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Economic Commission for Latin America

TOWARD DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVES */

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1. The problem

Can one add anything relevant to the present conjuncture and the foreseeable future to the debate over styles of development for Latin America? During the 1970s the real processes of "development" intensified the traits of dynamism, improvidence and inequity that the debate over styles aspired to influence for the better. The debate helped toward a proliferation of "Declarations" and "Plans of Action" endorsed by the governments of the region, but the value-oriented priorities proclaimed in these texts had little to do with the policies the governments applied, and less to do with what actually happened. Most countries of the region received capital inflows on a scale beyond the fondest hopes of the governments a few years previously. Production and consumption rose and diversified. The societies "modernized" rapidly if contradictorily. The debate over styles finally seemed to lose relevance; even if major changes in the real styles might be desirable, they were neither needed nor practicable.

The present conjuncture is one of bleak awakening. The efforts of governments and political movements to find a way ahead face crippling constraints, deriving not only from the external debt burden and the dictates of creditors, but also from the structures of the societies and economies that have taken shape and the reflections of these structures in values and expectations. Authoritarian, neoliberal, developmentalist, reformist and revolutionary prescriptions are all in disarray. One might expect a bewildered resentment among the groups that benefited briefly from the style of "development" and from those excluded and now more impoverished than ever. One might also expect that the groups that presided over this style will be even less scrupulous than before in their choice of tactics to keep their gains and shift the costs of crisis elsewhere.

At the same time, the region is experiencing a reinvigoration of popular movements and democratic initiatives, differing widely in content and intensity from country to country, but almost as generalized as the crisis itself. Several countries have shifted from military-authoritarian to pluralist democratic regimes, and it is probable that this trend will continue during the immediate future.

/The trend
The trend is obviously precarious. If the democratic régimes cannot extricate themselves from the thankless role of administrators of the bankruptcy left by their predecessors, they will represent one more recurrence in the disillusioning cycle of pseudo-democracy and real authoritarianism that Latin America has experienced for too long. And the next authoritarian recurrence, confronting economic stagnation, the same debt burden, and popular mobilization, would have to be even more brutally "concentrating and excluding" than its predecessors.

The problem before us, then, is to study the viability of democratic or "social democratic" 

alternatives in the present conjuncture in terms that will be accessible and helpful to the intellectual, political, and bureaucratic actors that are seeking to make such alternatives viable. A recent attempt to identify the "fundamental orientations" of the new democratic ideology emerging in Latin America, juxtaposed to a formulation of the inescapable tasks confronting democratic régimes and movements, offers a promising starting point. Four orientations are distinguished: "1) la idea de una difusión y consolidación de prácticas efectivas de autogobierno; 2) la idea de un proceso de expansión de los ámbitos de vida sometidos a control personal; 3) la idea de la necesidad de un proceso de fragmentación o socialización del poder; 4) la idea de una restitución (que es a la vez superación) a la colectividad de capacidades y potencialidades personales, que se encuentran perdidos en el juego de estructuras sociales, autonomizados en la relación con las mujeres y los hombres que las padecen". This new democratic ideology tends to be anti-State. "No sólo torna sospechosa la concentración de poder en el Estado -la que para las ideologías progresistas del pasado era un desideratum obvio, casi natural-, sino que acusa también una marcada hostilidad hacia las expresiones contemporáneas de estatismo: control y dirección tecnoburocráticos, la legitimidad del experto como fundamento de autoridad."2/ The same author states that "the democratic political society constitutes itself primordially through processes of free rational public deliberation".3/

Another possibly useful way of looking at the environment for democratic alternatives proposes the recognition and acceptance of a permanent tripartite tension involving the State and its agents; the political parties and other movements organized at the national level that aspire to represent the people, and dominate
and dominate or influence the State; and, finally, the people themselves with their localized and informal groupings. "Each of these actors needs the other two but its limitations demonstrated by experience justify distrust on the part of the others. History has been equally unkind to theories of the state as embodiment of ideal rationality and guardian of the general welfare; of vanguard parties equipped by theory to guide a destined class to power; and of the people as sources of democratic controls over state and parties ... The present mutations in the world order, the perverse consequences of the myths of development as well as the myths of revolution, are generating new paradoxes in the attempts of the state, political movements and people to make sense of each other, to manipulate each other, or to dispense with each other." In the present conjuncture, it is peculiarly difficult for each collective actor to make sense of the others, if only as a basis for a "survival strategy".

The first task of the democratic régimes now emerging is to cope with crisis effectively enough to recover a reasonable degree of autonomy in economic and social policy; distribute sacrifices in a manner perceived as fair; curb disorganization, arbitrariness and corruption in the public administration; and invigorate investment and production. Democratic movements not yet in power need to demonstrate that they can cope similarly if given the opportunity. The régimes and movements need to mobilize wide enough consensus among different social forces so that they can act coherently in the face of inevitable external and internal resistances or sabotage. The idea of a "national pact" as a means of educating the public, securing public participation in policy formulation, and committing the public to support the pact once agreed on has thus come to the fore. But who are to participate in drawing up the pact and who are to agree to honour it, if one thinks in terms of the fundamental orientations and tensions outlined above?

The following is one of the more concrete proposals: "La formulación y ejecución del acuerdo deben apoyarse en una información amplia y permanente a la opinión pública sobre los datos y variables fundamentales del cuadro económico y social. ... El Acuerdo sería elaborado por el Poder Ejecutivo Nacional y sometido, para su aprobación, al órgano representativo de la voluntad popular: el Congreso. /Los legisladores,
Los legisladores, que representan las diversas corrientes de opinión de la sociedad argentina, someterían la propuesta del Ejecutivo a un debate profundo. La decisión del Congreso sancionaría el compromiso político que respaldaría el Acuerdo. El Poder Ejecutivo Nacional establecería inmediatamente los cauces de consulta y concertación para que las entidades representativas de los sectores sociales y económicos se informaran en profundidad del contenido del Acuerdo y de sus repercusiones sobre los intereses sectoriales y privados.5/

Proposals of this kind rest on the same optimistic rationalism and faith in the basic harmony of social interests as did the development planning doctrines of the 1960s. Underneath the democratic procedures the supposition lingers that experts can find correct solutions and that if these solutions are submitted to democratic debate the representatives of the public will endorse them with minor amendments and the public will then feel committed to act on them. One may have doubts on the extent to which different sectors of the public will digest and accept the impartiality of the information offered by the Executive, and on the extent to which these sectors will feel themselves represented and committed by the Congress or even the leaders of the sectoral organizations. One might advocate a larger input from below in the formulation of the pact, a recognition that justified distrust of the State and its experts, and of the capacity of the powerful to shift costs to the weak, will not be erased simply by following the procedures of representative democracy. One must also recognize, however, that the democratic régimes cannot embrace immediately ideal schemes for popular participation. In order to strengthen confidence and legitimacy, the democratic régimes will have to place on the wisdom of their experts and the representativeness of their legislative bodies, political parties and sectoral organizations as much weight as they will bear.

