REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN LATIN AMERICA

SYSTEM OF CO-OPERATION AND CO-ORDINATION AMONG PLANNING BODIES OF LATIN AMERICA

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1. Introduction

All the Latin American countries to a greater or lesser extent face the problem -sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly recognized- of converting societies typified by considerable degrees of heterogeneity into something more homogeneous. This is a fundamental part of the process of national construction, a process dealt with in different forms and with different intensities according to the different ideological and political schemes.

In the progress slow, rapid or revolutionary-from a highly heterogeneous society to a more homogeneous society, certain more visible aspects or manifestations of this heterogeneity are normally given more stress, for example, the distribution of income among persons or sectors, differentiated access to collective social services, the capacity of participation, equally differentiated, in political processes, urban-rural differences, etc.

Some time ago—a couple of decades—it began to be recognized, although not very formally, that some of the dimensions of social heterogeneity are connected with geographical space, and consequently, the tackling of the problem necessarily involves handling variables defined in territorial terms. This has led to the generation of growing interest in the design of spatial policies. As Alder and Morgan say: “The contention is that an individual’s life chances and opportunities for self-realization vary not only with location in the social structure, but also with location in the spatial structure. If this is accepted then it follows that spatial policy may contribute to the achievement of social equity, and more fundamentally that the achievement of social equity ultimately requires policy and action addressed to the spatial structure” (Alden, J. and R. Morgan, 1974)

/ This progressive
This progressive recognition of the interaction between spatial and socio-economic structures and between the respective processes of change has had at least three types of consequences. Initially a strong tendency—still extant—emerged to identify regions and multiregional systems, as a means of expressing in territorial terms some of the heterogeneities characterizing the developing societies; for example, the regional partition of the countries has very frequently been used to demonstrate a dimension of the problem of regression in distribution, by quantifying the disparities in income between regions. On the other hand, with something of a time lag, the same cognitive process led to various attempts to regionalize economic and social policies or else in more ambitious schemes led to various attempts genuinely to integrate a regional dimension into the very design of the development plans and policies. In both cases, there is a definite effort to evade the design and implementation of homogenous, comprehensive or aggregate policies which because of their nature are inefficient for dealing with situations of great heterogeneity, in which such policies simply do not reach certain focal groups. Lastly, as a natural consequence of the above processes, it was sought to create an institutional apparatus—under very different forms—capable of carrying on the administration of regional development programmes, both of national scope and of geographically more limited scope.

1/ This does not mean that the so-called industrialized or developed societies are free from heterogeneity, but it is clear that they have it less acutely.
Gradually, many of the elements which typify or define a planning situation were put together, i.e., substantive knowledge, a planning procedure or process, a group of agencies responsible for designing and implementing plans and policies, professionalized agents and discretionary machinery for resource allocation.

In its formal aspects, regional planning in Latin America reached its height probably in the ten years between the mid 1960s and the middle of this decade.

At the present time a process of readjustment may be observed in the sphere, concepts, and instruments of regional planning and the form in which these elements are structured in practice, in action. In Latin America, as in other parts of the world, this is not the first time that this situation has occurred; a similar professional crisis was experienced between the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, when the 'fit' between of what was visualized as "the regional problem" to the response then prevailing (the planning of specific regions, or as it is currently known, intra-regional planning) was called in question. The process of adjustment at that time first and foremost determined a change in scale in regional action; there was a move towards the planning of a national system of regions or to what is known as interregional planning. Naturally, the change in scale also implied certain changes in the particular concepts and instruments of the profession, but this was rather secondary. The actual bases of the rationale of regional action were not questioned.

1/ In the sense in which Faludi uses this terms in his analysis of substantive theory and theory of procedures in planning. See Faludi, A., Planning Theory, 1973, Pergamon Press, Oxford, Chapter I.
A great deal of literature has been devoted to reviewing this early process of adjustment. The Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning has published a study (ILPES, 1977) reviewing this question and stating some outstanding examples—at the Latin American level—of experiences of regional planning moulded on both the first and the second phases discussed.

Unlike developments at the beginning of the 1960s, the very concept of the regional development strategy is now being questioned and consequently both the objectives of regional development and the means or policies used to date are being revised. This is the same as what is behind the present polemics between what are known as the "from the centre down" and "from the bottom up" paradigms.1 These alternatives refer to regional development styles and strategies in which, in the first case, the regional development policies show marked centralist characteristics while being based on large-scale processes which are predominantly urban and highly selective from the territorial point of view. In the second case, the regional development policies are generated in a decentralized form and consequently are more directly associated with regional resources and the scales appropriate to each region and offer more opportunities for the participation of the local population.

The above-mentioned book by Stöhr and Taylor contains the most up-to-date discussion on both types of paradigm. This process of revision is not of course, independent of the more general question associated with the international discussion of development, growth,

distribution, styles, basic needs, etc., and reflects from a more restricted angle present dissatisfaction with the social performance of the current development models.

Despite this crisis, which is not alien to the general crisis in planning which may be observed in Latin America, well-founded reasons exist to maintain that an adequate regional development policy is a more than significant component of the economic, social and political modernization efforts being made by the Latin American countries and that an effort at reflection and innovation as regards alternative forms of tackling the regional question is therefore justified. We shall return to this later.

Some aspects of the Latin American experience in regional planning will be reviewed below, stressing the forms of squaring the difficulties of a theoretical, methodological and operational order which appear when this experience is analyzed. Next the role which this activity may play in the economic, social and political development of the Latin American countries during the next decade will be discussed, as a thesis, and lastly some suggestions will be made for helping to make regional development policies more functional in terms of the situation of the Latin American countries.

1/ See: de Mattos, C., "Plans versus planning in Latin American experience", CEPAL Review, No. 8, 1979, Santiago, Chile
2. Latin American experience of regional planning

2.1 The origin of the activity

Nearly forty years mark the experience of regional development in Latin America. In his review and analysis of regional development programmes existing in Latin America at the end of the 1960s, Stöhr identifies more than sixty such programmes of different types (Stöhr, W., 1972). In view of the great variety he has identified, the possibilities of establishing a typology are very wide-ranging, but for the purposes of grouping these programmes in significant categories the practice followed here will be initially to separate these experiences into those aimed at specific regions (intraregional development programmes) and those aimed at the development of a national system of regions (interregional development programmes) so as to introduce further considerations which make it possible to differentiate between the several final objectives pursued by both types of programme.

As from the 1940s continuous references to regional development began to appear in Latin America. In professional and academic circles closely linked with planning practice, which at that time was still the vindication of the technicians vis-à-vis the politicians, the need for regional development was put forward in many Latin American countries. Although "regionalist" concepts have not been formulated with any precision, there is no doubt that this is a current of technical opinion which favours inward-directed development based on consideration of the needs of the regions within the countries. The movement therefore has a double nature, in that on the one hand it may be interpreted as a particular form of
doctrine in some way linked, although possibly not in an entirely rationalized form, with nationalist development trends; while it may also be understood as a normative type theory of territorial application of economic and social development. In fact, these two general characteristics, one political and the other technical, appear to be implicit and merged in a general and poorly defined idea of regional development (Neira, E., 1976).

During what may be called the first period of regional planning in Latin America the most usual response to specific development problems, but most particularly the problems of underdevelopment and lack of development, consisted in delimiting a "problem region" and preparing for that region proposals aimed at solving its individual problem.

In terms of a broad-based conceptualization of the categories "centre" and "periphery" it can be seen that the great majority of whatever known as regional development plans, programmes or projects constituted activities promoted by the social and economic forces of the "centre" for the purpose of exercising different forms of control—both economic and political—on specific peripheral regions. Thus identification of a "problem region" and its consequent problems, stemmed more from the viewpoint of how a given situation actually or potentially affected the interests of the centre than from a standpoint more closely linked to the integral development of that region (or another). In fact, in some experiments, which are noteworthy for their massive use of resources, the "problem region" identified was far from being in the first place a region, and secondly from having a significant (social) problem. On the other hand, the "region" could presumably contribute significantly to the growth of the production apparatus of the centre.
Within the category of programmes aimed at a specific region, therefore, it is possible to distinguish a first type of action typified by two characteristics: (i) it is fostered by the centre and (ii) its objective is to exploit both natural and energy resources. This form of regional development is characterized by the stress laid on enhancing the value of resources not incorporated in the economy and, obviously, located in a peripheral region. The intervention of the centre is not ultimately aimed at the development of the region, taken as a spatial, economic and social entity, but at taking advantage of its natural and energy resources to maintain the activity of the industrial apparatus of the centre, and/or expanding the economic base of the nation so that the economy as a whole will be less dependent on a small number of export activities.

In the circumstances, regional development, taken as a broad-based process implying the modernization of the region's spatial, economic, social and political structure, comes to be considered as a desirable subproduct, but not as an actual aim of the center's action; if in the end it does not occur, this does not invalidate the center's action which was based on a different motivation. In its most concrete expressions, now as in the past this type of regional development takes the form of operations in river basins, intended to exploit or regularize navigation, hydroelectric energy and raw materials. The archetype of these experiences is probably the development programme of the Guayana region of Venezuela, a case which will be examined in some detail below.
Within this same category of programmes directed at a specific region, a second important type of activity may be distinguished, characterized by: (i) its promotion from the centre and (ii) its objective of economic domination. Some of the most quoted and apparently most successful examples of regional development actually correspond to situations in which the centre was successful in imposing its domination on a peripheral region. For the purposes of this analysis, the "exploitation" of a region's natural and energy resources and "domination" are two processes of different complexity where the latter may include the former. The "domination" of one region by another, is understood to be a situation in which the dominant region conditions the economic development of the other in such a way that this development actually functions better for the interests of the dominant region (centre) than for those of the dominated region (periphery). This presupposes the co-opting of the peripheral elites.

Domination does not mean -nor necessarily at least- curbing the economic growth of the region which is in a subordinate position. Quite on the contrary, domination normally will mean stimulating the industrialization of the region in question and precisely in some cases the measurement of quantitative results in terms of industrial diversification, employment generated, productivity, etc., leads to the identification of these results with the "success" of a specific regional development programme. The fact is passed over, however, that the net results of all these policies subsidized the development of the centre, and is paid for by the dominant periphery. As is well known, the case of the Northeast of Brazil fastly falls within this category and the net transfers of the Northeast to the central south have been thoroughly studied.1/

1/ Among other studies the pioneer study of Baer stands out. See Baer, W., Industrialization and Economic Development in Brazil, University of Yale, Irving Inc., 1965.
It should, however, be recognized that even at the purely
theoretical level it would be difficult to conceive of the existence
of a regional development programme directed at a peripheral region
which did not in some form benefit the "centre", particularly when
such programmes are conceptually located within the mould of the
"from the centre down" paradigm. But what is at stake is not of course
the absolute benefit to the centre, but the relative distribution
of such benefits between the centre and the region dominated.

Although the two forms of interregional development described
have been those of greatest importance (judging from the amount of
resources involved) it is no less true that, still from the standpoint
of programmes receiving their impetus from the centre, in Latin America
various other forms of regional development are to be found. For
example, the overriding objective of some programmes which are known
as regional development programmes has been to ensure the political
control of some regions. On such occasions the action of the centre
stems from the need to maintain the political and institutional order
threatened by the demands of movements sponsored by the deplorable living
conditions existing in certain parts of the periphery. It is, for
example, possible that the efforts made in the Northeast of Brazil
have been a political response to the agitated peasant movement of
the late 1950s.

On other occasions, the regional development programmes aimed
at specific regions have emerged as a consequence of the need to
rebuild areas affected by natural disasters, while in others the
programmes have originated in geopolitical and national security
considerations, and in such cases been directed at the development
of frontier areas.
2.2 The reformulation of the 1960s: from intraregional planning to interregional planning

A mixture of factors of a technical and a political nature led, during the early part of last decade, to a significant change in the form of approaching the regional question in Latin America. As an ILPES document says, it is no coincidence that the appearance of the national "approach" to regional planning in Latin America should just have occurred in the 1960s. It was precisely in this decade that "inward-directed" development entered on a new phase of structural and technological change in the industrial sector, associated with a rapid change in patterns of consumption and the location of the corresponding markets, still more concentrated now at the national pole (ILPES, 1977). This process led to making regional disparities even more acute, and contributed to giving a "national" slant to this problem, thus generating the necessary political conditions for tackling development and regional planning more comprehensively.1

At least two important factors of a political nature (not necessarily interdependent) may be observed in various Latin American countries in the 1960s, which have made a powerful contribution to the emergence of regional planning on a national scale.

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1/ Alan Gilbert in his book Latin American Development (Penguin Books, 1974) affirms in this regard that the establishment of regional development agencies in Chile, Brazil and Venezuela closely followed the election of political parties which had been associated with the idea of administrative decentralization and regional growth. The author refers to the governments of Frei in Chile, Kubitschek in Brazil and Betancourt in Venezuela.
On the one hand a change was to be seen in the structure of the social forces which served as the main support of the governments of some countries. In such cases the governments no longer represented the interests of the urban-industrial groups (or at least did not represent them with the same intensity as in the immediate past) nor those of the groups of rural land-owners. The basis of support was now rather to be found in the sectors of the industrial and agricultural proletariat and in the more intellectual middle-level groups which were more in favour of social change. This was the case of governments such as that of Frei in Chile, Torres in Bolivia, Velasco in Peru, Caldera in Venezuela and Torrijos in Panama, inter alia.

On the other hand during the same period economic growth as an absolute objective of development efforts and emphasis given to the problem of redistribution, or at least redistribution began to be perceived as compatible with growth. This is indissolubly linked with the first mentioned factor; i.e., the new political "clienteles" called for more participation in the distribution of economic benefits and also in the decision-making processes.

Government response sought to channel and disperse these pressures, so as to turn them away from the central state apparatus; a form of achieving this objective was to offer an intermediate level - regionalization and its institutional apparatus - in which some claims were to be watered down and others made viable.

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1/ This division is artificial in many cases.
From another standpoint and as part of the "planning" climate of the 1960s new dimensions were being sought for State management to favour the professionalization of regional planning (inter alia) and create the conditions for substantive progress in technical knowledge of regional problems. This led, for example, to observing the importance of interregional relations (both domination-dependence and flows) in explaining the relative situation of the different regions of a country and led to the conviction that the problems of one region in particular (or of several) could only be solved in the broader context of the phenomena which link the entire system of regions.

At the same time the influence of systems theory and analysis was felt on regional planners. This led to the consideration of each region as an open system inserted in a larger system: the group of regions; this gave even more emphasis to the question of interregional relations, and processes of interregional planning conceived as part of the general systems theory were designed. The most conspicuous example of this trend is the well-known book by Hilhorst (Hilhorst, 1971), and to a lesser extent the study by Chadwick (Chadwick, 1971).

