TOWARD DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVES */

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| CONTENTS |
|----------|---|
| Summary  | v  |
| 1. The problem | 1 |
| 2. Democratic alternatives and directions of deviation | 7 |
| 3. Other deviations | 9 |
| 4. The quality of public discourse | 13 |
| 5. Collective actors | 18 |
| 6. The external environment for democratic alternatives | 23 |
| 7. In conclusion | 27 |
| Notes | 29 |

/Summary/
Summary

This paper inserts itself within the framework of the debate over styles of development for Latin America, arguing that a style of development worth striving for must give a more effective priority than heretofore to the values of democracy, freedom, and human welfare.

The present debate over these issues is different from that which prevailed during the seventies. Authoritarian, neoliberal, developmentalist, reformist and revolutionary prescriptions are all in disarray. At the same time, the region is experiencing a reinvigoration of popular movements and democratic initiatives, differing widely in content and intensity from country to country, but almost as generalized as the crisis itself. One can also confirm a trend in several countries of the region, although precarious, to shift from military-authoritarian to pluralist democratic regimes.

It is relevant, then, to study the viability of democratic or "social democratic" alternatives. In this respect the author calls attention to the fact that the first task of the democratic regimes now emerging is to cope with crisis effectively enough to recover a reasonable degree of autonomy in economic and social policy; distribute sacrifices in a manner perceived as fair; curb disorganization, arbitrariness and corruption in the public administration; and invigorate investment and production. It follows a discussion over the several attempts to formulate preconditions and tactics for democratic, self-reliant development alternatives in Latin America, underlining that in present discussions the traits of planners utopias persist: the dream of achieving national consensus and the benevolence of the world centres of power through quantified demonstrations of what must be done and what will come of doing it - if all the actors assume their proper roles. The production of "committee utopias" in the form of declarations and "plans of actions" also continues, mainly as a consequence of the self-perpetuating rituals of international organizations.

In general, however, the present discussion seems to have shifted toward an effort to achieve realism without falling into opportunism or "crisis management". This implies, according to the author, an effort to understand how structural and ideological changes in different strata of the national societies, in conjunction with the crisis and the emergence of democratic regimes and autonomous popular movements are changing national styles, not necessarily of "development", but of ways of conducting public affairs and private livelihood from which viable and democratic national projects can emerge. To sum up, the perception of crisis in intellectual circles, and the effort to formulate alternative styles of development are not new, but the propensity to formulate the alternatives in utopian or catastrophic terms has moderated now that the societies are closer to the brink of real catastrophe and that conviction of the need for democratic alternatives has spread to wider circles of the societies.

The several possible deviations from emerging national projects which may be called "democratic" or "social democratic" are analyzed in the

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second part of the document: technobureaucratic developmentalism, populism, and socialism. In any case, the listing of "deviations" does not imply that proponents of democratic alternatives should aim at ideal consistency and clear differentiation from the three tendencies. In view of the political traditions of Latin America; the history of the parties and movements now entering into discussions of democratic alternatives, and the continuing appeal of developmentalist, populist and revolutionary socialist ideologies it can be expected that the real national projects of governing alliances will combine incongruous elements and shift in one direction or another in the course of policy application without necessarily losing the capacity to advance.

In addition to deviations in the direction of alternative overt projects or political styles, one must consider the permanent vulnerability of democratic national projects to capture or manipulation by more or less hidden or inadmissible particularist styles of determining who gets what and how. One should therefore expect to reappear, under new guises, interests and tactics which have been present throughout the history of all countries of the region: corporativism, localism, clientelism and prebendalism, finance capitalism, currency speculation, smuggling, drug traffic and militarism.

Next, the author evaluates, through the analysis of the public discourse embodied in democratic projects, some of the factors that set limits to the quality and creativity of such discourse, calling attention to the importance of popular participation and the need, nowadays more than ever, of mobilizing myths that may entail the overcoming of the present crisis by society. Among these factors it is emphasized, on the one hand, the creativity of intellectuals and social scientists outside the public sector and their ability to interact with political leaders, technobureaucrats and the public at large. The creativity of planners, economists, engineers and other technobureaucrats acting within the public sector is equally important.

On the other hand, while one may prefer to emphasize collective social forces, it is underlined that the emergence of political leaders, and eventually of chiefs of state capable of personifying the democratic style and centring national debate on its requirements and promises remains of decisive importance. Finally, it is pointed out that the democratic style obviously requires varied channels for public information and debate, really accessible to all strata of the population; and today, even in relatively authoritarian settings, the Latin American urban middle-class public is in a better position to become informed than the public in most other parts of the world, including some of the central countries.

In the final portion of the essay the author adds to the analysis the role of collective actors, as well as the influence of the external environment to the viability of democratic styles of development. In what is related to the former his arguments rely on the hypothesis that recent social structural changes and their ideological reflections have, on the whole,
strengthened the predisposition of the different classes and groups to embrace democratic alternatives and take part in the complex interplay of innovation-cooperation-conflict-restraints that they imply. As to the implications of a changing and hostile external environment, it is indicated that democratic regimes have real opportunities to use the harsh external situation as a means of mobilizing national solidarity, while at the same time such solidarity strengthens their hand against external dictation.

The overall conclusion is that participatory democracy offers some hope, if no assurance, of doing things better, and this hope has two main aspects: first, the creative adaptation to popular cultures and perceived needs of ways of producing goods, providing services, harmonizing supply and demand in patterns of consumption that the societies can afford, and offering meaningful as well as income-generating activities to the whole population. Second, creative resistance to over-standardization, manipulation, corruption, and exploitation in the name of development.

One must hope that the struggles for participatory democracy, however confused and conflictive in their immediate manifestations will become system-transforming and value-transforming so much as self-serving.
1. The problem

Can one add to the debate over styles of development for Latin America anything relevant to the present conjuncture and the foreseeable future? During the 1970s the real processes of "development" intensified the traits of dynamism, improvidence and inequity that the debate over styles aspired to influence for the better. The debate helped toward a proliferation of "Declarations" and "Plans of Action" endorsed by the governments of the region, but the value-oriented priorities proclaimed in these texts had little to do with the policies the governments applied, and less to do with what actually happened. The societies "modernized" rapidly if contradictorily. Production and consumption rose and diversified, although the numbers of the critically poor probably did not shrink. Many countries of the region received capital inflows on a scale beyond the fondest hopes of their governments a few years previously. Toward the end of the decade a spurt in growth rates encouraged false confidence while the world economic order was already in difficulties. The debate over alternative styles finally seemed to lose relevance; even if major changes in the real styles might be desirable, they were neither needed nor practicable.

The present conjuncture is one of bleak awakening. The efforts of governments and political movements to find a way ahead face crippling constraints, deriving not only from the external debt burden and the dictates of creditors, but also from the structures of the societies and economies that have taken shape and the reflections of these structures in values and expectations. Authoritarian, neoliberal, developmentalist, reformist, and revolutionary prescriptions are all in disarray. One might expect a bewildered resentment among the groups that benefitted briefly from the style of "development" and also from those excluded and now more impoverished than ever. One might also expect that the groups presiding over this style will be even less scrupulous than before in their choice of tactics to keep their gains and shift the costs of crisis elsewhere.

At the same time, Latin America is experiencing a reinvigoration of popular movements and democratic initiatives, differing widely in content and intensity from country to country, but almost as generalized as the crisis itself. Several countries have shifted from military-authoritarian to pluralist democratic regimes, and it is probable that this trend will continue during the immediate future. In other countries one sees efforts by the politically dominant forces to introduce a greater degree of pluralism and spaces for participation into systems that were formally democratic but in practice oligarchic or bureaucratized. These trends are obviously precarious. If the democratic régimes cannot extricate themselves from the thankless role of administrators of the bankruptcy left by their predecessors, they will amount to one more recurrence in the disillusioning cycle of pseudo-democracy and real authoritarianism that Latin America has experienced for too long. And the next authoritarian recurrence, confronting economic stagnation, the long-term debt burden, and popular mobilization, would have to be even more brutally "concentrating and excluding" than its predecessors.

The problem
The problem before us, then, is to study the viability of democratic or "social democratic" alternatives in the present conjuncture in terms that will be accessible and helpful to the intellectual, political and bureaucratic actors that are trying to make such alternatives viable. A recent attempt to identify the "fundamental orientations" of the new democratic ideology emerging in Latin America, juxtaposed to a formulation of the inescapable tasks confronting democratic régimes and movements, offers a promising starting point. Four orientations are distinguished: 1) the idea of a diffusion and consolidation of effective practices of self-government; 2) the idea of a process of expansion of the spheres of life that are under personal control; 3) the idea of the necessity of a process of fragmentation or socialization of power; 4) the idea of a restitution to the collectivity (which is at the same time a conquest by the collectivity) of personal capacities and potentialities, that are now lost in the functioning of social structures become autonomous in relation to the women and men who put up with them. This new democratic ideology tends to be anti-state: "It not only views with suspicion the concentration of power in the state—which for the progressive ideologies of the past was an obvious, almost natural desideratum; it also shows a marked hostility toward the contemporary expressions of statism—technobureaucratic control and direction, the legitimacy of the expert as source of authority." The same author states that "the democratic political society constitutes itself primordially through processes of free rational public deliberation." The extent to which such orientations correspond to real changes in political values shared by significant sectors of the national populations can hardly be assessed for the present. They encounter the obvious objection that strong states are more needed than ever in order to cope with economic crisis. Another possibly useful way of looking at the environment for democratic alternatives proposes the recognition and acceptance of a permanent tripartite tension involving the state and its agents; the political parties and other movements organized at the national level that aspire to represent the people and dominate or influence the state; and, finally, the people themselves with their localized and informal groupings. "Each of these actors needs the other two but its limitations demonstrated by experience justify distrust on the part of the others. History has been equally unkind to theories of the state as embodiment of ideal rationality and guardian of the general welfare; of vanguard parties equipped by theory to guide a destined class to power; and of the people as sources of democratic controls over state and parties... The present mutations in the world order, the perverse consequences of the myths of development as well as the myths of revolution, are generating new paradoxes in the attempts of the state, political movements and people to make sense of each other, to manipulate each other, or to dispense with each other." In the present conjuncture it is peculiarly difficult for each collective actor to make sense of the others, if only as a basis for a "survival strategy".

