POpulation and Development in Latin America

Volume II
Chapter IV

POPULATION AND MODERNIZATION

Introduction

The issue of population policies has to be set against the background of the development process and viewed in terms of strategies for change and alternative notions of what society should be. Because of its implications, it is related in the immediate present to questions of short- and medium-term policy; moreover, it is impossible to formulate the model for future social structures without dealing with such issues as population quality, quantity and location. Population policies inherently touch upon issues that vitally affect the beliefs and value commitments of social groups and classes, have an effect on the ideological framework in relation to which stability and change is gauged, and are associated with a redefinition of the system of human relations, in particular, the function of the family and the social role of women.

It is this multiplicity of facets that makes the issue at once so specific and so diffuse, specific when it simplifies into a bare outline of variables, diffuse when exploring its great variety and complexity. The aspects it touches upon can be formalized to a high degree, and yet it is difficult to understand the significance of such abstractions unless it is remembered that each of them is linked directly not only to the rational orientations of human beings but also to their vital images, identifications and life goals. The success of such policies as Governments may adopt in this field have so far depended rather less on the political consensus achieved at any particular moment than on the possibility of persuading individuals and families, subject to the goals set by the particular society, to move and physically locate themselves in certain areas of the national territory and to plan the size of their families. In turn, the ability to make political consensus a reality at the grass roots level is dependent on many factors that over the short run generally escape Government control and in any case respond to the pace and direction of over-all progress.

Latin America's population problems must be viewed against a background of economic and social semi-development. The broad diversity of national situations in the region may be described in terms of a typical pattern of evolution, in the sense that although the social structure and institutions
of the rural past have been or are about to be superseded and significant progress has been made in industrialization, it is nevertheless difficult to affirm that countries have as yet established themselves as modern industrial societies.

Certain indicators can help to define the nature of this unusual state of affairs. There are significant differences between economic growth and the level of social progress, inter-related sectors corresponding to different stages of the modernization process tend to coexist, and there are indications of a high degree of cultural heterogeneity, as well as sharp contrasts in the relative access of social groups and regions to the benefits of technological progress. (See table 1).

It is difficult to interpret the trend of these indicators, particularly since it has proved all but impossible to project the future direction that countries will take on the basis of recent patterns. The events of the past decade have rendered obsolete the economic and social models that have been the basis for action by Governments and their oppositions for more than 30 years. The basic dilemma arises when determining whether the present situation is just a transitional stage in the complex itinerary of industrial evolution, or whether there are indications that the possibilities for significant advances have gradually been exhausted, with progress now depending on a modification of the rules of the game at the national and international levels.

In an atmosphere in which analytical work is concerned less and less with projecting social models and increasingly with identifying the assumptions and incongruencies of these models, giving rise to an almost introspective manner of reflecting on the direction and limits of recent development, the population issue comes to the fore as a result of the search for new strategies and avenues to dispel the ambiguities of this intermediate stage of semi-development.

It is clear that the current concern with the issue constitutes an indirect admission of the fact that the development of Latin America has been unbalanced and inadequate, and this in turn is prompted by new and higher levels of progress achieved in the region.

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Source: United Nations estimates based on official figures.

[a/ Expressed in units of energy contained in 1 kilogramme of petroleum.
[b/ Relates to Eastern Europe, including the USSR.
[c/ Relates to East and South-East Asia, excluding Japan.
[d/ Relates to East Asia.]
This growing interest in the population issue springs from three complementary sources. First, the scientific and doctrinal interpretations of economic and social development which, in recognizing the importance of non-economic aspects, must identify the main interrelationships that appear to exist between population trends and over-all progress in order to define the role of population as a factor in development. Secondly, the evolution of demographic behaviour in different social groups reflects their effort at adapting their life styles to their concrete possibilities and circumstances within an over-all pattern of semi-industrialization. And thirdly, the action of Governments expressed through plans, policies and programmes, which respond to some extent to the need to compatibilize macro-strategies for development with the demand for services from family units.
A. POPULATION AND THE INTERPRETATIONS OF DEVELOPMENT 1

1. Recent situation

During the past decade, the concern of Latin American academic circles for population problems followed in the wake of ideological considerations. The most popular analyses of development showed an indirect interest in the problem and incorporated the volume, localization and growth rate of the population as a datum or factor in the formulation of given interpretations of development. Throughout the 1960's, social research institutes and centres tended to limit themselves to demography in the strictest sense, for the most part leaving the study of the relationship between population and development and of policy design to social doctrines whose main source of inspiration was the ideological controversy regarding the nature of the social order and the role of Latin American countries in the world system.

The major arguments advanced by these doctrines related to the greater or lesser relevance of the population problem to development policies and, in the medium and long term, to the objectives of economic and social change. A closer look at the assumptions on which the arguments rest, reveals the existence of two trains of thought around which the various positions have been taken. With the realization that both the volume and growth rate of the population have some bearing on the transformation of the economic organization and social structure of countries, an effort was made to assess the impact of demographic factors and, above all, to determine at what point an unduly large population slows down the development process and under what conditions it can be converted into a positive factor for change.

The inverse relation between those two processes - that is, the effect that the economic and social development of Latin America might have in the near future on demographic trends - has also received considerable attention.

In the first case, the arguments are based on certain diagnoses and interpretations of the nature of development; in the second, an attempt is made to form a clearer picture of the significance of the current demographic transition.

2. Diagnosis of the crisis and role of demographic growth

The state of semi-development achieved by the region indicated that there had not been sufficient progress to resolve several problems inherited from the past nor to resolve the new problems which were brought on by a greater degree of social differentiation.

Under these circumstances, it was recognized that the dynamic domestic policy of countries aiming at a more autonomous form of development was at variance with their growing need for resources, technology and scientific knowledge from the countries at the centre and with their dependency on the world market in raw materials. Rapid but limited growth appeared to have brought about a situation in which development potential was stifled by internal obstacles of a structural and institutional nature. The countries were faced with increasingly serious dilemmas in which they had to choose between social needs and aspirations and the requirements of general economic efficiency. Moreover, a critical lack of continuity was discernible between the capacity of institutions to mobilize groups and sectors, to bring about agreement among them and channel their aspirations in a functional manner, and their ability to work towards the achievement of social targets.

(a) The theses

As was to be expected, the diagnosis of the crisis took the form of theses regarding the possibility for the Establishment to explore new avenues and lay the foundations of a more efficient order.

In recent decades, the ideologies that have determined social change in Latin America have placed more and more emphasis on the need to run the nation with the greatest possible autonomy and ensure an increasing participation of the large majority of the population by means of the expansion of the domestic market and the reform of the administrative and political institutions. Naturally, the main differences have been in the industr
of the reforms, the strategy or critical path adopted and the alternative models of social organization.

The conservative developmentalist thesis is founded on the potential which the present Establishment offers for rapid development based on the consolidation of the domestic order, on the concentration of resources and their application to industrialization targets, on attracting foreign investment and on the more efficient exploitation of the markets of the economically advanced countries.

Others have stressed the need for the gradual removal, in the medium and long term, of those obstacles of a structural nature that hinder development, that is to say, the creation, at a reasonable economic and social "cost", of the appropriate conditions, incentives and institutions for adjusting the social order to a system of development under which the raising of industrial productivity is compatible with the expansion of the domestic market.

The revolutionary thesis predicated that the Establishment's potential has been exhausted and that the future of industrialization resides in the creation of a new system of political and social relationships involving a radical redefinition of the institutions of ownership and the structure of political power.

The three theses differ among themselves both in their interpretation of the relevance of the political and social variables and in their selection of models or projects of society. In the eyes of the conservatives, the consolidation of the political order depends on the relatively extensive opportunities for economic growth, which in the long term will make it possible to correct the immediate imbalances and sacrifices implicit in development. It accepts, moreover, the model of the capitalist consumer society which tends towards a two-fold expansion of the domestic market, stepping up the consumption of the highest income groups while gradually incorporating those sectors of society which, because of the very speed of the process, stand on the threshold of incorporation. The images that are used to explain the meaning of the transition and of the critical phases are drawn essentially from the study of the processes of modernization that led to the creation of an industrial order in the more advanced countries.

/The revolutionary
The revolutionary viewpoint is that potential economic progress is imprisoned within the existing system of domination and that its liberation entails giving priority to the great task of political transformation and creation involved in the advance towards a socialist system. The model of the future social order is inspired by the revolutionary experience of the socialist countries and its application to local conditions means resorting to the instruments of analysis and to the guidelines afforded by the revolutionary ideologies.

In the view of those who consider that the Establishment is open to the introduction of successive reforms aimed at creating a more functional and just social order, it is essential to strike a balance between economic growth with measures to redistribute benefits and transform the institutional framework. The fundamental logic of this strategy resides in the advantages offered by the step-by-step approach, assuming that the accumulation of successive economic and social changes in a given direction eventually modifies the political system. It is difficult to pinpoint the precise model of society that is involved here, inasmuch as it involves the definition of non-revolutionary forms of life and controls while at the same time accepting the values of a liberal political order. Implicit in this is the notion of some kind of mixed social structure which is to evolve pragmatically out of the experience of development.

(b) Population and prospective change

These forecasts regarding the possibilities of the Establishment in the present situation of semi-industrialization constitute the frame of reference for the Latin American debate on population problems.

Traditionally, the doctrine accepted in the region was based on the idea that population growth was a favourable factor for development. The feeling was that population growth helped to increase and diversify demand, generated pressures for a better utilization of resources, and stimulated the creation of capacities which were essential in raising overall productivity. It was affirmed that the environment created by high population density facilitated the emergence of a modern industrial culture through progress towards social diversification and the division of labor and
labour and by creating a scale which oriented and gave meaning to scientific
and technological development. It was even accepted that the more rapid
replacement of generations helped to accelerate the changes, since better
trained young minds had in fact new conceptions which were more in line
with progress in production and social modernization.

It was also believed that only those countries which had attained
an appreciable population could play a part in the world balance of power,
and that for all practical purposes development opportunities should not
be unrelated to the place which the nations occupied in the international
system. The dilemmas posed by the state of under-development prompted
the different groups to revise this traditional conception, in the light
of their economic and social objectives of change.

(c) Population and conservative developmentism

To the more representative sectors of conservative opinion the high
rates of population growth pose a dilemma which is difficult to resolve,
since it involves balancing traditional moral considerations against the
goal of achieving rapid progress within the established social order. It
is recognized that accelerated population growth can give rise to
insuperable contradictions between the goals of economic development and
social improvement. The extreme view is that population growth conflicts
with economic development, since the capacity of social services and
institutions and the resources which can be used for productive purposes
run the risk of lagging behind the demand of a rapidly increasing population.
This position does not, however, exhaust the alternative possibilities
offered by conservative developmentism. Others accept the importance of
the problem, but emphasize that the idea of the "overwhelming" nature of
population growth rates is based on the assumption, within the medium term
of a state of mass mobilization. They maintain that wherever conditions
guarantee a period of mediatization of the participation and continuity
of the social order, excess population helps to keep wages down. Thus, in
countries where the domestic market has reached a volume compatible with
the level of modern technology, a curb on the rapid rise of industrial
wages would be a comparative advantage as regards exports of manufactures.

Furthermore, the
Furthermore, the population would have additional functions within a strategy of stepping up economic growth. With plentiful natural resources there would be a greater social capacity for land settlement and, in general, for opening up new frontiers within the country, incorporating new factors and possibilities into the economy. Moreover, with the assurance of economic growth during a transitional stage in a world that must increasingly adopt the scale of production imposed by modern technology, a subsequent phase of redistribution would offer a dynamic reserve of wide possibilities for consolidating whatever development had already been achieved.

(d) Population vis-à-vis revolutionary ethics and practice

Revolutionary developmentism focuses the problem of population growth in a dual perspective. At the level of private conduct, it favours responsible voluntary procreation, and ultimately the ethics of freedom and equality for women. It is accepted that in pre-revolutionary society, support should be given to efforts providing indispensable services and information to whoever may request them, but by no means to accept pressures or incentives of the power élite to control the birth rate of the broad masses for political purposes. The central idea is that the decisions of couples with respect to the birth rate should reflect a cultural change induced by a larger share in the benefits of progress, so that the full realization of these goals would be possible only in a revolutionary society.

At the level of general trends, excess population is considered to be a genuine instrument of change. Like their conservative counterparts, revolutionary ideologies point out that, given a minimum of political mobilization, rapid population growth accentuates pressures on institutions and resources, which, within the dynamics of a social confrontation between the masses and minorities, could help create the general conditions conducive to revolution. In addition, increased population pressure is in itself an incentive to the adoption of new and more progressive criteria of rationality and social justice. These two perspectives are summed up in the assertion that it is only in a revolutionary society, which develops in conformity with these criteria, that general population targets should
and can coincide with the decisions of couples regarding the number of children they are to have.

(e) Population growth and structural changes

With regard to what might be called the structuralist approach to development, the central issue is defined by the historical singularity of the Latin American situation. Rapid though "insufficient" economic growth over the past three decades had disrupted the traditional balance between birth and death rates, in a context of technological modernization and increased consumer aspirations induced by the new levels of progress.

It thus became necessary to place population problems within this development framework and to determine how far population trends and the dynamics and bottlenecks of progress affected one another, in order to frame realistic policies which considered the part which population growth played in development.

These broad guiding principles lead to some general conclusions which help to define the structuralists' position. The crux of the argument is that the importance of these problems and of a population policy in Latin America stems from the need to accelerate change, but under no circumstances would such a policy constitute an alternative to efforts aimed at realizing economic and social changes. Moreover, strictly speaking, population policies are apparently inseparable from social policy, and to imagine options which acting independently could significantly alter population trends, is completely illusory. On the contrary, the rapid increase in excess population has short - and medium - term consequences which development policy should take into account.

The structuralists affirm that, while they accept a development strategy aimed at harmonizing the need to maximize general economic efficiency with a steady rise in the levels of living of the broad masses, within the medium - and long - term population growth rates will have to be compatible with the fulfilment of those objectives. The combination of economic growth and social justice, on the basis of sweeping technological change, presupposes that declining rates of population growth would rapidly be attained.
3. Images of the demographic transition

These conceptions of the role of population in present development conjunctures are based on particular images of the demographic transition. The decision whether or not to intervene in such matters implies that there are priority areas in development plans that are affected by population trends and, furthermore, that these trends reflect the level and nature of development attained. If one accepts that, starting from a certain point in the region's recent history, the modification of a traditional state of equilibrium has given rise to a distinctive demographic evolution, then there is reason to wonder what the "natural" course of this transition is, that is to say, what direction the process will assume if unchecked by policies and programmes having a direct bearing on the birth rate.

(a) Self-regulation

A widespread interpretation emphasizes the fact that the acceleration of development necessarily leads to the self-regulation of demographic processes, since the birth rate would depend directly on variables such as school attendance, the incorporation of women in the labour force and higher aspirations associated with higher income levels. In stressing that the play of factors in the modernization process finally leads to a new balance between the birth rate and the mortality rate, it is affirmed, on the one hand, that the demographic transition must necessarily follow the course taken by that process in the industrial countries, and it is suggested, on the other hand, that any attempt to alter the course determined by the forces and factors operating in the transition will bring negative consequences.

(b) The critical phase of indetermination

Those who accentuate the importance of internal disequilibria as characteristics of a situation of semi-development, argue that the "natural self-regulation cycle" is neither necessary nor irreversible, since there is a phase of "indetermination" which is the result of a lag in the decline of birth rates. Taking it for granted that modern medical practices bring about a historically different demographic situation, it may be concluded that the duration and the possibilities of modifying the
trends during the "indetermination" phase are dependent upon the nature and degree of the disequilibria. Only an environment in which economic policy is based on social modernization measures makes for the creation of the social forces and institutional machinery which help to make birth control programmes successful.