Naturally, the change in scale which began to occur in the scope of regional planning in Latin America was also nourished by observation of the trends in force in this regard in some European countries, notably France and the socialist countries.

The fact is, as Alayev says, that in 1965 the recently created National Planning Office of Chile, formulated a national regional development policy for the first time in Latin America (Alayev, 1978) an example which was soon to be followed by the majority of the countries in which the regional problem began to emerge as a matter of "national" import.
In the case of regional planning at the national level or interregional planning, different forms may also be distinguished on which groups bring pressure to bear in favour of these schemes and depending on the real interests pursued, transcending the mere labels. The case of Chile clearly illustrates this fact: the national regional development policy upheld under the governments of Frei (1964-1970) and Allende (1970-1973) is completely different from the present one, although this does not therefore cease to be a national regional development policy.  

In some examples of national regional development policies the pressure in favour of introducing a scheme of this nature finds its origins in the periphery's own social forces, which, as was indicated above, became through political processes the governments' main forces of support. Generally speaking, the main objective of interregional development programmes which originate in this way is national integration. Chile and Peru in their time perhaps constituted the most outstanding examples of this type. In other cases the national regional development policy is given its impulse by the "centre"—as in many of the intraregional examples—with aims such as bringing into play all the potential (natural and human) resources of the country so as to

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speed up its growth to the maximum, or with objectives directly inspired in the doctrine of national security. Some of these experiences of regional planning on a national scale will be reviewed below.

2.3 Methodological implications of the change

The passage from intraregional to interregional planning had important methodological implications.

In the first place it was necessary to construct macroeconomic frameworks or models into which the national regional development policies could be inserted. Gruchman has used the following classification of the different quantitative macro-models tried out in various countries: (a) comprehensive systems of sectoral and regional projections; (b) models of Klaasen-type industrial location and attraction; (c) models for interregional investment programming, such as the Rotterdam and Warsaw models, and (d) comprehensive models of indicative (France) and normative (socialist countries) regional planning (Gruchman, 1976).

It was the construction of the macroeconomic model which gave impetus through regional planning to the design of multi-level planning processes, simultaneously seeking the identification of decentralized decision-making procedures (between a central body for regional planning and the corresponding regional agencies) and a method capable of guaranteeing the compatibility of the group of decisions as a whole. It should be recognized that far more progress was made from the sectoral standpoint than from the regional point of

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1/ Chateau, J., Geopolítica y regionalización. Algunas relaciones, Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences, Working Document N° 75/78, 1978, Santiago, Chile
Since the Rotterdam model (Hennes, L., J. Tinbergen, G. Waardenburg, 1969) may be considered as a model of regional programming integrated into a system of multilevel planning, it should be noted that in the case of Latin America, only in Mexico and Chile was the development of multilevel planning attempted with a regional component (ODEPLAN, 1968; Carrillo-Arronte; 1970).

The same effort to build macromodels for regional planning generated a new demand in terms of regional statistical information. This led to the establishment of rudimentary regional information systems which reached different levels of development in different countries. In any case, the question of information for regional planning came to constitute a preferential area of study and work and imposed specific methodological requirements on the generation and processing of regional information.\(^2\)

Another methodological consequence of the progress from intraregional planning to interregional planning consisted in a gradual increase in the degree of centralization in handling the regional planning process, despite the decentralizing trend incorporated in the idea of multilevel planning and also despite the declared objective of using the control of regional development as a means of decentralization in decision-making.

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\(^1\) The theoretical principles of multilevel planning are mainly to be found in Kornai (1967). A broad sectoral application, to the case of Mexico, is to be found in Goreux and Manne (1973). A proposal for regional implementation is to be found in Boisier (1976).

To some extent this process proved inevitable if it is taken into account that the still current conception of regional development comes completely under the "from the centre down" paradigm. Moreover, the shortage of technical personnel for each region and the stress laid by interregional planning on questions of consistency and compatibility between, for example, the different goals of regional growth, inexorably led to the design of highly centralized processes. Stöhr's book on regional planning in Latin America is particularly illustrative in this respect. Another author comments that to date the decentralization of decision-making has generally appeared as a passive component of the regional development policies. This means that it has followed the changes in the economic importance or social structure of the regions, but little use was made of it as an active or strategic element for regional development or social change. First of all, because little is known of the relevance of delegation in decision-making for stimulating socio-economic development, and secondly because unless it can be kept within bounds and adequately controlled, it may endanger national unity or lead to the replacement of the established central authority (Pichardo, 1976).

This situation has not only caused frustration on the part of the regional communities, but also a legitimate counter-reaction, which constitutes one of the basic elements in the present regional planning crisis.

Another important matter from the methodological point of view relates to the progressive development of the strategic regional planning processes which accompanied the boom in regional planning at the national level, although it cannot be considered exclusive to this field of planning.
The concept of "strategy" was introduced into the terminology and practice of Latin American regional development through a simplistic interpretation of the concept. In fact the strategic procedure was understood not as a stochastic planning procedure in which the assessment of alternatives and the reactions of the milieu play a determining role, but only as an artifice to avoid the quantification presumably inherent in a plan; the strategies continued to be as normative as the more orthodox plans.

Despite the faulty introduction of the concept, the idea of a national regional development strategy continued to be improved as an alternative to the normative procedure. This development was associated with a more systematic review of substantive theory on regional development, a review which showed up some serious shortcomings existing in this field. The application of a strategic procedure obviously requires a positive theory which enables causal relations to be identified, but it is less demanding in terms of a normative theory. The application, however, of a normative planning procedure demands a condition the existence of a normative theory; in turn, the existence of a normative theory pre-supposes a well-structured positive theory and this does not seem to be the case in (inter) regional development. In fact, as regards the positive (substantive) theory, there is a partial body of knowledge capable of explaining how space is structured (basically the spatial organization theories of Lösch and Christaller); there is also a partial body of knowledge capable of explaining the different processes of change of the spatial

1/ This can be clearly seen in the first official documents on regional planning in Chile (e.g., Estrategia para el desarrollo de la Región del Biobío, OD-PLAN, 1966), in which the strategy merely proves to be a qualitative plan.

2/ See Panama, Ministry of Planning and Economic Policy; Estrategia para el desarrollo regional a mediano y largo plazo, Panama, 1976.
structures (the so-called theories of regional growth), but knowledge of how these processes are linked is still incomplete \(^1\) and it is therefore difficult to speak of a complete positive theory and hence of a normative theory. **Vi-s-à-vis** an incomplete knowledge of how to mould reality the strategic planning process is clearly advantageous from the standpoint of risk management.

Whether by strategy or plan, the effort to control the entire system of regions led to the need to clearly establish regional priorities, in view of the impossibility of earmarking significant resources for all regions. Generally speaking, the implicit or explicit (the smaller number) criteria for conferring interregional priorities have been eminently economic and preferential attention has been given to seeking a situation of relative balance between the safety of global economic growth and the objectives of deconcentration and decentralization. In professional terms, the majority of the strategies tended towards an option of "concentrated deconcentration" in a region or in a few regions.

It should be observed that a strategy of "concentrated deconcentration" within the framework of the "from the centre down" paradigm stands on at least two hypotheses: **firstly**, on the possibility of identifying spatial subsystems sufficiently differentiated from each other, and **secondly** on the possibility of reproducing within the subsystems,

\(^1\) Part of the difficulty—in the case of Latin America—lies in the difference in the validity of the traditional theories of the organization of space versus the regional growth theories.
relations, of domination-dependence similar to those observed at the national level, as a form of boosting economic growth. In turn, these hypotheses are indissolubly linked to the entire conception of polarized development. This means that an additional methodological consequence of the change of scale mentioned above consisted in revitalizing the concepts and instruments pertaining to the theory of polarized development.

This in turn had two effects. On the one hand a very intense and very fruitful debate took place in Latin America at the beginning of the 1970s on the validity of the theory and the strategies of polarized development.\(^1\) It is partly the results of this discussion which allow Alayev to state that in this respect it is possible to confirm that there already exists a theoretical school of regional development in Latin America (Alayev, 1978, p. 102). On the other hand, the emphasis on questions of polarized development led to a more profound and fruitful review of the theories of domination and internal colonialism,\(^2\) and of the elements which condition the interregional mobility of the factors of production,\(^3\) while a national regional development strategy presupposes action aimed at modifying the traditional pattern of spatial mobility which according to Myrdal would only serve as a further support to the historical process of territorial concentration.

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1/ The discussion is mainly contained in: ILPES/ILDIS (eds.), Planificación regional y urbana en América Latina, Siglo XXI, México, 1974 and ILPES: Los polos de crecimiento. La teoría y la práctica en América Latina, 2 volumes (mimeo), Santiago, Chile, 1978.


An additional three elements could be added to make up the picture of the methodological effects of the progress from intraregional planning to interregional planning. Logically, the change implied a reduction in the relative importance of intraregional planning procedures (a matter to which we shall return later). At the same time, the level of abstraction of the proposals for regional change increased considerably, and this contributed to the lack of practical impact of the policies followed on various occasions. At the same time a series of factors came together to generate what Coraggio has termed the vice of pure spatialism, i.e., a tendency to consider territorial phenomena as self-contained, and self-produced.

3. A summary of some experiences

This section will describe very briefly some of the most lesson-worthy experiences in regional development planning in Latin America, both in the intraregional and interregional phases. ¹/

3.1 The case of the Northeast of Brazil

This macroregion of Brazil which covers nine States contains 18% of the surface area of Brazil and contains 30% of its population²/ and is one of the most underdeveloped regions of Latin America. Its typically commodity exporting economy has virtually remained in a state of crisis since the beginning of the decline of the sugar-cane economy at the end of the seventeenth century. Various cycles of recovery based on new export products (cotton, cocoa, tabacco), sporadic booms in sugar cane or the development of the stock-raising economy, together with the increase of the great rural areas devoted to purely

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¹/ This section corresponds to part of Chapter III of the ILPDS document: Desarrollo regional y desarrollo económico en América Latina, Document CPRD-E/19, Santiago, Chile, 1977.

²/ I.e., approximately 30 million inhabitants (in 1970); a population larger than that of the Republic of Argentina. / subsistence crops
subsistence crops and the frequent droughts in what is known as the sertão, have done no more than keep the region in a state of stagnation and generalized poverty, which has branded it in the Brazilian and the Latin American context as a typical "problem region".

The first efforts to alleviate the chronic problems of the Northeast were aimed at regulating the water supply so as to be able to cope with the periods of drought which assume catastrophic proportions particularly in areas of subsistence economy. Specialized bodies were set up which developed the corresponding infrastructure (dams, irrigation, canals, etc.) in a phase which Hirschmann critically called the "hydraulic approach". In fact, this type of measure in isolation was not a way to solve the complex problem of the integral economic and social development of the Northeast. In 1956, under the Kubitschek Government, a working group was entrusted with the preparation of a diagnosis of the problems of the Northeast, and the main lines of a strategy of reforms. The work of this group culminated in a report submitted to the Government of Brazil by Celso Furtado in 1959, proposing an action programme.

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1/ Area of the interior in which a critical region known as the "polígono das secas" (drought polygon) was delimited.

2/ Such as the Departamento Nacional de Obras contra as Secas (DNOCS) and the Comissão para o Desenvolvimento do Vale do São Francisco (CDVSP).


4/ Working group for the development of the Northeast. (GTDN)
The GTDN strategy laid down that a successful regional policy in the Northeast presupposed deep-seated political and institutional changes and changes in the region's power structures. It also argued that the problem of that particular region was bound up with the total development of Brazil, and upheld a principle of regional balance as a national objective in itself, justified by political and social reasons rather than reasons of global economic growth. The main points on which the proposed strategy was based were:

(a) Industrialization, with stress on employment and the use of local resources; the projects included the setting-up of a steelworks and related processing industries, a cement plant and a fertilizer factory, all located in the densely populated coastal area; the modernization of the traditional textile industry was also anticipated;

(b) Restructuring of agricultural activity in the wet coastal regions and the valley of San Francisco in order to diversify and increase the supply of food to the cities in the process of industrialization;

(c) Restructuring of agricultural activity in the dry areas of the interior, in order to increase productivity and reduce the areas of subsistence economy; greater specialization in stock-raising and cotton-growing was anticipated;

(d) Settlement of the rainy and forested areas bordering on the Amazon basin so as to receive surplus rural manpower.

A decisive condition for implementing this strategy was a simultaneous attack on several fronts considered to be essential.

On the basis of Furtado's proposals SUDENE was set up in 1959 with Furtado himself as its first director. The First Model Plan aroused wide-ranging discussion and opposition from the more conservative sectors, but
sectors, but it was finally adopted in 1961, with the support of the reformist political sectors. The implementation of this plan (1961-1962) and its continuation, the Second Model Plan (1963-1965), was however modified by the political situation, which required that over-againstive measures should be avoided; emphasis on the areas of action was substantially modified restricting the programmes of agrarian reform and giving priority to infrastructure (highways, energy) and industrialization; for this last-mentioned the necessary incentives to the investment of national capital in SUJENE-approved projects were created.

In the Second Model Plan these incentives were extended to foreign capital, a manifestation of the gradual transition to what is known as the second phase of the "inward directed" development model.

The development policy of this period, based on rapid industrialization through imports substitution, little by little lost its initial thrust owing to various shortcomings and desequilibria in the development achieved; the trend towards inflation became more acute and situations of increasing social tension were created which developed into the political changes of 1964.

In the new situation, and without formally modifying its functions and objectives, SUJENE lost a great part of its initial influence in the development of the region, and found its political weight reduced with the creation of independent sectoral bodies competing with its functions of co-ordination, and owing to its inclusion in a national planning and co-ordination system together with other similar bodies created for other regions.

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1/ According to the well-known article 34/18.
The Third Model Plan (1966-1968) and then the Fourth (1968-1973) confirm the continued formal existence of the fundamental objectives of SUDENE. However, its real functions were restricted to the review and approval of projects, within the framework of the industrial promotion policy of article 34/18; as from 1965 this policy meant a considerable increase in private investments in the Northeast and the emergence of a large-scale technologically advanced manufacturing industry, with increasing participation of foreign capital.

The devastating drought of 1970 and its sequels brought into evidence the modest results of the partial policy followed by SUDENE, a fact which was also reflected in the statistics—which showed an uninterrupted rural exodus towards the centre-south—and dramatically in the proliferation of the shantytowns of the major metropolitan centres. A fundamental aspect of these results relates to the type of industrialization observed in the region. This was concentrated almost exclusively in Recife and Salvador (the largest regional metropolitan centres) and was generally highly capital-intensive, with little employment effect in the region, and specializing in the production of consumer durables, capital goods and intermediate products for the metal products and machinery industry, which linked it basically to the centre-south market (in view of the small volume of regional demand), i.e., it developed with marked enclave characteristics. Simultaneously, the agrarian structures of the interior were maintained practically intact and their rural populations remained marginalized.