For most democratic régimes now on the scene the most they can realistically expect may be to leave the national economy a little sounder and democratic procedures a little firmer than they found them. They cannot accomplish even this much, however, unless they offer hope of doing more, some vision of a better post-crisis future. This leads back to the formidable agenda left by the past debate on styles of development. Proposals continue to abound. They leave the
impression that radically original options are lacking and that zeal to invent them might only confuse matters. The governments and the national societies must go back to struggling to do better the things that ECLA and others have exhorted them to do for a good many years, and that most of them have intermittently been trying to do or claiming to do. Future national projects will presumably include policies for industrialization aimed at a domestic mass market; rural-agricultural policies reconciling national self-sufficiency in basic foods with better livelihood and more self-determination for the rural population; the universalization of basic social services and other means of guaranteeing a floor under family levels of living; serious attention to environmental upgrading and husbanding of natural resources. And they must reconcile these policies with the old intractable struggles over the balance of payments, monetary stability, and many other things. They are advised to act boldly but do nothing in excess. "Don't put all your eggs in one basket" and other old saws come to mind. They can find a certain number of reasons why they should be able to do these things better than before: higher income and educational levels, social structural changes, greater national integration, modernization of the State. They can find other obvious reasons why the tasks may be even more difficult. These need not be listed here; they recur obsessively throughout the present paper.

Attempts by social scientists and ideologists to formulate preconditions and tactics for democratic, self-reliant development alternatives in Latin America have been numerous, as part of a worldwide movement that reached its peak in the mid-1970s. From their beginning, even in years when prospects for economic development as conventionally conceived looked reasonably good, many of these attempts pointed to impending crisis or even catastrophe unless the governments and societies embarked on radical changes in values, economic and social structures, and relationships with the world economic and political order. As was suggested at the beginning of this paper, these propositions, through the international organizations and national planning bodies, found their way into governmental declarations of objectives, but did very little to prepare governments or public opinion for the real crises that have come upon them.
In present discussions of development styles and alternatives the traits of planners' utopias persist: the dream of achieving national consensus and the benevolence of the world centres of power through quantified demonstrations of what must be done and what will come of doing it -if all the actors assume their proper roles. The conviction that worthwhile alternatives can become viable, or will reveal themselves, only after a determined class alliance or political movement has taken power also remains current. The production of "committee utopias" in the form of declarations and "plans of action" also continues, mainly as a consequence of the self-perpetuating rituals of international organizations.

In general, however, the present discussion seems to have shifted toward an effort to achieve realism without falling into opportunism or "crisis management". This implies a distrust for ideological strategies aimed at "irreversible changes" in the societies and economies. It implies an effort to understand how structural and ideological changes in different strata of the national societies, in conjunction with the crisis and the emergence of democratic regimes and autonomous popular movements are changing national styles; not necessarily of "development", but of ways of conducting public affairs and private livelihood from which viable and democratic national projects can emerge. As the formulation of "fundamental orientations" above indicates, this also implies a wariness towards the State quite different from the neoliberal project of the state reduced to umpire (backed by force) of a game whose rules had been set to reward certain players and castigate others.

The national projects aimed at would have to mobilize sufficient solidarity and self-reliance to cope with a permanently difficult and continually changing external environment, and to reverse the social polarization and marginalization that have prevailed up to the present throughout the range of development styles in Latin America. They would have to contain and survive continuing conflicts of interests and ideologies, miscalculations and inefficiencies, particularist tactics for manipulation, corruption, or subversion. The discussion supposes that most components of the societies can place national interests above corporative interests, but does not harbour illusions that this will come about consistently or in response to rational demonstration of what must be done. It assumes that /mixed economic
mixed economic systems, combining private enterprise and market incentives with innovative co-operative activities, combative representation of group interests, and extensive State intervention aiming at "socialization of the surplus" can function better than heretofore, and that in any case no plausible alternative is at hand. It also assumes that such functioning will be permanently precarious.

In the earlier discussions of development alternatives, the social shortcomings and internal dissatisfactions of the high-income industrialized countries constituted arguments for bold originality; they could no longer be accepted as models. The argument remains valid, but at present the difficulties of these countries, in particular the dilemmas faced by the social democratic régimes in Europe, contribute to soberness and perplexity in assessing the viability of innovative democratic alternatives in Latin America. It is evident that even societies with relatively homogeneous social structures, strong sense of national identity, dynamic systems of production and technological innovation, efficient administrative systems, and régimes committed to participatory democracy and human welfare cannot satisfy popular demands for full employment, or avoid measures for industrial modernization that have a painful impact on the very population groups whose needs they are committed to serve. It goes without saying that the two "socialist" camps claiming to be guided by Marxism have lost practically all their former appeal as models.

To sum up, the perception of crisis in intellectual circles, and the effort to formulate alternative styles of development are not new, but the propensity to formulate the alternatives in utopian or catastrophic terms has moderated now that the societies are closer to the brink of real catastrophe and that conviction of the need for democratic alternatives has spread to wider circles of the societies. This may turn out to be a stage of ideological exhaustion and lowering of expectations, to be followed by quite different and anti-democratic reactions to continuing crisis, but for the present non-utopian proposals relying as much on initiatives from within the societies as on initiatives from the State can get a hearing. Social scientists and ideologists have a duty to put forward proposals worth a hearing, and to seek a different kind of hearing from the rituals of conferences and "plans of action". Finally, they would do well to avoid an excessive zeal.
excessive zeal for originality. Practically all relevant policy approaches have been tried somewhere in Latin America, and a recurrent weakness has been the propensity to put forward schemes claiming to be radically new instead of trying to combine innovation with continuity.

2. **Democratic alternatives and directions of deviation**

The emerging national projects that can be labeled "democratic" or "social-democratic" are those of politician-intellectuals trying to reconcile economic realism, democratic values, and arbitration of the demands of key forces in the societies so as to achieve a combination of support and acquiescence broad enough to enable the régime to survive and achieve certain advances in the general welfare. Their viability depends partly on measurable structural changes in the societies and economies, partly on the evolution of the external environment, and partly on ideological receptivity in the forces able to make themselves heard. The extent of this receptivity can be inferred from voting patterns and mass demonstrations, but is an unknown as to coherence and durability. The projects represent a "middle ground", calling for major changes in the societies and economies while avoiding utopian expectations and voluntarist or authoritarian tactics. Various political and economic forces, combining with partial frustration of initial hopes, will continually push or pull them out of the middle ground toward three different kinds of overt projects or strategies:

a) **Technobureaucratic developmentalism**

This approach implies that the major policy problems are technical, that correct solutions can be determined only by experts, and that democratic participation in policy should consist mainly of listening to the experts and acting accordingly. The present crisis has been a severe blow to technobureaucratic prestige, but one can expect a combined pressure toward technobureaucratic policymaking originating in the real need for and in the supply of "experts". Even if popular initiative becomes as dynamic as can be hoped, the new national projects will involve a considerable amplification in the responsibilities and planning capacity of the State, after a period in which these have deteriorated or become privatized. Neoliberal technobureaucrats will fall into eclipse, but the governments will have to recruit technobureaucrats with developmentalist backgrounds, possibly...
backgrounds, possibly but not necessarily enlightened by the frustrations of the past decade. To the extent to which the economic problems confronted—particularly the renegotiation of debts, the quest for markets, and the stimulation of productive investment—prove intractable, the government may find no alternative to relying on secrecy in policy formulation and to the technobureaucratic mystique—the infallible prescriptions of the experts. This would probably but not necessarily mean a drift toward greater conservatism, a lower priority to action against poverty, and a partial denationalization of policy, as the prescriptions of the international technobureaucratic elite would carry greater weight. Technobureaucratic voluntarism and over-optimism directed toward rapid structural transformations are also conceivable. In such a case, highly democratic and participatory conceptions might mask the technobureaucratic bias: the experts would identify their own ideological preferences with those of the masses.