(c) The demographic trap

Lastly, there is the position of those who believe that this transition leads towards a cumulative deterioration of certain relationships, and that to give the tendencies free rein necessarily leads to a "demographic trap" which could ultimately come to constitute an insurmountable obstacle to development.

The "trap" is the result of the semi-modernized state of society and the lack of synchronization in the rhythm of economic and social changes. When the death rate drops and a traditional birth rate is maintained, an age structure is created which tends to intensify the rate of demographic growth with a sustained increase in the dependent population at the base. In such conditions, the impact of policies to improve the "quality" of the population and assimilate the "marginal" social sectors into productive employment is retarded by the demographic aggravant, thus favoring the conditions leading to a situation of strangulation.

The demographic trap thus obliges the state to accept the responsibility of controlling demographic growth as part of general development policy.
3. SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND DEMOGRAPHIC GROWTH

I. Hypotheses on demographic change

A brief review of recent population trends in Latin American countries shows considerable variety in terms of current stages in the demographic transition. In most countries, however, the trend has been towards an acceleration of population growth as a result of the increasing imbalance between the birth and mortality rates. What is likely to be the future course of population growth in such countries?

To answer this question properly, it would be necessary to make a careful and far-reaching analysis of the situation and trends in components of demographic change and related economic and social factors in each individual country such an endeavor goes far beyond the scope of the present study. Nevertheless, some general observations may be made here regarding population growth prospects in these countries.

First of all, given that the probable range of variation of mortality in the future will be relatively limited, and that international migration, although unpredictable, will probably exert very little influence in most countries, it can be concluded that fertility will be the key variable in future growth process; its evolution will largely determine the rate of population increase.

Secondly, recent research into the existence of differential fertility rates, and into birth control attitudes and practice in the populations of many countries, together with the growth in the coverage of family planning programmes and the interest of Governments in them, lead to the conclusion that the process of change in the reproductive behaviour of the population is much more than dynamic than would be

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2/ Social change and social development policy in Latin America (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.70.II.G.5), page 47.
suggested by analyses of recent trends in an over-all indicator such as the crude birth rate.

Thirdly, it is becoming increasingly evident that the progress which has been registered in the technology of birth control techniques, together with the increase in the scope and effectiveness of the mass communications media, have weakened the causal relationship between socio-economic change and fertility decline. These developments would thus come to reinforce prediction made by the United Nations 3/, on the basis of an analysis of the relationship between fertility patterns and socio-economic indicators, that several countries with currently high rates of population growth would now be on the verge of experiencing a drop in their birth rates. The decreases observed in several countries during the past decade would appear to bear out this predicted trend.

Lastly, it is worth noting that, given recent developments in birth control technology and mass communications media, declines in birth rates could possibly become accelerated in much the same way as mortality has been lowered in developing regions. That is, the demographic transition which took more than a century to unfold in the technologically-advanced nations could be telescoped into a few decades in many Latin American countries.

2. Urbanization and fertility

It is in the urban environment, particularly in the large cities, that the principal changes in reproductive behaviour occur. The situations that this social structure determines, the motivations it induces and the expectations it creates, constitute the dynamic factor par excellence in the process of modernizing demographic behaviour.

Although the Latin American city is at once the stage and the focal point of this transformation, in many countries the very nature of urban development, while creating the conditions essential for change, also maintains other conditions that constitute veritable barriers to the spread of change.

3/ Population Bulletin of the United Nations, № 7 (United Nations publication, Sales № 64.XIII.2).
A brief examination of the cities of the region viewed as systems for living suggests the existence of social structures that perhaps represent moments in a typical pattern of development, with each moment having its corresponding and clearly defined fertility patterns.

To illustrate the trend of these changes it may be useful to look at four types of urban establishment. Historical urban social structures can be classified according to the nature of the predominant elite into aristocracies and oligarchies. Contemporary structures, can be defined in terms of the impact of industrialization into two types of establishment, in one of which the domination of the middle classes becomes stronger, and the other in which progress in industrialization generates a situation of semi-development where expectations rise far above concrete possibilities.

Available data would indicate that there has been a steady evolution in the sense of replacing birth-promoting attitudes based on an ideology and a religious ethic with secular criteria induced by social mobility and consumption, and that these new values have in part emerged out of the transformations of the elite and the consolidation of a middle-class culture.

(a) The structures of the past

Here, it may be worthwhile to refer to cities as they were typically in the past - generally relatively small agglomerations that were organized to provide services for a fairly small elite during pre-industrial stages of Latin American development.

(i) The aristocratic city

The aristocratic urban establishment was structured around a group of families whose livelihood was based on the ownership and exploitation of land. The relative absence of economic differentiation reflected a social structure in which the elite not only occupied the central and predominant place, but also to a large extent constituted the direct source of most employment opportunities and income for the other sectors of the city. Criteria of stratification were
predominant and the small middle classes occupied a subordinate service position. The masses, while more numerous, were stratified in accordance with the location of their activities vis-à-vis the aristocracy.

In this atmosphere of limited opportunities, and hence of little mobility, where competitive values had little significance as compared with stratification criteria, the reproduction of the elite and the middle classes was ideologically regulated by transcendental norms that favoured abundant fertility and this also permeated the behaviour of the masses.

(ii) The oligarchic city

The oligarchic urban establishment reflects a stage of greater differentiation. Exports of raw materials to international markets herein favour the consolidation of a social structure based on an alliance of the interests of landowners and exporters. The size of the city swells and the quantity of the economic surplus multiplies.

Exporting requires more specialized services, and hence through these changes new opportunities are created that foster the formation of a more extensive and complex middle class, and of lower strata that are larger and yet less diverse. However, within the lower strata, artesan-type skills maintain their traditional importance and lead to the emergence of a sub-elite which gradually organizes itself, often under the guise of forming a workers' culture.

The middle classes monopolize opportunities for social mobility, and the elite ceases to be a hard core of inter-related families now that it has been joined by interests associated with the export trade. After this breakthrough, there is a change in the ideologies justifying the social order. Many of the transcendental notions that formerly governed behaviour become secularized, and the importance of acquisitive values grows.

The new levels of competition, however, do not seriously affect the positions held by the elite, which tends to retain its traditional reproductive behaviour. As the middle classes increase in size, they

/strengthen their
strengthen their commitment to secular values, and here the first signs of a reproductive behaviour oriented towards mobility and the acquisition of status can be observed in a slow gradual decline of average family size. The lower strata maintain their traditional level of fertility.

(b) Present-day structures

Industrialization brings with it a complete upheaval of the patterns of urban life, a major transformation in the structure of employment and an unprecedented opening up of new opportunities. Cities expand rapidly until, in some cases, they attain the proportion of metropolises and even megalopolises. The growth rate of the economic surplus not only exceeds past trends but swiftly reaches high levels. Along with schools, the expansion of the urban market plays a key role in the socialization of the population, both institutions creating new expectations and consumer patterns.

The elite changes its character. A new social pact leads to the gradual admission of industrialists, administrators and technocrats. The norms that determine power structures have to be adjusted to the requirements of a larger, more fluid and complex elite. Not only do ideologies become increasingly secularized; they begin to be permeated by concepts that emphasize functionality targets at the expense of values of hierarchical ranking.

This expansion opens up new avenues of social mobility and preference is given to ideologies that justify the social displacement of families and individuals. Some sectors of the middle classes are absorbed into the elite and the rules governing entry into it are partly relaxed.

Craftsmanship loses all meaning in city life and the organized industrial workers become the sector through which the social demands of the masses are voiced. The system of qualifications is modified and, along with it, the notion of a natural working-class hierarchy based on skills. It is the access to the urban market by means of industrial employment and the possibility of influencing the power structure through organization that determine the degree of integration
in the culture of the city. Accordingly, new paths slowly begin to open up for the social mobility of individuals making their way up from the lower classes.

The balance between the expectations and the possibilities of mobility is generally critical. Inadequate development is a factor that tends to create expectations that go beyond the available opportunities.

Within this general pattern two stages can be distinguished. The first begins with the crisis of the system of oligarchical domination as, between the fissures of the crumbling order, a Establishment evolves in which the middle classes gradually come to play a central role. In the second stage, the main phenomenon is industrialization, whose effects are felt at every level of the social structure but which has a limited capacity for creating a system of life based on technology and on production of the industrial type.

(i) The mesocratic urban Establishment

In its early stages, industrialization encouraged the formation of an urban Establishment possessing three fundamental characteristics:

- A quantitative increase in the masses which come to represent a large proportion of the population of the city but of which only a very small nucleus is politically organized.

- An expansion of the middle classes which increase their political and social influence to a significant degree and which include various entrepreneurial segments of the population.

- An intensification of the process of secularization based on the development of the urban market and on a middle class committed to the values of an acquisitive and socially mobile society.

In this context, the rise of the middle classes is bound up with ideologies that question the legitimacy of the existing order and offer alternatives that emphasize the recognition of personal merit. The basic idea is to create a stable hierarchy that permits the free acquisition of a position in society on the basis of individual ability.
As the middle class comes to constitute the principal support of the social order and its standard of living rises, so there is an intensification in competition for the means and symbols that are indispensable for acquiring and maintaining social status.

The fate of the masses is determined by their access to stable and productive employment and to culture and by their ability to organize themselves. The objective of the struggle of vast masses is in any case to gain a foothold in the market by means of organizations that emphasize solidarity, and thus considerations of acquisition and social mobility filter down to them only in a slow and selective manner.

Fertility follows this general pattern extremely closely. The social groups most intensely committed to the acquisition of status tend to employ birth control, a tendency which rapidly becomes one of the distinctive features of the nascent culture of the middle class. It will likewise be found that the frequency of induced abortions is greater among these groups.

The traditional elite groups see reproduction in terms of transcendental considerations, while among the lower classes, children continue to be an inevitable phenomenon.

(ii) The semi-industrial city

The semi-industrial city is characterized by the initiation of a far-reaching transformation of urban culture and, by the imbalance between social expectations and the inability of the system to fulfil them as well as an imbalance between the requirements and the possibility of resolving the problems posed by the human agglomeration.

The middle classes presently constitute a large proportion of the population; there exists a more complex elite in which primary relationships lose their relative importance and a social stratification of the masses is taking place as a result of the appearance of marginality.

Social capillarity increases but the secularization and universalization of customs come up against limits that are implicit in prestige systems and in the distribution of opportunities for mobility. The fruits of urban progress are distributed on a selective basis so that only the upper segments of the popular sectors acquire access to the market and to social mobility. This insufficient and selective diversification gives greater stability
greater stability to prestige systems and to principles that were traditionally associated with the rank of the families.

Below the level of the specialized industrial workers, the various nuclei that are in situations of marginality organize themselves in terms of their most fundamental problems of incorporation so as to assure a foothold in the market.

Reproductive behaviour conforms to the following set of situations:

1. The new complexity of the elite and the replacement of the system of primary relationships by a system of representation and administration of interests leads to a lower birth rate in accordance with heightened inter-personal competition.

2. In the middle classes, the birth rate continues to go down as consumption levels go up and competition for opportunities of social mobility increases.

3. A similar phenomenon occurs among industrial workers belonging to trade unions as they develop aspirations towards mobility and become consumption-minded.

4. In marginal sectors, political mobilization and basic organization are factors that tend towards a rationalization of reproductive behaviour, as opposed to what happens among sectors that still constitute an amorphous mass.

Bearing in mind the limitations of the process of urbanization and cultural secularization on the one hand and the intensification of aspirations towards consumption and mobility on the other, an increase in the frequency of induced abortions is discernible, especially among the masses.

5. Social structure of the city and impact of selected variables

Recent research would indicate that the behaviour of certain key variables which influence the reproductive conduct of the population would seem to modify their effects according to types of urban social structures. Unfortunately, the results are barely indicative of the existence of relationships, and the data at most permit us to formulate educated guesses regarding their significance.
(a) Educational level of mother

The data show that the educational level influences reproductive behaviour in Latin America as elsewhere. Studies indicate an inverse ratio between number of children and women's education. Nevertheless, although the relationship is monotonic in all the cases studied, there are important variations as regards birth rate and educational levels. In some urban centres, the differences in birth rate attributable to education would seem to be smaller; in other cities the critical point at which the educational level has the effect of reducing the birth rate is higher, and different critical levels may even exist. It is clear that although education has a univocal effect on the birth rate, its role varies according to the specific social context.4/ Several hypotheses will serve to illustrate the trend of these variations.

It would in fact appear that in the social environments having a more widespread experience of mobility and market participation, and a higher degree of cultural secularization, sizable increases in educational level lead to small differences in birth rates, the critical threshold being reached only with respect to those who in practice have no education, in other words, those who are excluded from the market and from mobility.5/


5/ Virginia Rodríguez, op. cit.
In urban social environments having low levels of market participation and wherein mobility experiences are more restricted and occur within a less secularized culture, education has a different role. As a general rule, birth rates are higher and hence rates similar to those in the first type of environment described require a lengthier period of formal education. Furthermore, there are significant differences in the number of children as a result of the education received. A rapid examination of education thresholds appears to show a direct relationship between a greater degree of mobility and participation in the market and the critical level of education at which the birth rates begin to fall 6/.

It should also be added here that in the environments in which the standards of a transcendental culture prevail, the more educated the mother the more likely she seems to adopt secular notions regarding reproductive behaviour.

(b) Economic participation of urban women

Studies show that the birth rate is lower for working women 7/. Although this is the conclusion reached in most research, the data do not make it possible to clarify the significance of the relationship. The central assumption underlying this finding is that there is a fundamental incompatibility between work outside the household and bringing up children.

This would seem to be borne out by studies showing that the difference between the ideal number of children aspired to and the actual number is significantly higher with working women, owing to a greater propensity to remain single or to marry at later ages 8/.

6/ Alfredo Lattes, op. cit.
7/ Ana María Rothman, La participación femenina en actividades económicas en su relación con el nivel de seguridad en Buenos Aires y México (CELADE, Series C, No. 108, 1969); Paula Rollerbach Mass, Maternal Employment and Fertility in Metropolitan Latin America (Duke University, 1971); Henry Kirsch, "Development strategy implications of population growth and labour force absorption in Latin America".
8/ Ana María Rothman, op. cit.
There are indications that work outside the home does not
of itself determine a lower birth rate, as compared to the influence
exerted by the motivations to take an outside job. It may be observed
that in "white-collar" jobs, which represent a more definite trend
towards mobility and consumption, the incompatibility between job and
home is intensified.

It would also seem that urban culture conditions the degree of
compatibility between women's roles in society. In cities where market
experience and mobility affect small groups of the population, and where
the secularization of culture is in its early stages, a high fertility rate
is to be observed, along with low knowledge of contraceptive methods,
low education, lack of stimuli to undertake work outside the home, and
hence, a clear incompatibility between job and home.

Existing data show that in cities where consumer society organization
predominates, women constitute a larger share in the labour force, and
a greater proportion of the female labour force is employed in productive
employment requiring some degree of qualification; thus women generally
have attained educational levels comparable with those of men.

It should also be added that there appears to be a clear link between
the type of urban social structure and levels of qualification and
participation of women in the labour force by age. There are indications
that in the least developed urban social systems the majority of working
women have low levels of schooling; this means that with more education,
women's share in employment drops, with the sole exception of the group
which reaches university level. In cities, however, where social
mobility is intensified and purchase criteria predominate, the converse
ratio should occur, resulting in an increasingly smaller proportion
of unqualified women.