The first task of the democratic régimes now emerging is to cope with crisis effectively enough to recover a reasonable degree of autonomy in economic and social policy; distribute sacrifices in a manner perceived as fair, curb disorganization, arbitrariness and corruption in the public administration; and invigorate investment and production. Democratic movements not yet in power need to demonstrate that they can cope similarly if they get the opportunity. The régimes and movements need to mobilize wide enough consensus among different social forces
social forces so that they can act coherently in the face of inevitable external and internal resistances or sabotage. The idea of a "national pact" as a means of educating the public, securing popular participation in policy formulation, and committing the public to support the policy once agreed on has thus come to the fore. But who are to participate in drawing up the pact and who are to bind themselves to honour it, if one thinks in terms of the "fundamental orientations" and the tensions outlined above?

The following is one of the more concrete proposals: "The formulation and execution of the pact must rest on full and continuous information directed to public opinion on the fundamental data and variables of the economic and social setting... The Pact will be elaborated by the National Executive Power and submitted for approval to the organ representing the will of the people: the Congress. The legislators, who represent the various currents of opinion of the Argentine society, would submit the Executive's proposal to a profound debate. The decision of the Congress would ratify the political commitment supporting the Pact. The National Executive Power would immediately establish channels for consultation and adjustment so that the entities representing the different social and economic sectors might inform themselves in depth concerning the content of the Pact and its repercussions on sectoral and private interests."

Proposals of this kind rest on the same optimistic rationalism and faith in the basic harmony of social interests as did the development planning doctrines of the 1960s. Underneath the democratic procedures the supposition lingers that experts can find correct solutions and that if these solutions are submitted to democratic debate the representatives of the public will endorse them with minor amendments and the public will then feel committed to act on them. One may have doubts on the extent to which different sectors of the public will digest and accept the impartiality of the information offered by the Executive, and on the extent to which these sectors will feel themselves represented and committed by the Congress or even the leaders of the sectoral organizations. One might advocate a larger input from below in the formulation of the pact, a recognition that justified distrust of the state and its experts, and of the capacity of the powerful to shift costs to the weak, will not be erased simply by following the procedures of representative democracy. One must also recognize, however, that the democratic regimes cannot embrace immediately ideal schemes for popular participation. In order to strengthen confidence and legitimacy, the democratic regimes will have to place on the wisdom of their experts and the representativeness of their legislative bodies, political parties and sectoral organizations as much weight as they will bear, or more. And if the democratic regime starts with a reasonable degree of political credibility, the potential of the pact-making procedure as a collective ritual may be substantial.

For many democratic regimes now on the scene the most they can realistically expect may be to leave the national economy a little sounder and democratic procedures a little firmer than they found them. They cannot accomplish even this much, however, unless they offer hope of doing more, some vision of a better post-crisis future. This leads back to the formidable agenda left by the past debate on alternative styles of development. Proposals continue to abound.
They leave the impression that radically original options are lacking and that zeal to invent them might only confuse matters. The governments and the national societies must go back to struggling to do better the things that CEPAL and other institutions have exhorted them to do for a good many years, and that most of them have intermittently been trying to do or claiming to do.

For present purposes, it would be inappropriate to enter in detail into short- and long-term policies for democratic régimes. Numerous studies and debates are now focussing on this question with the attention to detail and to national differences that it requires. Future national projects will presumably include policies for industrialization aimed at a domestic mass market. The belief that the world economic order will make room for an indefinite number of export-oriented Singapore and Taiwans is unlikely to regain its previous appeal. They will presumably include rural-agricultural policies aiming to reconcile national self-sufficiency in basic foods with better livelihood and more self-determination for the rural population. For a good many countries, one of the most paradoxical aspects of the present crisis is the pressure to increase specialized agricultural exports in order to pay debts while nutritional levels fall, food production stagnates, and food imports can no longer be afforded. The universalizing of basic social services and other means of guaranteeing a floor under family levels of living will demand large resources and thoroughgoing reforms of the programmes that have been accumulated piecemeal, with their entrenched bureaucracies and clienteles. Environmental upgrading and husbanding of natural resources will need urgent attention. And the governments must reconcile these policy needs with the old intractable struggles over the balance of payments, monetary stability and many other things. They are advised to act boldly, but do nothing in excess. "Don't put all your eggs in one basket" and other old saws come to mind. They can find a certain number of reasons why they should be able to do these things better than before: higher income and educational levels, social structural changes, greater national integration, modernization of the state administrative machinery. They can find other obvious reasons why the tasks may be even more difficult than when they were proposed twenty or thirty years ago. These need not be listed here; they recur obsessively throughout the present text.

Attempts by social scientists and ideologists to formulate preconditions and tactics for democratic, self-reliant development alternatives in Latin America have been numerous, as part of a worldwide movement that reached its peak in the mid-1970s. From their beginning, even in years when prospects for economic development as conventionally conceived looked reasonably good, these attempts pointed to impending crisis or even catastrophe unless the governments and societies embarked on radical changes in values, economic and social structures, and relationships with the world economic and political order. As was suggested at the beginning of this paper, these propositions, through the international organizations and national planning bodies, found their way into governmental declarations of objectives, but did very little to prepare governments or public opinion for the real crises that have come upon them.
In present discussions of development styles and alternatives the traits of planners' utopias persist: the dream of achieving national consensus and the benevolence of the world centres of power through quantified demonstrations of what must be done and what will come of doing it -if all the actors assume their proper roles. The opposing conviction that worthwhile alternatives can become viable, or will reveal themselves, only after a determined class alliance or political movement has taken power also remains current. The production of "committee utopias" in the form of declarations and "plans of action" continues, mainly as a consequence of the self-perpetuating rituals of international organizations.

At the same time, however, the present debate seems to have shifted toward an effort to achieve realism without dwindling into opportunism or "crisis management". This implies a distrust for ideological strategies aimed at "irreversible changes" in the societies and economies. It implies an effort to understand how structural and ideological changes in different strata of the societies, in conjunction with the crisis and the emergence of democratic régimes and autonomous popular movements are changing national styles, not necessarily of "development" but of ways of conducting public affairs and private livelihood from which democratic national projects can emerge. As the formulation of "fundamental orientations" quoted above indicates, this effort also implies a wariness toward the state quite different from the neoliberal project of the state reduced to umpire (backed by armed force) of a game whose rules have been set to reward certain players and castigate others.

The national projects in question would have to mobilize sufficient solidarity and self-reliance to cope with a permanently difficult and continually changing external environment, and to reverse the social polarization and marginalization that have prevailed up to the present throughout the range of development styles in Latin America. They would have to contain and survive continuing conflicts of interests and ideologies, miscalculations and inefficiencies, particularist tactics for manipulation, corruption or subversion. The discussion supposes that most components of the societies can place national interests above corporative interests, but does not harbour illusions that this will come about consistently or in response to rational demonstrations of what must be done. It assumes that mixed economic systems, combining private enterprise and market incentives with innovative co-operative activities, combative representation of group interests, and extensive state intervention aiming at "socialization of the surplus" can function better than heretofore, and that in any case no plausible alternative is at hand. It also assumes that such functioning will be permanently precarious.

In the earlier discussions of development alternatives, the social shortcomings and internal dissatisfactions of the high-income industrialized societies constituted arguments for bold originality; these societies could no longer be accepted as models. The argument remains valid, but at present the difficulties of these societies, in particular the dilemmas faced by the social democratic régimes of Europe, contribute to soberness and perplexity in assessing the viability of democratic alternatives in Latin America. It is evident that even societies with relatively homogenous social structures, strong sense of national identity,
dynamic systems of production and technological innovation, efficient administrative machinery and régimes committed to participatory democracy and human welfare cannot satisfy popular demands for full employment, or avoid measures for industrial modernization that have a painful impact on the very population groups whose needs they are committed to serve. Meanwhile, the claims of the two Marxist-socialist camps to be able to solve problems of this kind have steadily declined in plausibility. The incorporation of a rapidly growing, youthful, spatially mobile labour force into productive employment and the reconciliation of this objective with continuing incorporation of new technologies, mainly of exogenous origin, will present problems very different from those of the "mature" industrial economies, but no less formidable.

The democratic national projects of today, as was suggested above, have a good deal in common with the developmentalist and populist projects of the 1950s and 1960s, codified in the Charter of Punta del Este and the Alliance for Progress. This historical dimension deserves study. Did the earlier projects give way to the very different projects of the 1970s because of errors in their political strategies or their execution; because the existing entrepreneurs, middle classes and other key actors were unable or unwilling to play the parts expected of them; because the world economic and political order, in particular the behaviour of the United States, shifted from supporting to obstructive; or for other reasons? The world order at first glance seems to be lacking in most of the supportive features it had in the earlier period: unmanageable debts instead of offers of aid in exchange for good (non-revolutionary) behaviour; protectionism instead of expanding export markets; productive systems transnationalized; political obsession with the East-West conflict; international co-operation at a low ebb of impotence. However, the absence of a benevolent deus ex machina disposed to solve development problems also offers some hope: that of mobilizing broad national and regional alliances around resistance to dictation, and a quest for collective self-reliance.

