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REFLECTIONS ON STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM:
THE FEDERAL EXPERIENCE IN BRAZIL

by
Kleber Nascimento *

* Chief, Research Centre of the Brazilian School of Public Administration. Translation by Charles Reginald Girdwood, Graduate of the Brazilian School of Public Administration, of the article published in the Revista de Administracao Publica of the Getulio Vargas Foundation, 1st. Semester, 1967.
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Introduction

On February 25th, 1967, by Decree-Law N° 200, President Castello Branco approved a bill for administrative reform drawn up by a group of advisers from the Office of the Minister Extraordinary for Planning and Economic Co-ordination. This bill represents the fourth attempt at an all-encompassing and global reform since the last administration of President Getulio Vargas. Thus, the history of federal administrative reform in Brazil — whether undertaken in a parliamentary or presidential system; a bipartisan or multipartisan system; a constitutional or extra-constitutional régime; or whether under the responsibility of a special commission (such as the Commission for Administrative Studies and Projects — CEPA) or a Minister Extraordinary — already offers enough perspective and wealth of circumstances to warrant a more detailed analysis in terms of administrative theory. On the other hand, although long and rich, the experience has been frustrating, since none of the previous attempts at reform has succeeded in reducing the gap between the operational capacity of the bureaucracy and the growing administrative demands of social and economic development. Therefore, it becomes all the more pertinent to provide an analysis which not only identifies the basic elements of past flaws, but provides a diagnosis of these problems leading to the formulation of more successful future strategies for implementing both present and future reform projects.

Historical synthesis of the reform experience

Strictly speaking, the movement for the federal administrative reform in Brazil began in the thirties, under the revolutionary government of Getulio Vargas. In fact, it could be said that it was the 1930 Revolution which established the basis of the Administrative State in Brazil.

The first corrective steps were concentrated in the area of matériel administration, with the creation of a Permanent Commission on Standards, in 1930, and of a Central Purchasing Commission, in 1931. In 1934, the Federal Constitution provided for the merit system (articles 168 and 170, paragraph 2), and two years later, in 1936, the first general law for the civil service in Brazil — Law No. 284, of October 28 — established basic rules for personnel administration and a system of position classification. It also created a central personnel agency, the Federal Civil Service Council. The Federal Constitution of 1937 provided for the establishment of an administrative department for the civil service — known today as DASP — organized in 1938, which was to play a major role in all future reform efforts. The year 1939 saw the introduction of the first Federal Civil Servants Statute of the Union. In 1940, also by a decree-law, the budgeting and accounting procedures of the states and municipalities were standardized. A new civil servant's statute was approved in 1952 and in that same year a long and regrettable struggle was begun for the adoption of a job classification plan based on the duties and responsibilities of the various positions of the civil service. In 1954, the first Bill designed to reform the general structure and methods of the federal administration was introduced to Congress. A new attempt, this time under President Juscelino Kubitscheck, did not obtain approval. President João Goulart appointed Amaral Peixoto as a special Minister for administrative reform, but still no reform came about. The Government of Castello Branco also concerned itself with this problem and enacted accordingly Decree-law No. 200, which controls "the organization of the Federal Administration, establishes policies for the Administrative Reform and other measures". 

Throughout these thirty years of reformative efforts, there is no denying the gap that has existed between proposed objectives and the actual attainment of goals, whatever the area under consideration. In personnel administration, for example, the merit system, although prescribed in the Constitution since 1934, does not account, as yet, for

10 per cent of the federal civil servants, according to unquestioned statistics furnished by the DASP. Had the constitutional provision been complied with, and taking into account retirements, deaths, resignations, dismissals and other forms of vacancy, at least 90 per cent of all present civil servants would have entered the civil service under some form of open competitive examination. This gap between the calculated merit figure of 90 per cent and that of the actual 10 per cent obtained is an indication of the high degree of formalism of the personnel system of Brazilian federal administration. The gap between the intention and actual fulfilment of goals is also a common factor in other reforms of the housekeeping activities. In fact, who would deny the systematic decline in the field of matériel after the auspicious beginnings of the Permanent Commission on Standards and of the Central Purchasing Commission? The operational jurisdiction of the Federal Purchasing Department is becoming ever smaller. What has been done, of any significance, in the field of patrimonial administration? The Public Buildings Division is only one amongst innumerable ghost-agencies in the public service. Finally, the budgetary system has been practically of no use at all as an instrument of government planning, since the budget is characterized by a lack of veracity (hence its almost uselessness as an instrument of programatic control). In short, when making a general assessment, the wide gap between what was intended and what actually has been done becomes evident.

One should not conclude, however, that DASP was a failure. Far from it, the Daspian contribution to the Brazilian public service has been, in point of fact, invaluable. To ignore it would be not only ingratitude but intellectual blindness. The flaws with which DASP is charged spring from various causes, the most serious of which is the neglect and even antagonism of which the agency has been victim since 1945, except during the period of the last Vargas government. Thus, the point of view here submitted is not that of DASP's failure, but rather that the Daspian reformative action would have produced more profound and lasting effects and engendered other

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2/ In the Riggsian sense.
forces capable of carrying on the innovation task if the strategy of change on which the reforms were based had been adequate to the needs and possibilities of the Brazilian federal bureaucracy.

Though it might seem so at first glance, this is not a purely academic point of view. The fact that it cannot be tested scientifically — since the past cannot be brought back so that a different strategy from the one used could be tried — does not diminish its crucial importance under the present political situation in Brazil. This is so because, in a way, this country is witnessing — and no one can ascertain whether it is for the last time — political conditions very similar to those prevailing in Vargas' time, in which the public administrator disposed of exceptional powers to implement changes, regardless of the acceptability of such changes. Thus, it is not only valid but indispensable to ask: will the strategy today be the same as that of yesterday? If so, we should inquire further: will today's reforms bring in themselves, as did those of yesterday, the germs of counter-reform? Will identical strategies forge identical destinies? Will revenges repeat themselves as in 1945, cancelling out the positive aspects as well as the shortcomings of the reforms? What can be done in terms of strategy, in order to guarantee, for tomorrow, the continuity of some of the achievements obtained after so much struggle today?

A new analytical approach to the reform: change strategy

Analysis of the experience of administrative federal reform in Brazil from the standpoint of the strategy of change on which the reform was based is justified on various grounds. In the first place, such an approach has not yet been explored. Criticism and analysis of the reforms, when worthy of appraisal, have concentrated on the what, the content, purposiveness of the reforms, and not on the strategy of its launching and implementation. Second, many barriers to reforms, though they may often exist before the reforms themselves are often functions of the very strategy adopted. In point of fact, it is theoretically plausible and can be empirically demonstrated that the detrimental potential of such obstacles varies with the strategy; that is, particular strategies tend to reinforce, and others...
to weaken, the paralyzing effects of the obstacles. Finally, to focus our analysis on strategy is justifiable because, after so many years of reformative experience, the teleological aspects of the reform, the diagnosis of the shortcomings and of needs, and the elaboration of solutions, are well known to the senior technicians of the public service. Who would react against the streamlining of the Presidency of the Republic? Who would ignore the necessity of decentralizing administrative machinery? Who would deny the need to institutionalize planning activities at the ministerial level? Who would refute the best tendencies designed to make the budget an instrument of economic and financial planning? Who would dispute the vitalness of programatic control of budget execution, rather than a mere legal or formal control? Therefore, whereas the need for such reforms has become increasingly less controversial, the problem of how to unleash the reform— a strategic problem— becomes ever more crucial. In point of fact, it is well possible that the whole drama of under-development is not so much the lack of knowledge of adequate solutions, but, rather, one of how to conceive and put into motion strategies that might convert some of those solutions into reality.

