16 September 1983

The Situation of Youth
in the
English-speaking Caribbean */

An overview of needs, an analysis of problems and suggestions for policy and programme initiatives

*/ This document was prepared by Atherton E. Martin, a consultant to ECLA Subregional Headquarters for the Caribbean, to be presented to the Latin American Regional Preparatory Meeting for the International Youth Year. San José, Costa Rica, 3-7 October 1983. The views expressed in this paper are the exclusive responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Organization.

83-9-1594

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/INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

"The General Assembly, in recognizing the importance of direct participation of youth in sharing the future of humanity and the necessity of meeting the needs and aspirations of youth, based its decision for programming the International Youth Year on its concern for the situation of youth. To ensure that the Year could usefully serve to mobilize efforts at the local, national, regional and institutional levels, International Youth Year should acknowledge the conditions that confront young people realistically and with determination. Only a profound understanding of the current situation and likely prospects can lead to the promotion of the best educational, professional and living conditions for young people in order to ensure their active participation in overall development and peace..." (21)

In the context of this mandate for a renewed thrust in the area of youth worldwide, this study focuses on the situation in the English-speaking Caribbean. Though similar in colonial history to the rest of Latin America, the English-speaking Caribbean is sufficiently unique in its socio-cultural and recent political history to warrant separate attention. There are, however, aspects of the polity which are common to the entire Latin American region and these must be noted here, as linkage in past history will warrant linkage in the creation of new history, regardless of language. Notable among these aspects of commonality and linkage are: skewed land distribution and tenure; a large neglected peasantry side-by-side with a stagnant plantation agriculture; energy, trade and technology dependency; (4) underutilized human resources; skewed distribution of wealth according to sector, class, race, sex and age, with consequent impoverishment of marginalized social groups; last, but of increasing importance, the increasing militarization of the region with concomitant dangers to peace and human life.

These common realities form the macro-social context within which the nagging problem of "non-development" persists. In turn, this process of "non-development", common to most of Latin America, is the context within which youth and other marginalized groups function.

/This view

This view underscores the appropriateness of the three themes selected by the United Nations for International Youth Year, 1985: participation, development and peace. Uninformed, untrained youth remain dependent upon the output of others for survival, are not prone to demand, or take advantage of, opportunities for participation in matters affecting them. Such persons are not likely to exert much effort at understanding, and far less at changing the causes of their marginalization. By further extension, youth in this situation are even less inclined to address the regional and global issues of war, peace, racism, apartheid, or economic domination, especially in the English-speaking Caribbean where these forms of marginalization are not often characterized by the brutal, institutionalized, physical violence common in some other parts of the Third World.

The purpose of this study is to provide an understanding of the reciprocal impact of youth on society in the English-speaking Caribbean, but to do so in a manner that considers the macro-social reality alluded to here. The scope of the study permits (requires) reference to a broad spectrum of problems facing youth, but the focus is on the most critical problems which are related directly to the type of political economy informing thinking on dependency (6) and the plantation model. (5)

The study therefore emphasizes a review of youth participation in the economic life of their respective countries as the takeoff point for assessing their participation in, or marginalization from, the Caribbean polity. This is not to understate the importance of other areas such as education, (9) nutrition and health, housing, culture, recreation, etc., but to suggest that the issues focused on by this report are the general and specific contexts within which these various aspects of the situation of youth may be correctly understood.

The study is a combination of empirical data and qualitative analysis that describes the demographic, economic and social situation of youth in the Caribbean. The data identify the problems that have resulted from the marginalization of youth and, where data permit, assess the reciprocal impact of youth on important aspects of Caribbean life.

The data are analysed with a view to suggesting linkages between issues, identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the existing data base and making recommendations for improving the statistical base from which effective programmes of youth are planned.

/The countries

The countries studied are the seventeen listed in table I and the other tables presented in the report, although the focus of the comments is the English-speaking Caribbean.

The data presented come from the sources listed in the Bibliography and where statistical extrapolations were employed to fill gaps in the data base, this is appropriately noted.

Comments on the Data Base

The type and completeness of statistical data gathered in the region vary widely from country to country, in some cases glaringly so. For example, even in those countries where agriculture is the basis of the economy, data on land tenure, distribution and use are either not available, or outdated. In the same vein, information on race and ethnic origin as it relates to ownership and management of economic resources is lacking for many countries in the Caribbean, (4) so that although demographic data may show one group comprising 80% or more of the population and another 0.25%, as, for example, in the case in Antigua of persons of African and Syrian descent, respectively, (20) the extent of control by the latter group over land, commerce and industry though readily observed, is not reflected in the data. As politically problematic as this may be when raised for open consideration, the alienation of thousands of Antiguan youth of African descent from jobs (table IV) is in stark contrast to a statistically unknown, yet observed fact, which is that very few youth of Syrian descent are unemployed in Antigua.

In the case of Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, where race and ethnic origin impact so openly and significantly on political and economic life, (12) a serious flaw in the data base is suggested when a Statistical Digest of 230 tables makes reference to this fact in only two tables. (19) Given the long line of culture behind both the African and Indian groups being referred to here, it is not inconceivable that data on nutrition, family structure, productivity, sectoral employment, income per capita and by household, among other clusters, could be of immense use to national and local planners working in these areas.

There is clear need for a common approach to the treatment and observation of statistical data. In addition, new, more subtle data clusters need to be aggregated if policy formulation and planning is to be fine-tuned.

/One such

One such area is the data cluster referred to as "place of residence" -rural or urban. The distinction between rural and urban areas is clear even in the smaller, poorer islands but is not reflected so clearly in "place of residence" as in such factors as size and type of dwelling house; available utilities; income; type of job/work; levels of literacy and formal education; portion of disposable income allocated for food versus other basic needs; extent and availability of social services, including recreation and sports; degree of social organization in the security/military services; migration patterns (external); and in some cases political behaviour reflected through voting patterns.

Other factors besides the small size of these countries tend to mask the rural/urban distinction; for example, the migration of rural youth to the town where they rapidly adopt the manner and style of the city dweller, while many city dwellers have, and maintain, their connection with the rural experience.

Another factor which can cloud this social demographic indicator is the process of suburbanization, where in a country like Trinidad and Tobago sections of Port of Spain, the capital city have lost 28 per cent of their population between 1970-1980, and nearby surrounding areas (Diego Martin, Petit Valley, etc.) formerly rural, have seen increases of 35% or more in the same period.

The high mobility of this age group between town and country, and between agricultural and industrial economies, suggests that residency as a planning tool may have limited or transitory significance in the case of youth.

Most data bases do not reveal these subtle yet important differences and the "urban/rural" categorization is often based simply on residence, an apparently incomplete base from which to plan and locate programmes for the youth of these communities.

Of course, there is also the anticipated low level of timeworthiness of much of the data, probably as much a reflection of limited funds and weak administration nationally as of the lack of appreciation by planners and/or policy-makers of the relationship between sound data and sound planning. In the United Nations Demographic Yearbook already referred to, for example, data from the 1970 census are still the most current available for several Caribbean countries.

When country data are available, with some exceptions, the treatment of the information appears superficial, and in the case of youth, not clustered for ready use. In many instances, the precise location, involvement and situation

/of youth

of youth is not isolated, causing concern about the statistical basis for youth development programmes planned and implemented in the past by several Caribbean countries. (10)

Additional comments on the significance of "Place of Residence" as a data cluster

Given the plantation history of all these countries and the role of this historical process in structuring their economies as suppliers of primary agricultural products to consumers in industrialized countries, (4) the location of the population has been accorded high significance as an indicator of socio-economic change. One standard measure of level of economic growth transplanted from use in the industrialized economies is the number of people actively involved in agriculture, the operating factor being that economic progress was being made when the number of persons required to feed the population decreased. In countries like Dominica, therefore, where more than 40% of the work force is today involved in primary crop production, use of this growth indicator suggests a state of "non-development".

In the application of this indicator to the more industrialized (Western) countries it is not often considered that while the industrial revolution enabled the rapid transformation of these economies from agricultural to industrial, the colonized tropical world enabled the simultaneous maintenance of a supply of cheap labour, raw material for industrialization, and cheap food. Therefore, although the domestic economies of these countries shifted from a manual to a mechanized production mode resulting in increased labour productivity and output per capita, they still maintained a large, albeit overseas, agricultural sector.

To expect the Caribbean countries to achieve similar levels of growth (measured according to these criteria of rate of industrialization, reduction of the agricultural work force, exploitation of overseas supplies of raw material and markets, etc.) is a vain hope. This is particularly so because the natural resources of these countries have been depleted, much skilled labour has migrated, educational and training facilities are not designed or able to prepare workers for modernization via industrialization, and health, transport and other services are inappropriate to the development needs an the large rural populations still characteristic of most of these countries. The chances of development via Western-style industrialization are further limited by the control over the

/world trade

world trade exercised by large Western corporations which continue to maximize profits through the height of a world recession. All of this is underpinned by constitutional and political structures borrowed from the very societies which enslaved and colonized these countries.

The use of standard criteria to describe the situation of youth or other social sectors should be tempered by the realization that an indication of a healthy economy for an industrialized country may very well be evidence of precisely the opposite condition in a primary agricultural economy. This is particularly so for residence, as large numbers of urban residents may accompany a vibrant mechanized industrial growth phenomenon in the former but often point to a stagnant agriculture, high unemployment, family disruption, inadequate housing and social services in the latter.

I. THE CONTEXTUAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY

The youth population of the world is expected to increase by 60% between 1975 and the year 2000, from 738 million to 1 180 million. (21) This startling increase will be the result of a 5% growth rate in the more developed regions, with Africa, Asia and Latin America almost doubling their youth population in that time period.