A similar situation exists with regards to age participation. Data
indicate that in the most traditional urban systems, there are few
differences in female participation by age, and there is perhaps a
slight tendency for participation to increase between 40 and 50 years of
age; however, where the population is characterized by a higher degree of
market experiences and mobility, the tendencies appear to be different. The increase in female participation would be such as to gradually become a decreasing function, illustrating a new adjustment between consumption aspirations, mobility and family life.

To sum up the foregoing, it is obvious that the development of the aforementioned tendencies reflects the emergence of a new style of life dominated by a consumer culture wherein the market and social mobility finally redefine woman's role in society. The increase in female participation in economic activity is linked with schooling, with a slow but steady withdrawal from traditional low productivity employments, and with a postponement first of the age at marriage and subsequently of child-bearing. The net result is a drop in the birth rate 9/.

(c) Social stratification, mobility and reproductive behaviour

Up till now, the little research which has been carried out on the relation between the birth rate and social stratification has unfortunately utilized partial indicators and aggregate categories.

As a general rule, employment status has been used as an indicator to demonstrate the theory that the higher the occupational rank of the husband, the fewer children families tend to have 10/. As in the case of the above-mentioned variables, this ratio appears to be a function of the type of urban social structure.

Indeed, under certain conditions, the regulation of the number of children in accordance with rational criteria, is more closely associated with middle class values and culture, while in other circumstances those tendencies penetrate the elite levels and filter down towards the lower classes. The net impact on the city's birth rate evidently depends on the percentage of the population in each stratum. Where such behaviour is found only in the middle class, the effect on the city's birth rate will not be significant given the former's reduced number. Growth

9/ Paula Hollerbach Mass, op. cit.

of the middle classes would bring a larger reduction in the city's reproduction rate and a gradual dissemination of their criteria amongst the élite and lower classes, resulting in a clear drop in average urban fertility.

The few existing studies on social mobility and fertility complement these theories. Research shows that the educational success of low class students may be related to the smaller size of the original family, and that the groups experiencing ascending mobility are typified by smaller family nuclei than the downwardly-mobile, while those which do not undergo changes in status have larger families than the rest 11/.

(a) Mass mobilization and the birth rate

Partial research results suggest that political mobilization and organization could constitute a factor which would rationalize reproductive behaviour. While no conclusive evidence can be found, existing data are consistent with this theory 12/.

It has been observed on various occasions that among the popular classes the members of Protestant groups, typified by a high level of organization and cohesion, have smaller families. It has been noted that in the popular classes, fertility tends to drop, first in the organized workers category. In both cases, while the variables involved would by themselves explain the lower reproduction rate, it would however be erroneous to ignore the role of conscientization in these sectors.

Recent research shows that in the marginal strata, fertility declines with community organization and political mobilization. Studies of the


same age cohorts show that schooling and the participation of women in the labour force have different effects on reproductive behaviour depending on the existence of the above-mentioned conditions. In an amorphous social group, employment and education of women are variables which go a long way to explain the differences in fertility. However, where unstable educational levels and participation in employment exist, and where the social group is organized to attain goals, it may be observed that the birth rate also tends to drop.

Apparently, the mobilization of a marginal group to achieve specific aims, creates in individuals a level of consciousness which contributes to a better understanding of their situation in relation to the structure of society, and induces conduct tending to link individual destiny to specific action projects. Mobilization creates expectations of a better life, and forms aspirations to mobility in sectors which lack the attributes allowing them to participate in the market; it is a source of socialization which, through the understanding of the political opportunities offered to acquire concrete benefits from the authorities, aids the gradual assimilation of rational principles of action. It may also be assumed that the organization resulting from the initial mobilization completely redefines the situation of individuals and their families; by replacing the traditional solidarity based on primary relationships for survival in a hostile environment with the solidarity from the attainment of common goals through the power derived from greater cohesion, the idea that rational behaviour can redefine the destiny of the individual is reinforced.
C. PUBLIC ACTION IN THE FIELD OF POPULATION

1. Considerations regarding population policies

One of the peculiarities of the Latin American situation is the intervention of the State in population matters - to a considerable extent in some countries and to a much lesser in others. This phenomenon is very likely due to the role which the State has played in the development process and to the long-standing tradition of public health and social medicine which is characteristic of most of the countries of the region.

The intervention of the public sector in this respect has obeyed two sets of considerations. The first, of an abstract nature, are founded on the projection of a model of future society and on the outline of global development strategies wherein it is assumed that both the volume of the population and the demographic growth rates will be of major relevance. The second have to do with the health and wellbeing of the families.

By and large, Latin American Governments have avoided explicit definitions of their population policies. Where specific proposals have been formulated with a view to modifying birth rates, they have taken a form which could be described as a demographic policy. Such targets have so far varied widely - from mere general statements to the formulation of plans establishing time objectives and defining the methods for achieving them. The purely demographic dimension of such policies does not, however, cover the full extent of the public sector's involvement. Some countries have recognized the advisability of the State's refraining from formulating explicit demographic targets, but this does not imply the cessation of such specialized services as the community may require and which may have a bearing on the birth rate. This neutrality of the public sector has not been the rule everywhere; in some cases, commitments for the provision of services have been so far-reaching that they have in fact constituted tacit demographic objectives, while elsewhere they have been geared strictly to direct social demands and in other situations, to marginal considerations.

/2. Social
2. Social consensus and the justification of State intervention

A summary review of the situation indicates that, in formulating policies whose main purpose has been to alter the birth rate, a fundamental role has been played by interpretations of the nature of the development process and of the destiny of the country as a social project and by the leanings of religious groups and institutions exercising an influence on the definition of the community's moral values.

Such interpretations have served as a basis for the formulation of these policies wherever a genuine consensus has existed. This, however, has been the exception rather than the rule. Where no consensus has evolved, the conflicting interpretations have prevented the achievement of these objectives. A power of veto has likewise been wielded by religious groups.

The State's commitment to provide mere services requires, in practice, a much lesser degree of consensus. Programmes have been organized in order to meet concrete health requirements and have spread thanks to the support of the social sectors and professional groups most directly concerned. The relative neutrality of the State in terms of the establishment of demographic targets has partly reflected the dissuasive capacity of dissident sectors of opinion; moreover, the existence of programmes that commit the public sector often signifies broad acceptance of a set of indispensable measures which even its opponents are prepared to tolerate.

The justification for such policies varies according to whether or not the State holds a neutral position with regards to the decisions of the families. Efforts directed to alteration of the reproduction rate derive from economic considerations concerning the rate and nature of development, from concepts of land settlement and territorial integration and from geo-political visions of power and international influence.

On the other hand, when a policy of neutrality is adopted and the public sector's influence is exerted indirectly through specific programmes, the main factors are the wellbeing of the family nucleus and, possibly, the tacit awareness that the possibility of intervention is de facto restricted by the imbalances inherent in semi-development and by the
existence of backward social sectors; consequently, these activities have
to be designed in terms of social policy and not as part of an economic
development strategy.

The concept of family wellbeing has frequently been linked to the
idea that every woman has a right to decide freely how many children she
wants to bear, and that the provision of the indispensable services and
access to information should form part of the redistributive policy in the
field of education and culture, thereby modifying the kind of situation
where certain sectors are in a position to decide upon the size of their
families while, for the vast masses, fate is the deciding factor.

3. The state of population policies

The public sector's ventures into the realm of population have not
always culminated in the definition of concrete proposals. In countries
like Argentina and Uruguay, the occasional interest shown by people in the
public eye in a higher demographic growth rate, while not amounting to a
policy in the strictest sense, does point to a desire among certain
important sectors of public opinion that the State should intervene. This
also would appear to have been the situation in the recent past in Ecuador.

In Venezuela, and until little more than a year ago, in Mexico, the
State had shown some hesitation about becoming directly involved in
attempts to modify the birth rate.

In Honduras, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic, demographic
policies have been formulated with a view to reducing population growth,
to the extent of defining birth rates and time horizons.

Generally speaking, the following represents the situation as to the
definition of public population objectives in so far as they can be
distinguished at the present time:

(a) Governments in favour of faster population growth but which have
not yet translated their intentions into policies (Argentina and Uruguay);

(b) Governments which consider that present rates and current trends
are acceptable and that the public sector should avoid defining demographic
targets (Brazil and possibly Peru);
Table 2

DEMOGRAPHIC POLICIES AND FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES IN TWENTY LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>The Government: Provides family planning services in the form of:</th>
<th>Does not provide family planning services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National or Speral, local or limited programmes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Have a demographic policy:</td>
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<tr>
<td>(a) In favour of rapid population growth</td>
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<td>(b) Opposed to rapid population growth</td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) Which accepts existing rates and trends</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Honduras, Dominican Republic, El Salvador</td>
<td>Brazil, Peru</td>
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<tr>
<td>Have no demographic policy:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(a) Public feeling in favour of more rapid population growth</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) Public feeling in favour of slower population growth</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) Government neutrality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua,</td>
<td>Ecuador, Paraguay, Venezuela, Bolivia</td>
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</table>

//(c) Governments
(c) Governments which manifest an intention to intervene through nation-wide programmes which would ultimately have repercussions on the birth rate yet, refrain from establishing demographic targets (Colombia, Cuba, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama);
(d) Governments which intervene by means of special programmes of local or limited scope (Venezuela and Paraguay);
(e) Governments which have defined targets for lower birth rates (El Salvador, Honduras and the Dominican Republic).

4. Public sector programmes

While Governments have expressed intentions and initiated policies that have varyingly supported or opposed family planning programmes, the public sector has in fact expanded its activities in this area.

Over the past decade, public health planners and experts in the region have recognized that there are unsatisfied needs in the field of mother and child health, and that there seem to be clear indications in urban areas of growing demand for family planning information and services.

This recognition has led to a rapid expansion of public and semi-public programmes of varying nature and scope which, as a general rule, tend to improve mother and child health and, within this context, provide information and medical services that have an influence on family planning. For example, in some government departments, specialized administrative units have been set up, action programmes and staff training programmes have been initiated and there has been a rapid increase in medical and social research, together with investment in installations and facilities. Given their preoccupation with the unit cost of medical care in a situation of meagre resources and given the disproportionate segment of the total budget spent on maternal-child care, it is not surprising that doctors and health administrators have formed the group that has pressed most forcefully for the establishment of such programmes. Frequently, such initiatives have met with success although opinion has been against them and the survival of programmes has depended on their ability to limit activities to public health issues. While at another level, arguments still rage over the role of population increase in development, growing awareness of the health
problems of the lower strata and the need to improve the allocation of scarce resources assigned to the health sector, has resulted in public administration's becoming the sponsor of these initiatives and undertaking their expansion according to demands and needs.

5. Origin of activities

As a general rule, family planning activities have been initiated by private associations. It has been found that such programmes, often not recognized by the competent authorities, reached significant levels after their initial phase. The duration of this phase would seem to have been determined by the relationship between the level of concern for the social and medical problems in the community and the level of cultural and religious opposition.

A rapid examination of the development of these programmes shows that the later they were initiated the shorter their initial phase (See table 3). Everything indicates that there has been a change in the general situation, in the sense that opposition has been less radical. This may well have coincided with increases in school attendance, the growth of urbanization, the growing secularization of values, the increase in the number of live births per woman of child-bearing age observable from 1950 onwards, and the expansion of medical services, all of which have led to greater awareness of the health problems of the lower strata.

The private phase was followed in most cases by a stage in which the State took over control of activities. The work of private associations was then linked to the activities of the public sector in three ways:

(a) In many countries, private associations initiated their activities in collaboration with clinics and public hospitals. Subsequently, the public institutions became interested in expanding and rationalizing services.

(b) In other cases, the work of the associations paved the way for State intervention.

(c) There have also been countries in which the State has deliberately avoided intervention, although it has permitted the gradual strengthening of such activities and growing use of public facilities.

/table 3
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<td>Before 1940</td>
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<td>Chile</td>
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<tr>
<td>Between 1950 and 1959</td>
<td>Barbados (agreements with public sector)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mexico</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Uruguay (agreements with public sector)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Argentina (agreements with public sector)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Brazil</td>
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<td>El Salvador</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Honduras (agreement with public sector)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Colombia (agreements with public sector)</td>
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<td>1965</td>
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<td>Panama</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Venezuela (agreement with public sector)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
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<td>1967</td>
<td>Peru</td>
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It is also noteworthy that public sector activities reached significant levels after a period of gestation or consolidation of programmes during which objectives were established and other problems such as administrative location, financing and methods of operation were resolved. It is evident that the specific evolution of programmes has depended on a number of factors, including the importance of these initiatives during the private phase, the social and cultural opposition encountered, and the ability to devise programmes of health administration. It is interesting that the longer it took to initiate such activities, the less time was needed to consolidate the programmes (see table 4).

6. Present stage of the programmes

It is difficult to assess the scope of such public sector activities. The majority of them are recent, and the available data are partial or incomplete and nearly three years dated. Differences in the national situations are quite evident, however, and recent developments have probably not greatly altered the general picture which existed up to 1969.

Neither do the results of the programmes seem satisfactory: in 12 countries less than 3 per cent of the women were protected, and only in two was the proportion above 10 per cent (see table 5).

On the basis of a very preliminary review of these data, three situations may be distinguished: first, countries which in fact have no infrastructure of services; second, those which are in the process of expanding such services, and lastly, those which already have satisfactory facilities.

In countries with a high birth rate, the lack of infrastructure may result from policies (or rather, demographic principles), which are opposed to State intervention, or from absence of an adequate system of medical services.

/Table 4
Table 4

DATES OF INITIATION AND CONSOLIDATION OF FAMILY PLANNING ACTIVITIES IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 1960</td>
<td>Barbados</td>
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<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>1964</td>
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<td>1965</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Honduras</td>
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<td>Nicaragua</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
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<td>1969</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percentage of protected women of childbearing age</td>
<td>Number of women of childbearing age per family planning clinic</td>
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<td>Under 3</td>
<td>Under 10 000</td>
<td>10 000–20 000</td>
<td>20 000–50 000</td>
<td>Over 50 000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Colombia, Paraguay, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 5</td>
<td>Panama, Honduras</td>
<td>Dominican Rep.</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 10</td>
<td>Chile, Costa Rica</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Where the infrastructure is insufficient and is in process of being expanded, the critical factors would seem to be that the programmes had only recently been consolidated, and that the system of health institutions was still very inadequate. In turn, countries which already have adequate services, either started much earlier and/or possess a better developed public health system, or else they are small countries with a low level of urbanization but with a rural population concentrated in some densely populated areas.

The results of the programmes in countries which have adequate facilities seem in their turn to depend on the general stage of development and modernization.
D. CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing chapters show how current interest in Latin America in population problems is determined by factors and circumstances that arise from the level of economic growth and from the process of social modernization. These factors and circumstances have gradually found their expression in a revision of the development system and of its objectives, in profound modifications in the conduct and values of the population and in new solutions and institutional attitudes. Given the disequilibrium and ambivalence that exist in a state of semi-development, the subject has lost its apparent specificity and has instead become bound up with the concepts and ideologies of social change and has come to constitute, in its own right, one of the fundamental variables in the outlines and projects of society that are currently being debated.

It is therefore understandable that, when viewing the question of population within the context of present-day diagnoses and theses of development, the region should place so much emphasis on speeding up the process and clarifying its objectives. Many of the dilemmas which arise in discussing the role of population in development (and these are complicated even further by the introduction of immediate political considerations) are in fact dilemmas borrowed from the definition of the social and political objectives that determine economic growth. All this stems from a recognition of the crisis of conventional models of social coexistence and economic transformation and a desire to explore new avenues of social integration and institutional rationalization to overcome the social and political barriers that the economic process have encountered at this particular stage of semi-development.