It should be pointed out that though, in the great majority of cases, the reforms were defeated when still in the legislative stage (where barriers were almost unsurmountable), those approved by the Legislature, or made without its participation, have also failed. In other words, past strategy of administrative implementation, which is the object of this article, has not been able to overcome the barriers to execution of reform measures. The fundamental questions put forth here are: why did the attempted implementation of any of the reforms, even those approved by Congress (or regardless of legislative approval, as during the dictatorial periods), not correspond to their intended objectives? What is the

significance, from the standpoint of the strategy of change, of the gradual backslide which has extinguished, since the redemocratization of the country in 1945, so many of the positive gains of the reforms? What strategy variants could be applied to minimize the counter-reform?

Basic components of a strategic model

Any model change strategy can be analytically reduced into three basic components: a normative or ideological component, a substantive component and an operational or behavioural component. The first refers to assumptions, beliefs, preferences, attitudes and values that underlie what could be called the philosophy or ideology of change-agents of reform. The statement "So and so is in the Posdcorbian era", for example, characterized - though in a somewhat faulty, when not in a hasty and malicious way - the administrative ideology of the person in question. In other words, what is meant is that such a person attaches to the formal organization an excessive conditioning power, which it does not really possess. Another ideology is that held by those who stress the human relations aspect. For them, the strategic action should concentrate on the components of the informal organization. Though they may not always appear explicitly in documents pertaining to the reforms, the values of the change agent reflect themselves in a definitive manner on the strategy, and make up its normative or ideological component.

The substantive component refers to the actual content of the strategy, such as presented in the reform bills. Whether the measures contained in the change proposal have been drawn from experience within the system which

5/ Those who subscribe to the "human relations" point of view go a bit too far when they argue that motivation foregoes organization. The philosophy of human relations has undergone profound revision in the United States (a fact that many Brazilian "importers" have not yet realized) aimed at correcting several of its disfunctions, among which could be noted: (1) tendency to subordinate the organizational objectives to group interests; (2) encouragement of self-defense on the part of managers by transferring to the group (in the name of "democratic leaderships") responsibilities which should not be delegated; (3) the fallacy of complete compatibility between individual needs and organizational rationality and, what is perhaps worst of all, (4) the discredit resulting from the lack of differentiation between charlatanism and science.
is the object of change, or from experience with other systems; whether the analysis of obstacles to the reforms considers only cognitive hindrances (such as lack of data, information, knowledge, know-how) or whether it also takes into account value limitations (such as resistance to commitments in the way of schedules and dates, personalism, biases, mistrust); whether the reform is a wholistic or gradualistic one, on a long, medium or short term basis - are differences in content which affect the strategy and must, therefore, be considered when assessing such strategy.

The operational or behavioural component refers to the kinds of action taken by the change agents in the reform process. This component becomes visible only when a strategy is put into motion, but its characteristics can be identified early from the planning stage of the reform. Whether communications flow on a two-way basis between the reform group and the other agents of the bureaucracy, or only downward from the former to the latter; whether the reforming action only aims at the formal aspects of the system or involve the informal ones; whether the reform leadership tends to insulate so that the "clique" of the reform becomes even more distant from the leaders of the bureaucracy or on the contrary, tends to coopt so as to gradually absorb important strata of the bureaucracy - such are significant operational differences which cannot be disregarded in the evaluation of any change strategy.

Observe that these three components of any model of change strategy - value, content and action - are not in reality distinct from one another. Their separation is defensible only in the abstract, for purposes of theoretical analysis. Actually, the significance of the three components for the characterization of a model of change strategy is likely to be unevenly distributed. The normative or ideological component precedes and conditions the other two. More precisely, the value system of the change agents bears decisively on their perception of what is to be done (substantive component, content) and how it is to be done (operative component, action). A reverse order of influence - from action to value -
is not tenable. Thus the importance of concentrating the analysis of the change strategy on the value or ideological component, comparing it with the typical behavioural characteristics of the system object of change.

The Brazilian Administrative Reforms and their strategic model

An analysis of administrative reform experience in the federal area leads us to infer that the strategies whereby reforms have been attempted do not differ significantly from one another. In some sense, there have not been individual strategies, but a specific prevailing strategic pattern throughout the reform experience. This is suggested by some impressive regularities which are common not only to reforms in distinct areas such as personnel and budget, but also in a single area such as that of position classification. Should those diagnoses be correct (which we shall try to demonstrate in this article) the theoretical and pragmatic relevance of identifying and defining the characteristics of such a prevailing strategic pattern could not be ignored, for only after that identification and definition would it be possible to assess the strategic adequacy or inadequacy of the reforms, in the light of the prevailing behavioural traits of the Brazilian Bureaucracy.

Based on the fundamental components of any strategy model - value, content and action - discussed above, it is possible to abstract in a theoretical model the change strategy that has prevailed in Brazilian reform attempts. The strategic model of Brazilian administrative reforms can be shaped as follows:

Operational component: action
  Focus of action: formal elements
  Style of influence: compliance
  Power dynamics: insulative

Substantive component: content
  Scope of change: wholistic and immediate
  Diagnostic orientation: cognitive

/Ideological component:
Ideological component: value

Strategy and behavioural prerequisites

Strategy and process orientation

In the following pages each of those components will be analyzed in the light of the Brazilian experience, in an effort to render the model empirically valid.

The operative component: action

Of the various elements of the operational or behavioural component, three warrant special mention: the focus of strategic action, the process of influence used by the change agents and the type of power dynamics between the change agents and the leadership of the client system.

Focus of action: formal elements

The action of reform has been focused almost always upon the formal structure of the system. In matériel administration, for example, the majority of the reform efforts (after a spell of significant contributions) has limited itself to "chart organization". Thus, in 1938 the Division of Matériel of the DASP absorbed the duties of the Permanent Commission on Standards, which was abolished. In 1940 the Central Purchasing Commission was replaced by the Federal Purchasing Department. In 1941, the testing laboratories which belonged to the former Central Purchasing Commission were transferred to the National Institute of Technology. Two years later, in 1943, the laboratories were withdrawn from that institute and transferred to the Federal Purchasing Department. Also in 1943, the Council of Matériel Administration was created with the purpose of promoting better co-ordination among, and greater efficiency of the agencies involved with the administration of matériel in the federal service. Finally,

7/ Decree-Law 2206, Coll., May 20, 1940.
8/ Decree-Law 1184, Coll., April 1, 1941.

/in 1945,
in 1945, the Division of Matériel of the DASP as well as the Council of Matériel Administration were subordinated to the Federal Purchasing Department.\textsuperscript{11}\ The structural and functional reshuffling, one is able to ascertain from the description of the responsibilities of every new or transferred agency that, ultimately, as far as strategic orientation is concerned, these replacements did not represent any change at all. They amounted to a mere substitution of labels in order to heighten or lower the organizational status of the agencies. The formal attributions of the matériel system did not change significantly. In some cases the efforts to improve the system of matériel were concentrated on questions such as how to achieve a better co-ordination by subordinating agency \textit{X} to agency \textit{Y}, or by transferring given responsibilities from one agency to another. The prescriptive language of the reforms was typically couched thus:

"Without harm to their attributions, the National Institute of Technology of the Ministry of Labour, Industry, and Commerce and the testing laboratories of the federal administration shall co-operate with the agencies of matériel..."\textsuperscript{12}\ Such instructions were rarely translated into common procedures, since the compliance power of the formal organization had always been insufficient, especially after the overthrow of the dictatorial régime, to obtain the desired goals.

