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ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA
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CARIBBEAN/LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS

A Study Prepared for the Economic Commission
for Latin America (Subregional Office for the
Caribbean) and the Caribbean Community Secretariat

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This report was prepared by the consultants at the request of the Executive Secretary, together with other preparatory reports, as an input to the study to be undertaken by the Secretariat on expanded co-operation between the Caribbean area and the rest of Latin America. It has not yet been discussed between the consultants and the Secretariat and is distributed in response to a specific request by the Seventh Session of CDECC meeting at the technical level. The views expressed by the consultants do not necessarily reflect those of the Secretariat.

C O N T E N T S

	<u>Page</u>
Preface	1
The Historical Background	1
The Geo-political Situation	8
Existing Patterns of Extra- regional Relations	18
Participation in Regional Organizations	29
New Strategies and Formats	40
Summary of Main Recommendations	48

P R E F A C E

1. We were requested to undertake a study with the following basic objectives.^{1/*}

(a) To provide the basis on which the subject of Caribbean/Latin American relations would guide discussion and future action;

(b) To trace the historical background with a view to identifying those social, historical and cultural factors of relevance to a better mutual understanding such as:

(i) cultural, including language, religion, institutional differences and approaches;

(ii) ethnic origins and their significance for extra-regional links;

(c) To identify those economic factors capable of stimulating greater economic activity between both groups, recognising differences in territorial size, levels of development and resource endowments;

(d) To analyse the geo-political situation bearing in mind the special features of island developing states and the existence of territorial disputes;

(e) To study the history and growth of the relationships between the two sub-groups as it has evolved since the achievement of independence by CARICOM states, identifying difficulties which have arisen in both bilateral and multilateral relations;

(f) To study the existing pattern of extra-regional relations (political, economic, cultural) of the two sub-groups, including importantly, the role of Latin American and/or Caribbean states in the United Nations System and in such interregional organizations as the Non-Alligned Movement, the Group of 77, the ACP Group and the Commonwealth and the impact of such extra-regional relations between the two groups;

* / Footnotes to text may be found on page 50.

(g) To study the workings of regional organizations such as ECLA, OAS, SELA, GEPLACEA, OLADE in which both groups participate;

(h) To recommend new strategies and formats for the elimination of identified difficulties and for the further development and management of Caribbean relations with Latin America at both bilateral and multilateral levels;

(i) To identify areas of complementarity and mutual interest towards the formulation of projects which can be undertaken by Caribbean and Latin American states within the framework of ECLA and specifically the CDCC and other regional organizations such as SELA and the OAS.

2. After some discussion it was agreed that the focus on economic aspects would be limited in the light of ongoing work (referred to below) by other ECLA subregional offices and the CARICOM Secretariat.

3. The idea of an examination of the state of the relations between Caribbean and Latin American countries and the call for a study of this matter came out of a concern felt in the Caribbean, and also in the Economic Commission for Latin America, that positive steps needed to be taken to put these relations on a sounder basis.

4. Since the commissioning of the study two issues have emerged which have significant implications for Caribbean/Latin American relations.

First in the Malvinas/Falkland Islands affair, and the conflict between Argentina and Britain. The positions taken by the CARICOM countries, and the reaction to this on the part of some in Latin America served, among other things, to bring into the open some of the deep differences which exist and some of the misunderstandings and misperceptions. This situation has more than confirmed the need for a close study of the relations between Caribbean and Latin American countries, and for appropriate action to improve these relations.

6. The Caribbean Basin Initiative constitutes an attempt to establish special economic relationships between the countries of the Caribbean and Central America and the United States. Concerns in the region centre on the exclusion of some countries in the Caribbean Basin

from the programme, and fears about the possible negative effects of the programme on efforts toward close economic relations between Caribbean Basin countries and Latin America.

7. The study has been carried out mainly from a Caribbean perspective. In this, and other respects, it must be seen as a preliminary exercise, indicating major issues, enlarging on some and pointing to further areas of enquiry, exploration or action. Parallel to this study, work is being undertaken by the offices of the Economic Commission for Latin America in Bogota^{2/} and Mexico City^{3/} and this will provide a valuable basis for the consideration of practical measures toward more effective economic co-operation between Latin American and Caribbean countries. In addition, we understand, a team from the Caribbean Community Secretariat has recently visited the Headquarters of the Andean Pact for discussions on economic relations.

8. The report, while drawing attention to differences and difficulties in relations, is written in full awareness of the many areas and instances of healthy relations and co-operation between Caribbean and Latin American countries. At the same time, it is recognized that there are special and sensitive elements, such as cultural and ethnic factors, and extra-regional relations, which have a strong bearing on the issues being examined in the study and our purpose here is to try to ensure that they are faced in responsible, frank and constructive manner.

9. It is clear that while the two groups of countries have many common interests, there are major differences between them. Some of these are real; others are the product of lack of information or of misunderstandings. In any event geography imposes on these countries the necessity to find the most satisfactory relationships. It is, then, the effective management of these relationships that requires attention and action.

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THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1. There can be no doubt that many of the relationships that now exist between the Caribbean countries and Latin America are rooted in the history of each of these groups of countries, and in the manner of their emergence as independent states. For the purposes of this study it will only be possible to touch briefly on some of the main factors here, and to suggest the ways in which they have facilitated co-operative relationships, or have inhibited them.
2. Each of the two groups at one time formed part of one of the great empires established by conquest by Western European powers; and each still bears the marks and influences of that experience. Each group expresses in its own way the characteristic ambivalence toward the former metropolitan centre (or the block of countries with which it is associated) the resentment at the disadvantages which they feel still exist, particularly in economic relations, and the positive sentiments based on the long-standing cultural connections.
3. While such negative feelings in some instances provide a basis for solidarity between the two groups, again on some international economic issues, the remaining links of sentiment and real contact with each metropolitan centre give rise to differences and difficulties between Latin American and Caribbean countries, and to serious misunderstanding.
4. Latin American countries gained their independence in most cases in the early nineteenth century. Their struggle for independence, involving military campaigns, and a strong sense of unity against a common opponent, as expressed for example in the exploits of such figures as Simon Bolivar, helped to create the feeling of Latin American solidarity and a sense of joint destiny. Thus it is felt in Latin America that Bolivar's concept of a Latin American league of nations laid the foundations of the Pan American movement.

5. Spain maintained its hold on Spanish America for 300 years. Yet all of these colonies were liberated in a period of fifteen years between 1810 and 1825 - all, that is, except Cuba and Puerto Rico. The contrast has been drawn between North America where the thirteen English colonies became one independent state, the United States of America; and Spanish America where seventeen separate republics emerged from the wars of liberation. This is attributed to the great diversity in cultural, ethnic and other characteristics, in Spanish America, the nature of the colonial administrations, and obstacles deriving from geography and terrain which greatly inhibited transport and communication between the territories.

6. It has been stated that the emancipation of Spanish America "marked a further stage in the shift from a Mediterranean to an Atlantic civilization, and opened an enormous region to trade and immigration..." "...it brought into existence a number of new states which thereafter would have to be taken into account by statesmen in other parts of the world in the conduct of diplomacy and strategy."^{4/}

7. Who are the people of Latin America? To begin, there are the original indigenous populations - the Indians - who in spite of the harsh impact of the conquest on them, remain as a significant element in many countries. Much visible evidence of the unique cultures of some of these peoples exists.

8. But the settlement of Europeans before and after the liberation of Latin America ensured the predominance of that element in much of the region in cultural, social, political and economic terms. This fact must have a considerable influence on the way in which the people of these countries see themselves, on their relations with the rest of the world, and, of course, on their perceptions of and attitudes toward the Caribbean group of countries.

9. The complexity of the ethnic and cultural situation is increased by reason of the existence of significant numbers of people of African origin in many Latin American countries - the descendants of slaves, or of immigrants from the Caribbean. The position that these groups occupy in

Latin American countries undoubtedly also has a bearing on the perception in these countries of the Caribbean, where the majority of the population are of African origin.

10. This of course, is not a static situation, as the mixing of the races along with other influences, have been associated in some Latin American countries, with an evolving set of attitudes in the matter of race relations and the like. How Latin American societies evolve in the future in the face of this complex cultural and ethnic situation, how they cope in political, economic and other terms with the pressures and demands emanating from this situation which will inevitably grow more insistent, will be of considerable consequence to relations within the region - not the least to the relations between these countries and the Caribbean.

11. Haiti occupies a unique position in the history of Latin America. That Caribbean country fought a successful war of liberation against the forces of Napoleon, and in 1804 became the first Latin American country to achieve independence. This country so different from the rest of Latin America, in its experience with French colonial power, and its predominantly African population played an important role in the liberation of the region. Simon Bolivar, after his period of exile in Jamaica, went to Haiti as did other Spanish American patriot refugees, where he received assistance from the President of Haiti toward the equipping of his expeditionary force for the final effort of liberation.

12. Spanish and Portuguese are the main languages of Latin America, and this constitutes a vital cultural link between the countries of the region and with Spain and Portugal.

13. The efforts to replace the political and administrative machinery of Spain after the liberation of Latin America, and to preserve the democratic traditions which invested the liberation movements, have not been universally successful. Latin America presents a picture of a great variety of political systems and institutions, and continues to experience political changes and

upheavals in many cases. Few of the countries today are democracies.

14. A number of clear differences between the Caribbean countries and Latin America have emerged from these different historical processes.

15. The Caribbean English-speaking countries have had a much longer experience as colonies, and were the subject of conquest and re-conquest in the rivalries between the Western powers. At one time these countries occupied a position of great importance in the economic and strategic systems of the European powers. In addition to the skirmishes and open wars which affected the area as these powers sought to gain or retain possession of particular territories, the area was subject to a series of upheavals as the slaves, brought in large numbers from Africa, rebelled against their masters and fought against the forces of the Government which supported the system of slavery.

