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DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES FOR THE NEXT CENTURY

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A vigorous policy of industrialization is required as an inevitable complement to technical progress in primary production. While the contribution of foreign enterprises to development is highly valuable, it is essential for the promotion and consolidation of free enterprise to encourage the ability and initiative of the Latin American entrepreneur as well.

-- Raúl Prebisch (1959, 269)

I. Introduction

The idea of a mixed economy is possibly the most valuable heritage that the twentieth century bequeaths to the twenty-first in the realm of economic policy. The nineteenth century had discovered capitalism. The twentieth learned how to tame it and render it more productive by supplying the institutional ingredients of a self-sustaining market economy: central banking, stabilizing fiscal policy, antitrust and regulation, social insurance, political democracy. It was during the twentieth century that these elements of the mixed economy took roots in today's advanced industrial countries. The simple idea that markets and the state are complements--recognized in practice if not always in principle--enabled the unprecedented prosperity the United States, Western Europe, and parts of East Asia experienced during the second half of the century.
The truism that private initiative and collective action are both required for economic success arrived in developing countries rather late. As most of them were becoming independent in the 1950s and 1960s, the apparently successful example of the Soviet Union and the anti-market ideology of national governing elites resulted in heavily state-centric development strategies. In Latin America, where countries had long been independent, the dominant "structuralist" view held that market incentives would fail to elicit much of a supply response. Throughout the developing world, the private sector was regarded with skepticism and private initiative was severely circumscribed.

These views underwent a radical transformation during the 1980s under the joint influence of a protracted debt crisis and the teachings of the Bretton Woods institutions. The "Washington consensus" emphasizing privatization, deregulation, and trade liberalization was embraced enthusiastically by policy makers in Latin America and post-socialist Eastern Europe. The reception was more guarded and cautious in Africa and Asia, but there too policies took a decided swing towards markets. These market-oriented reforms paid at first little attention to institutions and the complementarity between the private and public spheres of the economy. The role assigned to the government did not go beyond that of maintaining macroeconomic stability and providing education. The priority was on rolling back the state, not on making it more effective.

A more balanced view began to emerge during the closing years of the twentieth century, as it became clearer that the Washington consensus would fail to deliver on its promise. The talk in Washington turned towards "second-generation reforms," "governance," and "reinvigorating the state's capability." And multilateral institutions began to take a considerably humbler view.

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2 The last term is from World Bank's 1997 World Development Report on the state (p. 27).
of conditionality. Several developments added fuel to the discontent over the orthodoxy. The first of these was the dismal failure in Russia of price reform and privatization in the absence of a supportive legal, regulatory, and political apparatus. The second was the widespread dissatisfaction with market-oriented reforms in Latin America and the growing realization that these reforms have paid too little attention to mechanisms of social insurance and to safety nets. The third and most recent was the Asian financial crisis which exposed the dangers of allowing financial liberalization to run ahead of adequate regulation.

So we enter the twenty-first century with a better understanding of the complementarity between markets and the state—a greater appreciation of the virtues of the mixed economy. That is the good news. The bad news is that the operational implications of this for the design of development strategy are not that clear. There remains plenty of opportunity for mischief on the policy front. In particular, it is unlikely that an augmented Washington-consensus strategy—appending to the old orthodoxy a new set of blueprints aimed at so-called second-generation reforms—will take us very far. As I shall argue below, the state and the market can be combined in diverse ways. There are many different models of a mixed economy. The major challenge facing developing nations in the first decades of the next century is to fashion their own particular brands of the mixed economy.

In what follows, I review some of the principles that should guide this quest. I begin in section II by presenting a conceptual framework for analyzing the "deep" determinants of growth. The key challenge here is to sort out the respective roles of geography, integration, and institutions in shaping long-term growth. In section III, I provide a capsule history of the post-World War II growth performance of developing countries and emphasize the role of "investment strategies" in sparking growth. Since the reasons for the disappointing growth
performance of the last two decades are intricately linked with current policy prescriptions, I present my own interpretation of what went wrong. I argue that partial and gradual reforms have often worked better because reform programs that are sensitive to institutional preconditions are more likely to be successful than those that assume new institutions can be erected wholesale overnight. Learning and imitation from abroad are important elements of a successful development strategy. But imported blueprints need to be filtered through local experience and deliberation.

Section IV focuses on institutions, and undertakes a more detailed analysis of market-supporting institutions. I discuss five functions that public institutions must serve for markets to work adequately: protection of property rights, market regulation, macroeconomic stabilization, social insurance, and conflict management. This section emphasizes, however, that there are in principle a large variety of institutional setups that could fulfill these functions. We need to be skeptical of the notion that a specific institution observed in a country (the United States, say) is the type that is most compatible with a well-functioning market economy.

Section V turns to some of the implications for international governance. A key conclusion is that international rules and IFI conditionality ought to leave room for development policies that diverge from the dominant orthodoxies of the day. Section VI evaluates the priority that openness to trade and capital flows should receive in the design of development strategies. I argue that trade and capital flows are important insofar as they allow developing countries access to cheaper capital goods. But the links between opening up to trade and capital flows and subsequent growth are weak, uncertain, and mediated through domestic institutions. Section VII provides some concluding thoughts.
II. In Search of the "Deep" Determinants of Growth

To organize our thinking about the economics of growth, it helps to distinguish between the "proximate" and "deep" determinants of growth. Figure 1 shows the standard way in which economists think about the determination of income. The total output of an economy is a function of its resource endowments (labor, physical capital, human capital) and the productivity with which these endowments are deployed to produce a flow of goods and services (GDP). We can express this relationship in the form of an economy-wide production function, with $a$ standing for total factor productivity. Note that $a$ captures not only the technical efficiency level of the economy, but also the allocative efficiency with which endowments/resources are distributed across economic activities. The growth of per-capita output can in turn be expressed in terms of three proximate determinants: (a) physical capital deepening; (b) human capital accumulation; and (c) productivity growth.

Conceptually, this is a straightforward decomposition, and it has given rise to a large literature on sources-of-growth accounting. But one has to be careful in interpreting such decompositions because accumulation and productivity growth are themselves endogenous. This prevents us from giving the sources-of-growth equation any structural interpretation. For example, observing that 80 percent of the growth is "accounted" for by accumulation and the rest by productivity does not tell us that growth would have been necessarily 80 percent as high in the absence of technological change; perhaps in the absence of productivity change, the incentive to accumulate would have been much lower and the resulting capital deepening significantly less. Indeed, to the extent that growth is driven by other fundamental determinants, not directly captured in the growth-accounting framework, the causality may well run backwards, from growth to accumulation and productivity instead of the other way around.
For these reasons it is best to think of accumulation and productivity change as proximate determinants of growth at best. The deeper determinants are shown in Figure 2. While there is no shortage of candidates, a three-fold taxonomy useful:

1. geography;
2. integration (trade); and
3. institutions.

The first of these relates to the advantages and disadvantages posed by a country's physical location (latitude, proximity to navigable waters, climate, and so on). The second relates to market size, and the benefits (as well as costs) of participation in international trade in goods, services, capital, and possibly labor. The third refers to the quality of non-market institutions—ranging from the legal system to broader political institutions—that play an important role in promoting or hindering economic performance.

Figures 3, 4, and 5 display some illustrative scatter plots, showing the relationship between each of these three factors and incomes. I use distance from the equator as the measure for "geography," the share of trade in GDP as the measure of integration, and an index of the quality of institutions. A first pass through the data indicates that all three are significantly correlated with per-capita income. Such correlations are the stock-in-trade of the growth empiricist. The problem however is that neither trade nor the quality of institutions is truly endogenous, which creates severe difficulties of interpretation. I shall return to this issue below.