Semi-development in the region has likewise brought major changes in population behaviour, particularly in urban centres. This is an obvious result of progress. What began as a barely perceptible adjustment is rapidly becoming the affirmation of new values and models of life.

In a little over half a century, a secular culture has evolved that is run more and more along acquisitive lines.

The imbalances and lack of continuity that are characteristic of semi-development give rise to a peculiar demographic situation in which
the growth rate of the population increases. Progress, though evident, is limited and is selective in the way it affects classes, sectors and groups of society.

The secularization of behaviour is reflected in three parallel but asynchronous processes that define the nature of the system of modernization:

(i) the intensification of market relationships and, concomitantly, the incorporation of new sectors of the population;

(ii) the diffusion and intensification of experiments in social mobility;

(iii) the expansion of the citizenry by means of political mobilization and the appearance of basic organizations.

Available information is indicative of the role that these processes play in the secularization of reproductive behaviour and of the selective way in which it evolves. In a stage of semi-development, its overall impact is necessarily slow and gradual, although the apparent stabilization of the rate of reproduction conceals underlying dynamic situations. The clearest symptoms of this trend are undoubtedly the redefinition of the role of women in society and the readjustment of family relationships in line with a more competitive, unstable and fluid urban context.

Further proof that a definite evolution is taking place, is the fact that, contrary to what happened in the industrialized countries in the past, population problems in Latin America have become a matter for action by the public sector. This raises the question of the definition of alternative development styles and the existence of social requirements and demands. State action has often taken place without there being any real consensus simply because the state has had to face the painful realities of human reproduction among the urban lower classes.

/ The foregoing
The foregoing all goes to show that the incorporation of the population variable in development policies must reflect the variety of situations that exists in Latin American countries and that the use of birth control as an alternative to development in any case implies neglect of the social forces that generate changes in reproductive behaviour.

It is also obvious that interpretations of population problems have evolved at two fairly isolated levels: at one level, the macro-interpretations which, generally speaking, do not consider social requirements and demands and, at the other, a more pragmatic attempt to solve specific problems of health and wellbeing directly. Population policies must be capable of integrating both approaches.
Chapter V

FEMALE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND FERTILITY

1. Introduction

Knowledge of the characteristics and evolution of the labour force is fundamental to any attempt at improving a given nation's level of development. Certainly one of the most crucial problems faced by policy-makers in Latin America is the rapid growth of the economically-active population and the simultaneous inability to productively utilize human resources.

Within this domain, the question of female economic activity plays a particularly significant role in the determination of the size and characteristics of the labour force.

Firstly, the participation of women in productive activities directly swells the size while affecting the quality and composition of the economically active population; in this sense, it is of considerable importance to weigh the consequences of the projected entrance of over ten million women into the Latin American labour force before the end of the century. But, simultaneously, this female participation exerts a powerful influence on fertility patterns and thus on the future structure of the labour force. Or, from a converse standpoint, the participation of women in the labour force rises to a cardinal position in any treatment of the economic effects of fertility decline. The purpose of the present paper will be to examine selected aspects of this double-edged influence of female economic activity.

2. Levels and correlates of female economic activity

The evaluation of female economic activity is a rather complex undertaking since the participation of women in the labour force responds not only to those variables which act upon male participation such as age structure, the demand for labour, the extent of education, and social security facilities, but also to such factors as marital status, number and age of children, husband's income level and various cultural factors. Furthermore, the issue resists any comprehensive analysis of the direction and degree of causation...
since adequate data is sorely lacking. Not only is census data not available with which to measure the effect on activity rates according to age and number of children, but in some cases even the most elementary information is lacking. In Ecuador, for example, the 1950 census reported female activity rates of 30.3 per cent, while in 1962 it was registered at 16.7 per cent; a recent analysis of human resources in that country after concluding that the difference was due to tremendous errors in the 1962 enumeration, summarily resolved the problem by adjusting rural female participation rate upward by somewhat over 50 per cent 1/.

Until more reliable and detailed empirical source material become available either in the form of official samples of national censuses or by way of surveys, it will be impossible to reach conclusions of a definitive nature which identify and illuminate with precision the interaction of all the relevant variables. Nonetheless, on the basis of existing data some comments may be made which, in conjunction with conclusions of previous studies will serve to reveal the major currents of this problem area. For the most part the information on which the present analysis is based derives from a comparative study of urban fertility in seven major Latin American metropolitan areas conducted by the Latin American Demographic Centre 2/. The surveys of these cities, covering samples of 2,100 to 2,500 women, twenty to fifty years of age were conducted between late 1963 and the end of 1964. Unfortunately at the time of this writing, existing tabulations were of the bi-variate type, thus making it impossible to exercise any form of control over other intervening variables; in this sense, the findings presented here are of a tentative nature.

1/ Ecuador, Junta Nacional de Planificación y Coordinación, Plan Ecuatoriano para el Desarrollo de los Recursos Humanos, (Quito, 1970), Volume I, p. 89. The same study also shows that of a sample of 377,031 men and 156,107 women, 12.8 per cent of the men and 15.3 per cent of the women are employed over 70 hours per week and 2.4 per cent of the total wish to work over 30 hours per week more. See: Ibid., Tables II-28-A and II-28-B.

2/ CELADE: Programa de Encuestas Comparativas de Fecundidad - Zona Urbana, hereafter referred to as PECFAL-U.
Activity rates for the women in these seven cities, vary between 26.8 and 39.5 per cent (table 1), and the course of the age specific rates for the major cities correspond in general terms to the pattern observed in the respective nations taken as a whole, with the exceptions of Venezuela and Costa Rica (table 2). Numerous studies have pointed to the positive correlation which exists between the evolution of urbanization-industrialization and female participation in the labour force. Table 1 provides strong support for this proposition. The activity rates for women in the seven cities are considerably higher than those for the respective countries. Naturally, the age restriction of the samples tend to distort the differences as does the fact that women are underenumerated in the country totals where segments of the rural sector are omitted not only by reason of simple error but also by design as in the case of women in farm households. Nevertheless, it is significant that age specific activity rates from age 20 to 50 evidence the same urban advantage (table 2). Size of city also appears to exercise influence over activity rates. In Venezuela (1961), the rate for women living in urban areas outside of Caracas was 16.6 per cent while the rate for Caracas was 29.1 per cent. The same situation was found for Guatemala (1964), where the rates were: Guatemala City, 28.2 per cent; other urban areas, 13.7 per cent. Similarly in Chile (1960), the rates for Santiago were 31.6 per cent while those for other urban areas were 23.9 per cent. In Mexico (1960), the differences between Mexico City rates and other urban places were also considerable 3/.

# Table 1

**FEMALE ACTIVITY RATES BY CITY AND COUNTRY**  
*(Percentages)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Activity rate</th>
<th>Country a/</th>
<th>Activity rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bogotá</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buenos Aires</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caracas</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>México</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panamá</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San José</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Río de Janeiro</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CELADE: (PECPAL-U), Tabulation Group II, Variables 25 x 12 and International Labour Office, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1969*. Based on data in Table 2A.

*a/* 15 years + according to 1960 round of censuses.
## Table 2

**Female Age Specific Activity Rates by Urban Area and by Country**

(Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Bogotá</th>
<th>Buenos Aires</th>
<th>Caracas</th>
<th>México</th>
<th>Panamá</th>
<th>San José</th>
<th>Río de Janeiro</th>
<th>Colombia</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Venezuela</th>
<th>México</th>
<th>Panamá</th>
<th>Costa Rica</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 and over</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**

For A: CELADE (PEOCAL-U), tabulation group II, variables 14 x 26.

As might be expected, the largest proportions of the women in the seven cities' survey were occupied in the lower occupational categories with noticeable differences among the countries, most probably to be explained either by transitional stages in the economic structure of the country, rapid urban migration, or by a greater degree of industrialization already attained over a large economic base. This is indicated (table 3), in the cases of Buenos Aires with 16.2 per cent of its active women in unspecialized manual occupations in varying degrees of contrast to Mexico (27.2 per cent), Bogotá (36.2 per cent), Caracas (41.3 per cent) and Rio de Janeiro (51.9 per cent) leaving aside for the moment the instances of Panamá and San José whose national economic structure and evolution present somewhat unusual situations.

To some extent this profile is also conditioned by the preparation of the women in the labour force. Low educational attainment limits the employment possibilities of women to those occupations which require no special preparation and which mirror negligible productivity and income levels (such as the general service sector). Table 4 reveals a strong relation between women with no schooling to only three years of primary education, which in most cases would mark them as functional illiterates and the lowest occupational categories. This corresponds in general to the differential among cities of women in unspecialized manual occupations just noted in the preceding paragraph. Thus, in Buenos Aires, there are 6.9 per cent of active women with no more than three years of schooling, while in Mexico there are 36.3 per cent, Bogotá 38.8 per cent, Caracas 32.3 per cent and Río de Janeiro 34.6 per cent.
Table 3

DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVE WOMEN ACCORDING TO OCCUPATION

(Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Bogotá</th>
<th>Buenos Aires</th>
<th>Caracas</th>
<th>México</th>
<th>Panamá</th>
<th>San José</th>
<th>Rio de Janeiro</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher supervisory</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower supervisory</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized manual</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecialized manual</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CELADE (PESPaL-6), Tabulation Group II, variables 14 x 26.
Table 4

FEMALE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>A. Activity rates by education</th>
<th>B. Distribution of active women by education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None - 3 years primary</td>
<td>Primary, ¾ years + and complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogotá</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buenos Aires</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caracas</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>México</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panamá</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San José</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Río de Janeiro</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GELADE (PECPAL-U), Tabulation group II, variables 20 x 25.
A significant difference is also to be found in activity rates according to educational level where a positive correlation exists with regard to those women who had some university experience even if uncompleted (table 4). A higher correlation with respect to the activity rates of women with secondary education would be evidenced if this category were to distinguish between those who had merely attended 1 to 3 years and those who had completed the secondary cycle. The implications of this phenomenon to circumstances of lower fertility may be related to the possibilities for governments to increase the proportions of the school age population who may be given the opportunity to lengthen their period of education and thus enter the labour force at a later age. In the long term, however, larger numbers of better educated women will enter the labour force with higher occupational aspirations - and this will require the broad-based reforms fundamental to a global developmental process capable of providing considerably more jobs with adequate income levels for a skilled labour force.

It is of interest to examine the extent to which active women are employed either in or outside the home, inasmuch as this variable presumably would have some direct relation to fertility levels. The largest percentage of women who were occupied outside the home was found in Panama, Buenos Aires and San José with a marked difference between these levels and those observed in Bogotá, Caracas, México and Río de Janeiro (table 5). For those active within the home, a rearrangement in the combination of cities may be seen with Bogotá, San José and Río de Janeiro now grouped together in the highest ranks. This denotes a greater significance of artisan cottage industries and services in these cities. The data also suggests that as a result of changes in production and distribution systems, (e.g., the growth of modern industries) activities such as dressmaker, small retail outlets, etc. ... are no longer as viable in the other cities which exhibit relatively less home based female economic participation.

//Table 5
Table 5

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF WOMEN INACTIVE, ACTIVE: WITHIN AND OUTSIDE HOME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bogotá</th>
<th>Buenos Aires</th>
<th>Caracas</th>
<th>México</th>
<th>Panamá</th>
<th>San José</th>
<th>Rio de Janeiro</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inactive</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>69.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active home</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active outside</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CELADE (PEOPAL-U) Tabulation Group II, variables 25 x 12.

Further insight
Further insight into the manner by which this transitional mechanism operates may be gleaned from the changes noted in female participation rates in Mexico between 1950 and 1960. In Figure 1 it can be seen that both the entire nation and the region comprising the State of Mexico and the Federal District, that is, the most urbanized area, female economic activity rose for all age groups from 15 to 59 years of age and diminished for those groups at the extremes of the age spectrum. It may also be observed that while in 1950, participation rates remained practically constant from age 25 on, in 1960, they fall steadily from the age of 50 onwards. Since the same trend exists for male participation rates, only in a more marked fashion, it is reasonable to assume that the changes in the extreme age groups correspond to such factors as expanded educational and social security coverage. Closer examination of the behaviour of the different groups within the 15 to 59 year range reveals changes from 1950 to 1960, which to some degree may be related to the phenomenon of the evolution of the economic structure discussed earlier. Whereas in 1950, the highest participation rates at the lower age levels correspond to the 15-19 group, in 1960, they are found in that of 20-24 years of age. Yet in 1960, there is significantly higher economic activity on the part of women between the ages of 40 and 50. The presence of the U-shaped curve thus formed in 1960 would seem to indicate the presence of a transitional economic stage with high rates for the older female population (characteristic of less developed nations), and rising rates for the younger generation (typical of more concentrated industrial economies). Although this suggests the coexistence of two economic systems, the trend from 1950 to 1960 points to the growing prevalence of modern techniques of production and distribution in Mexico.

Given the close association between domestic obligations and women's economic activity, the relationship between female participation in the working force and marital status warrants special attention. As can be seen from table 6, significant

/Figure 1
MEXICO: FEMALE AGE SPECIFIC ACTIVITY RATES, 1950-1960

Source: Appendix, Table IV.

/Table 6
### Table 6
FEMALE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY BY MARITAL STATUS
(Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Single</th>
<th>Married</th>
<th>Consensual union</th>
<th>Widowed separated, etc.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Activity rates by marital status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogotá</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buenos Aires</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caracas</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>México</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panamá</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>37.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San José</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>33.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Río de Janeiro</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Distribution of active women by marital status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogotá</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buenos Aires</td>
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<td>55.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caracas</td>
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<td>31.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>México</td>
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<td>37.7</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panamá</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San José</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Río de Janeiro</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. Distribution of inactive women by marital status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogotá</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buenos Aires</td>
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<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caracas</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>México</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panamá</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San José</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Río de Janeiro</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D. Distribution of all women by marital status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogotá</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buenos Aires</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caracas</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>México</td>
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<td>65.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panamá</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San José</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Río de Janeiro</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CEDLAS (PEPAS-II), Tabulation Group II, variables 19 x 26.

/activities rates vary from those in table 5 due to the different number of respondents. /differences in
differences in activity rates exist between two categories of marital status. For single women, widows and those separated or divorced, activity rates - although to slightly differing degrees - all exhibit the same tendency towards much higher activity rates than married women or those living in consensual union. The lowest rates were to be found among married women with the exceptions of Panama and Buenos Aires. But in the latter case the minuscule number of cases reported of consensual union probably affects the pattern.

In each of the cities well over half of the inactive women were married, except in Panama where this proportion reached only 45.5 per cent (table 6). In that city which has by far the largest proportion of respondents classified as living in a consensual union, a third of the inactive women and almost 27 per cent of all women interviewed were living in consensual union. A closer examination of table 6 (sections B and D) reveals that for all cities there is a greater percentage of single women among those active in the labour force, a fact which could point to other intervening variables, such as age at marriage, in the determination of lower fertility rates among economically active women which are indicated in table 7.  