From the supply side, the prospect of an enhanced role for the State and increased public employment of professionals, combined with a renewed sense of centrality for social scientists and intellectuals, will be among the main attractions of the democratic national projects for university-educated middle-class youth. The temptation will recur to substitute their own interests and ideological biases for those of the national society.

b) Populism

Populism, even more than technobureaucracy, is now under a cloud. In pluralist democratic systems, however, competitive electoral promises and manipulation of disposable masses cannot be excluded. Electorally, the new projects cannot depend on the supposedly enlightened middle classes and the class-conscious organized workers alone. Moreover, determined efforts to alleviate the poverty and open channels for the autonomous participation of the "excluded" strata of the population follow from the values of the projects. If the projects give priority to agrarian reforms, employment, education, health, housing and other basic needs of the excluded strata the costs and difficulties of implementation (including those of diversion of benefits to the middle strata) will be formidable, but the measures will not be characteristically populist. Neither will tactics encouraging the organization of the excluded to defend their sources of livelihood and obtain /a fairer
a fairer share of public social expenditures. However, understandable motivations
to broaden the base of support of the democratic projects at minimum cost and head
off political adversaries mean a permanent temptation toward exaggerated electoral
promises, clientelistic mobilization, token assistentialism, co-option of pliable
potential leaders of the masses, and repression of the less pliable. Moreover,
one cannot be sure that modernization of social structures, rising educational
levels, etc., have really dissipated the threat of more extreme and irresponsible
forms of populism manipulated by charismatic leaders. The historical experience
of the United States suggests that even the most advanced "modernization" of a
society need not preclude the continual resurgence of different forms of populism,
nor guarantee predictability of political behaviour on the basis of social class.
If democratic projects in Latin America prove ineffective, even the most simplistic
promises may again rally support, and not only among the excluded masses.
c) Socialism

In the terminology proposed by Aníbal Pinto, "socialism" represents a
different "system" rather than "style" of development. To the extent to which
the democratic projects depend for support on organized workers, parties
identifying themselves as Marxist, intellectuals and students they will be pulled
in the direction of a radical break with the basically capitalist economic system,
compromises with economically powerful elites, and "renegotiated dependency" on
the capitalist international order. The pull toward socialism within democratic
national projects, however, might have several outcomes short of a radical change
of system. The meaning of socialism as an alternative system or a path to utopia
is less clear than it seemed a few years ago. Conceptions of socialism as the
outcome of seizure of State power and control of the means of production by a
destined class have lost credibility. In the present context, the pull toward
socialism might affect mainly the style of political discourse, contributing to
greater internal polarization and shifts in definition of external allies and
adversaries, without negating the commitment to pluralism and to a mixed economy.
It might lead to priority to nationalization of key industries, banks, mines, etc.,
not so much from a theoretical preference for public ownership as from urgent
reactions to crisis situation. It might feature gradualist schemes for worker
participation in industrial decision-making, decentralized co-operative innovations in popular livelihood and mutual aid, and agrarian reforms aiming at collective or co-operative tenure and exploitation. In conditions of extreme crisis or sabotage of democratic projects, an alliance with the revolutionary left might lead to abandonment of the middle ground altogether and implantation of "siege socialism", but this outcome is plausible mainly in some of the smaller and poorer countries of the region.

The above listing refers to tendencies that will present themselves in many different guises and under different labels. The negative or positive connotations of the labels to different users also have a certain importance. To label features of democratic projects "technobureaucratic" or "populist" is to damn them, while "revolutionary" or "socialist" will attract some components of the broad alliances that are needed and repel others. The labels "social democratic" or "reformist" will also symbolize acceptability to some and futility of mystification to others. In any case the listing of "deviations" does not imply that proponents of democratic alternatives should aim at ideal consistency and clear differentiation from the three tendencies. In view of the political traditions of Latin America; the history of the parties and movements now entering into discussions of democratic alternatives; and the continuing appeal of developmentalist, populist and revolutionary socialist ideologies it can be expected that the real national projects of governing alliances will combine incongruous elements and shift in one direction or another in the course of policy application without necessarily losing the capacity to advance.

3. Other deviations

In addition to deviations in the direction of alternative overt projects or political styles, one must consider the permanent vulnerability of democratic national projects to capture or manipulation by more or less hidden or inadmissible particularist styles of determining who gets what and how. The fact that democratic projects are in a middle ground, open to compromises and concessions in order to widen consensus and placate adversaries, increases their vulnerability. Particularist tactics have, in fact, flourished under all preceding styles of development in Latin America and have been able to distort or subvert them.
They became particularly well-entrenched and shielded from scrutiny during the
decade of military-authoritarian régimes, for whose discrediting they were
partially responsible, but they have functioned just as effectively under populist
and pseudo-democratic régimes. They are deeply rooted in the expectations of all
sectors of the societies concerning the ways in which the economic and political
systems function, and their adaptability is considerable. The democratic projects
have at hand a partial antidote in their openness to public criticism. They will
have to confront certain entrenched particularist interests from the beginning,
and have good prospects for curbing them, in view of the present unpopularity of
these interests. However, similar interests and tactics can be expected to
re-emerge continually in new guises.

a) Corporativism

In societies with long traditions of struggle for advancement of group
interests, in which no group sees good reason to accept restraint in the name of
national interests and social solidarity, since power holders have repeatedly
used such appeals for particularist advantage, democratic projects may be unable
to find a dependable base either in the middle or working classes. The political
credit of the democratic alliance and the resources of the state will then be
dissipated in petty bargaining and concessions in the face of tactics of
non-co-operation or "representational violence". At the same time, the values
of the democratic style imply that militant bargaining in defense of perceived
interests is legitimate, and that the strata hitherto unorganized and excluded
have a right to participate. No clear dividing line can be drawn between
corporativist tactics and legitimate group revindications. Norms for entitlements
laid down by planners will be received with justified suspicion. The obvious
objective is to convince the contending groups that their long-term interests
along with those of the nation call for shared sacrifices in the face of crisis;
but this requires that the democratic alliance overcome entrenched experience-
based reactions and convince the contenders that sacrifices really are being
shared.

/b) Localism
b) **Localism**

The interplay between over-centralization and the tactics of local power holders, with or without mass backing, to defend their interests against centralism and obtain larger resources from the State also has a long history. Local resentments and skepticism concerning the good intentions of the centre are deep-seated and presumably will find more militant expression with democratization. In principle, the democratic projects call for decentralization, fairer distribution of public resources and income-generating activities, and vigorous participation by local groups in advancement of their perceived interests. However, the traditional patterns of neglect, local conviction that the centre can solve all problems if it wants to, non-co-operation, manipulation and coercion will be hard to overcome or compatibilize with open decision-making under conditions of extreme scarcity of public resources.

c) **Clientelism and prebendalism**

If distributable resources are insufficient to support corporativism, pressures toward clientelism, already deeply rooted in Latin American political practices, become stronger. If the promoters of democratic alternatives confront an array of autocratically managed unions, local political machines and bureaucratic mini-empires, the easiest way forward will be to buy off the leaders and equate their support with support from the masses they represent. Moreover, the democratic leadership will be under permanent temptation to take the initiative in creating clientelistic ties and distributing prebends as a means of co-opting leaders and neutralizing inconveniently militant organizations. In fact, overtly democratic alliances in some countries have evolved into remarkably stable pseudo-democratic systems by relying on this tactic.