**Geography.** Geography plays a direct and obvious role in determining income, because natural resource endowments are shaped in large part by it. The quality of natural resources depends on geography. Commodities such as oil, diamonds, and copper, are marketable commodities that can be an important source of income. Soil quality and rainfall determine the
productivity of land. Geography and climate determine the public-health environment (the inhabitants’ proclivity to debilitating diseases such as malaria), and shape the quantity and quality of human capital.

Geography also influences growth via the other two factors. Geography is an important determinant of the extent to which a country can become integrated with world markets, regardless of the country’s own trade policies. A distant, landlocked country faces greater costs of integration. Similarly, geography shapes institutions in a number of ways. The historical experience with colonialism has been a key factor in the institutional development (or lack thereof) of today’s developing countries, and colonialism itself was driven in part by geopolitical considerations—consider the scramble for Africa during the 1880s. The natural resource endowment bequeathed by a country’s geography also shapes the quality of institutions. Natural-resource booms, for example, are often associated with the creation of rent-seeking and rent-distributing institutions—the so-called resource curse.

Geography is arguably the only exogenous factor in our three-fold taxonomy. Trade and institutions are obviously endogenous and co-evolve with economic performance. Nonetheless, it is useful to think of these as deep causal factors to the extent that they are not fully determined by incomes per se. Trade is obviously shaped in large part by a country's conscious choice of policies; and institutional development is at least partly a choice variable as well (or in any case can be determined by developments exogenous to the economy).

Trade. The significance of integration in the world economy as a driver of economic growth has been a persistent theme in the literatures on economic history and development economics. An influential article by Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner (1985) went so far as to argue that countries that are open to trade (by their definition) experience unconditional
arrows in Figure 3. Those who stress the primacy of geography (climate, resources, and health) emphasize the arrows that emanate from that particular box—both to incomes (via endowments and productivity) and to trade and institutions. Those who view integration into the world economy as the key to growth emphasize the outward arrows from trade to incomes and institutions. The institutionalists emphasize the primacy of institution-building, arguing that more trade and higher incomes are the result of better institutions.

Econometric results can be found to support any and all of these categories of arguments. However, very little of this econometric work survives close scrutiny (see the critique by Rodríguez and Rodrik 1999 of the literature on trade), or is able to sway the priors of anyone with strong convictions in other directions. Moreover, there is little reason to believe that the primary causal channels are invariant to time period, initial conditions, or other aspects of a country's circumstances. There may not be universal rules about what makes countries grow. For a small country near major shipping routes, trade may indeed be the shortest route to economic salvation. For a large country located in a geographically disadvantaged region, a period of institution building may be the only way to escape poverty.

III. What Does the Evidence on Growth Really Show?

The "augmented Washington Consensus" goes beyond liberalization and privatization to emphasize the need to create the institutional underpinnings of market economies. The reforms on the list include financial regulation and prudential supervision, governance and anti-corruption, legal and administrative reform, labor-market "flexibility," and social safety nets (Table 1).
Operationally, these institutional reforms have two noteworthy features. First, they are heavily influenced by an Anglo-American conception of what constitutes desirable institutions (as in the preference for arms-length finance over "development banking" and flexible labor markets over institutionalized labor markets). Second, they are driven largely by the requirements of integration into the world economy. The latter explains the emphasis on the international harmonization of regulatory practices, as in the case of financial codes and standards and of the WTO agreements.

As I will discuss below, market economies rely on a wide array of non-market institutions that perform regulatory, stabilizing, and legitimizing functions. The recent emphasis on institutions is therefore highly welcome. However, it needs to be borne in mind that institutional basis for a market economy is not uniquely determined. There is no single mapping between a well-functioning market and the form of non-market institutions required to sustain it. This finds reflection in the wide variety of regulatory, stabilizing, and legitimizing institutions that we observe in today's advanced industrial societies. The American style of capitalism is very different from the Japanese style of capitalism. Both differ from the European style. And even within Europe, there are large differences between the institutional arrangements in, say, Sweden and Germany. Over the long term, each of these variants has performed equally well.4

The point about institutional diversity has in fact a more fundamental implication. The institutional arrangements that we observe in operation today, varied as they are, themselves constitute a subset of the full range of potential institutional possibilities. This is a point that has

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4 One needs to guard against the common journalistic error of supposing that one set of institutional arrangements must dominate the others in terms of overall performance. Hence the fads of the decade: with its low unemployment, high growth, and thriving culture, Europe was the continent to emulate throughout much of the 1970s; during the trade-conscious 1980s, Japan became the exemplar of choice; and the 1990s have been the decade of U.S.-style freewheeling capitalism. It is anybody's guess which set of countries will capture the imagination once the effects of the correction of the U.S. stock market play themselves out.
been forcefully and usefully argued by Roberto Unger (1998). There is no reason to suppose that modern societies have already managed to exhaust all the useful institutional variations that could underpin healthy and vibrant economies. We need to maintain a healthy skepticism towards the idea that a specific type of institution—a particular mode of corporate governance, social security system, or labor market legislation, for example—is the only type that is compatible with a well-functioning market economy.

Leaving aside the question of long-term choice over institutional forms, the augmented Washington Consensus approach also suffers from a fatal flaw insofar as it is presented as a recipe for stimulating economic growth: it provides no sense of priorities among a long and highly demanding list of institutional prerequisites. This kitchen-sink approach to development strategy flies in the face of practical reality and is at odds with the historical experience of today's advanced industrial economies. What are today regarded as key institutional reforms in areas such as corporate governance, financial supervision, trade law, and social safety nets did not take place in Europe or North America until quite late in the economic development process (Chang 2000). Indeed, many of the items on the augmented Washington Consensus agenda (Table 1) should be properly viewed as the outcome of successful economic development rather than a prerequisite thereof.

The reality of growth transformations is that they are instigated by an initially narrow set of policy and institutional initiatives, which might be called "investment strategies" (Rodrik 1999). Adequate human resources, public infrastructure, social peace and stability are all key enabling elements of an investment strategy. But as Prebisch emphasized long ago (see the quote that opens this paper), industrialization is unlikely to happen on its own or purely via foreign trade and investment. What is needed often is a set of targeted policy interventions that
kindle the animal spirits of domestic investors. These investment strategies set off a period of economic growth, which in turn enables a virtuous cycle of institutional development and further growth. The initiating reforms are rarely replicas of each other, and they bear only partial resemblance to the requirements highlighted by the enlightened standard view. Typically, they entail a mix of orthodoxy with unconventional domestic innovations.

I discuss below three sets of investment strategies briefly, to elucidate this central point and to highlight the diversity of paths taken to greater prosperity: import-substitution, East-Asian style outward orientation, and two-track reform strategies.