In the area of position classification, the strategic action of the reforms was also focused upon the formal structure. Of all the attempts to classify civil service positions, the first of which dates back to 1907,\textsuperscript{13}\ 

\textsuperscript{11}/ Decree-Law 8823-A, Coll., December 7, 1945.
\textsuperscript{12}/ Decree-Law 11101, Coll., Art. 12, December 11, 1942.
\textsuperscript{13}/ The history of the attempts at implementing a system of position classification in the federal civil service is presented in detail by the author in Classificação de Cargos no Brasil, op. cit.
only two proposals ever achieved legislative approval; the Law of Readjustment which was enacted in 1936 and represented the first legislative breakthrough in position classification, and Law 3780, of July 12, 1960, which established the present system. In this area, frustration has been greater than in others. Whereas some significant gains had been achieved with the Law of Readjustment, they were nevertheless lost along the years for lack of continuity in efforts to revise and bring up to date the classification plan. As regards the present plan, the consequences have been more disastrous than beneficial for federal administration. There is a total divorce between what was intended to be done and what is actually being carried out. The criteria used for transferring positions from the old to the new system—a process which is known as *encadramento*—are completely different from those used in drawing up the plan. No attention whatsoever was given to training as a means of adjusting the man to the job. Here, again, the focus of action of the reform was confined to formal elements, such as adequacy of class specifications; complete distinction between a position and its eventual occupant; and well-defined lines of promotion across and within classes of position; and so on.

In the area of organization and methods, in which the schemes generally known as "administrative reform" are classified, the reforming action is no different, its attention being focused on the purely formal aspects. The classical principles of span of control and homogeneity of functions have guided the elaboration of projects of administrative reforms, since the first one in 1953 to the one known as the Amaral Peixoto Reform. The rationale of these reforms is based on the assumption that greater efficiency can be obtained if the structural arrangements of the bureaucracy facilitate rather than hinder the administrative process. Thus, lines of authority and responsibility are redefined, agencies are broken up or merged, so as to keep in line with the principle of homogeneity of functions, and the number of subordinates who report directly to a superior is also reduced in keeping with the principle of span of control. Pertinent questions here would be: is the bottleneck at the Presidency a problem predominantly behavioural
predominantly behavioural or structural? Is administrative decentralization a problem of knowing how to delegate or of willingness to delegate and of willingness to accept delegated responsibilities? How much of the rationality of formal reorganizations clashes with non-rational behaviour?

**Style of influence: compliance**

The style of influence used to implement the reform has been based on a process of compliance rather than on a process of internalization. The former is characterized as predominantly mandatory, where decisions are presented in final form, complete and finished, leaving little or no flexibility for alternative actions in the light of unforeseen conditions. The latter is predominantly suggestive and exploratory, where solutions are presented as starting points which are gradually modified as the reform progresses, adapting themselves to the real conditions. The critical distinction between the two processes, however, is that only the process of internalization leads to a perceptive reorganization, by the individual, of the relation between the means used in the change and the designs proposed by it. This is so because the process of internalization involves the value aspects (attitudes, habits) which hinder any change, whereas the compliance process confines itself to the cognitive aspects (lack of know-how, lack of information).

This distinction becomes critical when one compares the necessary conditions for ensuring continuity in the change process put forth by both processes. In the compliance process, maintaining the change requires permanent control on the part of the reform agents, which is not the case when the system object of change has internalized the reform values. The

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federal experience of administrative reform\,\textsuperscript{15/} clearly reveals the constant need - and, for long periods, the exercise of - permanent control of the changes wrought, so as to ensure their continuity. This applies all the more so to the reforms effected during periods of exception. It should not be forgotten that no sooner were the controlling powers of the change agents reduced with the return of democracy to the country, than the reform efforts suffered a setback which continues even today. The majority of the achievements obtained through a compliance process of influence entered a phase of progressive weakening. This was due to the fact that the process was not able to internalize in the system object of change the values which would maintain and give continuity to the reform. The distinction between the compliance process and that of internalization is thus useful for understanding why and how the movement of administrative reform in Brazil obtained its greatest achievements under dictatorial régime and suffered its greatest defeats after the return to democracy.

The present political situation revives the importance of this point, since the public administrator has again compliance power at his disposal as an instrument of change strategy. There are numerous instances of this power which are best highlighted in recent income tax reforms and in the prominence of the Office of the Ministry of Planning. In both cases exceptional tools are available to enforce the reform measures. However, indispensable as it might be even for the survival of the régime to resort to compliance power, it is imperative that today's reform rid itself as much as possible of the seeds of tomorrow's counter-reform. Hence the great dilemma of today's Brazilian public administrator: that of disposing of a process of influence which should be needed to the very indispensable

\textsuperscript{15/} The reader will have noticed that, as used in this article, the term "administrative reform" is not limited to the structural reforms which have been attempted since 1953. On the contrary, the expression has an all-encompassing sense, including any considerable attempt to make changes in public administration and especially those changes that depend on legislative approval since they alter basic criteria of operation, rights and authority relations.

/minimum so
minimum so as not to endanger today's achievements. Thus the paradox of
the rationality of a strong régime: to minimize the use of the compliance
process and to maximize the internalization process, so as to nullify,
beforehand, any revenges that might destroy indiscriminately both the
positive achievements of the reforms as well as those which experience
proved to be less fortunate. Thus the infinitely greater complexity of
the responsibility of the new President, whose task is no longer that of a
relatively simple strategy of revolution but rather of a strategy of
devolution - devolution not to groups or individuals who came before him,
but devolution of responsibilities to ever wider circles of the leadership
of the public service, a devolution that will expand the reforming power
through growth and qualification of the reform group, a devolution that
will draw upon the reform values (and not upon its agents) as basic
instruments for assuring continuity of the proposed changes. The social
and financial cost of the counter-reform which undermined the Daspian work
is priceless. Though there were inadequate aspects to this work, the
counter-reform made no attempt to distinguish between the functional and
disfunctional aspects, but aimed at all indistinctly. This is what should
be avoided by abolishing, as far as possible, the easiest process – compliance –
in favour of the process of internalization.

Power Dynamics: insulative

As regards the power dynamics between the change agents\textsuperscript{16/} and the
leaderships of the system object of reform, the strategy has been characterized

\textsuperscript{16/} The expressions "change agents", "reform agents" and "reform group"
are used interchangeably throughout this article, and refer to the
group of individuals formally responsible for conceiving a particular
reform.
by its insulative, rather than cooptative, style. In other words, the reform group does not grow in number as the reform develops itself, but rather isolates itself from the other agents of the system. Thus, instead of converting gradually to the reform process layers ever more numerous of the leadership of the public service, the reform group acts as though it were concerned in defending "its own" reform. As a result, it fosters indifference, when not antagonism, on the part of the heads and advisors at all levels.

The strategy has ignored who really runs the bureaucracy (the present leaders) and who can run it (the potential leaders). This explains most failures in attempting to implement what seems crystal-clear on paper.

The insulative style of the power dynamics between the agents of change and the leaders of the system becomes all the more crucial when not only the number, but the very composition of the reform group does not change significantly throughout the history of the reforms. This tends to hinder the work of these agents in such a way as to cause objections to, and misinterpretations of their proposals, for the simple reason that such proposals come from them, regardless of the degree of rationality such proposals might contain. This fact becomes all the more crucial because often these very agents are the best qualified in terms of experience and professional training to guide reforms of the public service. Their loss of face before the leaders of the system could and should be overcome by adopting different strategies.

17/ The term cooptation refers to the process of assuring or expanding acceptance of a particular group, idea, or organization through incorporation (cooptation), to the structure of command of the change agents, of individuals notably known for their influence (whatever the basis of their influence) into the system object of change. This strategy purposely used in the Tennessee Valley Authority experience is superbly theorized by Philip Selznick in "TVA and the Grass Roots - A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization". Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949.

18/ Such a growth needs not necessarily be formal, by official appointment of new elements to the reform group, but informal (and no less effective for this), by a more active participation of these elements since the planning stage of the reform.
The substantive component: content

Amongst the elements of this component two stand out: change scope, understood here as a combination of the scope or inclusiveness and temporal perspective of the reform; and the diagnostic orientations which guide the obstacle mapping, that is, the biases of the reform group in the evaluation of the change barriers. These two elements condition significantly the content of a reform strategy.