d) **Finance capitalism, currency speculation, smuggling, drug traffic, etc.**

The democratic national projects will confront diverse interests, ranging from manipulators of the financial system through more or less legal means and transnational enterprises with hidden tactics for exporting profits and penetrating the national economies to mafia-type combinations that have grown enormously in wealth and political influence. These interests may control resources greater than those of the State, and have in common their internationalism, the weak identification of
identification of their interests with those of any specific country. Their activities lead to a wide gap between real economic and political processes and the visible ones on which governments base their forecast and plans. They may or may not resist democratic national projects frontally, but if they do not it will be because they are confident of their ability to protect their own operations, whether by corrupting or intimidating the agents of the State, by external political and economic pressures, or by striking mutually advantageous bargains with the democratic government. Such bargains are quite conceivable, particularly in the cases of the transnational enterprises and the financial interests that might be induced to repatriate funds from abroad, but the democratic régimes will need to keep in mind the adage that he who sups with the devil should use a long spoon!

e) **Militarism**

Emerging democratic national projects generally confront military and police apparatuses recently in power or influential behind the scenes, now discredited by economic failures, repressive excesses and corruption, and weakened by internal divisions, but able to enforce vetoes over some aspects of national policy and to claim sizable proportions of the national budgets. These interests justify their claims by reference to national security doctrines and the menace of violent subversion, on the one hand, and to supposed territorial ambitions and exaggerated armaments in neighbouring countries, on the other. The former justification receives strong support from their counterparts in the United States. Both justifications are susceptible to manipulated crises, if the political leadership fails to respond to military demands. The conditions under which some democratic alliances come to power give them assets for an effort to subordinate the military to a restricted legitimate role, and to expose to public debate the limits of this role and the resources needed to perform it. More however, pressures and bargaining take place in relative secrecy, with a good deal of insecurity in the political leadership and the general public as to how the military will react under given conditions. In a good many cases the strictly particularist interests of the higher ranks of the military, legitimate (salaries and perquisites) and illegitimate
(business ventures, influence peddling) have flourished in recent years, stimulating public resentment, but tempting the political leadership to tolerate prebendalism as an alternative to policy concessions. In a few countries the growth of an armaments industry with export capacity and linked to counterparts in the central countries raises the prospect of "military-industrial complexes" with new motivations and means for influencing public policy. The reality of ultra-left movements recalcitrant to a democratic modus vivendi complicates the problem of bringing militarism under control. If the democratic régime relies on military responses to "armed struggle" tactics it risks escalation and increasing subservience to "national security" doctrines. If it tries to bargain with the ultraleft it faces other obvious dangers.

4. The quality of public discourse

Democratic styles and projects, under present conditions, call for ways of looking at popular participation quite different from the styles hitherto current, when development as a mobilizing myth was more potent and clearer in content, when it was plausible to hope that State intervention guided by planning, or impersonal market forces, or external financing and technology, or the rise to power of new classes, or the right kind of education, or some combination of these would lead to a happy future. Various conceptions of development accorded importance to public participation, but assumed that this should consist mainly of learning to fill roles laid down by a correct theory and strategy. The legitimacy of conflictive participation might be admitted grudgingly, as a cost to be kept within bounds, or such participation might be welcomed if it meant the displacement of anti-developmental élites by pro-developmental élites. In either case, some school of theory must have correct answers to the questions: who should participate, how, and for what ends?

At present, mobilizing myths may be needed more than ever if the societies are to cope with crisis rather than enter into descending spirals of impoverishment and disintegration. However, plausible myths are not at hand. As was stated above, the democratic régimes must present for public consideration some combination of short-term expediences and longer-term policies that do not differ dramatically from policies that have been attempted in the past, that will take years to mature, and whose success cannot be guaranteed.
If the different sectors of the public are to make realistic responses to the alternatives before them and contribute creatively to constructing these alternatives through "free rational public deliberation", they will have to require a relatively sophisticated ability to cope with the indeterminate, and combine vigorous defense of their perceived interests and their visions of the good society with patience and ability to compromise. For the external proponent of democratic styles, it is hard to strike a balance between utopian visions of national harmony and formal pacts democratically arrived at, and a pessimistic view of the real processes of negotiation, conflict, manipulation, rational argument, precarious promises, and appeals to emotional symbols, through which policies will take shape. The social forces trying to participate democratically cannot afford to take government claims at face value, but neither can they give up hope of national policies that deserve their critical support.

The most important factors in assessing the potential for democratic participation are presumably the characteristics of the different social classes, with their perceptions of their own and the national situations, and the characteristics of the political parties and other organizations through which these classes relate themselves to policy formulation. It can be supposed that the internal differentiation of classes and sub-classes has advanced considerably in recent years; that the ideological and organizational reflections of this differentiation are complex, poorly understood, and very different from country to country; moreover, that the present crisis has thrown the previous trends of differentiation into disarray. For the moment, however, let us evade this formidable topic, and try to evaluate some of the factors that set limits to the quality and creativity of "free rational public deliberation".

a) The creativity of intellectuals and social scientists outside the public sector, including literary and artistic figures, and their ability to interact with political leaders, technobureaucrats, and the public at large are of crucial importance. Resources are promising, in view of the remarkable rise since the 1950s in numbers, qualifications, and ideological diversity among intellectuals studying and polemizing about "development" in the broadest sense. Novelists, poets, musicians and artists have exposed the contradictions of the social order.
and challenged complacency. After a stage of intense partisanship and revolutionary optimism, with differing national periods of rise and decline, these movements encountered various shocks and disillusionments, with narrowed possibilities for research and diffusion of findings, but survived and adapted. Universities lost much of their creative capacity, sometimes because of repression and sometimes because of massification, but autonomous centres for economic, social and political research took their place. In general, as was suggested above, intellectual discourse became soberer, less dogmatic, and more disposed to embrace pluralist democracy as an end as well as a means. It is evident that varied efforts are now under way to criticize previous political and economic concepts, understand what is happening in the national societies and the world, and on the basis of this understanding propose viable alternatives. The ability to advance ideas in terms accessible to a public sensitized by crisis is more problematic. This is undoubtedly happening to some extent, but the renunciation of utopian and Manichaean visions complicates the task. In some settings, intellectuals are dynamically involved in popular movements; in others, their ideas reach only the better-educated parts of the middle classes. It must be significant that individuals with social science or intellectual backgrounds are prominent among the leaders of emerging democratic political movements.

b) The creativity of planners, economists, engineers and other technobureaucrats acting within the public sector is equally important. There is no clear dividing line between this group and that discussed above as far as personalities go. Many individuals have shifted repeatedly between the roles of technobureaucrat and critical intellectual, and the emergence of new democratic régimes implies that certain ex-technobureaucrats who have been relegated to the latter role in recent years will get another chance. However, the problems of creativity and credit with the public in the two roles are quite different. The planners and other technobureaucrats, while warning of various evils if their advice were not followed, have proved remarkably incapable of foreseeing and prescribing for the kind of crisis that has struck the region. By now the argument that their prescriptions have failed mainly because governments and people lack the political will to adhere firmly enough to the prescriptions has become hollow.
The crisis has left some schools of technobureaucrats more discredited than others but no school is in particularly good shape. At the same time, the crisis has made their services more indispensable than ever. A government may shift from one school to another, without much faith in any of them, and occasionally use its technobureaucrats as scapegoats, but it cannot do without expertise.