16. These Caribbean countries achieved independence mainly in the 1960s - on the basis of political agitation and negotiation. Thus for them independence came in an era and in a manner quite different from those in which the liberation of Latin America took place. In the case of the Caribbean countries their relations with the metropolitan power went through a fundamental change once the claim to independence was established and conceded. Thus for these countries there was a period of "tutelage", a learning period in which constitutional changes and other events gradually led up to the point of full independence.

17. Again, during that period, major social and other changes took place, changes arising out of the growing social and political consciousness of the people, and resulting in the emergence into political prominence and leadership positions, before independence, of individuals and groups representative of the mass of the populations. The contrast in this respect with Latin America is clear.

18. The effort to form a Federation embracing these countries before their achievement of independence, proved abortive. But the operationalisation of the concept of a Caribbean Free Trade Association followed by the establishment of the Caribbean Community have been important factors over the past thirty to forty years - in the relations between these countries, and in the way that they are seen by others, including Latin America.

19. By reason of the manner and timing of their emergence into independence, they have retained special relationships with the United Kingdom, and this too has had a significant effect on their relations with Latin America.

20. And who are the people of the Caribbean? Except in the mainland countries - Guyana and Belize - the indigenous Indian populations "disappeared" rapidly after the conquest of the territories. Little trace of their existence remains except in simple artifacts unearthed in a few locations. The present populations consist in the main, of descendants of the relatively small numbers of settlers from the United Kingdom, the large numbers of African slaves who were transported to the area, and the people from India and elsewhere who came later as indenture labour, or otherwise. The Caribbean therefore presents a very different picture from Latin America in this respect.

21. The language of the area is English, with traces of French in those countries once held by France. The late development of universities in the Caribbean is an important point of difference between the Caribbean and Latin America. It meant, for example, that opportunities for higher education, for the pursuit of rigorous research and training based in the foundations of the cultural and social and other aspects of the community, came very late. Scholars from the Caribbean had to pursue such training in universities in North America and Britain, thus further reinforcing links with those countries. Even today there is very little contact between scholars from the two groups of countries, and apparently very little in the research and curricula of their universities and schools that relates to each other's history and circumstances.

22. Here, and in other respects, the language difference is a potent factor. The Caribbean countries long before independence established their political systems on the basis of the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy. The complex of institutions within and outside of the governmental sphere, and the play of public discussion, all form elements in this system and represent unique features of Caribbean life. In spite of major changes and

serious difficulties, this pattern remains largely in place. It has profound effects on the ways in which Caribbean countries perceive themselves, and on their political relations with other communities, including the Latin American countries.

23. Caribbean English-speaking countries have made significant impacts on communities outside, including some distant ones. This has resulted from the unique history and other circumstances of the countries, their demographic composition, and among other factors the necessity of a search for freedom and wider opportunities inside and outside their borders, following the confining experience of hundreds of years of slavery and colonisation.

There has been, over a long period, a small but very significant movement of people from the Caribbean to Africa and this along with the work and writings of Marcus Garvey, George Padmore and others has had a profound impact on that continent - in particular West African countries. Here must be mentioned also the work of Frantz Fanon, a product of the Caribbean also; in this case, the French-speaking area.

24. In the earlier years of the twentieth century, there was considerable migration from the Caribbean to a number of Latin American countries, notably Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Cuba, Ecuador, Venezuela. The descendants of these migrants still live in those countries, in many instances regarding themselves and being regarded as "Caribbean" peoples, retaining their original language and customs. This movement has had some positive effects in terms of increasing contacts and information between the two groups of countries. But these effects appear to have been rather limited. One must wonder what perceptions have existed by reason of this - of Latin America - and of the Caribbean respectively.

25. Migration of Caribbean peoples to the United States has had important effects, notably in the light of the large population of Blacks in that country. The same is true of migration to Britain, although in this case it is the flow of emigrants from the Caribbean, from Africa and from Asia in the past three decades which has been converting that former centre of a great empire into a multi-racial society.

In the case of both countries the presence of emigrants and their descendants has sharpened the focus of attention on the Caribbean.

26. The factor of size could be another important one in the perceptions, and in the relations between the Caribbean and Latin America. The latter group contains a number of countries very large in physical size and in population. Moreover, in respect of some commodities, their output is large indeed. This contrasts sharply with the small Caribbean countries, with their seriously limited material and human resource bases.

27. It would seem then, that there are basic and very significant differences between Latin America and the Caribbean in ethnic, cultural, political and institutional terms, and in size; and that these differences along with the lack of adequate contact and exchange between the two groups of countries present real difficulties in the way of pursuing collaborative relationships. These, and the perceptions by each group of the other, require close understanding if relations are to be placed on a firmer and more effective basis.

THE GEO-POLITICAL SITUATION

28. The long political and economic relationships of the English-speaking Caribbean countries with Europe, in particular the United Kingdom, the extreme dependence of the countries on these relationships for their viability, and the cultural and educational (information) impact of the relationship, have not disposed the people of these countries to think of themselves as being part of the American Continental Zone. This has meant, that at the level of policy, little thought has been given to the question of the political and economic implications of geographical location, especially as these relate to the countries of South and Central America.

29. Problems of territorial jurisdiction have imposed upon certain states - Trinidad and Tobago, Belize - the necessity to divert technical and diplomatic expertise to immediate problem-solving with South and Central American neighbours. But the necessity to elaborate strategies for long term relationships with countries in most cases physically larger, more populous, and wealthier than themselves, has not been perceived as urgent.

30. Thus even the much heralded diversification of international relationships, undertaken by some of these Caribbean Community countries in the 1960s and 1970s, can be said to have related more to the countries of Africa and Asia and less to those of the South and Central Zones. This has of course, been partly because the South and Central American states as a whole have not been active participants in the programme of the Non-Aligned Movement, the main non-Western institutionalised international forum in which CARICOM states have been diplomatically active.

31. As the CARICOM states have had experience of independence, they have begun to take cognisance of a variety of pressures emanating from the South-Central American Zone, and from the non-Anglophone Caribbean environment. These pressures have induced some recognition of the need for elaborating longer term strategies. Even problems of territorial jurisdiction requiring immediate responses, are

seen to have wider implications than the mere territorial. In effect, these implications speak to questions of adjustment to neighbouring states with whom there have historically been limited relationships, and from full contact with whom they have hitherto been protected or prohibited by the colonial power.

32. The Guyana/Venezuela attempts to resolve their territorial controversy, when linked to Guyana's territorial difficulties with Suriname, and Brazil's interest in ensuring stability of boundaries in her environment, indicate that what is here posed even if territorial questions were resolved, is the problem of the progressive working out of a nexus of diplomatic and functional relationships between a set of states - some new, some older - of the Northern-South American area. The differences in economic and or population size, and physical endowments, between Guyana and Suriname (physically large states by CARICOM standards) on the one hand, and Venezuela and Brazil on the other, serve to suggest that some of the historical characteristics in the relations between major and minor powers will of necessity come into play. And the sense of the development of a new arena of international relations is enhanced by the apparent desire of another Northern-South American state, Colombia, to engage itself in the Caribbean area.

33. Much the same might be said of the territorial difficulties between Guatemala and Belize. Here it seems, the recognition by Belize of the political and economic implications of geographical location, is greater than in most other CARICOM states. It is clear that even while being a full member-state of the Caribbean Community Belize will be engaged, even after the territorial dispute has been resolved, in developing a range of diplomatic and economic relationships with the countries of Central America and with the major regional state of Mexico. Such relationships will evolve irrespective of differences in the nature of regimes, and in the ideologies of regimes, as between Belize and the other states; though these factors will undoubtedly qualify the relationships.

34. Inevitably, as these relationships between CARICOM members on the continental mainland and their neighbours develop, there will be sensitivities on the part of the CARICOM group. On the other hand the mainland states

(Belize, Guyana), bound culturally and in part economically to the Caribbean Community and the Common Market, have shown indications of perceiving the CARICOM system as a possible diplomatic counterweight; and as a channel through which wider relationships can be maintained between themselves as small states, and states in other geo-political zones. For there now seems also to be a perception among some of the larger mainland states, that some virtue exists in having systematic relationships in addition to those in the Hemisphere in which the United States is the constant and dominant partner.

35. Another area in which the CARICOM states have come to an awareness of the developing significance of the South American mainland for themselves, is that relating to the Law of the Sea. Most of the CARICOM countries, as island-states, have some to independence during the course of the negotiations in the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Given their existence in a small semi-enclosed sea, the CARICOM states, even if they had the technological capability for taking complete advantage of a two-hundred-mile economic zone declaration, would be unable to do so, as a result of their close proximity to each other.

36. On the other hand, most of them have not looked with particular favour on the two-hundred-mile economic zone or territorial sea extension of south American coastal states, as this has affected their own customary fisheries activities. The agreements signed between Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil in 1972, and Barbados and Brazil in 1973, are indicative of the problem here. In turn the island-states' own CARICOM mainland partner, Guyana, anxious to be in no less favoured a situation than Brazil and others, has herself sought to impose restrictions and ensure rights for herself similar to theirs. Again this has affected the island-states traditional activities.

37. The largest of the island states, Jamaica, has within the UNCLOS context characterised herself as a 'Zone-locked' state, this concept focussing on the difference in situation and therefore interest between herself and the South and Central American states

which have generally followed the two-hundred-mile principle. Jamaica has recently succeeded, after much effort, in negotiating a fisheries agreement with Colombia which will protect the activities of her fishermen in areas claimed by Colombia, partly as a consequence of her ownership of islands in the Caribbean Sea itself.

