THE CONCEPT OF PARTICIPATION: AN EVALUATION
Participation has received in recent times a great deal of attention by national and international development agencies. One needs only to skim through the official speeches of Latin American leaders or the publication of international institutions to find references to the importance attributed to participation in the pursuit of development with justice. It is heard that the passivity of the lower classes - be they the peasants, the industrial workers, or the lumpenproletariat - is an obstacle to the achievement and maintenance of the social legislation that comes to their support. Housing problems - so it is stated - will not be solved if the poor would be purchasers do not organize into organisms of defense of the conquests made in their name by the concerned governments; the agrarian reform will not proceed at the necessary speed without the intervention and pressure of organized peasants. As states the Informe sobre el Seminario Latinoamericano de Reforma Agraria y Colonización: "... es absolutamente imposible llevar a cabo una reforma agraria profunda y rápida sin que los grupos sociales interesados en el proceso de cambio tengan capacidad de decisión política a través de las organizaciones o partidos que los interpretan y representan". 1/ Truly, "The proposition that authentic development requires popular participation has become current in planning circles as well as in political movements and the press". 2/

1/ A. Giles, "Planificación Regional de base agropecuaria: programas integrados de desarrollo", Revista Interamericana de Planificación 8, 31, 37-59. The translation of the sentence would be as follows: it is impossible to conclude a thorough and fast agrarian reform if the concerned social groups do not have the capability of influencing political decisions through the organizations and parties that represent them.


/The abundance
The abundance of the literature has not been however devoid of ill
effects on the clarity and the utility of the concept. Participation has
become a pool of different phenomena from which researchers and politicians
have drawn to their fancies. Its units of reference have been both the
countryside, the urban areas, and the nation; its goals have ranged from
economic development to the improvement of personality, from the increase
in agricultural productivity, to civic and political progress; 3/ its very
meaning has varied according to the nature and the motivation of its users.
Participation has thus often come to indicate the popular contribution to
development for government officials, and their share in the fruits of
development for the masses. 4/ In conclusion, anybody who enters the field
must first make sense of the confusing variety of definitions and usages.

The clarifying of a used, and, often abused, concept, is the first
goal of this paper. However, since all definitions have, so to say, the
same right of citizenship in the social sciences, and only their use
justifies the selection of a definition, I have been forced to present
the two major different usages and to defend my selection. A brief review
of the historical record of participation in the 60's in Latin America
constitutes the first background against which to define the concept.
The second, and more important, has been its theoretical usage, to which
I dedicate the second part of the first section. Third, I try to
demonstrate, with the support of empirical evidence, the validity
of the hypothesis on which the second definition of participation is
based, that political participation affects the distribution of social
goods. Finally, I suggest a methodology for the preliminary estimation
of the distribution of political participation. To each of these points
I will dedicate one section.

Before entering the heart of the matter, let me ask of the reader a
little patience: the subject matter is so complex, and the available data
so scant that the following discussion is not as homogeneous as I would
have desired. However, let the subject be considered guilty and not the author

3/ N.U. La participation du people au process: tendences actuelles du

4/ Aristide Zollberg, Popular Participation in Africa: A Framework for
Analysis, Paper presented at the U.N. Workshop on Popular Participation
II

There are two major conceptions of political participation: political activity, and influence in the decision-making processes that take place in all major social institutions. Let us analyze them in this order.

Much of the literature that goes under the rubric of participation in Northamerican political sociology, and in the recent Latin American political history, defines the phenomenon, implicitly or explicitly as political activity. The official definition of participation in fact runs as follows: "those voluntary activities by which members of a society share in the selection of rulers, and, directly and indirectly, in the formation of public policies". Hence, it is possible to include in the category of political participation, phenomena as different as exposure to political stimuli and the occupation of a public and party office.

By extension, participation refers to memberships in all role-specific organizations and institutions, political, economic, cultural. Thus a recent work on participation in Latin America, lists as forms of participation membership in such organizations as neighborhood and labor management organisms, rural cooperatives, leagues, and finally, unions. The overall degree of participation of a class or a functional sector, can be measured by the weighted average of the rates of participation of its members in these role-specific organizations. Thus, any increase in the membership of such organizations could be construed as an increase in the participation of the class it allegedly represents.

This conception of participation in spite of the merit it has of easy operationability has been widely criticized, on account of its disregard for power. Participation in community development projects, electoral participation, union membership, in fact, do not necessarily wield to a class the power it seeks on the decisions in the relevant policy areas. Therefore, it becomes necessary to distinguish between activity meant to achieve power and the possession of power itself. Re-examining the official definition presented above, one notices that such a distinction is not clearly made, perhaps, because of the assumption it implicitly makes that political activity in democratic countries proportions power as a matter of course.

Let us take up where the analysis was left, and suggest a different way of conceptualizing the material. Three concepts in my opinion are useful: mobilization, political activity, and participation. The first refers to the compulsory organization of classes or sectors in government-controlled organizations, aimed either at enlisting the support of potentially powerful groups in the ruling class, struggle against other groups, or to channel and control a destabilizing force.