**Import-substituting industrialization (ISI).** Import-substituting industrialization (ISI) is based on the idea that domestic investment and technological capabilities can be spurred by providing home producers with (temporary) protection against imports. It might seem odd that I include ISI among my successful investment strategies, as this approach to development policy has fallen into disgrace since the 1980s. However, the reality is that ISI did quite well for a substantial period of time in scores of developing nations. Until the first oil shock hit in 1973, no fewer than 42 developing grew at rates exceeding 2.5 percent per capita per annum. At this rate, incomes would double every 28 years or less. Most of these countries followed ISI policies. The list includes twelve countries in South America, six in the Middle East and North Africa, and even 15 in Sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, there were no less than six Sub-Saharan African countries among the 20 fastest-growing developing countries in the world prior to 1973: Swaziland, Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Lesotho, Gabon, and Togo, with Kenya ranking 21st. There can be little doubt that economic growth led to substantial improvements in the living conditions of the vast majority of the households in these countries. Between 1967 and 1977,

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5 The following is based on Rodrik (1999), chapter 4. The reader is referred to this source for further information and references.
life expectancy at birth increased by four years in Brazil (from 58 to 62), by five years in Cote d’Ivoire (from 43 to 48), by five years in Mexico (from 60 to 65), and by five years in Pakistan (from 48 to 53). In Kenya, infant mortality fell from 112 (per 1,000 live births) in 1965 to 72 in 1980.

ISI policies spurred growth by creating protected and therefore profitable home markets for domestic entrepreneurs to invest in. Contrary to received wisdom, ISI-driven growth did not produce technological lags and inefficiency on an economy-wide scale. In fact, the productivity performance of many Latin American and Middle Eastern countries was, in comparative perspective, exemplary. According to estimates produced by Collins and Bosworth (1996), not only was average total facto productivity (TFP) growth during the period preceding the first oil shock quite high in the Middle East and Latin America (at 2.3 and 1.8 percent, respectively), it was actually significantly higher than in East Asia (1.3 percent)! Countries like Brazil, Dominican Republic, and Ecuador in Latin America, Iran, Morocco, and Tunisia in the Middle East, and Cote d’Ivoire and Kenya in Africa all experienced more rapid TFP growth than any of the East Asian countries in this early period (with the possible exception of Hong Kong, for which comparable data are not available). Mexico, Bolivia, Panama, Egypt, Algeria, Tanzania and Zaire experienced higher TFP growth than all but Taiwan. Of course, not all countries following ISI policies did well: Argentina is a striking counter-example, with an average TFP growth of only 0.2 percent during 1960-73.

The dismal reputation of ISI is due partly to the subsequent collapse experienced by many of its adherents in the 1980s, and partly to the influential studies of Little, Scott, Scitovsky (1970) and Balassa and associates (1971). What these two important studies did was to document in detail some of the static economic inefficiencies generated by high and extremely
dispersed rates of effective protection (ERP) in the manufacturing sectors of the countries under study. The discovery of cases of negative value added at world prices—that is, cases where countries would have been better off by throwing away the inputs than by processing them as they did in highly protected plants—was particularly shocking. However, neither study claimed to show that countries which had followed “outward oriented” strategies had been systematically immune from the same kind of inefficiencies. In fact, their evidence can be read as suggesting that there was no such clear dividing line. Moreover, the systematic evidence on TFP growth reviewed above belies the idea that ISI produced more dynamic inefficiency than “outward orientation.”

Hence, as a strategy of industrialization, intended to raise domestic investment and enhance productivity, import substitution apparently worked pretty well in a very broad range of countries until at least the mid-1970s. ISI achieved a more than respectable record as a successful “investment strategy.”

However, starting in the second half of the 1970s, a disaster befell the vast majority of the economies that had been doing well. Of the 42 countries with growth rates above 2.5 percent prior to 1973, less than a third (twelve) managed the same record over the next decade. The Middle East and Latin America, which had led the developing world in TFP growth prior to 1973, not only fell behind, but actually began to experienced negative TFP growth on average. Only East Asia held its own, while South Asia actually improved its performance (see Collins and Bosworth 1996).

\footnote{For example, the figures provided by Little et al. (1970, 174-190) show Taiwan to have had a higher average ERP in manufacturing, as well as greater variation in ERPs, than Mexico long after Taiwan’s trade reforms were introduced. This is significant since we commonly think of these two countries as exemplars of two diametrically opposed styles of development.}
Was this the result of the "exhaustion" of import-substitution policies? As I have argued elsewhere (Rodrik 1999), the common timing implicates the turbulence experienced in the world economy following 1973—the abandonment of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, two major oil shocks, various other commodity boom-and-bust cycles, plus the Volcker interest-rate shock of the early 1980s. The fact that some of the most ardent followers of ISI policies in South Asia (India and Pakistan in particular) managed to either hold on to their growth rates after 1973 (Pakistan) or increase them (India) also suggests that more than just ISI was involved.\(^7\)

The actual story implicates macroeconomic policies rather than the trade regime. The proximate reason for the economic collapse was the inability to adjust macroeconomic policies appropriately in the wake of these external shocks. Macroeconomic maladjustment gave rise to a range of syndromes associated with macroeconomic instability—high or repressed inflation, scarcity of foreign exchange and large black-market premia, external payments imbalances and debt crises—which greatly magnified the real costs of the shocks. Countries that suffered the most were those with the largest increases in inflation and black-market premia for foreign currency. The culprits were poor monetary and fiscal policies and inadequate adjustments in exchange-rate policy, sometimes aggravated by shortsighted policies of creditors and the Bretton Woods institutions. The bottom line is that in those countries that experienced a debt crisis, the crisis was the product of monetary and fiscal policies that were incompatible with sustainable external balances: there was too little expenditure reducing and expenditure switching. Trade and industrial policies had very little to do with bringing on the crisis.

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\(^7\) India did liberalize its trade regime partially and gradually after 1991, but its relative performance began to improve a full decade before these reforms went into effect (in the early 1980s). So India's superior performance after the oil shock cannot be attributed to changes in its trade regime.
Why were some countries quicker to adjust their macroeconomic policies than others? The deeper determinants of growth performance after the 1970s are rooted in the ability of domestic institutions to manage the distributional conflicts triggered by the external shocks of the period. Social conflicts and their management—whether successful or not—played a key role in transmitting the effects of external shocks on to economic performance. Societies with deep social cleavages and poor institutions of conflict management proved worse at handling shocks.  

"Outward-oriented" industrialization. The experience of the East Asian tigers is often presented as one of export-led growth, in which opening up to the world economy unleashed powerful forces of industrial diversification and technological catch-up. However, the conventional account overlooks the active role taken by the Taiwanese and South Korean governments (and Japan before them) in shaping the allocation of resources. In neither of these countries was there significant import liberalization early in the process of growth. Most of their trade liberalization took place in the 1980s, when high growth was already firmly established.

The key to these and other East Asian countries' success was a coherent strategy of raising the return to private investment, through a range of policies that included credit subsidies and tax incentives, educational policies, establishment of public enterprises, export inducements, duty-free access to inputs and capital goods, and actual government coordination of investment plans. In Korea, the chief form of investment subsidy was the extension of credit to large business groups at negative real interest rates. Korean banks were nationalized after the military coup of 1961, and consequently the government obtained exclusive control over the allocation of investible funds in the economy. Another important manner in which investment was subsidized

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8 See Rodrik (1999) for further discussion and evidence on this point.
in Korea was through the socialization of investment risk in selected sectors. This emerged because the government—most notably President Park himself—provided an implicit guarantee that the state would bail out entrepreneurs investing in “desirable” activities if circumstances later threatened the profitability of those investments. In Taiwan, investment subsidies took the form of tax incentives. In both cases, public enterprises played a very important role in enhancing the profitability of private investment by ensuring that key inputs were available locally for private producers downstream. Not only did public enterprises account for a large share of manufacturing output and investment in each country, their importance actually increased during the critical take-off years of the 1960s. Singapore too heavily subsidized investment, but it differs from Korea and Taiwan in that its investment incentives heavily on foreign investors.