The technobureaucrats thus find themselves in a peculiarly ambiguous position, with their ability to invoke infallible theories or technical neutrality to shield themselves from political conflict much weakened. They need more than before to be able to discuss policy alternatives, risks, constraints and incognita with political leaders, critical intellectuals and the general public in a spirit of co-operative contributions and approximations to viable policy rather than enlightenment from above. The crisis calls for innovation and experimentation, but its "management" diverts the technobureaucrats working in the public sector from thinking along these lines, or studying with open mind the innovations and adaptations that are actually emerging in the societies.

The planning agencies are the logical focal point for such a task, and some of them are reasonably well equipped for it, although they continue to be chained to the preparation of fixed-term "book plans" that are shelved as soon as completed. For some time, various planning agencies have been struggling with ambiguities and role-conflicts different from those described above for the technobureaucrats in general. His discourse on planning has long left behind the original supposition of neutral technical rationality. Proposals for "participatory planning", "transactive planning", etc., sound, and to some extent have taken root, at least in the social divisions of the planning agencies. Some planners have taken seriously the proposition that they should try to help the society toward an economic system suited to the strengthening of democracy. Political leaderships have intermittently encouraged or tolerated planning for participatory democratic styles of development. The resulting proposals have entered published plans in incongruous juxtaposition to more traditional approaches, but have proved too remote from the real functioning, of the economies and the political systems to produce much more than frustration for the planners. At present, one can only hope that planners will try again with firmer links.
firmer links to political processes and more realism concerning the functioning of
the State, within the context of "free rational public deliberation".

c) While one may prefer to emphasize collective social forces, the emergence
of political leaders, and eventually of chiefs of State capable of personifying
the democratic style and centring national debate on its requirements and promises
remains of decisive importance. This supposes a difficult combination of self-
confidence and self-restraint on the part of the leader, who must start from a
relatively coherent but undogmatic conception of national problems, what he wants
to do about them, and how much he can do with the political resources he can
mobilize and within the political and other constraints he confronts. He faces an
unavoidable public propensity to attribute the strengths and weaknesses of his
movement or his régime to his personal qualities and to expect "solutions" that
he cannot provide. At the same time he must try to infuse confidence that the
major national problems are soluble, that the deficiencies of previous ways of
conducting public affairs can be overcome, that all legitimate interests can get
a hearing without relaying on corporativist or clientelist tactics. A few
promising candidates for this difficult role have emerged, but more commonly the
kinds of régimes that have prevailed in recent years seem to have limited the
possibilities for innovative leadership to gain experience and public visibility.
The rise of charismatic "terrible simplifiers" does not seem to be an immediate
threat, and the intractability of the tasks ahead should preserve even the most
self-confident political leaders from delusions of personal infallibility.

d) The democratic style obviously requires varied channels for public
information and debate, really accessible to all strata of the population.
Criticism of the mass communication media in Latin America are too well known
to need elaboration here: excessive control by élites with particularist interests
or by the State; excessive dependence for content on agencies of the central
countries; predominance of consumerist propaganda, sensationalism and triviality
in the media directed to a mass public. However, it would be pointless to call
for an ideal seriousness and impartiality in the media, and most of the proposed
remedies for present shortcomings may be worse than the disease. In most countries,
in fact, some mass media have opened themselves to serious debate on the present
crisis and democratic alternatives. Intellectuals are expressing their inquietudes and offering their proposals through these media. The educated middle-class public has expanded enormously in recent years through the growth of secondary and higher education; however one may assess the quality of the education. Even in relatively authoritarian settings, the Latin American urban middle-class public is in a better position to become informed than the public in most other parts of the world, including some of the central countries. The extent to which this public actually follows public affairs, in the critical spirit called for by the democratic style, can only be surmised. The extent to which the issues penetrate the urban working class, the marginal strata, and the rural population, and the channels of such penetration are even less susceptible to confident generalizations. The shocks to which these strata have been subjected in recent years might be expected to generate a desperate groping for some way to make sense of the situation and some reason for hope. Most of them have access to transistor radios or television, if not to the printed press. The organizational and ideological channels that previously filtered their views of national affairs have been disrupted but not eliminated, and are probably now regaining influence. The multiplication of ideologically diverse local radio stations would probably be the most promising way of informing them through mass media. From the standpoint of "free rational public deliberation", however, the most important recent trend may well be the proliferation, stimulated by religious as well as political movements, of small groups or "base communities" engaged in self-conscientization and self-help. This trend coincides with the "fundamental orientations" proposed for the new democratic ideology, although it has been criticized for going too far in isolating itself from broader political movements and thus falling into an unwanted dependence on service-providing State bureaucracies.

e) The question of channels for public information and interpretation leads us back to the question of the repercussions of the recent past on public confidence in development prescriptions, national projects, and intellectual diagnoses. What are the psychological consequences and collective memories among different classes and groups deriving from experiences of technobureaucratic arrogance, sectarian or demagogic excesses, and the fate of the varied national projects that
have dominated public policy? National trends have been paradoxical: on the one side dynamic processes of economic growth and structural change bringing upward mobility and transformed life-styles to parts of the national populations, hope to others, intensified exclusion to still others. On the other side, one sees the series of lost opportunities and unfulfilled promises to make these dynamic processes more equitable, more compatible with democracy and human welfare. Can the opening of more adequate channels for "free rational public deliberation" overcome fatigue, skepticism, resentment and opportunism now that political leaderships embark once again on appeals for popular participation, national unity, and patience?

Lastly, one must consider the receptivity of democratic political leadership and different sectors of public opinion to newly emerging (or rather long neglected) problems such as environmental deterioration, squandering of natural resources, megalopolitan hypertrophy, and critical poverty concentrated in regions with little economic potential; and the channels through these questions reach public awareness as "problems". In recent years, awareness of these problems and programmes to grapple with them seemed to be advancing. In the context of pluralist democratic reactions to crisis and lowering of expectations for short-term solutions can these problems retain an adequate place in public attention? It is hard to imagine how participatory democracy can cope with the task of making humanly habitable the focus of urban agglomerations that have emerged, or the task of redistributing population from the most over-crowded and deteriorated rural zones, but without widespread public concern over such needs they will not be tackled at all, or will be tackled at an even more acute stage through technobureaucratic coercion.

5. Collective actors

Discussions of the viability of alternative strategies for development or strategies for revolution in Latin America have persistently tried to identify some class or social force destined to act as guide or catalyst in the kind of transformation wanted. None of the classes or other collective actors has performed predictably,
and a present attempt to identify agents for democratic styles and projects might well, for various reasons, be more hesitant, more aware of ambiguities, and more disposed to look outside the conventional collective categories. For one thing, the fundamental orientations of the democratic style imply that individual free will deserves as much respect as class-determined behaviour. For another, these orientations imply that all classes have the right and capacity to participate on equal terms; "free rational public deliberation" cannot be concentrated in a destined vanguard class, and still less in a party representing it.

The case for the viability of democratic alternatives has to rely on the hypothesis that recent social structural changes and their ideological reflections have, on the whole, strengthened the predisposition of the different classes and groups to embrace such alternatives and take part in the complex interplay of innovation-co-operation-conflict-restraints that they imply. As was suggested above, there are as many reasons for skepticism as for confidence, but men of good will cannot avoid taking up the wager. In any case, the hypothesis cannot be tested in advance and in general terms. Its degree of validity will appear country by country as democratic national projects take shape. Even then, results will be ambiguous and judgments subjective. Such projects may "fail" in obvious ways, but they will never "succeed" in the sense of achieving a predetermined utopia by following a predetermined path.