To sum up, the perception of crisis in intellectual circles, and the effort to formulate alternative styles of development are not new, but the propensity to formulate the alternatives in utopian or catastrophic terms has moderated now that the societies seem closer to the brink of real catastrophe and that conviction of the need for democratic alternatives has spread to wider circles of the societies. This may turn out to be a stage of ideological exhaustion and lowering of expectations, to be followed by quite different and anti-democratic reactions to prolonged frustration, but for the present non-utopian proposals relying as much on initiatives from within the societies as on initiatives from the state can get a hearing. Social scientists and ideologists have a duty to put forward proposals worth a hearing, and to seek a different kind of hearing from the rituals of conferences and "plans of action". Finally, they would do well to avoid an excessive zeal for originality. Practically all relevant policy approaches have been tried somewhere in Latin America, and a recurrent weakness has been the propensity to put forward schemes claiming to be radically new instead of trying to combine innovation with continuity.
2. Democratic alternatives and directions of deviation

The emerging national projects that can be labelled "democratic" or "social-democratic" are those of politician-intellectuals trying to reconcile economic realism, democratic values, and arbitration of the demands of key forces in the societies so as to achieve a combination of support and acquiescence broad enough to enable the régime to survive and achieve certain advances in the general welfare. Their viability depends partly on measurable structural changes in the societies and economies, partly on the evolution of the external environment, and partly on ideological receptivity in the forces able to make themselves heard. The extent of this receptivity can be inferred from voting patterns and mass demonstrations, but is an unknown as to coherence and durability. The projects represent a "middle ground", calling for major changes in the societies and economies while avoiding utopian expectations and voluntarist or authoritarian tactics. Various political and economic forces, combining with initial hopes, will continually push or pull them out of the middle ground toward three different kinds of overt projects or ways of managing public affairs.

a) Technobureaucratic developmentalism

This approach implies that the major policy problems are technical, that correct solutions can be determined only by experts, and that democratic participation in policy making should consist mainly of listening to the experts and acting accordingly. The present crisis has been a severe blow to technobureaucratic prestige, but one can expect a combined pressure towards technobureaucratic policy-making originating in the real need for and in the supply of "experts". Even if popular initiative becomes as dynamic as can be hoped, the new national projects will involve a considerable amplification in the responsibilities and planning capacity of the state, after a period in which these have deteriorated or become privatized. Neoliberal technobureaucrats will fall into eclipse, but the governments will have to recruit technobureaucrats with developmentalist backgrounds, possibly but not necessarily enlightened by the frustrations of the past decade. To the extent to which the economic problems confronted -particularly the renegotiation of debts, the quest for markets, and the stimulation of productive investment- prove intractable, the government may find no alternative to relying on secrecy in policy formulation and to the technobureaucratic mystique -the infallible prescriptions of the experts. This would probably but not necessarily mean a drift toward greater conservatism, a lower priority to action against poverty, and a partial denationalization of policy, as the prescriptions of the international technobureaucratic elite would carry greater weight. Technobureaucratic voluntarism and over-optimism directed toward rapid structural transformations are also conceivable. In the latter case, highly democratic and participatory conceptions might mask the technobureaucratic bias: the experts would identify their own ideological preferences with those of the masses.

From the supply side, the prospect of an enhanced role for the state and increased public employment of professionals, combined with a renewed sense of centrality for social scientists and intellectuals, will be among the main attractions of the democratic national projects for university-educated middle-class youth. The fact that the middle ranks of the public administration can draw
upon a much larger supply of educationally-qualified entrants than a few years ago is an asset for the projects. In most countries, however, the supply of candidates is by now probably in excess of needs and the technical qualifications are far from ideal. These prospective middle-rank technobureaucrats cannot avoid a propensity to substitute their own corporate interests and their ideological biases for those of the national society.

b) Populism

Populism, even more than technobureacracy, is now under a cloud. In pluralistic democratic systems, however, competitive electoral promises and manipulation of disposable masses cannot be excluded. Electorally, the new national projects cannot depend on the supposedly enlightened middle classes and the class-conscious organized workers alone. Moreover, determined efforts to alleviate the poverty and open channels for the autonomous participation of the "excluded" strata of the population follow from the basic values of the projects. If the projects give priority to agrarian reforms, employment, health, education, housing and other basic needs of the excluded strata the costs and difficulties of implementation (including those of diversion of benefits to the middle strata) will be formidable, but the measures will not be characteristically populist. Neither will policies encouraging the organization of the excluded to defend their sources of livelihood and obtain a fairer share of public social expenditures.

However, understandable motivations on the part of the régime to broaden its base of support at minimum cost and head off political adversaries mean a permanent temptation toward exaggerated electoral promises, clientelistic mobilization, token assistentialism, co-optation of pliable potential leaders of the masses, and repression of the less pliable. Furthermore, one cannot be sure that modernization of social structures, rising educational levels, etc. have really dissipated the threat of more extreme and irresponsible forms of populism manipulated by charismatic leaders. The historical experience of the United States suggests that even the most advanced "modernization" of a society need not preclude the continual resurgence of different forms of populism, nor guarantee predictability of political behaviour on the basis of social class. If democratic alternatives in Latin America prove ineffective, even the most simplistic promises may again rally support, and not only among the excluded masses.

c) Socialism

In the terminology proposed by Aníbal Pinto, "socialism" represents a different "system" rather than "style" of development. To the extent to which the democratic alternatives depend for support on organized workers, parties identifying themselves as Marxist, intellectuals and student movements they will be pulled in the direction of a radical break with the basically capitalist economic system, with its requirements for compromises with economically powerful elites and "renegotiated dependency" on the capitalist international order. The pull toward socialism within democratic national projects, however, might have several outcomes short of a thoroughgoing change of system. The meaning of socialism as an alternative system or a path to utopia is less clear than it seemed a few years ago. Conceptions of socialism as the outcome of seizure of state power
state power and control of the means of production by a destined class have lost credibility. In the present context, the pull toward socialism might affect mainly the style of political discourse, contributing to greater internal polarization and shifts in definition of external allies and adversaries, without negating the commitment to pluralism and to a mixed economy. It might come down to nationalization of key industries, agribusinesses, banks, and mines not so much from a theoretical preference for public ownership as from urgent reactions to crisis situations, or inability to find other means of bringing the activities of these enterprises into line with the national project. It might manifest itself in schemes for the deepening of popular participation: worker self-management in industries, decentralized co-operative innovations in popular livelihood and mutual aid, and agrarian reforms aiming at collective or co-operative tenure, exploitation, and credit. At the other extreme, in conditions of extreme crisis or sabotage of democratic projects, an alliance with the revolutionary left might lead to abandonment of the middle ground altogether and implantation of "siege socialism": that is, centralized control of all economic activity and of popular mobilization focused on defense against external and internal enemies. This last outcome is plausible mainly in some of the smaller and poorer countries of the region.

The above listing refers to tendencies that will present themselves in many different guises and under different labels. The negative or positive connotations of the labels to different users also have a certain importance. To label features of democratic projects "technobureaucratic" or "populist" is to damn them, while "revolutionary" or "socialist" will attract some components of the broad alliances that are sought and repel others. The labels "social democratic" or "reformist" will also symbolize acceptability to some and futility or mystification to others. In any case, the listing of "deviations" does not imply that proponents of democratic alternatives should aim at ideal consistency and clear differentiation from the three "deviations". In view of the political traditions of Latin America; the history of the parties and movements now entering into discussions of democratic alternatives; and the continuing appeal of developmentalist, populist and revolutionary socialist ideologies, it can be expected that the real national projects of governing alliances will combine incongruous elements and shift in one direction or another in the course of policy application without necessarily losing the capacity to advance.

3. Other deviations

In addition to deviations in the direction of alternative overt projects or political styles, one must consider the permanent vulnerability of democratic national projects to capture or manipulation by more or less hidden or inadmissible particularist styles of determining who gets what and how. The fact that democratic projects are in a middle ground, open to compromise and concessions in order to widen consensus and placate adversaries, increases their vulnerability. Particularist tactics have, in fact, flourished under all preceding styles of development in Latin America and have been able to distort or subvert them.
They became particularly well-entrenched and shielded from scrutiny during the years of military-authoritarian régimes, for whose discrediting they were partially responsible, but they have functioned just as effectively under populist and pseudo-democratic régimes. They are deeply rooted in the expectations of all sectors of the societies concerning the ways in which the economic and political systems function, and their adaptability is considerable. The democratic alternatives have at hand a partial antidote in their openness to public criticism. They will have to confront certain entrenched particularist interests from the beginning, and have good prospects for curbing them, in view of the present unpopularity of these interests. However, similar interests and tactics can be expected to re-emerge continually in new guises. The following discussion deals first with certain tactics and attitudes, then with two kinds of organized interests with which the democratic alternatives must grapple.

a) **Corporativism**

In societies with long traditions of struggle for advancement of group interests, in which no group sees good reason to accept restraint in the name of national interests and social solidarity, since power holders have repeatedly used such appeals for particularist advantage, democratic alternatives may be unable to find a dependable base either in the middle or the working classes. The political credit of the democratic alliance and the resources of the state will then be dissipated in petty bargaining and concessions in the face of group tactics of non-co-operation or "representational violence". At the same time, democratic values imply that militant bargaining in defense of perceived interests is legitimate, and that the strata hitherto unorganized and excluded have a right to participate. No clear dividing line can be drawn between corporativist tactics and legitimate group revindications. Norms for entitlements laid down by planners will be received with justified suspicion. The obvious desideratum is to convince the contending groups that their long-term interests along with those of the nation call for shared sacrifices in the face of crisis; but this requires that the democratic alternative overcome entrenched experience-based reactions and convince the contenders that sacrifices really are being shared.

b) **Clientelism and prebendalism**

If resources are insufficient to support corporativist redistributive tactics involving broad sectors of the population, pressures toward clientelism, already deeply rooted in Latin American political practices, become stronger. The individual seeks vertical ties with a patron, in the bureaucracy or elsewhere, powerful enough to help, in exchange for some kind of service. If the promoters of democratic alternatives confront an array of autocratically-managed trade unions, local political machines and bureaucratic mini-empires, the easiest way forward will be to buy off the leaders and equate their support with support from the masses they claim to represent. Moreover, the democratic leadership will be under permanent temptation to take the initiative in creating clientelistic ties and distributing prebends as a means of co-opting leaders and neutralizing inconveniently militant organizations. In fact, overtly democratic alliances in some countries have evolved into remarkably durable pseudo-democratic systems by relying on this tactic.