Political activity is voluntary and thus it aims at defending a class’ interests, but does not necessarily ensure power, while participation is access to power.

Historically, the distinction between these three forms of political action are not as clearly cut as they are in theory: often, some political parties support the formation of independent organizations, and political activity is a ticket to the access to political power. There are, however, rather clear cases for each of the concepts.

An instance of mobilization is probably the system of Mexican unions to which the state party dictates policies and of which it selects leaders. Let us listen to an avowed supporter of the existing government: "Aunque los dirigentes de las ligas (de Comunidades Agrarias) son electos formalmente en ocasión de los congresos estatales, ... en su nombramiento intervienen diversos intereses. Dado el papel clave de las ligas en el mantenimiento de la paz social en el campo, y la estabilidad política en el estado,
sus secretarios generales ... se encuentran vinculados ante todo con el
gobernador del estado. Al mismo tiempo dependen estrechamente del Comité
Ejecutivo Nacional de la propia CNC, que interviene activamente en la
selección de los secretarios de las ligas". Given these conditions,
it is ludicrous to infer from the data on the membership in peasant
organizations (where Mexico fares the highest in Latin America) that
the participation, or even the political activity of peasants in Mexico
is higher than in other countries.

A case somewhat apart, on which it is worth to make a brief parenthesis,
is that of Peru, where recent experiences of labor management are unique in
Latin America. Here, to refresh our memory, the military junta, come to
power in 1968, has created three new institutions: the Cooperativa de
Producción Agrícola, the Sociedad Agrícola de Interés Social, and the
Comunidad Laboral, which to different extents, and in different sectors
of the economy, have produced, or aim at producing, changes in the
distribution of assets, and in the responsibility in the decision-making
process at the local level. While other references will be made in
the course of this work on the Peruvian situation, let me here state my
ignorance on whether the power of the masses has fundamentally changed.
Whether they represent a definite turning point in the power distribution
in Peru matters little to the economy of this work. It is interesting,
however, that mobilization may indeed affect popular political
participation. A case of independent political organization is, on the
contrary, the neighborhood organisms, risen during the 60's in most large

8/ S. Reyes Osorio, et. al., Estructura agraria y desarrollo agrícola
en México, Chapter VIII, "Las organizaciones campesinas", México: Fondo
liderazgo en el sindicato", in R. Pugh et. al. (eds.) Estudios de la

9/ My source of information on Peru have been: Mike Anderson and P. Knight,
who wrote jointly and separately, on workers' participation in Peru.
Also the article by O. Delgado quoted above is of interest, with Jaime

10/ Carlos Delgado, "Sinamos, la participación popular en la revolución
peruana", Participación, 2, Febrero 1973, 6-25; see especially page 10.
cities, such as Lima, Mexico, Caracas, Guayaquil, Cali, Bogotá, Medellín, Santiago, Montevideo and Buenos Aires, and whose aim was to press for the creation of the urban infrastructures in newly settled areas, or, as in Chile, to defend the illegal squatter settlements. 11/

Less clear is the classification of unions, cooperatives, and leagues which, in most cases, are dependent on the powers-that-be, or have little access to political power, but in some, as in Argentina, seem to be real power centers.

The issue of political participation as power, however, does not emerge from the analysis of concrete cases as in some recent theoretical analysis of the political aspects of development.

One of the crucial developments of the field in the last half of the 60's in fact, has been the emphasis on the centrality of the political structure in economic development. It has been finally understood that economic processes are not the automatic adjustment of the social structure to the stimulus of maximization of productivity or of social welfare, rather, that they are the result of conscious decisions by the economic and political leaders and that, therefore, not only market mechanisms but the distribution of power as well must be considered crucial to the forecasting and understanding of development. 12/


/Onco political
Once political factors were given their due importance, the question rose: how does the political participation of the masses affect economic growth? What distribution of power is likely to spur economic growth?

Two theories addressing these questions rose with entirely different diagnoses. Among those who considered participation to favor growth various approaches of different theoretical relevance may be identified. Of low relevance the functionalist theory, which, to be sure, never raised the issue in the terms proposed here. The naive polarity it posits between tradition and modernity — the former characterized by low growth and lack of democracy, the second by high growth and participation — seems to side it with the theories which take modern structures — among which democracy — to favor economic development.

More worthy of mention is the following hypothesis: since the capital formation for take-off requires the effacement of consumption demands in favor of savings and investments, popular participation in the decision-making process, accompanied by the consciousness that present sacrifices will be later rewarded, insures that the necessary restrictions of consumer demand are not accompanied by harmful political instability.13/ In fact, while Kling suggests that polarization of wealth gives rise to political instability Campos 14/ among others, that instability is inimical to development.

Despite its distinguished pedigree, however, this theory has been recently challenged. While it is an established fact that the antinomy consumption-investment is the crucial feature of the Latin American development process it is not as clear that popular participation would not affect the process of capital formation so as to reduce the investment-consumption ratio.

13/ This position is taken by some international agencies. See N.U. "La participation." op. cit.; Economic and Social Council, Popular Participation and its Practical Implications for Development. Note by the Secretary General, E/CN.5/469, 1974, 4-5. ECAFE, Community Development and Economic Development E/CN.11/540, 1960.