In the English-speaking Caribbean the growth in the number of youth will be part of an overall population increase that is projected according to one estimate (24) at 30% between 1975 and 1985. In spite of this comparatively modest rate of increase, (24) existing high levels of unemployment, coupled with trade and debt problems, (12) can only compound the economic and social marginalization of the youth, already the worst-hit victims of Caribbean non-development. (24)

Tables IV and V of this report bear witness to the plight of youth caught in the throes of stagnating economies which remain dependent (4) on a part of the world economy which is itself facing dire difficulties. (7) The resultant unemployment is the most critical problem facing youth, and it is not uncommon for young high school graduates to spend years in this frustrating state of "inbetweenity" as young adults who remain dependent on family and friends, unable to contribute to household income, or national economic or social wealth.

Table VI reflects one of the alarming consequences of this situation, an extraordinarily high rate of childbirth for women between the ages of 14 and 24. Of course given the "advances" in medicine made in the past twenty years, the

/mortality rate

mortality rate is very low, giving rise to a new wave of young dependents placing additional strain on already over-burdened health and educational facilities.

With the persistent disconnection between educational curricula, training programmes and the resource base of the countries, when jobs are available they are often in the residential or domestic areas of the economy, low-paying and dead-end. (4) The increase in juvenile delinquency and drug-related crime which these circumstances breed (10) is fueled by the aggressive penetration of these tiny societies by subculture notions transmitted through movies, tourism (11) and other means. The alienation and desperation that result were most recently and tragically illustrated in Trinidad and Tobago, where the showing of a movie on youth gangs was followed by the sight of young Trinidadians dressing and acting in the socially disruptive manner of the groups of rebellious High Schoolers portrayed in that movie.

With protectionist policies spreading to the area of migration, the traditional escape valves to North America, the United Kingdom and to the larger Caribbean islands (24) have been shut off, forcing increasing numbers of youth to stay home and live in worsening economic conditions. This bottling-up effect, combined with high fertility rates, low mortality rates, the selective migration of highly trained persons, and economic recession, produce the situation of high tension, polarization, and social dysfunction which characterizes most of these countries.

As if this were not enough, the situation is further compounded by the rural/urban migration within countries. This creates a situation of intense job competition between rural and urban youth and increases pressure on housing, health, and recreational facilities, exacerbating an already tenuous family situation. Additionally, the loss of young persons from the rural areas raises the average age of the farming population, reducing the likelihood of the prospects for modernized agriculture, particularly in the areas of food production and agroindustry, two crucial aspects of the regional plan for economic reconstruction. (13)

A slight ray of hope evident in most of the countries is the observed return of youth to the land, largely as part of the Rastafarian movement. This phenomenon is not yet satisfactorily recorded but could be a sign of an option

/voluntarily initiated

voluntarily initiated by youth. In all these countries, there is evidence that young people respond positively to agricultural employment "if it provides them with a decent level of living..."

Although not yet a major factor in the English-speaking Caribbean, it is worthwhile noting that in many countries of the region, the military and security forces absorb significant numbers of youth. This kind of data is not readily available, but from reports of events in countries where the military is actively engaged it is quite clear that young people-killing-young people is not the type of "employment" or "participation" needed in the world.

It is useful to return here to the introductory theme, namely "The situation of youth is intimately linked to the development process", (4) and extend this to say that so long as youth are treated as an object of development instead of being fully integrated in the tasks of that development, the problems facing youth today will not be resolved. This scenario (see Parts IV and V) is characterized by the exclusion of youth from involvement in all but the most frustrating and de-humanizing roles, giving rise to the tragedy of marginalization. Whatever form it takes, the tragedy of society preying upon itself persists.

When such exclusion becomes permanent, entire social groups become marginalized (denial of jobs, of land, of rights). Discontent sets in and "the system" is marked for attack. The internal and international implications of this are well known as the people seek to end their misery either by adjusting to the status quo, attempting to flee their country, or mobilizing to change "the system" (see figure I).

The thrust of the United Nations General Assembly resolution 34/151 of 17 December 1979 designating 1985 as International Youth Year: Participation, Development, Peace, points firmly to the need for policy and programme initiatives designed to deal with the third option (i.e., mobilizing to change "the system"). This calls for an approach which both learns from the past and is informed by an accurate understanding of the present situation of youth. This study is one part of the step in that direction for the English-speaking Caribbean.

The conceptual framework within which this study is conducted arises out of an understanding of the macro-social context of the Caribbean just described. Establishing this framework therefore means describing the interplay of forces in the Caribbean, (14) particularly as these impact on the situation of youth.

/To begin

To begin with, the operative view is that the right to enjoy peace and development carries with it the responsibility of maintaining that peace and sustaining that development.

A close adjunct to this view is that peace is not the result of an accord between nations, or simply the absence of war. Peace is not the quite that prevails when people are intimidated into silence in the face of oppressive conditions. Peace prevails, when conditions are created conducive to people's participation in the satisfaction of their basic needs. By extension, this means the utilization of available natural resources by people to meet their needs for food, clothing and housing, while minimizing the dependency upon external sources for meeting these basic needs.

If this sounds like a definition of "development" it is because peace and development are so inextricably linked that a state of peace cannot exist in the midst of poverty or human deprivation.

When, therefore, the organization of an economy, the existence of a class structure, or a racial regime, creates, sustains or tolerates a situation of human deprivation expressed maybe as the lack of jobs, food, housing, etc., such a situation is not only a threat to peace, but is itself the manifestation of the absence of peace, and describes a state of non-development.

In this context, the process of development may be defined as the way a society organizes to establish and sustain peace. Operating with this conceptual framework means that progress in the construction of schools, hospitals, roads, sports complexes, like growth of per capita income and gross national product, does not automatically mean development, as evidenced by the existence of large pockets of poverty and want within the countries displaying 'growth' according to these criteria. Although the paradox of development cum poverty is more clearly evident in some of the larger, industrialized countries of Latin America, in the smaller, plantation economies of this region the phenomenon of the impoverishment of specific sectors (farmers, women, youth) is readily observed. The same phenomenon is of course apparent at the global level as more development aid is accompanied by trade, fiscal and political arrangements that ensure the widening gap between North and South, rich and poor nations.

/Application of

Application of the "peace-is-development" concept to the situation of youth reveals that although more schools, training programmes and special institutions (19) are in operation today, this has not resulted in a more relevant education responsive to the needs of the countries in the region. In Carrington's view, (9) this condition exists primarily because there is not a development philosophy (framework) within which education can be correctly situated. As a result, values, information and skills are transmitted in an atmosphere where neither policy-maker, teacher, nor student are aware of the purpose of the exercise. The end result is that school material, and school itself, appears relevant only to targets of social fairness (access) and localization (Caribbean Examination Council), but is only marginally linked to goals of productivity, employability, basic needs satisfaction and peace.

Today there are additional pressing reasons why we should be concerned about the situation of youth education, employment and meeting basic needs. For example, now that these Caribbean countries have been directly drawn into the militarism matrix (note the allocation of military assistance to the Eastern Caribbean), the "peace-is-development" concept allows an assessment of the impact of militarism (8) on the situation of youth specifically and on these countries generally.

For example, how does the expenditure of US$ 11.5 million on the establish establishment of a subregional security force (13) balance with the need for improved food production, agro-processing and marketing, within and between the very countries that are signatories to this security agreement? What is the opportunity cost of the militarization of small countries in terms of jobs, training, earning and foreign exchange, land utilization for production and social needs?

All of this is to show that although it may appear theoretical and intangible to talk about development philosophy, or the establishment of a "peace-is-development" conceptual framework for examining the situation of youth in the Caribbean, the cold reality is that Caribbean, Hemispheric and global geopolitics, budget deficits, trade balances, interest rates, protectionism, the arms, oil and food race, are the elements of the power matrix within which the problematic of youth can be correctly situated.

/II. THE

II. THE PROBLEMATIC

"Social alienation in the West Indian case derives from the particular deep roots in the international capitalist system. White foreigners from Europe-USA captured and still control the basic resources of these societies, i.e., the true wealth. Black people provide the bulk of the labour power and brown people dominate the intermediary layer between these two groups. Small minority groups occupy the most powerful position, interivally". (4)

The question that follows from this assertion is: Are these societies, with their skewed power structures, capable of transforming the relationship between the marginalized (powerless) and the managers (powerful) to allow the fullest energies of the youth (farmers, women) to be harnessed for peace with development? Beckford (4) has suggested that "for the (Caribbean) as a whole, ... the fundamental characteristic of the policy is that of dependency ... (that) leads to alienation and generates the internal power for social change". But there is a parallel, equally powerful yet more difficult polity involving participation, motivation and mobilization for economic reorganization.

The dual problematic may be illustrated as follows:

Figure I



/The problematic

The problematic (figure I) suggests that the (historical) organization of the economy in most of these countries leads to the deepened marginalization, or participation, of all social groups. Marginalization (the broken line) (from land, jobs, relevant education, health, housing, decision making) leads to frustration with the status quo, which in turn encourages the rebellion against society so characteristic of youth today. This leads to dysfunctional behaviour that brings about a hardening of attitudes and entrenchment (legally, militarily, etc.) of the group(s) in control. Participation (the solid line) suggests that increased involvement (in the conceptualizing, planning, implementation and evaluation of the societies' needs) leads to greater motivation (of youth) in support of efforts to mobilize production, education, health or recreation activities towards reorganizing and strengthening the society's capacity for "peace and development".

Posing the problem this way (figure I) is not to say that youth must, or can, transform the society by themselves, or that it will be done for them. The problematic certainly suggests, however, that the task is one of creating the climate, mechanism and the motivation for increased involvement in the organization of the economy and society for "peace-with-development". (21)

Understanding the social and economic situation of youth in this context means grasping the impact of dependency on employment, education, health, and community involvement. This study presents empirical data (tables I-VII) that quantify the degree of marginalization and participation of youth in economic and social contexts. As already noted, where data are insufficient or non-existent, qualitative analysis is used to describe the situation and underlying causes.