After 1970, as a reaction to the drought of that year, a National Integration Programme (PIN) was introduced involving the construction of the system of highways into the Amazon Basin—including what is known as the Trans Amazon Highway—and complementary projects for settling these
settling these areas, as well as irrigation projects in the Northeast. In mid-1971 measures for agrarian reform and rationalization were programmed in the Northeast and North (PROTERRA), although later they were restricted to some States of the Northeast.

The Trans-Amazon Highway, in particular, became a national project and emerged as a solution to the chronic problems of the Northeast, in the form of a mass emigration of surplus manpower towards the areas of settlement which would be opened up by this highway. In practice, however, the areas technically suited to agriculture proved to be limited, although those appropriate for extensive stock-raising were larger. The original settlement programme— for the installation of 600,000 persons on the new lands—now seemed barely feasible, because of what has not been said and also because of the enormous costs of infrastructure and settlement, the difficulties of adaptation of the new settlers to difficult ecological conditions, etc.

Currently there is a tendency to stress the indubitable importance of the effort made in terms of national security, the development of extensive deposits of raw materials, and the development of extensive stock-raising activity, in which national and foreign capital would join forces.

On the other hand, the Trans-Amazon Highway project is seen by the critics as yet another attempt to fashion an escape valve for tensions in the country by settling unpopulated regions, and not as complement to a real process of land reform, in this case in the Northeast.
3.2 The case of the Guayana region of Venezuela

At the beginning of the 1950s, Guayana was a typical region of what has been termed the "virgin periphery" - vast in extent, almost unpopulated, with immense barely exploited resources, practically isolated in physical terms and economically separate from the consolidated regions of the national territory. To the subsistence economy which employed nearly all its scattered population was added in those years the only economic activity of importance in the region: the development by foreign companies of two large-scale iron mines, El Pao and Cerro Bolívar. The regional transport system was reduced to railways which linked these mines with the Orinoco, the external outlet for the ore.

As was observed earlier, the development of Guayana was determined essentially not by problems of the actual region but by the needs of the Venezuelan economy as a whole. The Venezuelan economy, as is well known, depends on its oil exports, a mining activity which is highly capital-intensive and employs only 2% of the country's labour force. The income from petroleum permitted—in the 1950s—the development of manufacturing industry based on import-substitution, which basically consisted in assembling consumer products using imported parts or inputs.

This development was naturally concentrated in Caracas and the immediate central region, advantageously located in relation to the import ports and the main consumer market.

/ A high
A high rate of industrial growth (around 10% annually) and its dependence on import capacity meant that the country would inevitably have to face balance-of-payments problems in view of the relatively slow growth (2 or 3% annually) of income petroleum. This situation generated pressure for a further import substitution of intermediate products by nationally manufactured goods. On the other hand, growing energy needs could be anticipated in relation with expected industrial growth.

As from 1950s the Venezuelan government took the decision to build a major iron and steel plant in Guayana and to take advantage of the vast hydroelectric potential of the Caroni, the Venezuelan Development Corporation made a start on these plans.

At the end of the decade, the need for structural change and diversification of industrial production at the national level was forcefully felt: the Plan de la Nación 1960-1965 launched an ambitious programme of industrial development. This gave special priority to production –in Guayana– of electrical energy, steel, aluminium, enriched iron, metal manufactures and machinery, wood pulp and chemicals, for which the region was abundantly provided with the necessary natural resources.

The development of the Guayana region of Venezuela thus constituted a basic need for achieving the objectives of the Plan de la Nación 1960-1965 and the development of the Venezuelan economy in the medium and long-term. Together with the initiation of the Plan de la Nación the Corporación Venezolana de Guayana (CVG) was thus set up in 1960, this was a regional development body with broad autonomy of action and responsible for implementing infrastructure and industrial projects in the region in keeping with its potential resources.

/ In 1960
In 1960-1965 the CVG, with the participation of public and private capital, set in motion a programme for the development of the Guayana region, establishing short-term (1960-1965), medium-term (1960-1968) and long-term (1960-1980) targets. In the short-term phase, the iron and steel plant of the Orinoco came into production, a key industry in the industrial complex programmed for the region. In the next phase there were already nearly 80 ongoing projects, both industrial projects connected with the complex, and projects concerned with energy infrastructure (Guri Dam), housing, urban equipment, etc. "Firm" goals were established for the long-term, consisting in the completion or expansion of projects already begun or adopted, as well as "potential" and more ambitious goals, which included projects which were desirable and feasible and still at the evaluation or promotion stage.

The strategic idea behind the action of the CVG has been to establish in this region -specifically in Ciudad Guayana- a pole of development which would incorporate the region and its resources into the country's economy and at the same time promote the integral socio-economic development of Guayana; this pole was to counterbalance the concentrative pull of the central region (Caracas), and contribute to a more balanced spatial structure.

The important effort made has had significant effects on the industrial structure of Venezuela, in that particular region, in terms of its greater integration and economic weight within the nation and a substantial population growth due to migration towards new sources of employment, particularly towards Ciudad Guayana, the new dynamic regional centre the estimated population of which for 1980 would reach 300,000 inhabitants and metropolitan level. These
achievements obviously constitute a success as far as some of the proposed objectives are concerned. Recent appraisals, however, have stressed the negative aspects of this development and its inadequacies with respect to other objectives. Industrial development has been fundamentally restricted to the basic industries, which process inputs for the industry of the centre; it has not been possible to establish a genuine industrial complex with sufficient forward linkage in the region itself which would give it relative autonomy vis-à-vis the centre and more self-sustained growth. Here once again is the case of an industrial centre of an enclave type in the periphery, supplying the inputs required by the centre or externally, but incapable of inducing diversified industrial development in the region.

For all its spectacular growth, Ciudad Guayana has not succeeded in achieving the diversity and stability which characterize a mature metropolitan centre; owing to the bias of its industrial development, the immigrant population does not find an adequate supply of employment, which leads to a large floating population and marginal urban areas. This restricts the consumption capacity of the regional market and generally depresses activity in the sector which aim to satisfy the needs of the local population. The growth effects of the pole on the region are therefore very limited.

Owing to these and other shortcomings various social conflicts have been created originating in the frustration of the expectations of the immigrant masses.

/ In brief,
In brief, the Guayana plan seems not to have been able to curb the tendency towards the concentration of industrial growth in the central region, nor has it succeeded in reducing, in the case of this region, the great difference in incomes and living standards between the centre and the periphery in Venezuela.

3.3 The case of Chile

Chile was perhaps the first of the Latin American countries to adopt and institutionalize an approach to regional planning at the national level as from 1965. Owing to its peculiar geographical configuration and the marked division of its territory into three clearly-differentiated ecological regions, which determined specific modes of occupation and use of space and of natural resources, the regional problem in Chile became acute from an early stage.

In the central third of the country (between La Serena and Puerto Montt), are concentrated the agricultural land, 90% of the population, the majority of the urban centres (including the three metropolitan areas) and the bulk of industry. It is also this area which constituted the traditional Chile, with the oldest real occupation, from which a process of territorial settlement extended to the North and the South. Owing to its geographical and climatic conditions, the settlement of the two end zones was scarce and their population density has always remained low.

The first major qualitative division of Chilean geo-economic space, linked to a process of planning of territorial and regional development was made between: a consolidated central zone, and (b) two outer settlement zones. The latter correspond to the virgin periphery, since their potential resources are still little known and little exploited (except in very specific places).

/ The process
The process of spatial concentration which began with the phase of industrialization based on import substitution in the thirties and forties, mainly took place in the central zone, where Santiago, the emerging national pole is located and the traditional periphery formed by the agricultural areas from which the mass of migrants comes.¹

The first attempts at promoting regional development in Chile were of a mono-regional nature, particularly as regards the two extremities, owing to geopolitical concerns aimed at strengthening the integration of these zones with the rest of the country. Specifically, import facilities were granted to them (the free ports of Arica and Punta Arenas), and in the extreme north the Arica Development Board was set up, the work of which contributed to the development in this city of an assembly industry (automobiles, electronics, etc.). This did not, however, deal with the fundamental aspect of the Chilean regional problem which, as has been said, was emerging in the central zone.

In 1965 the National Planning Office (ODEPLAN) was set up, with a Regional Planning Department, the Regional Offices (ORPLAN) are subordinate to this, one for each of the twelve regions into which the territory is divided (including what is known as the Metropolitan Area of Santiago).

¹ In order to appreciate the degree of urban concentration in this area, it should be noted that in 1975 of its approximately 9 000 000 inhabitants, 3 000 000 lived in Greater Santiago and another million was equally distributed between Greater Valparaíso and Greater Concepción, the country's other two metropolitan areas.
The regional strategy adopted was that of poles and centres of development, giving a hierarchical position to the regional capitals established with the regionalization of the territory. Outside the national pole (Santiago), three multi-regional poles were established (Antofagasta, Valparaíso and Concepción) and ten regional poles; a number of intraregional centres of development, corresponding to smaller cities with a more local influence were also established. Among the regional poles, those concerned with frontier development (Arica and Punta Arenas) are singled out in view of their location and their geo-political importance.1

Priorities were also allocated among these centres in terms of their function as industrial development centres. On the periphery the first priority for industrial location was given to Antofagasta and Concepción and around Santiago to medium and medium-large cities (including Greater Valparaíso), with a view to the internal deconcentration of the centres.

This definition of the system of poles and centres of development was not, however, followed by consistent measures of implementation, which meant that this definition did not in actual fact go beyond the statement of spatial goals of an indefinite term. A serious effort was made to promote Concepción as a pole of development (in the sense that Perroux gives to the term) with debatable results.

1/ It should be noted here that the term "pole" was applied erroneously to centres which in fact were being assigned a role of "central positions" and which would not have the dynamic function implicit in the term used by Perroux.
This experience of deconcentration lost its impetus and its priority, at least in the medium-term, when ODEPLAN centred its attention on the spatial organization of what was known as the Central Macrozone (constituted by Santiago and the surrounding provinces), as from 1969, thus confirming that it is genuinely difficult to invert the forces tending towards concentration inherent in the current model.

During the following government there were no innovations in the existing regionalization, and ODEPLAN largely concerned itself with short-term problems. However, attention was paid to defining a long-term territorial development strategy, which would serve as a frame of reference for future annual plans. This strategy concentrated its attention particularly on the central zone, and proposed for it a process of deconcentration of development based on the formation of "integrated spaces" (as opposed to the limited character of poles and centres), aspiring in the long-term to constituting a development corridor—an almost continuous integrated space between La Serena and Puerto Montt; this corridor would be structured on the basis of major industrial centres exercising a deconcentrating effect and smaller intraregional integration centres. The spatial structure resulting from the implementation of this strategy would give rise to a new regionalization of Chilean territory, functionally involving the future spatial image rather than the reality which exists.

The most recent strategy does not differ very much from the previous ones as far as the proposed spatial pattern is concerned; perhaps it gives more attention to the outer regions so as to reinforce national integration. It is apparently applied to a new pre-established regional framework, based on criteria somewhat similar to
similar to those behind the first regional division of the country (of 1965), and a new institutional organization on defining which great stress has been laid. It is not possible to give more details here, since this process of definition has not yet been concluded.

In brief, it may be said that the Chilean experience of regional planning on a national scale has a wealth of ideologically differentiated proposals and bases, but owing to the very discontinuity of the political process and the limited period of its action (10 years), its is lacking in appreciable results. On the other hand, since deconcentration as an objective is at odds with the spontaneous trends typical of the development model which has predominated in these years, an effective implementation of a more balanced regional development would have required the handling by the State of powerful means susceptible of modifying these trends and orienting the spatial processes towards the new structures desired. These means were not available to a sufficient extent, or could not be used effectively.
3.4. The case of Peru

The concern in Peru at the uneven economic development of the country is of long standing. But only in 1965 did the first attempts by the Government to tackle the regional planning of development emerge, with the division of the territory into eight planning regions, and only as from the political and institutional change of 1968 did planning action as such begin.

As in the case of Chile (and the majority of the countries of Latin America), in Peru there exists a fundamental geographical difference between natural regions, and a historical - and in Peru an ethnic - base which has determined different patterns of territorial occupation and utilization of resources, and has served as a starting point for the subsequent processes of structuring space in a functional form for the phases of development through which the Peruvian economy has passed. As has been seen in Latin America in general, the development models followed by these countries have been of an increasingly concentrating type since the 1930s, and this process has been even further intensified since the end of the 1960s and the beginning of this decade.

The great natural division of Peru is longitudinal, parallel to the coast and towards the interior. The Coast zone, a desert-type region sporadically crossed by fertile valleys in which the population is concentrated, covers 10% of Peru's territory, and contains around 48% of the population of the country 1/, includes the Lima-Callao metropolitan area and Peru's main medium-sized cities 2/ - and is the most modern,

1/ Around fifteen million in 1975.
2/ Of the 7 000 000 inhabitants of the Coast, some 2 000.000 correspond to the metropolitan area of the capital.
most highly urbanized and industrialized region. The Sierra zone occupies nearly 30% of Peruvian territory and accounts for slightly over 50% of the country's population (some 8,000,000 people); this is a mountainous area of steep valleys where the inhabitants - almost entirely Quechua and Ayumara - subsist on the basis of a primitive low-productivity agriculture. The low socio-economic level and high rural density of this area give rise to increasing migratory flows towards the urban coastal centres. The urban network in this area is old and disjointed, and depends on the hierarchically better-placed coastal centres.

Lastly, the Selva corresponds to the Amazon area of Peru and is an enormous almost uninhabited zone (2% of the population), which covers around 60% of Peruvian territory. The majority of its inhabitants are Amazonian forest dwellers, and the potential resources of the area are practically unknown. It may be seen that the problems of regional development in Peru on the one hand concern the incorporation of the Selva into the national economy, but the most significant problems, in social and cultural terms, occur in the disequilibria and the contrasts in development to be seen among the growing urban-industrial concentrations of the Coast and the traditional rural areas of the Sierra, and in the coastal area the growing preponderance and concentrating power of the activities and population of the Lima-Callao agglomeration, 1/ vis-à-vis other centres towards the north and the south.

It is, however, necessary to stress as a starting point for the analysis of Peruvian regional development strategies, that the commodity-

1/ This agglomeration already concentrates 60% of the gross industrial product.