While trade policies that spurred exports were part of this complex arsenal of incentives, investment and its promotion was the key goal in all the countries. To that end, governments in Korea and Taiwan freely resorted to unorthodox strategies: they protected the home markets to raise profits, implemented generous export subsidies, encouraged their firms to reverse-engineer foreign patented products, and imposed performance requirements such as export-import balance requirements and domestic content requirements on foreign investors (when foreign companies were allowed in). All of these strategies are now severely restricted under the WTO agreements.

The two-track strategy. A relatively minimal set of reforms in China in the late 1970s set the stage for the phenomenal economic performance that has been any poor country’s envy since then. The initial reforms were relatively simple: they loosened the communal farming system and allowed farmers to sell their crops in free markets once they had fulfilled their quota obligations to the state. Subsequent reforms allowed the creation of township and village
enterprises and the extension of the "market track" into the urban and industrial sectors. Special
economic zones were created to attract foreign investment. What stands out about these reforms
is that they are based on gradualism, experimentation, and dual tracks (state and market "tracks"
co-exist side by side).

One can interpret Chinese-style gradualism in two ways. One perspective, represented
forcefully in work by Sachs and Woo (2000), underplays the relevance of Chinese particularism
by arguing that the successes of the economy are not due to any special aspects of the Chinese
transition to a market economy, but instead are largely due to a convergence of Chinese
institutions to those in non-socialist economies. In this view, the faster the convergence, the
better the outcomes. "[F]avorable outcomes have emerged not because of gradualism, but despite
gradualism" (Sachs and Woo, 2000, 3). The policy message that follows is that countries that
look to China for lessons should focus not on institutional experimentation but on harmonizing
their institutions with those abroad.

The alternative perspective, perhaps best developed in work by Qian and Roland, is that
the peculiarities of the Chinese model represent solutions to particular political or informational
problems for which no blueprint-style solution exists. Hence Lau, Qian, and Roland (1997)
interpret the dual-track approach to liberalization as a way of implementing Pareto-efficient
reforms: an alteration in the planned economy that improves incentives at the margin, enhances
efficiency in resource allocation, and yet leaves none of the plan beneficiaries worse off. Qian,
Roland, and Xu (1999) interpret Chinese style decentralization as allowing the development of
superior institutions of coordination: when economic activity requires products with matched
attributes, local experimentation is a more effective way of processing and using local
knowledge. Qian et al. find much to praise in the Chinese model because they think the system
generates the right incentives for developing the tacit knowledge required to build and sustain a market economy, and therefore are not overly bothered by some of the economic inefficiencies that may be generated along the way.

A less well-known instance of a successful two-track strategy is that of Mauritius. Mauritius' superior economic performance has been built on a peculiar combination of orthodox and heterodox strategies. An export processing zone (EPZ) operating under free-trade principles enabled an export boom in garments to European markets and an accompanying investment boom at home. Yet the island's economy has combined the EPZ with a domestic sector that was highly protected until the mid-1980s. Mauritius is essentially an example of an economy that has followed a two-track strategy similar to that of China. This economic strategy was in turn underpinned by social and political arrangements that encouraged participation, representation and coalition-building.

The circumstances under which the Mauritian EPZ was set up in 1970 are instructive, and highlight the manner in which participatory political systems help design creative strategies for building locally adapted institutions. Given the small size of the home market, it was evident that Mauritius would benefit from an outward-oriented strategy. But as in other developing countries, policy makers had to contend with the import-substituting industrialists who had been propped up by the restrictive commercial policies of the early 1960s prior to independence. These industrialists were naturally opposed to relaxing the trade regime.

A Washington economist would have advocated across-the-board liberalization, without regard to what that might do the precarious ethnic and political balance of the island. The EPZ

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9 The IMF gave Mauritius its highest (i.e., "worst") score on its "policy restrictiveness" index for the early 1990s, and reckoned that the country remained one of the world most protected economies even by the late. See Subramanian (2001).
scheme provided a neat way around the political difficulties. The creation of the EPZ generated new opportunities for trade and employment, without taking protection away from the import-substituting groups and from the male workers who dominated the established industries. The segmentation of labor markets early on between male and female workers—with the latter predominantly employed in the EPZ—was particularly crucial, as it prevented the expansion of the EPZ from driving wages up in the rest of the economy, thereby disadvantaging import-substituting industries. New employment and profit opportunities were created at the margin, while leaving old opportunities undisturbed. This in turn paved the way for the more substantial liberalizations that took place in the mid-1980s and in the 1990s. Mauritius found its own way to economic development because it was able to devise a strategy that was unorthodox, yet effective.

Some conclusions from the empirical record. The experience we have reviewed lends itself to some generalizations. Market incentives, macroeconomic stability, and sound institutions are key to economic development. But these requirements can be generated in a number of different ways—by making the best use of existing capabilities in light of resource and other constraints. There is no single model of a successful transition to a high growth path. Each country has to figure out its own investment strategy. Once the appropriate strategy is identified (or stumbled upon), the institutional reforms needed may not be extensive. Most of institutional development occurs alongside economic development, not as a prerequisite to it.

It is individual initiative that ultimately accounts for all economic progress. The market system is unparalleled in its efficacy in directing individual effort towards the goal of material advancement of society. Early thinking on development policy, as I mentioned in the introduction, did not take sufficient account of this. Structuralists downplayed market incentives
because they viewed them as ineffective in view of pervasive supply and other "structural" constraints. Socialists downplayed market incentives because they viewed them as inconsistent with the attainment of equity and other social goals.

Both fears have turned out to be groundless. Farmers, entrepreneurs, investors all over the world and regardless of income and education levels have revealed themselves to be quite responsive to price incentives. In South Korea and Taiwan, the private sector's strong response to the tax and credit incentives put in place during the early 1960s was a critical instigator of these countries' growth miracles. In China, the dual-track system that allowed farmers to sell their crops in free markets (once their quota obligations were fulfilled) resulted in a large increase in agricultural output and sparked the high growth that has continued to date. After it reformed its cumbersome industrial licensing system, reduced the cost of imported capital goods, and altered relative prices in favor of tradables, India was rewarded with a sharp increase in investment, exports, and growth. While inequality has gotten worse in some of these cases, poverty levels have been reduced in all of them.

So market incentives work. If this were the entire story, the policy conclusion would be equally straightforward: liberalize all markets as fast as you can. This in fact was the message internalized by the advocates of the Washington consensus and the policy makers who listened to them.

But the experience with development during the last half century reveals another striking fact: the best performing countries are those that liberalized partially and gradually. China, of course, stands out in this respect, as its astonishing success since 1978 is due to a strategy based on dual tracks, gradualism and experimentation. Save for Hong Kong, which has always been a laissez-faire haven, all the other East Asian success cases have followed gradualist reform paths.
India, which has done very well since the 1980s, has also liberalized only partially. How much reform did it take for India to leave behind its "Hindu rate of growth" of three percent a year? DeLong (2001) shows that the conventional account of India, which emphasizes the liberalizing reforms of the early 1990s as the turning point, is wrong in many ways. He documents that the growth take-off came not in the 1990s, but in the 1980s. What seems to have set off growth were some relatively minor reforms. Under Rajiv Gandhi, the government made some tentative moves to encourage capital-goods imports, relax industrial regulations, and rationalize the tax system. The consequence was an economic boom incommensurate with the modesty of the reforms. DeLong speculates that the change in official attitudes in the 1980s, towards encouraging rather than discouraging entrepreneurial activities and integration into the world economy, and a belief that the rules of the economic game had changed for good may have had a bigger impact on growth than any significant policy reforms.