One such area for which few empirical data have been gathered, either for these societies as a whole or for youth in particular, is the role of race, colour, and class in determining occupational and political status. Although there are readily observable correlations between wealth, class and colour in the region,(15) an expanded data base would add clarity on questions of the structure of Caribbean economies, the composition of the upper class, the working class, the landowners, the owners of capital and controllers of finance, those exercising political power through Government, the Media, the Military; and the relationship between achievement in education and all of the above. In short, the data would enable the constitution of a power matrix that reveals the "who" of the power

/relations in

relations in these societies where youth remain disproportionately marginalized. Data on who controls the economy are sketchy, but work in this area, specifically along the lines of the horizontal and vertical integration of directorates of major corporations in Trinidad and Tobago, has recently been started.

Agricultural census data on land tenure and ownership quantify the spread (or lack of it) of ownership, but this will shed light much more directly on the issue of land, job and production alienation of youth, when land capability data and land utilization profiles are aggregated alongside the clusters being assembled by Emmanuel, Carrington, Parris and others. Data revealing the degree of overlap in land ownership and commercial, industrial, or banking interests could point more clearly to the problem of land used more for speculation than for production. For example, land used to secure loans for investment in other sectors (housing, tourism) often means that arable land is left idle while the country imports food to nourish the visiting tourists living in the houses and hotels built with loans secured by that same idle arable land. These are the types of internal linkages which an expanded data base would address, providing a more comprehensive empirical context with which to examine the situation of youth.

III. WHO ARE THE YOUTH?

In describing an empirically-based profile of youth, chronological and quantitative data are indispensable. In such a case, the definition of youth according to age criteria is the practical and reliable way to isolate the group for study.(19) However, the broader objectives of the study, which call for defining the situation of youth within the social and economic context of the Caribbean, require flexibility in the application of the age criterion. (16)

For the purposes of this study, this flexibility means that outside of the areas of standard data aggregates, as contained in the United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1979, the process of isolating youth needs is often limited by the shortage of data. These gaps are identified as they appear, and qualitative analysis substituted for statistical deficiencies.

/There are

There are situations, for example, when "it is not age that defines the status of youth, but its status that defines its age". (19) In this regard, youth from a small rural village in St. Vincent probably have much more in common with rural youth in Jamaica (in terms of work experience, educational level, "worldview", degree of participation in or marginalization from the sociopolitical process, etc.) than they have with youth from Kingstown, the capital of St. Vincent.1/

One notes, also, the significant social process related to the growth of the subculture of Rastafarianism that in the view of some social commentators 2/ has brought about a "oneness" among Caribbean youth, whether rural/urban, agricultural or industrial. Were these trends to be empirically verified, it would only strengthen the view that, in the final analysis, strict adherence to an age definition of youth severely limits the scope for accurate description of the situation of youth, as related not only to the similarity in land tenure, economic disorganization, patterns of educational and cultural alienation, but also to the politics of patronage and dependence (as opposed to participation and self-reliance), and the lingering vestiges of a local propertied class structure that has increasing linkage with regional and global mechanisms of finance and information. These are the factors which ultimately determine the position of all social groups in the matrix of political power (part II), and make status, not age, the key factor in identifying youth.

To sum up, although the quantitative data in this report refer to persons between the ages of 15 and 24, the operating definition for youth is ... "an intermediate period which begins with the acquisition of physiological maturity and ends with that of social maturity: in other words, the assumption of the sexual, economic, legal and social rights and responsibilities of the adult" ...3/

1/ See Kirsch, page 113 for description of similar situations in Latin America.

2/ Hollis Liverpool - 'The Mighty Chalkdust', a Trinidadian calypsonian.

3/ Carlota Bubler, in Kirsch, p. 112.

/IV. AN

IV. AN EMPIRICAL PROFILE AND ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION AND MAJOR SOCIOECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF YOUTH IN THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN

The data which follow provide an empirical basis for describing the situation of youth in the Caribbean as elaborated in the accompanying comments. Tables I through V reflect the hard economic and population data that are readily available for all seventeen countries. Mainly as a result of the institutionalization of census procedures, data clusters according to participation in major economic sectors are available for the age group 15 to 24 years (tables IV and V).

For demographic indicators (tables I and II), the most current, complete data are used. For economic indicators (tables III, IV and V), data are often less current and the decision was to utilize data as close to the 1970 Census as possible. There are two reasons for this: 1) the need for complete clusters, and 2) the fact that the economic situation for most of these countries appears to have deteriorated in the 1970s, meaning that the best possible scenario is portrayed by the data. Users of this situation profile will therefore be aware that adjustments, extrapolations, and assumptions regarding the changing situation of youth in the economic sphere would more than likely have become more critical. (23) For social indicators (tables VI and VII), bearing in mind that gains have been made here, the most current available data are used which, when placed alongside the economic indicators, provide a sobering, realistic view of the macro-social context within which youth operate.

Data presented in tables VI and VII represent an attempt to capture the subtle, less tangible indicators and can be described as an attempt to 'humanize' the data. This means that although the hard data on gross national product, per capita income, trade balances, etc., are vital in describing the overall situation within which youth have to operate, these data do not address the "quality-of-life" indicators of special concern to the target group. Such indicators as income distribution, job and training opportunities, participation in social and political process, often the basis for appeals to the youth by various leaders, are not captured in the trade balance sheets or the national accounts. In keeping with the expressed concern of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for "... direct participation of youth in sharing the future of humanity..." (21) the accompanying comments and analysis explore the data's capacity to describe these intangibles.

/This approach

This approach often results in more questions being asked than answered, but if the questions coincide with the issues being raised by youth, the data base then provides a more accurate measure of their situation.

1. Demographic structure and youth

Table I

With the exception of St. Kitts/Nevis, Suriname and Montserrat, which showed net declines in population 1970-1980, all other countries exhibit stable or gradually increasing populations. Growth rates remained well below 2% for the region as a whole, although Belize, the Dominican Republic and St. Vincent and the Grenadines show rates above the regional average.

The growth rate of 1.53% for the 1970s is a slight increase over that for the 1960s (1.48%). One factor which evidently influenced this change was that emigration from the 12 CARICOM States in the 1960s totalled 598 000 -equivalent to roughly half the 1.48% natural population increase. (24)

Youth were the most active members of this migrant stream, (24) as in Jamaica where 94 813 persons between age 15-24 formed 32% of the entire migrant stream for that decade. The corresponding figures for Trinidad and Tobago were 22.3%, Guyana, 46%, and Barbados, 27%. (24)

For reasons already discussed in part I, it was decided not to use the categories of rural and urban residence, which by themselves do not have much demographic relevance for these small nations. It is felt, for example, that land tenure, distribution and use are data clusters which speak more directly to the problems and situation of youth for whom rural or urban residence have much more to do with idle lands in the hands of absentee owners, availability of credit, markets, inputs and technology for gainful agricultural enterprise.

Data clusters in these areas, correlated with residence data over a 10-year period, for example, would reveal more about the impact of structural transformation on the participation of youth in the economy than a review of isolated migration or residence data.

/Table I

TABLE I

DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF POPULATION BY SEX, RATE OF INCREASE AND DENSITY, ACCORDING TO LATEST AVAILABLE CENSUS DATA

Country	TOTAL POPULATION 1970	TOTAL POPULATION 1980	MALE 1970	MALE 1980	FEMALE 1970	FEMALE 1980	Annual Rate of Increase 1970	Annual Rate of Increase 1980	Surface Area (km^2)	Density per km^2 1970	Density per km^2 1980
Antigua	65,525	72,355[a]	31,054	34,460	34,471	37,895	1.6	1.04	442	170	
Bahamas	175,192	209,505[b]	87,433	...	87,759		...	1.95	13,935	16	
Barbados	237,701	249,000[c]	112,034	118,600	130,400	139,800	...	.47	431	582	
Belize	120,936	140,353[d]	60,737	...	60,199	...	3.1	1.6	22,965	7	
Cuba	8,569,121	9,810,671[e]	4,392,870	4,991,195	4,176,151	4,819,476	1.2	1.4	114,524	85	
Dominica	70,513	83,690[f]	33,581	...	36,932	...	1.3	1.8	751	105	
Dominican Republic	4,006,405	5,430,879	1,998,990	2,710,009	2,007,415	2,720,870	2.9	3.5	48,734	108	
Grenada	93,858	110,137[g]	44,297	53,841	49,561	56,296	...	1.7	344	285	
Guyana	701,885	812,000[h]	349,233	403,000	352,652	409,000		1.5	214,969	4	

TABLE I (CONT'D)

Country	TOTAL POPULATION 1970	TOTAL POPULATION 1980	MALE 1970	MALE 1980	FEMALE 1970	FEMALE 1980	Annual Rate of Increase 1970	Annual Rate of Increase 1980	Surface Area (km^2)	Density per km^2 1970	Density per km^2 1980
Haiti	4,329,991		2,089,845		2,240,146		1.8		27,750	177	...
		5,008,500		2,436,400		2,572,100		1.5			
Jamaica	1,848,512		885,960		927,752		1.4		10,991	197	
		2,186,100[1]		...		...		1.8			
Montserrat	11,698		5,502		6,196		1.6		98	133	...
		11,606[j]		...		...		-.07			
St. Kitts-Nevis	46,354 (1975)		22,287		24,067		.4		357	188	...
		44,404[k]		...		...		-.42			
Saint Lucia	100,893		47,763		53,130		.3		616	183	...
		(1979) 118,400		55,920		62,480		1.7			
St. Vincent and The Grenadines	87,305		41,325		45,980		1.1		388	250	...
		123,758[1]		...		...		4.1			
Suriname	384,903		192,500		192,403				163,800	2.3	...
		352,041		173,083		178,958		-.8			
Trinidad and Tobago	940,719		465,857		474,862				5,130		
		1,259,500		635,400		624,100					

Source: UN Demographic Yearbook, 1979, Table III (for 1970 data)
UN Demographic Yearbook, 1980, Table VII (for 1980 data).