Scope of change: wholistic-immediatist

As regards its scope or inclusiveness, a reform may be partial (in varying degrees of partiality) or wholistic. As regards its temporal perspective, the reform will be immediate, on a medium- or long-term basis. The strategy of reform in Brazil has been wholistic-immediatist, in the sense of trying to do "everything at one time". It is a tendency which has come right from its roots. Thus, in 1931, the Provisional Government centralized the purchasing activities under the newly created Central Purchasing Commission "...with the responsibility for buying and distributing all goods necessary to the public services, besides promoting market surveys, examining the nature, quality, and resistance of materials to be bought, and solving problems related to the simplification, standardization, specification, technical testing, and control of the conservation and consumption of matériel."\(^{19}\) Thus, instead of adopting a gradualistic approach, thereby progressively assuming the responsibilities of purchasing for the entire federal service, the Commission adopted a wholistic approach by extending its jurisdiction to all supplies and equipment and to all ministries at once. There is little doubt that, as far as change strategy is concerned, this wholistic approach jeopardized the reform process, as observed by a scholar of the Brazilian experience: "In spite of the lack of restraints on the Central Purchasing Commission, it soon became evident

that the organization was incapable of performing all of its responsibilities because of workload; speed of processing purchases then became the criterion of action. Prices were made without price surveys; within a short time vendors became aware of this deficiency, and a return to the pre-1930 pricing practices resulted. These practices added to the lack of understanding of the idea of central purchasing already prevalent, and considerable antagonism was generated toward the Commission. 20

The same tendency can be observed in the field of position classification. Approved in 1960, the Classification Law established a period of two years for its complete implementation. This process, however, is far from finished. The temporal perspective unrealistically short has resulted in successive extensions of deadlines, with profound consequences to the idea of position classification based on the actual duties and responsibilities of the positions.

The most deplorable symptom of the plan’s wholistic-immediate change scope, however, was that it encompassed not only so-called direct administration (ministries and some departments) but was equally extended to all autarchies, including railroads and ports under federal control, almost doubling the number of positions to be transplanted to the new system. 21 Lacking as it were a sufficient number of qualified personnel to tackle the problem of direct administration, DASP was at a complete loss when it attempted to classify positions in so-called indirect administration. Having lost control over enforcement of the criteria on which the enquadramento should be based, it was beyond this central agency’s power to avoid the ensuing chaos, discontent and total discredit for the idea of position classification. At worst, the plan has been interpreted so that it gives legal sanction to old personal privileges and opens the way to new ones, such as the transference of function to achieve special enquadramentos.


The struggle for a merit system followed the same strategy as in other areas. Though prescribing merit as a basis for entrance for the whole federal service, the Federal Constitution of 1934 failed to attribute the responsibility for implementing that principle to any existing or new agency. Thus, as late as 1936 no steps had yet been taken to fulfill the letter of the Constitution which continued to be as good as mute. Again, a wholistic and immediate orientation prevailed in 1936, when the Federal Civil Service Council centralized examinations for all career positions. Because of its collegiate form and the lack of an appropriate staff, the Council was only able to carry out twelve examinations, three in 1937 and nine in 1938, the year of its extinction. In spite of the administrative limitations of the bureaucracy in undertaking such a frontal attack on the vices inherited from the past, change agents still insisted on a wholistic approach. The Federal Constitution of 1937 prescribed the merit system, through public examination, as the only form of entrance to all the existing positions in the public service. The Selection and Training Division of DASP was given, in 1938, jurisdiction over all the positions of the Executive Branch of the Federal government throughout the country, and all the subsequent laws have explicitly prescribed the merit system as the only form of entrance to all career positions.

These first attempts at introducing the merit system on a full scale and within the shortest possible time are good illustrations of what Hirschman has termed "the motivation-outruns-understanding style of

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problem-solving", which is characterized by endlessly repeated calls for a full, integrated, definitive and rapid solution of the difficulties that are encountered. Evidence of the wholistic approach of the strategy of the reforms through the merit system can be best illustrated by the statement of a recent reform group:

"From all this one concludes that it is clear, even emphatic, that federal legislation determines the practice of public competitive examinations for all the positions encompassed by the classification plans of both direct administration and the autarchies. Furthermore, such legislation also centralizes in DASP the authority and responsibility for carrying out all such examinations, and, consequently, for the preparation of the lists of candidates who are eligible for appointment."26/

The foregoing discussion of the wholism (globalism) which has characterized the change strategy of the merit system reforms may seem exaggerated. Moreover, some might argue: After all, is it not only natural for public administrative reforms to tend towards the wholistic? If we take as a basis the North American experience - which inspired the experience of administrative reform in Brazil - our answer is no. Much to the contrary, the American experience is an example of gradualism. As registered by one of the best historians of the United States Civil service, Paul Van Riper:

"The act itself (Pendleton Act) placed only slightly over 10 per cent of the positions in the federal public service - mainly clerical positions in Washington and in post offices and custom houses employing fifty or more persons - under the merit system to form the classified civil service..."27/


26/ Ministro Extraordinário para a Reforma Administrativa, "Normas para a Preservação e Revigoramento do Sistema de Mérito", op. cit., p. 8, Italian added.


/The gradualism
The gradualism of the American reform was not conceived by the legislature. Rather, it was an essential part of the philosophy of change of the American reformers. Their perceptions of political and administrative reality is worthy of note. In his testimony before the Senate Select Committees to examine the various branches of the Civil Service on January 13, 1881, Dorman B. Eaton, the main promoter of the reforms, expressed his views in regard to the comprehensiveness of the Pendleton Act:

"Another observation I want to make is that I think no law should be passed which would require the application of this system of examinations to the whole civil service of the government at once, or even to all that part to which it is legitimately applicable, as I have defined it. It would be too large altogether... We have got to create the machinery. ...In bringing new men together and entering for the first time upon a new system, you would be utterly overslaughtered and broken down if you were to be required to carry it all at once."28/

Clearly, Eaton's understanding of the problem did not outrun his great motivation to see the full and definite meritization of the American Civil service. Thanks to this - and the lesson is still valid today for so many of the developing countries - the expansion of the merit system was gradual, but steady, as can be seen from table 1:29/

In the Organization and Methods area, the wholistic and immediatist approach of the Brazilian reform strategy prevailing right from the beginning with the creation of the old Efficiency Commissions which, encompassing activities both of organization and of personnel, were practically unable to do much in the Organization and Methods area. Even after the creation of DASP, the new efficiency commissions insisted on the error, being unable once again to make any contributions in the Organization and Methods area. Two early Daspian reformers justify such a failure thus:


29/ This chart is a condensation, by the author, of data released by the United States Civil Service Commission, as presented by Glen O. Stahl in his Public Personnel Administration (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 5th edition, 1962), p. 44.
Table 1

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Positions in Executive Civil Service</th>
<th>Number of Positions in Competitive Service</th>
<th>Percentages of Positions Subject to Examinations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>131 203</td>
<td>13 780</td>
<td>12.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>208 000</td>
<td>94 693</td>
<td>45.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>435 000</td>
<td>292 460</td>
<td>67.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>580 494</td>
<td>462 083</td>
<td>79.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>1 014 117</td>
<td>726 827</td>
<td>71.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1 934 040</td>
<td>1 631 876</td>
<td>84.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>2 371 405</td>
<td>1 991 506</td>
<td>83.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>2 398 705</td>
<td>2 050 929</td>
<td>85.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"The reason (for the failures) is that the commissions were overtaken by the excessive workload regarding personnel problems, such as: preparation of promotion proposals, inspection of admission processes, and reintegration and improvement of extranumeraries. Besides, the practice was established of submitting to the commissions other matters entirely alien to their purposes, whenever such matters involved some complexity." [20]

Finally, even after DASP had eventually managed to confine the efficiency committees to Organization and Methods activities, the work plan organized by it was clearly wholistic, since it included all activities pertaining to means administration: personnel (from the standpoint of efficiency), matériel (equipment and installations), financial resources, organization, work methods, and relationships among agencies and between them and the public. [31] In short, the strategy of administrative reforms has, one way or another, been characterized by a wholistic approach.