It can be taken for granted that relations between the democratic projects and the élites or power holders -entrepreneurial, financial, political, military- now on the scene will be difficult. The democratic projects, unlike more revolutionary projects, do not expect to liquidate or expel these élites, but to clip their wings, induce or compel them to act differently -to accept more modest shares of the national income, relinquish illicit sources of gain, invest their funds locally instead of exporting them, pay taxes, moderate their consumption of luxuries, refrain from trying to get their way by violence or corruption. The élites as a whole are not likely to undergo conversion to values motivating them to embrace these new patterns of behaviour, but they may see good reasons to embrace the democratic projects provisionally, in the breakdown of oligarchic or military-authoritarian styles and the consequent risk of national disintegration or revolution. At best, they will try to manipulate the democratic styles in their own interests.
own interests. They have at hand a wide range of tactics for doing so, including their links with the governments, military establishments, transnational corporations and banks of the central countries. In a sense, however, their interactions of co-operation-manipulation-intimidation with the democratic projects come from outside. The promoters of these projects can assess their probable moves and devise counter-moves.

The characteristics of the middle strata have a different kind of importance for the viability of democratic projects, since their participation, interacting with their tactics for self-advancement and self-protection, are "internal" to the projects, which can hardly be imagined without active participation from some components of the middle strata and at least passive support from most of the remainder. The extent to which this precondition can be met presumably varies widely from country to country, depending on the evolution of the middle strata and their reactions to previous experiences of authoritarianism, populism, etc. It can be assumed that the majority almost everywhere would prefer democratic styles of conducting public affairs under certain conditions. These conditions, however, may stand in the way of the participation of the strata below them in the social scale.

The most obvious stumbling blocks derive from the precariously privileged status that the middle strata have achieved, the widening gap between expectations from education and the occupational or income rewards of education, and the consumption standards that the middle strata now claim as rights. Under present conditions a genuinely democratic national project must include major educational reforms, some degree of income redistribution away from the middle strata, and a curbing of consumption of middle strata as well as elites, particularly in regard to imported goods and foreign travel. Such changes will test the limits of democratic sentiments in the middle strata, but they have been discussed so thoroughly in other studies that it is pointless to dwell upon them here.

A problem still more "internal" to the democratic style lies in the ubiquity of the functions of intermediation of the middle strata and the generally clientelistic and exploitative traits of these functions. As professional politicians and lawyers they mediate between the State, in its functions of /provider of
provider of public services and monopolist of organized violence, and the masses of the population. As bureaucrats and publicly employed professionals they perform different kinds of intermediation between State and public. As industrial and commercial managers, publicists, shopkeepers, produce buyers, transporters and money lenders they mediate between the direct producers and the market system. As teachers they mediate between the youth and the social structures they will be entering. Under authoritarian régimes some of these roles - particularly that of political intermediary - have lost importance, and some efforts have been made to limit the supply of contenders for intermediation roles at its main source, the universities. In general, however, the size and diversity of groups engaged in some form of intermediation has continued to increase. Supply has created its own demand.

With the emergence or re-emergence of democratic styles of conducting public affairs, new opportunities (as well as real needs) for intermediation will appear, in political and interest-group organizations as well as the bureaucracy, and individuals from the middle strata, particularly educated youth, will try to take advantage of them. Other roles (e.g., small commercial intermediaries and transporters) will remain precarious or become more so, and their holders will try to gain privileges or protection through democratic openings for agitation and pressure, including strikes. The considerable amplification of the middle strata combined with the prospects for economic austerity or worse imply that competition within these strata for jobs, credits, and services from the State, along with pressures for legal protection of educational credentials for preferred employment, will be strong for the foreseeable future. If a national project singles out reinvigoration of the domestic market as essential to recovery, measures to strengthen middle-class purchasing power are likely to get priority.

Thus, even with the best of democratic intentions on the part of the middle strata, they will be propense to monopolize whatever the democratic style can offer in two senses: in the roles of intermediation that will determine the authenticity of democratic content, and in the material benefits available from the State and the productive system. And for a good many members of the middle strata intentions will not be good: they will assess the democratic style mainly
for its openings to particularist gains. Finally, two opposed deviations from the democratic commitment must be mentioned, although both of them have probably lost ground to some extent in comparison to a few years ago. First, some parts of the middle strata in some countries have become fanatically authoritarian and elitist as a result of fear that any opening to participation by the excluded masses will lead to revolution, chaos, violent deprivation of personal freedom as well as material advantages. Second, other parts of the middle strata, mainly university-educated youth, continue to look for their utopia on the other side of this nightmare, rejecting pluralist democracy and aspiring to mobilize the masses for the seizure of power.

The characteristics of urban wage workers are also of obvious "internal" importance to democratic styles. Their recent processes of occupational differentiation, shifts in ideological allegiances, and rise or fall of relative importance within the economically occupied population are too complex and varied from country to country to be discussed here. At present, their organizations are very much on the defensive, and they are bound to see in the democratic projects opportunities to recuperate job security and previous levels of real income. The trouble is that under present conditions the democratic projects cannot offer them much more than freedom to defend their perceived interests. In the short term, a serious attack on the intolerably high levels of unemployment means, inter alia, wage restraint. In the longer term, democratic régimes will face dilemmas similar to those of the social democratic régimes of Europe. Changes in technology and the organization of production may or may not depress overall employment levels, but they will mean continued shocks to the workers' sense of security, devaluation of skills, advantages for educated youth over older workers, geographical shifts in industrial locations destroying the livelihood of settled communities. Democratic styles cannot afford to accept technological imperatives fatalistically nor to over-protect the better-organized categories of workers against change. More innovative research on the full implications of technological alternatives is needed, but a democratic style cannot leave the solutions to technobureaucrats.

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In most countries of the region, the middle strata and the wage workers in "modern" occupations remain minorities, in spite of their phenomenal growth in recent years. To the extent to which democratic projects draw their intellectual inspiration and their mass support from the middle strata and the organized workers, they cannot avoid a propensity to look on the majority of the population in terms of "problems", of provision of employment, of relief of critical poverty, of raising of educational levels, of "incorporation" into the national society, with a permanent ambivalence toward their mobilization. In a good many cases, particularly those of the most impoverished rural zones, the possibility of real "incorporation" and the capacity of the people to make themselves heard may both appear to be so low that the proponents of democratic projects might well prefer to forget them and turn their attention to the more hopeful parts of the society. According to some political scientists, democracy cannot support an excess of participation; the apathy of most of the population most of the time is a condition of its functioning. For a régime overwhelmed by problems and pressures this kind of reasoning must be tempting.

If democratic styles are to be more than a disguise for middle class domination of the societies, however, one must ask how the "excluded", "marginalized" or "dominated" can participate forcefully and autonomously in advancing their own perceived interests and in transforming the style of development through new kinds of interaction with the State, the élites and the intermediaries. The groups in question are as heterogeneous as the middle strata, and their relative importance, cultural self-identifications, organizational capacity and views of their own relation to the national society obviously differ widely from country to country. Any generalization, whether idealizing or denigrating them, risks losing sight of their individuality as persons trying to cope with a world they never made, possibly succeeding better than the outsider can grasp — if not, they would have perished by now.