Table 7

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION AND AVERAGE NUMBER OF LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN ACCORDING TO ACTIVITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Inactive</th>
<th>Active</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Active outside home</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Average number of children</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Average number of children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogotá</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>2.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buenos Aires</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caracas</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>3.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>México</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>3.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panamá</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>2.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San José</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>1.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Janeiro</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>1.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CELADE (PECNAL-U) Tabulation Group II, variables 25 x 12.
Apart from the increased domestic obligations of married women and their greater likelihood of pregnancy (in which case number and age of children will be most important factors in explaining labour force participation), the role of married women (as determined by the prevailing attitude toward working wives and the aversion of employers to expose themselves to the risk of providing maternity leave and pay), and their dependence upon their husband's income are, no doubt, influential variables. With a limited demand for labour, married women who might, under other circumstances, enter the labour force do not; they either remain inactive or, if once employed and having lost their jobs, are more likely to fall back on the husband's income as the family's source of support.

2. Female economic activity and fertility

A considerable body of literature would suggest that there is an inverse relation between female economic activity and fertility rates. The results of the seven cities' survey being examined here add further weight to this frequently-reported occurrence (table 7) 5/. The mean number of children born to economically-active women is significantly lower than the corresponding figure for inactive women. The lowest average number of live births for working women, as is to be expected, occurs in Buenos Aires, with exceptionally higher levels in Mexico and Caracas. And for Chile, a recent study has provided empirical evidence to show that female participation rates vary not only according to whether or not the woman has had children, but even more so according to the number of children, a factor which would obviously

5/ In the early 1960's this negative correlation was discovered for 13 metropolitan areas of Latin America to the extent that for every 1 per cent increase in the female participation rate, the number of children per 1,000 women dropped by 7 per cent. See: Andrew Colyer and Eleanor Langicis "The Female Labour Force in Metropolitan Areas: An International Comparison", Economic Development and Cultural Change, 10, 4 (July, 1962), p. 584.
affect the woman's domestic obligations. From an analysis of 1960
census data it was found that for the country as a whole the effect
of one child on feminine activity rates was minimal, but that for
those women who were married or living in consensual union, the
presence of two or more children considerably reduced economic
activity 6/.

With respect to those women active outside the home, the
effect of childbearing evidenced in the survey is quite strong. The
differential in the average number of live births is greater if a
comparison is made between women who work away from home and those
who are inactive (table 8). A corollary to this relation is that
the fertility pattern of those women who are active within the home
is more similar to those who are inactive with the apparent exception
of Caracas, the only case where fertility levels for women active
away from home are slightly higher than for those women working at
home. Although numerically small, this sole deviation from the
pattern of the other cities suggests that other social factors are
operating at stronger levels there than elsewhere. In fact, it has
been reported that the majority of mothers who work away from home
are obliged to do so due to the absence or lack of responsibility
of the fathers 7/.

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6/ Victoria Ostrovich, "Características y Evolución de la
Población Económicamente Activa de Chile, 1940-1960" (Santiago:
Universidad de Chile, Centro de Estudios Socio-económicos,

7/ The illegitimacy rate in Venezuela is 62.5 per cent, and great
concern has been expressed by the Venezuelan Ministry of Health
for the well-being of the large numbers of children who are
growing up in the absence of a father figure. See: Population

/ Table 8
Table 8

VOLUME NUMBER OF LIVE BIRTHS PER WOMAN AND OBSERVED DIFFERENCES ACCORDING TO ACTIVITY STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Inactive (1)</th>
<th>Active (2)</th>
<th>Active outside home (3)</th>
<th>A Difference (2-1)</th>
<th>B Difference (3-1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bogotá</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>-1.32</td>
<td>-1.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buenos Aires</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>-0.77</td>
<td>-0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caracas</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>-0.58</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>México</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>-0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panamá</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>-0.81</td>
<td>-1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San José</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>-1.66</td>
<td>-1.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Janeiro</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>-0.65</td>
<td>-1.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table 9.
An analysis of the fertility differential among the cities reveals that for Buenos Aires, fertility is the lowest in all categories - inactive, active and active away from home - with Mexico and Caracas exhibiting the highest levels. A comparison of the data among the cities themselves leads to a further observation that for the developing countries of Latin America, the trend of rapid urbanization unless accompanied by a corresponding process of modernization and global development is not conducive to lower fertility 8/.

Unfortunately, the survey data do not permit analysis by age of children. Nonetheless, other researchers have demonstrated that this is a key variable delineating the extent of female economic activity. One study has shown that in Chile women's participation in the labour force declines in the order of 3 per cent for every additional child under 14 years of age 2/. This appears to be of particular importance in those cases where two or more children are already present since the possibilities for women (especially younger mothers who would not have older children) to arrange for the care of the children while they work is quite limited.

4. Fertility decline and the evolution of the labour force

The relationship between urban participation in the labour force and fertility is such, then, that it may be expected that any significant decrease in fertility will result in larger numbers of women looking for jobs, and this, in turn, will increase the strain upon the already over-burdened labour absorptive capacity of the Latin American economies. Whatever the direction of causation - employment status as a cause of fertility or as a consequence - and both are no doubt operative, the prospects on this level alone are not heartening for the medium-term. Yet the other relevant

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8/ This, of course, refers only to the situation among cities, and not that to be found between rural and urban areas where differential fertility levels certainly exist.

2/ Population Council, "Chile", Country Profiles (October, 1970), p.3
factors must be recalled. For Mexico it has been shown that
demographic factors account but for a small percentage of the
increase in female activity 10/. In the case of married women and
those living in a consensual union, the husband's condition of
employment, the attitude of society with respect to working wives
and mothers, and that of employers to hiring married women and
incurring consequent liabilities to higher labour costs under
labour regulations governing maternal leave represent potentially
important obstacles to the employment of many women. Also, one of
the most important factors which would act to diminish female
activity rates is the very limited availability of job opportunities.

When the levels of un- and underemployment are high, recourse
may be had to the "discouraged" and "additional worker" hypotheses
to fathom the problem of the incorporation of potential workers
into the labour force. The first hypothesis states that when
unemployment increases, a number of potential workers leave the
labour force, and do not even seek work because they are discouraged
by the lack of job opportunities. The counterpoint to the first
hypothesis is that of the "additional worker" which occurs when in
response to rising unemployment so-called secondary workers enter
the labour force. Quarterly survey data for Bogotá from 1963 to
1966, used in a regression analysis to test these hypotheses
indicated that total participation rates for both sexes between
the ages 15 to 54 did indeed fall as unemployment rose 11/. The
association was such that a 1 per cent increase in the unemployment
rate was accompanied by a 2.6 per cent decrease in the participation

10/ El Colegio de México, Dinámica de la Población de México,
pp. 155, 164-168.

11/ For the formulation of this hypothesis see Thomas Dernberg and
Analysis by Age and Sex", American Economic Review, 56, 7
(March, 1966), pp. 77-95. Its application to the case of
Colombia is found in Miguel Urrutia, "El Desempleo Disfrazado
en Colombia" Empleo y Desempleo en Colombia, (Bogotá: Centro
rate. For women in the 15-19 year old age group and older women in the 45-49 group, however, a positive relation existed so that an increase of about 1 per cent in the rate of unemployment was related to an increase of 2 to 2.6 per cent in the participation rate; the rate of increased participation for men aged 45-49 was 0.5 per cent. The presence of this "additional worker" effect within these age groups particularly for women is explained in terms of the increased need during periods of growing overall unemployment for women of those ages to supplement family incomes by going out to work. This need is made even more critical given the low and unequal distribution of income and the lack of unemployment insurance. At the same time it is important to note that the Bogotá study points to the existence of a social bias against the hiring of women and the fact that a slack labour market exercises negative pressures on the participation rates of the majority of women age 15-54.

A weighing of the net effect of the discouraged and additional worker in the labour force suggests that female activity rates will not increase substantially as a result of lower fertility until the demand for labour undergoes meaningful alteration. To some degree the pressure will be offset in addition by the relative expansion of the educational and vocational training system facilitated under conditions of lower fertility. Of course, the latter is a medium-term palliative, and jobs will eventually have to be found for the better trained women upon completion of their education.

In quantitative terms for the long-run, the aforementioned process may be approximately summarized by the labour force projection for Latin America to the year 2000 mentioned earlier. Assuming constant participation rates, a continuation of past trends in fertility and overall economic growth (table 9, Hypothesis 1), the economically active population of the region for the end of the century was calculated at about 217.5 million people. But under circumstances of more rapidly decreasing fertility, redistribution of income and consumption patterns, expanded educational and social /welfare systems,
welfare systems, increased per capita income and changing male and female participation in the urban labour market (Hypothesis 2), the figure rises to 221.2 million people. Although, at first glance the difference in that time frame may not appear very great, its sex-age composition alludes to the demands which would be made of the region's economic structure to furnish jobs for women, education for the young and social security for the old.

Table 9
LATIN AMERICA: ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION, YEAR 2000
(Thousands of persons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 2</td>
<td>221.183.9</td>
<td>162.888.7</td>
<td>57.295.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 1</td>
<td>217.538.3</td>
<td>170.482.6</td>
<td>47.055.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>3.645.6</td>
<td>-6.593.9</td>
<td>10.239.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fucaraccio and Arretx, Relaciones entre Variables Económicas y Demográficas, table 20.
The above calculation, however, may overestimate to a considerable extent the increase in female participation since it is based upon the results of a linear regression analysis which depends only upon the gross birth rate variable to determine urban female economic activity. In practice, the problem involves a number of other important variables. The instances of Argentina and Uruguay should be recalled in regard to this issue. They are countries in which the burden of child care is no greater than in most industrialized countries of the West as an impediment to female economic activity, and yet female participation is significantly lower. In view of the data already presented, it is not unreasonable to conclude that a weak labour market in combination with social prejudices restrains female participation rates from reaching higher levels. The cultural bias which better educated women will have to confront in their search for jobs compatible with their preparation was manifest in a recent study conducted in Chile. In interviews with industrial supervisory personnel in Santiago, the overwhelming reluctance of these men to accept women who had graduated from technical secondary schools in either technical or lower supervisory capacity was most evident 12/.

Since the empirical data needed to measure and forecast with precision the net effect of these opposing forces is not yet available in sufficient quantity, findings must be tentative in nature. Nevertheless, it should be noted that although the influences determining female incorporation into the labour force are extremely complex, these factors are not active in the case of male participation rates which are primarily governed by age structure (with the exception of the very young and oldest groups); and in the long-term this responds directly to the birth rate. As indicated earlier in this discussion, population control is essentially complementary in nature with respect to a unified

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development strategy just as is concern over per capita income
growth rates. From a broader perspective the choice is not between
lower fertility and higher growth rates, nor between output or
employment, the long heralded factor-proportion problem. These
are merely artificial dichotomies which may indeed present short-
run contradictions, but which ignore the basic question of the
well-being of much of the population of Latin America and avoid
the issue of human welfare planning as a total process. Integration
rather than separation of population, employment and economic
growth policies is an essential requirement toward the realization
of this goal.
Chapter VI

INTERNAL MIGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA: VOLUME, CHARACTERISTICS AND CONSEQUENCES

Introduction

Few substantive topics have received more widespread attention in Latin America during the past decade than internal migration. It is generally agreed that the Latin American population is highly mobile and that migratory movements exert a pervasive influence on the economic, political and demographic structures of both receiving and sending areas. Despite this consensus, however, discussions of the actual dimensions of these movements on a regional scale and the manner of their impact on the society's institutional framework often border on the speculative.

The objective of the present paper is to contribute to the elucidation of the significance of internal population movements in the region. To this purpose, the first section will provide a brief overview of global trends in internal migrations at the national level as background to the more intensive examination of migration differentials and migrant adjustment patterns in later sections. Throughout this presentation we will draw heavily on the experience of population movements in Colombia to illustrate the magnitude and consequences of Latin American migration processes.

A. VOLUME OF INTERNAL MIGRATION

Several problems confront the researcher attempting to provide a meaningful general picture of the magnitude of recent population movements in the region. First, our only sources of information on volume of internal movements on a nation-wide scale are the periodic population censuses \(^1\) but results from the 1960 and 1970 rounds of censuses are either unavailable or else, for various reasons, of reduced utility.

\(^1\) Eventually, the periodic household surveys being carried out in an increasing number of Latin American countries may provide an alternative source of information.
reduced utility in many countries. Moreover, attempts at international comparisons of migration statistics are seriously hampered by definitional and measurement problems. Indeed, some of the more serious difficulties plaguing this area stem from the variety of meanings which the term "migrant" can have within a given country and especially in international comparisons. Inevitably, a migrant is operationally defined as a person who has crossed a given politico-administrative boundary but these demarcations are rarely the most relevant ones for our understanding of the migration process.

On another level, available migration statistics, except for information on basic demographic characteristics, tend to treat migrants as an undifferentiated mass. The heterogeneity of migration experiences is easily glossed over even when we are examining only one locality within a given country, let alone in international comparisons. For instance, in Brazil, the Northeastern peasant fleeing from a severe drought and who, through a combination of circumstances and after several more or less lengthy stopovers arrives in Rio, has little in common with the businessman from São Paulo setting up a new shop in Rio, nor with the engineering student from Goias or the skilled worker from Paraná. Yet, all of these individuals will be considered in the same census category as migrants to the state of Guanabara. At any rate, all of these persons at least have a common denominator in terms of their migrant destination. But, when this type of variety is multiplied to the national experience and from there to some twenty countries, then the discrepancies are obviously magnified.

In any case, these highly diversified movements undoubtedly amount to a considerable volume of migration. The first question which concerns us here is - what proportion of the Latin American population is constituted by migrants? The simplest manner of answering this question is in terms of the number of persons residing in a province (state, department) other than that of their birth (i.e., lifetime migrants). Given the variable nature of the migration defining
migration defining units, comparisons of these figures, shown in table 1, are apt to be strictly valid only for the same country at different points in time rather than across countries.

Despite the shortcomings of the data, it is nevertheless significant that the absolute number of persons who are residing in a politico-administrative unit other than that of their birth increases substantially at each census date in every country for which data are available. In Brazil, for instance, the 1940 census showed that 3.4 million people were residing in a state other than that of their birth; preliminary results from the 1970 census indicate that 10.7 million persons were enumerated in a macro-region other than that of their birth. That is although the number of migration-defining units is reduced by more than half (since there were 27 states and territories in the 1940 tabulations but only 10 macro-regions in the 1970 data) and thus to be counted as a migrant the individual has to travel, on the average, a much greater distance, the number of migrants has nevertheless tripled during the interim. In Mexico, the number of lifetime interstate migrants experienced a similar increase from 2.1 million in 1940 to 7.2 million in 1970. Much the same type of increases in the absolute number of migrants were registered in the remaining countries listed in table 1. In practically all cases, the migrant population grew faster than the total population.

/Table 1
Table 1
NUMBER OF PERSONS ENUMERATED IN A PROVINCE OTHER THAN THAT OF THEIR BIRTH, SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1940-1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Census year</th>
<th>Number of migrants (in thousands)</th>
<th>Percentage of total population defined as migrant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>2,567</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>4,579</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>3,420</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>5,207</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>10,711</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>1,416</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1,723</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2,030</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1,617</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>3,164</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>158</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>630</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1940</td>
<td>2,120</td>
<td>10.7</td>
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<td>1950</td>
<td>2,437</td>
<td>12.9</td>
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<td>1970</td>
<td>7,181</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1950</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>15.4</td>
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<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>16.4</td>
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<td>Peru</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>675</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1961</td>
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<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>908</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1,532</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Population censuses.

a/ Migrant-defining units are "macro-regions" (i.e., clusters of states).
In relative terms, it is clear that the proportion of the total population defined as migrant varies greatly from country to country; this proportion ranges from around 10 per cent in the region's two largest countries, Mexico and Brazil, in 1940, to over 25 per cent in Argentina and Chile as of 1970. In addition, it would appear from table 1 that the proportion of the total population constituted by migrants increased rather steadily in practically all countries up until the 1960's. Thus, for instance, migrants constituted 10.7 per cent of the entire population of Mexico in 1940, 12.9 per cent in 1950 and 15.0 per cent in 1960. Meanwhile in all other countries listed, except Chile and Costa Rica, migrants also represented a growing proportion of the total population at corresponding intervals. Yet, in Mexico and Chile, the only two countries within which the comparison between migrant proportions at different dates can presently be extended to 1970, no significant change has occurred between 1960 and 1970. If this pattern were to be subsequently verified in other countries as well, it would indicate that while the absolute number of migrants continues to grow, the proportion of migrants in the total population would tend to level off.