Explanatory notes on table I

a) Data for Antigua under 1980 column are for 1978 and contained in the 1978 Statistical Yearbook for Antigua and Barbados.
b) An estimate for the year 1979, in Quarterly Statistical Summary for Bahamas.
c) In monthly Digest of Statistics No. 16.
d) In World Bank Report on Belize, 5 April 1982.
e) In Anuario Demográfico de Cuba 1979 (Table 6).
f) In World Bank Report on Dominica, 18 May 1981.
g) In Abstract of Statistics for 1979 (Table 2.4).
h) In Quarterly Statistical Digest, October-December 1977 (Table 35).
i) In Economic and Social Survey - Jamaica, 1981 (Table 17.3).
j) In Preliminary Data of 1980 Census (Table 2).
k) In Annual Digest of Statistics for 1980.
l) In Digest of Statistics for 1980 (Table 11.1).

/Table II

Table II

In none of the 17 countries studied does youth make up less than 16% of the 1970 or 1980 populations, and in at least one country, Dominica, youth were 32% of the 1970 population, while St. Kitts/Nevis shows a similar position for youth in 1980. The data reveal that the youth average of 23% of the 1980 population of the countries studied, a significant figure by any standard, does not include Antigua, Bahamas and Suriname. An even more startling discovery is the increase in the size of this group in the intercensal period. The increases for selected countries are as follows:

Country	Increase	Percent increase over 1970
Barbados	14 560	32.2
Belize	15 794	75.8
Grenada	12 948	75.3
Jamaica	229 170	78.4
Trinidad and Tobago	83 417	44.8

The main economic implication of this trend in the 1970s is that large numbers of young adults who were dependents in the 1960s are now job-seekers, trained and trainable. The challenge to the Caribbean economies in the 1970s and 1980s is to ensure productive employment of this vibrant segment of the population. The challenge to the youth is to find creative ways to become productively involved. In short, the enormity of the challenge cannot be overstated.

2. Selected Caribbean economies, according to direction of trade and pattern of dependence

Table III

The high degree of dependency of Caribbean countries is readily established by a review of data on the direction of trade, trade balances, and degree of openness (table III, A), B) and C)). When reviewed together, it becomes clear that not only are these economies wide open to external trade influences and hence vulnerable to events in the industrial countries over which they have no control, (7) but of more direct concern to the youth, these economies are fuelled by the fragile combination of importing basic goods and exporting non-essentials. Even more tragic is the fact that life made 'easy' by imports, combined with high wages in the public and commercial sectors compared with the low wages and incomes in

/Table II

TABLE II

DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF YOUTH
BY SEX AND % OF TOTAL POPULATION

2. Persons between ages of 15 and 24 at 1970 and 1980 censuses

Country	MALE 1970	MALE 1980	FEMALE 1970	FEMALE 1980	(Both sexes) TOTAL 1970	(Both sexes) TOTAL 1980	% of Total Population 1970	% of Total Population 1980
Antigua	5,967		6,371		12,338		19.0	
Bahamas	13,312		13,971		27,283		16.1	
Barbados	22,704 d/	32,070 ('78)	22,446 d/	27,640	45,150	59,710	18.9	23.9
Belize	10,367	18,404 g/	10,453	18,210 g/	20,820	36,614	17.3	26.0
Cuba a/	792,365 ('75)	936,744 ('79)	765,168	909,779	1,557,533	1,846,543	16.5	18.8
Dominica b/	10,289	10,615 g/	12,253	10,217 g/	22,542	20,832	32.4	24.8
Dom. Republic	368,040	497,708	408,325	549,589	776,365	1,047,297	19.3	19.2
Grenada c/	8,343	15,169 g/	8,830	14,952 g/	17,173	30,121	18.1	27.3
Guyana	85,097 ('74)	107,127 g/	85,942	107,062 g/	171,039	214,819	22.0	21.0
Haiti		518,600		516,300		1,034,900		20.6
Jamaica	140,616	259,070 g/	151,322	262,038 g/	291,938	521,108	16.0	23.8
Montserrat	1,001	1,493 g/	968	1,476 g/	1,969	2,969	17.1	25.5
St. Kitts-N-A	6,051 ('75)	7,301 g/	5,695	7,295 g/	11,446	14,596	24.6	32.8
Saint Lucia	7,569	8,979 ('79)	8,799	10,439	16,368	19,418	16.3	16.4
St. Vincent d/ and the Grenadines	7,151	14,473 g/	7,816	14,017 g/	15,067	28,490	17.4	23.0
Suriname e/	26,037 ('65)		27,114		53,151		16.3	
T'dad. and Tobago f/	91,051	138,000	95,032	131,500	186,083	269,500	19.7	21.4

Source: UN Demographic Yearbook, 1979, Tables 3 and 7.

a/ Anuario Demográfico de Cuba - 1979, Government of Cuba.
b/ Statistical Digest No. 5 - Table 5 - published by Government of Dominica; the data are for age group 15-44 years.
c/ Abstract of Statistics, 1979, Table 2.3 - published by Government of Grenada.
d/ Abdulah, N., The Labour Force in the Caribbean. Table A1, pp. 87-88.
e/ Statistical Yearbook for 1960-65 - published by General Bureau of Statistics, Suriname.
f/ Projections from Annual Statistical Digest No. 26, Central Statistical Office, Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.
g/ World Bank, Caribbean Regional Study, Vol. VII, Population and Employment. Report No. 566a. Table 1.13b.

TABLE III PROFILE OF SELECTED CARIBBEAN ECONOMIES ACCORDING TO (A) DIRECTION OF TRADE, (B) TRADE BALANCES FOR 1967 AND 1974; AND (C) DEGREE OF OPENNESS AND MAIN EXPORTS (1978)

(A) Direction of trade (percentage of total exports and imports)

Country	Year	USA		UK		CANADA		CARIBBEAN		CARICOM	
		Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.
Barbados	1967	17.9	19.6	54.4	28.6	8.6	12.5	12.9	11.7	10.4	10.0
	1974	36.4	19.4	19.8	20.5	7.4	9.1	26.2	18.5	24.2	17.3
Guyana	1967	23.3	27.6	24.5	25.5	18.6	11.0	11.7	12.0	10.4	11.4
	1974	25.2	25.7	20.9	20.5	4.5	4.9	12.1	27.0	11.2	26.5
Jamaica	1967	40.0	39.0	26.3	19.9	13.9	11.4	5.4	3.3	2.7	1.5
	1974	46.6	35.3	15.6	12.4	4.6	5.4	5.5	10.7	4.4	7.6
Trinidad and Tobago	1967	38.8	16.3	12.7	14.5	4.4	5.2	14.3	2.4	5.9	2.2
	1974	60.2	10.6	2.3	5.5	1.3	2.2	19.0	2.1	7.1	1.6

(B) Total exports and imports and trade balances for these Caribbean countries for 1974 (US$)

	Exports	Imports	Balance
Barbados	86,200	208,800	-122,600
Guyana	236,200	222,400	13,800
Jamaica	730,100	934,900	-204,800
Trinidad and Tobago	1,734,500	1,572,800	161,700

Source: CARICOM Digest of Trade Statistics, September 1976, in Carrington, L. Education and Development in the English-speaking Caribbean, Tables 3, 4 and 8.

/agriculture, has

agriculture, has contributed to the US$ 610 million food import bill for the Commonwealth Caribbean alone. (13) For youth, this means less jobs and higher living costs, coupled with the fact that wage rates for the 15 to 24 age groups are lower than all other groups that form part of the labour force with the exception of those 65 and over. (1) ... "the 1980s (will) confront a new generation with a concrete structure crisis of chronic economic uncertainty and even deprivation". (23)

Even when exports are highly developed, these economies remain dependent upon the vagaries of world markets for products for which cheaper sources and substitutes exist. (2) In such a situation, economic viability often becomes dependent upon special trade concessions or strategic political relations, as is the case with the banana-producing countries and Puerto Rico, respectively.

Somewhere within this matrix of openness, dependency, and the daily buffeting of these tiny economies, the youth of the Caribbean survive.

3. Levels of youth involvement in the economy: an overview

Table IV

The group classified as "not economically active" (item 2) includes students, homemakers, persons who have stopped looking for work, seasonal workers (especially where these are overseas migrant workers, as in the case of Haitian sugar workers in the Dominican Republic), and persons not enumerated for various reasons.

The labour force (item 3) refers to all persons listed as engaged in work, available for work or seeking work within the year prior to data collection.

The economically active category refers to persons actually employed (wage or self) at the time of enumeration.

One observation directly relevant to the situation of youth in the Caribbean is the extent of youth involvement (items Y6 and 7) in the economically active (A4) and unemployed (A5) segments of the population. For example, although Haiti is known to be the poorest country in the region (according to standard per capita income criteria) the data reveal a 30.9% level of economic involvement for youth (Y6): 7.2% higher than that for Trinidad and Tobago, the country with the highest per capita income in the region. These two countries also display the highest levels of youth unemployment of all the countries studied: 88.5% for Haiti and 75.9% for Trinidad and Tobago (item Y7).