In the equation relating the degree of participation with such ratio in fact, intervene not only cultural and individual variables (political ideology such as nationalism, and perception of individual mobility) but also and foremost the perception of the justness of the distribution of goods. It is common sense that individuals may accept restrictions when shared by their peers. But in underdeveloped countries where, as often in poor countries, classes and sectors compete for privileged access to the scant national goods, where intra-class and inter-class solidarity is low or inexistent, the participation of the previously marginal classes is likely to increase the pressure on the social goods, thus reducing the rate of saving and investment, and slowing the process of capital formation. The participation of the lower classes, therefore, in the conditions described above is not conducive, but detrimental to economic growth.

Of course, where lack of sectorial conflict and high solidarity obtain, participation could be translated into acceptance of restriction of consumption and, therefore, set in motion the process of accumulation. But this process is very exceptional, since modernization increases the differentiation of social and productive structures and, thus, the conflictiveness of classes. Incidentally, let me here state an interesting idea: given that largely peasant societies enjoy a high degree of solidarity, and have relatively lower consumption desires than the industrial worker, they have also, in conditions of elite stability and dedication to development, the highest chances of passing through the take-off stage.

Turning, however, to the main goal of this section, let me line up the supporters of the hypothesis that in the present conditions of power distribution participation would reduce growth: among others, let me remind Apter, Graciarena and Furtado. 15/

In this connection, the position of Furtado is particularly interesting and is worthy of a more detailed presentation. The kernel of his argument is the following: by virtue of their cultural dependence, the economic elites of underdeveloped countries strive to imitate the consumption patterns of the elites of the developed world. Given the variety of goods flowing in the latter, those elites, in order either to buy imported goods, or dearer national products, must control high levels of income. Hence the necessity of income inequality. In turn, two fundamental processes are set in motion: first, the development of import-substituting industries for durable goods. Second, the stagnation of the same industries, after the demand of the elite has been satisfied, for lack of further demand due, in turn, to the high income inequality.

While this last hypothesis has been criticized 16/, the idea that participation, in absence of far-reaching changes in the distribution of power would reduce economic growth seems to me well taken. Income redistribution would in fact change the pattern of demand, increasing the demand for inelastic agricultural products, and services, to the detriment of durable goods. The consequences would be the stagnation of the industrial sector and inflation. Whatever may be the validity of these hypothesis, it is clear that participation here means influence in the decision-making process at all levels of the social structure power. Only if this is so, participation may in fact be expected to affect the distribution of goods. But does in fact power act in this fashion? I believe so, and to this issue, I will dedicate the next section.

Before entering the issue, it may be useful to recall that the above-mentioned theorists were not the first to stress the relation of power and privilege; on the contrary, an important stream of sociological thought has been dedicated to this issue. Anyone who enters it may feel with Hobbes, Machiavelli, Lenski, Mills, in a good, though perhaps exacting company, but certainly not alone.

Positions on the issue, to be sure, have been widely different. I would not want to be accused to rub in the obvious by recalling that Marx, Hobbes, Machiavelli, to cite the most important, have underlined the connection of power and privilege 17/; while others, such as Weber, have downplayed it. Not to serve Weber badly, however, it must be remembered that he included the patrimonial state, characterized by the overlapping of political and economic roles in his typology of domination. But, also that he stressed that the modern state is defined, among other criteria, by its independence of society. And, in the same line of thought, that he separated power from the other major rank systems, class and status 18/, thus initiating a whole dynasty of sociologists who, like Runciman 19/ maintain that the three ranks are irreducible. At first sight, however, it seems that common sense and hard data have brought sociology to the other shore, to reduce the emphasis on the distinction of the ranks. To believe Parkin 20/, "The distribution of power could be understood as another way of describing the flow of rewards; the very

fact that the dominant class can successfully claim a disproportionate share of rewards vis-à-vis the subordinate class is in a sense measure of the former's power over the latter. Similarly, Lenski, in his famous work aptly entitled 'power and privilege' stated: "privilege is largely a function of power, and, to a very limited degree, a function of altruism" 21/; and a recent work on Mexican Community power 22/ takes equality of access to economic values to constitute one of the defining criteria of democracy.

But the issue of the relation between power and privilege has come to the fore also in economic theory in connection with a crucial phenomenon of the recent history of development: the failure of economic growth to equalize the distribution of income, and to eradicate poverty. The analysis of the distribution of income in countries that experience high rates of growth in fact, reveals, if anything, that the distribution worsens, and poverty spreads. 23/ As it was believed, on the contrary, growth would better the lot of the poor, expectations were left unfulfilled.

This disappointment has forced economists to ask, perhaps with a different perspective the questions sociologists and political scientists consider their trade. Thus, the relations of state and society, of income distribution and economic growth are analyzed also in the context of economic analysis, and hypotheses presented which bear great resemblance to those formulated by political sociologists. 24/ This change of emphasis, 


/originated, as
originated, as I said, in connection with the failure of developing countries to reduce poverty, was also made necessary by the lack of realism of the assumption of absence of exogenous forces made more and more evident by the massive intervention of the state in the economic system.