At this point, it should be stressed that the migration figures cited in preceding paragraphs grossly underestimate the real volume of internal migrations in Latin America. Indeed, these figures all relate to lifetime migration and thus omit return migration, mortality to migrants and polystage movements. More importantly, since these data relate to larger politico-administrative units such as "state", "province" or "department", they provide but a partial picture of total mobility in the sense that a substantial proportion of all movements takes place within these units. Thus, for instance, in Colombia, if we count inter-municipal as well as inter-deparmental movements, then we find that 36 per cent of all Colombians are migrants instead of
the 18 per cent shown in table 1 2/. Likewise in Brazil, as of 1970, some 12 per cent of the population was living in a macro-region (of which there are ten) other than that of their birth; but, if inter-municipal movements are considered, then it becomes clear that one out of every three Brazilians is a migrant 3/. The figures for Costa Rica are strikingly similar to those for Colombia and Brazil; inter-provincial migrants made up only 16 per cent of that country's total population in 1964 but one out of every three persons had experienced at least one inter-municipality migration 4/.

All of the aforementioned figures refer to the simplest (and crudest) indicator of population movements - lifetime migration. More relevant as indicators of trends in population mobility are those which refer to a definite time period such as estimates of intercensal movement obtained from indirect residual methods or, direct information based on census questions such as - "where were you living x years ago?" or, "how long ago did you move into this community?" Indirect techniques of migration estimation have been profitably applied at the national or local level in several countries and provide our main source of information on size and duration of migration streams 5/. In the 1960 and 1970 rounds of

2/ G. Martine: "Volume and characteristics of internal migration in Colombia", ECLA, Social Development Division, pp. 4-5, 1972.


censuses, several countries also introduced a direct migration question into the census form.

Analysis of either of these sources on a country by country basis would take us far beyond the scope of the present paper. There is, however, one point in this connexion which is particularly interesting in terms of our discussion of overall migration volume; preliminary experience with direct data would show that these sources systematically yield higher migration figures than those obtained from indirect methods. For instance, in Venezuela, applying responses from the 1961 census one-year migration question to the entire 1950-1961 period would indicate that some 2 million people transferred their residence across a state boundary during the interim; by contrast, indirect estimates would show that the net flow amounted to less than 1 million 6/. Similar experiences could be cited with regard to migration estimates in Chile, Brazil or Mexico. What accounts for these discrepancies between direct data and indirect estimates?

Part of the answer probably lies in methodological problems, but it is also indubitable that the real magnitude of population movements is much higher than that shown by indirect estimates or by lifetime migration statistics, even when appropriately small politico-administrative units are used in defining migration. This would also suggest that a relatively important core of Latin Americans are apt to be extremely mobile in the sense that they migrate several times in a relatively short time span while the majority of the population has never moved.

Recapitulating and generalizing from the admittedly sketchy existing materials, it might be hazarded that at least one out of every three Latin Americans has changed his usual place of residence at least once during his lifetime. In the same vein, it could conceivably be argued that from one-third to one-half of all these moves imply a change of residence into another state in which case

6/ Chi-Yi-Chen - (op. cit.) pp. 17-18.
the move is likely to cover sizeable distances. Our next question
then becomes - where are the migrants coming from and what are
their preferential destinations?

There would appear to be a great deal of consensus in the
literature that the overwhelming majority of population movements
in Latin America are from rural to urban (and preferably large urban)
localities. These conclusions, however, are based on the demonstration
of sizeable differentials in urban and rural population growth rates
rather than on direct information. In a widely-circulated paper, for
instance, Ducoff asserts that between 1950-1960, the urban-rural
population flows in Latin America contained some 14.6 million
people 7; extending his calculations to the 1960-1970 period
would indicate a similar transfer of some 24 million people in the
recent decade.

Given that the assumptions underlying such calculations appear
reasonable and given the magnitude of the supposed flow, it is
understandable that internal migrations in Latin America are
readily equated with rural to urban movements and particularly with
direct movements from the farm to the large city, thereby resulting
in a "ruralization" of important sectors of the Latin American
metropolises. Moreover, these conclusions are bolstered by migration
surveys in large cities which show that a substantial proportion of
all migrants have a rural background.

Nevertheless, these generalizations conceal several interrelated
postulates which warrant separate investigation. Firstly, with
respect to the preferential destination of migratory movements, it
is worth highlighting that statements regarding the predominance of
rural to urban or other-directional movements on a nation-wide scale

7/ Louis J. Ducoff, "The role of migration in the demographic
development of Latin America", The Milbank Memorial Fund
Quarterly, 43 (4), part 2, pp. 197-210. Similar approaches are
used by Lowdon Wingo, Jr., "Recent patterns of urbanization among
81-109, 1967; and; UN Bureau of Social Affairs, "Demographic
aspects of urbanization in Latin America", in Urbanization in

/are apt
are apt to be made on the basis of inference from differential rates of growth. That is, census data generally do not furnish direct information on the migratory origins of the urban and rural populations, much less on that of populations residing in localities of varying sizes; meanwhile local area surveys do furnish information on rural-urban origin but necessarily omit other migration streams.

To our knowledge, pioneering efforts at tabulating migration materials by "capital city", "other urban areas" and "rural areas" by CELADE constitutes the only currently available source of nation wide information on this matter 8/. Results from two studies based on these materials seriously question the validity of the affirmation that in Latin America, the only important movements are from rural to urban and especially to the largest city. In Colombia, as of the 1964 census, six and a half of the country's total population of 17.5 million resided in a municipality or department other than that of their birth. Of these, Bogotá had attracted only a slightly higher proportion of all migrants (12.6 per cent) than its proportion of the total population (9.6 per cent). Meanwhile, the other urban areas of the country which contain 43 per cent of the national population harbored 53 per cent of all migrants. But it is perhaps even more revealing that 36 per cent of all migrants were living in rural areas 9/. Unfortunately, no information is available on the rural-urban origin of any of these moves but it is nevertheless safe to assume that in Colombia, around one third of all migrations are from rural to rural areas.

From a study carried out on ONUCE tabulations for Costa Rica, it can likewise be deduced that in 1963, one-third of the country's 1.3 million inhabitants were residing in a municipality or province

8/ Details of the objectives and characteristics of CELADE's project to provide special tabulations from census samples can be found in: CELADE, Banco de Datos, Boletín informativo, No 5, 1972.
9/ Martínez, op. cit., pp. 5 and 6.
other than that of their birth. Some 30 per cent of these migrants resided in the capital city of San José and 14 per cent in other cities. More to the point, no less than 57 per cent of all migrants were enumerated in rural areas 10/. Hence, there can be no question but that in Costa Rica, despite the much-commented attraction excercised by the capital city, the main migratory currents are rural to rural.

Comparable data for other countries of the region are unfortunately unavailable as yet. Special tabulations from the 1970 round of censuses will provide much greater detail on these questions but for the present the two illustrations cited above warn of generalizing to the absolute preponderance of urbanwards movements. This should not be construed as a dismissal of rural to urban migration since it is unquestionable that this type of flow constitutes the most important type of movement in Latin America. However, given the exclusive emphasis which has sometimes been placed on rural to urban movement, other types of migration have to be re-evaluated. As for the future, given the progressive urbanization of the Latin American population which is currently taking place, it is inevitable that urban to urban movements will account for a growing share of all migrations. The remainder of this paper will be concerned with examining the significance of migratory movements, both for receiving areas and for the migrants themselves, in three types of destination areas.

B. MIGRATION ADJUSTMENT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The effects of migration, whether for sending areas, for receiving areas, or for the migrants themselves, are in large part a function of the composition of the migrant population. Essentially, discussion as to the functions or dysfunctions served by migration for a given receiving area, hinges upon the ability of migrants to establish themselves productively in their new environment. Indeed, these

10/ Pantelides, op. cit., pp. 4-5.
characteristics determine whether or not migration results in a rational redistribution of productive manpower in a matrix of unequal national opportunities or, in the clustering of parasitic elements in an already cluttered socio-economic or employment structure.

Despite their importance, however, the lack of satisfactory information directly relating characteristics of migrants to those of the non-migrant population at destination is a common complaint and has led to conflicting statements as to the role of migrants 11/. A set of special tabulations prepared by CELADE from a sample of the Colombian census as part of the former's OMUECE project 12/, provide us with an opportunity to delve into the characteristics and adjustment of migrants at considerably greater length than is customary in nationwide studies. These tabulations distinguish between migrants to three broad destination categories - the capital city (Bogotá), other urban areas, and, rural areas. The following discussion of migration adjustment and consequences will gravitate on two main axes:

(1) demographic characteristics of migrants: age-sex composition and marital status;

(2) characteristics determining the economic adaptation of migrants: literacy and education, labour force participation, branch of economic activity, occupational status and, participation in

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12/ Cf. CELADE, Banco de Datos, Boletín Informativo Nos. 3 and 4.

/economically-marginal
economically-marginal activities. The elaboration of migration differentials in each of these areas should progressively provide the elements for an overview of the positive or negative repercussions of migration for the various receiving areas; these elements will be drawn together in the concluding paragraphs of this section.

1. **Social and demographic characteristics**

(a) **Age composition of the migrant population**

Although the search for universal migration differentials has been relatively fruitless, one variable - the age of migrants - has demonstrated considerable regularity throughout the world. It would appear that in Latin America, as elsewhere, young adults predominate in the migrant population, particularly as concerns migratory currents towards urban areas of attraction. (The composition of migration streams to rural areas, by contrast, has received very little attention.)

For instance, in a sample survey of six Brazilian cities, it was found that 66.5 per cent of all migrants to these cities were between the ages of 15-39 at the time of their arrival 13/. Similarly, in San Salvador, a 1960 sample survey indicated that 64 per cent of all migrants to that city were between the ages of 15-44 at the time of the survey 14/. In Metropolitan Lima, a 1966 survey revealed that 56.5 per cent of all migrants to the area were between the ages of 15-39 at the time of the survey 15/. In Greater Santiago, among recent migrants (i.e., those with fewer than ten years of residence), 83.1 per cent were between the ages of 15-44; more than six out of ten of these recent migrants arrived before their twenty-sixth birthday 16/.

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/Faced with
Faced with such repetitive evidence, it would be highly unanticipated to find anything but a predominance of young migrants in Colombia. Table 2 compares the age structure, by sex, of recent migrants (i.e., those with less than five years of residence at their destination) to Bogotá, other urban areas and rural areas, with that of a population unaffected by migration - in this case that of Colombia's total population. The comparison is perforce restricted to the population aged 10 and over because of data problems in the under 10 category for the present sample.

Table 2

COLOMBIA: AGE COMPOSITION OF RECENT MIGRANTS COMPARED TO THE AGE COMPOSITION OF THE COLOMBIAN POPULATION, BY SEX AND DESTINATION, 1964

(Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age and sex</th>
<th>Recent migrants to Bogotá</th>
<th>Recent migrants to other urban areas</th>
<th>Recent migrants to rural areas</th>
<th>Population of Colombia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OMUECE, Colombia, tables 1 and 20.
Table 2 demonstrates that migrants in Colombia do indeed tend to be selective of younger age groups but the patterns vary considerably by sex and destination. Amongst males, the main differential between migrants and the national population relates to the 20-29 age group. In brief, recent male migrants to all three destinations, but particularly to Bogotá, have a substantially higher proportion of their total in the 20-29 category than does the country as a whole; in the capital the difference is so large that practically all other migrant age groups are proportionately smaller than corresponding categories of the nation's total. The predominance of this same age group is also substantial in male migration to other urban areas and to rural areas although not as accentuated as in the case of Bogotá. Overall then, the age distribution of male migrants to rural areas is most akin to that of the nation, while that of migrants to Bogotá is least similar.

The ascendency of youthful migrants is heightened in the case of females; women migrants are considerably younger than the nation's female population but they are also significantly younger than male migrants. This is particularly true in movements to Bogotá and other urban areas where some forty per cent of all recent female migrants are aged 10 to 19. Altogether, 72 per cent of 10 and over female migrants to Bogotá and 68 per cent of those to other urban areas are aged 10-29, as compared to 57 per cent of the comparable categories of the national total. In rural areas, women migrants tend to be somewhat older and, although their ascendency over the national population is pronounced in the 20-29 category, their overall age structure deviates less than the other migrant groups from that of the country's population.

In short, as was to be expected on the basis of previous investigations into migration differentials, migrants to all areas of Colombia are highly selective of the younger age groups. Female migrants are generally younger than their male counterparts while the predominance of youthful migrants of both sexes is particularly accentuated in movements to Bogotá and, to a lesser extent, in those towards other
towards other urban areas. Supposing that, as is plausible, previous migrants have been drawn largely from the same age groups as recent migrants in 1964, what has been the long-term effect of this pattern on the demographic structures of receiving areas?

Interestingly enough, the cross-sectional examination of the age-sex composition of natives, migrants and immigrants in table 3 does not immediately betray this preponderant youthfulness of migrants. Indeed, the numerical superiority of migrants only becomes evident in the cohorts over age twenty and it tends to increase with advancing age.

The explanation, of course, derives from the fact that the age-sex distribution of the native population is affected by births, deaths and migration, whereas that of migrants is affected only by deaths and migration. Hence the native population of Bogotá, other urban areas and rural areas is increased by births to natives and non-natives as well, and consequently its population composition displays a wide base which is depleted at each succeeding cohort by the normal progression of mortality, and by out-migration. By contrast, each level of the migrant population structure is continually being added to by net migration. Thus, for instance, the 30-39 migrants in 1964 are constituted by all survivors of the 30-39 migrants in the period 1954-1964, plus the survivors of 20-29 migrants in 1944-1954 and so forth. Hence while the age-sex pyramid of natives is approximately regular, that of lifetime surviving migrants shows a bulge in the central age groups as a result of continued infiltration in these groups.

In light of these basic considerations, it can easily be understood that the cross-sectional examination of population composition does not immediately demonstrate the youthfulness of incoming migrants.

/Table 3
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age and sex</th>
<th>Bogotá</th>
<th></th>
<th>Other urban areas</th>
<th></th>
<th>Rural areas</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Natives</td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Natives</td>
<td>Migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-9</td>
<td>85.9</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>57.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>69.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>64.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>65.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 and over</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>62.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Female

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age and sex</th>
<th>Bogotá</th>
<th></th>
<th>Other urban areas</th>
<th></th>
<th>Rural areas</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Natives</td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Natives</td>
<td>Migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-9</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>75.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>59.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>62.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>63.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>62.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 and over</td>
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<td>83.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>52.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>41.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ONDEH, Colombia, table 18.
Aside from this methodological remark, the main observation which can be derived from the examination of table 3 relates to the large proportion of both the male and female population of Bogotá, other urban areas and rural areas which is constituted by migrants. Although this statement holds weight for all cohorts, in Bogotá, these proportions are particularly impressive in the age groups over thirty since 70 to 80 per cent of the total population of each of these cohorts is constituted by migrants. In other urban areas, migrants made up over 60 per cent of all age-sex groups over thirty and, in rural areas, the corresponding proportion varies between 40 to 45 per cent for men and 35 to 40 for women.

