual is negatively affected by increases in the number of persons having access to them (e. g., automobiles, suburban homes, higher education). (Hirsch, op. cit., p. 27–31).

profound revolution in the values and behaviour of the educated youth; the ferment of youth subsided by the early 1970s, but now may be on the rise again.

The movements in question affect the functioning of society and the state in several quite different ways:

(i) They exert pressure on the state to guarantee rights and offset social or biological handicaps by regulations and compensatory services, as in the cases of "affirmative action" to guarantee women and minorities parity in employment and education. These measures place unprecedented responsibilities on the welfare state and introduce serious rigidities into the functioning of public services and private enterprises.

(ii) Some of them resort readily to extra-legal tactics such as disruption of essential services, boycotts and tax strikes that hamper the functioning of the state and contribute to its discredit as either impotent or repressive.

(iii) They generate a wide range of initiatives for personal or group secession from the prevailing life style and the political and economic systems.

(iv) The clash in life styles, the cultural shock produced by certain libertarian demands, and the frictions produced by bureaucratic regulation of group rights excite organized resistance, counter-mobilization, and extra-legal disruption by other elements of the societies, including the police.

5. The traditional political roles of the middle and working classes shift to some extent. The more highly educated and upper-income elements of the middle classes become more open to new life styles, egalitarian and reformist policies, and global issues such as environmental protection and limits to growth. A large part of the working class, particularly the better-off and better-organized elements, remains culturally conservative, becomes less open to the appeals of socialist and social reform ideologies, and concentrates on particularist demands: The impingement on its values of the middle class cultural revolution, and the impingement on its immediate interests of continual technological innovation, loss of dynamism and dwindling employment in traditional heavy industries, and internationalization of production and labour markets under the aegis of the transnational corporations, places it on the defensive. It thus exerts pressure on the state to stimulate production along traditional lines, to restrict imports, and to exclude foreign labour. It is generally negative toward environmental and energy-saving regulations that might curtail employment.

6. The complexity of the public services required by high-consumption, highly urbanized, highly mobile societies means that a wide variety of specialized occupational groups either negotiating directly with the state (police, firemen, postal employees, teachers, doctors, etc.) or engaged in activities so central to the functioning of the society that their demands impinge necessarily on the state (transport, power and communications workers) become able to enforce demands by tactics disrupting the life styles and expectations of large sectors of the population. Their increasing readiness to resort to such tactics, and the declining capacity of the state to

prevent this by legal prohibitons and repression, coincides with widespread dissatisfaction over the declining quality of the services and the inability of the state to run them efficiently.

7. Mass formal education shares conspicuously in the disillusionment with the achievements of the welfare state. The apparent capacity of the schools to socialize youth and inculcate tool skills declines, in spite of increasingly prolonged and costly compulsory periods of schooling, during a period in which the capacity of the family to perform these functions is also declining. The impression gains ground that the schools are serving a custodial function (freeing parents from children and keeping them off the streets) more than an educational function.

The egalitarian objectives discussed above force additional responsibilities on the schools while widely publicized research fortifies scepticism about the capacity of the schools to contribute to such objectives. At the same time, the "massification" of higher education devalues its role in selection for preferred occupations, leads to further prolongation at post-graduate levels, and contributes to the cycles of youth protest. "Scholarly research" becomes increasingly formalized as a means of employing and also screening the products of higher education. Part of the eligible youth abandon education in rejection of these patterns.

Population and livelihood

8. Fertility rates decline with unexpected rapidity to levels below replacement, with consequent accelerated aging of the national populations.[5] This has a series of repercussions on the societies that will become progressively more important:

(i) The numbers of young people passing through the school systems in the 1960s and then entering the labour market in the 1970s have been exceptionally high owing to the so-called "baby boom" of the later 1940s and the 1950s. With the present slowdown in economic growth, their absorption into the labour force is lagging. Unemployment rates for the active population under 25 years of age are much higher than rates for the rest of the active population, and difficulties in finding jobs matching expectations are particularly serious for the more highly educated youth. However, the numbers entering the school systems have been

[5] In the countries with relatively high fertility rates in the recent past, such as the United States, this does not mean that a stationary population can be expected before the end of the century, even if the present trend continues. In Germany (D. R. as well as F. R.), however, and in a few other European countries in which a recent drop in the birth rate follows a relatively long period of low fertility, the population is now beginning to decline.

falling for some time, and projections for the future are now being revised downward.[6]

The numbers entering the labour market will also shortly begin to fall. Presumably the excess of young entrants over demand will dry up and be replaced by an excess of demand over supply, although the groups that have experienced prolonged unemployment may continue to present serious problems of adaptation. Whether the lesser numbers of youth will result in labour shortages will depend partly on future rates of economic growth and styles of technological innovation and partly on the participation rates of women, immigrants, and the upper-age groups.

(ii) The unexpectedly rapid aging of the population is already producing important shifts in needs for different social services, with unused capacity in the schools and overburdened services for the aged. The importance of geriatric medical care rises and that of pediatric care declines. The market for consumer goods, recreational services and housing also changes. Within the norms of the consumer society, industry and advertising must adjust and try to manipulate the changes.

(iii) The increase in the relative size of the upper age groups and the continual amplification of social security benefits and coverage over recent years generate unexpectedly formidable rises in social security costs, bringing abruptly to the attention of the societies the ominous implications of the future burden. This trend combines with the broader disillusionment with the welfare state and the quest for alternative life-styles to encourage rising evasion of labour laws and taxes, particularly through self-employment and artisanal activities.

Complex conflicts of interests and aspirations between the population of active ages and the upper age groups, or between sectors of both groups, are emerging. With recession the position of older workers becomes more insecure; if their jobs disappear they are unlikely to find new ones. Some of the aging continue to press for early pensioned retirement, while others demand the abolition of fixed-age retirement and legally-guaranteed equal access to jobs, because of the frustrations of inactivity at reduced income levels.

Increased employment of the aging will presumably become necessary to compensate for the decline in young entrants to the labour force and to relieve the social security burden. During the transition period, however, this will generate other frustrations among the younger employed whose prospects for better-paying jobs and promotions become clogged. It will also add to the complexity of bureaucratic

[6] In the United States, projections for total school-age population (5–24) in the year 2000 have been revised downward from 125 million to 79 million, only slightly higher than the present figure. The proportion of high school students going on to higher education is declining and this together with the declines in size of the age groups, indicates that higher enrolment may be only 13 million in 2000, against 17 to 22 million once expected. ("The Future Revised: Education's Big Boom Is Ending But Studies Get More Diverse", *The Wall Street Journal*, 8 April 1976).

protection of equal rights. Even without the re-entry of the groups above the present retirement ages, the average age of the labour force will rise; warnings are now heard that this will mean a crippling of innovativeness and labour mobility.

(iv) According to some prognoses, the industrialized countries are falling into a demographic trap, in which the devaluation of the family and the increasing burden of the aged on the young will lead to fertility rates permanently below replacement levels and to impoverished and decadent national societies. It seems equally likely, however, that future fertility rates, with universally accessible and acceptable contraception and abortion, will fluctuate abruptly with changing cultural fashions, economic conditions, and degrees of optimism or pessimism concerning the future, resulting in unprecedentedly uneven age profiles of the population.

It is also probable that the populations of the industrialized countries will increasingly be replenished, whether their dominant forces permit this or not, by waves of migrants from other parts of the world. For national societies adjusting to the ecological, political and social limits to growth and to the demands for human equality, the present demographic trends are not necessarily negative, and it is simplistic to assume that an aging population must be stagnant. However, the trends obviously call for comprehensive readjustments in work patterns, in sources and uses of income, and in social interactions, for which there is now no consensus.

9. The industrialized countries become increasingly dependent on foreign labour to perform lower-paid manual work. The characteristics and circumstances of entry of such labour differ according to country but it has become important throughout the industrialized world. In some countries it is composed mainly of migrant workers under contract for fixed terms, without families; in others of illegal migrants with or without families; in others of permanent immigrants mainly with families and selected by the host government according to some criterion of employability; in still others of migrants deriving rights of entry from the former colonial status of their homeland.

The migrant workers come mainly from "semi-developed" countries rather than from the "least-developed" countries, whose excess labour force is physically and educationally ill-adapted to the demand. The semi-developed countries consequently face a drain of labour in times of prosperity, offset by remittances to families from workers abroad, and an intensified unemployment problem in times of recession. (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Mexico, and the Caribbean island countries are those most affected). Whatever the circumstances of their entry, the migrants gradually gain a permanent foothold in the labour force and the society, under disadvantageous and sometimes conflictive conditions, and their presence changes the outlook and conditions for solidarity of the working class.

Economic recession and rising unemployment make it probable that the entry of migrants will be curbed during the immediate future, but these factors do not altogether offset their willingness to accept incomes and working conditions that are no longer acceptable to the native labour force.

Two quite different kinds of migrants are also contributing to the increasingly multi-ethnic character of the populations of the industrialized countries: professionals and technicians entering the labour force at middle or even high income levels, and political exiles whose insertion into the labour force is often unrelated to their previous experience. The numbers and national diversity of political exiles have increased rapidly, and they are beginning to have important catalytic roles both in the organization of other migrants and in the evolution of political movements in the host countries.

10. Modernization of agriculture, shifts in the structure of industrial production and other factors have brought about wide variations in rates of economic growth, income levels and demands for manpower in different internal regions. In the European countries here considered, with nearly full employment from the late 1940s up to the mid-1970s and with slow growth in the labour force offset by the importation of labour, these disparities have not generated unmanageable tensions in the urban zones of rapid growth and inmigration. They are, however, generating increasingly militant demands for autonomy and for a larger share of public resources from declining regions and occupations, especially but not exclusively where the regional population is culturally or linguistically distinct from the national majority. Questions of the unity of the nation state and the basis for claims to self-determination, which seemed to have been resolved in Europe, have thus been reopened with unexpected violence.

In the United States the consequences of uneven regional growth and changes in livelihood have been quite different. Exceptionally rapid modernization has expelled from agriculture a population with relatively low educational and skill levels, and in large part hampered by racial discrimination. A "marginalized" population in extreme poverty by national norms has thus concentrated in the great cities, bringing about a sometimes violent competition for jobs, services and housing between the new urbanites and the longer-established urban working class; the mushrooming of an extremely costly public welfare system that unintentionally generates disincentives to employment and stable family life; and the flight of much of the middle-class urban population to the suburbs.

As the new urbanites become increasingly able to compete with other urban groups in enforcing demands through the vote and through organized action, city government enters into a crisis of continually rising costs and static resources. The simultaneous entry of millions of foreign workers, first in agriculture and later in the lower-paid urban occupations, places additional strain on the national capacity for adaptation to economic, demographic, and cultural change.

11. Crime, especially violent crime, increases markedly in quantity and visibility. This trend is associated to some extent with the urban crisis referred to above, but appears also in countries in which this crisis is not acute. While speculation on crime requires particular caution, in view of temptation to sensationalism and the unreliability of indicators, it is plausible that the rise in visible crime reflects the

declining legitimacy of the state and the social order that also manifests itselt in the militant libertarian-egalitarian demands and the quest for alternative life-styles.

The "respectable" elements of the societies vacillate between demands for drastic repression and demands for broad reforms aimed at the social causes of crime, with declining confidence in the effectiveness of any solutions. Resentment against the state follows for inability to cope with the problems; there is increased distrust of ethnic groups associated with violent crime and generalized refusal on the part of the marginalized urban population to accept the role of deviants from a just social order. Resistance movements and links with political militancy emerge in the prisons, increasingly overcrowded and discredited in their rehabilitatory and punitive functions.

12. Reactions of different sectors of public opinion to trends in the rest of the world become increasingly confused, self-contradictory, guilt-laden, and resentful. The concern of parts of the middle classes and parts of the labour movement over world poverty, human rights, population growth, environmental and related problems becomes stronger, but mingles with rising disillusionment over the efficacy of "aid" (military as well as economic and social); resentment over aggressive economic and other policies of Third World governments; uneasiness concerning the domestic repercussions (particularly the impact on employment) of activities of transnational corporations in these countries; and hardening of stereotypes concerning the oppressiveness, corruption and incompetence of Third World governments and dominant classes. Small but conspicuous political movements identify themselves with Third World revolutionary struggles and even try to reproduce these struggles in their own countries.

Distrust of the motives of the home government in supporting and distributing "aid" and impatience with such policies in the face of apparent governmental incapacity to solve domestic problems are probably must pronounced in the larger industrialized countries, particularly in the United States in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. In certain middle-sized countries in Europe and in certain Commonwealth countries the more articulate currents of public opinion seem to favour the kind of transformation in the Third World that is summed up in "another development" and to support relatively openhanded government co-operation in such initiatives.

In the European countries in question this sentiment coincides with the achievement of relatively egalitarian welfare-oriented societies under democratic socialist governments. Elsewhere, particularly in Canada and Australia, nationalist reactions against economic, political and cultural dominance by the world centres have generated a degree of self-identification with the Third World without, of course, overcoming the confused, suspicious, or censorious attitudes noted above.

13. *Japan,* ever since it entered the modern world order, has contradicted current theories of development and modernization, constituting an astonishing example of what can be achieved by a country with a highly unfavourable resource

endowment and a social structure very different from that associated with capitalist development elsewhere. At present, it also constitutes a *reductio ad absurdum* of expectations concerning the benefits of very high economic growth rates.

Most of the seeds of change discussed above are visible but their specific traits and their probable consequences are far apart from those in Europe and the United States. One sees at present:

(i) Apparent proximity to the ecological limits of growth in terms of air and water pollution and intensified overcrowding of population combined with mass ownership of durable goods.

(ii) Exceptionally rapid incorporation of the population into a consumer society with a particularly traumatic consumer shift from products moderate in space and energy demands to the automobile.

(iii) Rapid increase in resistance by the working class to the low wage levels that facilitated export-oriented economic growth.

(iv) Demographic transition to low fertility accelerating through the 1950s, resulting in a present labour force nearly stationary in size.

(v) In consequence of these four trends, an urgent need to export further industrial growth to countries with more abundant manpower, low wage levels, and more incipient pollution problems. (In contrast to Western Europe, which has imported workers to take the less attractive jobs, Japan is exporting the jobs; in the United States the two tactics have been followed simultaneously.)

(vi) A boom in mass tourism, mainly to countries with lower costs of recreational services; the impact of European tourism on the Mediterranean and United States tourism on Mexico and the Caribbean has its counterpart in Japanese tourism in Southeast Asia.

(vii) Most recently, a sharp decline in the rate of growth in production, the appearance of appreciable unemployment for the first time since the early post-war period, and the weakening of traditions of job security in enterprises.

The vulnerability of the economy to external shocks and the improbability of recuperation of growth rates matching those of the past are presumably important stimuli to anxiety and distrust of the capacity of the state to cope; however, these factors are offset by a high degree of social discipline and by social sources of personal security unmatched in the United States or Europe. At the same time, violent rejection of the existing order by political movements with an appreciable following among the youth takes particularly extreme forms, and frustration at the shattering by external and internal factors of the dream of permanent full employment and consumerist development may well exacerbate this.

14. In the *European Mediterranean Countries* (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) overall trends and patterns differ strikingly from those of the rest of Europe, although France has certain traits in common with the group in spite of its higher income level; Yugoslavia in spite of its Socialist economic and political system; and Turkey in spite of its lower income level and more predominantly rural population.

The countries in question are economically and socially semi-developed or unevenly developed. Their more backward internal regions are suppliers of labour not only to the more developed parts of the same countries but also to the rest of Europe.

Tourism from the rest of Europe is an important factor in their economic growth and in their social changes. As in Mexico and the Caribbean, tourism demands at the same time considerable investment in modern facilities expected by tourists, the preservation of a "traditional" culture and artisanal activities, and relatively low wage rates in service occupations.

These countries are undergoing rapid and uneven modernization, with more disruptive socio-cultural consequences than in the rest of Europe; differences between the life styles of internal regions and social classes continue to be wide. The demographic transition to low rates of population increase is only recently completed or is now under way. Politicization is relatively intense, with Marxist working-class parties; neo-Marxist and anarchist intellectual currents and youth movements; clerical, traditional-reactionary and neo-fascist movements; and national-separatist movements all showing greater vigour and mass support than elsewhere in the "developed" non-socialist world. The capacity of the State to act as arbiter is increasingly precarious, for different reasons in each country. The political role of the military is prominent but ambiguous, sometimes shoring up the existing order, sometimes pressing for radical change.

The resemblances to Latin American patterns are obvious, and a good deal of mutual political-ideological-cultural interaction might be expected. In the Mediterranean countries, however, the relative size and influence of the organized working class are greater and the dimensions of the marginalized rural and urban groups in critical poverty much smaller; the political game is more structured; the influence of parties with mass memberships and coherent ideologies is stronger; the appeal of populism and charismatic leadership is weaker; and the capacity of the military to act autonomously in pursuit of self-determined political missions is somewhat more limited. Industrialization in most of the Mediterranean countries is more advanced both quantitatively and qualitatively; the national bourgeoisie has a higher degree of control of the major enterprises; and some transnational corporations are based in Mediterranean countries.

In the cyclical swings between authoritarian and democratic-pluralist regimes characteristic of both regions, Latin America has in recent years been moving in the direction of authoritarianism in the presence of conflicts otherwise unmanageable by the dominant forces, while the Mediterranean countries have been moving in the opposite direction, with accompanying increases in the relative strength of Marxist-oriented movements. Popular frustration over economic recession and rising unemployment, swelled by the reflux of workers from the rest of Europe, at a time when the societies were on the verge of mass consumerism and the workers were refusing to accept previous wage levels, may be particularly important here, whether in providing impetus toward structural transformations or bringing about a reversal of the political cycle.

However,the Mediterranean countries are complexly committed to a world order and a European order that penalize deviations from pluralist democracy in politics and from openness to international market forces in the economy. The leaders of the mass political movements ideologically committed to structural transformation are evidently well aware of the constraints presented by the international order and by the consumption expectations of different classes within the countries. Thus, their programmes and tactics become more cautious to the extent that governmental power becomes a real possibility for them. At the same time, smaller movements at both end of the political spectrum that refuse to accept the contraints increasingly resort to disruptive or terrorist tactics.

(b) The socialist camps

Seeds of change in the "Second World" of industrialized countries whose dominant forces identify them as socialist and view development from a Marxist-Leninist perspective can be discussed with relative brevity. The present chapter focusses on the probable implications for Latin America of internal changes in national societies in the rest of the world. Latin American interactions with the Second World, in spite of the presence in the region of one country – Cuba – committed to Marxist-Leninist socialism, are relatively restricted. Even the currents of opinion that seek radically different styles of development now find more in common with similar currents in the First World and in the remainder of the Third World than with the institutionalized socialism of the Second World. The appeal of the industrialized socialist countries as models for the Good Society seems to be static or declining in spite of their demonstrable achievements and their deliberate competition for acceptance as models.

Moreover, it is harder to identify the significant internal seeds of change in the socialist countries and assess their capacity for growth than in the case of the countries discussed above. The dominant forces are better able to control or conceal their manifestations. For some time the Second World will probably be able to transmit to the Third World a narrower and more coherent range of messages, and to accept fewer stimuli to change from it, than will the industrialized market-economy countries, but sudden changes in the messages and stimuli or an increasing diversification and contradictoriness cannot be ruled out.

The Second World is notoriously divided into two rival camps that agree on very little except in their rejection of capitalist organization of production and their insistence on Marxism-Leninism as theoretical framework for policy. Yugoslavia seemed for a time to offer another model of particular interest to semi-industrialized Third World countries but its external influence has waned. Yugoslavia's experience in decentralized workers' management and the combination of market incentives with socialist central planning has been ambiguous; and the seeds of change now

visible suggest that the national society has not overcome the sources of tension common to the semi-industrialized labour-exporting tourism-dependent Mediterranean countries.

The first major camp, that of the *USSR and its European associates,* seems to have entered a period of routinized imposition of stereotypes concerning the style of development and the level of human welfare achieved. Reform initiatives that seemed promising during the 1960s have been ruled out as dangerous to the system of political domination, and the national regimes and societies have evolved with varying degrees of rigidity or flexibility within the limits of the system. The countries are moving haltingly toward the achievement of consumer societies similar to those now undergoing cultural mutations elsewhere. This trend has several features:

– a raising of consumption levels and introduction of consumer durable goods officially planned and controlled;

– an infiltration of cultural-recreational tastes and aspirations, particularly among urban youth, that is disapproved but largely uncontrollable;

– a proliferation of illicit or unrecognized systems for the production and distribution of consumer goods and services that parallels the phenomena of "black" labour escaping regulation and taxation in the market-economy welfare states.

Under these conditions, cultural influences, including forms of dissidence, from the richer consumer societies are better able to penetrate the socialist societies than the latter are to exert counter-influences. The long experience of austerity does not seem to have generated creative life styles, but a hidden appetite that emerges to the extent that real consumption opportunities appear.

Several factors hamper the movement toward the consumer society: (i) the lagging productivity of agriculture, making the achievement of a varied diet precarious, increasingly dependent on external supplies, and politically neuralgic; (ii) the low capacity of the planning system to improve consumer goods production, distribution and responsiveness to consumer tastes; (iii) chronic problems of work incentives and societal participation associated with a long history of routinized and centralized mobilization and exhortation; and (iv) the need to devote relatively high proportions of the national income to armaments and heavy industry related to armaments in order to meet prevailing conceptions of the obligations of a world power and match a rival enjoying a much higher per capita income level.

In the European parts of this socialist camp, low birth rates over a long period are now resulting in nearly stationary and aging labour forces and the beginning of labour transfers from less industrialized socialist countries or peripheral zones of the same countries, supplementing previous flows of rural labour into industry. Pressures on women to enter the labour force have been constant, and the high participation of women, along with urban housing shortages, have contributed to the low birth rates.