20/ Gama e Silva, José Saldanha da, and Passarinho Pereira, Daisy Floris, op. cit., p. 47.

Diagnostic Orientation: Cognitivism

Though less visible than the first, this element of the substantive component of the strategy can also be inferred from the content of the reform projects. Obstacle mapping is a psychological process which occurs, with a greater or lesser degree of explicitness, in any attempt at change. In any strategic concept of a reform, the change agent makes certain assumptions as to the barriers raised against the changes intended. Such assumptions vary, however, from one agent to another, according to his perception of what are the fundamental obstacles to be overcome.

Two distinct diagnostic orientations can be identified in the obstacle-mapping process of a reform: cognitive orientation and normative orientation. In the first case, the diagnosis of the change agent would concentrate on factors such as lack of data, shortage of technical skills, inadequacies of legislation and the laying down of rules, absence of norms and instructions, etc. In the second case, the diagnosis would focus on problems such as lack of initiative, lack of interest, "good-guy-type" behaviour, self-defence, resistance to commitments of dates and deadlines, self-indulgence, personalism, and so forth. The distinction between a cognitive and normative orientation can be best understood with the help of the following example, where the first two diagnoses reveal a cognitive orientation whereas the last two indicate a normative orientation:

As a rule, the cause of bottlenecks and inefficiency in organizations are due to:

1. inadequate legislation, outdated rules, in short, the structure of the organization. It is almost impossible to operate in a maze of requirements and unnecessary controls which only serve to multiply and complicate the work routine;
2. the shortage of personnel with technical and professional skills (with exceptions, of course) to carry out with efficiency the tasks they have been assigned;
3. the general lethargy, lack of initiative, fear of responsibility (with exceptions, of course);
4. subordination of the needs and objectives of the organization to the personal interests of the employees as a typical solution for the conflict between the individual and the organization.

/Both these
Both these diagnostic orientations, therefore, bear significantly on the strategy adopted because the very selection of the obstacles to be overcome leads the reforming action to concentrate on one or the other type of barrier. In the Brazilian reform experience the cognitive orientation has prevailed. Its greatest contention is based on the assumption that the system does not change because it does not know what and how to change. It is beyond the scope of this article to present a content analysis of documents and projects of reform that would show the cognitive nature of Brazilian reform strategy. However, an examination of official documents, reports and articles concerning the reforms clearly shows that the diagnostic orientations of the change agents emphasized the cognitive impediments, overlooking the normative obstacles. Pertinent questions here would be: does the system actually not change because it does not know how to change (cognitive) or because it does not want to change (normative)? Are the reasons due in particular to the absence of appropriate knowledge (cognitive) or appropriate behaviour (normative)? Which of these two limitations have greater obstructive potential, greater hindering power?

The importance of the change agent's diagnostic orientation is crucial due to its influence not only upon other elements of the strategy but also upon the dynamics of the obstacles to the reform. In other words, particular diagnostic orientations raise, or at least strengthen, certain strategic patterns; moreover, certain diagnostic orientations, ignoring particular obstacles, may unleash and activate these very same obstacles. The struggle for the merit system in the federal civil service is a good example of this point. Having defined the merit system as "one in which entrance to the civil service depends upon the candidate's competence as tested in competitive examinations" the underestimate of normative resistances stimulated particular patterns of change strategy. The focus of action, for example, confined itself to the "gateway" to the public service, i.e., the selection process and the competitive examinations became an end in themselves. Worse than the emphasis on the mere formal aspects of many of the competitive examinations was the fact that the concentration of human and financial resources on the task of selection was obtained at the sacrifice of other phases of personnel administration, such as training. Considering the specific conditions of the Brazilian educational system, training would have been of much greater relevance as
relevance as regards the professionalization of the public service. Other elements of the strategy were directly affected by the cognitive orientation. The scope of change, for example, would not have been wholistic; had the change agents assessed realistically particular normative impediments. Due to the lack of human and material resources to implement the reform, the unrealistic wholism of the strategy was responsible, among other things, for a total frustration and discredit of the merit system. A merit system which is only partial in its application, but commands respect, is better than an all-embracing one but discredited.

Finally (still as regards an underestimation of normative impediments), from the standpoint of latent or manifest obstacles, a strategy centered on selection unleashed violent reaction in a political context where clientelism prevail. Whereas the reform attempted openly to abolish the spoils system in the public service, many politicians reacted against DASP and, after 1945, "took advantage of their chance" and practically emasculated the reform agency. Such obstacles would have continued latent, or at least would have lost much of their impact if the focus of strategic action (redefined in the light of a normative diagnostic orientation, rather than cognitive) had centered on training rather than on selection.  

32/ One should not infer from this an approval of certain so-called sociological interpretations which enhance the political functions of the bureaucracy and condemn the "technicism" of the reformers who try to bar the spoils system from the public service. Such an interpretation has some validity in developed contexts, where the technical criteria of the merit system, which apply even to the highest echelons, drastically reduce the flexibility of the system. The least controversial examples of such a case are to be seen in the British civil service and in the American civil service at the time of President Eisenhower. Under such conditions, the Executive may feel politically stifled in its task of governing; thus certain measures taken by Eisenhower in this area. However, the idea has been applied to under-developed contexts based on another rationale that since the private sector is unable to create a sufficient number of jobs so as to absorb even a small fraction (in terms of economical and social stability) of the active population, the public sector must, both as a matter of social responsibility and political survival of the régime itself, absorb this quota of unemployed regardless of their professional qualifications. In the Case of Brazil this contention is, to say the least, irresponsible and dangerous. In the first place, because it is not based on objective data about the impact of industrialization upon the Brazilian economy; and therefore ascribes to the public sector - through misinformation - a responsibility which no longer makes the same sense as 20 years ago. In the second place, because by ignoring the very important distinction between patronage (so evident in the style of Vargas) and spoils (so evident in the style of Goulart) it offers a basis for strengthening the spoils system.
merit system had not been literally copied from the American experience (and from the initial phase of that experience, around 1883) but had undergone what could be called "sociological reduction", or still better, a process of "sociological imagination", the focus of the reform would have been on training rather than on selection. As such, the merit system would be defined as that in which "the civil servant is provided with the necessary training to perform adequately his functions so that his holding of a position be based upon his merit in performing its tasks". Who would consider the first definition more valid than this one? Who would dare to defend a single definition of the merit system? Who would disagree with the fact that one of the crucial tasks of the administrator in the underdeveloped context is a re-definition, re-ordering and often a repudiation of instruments, definitions, methods and techniques derived from hegemonic societies?

The ideological component: value

The normative or ideological component of reforms is the most important of all for, as stressed before, it precedes the other components and bears its influence upon them. In an analysis of administrative ideology upon which both the formulation as well as the execution of the reforms have been based, two propositions deserve special attention: first, that the prevailing strategy in the Brazilian reform experience has been based on behavioural prerequisites and, second, that the strategy presumes a conditioning of the ends to the means — a process orientation.

Strategy and behavioural prerequisites

The concept of "prerequisites" is fundamental in the study of planned change, in any area subject to scientific intervention, from Psychology to Cultural Anthropology. Is the change possible only if certain prerequisites are attained, or should the change strategy be conceived in


such a way as to disregard the prerequisites? regards the study of economical development; this question is closely related with the strategies of an integrated, harmonic development, as opposed to strategies which see development as a chain of disequilibria. It is surprising that the studies of administrative development have not made use, as yet, of the concept of prerequisites to explain the change philosophy which underlie many reform strategies, mainly those of the developing world. In the case of the Brazilian federal experience, the reform strategy seems to require a prevalence, in the bureaucracy, of rational behaviour which closely resembles Max Weber's model of bureaucratic rationality.