38. The urgency of the situation created by the UNCLOS negotiations has been brought home to many of the smaller island-states in the Caribbean Community by the active desire of Venezuela to delimit her own territorial sea and economic zone areas. Apart from the fact that two-hundred-mile economic zone extension gives Venezuela an extensive presence in the semi-enclosed Caribbean sea, her activity has forced other countries, including the United States and France (by virtue of their possession of territories in the area), to pursue their own delimitations vis-à-vis the Caribbean countries. In addition, the Venezuelan ownership of Aves Island in the vicinity of the North-eastern Caribbean, has brought the smaller island-states into a somewhat unanticipated relationship with that country. It might be noted in passing, that the various delimitations in the Caribbean Sea have negated the Jamaican attempt to ensure a wider stake in the sea for herself; through the proposal that the Caribbean be accepted as a "matrimonial sea".

39. Venezuela's active presence in the Caribbean Sea in the course of UNCLOS, has simply highlighted a previously existing assertion of national interest encompassing both economic and security components. The country actually possesses the longest coastline of any state in the Caribbean. Her geophysical and economic (petroleum) relationship with the Leeward Islands of the Netherlands Antilles, has already induced her to take an interest in the political viability of those entities.

40. Then the nature of her petroleum trade with the United States and her general trade with the North Atlantic countries, has led Venezuela to perceive the Caribbean as a gateway to that area. Post-1959 antipathies between Cuba and herself have reinforced this concern.

41. It is, of course, within this general context that Venezuela's demonstrations of interest in the CARICOM Windward and Leeward Islands must be seen; even at a time when, on the road to independence, they were

still technically colonies, as Associated States of the United Kingdom. That active interest of one northern South American country has, as we have indicated above, spurred the interest of another, Colombia. It can be anticipated that these interests will be pursued more actively in the foreseeable future.

42. The material reflection of the concern of the major regional mainland countries in the vicinity of the Caribbean, in the political and economic stability of the CARICOM states, has been their adherence, as important contributing members, to the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB); and their establishment of the San José Accord oil facility, designed to ease the financial consequences for the Caribbean (and Central American) states of the dramatic increase in petroleum prices.

This institutionalisation of concern and national interest indicates, once again, the long-term nature of the relationship in which the CARICOM countries will be involved; as distinct from relationships consequent upon the necessity to immediately resolve colonial-legacy type problems, or to urgently implement law of the sea agreements.

43. We turn from the wider so-called Caribbean Basin area encompassing the states or the mainland bordering the Caribbean Sea, to the area whose centre is the archipelago chain itself. We refer to the archipelago plus the historically connected mainland territories of the Guyanas and Belize. This is the area encompassing CARICOM, but defined in recent times by the composition of the Caribbean Development and Co-operation Committee (CDCC) formed in 1975.

44. We need not concern ourselves with the motivation for the formation for the CDCC, although we might say that there has been a concern among the Caribbean political leadership, since the demise of Federation of the West Indies, for some degree of institutionalising of relations between the groupings in the archipelago formerly dominated by a variety of colonial jurisdictions.

45. The counterposing of the two formulations CARICOM - CDCC indicates however that the geo-political problem here is that of the *incomplete diplomatic coherence of intra-Caribbean relations*. The problem is indicated by the attempts of both Haiti and the Dominican Republic to establish some form of relationship with CARICOM, and the continuing difficulties in arranging mechanisms that are satisfactory to all the parties. Further, the 'normalisation' of relations with Cuba, which the CARICOM countries thought themselves to be achieving in the early 1970s, has not come to fruition; though it is of course well known that this has been, and is complicated by the larger problem of Cuba-United States relations.

46. That the historical patterns of trade and cultural relationships are not such as to have brought the CARICOM states on the one hand, and Haiti and the Dominican Republic on the other, into close proximity, is only part of the problem. That the competition for American sugar quotas may increase rather than decrease political distance, is also only a part.

47. What has not yet occurred in spite of the existence, and the extensive work programme of the CDCC, is the development of any meaningful relationships between the institutions (public and private) within the various countries involved. Such a process is complicated, ab initio by the differences in language between Haiti and the Dominican Republic and even their nearest CARICOM neighbour, Jamaica (though it must be observed that this has not inhibited, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the development of active, though informal "higgler" trading relations between Haiti and Jamaica, conducted by Jamaicans travelling to Haiti, to alleviate shortages in Jamaica).

48. CARICOM has been hesitant to engage in a process that might "widen" the institution, at a time when it is widely felt that the 'deepening' process is not progressing satisfactorily, due to factors not all within control of member-states. At the same time the CDCC while undertaking a number of region-wide programmes of a technical nature aimed at providing over time a basis for co-operation, is not equipped to function as a facilitator of inter-institution relationships between the States. It possesses neither the system of Standing Committees nor that of private

sector allied institutions, nor the apparatus for functional co-operation characteristics of CARICOM. While these are lacking, the political motivation which might sustain the longer term technical work based at the CDCC's centre, has also tended to wane.

49. It is possibly unfair to require of the CARICOM states at this point that they provide the bulk of the financial wherewithal for sustaining a substantial CDCC functional co-operation apparatus, in addition to that of CARICOM. But a complete exploration of the possibility and ability of the UNECLA system resources for something of this nature does not seem to us yet to have been made. (We are making here a distinction between the UNECLA system and the CDCC system which we shall attempt to develop in a subsequent section).

50. The active relationships that developed in the second half of the 1970s between Jamaica and Cuba (initially supported by the CARICOM 'joint recognition' approach towards Cuba) suggested that there would have to develop in time some understandings or norms on diplomatic relationships between the States of the Northern Caribbean or Greater Antilles. (The development of an active component of the Socialist International in the Dominican Republic further suggested the possibilities of this).

51. The normalisation of Cuba - CARICOM relationships were impeded, in a sense by the Cuban Government's assistance to the MPLA in Angola, utilising some CARICOM states as transit points, in an interesting reversal of the middle passage. The moral basis of this assistance is not necessarily at issue. What is pertinent to note is that some CARICOM Governments took the view that the engagement was one too substantial for states of their size and likely to draw the Great Power imbroglio further into the area. Dissonance of views within CARICOM on this matter halted the consensus approach to Cuba.

52. The Cuban manoeuvre of assistance across the Atlantic brought into relief the question of the military weight of that country vis-à-vis other states in the Caribbean Basin, and has induced the

the search for counterweights - diplomatic and otherwise. This search has undoubtedly affected relationships within the CDCC.

53. Any rationalisation of relationships in the Northern Caribbean would undoubtedly have had to take into account the fact of the United States geographical presence in that zone, through her jurisdiction over Puerto Rico. The semi-autonomous constitutional character of Puerto Rico would not therefore necessarily have inhibited her propagation of some quasi-diplomatic activity in that area. (The active role of Puerto Rico in the 1950s in the Caribbean during the regime of Munoz Marin should be borne in mind here). There are indications now that Puerto Rico is inclined to assume some such role under the aegis of the proposed Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI); though the possibilities for it can either be enhanced or limited by the degree of receptivity of other CARICOM states.

54. The Caribbean Basin Initiative is seen by some in Latin America as divisive, running counter to the efforts and aims toward closer economic and other relations in the whole region, and giving special advantages to the countries involved. It might be regarded as further emphasising what are regarded as the special or separate position of the Caribbean countries in relation to the region as a whole - a position already demonstrated by the subregion's links with Europe through the Lomé Agreement and with the Commonwealth.

55. The Caribbean Basin Initiative represents an attempt to boost the economies of these countries and others in the Caribbean and Central American area, so as to eliminate these perceived dangers.

56. In some important matters there are serious differences of perception or policy between Latin America and the Caribbean arising from these relations. On the question of human rights - an issue pursued aggressively by the Carter regime in the United States, there was resentment in some Latin American countries, while Caribbean countries were among those which took positive positions on the issue.

57. On the issue of "subversion" and the introduction of alien ideologies into the Caribbean, there is a division of opinion in the two groups of countries. While many in Latin America appear to see the Caribbean and Central America as danger spots in this respect, there is a large

body of opinion in the Caribbean which rejects the notion that the area should become in the words of Professor Gordon Lewis "an index and symbol of the East-West conflict".

58. This issue will probably become an even more prominent one in the future as both Latin American and Caribbean countries face the turbulence which is already more than evident in their efforts to achieve economic growth, real social progress and political stability - in increasingly difficult world conditions.

59. It is then, the potential in the types of arrangements discussed above, negative and/or positive, to which we refer in the phrase "incomplete diplomatic coherence of intra-Caribbean relationships". What also becomes clear is that the enhancement of these relationships has to take cognisance of the role and significance of the United States in the area, either directly or indirectly through her territories.

60. The American presence in the area is always motivated by a mix of material and ideological interests, though often rationalised under the aegis of her security interests. In the contemporary period the expression of protection of these interests has come to be enunciated in the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI).

61. The ideological aspect of American interests appeared to have been met in the 1970s and early 1980s by an ideological counterweight in the developing nexus, cutting across traditional language and cultural barriers, between Guyana - Grenada - Jamaica - Cuba - Nicaragua - Suriname. This nexus could be said to be another version of a Caribbean Basin system, unmediated by American power. But the fragile material underpinning of such an incipient system has not given it enough weight to withstand the separate frailties of its components and their susceptibility to pressure.

62. In summary, what we can perceive is a series of actual or incipient diplomatic (geo-political) systems, of varying weights, with memberships that are mutually exclusive, each system to some extent

in competition even though there are important elements of collaboration. New systems are represented in the acronyms CARICOM, CDCC, CBI, and in addition there is the framework of an incipient radical alliance, and the developing relationships of the Northern South American system.