The importance of power on the distribution of social goods is in fact related to the role performed by the state in the development process of less developed countries. Graciarena 25/, who more than any other has analyzed the issue at hand, points out that the state's importance resides in its obligation to maintain the relations of property on one side, and on the other, by its right to distribute benefits by means of monetary, fiscal, credit, price and income policies. Furthermore, he reminds the reader that there still are countries where a large proportion of the income of some sectors is constituted by government transfers, in the best tradition of the patrimonial state.

In conclusion, there is a growing interest by social scientists of different disciplines in the relation of power and privilege. Participation - access to power - is hence assigned a crucial role in the determination of the economic structure and growth. But the number of empirical analyses aiming at supporting the hypothesis that posits these interrelations, are still few. The difficulty lies, of course, in the evaluation of the independent variable, participation. We know what properties characterize democracy, but we cannot measure them. For this reason, the existing empirical works focus on the second, income, and only secondarily on the first. 26/

My purpose here is to bring the available evidence to support the hypothesis that the political participation of a group determines its access to social goods. While I will not be able to supply an indicator of political participation, I will take income to be the indicator of social goods.


26/ See Irma Adelman and Cynthia Morris, op. cit.
The limited number of observations at my disposal has prevented me from identifying the effects of participation on the distribution of values independently of the connected effects of other variables such as unemployment, structural heterogeneity and education, which could be considered causally prior to income distribution. In other words, I will not construct a theory of income distribution. Rather, I will defend one of the hypotheses which could be included in such a theory, namely, that relating participation and income.

The limitations of this approach are evident if we put in mind to the fact that income distribution is unlikely the effect of only one independent variable. Yet, I believe, that the other independent variables are in turn, to a large extent, causally dependent on the distribution of power. Given the crucial role of the state - in the process of development - to which I made reference earlier, the rate of saving and distribution of investment, the relative prices of factors and of consumer goods, which, in turn affect the growth of the economy, are to a large extent, determined by the goals and interests of the powers that be. The features of international economic relations (the price and demand of exports, the capital flow) which determine the importing potentiality of the country, constitute but boundaries given, within which the educational, employment, regional development policies that affect income distribution are selected, rather than independent issues.

Given these theoretical biases and limitations, this is what I intend to do: I will first try to demonstrate that there exists a relation between participation and income; second, I will suggest that there is causal asymmetry between the two variables, and that power is the independent variable. The data I intend to employ refer to the personal and household distribution of income for some Latin American countries. They have been supplied by the central statistical agencies of these countries, and made comparable by the Statistical Division of the Economic Commission for Latin America, or compiled by independent researchers. Owing to their different origin, to systematic and chance errors in the surveys, to the different units of analysis - the employed individual or the household - the national data are not entirely comparable. Yet, to repeat an old refrain in the
history of sociological investigations, "the data are very weak, but they are also the only data we have. Instead of rejecting all analysis, let us make of them what is possible. With this caution in mind, let us proceed.

Table 1 gathers the most reliable data in our possession on the personal distribution of income in some countries of Latin America. The first observation that must be made, is that, while some countries have abundant data, others have no information at all. Second, that evaluations of income distribution differ according to the source and the methodology employed. Earlier estimations which differ in fact rather substantially from the ones gathered in this work have been disregarded. In any event, the reader may be reminded that we are not in the realm of precise measurement and that, therefore, all inferences that will be drawn from the selected sample are as correct as the data are reliable.

Within the limits warranted by the data to support the stated hypothesis let me draw the attention of the reader first to the inter-country variations in the percentage of national income acquired by the first and the last two deciles; secondly, the intra-country time variations in the percentage of income acquired by the highest 60 percent in Mexico and Brazil for which these data are available.

In connection with the first point a glance is sufficient to reveal great differences between and within countries; but also that the "within" variations are relatively smaller than the "between" ones. Furthermore, that the political structure seems to affect, as I contend, the income distribution. In fact the countries which, during the 50's and/or the 60's enjoyed a relatively high degree of popular participation, as Chile, Uruguay, and 1950 Argentina, show consistently a higher share of the two


### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Honduras</th>
<th>Guatemala</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>Nicaragua</th>
<th>Panama</th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>Puerto Rico</th>
<th>Uruguay</th>
<th>Venezuela</th>
</tr>
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<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
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<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
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<td>3.3</td>
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<td>5.5</td>
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<td>4.5</td>
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<td>7.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
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<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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3. See also op. cit., 73-99.
4. In 1972 the unit of analysis is income earners. For 24 non-agricultural income earners.
poorest deciles, than countries such as Honduras, Nicaragua, Brazil, where the political participation of the masses was low. To supply a preliminary — and admittedly simple — statistical analysis of the data, I have tabulated the share of the lowest two deciles for the listed countries with a three-column ordinal scale of popular participation. For this evaluation I do not possess any hard and fast methodology. The voting participation, the plurality of parties, the frequency of elections, and similar indicators that are commonly used to measure political participation do not serve us well 22/, when dealing with developing countries. The lack of the western democratic system of representation in fact, does not signify the lack of popular participation. I have classified, therefore, the countries, on the ground of historical analyses of their political system at the time the survey was taken.