Among the examples of Weberian rationality one could mention impartiality in dealing with administrative matters; political, philosophical and religious neutrality, as the basis of the decision-making process; impersonalization, instead of personalization, in carrying out the public function; the use of "office time" for organizational objectives, instead of personal objectives, etc. Thus, in so far as the measures depend on the prevalence of such behaviours, and in so far as they represent exceptions and not the rule in the behavioural orientations of the bureaucracy, the strategy finds no echo in the behavioural patterns of the public servants. Observe that the fact that the strategy is based on behavioural prerequisites is not enough to render it void; the voidness is characterized by the lack of such prerequisites in the bureaucracy and - worst still - by the lack of measures designed to develop in the civil servant behavioural patterns on which the success to the reforms would depend.

Some examples may better clarify the relations between change strategy and behavioural prerequisites. In budgeting, the establishment of a posteriori control in order to facilitate purchasing operations often gave place to many disfunctions for the bureaucracy. In order to utilize their resources fully and avoid the possibility of losing their budgetary allotments, most

government agencies developed the practice of attesting to the receipt of supplies which had not been delivered. The excuse for such practices was that the systematic delays of the budget allotments resulted in a shrinkage of the trading year, since purchasing orders could never be dispatched before May. Thus, the only way to avoid an interruption of supplies to the public service was to purchase from the very beginning of the year. The use of an a posteriori control, as it was assumed, would be a means of eliminating this kind of abuse. This was not the case, however, for a great deal of corruption resulted from this manoeuvre. The efficacy of the a posteriori control depended, therefore, on a behavioural orientation which did not prevail in the public service. The measure was functional only in intention, since the disfunctional aspects of it prevailed throughout.

The experience in position classification offers another example of the gap between the strategy and the behavioural patterns upon which it is dependant. Because DASP suffers from a shortage of specialists and is thus unable to analyze in loco the situation of every agency, it has to depend on data supplied by the personnel departments of the different government agencies in order to decide upon the enquadramento of the civil servants. Since, on the other hand, the enquadramento has almost always been carried out on the basis of the job titles presented in an inventory roster made up prior to the present position classification plan (and not on the basis of the duties and responsibilities actually performed by the civil servant) it has given place to a manoeuvr which could be called "the trick of labelling". This consists in re-labelling a class or job category in the former system so that its occupant might be classed in a much higher position. As DASP proceeds with the enquadramento based on lists supplied by the different departments, the manoeuvr works out because DASP is overwhelmed with work and short of qualified personnel. Perhaps the most striking example is the episode of the Administration of the Port of Rio de Janeiro. Besides creating such categories as

/Port Doctors
Port Doctors and Port Typists - an attempt to avoid the same treatment dispensed to corresponding classes in the civil service - an attempt was made to transform elevator-operators into "technicians in ascension". The "Jornal do Brasil" commented at the time:

"CHAOS IN THE PORT AUTHORITY - the Minister of Transportation approved the re-classification plan of the personnel in the Rio de Janeiro Port Authority where, amongst other curiosities, the job of "port typist" was created and mere elevator-operators were transformed into "technicians in ascension", equal in position to engineers in the civil service.

Many other examples could be found in other areas of institutional administration. It will suffice, however, to conclude with the case of the extranumerário (extranumerários were not subject to entrance examinations). Created as an attempt to give the Executive a greater flexibility in its task of administration, the number of extranumerários increased incensantly, due to certain advantages such as greater functional mobility, so that by 1960, they represented about two thirds of the federal civil service. Here again, the functionality of the intention lost to the disfunctionality in its execution. The strategy was based on behavioural prerequisites not typical of the Brazilian bureaucracy. One notices, therefore, a tendency of the system to reject those aspects which are in conflict with its prevailing orientations (the functional aspects) and to absorb those compatible with such orientation (the disfunctional aspects). Thus, instead of actually changing the client system, the reforms have contributed a great deal to the stabilization of the status quo, by providing opportunities for the reinforcement of patterns that already prevail in the behavioural profile of the bureaucracy.

Strategy and process-orientation

One of the notions of administrative theory that most influenced the reformers was Willoughby's distinction between functional (ends) and institutional (means) activities as far back as 1927. Several different trends are rooted in such a distinction. Two, however, are particularly relevant for a criticism of the strategy used in the Brazilian experience. The first argues that only by possessing efficient administrative means (personnel, matériel, etc.) can a government accomplish its purposes. Therefore, the aspect to be concentrated upon is the means, or the housekeeping activities, as Willoughby called them, since they represent basic conditions for governmental efficiency. The second idea was that, since those activities are common to all governmental agencies, reasons of efficiency and of a technical and economic nature as well, dictate the centralization of those functions in a single specialized agency to report directly to the Chief Executive.

Among the possible consequences that may have resulted from this stress on the housekeeping activities - conditioning the achievement of the ends to the efficiency of the means, which we call process-orientation - was a disregard for the actual goals to be pursued by the bureaucracy. What happened in effect was the triumph of technique over purpose; in other words, a process-orientation prevailed over a teleological orientation. While it is impossible to establish, on the one hand, any causal relationship between such a process-orientation of the reforms, and on the other, the lack of goal-orientation that characterizes much of the behaviour of the Brazilian bureaucrat, one might venture the hypothesis that the process-orientation of the reformers may have reinforced cultural patterns which tend to confer a higher place to instrumental, rather than terminal, values - thereby becoming an agent of the status quo, rather than of change. Observe, en passant, the relation between the notion of process-orientation and prerequisites. In this case, the means tend to be seen as prerequisites to the ends. Finally, it is worth stressing that, besides concentrating on the means, the reformers chose such "inflexible" means as personnel, matériel, etc.

matériel, etc., which, especially in an underdeveloped country, increase the cost of the reform and have less of a multiplying effect upon the dynamics of the civil service. If means were to have been the focus of concentration, it would have been more profitable to concentrate on the "elastic" means such as research, planning, and leadership.

Among the possible consequences deriving from the second notion — centralization of the means — one could mention the atrophy of some of these activities (such as those related to the conservation of public buildings), in benefit of others which DASP had to consider with priority; and the long struggle with the Ministry of Finance regarding the formulation of the budget proposal, of disrupting consequences for DASP. Had the obstacle-mapping taken into account not only the cognitive impediments, but also the normative ones, the reformers would have probably tried to streamline the budget process by adopting another strategy. After all, would it not have been more sensible to seek such a streamlining through the Ministry of Finance, instead of against it? How rational was it to provoke an obstacle that could have been overcome for the good of the reform, just to "complete", with the budget, the centralization of the means? Which is the more important, the process or the goal?

Critical synthesis: the triple inadequacy of the strategy

Assuming, then, that the normative or ideological component precedes and conditions all the others, criticism of the prevailing reform strategy in Brazilian federal experience must concentrate on the ideology of the reforms. Such an ideology is composed of several elements, two of which — the dependence on the prevalence, in the bureaucracy, of particular behavioural patterns, and the process-orientation — were discussed when analyzing the Brazilian model of change strategy. As for the former of these elements, the strategy is triply inadequate. In the first place, it is so for depending on behavioural patterns which do not characterize the behavioural orientations of the Brazilian bureaucracy. These behavioural patterns resemble those of Max Weber's ideal bureaucrat: one characterized by a high degree of functional rationality. The notion of time as a scarce commodity and the sense of commitments in the way of schedules, for example,
are indispensable attitudes for the implementation of work rationalization, routine simplification and purchasing schedules. These attitudes are behavioural prerequisites without which the formal elements of the reform - flow charts, time charts, PERT diagrams - produce no change effect and are lost in an air of indifference or in an atmosphere of antagonism. On the other hand, to see time as a scarce commodity is not enough, since this can indicate an awareness of making the best use of the working hour either for the benefit of the organization or for one's own benefit. The case is very common for individuals who never have time and are always really very pressed for time, rushing around... because they have four or five other activities outside the civil service which demand from them a maximum temporal orientation. The "subordination of one's private interests to the general interests" (as pointed out by Fayol), impartiality in relation with subordinates (instead of preferences), neutrality as the basis of the decision-making process (instead of factiousness), the use of functional authority for organizational (and not for personal) ends exclusively, are other examples of attitudes which together would make up what could be called the behavioural profile of the Weberian bureaucracy, which is far away from the prevailing behavioural patterns in the Brazilian bureaucracy.