/Table IV

TABLE IV

COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF LEVEL OF ECONOMIC INVOLVEMENT FOR ADULT AND YOUTH IN SELECTED CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES

1970

	Antigua and Barbuda		Barbados		Belize		Dominica		Grenada	
	ADULT (A)	YOUTH (Y)	ADULT (A)	YOUTH (Y)	ADULT (A)	YOUTH (Y)	ADULT (A)	YOUTH (Y)	ADULT (A)	YOUTH (Y)
1) Total population	32,878	12,335	128,550	45,150	60,700[b/]	20,820[d/]	35,400[b/]	11,666[d/]	49,100[b/]	17,173[d/]
2) Not economically active - total	4,130	n.a.	32,454	6,637	25,919	8,927	12,827	3,478	15,092	5,344
- % of (A1)	(12.5)		(25.2)	(14.6)	(42.7)	(42.8)	(36.2)	(29.9)	(30.7)	(31.1)
3) Labour force ((1)-(2))	28,748	n.a.	96,096	38,513	35,781	11,893	22,590	8,188	34,108	11,829
4) Economically active - total	22,173	[illegible],735	83,981	35,718	31,200[b/]	9,957[e/]	19,600[b/]	6,089[e/]	26,300[b/]	7,433[e/]
- % of (A1)	(67.4)	(62.7)	(65.3)	(79.1)	(51.4)	(47.8)	(55.4)	(52.1)	(53.5)	(43.2)
5) Unemployed - total	6,575	4,600	12,115	2,795	3,581	1,936	2,973	2,099	7,708	4,396
- % of (A1)	(20.0)[a/]	(37.2)	(9.4)	(6.1)	(5.9)[c/]	(9.3)[f/]	(8.5)[c/]	(18.0)[f/]	(15.7)[c/]	(25.6)[f/]
6) Level of youth involvement in A4(%)		34.8		42.5		31.9		31.0		28.6
7) Level of youth involvement in A5(%)		69.9		23.0		54.0		70.0		57.0

/(Cont.)

TABLE IV (CONT'D)

	Guyana		Haiti		Jamaica		Montserrat		St. Kitts	
	ADULT (A)	YOUTH (Y)	ADULT (A)	YOUTH (Y)	ADULT (A)	YOUTH (Y)	ADULT (A)	YOUTH (Y)	ADULT (A)	YOUTH (Y)
1) Total population	370,100[b/]	136,014[d/]	2,351,623	820,678	968,300[b/]	285,839[d/]	6,900[b/]	1,969[d/]	22,900[b/]	7,055[d/]
2) Not economically active - total	129,649	46,930	338,646	135,598	347,590	88,953	2,590	499	8,883	2,633
- % of (A1)	(35.0)	(34.6)	(14.4)	(16.5)	(35.8)	(31.1)	(37.5)	(25.3)	(38.7)	(37.4)
3) Labour force ((1)-(2))	240,451	89,084	2,012,977	685,080	620,710	196,886	4,310	1,470	14,017	4,422
4) Economically active - total	159,400[b/]	42,432[e/]	1,904,113	588,695	495,800[b/]	114,565[e/]	3,800[b/]	1,248[e/]	12,300[b/]	3,470[e/]
- % of (A1)	(43.0)	(31.1)	(80.9)	(71.7)	(51.2)	(40.0)	(55.0)	(63.3)	(53.7)	(49.1)
5) Unemployed - total	81,051	46,652	108,864	96,385	124,910	82,321	510	222	1,717	952
- % of (A1)	(21.9)[c/]	(34.3)[f/]	(4.6)	(11.7)	(12.9)[c/]	(28.8)[f/]	(7.4)[c/]	(11.3)[f/]	(7.5)[c/]	(13.5)[f/]
6) Level of youth involvement in A4(%)		26.6		30.9		23.1		32.8		28.2
7) Level of youth involvement in A5(%)		57.5		88.5		65.9		43.5		55.4

/(Concl.)

TABLE IV (CONT'D)

	Saint Lucia		St. Vincent		Trinidad and Tobago	
	ADULT	YOUTH	ADULT	YOUTH	ADULT	YOUTH
	(A)	(Y)	(A)	(Y)	(A)	(Y)
1) Total population	50,200 b/	16,369 d/	42,200 b/	15,067 d/	539,500	186,083
2) Not economically active - total	18,429	4,999	15,177	4,679	189,150	42,320
- % of (A1)	(36.7)	(30.5)	(35.9)	(31.0)	(35.0)	(22.7)
3) Labour force (1-2)	31,771	11,370	27,023	10,388	350,350	143,763
4) Economically active - total	26,500 b/	8,064 e/	21,200 b/	6,531 e/	232,200	54,071
- % of (A1)	(52.7)	(49.2)	(50.2)	(43.3)	(43.0)	(29.0)
5) Unemployed - total	5,271	3,306	5,823	3,857	118,150	89,692
- % of (A1)	(10.5) c/	(20.2) f/	(13.8) c/	(25.6) f/	(21.9)	(48.2)
6) Level of youth involvement in A4(%)		30.4		30.8		23.2
7) Level of youth involvement in A5(%)		62.7		66.2		75.9

Explanatory Notes: a/ ECLA, 1981 Report on Economic Activity in Caribbean Countries, Table VI.
b/ Abdulah, N. Table 13.) Data for Dominica computed from these sources only.
c/ Ibid, Table A8.) " " " " " "
d/ Ibid, Table A1.
e/ Ibid, Table A13.
f/ World Bank Report No. 566a, - Table 2.9.

N.B. Adult refers to all persons between ages of 15 and 65;
Youth refers to all persons between ages of 15 and 24.

Sources: Item (1) Table 36 column 1 in UN Demographic Yearbook 1979 for Antigua, Barbados, Haiti; see also Explanatory Notes b/ and d/ above.
Ibid (2) Table 37 column 1 for Antigua, Barbados and Haiti; otherwise, derived as 1-(4+5).
(3) Difference between items (1) and (2).
(4) Table 36 column 2 for Antigua, Barbados, Haiti; otherwise, see Explanatory Notes b/ and e/ above.
(5) Difference between items (3) and (4) for Barbados and Haiti; otherwise, see Explanatory Notes c/ and f/ above.

/One preliminary

One preliminary comment which can be made about these data clusters is that growth measured according to the standard economic criteria is not necessarily or proportionately reflected in just and equitable development measured in terms of the distribution of wealth or the access of major social groups to goods and services.

This would seem to reinforce the calls made repeatedly, and most recently by the Groups of Caribbean Experts, (13) that development as growth with justice involves giving as much attention to the deliberate distribution of jobs, income, goods and services as to increasing their extent and quality. For the situation of youth in the region, this means, for example, that policies should not only be concerned about putting ever-increasing numbers of children through schools and training programmes but also about following up to ensure jobs for the skilled, housing for their families, and land credit and markets for the trained farmers.

4. Levels of youth involvement in the economy, by major economic sectors

Table V

The decades of the 1960s and 1970s saw high unemployment, unequal distribution of income, a flaccid agriculture, and a dearth of innovative steps towards diversification and/or industrialization. (13) In the 1970s these bottlenecks to growth intensified with new pressures on the energy-deficient economies of the region as a result of sharp price increases for oil and oil products, particularly fertilizers.

Even after attempts by several governments to expand the absorptive capacity of the State sector for jobs, by entering into joint ventures, wholly-owned or nationalized industries, unemployment continued to rise, now accompanied by galloping inflation.

It bears repetition here that a jobless young person is the most explosive force for rapid social change of various kinds, a fact attested to by the rapid spread of Rastafarianism in the 1970s but also tragically reflected in the desperate flight of thousands of young Haitians to the United States in open boats across 800 miles of ocean. The 88% unemployment rate for Haitian youth (table IV) tells a good deal of that story.

/Table V

TABLE V A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF YOUTH ECONOMIC ACTIVITY BY SECTOR AND SEX AND AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL WORKING POPULATION (BY SECTOR AND SEX) FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES

		(1) AGRICULTURE		(2) INDUSTRY		(3) TRANSPORT		(4) CONSTRUCTION		(5) COMMERCE	
		Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
HAITI	Male	197,157	26.1	12,858	25.7	1,932	16.0	3,084	18.4	2,841	16.8
	Female	121,365	25.9	25,450	39.9	265	43.0	87	43.2	29,875	18.3
	Both Sexes	318,522	26.0	38,308	33.7	2,197	17.3	3,171	18.5	32,716	18.1
	TOTAL WORKING POPULATION	1,223,357		113,639		12,682		17,054		179,947	
ST. KITTS-NEVIS	Male	395	15.8	414	40.9	142	21.6	484	45.2	See FINANCE 6 -	
	Female	151	12.0	80	6.3	35	41.6	8	32.0	" "	" -
	Both Sexes	546	14.5	494	39.1	177	23.9	492	44.9	" "	" -
	TOTAL WORKING POPULATION	3,746		1,262		740		1,095		" "	" -
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	Male	5,232	16.9	7,640	22.4	2,417	5.3	3,265	15.6	5,869	28.7
	Female	203	3.9	3,413	38.2	553	30.0	106	11.2	3,050	33.9
	Both Sexes	5,435	16.1	11,053	26.1	2,970	13.5	3,371	15.7	8,919	31.6
	TOTAL WORKING POPULATION	33,655		42,281		21,902		21,348		28,165	

/(Cont.)

TABLE V (CONT'D)

		(6) FINANCE		(7) COMMUNITY		(8) SELF		(9) OTHER		(10) TOTAL	
		Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
HAITI	Male	152	7.3	17,999	36.8	43,957	8.1	1,360	14.9	281,340	19.4
	Female	89	26.7	35,438	56.6	43,147	15.7	634	29.7	256,530	24.7
	Both Sexes	241	10.0	53,437	47.9	87,104	10.7	1,994	17.7	537,870	21.6
	TOTAL WORKING POPULATION	2,394		111,380		811,369		11,237		2,478,672	
ST. KITTS-NEVIS	Male	192	30.8	414	39.1	N.A.	-	48	24.4	2,089	24.9
	Female	271	39.7	714	37.6	N.A.	-	40	32.0	1,299	42.4
	Both Sexes	463	35.4	1,128	38.1	N.A.	-	88	27.4	3,388	29.6
	TOTAL WORKING POPULATION	1,305		2,953		N.A.	-	321		11,422	
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	Male	10,024	25.4	N.A.		1,467	9.7	698	9.8	36,612	21.1
	Female	8,395	28.2	N.A.		331	8.7	370	20.4	16,421	28.5
	Both Sexes	18,419	27.3	N.A.		1,798	9.5	1,068	11.9	53,033	21.8
	TOTAL WORKING POPULATION	67,360		N.A.		18,844		8,915		242,470	

Explanatory notes on table V

Data clusters for youth involvement by sector are available for Haiti, St. Kitts/Nevis, and Trinidad and Tobago for 1970.