In recent times in a good many countries they have experienced violent repression deliberately aimed at forcing them to relinquish forms of incorporation they had begun to achieve, aimed at securing their passivity and atomization. In others, they have become accustomed to a kind of limited, clientelistic participation.
through political intermediaries or organizations manipulated by the State, with an insistent democratic or even revolutionary rhetoric belied by realities. In still others, they have encountered the rise and fall of a bewildering variety of participatory initiatives emanating from the State, and also from political or religious groups independent of the State or even hostile to it. Altogether, one might expect a considerable political sophistication among the excluded groups, considerable wariness toward external organizers, and a realistically pessimistic appreciation of their ability to influence public policy. The external environment might from time to time stimulate quite different reactions: temporary mobilization behind populist promises, violent outbreaks deriving from suppressed resentment, but these may be somewhat less likely than heretofore; hopes and fears of mass uprisings able to upset the balance of power have waned.

According to scattered observations, the most prevalent attitudes in the recent past have combined distrust of the State and political movements with strictly local solidarity promoted by some external agents especially from the Church. This pattern coincides with the "fundamental orientations" for a new democratic ideology quoted at the beginning of this essay. It presumably reflects the direct experience of the excluded as well as the ideologies of the kinds of agents that have managed to retain contact with them during periods of repression. The desideratum for a democratic style, then, would be to open spaces for a shift in such attitudes toward wider participation, toward a sense of belonging to the national society and being able to make oneself heard in it, without an abandonment of justified wariness toward the State and political movements, in the face of the permanent likelihood of manipulation and pressure to accept subordination.

6. The external environment for democratic styles

The democratic styles and projects call for an enhancement of self-identification with the nation throughout the contending classes and groups, making a national pact possible, and this in turn implies an enhancement of national self-affirmation and self-determination vis-à-vis the rest of the world. It is obvious, however, that the dependence of the national societies on the world order has become more complex in recent years and more "internalized" through the links of diverse
national forces with their counterparts, ideological models, or protectors abroad. It is also obvious that the present crises of the world order have abruptly transformed the manifestations of this dependence and disoriented the internal forces linked to it. These repercussions at the same time open the way to democratic styles and make their survival peculiarly precarious.

Political leaders committed to such styles must hope that the world crises will resolve themselves before long, and they cannot avoid repeating the traditional developmentalist appeals addressed to the world centres for expanded and more dependable export markets and financial transfers, but they cannot rely on responses to such demands to alleviate their domestic crises or give them excuses for not overcoming these crises. It is more realistic for them to assume that the external environment will continue to be difficult, whatever the short-term political and economic ups and downs of the world centres. Responses need to be flexible and tough-minded, based on close attention uninhibited by ideological blinkers to what is actually happening abroad. In recent years the external aspects of development policy have been in the hands of technobureaucrats and financiers whose reasoning, tactics, motivations and links with the transnational élite might be opaque even to the political leaderships to which they reported. Under present conditions, when experts disagree and leaders have discredited their expertise, when no policy can be guaranteed success, can "free rational public deliberation" grapple with the issues? Can the external environment of disrupted dependence become compatible with democratic styles or even a means toward their consolidation? Can the proposals for "endogenous" development based on national cultures, collective self-reliance, de-linking, etc., that were current before the crises reached their present intensity become more relevant within a democratic style embodied in a national pact? Clearly the decline in utopian expectations applies even more to the international than to the domestic aspects of styles of development; a "new international economic order" benevolently supportive of countries exercising their right to determine their own style of development is not in the offing.

However, democratic régimes have real opportunities to use the harsh external environment as a means of mobilizing national solidarity, while at the same time such solidarity strengthens their hand against external dictation. The debt burden is
the most obvious example. An easily identifiable adversary is a political asset, and few adversaries can be easier to identify or blame for domestic hardship than the international banks and the IMF. For democratic régimes the problem would be to use this weapon and others such as control of the operations of transnationals with restraint, to strengthen national solidarity and bargaining power, without being carried away into demagogy or paranoia.

Democratic régimes and movements can identify a wide range of potential external allies as well as adversaries and require realistic appreciations of their strengths, limitations, openness to determined policies and ideological preconceptions. Relations with some of these allies represent a certain internationalization of free rational public discourse as well as social action, so that the main contacts are between likeminded movements and intellectual currents rather than régimes. Inevitably, such contacts imply pressures toward changes in the national project itself, not necessarily to be accepted, but legitimate as part of the democratic process as long as they remain in the open.

a) It is reasonable to expect an increasing number of democratic régimes in Latin America in the near future, with strong motivations for supporting each other, and a dwindling number of régimes with motivations for sabotaging democratic styles elsewhere. It is also reasonable to expect that, as in the past, a certain number of régimes that are far from democratic internally, at least in the sense of relying on "free rational public deliberation", will support democratic styles elsewhere as an expression of values that domestic power realities or external aggression hinder them from putting into practice, and will expect support from them in turn. Thus, prospects for a common front against external pressures and eventual collective self-reliance should improve.

b) Prospects for support from social democratic governments and movements in Europe are also favourable. In regard to the United States, the coming presidential election may determine whether governmental reactions will be relatively positive or relatively cold. In the best case, it would not be prudent to count very much on United States economic co-operation and abstention from protectionism.
In the best case, also, experience from the time of the alliance for Progress suggests that regimes committed to democratic styles will do well to keep a certain distance, since an embrace could become excessively constraining, paternalistic and conducive to erroneous expectations on both sides. The mobilization of public opinion for a nationalist stance in relation to debts, transnationals, and protectionism cannot altogether avoid identifying United States policy with these adversaries. In any case, currents of opinion in the United States sympathetic to democratic styles -including, probably, the organized weight of migrants from Latin America- can be expected to exert some restraining influence on United States policy.

c) Prospects for support from countries in other regions of the Third World are more ambiguous, beyond such symbolic forms as United Nations votes. Democratic styles in most of these countries, if viable at all, will probably take forms and adopt objectives quite different from those here discussed for Latin America.

d) Prospects for support (or subversion) from the two "socialist" camps headed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China are now of secondary importance. These camps are now in no position to provide economic co-operation on a scale offsetting possible destabilizing tactics from the capitalist camp. Their main present contribution to democratic styles may be as anti-models. Their loss of credibility as models for development strategy coincides with loss of credibility of revolution as a means of seizing State power, to some extent protecting democratic styles from attack from this side, while the discrediting of authoritarian neoliberal schemes protects them against attack from the other.

e) Latin America has become a region of large-scale and highly diverse net emigration. In relation to the external relations of democratic styles the implications are contradictory. The following main types of migrants can be distinguished:

i) Members of the élitè who have migrated with part of their capital, escaping insecurity, seeking higher profitability, or finding the United States variant of the consumer society more congenial. Their economic power in parts
of the United States must be considerable. Drug traffickers and other illicitly wealthy individuals form an important sub-group. These migrants have links, on the one side, with military and para-military exiles and, on the other with a larger category of entrepreneurs, professionals, etc., mainly from Cuba, by now integrated into the United States economy and political system. These groups can be expected to be hostile to democratic styles, as defined here, or suspicious of their possible leftward deviation, or disposed to manipulate them for their own ends. They have a number of assets for manipulation or destabilization: economic and political influence in the United States as well as their country of origin, control of certain mass communication media, ability to subsidize political movements or armed subversion.

ii) Intellectuals, academics, and political activists who have left their countries of origin, voluntarily and otherwise. These groups can be expected to enter into quite diverse relationships with national democratic styles. They can form bridges with intellectuals and political movements abroad and, through their access to the press and to specialized economic political reviews, help to form external public opinion; or they can return and intervene directly in designing democratic projects and in public debate over them. Ideally the international experience of these intellectuals and activists should mean a valuable broadening of national horizons. It can also, of course, mean the introduction of sectarian conflicts from abroad, or the re-introduction of such conflicts from the pre-exile past.