The criteria which have been employed are diverse: with the formal aspects of the political structure (voting, etc.), whose efficiency by themselves I have criticized, also in formal indicators of the popular participation in decision-making. The extreme cases (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay on one side, Brazil and most of the Centro-American countries on the other) were easy to place. For what concerns the other countries, the classification has been more arbitrary. Mexico 1963 and Venezuela 1972 and Costa Rica 1966 are naturally assigned to the middle category; but for 1972 Panama, 1961 Peru and especially 1970 Colombia, placement has been uncertain. The classification I proposed seems to me the best, but the dissenting reader is invited to reorganize them at will, and compute the relevant statistics.

22/ For an attempt of measuring participation, see I. Adelman and C. Morris, op. cit.
Table 2
THE PERCENTAGE OF INCOME ACQUIRED BY THE FIRST AND LAST TWO DECILES BY DEGREE OF POPULAR POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>first</td>
<td>country</td>
<td>first</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Uruguay 1967</td>
<td>4.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>Argentina 1953</td>
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<td>5.6</td>
<td>Puerto Rico 1953</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Chile 1967</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 23.8 | 15.9 | 19.3 | tot. 59.0 |
| n 4 | 4 | 7 | 15 |
| x 5.9 | 4.0 | 2.8 | 3.9 |

Given the character of the observations, I have employed an analysis of variance technique, obtaining an F of 28.9 significant at the .01 level.

Further evidence can be summoned to the same effect by the analysis of time changes in the distribution of income for two of the major Latin American countries, Mexico and Brasil which have constituted in the last decade, the epitome of different styles of development. According to Graciarena 20/ there can be identified in the panorama of Latin America two types of income distribution that are in turn determined by two different structures of power. The former is characterized by the concentration of the marginal increases of the national income in the top 5% of the perceivers; and in the urban-industrial sector. The latter, by a more even distribution of income, due not so much to a larger share acquired by the lower classes

20/ I am here referring to a yet unpublished paper by Mr. Graciarena.
although they also differ on this— as to the middle class' lot. In Brazil, which can be considered the prototype of the elitistic distribution, the top 5% of income-earners accounted in fact for around 28% of the national income receipts in 1960, and for around 35% in 1970, thus increasing their share of income by 26%. In presence of such gains by the top earners, the lower 90% of the income-earners lost relative ground, and the lower half of the highest 10% gained only 7.5%. In conclusion the changes in income distribution that have occurred in Brazil from 1960 to 1970 have been detrimental to all the income earning population with the exception of the richest 10%.

In Mexico, the changes in the distribution of income from 1950 to 1970 present a very different profile. Here, in fact both the first 5% and the first 10% lost relative ground, while the 8th and 9th decile gained considerably, and the 5th, 6th and 7th maintained their relative position. Thus, the larger proportion of the increments in income receipts was concentrated in the middle-upper clase rather than at the very top, as in Brazil.

The connection of this difference in the profiles of income distribution with differences in the political systems— continues Graciarena— is evident. Besides telling of the different degree of coercion obtaining in the two countries, it also indicates differences in the degree of public intervention in the economy, and above all it points to a different distribution of access of social classes to political power.

Let us summarize the contention of this first part of the present section: there exists a relation between income distribution and popular political participation. Where popular participation is higher, income is more evenly distributed among the income classes. Where the middle class has a relatively high access to power, as in the case of Mexico, the changes in the distribution of income see it more than proportionately represented. Where bureaucratic systems— to use Apter's 31/ typology— exist, that is, where power is concentrated at the very top of the social texture, to the detriment of the lower and the middle classes, income is very unequally distributed.

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31/ Apter, op. cit.
I also promised to bring support for the hypothesis that the independent variable in the presented correlation is political participation. My argument will be weaker than the one just concluded because the issue is theoretically more complex, and the data less readily available. In any event, I believe that the risk must be assumed of inferring from weak information if the investigation is guided by the theoretical relevance of the issues.

I will develop my argument in two parts, with different degrees of strength.

The weaker first point may be presented as follows: since the state is the sole guarantee of private property, the proportion of the national income which is acquired on account of property is maintained by political power, "El estado opera asegurando la persistencia de las relaciones de propiedad, y por lo tanto, mantiene las bases de la distribución del ingreso". 32/

In Latin America, as table 3 indicates, the income of unincorporated enterprise plus property income account for a proportion of the national income which varies from 14.6 % in Panama to 66.1 % in Guatemala.

The second half of my argument hinges around the following hypothesis: any redistribution of income is usually preceded by a change in the distribution of power. In other words, an increase in the degree of diffusion of power, ensuing a growth in the political participation of the lower classes is translated into a redistribution of disposable income, or by means of welfare policies (housing, medicare, pensions, and the like) and of redistribution of income sources (land, enterprises, etc.).