/export model
export model or outward-directed growth for various reasons lasted in Peru until nearly the end of the 1960s, although to some extent the process of industrialization based on import substitution had already been initiated. This relatively late industrialization meant that the process of concentration of activities and population in the metropolitan area of Lima, although intensive, has not reached its potential volume and is still to be found in its initial phases; this is also reflected in the relatively low rate of urbanization and metropolinization still to be seen in Peru, and in the great rural masses which still remain immobilized and marginalized in the Sierra. This initial situation will be favourable to a more balanced regional development, if the subsequent industrial development of Peru were to adopt a model the technological characteristics of which make it less concentrative and aimed at a more generalized demand.

Since 1962 Peru has had a national planning system. The Central Office for Regional Planning, which is part of the National Planning Institute (INP) concerns itself with the problems of spatial and regional development.

This body amended a regionalization project in 1965 and in 1968 established five planning regions: North, Centre, South, East and Metropolitan Lima. In each region a Regional Planning Office was set up, as subsidiary bodies of the Central Office.

In 1968 a Long-Term Development Strategy (to 1990) was approved, which proposes to speed up inward-directed growth, apparently with more distributive characteristics, based on the incorporation into the domestic consumer market of large, hitherto groups marginal, particularly from

1/ These regions cut across the territory, each including parts of the country's three natural regions; the exception is the east region which is exclusively located in the Selva, and Metropolitan Lima, which is exclusively urban.

/ the Sierra.
This is part of a process of social reforms both in agriculture (land reform) and in industry (reform of the system of enterprise ownership). 1/

From the regional standpoint, the strategy proposes important changes in the distribution of the population throughout the country, with a large-scale effort devoted to the rural colonization of the Coast and the Selva, at the expense of natural growth of the oversaturated areas of the Sierra. As regards urban growth it proposes the creation in the medium-term of poles of development or "centres of countermailing demand" to counter balance the pull of Lima and make possible the economic life of each region by strengthening the links between areas of complementary activities. For certain more important regions it defines national development axes, which would be made up of a number of urban-industrial centres with complementary functions.

In brief, the present spatial strategy of Peru proposes at the national level the following elements of regional dynamism:

(a) National pole: the Lima-Callao metropolitan conurbation in the Metropolitan Lima region.

(b) Axes of national development: the Chiclayo-Trujillo-Chimbote axis, in the northern region and the Arequipa-Ilo-Tacna axis in the southern region.

(c) Regional poles: Pucallpa in the central region and Iquitos in the eastern region.

In addition to these space-structuring elements at the national level, at the intraregional level greater detail is given to defining complementary centres aimed at integrating the regional spaces, particularly the Sierra, into the corresponding axes on coastal poles.

1/ Including restrictions on the participation of foreign capital.
The spatial strategy of Peru is characterized, as can be seen, by its accent on the development of the Coast, in which the main polarizing elements to counterbalance the Metropolitan area of Lima are to be found. The occupation of the Amazon region of the interior, although stressed in the global strategy as one of the long-term national objectives, appears secondary, or relegated to a subsequent phase.

Another aspect which should be stressed is the use of the strategic concept of development axes, which is tactically more flexible, since it permits the functional incorporation of a group of centres into a broader dynamic space, with a better-defined polarizing effect.

3.5 The case of Panama

The regional development strategy of Panama is one of the most recent attempts to define an endeavour to plan space at the national level in Latin America. It is of special interest because it concerns one of the smallest countries of the continent, to which its geographical position and historical destiny have assigned the role of an international traffic corridor, a fact which has been central in its development as a nation and in the structuring of its space.

In addition, all the spatial processes and characteristics common to most of Latin American countries are to be found in Panama: rapid urbanization with the corresponding migration from rural areas; a large-scale process of spatial concentration in a pole-type urban centre and its immediate area, and acute spatial disequilibria in levels of wellbeing, with the natural sequel of social and political tensions.

This spatial concentration which developed around the traffic corridor is not the result of self-reliant domestic dynamism from a national development pole.
development pole, but rather the effect of an exogeneous factor;\textsuperscript{1} in other words, the centre-periphery model of spatial development functions in terms of a centre which is basically located outside the economy of the country.

The rest of the nation does not possess natural resources of any importance and is incorporated in the economy of the centre to a very small extent. The Panamanian economy is very open and lacking in industrial development. The population is predominantly rural (60\%) and very scattered, and genuine urban-type centres are very few. Panama City has 350 000 inhabitants out of the country's total of 1 500 000.

In view of the size of the country and a certain minimum efficient size which a region must have for its integral development, Panamanian territory has been divided, for the purposes of space-planning, into a few relatively large regions—specifically, three macro-regions: the Metropolitan, Eastern and Central-Western regions, this last to be divided into two in the medium-term.\textsuperscript{2} The first region may be described as organized and dynamic, the second as an area of settlement and not developed, and the third as consolidated and backward.

\textsuperscript{1} Ultimately, the dynamizing factor of the Panamanian economy proves to be the export of a natural resource (inward-directed development); this resource is exploited by foreign investment, using highly capital-intensive technology and has a relative local employment effect. Other subsidiary activities of a domestic origin have been concentrated around this enclave creating a "centre" with very special characteristics.

\textsuperscript{2} In fact when the government officially published the regional development strategy this division took place.
The long and medium-term objectives of spatial development in Panama are defined on the basis of the general national development objectives laid out in the National Development Strategy 1970-1980, and are envisaged in three categories which complement each other. 

(a) Objectives of the spatial system, such as fiscal, economic, social and political integration and the functional organization of the space;

(b) Regionalized national objectives, such as institutional development, the strengthening of the national identity, the reduction of unemployment and marginality, and the stimulation of economic development;

(c) Long-term objectives of each region. For the Eastern region, these are the settlement and relocation of the population, ecological conservation and the incorporation of indigenous groups; for the Central-Western region, the improvement of agricultural productivity, agrarian reform, the structuring of rural space, the improvement of rural-urban access and regional industrialization; and lastly, for the Metropolitan region, the reduction of spatial friction and the extension of urban functions.

The strategy defines guiding principles which establish the frame of reference for specific regional development policies. These principles are:

(a) Primordial responsibility of the public sector in the regional development effort;

(b) Priority (in the medium-term) of increasing activity in the centres and already developed areas of the interior, over the creation of new activities in still unexploited areas;

(c) Priority (in the medium-term) of agricultural development and the rural milieu over the industrial-urban milieu;

(d) Combination of
(d) Combination of direct aid to persons (areas of misery) with State aid to the development of places; and

(e) Making the most of the regional development effort to channel and strengthen the participation of the population.

The policies based on these strategic guidelines should lead to substantial changes in the spatial structure of Panama, which in the long-term would come to be characterized by the following urban elements (image-objective):

(a) A transit axis which would include the Colón-Panama zone (parallel to the Canal) and would be extended from the capital towards the west, as far as Chorrera; this axis is identified with the national pole of development and performs diversified industrial and service functions. It corresponds to the Metropolitan region;

(b) A peninsular growth axis, in the Central-Western region, which would include the (potential) industrial centre of Chitré-Los Santos and the neighbouring services centre of Las Tablas;

(c) A western growth nucleus, in the extreme west of the country, around the (potential) industrial and services centre of David; it would include several smaller dependent centres;

(d) Three services centres (central points) existing in agricultural areas of the Central-Western region; and

(e) A (potential) services centre in the Eastern region, which has not yet been incorporated.

It is still not possible to review possibilities of implementation nor the accent of the regional policies in different phases of this process, and still less the extent to which the economic surpluses generated along the transit axis could be diverted towards the periphery. All this will partly depend on...
depend on the political decisions and the means available to the
government to implement them, but what will be of decisive influence
will be the development model adopted, the internal logic of which
it will be difficult to cross with measures which are not a coherent
part of it.

3.6 The case of Bolivia

The initiation of economic planning in Bolivia dates from
1963, with the creation of the National Planning Council, one of
the first measures of the 1952 revolution. In 1962 the National
Planning Board was set up, and successive modifications to the
system led to the creation of a Ministry of Planning and Co-ordination
(in 1970), and finally to the present CONEPLAN in 1972. Although
in the long-term development strategy (1971-1991) the problems of
regional development were tackled for the first time, only in this
latest reorganization of the planning system was a body set up
expressly for regional aspects: the Regional Planning Office, part
of the CONEPLAN secretariat.

Geographically, Bolivia, like Chile and Peru, shows a basic
natural division of its territory into three macro-regions which
are the continuation to the south and south-east of two of the
three regions into which Peru is divided. These are:

(a) The Altiplano which starts in Peru around lake Titicaca,
covers 15% of Bolivia's territory and contains 15% of its population.
This is the site of La Paz with around 500,000 inhabitants;

(b) The Mountain region, with a structure similar to that
of the Peruvian Sierra, taking in 30% of the territory and 65% of
the population, and

(c) The Plains, a region similar to the Peruvian Selva, but
more densely populated in its southern part, taking in 55% of the
national territory and barely 20% of the population.

This division,
This division, which as in Peru is not only geographical in nature, coincides with differentiated social and economic structures, and a particular ethnic substratum in each (Aymara in the Altiplano, Quechua in the Mountain region and Hispanic in the Plains). The Altiplano and the Mountain region are considered to be traditional regions while the Plains is a region of settlement and has recently acquired some modern and dynamic characteristics particularly in the Santa Cruz region.

The commodity exporting development model has persisted in Bolivia practically up to our times; industrial development based on import substitution is relatively incipient, and at the same time there has been rapid progress in the services sector, the basis of urban growth. This latter process has been delayed by the lateness and slowness of industrialization, so that the rate of urbanization in Bolivia is still lower than in Peru. The urban system, unlike Chile and Peru has a much better balance between its major centres, as a consequence of the emergence of various important centres in colonial times. The weakness of import-substitution industrialization has delayed the effect of spatial concentration which accompanies and characterizes it. Thus La Paz contains only 10% of the country's 5 000 000 inhabitants and is rivalled in importance by Cochabamba and Santa Cruz.

For the same reason, in Bolivia the differences in interregional development (measured in terms of the per capita gross domestic product) have not become as acute as in Chile and Peru. However, the urban-rural imbalance in per capita income is very extreme (a ratio of 9:1) owing to the less developed economic structure of Bolivia, where the rural population accounts for 64% of the total population.
This incipient and still relatively balanced urban structure—even more in Bolivia than in Peru—is an initial advantage for the planning of future spatial and regional development, since the organization process may still be directed towards a more balanced spatial distribution than would be spontaneously produced if the current conservative development model were continued.

A first step in the efforts towards the national planning of regional development in Bolivia was the definition—within the framework of the 1971-1991 development strategy—of five planning regions. This regionalization was subsequently abandoned and an approach to the organization of space adopted, rather than the planning of a system of regions.

The strategy of spatial and regional development proposed in 1971 for the long-term was contained in the global decision to get the phase of outward directed development over quickly and enter on a process of inward-directed development taking advantage of the potential domestic market, which takes in 85% of the population; i.e., industrial development in this new phase would be directed at the mass market for current consumer goods, rather than at a selective market, which would be tiny in Bolivia and would be combined with the dynamism and diversification of exports and a production structure capable of absorbing large contingents of manpower of rural origin and making possible a broader distribution of income.

In social aspects the growth of health, education and social services was proposed, and this also meant an increase in their geographical coverage.
These general objectives were manifested in strategic sectoral and regional proposals. According to these latter, in addition to the regionalization of the territory already mentioned there would be a polarization of economic space by establishing poles of industrial development (specifically in Santa Cruz, Oruro, Cochabamba and La Paz), agro-industrial poles (in Sucre and Tarija), agro-industrial centres and mining-industrial centres, the latter two categories being of lesser importance.

The 1972-1977 Quinquenual Plan suffers from the limitation of not giving sufficiently explicit lines of action referring to the spatial and regional development of the country, since it basically stresses the global and sectoral policies for the period considered. However, since there is an awareness of the importance of regional problems for the development of Bolivia, a start was made in 1975 on preparing a new spatial strategy in line with the present objectives and orientations of global economic planning, in the preparation of which the United Nations Development Programme has participated. The general lines proposed as a basis of this spatial strategy are given here.

In the first place, it was proposed that the sectoral and territorial strategies for the immediate future—and because of the restrictions on the balance of payments—must be capital-saving, if the situation is not to be exacerbated. Hence the spatial strategy defined must be selective and concentrate its action on areas with a definite growth potential.
It is noteworthy that this territorial structure of the Bolivian economy is concentrated in a small area, made up of the La Paz-Santa Cruz-Potosí triangle, in which the La Paz-Cochabamba-Santa Cruz axis has predominating economic authority. In this triangle are to be found most of the sectors of production and services, which generate the country's activity and income; this area contains 90% of Bolivia's installed capacity and urban population. On the other hand, Bolivia appears as a mosaic of regions without links between them, with little functional interdependence and nearly no geographical mobility of the capital and labour factors. This is reflected in the disequilibria of the factors of production in the different regions, and this affects the technology used, the differences in productivity between regions and interregional socio-economic disparities.

Stress is therefore laid on the strategic need to achieve the integration of the regional subsystems into a national whole, eliminating the social or cultural barriers which stand in the way.

Another fact of note as regards recent trends (between 1962-1971) towards spontaneous change in the spatial structure of Bolivia is that the economic importance of two areas of the country, Santa Cruz and Chuquisaca-Tarija, has clearly increased, while the importance of the traditional area (around La Paz-Cochabamba) declined. It should be stressed in this regard that it is the task of a national regional development policy to facilitate this spontaneous trend towards deconcentration by eliminating infrastructural and other impediments.
Taking as a starting-point the five national objectives relating to regional development, and a certain number of conditions or requisites which the strategy and the regional policies to achieve these objectives must fulfill, priority areas have been defined, the development of which would constitute a maximum contribution to achieving the national objectives stated. These priority spatial elements are:

(a) The La Paz-Cochabamba-Santa Cruz axis with the areas forming their hinterland, owing to their present dynamism and favourable factors of location and their potential dynamizing effect on neighbouring areas (mining and agricultural).

(b) The La Paz-Oruro-Potosí-Tarija axis, with a connexion as far as Sucre plus its hinterland, in that it possesses a minimum urban and road infrastructure which if improved will contribute to expanding the recent advances in the agricultural sector.

These two axes would constitute the country's territorial skeleton, known as the Fundamental Territorial Subsystem (FTS); its consolidation and subsequent integration will not preclude activities in other peripheral areas (for example, Beni, Mutún and others) whose potential also justifies a regional promotion effort. In the long-term these peripheral areas would also finally be integrated into the FTS.

An official and more up-to-date version of the situation of regional planning in Bolivia was submitted by the Ministry of Planning and Co-ordination at the First Conference of Ministers and Heads of Planning of Latin America held in Caracas in 1977. This version was published in the ILPES Boletín de Planificación 4-5, 1978.
The cases summarized above are illustrative of the diversity of regional development experiences at the Latin American level, but they do not even remotely exhaust the totality of this experience.