All these countries unleashed the energies of their private sectors, but did so in a cautious, controlled manner. An important reason why gradualist strategies worked in the cases mentioned is that they were better tailored to pre-existing institutions at home. They therefore economized on institution building.¹⁰ South Korea used a repressed, heavily controlled financial system to channel credit to industrial firms willing to undertake investments. The textbook alternative of financial liberalization coupled with investment tax credits might have been more efficient on paper, but was unlikely to work as well in the Korea of the 1960s and 1970s and pay off so quickly. Instead of relying on dual-track pricing, China could have liberalized agricultural prices completely and then compensate the urban dwellers and the treasury through tax reforms, but it would have taken years if not decades for the new institutions to be erected.

¹⁰ See Qian (1999) for a good account of China's experience along these lines.
(a) Property rights

It is possible to envisage a thriving socialist market economy in theory, as the famous debates of the 1920s established. But today's prosperous economies have all been built on the basis of private property. As North and Thomas (1973) and North and Weingast (1989), among many others have argued, the establishment of secure and stable property rights have been a key element in the rise of the West and the onset of modern economic growth. An entrepreneur does not have the incentive to accumulate and innovate unless s/he has adequate control over the return to the assets that are thereby produced or improved.

Note that the key word is "control" rather than "ownership." Formal property rights do not count for much if they do not confer control rights. By the same token, sufficiently strong control rights may work adequately even in the absence of formal property rights. Russia today represents a case where shareholders have property rights but often lack effective control over enterprises. Township and village enterprises (TVEs) in China are an example where control rights have spurred entrepreneurial activity despite the absence of clearly defined property rights. As these instances illustrate, establishing "property rights" is rarely a matter of just passing a piece of legislation. Legislation in itself is neither necessary nor sufficient for the provision of the secure control rights. In practice, control rights are upheld by a combination of legislation, private enforcement, and custom and tradition. They may be distributed more narrowly or more diffusely than property rights. Stakeholders can matter as much as shareholders.

Moreover, property rights are rarely absolute, even when set formally in the law. The right to keep my neighbor out of my orchard does not normally extend to my right to shooting him if he actually enters it. Other laws or norms--such as those against murder--may trump property rights. Each society decides for itself the scope of allowable property rights and the
acceptable restrictions on their exercise. Intellectual property rights are protected assiduously in the United States and most advanced societies, but not in many developing countries. On the other hand, zoning and environmental legislation restricts the ability of households and enterprises in the rich countries to do as they please with their "property" to a much greater extent than is the case in developing countries. All societies recognize that private property rights can be curbed if doing so serves a greater public purpose. It is the definition of what constitutes "greater public purpose" that varies.

(b) Regulatory institutions

Markets fail when participants engage in fraudulent or anti-competitive behavior. They fail when transaction costs prevent the internalizing of technological and other non-pecuniary externalities. And they fail when incomplete information results in moral hazard and adverse selection. Economists recognize these failures and have developed the analytical tools required to think systematically about their consequences and possible remedies. Theories of the second best, imperfect competition, agency, mechanism design, and many others offer an almost embarrassing choice of regulatory instruments to counter market failures. Theories of political economy and public choice offer cautions against unqualified reliance on these instruments.

In practice, every successful market economy is overseen by a panoply of regulatory institutions, regulating conduct in goods, services, labor, asset, and financial markets. A few acronyms form the U.S. will suffice to give a sense of the range of institutions involved: FTC, FDIC, FCC, FAA, OSHA, SEC, EPA, and so on. In fact, the freer are the markets, the greater is the burden on the regulatory institutions. It is not a coincidence that the United States has the world's freest markets as well its toughest anti-trust enforcement. It is hard to envisage in any
country other than the United States a hugely successful high-tech company like Microsoft being dragged through the courts for alleged anti-competitive practices. The lesson that market freedom requires regulatory vigilance has been driven home recently by the experience in East Asia. In South Korea and Thailand, as in so many other developing countries, financial liberalization and capital-account opening led to financial crisis precisely because of inadequate prudential regulation and supervision.\(^{12}\)

It is important to recognize that regulatory institutions may need to extend beyond the standard list covering anti-trust, financial supervision, securities regulation and a few others. This is true especially in developing countries where market failures may be more pervasive and the requisite market regulations more extensive. Recent models of coordination failure and capital market imperfections\(^{13}\) make it clear that strategic government interventions may often be required to get out of low-level traps and elicit desirable private investment responses. The experience of South Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s and 1970s can be interpreted in that light. The extensive subsidization and government-led coordination of private investment in these two economies played a crucial role in setting the stage for self-sustaining growth (Rodrik 1995). It is clear that many other countries have tried and failed to replicate these institutional arrangements. And even South Korea may have taken a good thing too far by maintaining the cozy institutional linkages between the government and chaebols well into the 1990s, at which point these may have become dysfunctional. Once again, the lesson is that desirable institutional

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\(^{12}\) See also the recent paper by Johnson and Shleifer (1999) that attributes the more impressive development of equity markets in Poland compared to the Czech Republic to the stronger regulations in the former country upholding minority shareholder rights and guarding against fraud.

\(^{13}\) See Hoff and Stiglitz (1999) for a useful survey and discussion.
arrangements vary, and that they vary not only across countries but also within countries over time.

(c) Institutions for macroeconomic stabilization

Since Keynes, we have come to a better understanding of the reality that capitalist economies are not necessarily self-stabilizing. Keynes and his followers worried about shortfalls in aggregate demand and the resulting unemployment. More recent views of macroeconomic instability stress the inherent instability of financial markets and its transmission to the real economy. All advanced economies have come to acquire fiscal and monetary institutions that perform stabilizing functions, having learned the hard way about the consequences of not having them. Probably most important among these institutions is a lender of last resort—typically the central bank—which guards against self-fulfilling banking crises.

There is a strong current within macroeconomics thought, represented in its theoretically most sophisticated version by the real business cycles (RBC) approach—that disputes the possibility or effectiveness of stabilizing the macroeconomy through monetary and fiscal policies. There is also a sense in policy circles, particularly in Latin America, that fiscal and monetary institutions—as currently configured—have added to macroeconomic instability, rather than reduced it, by following pro-cyclical rather than anti-cyclical policies (Hausmann and Gavin 1996). These developments have spurred the trend towards central bank independence, and helped open a new debate on designing more robust fiscal institutions.

Some countries (Argentina being the most significant example) have given up on a domestic lender of last resort altogether by replacing their central bank with a currency board. The Argentine calculation is that having a central bank that can occasionally stabilize the
economy is not worth running the risk that the central bank will mostly destabilize it. Argentine history gives plenty of reason to think that this is not a bad bet. But can the same be said for Mexico or Brazil, or for that matter, Turkey or Indonesia? A substantial real depreciation of the rupee, engineered via nominal devaluations, was a key ingredient of India's superlative economic performance during the 1990s. What may work for Argentina may not work for the others. The debate over currency boards and dollarization illustrates the obvious, but occasionally neglected fact that the institutions needed by a country are not independent of that country's history.