An empirical characterization of the behavioural profile of the federal bureaucracy is a matter of urgent administrative research in Brazil. Though this profile is still virtually unexplored, it seems reasonable to admit, considering the lack of more objective data, that the prevailing behavioural orientations in the civil service tend to be antagonistic to those which constitute the behavioural prerequisites of an instrumental strategy. Hence the inadequacy of this strategy as applied to the Brazilian reality.

38/ Two aspects of the governmental profile of the Brazilian bureaucracy - authority orientations and temporal orientations - were studied by the author and are discussed in his Ph.D. thesis, "Change Strategy and Client System: Administrative Reform in Brazil" (Graduate School, University of Southern California, 1966), Chapters V and VI.
In the second place, the strategy is inadequate since it does not incorporate tactics, stimuli, or measures designed to intensify or generate behavioural patterns essential to the success of the reform. In fact, the reform agents have almost completely ignored the problem of conceiving strategies that will foster the integration of civil servants in the change process. What has been done to sell the social value - not only the administrative, technical and rational value - of the reform measures? What has been done to reorganize the perceptions of the civil servants (and, in particular, of those who possess authority) in order that each might feel responsible for the reform; a reformer and not merely one who is reformed? What stimuli have been conceived to compensate for and foster behavioural patterns compatible with the reform measures? Almost nothing. The assumption of the Brazilian reform strategies, though implicit, is that in Administration, what is logical is necessarily psychological - a false assumption because it conceives the human being as strictly rational, forgetting the emotional aspects (illogical or non-logical) of his individuality. The fact of having action oriented to the formal elements, of using an authoritative model of influence and of being confined to cognitive obstacles, explains the strategy's failure of fostering and generating the behavioural patterns on which it depends. This explanation, however, only reafirms this second inadequacy.

Finally, an instrumental strategy is inadequate because, as regards the inadequacies analyzed above; it results, after all, in the disfunctionality of the reform goals. The discussion of this point makes two digressions necessary. The first concerns the distinction between the teleology and the strategy of the reforms, or, in other words, between its set of objectives and its modus operandi. It should be said that the ends of the reforms are, at least in principle, adequate, since they embody an effort aimed at greater rationality in the civil service. They attempt to substitute merit for nepotism, equity for personalism, morality for corruption, economy for waste, efficiency for moroseness in the fulfilment of the public function.
Thus, from the teleological standpoint, the reforms were not disfunctional. The second digression regards the potential dualism in every bureaucratic action, since such an action may be functional for a given reference and disfunctional for another. This concept, of major value to modern administrative theory, arose from the works of Talcott Parsons, and its application to organizational theory is due to Robert Merton. Applying the concepts of functionality and disfunctionality to Max Weber's bureaucratic model, Merton criticized the analytical bias of the model, showing that Weber limited himself to the study of the functional aspects of the bureaucratic form of organization, missing the disfunctional analysis of bureaucracy arising also from the same principles and methods responsible for administrative efficiency. For instance, a well-specified structure of authority may on one hand be a leverage for disciplined performance and adequate identification of responsibilities for the application of penalties. On the other, it can be a deterrent to upward communication, risk-taking, initiative and creativity. Military and religious organizations, in particular, tend to be faced with such problems. Merton's analysis is much in line with Gideon Sjoberg's concept of "contradictory functional requirements".

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39/ Today, the concepts of "function" is one of the universals of science. In the social sciences, "functionalism" has become the central referant, when not the label, of many schools of thought. Anthropologists like Linton, Malinowski, Herkovits, Tadcliffe-Brown, and Ruth Benedict have extensively discussed the functions of cultural patterns. In psychology, the functionalism of Angell, Dewey, and Carr represented a reaction against the introspectionism of Titchner. Economists, particularly after Keynes, has relied more and more on the concept of "function"; possibly, the most manifest indication of this tendency can be found in studies of econometrics. Finally, structural-functionalism became a distinct sociological school of thought expounded by men like Parsons, Merton, Levy and Shills. The concept of "function" as applied to bureaucratic theory is derived from this sociological perspective.


According to this concept every system - and bureaucracy is a system - presents inherent contradictory functional requirements which lead to the development of contradictory sub-structures. In complex organizations, the most clear example of this precept is the classical distinction between formal and informal organization, the former resulting from a functional need (the need for general rules and instructions as a guarantee toward the operational unity of the organization) and the latter resulting from another functional need (the sense of teamwork, of value integration). Another example still to be found in modern organizations refers to the contradictions between the stimuli given toward the strict observance of rules and regulations and, at the same time, to the spirit of initiative, to the capacity of achieving objectives (even if this implies in acting against the rules and regulations).

The following table devised by the author, is an application of the notions of contradictory functional requisites to some of Weber's ideal model of bureaucracy.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional Requirement</th>
<th>Contradictory to each other but essential to</th>
<th>Functional Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Depersonalization</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Identification with organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detachment</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>esprit de corps, involvement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity to rules,</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Risk-taking, initiative,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disciplined and uniform performance</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>innovation, creativity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standardization of</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Flexibility, adjustable-developmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>methods, time and</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>procedures, formalization</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Professional authority as the basis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of channels</td>
<td></td>
<td>of decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positional authority</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>(expertise)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as the basis of decision</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(discipline)</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nascimento Kleber, Change Strategy and Client System: Administrative Reform in Brazil, op. cit., p. 262. For further elaboration of this concept and its implications for a theory of bureaucracy, see the essay "Functionality and Disfunctionality of Position-Orientedness in Organizational Behaviour", op. cit., p. 253-268.
To sum up, administrative efficiency equally depends on bureaucratizing elements (needs listed on the left) conducive to a certain measure of operational uniformity, as on debureaucratizing, or at least "non-bureaucratic", elements (needs listed on the right) in order to ensure the system a minimum capacity on self-adjustment and innovation. The conciliation of these antagonistic needs so as to minimize disfunctionalities and maximize functionalities is the major and inalienable task of the administrator. This compatibility greatly depends - much more than is generally thought - on the pre-dispositions or prevailing behavioural tendencies of the administrative system. If the system is characterized by disfunctional behavioural orientation, i.e., anti-bureaucratic, the mere introduction of measures demanding a high degree of rational behavioural patterns will only result in disfunctions for the system. With this remark - of major importance to the strategy of any reform - we can close this theoretical digression and return to criticism of the Brazilian experience.

The last of the three inadequacies of the strategy of Brazilian reforms is that the latter have resulted, in the end, in the disfunctionality of their objectives. This is so because, given the Brazilian bureaucracy's disfunctional behavioural orientations - orientations which the strategy has not attempted to correct - and furthermore, considering that every bureaucratic action (that is, every administrative reform) is potentially functional and disfunctional, the tendency of the civil service will be (and has been) to reject those aspects incongruent with their typical behavioural orientations and to absorb those which are compatible with such orientations. In other words, this results in a tendency to repel the functional aspects of the reforms and absorb their disfunctional aspects. Many examples of such dynamics were pointed out throughout this article. The doubling of the number of extranumerários over the number of career civil servant (called "funcionários"), the labelling of classes such as technician-in-ascension, the practice of taking dishonest advantage of the a posteriori control, and many others - are crystal clear examples of the "disfunctionalization" of objectives which, in principle, were entirely functional. To conclude, the strategy of the reforms has "disfunctionalized"
its teleology to such an extent that the changes have resulted, in many cases, in tools for strengthening the status quo (rather than for innovation) because, "in erasing the past", they have conferred rights, "legalized" odd situations and privileges, in the hope that "from here on it will be different". This is the most crucial inadequacy of the change strategy which has prevailed in the Brazilian experience of administrative reform: disfunctionalization the goals of the reform, which strengthens the status quo and discredits the reforms.