EXISTING PATTERNS OF EXTRA-REGIONAL RELATIONS

63. The fundamental difference between Latin America and the Caribbean in so far as extra-regional relations are concerned, derives from the fact that most Latin American countries have been involved in international relations for over one and one-half centuries, while the Caribbean countries' experience in this sphere amounts to two decades, or less.

64. Each of the two groups has diversified its relationships with the rest of the world considerably, starting with its original links with the metropolitan European powers, and reaching gradually out to wider relations with other North Atlantic countries, and with developing countries.

65. For the purposes of this study, the central issue is the impact of these extra-regional relations on the relations between Latin American and Caribbean countries.

66. In the case of Latin America, the links in terms of economic, cultural and sentimental terms have remained. Among the latest manifestations of this have been the call by some Latin American states for Spain to be granted full membership of ECLA, and the new programme of co-operation in education and other fields between Spain and Latin America. It has been suggested that Spain's membership of the European Economic Community might be seen as holding the prospect of an advantageous relationship between Latin America and that group.

67. Migration from Europe deepened the ties, and widened them as English-speaking persons, Italians, Germans and others moved to both North and South America, and reinforced the already existing European element in the populations.

68. Latin America is thus, in part, an extension of Europe, mainly in the cultural sense. But this factor is qualified by a number of circumstances. It has been observed that "Latin Americans have grown up, so to say, in opposition to Europe", and that they envisage

the rise of Latin America as Europe declines. Spain and Portugal have long lost their pre-eminence in European and in world affairs.

69. Moreover, Latin America - with its long period of independent status, the fact that the countries are numbered among the developing nations, their complex ethnic and cultural mix - represents at one and the same time two worlds. There are great differences between those countries in which the European element is dominant - such as in some of the states of South America, and those in which the indigenous populations represents the predominant elements - as in most Central American states.

70. In relations with industrialised countries, there are of course significant differences between the large Latin American countries such as Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, and the smaller ones. The larger countries, by reason of size, their huge economic potential, the goods they produce and sell on the world markets, their capacity for having diplomatic representation in a wide range of countries, their demand for technology and for investment funds and loans from Western and Japanese sources, are in a position to exercise much greater influence, and in turn to be taken more seriously. Argentina's actions in the face of United States attempts to impose an embargo on wheat sales to the USSR are a case in point. Mexico's energy endowment and the impact of this on her relations with the United States is another.

71. As the Latin American economies and their export capabilities in secondary and other products grow, their pressure for greater access to the United States market becomes an increasingly contentious issue; and Latin America becomes increasingly critical on the issue of protectionism by the United States and other industrialised countries.

72. Diversification of their economic and trading relationships for example, by way of the drive for increased trade with the EEC, Japan, the USSR and other Eastern European countries, and the efforts at stepping up intraregional economic relations are part of their strategy as what are now called "newly industrializing countries".

73. The Caribbean countries emerged into independence with their economies close linked with the western economic system and greatly dependent on that group. This was the inevitable result of over four hundred years of colonial status. In terms of their economies and their political and governmental institutions, they were in a sense extensions of the western systems. They have sought to diversify their economies and to spread the range of their economic and political relations. Much of their energies have been concentrated on the pursuit of their subregional relations (CARICOM, etc.) and through multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Bretton Woods system. Their limited size and human and other resources have placed constraints on their capacity to establish diplomatic and economic contacts, and in this respect the multilateral route is seen by them as an appropriate substitute.

74. Thus, Caribbean countries have few embassies, and these are found mainly in North America and Europe. They have sought in large part to protect from erosion, or to advance, the interests which they have in these countries by way of trading preferences or special arrangements in the marketing of products, or as sources of finance, tourism, and the well-being of Caribbean peoples who have emigrated.

The United States

75. The rise of the United States to the position of pre-eminence in the western world, has given that country a basis for establishing an almost overwhelming interest and influence in the affairs of Latin America. The search for a balanced relationship between that country and Latin America has occupied the attention of leaders and governments for a long time, and continues to do so. United States influence and ties with Latin America have been built upon the factor of proximity. Here a major element has been United States security concerns, and especially that country's efforts to restrain or eradicate "radical" influences which are presumed from time to time to threaten the area. United States interest and involvement have been expressed in a variety of ways, including direct military intervention,

investment, trade, cultural contacts, and the impact of North American tastes and values and technology.

76. The Central American countries and the island countries of the Caribbean, have received special attention from the United States, in part because of that country's concern with protecting the approaches to the Panama Canal; and in more recent times, because of the dangers as perceived by the United States and others, of radical, not to say communist influence and insurgency. The United States interest in Cuba, for example, is a long-standing one. That country's intervention in the Cuban war of liberation from Spain at the end of the nineteenth century, resulted in Cuba coming for a few years under United States military rule and being for a long period afterwards, through the mechanism of the Platt Amendment, a virtual ward of the United States.

77. There is more than an element of ambivalence on the part of Latin America towards this relationship - a mixture of admiration and recognition of the benefits of having so close an economic and military superpower, along with exasperation and sometimes anger at United States actions in or attitudes to the region. Varying U.S. official approaches to human rights have brought strong reactions from Latin America. Latin Americans tend to move from expectation to disappointment with the contribution of the United States in dealing with the basic long-term economic problems of the region.

Canada

78. Latin American relations with Canada have taken a new turn in recent years. In the late 1960s the Trudeau administration sought to establish a specific set of policies in respect of Canada's relation with Latin America and the Caribbean. Steps were taken to articulate the new approaches and to make the necessary institutional changes - for example in the Department of External Affairs and other Departments. In 1971 Canada obtained Permanent Observer Status in the Organization of American States (OAS) and later achieved similar status in the Andean Group; and in 1972 full membership of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). These were expressions of Canada's perception of itself as "a distinctive North American country

firmly rooted in the Western Hemisphere" and its desire "to explore new avenues of increasing our political and economic relations with Latin America where more than four hundred million people will live by the turn of the century and where we have substantial interest".

79. It is notable that in spite of strong feelings and pressures on Latin America and the United States, Canada has reserved the right to pursue its relations with Cuba in its own way. This is one of the factors militating against her full membership of the OAS and accession to the Rio Treaty. Canada has refused to join in the trade embargo against Cuba, and Prime Minister Trudeau visited Cuba on his Latin American tour in 1976. On the other hand, in response to Cuba's emplacement in Africa, Canada, while increasing trade relationships has virtually stopped the grant of economic aid to that country.

80. These approaches on the part of Canada represent in part that country's determination to maintain a foreign policy in global matters, as well as hemispheric, independent of the United States, and in part, her need for diversification of markets, especially in the face of difficulties in trade with Europe since the establishment of the EEC. By the same token this interest on the part of Canada opens wider opportunities in trade, investment and the like for Latin America. Over the years there has been an increasing interest and growth in direct investment of Canadian capital in Latin America. There is also considerable interaction between Latin America and Canada by way of special aid programmes directed to the Region through governmental and non-governmental channels.

81. Canada, along with Mexico, shares a very long border with the United States. This, for each country, presents both opportunities and problems. The fact that both Canada and Mexico are major producers of petroleum, and sell to the United States is a factor of special significance.

82. Also important is the strong interest of these three countries in Central America and the Caribbean, each having its own perceptions and its own prescriptions for these groups of countries.

83. The Caribbean countries have had a close relationship with Canada over a long period - through migration, trade, and investment in the mineral and other sectors. Note should be taken of the Canada-West Indies trade agreements, subject to renegotiation periodically.

84. As a member of the Commonwealth, Canada has been in a special position to establish closer relations with the English-speaking Caribbean countries; that country has tended to increase its interest in this group of countries as the United Kingdom has become more and more preoccupied with its involvement in the European Economic community.

85. After a review of aid policy in 1979-1980, a decision was taken by the Canadian Government to accord much higher priority to the Commonwealth Caribbean countries. Within this category, special attention was to be given to the Windward and Leeward Islands (OECS) group. The multilateral approach to the Caribbean was an important deviation from Canada's inclination towards bilateral assistance.

86. Canada has taken a determinedly independent view of the issue of the political and social upheavals in Central America and the Caribbean - a view which is close to that held by many in the Caribbean. Note should be taken also of her active development of trading relationships with many of the larger South American countries. It is possible that that country could play an even more positive role in the future in Caribbean/Latin American relations, and as a Commonwealth country with large interests in Latin America, play an important facilitative role for the Caribbean.

The United Kingdom

87. Relations between the Caribbean countries and the United Kingdom have been of particular significance in their impact on Caribbean/Latin American relations. And the Malvinas/Falklands issue has had a most serious impact on Latin American relations with the United Kingdom and on that region's relations with the Caribbean.

88. It appears that many Latin Americans were unable to understand from the time of the achievement of independence of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, the quite unique relationship between these countries and the U.K.

As a group of countries which had severed their connection with their former metropolitan rulers and in a most vigorous way established free republics, it may have been difficult to accept that the Caribbean countries who retained the connection with the British Crown and the Commonwealth, were truly independent.

89. This factor, in addition to the clear cultural and ethnic differences and the long period of colonial status of the Caribbean countries, seem to have posed a major question as to the type of relationship which might be cultivated between the newly independent Caribbean countries and Latin America.

90. The Caribbean relationship with the United Kingdom has changed over the past two decades, as Canada and the United States have come to occupy a more prominent position in matters of trade, investment and the like, in respect of that group. But the special trading relations, the preferences on some Caribbean products in the United Kingdom market, continuing aid to most of the islands, migration to the United Kingdom, the maintenance of the Westminster political system and the Commonwealth connection, the common language, plus the fact that some territories in the Caribbean group have not yet achieved independence, all these together constitute a continuing special relationship.