(b) Composition of migration currents by sex

The patterns of migration by sex are perhaps less striking than those by age but available sources would seem to indicate a preponderance of female migrants in most Latin American migration streams, particularly among short-distance and urban-ward migrants. Elizaga, reviewing the annual rates of migration by sex to major Latin American nuclei between 1938 and 1963, concludes that female migration is more intense than male migration 17/. Similar results have been obtained in the aforementioned surveys of migration to six Brazilian cities, to Lima, to San Salvador and to Santiago 18/. Further corroboration stems from the fact that the urban sex ratio is lower the national in every Latin American country except Peru, apparently as a result of predominantly female rural-urban migration which is characteristic of the region 19/.

17/ Juan Elizaga, "Internal migrations in Latin America", Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, 43 (3-4) pp. 149-150.
18/ Cf. above footnotes pp 13 to 16.
Yet, in a study of inter-departmental migration in Guatemala, Arias found that migration was generally higher among males; only six out of twenty-two departments showed higher figures for females, and of these, only Guatemala showed a net gain 20/. Moreover, Elizaga finds that in Venezuela, the data reveal a remarkable uniformity of both sexes in the interstate as well as intra-state migration 21/. In Mexico, Burnight finds that males substantially outnumbered females in net inter-state migration during both the decades 1930-1940 and 1940-1950. Over this period, although the rates for both sexes increased from the 1930's to the 1940's, approximately the same difference in the male and female rates were observed 22/.

The discrepancies between these two sets of observations are not necessarily irreconcilable, however; in effect, when as originally suggested by Ravenstein 23/, distance and direction are controlled, it is found that women predominate in rural to urban, and in short distance movements. This fact can be linked primarily to the occupational aspirations of young rural women; they are more likely to look for employment opportunities, particularly in the domestic services or in industry, in the cities. In turn, young males predominate in long distance and rural to rural movements, and consequently, when investigating overall migration patterns, the countervailing trends tend to balance each other out.

According to these perspectives, we would expect Bogotá to attract a disproportionate amount of female migrants, other urban areas (since they are made up of both large metropolitan areas, small towns and all intermediate size cities) to have a diminished though still important majority of female migrants; lastly, rural areas could be expected to attract a disproportionate number of male migrants.

Table 4 does in fact indicate that these are the prevailing patterns. Fifty-six per cent of all migrants to Bogotá were females; moreover, women predominated in all migrant age cohorts except the 30-39 group where men had a slight majority. Women made up 54 per cent of all migrants to other urban areas and again they predominate in all cohorts except the 30-39 category. By contrast, a strong majority (59 per cent) of all migrants to rural areas were men, and this sex predominated in all age groups without exception.

Table 4

COLOMBIA: SEX RATIO OF RECENT MIGRANTS,
BY AGE AND DESTINATION, 1964

| Age | Destination | |  
|-----|-------------|---|---|---|
|     | Bogotá | Other urban areas | Rural areas |
| 10-19 | 62 | 71 | 130 |
| 20-29 | 95 | 88 | 141 |
| 30-39 | 101 | 108 | 148 |
| 40-49 | 90 | 98 | 165 |
| 50-59 | 57 | 94 | 150 |
| 60 + | 47 | 77 | 140 |
| Total | 79 | 85 | 141 |

Source: OMUECE, table 23.
Within each of these groups, however, important differentials can be noted in the sex ratio by age. For instance, in migrations to Bogotá, young women outnumber men in the 10-19 age groups by a ratio of ten to six. This finding is in consonance with our previous analysis of migration patterns by age (cf. table 2) wherein it was demonstrated that recent female migrants are much more likely than men to be found in the 10-19 age category. This type of differential is prevalent in the majority of urbanwards migrations in Latin America and here too it is, in all likelihood, attributable to the influx of young girls seeking employment in the capital as domestic servants. Women migrants to Bogotá also outnumber men in all other age groups except the 30-39 cohort but the difference is particularly accentuated in the 50 and over age groups. It seems plausible that these differentials in older age groups are traceable to mortality differentials by sex in areas of origin which would prompt female survivors to establish residence with previously migrated family members.

The data on sex differences in migrations to other urban areas conform closely to the patterns cited for Bogotá except that the differentials are less accentuated than in the latter. More specifically, women again predominate in all age groups except the 30-39 category and the differences are greatest at both extremes of the age scale. The same explanations which were preferred in the case of Bogotá are probably valid here too and the fact that the differentials are less incisive here derives from the inclusion of smaller towns and cities in the category of "other urban areas". That is, Bogotá would be a prototype of the migration differentials which are to be expected in movements towards large cities and the salient characteristics of these patterns are moderated when lesser centres are considered.

The sex characteristics of migratory movements to rural areas contrast sharply with those outlined above for Bogotá and other urban areas. Here, male migrants are consistently and substantially more numerous than females in each age group without exception. This
profile by sex is evidently the reverse of the urbanwards migration pattern and bespeaks of possible seasonal movements but, more importantly, of the type of employment opportunities available in non-urban areas. Young girls and women simply do not migrate en masse to rural areas in order to seek new opportunities.

The age-sex composition of migrants in Colombia thus exhibits a general pattern in conformity with that which could be expected on the basis of selectivity principles consistently corroborated in Latin American studies of migration. The overwhelming majority of recent migrants are young when they arrive at their destination; moreover, women predominate in migration streams to towns and cities while migrations to rural areas include a substantial majority of men. These differentials would appear to evolve naturally from the structure of employment opportunities available in each of the destination areas.

(c) Marital status

The marital characteristics of the individuals swelling Latin American migration streams have received relatively little attention. This dearth of analysis stems not from lack of interest in the problem since the impact of differentials in marital status on the social systems of both receiving and sending areas are inevitably of considerable movement. The neglect of marital status in the literature stems rather from insufficient data.

What studies do exist in Latin America would indicate that migrants to large cities are disproportionately single when compared to the populations from which they originate or to which they are headed \(^\text{24/}\). From local area surveys in Colombia, it could only be hypothesized that the marital status of migrants varies considerably according to the source and destination of migrants \(^\text{25/}\). Despite these local variations, however, considerable consistency is found in the examination of marital status in our three broad migrant groups.

\[^{24/}\] Browning, op. cit., p. 288.

Table 5

COLOMBIA: COMPARATIVE MARITAL STATUS OF MIGRANTS AND RESIDENTS, BY SEX, DESTINATION AND TYPE OF MIGRATION, 1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bogotá</td>
<td>Other urban areas</td>
<td>Rural areas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmarried</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residents</td>
<td></td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>59.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-DAI</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>64.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-DAM</td>
<td></td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Marital Union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residents</td>
<td></td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-DAI</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-DAM</td>
<td></td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OMUECE, Colombia, table 20.

Taking an overall view of the comparative marital status of recent migrants and residents in table 5, several revealing patterns can be discerned. Firstly, recent migrants have a substantially higher proportion
higher proportion of unmarried (i.e., single, separated or widowed) men and women than does the resident population of either the capital or other urban areas, with the differential being much more accentuated in the former. By contrast, although recent male migrants to rural areas have a slightly higher proportion of their total in the unmarried category than do residents, this difference is more than compensated by the converse differential prevailing in the female population. None of these relationships appears to be significantly or consistently affiliated to short-distance (inter-municipal) or long-distance (inter-departmental) migration.

The data discussed above refer to aggregate total of migrants and residents without exercising controls on any of several possible intervening variables except sex. Consequently, much of the observed variation could be attributable simply to the varying age structures of the different groups and consequently further elucidation requires control over age. Table 6 presents a comparison of marital status of recent migrants and residents to our three main areas in terms of rates standardized on the composition of the Colombian population in 1964. It shows that, even after the effect of age on marital status has been eliminated, previously-analyzed patterns still hold true, although their sharpness, in some instances, recedes somewhat.

### Table 6

**COLOMBIA: COMPARISON OF THE PROPORTION OF UNMARRIED PERSONS IN THE POPULATION OF MIGRANTS AND RESIDENTS, BY SEX, DESTINATION AND TYPE OF MIGRATIONS; RATES STANDARDIZED ON AGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION, 1964**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migrant Status</th>
<th>Bogotá Male</th>
<th>Bogotá Female</th>
<th>Other urban areas Male</th>
<th>Other urban areas Female</th>
<th>Rural Areas Male</th>
<th>Rural Areas Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residents</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>53.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-DAI</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-DAM</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: OMUECE, Colombia, tables 1 and 20*
In Bogotá, the previously noted preponderance of unattached migrants is confirmed for both men and women. In other urban areas of Colombia, the differentials are still in the same direction but now the ascendency of migrants, particularly females, in the unmarried category has been reduced to an insignificant level. In rural areas, the distribution has been little affected by standardization and hence recent male migrants to these areas still hold on edge in the unmarried category while women migrants tend to have a smaller percentage in this group than do residents. The reconfirmation of this divergent trend among ruralwards migrant women is thus consonant with our data on the high sex ratio of migrations to rural areas and implies that females are much less likely to migrate to a rural area unless it is to accompany their husbands. Finally, it is noteworthy that, again, distance travelled seems to have little effect on differentials by marital status.

In short, it would appear from present evidence that migrants of both sexes in urbanwards migratory movements are predominantly unattached young people striking out for a new life on their own. Moreover, it can be inferred that the larger the city of destination, the more pronounced the tendency. In ruralwards movements, male migrants follow the same pattern but women in these streams are more likely to migrate with their spouses. These marital characteristics of migratory movements are evidently conditioned to a great extent by the sex ratio and age distribution of each migratory stream and thus standardization tends to reduce some of the differences. Nevertheless, the essential point remains that migrants are, in fact, disproportionately represented in the unmarried category.
2. Characteristics determining the economic adaptation of migrants

From an economic standpoint, perhaps the most important consequence which derives from the demographic composition of migrant streams relates to its impact on the physical ability of migrants to productively enter the labour force of receiving areas. Since, as shown in the above section, migrants are predominantly young and unattached, receiving areas are theoretically favoured by the constant influx of people who are, physically at least, capable of entering the labour force in larger numbers than the native population. In turn, sending areas are deprived of a substantial segment of their young manpower.

But, whether or not the migrants are qualitatively, as well as physically, capable of entering the labour force of receiving areas in larger numbers than the native population is another matter. Moreover, it is not at all impossible that receiving areas experience over-migration in relation to their manpower needs or that migrants are relatively unequipped to participate productively in the economy of their receiving areas. The following pages will be addressed to the problem of the qualitative contribution of migrants to the labour force of receiving areas.

(a) Literacy and education

Two seemingly conflicting hypotheses can be entertained regarding the ability of migrants to enter the labour force of receiving areas. The first maintains that migrants are recruited primarily from the better-educated, more intelligent or more capable sectors of the population; in such a perspective, the migrants are either well-trained or more apt to be trained, particularly alert to changing opportunities and mobile enough to take advantage of them

/ The second
The second hypothesis claims that educational opportunities in regions of heavy out-migration are so limited that migrants have usually had little formal training in comparison to the residents at their destination and consequently, are destined to enter the lowest occupational and income strata.

Both of these hypotheses probably have some validity, inasmuch as they characterize different but chronologically simultaneous situations. Actually, the situation is considerably more complex than that suggested in the above two hypotheses and several conflicting influences, structural and motivational, eventually determine both the educational selectivity of migration streams as well as the educational differentials between migrants and natives at destination. Primary among these is the structure of the educational system of receiving and sending areas. Generally speaking, the educational opportunities available in rural areas and smaller cities will be less adequate than in larger urban centers, thus prompting migration of young people in search of higher educational facilities. Moreover, education in itself may stimulate out-migration inasmuch as it raises the level of aspirations and of unsatisfied needs in the population of rural communities and lesser centers. In addition, individuals having attained a higher level of education in smaller centers may have difficulty in finding positions corresponding to their level of skills and are thus more prone to migrate.

On another level, it can be speculated that, to the extent that migrants are responding primarily to pull factors at their area of destination, we would expect them to be positively selected. In this perspective, better-educated individuals would have more knowledge of existing opportunities and be better equipped to take advantage of them. But, when negative factors in the area of origin prompt most of the decisions to move, it is plausible that two contradictory tendencies unfold.
On the one hand, the more educated sectors of the population would normally be more perceptive of the bleak prospects in store for them in their home community and thus be the first to leave. On the other, it could be argued that in push migrations, the least trained segments of the population would be less capable of maintaining themselves locally and thus be compelled to abandon their native areas.

The empirical isolation and verification of these several conflicting yet overlapping factors is particularly difficult to perform and their influence is certain to vary appreciably in space and time. Nevertheless, whatever the nature of the specific factors affecting the educational composition of migration streams, it would appear from the literature that two basic generalizations are consistently reiterated in Latin American countries. Firstly, rural to urban migrations are selective of the more highly-trained elements of the population at origin. Secondly, the migrant population of larger urban centers usually exhibits a level of education inferior to that of the native population of the destination city. That is, although migration is selective of the better-trained elements at origin, differences in the structure of the educational system between receiving and sending areas decree an inferior level of education for migrants at their destination, particularly if this destination is a larger city.

In Colombia, the findings of available studies would tend to bear out these conclusions. For instance, the social status of migrants (as measured by education and occupation) and of their parents is significantly higher than that of the native population at the area of origin yet considerably lower than that of the native population of Bogotá. By contrast, other

27/ Cf. Browning (op. cit.) as well as footnotes 9 to 12 and 16-17.


/studies have
studies have suggested that migrants to some of the secondary cities and rural communities were more literate than the native population of these same destination areas 29/.

In the present context, since we are dealing with data relating to three broad destination areas we cannot purport to establish the complex etiology or even the characteristics of individual streams. Rather, our purpose will be to evaluate the overall configuration which results from the intermingling of various migration currents.

A first glimpse at the relative training of various migrant and resident groups is provided by the information on literacy shown in Table 7. The first point which calls our attention when we examine the per cent of each migrant and resident group who are literate is that migrants seem to find their own level remarkably well in terms of literacy. Migrants to Bogotá, both male and female, have a higher proportion of illiterate individuals than do migrants to other urban areas and these in turn have an even greater ascendancy over the migrants to rural areas. But, when the literacy level of the migrant and resident population at each of these destination areas is examined, then differences are often found to be negligible. Nevertheless, the differences are all in the direction which could have been predicted on the basis of previous findings, namely, that migrants to Bogotá have slightly lower literacy levels than residents while the converse is true in other urban areas and more noticeably so in rural areas. It is also worth noting in Table 7 that none of these differences between migrant groups or between these and resident populations can be attributed to differential age composition since age standardization of literacy rates merely reiterates the above findings.

Table 7

COLOMBIA: LITERACY OF RECENT MIGRANTS AND RESIDENTS, BY SEX AND DESTINATION;
COMPARISONS IN TERMS OF PERCENTAGES AND STANDARDIZED RATES, 1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of comparison and sex</th>
<th>Bogota</th>
<th>Other urban areas</th>
<th>Rural areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Residents</td>
<td>Migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent literate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>94.9</td>
<td>87.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>82.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy: Standardized rate a/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>94.8</td>
<td>86.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>88.3</td>
<td>81.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CNUCE, Colombia, tables 15 and 23.

a/ Rates standardized on the age composition of the population of Colombia.

/Looking next/
Looking next at educational achievement, the relative educational composition of migrant groups going to Bogotá, to other urban areas and to rural areas shown in table 8 confirms the previously-intimated trend. More specifically, migrants to Bogotá are undeniably better educated than their counterparts headed for other urban areas. Similarly, the latter migrants hold a distinct and sizeable advantage over migrants going to rural areas. These differences are monotonic for every age and sex cohort.