Recent trends of particular importance in the smaller countries of this camp include an increasing reliance on mass tourism from Western Europe as a source of

foreign exchange; and an increasing receptivity to transnational enterprises offering technological innovations and exportable products in exchange for an entry into new markets and a low-wage, dependable, relatively well-qualified labour force. Both trends point to increasing dependence on cultural and technological innovations from the market-oriented consumer societies.

In the second camp China stands alone, with a unique combination of advanced industrial-technological capacity, huge population, low income levels and peasant majority that differentiates it both from the first socialist camp and from the increasing number of small non-industrialized Third World countries whose dominant forces have chosen variants of Marxism-Leninism as frames of reference for policy.

In recent years the Chinese socialist style of development has manifested more innovativeness than that of the first socialist camp, with periods of consolidation-bureaucratization alternating with periods of revolutionary ferment generated by poorly understood combinations of stimuli from above and pressures from below. It is much better shielded from the heterogeneous influences emanating from mutating consumer societies than is the Soviet-Central European style.

The sheer impossibility of substituting diversified industrial consumer goods incentives for shared frugality in a population such as the Chinese, the smallness of the groups even aware of other life-styles, and the capacity of the leadership to generate compelling national objectives should combine to preserve the coherence of the style for some time to come, although not necessarily with the kind of conflictive innovativeness with which it has been associated.

The Chinese style of development, or rather the idealized versions of it current abroad, has two facets associated with the alternation mentioned above and appealing to completely different currents of opinion in the rest of the world. The first is the frugal, egalitarian, resource-conserving, orderly, peasant-based social order, generating innovations in local participation and labour-intensive production but otherwise conformist, zealously practising family planning, attractive to frustrated developmentalists of many political complexions. The second is the "cultural revolutionary" challenge to political gradualism, bourgeois life styles, bureaucratization and imperialism, accompanied by an apocalyptic vision of the future, inspiring the Maoist movements outside China and especially attractive to minorities among university-educated youth.

China has also been crucially important to the advocates of "another development", both as a source of concrete prescriptions for rural transformation and as the only plausible demonstration (other than Tanzania) that a real national society might set out seriously to realize its frugal egalitarian utopia. The seeds of change now visible in China – particularly the Chinese revelations of the high costs and the origins in political factional struggle of certain manifestations of technological voluntarism and anti-élitism – suggest that China, like the USSR before it, will decline in plausibility as a Utopia, or as a scene of Manichean conflicts between champions of "good" egalitarian-participatory and "evil" technocratic-centralist policy lines.

The warnings of the Chinese themselves that their experience is not a model for the transformation of other societies will have to be taken to heart.

China will retain enormous interest for study of the interplay of political, economic and cultural factors in the socialist transformation of real societies, especially in regard to the management of communications between national centre and periphery in circumstances in which mobilization of the masses has a high priority, peasant cultures and values are undergoing complex mutations, and messages travelling in both directions are bound to become exaggerated and distorted by factors unrelated to their original purpose.

(c) Regions of the Third World other than Latin America

It is legitimate to insist, in considering the application of the principles "of another development" to Latin America, that the relatively urbanized and industrialized position of the larger countries of the region, and their complex involvement in the present international order, imply quite different options and constraints from those facing the poorer predominantly rural parts of the world. As already suggested, mutations in the central market-economy countries are particularly relevant to the possibilities for transformation in Latin America.

However, it would be equally over-simplified to suppose a clearcut dividing line between "semi-developed" Latin America and the rest of the Third World. In differing ways, most of the other Third World countries are also complexly involved in the international order. The aspiration to endogenous rural-community-oriented styles of development in a good many of these countries has stronger justifications than in Latin America, but it is not clear whether the resistances to such styles from the unevenly modernized social, political and economic structures will be any less formidable.

The Third World national societies outside Latin America can be classified according to several criteria, all of which have some relevance for present purposes:

(i) according to the size of the populations and the economies and thus their weight within the world order;

(ii) according to geographical and cultural proximity and consequent intensity of interactions;

(iii) according to endowment with or lack of raw materials in sufficient international demand to give them strong bargaining positions;

(iv) according to political regimes (personalist-tyrannical, stable authoritarian, one-party mobilization, negotiated balance between ethnic-religious-linguistic groups, democratic-pluralist);

(v) according to levels of per capita income, urbanization and industrialization (that is, approximation to patterns of semi-development); and

(vi) according to the style of development preferred by the forces controlling the state (liberal-capitalist, state-capitalist, socialist, various hybrids).

At present, a comparison of classifications according to these different criteria would show more incongruities than regularities. In particular, the adoption by forces controlling the state of a capitalist or socialist or hybrid strategy for development has become increasingly divorced from the objective conditions. The world-wide reproduction of the European model of the nation state accompanying the liquidation of colonialism in regions in which traditional political lovalties had quite different bases (dynastic-absolutist, feudal, tribal, etc.) has been fruitful of anomalies. At the same time, the extreme differences in national societies and the occasional precariousness of national self-identification accompany and probably fortify an increasing degree of regional and international solidarity and self-identification as Third World countries seeking indigenous solutions to common problems and confronting the central countries with common demands.

For present purposes, the following five-fold semi-regional classification may be most suggestive: (1) the Arab states (including those of North Africa) and Iran; (2) Africa south of the Sahara; (3) the South Asian states with huge populations and particularly low incomes; (4) the states of Southeast Asia; (5) the island mini-states of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the Caribbean. Each group is internally heterogeneous but has common traits not shared to the same degree with the rest of the Third World, and interactions within the groups – conflictive as well as co-operative – are more intense than interactions with the Third World as a whole.

1. In many respects the *Arab-Iranian group* has more in common with Latin America than do the other groups: long traditions of urban political-economic-cultural dominance; very wide differences between countries in stages of economic growth, in degrees of urbanization-modernization, and in political regimes, combined with strong cultural-linguistic ties, well-established mechanisms for group action, and also deeply rooted sources of intra-group conflict. The larger countries, including oil exporters such as Iran as well as importers such as Egypt and Morocco, have reached patterns of dependent semi-development similar to those of Latin America. The upper-income strata have broadened and diversified; the gap between them and the lower strata in the income distribution has widened; "modern" consumer societies for minorities have emerged; and a marginalized under-employed labour force, in part expelled from agriculture, is expanding.

The degree of voluntarism and diversity in governmental choices of styles of development is a good deal higher than in Latin America. However, the non-capitalist development strategies that have emerged in several countries have been relatively centralized, bureaucratized, oriented to the introduction of advanced technologies in industry and agriculture, heavily dependent on imported equipment and specialists in the oil-exporting countries and on external financial aid in the others.

The advocates of "another development" have not found congenial innovative and participatory styles in this group of countries.[7] In any case, countries in this group seem to have a high propensity toward the exertion of pressures for change in the international order as a whole, owing partly to oil resources and consequent availability of funds that governments can allocate with fewer constraints than elsewhere, partly to strategic geopolitical location, and partly to the contradictory combination of militant solidarity and violent factionalism that derives from the Israel-Palestine problem.

2. In *Africa south of the Sahara* questions of national identity and viability are particularly prominent, with the region fragmented into a large number of relatively small states, most of them with very short histories within their present boundaries, few of them internally homogeneous, few of them with human or material resources sufficient for "development" as this has conventionally been understood. Thus, external aid and regional solidarity, the latter partly to ensure that "aid" will not perpetuate dependency and conflict between clients of different industrialized states, are particularly necessary and particularly difficult to obtain and manage.

Initiatives for regional unity coexist uneasily with centrifugal pressures within countries, with the emergence in some countries of erratic personal rule, and also with aspirations to autonomous national styles of development, usually labelled "socialist", intended to bypass the impracticability of conventional development styles and supply cultural-psychological compensations. Political-bureaucratic-military élites (with roles not clearly differentiated) have a relatively free hand to choose such styles because of the weakness of other social forces. At the same time, the weaknesses of the state machinery, the limitations of communication between the élites and the mainly rural masses, the dependence of the economies on raw material exports and external subsidies, and the adoption by the élites of consumerist ways of life that require concentration in their hands of the proceeds of the exports and compulsion of the producers, result in real styles that various analysts identify as "bureaucratic-capitalist" rather than "socialist".

Only one of the national strategies, that of Tanzania, has attracted the advocates of "another development" as a potential model for participatory egalitarian transformation, and even here the constraints of economic dependence, meagre resource endowment, and faulty communications between innovating élite and masses remain inhibiting. While a few of the African countries (Nigeria, Zaire, Zambia)

[7] Samir Amin applies the following assessment to the purportedly socialist as well as the market-economy countries in the group: "The Arab World is already highly urbanized, its lower middle class – a reactionary class integrated into the capitalist system – is highly developed, and its countryside is dominated by kulaks, the beneficiaries of the bourgeois land reforms; all this is reflected in extensive deculturation, considerable moral and intellectual disarray, in short all the signs of Lumpen-Europeanization. . . . The sole cause for hope is the fact it is no longer possible to resolve the manifold contradictions to which this dependent development has given rise." (Samir Amin, *La nation arabe: nationalisme et luttes de classes*, Les Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1976, pp. 150–151). (Author's translation)

have achieved relatively strong positions as suppliers of important raw materials, none of them as yet has been able to industrialize to a significant degree or to achieve a relative weight in the region comparable to those of some Arab and Latin American countries in their regions.

3. The *larger South Asian states* are, in terms of per capita income and absolute size of populations, at extremely low levels of productivity and consumption, the "least-developed" in the world. (For present purposes, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh belong to this group; Sri Lanka, in spite of its geographical location, has more in common with the next group to be discussed.) If international aid were distributed according to a uniform means test, the countries in this group would receive most of it. At the same time, all of them have industrial sectors and export activities that, while small in relation to their populations, are fairly large in absolute terms or compared with those of other Third World countries; India has the largest industrial sector in the Third World. Structurally heterogeneous development, as in Latin America, ha generated its own market and its own vested interests in perpetuation of the same style.

In South Asia, the conservative character of the forces dominant over the rural majority props up this line of development politically while hampering it economically. Up to the present, socialist-reformist aspirations of the national regimes have led to bureaucratization and the construction of complex systems of special privileges rather than to major changes in economic and social realities, as was documented in Gunnar Myrdal's *Asian Drama* (1968).

The warnings now current of critical poverty deteriorating into mass famines apply more plausibly to South Asia and to parts of Africa than to other regions of the Third World. In Africa, the populations threatened are relatively small, and although relief action is hindered by their geographical remoteness and other factors, famines can be arrested by international aid without unmanageable costs. If the international sources of aid do not act or act ineffectually, as in the Sahel and Ethiopian droughts of the early 1970s, the international repercussions of famines in isolated thinly populated areas are weak.

In South Asia, the overall capacity to increase food production faster than population is not yet exhausted, but the governments seem decreasingly able to manage production incentives, prices to the consumer and distribution networks reconciling their various objectives, and remain dependent on subsidized food imports to meet shortfalls. Various prognoses indicate that over the long term only a comprehensively planned combination of agrarian transformation, population control, and very large-scale external aid will be able to prevent an unmanageably wide gap between food needs and food supplies.[8] Even in the short term, a few bad crop years might face

[8] See, for example, the scenarios in Mihajlo Mesarovic and Eduard Pestel, *Mankind at the Turning Point: The Second Report to the Club of Rome* (Dutton/Reader's Digest Press, New York, 1974).

the international food distribution system with a crisis that it would not meet, particularly if production were to slump in the United States, the USSR, and South Asia simultaneously. A famine decimating the populations of some or all of the countries in this group would follow. The shock for the international order and for the region itself would be severe, but the consequences are hard to assess, and the kind of chaotic general collapse sometimes predicted seems unlikely.

One might expect an exacerbation of several different trends in the central countries as well as in South Asia – toward horrified rejection of the prevailing international order and consumerist styles of development, toward greater national selfishness and insistence on population control as the only solution, toward more repressive regimes protecting the lives and property of the better-off South Asians with assistance from some of the central countries, and toward protracted revolutionary struggles aimed at the implantation of egalitarian austerity. The past experience of China as well as India demonstrates that famines in peasant populations do not by themselves bring about either the collapse or the transformation of the pre-existing social and political order.

The poverty of the masses of South Asia and the increasing implausibility of expectations that industrialization and agricultural modernization can overcome this poverty have been crucial to demonstrations of the necessity of "another development". At the same time, conceptions of rural community potential for endogenous self-reliant development stemming from Gandhism have been nearly as influential as the Chinese experience in shaping the more concrete prescriptions. It must be remembered that in the 1950s the government of India hoped to combine development through industrialization with large-scale programmes of rural community development, using trained change agents to stimulate innovation, co-operation and self-help in the villages.

Neither these programmes nor the more recent introduction of high-yielding crop varieties (the so-called Green Revolution) seem to have brought the rural societies any closer to the ideals of social equality and collective effort. The rural power holders, through their links with the national power structure, have consistently been able to manipulate the rural programmes, whether the latter were participationist or technocratic in orientation. Arguments for endogenously-inspired collective rural development are now being made with renewed fervor[9], and local initiatives corresponding to the ideals continue to appear, but the way to multiply these initiatives to a scale matching the needs for rural transformation without their undergoing bureaucratic standardization or capture by local vested interests seems no clearer than before.

4. The national societies of *Southeast Asia* have in common medium size, relatively satisfactory ratios between land and population that are now endangered by

[9] See Wahidul Haque, Niranjan Mehta, Anisur Rahman and Ponna Wignaraja, "Toward a Theory of Rural Development", *Development Dialogue*, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Uppsala, 1977, 2.

high rates of population increase, and peasant majorities that, except in war-devastated or otherwise disadvantaged internal zones, have not reached the depths of poverty and precarious food supply weighing upon South Asia. Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, and Sri Lanka belong to this group. Indonesia has many traits in common with it in spite of its larger population and the higher proportion of this population in critical poverty. Singapore and Hong Kong, as city states without a rural hinterland, are comparable to certain rapidly industrializing urban centres of the other countries, but not to the countries themselves.

Southeast Asia now comprises states that have embarked vigorously on dependent capitalist styles of development (Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Hong Kong, as well as Indonesia) and states with socialist styles that have emerged following prolonged and very destructive periods of warfare. Two countries fall outside this dichotomy: Burma has a self-isolated "military socialist" regime *sui generis* that has excluded dependent industrialization and urban consumer-society modernization and has relied on the peasant majority's ability to produce surpluses of rice, without, apparently, achieving significant innovations in social relations or production; and Sri Lanka since the 1940s achieved a range of social services and consumption subsidies unique among low-income non-socialist countries.

The experience of Sri Lanka is of considerable interest for "another development". First, it has demonstrated that redistributive policies for the satisfaction of basic needs can be materially and administratively feasible in a poor country with a rural majority. Second, it has demonstrated that such policies can emerge from open political competition for mass support, at formidable costs of several kinds but without necessarily incurring the breakdowns that have been common to populist regimes in countries with considerably higher income levels. Third, it has demonstrated that, within a dependent capitalist raw-material-export-oriented economic framework, the inhibiting effects of such policies on accumulation and production incentives, while formidable, can be bearable and compatible with a certain amount of economic growth over an extended period.

Lastly, on the negative side, Sri Lanka has demonstrated that neither political democracy nor development planning offer effective ways of overcoming the shortcomings of the welfare state, in the absence of a transformation of social structures, values and incentives. Political and economic difficulties have been recurrent and increasingly severe, but no practicable and widely acceptable alternatives to the present system seem to be in sight.

In the market-economy countries of Southeast Asia income concentration seems to be on the increase; minority consumer societies are becoming highly conspicuous with the expected accompaniment of growing underemployed rural and urban marginal strata. The rise of mass movements of educated youth rejecting the style of development and trying to mobilize the disadvantaged urban and rural masses against it has been particularly pronounced in these countries; while movements of

this kind have been repressed and silenced in various countries, their reapperance is probable.

In the three socialist countries, and particularly in Vietnam, the aftermath of war and the paucity of external aid left no alternative to a frugal self-reliant disciplined style of development, and the war itself generated forms of mobilization and control attuned to such a style. The fact of victory against overwhelming odds gave this style considerable potential attraction for seekers of "another development" in other relatively small and poor countries, but the conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia has already quenched hopes that these countries might over the long term achieve innovative and participatory patterns and exert influence distinct from the Chinese and Soviet models.

The geographic position of Southeast Asia and the declining ability of central countries to enforce hegemony over it give the dominant forces of the countries, whether capitalist or socialist, a good deal of latitude in modifying the terms of external dependency by varying their relationships with China, the United States, the USSR, and Japan, although this latitude hardly offsets the dangers of the position.

In the more aggressively market-oriented countries one finds governmental initiatives designed to counteract the polarizing and marginalizing forces of the style of development (through agrarian reforms, employment creation, participatory mechanisms, conciliation of the disaffected youth, campaigns against corruption and concentrated wealth) and tactics aimed at accommodation with socialist neighbours, combined with the maintenance of regimes sufficiently authoritarian to smother internal conflicts, guarantee stable rules of the game and offer a dependable low-wage labour force to transnational enterprises. It is significant that several of these countries have recently been favoured areas of external investment, because of their resource endowment, because of confidence that their dominant forces can maintain order, and because of expectations of growing internal markets for consumer goods, while the South Asian countries have not, because their problems have increasingly seemed insuperable within a peripheral capitalist framework.

5. The scattered island mini-states of the Indian and Pacific Oceans and the Caribbean have in common plantation economies, now in many cases undergoing a transformation to tourist economies; ethnically heterogeneous populations deriving largely from successive importations of plantation labour; weak national identities; dependence on external stimuli and constraints so pronounced as almost to rule out the possibility of autonomous styles of development. These disadvantages may paradoxically, as in the cases of some African states, stimulate an intellectual and popular striving for "something else" in the form of endogenous life styles, cultural nationalism, xenophobia and charismatic leadership to compensate for the lack of preconditions for conventional development processes and strategies.

The mini-states are extreme cases in the present crisis of the nation state and the international order made up of nation states. The number of very small units con-

tinues to increase at a time when the separate viability of even the larger nation states comes under question. The mini-states depend for protection of their rights and support of their precarious economies on a system of international organizations continually becoming more complex, which places on them heavy burdens of representation and diversion of their attention from internal tasks.

(d) Latin America: a future open to choice or hazard?

The preceding pages have implicitly posed the questions: What are the alternatives open to Latin America in a world of national societies undergoing such diverse and mutually contradictory mutations? What will be the range of alternatives in a few years? To what extent is the future predetermined by Latin America's peripheral semi-development, the commitment of its dominant social forces to the consumer society and to the new international division of labour that the transnational enterprises are shaping?

The current personification of the countries of the region as an international middle class within the capitalist world order is an analogy that cannot be pushed very far. A "middle class" composed of imitative, structurally heterogeneous national societies implies internal contradictions and tensions, a precarious balance between the worlds of "rich" and "poor" countries, quite different from the supposed progressive and stabilizing roles of middle classes within national societies.

It is evident, however, that the special relationships – cultural as well as economic and political – between Latin America and the central market-economy countries make the mutations in these countries of crucial importance for assessment of the feasibility of major changes in Latin American styles of development. Even the smaller and poorer Latin American countries have appreciable "modern" urban superstructures and classes looking to the First World for models. The governments of the First World are more disposed and better able to hinder the emergence of radically different styles of development in Latin America than in Africa and Asia.

Thus, the internal as well as external balance of power suggests that in most of Latin America during the immediate future, demands for equality for nation states within a reformed international economic order will continue to have the upper hand over demands for equality for human beings within transformed national societies. The blueprints for "another development" will continue to have a mainly ornamental role in inter-governmental deliberations concentrated on bargaining tactics and justifications for demands vis-à-vis the central countries.

If the First World should recover and maintain sufficient prosperity, self-confidence and technological innovativeness during the remainder of the twentieth century, one might envisage two plausible futures for the countries of Latin America. Either might be accompanied by political struggles as persistent and disrup-

tive as those of recent years but without basic changes in the internal distribution of power. Either might be acoompanied by considerable gains in national income levels and in the stock of productive capital without any narrowing of the income gap between Latin America and the central countries or any significant reduction in technological and financial dependence.

One future would be a projection of present styles of development, accompanied by an intensification of the efforts that have been made intermittently during the past half century to counteract the "concentrating and excluding" logic of these styles and democratize the consumer society. Governments would strive to capture somewhat larger proportions of increments in the national income and curb the consumption of the upper-income strata to some extent, so as to raise the rate of productive investment. They would continue to respond to the employment pressures of educated youth and the pressures of organized workers to raise their share of income, but they would also allocate resources and seek more effective policies to bring the under-employed, under-educated and under-nourished masses into some kind of productive and participatory relationship to the national society.

It hardly needs demonstration that the achievement of an ideal welfare state reconciling the multiple objectives and heterogeneous pressures is unlikely. Nevertheless, present national income levels and the apparent capacity of the state to intervene in the economy and administer social services support arguments that a good deal more can be done along these lines than has been done, without drastically curtailing the consumption of the rich or preventing capital accumulation.

In a prosperous and expanding world economy, the governments of the central countries and the transnational enterprises might be expected to look benevolently on welfare state policies in the periphery, if only as acceptable alternatives to more radical policies, and to give them some support through their credit and trade policies. The two safety valves of expansion of bureaucratic employment for the middle strata and public works employment plus consumption subsidies for the poor might then continue to function for some time and permit the maintenance of formally democratic political procedures.

Such a future can be criticized as unjust, wasteful of societal resources, unsustainable over the long term and uninspiring in comparison with the vision of "another development". Nevertheless, it may continue for some time to be the only practicable path for governments seeking to mitigate the human disbenefits of a style of development that they cannot transform. Neither the advocates of "another development" nor the ideological enemies of dependent capitalist semi-development have as yet been able to demonstrate plausibly how real social forces and real governments might be able to manage affairs differently.