iii) Workers and peasants who have migrated to the United States, and to a lesser extent to Europe, Canada and Australia, in search of employment. This category is now numbered in the millions. The present crisis has intensified motivations to migrate, and at the same time has considerably shrunk employment opportunities and made the political and economic status of migrants more precarious. At the same time, a part of the migrants have struck roots, have achieved a certain capacity for organized defense of their interests, and are beginning to exert a broader influence through voting and the various pressure tactics in which immigrant minorities in the United States have a long experience. These groups can be
can be expected to respond to democratic projects in their home countries, to the extent to which they are aware of them. Democratic régimes in Latin America should have good possibilities to activate this sympathy through cultural activities, support of migrant organizations, and services offering advice and defense of migrant rights, as European countries and their migrants have done for many years. The broader cultural consequences of this kind of migration for the excluded strata in Latin America can only be guessed at. If opportunities for work in the home countries improve enough to attract migrants to return, they should be valuable sources of innovation.

7. In conclusion

The argument in the preceding pages assumes that a style of development worth striving for must give a more effective priority than heretofore to the values of democracy, freedom, and human welfare. The argument has a negative side: the prevailing styles of development up to the present have generated so many contradictions and disbenefits that the democratic alternatives are worth a try. It also has a fatalistic side: the democratic impulse, stimulated by recent social structural changes but not altogether dependent on them, is too strong to be subordinated to technobureaucratic conceptions of efficiency. Unless it can relate itself positively to the legitimate requirements of national policy-making it will continually disrupt the efforts of the State to cope with crisis or plan for the longer term.

The paper avoids discussion of individual countries, not for reasons of discretion, but in an effort to distinguish aspects of the quest for democratic alternatives that are applicable to most if not all Latin American countries. It supposes that the relevance of democratic alternatives, in the sense in which the term "democratic" is used here, does not, in the Latin American context, depend on future achievement of a given level of "development" or national integration. Even the countries most prosperous, politically stable, and enlightened in their development policies are deeply enmeshed in the tensions and sources of precariousness discussed. Even the countries that are poorest and most habituated to authoritarianism are touched by the striving for participatory democracy.

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This avoidance implies that discussion of the social and economic policies needed to consolidate the democratic alternatives must be limited to very general terms. Throughout Latin America, these questions are being subjected to a vigorous debate focused on specific countries and on new possibilities for collective self-reliance, as they should be. In a sense, the main lines of policy needed are too obvious for a repetition of general prescriptions to be useful. In another sense, the real options differ too much from country to country for the prescriptions to offer more than a starting point for discussion.

There is another reason for placing the emphasis elsewhere. The question is not simply what must be done but how, and who will take part in the doing. Latin America has too long a history of plausible rationalist development strategies that have gone wrong—in their impact on the people they were supposed to benefit, if not in their narrowly economic consequences, as measured by the conventional indicators. Part of the blame lies with inadequate understanding of the functioning of the world economic and political order (or evasion of such understanding for the unwelcome conclusions it might force on the policy-makers). Another part of the blame, however, lies with the lack or weakness of mechanisms in the societies that would counteract technobureaucratic megalomania, disregard of the limitations of technological and administrative capacity, disregard of social and environmental side-effects, ignorance of local conditions, propensities to corruption and manipulation of policies by hidden interests. In different ways and degrees, developmentalist-reformist, neo-liberal and socialist styles or systems of development have all gone astray for lack of self-corrective mechanisms.

Participatory democracy offers some hope, if no assurance, of doing things better, and this hope has two main aspects: first, the creative adaptation to popular cultures and perceived needs of ways of producing goods, providing services, harmonizing supply and demand in patterns of consumption that the societies can afford, and offering meaningful as well as income-generating activities to the whole population. Second, creative resistance to over-standardization, manipulation, corruption, and exploitation in the name of development.

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This brings us back to a common ambiguity in the terms in which democratic alternatives are discussed: the lingering supposition that such alternatives can or must be opened up, guided, and restrained from above, by the State or a political movement. Obviously, the forces controlling the State, technobureaucrats and political movements are going quite legitimately to continue to try to fill such a role. By now, however, there is abundant empirical evidence that they are not very good at it, that their overt objectives and their pretensions to development planning can mask quite different objectives, or even a real lack of objectives and strategies, an opportunistic or haphazard series of responses to pressures, or a naive faith in the virtues of indiscriminate growth and technological modernization.

Thus, this exploration of democratic alternatives affirms the permanence of a contradiction or tension between the real need for planned transformation of social and economic structures, for a central direction capable of overcoming resistances and, in Dr. Prebisch's terms, managing the "socialization of the surplus" generated by economic growth; and the need for democratic institutions from the local to the national level that are both autonomous and critical, capable of innovating within their own spheres of action, continually challenging the political leaders, technobureaucrats, and local or national power structures. As long as these challenges remain predominantly corporativist, redistributivist and focussed on concessions that the State is incapable of providing, they lead back to the cycle of democratization-exclusion. One must hope that the struggles for participatory democracy, however confused and conflictive in their immediate manifestations will become system-transforming and value-transforming as well as self-serving.

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1/ The label "social democratic" for the alternatives under consideration has certain advantages. It corresponds to the label adopted by several of the political movements seeking such alternatives and by their political allies outside Latin America, and it conveys in a general way the manner of conducting public affairs, the role of the State, and the human welfare objectives that are in question. It also has disadvantages: the relatively long history of its use in other regions leaves the impression of a style that may once have been dynamic, but that has become bureaucratized and routinized, complacent, sluggish in response to new challenges, with "democracy" subordinated to self-perpetuating party and trade-union machines, and the "social" ideal to the costly and paternalistic welfare State. In fact, all the available labels (including "democracy", "development" and "revolution") have become shopworn over the years, and one cannot hope to achieve an illusion of originality by coining new ones. The present text thus identifies the alternatives aimed simply as "democratic". It uses the term "style" in the sense proposed by Jorge Graciarena, as the "concrete and dynamic modality of development of a society in a determined historical moment". The term "alternative" introduces the theme of rational choice; the term "national project" represents a codification of the choice by a régime or movement; the term "national pact" represents agreement on a project by representatives of a broad range of forces in a given society.


5/ Aldo Ferrer, "Vivir con lo nuestro" para romper la trampa financiera y construir la democracia, El Cid Editor, Buenos Aires, November 1983, pp. 95-96.

6/ "Sería difícil nombrar una élite, grupo o estrato social, salvo quizá los grandes terratenientes, a quien no haya honrado alguna escuela ideológica en los últimos años con el título de líder del desarrollo. Las clases medias en general, los empresarios industriales, los funcionarios públicos de formación técnica, las juventudes en general o los estudiantes en especial, los trabajadores organizados, han sido todos propuestos para desempeñar esa función en un número impresionante de estudios y trabajos polémicos. ... Las corrientes ideológicas que consideran que la destrucción revolucionaria de las estructuras existentes es el único camino que conduce al desarrollo cifran sus esperanzas en los campesinos y los estratos urbanos desposeídos, como elementos cuyos intereses o supervivencia son los más incompatibles con el mantenimiento del statu quo."

Economic Commission for Latin America, El cambio social y la política de desarrollo social en América Latina, 1969, p. 27.