Column (2) "Industry" combines columns 2 and 3 of Table 38 in the UN Demographic Yearbook 1979, i.e., mining and manufacturing, respectively.

Column (3) combines "Transport and Utilities", i.e., columns 4 and 7 of Table 38 already referred to.

Column (8) "Self" refers to the category labelled "own-account worker" in Table 40 of the UN Demographic Yearbook 1979.

Column (9) "Other" refers to the category "Activities not adequately defined" (ref. Table 38 of UN Demographic Yearbook 1979).

/The statistical

The statistical assessment of the economic situation of youth begun in table IV is given a more detailed review in table V, which establishes levels of youth involvement by major industrial sector. These data would not only allow precise identification of growth sector points in the economies, but would also enable measurement of the youth contribution to sectoral and national growth. Unfortunately, there appears to be a disturbing lack of data on this aspect of the situation of youth.

To underscore the usefulness of these data, now available for the three countries listed in table V, the St. Kitts/Nevis data reveal that youth involvement in agriculture is a mere 14.5%. With agriculture, specifically sugar production, accounting for well over 50% of the GNP it must be a matter of concern that if this situation continues unattended the average age of the agriculture work force will increase rapidly, with an accompanying decrease in productivity and output.

The correct isolation of such factors is of unquestioned importance to effective planning for economic development in St. Kitts/Nevis.

In yet another area, the importance of developing a data base for the clusters identified in table V can be illustrated. It is widely accepted that gains have been made in all three countries in education, health and other social service sectors in terms of schools and hospitals built, nurses trained, doctors per 1 000 persons, etc. An education, as opposed to "a place in school and a diploma", really assumes full meaning only when gainful employment (wage or self) offers the person an opportunity to apply that education towards personal and social betterment. Data on youth employment by sector placed alongside performance data for the major industrial sectors will at least provide a basis from which to assess the relevance of educational and training programmes vis-à-vis available and potential employment opportunities. (24)

By way of illustration, the data for St. Kitts/Nevis indicate that youth comprise 29.6% of the total working population, with agriculture sharing 14.5% of the youth work force. The significance for the agricultural-based economy has been raised earlier. The additional concern being raised here is that if economic data show prospects for sugar are not good, then 'heretical' though this may seem, the correct youth training and employment strategy may not be one that stems the tide of rural-urban migration. The options may lie more correctly in the area of training for non-sugar or even non-agriculture-related skills, rather than seeking to force the sector to accept its 'fair share' of young workers.

/The data

The data for Trinidad reveal an extraordinarily low level of participation by young women in agriculture (3.9%). Although the participation index for youth in the sector (16.1%) may appear less critical than the St. Kitts data (14.5%), a closer look at the data reveals that whereas in St. Kitts/Nevis six sectors offer over 20% employment to youth, in Trinidad, only three sectors, two of which are closely linked (commerce and finance), offer a similar level of participation to youth.

The data reveal an even more critical situation for youth in Trinidad and Tobago when reviewed alongside the 48% unemployment rate for youth (table IV) and a 91% oil-dependent economy. Given this, plus the current depression in oil prices, the Trinidad economy may not be as resilient as far as opportunities for youth employment are concerned, even when measured against the smaller, agricultural economy of St. Kitts/Nevis.

5. Social situation of youth according to births, deaths and major causes of death

Table VI

Bearing in mind that the usefulness of the data is limited by the inconsistent time series, which provide information on related issues (birth rates, deaths, etc.) but for different years, the following observations seem pertinent:

Column (3) - in all the English-speaking countries young mothers account for upwards of 40% of all births, a not unexpected pattern, but certainly one which draws attention to the need for pre- and post-natal care, family-life education, and family planning.

Columns (6-12) - the profile of mortality for youth is predictably low, with the notable exception of Guyana (10.9% of total), which shows a percentage of youth deaths higher than Haiti, the poorest country in the region. Of importance, however, is that the total number of youth deaths in Guyana represents only 13.5% of the total number of youth deaths in Haiti.

Columns (13-14) - in four out of the six countries for which data are available, benign neoplasms and unspecified neoplasms are a major cause of death. Hypertension and heart disease are major factors in Cuba and Trinidad and Tobago.

The Annual Report of the Trinidad and Tobago Ministry of Health for the year ending 31 December 1979 (table 7) shows that in 1977 accidents were responsible for 23% of all deaths for persons between 15 and 44 years.

/Table VI

Table VI

Social Situation of Youth according to Births, Deaths and Major Causes of Death

Country and Year	Births			Birth Rates		Deaths and Death Rates							Major Causes of Death		
	All Mothers	Youth	Mothers	All Mothers	Youth Mothers	Infant		Youth		Total		Youth as % of total	Disease/Injury	No.	Rate
	No.	No.	%			No.	Rate	No.	Rate	No.	Rate				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	
Antigua (1975)	1362	788	57.8	-	-	52	-	13	-	463	6.6	2.8	-	-	-
Bahamas (1976)	4807	2385	49.6	81 (1975)	107	131	28	21	2.0	976	4.6	2.1	B19 B30	136 95	6.3 46.6
Barbados (1977)	4482	2369	52.8	74 (1976)	102	118	-	52	0.75	2159	8.5	2.4	B19 B30	319 277	14.7 108.8
Belize (1972)	5303	2907	54.6	191 (1970)	226	291	-	17 (1974)	-	721 (1974)	-	2.3 (1974)	- -	- -	- -
Cuba (1971)	256014	143665	56.1	121 (1970)	177	9575	37.4	1631	1.2	54109	5.6 (1978)	3.0	B19 B28	8849 9731	101.8 112.0
Dominica (1969)	2694	1149	42.6	214 (1960)	229	157	-	14	-	744	5.3 (1977)	3.1	- -	- -	- -
Dominican Republic (1976)	169161	59999	35.4	184 (1970)	154	10245	81.0	1088	1.4	25125	5.2	4.3	-	-	-
Grenada (1978)	2521	1524	60.4	177 (1964)	209	110	-	22	-	765	6.9	2.8	- -	- -	- -
Guyana (1972)	25065	12916	51.5	136 (1970)	166	1267	50.5	686 (1976)	-	6251 (1976)	7.9 (1976)	10.9 (1976)	- -	- -	- -
Haiti	-	--	-	-	-	-	-	5071 (1972)	5.3	69109 (1972)	17.4 (1975)	7.3 (1972)	- -	- -	- -
Jamaica (1964)	68359	32580	47.6	180	220	2710	-	308 (1970)	1.1	14193 (1970)	5.9 (1978)	2.1 (1970)	B30 B19	2200 1583	115.2 82.9
Montserrat	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3 (1973)	-	107 (1973)	13.1 (1978)	2.8 (1973)	- -	- -	- -

/(Cont.)

Table VI (cont.)

Social Situation of Youth according to Births, Deaths and Major Causes of Death

Country and Year a/	Births: All Mothers No.	Births: Youth No.	Births: Mothers %	Birth Rates: All Mothers	Birth Rates: Youth Mothers	Deaths and Death Rates: Infant No.	Infant Rate	Youth No.	Youth Rate	Total No.	Total Rate	Youth as% of total	Major Causes of Death: Disease/Injury	No.	Rate
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	
St. Kitts-Nevis (1978)	1059	723	68.2	116 (1975)	137	44	-	12	-	466	9.4	2.5	-	-	-
													-	-	-
St. Lucia (1978)	3981	1821	45.7	133	168	312	-	33 (1973)	1.5	840 (1973)	7.2	3.9 (1973)	B45 b/	132	140.4
													B44 c/	114	863.6
St. Vincent (1963)	3678	1810	49.2	232 (1960)	290	277	-	14 (1964)	5.3	821 (1964)	-	1.7 (1964)	-	-	-
Suriname									-				-	-	-
Trinidad and Tobago (1977)	27895	14739	52.8	101 (1975)	129	586	-	267	1.1	7311	6.5	3.6	B28 d/	1008	90.1
													B30 e/	917	82.0

Source: United Nations, Demographic Yearbook 1979.

Explanatory notes

Data for Column(s) (1), (2) and (3) are taken from Table 10 of Source.
" " " (4) and (5) " " " " 11 " "
" " " (6) and (7) " " " " 16 " "
" " " (8) and (10) " " " " 19 " "
" " " (9) " " " " 20 " "
" " " (11) " " " " 18 " "
" " " (12) derived from Columns (8) and (10).
" " " (13) and (14) are taken from Table 21 of Source.

a/ All data are for the year indicated in "Country and Year" column, except where otherwise noted. The year noted for column (4) applies also to column (5).
b/ B45 Senility without psychosis.
c/ B44 Early Infancy-related.
d/ B28 Hypertension with heart disease.
e/ B30 Influenza.