Is there empirical support for this hypothesis? Again the relevant empirical material is fragmentary because it was often gathered for different purposes and does not, therefore, constitute as yet a homogeneous literature. Let me thus present only the most interesting studies that bear witness to my argument. The first is an analysis of the relation between changes in income distribution - measured by a redistribution index which takes into account social expenditures and taxes - during the last

32/ J. Graciarena, La estructura..., op. cit., p. 173.
### PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL INCOME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Wage and salary income</th>
<th>Income of unincorporated enterprises</th>
<th>Property income</th>
<th>Corporate savings and direct corporation taxes</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>(-) 1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>(-) 0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>39.3a/</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>3.9b/</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>(-) 0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>65.7a/</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>3.9b/</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>66.1a/</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>(-) 1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>(-) 0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>(-) 2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>(-) 1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The figures shown are three-year averages. There is some variation in the years covered depending on data availability, but in general the period is the early 1960s. The only exception is Mexico, where the estimates refer to the single year 1950.


a/ Also includes saving of corporate enterprises.
b/ Direct corporate taxes only.
century in Sweden, France, and United Kingdom. Its major finding is that there is a significant correlation between these changes and changes in the political participation of the lower classes, measured by such indicators as enfranchisement, voting turnout, percentage of left voting, and the percentual participation of the labor force in civil service. Although at the author's own admission, the statistical strength of the relation is not always as desired, the regression line is in the prestated direction.

The second reference worth making is to a set of studies on single national policies. The area is not, as I stated, well developed, both on account of the disrepute to which the analysis of public policy has been held for its alleged lack of theoretical value, and of the complexity of the issue. However, two policy areas on which the attention of social scientists has been greater can be analyzed for the purpose at hand: housing and agricultural policy. In both cases a clear distinction must be made between the purported goal of public officials, and the achieved end. In fact, while it was stated in political circles that the main target group of these policies were the lower urban class and the landless and small peasants, the recipients of public money were more powerful groups, the middle urban class, and the rural bourgeoisie. This contention holds out both for pre-September 1973 Chile and for Brazil's housing policy. If we move our attention to agricultural policy, the same inference that public policy favors powerful groups is warranted: let us make a brief review of the major features of agrarian


34/ Carlos A. Borsotti, Notas sobre la teoría y la metodología de la inclusión de los aspectos demográficos y sociales en la planificación del desarrollo, CEPAL/Borrador/DS/19, División de Desarrollo Social 1975.

reform programs in Chile and Peru, which more than other countries have been subject to recent changes. In Peru, suggests Feder 36/ the distribution of land has as yet affected less than 1/3 of the potential beneficiaries, on account of the restriction posed by the government on the minimum size of the alloted land. Thus, its consequence was to "weaken the campesinos politically by a discriminatory distribution of rewards", and to create a loyal middle bourgeoisie. In Chile, the raw data of land distribution by government are the following: the Christian Democratic government distributed 3.6 million hectares from 1965 to 1970, the Popular Unity 6.2 million from 1971 to 1973, while the present government has returned to the earlier proprietors 1.4 million hectares from September 1973 to September 1974. 37/ A similar pattern of distribution of benefits by agricultural policy has also obtained in Mexico 38/.

In this connection is also worthy a mention a recent work on the impact of fiscal policy in the Colombian distribution of income, whose main finding is that the percentage of personal income acquired by the poorest 50% of the population in 1966 changes only from 13.9% to 14.0% on account of taxation and public expenditure.

These data, do not speak for themselves. They, however, point consistently in the same direction: political participation is related to the access to social goods and changes in the second are preceded by changes in the first, thus grounding my contention that there is a


/causal asymmetry
causal asymmetry between the two variables and that participation is the independent one. The state in less developed countries, it may be added, does not seem to reduce the inequality of opportunities among social classes to any relevant degree; thus contradicting the hypothesis which attributes it the function of regulating and restraining the brutality, so to say, of the market mechanism.

This relation between the distribution of power and the distribution of benefits following public policy also suggests an interesting methodology for the preliminary evaluation of the distribution of power among classes and functional sectors. To this last issue, let us turn next.
The conclusion of the last section was that participation is primarily political power. In fact, only political power yields the influence on the decision-making process necessary to divert part of the national product to one's own advantage, and, therefore, affect the process of economic growth. Such definition of the concept was required by the theories of participation and development presented at the outset.

Once this perspective is accepted, however, one bothersome problem remains: how can we evaluate participation? The first meaning of participation - political activity - is rather easily indicated by the participation of members of a class or functional sector in the activity of an organization, be it a union, a league, a cooperative, a party. I have however defended the idea that political activity cannot be confused with political power, and have taken the second to be more relevant. Therefore the indicators which are usually employed cannot be used here.

Sociology is not entirely at a loss, however, to deal with this problem: the empirical studies of elites, and the studies on the distribution of community power, to quote but two areas of concern, have been systematic attempts to analyze power. When focussed on a limited geographical area or event these studies have been very sound and have proportioned valuable insights, but their findings are hardly extendable to nations.