The more difficult immediate questions for such a future then lies in the willingness of the dominant forces in Latin America to give more than lip service to welfare objectives and in the ability of the state to secure a certain degree of autonomy in pursuing such objectives. The following quotation sums up the reasons for

doubt whether the national societies, if the internal and external distribution of power remains unchanged, will be able to advance even this far in the direction of "another development":

> For example, is the Mexican state – a state constitutionally and rhetorically committed to social justice; massively involved in the development process; overseeing an economy that is profoundly penetrated and multinationalized; with a modernizing industrial sector, export-oriented agriculture, currency tied to the dollar, inflationary pressures, and balance of payments problems – any more "autonomous" from domestic anti-egalitarian class forces today than forty years ago? Could even the most progressive Mexican regime imaginable consistently decide in favour of impoverished *ejidatarios* when the interests of Mexican and international agribusiness are at stake? The answers are obvious for the Mexican case ... but they would not be much less controversial for any regime, no matter how "progressive" its expressed commitments, as long as these kinds of developmental rules and class alliances guide the processes of accumulation and distribution.[10]

The other plausible future, under the supposition of confirmed world hegemony by the present centres, has been described most implacably by Helio Jaguaribe:

> In the new emerging class of international "executives", who are coming to be recruited from the local middle classes of countries under United States hegemony, through a previous educational and training program that makes their standards of work and behaviour conform to the American executive patterns, we can see something equivalent to the Roman class of equites, who were also, after some time, recruited from the provincial middle classes through a previous process of Romanization. The new equites are likely to form a dependable, efficient, and honest bureaucracy, much better qualified to manage the provincial affairs than the relatively inept local elites, who were led to choose the dependent way because of their own incapacity for autonomous development. The provincial form of dependency would, therefore, improve both the self-support of provinces and their dependence on the metropolis, enlarging, along the way, the employment conditions for the local middle class, to which the new international executive careers would be opened. ... however, ... all available evidence, from both historical and current practices, indicates that the process of incorporation of dependent peoples into a more powerful and culturally advanced society is made at the expense of the great unskilled masses of the former. ... In a cybernetic society, where unskilled labour is almost unnecessary and where the cost of education is so high ... it is

[10] Richard R. Fagen, "Studying Latin American Politics: Some Implications of a *Dependencia* Approach", *Latin American Research Review*, XII, 2, 1977, p. 14.

likely that the great "demographic surpluses" of the provinces will be condemned to gradual extermination.[11]

An indispensable precondition for either of these futures is the persistence of world centres transmitting coherent messages to the dominant forces in the semi-developed periphery and able to exercise hegemony for coherent purposes. The discussion of seeds of change has indicated that this precondition cannot be counted on, even if one leaves aside the strictly economic vicissitudes that now confront the centres, the energy shortages, the ecological constraints, and the precariousness of "competitive detente"between the First and Second Worlds. The central countries are unlikely to provide a stable supportive environment either for the gradual consolidation of welfare states in the periphery or for the imposition of political and economic systems discarding welfare pretensions and governed solely by criteria for efficient use of resources for the benefit of the power holders. The conception of development as a striving to catch up with the world leaders will no doubt persist for some time but will become less and less tenable.

Indeterminate Future

The prospect, then, is for a highly indeterminate future in which the central countries will transmit continually changing combinations of stimuli, shocks and inhibitions to the rest of the world (and, of course, to each other) and in which the rest of the world will make equally confused and shifting responses as one pressure or another comes uppermost. In spite of governmental aspirations to stabilize the periphery, the centres will not be able to avoid destablizing. The sudden impact of revelations in certain central countries of bribery by transnational enterprises and of subversion by intelligence agencies, both by-products of domestic political struggles and resistances to the prevailing style of development, illustrate the unpredictableness and diversity of the accidents in the road ahead of any central strategy for domination.

While the governments of the central countries will continue to minimize the scope of confrontations and make whatever concessions they feel they can afford, their actions will continue to respond more to domestic considerations (e. g., protecting supplies of key raw materials; satisfying the demands of the military-industrial complex and the organized workers; curbing the tactics of the transnational enterprises sufficiently to keep them from nullifying governmental employment, balance-of-payments and other objectives) and to rivalries among themselves than to the needs and demands of the periphery.

[11] Helio Jaguaribe, *Political Development: A General Theory and a Latin American Case Study* (Harper and Row, New York, 1973), pp. 383–384.

At the same time, the increasing diversity and militancy of the domestic social forces intervening in central-country politics, culture, and economic organization introduces wider opportunities for social forces in the periphery, in power or out, seeking more advantageous terms of dependency or freedom from interference in transforming the national style of development. They can find alternative allies in different sectors of the state apparatus of the former countries, in their legislative bodies, in their political parties and trade unions, and in a wide range of organized groups promoting causes from environmental protection to human rights and equality of the sexes. An increasing internationalization of ideological-promotional movements and interest groups may co-exist uneasily with the increasing penetration of transnational enterprises, increasingly imitative consumerism, and increasing dependency through indebtedness – and also with rising insistence on nationalism and self-reliance in styles of development.

Some few of the smaller industrialized countries of Europe and some of the "high-income dependent" countries outside Europe will probably advance farther in vicarious utopianism, the promotion of "another development" in the Third World, in practice having to concentrate their hopes and their aid on a few promising national societies. Even in these latter cases, it is unlikely that popular support for "another development" wil become strong enough to permit any government to undertake aid on a scale seriously depressing domestic levels of living, as the universalist versions of "another development" imply.

In the case of Latin America, the influence of mutations in the central market-economy countries will undoubtedly continue to be stronger than the influence of mutations elsewhere. Interchanges with other Third World regions, while they are on the rise, are practically restricted to the sectors of government concerned with international affairs and development policy, certain intellectuals and social scientists, and the leaders of certain political movements. The proportion of the Latin American population, outside the Caribbean sub-region, that feels kinship with or interest in the social changes of Africa and Asia must be small.

The capacity of the two socialist camps to influence the course of development in Latin America depends partly on their demonstration of the viability of non-capitalist development, as their reality is filtered through the mass media and the consciousness of different sectors of opinion; partly on the strength of disciplined social movements identifying themselves with one camp or the other; and partly on the ability and willingness of the two camps to offer material and technical aid to governments and movements. In the first area in recent times China has had the advantage, but an advantage more relevant to other parts of the Third World than to Latin America. It has offered a model more accessible to very poor predominantly rural societies than to relatively urbanized societies. In the other two areas, the USSR has had the advantage, in view of the greater organizational cohesiveness and working-class base of the parties looking to it for guidance and in view of its greater industrial and technological capacity.

In Latin America aside from Cuba, during the immediate future it is improbable that the two socialist camps will exert a stronger influence than in the past. The two facets of the Chinese experience will continue to edify different sectors of opinion, whatever their fate in China, but the possibility of direct borrowing has nearly disappeared. Soviet trade relations and technical co-operation will probably have an appreciable but deliberately restricted role in a good many countries. The irradiation of Soviet internal social trends, however, in the absence of unforeseeable changes in their present patterns, will be weak, possibly serving mainly the advocates of peripheral capitalism in their efforts to demonstrate the absence of any better alternative.

Cuba since the beginning of the 1960s has had an important and deliberately cultivated role in posing a radically different style of development, corresponding in many respects to the objectives later proposed for "another development", as both possible and necessary for Latin America. The Cuban experience deserves a more detailed assessment than it can be given in the present context. On the one side, Cuba has demonstrated that a socialist alternative can be viable and capable of satisfying basic needs of a previously marginalized population to an extent unmatched elsewhere in Latin America. On the other side, it has achieved this at a price, in terms of extreme austerity in consumption, centralization of economic and political power, integration into one of the world socialist camps, and expulsion of the large minority of the population unwilling to accept this style of development, that is higher than social forces likely to take power in any other country of the region may be willing or able to pay.

Marxist-Leninist ideological orthodoxy, central planning of the economy, and integration with the Soviet camp will not be able to isolate Cuba from the "seeds of change" that have been discussed above, and may prove as inhibiting to necessary future transformation as the peripheral capitalist ties of dependence of the remainder of Latin America.

The argument pursued here does not imply that the future of Latin America can or will be passively subject to destabilizing mutations of the central countries, or that the repercussions of these mutations will soon outweigh the deliberate efforts of the centres to shore up peripheral capitalism and temper its harshness by subsidizing welfare state initiatives. It is even possible that variants of the market economy and the consumer society will be able to maintain themselves, successfully on their own terms, in Latin America after their decomposition is farther advanced in the centres, because of the greater capacity of the dominant forces in Latin America to repress the contradictions.

It is also quite likely that the visibility of extreme inequality and exploitation in Latin America, the failure of efforts to transform styles of development, the associated repression, struggles against repression, and expulsion of dissidents to the centres will have a significant impact on mutations in the centres themselves, providing tactical lessons, rallying issues, and grounds for denunciation of the

transnationals and the consumer society. In one way or another the peoples of Latin America are bound to be active participants in shaping a future that will be confused and conflictive, not predetermined by the region's present insertion in the international order or the present inability of counter-élites to offer convincing alternatives.

The argument does imply that the debate over "another development" is only beginning. The inherent compulsion of the present system of international organizations to cast "another development" in a universalist and immediatist mould of strategies and plans of action to be agreed on by governments tends to devalue it as an inspiring myth and relevant Utopia by inflation and evasiveness; but the basic propositions will recur, with changing terminology and emphasis, and will be taken up by new social forces and movements acquiring greater realism and political viability, as the various hybrids of the welfare state and the repressive state lose credibility.

CHAPTER NINE

Poverty as a Social Phenomenon and as a Central Issue for Development Policy

A. Ideologies of development and identification of the target group

Action-oriented ideologies of social change or "development" must identify some class or group as central to the kind of change wanted. In an ideology emphasizing consensus this centrality can mean capacity for leadership and innovation in an ongoing process. In an ideology emphasizing conflict it can mean an irreconcilable contradiction with the existing order, implying that a different order is both necessary and possible.

The identification in recent appeals for "integrated development" or "another development" of the "critically" (absolutely, extremely, abjectly) poor as the main target group for policy shifts attention from the fostering of groups expected to assume innovating and stabilizing roles and to reap differential rewards for performing these roles (entrepreneurs, technologists, the middle classes, progressive farmers, etc.) to redressing of the disabilities of the least dynamic components of the national societies, those left behind or hurt by present processes of growth and change.

Adoption of the label of "poverty" in preference to other ways of identifying the disadvantaged target group carries with it certain preconceptions on the nature of the problem and on acceptable solutions, but also accords with the blurring of ideological or theoretical distinctions characteristic of utopias devised by committees. The prescriptions for elimination of poverty imply a consensus view of future development, while the accompanying diagnoses incorporate conflict interpretations of the past and present.

The rejection of market forces as arbiters of distribution of the fruits of development, combined with the identification of a beneficiary target group having in common mainly weaknesses, places enormous responsibilities on the nation state and on the world community of nation states as planners and administrators of development. For the most part, however, the appeals avoid any serious consideration of the capacity of the state or the international order to carry out such tasks. Continual use of the passive voice (such and such an action "must be" carried out) evades identification of the *deus ex machina* that is to put down the mighty and uplift the poor.

A discussion of various alternative ways of identifying the social classes or groups whose interests are least served by the existing order may help to clarify the above points:

1. *Proletariat, lumpenproletariat, subproletariat.* The term "proletariat" is identified with the most influential conflict theory of development. By Marxist definition, the proletariat has a central role in capitalist societies. This role of seller of labour power prepares it eventually to transform the society, with a little help from revolutionary intellectuals, through consciousness of radical incompatibility between the relations of production and further development of the forces of production, and through the capacity for organized and disciplined action forced on the proletariat by its participation in capitalist industry. Poverty spurs it to act, but it is not poverty but a specific form of exploitation that determines its central role in societal transformation.

Marx labelled "lumpenproletariat" the urban poor lacking any foothold in industrial wage labour, even the precarious foothold of members of an unemployed "industrial reserve army". The lumpenproletariat were presumably even worse off materially than the proletariat, and their numbers might be quite large, but they constituted merely an ambiguous social force whose future would be determined by the outcome of the struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie. The lumpenproletariat might in certain conjunctures be a source of revolutionary cannonfodder; more often they would be a nuisance manipulable by the enemy.

Introduction of the term "subproletariat" is more recent and recognizes special conditions in countries at most semi-industrialized, with economies dependent on the world centres. In such settings the numbers of people subsisting precariously can become too large to be identified plausibly with an industrial reserve army, and they are not limited to the mainly parasitic sources of livelihood associated with the lumpenproletariat; many of them are engaged in activities that are socially useful or "productive" but technologically primitive and affording very low incomes.

The subproletariat can thus be identified as an essential ally or even replacement of the industrial proletariat in revolutionary transformation in countries in which the latter is small and relatively privileged. The conception of the "developmental" importance of the class remains the same: that is, it is in irreconcilable contradiction with a bourgeois-dominated economic system that cannot help breeding its own grave-diggers.

The identification of propertylessness and sale of labour power as source of the basic contradiction leading to revolutionary transformation makes it rational to welcome the "proletarianization" of self-employed artisans, shopkeepers and land-holding peasants, even if this results in their short-term impoverishment. Otherwise, their immediate interests and their illusions will predispose them to political tactics that are destined to failure or manipulation by the dominant forces in the existing order.

The state, under certain conditions, may assume a semi-autonomous role of arbiter between classes (Bonapartism) but it cannot be expected to transform class relationships or eliminate poverty until it is itself captured and transformed by the proletariat or subproletariat. Under this conception, demonstrations of the ethical inacceptability of poverty and the duty of the state or society to eliminate it, lacking identification of a social class destined to act, can be no more than propagandistic devices or mystifications.

2. *Marginal* or *marginalized* population. These terms, in their more recent usage, have identified population components practically identical with the "subproletariat", but without necessarily drawing Marxist conclusions on their role. Like "subproletariat", they have been associated with attempts to explain and prescribe for apparently new situations coming to the fore in countries still predominantly rural, dependent-capitalist, undergoing relatively rapid urbanization, some degree of industrialization, and accompanying disruption or breakdown of pre-existing rural and urban social structures.

The terms emphasize an unsatisfactory relation between the groups in question and the rest of society, and it is easier to define them negatively than positively. The "marginal" are not altogether excluded from the changing society and economy, or they would be irrelevant to them – as in the hypothetical cases of completely isolated subsistence cultivators or hunting-gathering tribesmen within the national territory. They are not simply poor, since equally poor social groups may have central although highly exploited roles. They are not simply exploited, nor simply an industrial reserve army, since the dominant forces in the society may have no use for their services, even as a means of keeping down wage claims of the employed workers, or may prefer not to use them because alternative combinations of capital and manpower present fewer problems and obligations.

They are linked to the social order economically, culturally and ecologically, but on terms disadvantageous to themselves and also to the rest of the social order. They do not constitute a class, in terms of common relations to production or class consciousness, and they have no central role qualifying them as candidates to replace the existing order, but their presence indicates that the order is functioning badly, and their growth in numbers and their increasing urban concentration might eventually enable them to destroy it, or at least make its functioning continually more repressive and costly.

The question then arises whether measures directed by the state to the marginal groups (particularly education, employment creation and local participatory schemes) can overcome or alleviate their marginality, or whether the social, economic and political orders must somehow be transformed to make possible their participation on acceptable terms.

"Marginality" as a label has been compatible with either a reformist or a revolutionary conclusion; this may account in part for its popularity in policy-oriented discussions and also for the more recent waning of this popularity.

3. The *oppressed*. Identification of the target population as "the oppressed", in the usage associated in particular with Paulo Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, places an ethical emphasis on the injustice of relations between oppressors and oppressed, irrespective of the roles in production of the two categories. It brings to the forefront of attention a requisite of societal transformation that is implicit or secondary in the terminologies discussed above: the spiritual liberation of the oppressed population groups through systematic "conscientization" concerning their own situation and their capacity to change the world. It gives an essential role to "pedagogy" from outside the oppressed group (from dedicated intellectuals) but attributes ultimate responsibility and initiative to the oppressed themselves. The transformation of consciousness and achievement of group solidarity have priority over the raising of consumption levels, the seizure of political power, or the achievement of public ownership of the means of production. The latter objectives follow logically upon the former, but their pursuit would be self-defeating or futile unless preceded or accompanied by authentic conscientization.

Under this conception, the state is normally an instrument of the oppressors and cannot be expected to take the lead in conscientization. The advocates of conscientization seem to assume implicitly that the state can be expected to tolerate conscientization activities, although this assumption seems to contradict their diagnosis of the sources of oppression. Even in the case of a revolutionary state controlled by forces committed to the elimination of oppression and poverty, conscientization initiatives directed to autonomous participation by the oppressed would have to come mainly from sources other than the state, and might be expected to persist in permanent tension with the centralizing and mobilizing drives that are inseparable from action by the state.

4. The *people*. This term is the broadest and vaguest of the identifications of a disadvantaged target group considered here, and in its association with movements labelled "populist" has the widest political currency. Its users generally suppose that the "people" are a majority but not the totality of the national population. They comprise wage workers, peasants, salaried employees and small businessmen as well as "marginal" and "subproletarian" groups.

The "people" confront "oligarchs", "élites", and "exploiters", domestic and foreign. As a majority, they have both the right and the power – through the vote and through organized mass action – to make use of the state to achieve a relatively egalitarian income distribution and ample public services. (Or the initiative can come from a political leadership that mobilizes the "people" against the "exploiters" and wields the powers of the state in their name.) The inclusiveness and heterogeneity of the target groups thus identified imply that the legitimate claims of the "people" can be met without irreconcilable conflict between different sectors over their shares of the pie; there will be enough to go around. It is also supposed more or less implicitly that the claims can be met without revolutionary change in the relations of production; the exploiters are to be tamed and milked but not liquidated.

5. The *underemployed* and *unemployed*. This identification of the disadvantaged target group accords more readily with the conventional non-Marxist images of economic development than do the others. It centres attention on two directly "developmental" and quantifiable aspects of the plight of the target group: (a) failure to contribute adequately to production of goods and services; (b) failure to earn thereby an income adequate for family subsistence or participation in the consumer goods market.

In practice, the description and quantification of the target group as well as prescriptions for it have proved a good deal more elusive than was hoped when "employment" was proposed as a central policy focus for poor countries in the 1960s. Gunnar Myrdal effectively demolished the conventional techniques for definition and measurement, in their application to such countries, in *Asian Drama*.[1]

Attempts to quantify an "unemployment equivalent" in terms of sub-utilization of the economically active population have lumped together quite different real shortcomings in sources of livelihood. A series of country studies aimed at comprehensive policy recommendations organized by the ILO within its World Employment Programme since 1969 have led the investigators back from the problems of unemployment and creation of more employment opportunities to "the more general issues of poverty and inequality" and to the conclusion that "ultimately, the only way of reducing poverty is to reduce inequality".[2]

Moreover, the weight of evidence now indicates that in most poor countries open unemployment, affecting mainly youths and women who are not heads of households, does not identify the groups that are worst off within the existing order. "Insofar as poverty and deprivation are to be tackled as major social problems, it would be unrealistic and perhaps very misleading and harmful to assume that this can be tackled through tackling the problem of unemployment."[3]

6. The *critically (absolutely, extremely, abjectly) poor*. Concern with the "poor" as a population category manifestly unable to satisfy minimum needs and requiring public assistance on grounds of humanitarianism or maintenance of public order

[1] "The unsuitability of western concepts of employment and unemployment", pp. 1115–1124, in *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations* (Pantheon, New York, 1968).

[2] Keith Griffin, "Employment strategies in world perspective", document presented at Symposium on Employment Strategies and Programmes, Commonwealth Youth Programme, Barbados, Sept.–Oct. 1975.

[3] Jack Harewood, "The magnitude and nature of unemployment in the Caribbean", document presented at the same Symposium.

goes back at least to the 16th century in certain European countries.[4] The sociologist Georg Simmel summed up thus the role of "anti-poverty" measures in industrialized societies at the beginning of the 20th century:

> If we take into account the meaning of assistance to the poor, it becomes clear that the fact of taking away from the rich to give to the poor does not aim at equalizing their individual positions and is not, even in its orientation, directed at suppressing the social difference between the rich and the poor... If assistance were to be based on the interests of the poor person, there would, in principle, be no limit whatsoever on the transmission of property in favour of the poor, a transmission that would lead to the equality of all. But since the focus is the social whole – the political, family, or other sociologically determined circles – there is no reason to aid the person more than is required by the maintenance of the social *status quo.*[5]

This approach to poverty has by no means been superseded in the conceptualizations and the real policies identifiable in many countries:

> ... we may define poverty as that level of deprivation which in the judgement of society (or in the judgement of those who articulate or claim to articulate public opinion) is so designated.
>
> In and of itself, this definition is so broad as to appear meaningless. As a heuristic tool, however, it provides a more adequate base and focus for our analysis. Once the spotlight is turned not only on the poor but also on those whose definition assigns individuals and groups to this social category, we have taken a crucial step from the sociology of the poor towards a sociology of poverty in the true sense of term.
>
> When the reformer speaks of the poor and the revolutionary speaks of the people, they most likely accentuate different statuses of the same sector of the population. The differences in terminology, however, give notice of differences in intent and in sources of legitimation on which the appeal is based. To speak of the poor is to appeal to the conscience or self-interest of the non-poor on moral

[4] "In every city, on the fringe of this working or labouring population, there was also a large sub-group whom the more respectable workers and tradesmen tended to despise and reject. These were the destitute, the beggars, the homeless, the vagrants, the *gens sans aveu*, and the casually employed, who floated in and out of jobs, *dépots de mendicité, hopitaux*, doss-houses and prisons. ... In all cities these elements were a matter of constant concern to the police and public authorities. ... How many were they? It might be as much as a quarter or a fifth of the urban population. ... In Paris, figures published over a twenty-year period between the 1770's and the 1790's suggest that about one-sixth of the population were constantly in receipt of public charity; and ... the proportion in London was probably as high." George Rudé, *Europe in the Eighteenth Century: Aristocracy and the Bourgeois Challenge* (Cardinal History of Civilization, London 1974, p. 90–91.)