6. Social situation of youth according to voter participation in general elections: the impact of the 18-year-old vote

Table VII

i) Since 1951 (14) the system of electoral politics based on the universal adult franchise (21 years and over) has been the method for choosing government leaders. This system, based on the Westminster Model of Britain, involves candidates (representing different political parties) in a contest for seats in the country's Parliament according to support received from voters in areas demarcated by law as electoral constituencies.

ii) Beginning in St. Lucia in 1969, (14) a change was made in the franchise rules governing participation by citizens in the selection of national leaders. This change directly affected youth between ages 18 and 21, by lowering the voting age from 21 to 18 years.

iii) There is little doubt that this act of participating in elections as a voter is basic to the system of parliamentary government. This notwithstanding, one of the unfortunate aspects of this legacy of elections is the fact that the act of voting is often misrepresented as being conclusive evidence of democracy in operation, although the years between elections are largely characterized by minimal participation of the people in decisions affecting their lives.

iv) Having situated youth in the economic context of the region, the concern now is with both the quantitative and qualitative measure of their participation in the areas traditionally less empirically documented. In this connection, the data in table VId, although "not designed to assess voting patterns of electors", (14) can, with the appropriate qualifications, provide indication of the situation of youth in the area of voter participation.

The data presented address voter participation as a percentage of votes cast in the elections immediately preceding and following the enfranchising of 18-year-olds. Antigua is one of the few cases in which there was a considerable increase in voter turnout following the reduction of the voting age. This is so in spite of the figures pointing to a decrease in voter registration, a data trend considered unrealistic and difficult to accept as accurate in view of the remarkable achievement of 95.0% voter participation. (14)

/Table VII

Table VII

Impact of the 18-year-old vote on Social Situation of Youth - Levels of Community Involvement

	St.Lucia		Barbados		St.Vincent		Dominica		Antigua		Grenada	
	1964	1969	1966	1971	1967	1972	1970	1975	1971	1976	1972	1976
Total No. of Registered Voters	37,748	44,868	99,988	115,189	33,044	42,707	25,899	29,907	30,682	26,197	41,529	63,193
		+18.8		+15.2		+29.2		+15.4		-14.6		+52.1
Total No. of Votes Cast	19,601	23,892	79,258	94,019	27,278	32,289	21,122	23,107	17,309	24,879	34,679	41,238
%	51.9	53.2	79.3	81.6	82.6	75.6	81.6	77.3	56.4	95.0	83.5	65.3

Source: Extracted from Emmanuel, P.A.M. (1979), General Elections in the Eastern Caribbean: A Handbook. Tables 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8.

/St. Vincent,

St. Vincent, Dominica and Grenada reveal that in spite of increases in voter registration, there was a decrease in voter participation in the election immediately following the enfranchisement of 18-year-olds. St. Lucia and Barbados recorded slight increases in voter participation (1.3% and 2.3%, respectively) following the registration of 18-year-olds.

The data available for these countries do not point to a conclusive relationship between the registration of youth voters and comparable increases in voter participation. While being careful not to read too much into this preliminary data base, and noting that further study of the "sociological factors associated with voter alignments" is needed, one tentative observation is that as important as the vote is to the systems of parliamentary elections prevailing in the region, youth do not appear to have selected voting as a decisive mode of participation in their country's affairs. Is this apparent apathy to voting related to a perception of the exercise as having only marginally improved their situation in areas of education, employment, sports, culture, community service?

Of special interest, therefore, for this section of our study is discovering what areas, forms and degrees of participation youth have selected for involvement in the broad social life of their countries.

What has been the impact of "the emergence of resistance movements or national liberation movements, revolutionary upheavals" (12) on the situation of youth? In this regard, how has the revolution in Grenada (the only one in the English-speaking Caribbean) affected the levels and forms of youth participation in that process? How does this performance compare with other countries that have persisted in the Westminster Model as a means of changing their national political leadership? A useful profile on the situation of youth would be provided by data clusters that quantify youth performance in such areas as number and relevance of training opportunities, employment, involvement in policy, planning, and managing economic enterprises and social or political activities in the country (see figure I).

Youth involvement in voluntary associations also would provide a useful indication of that group's situation, as the level of participation in voluntary work is often related to understanding of, and commitment to, the goals of the society. In addition, this in turn could be a reflection of the effectiveness of the formal education process and/or the impact of political mobilization. In this

/latter regard,

latter regard, it has been argued (12) that in societies where the major political parties align themselves with, or create, voluntary associations, the orientation and effectiveness of these groups as vehicles for youth participation can be seriously compromised as political expediency overrides basic developmental goals as the main motivating force.

One 1974 study on Trinidad suggests that youth dissatisfaction with the mode of their involvement in efforts to develop the country may be one factor contributing to the emergence of young people in 1970 as dissident activists against the government. (12)

It has been suggested that a major consideration affecting youth participation in these social and political areas is recognition and acceptance of the fact that youth is not a transitional phase during which persons are to be mere recipients of assistance but young people are participants "as of right in every society's efforts to bring about its own transformation". (19)

V. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

SUMMARY

A group of Caribbean Experts headed by the current President of the Caribbean Development Bank recently concluded (13) that the seven major problems facing the region in the 1980s are as follows:

1. Low food production
2. A lack of linkages between sectors
3. Inadequate national planning and management
4. Inefficient enterprise management
5. The impact of world economic recession in major trading countries
6. The absence of special policies and measures for employment creation
7. An unenterprising private sector.

Analysis of the underlying causes of these problems places their roots in the historical remnants of plantation society, (14) as reflected in contemporary hierarchical relationships based on race, colour, sex, class, wealth, land ownership, and institutionalized political patronage. In such a situation, not only are the basic needs of the population not met, but the mood of national

/dependency that

dependency that characterizes such economies also ensures the exclusion of major social groups from meaningful involvement in areas of policy and planning that directly affect their situation. The groups most marginalized in this way are the rural peasantry, women and wage earners. Of particular concern to us in this study is the fact that youth comprise the largest segment of two of these marginalized groups (women and wage earners), the peasantry suffering from a shortage of youthful farmers due to steady rural-urban migration. With the hopes for resolving the problems of the 1980s hinging directly on an organized, disciplined, skilled approach to economic growth, it is easy to see why the marginalization of this skilled and trainable population group is a matter of major concern.

Compounding this concern is the fact that at the base of this process of structural marginalization is the promotion and reinforcement of values based more on the consumption of goods and services not produced by these countries; values which shun manual work, which interpret freedom as licence, might as right, "getting caught" as the crime, and "trickle-down" rather than "build-up" as the economic growth model. Further, with politics pictured as the privilege of the powerful over the powerless, and an accident of geography locating the United States next to the Caribbean, it has not been difficult to promote the notion that chances of development are indispensably and, almost exclusively, dependent on good relations with the United States (the Caribbean Basin Initiative is only the most recent expression of that school of thought already firmly enshrined in the Monroe Doctrine.

Although the "miracle" of Operation Bootstrap is seen by many as actually implying economic dependency and stagnation for Puerto Rico, (8) and notwithstanding the political independence of most of the English-speaking Caribbean, educational curricula, legal and political systems, patterns of trade, and development remain set in the mould of imitation and "copycatism". In some cases it even appears that more effort is being exerted to duplicate the worst possible aspects of the "advanced" societies, resulting in nudist practices offensive to local habits, male prostitution, crime and the development of a pornography industry.

"Children learn what they live", so it is not reasonable to expect young people to be more moral in the face of public immorality, more disciplined in the face of intolerance, more productive in the face of gross inefficiency, more learned in the face of irrelevant school curricula, more respectful of the law in the face

/of a

of a legal system that penalises the poor while enabling the rich to plunder the society, or to be peaceful while increased militarism is promoted as the way towards peace. To expect this is to wallow in realms of fantasy so deep as to make "tim-tim" (fairytales) appear as proven scientific fact.

It is little wonder therefore that the youth of today's Caribbean are hardpressed in their attempts to survive and grow up to be "decent, law-abiding and productive" citizens. Little wonder also that the available empirical data (tables I through VII) show that youth, the largest single social group in the region, have the highest birth rate, the lowest level of economic activity, and, in spite of more schools, remain the victims of dependent thinking in countries dressed up as independent parliamentary democracies.

Unfortunately, as pointed out in part I of this report, not all parts of the foregoing analysis benefit from the type of empirical data base needed for detailed assessment of the problems. For example, a report on the low death rates which prevail in the countries studied (table VI), though a tribute to the medical profession, will not reveal the increased suffering generated by this achievement due to the lack of proper child nutrition, housing, schooling and employment.

In addition to identifying the information needed to complete this humanized data base, the following section suggests action to be taken by the public and private sectors, and by youth themselves, in tackling the problems confronting young people in the English-speaking Caribbean.

RECOMMENDATIONS

People can be motivated to change things through a process of conscientization, capacitation, mobilization, organization, implementation, and further conscientization. There are instances where people have been embarrassed into change by having someone else begin and finding it easier to follow the example set. Then there are times when people are forced into change as a result of trade, fiscal, political or military pressures. Recognizing that all three modes operate concurrently in varying degrees, the recommendations which follow are not designed for implementation as a whole. Rather these suggestions are designed to move the change process as far away from the force mode and as close to the motivation mode as possible.

/Based on

Based on the conviction that the problem situation of youth does not exist, and hence cannot be resolved, outside of the context of the larger society, these recommendations are organized according to "what society can do for youth by doing for itself", and "what youth can do for itself by doing for society".

WHAT SOCIETY CAN DO FOR YOUTH BY DOING FOR ITSELF

1. Adopt a new approach to national planning that works towards the Caribbean as one economic and political entity.

A. Establish mechanisms for consultation, among social groups and between social groups and national governments, that define objectives, priorities and methods;

B. Consultation should be issued and process-oriented instead of sector focused (this means, for example, that organizations of peasants, workers, youth, women, policy-makers, etc., would work together on the problem of agroindustry, and not a Ministry Planner in isolation from the others who must be committed to the plan in order for it to work).

Note: A and B are the most crucial yet difficult suggestions to get implemented, precisely because this requires an act of political will and skill on the part of powerful and powerless groups. In most cases this will not occur out of the goodwill of the powerful, but requires the organization of the powerless (workers, women, farmers, youth) into institutions capable of speaking to this process from a position of some strength. The role of regional and international agencies here has already been alluded to, but it is clear that more decisive intervention is necessary in the name of participation, peace and development. One concrete area for such intervention is in the establishment of a humanized data base.