As regards the larger unit of analysis, the existing studies either abound in intelligence and imagination - such as Mills "Power Elite", but lack a sound methodology, or as most elite studies, are written with an impeccable methodology, but are often unimaginative. Their exclusive concern for the individuals who occupy positions of power, or so are reputed, relegates to a secondary position the crucial issue of the distribution of power.

Although this paper will not suffice to give final solution to the problem, I think that there is one possibility for a preliminary evaluation of the distribution of power, and, thus, participation, through the analysis of public policy. The methodology I am suggesting will not be a detailed set of prescriptions for immediate use, since the nature of available data...
will be, in the end, called to determine the concrete line of investigation. My purpose is therefore, more humbly, to draw the attention of the researcher to an hypothesis which could supply a good indicator for the distribution of power: namely, that the distribution of power is related to the distribution of benefits from public intervention.

The importance of public policy to the estimation of power has long been recognized in sociological theory. Wright Mills, at the end of his famed work, admitting that his evidence was not conclusive, proposed as a guideline for future research to select a relevant decision from each aspect of public policy and to measure the degree of influence exercised upon such decision by the members of the elite. Such evaluation would be in turn an evaluation of the distribution of power.

I agree with Mills on the validity of this approach. However, since it requires a degree of access to policy making that is difficult to achieve, and a considerable amount of financial resources, I propose a similar, and yet different method. Similar in that it focusses on the process of public policy, but different because, instead of evaluating the degree of influence on it, it infers the degree of power from the amount of benefits accruing by virtue of state intervention. In other words, it assumes that the answer to the question "cui bono" is also the answer to the question on who has power. This position has been also taken with a natural degree of caution by Graciarena, who states "La hipótesis de trabajo que se sugiere es que la primera relación (A - B) (sector productivo - estado, medidas de política económica) puede ser inferida a la segunda (B - C) (medidas de política económica - aumento del ingreso del sector productivo o grupo funcional)."

The fundamental assumption of this strategy is that the distribution of benefits following public policy is the outcome of the distribution of power at any given moment. It must be remembered here that the state is not the epiphonema of social stratification, and that, therefore, also

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40/ Jorge Graciarena, Estructura... op. cit., pp. 212.
state members (bureaucrats, politicians, military men) enjoy a degree of power independently of the class they represent. Classes, individuals, and state members, enjoy a degree of control over the state. I assume that the outcome of state activity (policy) is determined by such distribution of power. If this hypothesis is correct, it is a matter of course to evaluate the cause by means of its effect: the classes or groups which draw the greatest benefits from state activity are the most powerful. The degree of participation of the lower classes, therefore, will be measured by the benefits it draws from state intervention.

Is the fundamental assumption correct? The analysis made in the third section of this work, demonstrating a relation between political participation and distribution of incomes, indicates that the assumption is by and large correct. However there are various processes which militate against the establishment of a perfect correspondence between the concept (participation) and the indicator (benefits from public policy). The major ones are:

1. Public policy is not determined by the distribution of power alone, but also by the ideology of the elite. The Peruvian revolution could not be understood without appreciating to its true value the role of the education in economic and social affairs undertaken by the high military officers.

2. Public policy is not determined by the distribution of power, but by the elite's appreciation of it. The appreciation, of course, does not entirely correspond to reality. Can we exclude that there might be unintelligent or irrational elites? Were this not the case, we could not understand social change.

3. Public policy is not determined by the distribution of power alone, but by the projection of such distribution after the policy has been undertaken. In other words, public policy is not an outcome of power, but an instrument of conflict as well. How, for instance, could we

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41/ R. Bendix, op. cit.

42/ Carlos Delgado, "Sinamos, La Participación Popular en la Revolución Peruana", Participación, 2 febrero 1973, 6-25; see especially p. 10. /understand the
understand the Peruvian agrarian reform, and the expropriation of the Northern sugar complexes without reference to the conflict existing between Velasco's military elite, the large sugar industrialists and foreign interests?

I cannot refute these criticisms. Since, to a different degree, they are correct, it is more urgent to evaluate the error they produce in the suggested approach.

Such damage, I submit, is inversely related to the time-period in which we consider the unfolding of the policy under analysis: the error term reduces with the length of the period. In fact, while ideological biases and misjudgements of the social distribution of power affect the policy output at any given time, the possibility of modifying such policy reduces in the medium and long run their effect. The case of revolutionary policies that remained dead word either for the later disinterest of governments, or for the obstructionism of the bureaucracy illustrates this point quite well.

For what refers specifically to the third point, the amount of the error term depends on the frequency with which governments have intervened to elicit support from potentially powerful allies, and on the extent to which the distribution of benefits has been affected by this intervention. While the answer to the first question, is certainly, "many", that to the second is more uncertain. My conviction is that the distribution of benefits has usually been affected only to a small extent. First because alliance was bought, so to say, as cheap as possible; and second, because, once the alliance has served to defeat the common enemy, it lost its "raison d'etre", and the payment to help with the accountant's terminology suspended.

Some historical cases of Latin American countries support my conviction. The mind goes naturally to the handling of the Mexican agrarian reform, where ejidos were constituted with the specific goal
now admitted also by official spokesmen 43/ of reducing the potentially threatening unsatisfaction of peasants. Or to the Peruvian agrarian reform where the expropriation of the sugar-industrial complexes had, as I said, the goal of undermining the basis of support of the industrial and foreign bourgeoisie.