[5] Georg Simmel, "The Poor", originally published in 1908, reprinted in Chaim L. Waxman, Ed., *Poverty: Power and Politics* (Grosset & Dunlap, New York, 1968) p. 8–9.

grounds. To speak of the people is to demand the rights of citizens often in considerably less genteel terms . . .

If it is possible to refer to the same individuals and groups alternately not only as the poor but also in terms of such other statuses as the Negro, the aged, the citizen, the unemployed, etc., then the normative judgement which elects to address these individuals or groups as "the poor" is more significant sociologically than the economic indicators to which the designation "poverty" is attached.[6]

International declarations on human rights and social development, however, since the 1940s have called for *elimination* rather than *mitigation* of poverty, and this objective began to come to the forefront of the international debate over development in the late 1960s, along with the objective of full employment, as part of a reaction against the conventional wisdom on economic development priorities and the blessings of high growth rates. As in the earlier "social development" arguments, the term "poverty" and the accompanying data on extreme consumption deficiencies served to dramatize the failure of prevailing patterns of economic growth to contribute to the well-being of a large part of the population in "developing" countries. They did not commit the user to a precise definition or policy conclusion, beyond the limited economic argument that in populations living in extreme poverty higher consumption is a precondition for higher production.

Gunnar Myrdal's *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations,* a landmark in the rethinking of development of the late 1960s, in spite of its sub-title, does not include a heading for poverty in the subject index. Moreover, while this work places considerable emphasis on inadequate consumption as a reason for the inability of the poorer strata to "develop", it places even more weight on institutional factors, values, and social inequality:

Thus it may well be the case that the upper strata in a poor village in India do not have a significantly higher income than sharecropping tenants or landless peasants. Yet there is an important difference between these groups: the former often receive incomes without working while the latter do not . . . The inequality in social status creates major incentives to withdraw from productive activity, especially if its pecuniary rewards are minimal. . . . The fact, therefore, that everyone in a village may be almost equally poor does not imply that everyone is equal; on the contrary they are all so poor because they are so unequal.[7]

In the mid-1970s, "elimination of poverty" as central objective of development and identification of the "poor" (qualified by some intensifying adverb) as target group are common to all the appeals for new styles of development, or "another development". As was suggested above, the popularity of these formulations derives from their adaptability to the needs of holders of different ideological positions

[6] Deborah I. Offenbacher, "The Proper Study of Poverty: Empirical versus Normative Perspectives", in *Poverty: Power and Politics* op. cit. (p. 41, 52–53).

[7] *Asian Drama, op. cit.*, p. 569.

seeking common ground, and also from their hoped-for capacity to arouse world opinion to the shortcomings of the existing order. Thus, any attempt to explore the implications of identification of the critically poor as target group runs up against the difficulty that this formulation means different things to different users.

The following pages try to single out a usage emerging as the lowest common denominator and pointing to certain probable consequences of a policy focus on critical poverty within existing nation states and within the existing world order. Certain suppositions belong to this lowest common denominator:[8]

(a) The basic problem and reason for preoccupation with the critically poor is their inadequate consumption, particularly their inadequate intake of food.

(b) A dividing line can be drawn by means of statistical indicators between the critically poor and the relatively poor, and policy should concentrate on the former.

(c) The critically poor can and must be "helped" by public programmes and the allocation of public funds (including allocations by well-to-do countries for the poor of other countries) to overcome their deficiencies.

(d) Superfluous consumption of the better-off should be curbed to the extent that it conflicts with meeting ot fhe basic consumption needs of the critically poor.

(e) The critically poor manifest cultural adaptations to their plight that help to make their poverty self-perpetuating.

(f) The overwhelming majority of the critically poor are in rural settings; therefore rural programmes should have priority.

(g) The movement of rural poor to the cities does not bring them real gains and is dangerous to the social order; this is a further reason for relieving rural poverty *in situ*.

Under these suppositions, the relation of the critically poor to production is viewed mainly in terms of the provision of jobs, training, land, or tools enabling them to produce more so that they can earn more and consume more. The broader questions of whether they can in reality produce more, or keep a larger share of what they produce, or take initiatives, or participate in decisions that affect their livelihood, without a transformation of their relationships with the rest of the society or a transformation of the society itself, are not ignored.but are treated with a certain reluctance or evasiveness, suggesting compromises between different ideological positions.

The proposals assume that the dominant forces in the existing order can "help" the critically poor if they really want to, or if the threat to political stability pre-

[8] The most authoritative and characteristic example of this usage is *The Assault on World Poverty: Problems of Rural Development, Education and Health* (Published for the World Bank by the Johns Hopkins Univertsity Press, Baltimore and London, 1975). The contributors to *Redistribution with Growth*, a Joint Study by the World Bank's Research Centre and the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex (Oxford University Press, 1974), are more concerned with the relation of poverty to political power and the real constraints on public action.

sented by the frustrated poor alarms them sufficiently[9] *and* if sufficient international aid with the right kind of strings attached is forthcoming.[10]

While the proposals commonly recognize that power structures and vested interests *may* be incompatible with improvement of the lot of the power, they leave the impression that these hindrances are mainly local, rural and traditional. The possibility that national (or international) power structures are also stumbling blocks may be admitted, but with the implication that these are remediable cases of political shorthsightedness.[11]

The documents in question refer repeatedly to the "providing" of aid from above, the stimulation of participation from above, and the curbing of selfish local interests by benevolent restraints from above. If the political will at the national centre cannot be counted on to carry out any of these functions, nothing can be done other than pilot projects and conventional programmes from which the locally dominant forces might permit a little to trickle down to the critically poor.[12]

The documents – with a few exceptions such as the 1975 Dag Hammarskjøld Report – present the possibility that the neglected poor will eventually upset the applecart partly as a warning to shortsighted governments and partly as a disaster equivalent to the collapse of "civilization" – this last in spite of the high marks given to the People's Republic of China by practically all the documents arguing for a policy focus on critical poverty. The expectation of a developmental solution generated precisely by the contradiction between the target group and the unsatisfactory existing order, associated with use of the terms "proletariat" and "subproletariat", is absent or slips in as an incongruous element in compromise formulations.

[9] "The real issue is whether indefinite procrastination is politically prudent. An increasingly inequitable situation will pose a growing threat to political stability." (Adress by Robert S. McNamara to Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the World Bank, Nairobi, Kenya, 24 September 1973, excerpted in *the Assault on World Poverty*, p. 94).

[10] International resource transfers to the Third World "should be concentrated on countries whose efforts are or will be directed towards the priority goal of satisfying the needs of the majority poor and which are carrying out or will carry out the necessary structural transformations ..." (*Another Development, The 1975 Dag Hammarskjold Report on International Development and Cooperation*, p. 18).

[11] "In some developing countries, present policies and institutional structures are so far from favorable to rural development that a policy shift could only follow a major political change. ... Whatever the reason, unless more governments commit themselves firmly to devising strategies and policies to raise the standards of living of the rural poor, the lot of millions of people will not improve significantly." (*The Assault on World Poverty*, op. cit. p. 29.)

[12] "In many countries, avoiding opposition from powerful and influential sections of the rural community is essential if the program is not to be subverted from within ... in cases where economic and social inequality is initially great, it is normally optimistic to expect that more than 50% of the project benefits can be directed toward the target group; often, the percentage will be considerably less." (*The Assault on World Poverty*. op. cit. p. 40.)

One can conclude that the international focus on the "critically poor" as target group is part of an ongoing revolution in thinking about development and responds to a persistent intolerable contradiction between universally accepted human values and real processes of economic and social change. However, the nature of international discourse produces inhibitions, evasions, and substitutions of promotional devices for objective analyses, to which the focus on the "critically poor" lends itself better than alternative ways of identifying the groups whose needs are least served by the existing order.

In the discussions by "experts" of how to eliminate critical poverty without confronting the problems of power, exploitation, and inequality one sometimes catches an echo of the mice discussing how to bell the cat – but also, in meetings at a higher level, of cats discussing how to promote the wellbeing of mice.

B. Some problems of a policy focus on critical poverty in stratified societies

Whatever the shortcomings of the term and the ideological ambiguities of its users, the question of "critical poverty" is inescapable in any society whose dominant forces profess human welfare values with a reasonable degree of sincerity and must try to reconcile multiple objectives within political and economic settings that give them only limited room to manoeuvre. In stratified societies whose economies respond to a mixture of market incentives and government intervention, with processes of "modernization" changing the traits and visibility of the critically poor, one can expect a gradual and intermittent expansion of conventional social measures expected to alleviate the plight of the poor, more or less in the spirit summed up by Georg Simmel: a continual experimentation with participatory, self-help and job-creation mechanisms that promise to help the poor help themselves at reduced cost to the state; consequent changes in their levels of living, spatial distribution, and relations to society and the state; and also the appearance of various unexpected and unwanted by-products of the measures and mechanisms.

The objective of "eliminating" critical poverty is likely to remain elusive. The realities that stand in the way include the following:

1. *Power*. The critically poor, almost by definition, have less access to power compelling a hearing for their needs than has any other stratum of society. They are unimportant as suppliers of labour power that they might withhold or as markets for consumer goods. They are too heterogeneous in everything except their poverty, and for the most part too isolated and submerged at the bottom of rural power structures to be able to unite other than locally and ephemerally to improve their lot. The main forms of protest accessible to them are demonstrations, riots,

land seizures and votes for populist candidates, and these expedients are most of the time in most local settings too ineffective or too dangerous to be resorted to.[13]

The critically poor are likely to have an all-too-realistic appreciation of their lack of power and of the probable consequences to themselves of militant protest, and this leads them to seek dependent clientelistic relations with the state or with local power holders. One can find no evidence in history or in recent development experience that the state, except in a period of fundamental revolutionary change, can acquire either the capacity or the will to give the critically poor a share in power or encourage systematically their "conscientization".

Even when the critically poor enter into a victorious revolutionary class alliance their access to autonomous power to advance their own interests is invariably short-lived; other priorities must be served.[14] Mobilization of the poor, leading to conflicts between public agencies and between different levels of government, did enter into the United States "war on poverty" of the 1960s, for reasons too complex to be explained here, but its incompatibility with national and local power structures ensured its eventual curtailing or sterilization; only small minorities among the poor were directly mobilized and these were unable to maintain their impetus once official backing dwindled.[15]

[13] "... do categories like 'landless', 'jobless', 'sharecropper', and so forth define groups in ways which are consistent with existing or plausible political alignments? A simple class structure has considerable merit: feudal landlords, rich peasants, tenants and landless in the countryside; national bourgeoisie, lower middle class, proletariat, and unemployed marginals in the towns; and perhaps foreign capital in both. Yet, although those at the bottom of the pile thus defined should match closely the poverty 'target groups', they do not form a single class having a clear perception of its common interests and of how to act in order to secure them. Of course there may be a strong economic basis for a class alliance among small farmers, tenants, landless, jobless and urban marginals. But working alliances of this kind tend to be rare, which is one major reason why the poor remain poor." (C. L. G. Bell, "The political framework", in *Redistribution with Growth, op. cit.*)

[14] Socialist revolutions, to the extent that they imply genuine transformation of systems of production rather than the adoption by an élite of a new political label, commonly convert labour surpluses into labour shortages, thus generating a need for mobilization of all available manpower, and require the rationing of scarce basic goods according to criteria other than ability to pay. Both trends improve the relative positions of the employable poor, who presumably also receive important psychological dividends in terms of perceived participation and hopes for the future. In later stages of consolidation, however, special privileges in distribution of goods and concealed unemployment in low-productivity jobs seem to be common. It remains an open question whether existing socialist systems can eliminate poverty in the sense of relative deprivation or marginalization, and if not what the social and psychological consequences will be in settings in which it is inadmissable to attribute this to shortcomings of the system. One consequence can be a censorious attitude toward the "idle" or "parasitic" poor, and attempts to require them to work, not too different from the attitudes toward the recipients of public assistance that have emerged in capitalist societies.

[15] See Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare*, (Pantheon Books, New York, 1971), and *Poor Peoples' Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail* (Vintage Books, New York, 1979).

The argument that critical poverty constitutes a threat to the existing order so serious that the dominant forces must *eliminate* it for their own self-preservation is thus, in most national settings unconvincing, although, as will be seen below, its disruptive potential does call for some combination of control and relief.

The critically poor, whatever their numbers, become a serious threat only when a political system enters into crisis for reasons other than their poverty.[16] Even major famines do not necessarily goad the critically poor into anything more than easily repressed local disorders, as long as the national power structure remains intact, as events in parts of Africa and Asia have demonstrated. In the world today, one finds countries with a predatory élite ruling over a majority at the lowest levels of subsistence that are relatively stable to outward appearance, while other societies in which the dimensions of critical poverty are small, are chronically disrupted by conflicts over the distribution of income.

2. *Relative* vs. *critical poverty*. The supposition that the "critically poor" can be distinguished from the "relatively poor" by means of quantitative indicators and priorities for public action seems hardly tenable, even if one leaves aside for the moment the practical problems, as yet unsolved, of accurate measurement of the levels of living of enormous numbers of people with widely varying patterns of consumption and felt needs. (It can be taken for granted that, for present purposes, per capita incomes expressed in monetary terms are a poor makeshift).

First, with the apparent exception of minimum levels of intake of nutrients, poverty is inescapably relative:

[16] The conclusions of a discussion of policy alternatives in Kenya seem widely applicable: "The fact that a pattern of development generates intractable social problems is not sufficient to stimulate redress of the situation; this will occur only if the politically powerful see their interests being served as well in some alternative arrangement as in the existing one, or if the problems deepen into a crisis which fundamentally alters the balance of power. The latter, which implies revolutionary change, is historically unusual, and the former unlikely if, as has been suggested here, a solution to the social problems requires an effective redistribution of income and wealth. . . . The beneficiaries of the present pattern of growth in Kenya would not take kindly to a policy which denied them in future their disproportionate share of gains, even if such a policy were possible to carry out. The authors of the [ILO Mission] report recognize this and counter by the observation that a policy of directing growth towards the poor would not lack the support of the poor themselves. This obviously is intended to suggest that while the State may be creating enemies on the one hand, it will be creating a much more numerous set of friends on the other. The important question for governments, however, is not whether friends are being created, but whether or not this can lead to effective political support. . . . this seems highly unlikely. . . . the information channels . . . are in the control of and administered by precisely those interests in the private and public sectors which are opposed to the redistributive policies. Second, if the poor were aware of the power struggle within the elite to change the pattern of development, they would have to somehow be mobilized into effective political action". John Weeks, "Imbalance between the centre and the periphery and the 'employment crisis' in Kenya", in Ivar Oxaal, Tony Barnett, David Booth, Ed. *Beyond the Sociology of Development: Economy and Society in Latin America and Africa* ((Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., London 1975).

> When all is said and done, poverty has nothing to do with . . . absolute standards; it is entirely a relative concept that can be defined only within a specific context of time and space. . . . A household's poverty, for example, does not exist independently of the welfare of other 'reference groups', be they neighbouring households, peoples of other regions or linguistic groups, members of other classes or, indeed, other countries. Thus the notion of poverty is intimately connected with the idea of inequality, and our views on welfare are closely associated with our perception of equality.[17]

Second, the poorest of the poor generally represent the worst-off elements of several quite different social groups participating in some kind of gainful activity, separable by their means of livelihood and the measures relevant to their needs, along with a residue of social groups with special disabilities that restrict them to the most marginal activities and place the entire groups in "critical poverty": families without male breadwinners, vagrant children, aged persons without resources, unemployable derelicts and alcoholics. Except in countries with relatively high income levels the "fully employed poor" are generally in the majority. "Critical poverty" can hardly serve as an operational definition for a policy package aimed at *causes*, both because of the heterogeneity of the sub-groups and the causes of their poverty and because the policies other than consumption subsidies that are relevant to the needs of low-income occupational groups cannot be restricted to the part of each group that falls below a "critical poverty" line.

Third, the "relatively poor" within a specific social setting – that is, all the groups whose felt needs exceed their capacity to satisfy them – are invariably better able to act effectively, to organize to raise their incomes, and to take advantage of whatever services the state offers than are the "critically poor". They are understandably unwilling to step aside in favour of the latter.

Fourth, while the poor help the poor through informal mutual aid, generally to a much greater extent than the state helps them, the weaker are most directly and visibly exploited by neighbours whose own poverty makes them seek the meagre surplus that can be squeezed out of them: police and other petty functionaries, vendors, liquor dealers, moneylenders, petty criminals, local political intermediaries, etc. While these kinds of exploitation have received little attention from the sectors of opinion aspiring to help the poor or to organize the poor, they are probably in many settings so pervasive and so intimidating as to inhibit the "critically poor" from concern with wider changes. It is also probable that as one moves from the larger more modern cities to the mainly rural hinterland such exploitation becomes even more arbitrary and oppressive. To the extent that the dominant forces become preoccupied with unrest and needs for control this spontaneous exploitation can merge with deliberate recruitment of some of the poor into apparatuses for informing, for intimidation, and for removal of potential leaders.

[17] Keith Griffin, *op. cit.*, p. 14–15.

One can distinguish conceptually several strata that would be adversely affected by any significant reallocation of resources for the benefit of the critically poor:[18]

(a) The relatively poor in a restricted sense – the families of workers, artisans, vendors and peasants with incomes well below the national average but above a subsistence minimum, contributing more to production, somewhat more secure in their sources of livelihood, with somewhat more capacity for organization, and with somewhat better educational, health and nutritional levels.

(b) The "relatively poor" lower-middle strata (including most of the public functionaries with whom the "critically poor" come into contact), chronically unable to stretch their incomes to cover the "modern" standards of consumption they consider their due.

(c) The "relatively well-off" professionals, technicians, managers, and small businessmen at higher rungs of the same ladder of "modern" consumption, convinced that they deserve differential rewards for their scarce talents, aware that their incomes are modest compared to those of the élites above them, disposed to seek a market elsewhere if local income incentives are insufficient, and disposed to blame the plight of the critically poor on their own laziness and improvidence.

(d) The owners of land and capital and managers of the largest (frequently foreign-owned) enterprises, who may in practice be able to determine their own share of the national income and conceal or export as much of this participation as they see fit. These last groups generally have a symbiotic, if sporadically conflictive, relationship with political, military and techno-bureaucratic élites – which, however, in some national societies have managed to replace or subordinate them as recipients of the lion's share of the national income.

All of the above strata have more power to defend their interests than do the critically poor; their support or at least acquiescence is more needed for political stability and economic growth within capitalist or even within most purportedly socialist styles of development. To the extent that the dominant forces in the state, for whatever reason, set out to redistribute resources to the "critically poor" they may be able to make some headway by squeezing components of stratum (d) that have been excluded from the ruling political alliance (e. g., traditional landowners, foreign-owned enterprises).

In most national settings, however, they find it least difficult to divert some resources from stratum (a), and possibly from (b) and (c), by means, for example, of tapping social security revenues to provide benefits for groups too poor or too

[18] In terms of the perceived interests of the different strata, a redistribution of increments to future national income would be nearly as unwelcome as a redistribution of present income. Each stratum has unsatisfied needs or wants, continually raised by the dependent modernization of consumption. Moreover, within class-differentiated societies the maintenance of differentials in consumption is by itself a major source of satisfaction to the groups having any advantage over others. (For an attack on the illusion of painless redistribution of increments to income, see Weeks, *op. cit.*)

irregularly employed to contribute to social security,[19] or by using for anti-poverty programmes the proceeds of taxes withheld from earned incomes or regressive indirect taxes. This latter tactic is not likely to offset fully the advantages of strata (a), (b) and (c) in the struggle for a larger share of income and of public services, but it may divert part of their attention from the conflict of interests with stratum (d) to the conflict of interests with the "critically poor", who can be stigmatized as a parasitic and undeserving lumpenproletariat.

It is significant that conservative regimes that resist wage increases as harmful to development commonly argue that such increases do not help the critically poor, since the latter are self-employed, unemployed, or working in activities that are neither organized nor controllable by minimum wage legislation. To the extent that popular pressures influence government policy, the "relatively poor" are likely to gain at the expense of the "critically poor". To the extent that a techno-bureaucratic élite determines policy, the "critically poor", or some groups among them, may gain at the expense of the "relatively poor", in both cases without much impact on the higher income strata or the overall pattern of inequality.

The difficulties in the way of policy concentration on the needs of the "critically poor" are thus not limited to the claims of the "powerful and influential" elements of the community mentioned in *The Assault on World Poverty*. In urban areas where jobs are scarce the groups with access to them will defend this access from intruders and will resist initiatives, undertaken in the name of employment creation for the critically poor, to dilute their legal protection of wage levels and job security. The relatively educated will struggle to preserve and extend the income advantages now associated with differential educational qualifications.

In the countryside, a widening gap between critically poor and relatively poor is visible in most of the Third World, whether the dominant local trend is toward capitalist modernization of agriculture in medium and large holdings, co-operative organization of producers, or land redistribution to smallholders. In the first case, a minority of permanent wage workers, more or less skilled, may gain a status equivalent to the urban workers in "modern" activities. In the latter cases, part of the rural population collectively or individually gains access to land and capital permitting commercial farming, while another part enters into intermediary or specialized managerial and technical functions previously monopolized by the landlords or not carried out at all. In all cases the demand for unskilled labour remains stationary or declines. A residue of *minifundio* cultivators and landless labourers is left relatively or absolutely worse off than before. Co-operative members and landholding peasants, to the extent that they need additional seasonal labour, exploit this residue in much the same way as did the landlords.