The case of the Northeast of Brazil accurately illustrates a type of interregional development with very marked characteristics of domination. The case of the Guayana region of Venezuela, on the other hand, is an equally accurate illustration of interregional development powered by the centre with a view to the exploitation of natural and energy resources.

The examples of Chile and Peru throw into relief very ambitious regional planning efforts on a national scale promoted, in the first instance, by peripheral social forces and in the second instance by the centre itself.

Panama is a case of a small country in which some traditional notions of regional planning are discarded precisely because of the effect of the size of the country on their relevance as instruments of regional development. Bolivia, on the other hand, provides a good example of the present regional planning trend of attaching more importance to the spatial and organizational structure of a country than to a structure resulting from the imposition of regionalization.

The peculiar conformation of the spatial structure of Colombia, which is completely atypical in terms of the region, always gave a strong urban emphasis to efforts to orientate regional development in that country. It tends to shape a type of experience which is different from that observed in the majority of the other Latin American countries.

/4. Examination of
4. **Examination of experiences: Principal problems**

There are many efforts to evaluate Latin American experience in the use of regional development policies, although it should be pointed out that the majority of the appraisals are, more than anything else, descriptions at the level of the whole region or of individual countries without any real analytical content.

In this section an attempt will be made to throw light upon some of the principal problems which have made it difficult to achieve the objectives sought by incorporating regional planning in the systems governing economic development. To this end, it may be useful to make as fine as possible a distinction among theoretical, methodological and operational questions, admitting from the outset that such a distinction does not necessarily lead to the establishment of independent categories.

4.1 **Principal problems of a theoretical nature**

In touching upon the topic of the "theoretical" problems confronted in planning regional development in Latin America it might be necessary to distinguish between the problems which pertain to the basic concept of regional planning (i.e., those pertaining both to substantive theory and to procedural theory) and those

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1/ For Latin America as a whole, the most ambitious works are Stühr, W., *Regional development in Latin America: experiences and perspectives* (English translation issued by Nouton Pb., The Hague); Gilbert, A., *Latin American development: A geographical perspective*, Penguin, 1974; Alayev, N., *El desarrollo regional de los países latinoamericanos en los años 1950-1975*, CEPAL, Economic Development Division, 1975 (mimeo). Evaluations or general country descriptions are abundant and include the works of Haddad for Brazil (Haddad, 1978), Jatobá (also for Brazil) (Jatobá, 1978), Boisier for Chile (Boisier, forthcoming), Hilhorst for Peru (Hilhorst, forthcoming), Unikel for Mexico (Unikel, 1978) and Carrillo-Arronte (also for Mexico) (Carrillo-Arronte, 1978).
problems which, while of a more general nature, are no less important and relate to the way in which regional planning fits into proposals for social change and therefore to a theoretical interpretation of the whole of society and its processes of change.

From this last point of view, it may be asked whether or not the changes projected in the regional development strategies have been functional, i.e., whether or not they meet the interests of the groups in control of the State. If not, the result would have been an erroneous interpretation of the political functioning of the society.

The examination of the experience of some Latin American countries does not furnish a precise reply to this question. Even in those cases where the regional project was politically well established, the short-term problems, arising from the prevailing economic situation and created in part by regional planning itself, in the end neutralized the regional planning efforts. It would be possible to build up examples, such as that of Chile during the period 1964-1973, to illustrate this.

In other cases, the error was more apparent, and regional development planning simply lacked political viability.

As Solari, Franco and Jutkowitz pointed out in commenting on the well-known book by Cibotti and Bardeci, "...Thus they reach the conclusion that a basic problem lies in the question of their (the plans') political and social viability. It is useless for the planner to include big projects such as land reform in the absence of political conditions conducive to their implementation. This underlines the importance of carefully studying the existing political conditions, the distribution / of power
of power, the pressure groups, the interests harmed by this or that aspect of the plan and similar factors. Although the authors (Cibotti and Bardeci) do not say so in so many words, if the plan is a political project, a political diagnosis is required in advance. Otherwise nothing is known about the feasibility of the plans, and the planning may become a futile exercise involving the preparation of documents whose suggestions will never be followed". (Solari, Franco and Jutkovitz, 1976, p.605).

Since in national regional development strategies the change in the ways in which surpluses are appropriated, and subsequently in the direction of interregional transfers, was contrary to the past form of appropriation, a sine qua non of such as the one suggested in the quotation above. Actually such a diagnosis was never made. It was simply presumed, very ingenuously, that the interest of the executive power in the formulation of regional development strategies was enough to make the process viable. The real power structure was unknown, and it was only very late that the regional planners discovered that their profession had a real Pandora's box hidden within it.

In the light of the present experience, a notable example of political functionalism in regional planning (within the framework of the Latin American capitalist systems) may be the case of Panama; in any case, in that country it will be necessary to observe the effects of regional development efforts on the new situation resulting from the recovery of the Canal Zone.
In any case, an important problem tackled by regional planning in Latin America has been its low level of political functionalism. The handy argument of "the lack of political will to make plans progress" seems to be particularly valid in this case. Is there a lack of political will, or a lack of ability to convince on the part of regional planners with regard to the benefit of a regional effort for the development of a capitalist economy? Is it not possible that the regional planners themselves have not been very successful in furnishing a substantive demonstration of the need for such an effort, which calls for an analysis of:

(a) the underdeveloped position of the regions; (b) the need for development; and (c) the fact that only planning can ensure development in countries like the Latin American countries.\(^1\)

One of the biggest problems of theory in the field of regional planning and one which bears the greatest responsibility for making decision-taking difficult, is the "efficiency-equity conflict". As Richardson comments in his recent review of "The State of Regional Economics":

"The regional policy problem is frequently conceived as implying a 'trade-off' between aggregate efficiency and inter-regional equity. The policy-maker's task is then to determine society's (or his own) preferences between efficiency and equity and locate the point on the trade-off function (assuming that this can be derived) most consistent with these preferences" (Richardson, 1978).

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\(^1\) Solari, Franco and Jutkowitz, op. cit., p. 586.
Leaving aside the ambiguity with which the concepts of efficiency and equity are handled, the practical significance of the conflict has been that the allocation of resources on the basis of a criterion of efficiency would mean using the scarce resources in the economy for the expansion of those activities which are the most profitable. Such activities are primarily located in capitalized regions with the result that the criterion of efficiency is of no help to the poorer regions. On the other hand, the allocation of resources on the basis of a criterion of equity will mean using them in those very regions which are the most backward and where returns are lowest. Consequently, the criterion of equity would imply a social cost in that the potential rate of growth of the economy would be reduced.

In examining the way in which this problem has been dealt with in the regional development policies of Brazil, Jotabá states that "... the solution to the conflict is to be found entirely at the political level particular case, while the state of the art is of little importance (Jotabá, 1978). This certainly very widely supported view of assigning the problem to the realm of political decision does not seem very promising, nor does the attempt to erect on increasingly restrictive assumptions transformational functions whereby (supposedly) to measure the "rate of substitution" between efficiency and equity, which has been the approach taken by Mera, for example (Mera, 1967). According to Mera's analysis, the cost of efficiency in terms of equity would vary with the possible rate of substitution among factors of production; the closer the regional production functions come to the fixed-coefficient type of function, the lower the cost of one objective in terms of the other. / Whatever their
Whatever their choice of approach—relegating the question entirely to the political sphere or attempting to measure the value of transformation—the suspicion is growing among the experts that the conflict is far from being universal or general and that it will be possible to find more and more cases of compatibility.¹

Apart from the weight which distribution criteria might acquire, and apart from the displacement of the problem to a broader time frame, there are other little explored examples of compatibility. In Richardson's words, "To sum up, although it is undeniable that the trade-off problem frequently occurs, there are situation when it is possible to sustain an efficiency case for interregional equity strategies. The arguments may include the pursuit of long term rather than short term efficiency, maximization of the social rate of return (taking account of negative externalities in prosperous regions and positive externalities in underdeveloped regions), exploiting immobile idle resources, mitigating inflation and minimizing environmental degradation." (Richardson, 1978).

In the debate between efficiency and equity (which in practice tends to end in favour of efficiency, particularly when the global strategy is oriented towards rapid industrialization) a singularly important fact has been obscured which on not a few occasions has made the discussion sterile, at least as that fact is usually exposed. This is the relation between inequality in the distribution of personal income and inequality in the interregional distribution of income.

¹/ Beyond the solution provided by the elementary version of the neoclassical model (complete mobility, absence of externalities).
"Statements that (intra) regional income equalization will diminish total income inequality must be treated with a similar degree of circumspection. First, the relation or contribution of regional income differentials to total personal income inequality may be insignificant. Economic inequality is associated primarily with personal and other characteristics, including age, sex, education, occupation, etc. In Brazil, where both personal income concentration and spatial differentials are marked, income variations among regions do not contribute substantially to the observed total inequality in personal income distribution (Fishlov, 1972; Langoni, 1973). Existing personal economic inequality would persist even if full regional equalization of income were to occur". (Gilbert, 1976, p.124).

To sum up, although the argument for efficiency has had more weight than the argument for equity (partly because the conflict has been formalized on the basis of neoclassical constructions), there are beginning to be growing doubts as to its validity. In any case, the fact is that it has obstructed the implementation of regional development strategies. A pending task for regional planners is to demonstrate either the compatibility between global growth (if it is still important) and the reduction of interregional inequalities or the slight impact of interregional inequalities on interpersonal inequalities.

Another question of theory which has made it difficult to design regional strategies and put them into practice is, as was pointed out above, associated with the theory of polarized development. Since this matter has been the subject of a full public debate, it is not necessary to refer to it extensively; in any case, a comprehensive analysis of the problem is necessary. /Almost without
Almost without exception all the national regional development strategies formulated in Latin America were based upon or owed their treasonableness to the theory of poles of the exceptions being Cuba and Panama. Also almost without exception, what was done was to try to mechanistically within a given context, (That of Latin America), a presumably functional strategy to the regional situation of developed economies. No investigation was made of the not always explicit but basic assumptions of the original somewhat ideological but chiefly technological exposition; and what became an extremely restricted formula for promoting regional development was therefore held to be something of a "magical formula for industrialization and development". The "development pole" idea was generalized to the point where it became the battle cry for each and every community.

The present situation of the debate (in its technical aspects) may be summarized as follows:

(a) The idea of introducing a destabilizing element (a pole or key industry) in an area with the aim of producing the generalized growth of the whole range of regional activities seems appropriate if, and only if, the area offers a sufficiently diversified economic structure. This comes as the (analytically demonstrable) result of its being the regional multiplier (of employment or the product) to an extent directly proportional to the degree of regional economic diversification. This means (as is logical, moreover, given the regional context of the theory) that the polarized development strategy is effective in activating industrially diversified regions which, for one reason or another, are economically depressed;

(b) To use
(b) To use a polarized development strategy for purposes of promoting the development of areas with specialized structures, it is necessary to introduce simultaneously a network of activities such as to create in the area a complete (or sufficiently complete) range of interindustrial relations. This, however, raises a problem of scale—the massive use of resources, which, in itself, limits the application and, of course, the dissemination of such a strategy. Any of the alternatives tend to produce enclaves.

To accept the former solution is still a long way from the "burial of the growth pole idea" referred to by Kamal Salih (Salih, 1975). It would be necessary merely to recognize that a polarized development strategy is applicable in very special and restrictive conditions but that it will still be a part of national regional development strategies. In any case, it constituted one of the most serious problems of theory with regard to the strategies formulated in Latin America.

The whole centre-periphery approach and its use in structuring regional development strategies is bound up in the question of polarized development.

As early as 1966, John Friedmann wrote that owing to the historical development of centre-periphery relations in the interior of countries, the regional problem had for the first time become an issue of national importance (Friedmann, 1966). The same author indicated three structural characteristics typical of the centre-periphery model at the national level: (i) A colonial relationship; \( ^{1/} \) (ii)

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\( ^{1/} \) Not necessarily "domestic colonialism" of the type referred to by González Casanova, but rather "domination".
deterioration of the terms of trade and (iii) political pressure from the periphery to reverse the pattern of the model. Hilhorst has made a comprehensive analysis of the centre-periphery theory and of the Perroux theory of domination (Hilhorst, 1971).

The "centre-periphery" theory is part and parcel of the thinking at CEPAL, and given its explanatory and methodological value in the analysis of inter-country relations, there was always a tendency to apply the same ideas in studying the relations among areas in the same country. As Pinto put it, "since within each country, similar -although bearing their own stamp- problems arise in the relations among sectors and units which absorb technical progress at different rates and also operate at different levels of efficiency" (Pinto, 1965). According to Alayev, the transfer of the method from the international to the interregional scale is justified by the fact that the constructiveness of the method is not lost since at the national level almost the same powers and forces as those in the world centre-periphery system would operate (Alayev, 1973).

The implicit idea (that certain processes and methods may be scaled down without losing their intrinsic characteristics) is, to say the least, suspect. This is in fact an example of the central idea in the "centre down" paradigm (Hansen, 1973). It must, however, be recognized that arguments, both speculative and empirical, seem to be mounting in favour of the positive validity of the centre-periphery model at the national level.1/

The structural characteristics of a national version of the centre-periphery model described by Friedmann may be recouched more concretely. There are a number of necessary and sufficient conditions which must be met if the centre-periphery model is to be applicable as an explanation of the economic-spatial functioning of a regional system. The necessary conditions are: (i) the generation of surpluses, particularly international trade surpluses, in the economic activity of the periphery; (ii) the existence of a relationship in which the periphery is dominated by one or more centres; (iii) trade relations which are unfavourable to the periphery in its transactions with the centre or centres. The sufficient condition is the existence of machinery for the exaction and transfer of the surplus which may operate simply by means of the price system or through the adverse effect of national economic policies on the periphery.

Another aspect to which attention should be drawn in a discussion of the whole "centre-periphery" problem is related to the kinds of ownership of the regional resources. The fact is that the greater the extra-regional dominion over the natural and productive resources, the easier it is to transfer surpluses from one area to another. Another contributing factor in this connexion is the diversity in the geographical patterns of distribution of the "plants" and "head offices" of industries and businesses.

The notable fact is that in spite of the relatively abundant literature on the topic and of the unquestioned influence of CEPAL on Latin American planners, one of the few regional development strategies, apart from the initial case of Venezuela which discusses the topic explicitly (leaving the model aside in this case) is the
strategy of Panama. This has been a problem in that once the theory has been proven empirically in a given case (or not wholly refuted, in the Popperian sense), the resulting strategy is very direct (development poles, price policies and the like). In this sense, it would be possible to detect more than one inconsistency between the strategy proposals made in different countries and the real theoretical explanation of the spatial functioning of those same countries.