/c) **Localism**
c) **Localism**

In most Latin American countries national integration is further advanced than in a good many other parts of the world. However, the conflictive interplay between over-centralization and the tactics of local power-holders, with or without mass backing, to defend their interests against centralism and obtain larger resources from the state has a long history and in several countries is taking on renewed vigour with the formation of multiclas s regional alliances making use of general strikes and other militant tactics to enforce demands. In principle, the democratic projects call for decentralization, fairer distribution of public resources and income-generating activities, and vigorous participation by local groups in advancement of their perceived interests. However, the traditional patterns of neglect, manipulation and coercion, from the one side; and resentment, skepticism concerning the good intentions of the centre, and plausible expectations that tactics of violent obstruction are most likely to get a hearing from the other, will be heard to overcome or compatibilize with open decision-making under conditions of extreme scarcity of public resources.

d) **Licit and illicit economic interests**

For present purposes it may be legitimate to lump together very different lines of economic activity that would either be incompatible with democratic national projects or that would require a good deal more public scrutiny and regulation than heretofore. These range from manipulators of the financial system through more or less legal means, speculators in urban real estate, importers of non-essential goods, and transnational enterprises with hidden tactics for exporting profits and penetrating the national economies, to mafia-type combinations that have grown enormously in wealth and political influence. The main component of these last, of course, is made up of the drug traffickers, who are believed to control resources greater than the revenues of some of the states in which they operate, and to account for exports exceeding in value the main legitimate exports. Such activities increase and complicate the dependency of the national economies on the international order and make for a wide gap between real economic and political processes and the visible ones on which governments base their forecasts and plans. The groups behind them may or may not resist democratic national alternatives frontally, but if they do not it will be because they confide in their ability to protect their own operations, whether by corrupting or intimidating the agents of the state, by external political or economic pressures, or by striking mutually advantageous bargains with the democratic régime. Such bargains are quite conceivable, particularly in the cases of the transnational enterprises and the financial interests that might be induced to repatriate funds from abroad. A democratic régime may also be able to take advantage of conflicts of interests between different economic interest-groups: e.g., between transnationally-controlled industries interested in expansion of the domestic market and finance capital demanding contraction of the market to squeeze out resources for exports and debt payments. In any case, the democratic régimes will need to keep in mind the adage that he who sups with the devil should use a long spoon.

/e) **Militarism**
e) Militarism

Emerging democratic alternatives generally confront military and police apparatuses recently in power or influential behind the scenes; now discredited by economic failures, repressive excesses and corruption, and weakened by internal divisions, but able to enforce vetoes over some aspects of national policy and to claim sizable proportions of the national budgets. These interests justify their claims by reference to national security doctrines and the menace of violent subversion, on the one hand, and to supposed territorial ambitions and exaggerated armaments in neighbouring countries, on the other. The former justification receives strong support from their counterparts in the United States. Both justifications are susceptible to manipulated crises, if the political leadership fails to respond to military demands.

A quite different justification for military control is now in eclipse, mainly because of the disillusioning experience of the régimes that based themselves on it, but might well reappear in some countries if the democratic alternatives reach an impasse. That is, nationalist military leaders have claimed that they could govern more efficiently than the squabbling and self-serving civilian politicians, in the interest of development, social justice, and even eventual true democracy.

The conditions under which some democratic alliances come to power give them assets for an effort to subordinate the military to a restricted legitimate role, and to expose to public debate the limits of this role and the resources needed to perform it. More often, however, pressures and bargaining take place in relative secrecy, with a good deal of insecurity in the political leadership and the general public as to how the military will react under given conditions. In a good many cases the strictly particularist interests of the higher ranks of the military, legitimate (salaries and perquisites) and illegitimate (business ventures, influence peddling, protection of illegal enterprises) have flourished in recent years, stimulating public resentment, but tempting the political leadership to tolerate prebendalism as an alternative to policy concessions. In a few countries the growth of an armaments industry with export capacity and linked to counterparts in the central countries raises the prospect of "military-industrial complexes" with new motivations and means for influencing public policy.

In some cases, also, the reality of ultra-left movements recalcitrant to a democratic modus vivendi complicates the problem of bringing militarism under control. If a democratic régime relies on military responses to "armed struggle" tactics it risks escalation and an increasing subservience to "national security" doctrines. If it tries to bargain with the ultra-left and attract it into peaceful political competition it faces other obvious dangers, from the factionalism of its interlocutors, and from the reactions of the military and their external allies.
4. The quality of public discourse

Democratic alternatives and projects, under present conditions, call for ways of looking at popular participation quite different from those hitherto current, when development as a mobilizing myth was more potent and clearer in content, when it was more plausible to hope that state intervention guided by planning, or impersonal market forces, or external financing and technology, or the rise to power of new classes, or the right kind of education, or some combination of these would lead to a happy future. Various conceptions of development accorded importance to popular participation, but assumed that this should consist mainly of learning to fill roles laid down by a correct theory and strategy. The legitimacy of conflictive participation might be admitted grudgingly, as a cost to be kept within bounds, or such participation might be welcomed if it meant the displacement of anti-developmental elites by pro-developmental elites. In either case, some school of theory must have correct answers to the questions: who should participate, how, and for what ends?

At present, mobilizing myths may be needed more than ever if the societies are to cope with crisis rather than enter into descending spirals of impoverishment and disintegration. However, plausible myths are not at hand, beyond the myth of democracy itself. As was stated above, the democratic régimes must present for public consideration some combination of short-term expedients and longer-term policies that do not differ dramatically from policies that have been attempted in the past, that will take years to mature, and whose success cannot be guaranteed.

If the different sectors of the public are to make realistic responses to the alternatives before them and contribute creatively to constructing new alternatives through "free rational public deliberation", they will have to acquire a relatively sophisticated ability to cope with the indeterminate, and combine vigorous defense of their perceived interests and their visions of the Good Society with patience and ability to compromise. For the external proponent of democratic alternatives, it is hard to strike a balance between utopian visions of national harmony and formal pacts democratically arrived at, and a pessimistic view of the real processes of negotiation, conflict, manipulation, rational argument, precarious promises, and appeals to emotional symbols, through which policies will take shape. The social forces trying to participate democratically cannot afford to take government promises at face value, but neither can they give up hope of national policies that deserve their critical support.

The most important factors in assessing the potential for democratic participation are presumably the characteristics of the different social classes, with their perceptions of their own and the national situations, and the characteristics of the political parties and other organizations through which these classes relate themselves to policy formulation. It can be supposed that the internal differentiation of classes and sub-classes has advanced considerably in recent years; that the ideological and organizational reflections of this differentiation are complex, poorly understood and very different from country to country; moreover, that the present crisis has thrown the previous trends of differentiation into disarray. For the moment, however, let us evade this formidable topic and try to evaluate some of the factors that set limits to the quality and creativity of "free rational public deliberation".

/a) Intellectuals
The creativity of intellectuals and social scientists outside the public sector, including literary and artistic figures, and their ability to interact with political leaders, technobureaucrats and the public at large are of crucial importance. Resources are promising, in view of the remarkable rise since the 1950s in numbers, qualifications and ideological diversity among intellectuals studying and polemizing about "development" in the broadest sense. Novelists, poets, musicians and artists have exposed the contradictions of the social order and challenged complacency. After a stage of intense partisanship and revolutionary optimism, with differing national periods of rise and decline, these actors encountered various shocks and disillusions, with narrowed possibilities for research and diffusion of findings, but survived and adapted. Universities lost much of their creative capacity, sometimes because of repression and sometimes because of massification, but autonomous centres for economic, social and political research emerged in partial compensation. In general, as was suggested above, intellectual discourse became soberer, less dogmatic, and more disposed to embrace pluralist democracy as an end as well as a means. It is evident that varied efforts are now under way to criticize previous political and economic concepts, understand what is happening in the national societies and the world, and on the basis of this understanding propose viable alternatives.