[19] Carmelo Mesa-Lago, *Social Security in Latin America: Pressure Groups, Stratification and Inequality*, University of Pittsburg Press, 1978.

The disillusionment now being expressed over the so-called Green Revolution derives in part from the increasing visibility of this problem. The conversion of part of the rural population into the kind of progressive small farmers and technicians at which agrarian reform programmes have aimed can mean at the same time the emergence of a more broadly-based rural resistance to the claims of the residue.

3. *Consumption and public assistance.* The documents identifying the critically poor as a target group for development policy invariably emphasize the objective of introducing them to means of livelihood sufficiently productive to afford them satisfactory incomes. However, the definition of the target group in terms of insufficient consumption and the enormous difficulties in the way of a transformation from above of their relations to production, their access to earned incomes and their access to "qualifying" services such as education above the elementary level, point to the probability that assistential components of anti-poverty policy will predominate in practice.

The assessment of measures practicable within existing political systems that one finds in studies such as *Redistribution with Growth* contrasts sharply with the immediatist and universalist tone of many human-rights-oriented pronouncements on "another development". They suggest that all of the really practicable measures are likely to evade the structural aspects of the plight of the "critically poor" and that their extension to the whole of the target group in the near future is not in the cards.[20]

To the extent that a government can mobilize resources or obtain them from external sources, it is easier for it to distribute free or subsidized food and possibly housing to the poor than to change the structures of employment and land tenure

[20] For example: "It must be recognized that the inplementation of the various measures suggested here, while improving their condition, will leave many in poverty in rural areas for some decades in many countries in Africa and Asia. The alternatives are a policy of inaction or forms of labour utilization which have been adopted with apparent success, but at largely unknown cost, in China. Neither of these alternatives seems to be acceptable in the light of the political framework. . ." (C. L. G. Bell and John H. Duloy, "Rural Target Groups", *Redistribution with Growth*, p. 135). "The prognosis for a satisfactory land policy within the existing legal framework in most cities has to be gloomy. The fact remains, however, that without such a land policy, there is no possibility of a comprehensive solution to the housing problem of the urban poor. Nevertheless, a variety of second-best solutions should be pursued with vigor." "Implementation of these recommendations will no doubt be stoutly resisted by large industrialists who will resent encroachment on the private right to own land; and by the middle-class groups who are probably the principal beneficiaries today of public utility, transport, health, and education facilities. An attempt to provide more services to the poor without reducing services to the not-so-poor will only accentuate the existing urban/rural imbalance in the provision of the services and is probably beyond the fiscal capacity of most governments. Even if all these recommendations are successfully implemented, the urban poverty problem will be far from fully solved in most countries." (D. C. Rao, "Urban Target Groups", *Redistribution with Growth*, p. 153, 156–7).

sufficiently to provide an adequate livelihood to the groups most in need. The valid argument that better nutrition and health are prerequisites for advances toward the latter objectives helps to justify assistentialism.

Assistential and social service programmes have other practical advantages for political leaders that directly contradict the overt purposes: they provide considerable numbers of jobs for the educated middle strata, thus relieving one of the most insistent pressures on the state.[21]

In their early stages, they can attract external aid meeting a major part of the cost, particularly in the case of food distribution programmes. They can win political support in the form of votes from the "critically poor" themselves, or at least reduce the incidence of rioting and crimes against property, while meeting less opposition from other strata of population than would alternative measures.

Assistential and social service programmes aimed at the "critically poor" have emerged in most countries, at least in token form, but they can probably reach major importance only in countries in which: (a) the per capita national income is well above the Third World average and the state is able to capture an important part of it; (b) the "critically poor" constitute a relatively small minority of the total population; (c) a significant part of the critically poor are concentrated in cities and have some political importance, if only as a potential counterweight to the better-organized "relatively poor".

Under the above conditions, it is not improbable that the more extreme consumption deficiencies of the "critically poor" – or at least the *urban* "critically poor" – will be alleviated and their formal access to basic educational and health services improved, at increasingly burdensome cost to the state, without any significant impact on their access to productive employment or their place at the bottom of the income ladder.

The urban bias of such an assistential anti-poverty policy and probably the impact on agricultural production incentives and labour demand of subsidized food imports and price-controlled distribution would further stimulate the movement that has been under way for some time of the "critically poor" from the countryside to the cities. And as was suggested above, the agricultural modernization as well as agrarian reform policies capable of helping part of the rural "relatively poor" would at the same time contribute to the expulsion of the "critically poor".

For semi-developed dependent capitalist countries in which anti-poverty efforts are particularly likely to follow the line of least resistance, the experience of the

[21] "What [the programmes] have most conspicuously improved is the salary level of the people who work there; whatever it may do for the poor, the war on poverty is the best thing that's happened to social workers since the New Deal was established. For there is now a gigantic sellers' market for social workers, welfare administrators, and 'consultants' on welfare problems." (Charles E. Silberman, "The Mixed-up War on Poverty", in *Poverty: Power and Politics*, p. 92). In Latin America, in view of the practically unabsorbable present output of "social scientists" by the universities, this factor may become of considerable practical importance.

United States "War on Poverty" of the 1960 s and the expansion of public assistance that accompanied and followed it may be instructive. In this case, a series of measures responding to real needs and legitimate preocupations (as well as, of course, to calculations of political advantage), able to draw on more reliable information of many kinds and on a more efficient administrative structure than can any semi-developed country, grew by accretion into something no one intended: an enormously costly machinery resented equally by taxpayers and recipients of benefits, convincingly accused of promoting marginalization and disintegration of the family.

The main differences between this "assistential" system and a system of guaranteed minimum incomes (since advocated unsuccessfully in the United States as an alternative) lie in the paternalistic administration, in complex and humiliating criteria for assistance, and in the importance of assistance in kind, particularly food aid.

In the United States from the 1940s through the 1960s agricultural modernization and declining demand for agricultural labour converted rural poverty into urban poverty as rapidly and dramatically as in the semi-developed countries. At present, only 12 per cent of the population falls below a poverty line considerably higher in terms of income and consumption norms than any semi-developed country can envisage for policy purposes. However, the various programmes designed to eliminate this residue of poverty by up-grading job qualifications and prohibiting discrimination in hiring have not done so, and it can be assumed that recent increases in unemployment have intensified the marginalization of the urban poor.

It is well-known that resistance on the part of the upper and middle income strata to further redistribution in favour of the poor through public welfare is growing, under the spur of inadequacy of post-tax incomes to meet consumption standards, widening insecurity of employment, inflation, and public awareness of the anomalies of the welfare system.

Here too, the "relatively poor" are not convinced by arguments that they should curtail their consumption and dilute their job security in favour of the "critically poor". For the future of the semi-developed dependent capitalist countries, it is significant to note that assistential policies, once embarked on, can expand their claims on public sector resources from a negligible share to a very large one, in spite of their demonstrated incapacity to "solve" the problem of poverty, their unwanted side-effects on the life of the poor, and their unpopularity with very diverse sectors of opinion, for lack of any politically and economically practicable alternative within the existing patterns of society.[22]

It should also be noted that many of the "welfare-capitalist" national societies of Europe have been able to distribute higher proportions of the national income

[22] The following comment on the evolution of U. S. anti-poverty programmes also seems relevant to the present international focus on "critical poverty": "Each measure was presented at the outset as a politically neutral 'scientific cure' for a disturbing social malady. Each concrete program that evolved was couched in the murky, esoteric terminology customarily used by professionals. a terminology that obscured the class and racial interests at stake, so that few

through the state toward the lower strata by means of such measures as family allowances, low-cost housing, and free medical services without comparable strains, not conditioning entitlement on a means test and keeping public assistance in a subordinate role within social policy. Two main factors seem to have made this possible:

(i) the relative homogeneity of the national populations, so that most of the "critically poor" have not been identifiable by race or culture and thus subject to discrimination, nor displaced from rural settings that have given them no preparation for urban living and urban job requirements.

(ii) The countries have experienced shortages of labour from the 1940s, to the mid-1970s so that even the least qualified nationals were able to find jobs, and public measures to raise their employability responded to the real conditions of the labour market. In particular, marginalization from the labour force of youths and women belonging to disadvantaged minorities, leaving them no alternative to public assistance or anti-social sources of livelihood, could not reach significant dimensions.

4. *Fertility and family planning*. The families of the poorer strata generally have more children than do families in other social strata. Thus, either the adult breadwinners must sustain an inordinate number of dependants with their scanty incomes or child labour must remain an essential part of the family economy. In either case, the probability that neither the present family nor its descendants will emerge from poverty increases. The conclusion can readily be drawn that, all other things remaining equal, the poor family would be better off if it had fewer children and that persuading and helping it to limit reproduction should be an essential component of an anti-poverty policy.

This proposition, advanced with crusading zeal by the family planning movement a few years ago, ran into a hornet's nest of ideological controversy and attributions of impure motives that need not be returned to here. The upshot has been that family planning programmes directed to the poor have continued to expand, responding to very real demands among women of urban low-income groups, but the claims for their decisive role have fallen into discredit for various reasons. For one thing, family planning programmes had no significant impact on fertility in the mainly rural populations suffering most from extreme poverty. For another, the polemic reaction against the implication that the poor should reduce their fertility to make things easier for the well-to-do became so insistent that bodies proposing new development strategies with a focus on critical poverty are now inclined to concede the ground or avoid the topic altogether. The more recent international population policy declarations – which also constitute utopias devised by commit-

groups could be certain who would gain from the new programs or who would lose, or what they would gain or lose. Finally, the professionals and social scientists lent an aura of scientific authority to what might otherwise have been perceived as political rhetoric." (Piven and Cloward, *op. cit.* p. 277–8). The militant organizers that emerged from among the poor eventually labelled the professionals and functionaries of the programmes "poverty pimps".

tees – assert that the raising of the levels of living of the critically poor must precede or accompany rather than follow upon changes in their fertility levels.

Some attempts to quantify possible futures – in particular the Bariloche model for Latin America – assume that higher levels of living will in fact be reflected in a determined rate of decline in fertility, while in the absence of improvement in levels of living fertility will not decline.

This supposition is plausible if the improvements in the lot of the poor are to consist in higher and more secure incomes from productive work, more equitable access to educational and health services relevant to their needs, and enhanced capacity for organization and participation in decisions affecting their own lives. To the extent that assistentialism comes in practice to predominate in anti-poverty efforts, however, the effect of improved consumption on the planning of family size and child spacing seems more questionable, since the conditions of subsidized consumption, doles in kind based on availability of food aid, etc., would not enhance the capacity of the family to plan for a predictable future, and benefits might increase with the number of dependants.

In such a case, one might expect a revival in official quarters of the hope that some combination of incentives and pressures directed to the families or women receiving public assistance, such as payments for persons undergoing sterilization, would help reduce the burden of public assistance, and a corresponding revival of controversy over the legitimacy of measures that penalize families for reproducing "irresponsibly". Such measures, of course, become relevant to the critically poor only to the extent that they receive benefits that might be withdrawn.

5. *Quantification and poverty lines.* However much one might prefer quality of life and degree of satisfaction with life as central criteria, any attempt to determine the size and location of a "critically poor" target group must fall back on measurement of the quantity of goods and services consumed. Some policy-oriented studies attribute an almost magical significance to the quest for an adequate combination of consumption indicators, as if the shortcomings of gross national product as a yardstick were responsible for the failure of current development strategies to contribute more unequivocally to human welfare.

Quantitative information on levels of consumption remains notoriously incomplete and unreliable in most of the world; the rising concern over poverty has been backed up by figures that are plausible but that hardly bear close scrutiny. The main current methods of collecting and tabulating statistical information throw only a dim light on distribution, and for well-known reasons the unreliability of information increases both at the top and at the bottom of the income and consumption scales. The deciles or percentages in which the information is usually expressed cannot inform about the patterns of income utilization and consumption in families belonging to real social groups. Nor would information on overall family consumption be sufficient, since it is probable that in many social settings women, children, the disabled and the aged bear the brunt of "critical poverty" – whether or not

they are incorporated in families. Information on the distribution of consumption within families and the consumption of individuals without families, however, is particularly scanty.

The fixing of a "critical poverty line" in terms of quantitative adequacy of supply of components of the level of living to satisfy minimum physiological needs *seems* to be practicable only in the case of food intake, and even here the problems of determining minimum requirements and deriving practical policy conclusions are more complicated than they seem at first sight. Minimum calorie and protein requirements differ widely according to climate, physical exertion, etc. People are notoriously disinclined to match their consumption to the dictates of "experts" on the cheapest way to satisfy their physiological needs.

Techniques for measurement of food intake and physiological consequences within families are too costly to be used on a large scale. The statistics now current on food consumption, for all their apparent concreteness, contain about the same proportion of guesswork and the same motivations for problem-dramatization as the statistics on income levels and distribution.

Attempts to quantify critical poverty in terms of the components of levels of living that can most readily be measured probably exaggerate the depths of rural poverty and the poverty of groups whose life styles are least "modern". An urban group, or even a group in a relatively modernized rural setting, if its members live in shacks with thatched roofs, dirt floors, lacking piped water and latrines, if they have no access to schools or clinics, can be assigned to "critical poverty" without much question. A tribal or peasant population in the same circumstances, if food supplies are adequate, if the "primitive" conditions of settlement are not associated with high levels of debilitating disease, if local life affords no urgent needs for literacy, if community and family relations provide reasonable satisfactions, is another matter. One would need to go beyond the "primitive" material conditions to consider the people's assessment of their own way of life and the viability of this way of life in relation to change in the wider society.

Alternative methods of information-gathering and analysis, capable of throwing more light on the real patterns and meaning of consumption in specific settings are expensive and time-consuming. The anxiety to have better quantitative information about the poor, natural to the economists, sociologists and demographers engaged in discussion of the reorientation of development policy, confronts questions of costs and benefits and of linkages between information and action.

If the information that enters into national policy-making consists of separate quantifications of deficiencies in food consumption, housing, sanitation, schooling, etc the probability increases that the response will be both assistential and compartmentalized in separate programmes with quantitative targets for subsidized distribution of food, construction of dwelling units, etc. Experience with measures of this kind has been disappointing, and the likelihood that the "relatively poor" and the "relatively well-off" will benefit more than the "critically poor" is high. Yet

both the information and the action may be governed by political calculations responding adequately to the rationality of the forces controlling the state.

If, on the other hand, the policy-making organs confront exhaustive information on the conditions of each impoverished hamlet and shantytown, each marginal occupational group, and each type of family in the national territory, it is inconceivable that they will be able to digest the information and reconcile it with the kinds of standardized action that the state can in practice carry out. It is also quite certain that the groups urging different priorities on them will use their own versions of the information to strengthen their own claims. However much quantitative information may be amassed, it will never demonstrate "objectively" what can and should be done.

An information-gathering strategy is called for that converts the "critically poor" from a statistical abstraction to groups of people with diverse reasons for underconsumption, exposed to diverse forms of exploitation and discrimination, with diverse potentialities for emerging from poverty. The purposes of such a strategy, however, cannot be reduced to the provision of information to the state on the supposition that the state will use it for the more efficient and equitable relief of poverty. Information and the ways in which it is gathered and analyzed convey more complex and ambiguous advantages and dangers to all the actors in the drama of "development". Notoriously, the state can use the information-gathering process for purposes of evasion of action or delay, or of control, identifying potential sources of unrest that it may repress or relieve just enough to render them harmless. (This latter possibility has generated in recent years among anti-establishment social scientists a strong suspicion of officially-sponsored empirical investigation.)

For the poor, participation in the gathering of information can be a means of conscientization, of presenting their claims more vigorously, and of entering on diversified local action to meet their own needs. The outlook behind the initial definition of the target group may then bias its self-identification. If the group comes to identify itself simply as "poor" its interest will inevitably centre on demonstration of its poverty to the state or voluntary agencies likely to help. If it identifies itself as part of the "people", the "oppressed", or the "working class", its claims and tactics will be different.

Lastly, an information-gathering strategy designed to contribute to the *elimination* of poverty cannot confine itself to the problems of the part of the population that falls below a "poverty line", however defined, but must include the interactions between the social classes and groups making up the "critically poor", the "relatively poor", the "relatively well-off", the dominant forces in the national society, and the whole range of administrative-service-rendering-repressive mechanisms of the state.

C. "Critical poverty" in settings of semi-development: Latin America

If one accepts provisionally the practicability of separating "critical poverty" from "relative poverty" for policy purposes, and if one rules out the possibility of a revolutionary-egalitarian transformation of social relationships, one can reason that:

(a) The material and organizational capacity of the state to relieve "critical poverty" will vary inversely to the percentage of critically poor in the national population and directly to the level of per capita national income.

(b) Perception by the forces dominating the state of the "critically poor" as a threat to "development" or political stability will vary directly to their percentage of national population and their degree of concentration in large cities.

(c) The smaller the percentage of the "critically" poor in the national population the higher will be the proportion among them who will constitute "special cases" rather than "human resources" potentially usable within the prevailing style of development – e. g., families consisting of mothers with dependent children, children without families, destitute aged persons, and subsistence cultivators in the remoter and more depressed rural zones.

At one end of the range of possibilities – where the critically poor constitute 10 per cent or less of the national population – it seems reasonable to expect that a well-devised combination of special programmes can raise most of them above the critical level, without an unmanageable drain on the resources available to the state, but that the priority the state gives to such programmes will depend on the values really dominant in the society more than on a judgement of political or economic necessity. If the remainder of the national society is progressing, critical poverty of these dimensions can remain nearly invisible to it. At the other end of the range – where the critically poor in terms of inability to satisfy minimum physiological needs are in the majority – the state might seem to face the alternatives of permanent repression or the achievement of an austere and egalitarian style of development giving priority to mobilization of human resources for production and co-operative self-help.

In intermediate situations, in which the critically poor are a large minority, one can expect that the pressures on the state, the motivations for action directed to the poor, and the range of alternatives apparently practicable, will be particularly heterogeneous and self-contradictory.

According to the admittedly crude "absolute poverty" line adopted in *The Assault on World Poverty* – US $50 per capita income – the developing countries of the Americas account for only 5 per cent of the world population in absolute poverty, while between 11 and 12 per cent of the regional population falls below the absolute poverty line. About two-thirds of the population below this line in Latin America is rural, against more than 90 per cent in Africa and more than 80 per cent in Asia.

The inadequacy for subsistence of a $50 per capita income is presumably more extreme in the relatively urbanized and monetarized societies of Latin America than in Africa and Asia, but even if one raises the line for the Americas to $75, while holding it at $50 for Africa and Asia, the Latin American target group remains less than 10 per cent of the world total and less than 20 per cent of the regional population.[23]

In Latin America, if one excludes Cuba with its radically different patterns of distribution and consumption, Argentina falls at one end of the range, having a minority of "absolutely" or "critically" poor probably below 10 per cent and consisting of the kinds of special cases mentioned above. Haiti is at the other end, with a probable majority of the population, representative of its small cultivators, in "absolute" poverty. The larger and medium-sized countries other than Argentina are somewhere in the middle, with "absolute" poverty, in the terms envisaged in *The Assault on World Poverty*, probably affecting from 15 to 30 per cent of the population.

While any dividing line between the "absolutely" and the "relatively" poor must be partly arbitrary,[24] the strata corresponding roughly to the above percentages may have certain definable characteristics aside from low incomes and consumption. They correspond to the "marginalized", the "subproletariat", the "underemployed", the "oppressed", according to various ways of interpreting their problems. The

[23] *The Assault on World Poverty*, pp. 79–80. A recent report by Oscar Altimir, "Estimaciones de la distribución del ingreso en América Latina por medio de encuestas de hogares y censos de población: Una evaluación de confiabilidad" (CEPAL – BIRF, August 1975) demonstrates that the statistical basis for highly aggregated income distribution estimates of this kind remains extremely weak.
The International Labour Office proposes different poverty lines for the major regions. On this basis, the "seriously poor" fall below US$ 500 per capita in Western Europe, US$ 180 in Latin America, US$ 115 in Africa, and US$ 100 in Asia.
The "destitute" fall below US$ 250 in Western Europe, US$ 90 in Latin America, US$ 59 in Africa, and US$ 50 in Asia. Using these criteria, the ILO calculates that in 1972, 43 per cent of the population of Latin America were "seriously poor", against 69 per cent in Africa and 71 per cent in Asia. In Latin America, 27 per cent were "destitute", against 39 per cent in Africa and 42 per cent is Asia. (*Employment, Growth and Basic Needs.: A One-World Problem*, International Labour Office, Geneva, 1976).

[24] The percentages can, of course, be set much higher, depending on the yardsbick adopted. Estimates of "one-third" for the group in critical poverty are current, possibly as a distant echo of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "one-third of a nation" "ill-fed, ill clothed and ill-housed" for the United States of the 1930s. It is probable that in Latin America much more than a third of the population is ill-fed (qualitatively if not quantitatively) and ill-housed (in relation to modern standards for housing) but it seems desirable for present purposes to use a more restrictive poverty line. In particular, attempts to quantify the critically poor in terms of deficiencies of housing and lack of access to potable water, because information on these components of the level of living are more easily measured than food consumption, may be measuring a lag in modernization in rural areas or a crisis of over-rapid population growth in the cities rather than *critical* poverty.

category is, however, considerably smaller than the part of the population able to participate only meagrely in the market for manufactured consumer goods and "modern" housing. In the more representative Latin American countries the dimensions of "critical poverty" (to return to the adjective used hitherto in this chapter, are much too large for it to be relegated to "special measures", assistential or otherwise, but it remains a plight of heterogeneous minorities mostly participating in the labour force but relatively marginal to the more urgent concerns of political stability and economic growth as viewed by the forces dominating the state.

The critically poor cannot be ignored, but the case for priority meeting of their needs hovers uneasily between the ethical, the politically pragmatic, and the economically pragmatic.

The contribution to production of the "critically poor" is small, but the securing of a significantly larger contribution would call both for different structures of production and demand, and for a prior raising of their working capacity through better nutrition, health care and education.