Finally, another problem of theory in this field which has not been adequately solved is the problem of the size of countries and of the adjusting of (or failure to adjust) the instruments of regional planning to countries of limited geographical area. Again, the usual course has been to apply the same ideas and instruments indiscriminately regardless of the size (and of the effects of the size) of each country.

A large share of this theory and practice of regional or spatial planning is at present based on the concept of large spaces and on the possibility of reproducing, in sufficiently differentiated sub-national spaces, the structures and mode of operation which characterize the relations between the centre and the national periphery. There is still the possibility, however, that the analytical arsenal built on such foundations will not be completely applicable to the case of small countries, where spatial friction plays a different role, or in the case of regions of small size.

This has barely been explored, which is paradoxical in view of the fact that regional planning is a direct descendant of spatial economics, whose development was partially a reaction to the neglect of spatialism in traditional economic theory.
4.2 Principal methodological problems

The methodological problems relate to one of the typical components of an economic planning situation as described in the initial pages of this document. This component is the planning process or planning procedure.

Is there a regional planning process or procedure? Generally speaking, the reply is affirmative if the theory of Hilhorst, for example is accepted in that a planning process is defined in three stages: (i) the identification of objectives; (ii) the selection of instruments and (iii) the use of those instruments (Hilhorst, 1971).

Hilhorst's exposition is oversimplified, however, in that, in the case of regional planning as it is understood today, a distinction must be made between two hierarchically dependent levels of procedure – the process of inter-regional planning and, within its framework, the process of intra-regional planning. The two processes are interdependent but different in that the stages comprising them are not necessarily the same in terms of content and/or their relative priority.

The way in which the two are articulated throws light on the first of the methodological problems detectable in the regional planning experience in Latin America. What type of procedure should be followed in planning the development of a region in the context of an interregional development plan?

Since the reduction to scale of the interregional procedure is easily criticized in this case, a possible reply may lie in picking out what is basically strategical and political (in the sense of political negotiation) in the interregional procedure,1/ which leads

to the design of a process radically different from the traditional one and at the same time sufficiently interconnected with the interregional process. This type of proposal is included in the present movement to revise the theory and practice of regional planning all over the world (Friedmann and Douglas, 1975; Stöhr and Todling, 1977; Coraggio, 1976).

The absence of an adequate intraregional planning procedure produced one of the following effects: either national regional development plans simply did not succeed in stating their interregional component or else interregional plans divorced from the national plan were formulated generally with a methodology appropriate more to global than to regional planning.

Another general problem of a methodological nature is seen in the lack of formal and substantive integration of the regional development strategy or plan with the corresponding global plan. This was due to numerous causes, the basic ones being the difference in the professional training of global and regional planners and the notable unevenness, in terms of analysis, of the global and regional proposals. While the global planners, with all the formalizing capacity of economic analysis at their disposal, were able to make concrete replies to such basic questions as how much to invest, how far a country can go into debt and what the probable rise in prices will be, the regional planners were to some extent forced to operate at a very discursive, vague and long-term level.

If attention were now focused on the interregional planning process itself, it might be possible to formulate methodological observations at each step in the process. For the purposes of this analysis however, attention must be drawn to two matters:

/ In the
In the first place, a few short remarks must be made concerning the regional diagnoses.

On numerous occasions it has been pointed out that the majority of the regional diagnoses prepared in Latin America have been descriptive documents, but with a very limited positive or interpretative dimension. If interpretation is lacking, it is impossible to establish relations of causality in respect of the facts described, or if such relations are established, it is the result of intuition rather than of planning. The inability to establish causal relations in turn impedes policy identification, and when policies are identified, they are directed more to the apparent effects than to the causes.

This want of diagnostic interpretation must be attributed primarily to the fact that regional development theories are still embryonic and secondarily to the difficulty (more apparent than real in any case) of quantifying and formalizing regional phenomena, which itself has resulted from the scarcity of statistical data and of appropriate techniques.

Secondly, some observations may be made with regard to the objectives usually set forth in regional planning.

In this connexion, two considerations arise, the first of which is the greater complexity of the process of establishing objectives in regional planning as compared, for example, with global planning. This greater complexity is due to the fact of working simultaneously with three objects of planning; i.e., each region, the multiregional system and the national space. This, in its turn, raises complex problems of compatibility. On the other hand, and to leave the distinction made above aside for the moment, the basic problem with
regard to regional objectives has been precisely their inconsistency with global objectives. This should not necessarily be confused with the question of political functionality mentioned in the preceding section because even when such functionality has existed, the problem of consistency, extending even beyond the "efficiency-equity" question, remains.

For example, is the global objective of stability consistent with the regional objective of accelerating the industrialization of some area or other?

The exercise of verifying the consistency of regional and global objectives has rarely been carried out. One notable exception is observed in Bolivia, where at the beginning of the last decade, the United Nations Advisory Team (PODERBO Project) examined this factor as part of the task of formulating a long-term regional development strategy.

Obviously, if such an examination is not made, the probabilities of producing contradictory policies increase significantly, and the possibilities of incorporating regional objectives in general development plans shrink, although only because of the natural suspicion of global planners (for whom the analysis of the consistency of objectives is virtually routine of totally unevaluated proposals).

In addition, and to end this summary consideration of a number of methodological problems, attention must also be drawn to the sizable lag in the techniques of evaluating projects on the basis of regional criteria, which has made it difficult to defend the reasonableness of not a few regional proposals.
4.3 Principal operational problems

Operational problems affect the initiation or implementation of regional development strategies.

Regionalization itself must necessarily be singled out as the principal problem with regard to implementation. The problems arising out of attempts to justify certain regionalization efforts have been associated with two factors: the artificiality of some proposals and the political repercussions of regionalization.

With regard to the first of these factors, it is necessary to bear in mind that to a large extent the delineation of regions in Latin America (during the past two decades at least) was usually a priority task of the regional planners. The regions identified are in some cases really artifacts which do not actually correspond to the social powers and/or pre-existent bonds of loyalty. Nothing was known of the many-faceted nature of a region, from the differentiated space continuum to the collective consciousness of belonging to a place.

Naturally the attempt to delimit a social and political reality characterized by strong feelings of belonging, association and identity in geographical categories drawn up on purely economic lines gave rise to political and social resistance which ended by rendering the regionalization project sterile. This was true of Chile where some areas in the north and south during the period 1964 through 1970 were concerned, and also more recently of Ecuador in respect of the province of Chimborazo.

/ On some
On some occasions, local feeling is such a powerful force that any attempt at regionalization in which an effort is made to rationalize the structure of spatial relations is automatically doomed to failure. This seems, to some extent, to be Bolivia's case. As is shown in the comprehensive analysis of that country presented above, the proposed strategy in Bolivia all but avoids the question of regionalization, preferring to concentrate entirely on space and on the strengthening of institutions.

Sometimes, as in the case of Guatemala, the line of least resistance is taken and sectoral regionalization (the agricultural sector in this case) is adopted.

In this context it is worthwhile citing some of Alayev's comments on what happened in Latin America between 1950 and 1975.

"In the year 1950 the 19 Latin American countries were divided into 357 first-order administrative territorial units. Three hundred and twenty-six of those units belonged, on the basis of their degree of autonomy, to the 'first class' (states, provinces, departments), and 31 of them under the direct jurisdiction of the Central Government and endowed with special status (territories, intendencias, commissariats, regions) belonged to what we call the 'second class'. In the period roughly between 1970 and 1975, the total number of first-order divisions rose to 374, an increase of 17 units; as is well known, the number of second-class units decreased by 11 to only 20 units while the first class units rose by 28, to 354 units.

"The indicator of the percentage of population affected by the administrative changes (living in areas which have changed their 'status', going from one class to another, or their jurisdiction from one administrative centre to another) is as follows:

/ Brazil and
It is seen that in seven of these countries (all but Haiti, whose example is of little importance), the extent of the administrative reforms in the reorganization of the territory was modest; in 10 countries, as has already been stated, the administrative systems remained intact throughout the period, with one notable exception in the case of Chile, which will be discussed below.

"This scant mobility of the Latin American administrative systems (the changes mentioned affected only 2.6% of the continental population) call for a special investigation; let us confine ourselves to the conclusion that alongside the centralizing traditions there also exists a conservative tradition in respect of administrative division.

"The following table was drawn up on the basis of the materials from the Second Latin American Seminar on Regionalization and of the analytical study carried out by the Latin American Centre for Economic Projections of CEPAL with a few additional observations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil and Honduras</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Number of administrative divisions 1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"On the average, one region in terms of the plan corresponds to 3 or 4 administrative regions. But what is this correspondence? Is there any correspondence or 'congruity', as it is called, between the two systems? Congruity—when a region in terms of the planning system corresponds to the total number of administrative regions and the outer limits of a region under the planning system and the total number of administrative regions territorially coincide—exists in 6 countries (Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Haiti and Panama). In the other countries the territorial systems used in the plan are totally or partially incongruent with the administrative systems. This becomes all the more curious in view of the fact that theoretically the need for regional congruity, both outside and within Latin America, was established a long time ago. It seems

/ that the
that the majority of countries on the continent stand in need of more radical territorial administrative reforms. Since a wide range of activities (health, education and living programmes; the budgetary system; the collection of statistical data, etc.) are conducted through the administrative units, it may be concluded that the retention of incongruity results in discrepancy between economic and other government activities.

"When regionalization appears in the Latin American countries, the following pattern will emerge: first, planning areas will be created; second, the administrative system will be made congruent with the planning system; finally, the economic regions will be given the powers and functions of the first-order administrative units; in many cases and especially in those countries which are large in size, the old units will not disappear but will constitute a level half way between the new big units and the municipalities, which will have to be divided up later. (Alayev, op. cit.).

On the other hand, the attempt to introduce administrative regionalization clearly meant altering the pattern of the distribution of power within the internal and public administration apparatuses of each country. This resulted in political resistance at two levels: that of the rest of the institutions in the public sector and that of the administrative authorities (intendants, governors, mayors, etc.).

In all cases it has been difficult to readapt both the public and the internal administrations to the new structures proposed by the regional development strategy; in this connexion, the relatively inflexible position of the regional planners themselves has not been very helpful.
In this sense, Chile is an example of authoritarian but undeniably effective imposition of regionalization for purposes more of modifying the internal administration system than of planning. Venezuela, at the other extreme, may be cited as a case where flexible political negotiation achieved the establishment of a regionalization project.

Apart from the operational problem posed by the attempts at regionalization themselves, the regional development strategies suffered mainly from a lack of continuity in the application of the policies and of enough technical teams for each of the proposed regional administrations.

The lack of continuity evidenced in frequent changes in regional priorities has been due to various factors, including the absence of a supra-ministerial body (on the lines of a council of ministers for regional development) capable of going beyond the fluctuations of short-term policy and therefore of adopting long-term political decisions. The fact is that, even when it has a certain air of escapism about it, the modification of the existing patterns of regional development is a task which, although its results are long-term, is no less imperative now.
5. The role of regional planning in Latin America during the next decade

The preceding sections of this document may have left a relatively poor impression with regard to the implementation of regional planning in Latin America. Such an opinion would be only partially correct because while it is true that the "problems" relating to the regional experience have been pinpointed, it is no less true that the efforts for development and regional planning have by no means been discarded. Quite the contrary: today not only is renewed interest in the topic perceptible, but an attempt is being made in a number of countries to incorporate some aspects of regional development in the constitution itself. Likewise, the United Nations now supports sound technical co-operation programmes in this field in at least five Latin American countries (Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Venezuela and Ecuador), which shows the interest of Governments in incorporating the regional dimension in their development plans.

The regional question may be viewed from three complementary angles depending on the way it relates to big national problems.

First, it may be viewed as a question of adaptation or functionality in respect of the organization of space and the global development model. All ways in which space can be organized

1/ The organization of space relates to the structure (at a given moment) of human settlements and production bases, the network which links them up and the flows of resources, people and goods which are observed in that structure.

/ are not
are not equally efficient in terms of different development models (or styles). For example, space organized in a highly concentrated way presents added difficulties under an "inward-looking" development strategy or model, whereas, on the other hand, it may be an efficient kind of organization in relation to and "outward-looking" development model. A system of urban centres characterized by a high degree of primacy and marked urban-rural discontinuity is a stumbling block in the achievement of objectives such as national integration and social equity because of the obstacles to spatial diffusion inherent in such a system. According to Hermansen, the way in which the relationship between economic development and the organization of space is handled is reflected in two approaches to and ways of practicing regional planning: adaptive regional planning and regional development planning (Hermansen, 1970).

Second, it may be treated as a question of efficiency in the design and implementation of national economic policies. As mentioned above, structural heterogeneity has a geographical or territorial dimension, and therefore the implementation of homogenous or non-discriminatory type policies either does not allow for certain localized focal groups or else tends to worsen the situation with regard to the least developed regions.

Third, it may be viewed as a question of power distribution, particularly within the public administration system. Thus any attempt to establish a society with a relative balance of power confers an eminently political dimension on regional planning. In this case, some of the process of power distribution is in operation in a wide range of organizations of the territorial type and also at various levels in the hierarchy of territorially established authority.
Consideration such as those mentioned above justify, at it were, the establishment of a regional planning component in systems administering development. The following sections contain an exposition—a thesis—of the contribution which regional planning should be able to make to the economic, social and political development of Latin America in the immediate future and later.

5.1 Regional development and economic development

The relationship between regional development and economic development may appear obvious and simplistic since no author or expert would cast doubt on the affirmation that economic development should be understood to be a socially inclusive, rather than exclusive, process; and if, at the same time, it is postulated that it is preferable for regional development to be aimed at the incorporation of relatively backward areas and/or populations, the relationship between the two could only be one of positive association.

It is, however, one thing to accept positive association in generic terms and something else again to prove that economic development cannot succeed unless a regional development process precedes or runs parallel to it. In what follows a somewhat less ambitious course will be taken, and an attempt will be made to demonstrate the relationship between regional development and certain things usually considered to be central to economic development.

Economic growth—a sustained increase in the productive capacity of an economy—is, as is all too well known, associated with investment (as well as with other factors such as technological innovations and the quality of human resources). Thus, the
question of regional versus global growth (as the problem is usually posed) becomes in the last analysis a question of where to invest, geographically speaking.

The discursive argument whether to invest in the "centre" or in certain places in the "periphery" is not carried by either side. The choice of a strategy must necessarily be based on quantitative analysis. The factual conditions of each country will play a decisive role since there are reasons for expecting that countries at different stages of development, of different size and population and with different resource endowment and patterns of settlement will produce strategies which also differ. In addition, the time span worked with will determine the choice of strategy.