The ability to advance ideas in terms accessible to a public sensitized by crisis is more problematic. This is undoubtedly happening to some extent, but the renunciation of utopian or Manichean visions susceptible to dramatic presentation complicates the task. In some settings, intellectuals are dynamically involved in popular movements. In others, their ideas reach only the better-educated parts of the middle classes. A good deal of the debate remains within the confines of reviews and compilations of papers with a narrow and overlapping circulation. The expansion of higher education, whatever its shortcomings, should help toward a wider receptivity to the debate among students and ex-students. The role of priests and members of religious congregations in transmitting the debate to wider circles and reformulating its terms is a relatively new factor of considerable importance. It must also be significant that individuals with social science or intellectual backgrounds are prominent among the leaders of the emerging democratic political movements.

b) Technobureaucrats

The creativity of planners, economists, engineers and other professionals acting within the public sector is equally important. There is no clear dividing line between this group and that discussed above in regard to individual careers. Many persons have shifted repeatedly between the roles of technobureaucrat and critical intellectual, and the re-emergence of democratic régimes implies that certain ex-technobureaucrats who have been relegated to the latter role in recent years will get another chance. However, the problems of creativity and credit with the public in the two roles are quite different. The planners and other technobureaucrats, while warning of various evils if their advice were not followed, have proved remarkably incapable of foreseeing and prescribing for the kind of crisis that has struck the region. By now the argument that their prescriptions have failed
have failed mainly because governments and people lack the political will to adhere firmly enough to the prescriptions has become hollow. The crisis has left some schools of technobureaucrats more discredited than others but no school is in particularly good shape. At the same time, the crisis has made their services more indispensable than ever. A government may shift from one school to another, without much faith in any of them, and occasionally use its technobureaucrats as scapegoats, but it cannot do without expertise.

The technobureaucrats thus find themselves in a peculiarly ambiguous position, with their ability to invoke infallible theories or technical neutrality in order to shield themselves from political conflict much weakened. They need more than before to be able to discuss policy alternatives, risks, constraints, and incognita with political leaders, critical intellectuals, and the general public in a spirit of co-operative contributions and approximations to viable policy rather than enlightenment from above. The crisis calls for innovation and experimentation, but its "management" diverts the technobureaucrats working in the public sector from thinking along these lines, or studying with open mind the innovations and adaptations that are actually emerging in the societies.

The planning agencies are the logical focal point for such a task and some of them are reasonably well equipped for it, although they continue to be chained to the preparation of fixed-term "book plans" that are shelved as soon as completed. For some time, various planning agencies have been struggling with ambiguities and role-conflicts somewhat different from those described above for the technobureaucrats in general. Discourse on planning has long left behind the supposition of neutral technical rationality. Proposals for "participatory planning", "transactive planning", etc. abound, and to some extent have taken root, at least in the social divisions of the planning agencies. Some planners have taken seriously the proposition that they should try to help the society toward an economic system suited to the strengthening of democracy rather than a system maximizing growth irrespective of social and political costs. Political leaderships have intermittently encouraged or tolerated planning for participatory democratic styles of development. The resulting proposals have entered published plans in incongruous juxtaposition to more traditional approaches, but have proved too remote from the real functioning of the economies and the political systems to produce much more than frustration for the planners. At present, the character of the democratic alternatives as negotiated compromises between different social forces rules out the possibility of allocation of scarce resources through formal planning (illusory in any case). Planning can clarify the choices and sacrifices that are called for, and help toward more rational political decisions. It may even help the disadvantaged groups to present more realistic demands. However, past experience indicates that capacity to fulfill such functions is precarious and that the planning body is continually tempted to retreat into "book plans". One can only hope that planners will try again with firmer links to political processes and more realism concerning the functioning of the state, within the context of "free rational public deliberation".

/c) Political
c) Political leaders

While one may prefer to emphasize collective social forces, the emergence of political leaders, and eventually of chiefs of state, capable of personifying the democratic alternatives and centering national debate on their requirements and promises remains of decisive importance. This supposes a difficult combination of self-confidence and self-restraint on the part of the leader, who must start from a relatively coherent but undogmatic conception of national problems, what he wants to do about them, and how much he can do with the political resources he can mobilize and within the political and other constraints he confronts. He faces an unavoidable public propensity to attribute the strengths or weaknesses of his régime to his personal qualities and to expect "solutions" that he cannot provide. At the same time, he must try to infuse confidence that the major national problems are soluble, that the deficiencies of previous ways of conducting public affairs can be overcome, that all legitimate interests can get a hearing without relying on corporativist or clientelist tactics. A few promising candidates for this difficult role have emerged, but more commonly the kinds of régimes that have prevailed in recent years seem to have limited the possibility for innovative leadership to gain experience and public visibility. The rise of charismatic "terrible simplifiers" (foreboded by Jakob Burckhardt in the late 19 century) does not seem to be an immediate threat for Latin America, and the intractability of the tasks ahead should preserve even the most self-confident political leaders from delusions of personal infallibility.

d) Channels of mass communication

Democratic alternatives obviously require varied channels for public information and debate, really accessible to all strata of the population. Criticisms of the mass communication media in Latin America are too well known to need elaboration here: excessive control by elites with particularist interests or by the state; excessive dependence for content on agencies of the central countries; predominance of consumerist propaganda, sensationalism and triviality in the media directed to a mass public. However, it would be pointless to call for an ideal seriousness and impartiality in the media, and most of the proposed remedies for present shortcomings may be worse than the disease. Transfer of mass media from private ownership to control by popular organizations would be positive only if the organizations are genuinely autonomous and democratically guided by their members. Even the best-intentioned state regulation of content is suspect; the state may tolerate, but it can hardly welcome critical inquiry into its own pretensions.

In most countries, in fact, some mass-media have opened themselves to serious debate on the present crisis and democratic alternatives. Intellectuals are expressing their inquietudes and offering their proposals through these media. The educated middle-class public has expanded enormously in recent years. Even in relatively authoritarian settings, the Latin American urban middle-class public is in a better position to become informed than the public in most other parts of the world, including some of the central countries. The extent to which this public actually follows public affairs, in the critical spirit called for by the democratic alternatives, can only be surmised.

/The ways
The ways in which the issues penetrate the urban working class, the marginalized strata, and the rural population are even less susceptible to confident generalizations. The shocks to which these strata have been subjected in recent years might be expected to generate a desperate grouping for some way to make sense of the situation and some reason for hope. Most of them have access to transistor radios or television, if not to the printed press. The organizational and ideological channels that previously filtered their views of national affairs have been disrupted but not eliminated, and in many settings are probably now regaining influence. The multiplication of ideologically diverse local radio stations would probably be the most promising way of informing them and enabling them to make their own contributions to the national debate, as far as the mass media are concerned. From the standpoint of "free rational public deliberation", however, the most important recent trend may well be the proliferation, stimulated by religious as well as political movements, of small groups or "base communities" engaged in self-conscientization and self-help. This trend coincides with the "fundamental orientations" proposed for the new democratic ideology, although some proponents of democratic alternatives have criticized it for going too far in isolating itself from broader political movements and thus falling into an unwanted dependence on service-providing state bureaucracies.

e) Collective memory

The question of channels for public information, interpretation and debate leads us back to the question of the repercussions of the recent past on public confidence in development prescriptions, national projects and intellectual diagnoses. What are the psychological consequences and collective memories among different classes and groups deriving from experiences of technobureaucratic arrogance, sectarian or demagogic excesses, and the fate of the varied national projects that past régimes have advanced? National trends have been paradoxical: on the one side, dynamic processes of economic growth and structural change bringing upward mobility and transformed life-styles to parts of the national populations, hope to others, intensified exclusion to still others. On the other side, one sees a series of lost opportunities and unfulfilled promises to make these dynamic processes more equitable, more compatible with democracy and human welfare. Have the bolder national projects, calling for national transformation in the name of socialism, communitarianism or nationalism, left a collective memory of struggles that could have been won and lessons that can help in future struggles? Can the opening of more adequate channels for "free rational public deliberation" overcome fatigue, skepticism, resentment and opportunism now that political leaderships embark once again on appeals for popular participation, national unity and patience?

f) Long-term problems

Finally, one must consider the receptivity of democratic political leadership and different sectors of public opinion to a wide range of problems that were growing in dimensions long before the present crisis and that will remain intractable long after it -problems such as environmental deterioration, squandering of natural resources, megalopolitan hypertrophy, and critical poverty concentrated in regions with little economic potential- and the channels through which these
which these questions reach public awareness as "problems". In recent years
awareness of these problems and programmes to grapple with them seemed to be
advancing, although hardly with sufficient urgency. The dangers were becoming
too obvious to be dismissed as inevitable and bearable costs of "development".
In the context of pluralist democratic reactions to crisis and lowering of
expectations for short-term solutions can these problems retain an adequate place
in public attention? It is hard to imagine how democratic procedures can cope
with the task of making humanly habitable the kinds of urban agglomerations that
have emerged, or the task of redistributing population from the most over-crowded
deteriorated rural zones, or the task of curbing industrial, agricultural
and resource exploitation practices that are profitable to the individual but
harmful to the collectivity, but without widespread public concern and democratic
debate over such needs they will not be tackled at all, or will be tackled at
an even more acute stage through technobureaucratic coercion.

5. Collective actors

Discussions of the viability of alternative strategies for development or strategies
for revolution in Latin America have persistently tried to identify some class or
social force destined to act as guide or catalyst in the kind of transformation
wanted. None of the classes or collective actors has performed predictably,
and a present attempt to identify agents for democratic alternatives might well,
for various reasons, be more hesitant, more aware of ambiguities, and more disposed
to look outside the conventional collective categories. For one thing, the
fundamental orientation of the democratic ideology imply that individual free
will and rationality deserve as much respect as class-determined behaviour. For
another, these orientations imply that all classes have the right and capacity to
participate on equal terms: "free rational public deliberation" cannot be
monopolized by a destined vanguard class, and still less in a party representing
it.