The possibilities seem to be limited for the short term with which governments are most concerned, compared with other means of raising production. Moreover, exploitation of the critically poor is functional though hardly central to the existing order. They provide cheap domestic and artisanal services and a reserve of cheap seasonal agricultural labour; the expectations and life-styles of other social strata would have to be modified if their earnings and means of livelihood were to improve to a significant degree. Their presence as a labour reserve helps to keep down wage levels in industry, although their relatively low employability in modern industry and the capacity for organized self-defence of the better-off strata of the urban labour force limit the importance of this function except where workers' organizations have been suppressed by the state.

The critically poor are excluded from the market for manufactured consumer goods, but if the state is determined to broaden the internal market for such goods, it will find it more profitable economically as well as politically to increase the income share of the "relatively well-to-do", or of the "relatively poor" who are now on the margin of this market. The needs of the urban critically poor for cheap staple foods, cheap public transport, and cheap shelter do generate pressures that the state cannot safely ignore, and that may produce contradictions in its economic policies. These pressures, however, can be relieved by measures of relatively low direct cost to the state although they may be incovenient in other respects – distribution of food aid from abroad, price controls on staple foods and urban transport fares, distribution of building lots and minimum infrastructural services, toleration of peripheral squatter settlements on public lands.

The critically poor can constitute a source of troublesome political unrest, but mainly in situations in which other dissatisfied groups enlist them as allies. The most systematic attempts to do this have been made by revolutionary student movements and the gap in outlook between the two parties – the one aiming at societal

transformation through protracted violent confrontations, the other hoping for limited gains and greater security – have made their conjunctions short-lived. It is easier to repress or placate the demands of the poor than those of other groups – the organized workers, the educated youth – and since they are made up of several different rural and urban minorities with little in common except poverty their challenges are localized and sporadic. The prospect of their autonomous political mobilization arouses chronic alarm in the better-off strata and in the state apparatus, but this alarm might be attributed as much to a bad conscience as to real symptoms of unrest among the critically poor.

The outcome, to the extent that the state turns its attention to the critically poor, is sure to be some combination of three lines of policy: *assistentialism, control* and *aided self-help*.

The implications of assistentialism were discussed above. Information on coverage of assistential programmes in Latin America up to the present is as fragmentary as the programmes themselves. In a good many countries they seem to have reached a rather high proportion of the poor but to have reached them too thinly and intermittently – depending on availability of food aid from abroad or on populist electoral tactics – to have made a significant contribution to their consumption. In national settings in which the critically poor are numerous, doles and subsidized services (including public employment designed mainly to provide minimum incomes for the otherwise unemployed) must either be confined to certain groups among the critically poor or must be spread very thin.

As awareness of the possibility of assistance spreads, demands are bound to rise faster than benefits and to become increasingly organized, although usually remaining localized. Therefore, as long as the state is unable to move beyond assistential measures, the very expansion of these measures forces it to develop mechanisms of control and repression in order to keep the demands from getting out of hand.

Policy proposals incorporating aided self-help are diverse both in content and in terminology, and are by no means aimed exclusively at the "critically poor". In the view of many of their proponents, however, they represent a potential means by which the "critically poor" can raise levels of living without burdening the state with the very high costs of systems of assistentialism-cum-repression, and also without requiring an egalitarian revolutionary transformation – judged unattainable or unacceptable – in social and economic relationships. The state, with the assistance of voluntary agencies, is to raise the employability of the critically poor through training and guidance; help them produce enough to meet their basic needs as cultivators or artisans; and help them organize co-operatively to exchange goods and services among themselves, provide their own housing and community services, and obtain fair returns in their dealings with the rest of the society.

If there is no imediate prospect that the existing economic system can absorb even the more employable critically poor into "modern" productive activities, as seems to be the case in most of Latin America, the aided self-help approach must fall

back on a kind of parallel economy of the poor, insulated from the dominant "modern" economy and subjected to different controls and incentives from those applied to "modern" enterprises. The poor would then achieve levels of productivity and consumption above the present "critical poverty line", but the question of their full incorporation into the more dynamic sectors of the economy could be postponed to the relatively distant future. Meanwhile, the latter sectors would be able to advance more vigorously, freed of the greater part of the costs and dangers now associated with "critical poverty".

Small-scale initiatives of this kind have proliferated over the years within community development and co-operative programmes and are now being promoted as means to economic independence for women of the poorer strata. Generally they offer their target groups supplementary incomes for handicraft production in the home, chicken-raising, etc. The public programmes have typically been weak on the marketing side, sometimes leaving the producers with no return for the output that has been stimulated, unless private middlemen who can find outlets and enforce quality controls take over the marketing function in exchange for a major control in the returns. The more ambitious schemes for parallel economies seem to have tempted some public authorities but have not been applied on a significant scale.

Such schemes suppose a governmental capacity to insulate the target group from the remainder of national societies in the throes of uneven modernization that does not exist – at least as yet. The required willingness to accept modest improvements in living conditions in exchange for unremitting toil with primitive tools, and to support out of their poverty basic services that the state provides for better-off strata in the society, would be likely to break down precisely when and if initial progress had generated hope and organizational capacity, unless accompanied by controls even more rigorous than those complementing asistentialism. Within present realities, the aided self-help schemes seem destined to continue offering as comprehensive solutions measures that can at best result in secondary improvements in the conditions of minorities among the critically poor.

The propensity to over-generalize about the potential of aided self-help and to assume that localized achievements can be duplicated on an ever-larger scale, irrespective of the constraints of the wider social and economic order, has been particularly evident in the changing fashions for diagnoses and policy proposals for urban shanty-towns. The earlier observers looked on these as sinks of abject poverty peopled by unemployable rural migrants who would be better off if persuaded or compelled to go back where they came from. This general attitude continues to dominate a good many observations on poverty in Latin America or other parts of the Third World. However, studies of some peripheral settlements in some cities have been used to support equally sweeping generalizations to the effect that such settlements are constituted by "dynamic and creative people" who are able to solve their own problems with a little of the right king of aid from outside.

In fact, this dynamism and creativity are much more evident in some settlements than in others and in some political conjunctures than in others. At best they confront formidable constraints from the wider urban and national society. They cannot enable the families concerned to extricate themselves from the costs of urban sprawl and the polluted urban environment to which the settlements contribute, nor to compete on equitable terms in the job market and the educational system that helps to determine access to jobs.

* * *

The present discussion, like a good many other treatments of poverty as a focus for development policy, has been unable to emerge from the contradictions evident in the Latin American variants of the human condition. At most, it has made explicit some of the difficulties that emerge from intellectual attempts to shift the development policy focus from helping those best able to help themselves – the entrepreneurs, the modernizers, the strivers – to helping those least able to help themselves – the marginals, the oppressed, the poor – without explicitly rejecting previous suppositions on the nature of the development process.

On the one side, the weight of evidence indicates that Latin America as a whole, in contrast to other major Third World regions, has the *material* capacity to enable all its people to achieve, within one or two decades, an adequate livelihood in settings of social equality and freedom. The countries that are farthest from this capacity account for a small fraction of the regional population and genuine regional solidarity could offset their disadvantages. In a good many countries the "social" allocations made by the state, and the regulative and servicing powers held by the state, would already be sufficient to eliminate the extremes of poverty if equitably and efficiently utilized.

If the resources now devoted to the superfluous consumption of minorities, to armaments, and to the infrastructural requirements of humanly indefensible patterns of urbanization, or drained out of the region altogether, could be redirected, and if the human potential now wasted or worse could be mobilized, they would be more than ample for the legitimate requirements of "another development". The perpetuation of poverty alleviated by doles, minimal services and self-help schemes cannot be justified in terms of overall insufficiency of resources or the priority requirements for investment in productive capital.

The catchphrase "redistribution of poverty" that has served to justify absolute priority to economic growth up to a distant future of plenty for all is convincing only to the extent that one supposes:

(a) that the greater part of the high incomes are channeled into investment, or at least are received by individuals from whom "development" requires material incentives to greater effort;

(b) that the structure of economic growth and the accompanying expectations are such as to make later redistribution more rather than less feasible;

(c) that immediate redistribution must follow populist lines, without a transformation in the patterns of mass consumption and mass aspirations.

On the other side, the character of social relations and motivations; the ties of Latin America with the world order; the sources of dynamism of the systems of production and distribution; and the capacities of the state deriving from the given distribution of power in the societies do not point to any convincing path to equality, freedom, and priority allocation of resources to meeting of basic needs. The initiatives supposedly directed to such ends range from innocuous declarations of governmental good intentions, which can be subscribed to by forces acting in direct contradiction to them, and from the continual creation of bureaucratic mechanisms substituting ritual for relevant action, to violent attempts to demolish the existing order to clear the ground for the Good Society – attempts which generally end in a strengthening of the repressive traits of the former.

The contradiction between potential and reality can plausibly be attributed to historically determined systems of exploitation and conditioned motivations in different social classes. In any case, the functioning of the present national systems of dependent semi-development is so complex and at the same time so precarious, so far outside the control of national governments or the social forces dominating these governments, and the identifiable potential agents of societal transformation are so fragmented, that it remains to be demonstrated whether there is any politically viable alternative to a continuation of the precarious, conflictive, ambiguous processes of economic growth and social change that are now identifiable.

The "critically" and "relatively" poor, and the "relatively well-off" who are poor in relation to their own standards, will then continue to be actors in these processes, each with its own sporadically effective tactics to get attention to its wants, gaining in some contexts and losing in others, but with the "critically poor" remaining at the bottom of highly stratified societies.

The identification of a disadvantaged target group invariably comes from outside the group itself, from ideologists, political leaders and social scientists, and with instrumental as well as ethical or scientific objectives presents a simplified model of a complex reality. In the alternative identifications that were presented at the beginning of this chapter, two main instrumental-ethical orientations can be distinguished. According to the one orientation, the main purpose of the identification is to help the target group become conscious of its own situation and its own interests so that it can acquire a realistic strategy for transforming its situation and thus transforming the social order as a whole. Different versions lead to quite different strategies, but they agree that the target group must free itself through solidarity informed by its own vision of the existing society and of the kind of future society that will meet its needs.

According to the second orientation, the main purpose of the identification is to make *other* elements in the national society and the international order aware that the situation of the target group is inacceptable in terms of their own professed values and incompatible with secure perpetuation of their own preferred life styles. Different versions of this orientation also lead to differing strategies, but these are strategies for the state, for the international order made up of states, for the wealthy and powerful, or for all educated men of goodwill, only secondarily for the target group itself.

The orientation assumes that the deficiencies of the target group can be overcome only if guidance, policy-oriented research and material support are forthcoming. Such an orientation must be basically more congenial than the first to external identifiers of the target group, since it enables them to address their natural educated audiences and gives them legitimate leading roles in the strategy to be adopted. Attempted adherence to the first orientation requires the identifiers either to create the target group in their own image, attributing to it purposes and capacities that it can acquire only under their tutelage, or to discipline themselves, under continual temptations to self-deception and manipulation, to the difficult subordinate roles of "learning from the people" and "serving the people".

The preceding pages have stressed that the "critically poor" are objectively an agglomeration of different social groups and parts of groups whose main common characteristic is deficient consumption, lumped together on the basis of statistical indicators of dubious reliability and comparability from group to group. However, it is probable that members of some of these groups now identify themselves as "the poor" and that wider groups will do so if the dominant forces in their societies so identify them and offer them advantages for accepting such an identification.

For all the opinion surveys that have been made, we know little as to how the groups identified as "poor" see themselves and their place in society. The generalizations now current – including those made here – project on them the hopes and fears of educated élites, conservative, reformist, or revolutionary. These sectors of opinion cast the same actors alternatively in roles as "poor" seeking benefits, "oppressed" seeking liberation, "people" seeking majority rule, or "proletarians" seeking to overthrow and replace the existing order. The target groups adopt or adapt one role or another, or identify themselves in ways that are shocking and alien to educated opinion, as in xenophobic outbreaks and messianic movements. Their subjective choices among these roles will have as much to do with their future participation in "another development" as will their objective situations of deprivation.

For all the heterogeneity of the points of view now associated with the focus on "critical poverty" and equivalent terms, a self-identification of this kind is bound to be closer to conformity, dependency, and putting up with small improvements in things as they are than the alternative self-identifications.

Within the utopias devised by committees the focus on critical poverty overlaps with and also competes for attention with other propositions that contain in embryo

quite different lines for development policy. One such proposition calls for the restructuring of production for the meeting of "basic needs". Another proposition asserts that development strategy should aim at national or collective self-reliance, renouncing the illusion of salvation through external investments, technological borrowings, trade and aid. Neither proposition has been worked out as yet with sufficient concreteness for the real potentialities and preconditions to be clear, but both of them contain more radical implications for the transformation of international as well as national economic and social orders than does the focus on critical poverty.

The tracing of these implications calls for a chapter by itself. At this point it may be sufficient to pose the question whether the implications of the focus on critical poverty, at the level of the "experts" and international bureaucracies now seeking to revitalize the cause of development and justify their own survival, is not somewhat similar to its implications at the level of self-identification of the target group.

CHAPTER TEN

Preconditions and Propositions for "Another Development"*

1. Policy Making, or Alice in Wonderland Croquet

The author has thus far evaded the challenge to propose a more adequate focus for development policies capable of realizing the hopes that have been invested in "another development", "unified development", or "alternative styles of development". The preceding chapters exposed his inability to escape from scepticism concerning the relevance of prescriptions addressed to humanity at large or governments in general by the international bureaucratic and academic machinery that continually generates meetings and reports and missions around the elusive topic of "development".

The thorniest problem is not the formulation of better strategies for human-oriented development. The efforts of dedicated thinkers over the past two centuries seem to have uncovered all conceivable solutions; some of these solutions have been tested in practice; and some of them have helped to change the course of history. The institutionalized continuation of these efforts today continually rediscovers, without acknowledgement or even awareness, ideas current among utopian socialists of the early 19th century or late-19th-century Russian populists.

The would-be architects of ideal societies have commonly envisaged social change processes as more manipulable and less ambiguous in their consequences than has been the case. While their influence has been very great and has undergone surprising metamorphoses, they have failed to identify and "conscientize" social forces willing and able to apply strategies oriented to human welfare coherently, realistically, and flexibly over the long term.

A sympathetic study of the experiences of political leaders and planners who have tried to apply coherent strategies to their own national setting conduces to humility, and even suggests that the last thing they need is more generalized advice couched in catchwords, such as the "unified approach to development", on what they ought to do if they could count on an ideal social consensus and an ideal capacity to acquire and digest information.

*The term "another development" is borrowed from *What now? Another development*, in the 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Report on development and international cooperation, Uppsala, Sweden, 1975.

The "high-level expert" who pontificates on *what* must be done and evades the questions *who* and *how* is justifiably becoming a figure of fun. At the other extreme, the purveying in international reports of shopping lists of "practical" techniques and "pilot projects", on the supposition that policy makers can pick and choose from sketchy descriptions of what has allegedly succeeded elsewhere, is also reaching a dead end of futility.

The situation of the real participants in policy-making is generally closer to that of Alice in her Wonderland croquet game than to that of the powerful, benevolent, unimaginative entities to which development prescriptions seem to be addressed.[1]

Some of the propositions now competing for attention in the utopias devised by committees are more promising than others, not as ready-made prescriptions but as criteria against which policies can be assessed, and signposts to paths that national societies may not be able to avoid entering upon, *if* the future evolves along certain lines that seem at least as plausible as the alternatives.

This last point deserves emphasis. If the international economic order recovers its previous dynamism, if the present centres retain their hegemony and use it for the same purposes as heretofore, if the contradictions generated by present styles of development in semi-developed peripheral national societies such as those of Latin America continue to be manageable in one way or another, such propositions can, at most, be received by the dominant forces as "missing ingredients" to be added to the style of development in order to make it function better, or to forestall criticisms of its inequity, with the likely result of introducing secondary contradictions and anomalies in its functioning. However, if the medium-term future should bring catastrophic breakdown in the international order, we have no way of offering rational guidelines to the societies as to how to cope, or even of forecasting what social forces would become dominant in these societies.

The following pages will discuss the relevance of certain propositions on the supposition that the medium-term future will be one of frequent and traumatic mutations not amounting to catastrophe, of contradictory stimuli from the world centres and waning capacity of the centres to exercise hegemony, of challenges for which neither the forces dominating present governments nor the counter-élites are prepared.

In the short term, one can expect successive waves of frantic urgency for action subsiding into complacency at any sign of return to the "normal". Measures taken piecemeal to cope with disbenefits of styles of development will cumulatively change the character of the styles, for better or worse.

[1] "Alice thought she had never seen such a curious croquet-ground in her life; it was all ridges and furrows; the croquet balls were live hedgehogs, and the mallets live flamingoes, and the soldiers had to double themselves up and stand on their hands and feet to make the arches . . . Alice soon came to the conclusion that it was a very difficult game indeed. The players all played at once without waiting for turns, quarrelling all the while, and fighting for the hedgehogs . . ."

State interventions in the society will become more pervasive, but not necessarily more coherent, and these interventions will interact with the changing demands and values of social forces, and with changing forms of alienation from and resistance to the State.

Certain propositions from current discussions of "another development" may gain political viability through lessons of experience demonstrating their necessity for human survival, and through changes in values, social relationships, and power structures that can accord them effective priority over incompatible social demands.[2]

The propositions in question refer to the meeting of basic human needs, self-reliance, participation, and a theme recurring in discussions of "another development" but not yet endowed with a uniform label: it will here be called "meaningful human activity", that is, actively meaningful to the individual as well as contributory to the society's evolution toward "another development".

All of these propositions can be treated as "missing ingredients" in current styles of development, but if the future assumes approximately the traits suggested above, their unavoidability on the one hand and their incompatibility with certain other objectives and with prevailing life-styles on the other will become more evident.

The discussion of "seeds of change" in an earlier chapter suggested some of the ways in which this is beginning to happen. The future may then depend on the extent to which emerging forces in human societies can realistically and rationally evolve new life-styles summed up by the four propositions, accepting the sacrifices and making creative use of the opportunities they imply, and keeping under control the drives incompatible with such an evolution.

It is possible that human societies will prove so wedded to present life-styles that they will perish rather than undertake their transformation. It is also possible, unfortunately, that they will find no means of doing so which will not incur such heavy costs – in failed experimentation, substitution of facade achievements and rituals for real achievements, chronic conflict and mutual sabotage between groups trying to impose their own will, regimentation and manipulation of consensus – that "another development" will satisfy the hopes invested in it no better than the styles now prevailing have done.

Part of the case for the four propositions listed above is that, taken together, they point to caution in social engineering. Even if a portion of a national society should achieve the power to fit the whole society to a bed of Procrustes, the exercising of such power is not the most promising way to "another development".

[2] The future here envisaged corresponds to the scenario of "competitive détente" described by José Medina Echavarría in "Latin America in the possible scenarios of détente" (*CEPAL Review*, №2, second half of 1976), but supposes a greater loss of control by the two hegemonic powers, for internal and external reasons, and more freedom of action by the peripheral societies, without, however, the emergence of a coherent "new international economic order".

2. Priority to basic human needs

The call for priority to basic human needs has the virtue of directing attention equally to production, to consumption (as the main legitimate reason for wanting higher production), and to distribution (as the provision of relevant "basic" goods and services to all). It points to the elimination of critical poverty without singling out the poor as a category to be "helped". By itself, it has the disadvantage of being uninspiringly utilitarian.

The meeting of basic needs does not constitute an image of the future society adequate to inspire the enormous effort, including the effort of self-restraint and social discipline, that is called for, any more than does the more elaborate lure of consumerism.

For present purposes, the essential element in a definition of "basic needs" is that the term refers to the goods and services that can be produced and distributed to the whole of a national population, in accordance with realistic expectations, independently of the achievement of a more equitable world order. This does not mean autarky at the national level: all national societies will have to satisfy part of their basic needs through exchange of products for which they have comparative advantages, and the smaller the national population the larger this proportion will be. However, a basic needs strategy would presumably mean a smaller role for international trade than at present.

The national definition must respond to an objective criterion for "basic" (e. g., meeting minimum physiological needs) and also to the subjective criteria of the people whose basic needs are in question. It is important to avoid the trap of making definition and measurement ends in themselves, and also to resist the temptation to admit as "basic needs" the whole range of desiderata that have received international recognition as "human rights". A "right" is meaningful only to the extent that a national society is really capable of honouring it for all its members; otherwise, insistence on rights unavoidably becomes a tactic for the protection and extension of minority privileges. This point is particularly important for societies such as those of Latin America, in which different strata of the national population have quite different norms for basic needs, and in which the strata with relatively elaborate norms have greater power than the others to impose their conceptions on public policies.

Moreover, it cannot be taken for granted that conventional goods and services and conventional systems for their provision constitute the only means or the most efficient means of meeting the basic need to which they are addressed. This problem manifests itself differently in relation to each need and calls for examination of the widest possible range of alternatives. The prior fixing of quantitative targets (e. g. number of years of formal education) may cramp the search for better alternatives. In the case of education, for example, it now seems probable that concentration on the social *purposes* of education within societies having the overall

priorities summed up in "another development" will sharply diminish the relevance of the conventional norms, which can be satisfied by herding all children for a given number of days and years into buildings labelled "schools".

As regards transport, within present urban patterns, a considerable expansion of cheap public transport is a real basic need to be preferred to the proliferation of private automobiles; but a transformation of the urban patterns might remove most of the need by bringing places of work within walking distance of homes.[3]

The shift in national priorities and popular expectations implied by an authentic basic needs strategy is so extensive and so potentially traumatic to the "modernized" sectors of the population that such a questioning of conventional solutions and search for alternatives might reduce rather than intensify the political difficulties. It would widen the possibilities for popular participation and introduce an element of creativity counteracting the drab uniformity that might otherwise come to dominate such an approach.