The debate on this point has tended towards the polarization of those who take an absolute stand either for investment in the periphery or for investment in the centre; so is hard to believe that framing the discussion in these terms would be of help in finding a socially effective solution.

To illustrate the way in which the problem should be posed it is worthwhile commenting briefly on the Rahman model (Rahaman, 1963). Working with a dynamic programming model of an economy of two regions in which the rates of saving and marginal coefficients of capital-yield are given and constant, Rahman demonstrates that maximum growth of the total income is not necessarily achieved by allocating the total investment flow to the more productive region throughout the whole programming period. Given the marginal coefficients of capital-yield, the decisive elements are the rates of saving.
If the more highly developed region technically also shows the bigger rate of saving, the other region has no economic argument for reversing the investment policy in its favour. If, however, the less highly developed region has the same high rate of saving, the optimum strategy from the point of view of maximizing the aggregate growth may be to concentrate the investment in this region initially for a certain length of time, even if this means a short-term loss in production and income. This, however, is an optimum strategy only if the programming period is sufficiently long to allow the initial loss of income to be compensated within the same programming period because of the higher rate of saving of the less well developed region.

In spite of certain limitations in the Rahman model, which, moreover, have been referred to in the literature on the subject, it is important to bring his work to bear in this connexion not only because of its intrinsic value but also because it dates back relatively far, which notes it clear that it has not been a lack of analytical models that has prevented the quantification and objectification of the problem of the territorial allocation of investments and hence of the problem of regional versus global growth.¹

¹ Many other authors, none of them Latin American, have touched on the same topic. See, for example, the works of Reiner (1965), Hermansen (1975) and Siebert (1969).
Price stability is another big aspect of the general question development and its, moreover, a closely linked to growth. For various well-known reasons, the inflation is one of the over-riding concerns of government, and here again it would be appropriate to wonder whether there is any relation between the regional question and the size of price rises and whether some inflationary pressures might be relieved by controlling certain aspects of regional development.

This is a virtually unexplored topic despite a suggestive work by Higgins (Higgins, 1973), who has argued that the reduction of regional disequilibria is important for keeping rates of inflation down. His argument is based on the theory that labour markets are regional more than national whereas price rises are rapidly diffused throughout the national economy. Higgins's analysis is based on the well-known Phillips curve, i.e., on the relation between unemployment and inflation. In Higgins's view, those countries with the worst "trade-off", i.e., with high levels of inflation combined with high rates of unemployment are at the same time countries such as Brazil and Indonesia, which show very significant regional disparities. Conversely, the Phillips curves for countries such as England, Sweden and Australia, where there is practically no regional gap, are relatively favourable. According to Higgins, the reason for this is that in the first case inflation is produced in one region and unemployment is concentrated in others.

This is a subject which requires a great deal of further investigation. It goes without saying that the demonstration of some special relationship between inflationary pressures and regional imbalances will be going a long way towards associating the regional question with a political issue of national importance and thus will advance the task of incorporating regional action into the decision-making processes most relevant to economic policy.
Income distribution is perhaps the central topic in the present debate on economic development. As the general terms in which the question is couched are sufficiently well known, it is unnecessary to repeat them here, and it is preferable to proceed directly to a consideration of the ways in which regional development and distribution relate.

Three aspects of the question are relevant here: territorial differentiation in the pattern of income distribution, the sometimes opposing roles of inter and intraregional income distribution, and the issue of critical poverty.

The first of these factors is fairly simple. In the final analysis personal income distribution is not a problem which can be considered to be purely national with no geographical dimensions. Some of the few empirical studies available show that even in countries of very limited geographical size, the patterns of distribution tend to differ significantly from area to area; what is even more important, the factors responsible for this also tend to be different. 1/ CEPAL also reached a similar conclusion in a study in which income distribution in some metropolitan areas in various countries was compared with that in the rest of the territory. 2/

1/ According to a study prepared in 1974 by the Statistics and Census Bureau, this is true of Panama.

The conclusion which brings to mind is that in many cases, it is impossible to tackle the problem of income distribution without explicitly differentiating between regions in redistribution policies. In this regard, however, general principles cannot be established since, as was discussed above, in other cases the contribution of spatial heterogeneity to the total heterogeneity of income distribution may be non-existent or very limited.

The second factor has been very well dealt with in the literature on the subject, and it might be said, in this connexion, that there is now a consensus. The lessening of the income inequalities among regions may be and usually is accompanied by an increase in the disparity in income distribution within each region. It is not difficult to offer mathematical proof that an increase in interregional equity may be accompanied by a decrease in intraregional equity and, depending on the magnitude of the increase in international equity, an increase in international equity.*

A neo-classical discussion of an empirical example of this was prepared by Barkin in the case of Mexico (Barkin, 1972). Gilbert and Goodman come to the following conclusion in their recent analysis concerning the northeast of Brazil:

"The criterion of regional income equalization should be used with care. It is not difficult to conceive ways in which regional income convergence may occur without leading either to rapid national growth or to an improvement in the situation of the poor. Specifically, regional income convergence may be associated with negligible gains in (or sometimes even a lowering of)

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*real incomes*
real incomes of the poorest groups in society and with a worsening of the size distribution of incomes within the poorest regions" (Gilbert and Goodman, 1976).

The third factor -critical poverty- has been the subject of numerous studies recently. These have thrown light on two relevant facts from the regional point of view: first the "poverty maps" or "poverty x-rays" have made it possible to identify given areas or regions in which the level of collective poverty exceeds given limits; this, in its turn, should have helped to formulate strategy options favouring direct aid to people rather than localities. Secondly, studies of a more analytical nature (Molina and Piñera; 1979) have shown that the geographical dimension of poverty is an important explanatory variable. Although it is true that the analysis is up to date in terms of rural-urban categories, it is no less true that in many cases this categorization coincides with regional classifications.

The foregoing arguments throw light on the contribution which regional development and planning can make with respect to a problem as crucial as distribution, particularly by showing the geographical dimension of something traditionally considered to be a typical "national" problem.

1/ The surveys on the localization of poverty carried out in Panama and Chile, for example.

2/ This is a basic option in any regional development strategy.
Employment is another of the classical problems within the development debate, and, in some sense, employment and technology are two sides of the same coin.

The technology-employment binomial has been fairly thoroughly studied in regional terms, at least insofar as the evaluation of certain specific experiences is concerned. The general conclusion of these studies is well summarized in the following remarks by Stöhr and Todtling on the transfer of technology and capital to peripheral areas: "These capital and technology transfers are used in practically all the countries analyzed. Essentially they are instruments supposed to create as far as factor availability and infrastructure are concerned, conditions in peripheral areas, more like those of core regions. The strong emphasis of most regional development policies on capital incentives and on the introduction of high technology (often incorporated in capital) have stimulated the emergence of capital intensive industries in peripheral areas and have thereby increased regional productivity and regional output".

"At the same time the effects have produced relatively small employment effects and contributed comparatively little... in spite of the application of employment premium in some countries". (Stöhr and Todtling, 1978).

1/ Two interesting studies in the Latin American context are those of Koch-Weser for the northeast of Brazil (Koch-Weser, 1973) and Izaguirre for Venezuelan Guayana (Izaguirre, 1977).

2/ Italicized in the original.
The real issue however, is not to prove the capital-intensive nature of a large number of regional industrialization policies but rather to find and exploit other alternatives with a larger employment effect.

From this point of view, it is necessary to return to the thinking of Schumacher on "intermediate technology" and the regional scope which the author himself conferred on it. The distinguished German economist notes, the real task may be formulated in four propositions: Firstly, that jobs must be created in the areas where people actually live, and not primarily in the metropolitan areas towards which they tend to emigrate.

Second, that these jobs must on the average be sufficiently cheap for them to be created in large numbers without requiring an unreachable level of capital formation and imports.

Third, that the production methods used must be relatively simple in order to minimize the requirements for skilled personnel not only in the production processes but also with respect to organization, supply of raw materials, financing, marketing, etc.

Fourth, that production should be carried out primarily with local resources and principally for local use.

These four requirements may be met only insofar as a 'regional' approach to development prevails and, furthermore only if a deliberate effort is made to develop and apply what may be termed 'intermediate technology' (Schumacher, 1977).

This type of approach is clearly related to some of the characteristics assigned to the 'from-the-bottom-up' paradigm, specifically with respect to the use of small or medium-scale technology involving the increased use in situ of regional resources and primarily aimed at meeting the basic needs of each region.

/ So that
So that regional development strategies may make an effective contribution to solving employment problems, it will be necessary first to change the traditional objectives of regional development plans, which are still overly slanted towards economic growth targets, so as to promote the maximization of jobs. Clearly, this will also assist in achieving greater distributive equity.

What is surprising in the light of the currently serious problems of unemployment in many Latin American countries, however, is that whereas the simple identification, at the level of each region, of the sectors with the highest employment multipliers could assist in directing public expenditure in a manner perhaps more efficient than the traditional one, this does not take place in practice.

Although the use of intermediate or "socially suitable" technology may contribute, as mentioned above, to alleviating the problem of unemployment, it is equally certain that only a radical change in the territorial concentration pattern may solve it. This amounts to maintaining that the problem of massive, structural unemployment may only be solved in the regional development sphere, due to the combined effect of two forces; on the one hand migration, the increase of which tends to add to the geographical concentration of the population and consequently of the labour force; and on the other, technology, which generates a lower growth rate of demand for labour by industry and in general, by the formal urban sectors. These two tendencies produce a chain reaction, beginning with an increase in the rate of under-utilization of the labour force, which in turn leads to an increase in the size of the informal sector, which has direct repercussions on average productivity, the income level of salaried workers and the poverty of broad social strata.

/ Ecological or
Ecological or environmental problems are undoubtedly one of the most important issues in the current discussion of development or of "another kind of development".

Perhaps the topic of eco-development is one of the social subjects most suitable for being handled through regional development strategies, partially due to the localized nature of the problems of the conservation and renewal of resources on the one hand and of pollution on the other.

In considering the concept of eco-development proposed by M. Strong and I. Sachs, Gutman states: "From this perspective, regional planning is an especially suitable framework for the promotion of eco-development. The regional planning approach coincides with the emphasis placed by eco-development on diversity of styles and the maximum use of the opportunities provided by the local ecosystem". (Gutman; 1977).

The association between this type of concern for resources and the environment and regional development is also one of the basic characteristics of the "from the bottom up" paradigm in regional planning.

To wind up this cursory examination of some of the relationships between regional development and economic development, it is worth repeating the opinion expressed long ago by an eminent Latin American, who wrote in the prologue to a classic ILPES book: "But let us single out and simultaneously anticipate what is perhaps its most important conclusion: development can be boosted dynamically only if its geographical range is extended, if it is liberated from the barriers which currently appear to separate and fragment it within countries, and if it is given a unity which at present it obviously lacks".

1/ From the prologue by Cristóbal Lara B. to the ILPES book, *Dos polémicas sobre el desarrollo de América Latina*, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, Chile, 1970.
5.2 Regional development and social development

Social development is a transformational process primarily, but not exclusively, involving the expansion of the opportunities for self-realization by persons, whether as individuals or as members of groups. In this sense, social development presupposes a certain manner of distributing the products of economic activity and general access to collective social services.

As was noted in the first pages of this document, increased social equity is achieved through the execution of spatial or regional policies, inasmuch as an individual's access to opportunities depends on his position not only in the social network, but also in the spatial network. In the following pages, some of regional development's possible contributions will be reviewed with respect to some general social development objectives.

A society's well-being is currently measured by the size of its gross national product. "GNP is a concept which can be measured statistically thus it satisfies the requirements of a technocratic conception of contemporary society, and apparently includes all the goods and services which the community may generate over time to satisfy the basic needs of its members".¹ This approach is being radically questioned, although the essentially utopian nature of most proposals for different development styles

¹ Project on styles of development and environment in Latin America, report No 2, November 1978, CEPAL, Santiago, Chile.
must be pointed out. Perhaps, however, what seems utopian or at least premature at the global social level would be less so at the geographically smaller regional level. Here perhaps, the margin of the "possible" would be greater, and consequently, some dimensions of another "style" of development might be viable.

Social development must be understood as being based on broader dimensions than what Allardt call the having dimension,¹ which involves material needs and the notion of the economic product. The same author proposes to reveal two other types of human needs which seem to be particularly appropriate for inclusion in regional plans: the need to love, referring to relations between individuals and measured by components such as local solidarity, family solidarity and friendship, and the need to be, referring to the degree of self-realization of individuals (versus the alienation of the individual in mass society) and expressed by components such as the degree of irreplaceability, quantity of political resources and access to the decision-making system possessed by each individual. Galtung adds two additional components of interest for regional development: the possibility of choosing varied life styles and the degree of local autonomy versus external control.

The needs to love and to be are most easily realized in proximate social spaces, which for that very reason are closer to the regional than the national dimension. It is this that, from the regional development point of view makes the above concepts especially interesting.

¹/ Quoted in Stöhr and Todtling, op. cit., 1977.
Proposals such as those included in the "from the bottom up" paradigm, the "selective spatial growth" strategy, or the "negotiated regional planning" strategy, all of which have been brought up in recent years, have the common element of favouring a type of regional development on the "human scale", in contrast to the traditional, large-scale paradigm, which is often socially disruptive.

The new trends beginning to emerge in regional planning tend to give it a much broader sociological dimension than in the past. One of the concepts which appears repeatedly in the current literature is that of self-reliance (Seers, 1977; Stöhr, 1978; Villamil, 1977). The motion of self-reliance in regional development is connected with the ability of each region to establish its own development targets and styles (within a unified national framework, naturally through greater capacity for political negotiation. It also implies a change in the systems of property and control and in consumption patterns. However, it should be recognized that little is known so far about the role which the notion of self-reliance may play in economic development.

The individual's opportunities for self-realization obviously depend on various factors pertaining to the social structure, for example social mobility. They also depend on the variety of the social structures and systems, and particularly on the lifestyles to which the individual may have access. These factors are closely related to the degree of unity or diversity of the styles of development contained in the regional development project. The more the proposed regional strategy is centralist and authoritarian and involves little participation (a common trait of nearly all of them at present), the weaker the ability of each community to define forms of organization and development bases on its own values, and consequently, the lower the degree of diversity. We shall return to this subject later.
Social development is associated with the idea of "modernization", and it has often been suggested that regional development strategies have the final purpose of "modernizing" regions.