91. The Caribbean countries have demonstrated in a variety of ways their total independence and their freedom to take positions on economic and political issues which are in total opposition to those taken by the U.K. But the Malvinas issue has left many in Latin America with the feeling that the Caribbean countries have an overriding loyalty to the United Kingdom, and acted out of that sense of loyalty in their votes in the OAS, and in the deliberations on the issue at the United Nations.

92. The truth is that the Malvinas issue has come up repeatedly over the years at the United Nations and in the Non-Aligned Movement, and CARICOM countries' positions have always been strongly influenced by the fact that two of their group - Guyana and Belize - are the

subjects of territorial claims by Venezuela and Guatemala respectively, while Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela have a dispute of a somewhat different character. While therefore the anachronism presented by the existence of a British colony in the south Atlantic near the end of the twentieth century had been widely recognised in the Caribbean, these countries have been and remain deeply concerned as to the manner in which the issue is approached by the contending parties. They have been in the case of Belize prepared to see a solution in the popular desire for a separate independence - now realised.

93. The Caribbean countries disagreed strongly with the use of armed force as a way to the settlement of the claim. Apart from any considerations of morality, their situations as small entities with limited military capabilities would, in addition, reinforce this view. The U.K. is involved in the Guyana/Venezuela issue indirectly, as a signatory to the Geneva Agreement of 1966. And North Atlantic and other western countries and the rest of the world could become involved should the matter ever go the United Nations General Assembly or the Security Council.

94. In the case of Belize, the dispute has often been raised at the United Nations, and has represented an important factor in Caribbean/Latin American relations. The Caribbean countries have taken a very active part in the efforts to resolve the issue - in favour as already indicated, of Belizean independence and have not hesitated to put heavy pressure on the United Kingdom in this matter. Since most of Latin America has come to accept the right of Belize to independence, the issue and the U.K.'s involvement has not seriously affected relations with the Caribbean countries.

95. But in late June 1982, the new President of Guatemala restated that country's claim to Belize. With a United Kingdom military force in Belize, and in the face of the Malvinas war, now concluded, it is difficult to predict what might develop and how the Latin American/Caribbean relationship would be affected, given especially, the inclination to political instability in Guatemala itself.

Europe

96. The major elements in the relationship between Latin American and Caribbean countries and Europe - elements which affect the relations between the two groups are:

- The Lomé Agreement
- The reactions of European countries to the situation in Central America
- The Malvinas/Falkland Islands issue.

97. The Lomé Agreement, providing special trading, investment and other relations between the EEC countries and the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, has from the outset been seen by Latin America as a preferential and special set of relationships which discriminated against their countries. Some regard it as cutting across the lines laid down in the struggle for the New International Economic Order. It might very well be used to reinforce in the minds of some, the feeling that the ex-colonies of the United Kingdom and France and other European countries are not truly independent.

98. While some Latin American countries have established special relations with the EEC in trade and the like, and others seem quite ready to do so, the Lomé relationship remains a source of serious difference and difficulty between Caribbean and Latin American countries. These difficulties are reflected in the tensions between the Caribbean and the Latin American groups in Brussels.

99. Some European countries, either directly through their governments, or otherwise, have shown their deep concern about developments in Central America, and also in the Caribbean. They have tended to take a position different in real substance, from that taken by some Latin American countries and by the United States. This centres around the question as to whether the turbulence in these countries has mainly been generated by "subversive" elements, with support (military and logistical) and encouragement

from outside - or is the outcome of deep rooted social feeling stemming from long neglect and deprivation and lack of opportunity for participating in political life in the countries. European opinion tends to support the latter position.

100. The joint declaration by the Governments of Mexico and France concerning the importance of recognizing the insurgents in El Salvador as an element to be involved in any resolution of that country's problems, was a case in point. It brought very critical reactions from a number of Latin American countries and from one or two Caribbean countries also.

101. But it would seem that the Caribbean as a whole, and partly because of their own difficult circumstances, and their experience of ideological pluralism, are aware of the way in which poverty and frustration and economic hardship in general can lead to political and social upheaval - and in this sense they would be closer to the European perception.

The United Nations

102. The Latin American countries - twenty of them - became members of the United Nations at its establishment. (It is to be noted that Latin American countries were members of the League of Nations and therefore have had long experience in multilateral diplomacy). As the United Nations encouraged by Latin America, resorted to the Regional Group system for some of its work, these countries constituted the Latin American Group, and that group remained fixed in numbers until 1962 when Jamaica and then Trinidad and Tobago became independent.

103. In the Bretton Woods system, those countries had a special position forming three constituencies with three seats on the Executive Boards of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).

104. At the United Nations the advent of the newly independent Caribbean states appeared to present some difficulties to the Latin American countries in the matter of the former's acceptance as members of that Group. But these were eventually overcome. Today some eleven Caribbean countries are members of the United Nations and represent more than one-third of the membership of the Latin American Group. The contribution of these countries

to the Group has been acknowledged by some Latin Americans. This represents one of the positive opportunities for co-operation between the two groups of countries and it has been used to advantage on many occasions.

105. Nevertheless, marked differences have arisen on occasion. The Group works by consensus and therefore will take account of all views. It also deals in the main with procedural (non-substantive) issues, such as candidatures for positions on the United Nations bodies, chairmanship of such bodies and the like. Here the matter of balancing of the interests of both groups in selection for such positions has been the subject of discussion from time to time.

106. Occasionally, substantive issues are taken up by the Latin American Group. In a matter like the Panama Canal issue, solidarity has been maintained. But the issue of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands recently was, as already intimated, the subject of serious differences.

107. On substantive issues Latin America and the Caribbean work well together on most economic issues, particularly those pertaining to the New International Economic Order and Global Negotiations. On some political issues there are wide differences. On some of these many Caribbean countries tend to have positions closer to those of other Third World countries of Africa and Asia.

108. The Latin American countries are very active in Group of 77 matters in the different United Nations bodies (New York, Geneva, etc.). In recent years inputs have been made on certain matters through the Group by such bodies as the Latin American Economic System (SELA).

109. A number of Latin American countries are members of the Non-Aligned Movement, but that region has a lower proportion of membership of the Movement than Africa and Asia. The Caribbean countries, certainly those who first achieved independence, have been closer to that Movement.

PARTICIPATION IN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

110. The central question pertaining to institutional relations between the English-speaking Caribbean States and those of South and Central America, as the former became independent, was whether they should join the Organization of American States, and along with that institution, the Inter-American Development Bank.

111. For some countries, the imperative to join the OAS was greater than for others. It was felt in some cases that to the extent that geographical location suggested close relations in the future between themselves and particular Latin American States, then it would be useful to join the major political institution that influenced some of these relations. Other Caribbean Governments were aware that under the rules of hemispheric institutional relations, it would not be possible to benefit from the extensive financial resources available in the Inter-American Development Bank without adherence to the OAS.

112. Most Caribbean Governments were aware of the dominance of the United States in the OAS, and the manipulative use of the institution by that country periodically, to achieve or legitimize its security objectives. They noted the continuing reluctance of Canada, the other Commonwealth country on the continent, to accept membership of the OAS, even while she noted that there were certain functional activities in the system, participation in which would be mutually beneficial to herself and other Hemispheric States.

113. The argument, however, was recognized that these newly independent States all fell into the security zone covered by the mutual defence and security component of the OAS (the Treaty of Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance - the Rio Treaty), and that they would inevitably be affected by activities undertaken within their section of the security zone under the aegis of the Rio Treaty. In such a situation, it was argued, it was on balance more useful to be within the organization attempting to influence its functioning than outside it as a mere object of its activity. The independent CARICOM countries, with two exceptions, have since become members of the OAS, though only Trinidad and Tobago has adhered to the Rio Treaty. Guyana and Belize, through the persistent efforts of CARICOM partners, have gained eligibility for membership in the IADB, in spite of the exclusionary clause of the OAS Charter

prohibiting them from membership of the OAS - a stipulation which the CARICOM States are still actively seeking to remove. The OECS Group of States, are, for reasons relating to their small economic size, not members of the IADB, though they are eligible indirectly for assistance from it.

114. Yet in the process of making preliminary approaches to join the Inter-American institutional system, many Anglophone Caribbean Governments were up against sensitivities of some Latin American Governments towards them. These involved lack of clarity about their actual constitutional status and therefore concern about it; concern about motivations for joining the system; certain assumptions about the small size of the Caribbean States and their susceptibility to manipulation against the interests of Latin American States; concern about the possibility of the Caribbean countries, many of them miniscule in population and financial weight, when compared with most Latin American States, gaining numerical dominance in the OAS, and thus threatening their institutional hegemony within the organization. Caribbean Governments noted, too, that in terms of status ranking, relationships within the hemispheric institutions tended to be based on a highly stratified system.

115. Many of these concerns were noted by the late Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Dr. Eric Williams, in his contribution to the first debate on foreign relations held by the newly independent parliament of that country. But in time, assisted by the active desire of the United States that the Caribbean States should complete the Inter-American Institutional System's geographical coverage by adherence to it, some of these sensitivities were overcome.

116. The reverberations of the Argentina/Falklands Islands - Malvinas/United Kingdom issue in the Organization of American States, and the reactions of most CARICOM Governments have as we have indicated earlier, however, brought some of these sensitivities to the fore again. In particular there is the question of the numerical preponderance of the CARICOM States and the types of alliances that they are likely to engage in. The sharp differences in positions on the Falklands/Malvinas issue taken by Latin American States, Venezuela in particular, have highlighted this situation.