The case for the viability of democratic alternatives has to rely on the
hypothesis that recent social structural changes and their ideological reflections
have, on the whole, strengthened the predisposition of the different classes and
groups to embrace such alternatives and take part in the complex interplay of
innovation-co-operation-conflict-restraints that they imply. As was suggested
above, there are as many reasons for skepticism as for confidence, but men of
good will cannot avoid taking up the wager. In any case, the hypothesis cannot
be tested in advance and in general terms. Its degree of validity will appear
country by country as democratic national projects take shape. Even then, results
will be ambiguous and judgements subjective. Such projects may "fail" in obvious
ways, but they will never "succeed" in the sense of achieving a predetermined
utopia by following a predetermined path.

a) Elites

It can be taken for granted that relations between the democratic projects
and the elites or power holders -entrepreneurial, financial, political, military-
now on the scene will be difficult. The democratic projects, unlike more
revolutionary projects, do not expect to liquidate or expel these elites, but to
clip their wings, induce or compel them to act differently -to accept more modest
shares of the national income, relinquish illicit sources of gain, invest their funds locally instead of exporting them, pay taxes, moderate their consumption of luxuries and their travels abroad, do without the most advanced and expensive armaments, refrain from trying to get their way by violence or corruption. The elites as a whole are not likely to undergo conversion to values motivating them to embrace these new patterns of behaviour, but they may see good reasons to embrace the democratic projects provisionally, in the breakdown of oligarchic or military-authoritarian styles of government and the consequent risk of national disintegration or revolution. At best, they will try to manipulate the democratic alternatives in their own interests. They have at hand a wide range of tactics for doing so, including their links with the governments, military establishments, banks, and transnational corporations of the central countries. In a sense, however, their interactions of co-operation-manipulation-intimidation-sabotage with the democratic alternatives come from outside. The promoters of these alternatives can assess their probable moves and devise counter-moves.

b) **Middle strata**

The characteristics of the middle classes or strata have a different kind of importance for the viability of democratic national projects, since their participation, interacting with their tactics for self-advancement and self-protection are "internal" to the projects, which can hardly be imagined without active participation from some components of the middle strata and at least passive support from most of the remainder. The extent to which this precondition can be met presumably varies widely from country to country, depending on the width of cultural cleavages in the societies, on the evolution of the middle strata, and on their reactions to previous experiences of authoritarianism, populism, etc. It can be assumed that the majority almost everywhere would prefer democratic styles of conducting public affairs under certain conditions. These conditions, however, may stand in the way of the participation of the strata below them in the social scale.

The most obvious stumbling blocks derive from the precariously privileged status that the middle strata have achieved, the widening gap between expectations from education and the occupational or income rewards of education, and the consumption standards that the middle strata now claim as rights. Under present conditions, a genuinely democratic national project must include major educational reforms, some degree of income distribution away from the middle strata, and a curbing of the consumption of middle strata as well as elites, particularly in regard to imported goods and foreign travel. Such policies will test the limits of democratic sentiments in the middle strata, but they have been discussed so thoroughly in other contexts that it is pointless to dwell upon them here.

A problem still more "internal" to the democratic alternatives lies in the ubiquity of the functions of intermediation of the middle strata and the generally clientelistic and exploitative traits of these functions. As professional politicians and lawyers they mediate between the state, in its functions of provider of public services and guarantor of public order, and the masses of the population. As bureaucrats and publicly-employed professionals they perform different kinds
different kinds of intermediation between state and public. As industrial and commercial managers, publicists, shopkeepers, produce buyers, transporters and money lenders they mediate between the direct producers and consumers and the market system. As teachers they mediate between the youth and the social structures they will be entering. Under authoritarian régimes some of these roles—particularly that of political intermediary—have lost importance, and some efforts have been made to limit the supply of candidates for intermediation roles at its main sources, the universities. In general, however, the size and diversity of groups engaged in some form of intermediation has continued to increase. Supply has created its own demand.

With the emergence or re-emergence of democratic styles of conducting public affairs, new opportunities (as well as real needs) for intermediation will appear, in political and interest-group organizations as well as the bureaucracy, and individuals from the middle strata, particularly educated youth, will try to take advantage of them. Other roles (e.g., small commercial intermediaries and transporters) will remain precarious or become more so, and these actors will try to gain privileges or protection through democratic openings for agitation and pressure, including strikes. The considerable amplification of the middle strata combined with the prospects for economic austerity or worse imply that competition within these strata for jobs, credits, and services from the state, along with pressures for legal protection of educational credentials for preferred employment, will be strong for the foreseeable future. Moreover, if a national project singles out reinvigoration of the domestic market as essential to recovery, measures to strengthen middle-class purchasing power will receive a compelling justification.

Thus, even with the best of democratic intentions on the part of the middle strata, they will be propense to monopolize whatever the democratic alternatives can offer in two senses: in the roles of intermediation that will determine the authenticity of democratic content, and in the material benefits available from the state and the productive system. And for a good many members of the middle strata intentions will not be good: they will assess the democratic alternatives mainly for their openings to particularist gains.

Finally, two opposed deviations from the democratic commitment must be mentioned, although probably both of them have lost ground to some extent in comparison with a few years ago. First, some parts of the middle strata in some countries have become fanatically authoritarian and elitist as a result of fear that any opening to participation by the excluded masses will lead to revolution, chaos, violent deprivation of personal freedom as well as material advantages. Second, other parts of the middle strata, mainly university-educated youth, continue to look for their utopia on the other side of this nightmare, rejecting pluralist democracy and aspiring to mobilize the masses for the seizure of power.

c) Workers

The characteristics of urban wage workers are also of obvious "internal" importance to democratic alternatives. Their recent processes of occupational differentiation, shifts in ideological allegiances, and rise or fall in relative importance within the economically active population are complex and very different
from country to country. They include: i) workers forming large concentrations with relatively long traditions of organization and politicization (in steel, autos, mines, railroads, docks, etc.); ii) workers in new industries requiring high technical qualifications, generally in medium-sized enterprises or constituting privileged minorities in large enterprises; iii) semi-skilled workers, with a high proportion of women and of home piece workers, in new industries or labour-intensive stages of industrial processes that are largely transnationally-controlled and export-oriented; iv) semi-skilled workers in older industries producing mainly for the domestic market (textiles, food processing, etc.); v) workers in small artisanal workshops and appliance repair establishments; vi) unemployed and workers in public programmes for unemployment relief, to the extent to which they have previous experience as wage workers and maintain ties with the urban working class; vii) youth of working-class background seeking jobs but not yet securely incorporated into the labour force. In a good many countries the relative weight of the first of these categories, the traditional core of the "proletariat", has declined, while some of the other categories have grown considerably.

The capacities for class consciousness and for organization of the different categories are presumably very different, and the idea of the proletariat as a vanguard class destined to take power remains more an inspiring myth than a real possibility. The myth, however, has considerable importance for its influence on the terms under which some of the more organized parts of the working class would be prepared to participate in a democratic alliance. More generally, in recent years the organized workers have been very much on the defensive. They are bound to see in the democratic alternatives opportunities to recover lost legal guarantees of job security and previous levels of real wages. The trouble is that under present conditions the democratic national projects cannot offer them much more than freedom to defend their perceived interests. In the short term, a serious attack on the intolerably high levels of unemployment calls, inter alia, for wage restraint. In the longer term, as was suggested above, democratic régimes will face dilemmas different from but comparable to those of the social democratic régimes of Europe. Changes in technology may or may not depress overall employment levels, but they will mean continual shocks to the workers' sense of security, devaluation of traditional skills, advantages for educated youth over older workers, shifts in location of industries destroying the livelihood of settled communities. Democratic alternatives cannot afford to accept technological alternatives fatalistically. The apparent imperatives derive from the indiscriminate incorporation of imported technologies that are now under question in their places of origin. Neither can they afford to over-protect the better-organized categories of workers against change. More innovative research on the full implications of technological innovations is needed, but a democratic alternative cannot leave the solutions to technobureaucrats interpreting the research. One of the most important questions for "free rational public deliberation" will be the mastering of technology for human ends, with the creative participation of the workers.

/d) The
d) The "excluded"

In most countries of Latin America, the middle strata and the workers in "modern" occupations remain minorities, in spite of their phenomenal growth in recent years. To the extent to which democratic alternatives draw their intellectual inspiration and their mass support from the middle strata and the organized workers, they cannot avoid a propensity to look on the remainder of the population in terms of "problems", of provision of employment, of relief of critical poverty, of education, of "incorporation" into the national society, with a permanent ambivalence toward their mobilization. In a good many cases, particularly those of the most impoverished rural zones, the possibility of real incorporation and the capacity of the people to make themselves heard may both seem to be so low that the proponents of democratic alternatives might well prefer to forget them and turn their attention to the more hopeful parts of the society. According to some political scientists, democracy cannot support an excess of participation; the apathy of most of the people most of the time is a condition of its functioning. For a régime overwhelmed by problems and pressures the tacit application of this reasoning to the "excluded" must be tempting.

If democratic alternatives are to be more than a disguise for middle-class domination of the societies, however, one must ask how the "excluded", "marginalized", or "dominated" groups can participate forcefully and autonomously in advancing their own perceived interests and in transforming the style of development through new kinds of interaction with the state, the elites, and the intermediaries. The groups in question are as heterogeneous as the middle strata or the workers, and their relative importance, cultural self-identifications, organizational capacity and views of their own relation to the national society obviously differ widely from country to country. Lumping them together is a barely legitimate simplification for the purposes of the present exploration of democratic alternatives. Any generalization, whether idealizing or denigrating, risks losing sight of their individuality as persons trying to cope with a world they never made, possibly succeeding better than the outsider can grasp — if not, they would have perished by now. They are major contributors to the national economies through supply of cheap labour, food products, and services, and certainly not an undifferentiated mass of "critically poor", and their survival strategies probably contain many neglected lessons for future styles of development more conducive to equity and human welfare.