Ideally, it should make economic costs more manageable while permitting a more generous and inspiring conception of basic needs. At the same time, it would unavoidably complicate the planning and administrative problems; the opening-up of alternatives is a frightening prospect for bureaucratic institutions wedded to standardized procedures, and the capacity of public to embrace new ways of thinking about needs is an unknown quantity.

These considerations lead back to the essential complementary roles of meaningful activity, participation and self-reliance, to be discussed below.

Since the conception of "basic needs" advocated here is governed by national capacities rather than universal standards, the relevant short-term standards for some national societies may have to be meagre indeed, but in Latin America the norm can be well above the "rockbottom level of physical existence" referred to in the 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Report.[4] Under these circumstances, a basic needs strategy does not require strictly egalitarian distribution; the political and economic costs, if they could be met at all, would outweigh the benefits, and the implied regimentation would be a major disbenefit in itself.

[3] Ivan Illich and the Centro Intercultural de Documentacion (CIDOC) in Cuernavaca, Mexico, have done some of the most stimulating thinking on alternatives, although the alternatives proposed are sometimes simplistic. See Ivan Illich, *Deschooling Society*, New York, Harper & Row, 1973; *Energy and Equity*, London, Calder and Boyers, Ltd., 1973; and *Tools for Conviviality*. New York, Harper & Row, 1973.

[4] In reproducing a suggestion for India of an initial target of a daily income per working adult equivalent to 3 kg. of cereals in rural areas and 4.5 kg in urban areas. (*What Now? Another Development, op. cit.* p. 42.) The report of the Director-General of the International Labour Office, *Employment, Growth and Basic Needs: A One-World Problem* (ILO. Geneva, 1976) presents an acceptable classification of basic needs and emphasizes, first, that "basic needs constitute the minimum objective of society, not the full range of desirable attributes . . ." secondly, that "basic needs can be relative as well as absolute" (p. 33.).

Such a strategy does imply that public policy, to the extent that it controls the relevant factors and has mobilized sufficient understanding and support, should restrict the satisfaction of non-basic wants that conflict with the satisfaction of nationally defined basic needs and with the *kind* as well as the amount of capital accumulation required to enhance their satisfaction in the future. The relevant policy instruments would include differential taxation to discourage some forms of consumption, subsidies to other forms of consumption, restriction of non-essential imports, controls on commercial publicity, and others that come readily to mind.

The effectiveness of these instruments – most of which have been resorted to for one reason or another even within current "consumerist" styles of development – would depend on simultaneous changes in the values, expectations, and participatory capacities of different social strata, probably under the impact of crises demonstrating the non-viability of previous expectations.

The proportion of national income devoted to investment within a basic needs strategy might or might not be higher than before. Priority for the meeting of basic needs cannot logically be denied through a *generalized* plea for higher rates of accumulation, since the destinations of a large part of previous "productive" investment, and also of infrastructural and even social investment, would become irrelevant or worse.

It goes without saying that the need for accumulation will remain and that this will warrant austerity in the definition of basic needs for many years to come. However, the dominant forces in the national societies will be justified in calling for austerity mainly in so far as they can demonstrate that accumulation will, in fact, enhance the capacity to meet basic needs in preference to other ends.

Other things being equal, one might suppose that the conversion of the general proposition on basic needs in to a politically and economically viable strategy would become more feasible to the extent that:

(a) Existing national productive capacity is sufficient and the nature of the main products is such that a level of living can be afforded to all which is not so meagre that the population puts up with it only as far as it cannot help doing so – like the "critically poor" at present;

(b) National planning and administrative mechanisms are sufficiently well-developed – and the state has sufficient legitimacy – for state and society to be able to find practicable means of ensuring that basic needs have priority;

(c) The life styles and expectations of the population are sufficiently homogeneous to imply that realistic basic minima for the whole population would not come into unmanageable conflict with the demands of sizable minorities having specific conceptions of their own basic needs.

The real processes of dependent economic growth and social change in the Third World up to the present make it ingenuous to expect that all three of these conditions will be favourable to a basic needs strategy in any one national society. To

the extent that productive and administrative capacity is favourable and the State enjoys wide recognition as the legitimate formulator of national goals, the social differentiation of the population increases and the groups that stand to lose in the short term by a basic needs strategy become larger and more articulate.

Low levels of per capita income do not rule out a basic needs strategy if social solidarity is present and the States has a certain mobilizing capacity. China has demonstrated how much can be done under these circumstances, but also how traumatic are the historical processes that may make the doing possible. Sri Lanka, with a national system of subsidized or free rice distribution in effect most of the time since the 1940s, and with relatively well-developed educational and other social services, has also demonstrated the feasibility of a basic needs strategy at a per capita GNP level well below that of any Latin American country. The Sri Lanka policy seems to have entered into crisis not because of inability to afford the rice distribution and the social services, but because of inability to incorporate these into a coherent alternative style of development affording incentives to productivity and meaningful activity for the educated youth.

A basic needs strategy should become more feasible to the extent that production is already oriented towards staple foods, clothing, simple construction materials, and other mass-consumption goods, and services toward elementary education and basic health care at low unit costs. If production is oriented towards minerals or agricultural products for export, and if the State is able to capture a major part of the proceeds, this may also favour a basic needs strategy – depending on the character of the forces dominating the State – but with a greater bias toward assistentialism, as seems to have been the case in Sri Lanka.

The least favourable initial pattern would be an economic structure oriented towards the production of durable consumer goods, whether for the domestic market or for export, under the control of transnational enterprises, and requiring continual imports of capital equipment, production inputs, technology and promotional innovations.

This last pattern, combined with heavy investment in urban luxury residential and commercial construction, has in recent years come to predominate in some of the larger Latin American countries and exercises significant influence in almost all of them. As previous chapters have emphasized, the resulting dependent semi-development *apparently* enhances material capacity to implement a basic needs strategy, but reduces the likelihood of political will to do so. Moreover, the material advantage over poorer, more predominantly rural countries is party illusory.

The endowment of productive capital; the patterns of modernization of productive techniques; the relatively extensive infrastructures of power, transport and communications; the concentrated urbanization; and the elaborate, bureaucratized structures of education, health services, public housing and social security all have ambivalent roles. They are compatible – some of the time – with relatively high rates of increase in GNP and with either a highly concentrated "élitist" or a less concentrated "mesocratic" distribution of incomes; and they may possibly be

compatible with a combined assistential-repressive system for the relief of critical poverty, but the weight of evidence indicates that they are not compatible with a strategy giving consistent priority to the meeting of basic needs plus capital accumulation at levels that the economies should, in principle, be able to support.

The character of the capital equipment and technologies that have been introduced are clearly a large part of the problem – an automobile cannot be divided into twenty pieces to satisfy the basic transport needs of the masses, the construction techniques appropriate to modern apartment and office buildings cannot readily be adapted to "basic" housing, and the manufacture of durable goods cannot revert to simple employment-spreading technologies.

The attitudes of the key social groups that benefit or hope to benefit from the prevailing style of development constitute an even more formidable obstacle. University-educated intellectuals and planners who endorse a strategy for priority meeting of basic needs will probably resist its implications for themselves and their children. So will the leaders of the armed forces that will have to tolerate it, curb their own appetite for expensive innovations in military equipment, and turn a deaf ear to appeals from groups whose expectations are threatened.

If one supposes that continuing crises in the international order, changing stimuli from the world centres, and chronic inability in the national systems of semi-development to satisfy the expectations they have generated will periodically bring the question of "basic needs" back to each national agenda, it is far from inevitable that the responses will be adequate. The social forces that are prepared to tackle the problem cannot expect a smooth, consensual, rationally-planned transition, but they must struggle to keep the transformation from going to other extremes, such as doctrinaire solutions hastily imposed on an uncomprehending population; promises and gestures to satisfy the "basic needs" conceptions of all sectors of opinion; distortion of the strategy to serve the interests of the techno-bureaucracy and substitute propaganda for the recalcitrant reality.

3. Meaningful Human Activity and Employment

Man does not live by bread alone. The symptoms of crisis or breakdown in most national societies today derive as much from the failure of these societies to afford participation in meaningful activity as from their failure to satisfy basic needs for goods and services.

Up to the present, the satisfaction of basic needs has been, at best, a by-product of economic and political systems that have functioned according to their own laws. Men and women have had to serve the capitalist system, howerer irrelevant or even threatening to their own wellbeing the services demanded and the resulting output might seem to be, in order to make the system erratically and intermittently serve them. If public policy tries to make the system function too directly on

behalf of human welfare, curbing waste and potentially destructive activities, the system functions badly and human welfare suffers. If public policy eliminates an intolerable but essential component of the system, such as unemployment, the system responds with inflation.

The workers serving the system come to welcome pollution of their environment and insist on rising production of armaments, even if the latter are demonstrably obsolete for defence purposes or are demonstrably intensifying the risk of mutual mass extermination.

The paradoxical traits of the functioning of capitalism have been exhaustively diagnosed since the nineteenth century, and while public policies have managed to raise the satisfaction of basic human needs to a degree that could not have been expected in earlier stages, the means have remained indirect, wasteful, and plagued by unwanted and unexpected by-products.[5]

The socialist systems have come closer to an egalitarian distribution of basic goods and services, but here too the demands of the system for accumulation and defence, and the suitability of central planning to accomplish some ends rather than others, have also left people the servants of the system, and the satisfaction of their basic needs more a means to their participation in production than an end.

Functions of employment

Proposals for basic needs strategies have commonly accepted that the needs must be satisfied by improving the functioning of the economic system, naturally with major reforms, but with the expansion of employment still regarded as the central mechanism for accomplishing the human purpose of development. This is legitimate up to a point, but from the standpoint taken here it is essential to distinguish clearly the different reasons why the expansion of employment is expected to enhance the satisfaction of basic needs, to question whether expansion must

[5] "Keynes did not *want* anyone to dig holes and fill them. He indulged in a pleasant daydream of a world in which, when investment had been kept at the full employment level for thirty years or so, all needs for capital installations would have been met, property income would have been abolished, poverty would have disappeared and civilized life could begin. But the economists took up the argument at the point where it had broken off before the war. When there is unemployment and low profits the government must spend on something or other – it does not matter what. As we know, for twenty-five years serious recessions were avoided by following this policy. The most convenient thing for a government to spend on is armaments. The military-industrial complex took charge. I do not think it plausible to suppose that the cold war and several hot wars were invented just to solve the employment problem. But certainly they have had that effect. The system had the support not only of the corporations who made profits under it and the workers who got jobs, but also of the economists who advocated government loan-expenditure as a prophylactic against stagnation . . . So it has come about that Keynes' pleasant daydream was turned into a nightmare of terror." Joan Robinson, "The Second Crisis of Economic Theory", *The American Economic Review*, May 1972.

necessarily amount to maximization, and then to consider whether a different conception of meaningful human activity may not be required as a corrective to the subjection of human beings to systems that exact such a high price for their erratic and frustrating responses to needs.

What people *do* and their satisfaction with what they do are just as important as what they *receive* and their satisfaction with what they receive.

One cannot lightly propose a revolution in the work ethic as motor of development. Explorations along these lines risk intoxication with dreams of technological abundance and dreams of the painless emergence of a creative and altruistic new human being. Nevertheless, for better or worse, the traditional carrot and stick of the economic systems are beginning to fall into discredit, and present levels of productive and innovative capacity, even in semi-developed societies, should make it possible for these societies to begin to separate the obligation to work in "gainful" activities from the right to satisfaction of basic needs.

The main functions of employment can be summed up as follows:

(a) To produce goods and services and perform the social roles valued by the society;

(b) To give individuals and families access to incomes enabling them to satisfy their needs and wants;

(c) To enable the individual to enter into relationships with the social order, interpret personal interests in its maintenance or transformation, associate oneself with a class or reference group, and acquire organizational ties;

(d) To enable the individual to meet psychological needs for meaningful activity, self-realization, creativity, and status as family breadwinner.

The extent to which a given employment situation fulfils all of these functions is inevitably uneven, whether assessed from the standpoint of the individual or from that of the society, and uneveness is bound to be accentuated by rigidities and discontinuities in the labour market.

Some occupations (e. g., that of the plantation worker) can be satisfactorily productive but wretchedly paid, offering the worker no opportunity to participate actively in the society and no sense of meaningful human activity. Other activities (e.g. the publicist's, certain bureaucratic posts) can be highly paid and conducive to active identification with the society, but contribute little to a sense of personal achievement, and are irrelevant or negative in their relation to the meeting of basic needs. Further examples of incongruities in fulfilment of the basic functions of employment can readily be imagined.

From the policy standpoint, the relative importance of these functions and the possibility of taking them into account as objectives varies according to the style and the level of development. At the most primitive level, the maximum contribution of all able-bodied persons to food production might be overriding importance. At the other extreme, in a highly-productive, automated, egalitarian, post-industrial society the main social policy preoccupation might be with fulfilment of

the fourth function. It can be assumed that any society that has achieved some degree of economic diversification and modern state apparatus needs to and has some ability to pay attention to all four functions.

In all modern societies up to the present remunerated employment has been the principal means of accomplishing the first two functions for the bulk of the population, and it is generally also the most important means of accomplishing the last two – as far as they are accompished at all. It is never the only means, however. The higher the level of productivity, the wider becomes the range of options for the role of employment in fulfilment of the functions, but even in societies at very low income levels other means can be important. Production of goods and services valued by a local group or by the State can be undertaken partly by volunteer labour, with proceeds going to the whole community rather than the direct participants, or the authorities can draft labour for public works.

As economic growth proceeds the possibility of substituting capital and technology for labour increases, until in an automated production system the relevance of the number of workers to the volume of production may practically disappear. In any society above a bare subsistence level, part of the income generated through employment is redistributed therough mechanisms of family and community solidarity. As the level of productivity rises the feasibility of redistribution through public institutions – social security, social services, social assistance – widens and such redistribution comes to be viewed as both a human right and a political necessity.

At a sufficiently high level of per capita income, it is possible to make family livelihood practically independent of gainful employment, through guaranteed annual income policies, or a "negative income tax". As to the objectives of integration into the social order and self-realization, the range of alternatives to paid employment is obviously wide, even in the poorer societies.

To the extent that production and income distribution objectives require that most of the population spend a large part of its life in gainful employment, social participation and self-realization naturally are hoped for from such employment, and it is a grave deficiency in the social system if most employment does not contribute to these ends. As leisuré time increases and the proportion of the normal lifespan spent in employment shrinks, the main responsibility for meeting the two ends has to shift elsewhere, but no society has as yet found satisfactory alternatives. The malaise deriving from this deficiency in the high-income countries, particularly in regard to the aging retired population, is well-known.

Betters means to the same ends?

Optimal fulfilment of the four purposes of employment listed above does not in any society require either maximization of the time spent in employment by the

whole population able to work, or of the intensity of effort. In agricultural societies at low technological levels and with ample land for cultivation it may be essential that the whole population, including young children and the aged, contribute to the productive effort, but this effort has wide seasonal variations in intensity and includes tasks that are not at all onerous.

The early stages of industrialization with relatively simple productive techniques have also involved extremely long working days and extensive use of child labour, but these features seem to have been dictated by the patterns of control of the means of production and by cost-cutting competition between manufacturers rather than by their indispensability for maximum production.

In any case, as economic growth and technological innovation proceed, and as skill requirements in practically all occupational sectors rise, it becomes essential even in the interest of efficient production that part of the potential labour force be excluded from employment or helped to escape from it, and that the working time of the employed population be held well below the limits of physical endurance. In all modernizing societies a number of mechanisms appear through which the age span of the economically active population contracts at both ends, and the proportion of leisure time within the active age span increases, first in urban occupations, and later, as rural activities decline in relative importance and undergo technological and organizational changes, in the rural occupations also.

The economic activity of women follows different trends, shrinking with the decline of agricultural and artisan-type activities carried on by the family as an economic unit, then increasing with changes in family size and modern urban occupational opportunities, but in practically all societies covers a shorter average time-span and a smaller percentage of the relevant age groups than does the gainful employment of males.

Ideally, the average age for entering employment should rise mainly because the period of education lengthens and young people are thus better prepared for their future occupational roles. The average age for leaving employment should decline because the society is better able to support retirement pensions and offer meaningful activities for the persons whose contributions to production are no longer required.

During the active span the contraction of the amount of time spent at work should respond to technological levels that permit adequate production and incomes without interminable drudgery. It is obvious that even in the more homogeneous and welfare-oriented of the high-income industrialized societies changes in employment patterns have not corresponded smoothly to these ideals, and in the larger, more internally heterogeneous societies the changes have been conflictive and frustrating enough to shake confidence in the future of the system.

The system seems to demand from part of the labour force intense activity in order to earn incomes to provide a market for the goods it produces; and it renders superfluous other parts of the potential labour force, affording them, through the

redistribution mechanisms of the State, a subsistence that may cover "basic needs", but not the consumption wants that the system insistently promotes. It offers opportunities for meaningful human activities outside employment that are in practice accessible only to minorities.

The bringing of a higher proportion of the working-age population into gainful employment is not legitimately an end in itself, although it is understandable that the State, unable to balance the different reasons for wanting employment and with few effective means of making the economic system function for human ends, may not be able to avoid treating it as such. Expansion of employment is really a means to various ends and at the same time can interfere with the achievement of other socially valued objectives.

In dependent semi-developed countries, the definition of realistic employment objectives and instruments is complicated by the co-existence, in increasingly close contact and inter-action with one another, of widely differing technological levels, forms of organization of production, and ways of life, all of them subject to continually changing and increasingly pervasive external influences and constraints. Completely different employment policies might be appropriate for specific population strata and specific sectors of production and provision of services, but the impracticability of isolating the different strata and sectors from one another or from the external influences practically rules out the application of such policies.[6]

Arguments for use by the government of the policy instruments at its disposal to promote labour-intensive or "intermediate" techniques assume that the primary function of employment is distribution of income rather than production. Although the arguments commonly imply that labour-intensive techniques are better suited to the production of goods meeting basic needs, and that a basic needs production strategy would automatically expand employment, this seems to be only partly true.

The solution – at the level of general ideas – lies in the complementation of employment objectives by objectives for meaningful human activity. That is, the social order should guarantee to all adults and youth a right to engage in activities meaningful to themselves and to the society *and* to the satisfaction of their basic needs, within limits set by the productivity of the economy, irrespective of gainful employment status.

[6] Women's employment offers a particularly interesting example of complexities in determination of optimal participation in the labour force. Ideally, increased female participation should raise production, facilitate the performance of socially valued roles such as teaching and nursing, contribute to family income, enhance the capacity of women to participate on equal terms in social and political activities, and open to them wider opportunities for self-realization and creativity. Under present conditions of the labour market and the social order, however, increased participation by women might mean low-wage competition for jobs now held by males, thus increasing visible unemployment and depressing family incomes in the poorer strata, while overburdening women unable to escape from household maintenance, disrupting family organization, and reducing the quality of child care.

Production would be carried on by the most efficient techniques available, given relative scarcities of capital, labour, and technical-managerial talents, with a persistent effort to minimize routine drudgery and maximize opportunities for creativity and pride in work. The whole adult population would encounter alternative combinations of activities matching their interests and qualifications, and designed to enhance these qualifications while meeting societal needs and preserving freedom of choice: for example, voluntary labour combined with education, ranging from preventive health work, child care, services to the handicapped and the aged, and cultural activities, to harvest labour, repairs to urban or rural infrastructure, and other manual work.

As far as possible, the dividing line between employed and unemployed, intellectual and manual workers, "productive" work and household work would disappear.

There is nothing new in the posing of such a utopian objective for human societies, and the way to it is now less clear than it seemed to certain social thinkers of the nineteenth century. Ideologically coherent forces in each national society would have to struggle towards its achievement, probably over a long period, keeping within bounds the inevitable temptations to opportunism and to doctrinaire rigidity, and measuring progress in large part by the achievement of understanding and active participation on the part of the masses.

A strategy of this kind is obviously far from the intentions and the capabilities of the forces controlling the State in most countries at present, and also of the counter-élites that aspire to supplant them. However, once the dominant forces in any society take seriously the satisfaction of basic needs, and find inacceptable the assistential-cum-repressive approach to the alleviation of poverty, they can hardly avoid tackling the questions of meaningful activity and participation.

The few national societies whose governments are making a serious effort to apply a basic needs strategy are also striving to universalize meaningful human activities, whatever terms they may use and however wide the gap between aspirations and realities. The effort can hardly stop short of the kind of egalitarian, participatory, non-capitalist society proposed by the Bariloche Foundation as a condition for Latin America's meeting of basic human needs through its own efforts.[7]

4. Participation

The discussion now enters an area in which the gap between the ideal and the real is so wide, the temptation to evasiveness so strong, and the rehashing of verbal good intentions so distasteful that one approaches it almost with despair of saying any-

[7] *Catastrophe or New Society? A Latin American World Model*, Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, 1976, pp. 24–26.

thing new and useful. "Participation" for present purposes means having influence on the decision-making process at all levels of social activity and social institutions.[8]

"Participation" is not coterminous with "meaningful activity"; it is at least theoretically possible for the individual to be meaningfully occupied from his own standpoint and from that of the values of his society, without participating in or even being aware of the choices made by dominant forces in the society; and participation as a citizen obviously does not guarantee that the individual will find meaningful activity in the greater part of his life that is spent in other pursuits. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to suppose that neither will advance very far without support from the other.

Fernando Henrique Cardoso has summed up, at the end of a harsh diagnosis of the shortcomings of certain channels of participation in Latin America up to the present, the reasons for continuing to insist on it as an indispensable component of any acceptable image of the future. He fears that in default of the reactivation of the masses and without an anti-bureaucratic ideology based on individual responsibilities and awareness of social needs, the leap from what he calls "patrimonialism" to technocratic corporativism may land the Latin American masses in a reproduction of the barbarous life of the "concrete jungle" that so appalled the socialists of the nineteenth century:[9]

> Unless society can reassert vigorous participation in social and political processes, and define new kinds of controls applicable to enterprises, to cities, to the State and to the basic social institutions, a horrifying new world may be created which will replace the city – once the forum of liberty – by Alphavilles endowed with every requisite for reproducing, through mass media technology and apathy, a "frozen society".