117. Nevertheless, it can be said that there is perhaps now a greater awareness on the part of relevant Latin American States of the motivations underlying Caribbean Governments diplomatic orientations; of the sensitivities of the Caribbean Governments themselves concerning assertions about the nature of their sovereignty; and of the interests connecting Caribbean States and Latin American States in the Caribbean Basin, to stem a possible deterioration of relations deriving from this contentious issue.

118. It has been remarked by some observers that, in spite of much progress made in the course of the period since the late 1960's, the CARICOM Governments in the institutions of the Inter-American System can still benefit from a deeper understanding of the possibilities for effective manipulation of these highly bureaucratized organizations. The prerequisites for this are, of course, partly limited by the still relatively small number of Caribbean professionals working within the system, and the lack of familiarity of many Caribbean diplomatic participants in the system with the mode of legal and political principles and practices that dominate its functioning.

119. On the other hand, it could be said that these deficiencies and their attendant consequence of failing to draw the full quota of possible benefits from the institutions, are due to Governments' lack of understanding of the necessity for the development of a cadre of international public servants over a period of time, skilled in the mores and manipulation of such institutions.

120. Given the relatively small pool from which such a cadre can be drawn, the necessity for intra-CARICOM cooperation in such an endeavour becomes apparent. The importance of this can be further appreciated if we focus, as we do below, on the new hemispheric institutions that came into existence in the 1970's.

121. The question has been raised from time to time as to what the OAS as an institution can be used to do, in terms of facilitating the development of relations between the many Anglophone States and the older Latin American States; especially as this is likely to be hindered by cultural gaps, and differences in perceptions borne of differing colonial experiences, and impediments placed in the way of cooperation by colonial powers. The increas-

ing awareness, by Caribbean Governments at least, of the implications of their geographical locations, an awareness made sharper by the recent independence of Belize, emphasizes the importance of this question.

122. Note has been taken by some observers of the relative lack, still after 20 years of independence of some CARICOM States, of education in culture and language oriented towards Latin America. Education in the Spanish language when not undertaken in CARICOM Country schools and universities, is largely undertaken in the institutions of metropolitan countries. Student and staff exchange between Caribbean and Latin American tertiary institutions is still relatively limited. The use of electronic media in either the CARICOM or Latin American States for the development of educational programmes on the countries, and for the removal of stereotypes, is minimal.

123. The problem of cultural education is for the CARICOM States a dual one. It has to be directed at both the Spanish-speaking Caribbean States and the States of the wider South/Central American Zone, countries organized on differing cultural and sociological experiences.

124. No OAS institutions of a technical or cultural nature now exist in a CARICOM State. There have been suggestions that a major hemispheric centre, under the aegis of the OAS, concerned with language and cultural education should be established in the CARICOM area, making full use of modern approaches to education using the electronic media. Consideration might be given to this. Such an institution would complement the bilateral programmes now increasing particularly between CARICOM States and the mainland States in their immediate geographical environment, within the framework of scientific, technical and cultural cooperation.

125. Further as the CARICOM/Central American State of Belize consolidates its independence, consideration should be given to utilizing its geographical and cultural characteristics as a "bridging" State between the Anglophone and Spanish-speaking countries, for the establishment of tertiary education facilities concerned with training in the Spanish language and culture.

126. Some CARICOM States found, in the 1970's, that they shared with some Latin American Countries interests in increasing their strength and autonomy in negotiation with larger metropolitan States in respect of areas like commodity trade, shipping and energy. This orientation reflected the perception of developing countries of the possible benefits to be derived from so-called South-South cooperation.

127. Thus unlike their roles and status in the older hemispheric institutions, the CARICOM States found that they could play an important part in the negotiations concerning, and organization of, the new "special interest" Organizations, SELA, NAMUCAR, OLADE, GEPLACEA for example. There was considerable diplomatic effort made by the larger CARICOM States to ensure effective participation in formulating the aims and objectives of such organizations.

128. Yet the record, and sense of achievement, of CARICOM States in these organizations appears to have been mixed. And as financial constraints have imposed themselves, and CARICOM States have become more concerned with domestic economic policy in the early 1980's, their interest in these organizations seems to be beginning to wane. We understand that one CARICOM State has withdrawn from participation in NAMUCAR which has itself experienced financial difficulties.

129. The symbolic importance of many of these organizations lay in the fact that they were intended to function free of the alleged domination of the United States, and of the highly politicised atmosphere, that characterized the older hemispheric institutions. On the other hand it was felt that some Latin American and Caribbean States, using some of the resources gained from the 1970's increases in commodity prices, could autonomously support the work programmes of these institutions. This has not proven to be always the case as world recession has affected the economies of some of the States.

130. The less issue-specific organization, SELA, was intended to be the major proponent of Latin American and Caribbean initiatives in economic and technical assistance cooperation. It was open to question whether there might not be some duplication of orientation and effort between this new institution and the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America; though this was thought not to be the case.

131. The necessity for effective CARICOM State participation in SELA was recognized in the constitutional structuring of the organization. Yet it probably cannot be said at this time that the interest, or sense of achievement in this organization on the part of these states is high.

A more open recognition, in this period of austerity and lessened concentration on "commodity confrontation politics", could be made in this organization, of the more particular requirements of the CARICOM States as relatively small countries within the continental context; of their need for resources and technical assistance that strengthens their internal capacities for production and entry into Latin American markets; and of the need to allocate financial resources on a sub-regional basis to the Caribbean States for these purposes.

Towards this end the CARICOM countries could utilize either the ECLA or CARICOM Secretariats for undertaking an evaluation of their participation in SELA.

132. Finally an important point that should be noted about many of the new special-interest institutions which we have already hinted at, is the particular "political" context of their establishment in the period of developing-developed country confrontationist politics of the 1970's. It is probably the case that, in that context, more attention was paid to shaping their external orientation, than to ensuring their survival as instruments of South-South cooperation in an era of austerity and developed country protectionism. It is probably the case that a close examination now needs to be made of the needs of particular categories of States within them. In that context, the CARICOM States would not necessarily find themselves as an exclusive grouping, but might find areas of commonality and joint planning with other Caribbean States and even some small mainland countries.

UN/ECLA - CDCC AND THE CARICOM STATES

133. The probable commonality of interests and problems of the Caribbean States as a whole was no doubt part of the basis for grouping them within a third arena of Caribbean-Latin American relations - this time within the United Nations system of regional and sub-regional agencies.

134. The CARICOM States are late entrants to those systems (UN/ECLA, UNDP, UNICEF, UNESCO) which they have found in this hemisphere of necessity dominated by Latin American constitutional and political modes. The very location of the headquarters of many of these regional agencies has been indicative of this tendency. Though as a further development, sub-regional agencies have been established in CARICOM, Caribbean or Caribbean Basin States.

135. In many of these UN Agencies the question has arisen, with the dramatic increase in Caribbean representation, of the degree of real autonomy and influence in the formulation and implementation of programme that these countries possess. It is fair to say that in recent years there has been some expression of sensitivity on this question on the part of the older members of these agencies; and an attendant attempt at institutional innovations aimed at coming to grips with it. Yet, within what are highly bureaucratized institutions with extremely legalistic ways of procedure, these innovations are felt by some Caribbean States to represent only the beginnings of the search for effective autonomy, influence and benefit.

136. The UN/ECLA-CDCC system can be taken as indicative of this phenomenon. The organization of the Caribbean Development and Co-operation Committee (CDCC) follows by a decade at least, the establishment of the ECLA Subregional Office in Port of Spain. The two are serviced by the same Secretariat, and to all intents and purposes constitute one organization.

137. Yet the motivation for the addition of a new institution, the CDCC, to the already existing one, suggest a certain dissatisfaction with the ECLA-type of formulation of subregional system for the Anglophone Caribbean. At the narrower level of diplomacy (geopolitics) the formation of the CDCC could be seen as providing the CARICOM States with a mechanism for linking themselves in functional and other activities to the other States of the archipelago, while maintaining their own institutional coherence. On the other hand, the definition of the membership of the CDCC would separate it from the wider Caribbean Basin concept.

138. In sum, then, the inspirations of the formation of ECLA Subregional Office on the one hand, and of the CDCC on the other, obviously differ. ECLA emanates from the logic of the UN system; CDCC from an internal Caribbean inclination to 'complete' the organizational potential of archipelago

relations. It has been argued by some that the formation of the CDCC represents an evolution of the ECLA subregional concept itself. But the now acknowledged lack of articulation between the UN/ECLA system and the CDCC argues against this kind of formulation.

139. We can therefore make analytically, precisely because of its indication in practice, a distinction between ECLA and CDCC, in spite of their institutional uniformity. And we can suggest from this that the two have still not been effectively synthesized either in objectives or functioning. CDCC has not therefore been able to effectively draw on ECLA and the UN system for resources and legitimacy, as may be supposed to have been the intention of its promoters.

140. In the description of the CDCC's structure and activities, it is asserted that it should "act as a coordinating body for whatever activities relating to development and cooperation may be agreed upon and to serve as *an advisory and consultative body to the Executive Secretary of ECLA in respect of Caribbean issues and circumstances*".

141. Difficulties experienced from the Caribbean end in satisfactorily running the organization have led to a number of investigations into its procedures and suggestions for improvement of lines of communication between the Caribbean Office and the Santiago Headquarters. The reports of the Joint Inspection Unit (December 1980) and the Administrative Management Services Team (1981/2) are indicative in this respect.

142. Comparisons have also been made between the levels of autonomy of the Caribbean Office on the one hand and the Mexico and Bogota subregional Offices of ECLA on the other; and the suggestion has been advanced that the Caribbean Office should be "upgraded" to the level of the others.