In a good many countries in recent times they have experienced violent repression deliberately aimed at forcing them to relinquish forms of incorporation they had begun to achieve, aimed at securing their passivity and atomization. In others, they have become accustomed to a kind of limited, clientelistic participation through political intermediaries or organizations manipulated by the state, with an insistent democratic or even revolutionary rhetoric belied by realities. In still others, they have encountered the rise and fall of a bewildering proliferation of participatory initiatives emanating from the state, and also from political or religious movements independent of the state or even hostile to it. Altogether, one might expect a considerable political sophistication among the excluded groups, considerable wariness toward external organizers, /and a
and a realistically pessimistic appreciation of their ability to influence public policy. The national political and economic environment might from time to time stimulate quite different reactions: incorporation into broad popular movements demanding a change of régime, temporary mobilizations behind populist electoral promises, violent outbreaks deriving from suppressed resentment. In these last cases, recent events have demonstrated that the excluded, at the cost of their own blood, can provide powerful arguments for régimes under pressure to impose rigorous austerity policies.

According to scattered observations, a trend of some significance among the excluded combines distrust of the state and of political movements with strictly local solidarity promoted by some external agents especially from religious movements. This pattern coincides with the "fundamental orientations" for a new democratic ideology quoted at the beginning of this paper. It presumably reflects the direct experience of the excluded as well as the ideologies of the kinds of agents that have managed to retain contact with them during periods of repression. The desideratum for democratic alternatives, then, would be to open channels for a shift in such attitudes toward wider participation, toward a sense of belonging to the national society and being able to make oneself heard in it, without an abandonment of justified wariness toward the state and political movements, in the face of the permanent likelihood of manipulation and pressures to accept subordination.

6. The external environment for democratic alternatives

Democratic alternatives call for an enhancement of self-identification with the nation throughout the contending classes and interest-groups, making a national pact possible, and this in turn implies an enhancement of national self-affirmation and self-determination vis-à-vis the rest of the world. It is obvious, however, that the dependence of the national societies on the world order has become even more constraining in recent years and more "internalized" through the links of diverse national forces with their counterparts, ideological models or protectors abroad. It is also obvious that the present crises of the world order have disrupted the manifestations of this dependence and disoriented the internal forces linked to it. These repercussions at the same time open the way to democratic alternatives and make their survival peculiarly precarious. The preceding pages have placed their emphasis on internal conditions for viability of democratic alternatives. An adequate treatment of the external constraints and the prospects for transnational capitalism would require a different kind of paper, which the author is hardly qualified to attempt. For present purposes, the most that can be done is to present some tentative propositions relating aspects of the external environment to the question of viability.

Political leaders committed to democratic alternatives must hope that the crises of the world economic order will resolve themselves before long, and they cannot avoid repeating the traditional developmentalist appeals addressed to the world centres for expanded and more dependable export markets and financial transfers. However, they cannot rely on responses to such demands to alleviate their domestic crises or give them excuses for not grappling with these crises.
It is more realistic for them to assume that the external environment will continue to be difficult, whatever the shorter-term ups and downs of the world centres. Responses need to be flexible and tough-minded, based on close attention uninhibited by ideological blinkers as to what is actually happening abroad. In recent years the external aspects of development policy have been in the hands of technocrats and financials whose reasoning, tactics, motivations and links with the transnational enterprises and elites might well be opaque even to the political leadership to which they reported. Under present conditions, when experts disagree and blunders have discredited their expertise, when no policy can be guaranteed success, can "free rational public deliberation" grapple with the issues? Can the external environment of disrupted dependence become compatible with democratic alternatives or even a means toward their consolidation? Can the proposals for "endogenous" development based on national cultures, collective self-reliance, de-linking, etc. that were current before the crises reached their present intensity become more relevant within a democratic alternative embodied in a national pact? Clearly the decline in utopian expectations applies even more to the international than to the domestic aspects of styles of development; a "new international economic order" benevolently supportive of countries exercising their right to determine their own style of development is not in the offing.

The crisis of the 1930s, as various observers have pointed out, stimulated the larger Latin American countries to undertake, with a reasonable degree of success, policies making for economic self-determination, and in a smaller number of cases also stimulated democratization. In the very different crises of today, democratic regimes have real opportunities to use the harsh external environment as a means of mobilizing national solidarity and overcoming the delusive consumerist expectations of the recent past, while at the same time solidarity and changing expectations strengthen their hand against external dictation. The debt burden is the most obvious example. An easily identifiable adversary is a political asset and few adversaries can be easier to identify or blame for domestic hardship than the international banks and the IMF. For democratic regimes the problem would be to use this weapon with restraint, to strengthen national solidarity and bargaining power, without being carried away into demagogy or paranoia. Similar hopes can be entertained concerning policies to cope with protectionism in the central countries, to bring the operations of transnational enterprises into better correspondence with national interests, and to introduce greater selectivity into technological borrowing. In all of these cases, the shock to previous expectations can further receptivity to bold innovations in policy. These questions, however, are too complex for a superficial reference to be helpful. One risks looking over-eagerly for reasons for optimism.

Democratic regimes and movements can identify a wide range of potential external allies as well as adversaries and require realistic appreciations of their strengths, limitations, openness to determined policies and ideological preconceptions. Relations with some of these potential allies represent a certain internationalization of "free rational public deliberation" as well as social action, so that the main contacts are between likeminded movements and intellectual currents rather than regimes. Inevitably, such contacts imply pressures toward changes in the national project itself, not necessarily to be accepted but legitimate as part of the democratic process as long as they remain in the open.

/a) It
a) It is reasonable to expect an increasing number of democratic régimes in Latin America in the near future, with strong motivations for supporting each other, and a dwindling number of régimes with motivations for sabotaging democratic alternatives elsewhere. It is also reasonable to expect that, as in the past, a certain number of régimes that are far from democratic internally, at least in the sense of relying on "free rational public deliberation", will support democratic alternatives elsewhere as an expression of values that domestic power realities or external aggression hinder them from putting into practice, and will expect support from them in return. Thus, prospects for a common front against external pressures and eventual collective self-reliance should improve. Up to the present, the impact of the crisis on Latin American economic integration has been negative, as most countries have been forced to reduce their purchases from neighbours as well as from the central countries, but a combination of political will and economic necessity can give a new impetus to such integration.

b) Prospects for support from social democratic governments and movements in Europe are also favourable, and this may be of considerable importance in offsetting destabilizing pressures. In regard to the United States, the changing balance of forces in domestic politics may determine whether governmental reactions will be relatively positive or relatively cold. In the best case, it would not be prudent to count very heavily on United States economic co-operation and abstention from protectionism, unless economic recovery is more sustained than now seems probable. In the best case, also, experience from the time of the Alliance for Progress suggests that régimes committed to democratic alternatives will do well to keep a certain distance, since an embrace could become excessively constraining, paternalistic and conducive to erroneous expectations on both sides. The mobilization of public opinion for a nationalist stance in relation to debts, transnationals, and protectionism cannot altogether avoid identifying United States policy with these adversaries. At the same time, currents of opinion in the United States sympathetic to democratic alternatives - including, increasingly, that represented by migrants from Latin America and their descendants - can be expected to exert a restraining influence of some importance on United States policy.

c) Prospects for support from countries in other regions of the Third World are more ambiguous, beyond such symbolic forms as United Nations votes. Democratic alternatives in most of these countries will probably take forms and adopt objectives quite different from those here discussed for Latin America. Possible complementarities in trade, including barter arrangements, might achieve some importance as an extension of collective self-reliance, but the hope of significant financial co-operation from the oil-exporting states, bypassing the international banks, has disappeared.

d) Prospects for support (or subversion) from the two "socialist" camps headed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China are now of secondary importance. These camps are now in no position to provide economic co-operation on a scale offsetting possible tactics of destabilization or financial embargoes from the capitalist camps although, for some Latin American countries at least, they represent alternative markets and suppliers of goods that might become crucial if a debt payment impasse disrupts previous trade relationships. Their main present
contribution to democratic alternatives may be as anti-models. Their loss of credibility as models for development strategy coincides with loss of credibility of revolutionary seizure of state power as a precondition for development, to some extent protecting democratic alternatives from attack from this side, while the discrediting of authoritarian neoliberal schemes protects them against attack from the other.

e) Demographic transnationalization has become a phenomenon as striking and disruptive of previous expectations as economic and cultural transnationalization. Latin America has become a region of large-scale and highly diverse net emigration. The emigrants come from the urbanized and industrialized countries of the Southern Cone, in spite of their low rates of population growth, as well as from the large rapidly "developing" countries and the smaller, poorer and more rural countries. The implications for the external relations of democratic alternatives are contradictory. The following broad types of migrants can be distinguished:

i) Members of the elites who have migrated with part of their capital, escaping insecurity, seeking higher profitability, or finding the United States or European variants of the consumer society more congenial. Their economic power in parts of the United States must be considerable. Drug traffickers and other networks of illicitly wealthy individuals form important sub-groups. Such migrants have links, on the one side, with military and para-military émigrés and, on the other, with a larger category of entrepreneurs, professionals, etc., mainly from Cuba, by now integrated into the United States economy and political system. These groups can be expected to be hostile to democratic alternatives, as defined here, or suspicious of their possible leftward deviation, or disposed to manipulate them for their own ends. They have a number of assets for manipulation or destabilization: economic and political influence in the United States as well as their country of origin, control of certain mass communication media, ability to subsidize political movements or armed subversion. The more extreme tactics, of course, affect mainly the small countries of Central America and the Caribbean.