The transition from a "traditional" society to a "modern" society implies:

(a) Changes in the predominant normative structure, within which individuals find themselves increasingly forced to act in ways that have been strictly established beforehand, by means of increasing the situations in which they may legitimately choose between various alternatives;

(b) That the institutionalization of tradition is replaced by the institutionalization of change;

(c) Growing specialization of institutions and the emergence of relatively autonomous and specific value systems for each institutional sphere.\(^1\)

This modernization process does not occur simultaneously throughout the territory; it arises principally in the large urban agglomerations and spreads throughout the space of functional relations as well as the space of urban relations.\(^2\) For this reason, the modernization of the whole society presupposes the existence of a continuous urban system, well-linked up with the system of rural settlements. As is well-known, the majority of urban systems in Latin America are discontinuous and of an extremely high degree of primacy. For this reason, the modernization

\(^1\) Solari, A., R. Franco and J. Jutkowitz, op. cit.

and particularly of farming, implies the need to "fill in the gaps" in the structure of the urban system, that is to say, it presupposes specific policies for developing the national urban system, an important part of the regional development policy.

The provision of certain collective services such as health, education, and housing has traditionally been considered to be a basic component of social development, within a restricted, sectoral perspective, certainly, but one which is nonetheless valid.

The relationship between regional development and the provision of such services is too obvious to be discussed in detail. It is sufficient to point out that in the European experience of regional planning, collective services that is to say, education, health, housing and recreational facilities, constitutes perhaps the most important component of regional plans, for which specific programming methodologies have been developed (Klaasen; 1968). At all events, the localization of services such as education and health is a typical regional development problem, since geographical accessibility here is a determining factor.

5.3 Regional development and political development

"Development is a total social process, and it is only for the sake of methodological convenience or in a partial sense that we may speak of economic, political, cultural and social development" (Jaguaribe; 1973). This quotation from Jaguaribe is useful in making explicit the artificial nature of the exposition: the separation for analytical purposes of a whole which in reality is indivisible.

To speak of political development, it is necessary to define an ideological position: the choice here is obviously of democracy as a form of political organization and, consequently, the concrete
expression of the term "political development". In proposing a specific political option, this document is merely reviving the best of the Institute's tradition, expressed for example in the numerous works of José Medina Echavarria.

The relationship between regional development and the functioning of a democratic society is dual, and should be perfectly clear.

On the one hand, a basic precondition for democratic coexistence is a balanced distribution of political power. A society in which the decision-making power is overly concentrated, whether in private groups, public bureaucrats, the governing party or any other organization, is not truly democratic.

It is not only the concentration of power as a measure of the relative quantity of power possessed by each agent which is of interest, however, but also the centralization of power, that is to say, the vertical form in which decisions are made within an organization. In fact, what is actually undemocratic is the combination of the concentration and centralization of power. This leads to the conclusion that in attempting to recreate a democratic society, attention must be paid both to the achievement of a more equitable distribution of power among the various social groups (including the State itself) and the distribution of each share of power among the elements forming the basis of an organization. With respect to the latter aspect, the decentralization of power will mean the transfer of part of the decision-making capacity to intermediate bodies either public or not, many of which are or should be organized on a territorial basis (from neighbourhood councils to regional development bodies).

/ What is
What is the role of a regional development project in this matter? It is dual. Firstly, it must determine the best distribution of power among the various territorial bodies, the jurisdiction of many of which will overlap to a certain degree (for example, the regional government and the provincial government). Second, it must determine the best possible combination of centralization and decentralization of decision-making power. The fact is that modern society requires a certain degree of centralization, although for no other than purely technological reasons, but the need for decentralization is also a fact. Solving the equation of these opposing forces is part of the task of regional development specialists.

On the other hand, and at a different level, a conception of democracy ambiguously associated with the idea of equality—which, moreover, is hard to pin down—seems to prevail in Latin America. This conception, whose origin probably goes back to the legacy of the French Revolution, has been deformed to the point of turning the notion of equality into one of uniformity, and the conclusion is drawn that the more uniform and standardized the society, the more democratic the social system. This real preinversion of egalitarianism per se has developed hand in hand with an excessive degree of State centralization, because an all-embracing central State is clearly a powerful instrument for imposing upon the entire society essentially uniform values, norms, procedures and lifestyles.

This, however, does not imply that the above-mentioned process has not had some positive aspects. Uniformity and centralization have to some extent been the price paid for national unity, an element which has characterized and distinguished some Latin American societies and which, in some respects, continues to attract the
attention of the foreign observer. As many have pointed out, however, this unity is more apparent than real, and is in fact based on the extent to which a State which is both extremely and relatively powerful succeeds in imposing itself. One immediate consequence of this way of viewing democracy is that the State tends to make perfectly standardized public responses to a variety of local problems, which in turn implies a high degree of misfunctioning or absolute failure of such responses.

In other latitudes, the idea of a democratic society seems to be associated more with the conflict of "diversity in unity", that is to say, the harmonious existence of a variety of development styles within the unifying framework of the Nation. Certainly, this conception is much more humanistic, since it respects the right of each community to select its form of organization and style of development without, naturally, leading to political fragmentation. This view of a society is more democratic not only because it leaves room for a spectrum of social expression, but also because it is more closely associated with the question of the participation of individuals and groups in the formation of their own models for local societies. From the point of view of the State's action, the stereotyped public response is avoided in this format; rather, a particularized response, deeply immersed in local realities and consequently essentially participative, is given priority.

It might be appropriate to investigate the extent to which this style of public action could be combined with the traditional, more centralized style in Latin America. Again, the role of a regional development project would consist of furnishing the rationale so that such a decentralized and participatory system could generate viable development proposals.
development proposals consonant with major national objectives and projects. A society which leaves room for regionalism in its proper sense is certainly a more democratic society.

6. Conclusions

The preceding pages have reviewed some aspects of the regional planning experience in Latin America that are considered relevant. The document has also tried to show the relationship between regional development and the integrated development of society, specifically pointing to the links between regional development and processes of change in the economic, social and political fields.

An initial question which arises from the above analysis is a result of a very positive intellectual type. It refers to a noticeable change in the capacity for original Latin American thinking in the field of regional development and planning. Over the last decade, the original sources of influence have given way to autochthonic thinking (within the boundaries of realism in this field) which are even echoed and taken up in other regions.1/

The first experiments in regional planning on the sub-continent were sharply influenced by the "TVA model" when the goal was principally the control of river basins, and by the "Cassa per il Mezzogiorno" model

1/ Proof of this is, for example, the growing quantity of works by Latin American authors which are being published in English, both in Europe and in the United States, and the constant references to Latin American writers appearing in books and texts published in the "centre".
when the purpose was industrialization. The 1950s and 1960s represent the peak of the process of importing approaches and ideologies for regional planning: the so-called "European" and "American" schools, associated with names such as Isard, Rodwin, Friedmann, Srfr, Ferroux, Hilhorst, Rochefort, Boudeville, exercised an irresistible influence and control, which had both positive and negative aspects, on political leaders and the area's regional planners themselves.

Still in connexion with the renovation movement in Latin American economic thinking, regional planners began to base their proposals: firstly on an analysis of Latin American reality, and second, on their contact with the major concepts of economic thinking being developed in the region, and particularly in CEPAI (centre-periphery, structural heterogeneity, dependence, planning, etc.). This led to the revision, rejection or adaptation of a large part of the theoretical and methodological baggage that had been imported and to an attempt, which is still going on, to generate original thinking. Since this entire process must be transmitted and discussed, it is perhaps the ILPES international courses on regional planning where this creative process is best expressed and collected.

Today we can truly talk of a "Latin American School" of regional economics, and this should be seen as an extremely important achievement, a direct product of Latin America's vast experience in regional development programmes.

This experience, as the analysis in this document shows, has many weaknesses and even fairly obvious errors. It itself has been the product of a necessary but also dangerous process of social apprenticeship: necessary, because any form of planning or attempt deliberately to control and direct social processes in itself implies a process of apprenticeship, and dangerous, since in the successive proofs of success and error, the latter may turn out to be more impressive than
impressive than the former, thus perhaps contributing to a gradual loss of the activity's political weight.

It is extremely difficult to evaluate the impact of the Latin American experience in regional planning, partly due to its variety and lack of continuity, but also in part because there are no appropriate techniques for evaluating plans (beyond the partial forms of evaluating the achievement of specific goals), that is to say, evaluation techniques for programmes with multiple targets have not been adequately disseminated and developed. In the case of intraregional programmes, evaluation is even more complicated because of the difficulty of distinguishing between the effects of endogenous and exogenous policies on the region. This accordingly makes it impossible to arrive at an overall judgement of the effectiveness of regional development programmes in this and in other cases.

This document has developed, in a fairly explicit manner, a thesis: regional development at the national scale cannot be considered a necessary precondition for the process of social modernization. Development, which obviously is seen as a much more comprehensive process than mere growth, cannot be achieved unless economic and social policies contain a definite geographical component.

A thesis formulated in this way may not appear innovative. After all, this is generally what planners have been preaching. The problem, however, is to accept the triple dimension of regional development: the traditional, economic dimension, but also the social dimension and, most importantly, the political dimension, in a much more concrete way than the general admission that "planning is a political activity".

/ But to
But to propose that regional development, and consequently regional development planning, includes these three dimensions would be purely wishful thinking unless attempts are made to specify the factual conditions allowing this thesis to be brought to the level of economic policy decisions.

It cannot be concealed that more than ten years after Friedmann wrote in his book on Venezuela that the regional problem had become a "national" one due to the crisis in centre-periphery relations, this is not yet the case. The "regional problem" is still not perceived as a matter of serious national interest. Consequently, the first requirement for giving regional planning the role it merits is to transform "regional planning" into a national political issue, that is to say, something which is constantly at the centre of society's political discussion. Some specialists maintain that this may never be possible due to the very nature of the regional problem: important, but after all secondary. This reasoning does not seem particularly convincing, and other elements may be mentioned whose proper consideration could assist in transforming the regional problem into a political matter; unless this transformation takes place, it will be difficult to contribute to solving regional problems.

An adequate effort has never been made to demonstrate that the regional problem is one which affects the great majority of the population: something which should be obvious, but has not been. After all, the majority of the population of nearly all countries lives in the periphery, and in one way or another suffers the adverse effect of the centre's domination.
From another point of view, regional planners have not succeeded in adequately placing the regional problem within a framework, and especially in a language which expresses the dominant national concerns; for example, more effort has been expended in exposing the conflict between economic growth and regional development than in demonstrating their association. In particular, since growth continues to be a dominant concern in Latin America, and this seems to be appropriate even after the discussion of growth generated by the studies of the Club of Rome, then regional planners must demonstrate clearly that regional growth is a pre-requisite for economic growth, as discussed above.

Moreover, a larger role for regional planning will certainly depend on the economic ideology prevailing in a given country.

It is known that although everyone recognized the existence of the "regional problem", its solution is not always conceived in the same way. Strictly speaking, and in fairly general terms, "the regional problem" refers to the hierarchical coexistence within a single territory of different spatial systems and of the corresponding, equally different, processes of change. The uneven levels of income among regions, changes in the spatial distribution of the population, dominant-dependent situations, etc., are nothing more than visible and often quantifiable manifestations of the basic problem that has just been described.

In this sense, the prevalence of a purely neoclassical thought according to which "the regional problem" is simply an imperfection of the market leaves no room for regional planning. In fact, if the manifestations of the regional problem mentioned above are attributed to the defective functioning of the mechanisms which
should ensure permeability and mobility in the market, then the logical response would be to improve the dissemination of information (opportunities) and the transport and communications systems, as well as to eliminate institutional obstacles to the free movement of the labour force. It is already known that this leads to proposals designed to eliminate differential regional treatment (policies), collective labour agreements and ultimately all forms of trade unionization.

If the prevailing ideology is more development-oriented, the concept of the "regional problem" takes on a different dimension from the one described above, but it is still far from being a comprehensive regional planning approach. Indeed, within this perspective the "regional problem" would be considered as an undesirable but inevitable sub-product of the very process of economic growth, and particularly of the machinery for differentiation involved in growth.

The argument then takes as a starting point the fact that an economic concentration process is necessary so as to generate the surpluses leading to reinvestment and ultimately the growth of the process itself, with both a sectoral dimension (micro- and macro-economic) and a spatial one: the disproportionate growth of a city or a few cities. The same argument contend that once a certain level of concentration and development has been exceeded the same economic forces, now in the form of scale diseconomies drop in the profit rate and the existence of broader and better transport systems, will lead to a process of territorial deconcentration with a consequent reduction in for example, interregional income disequilibria. Similarly, it is maintained in this argument that the point of view of the overall efficiency of the economy (that is to say, maximization of the growth rate), geographic concentration / is convenient
is convenient, at least at a certain stage. In other words, it is convenient for stimulating the growth of the large cities.

If the reasoning of the concentration-efficiency-deconcentration-equity chain is accepted, the action of regional development consists of using the primal city as an economic multiplier and the urban system to support the process of spillage or leakage. The specific policies in this case will be more spatial than regional, that is to say, directed more at improving the functioning of the spatial system than at promoting the development of each region. Specifically, in this case it is a question of applying urban development and transport development policies as well as those to stimulate sectors and some urban centres.

Finally, if the prevailing economic ideology is part of the "structuralist" current regarding development, regional problems tend to be considered as part of the structural heterogeneity which characterizes developing societies within this perspective, the relationship between spatial organization and other types of social processes and structures (for example, the production structure) is considered to be reciprocal, yet temporally alternating. In other words, the reciprocal influence of spatial organization and social organization is recognized, and it is conceded that in the long run the spatial structure may determine social structures, but at various stages the relationship may be reversed. This reasoning leads to identifying the "specificity" of regional matters, which is conferred by: (a) the different constellation of natural resources in the territory; (ii) differing access to markets; (iii) the effect of spatial friction on the process of dissemination; (iv) the different degree of combination of modern
and traditional activities in various parts of the territory; (v) the various forms of domination exercised by the elements of the regional system, and; (vi) the unequal distribution of power.

Once the "specificity" of regional matters is accepted, a particular planning subject (distinct from the "global" or "sectoral" subject) is defined, together with a delimited professional field. In turn, this leads to the proposal of regional policies and the establishment of institutions linked to the management of regional matters. From this point of view, regional planning takes on a comprehensive dimension.

Together with the two factors just mentioned, which are located in the political and ideological sphere, it must also be noted that the role of regional planning in Latin America will also depend on the technical capacity of the regional planners themselves, and particularly on their ability to develop flexible responses to the variety and specificity of local problems. This is a responsibility which is of more direct concern to the institutions involved in professional training in this field in Latin America.

A fundamental question is implicitly posed, however, to which it must be recognized there is not yet a scientific response: to what extent do processes of expansion such as that of dependent peripheral capitalism leave adequate room for manoeuvring in the implementation of regional development strategies which to a great extent contradict the logic of the overall process?
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