(c) Institutions for social insurance

A modern market economy is one where change is constant and idiosyncratic (i.e., individual-specific) risk to incomes and employment is pervasive. Modern economic growth entails a transition from a static economy to a dynamic one where the tasks that workers perform are in constant evolution and movement up and down in the income scale is frequent. One of the liberating effects of a dynamic market economy is that it frees individuals from their traditional entanglements--the kin group, the church, the village hierarchy. The flip side is that it uproots them from traditional support systems and risk-sharing institutions. Gift exchanges, the fiesta, and kinship ties--to cite just a few of the social arrangements for equalizing the distribution of resources in traditional societies--lose much of their social insurance functions. And the risks that have to be insured against become much less manageable in the traditional manner as markets spread.

The huge expansion of publicly provided social insurance programs during the 20th century is one of the most remarkable features of the evolution of advanced market economies. In the United States, it was the trauma of the Great Depression that paved the way for the major
institutional innovations in this area: social security, unemployment compensation, public works, public ownership, deposit insurance, and legislation favoring unions (see Bordo et al., 1998, 6). As Jacoby (1998) notes, prior to the Great Depression the middle classes were generally able to self-insure or buy insurance from private intermediaries. As these private forms of insurance collapsed, the middle classes threw their considerable political weight behind the extension of social insurance and the creation of what would later be called the welfare state. In Europe, the roots of the welfare state reached in some cases to the tail end of the 19th century. But the striking expansion of social insurance programs, particularly in the smaller economies most open to foreign trade, was a post-World War II phenomenon (Rodrik 1998). Despite a considerable political backlash against the welfare state since the 1980s, neither the U.S. nor Europe has significantly scaled back these programs.

Social insurance need not always take the form of transfer programs paid out of fiscal resources. The East Asian model, represented well by the Japanese case, is one where social insurance is provided through a combination of enterprise practices (such as lifetime employment and enterprise-provided social benefits), sheltered and regulated sectors (mom-and-pop stores), and an incremental approach to liberalization and external opening. Certain aspects of Japanese society that seem inefficient to outside observers—such as the preference for small-scale retail stores or extensive regulation of product markets—can be viewed as substitutes for the transfer programs that would otherwise have to be provided (as it is in most European nations) by a welfare state. Such complementarities among different institutional arrangements within a society have the important implication that it is very difficult to alter national systems in a piecemeal fashion. One cannot (or should not) ask the Japanese to get rid of their lifetime employment practices or inefficient retail arrangements without ensuring that alternative safety
nets are in place. Another implication is that substantial institutional changes come only in the aftermath of large dislocations, such as those created by the Great Depression or the Second World War.

Social insurance legitimizes a market economy because it renders it compatible with social stability and social cohesion. At the same time, the existing welfare states in Western Europe and the United States engender a number of economic and social costs—mounting fiscal outlays, an "entitlement" culture, long-term unemployment—which have become increasingly apparent. Partly because of that, developing countries, such as those in Latin America that adopted the market-oriented model following the debt crisis of the 1980s, have not paid sufficient attention to creating institutions of social insurance. The upshot has been economic insecurity and a backlash against the reforms. How these countries will maintain social cohesion in the face of large inequalities and volatile outcomes, both of which are being aggravated by the growing reliance on market forces, is a question without an obvious answer at the moment. But if Latin America and the other developing regions are to carve a different path in social insurance than that followed by Europe or North America, they will have to develop their own vision—and their own institutional innovations—to bridge the tension between market forces and the yearning for economic security.

(d) Institutions of conflict management

Societies differ in their cleavages. Some are made up of an ethnically and linguistically homogenous population marked by a relatively egalitarian distribution of resources (Finland?). Others are characterized by deep cleavages along ethnic or income lines (Nigeria?). These divisions hamper social cooperation and prevent the undertaking of mutually beneficial projects.
Social conflict is harmful both because it diverts resources from economically productive activities and because it discourages such activities by the uncertainty it generates. Economists have used models of social conflict to shed light on questions such as the following. Why do governments delay stabilizations when delay imposes costs on all groups (Alesina and Drazen 1991)? Why do countries rich in natural resources often do worse than countries that are resource-poor (Tornell and Lane 1999)? Why do external shocks often lead to protracted economic crises that are out of proportion to the direct costs of the shocks themselves (Rodrik 1999b)?

All of these can be thought of as instances of coordination failure in which social factions fail to coordinate on outcomes which would be of mutual benefit. Healthy societies have a range of institutions that make such colossal coordination failures less likely. The rule of law, a high-quality judiciary, representative political institutions, free elections, independent trade unions, social partnerships, institutionalized representation of minority groups, and social insurance are examples of such institutions. What makes these arrangements function as institutions of conflict management is that they entail a double "commitment technology:" they warn the potential "winners" of social conflict that their gains will be limited, and assure the "losers" that they will not be expropriated. They tend to increase the incentives for social groups to cooperate by reducing the payoff to socially uncooperative strategies.

V. Implications for International Governance and Conditionality

My argument so far can be summarized with the four propositions below:

1) market incentives are critical to economic development;

2) market incentives need to be underpinned by strong public institutions;
3) market economies are compatible with a diverse range of institutional arrangements;
4) the greater the fit between market-oriented reforms and pre-existing institutional
capabilities, the higher is the probability of success.

The first two propositions are now widely accepted, and they form the foundation of an augmented Washington Consensus. According to the revised Consensus, liberalization, privatization and global integration are no less important, but they need to be supplemented and supported by reforms in the area of governance. But the importance of the third and fourth points is not adequately recognized.

We see the new Consensus in operation in a number of different areas. In the aftermath of the Asian crisis, for example, IMF programs in the region proscribed a long list of structural reforms in the areas of business-government relations, banking, corporate governance, bankruptcy laws, labor-market institutions, and industrial policy. A key component of the new International Financial Architecture is a set of codes and standards—on fiscal transparency, monetary and financial policy, banking supervision, data dissemination, corporate governance and structure, accounting standards—designed for application in all countries, but targeted especially on developing countries. And ever since the Uruguay Round, global trade negotiations have resulted in a number of agreements—in intellectual property rights, subsidies, and investment-related measures—that harmonize practices in the developing countries with those in the more advanced countries.

Hence, as it comes to be operationalized, the new view of development results in a ratcheting up of conditionality and a narrowing of the space within which policy can be conducted. In general, this is undesirable for a number of reasons. First, it is ironic that this is happening at precisely the moment when our comprehension of how the global economy works
and what small countries need to do to prosper within it has been revealed to be sorely lacking. It was not so long ago that East Asia's export-orientation and high investment rates were assumed to provide protection against the kind of external crisis that periodically rocks Latin America. A common exercise in the aftermath of the 1995 tequila crisis was to compare the two regions in terms of their current-account deficits, real exchange rates, export-GDP ratios, and investment rates to show how East Asia, for the most part, looked "better." East Asia had its critics of course, but what the critics had in mind was a gradual running out of steam and not the meltdown that transpired.¹⁴

Second, as I have emphasized above (point (3) above), market capitalism is compatible with a variety of institutional arrangements. The new Consensus either rejects this view (the extreme "convergence" view) or underestimates its significance in practice. The new set of external disciplines come hand-in-hand with a particular model of economic development that is in fact untested even in the historical experience of today's advanced countries. These disciplines foreclose some development strategies that have worked in the past, and others that could work in the future. The narrowing of national autonomy in the formulation of development strategy is a cost for which developing countries are unlikely to receive an adequate reward.