143. This lack of synthesis between CDCC/Port of Spain and the rest of the system, and the deficiencies deriving from it, supersede in importance the so-called 'ideological' and 'personality' differences existing within the organization. The CDCC forum, lacking real means of influencing the UN system (for resources), because the ECLA Subregional Office concept still takes precedence over it, has therefore in turn failed to gain legitimacy in the eyes of its very members.

144. If we view the problem in this way, then it is insufficient simply to suggest as an institutional solution to it, that the ECLA Port of Spain Subregional Office be given the same level of autonomy as, say, the Mexico Office, important though this may be. What needs to be removed is the obvious tension between the older subregional office concept and the more recent CDCC concept. The former, by practice, has its impulse from the top of the very hierarchical UN system; therefore the work programme, even when formulated within the subregion, has to await legitimacy from outside of the region, even though from within the UN/ECLA system as a whole.

145. It does not, therefore, seem too radical to say that the tension between the two de facto systems should be removed by abolishing the concept of the ECLA Subregional Office, and establishing the concept of the CDCC as the system for the area and as the ECLA system of representation in the area. Two questions follow from this suggestion. First, what would be the practical objective of it? And secondly, what would be the practical implications of it, in terms of the Caribbean countries' relations with Latin American States.

146. The objective for Caribbean States of a Subregional Organization within the United Nations system, and within the South-Central zone, should be twofold. It should allow the countries sufficient scope to formulate an indigenously-oriented work programme, and provide them with the means (the negotiating instruments) to obtain assistance from the UN system as a whole, without the complications of mediation from within the wider geopolitical area. Secondly, it should, as one subregional system in Latin America among others, provide the CARICOM States in particular with a bridge for directly maintaining and strengthening relations with other subregional groupings of the continent within the UN system.

147. The practical implications for Caribbean-Latin American relations follow from this. A CDCC subregional system could come to constitute the main mechanism for preparation towards horizontal economic cooperation (ECDC and TCDC) among Latin American and Caribbean States. A continuing mechanism for identifying resources for assistance from the more industrialized South American States, including those with no immediate geopolitical connections with the Caribbean, and from institutions within these States, seems necessary at

this time. The link with the wider ECLA system would be necessary for this. And here the coordinating function of the CDCC would be important.

148. Further, it seems to be the case that there is at present little communication between the ECLA Caribbean system and the system represented by other ECLA Subregional Offices within the continent. A more direct linkage between them should enhance the relationships between the narrower CARICOM grouping and the rest of the region. And none of this would inhibit bilateral relations, by way for example of the various Mixed Commissions now existing. For these, while meant to be for a continuing interchange, are in fact characterized by sporadic activity.

149. But there does seem to be much to be gained from having an institution directly concerned with identifying areas of assistance in the South American Zone that might be beneficial to the CARICOM States precisely in some of the areas in which the CDCC now concentrates: language, food production and technology, science and technology, sea resources. Insufficient use is made of the ECLA system by the CARICOM States in terms of that system's wide network of relations and contacts within the South-American Zone.

150. Would an autonomous CDCC Subregional system, negotiating assistance from the UN and Latin American systems, inhibit the activity of the CARICOM Secretariat? This would not seem to be the case. Conflict would only be prone to arise if the two institutions were seeking resources from the same sources, and concentrating their main diplomatic activities, and activities in respect of economic and technical assistance in the same areas. But a properly organized CDCC system should have the comparative advantage in the Latin-American area.

151. What now seems therefore to be required, given the suggestions already made by the Joint Inspection Unit and Administrative Management Services, is *the establishment of a small working group* to revise the substantive terms of reference for a Caribbean Subregional Secretariat (UN/CDCC), to reflect the following:

- (a) a uniform institutional system, rather than the currently existing dual ECLA/CDCC one, as suggested above; and

(b) the necessity for the subregional system to concentrate its resources on strengthening Caribbean country relations with relevant Latin American countries, and with private and public sector institutions within them, identifying and systematizing forms of assistance and cooperation possible between the Caribbean countries and in particular, industrializing Latin American States.

152. Secondly, the revised terms of reference should focus on establishing a bureaucratic relationship with ECLA Headquarters which would enhance the latter's capacity to bring the Caribbean Office into continuing relationships with the other ECLA Subregional Offices in Latin America, to facilitate the CDCC tasks outlined above.

153. Thirdly, the revised terms of reference should seek to simplify the relationship between a new CDCC and the UN system as a whole, particularly in respect of funding.

154. This Working Group should also explore the types of relationships that major and more highly industrialized Latin American countries might wish to have with a strengthened Caribbean Office; and the possible forms and levels of assistance that they might wish to allocate for Caribbean States' development needs, through the ECLA system, and to the CDCC as an institution. This should be of assistance particularly to the smaller Caribbean States.

155. Finally, the Working Group should explore the relationship between the CDCC Secretariat and the CARICOM Secretariat, suggesting a possible division of labour along the lines of comparative advantage suggested above.

156. The composition of the Working Group should reflect the interests of the UN-ECLA system, the CARICOM system and a representative cross section of Caribbean countries.

NEW STRATEGIES AND FORMATS

157. This section speaks to a number of areas in which action of an immediate or longer term nature seems to us necessary and possible. The idea here is to provide a reasonably wide agenda which might be selectively of interest to differing institutions and states;

Information

158. It appears that little information in the form of news or otherwise filters through to the two groups of countries about each other. To correct this will call for special efforts, on the part of the media, in the preparation or exchange of specific material which provides a basis for improved knowledge and understanding.

Language

159. An essential ingredient here, as in all other aspects of the relations between the two groups, is the matter of language. The barrier is a major one. Action here could include:

- further promotion of the teaching of Spanish in schools and other institutions in the non-Spanish-speaking Caribbean. (It would be useful to know the status of the English Language in Latin American countries in general);

- opportunities for students to study Spanish/English in the countries using these languages. At present many persons from the Caribbean go to such places as North America for study of Latin American affairs and Spanish;

- the provision of translation services for interesting or important documents so that they may be available to each group.

Education

160. The introduction in their educational institutions by each linguistic group of study programmes relating to the historical, cultural, social and other circumstances of the other. These

programmes should include:

- visiting lecturers at universities;
- student exchange; and
- other contacts between universities, e.g. through RIAL.

In all of these, and in other areas, the regional and subregional institutions can play a major role.

Cultural and Related Areas

161. Some of the issues raised in this report, and in particular those related to culture and ethnic and social factors in, and differences between Latin America and the Caribbean, could well be the subject of more penetrating analysis and frank discussion by way of symposia. These could involve a range of persons with special interests in, and knowledge of, the following matters:

- promotion of sporting contacts;
- promotion of cultural contacts in such fields as music, dance, literature and art.

Contact and exchanges in these areas would be of particular value.

Regional Organizations

162. At present a review of the role and operation of the OAS is underway. The 1980s, as the opening years have shown, will be a period of considerable difficulty for the region and for the world; and an increasing focus on South-South co-operation is developing. The Executive Secretary of ECLA has stated that the 1980s will be a period of introspection in the world and that this provides an opportunity to review the state of the relations between Latin America and the Caribbean.

163. It seems to be an appropriate moment for a review of the role and working of some of the major institutions in the Region - with particular attention to their capacity for improving the interaction between the member countries, notably between the Caribbean and Latin American countries. To such an exercise, the Caribbean countries should seek to make a valuable contribution.

164. Parallel to this is the need to look more closely at the capacity and the performance of the Caribbean countries - and indeed, other smaller countries of the Region - in their involvement in the work of the institutions, and their ability to derive adequate benefits as well as to make worthwhile contributions.

165. Caribbean countries should ensure that they make the fullest possible effort to work with these organizations, to understand their operations, to participate, to send adequate delegations to meetings and to obtain equitable presence of their nationals on the staff of these organizations. This involves the language factor. The Caribbean countries must ensure that their delegations are at no disadvantage in the matter of language - neither in respect of documentation, interpretation at formal meetings, nor in informal contacts.

166. One method which can be used here is the attachment of officials from the Caribbean for short periods to Regional Organizations to familiarise them with their practices.

167. A specific issue which might bear examination is the question of the Rio Treaty and the fact that so far only one Caribbean country is a signatory. The view has been expressed that regardless of any difficulties posed by the terms of the Treaty, in today's circumstances, the accession by Caribbean countries might remove a source of difficulty in the Caribbean/Latin American relations. At present these countries cannot participate or vote in meetings of Rio Treaty countries - as was the case in the Malvinas issue. Signing the Treaty would, it is argued, allow them to influence the deliberations.

168. There is also of course the issue of Clause 8 - the Exclusionary Clause - and this was raised by Caribbean countries at the St. Lucia meeting of the OAS. The question of accession by the Caribbean countries must be linked to this matter.

Subregional Organizations

169. While attempts have been made, there has not been a regular system of contact between subregional integration organizations such as CACM, OLADE, LAFTA and CARICOM. It would seem vital that such

contacts should now be promoted. They could begin on an informal basis with a very general agenda.

170. The possibilities of some links between CACM and CARICOM were raised in discussions. This would be a major device for building a relationship between Central American and Caribbean countries which in spite of major differences, have some elements in common, e.g. size, and are subject to special attention as a region "in -trouble" or a source of trouble.

171. In addition, the issue of Guatemala's claim on Belize and its impact on Caribbean and Central American relations, could be put in a new and perhaps more favourable atmosphere, as a result of close relations and co-operation between the two subregions. In this Belize can be an important bridging element.