ii) Intellectuals, academics and political activists who have left their countries of origin, voluntarily or otherwise. Events of the 1970s raised the numbers in this category to unprecedented levels, and forced the greater part to find refuge outside the region, rather than in other Latin American countries as previously. These groups can be expected to enter into quite diverse relationships with national democratic projects. They can form bridges with intellectuals and political movements abroad and, through their access to the press and to specialized economic or political reviews, help to form external public opinion; or they can return and intervene directly in designing democratic projects and in public debate over them. Ideally the international experience of these intellectuals and activists should mean a valuable broadening of national horizons. It can also, of course, mean the introduction of sectarian conflicts from abroad, or the re-introduction of such conflicts from the pre-exile past.

iii) Workers and peasants who have migrated to the United States, and to a lesser extent to Europe, Canada and Australia, in search of employment, or "pushed" by some combination of intolerable poverty, physical insecurity, and repression of popular movements.
popular movements. This category is now numbered in the millions. The present crisis has intensified economic pressures to migrate - although in some cases it has alleviated political motivations, and has at the same time considerably shrunk employment opportunities abroad and made the political and economic status of migrants more precarious. The insecurity and vulnerability to exploitation of "undocumented" migrants is well known. However, a part of the migrants have struck roots, have achieved a certain capacity for organized defense of their interests, and are beginning to exert a broader influence through voting and the various pressure tactics in which immigrant minorities in the United States have a long experience.

These groups can be expected to respond to democratic national projects in their home countries, to the extent to which they are aware of them. Democratic régimes in Latin America should have good possibilities to activate this sympathy through cultural activities, support of migrant organizations, and services offering advice and defense of migrant rights, as European countries and their migrants have done for many years. Remittances from migrants now seem to be of considerable importance for levels of living and local investments in parts of Latin America, and may even help to shore up the national balance of payments. The broader cultural consequences of this category of migration for the working classes and the excluded strata in Latin America can only be guessed at. If opportunities for work in the home countries improve enough to attract migrants to return they should be valuable sources of innovation as well as sources of challenge to local power structures.

7. In conclusion

The argument in the preceding pages assumes that a style of development worth striving for must give a more effective priority than hitherto to the values of democracy, freedom and human welfare. The argument has a negative side: the styles of development prevailing up to the present have accumulated so many contradictions and disbenefits that the democratic alternatives are worth a try. It also has a fatalistic side: the democratic impulse, stimulated by recent social structural changes but not altogether dependent on them, is too strong to be subordinated to technobureaucratic conceptions of efficiency. Unless it can relate itself positively to the legitimate requirements of national policy-making it will continually disrupt the efforts of the state to cope with crisis or plan for the longer term.

The paper avoids discussion of individual countries, not for reasons of discretion, but in an effort to distinguish aspects of the quest for democratic alternatives that are applicable to most if not all Latin American countries. It supposes that the relevance of democratic alternatives, in the sense in which the term "democratic" is used here, does not, in the Latin American context, depend on future achievement of a given level of "development" or national integration. Even the countries most prosperous, politically stable, and enlightened in their development policies are deeply enmeshed in the tensions and sources of precariousness discussed. Even the countries that are poorest and most habituated to authoritarianism are touched by the striving for participatory democracy. Naturally, some of these last countries, engaged in desperate struggles for national self-determination, might well find the argument too much concerned with checks and balances, too suspicious of state power, for their immediate needs.

/This avoidance
This avoidance implies that discussion of the social and economic policies needed to consolidate the democratic alternatives must be limited to very general terms. Throughout Latin America these questions are being subjected to a vigorous debate focussed on specific countries and on new possibilities for collective self-reliance, as they should be. In one sense, the main lines of policy needed are too obvious for a repetition of general prescriptions to be useful. The supply of regional "plans of action" is already more than adequate. In another sense, the real options differ too much from country to country for the prescriptions to offer more than a starting point for discussion.

There is another reason for placing the emphasis elsewhere. The question is not simply what must be done but how, and who will take part in the doing. Latin America has too long a history of plausible rationalist development strategies that have gone wrong - in their impact on the people they were supposed to benefit, if not in their narrowly economic consequences, as measured by the conventional indicators. Part of the blame no doubt lies with inadequate understanding of the functioning of the world economic and political order (or evasion of such understanding for the unwelcome conclusions it might force on the policy-makers). Another part of the blame, however, lies with the lack or weakness of mechanisms in the societies that would counteract technobureaucratic megalomania, disregard of the limitations of technological and administrative capacity, disregard of social and environmental side-effects, ignorance of local conditions, propensities to corruption and manipulation of policies by hidden interests. In different ways and degrees, developmentalist-reformist, neoliberal and socialist styles or systems of development have all gone astray for lack of self-corrective mechanisms.

Participatory democracy offers some hope, if not assurance, of doing things better, and this hope has two main aspects: first, the creative adaptation to popular cultures and perceived needs of ways of producing goods, providing services, harmonizing supply and demand in patterns of consumption that the societies can afford, and offering meaningful as well as income-generating activities to the whole population. Second, creative resistance to over-standardization, manipulation, corruption and exploitation in the name of development.

This brings us back to a common ambiguity in the terms in which democratic alternatives are discussed: the supposition that such alternatives can or must be opened up, guided, and restrained from above, by the state or a political movement. Obviously, the forces controlling the state, technobureaucrats and political movements are going quite legitimately to continue to try to fill such a role. By now, however, there is abundant empirical evidence that they are not very good at it, that their overt objectives and their pretensions to development planning can mask quite different objectives, or a real lack of objectives and strategies, an opportunistic or haphazard series of responses to pressures, or a naive faith in the virtues of indiscriminate growth and technological modernization.

Thus, this
Thus, this exploration of democratic alternatives affirms the permanence of a contradiction or tension between the real need for planned transformation of social and economic structures, for a central direction capable of overcoming resistances and, in Dr. Prebisch's terms, managing the "socialization of the surplus" generated by economic growth; and the need for democratic institutions from the local to the national level that are both autonomous and critical, capable of innovating within their own spheres of action, continually challenging the political leaders, technobureaucrats, and local or national power structures. As long as these challenges remain predominantly corporatist, redistributivist and focussed on concessions that the state is incapable of providing, they lead back to the cycle of democratization-exclusion. One must hope that the struggles for democratic alternatives, however confused and conflictive in their immediate manifestations, will become system-transforming and value-transforming as well as self-serving.

Notes
1/ The label "social democratic" for the alternatives under consideration has certain advantages. It corresponds to the label adopted by several of the political movements seeking such alternatives and by their political allies outside Latin America, and it conveys in a general way the manner of conducting public affairs, the role of the state, and the human welfare objectives that are in question. It also has disadvantages: the relatively long history of its use in other regions leaves the impression of a style that may once have been dynamic, but that has become bureaucratized and routinized, complacent, sluggish in response to new challenges, with "democracy" subordinated to self-perpetuating party and trade union machines, and the "social" ideal to the costly and paternalistic welfare state. In fact, all the available labels (including "democracy", "development" and "revolution") have become shopworn over the years, and one cannot hope to achieve an illusion of originality by coining new ones. The present text thus identifies the alternatives aimed at simply as "democratic", in the two senses defined by José Medina Echavarría: a system of citizen participation in government decision-making and an affirmation of inalienable personal rights of self-determination. ("Discurso sobre política y planeación", in La obra de José Medina Echavarría, Ediciones Cultura Hispánica, Madrid, 1980). It uses the term "style" in the sense proposed by Jorge Graciarena, as the "concrete and dynamic modality of the development of a society in a determined historical moment". ("Power and development styles", CEPAL Review, First Semester 1976.) The term "alternative" introduces the theme of rational choice; the term "national project" represents a codification of the choice by a régime or movement; the term "national pact" represents agreement on a project by a broad range of forces in a given society.


5/ Aldo Ferrer, "Vivir con lo nuestro" para romper la trampa financiera y construir la democracia (El Cid Editor, Buenos Aires, noviembre 1983), pp. 95-96.


7/ See, in addition to various articles by Jorge Craciarena, Aníbal Pinto, Raúl Prebisch, Marshall Wolfe, and others in the CEPAL Review, a recent compilation, *Autoafirmación colectiva: una estrategia alternativa de desarrollo*, Selección de Enrique Oteiza. (Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 1983).


9/ "It would be hard to name an elite group or social stratum, with the possible exception of the large landowners, that has not been nominated by some school of thought in recent years for the honour of leading the way to development. The middle classes in general, the industrial entrepreneurs, the technically minded public officials, the youth in general or the students in particular, the organized workers, all have been measured against the role in an impressive number of studies and polemical papers. ... Currents of opinion that see revolutionary destruction of the existing structures as the only avenue to development invest their hopes in the dispossessed, peasants and the urban marginal strata, as the elements whose interests or very survival are most incompatible with the continuation of the status quo." (Economic Commission for Latin America, *Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin America*, United Nations, New York, 1970, p. 31).


11/ For a convincing argument that the crisis will probably be of long duration, see Oswaldo Sunkel, "Pasado, presente y futuro de la crisis económica internacional", Revista de la CEPAL NO 22, abril 1984.

12/ For a cautious and balanced presentation of this question, see Robert Devlin, "La carga de la deuda y la crisis: ¿se deberá llegar a la solución unilateral?", Revista de la CEPAL NO 22, abril 1984.