The International Labour Office has directed its attention to the same problem in more instrumental terms, in discussing implementation of its proposed "basic needs" strategy:

> A weakness of many formulations of national development policy is that they are divorced from political reality. They tend to assume the existence of an autonomous State which pursues a generalized national interest as articulated by its technicians, independent of political constraints... In order to put a plain into action account must be taken of the size and organization of the interest groups and regional coalitions which would benefit or lose from the proposed policies and the consequential changes in social status and political influence . . . Because of the divergences between interest groups and within classes, governments often have some degree of flexibility in initiating policy and strategy changes. Their

[8] Carlo Geneletti, "The concept of participation: an evaluation", CEPAL/DRAFT/DS/125, August 1975.

[9] See Fernando Henrique Cardoso, *Autoritarismo e Democratização*. Rio de Janeiro, Paz e Terra, 1975, p. 163.

ability to implement them, however, is clearly related to their ability to promote consensus, weaken groups likely to lose from them and organize support from those who would benefit. . . . The main prerequisite for the effective implementation of this approach would thus appear to be an effective, decentralized and democratic administrative structure to translate policies into decisions and action and mass participation in the development process by the poverty action groups.[10]

This statement starts from a realistic formulation of the political problem and ends by proposing three acts of faith:

(a) that the proposals of the technicians interpret the national interest correctly;

(b) that the State has a sufficient measure of rationality and autonomy to seek a political strategy making the proposals viable;

(c) that decentralized, democratic decision-making and mass participation, once mobilized, will flow in channels indicated by the proposals and not in others.

The statement exemplifies the aspiration to reconcile a technocratic utopia with a participationist utopia and the vacillation between the two that recurs throughout the explorations of "another development", including the present text. The technocratic utopias imply that every problem has one optimal solution; participation should consist in the education and mobilization of the population to understand and apply this solution. The participationist utopias imply that various satisfactory solutions can emerge from the creativity of the people who need the solutions; that the flowering of collective creativity through the exercising of free choice is central to "another development"; that technicians should take part as helpers without delusions of their own infallibility; and that in the last analysis people have a right to be wrong.

Both utopias are ambiguous in their consequences for human welfare; neither is likely to impose itself over the long term, and it might be disastrous if one or the other did so; the tension between them seems to be necessary and permanent in the efforts of human intelligence to impose human purposes on the future evolution of society.

The shortcomings

Extremely varied forms and tactics of participation have appeared in the Third World and been hailed by one sector of opinion or another as the key to authentic development. They range from national electoral democracy through mass interest-group organizations to local community organization and workers' management. At present, the shortcomings of all these forms are more evident than their achievements. Some have failed with cruel consequences for the masses drawn into them;

[10] *Employment, Growth and Basic Needs: A One-World Problem, op. cit.* pp. 64–66.

others have persisted with extremely ambiguous consequences for development or egalitarian social justice; still others have remained stunted and localized.

Two essentially élitist alternatives have gained strength from these shortcomings: manipulated mobilization backed by repression and strictly limited to objectives laid down by the dominant forces; and terrorist tactics intended to make the functioning of the repressive social order impossible.

The fact that so many institutional forms of participation have been on the stage for some time and have left behind disillusionment, fear and suppressed resentments stands in the way of imaginative new efforts. The participation-minded planners and the masses both have reason to be wary. The invention of radically different approaches is unpromising. The national societies will continually have to return to a range of well-known institutions and techniques in the hope that they can be made to function better than hitherto. Even the techno-bureaucratic régimes recurrently try to use the same instruments for their own purposes and encounter some of the same stumbling-blocks as have their predecessors.

The shortcomings of the participatory institutions and initiatives can be summed up in a way that suggests an agenda for doing better:

(a) At the national as well as the local level they have been superimposed on political and economic structures with which they were incompatible. These structures might work badly without participation, but with it they could hardly function at all. The recurrent outcome has been that the participatory efforts have mobilized their enemies more effectively than their friends, have set in motion defence mechanisms (from the flight of capital to the discharge of workers and eviction of peasants) that hurt primarily the new participants, and eventually have been swept aside in a conjuncture of demoralization and confusion;

(b) The social groups enhancing their capacity to participate have naturally focused on consumption, whether in the form of housing, cheap food and transport, credit facilities for instalment buying, education or health services. The responses of the State have followed the line of least resistance, meeting the demands that involved least direct cost, and least opposition from other groups. The argument that participation would lead to mass understanding of the need for voluntary restraint of consumption in the interest of accumulation has proved inapplicable in the face of obvious waste and luxury consumption on the part of others, backed by the whole array of stimuli of the "consumerist" style of development;

(c) The various forms of participation and the participants themselves have focused on the extraction of benefits from the State or on neutralizing adverse State actions, even when this might seem alien to the logic of the specific form of participation – as in the case of workers' management and co-operatives. Thus, participation has meant increasing dependence, bureaucratization, and channels for control by the State, even when the initiative has come from social groups relatively hostile to the State. The well-known expansion of university-educated middle strata seek-

ing posts in bureaucratic agencies charged with participatory activities or offering themselves as intermediaries on the side of the newly participating groups has favoured this trend;

(d) The participatory mechanisms have been able to incorporate the lowest strata of the national populations – the poor, oppressed, marginalized, or sub-proletarian – only to the extent that their participation has been manipulated or neutralized by co-optation of leaders.[11] Such participation has been quite unable to exercise the function of countervailing power; that is, strengthening the government's disposition to undertake "basic needs" strategy in the teeth of opposition from better-off groups, in the way envisaged in the ILO statement quoted above.

Much the same thing applies at the local level; "community development" programmes have as often given the locally powerful new ways of exploiting the poor as they have given the poor a stronger voice in the community. Some peasant movements and the well-known "spontaneous" organizations of urban groups for land seizures, provision of community infrastructure, and negotiations with the authorities are partial exceptions, usually temporary but recurrent, and of considerable promise as "seeds of change" if radically different overall styles of development eventually emerge. Up to the present, where the forces controlling the State have perceived such movements as a serious threat, they have been repressed without much difficulty; more often, the co-optation of the leaders and the limited and defensive objectives of the members turn them into legitimized and basically conservative neighbourhood organizations or mechanisms for control and relief of tension through assistentialism.

Such participation has been assimilable as long as it has been localized, not calling for major changes in the access of the disadvantaged groups to employment and income. The national structures have been able to withstand a considerable broadening and diversification of the groups actively competing for higher incomes and status, with ambiguous consequences for the prevailing style of development, but have fallen into serious turmoil or hardened into repression at any prospect that the masses were about to enter the national political game in an organized and autonomous way. The result has sometimes been not only the violent exclusion of the masses but also the barring from effective participation of the middle and lower-middle strata that seemed to have achieved a permanent and secure share in decision-making. The semi-developed countries, those of Latin America in particular, confront two kinds of polarization, both increasing in scale with industrialization,

[11] Carlo Geneletti has argued (in "The concept of participation: an evaluation", *op. cit.*) that participation means access to political power; those who have least power obtain least from the State as well as the social and economic system; thus the degree of participation can be measured by the benefits accorded by the State to each group. Since the State represents existing power relationships, its efforts to mobilize those who lack power can be hardly more than pretence.

agricultural modernization and population growth, that should be equally daunting to the proponents of technocratic and participationist utopias:

(a) Between the population groups already sharing to some degree in the fruits of economic growth, in access to "modern" or "formal sector" employment, in post-primary education, etc., whether or not the power structure and the dominant ideology permit them to participate politically; and the groups that have gained little or nothing, that participate politically either not at all or precariously and intermittently through local organizations, clientelism, or electoral support of populist movements.

(b) Between urban agglomerations on a scale unknown in the world up to the present, and highly dispersed rural settlements, both undergoing continual changes in patterns and functions. At the one extreme, the metropolitan area of Mexico City had nearly 14 million inhabitants by 1980, and in the unlikely event that present trends continue that long, will have nearly 32 million by 2000. São Paulo had about 12.5 million in 1980, and could have 26 million in 2000; while the corresponding figures for Rio de Janeiro are 10 million and 19 million; for Lima 5 million and 12 million; for Bogota 4.4 million and 9.5 million. While the other present megalopolis of Latin America, Buenos Aires, can expect a relatively low rate of growth, and only two other cities (Caracas and Santiago) are likely to pass the 5 million mark by 2000, the total number of cities with more than one million inhabitants was 25 in 1980 and probably will be around 50 by 2000.

At these and smaller city sizes one can expect considerable diversity in rates of growth and in functions, depending on changes in technology, in transport and trade networks, and in the consumption patterns (including consumption of leisure time) imposed by the styles of development: specialized industrial centres, agricultural frontier marketing centres, mineral exploitation centres, political-administrative centres, and resort centres.

In all of these urban types, in-migrants will greatly outnumber natives; only certain provincial capitals and "museum cities", of small consequence in the overall trends, might be able to maintain demographic and social structural continuity. The forms taken by political participation outside the huge multi-functional agglomerations will depend in part on the kind of population attracted by the specialized functions.

At the other pole, the rural and small town population will doubtless continue to grow slowly in some countries, becoming stationary or declining in others, but will be far from static in spatial distribution, social structures, and life styles. It will be increasingly dominated by urban influences, but will manifest peculiar combinations of isolation and horizontal mobility, gaining access to some features of modernization but not others. While the population in the larger centres will continue to have a disproportionate representation of young adults, out-migration will continue to leave this age group under-represented in the countryside.

As long as current styles of development prevail, the greater part of the "beneficiary" population will be found in the cities, generally constituting a majority, while the greater part of the rural population will remain marginalized or "critically poor", although the rural share of the total marginalized population will continue to fall, and the relative importance of "beneficiaries" within the rural population may rise.[12]

Both urban and rural populations will continue to be polarized, with large marginalized minorities in the first and large beneficiary minorities in the second.

In the urban agglomerations, both the beneficiary and the marginalized population will be continually on the move as older neighbourhoods change their class composition or are eradicated by the expansion of commercial and industrial activities, and as transport networks encourage or discourage different patterns of urban sprawl. In the rural areas also, changing demands for crops and for labour, the opening-up of new lands, and the disintegration of traditional tenure systems will keep both the beneficiary and the marginalized population in movement.

Under these conditions, with the population groups segregated in different life styles by their income levels, but in continual contact with each other, in continual spatial movement and continually growing in numbers, a techno-bureaucratic State and ubiquitous mass communication media under the control of the State might well become the only effective unifying factors, ushering in the kind of anomic society depicted by Cardoso.

The consolidation of centralized techno-bureaucratic controls over such a population may not in the long term prove any easier than the consolidation of the decentralized and democratic mechanisms for decision-making called for by "another development". One can expect mutations of interest-group organizations, local community defence organizations, and religious as well as political movements offering security and hope to emerge continually, react in the most diverse ways to "future shock", and confront continual efforts at control and manipulation from the national centres of power.

Probably none of these forms of participation will actively involve the majority, either in the beneficiary or the marginalized population, at any one time. One can expect the nuclear family to continue to struggle with the impossible task of socializing children for a future in which most of them will have to form new families in settings completely different from the "family of orientation".[13]

One can expect the mass communication media and the educational systems to transmit messages even more diverse and contradictory than at present, partly

[12] The terms "marginalized" and "beneficiary" are used here for convenience, as emphasizing the aspects most relevant to the discussion of the well-known split between losers and gainers in the prevailing styles of development; the real divisions in urban and rural class structures are obviously a good deal more complicated.

[13] See Carlos Borsotti, "Notas sobre la familia como unidad socioeconomica", *Revista Paraguaya de Sociologia*, № 36, May-August 1976.

under the influence of the "seeds of change" transmitted from the central industrial or post-industrial societies, partly under the influence of domestic crises of consumerist development and incapacity of the labour market to absorb the output of the educational systems. Governmental efforts to regiment these messages in the interest of a determined style of development may curb the diversity but probably not eliminate it for very long.

One comes back to the not very original propositions that progress toward authentic participation in decision-making will require:

(a) simultaneous progress toward a style of development giving priority to basic needs and meaningful human activity;

(b) vitality and adaptability in all the organizational forms of participation now on the stage, none of them likely to become panaceas, all of them susceptible to distortions;

(c) the marriage of an intellectual élite consciousness and a mass consciousness, both of which are now fragmented and far from accepting the full implications of the present impasse.

The attractiveness of idealized versions of the Chinese style of development, even in sectors that have no sympathy for the ideological basis and the political tactics associated with the style, suggests a widening intellectual awareness of what must be done, but no workable idea of how to go about it (and who is to go about it).

The future can be expected to bring certain harsh lessons insistently and repeatedly to the attention of all strata of the population. If conclusions consistent with the values discussed above are gradually to permeate popular consciousness, the minorities that are already reaching these conclusions must undertake a task of conscientization without dogmatism, insisting on the long-term non-viability of present trends, risking some exaggeration and over-simplification but trying to stay well this side of catastrophism. They will need sufficient historical consciousness to keep in mind that the future will always be largely unexpected and that the challenges to human societies are not so much overcome as transformed into new challenges. "Development" or "history" does not move from a "beginning" to an "end" in utopia or disaster.

Inefficiency and injustice in the functioning of a social system are not sufficient proofs that it cannot continue to function.

Participatory development requires new ways of thinking throughout the national society, and these new ways are possibly coming to birth in a confused and contradictory fashion. The present popularity of speculations on the future, the controversy over the meaning of development, the proliferating international campaigns on the human environment, habitat, population, poverty, hunger, sexual and racial equality are all contributions to this process, however misdirected or evasive some of their manifestations may seem.

It is clear that popular consciousness, giving at least partial assent to militant minorities, is now setting limits to the functioning of the centralized industrial

societies that some of the dominant forces in them find deeply alarming. This inspires the latter, among other things, to devise counter-utopias demonstrating that the only way to achieve the objectives of this consciousness is unfettered economic expansion.

Similar currents are agitating techno-bureaucratic and academic circles in the rest of the world, torn by anxiety to preserve the previous myth of development; suspicion of the motives of "antigrowth", conservationist and redistributionist campaigns emanating from the world centres; and awareness that somehow their thinking and their policies must incorporate the new objectives.

We know much less about the real reception of the newer preoccupations by different strata of the populations of the peripheral countries, although generalizations are plentiful. The upper and middle strata cannot avoid some awareness of the questions through the mass media, but probably are even less disposed to draw conclusions relating to their own life-styles than are their counterparts in the central countries. Their immediate concerns are to broaden their entry into the consumer society and influence the State to ward off threats from below.

It is reasonable to suppose that the masses ot the population are also preoccupied by immediate problems of livelihood and security, but that their material expectations, even in the unevenly modernized, semi-developed societies, remain modest. The new preoccupations may add something to the egalitarian ferment that has long been at work among them, but the consequences can only be guessed at, particularly in settings in which rapid advances in popular mobilization have been followed by sudden exclusion. One can suppose a widespread anxiety, only partly conscious, for some meaningful interpretation of what is happening, allowing the individual and family to relate themselves to an image of the future, something more satisfying than the ceaseless struggle to make ends meet. The response, however, may take messianic or xenophobic as well as more conventional political lines.

Earlier chapters have criticized the use of the term "we" by self-appointed spokesmen for the impoverished masses. One should be particularly wary of attributing a common awareness, uniform aspirations, and capacity for organized action to broad population categories: *the* poor, *the* youth, *the* women, *the* workers, *the* peasants, etc. Some of these categories constitute social classes with a bent to self-identification and common action; others may be more real, as sources of self-identification, to the eye of the observer dealing with statistical aggregates than to the supposed members.

Individuals falling into such broad categories may shift among half a dozen contradictory self-identification, or have no self-identification disposing them to participate in group action. Nevertheless, declarations deriving from the international movements toward another development commonly assert that such broad categories are making demands on society that only minorities among them have dreamed of. As a corollary, it has been proposed that such categories name representatives to

sit with government delegates in international conferences to make their supposed demands heard.

One can justify such reification of broad population categories as a tactic designed to create the group consciousness that it assumes already to exist.

This is undoubtedly happening on a significant scale, and is one of the ways in which variants on the idea of "another development" are penetrating popular consciousness.

It is natural for the movements convinced that "something must be done" to project on the social groups for which they feel particular empathy their own values and aspirations. As a guide to political action that depends on the real readiness of broad population categories for mobilization, this frame of mind can be disastrously misleading.

First, it can obviously lead to over-confidence, defeat, and disillusionment, if the vanguard assumes a mass following that is non-existent, only superficially interested, or really preoccupied by questions that the vanguard has not understood.

Second, the supposition of common perceived interests within broad population categories masks real and perceived conflicts of interests within the category, such as those between different kinds of "critically poor" and "relatively poor". The result is likely to be an alliance between external spokesmen – governmental or otherwise – and the most articulate elements in the population category, excluding or manipulating the remainder.

There can be no substitute for humility and realism in the élite consciousness that tries to serve the masses, and these qualities have been in short supply up to the present. The cause of participation has suffered from excessive manipulativeness, on the one hand, and from over-confidence in uniform mass readiness to participate, on the other. It has been associated with excessive confidence in the problem-solving ability of the State. This is turn leads to the topic of self-reliance, even more venerable and ambiguous than that of participation, and now coming back to the foreground after years of relative neglect.

5. Self-reliance

Self-reliance, like the other broad guidelines proposed for development, has reappeared as a dialectical reaction to the preponderance of its opposite in the real trends of economic growth and social change. The terms in which it is imposing itself as a radical criticism of these trends show interesting parallels between the international, the national, local-community, and the family-individual spheres of action and interaction.

The relationships of dominance and dependence have become very frustrating to major forces in central as well as peripheral countries. The possible consequences of

continually rising indebtedness, continually ramifying activities of transnational enterprises, and continual shocks from the economic and political rivalries of the world centres have become so ominous that regimes of many different complexions are seeking means of enhancing their autonomy, and tailoring their plans to their internal resources, if only for the purpose of strengthening their bargaining power in the negotiations over a new international economic order. Meanwhile, the inability of the developmentalist-welfare State to satisfy all the demands made on it is generating a reaction on the part of national political leaderships, aiming or pretending to divest the State of some of its responsibilities through controlled decentralization. From different sectors of the public rises a chorus of partly contradictory accusations against the fiscal voracity of the State, its paternalism, bureaucratization, failure to solve problems, and inability to provide efficient services or sufficient jobs.

These reactions are evident in what might seem to be model welfare states. They should be particularly acute in semi-developed countries that have taken over the full accoutrements of the modern State without the command over resources, administrative capacity or social consensus needed to make them function for the general welfare.

In national societies at all levels of development, the resulting frustrations and fears have given renewed vigour to very diverse ideological and religious currents – cultural-nationalist, liberal, communitarian, anarchist – that for diverse reasons reject centralization, regimentation, paternalism, assistentialism, "mass society", and other contraries to self-reliance. Meanwhile, the momentum of the forces making for national entanglement in the web of dependence and human entanglement in the web of techno-bureaucracy continues, checked at some points and gaining even more strength at others.

> The following quotations sum up the positive reasons for insisting on self-reliance:
> If development is the development of man, as an individual and as a social being, aiming at his liberation and at his fulfilment, it cannot but stem from the inner core of each society. It relies on what a human group has: its natural environment, its cultural heritage, the creativity of the men and women who constitute it, becoming richer through exchange between them and with other groups. It entails the autonomous definition of development styles and of life styles . . . it does not ask the question 'how much can we get through exchange', but 'how much can we produce ourselves or with others'. Thus, the basis is laid for a search for new resources, for utilizing known resources in new ways and, sometimes, for questioning the need for the product . . . A self-reliant society is able to stand up better to crises: it is self-confident and has the means to sustain its dignity.[14]

[14] See *What Now? Another Development. op. cit.*, pp. 34–35.

Since this entails trying many different paths, so that the law of diversity may operate and there may be a good chance that one is going in the right direction (that is, will not end up in a blind alley), a practical conclusion immediately becomes evident: it is necessary to be nationalist, or at least "regionalist".

In point of fact, acceptance of a universal culture means, from this point of view, putting all the eggs in one basket: a risk that should not be run, for although it may somewhat increase the likelihood of gain, it makes the cost of losing infinite. Moreover, giantism reduces flexibility and the capacity for adaptation to unexpected changes.[15]

The positive case for self-reliance thus links it to creativity and participation; it assumes that neither the national society nor the individual will reach their full potential without making their own decisions and taking the consequences. The Dag Hammarskjöld Report couples this with the supposition that all societies will eventually pool their self-reliance in a highly co-operative and interdependent world order responding to common values.

The Varsavski formulation is somewhat closer to the survival of the fittest. It is up to each society to demonstrate that its own path is a valuable contribution to a human future of continued diversity and unending new challenges. If some cannot meet the challenges, a benevolent world order is not going to save them.

Both quotations hint at the negative case. Crises are going to come; the greater the training in self-reliance the greater the probability that the society or group or individual will surmount them. The national society can reasonably count on a certain amount of international aid if its leaders set out to transform the style of development. It can also expect a certain amount of obstruction. It will be able to use the one and cope with the other to the extent it reduces its vulnerability and increases its self-sufficiency, whether alone or associated with others in a like position.

[15] Translated from Oscar Varsavski, *Proyectos nacionales,* Buenos Aires, Ediciones Periferia, 1971, p. 228. (Author's translation)

Statistical Publishing House
Responsible for publication: Director József Kecskés
Printing Office – 81–2025–06
Budapest, 1981
Size of the book: 17,5 A/5 sheets
Printed in Hungary