Third, the practical difficulties of implementing many of the institutional reforms under discussion are severely underestimated. Today's developed countries did not get their regulatory and legal institutions overnight. It would be nice if third-world countries could somehow acquire first-world institutions, but the safe bet is that this will happen only when they are no longer

¹⁴ "I have learned more about how this new international financial system works in the last twelve months than in the previous 20 years," Alan Greenspan acknowledged recently (quoted in Thomas L. Friedman, "A Manifesto for the Fast World" New York Times Magazine, March 28, 1999, p. 71).
third-world countries. A strategy that tailors market-based reforms to existing institutional capabilities is more likely to bear fruit in the short run (point (4) above).

None of this is to suggest that the specific institutional reforms that dominate the agendas of the Bretton Woods institutions are without merit. No one can be seriously against the introduction of proper accounting standards or against improved prudential supervision of financial intermediaries. While some of the standards are likely to backfire in practice, the more serious concerns are twofold. First, these standards are the wedge with which a broader set of policy and institutional preferences—in favor of open capital accounts, deregulated labor markets, arms-length finance, American-style corporate governance, and hostile to industrial policies—are imparted on the recipient countries. Second, the agenda focuses too much on institutional reforms needed to make the world safe for capital flows, and therefore necessarily diverts political capital and attention from institutional reforms in other areas. The risk is that such an approach privileges freedom of international trade and capital mobility in the name of "sound" economic policy, and that it does so at the cost of neglecting other goals of development policy that may potentially clash with it.

Whatever shape the evolving architecture of the international economy takes, therefore, an important goal should be to leave space for developing countries to experiment with their own strategies.

VI. How Important is International Economic Integration?

As indicated in the previous section, the requirements of global economic integration have come to exert a long shadow over the design of development policies. Developing countries are incessantly lectured about the long list of requirements they have to fulfill in order
to integrate into the world economy. The trouble with the current discourse on globalization is that it confuses ends with means. A truly development-oriented strategy requires a shift in emphasis. Integration into the world economy has to be viewed as an instrument for achieving economic growth and development, not as an ultimate goal. Maximizing trade and capital flows is not and should not be the objective of development policy.

No country has developed successfully by turning its back on international trade and long-term capital flows. Very few countries have grown over long periods of time without experiencing an increase in the share of foreign trade in their national product. As Yamazawa (1999, 2) puts it, "no developing economy can develop within its protected wall." In practice, the most compelling mechanism that links trade with growth in developing countries is that imported capital goods are likely to be significantly cheaper than those manufactured at home. Policies that restrict imports of capital equipment, raise the price of capital goods at home, and thereby reduce real investment levels have to be viewed as undesirable prima facie. Exports, in turn, are important since that is what one purchases imported capital equipment with.

But it is equally true that no country has developed simply by opening itself up to foreign trade and investment. The trick in the successful cases has been to combine the opportunities offered by world markets with a domestic investment strategy to stimulate the animal spirits of domestic entrepreneurs. As mentioned earlier, almost all of the outstanding cases involve partial and gradual opening up to imports and foreign investment. There is simply no evidence that across the board trade liberalization is systematically associated with higher growth rates. Multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, and the OECD regularly promulgate advice predicated on the belief that openness generates predictable and positive consequences for growth. In fact, the available evidence on this is not nearly as strong as it is made out to be.
(a) The evidence on trade liberalization

Recently, Francisco Rodríguez and I (1999) have reviewed the extensive empirical literature on the relationship between trade policy and growth. We reached the conclusion that there is a significant gap between the message that the consumers of this literature have derived and the "facts" that the literature has actually demonstrated. The gap emerges from a number of factors. In many cases, the indicators of "openness" used by researchers are problematic as measures of trade barriers or are highly correlated with other sources of poor economic performance. In other cases, the empirical strategies used to ascertain the link between trade policy and growth have serious shortcomings, the removal of which results in significantly weaker findings.\(^\text{15}\)

Hence the nature of the relationship between trade policy and economic growth remains very much an open question. The issue is far from having been settled on empirical grounds. There are in fact reasons to be skeptical that there is a general, unambiguous relationship between trade openness and growth waiting to be discovered. The relationship is likely to be a contingent one, dependent on a host of country and external characteristics. The fact that practically all of today's advanced countries embarked on their growth behind tariff barriers, and reduced protection only subsequently, surely offers a clue of sorts. Note also that the modern theory of endogenous growth yields an ambiguous answer to the question of whether trade liberalization promotes growth. The answer varies depending on whether the forces of comparative advantage push the economy's resources in the direction of activities that generate

\(^{15}\) Our detailed analysis covers the four papers that are probably the best known in the field: Dollar (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995), Ben-David (1993), and Edwards (1998).
long-run growth (via externalities in research and development, expanding product variety, upgrading product quality, and so on) or divert them from such activities.

Indeed, the complementarity between market incentives and public institutions that I have repeatedly emphasized has been no less important in the area of trade performance. In East Asia, the role of governments in getting exports out during the early stages of growth has been studied and documented extensively (Amsden 1989; Wade 1990). Even in Chile, the exemplar of free-market orientation, post-1985 export success has been dependent on a wide range of government policies, including subsidies, tax exemptions, duty drawback schemes, publicly provided market research, and public initiatives fostering scientific expertise. After listing some of the pre- and post-1973 public policies promoting the fruit, fishery, and forestry sectors in Chile, Maloney (1997, 59-60) concludes: “It is fair to wonder if these, three of the most dynamic export sectors, could have responded to the play of market forces in the manner they have without the earlier and concurrent government support.”

The appropriate conclusion to draw from all this is not that trade protection should be preferred to trade liberalization as a rule. There is no credible evidence from the last 50 years that trade protection is systematically associated with higher growth. The point is simply that the benefits of trade openness should not be oversold. When other worthwhile policy objectives compete for scarce administrative resources and political capital, deep trade liberalization often does not deserve the high priority it typically receives in development strategies. This is a lesson that is of particular importance to countries (such as those in Africa) that are in the early stages of reform.

(b) The evidence on capital-account liberalization
The evidence on the benefits of capital-account liberalization is even weaker.\textsuperscript{16} On paper, the appeal of capital mobility is obvious. In the absence of market imperfections, freedom to trade enhances efficiency, and that is as true of trade in paper assets as it is of trade in widgets. But financial markets suffer from various syndromes--informational asymmetries, agency problems, self-fulfilling expectations, bubbles (rational and otherwise), and myopia--to an extent that makes their economic analysis inherently a second-best one. No amount of institutional tinkering is likely to make a significant difference to that basic fact of life.

The question of whether developing nations should be pushed to open their capital accounts (in an "orderly and progressive" manner as it is now recommended by the IMF) can ultimately be resolved only on the basis of empirical evidence. While there is plenty of evidence that financial crash often follows financial liberalization (see Williamson and Mahar 1998 for a survey), we have very little evidence that suggests higher rates of economic growth follow capital-account liberalization. Quinn (1997) reports a positive association between capital account liberalization and long-run growth, while Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995), Rodrik (1998), and Kraay (1998)--the last author using Quinn's (1997) own indicator of capital-account restrictions--find no relationship. Klein and Olivei (1999) report a positive relationship, but one largely driven by the experience of the developed countries in their sample. This is a field of inquiry that remains in its infancy, and there is clearly much more to be learned. The least that can be said at present is that convincing evidence on the benefits of capital-account liberalization has yet to be produced.

Among all the arguments in favor of international capital mobility perhaps the most appealing one is that such mobility serves a useful disciplining function on government policy.