172. Following are some possible areas of co-operation between CACM and CARICOM, indeed between subregional integration organizations in the Region in general:

- contact and co-operation between trade promotion institutions; this could be done under the aegis of CARICOM, and/or the Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce in co-operation with national trade promotion institutions;

- trade missions - (some have already taken place) including private sector commercial and industrial interests; and

- exploration of the possibilities of joint ventures in production perhaps with the prospect of taking advantage of the United States acceptance of the principle of cumulative origin in the granting of preferences to goods entering the United States market.

173. In the face of the great difficulties experienced by all of the subregional integration movements, the view is held by some that this approach to economic and other forms of co-operation has serious flaws and has not worked in this Region or elsewhere in the world. At the same time this approach involves a considerable input in financial and human resources. A vigorous appraisal in co-operation with such subregional organizations and taking advantage of the work of such bodies in other parts of the world, could be of significant value. It could help to point the way in future

efforts, including those directed at better co-operation between Latin American and Caribbean countries. Moreover, it could have an important bearing on the now more assertive movement toward South-South co-operation. This study would be an expression of Caribbean/Latin American co-operation and a contribution to the wider Third World Community.

174. The question of establishing some preferential arrangements between CARICOM and other integration groups, has been raised in our discussions. While the prospects might not be great, the matter may be worth examining.

Improvement of Co-operation between Individual Countries

175. A number of Latin American countries have traditional links with Caribbean countries and in recent years the level of such interaction has increased significantly, for example in the cases of Venezuela, Colombia and Mexico. The promotion of further co-operation calls for better knowledge and information on all sides, and particularly for specific efforts to seek out fruitful areas of possible co-operation in economic and other spheres.

176. In respect of co-operation ventures undertaken on a national basis, the operations of NAMUCAR, and the attempts by Mexico, Venezuela and Jamaica toward joint ventures involving bauxite and energy (JAVAMEX) represent two of the major examples. Important lessons could be learned from the experiences in respect of these projects; some evaluation could therefore be undertaken of them.

177. More generally, in the field of Science and Technology policy and applications, some contacts have been made between Caribbean countries and those of Latin America. Experience indicates, however, that there are a number of the latter states which are now reasonably advanced in the adaptation and development of technologies appropriate to the level of economic advancement and scale of the Caribbean states.

178. Within the CARICOM/CDCC area there are now a number of institutions and programmes concerned with this problem - ECLA, UNESCO,

the Universities of the West Indies and Guyana, as well as National Science and Technology councils. An effort should be made towards harmonising the programmes of the various institutions, for a more effective approach towards capitalising on the experiences of the Latin American States.

179. In addition, the Caribbean Basin Environment Programme approved by Ministerial meeting in Jamaica in 1981 and involving some 27 countries, represents a unique attempt at co-operation between these countries. It affords an example for the future. The early implementation of elements in this programme, and in particular, the establishment of the institutions agreed on, the Regional Co-ordinating Unit and the Monitoring Committee as well as Regional Legal Agreement and the Trust Fund, would be a real boost to the process of co-operation between Caribbean and Latin American countries.

Co-operation in International and Other Institutions

180. In the United Nations system, the opportunity for close co-operation between Latin American and Caribbean countries exists by way of the Regional Group operations. The practice of providing support - studies, position papers and occasionally, personnel - by way of the regional institutions (SELA and ECLA) can be of real value, especially in the absence of a Group of 77 Secretariat. The existence of such a Secretariat, and some modest effort is being made towards this, would of course provide a more effective means of funnelling such support from the Region's institutions. However, it would be important to ensure that these efforts represented the balanced interests of various elements in the Latin American and Caribbean community, and that they do not put the Region into difficulties with the other sectors of the Group of 77 in the United Nations.

181. In the Bretton Woods institutions, most of the Caribbean countries do not belong to the three Latin American constituencies; they are, however, represented in the Group of 9 caucus of developing country Executive Directors and in the Group of 24. There may be ways in which Caribbean and Latin American co-operation in these institutions could be advanced - but again, without creating difficulties in respect of other developing country interests.

182. The Lomé Agreement and the EEC/ACP relationship to the extent that they should constitute a problem in Latin American/Caribbean relations, could be

examined specifically to establish objectively the extent of any real disadvantage suffered by Latin America vis-à-vis the Caribbean. (It could well be that such disadvantage is far less than it is believed to be). Account would be taken of special agreements established between the EEC and individual Latin American countries and efforts by others to establish such relationships, for example, CACM countries.

General

183. In pursuing efforts toward improving Latin American/Caribbean relations and the level of co-operation, it must be recognized that there are major differences in the legal and constitutional systems as between the two group of countries, for example, the separation of powers stemming basically from the difference between the Westminster and the "United States" systems. These differences have a bearing on relations between countries, for example on the processes of decision making and of negotiation. A better understanding on both sides of such differences and their significance for relations could be an important contribution.

The improvement of relations and the level of co-operation will call for improvements in the manner in which Caribbean and Latin American subregional and regional affairs are dealt with, particularly in Government institutions and agencies, for example, in the degree of specialization within Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Commerce and Industry in these matters, and in the establishment of expertise, by adequate training, and by ensuring that language differences do not present a serious obstacle.

184. In all, or most of the above, the regional and subregional organizations can and should play an active role. It has been observed that the necessary organizational infrastructure exists, and it is really a matter of making more effective use of it. Much of the effort, however, will call for action by individual governments or private interests, and for bilateral contacts.

185. Finally, the CARICOM countries should seek to explore the possibilities, given their limited resources, for joint representation

in some Hemispheric institutions in order to maximise the capabilities available to them. This applies in particular to the smaller countries of the group whose external relations apparatus is still limited, and whose financial resources often do not permit effective single-state representation. The actual form of representation would, of course, be a matter for decision by the states themselves.

SUMMARY OF MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Institutional

(1) The Caribbean Community States should seek to advance the current efforts towards administrative reform of the relationship between the ECLA/CDCC Caribbean Office and ECLA, Santiago, by establishing a Working Group aimed at revising the substantive terms of reference of the ECLA/CDCC Caribbean Office, so as to reduce the tensions between ECLA-Caribbean and CDCC conceptions of their objectives.

(2) In this connection the CDCC should be advanced as an important facilitator of South-South co-operation between the Caribbean countries and the industrialising states of South America.

(3) The relationship between the CARICOM countries and the Latin American States should be facilitated by strengthening the direct connections between ECLA/CDCC (Caribbean Office) and the ECLA subregional offices in South and Central America. A main function of the UN/ECLA Headquarters should be to provide the mechanisms and resources for achieving this, so that areas of technical and other assistance in Latin America of benefit to the Caribbean states can be more easily identified and co-ordinated.

(4) The Working Group established should reflect the interests of CARICOM states, other Caribbean states and the UN/ECLA system. It should pursue the idea of attaining for the Caribbean Office a more autonomous mechanism for funding within the United Nations system.

(5) CARICOM states might wish to make a collective evaluation of their functioning in SELA, with a view to seeking to emphasize the function of this organization in assisting in meeting their needs for resources and technical assistance to take advantage of Latin American markets, and as a mechanism for making country-to-country and enterprise-to-enterprise links for "industrializing" purposes. They should emphasize that SELA's South-South co-operation activities should be increased.

(6) The CARICOM Secretariat and the ECLA/CDCC Secretariat should jointly undertake an evaluation of Caribbean states' experience of participation in NAMUCAR.

(7) An evaluation should be made of the effect of the EEC/ACP relationship on Latin American and Caribbean co-operation.

(8) An examination should be undertaken on the question of the significance of adhering to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) by CARICOM states.

(9) CARICOM states should investigate the possibilities of joint representation in certain regional institutions and international institutions (e.g. UNESCO) of major relevance to them and which maintain subregional offices linking Latin America and the Caribbean.

(10) The Caribbean states should seek to advance their co-operation in relation to the Law of the Sea as it applies to this area, bearing in mind the special status of the Caribbean Sea as a semi-enclosed one, in order to arrive at a set of community norms comparable to those characterizing the Latin American states.

B. Other

(11) CARICOM and Latin American states should further identify areas in education, culture and language instruction in which institutional arrangements can be made to advance CARICOM countries' understanding of the Latin American environment. The efforts of ECLA/CDCC in these areas, as well as in the field of documentations should be further financed.

(12) Co-operation in Science and Technology policy and applications should be enhanced. The CDCC mechanisms should be an important facilitator in this regard.

(13) Efforts should be made by Caribbean Governments to further promote training of public servants in the principles and practices of the institutions of the Inter-American system which are characterized by different legal and political principles. The bureaucratic influence of the CARICOM states in these organizations is currently too limited.

(14) That both ECLA and SELA should be utilised by Governments to encourage the development of links between private sector and statutory institutions within CARICOM countries on the one hand, and those of the non-Anglophone countries of the Caribbean and the states of Latin America on the other.

(15) Consideration should be given to taking advantage of the geographical and cultural characteristics of Belize as a "bridging" state between the Spanish- and English-speaking countries for the establishment of tertiary education facilities concerned with training in the Spanish language and culture.

(16) Efforts should be made to ensure a change in nomenclature of the Latin American group in international fora to that of Latin America and the Caribbean Group.

(17) The principle of the 'non-use of force' in the settlement of disputes should be advanced in diplomatic fora by the CARICOM states.

Notes

1/ CEPAL/CARIB 81/9, Proposed Study of Caribbean/Latin American Relations, ECLA Subregional Office for the Caribbean, Port-of-Spain, August 1981.

2/ Economic Relations of Colombia and Venezuela with the Caribbean, ECLA Subregional Headquarters for Bogota, Colombia, June 1982.

3/ E/CEPAL/G.1197, Economic Relations of Central America and Mexico with the Caribbean, ECLA Subregional Headquarters for Mexico, April 1982.

4/ George Pendle, A History of Latin America (Penguin Books)

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