In both cases, the proportion of benefits received by the peasantry versus, say, the rural bourgeoisie, is relatively small. In Mexico, the ejidos were assigned the poorest land, and the least capitalized farms, with the exception of the Laguna area. 44/ Furthermore, their financial dependence on state banks has in practice transformed them into appendages of the party-state machinery. In Peru, the peasantry at large gained very little from the expropriation of the now Cooperativas Agrarias de Producción, or the constitution of the Sociedades Agrícolas de Interés Social. It is calculated that the first (CAP) at the end of 1973 affected 8.7% and the second (SAIS) 3.8% of the rural labor force: a total of 12.5%. Furthermore, since the distribution of land did not change either the structure of production or the labor relations, the expropriation did not do away with inter-farm income differences, or with the exploitation of landless peasants. For instance official computations set the income of the member of CAP at four times the income of the non-member cane cutter. 45/

43/ M.A. Duran, the well-known Mexican historian, and economist, states: "Entre las funciones sociales de la propiedad de la tierra, deben contarse las de índole política, cuya más sencilla y clara expresión es que ha producido una tranquilidad que ha apoyado la lucha por el progreso. Las funciones políticas son complejas, pues incluyen el mantenimiento de las esperanzas de los campesinos..." Quoted in R. Batra, "Campesinado y Poder Político en México, un Modelo Teórico", Revista Mexicana de Sociología, 32, 3-4, 1972, 659-684, p. 663.

44/ See many of Stavanhagen's works, such as "The Future of Peasants in Mexico", in Institute of Latin American Studies, op. cit., 68-84.

45/ My source of information on Peru have been Mike Anderson and P. Knight, who wrote jointly and separately, on workers' participation in Peru. Also the article by C. Delgado quoted above is of interest, with Jaime Llosa, "Reforma Agraria y Revolución", Participación, 2, 3, 1973, 44-59.

/These remarks
These remarks legitimize the question of whether the reform was meant to benefit the peasantry or to impel the formation of a rural bourgeoisie of Kulaks with a state in the status quo, regardless of the majority's fate; they also legitimize my conviction that the error produced in the evaluation of the distribution of power by the employment of the state as a means of struggle is relatively small. In any event, the approach I suggest will prove its validity only upon usage.

Up to the present, although the methodology I am proposing has rarely been used to the purpose at hand, there are some works on the sector or income-class distribution of public expenditures and taxes. The existing attempts are of great interest to the political sociologist and very promising for what concerns the utility of the methodology. Objective difficulties are encountered, however, in the achievement of relevant data, and in their manipulation, on account of the variety of the items of the public budget that must be taken into account.

For this reason, it may be suggested to focus one's attention on specific policy areas, rather than to estimate the overall effect of government policy, and to use regional data where they are available for ecological correlations. It is impossible, however, to enter major details because in concrete research the nature of available data may suggest the type of investigation to the theoretically well prepared imaginative social scientist. The purpose of this section as I anticipated was indeed to suggest to such scientists an interesting work hypothesis as a guideline to concrete research, rather than spell out all its implications.

46/ See Carlo & Wilma Geneletti, op. cit.

Given the complexity of the issue, a summary is in order. The major goals of this paper - it may be useful to recall - were the following three: first, to clarify the concept of political participation. I have suggested in this connection that the two most common meanings of the term were political activity and political power, or influence on the decision-making process at all levels of social activity and social institutions. I have focussed my attention on the second meaning on account of the interesting lines of research it could open.

Second, to demonstrate that the connection implicitly posited between access to political power and access to social goods by the theories of political participation and economic development was empirically supported. This demonstration was made in two steps: one I indicated that there was a statistically significant relation between the degree of popular political participation and the relative equality of income distribution across countries. Two, that the causal arrow went from power to income and not viceversa. Third, to suggest a methodology for the preliminary evaluation of political participation. Since political participation can be defined as access to the state and since public policies distribute benefits according to the relative power of social classes, the distribution of benefits accruing to these classes from public policy could be taken as an indicator of the distribution of power.

These last two points were the most debatable, and in need of further treatment. The major difficulty that lies ahead in this pursuit is the estimation of the distribution of political participation. Either by rendering the methodology I suggested more as sophisticated or by trying other ways, the investigation should be pursued. This measure in fact, would open two crucial lines of research, the first on the effects of power on the distribution of social goods. The theory could be the same as I have defended earlier, but with more reliable measurements.
The second, on the theory of the state. The major weakness of the literature on this field, in fact, is the almost total lack of empirical analysis. The classical marxist idea that the state serves exclusively the interests of the bourgeoisie, or the idea that it performs so as to equalize the distribution of the opportunities offered the citizens, or Miliband's hypothesis that the state is a ransomer of the bourgeoisie have been so far only vague and unfounded statements.

But the importance of the issue in the areas of political sociology and economic development makes this pursuit undelayable and it has not dissuaded the author in his hope that he may be considered daring and not reckless.