\textsuperscript{16} This discussion on capital-account convertibility is based on Rodrik (2000).
Governments that have to be responsive to investors cannot squander their society's resources as easily. As Larry Summers (1998) puts it, "market discipline is the best means the world has found to ensure that capital is well used."

The idea is attractive, but once again one has to question its empirical relevance. When foreign creditors suffer from the syndromes noted above, a government intent on irresponsible spending finds it easier to finance its expenditures when it can borrow from abroad. Moreover, for such a government even domestic borrowing becomes politically less costly because, in a world of free capital mobility, there is no crowding out of private investors (since the latter can borrow from abroad). In both instances, international financial markets allow reckless spending that might not have taken place in their absence. Conversely, the discipline that markets exert in the aftermath of crises can be excessive and arbitrary, as discussed previously. As Willett (1998) points out, the appropriate characterization of market discipline is that it comes too late, and that when it comes it is typically too much.

A recent paper Mukand (1998) develops the analytics of such situations nicely. Consider the following stylized set-up suggested by Mukand's (1998) framework. Let there be two actors, a government (G) and a foreign investor (F), who have to decide on what actions to pursue when the underlying state of the world is not observable. The state of the world can be either "neat" or "messy." G receives a private signal about the state and then chooses a policy (which is then observed by F). The policy can be either "orthodox" or "heterodox." Assume the orthodox (heterodox) policy produces larger surplus in aggregate when the state of the world is neat (messy). The foreign investor F wants to invest only when there is a match between policy and the expected state (orthodox/neat or heterodox/messy). Further, F believes (perhaps incorrectly)
that the productivity of its investment will be higher under the orthodox/neat combination than under the heterodox/messy combination, and will invest more when he expects the first scenario.

Mukand (1998) demonstrates that the government may have two reasons to follow the orthodox policy under these circumstances, even when it receives a signal that the underlying state is messy (and therefore the heterodox policy would have been more appropriate). He calls the resulting biases "conformity bias" and "good-news bias." These can be explained as follows.

1. **Conformity bias:** Let F have a strong and unmovable prior that the state is neat. Even if G's posterior is sufficiently strong that state is messy, G may want to follow orthodox anyway because it will not be able to sway F's beliefs (posterior), and G may be better off having the investment and following the wrong policy than not having the investment and following the right (i.e. aggregate surplus-maximizing) policy.

2. **Good-news bias:** When F's posterior can be affected by G's choice of policy, G may want to follow orthodox policy to signal neat state and move F's state expectation to "neat," because more investment will be forthcoming when F expects the neat state rather than the messy state (assuming there is a match between expected state and policy in both cases).

Note that for the second scenario to materialize it is not necessary for the productivity of investment to be actually higher under orthodox/neat than under heterodox/messy. All that is needed is that the foreign investors believe so. In either case, the government finds itself driven by "market sentiment" to follow policies that are inappropriate and fall short of the optimum.

Governments do need discipline of course. However, in modern societies this discipline is provided by democratic institutions—elections, opposition parties, independent courts, parliamentary debate, a free press and other civil liberties. Governments that mess up their economies are punished at the polls. The broad cross-national evidence suggests that democratic nations tend to be pretty good at maintaining responsible fiscal and monetary policies. Most significant cases of fiscal profligacy occur under authoritarian regimes rather than democratic ones. It was military dictatorships that got Latin America into its debt crisis, and democracies
that cleaned up the mess. In Asia, democratic countries such as India and Sri Lanka have exemplary macroeconomic records by Latin American or African standards. Africa's only two long-running democracies (Mauritius and Botswana) have done an excellent job of managing booms and busts in the prices of their main exports (sugar and diamonds). Among the transition economies, the most successful stabilizations have occurred in the most democratic countries. One finds a strong negative association between the Freedom House index of democracy and the average inflation rate in a sample of more than 100 countries, after controlling for per-capita income. The international-capital-mobility-as-discipline position embodies a view of politics that is at best partial, and at worst harmful to democracy.

Finally, as pointed out above, the pursuit of the capital-account liberalization agenda has the effect of crowding out policy makers' agenda and diverting their energies from national development efforts. A finance minister that is spending all of his/her time mollifying investor sentiment and marketing the economy to foreign bankers is one that is spending no time on traditional developmental concerns: reducing poverty, mobilizing resources, and setting investment priorities. In the end, it is global markets that end up dictating policy, not domestic priorities.

VII. Concluding Remarks

The lesson of the twentieth century is that successful development requires markets underpinned by solid public institutions. Today's advanced industrial countries—the United States, Western European nations, Japan—owe their success to having evolved their own specific workable models of a mixed economy. While these societies are alike in the emphasis they place on private property, sound money, and the rule of law, they are dissimilar in many
other areas: their practices in the areas of labor-market relations, social insurance, corporate
governance, product-market regulation, and taxation differ substantially.

All of these models are in constant evolution, and none is without its problems.

European-style welfare capitalism seemed especially appealing during the 1970s. Japan became
the model to emulate during the 1980s. And the 1990s have clearly been the decade of
freewheeling capitalism American-style. Evaluated in an appropriately historical perspective, all
of these models have been equally successful. The evidence from the second half of the
twentieth century is that none of these models clearly dominates the others. It would be a
mistake to hold up American-style capitalism as the model to which the rest of the world must
converge.

Of course, all successful societies are open to learning, especially from useful precedents
in other societies. Japan is a good example of this. When Japan's legal system was reformed and
codified under the Meiji restoration, it was Germany's civil and commercial law that served as
the primary model. So my emphasis on institutional diversity and non-convergence should not
be viewed as a rejection of institutional innovation via imitation. What is important is that
imported "blueprints" be filtered through local practices and needs. Once again, Japan provides
the example. As Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard (1999, 11) discuss, Japan's selection of the
German legal system was an informed choice, not an imposition from abroad: "extensive debates
about the adoption of English or French law, and several drafts based on the French model
preceded the promulgation of codes that were largely based on the German model." In other
words, Japanese reformers consciously selected among the codes that were available those that
seemed the most suitable to their circumstances.
What is true of today's advanced countries is also true of developing countries. Economic development ultimately derives from a home-grown strategy, and not from the world market. Policy makers in developing countries should avoid fads, put globalization in perspective, and focus on domestic institution building. They should have more confidence in themselves and in domestic institution building, and place less faith on the global economy and blueprints emanating therefrom.
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TABLE 1

**The Original Washington Consensus**

- Fiscal discipline
- Reorientation of public expenditures
- Tax reform
- Financial liberalization
- Unified and competitive exchange rates
- Trade liberalization
- Openness to DFI
- Privatization
- Deregulation
- Secure property rights

**The Augmented Washington Consensus**

The original list plus:

- Legal/political reform
- Regulatory institutions
- Corruption
- Labor market flexibility
- WTO agreements
- Financial codes and standards
- “Prudent” capital-account opening
- Non-intermediate exchange rate regimes
- Social safety nets
- Poverty reduction
Figure 1: How economists think of income determination:

\[
y = ak^\alpha (hl)^{1-\alpha}
\]

\[
\hat{y} - \hat{i} = \alpha (\hat{k} - \hat{i}) + (1 - \alpha)\hat{h} + \hat{a}
\]

per-capita = capital + human capital + productivity

GDP growth = deepening + accumulation + growth
Figure 2: All of development economics on one page

income

endogenous

endowments

productivity

partly endogenous

trade

institutions

exogenous

geography
Figure 3: Partial association between income and distance from equator
Figure 4: Partial association between income and quality of institutions
Figure 5: Partial association between income and trade