C. Establish a humanized data base which speaks more directly and honestly to the power relations now constricting growth in these countries: power which needs to be released in the name of "peace with development".

New data clusters

Natural resources - not only how much land or mineral wealth exists, but where it is, who owns it? What is its expected economic contribution in income, jobs, and -in the case of farming- food and raw materials for industry?

/The economy

The economy - strengthen the data base here to reveal patterns of ownership: foreign, local, interlocking or multinational.

- information on the skills used and needed, by major sector;
- data on labour productivity according to age, training, wages, sector;
- access to social services of health, housing and education related to household income and job productivity;
- patterns of saving and consumption.

Government - the impact of policy options included in the budget on jobs, education, health.

- for this and all of the above, the racial and ethnic mix of goverment as this is reflected in voting patterns, participation in public, private and social sector programmes (sports, culture, community, self-help).

Education - participation by race, ethnic group, household income, sector of employment for household heads;

- attendance at school related to household income, employment by sector, level of education for head of household.

Media - circulation and distribution of major media;

- degree of coverage of local and regional versus international events by page, hours of broadcast, etc.;
- advertising devoted to local as compared with imported goods and services;
- relationship between movies/TV and dress, attitude towards authority, adults, peers, crime, violence.

Military - degree and patterns of expenditure;

- land allocated for this purpose;
- jobs created, directly, indirectly and other standard intersectoral linkages such as infrastructure, technology, training, consumption of goods and services.

Information like this would enable completion of the proposed power matrix, and the basis for planning training programmes, locating schools, health centres, housing, industry, etc., would benefit from a more organic, humanized data base.

/Not only

Not only would we be better able to plan these investments in the social and economic infrastructure, but we may even be able to assess the impact of such programmes in human terms long before it reaches the front page of the newspaper.

2. Infuse education with the clear philosophy of development that will have to prevail if the new approach to national planning (1, above) is effected.

Education is to be the means whereby we achieve ecocultural and intercultural harmony as part of the continuing process of mental decolonization. The first of these elements refers to the development and harnessing of the technology needed to efficiently use local and other resources to meet the basic human needs/priorities of the society. The hands-on approach to learning applies very crucially to the building of intercultural harmony in a region like the Caribbean where four major languages and two major Creole dialects are spoken. The English-speaking Caribbean is not only sandwiched between other linguistic and cultural blocks, but in the case of Dominica and St. Lucia (Grenada and Trinidad and Tobago to a lesser degree), which have bilingual populations, intercultural and linguistic communication can be facilitated by strengthening recent efforts at promoting Creole through cultural exchanges, booklets and other appropriate forms.4/ As the youth of the region begin to travel more frequently between the islands the importance of this intercultural harmony becomes even more vital for sharing experiences and skills and enhancing learning.

3. The change in approach to national planning and the restructuring of the educative process referred to in 1 and 2 above are likely to stimulate and accompany widespread economic transformation. This study is not designed to elaborate this aspect of the recommendation for society's action on behalf of youth, suffice it to say that this economic transformation would have to tackle the seven (7) major problems facing the Caribbean as identified by Demas and others. (13) By so doing the structural defects of the dependent economy which make for the social and economic marginalization of youth are tackled with a view to releasing the fullest energies of all sectors to work for peace with development.

4/ One such effort is the Project on Creole Discourse and Social Development proposed by the ECLA Office for the Caribbean (Ref. CEPAL/CARIB 82/15, 27 October 1982).

/These three

These three areas, national planning that enhances people's participation, education for peace and productivity, and economic transformation for development, are suggested as requiring direct policy and programme intervention if the situation of youth, as part of the overall Caribbean policy, is to be favourably affected.

WHAT YOUTH CAN DO FOR SOCIETY BY DOING FOR ITSELF

The issue is not "how to solve the problems of youth" but rather "how to ensure that youth play their fullest part in changing and improving their situation".

This approach is in sharp contrast to the passive non-participation epitomized in the words, "you are the men and women of tomorrow", words spoken to young people throughout the English-speaking Caribbean on the occasion of public speeches. The implication here is that young people need not concern themselves with the problems of economics, government, regional integration, peace and development. "The adults will take care of these matters", the youth are told, but suddenly upon high school graduation the words are changed to "you are big men and women now, why don't you get a job and start doing something for yourself?"

This instant transition from schoolchild to adult, with little preparation for the latter, is often followed by frustration from futile job-hunting, cultural alienation encouraged by media-promoted consumption of foreign goods, and the start of structural marginalization for the young.

One concern here, therefore, is to identify areas for activity for youth which will aid young people in making a more constructive transition to adulthood through attitudes and practices that further decolonization and development. At this point, the question most often asked by youth is "What can we do? We do not have power to change things, people don't listen to us!"

Following are four (4) possible responses to this question:

1) Changes in consumption patterns among youth in just one area, food, would impact directly on trade deficits, create openings for local production and employment, reduce waste and garbage disposal problems, and possibly result in a healthier population. In Trinidad and Tobago, where youth account for 20% of the total population and where food

/imports in

imports in 1982 came close to the billion dollar mark, significant savings on foreign exchange could have been registered if this group made a conscious effort to buy and eat local.

In the case of a country like Haiti, improved availability and increased consumption of food by youth could be expected to impact on their physical and mental productivity, while reducing the inordinate amount of time spent by the population "hustling for a meal".

2) Similarly, youth participation in (and demand for) training, and use of resources for production of goods and services needed by the country, can be the stimulus many agencies (public and private) need to make them more serious about vocational training, youth camps, co-operatives, farming, craft, industry, road and house construction that can utilize youth labour.

3) In like manner, given the reduction of the voting age to 18 years in most of these countries, and the large numbers of youth therein, political pressure can be exerted on national policy-making if the youth are registered to vote, are informed about their rights to participate in the political, economic and social life of their country, and receive the necessary regional and international backing to do so. In this regard steps to give legal and constitutional expression to socioeconomic human rights for youth need to be supported by appropriate organizations, including the United Nations, the Commonwealth Secretariat, the Organization of American States, the CARICOM Secretariat, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, and others.

4) At a time when security and military needs are being given such priority (witness recent subregional and security agreements), youth can strike a blow for rational attention to development needs by withholding its services from the military. Of course this is not easy where other job options are limited or non-existent; conversely, where a vibrant economy offers diverse opportunities, jobs in the military are often less of an attraction. On the other hand, we note that in a situation where a nation perceives a threat to its territorial sovereignty, and under conditions of revolutionary change, the youth are often in the forefront of active military duty -the case of Grenada since 1979.

/The underlying

The underlying thrust of these suggestions is that the organized use of land, technology and finance by the people will overcome the persistent maladies of underdevelopment (joblessness, homelessness, low productivity, ignorance) only when that large and vibrant social group, youth, is creatively organized to participate in the task. As long as this is not done; as long as youth remain marginalized, the situation for them and their countries will worsen. (21)

How will this participation occur? What is the catalyst needed to motivate youth into full participation in social and economic decolonization? The paradox is that youth, themselves the victims, are the catalyst and the main motor for structural change.

Although they are the product of an education that remains largely unresponsive to the development problematic presented in part II of this report and proposed by Carrington, (9) increasingly literate, articulate, aggressive and desperate youth are in evidence throughout the Caribbean. This is both the tragedy and the hope of these countries, as young people now appear to be in agreement on at least one fact, viz,..."their situation is totally unacceptable". As elementary a consensus as this is, it is the precursor of the catalyst for change.

When youth describe their situation as "dread", "rough", "things bad", "tribulation", they are at the point where one of three options will be exercised: 1) acceptance of the inevitability of the situation; 2) escape from the country; or 3) determination to change the situation.

Without the guidance that comes from an organized youth and a clear philosophy of national development, youth often progress to action on options one or two. Option one leads either to apathy or attempts "to get a piece of the action" through crime (10) and other socially dysfunctional actions. Option two sees the steady migration of young persons (many of them skilled). (24) (Figure I.)

When, however, the pain of marginalization is accompanied by the "midwife" of political mobilization (through trade unions, church or other voluntary agencies, youth groups, co-operatives, etc.), a new experience of involvement commences. This stands in direct contrast to that of marginalization and for the first time exposes youth to the opportunity for making an organized and creative contribution to change. (21)

Youth at this stage often get involved with sports, music, art and other creative, energetic forms of expression, participating in voluntary community service, trade union and co-operative activity, and sometimes open political work. (Figure I.)

/With direction,

With direction, some of these activities give rise to permanent institutions (Youth Councils, Co-operatives, Drama Groups and the like). Others quickly fade away. What is important, however, is that exercise of this option three ("determination to change the situation") provides an exit from marginalization, encourages and enables the emergence of youth leadership, and allows youth to experience the power essential for contributing to development.

This is the time when sensitive support from national and international sources can help ensure prospects for lasting improvement in the situation of youth. Programmes and policies are not a substitute for this process but must certainly be designed to do the following:

a) reduce the pain of mistakes that will inevitably be made, by providing the necessary backup services of training, extension, facilities and equipment, while

b) allowing youth the benefit of hands-on experience by assuring intersectoral linkages such as markets in the tourist industry for local craftwork and farm produce of youth co-operatives;

c) encourage the fullest participation by youth in areas not normally thought of as "youth work", such as curriculum design in academic and vocational courses, development policy in agriculture, sports, culture, to name a few;

d) emphasize the attitude of responsibility that must accompany the right to be part of reshaping society, by fostering the formation and recognition of well-organized youth institutions, run by youth.

Through this joint effort, by youth and the rest of society, youth can rise out of their marginalized situation, while acquiring the experience and skills needed to manage the societies already entrusted to them as students and workers, and soon to be entrusted to them as leaders.

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