Elements for formulating a Brazilian model of administrative reform strategy

The interpretation of the past provides a basis for devising strategic guidelines to enhance the implementation of future attempts at administrative reform. The analysis of the Brazilian experience may be summarized by identifying the three fundamental inadequacies of the strategy on which this interpretation of past failures of reform efforts is based: (1) the incompatibility between the behavioural requirements of the strategy and the behavioural reality of the bureaucracy; (2) the non-existence of measures aimed at inspiring or generating the behavioural patterns that the reform requires; and (3) the ultimate disfunctionalization of the teleology of the reforms, in that their functional aspects have not found a response in the bureaucracy, whereas their negative ones have.

The process of operationalizing reforms as a whole will result in increased possibilities of successful implementation if the strategy adopted bears in mind the practical conditions of the real situation in Brazilian bureaucracy. The formulation of a Brazilian model of reform strategy must consider the following guidelines:

Gradualistic orientation. The past has shown that the demands imposed by a wholistic and immediatistic change scope are beyond the existing administrative capabilities of the bureaucracy. During dictatorial periods, the non-existence of legislative barriers has been an especially compelling inducement to global changes. However, even if entirely free to plan and proclaim a wholistic reform, the bureaucracy is not prepared to meet the attendant administrative demands. The result of past reform attempts has been formalism, - the distance between planning and implementation of plans,
between law and behaviour - with real losses for the idea of reform. As noted before, an all-encompassing but discredited merit system may be worse than a limited but effective one. The main point is to keep the reform scope within realistic boundaries.

**Selectivity.** The constituent parts of any bureaucracy are unevenly change power. Some are highly stable, crystallized and virtually untouchable, others are adaptive enough to dispense with any outside help to become more effective; and still others may be under varying degrees of potential disequilibrium and might easily internalize certain changes. Past reforms in Brazil have not taken account of such differences. Rather, their wholistic orientation has promoted "across-the-board" undertakings, with a consequent misallocation of resources to areas which either (1) are irrelevant for the reform process as a whole, at a given stage, or (2) are so resistant to change as to be "unproductive investments" at a given moment. By adopting a selective orientation, change efforts would be concentrated on more change-prone areas, or those critical to public administration, no matter what their degree of adaptability. A recent example of this last case is to be seen in the gradual, selective and continued reform in federal taxation.

Selectivity leads to a strategy whereby scarce bureaucratic resources are allocated opportunistically, based on the degree of changefulness or the urgency of the administrative area under reform. The basic assumption of this orientation is that once change is unleashed in a given part of the system, that part becomes a source of change inputs for other parts.

**Continuity.** The reform experience of the past has been characterized by intermittency, rather than continuity, in change efforts. Reforms have usually been undertaken under conditions of crisis, when the disfunctions of the status quo have reached unbearable proportions. Much of their ineffectiveness has resulted from this intermittency - everything is started all over again, from time to time, by succeeding reform groups.
There is a need for approaching change as a continuous, rather than intermittent or crucial, task. Continuity is directly related to gradualism. A gradualistic approach represents, in fact, a piece-meal change strategy. Its basic advantage is its political feasibility and administrative adequacy as related to the operational requirements of the bureaucracy. Its main weakness is the slower rate of change it impels. However, the latter point does not have to be necessarily so, as long as the reform process is continuous.

**Normative orientation.** One of the most distinctive characteristics of the prevailing strategy of the Brazilian reform experience is that a cognitive orientation, rather than a normative one, has guided the obstacle-mapping process. Hence, even the training programmes related to the reforms have reflected the "machine-model" bias, entirely overlooking the behavioural aspects. It then becomes necessary to shift the focus of those training programmes so as to transform them into tools for internalizing the value aspects - attitudes, habits, opinions, moods - conducive to behavioural patterns necessary for implementing the reform. Only through a new approach to training, giving it a normative orientation (besides the cognitive one which has prevailed until now), will it be possible to strengthen and disseminate the behavioural patterns necessary to the reforms and discourage those which are antagonistic.

**Influence through internalization.** Past experience has shown that whatever were the achievements of the reforms during dictatorial periods in Brazil, those achievements entered a progressive stage of dilution, as soon as the controlling power of the DASP was reduced by the political redemocratization of the country. This is so because influence processes based upon authority require permanent control by the change agent to assure respect for effected changes. Once control is removed, the system reverts in large measure to its previous state. Therefore, in a true sense, change has not occurred. The relative success of the reform movement during a dictatorship is explained by the exceptional power of control in the hands of the reform agents. The débâcle of the reform is explained by the restrictions of this power, since the strategy used did not provide for the internalization of the values which would give continuity to the reform work.
In view of the current political situation in Brazil, the quest for internalization takes on a renewed importance for the reform process. In a way, there has been a return to the past, since the change agents can resort again to authoritative processes in order to effect change. The point, then, is how to reconcile the immediate need for authority (sometimes even to assure the survival of the régime) with the need for internalizing the values of the reforms, so as to assure the endurance of the achievements after the country's political situation returns to normal. From the standpoint of a strategy of reforms, this may constitute the most critical dilemma of the Brazilian bureaucracy of today. There are indications, for instance, that the reforms carried out in the Ministry of Finance have achieved excellent results - tax revenues have increased substantially, effective control systems have made tax collection easier and safer for both the taxpayer and the public employees, and so on. These reforms have adopted a gradualistic change scope; they also have reflected a selectivistic orientation, not in the sense of concentrating on a more changeful area of the bureaucracy, but on one where change was an imperative condition for the political stability of the régime. Nevertheless, there is no denying that the change agents have enjoyed authoritative powers which sooner or later will cease. The test of the strategic adequacy of the reform will occur when that power is removed. By simply recognizing the need for internalization, change agents will become more sensitive to the possibilities of increasing the endurance of today's achievements through instilling their corresponding values into the bureaucracy.

Leadership through cooptation. The strategy of administrative reform should avoid any elitist orientation that would result in insulating the reform group from the structure of leadership in the civil service. In the past, a handful of technicians, an administrative élite, undertook the task of reform. Thus, even though a network of subunits in charge of the reforms was formally created - the ministerial departments of administration - and the personnel of such units belonged to the ministries, the necessary cooptation of the leadership did not occur. Therefore, the organization structured to carry out the reforms never did constitute a system in the
sense of having central and peripheral units sharing the same values, professional qualifications, and loyalty to the organization. In other words, the change group never formed an integrated constellation, but remained a solitary star within the bureaucracy. From the perspective of change strategy, this insulation of the reform leadership bears heavily upon the development of resistance against the intended changes and in the coalescence of such resistances into a "united front" against the reforming elite. A progressive expansion of the leadership in charge of the reform, through cooptation, would greatly increase the possibilities of implementing such reform.

The above guidelines are by no means specific or comprehensive enough to constitute a model of change strategy for administrative reform in Brazil. However, if compared to the prevailing strategic characteristics of Brazilian reforms, these guidelines represent a shift from a structural to a behavioural concept of change strategy.

The Brazilian bureaucracy is crystallized and inflexible in several areas and non-formalized and hyperflexible in many others. Administrative reforms should perform a double though apparently paradoxical task of debureaucratizing the former and bureaucratizing the latter - in the Weberian sense. In both, the process and forms of change must embody a behaviourally-oriented strategy based upon the realities of the Brazilian bureaucracy.