It might be objected that part of the variation may be due to the differential accessibility of educational facilities in each of the three areas under consideration. That is, migrants to Bogotá, for instance, would be better educated than those to other urban areas simply because of the more widespread school enrolment characterizing the former. It is indeed possible that this condition exercises some influence, but that is sure to be minimal since we are dealing here with recent migrants, i.e., individuals who have been residing for less than five years in their current place of residence. Consequently, for the most part, whatever education they have received, was given to them prior to their arrival at destination. This is, of course, particularly true in all age groups over twenty where education is essentially a static characteristic.

In brief, our first conclusion concerning the selectivity by education of migrants in various streams is clear; the more educated the migrant, the more likely he is to choose a large urban-industrial center of attraction as his destination. Now the question arises, how does the educational achievement of recent migrant groups compare with that of the resident population in each destination area?

Age-standardized rates presented in Table 9 indicate that the answer to this question varies according to the destination and sex of migrants. In Bogotá, recent migrants have the same proportion
Table 8
COLOMBIA: COMPARISON OF EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF RECENT MIGRANTS AND RESIDENTS,
BY AGE, SEX AND DESTINATION, 1964

(Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No schooling</th>
<th>1 - 3 years</th>
<th>4 - 9 years</th>
<th>10 and over</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MI- Residents</td>
<td>MI- Residents</td>
<td>MI- Residents</td>
<td>MI- Residents</td>
<td>MI- Residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - 19</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 29</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 39</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 and over</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>48.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - 19</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 29</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>41.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 - 39</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 and over</td>
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<td>24.2</td>
<td>30.1</td>
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<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>25.6</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>36.5</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No schooling</th>
<th>1 - 3 years</th>
<th>4 - 9 years</th>
<th>10 and over</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MI- Residents</td>
<td>MI- Residents</td>
<td>MI- Residents</td>
<td>MI- Residents</td>
<td>MI- Residents</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - 19</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 29</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 39</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>46.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 and over</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>14.3</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - 19</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 29</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
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<td>30 - 39</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>35.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 and over</td>
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<td>30.5</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>30.5</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>35.1</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No schooling</th>
<th>1 - 3 years</th>
<th>4 - 9 years</th>
<th>10 and over</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MI- Residents</td>
<td>MI- Residents</td>
<td>MI- Residents</td>
<td>MI- Residents</td>
<td>MI- Residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - 19</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 29</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 39</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 and over</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - 19</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 29</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 39</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 and over</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CENDE, tables 13 and 25.

Table 9
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex and destination</th>
<th>Educational attainment</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No schooling</td>
<td>1-3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bogota</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other urban areas</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rural areas</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OMDESE, Colombia, tables 12 and 25.
as residents in the highest educational category being considered here but a smaller proportion is the next highest category complemented by larger proportions having had less than four years of schooling. Women migrants to Bogotá have a more clear-cut disadvantage than their male counterparts in that they have lesser proportions than resident women in the two highest educational categories and higher figures in the two lowest ones.

In urban areas, recent male migrants actually have a greater number of their total in the highest educational category and a lesser number in the lowest category than do resident ones. However, these differences are not particularly large and are compensated to some extent by a resident advantage in the 4-9 years' schooling range. Female migrants also hold a slight edge in the highest educational level but their overall status is substantially inferior to that of residents since this edge is more than countervailed by higher proportions in the two lowest levels. Interestingly enough, recent migrants to rural areas, who were earlier shown to be the least-educated of all migrants, have a notable educational advantage over their resident counterparts; this advantage is significant and consistent for both sexes.

In brief, the available evidence would tend to confirm the preliminary notions on educational training derived earlier from an examination of literacy data. Although recent migrants to Bogotá are the best-educated of all migrant groups, their educational level is slightly inferior to that of residents in the case of male migrants and significantly lower in the case of females. In other urban areas, male migrants have a slight advantage over residents but the situation is reversed in the case of female migrants. Rural migrants, however, show a distinct educational superiority over both the male and female resident population.

Taken collectively, the data on literacy and education would indicate that, whatever the nature of the causal factors resulting in educational differentials, migrants would appear to seek their own level
own level in educational training. The differences between groups of migrants headed to various areas are much more significant than those between migrants and residents at destination. Indeed, it might reasonably be inferred from the foregoing that the larger the city, the higher the educational level of the migrants it attracts. Migrants to rural communities have the lowest average educational attainment of any migrant group yet they are the only migrants to boast a substantial educational advantage over the resident population.

(b) **Labour force participation**

Analysis of the demographic composition of migration flow in Colombia led us to conclude that migrants to all three destination areas under consideration are predominantly selective of the young and unattached population. All other things being equal, such a population structure should be translated into a higher rate of economic activity by migrants to all three destination areas.

In this light, it is suggestive that a recent thoroughgoing analysis of employment in Colombia concludes that:

"In all cities except Bogotá, half or more of the unemployed were born in the city or within the neighbouring department, and the proportion of locally-born persons is generally somewhat higher among first-time job seekers. Perhaps more surprising is the fact that the migrants in all the cities surveyed have much higher participation rates and significantly

---

It will be remembered that the nature of the tabulations used here force us to compare recent migrants with all other residents. Since the latter category includes not only the native population but also all other previous migrants, it could be objected that the comparison between recent migrants and all others in terms of a static characteristic such as educational attainment is jeopardized by the inclusion of previous migrants into the "Others" category. Nevertheless, this does not detract from the validity of the conclusions drawn here since such a reasoning would merely imply that previous migrations were similarly selective.

/lower employment
lower unemployment rates than locally-born persons. In Bogotá, for instance, the rate of unemployment among native-born persons was 23 per cent, among persons born somewhere else in the department 12 per cent, and among others, 15 per cent. Although a good part of this difference can probably be explained by differences in the ages of the two groups, the lower rates of unemployment among immigrants may well have important links with migration and thus deserve further study. 31/

Viewed in this connexion, it is thus of considerable interest that in Table 10, migrants to all three areas under focus do in fact tend to have a higher proportion of their totals in the economically-active category than do the natives at their respective destinations 32/. This conclusion is valid for the totals of both males and females. Moreover, standardization for age composition (cf. bottom of table 10) does not affect this conclusion in the least. Closer scrutiny of variations by age group, however, reveals that in the case of males, the recent migrants' advantage is traceable solely to a disproportionately high number of young men aged 10-19 who are economically active. This would thus imply that recent migrants have a higher percentage of economically-active men simply because


32/ As utilized in the Colombian census, the economically active population is defined as "Aquella de 12 años y más, (in the OMACEC sample this is changed to 10 years and over), que durante el año censal ejerció una ocupación remunerada en la producción de bienes o servicios, y la que en condición de 'ayudantes familiares' trabajó sin remuneración en la empresa de su respectivo jefe de familia o pariente por lo menos durante un tercio del tiempo normal de trabajo. Dentro del año censual o período de referencia, el censo establece un límite de duración de actividad, continua o discontinua, de nueve meses, para la denominación de 'ocupados' y 'no ocupados'." República de Colombia, Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística - XII Censo Nacional de Población, 15 de julio de 1964. Resumen General.
Table 10

COLOMBIA: PERCENTAGE OF RECENT MIGRANTS AND RESIDENTS WHO ARE ECONOMICALLY
ACTIVE, BY AGE, SEX AND DESTINATION, 1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age and sex</th>
<th>Bogotá</th>
<th>Other urban areas</th>
<th>Rural areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Residents</td>
<td>Migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - 19</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 29</td>
<td>85.8</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>88.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 39</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>94.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>81.7</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>85.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>69.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Female

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age and sex</th>
<th>Migrants</th>
<th>Residents</th>
<th>Migrants</th>
<th>Residents</th>
<th>Migrants</th>
<th>Residents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 - 19</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 29</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 39</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standardized activity rates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age and sex</th>
<th>Migrants</th>
<th>Residents</th>
<th>Migrants</th>
<th>Residents</th>
<th>Migrants</th>
<th>Residents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>79.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CINECE, Colombia, tables 5, 23 and 25.

Notes:

- Rates standardized on the age composition of the population of Colombia.
- /they have
they have a much smaller proportion of their young people attending school, and therefore migrants in the long run will be at a disadvantage.

In the case of females, the higher proportion of economically-active recent migrants is verifiable in all age groups of each migration current (except the 40 and over age category in Bogotá). On the one hand, a higher rate of participation in economically-gainful occupations is consonant with a previously-established higher proportion in the unmarried category. On the other hand, however, higher participation rates may again be a mixed blessing since, in the present instance, they possibly indicate that recent female migrants are more often forced to take up gainful employment in order to supplement a meagre family wage. Conversely, the remainder of the population would have a higher proportion of housewives who can afford the luxury of not taking a job.

Thus, although recent migrants to Bogotá, other urban areas and rural areas would, at first glance, appear to be favoured by a higher rate of participation in the economically-active labour force, the decomposition of this higher rate by age and sex groups would imply that the situation may be globally unfavourable to recent migrants. Indeed, the recent migrants have a higher activity rate exactly in the least-productive segments of the population. On the other hand, it could be argued that, whatever the structure of their economically active populations, the fact remains that, here and now, the dependency burden among residents is higher than among recent migrants; that is, the active residents have to support a higher proportion of inactive individuals than do migrants.

Evidently, a more complete analysis of this question could be carried out only if data on participation rates were to be supplemented by data on unemployment, underemployment and on the proportion of housewives and students in each of the migrant and non-migrant groups. In any case, the higher activity rate of /migrants is
migrants is a datum of considerable significance. Further light on the topic will be provided by an examination of the migrants' occupational adaptation.

(c) Occupational adaptation

The previous sections demonstrated that migrants predominate in the unattached and young working age groups and have higher rates of participation in the labour force than do residents. These circumstances, considered per se, would denote a favourable adaptation of migrants and would tend to be generally positive for receiving areas since migrants are, physically at least, capable of entering the labour force in larger numbers than the native population.

Tempering this statement comes the observation that, at least in Bogotá, migrants are less literate and educated than residents. Moreover, the advantage of migrants in terms of total participation in the labour force stems solely from a disproportionate number in the least-productive age-sex cohorts. Consequently, it remains questionable whether the migrants' favourable dependency ratio connotes real advantages. The following pages will present data on the de facto adaptation of migrants. The migrants' qualitative penetration of the occupational structure of receiving areas will be investigated at several complementary levels.

In a sense, the data relating to occupational status are the most crucial in terms of gauging the adjustment and relative contribution of migrants to their receiving areas. Unfortunately, this indicator, in its several dimensions, is also founded upon the most problematic and ambiguous of concepts. Definitions of employment, unemployment and under-employment are necessary yet they vary greatly and generally leave a great deal to be desired, especially when one attempts to operationalize them. Classifications of occupation, occupational category and branch of economic activity are all constituted of heterogeneous status categories and certain fundamental assumptions have to be made in order to be able to utilize these
categories at all. Moreover, fundamental differences in the economic structure of each of the receiving areas obstruct comparisons of occupational adaptation to these areas.

These difficulties notwithstanding, the question of occupational adjustment cannot simply be overlooked since it is central to the dynamics of migration and to the process of migrant assimilation. In the present instance, certain basic assumptions had to be made about status ranking in the various approaches to the classification of occupation and these will be made evident within the context of each of the following sub-sections. It should be stressed, however, that the formulation of such judgements in no wise connotes a disregard for the real heterogeneity and overlap between categories; it simply implies that a given grouping is considered to be, at the aggregate level, more favoured than another, despite individual discrepancies within and between classes.

(i) Branch of Economic Activity. Having established that the participation level of migrants is generally higher than that of residents but that this advantage is largely traceable to the differential age-sex composition of the two groups, our next question will be in terms of the migrants' insertion into the different branches of economic activity. In accordance with our prior findings as to qualification by sex, the data relating to branch of economic activity in Table 11 have to be examined separately for males and females in order to be intelligible.


74/ "La rana de actividad económica se refiere a la clase de actividad del establecimiento o lugar donde trabajó la persona durante el año censo." República de Colombia, XII Censo, op. cit.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch of economic activity</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Rural areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bogotá</td>
<td>Other urban areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MI- Residents</td>
<td>MI- Residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>91.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, ranching, hunting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and fishing</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity, gas, water,</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sanitation</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport, wareh., and comm.</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal services</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OITCE, tables 6 and 25.
With respect to men, the main differentials established therein are that male migrants to Bogotá and to other urban areas have a larger proportion in the services category (both personal services and other types) and in activities of the primary sector than male residents of these cities and towns. Conversely, male migrants have a correspondingly lower proportion in manufacturing, construction and transport activities. The percentage engaged in commercial activities is equally large among migrants and residents. In brief, it would appear that the most noteworthy observations to be derived from table II is that recent arrivals to Bogotá and to other cities and towns of Colombia find it easier to contract employment in the services than in the more modern sectors of the economy.

Women migrants recently arrived in Bogotá and in other cities are even more disproportionately channelled into the service activities than men. More than three quarters of the economically-active female migrants to Bogotá and to other urban areas in the services sector; moreover, the great majority of these women are classified as engaged in personal services, thereby lending overwhelming support to the oft-repeated claim that cities exert a tremendous attractive force on unskilled young rural women seeking employment as maids. By contrast, the female resident population of Bogotá and of other urban areas has only 35 per cent of its total in personal service activities; conversely, residents have a substantially higher ratio in manufacturing and commerce.

Evidently, agricultural activities engage the majority of both the migrant and non-migrant population but it is interesting that recent male migrants are under-represented in the agricultural sector by comparison to residents. The differences are taken up gradually by each of the remaining sectors (mining, manufacturing, construction, commerce and transportation) but it is particularly expressive in the services category. Among active women, recent female migrants are less likely than the remainder of the population to be engaged in agricultural activities. But they are also under-represented in mining and manufacturing and, as a result, practically dominate the services (especially the personal services) sector.
(ii) Occupation. Of greater consequence than branch of economic activity in the assessment of migrants' economic adaptation is the type and level of occupations which they are able to obtain. Unfortunately, the data which relate to this crucial problem cannot be readily synthesized into one satisfactory indicator and our efforts to ascertain the relative occupational levels of migrants and residents will be carried out through successive examination of three complementary perspectives.

The Manual, Non-Manual Dichotomy

Our first approximation to the qualification of migrants and residents can be carried out in terms of their respective proportions engaged in manual and non-manual activities. The non-manual category as utilized here includes professionals, technicians, managers, administrators, office and sales workers as well as other related occupations. Consequently, there is no question but that on the aggregate level, the status endowed upon this category is higher than that of the manual group which includes all other labour force participants except the armed forces and the "unspecified occupations" which were omitted from consideration in table 12.

Initially, with reference to males in the capital city, it can be observed that recent migrants have a slightly higher proportion of their economically-active population in manual activities than residents but a lesser proportion in the higher status occupations. Amongst women, the variation is magnified many times over with residents having twice the migrant percentage in non-manual activities and a correspondingly lower proportion in manual activities.

/Table 12
Table 12

COLOMBIA: PERCENTAGE a/ OF ECONOMICALLY-ACTIVE RECENT MIGRANTS AND
RESIDENTS ENGAGED IN MANUAL AND NON-MANUAL OCCUPATIONS,
BY SEX AND DESTINATION, 1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex and Occupation</th>
<th>Bogotá Migrants</th>
<th>Bogotá Residents</th>
<th>Other Urban Areas Migrants</th>
<th>Other Urban Areas Residents</th>
<th>Rural Areas Migrants</th>
<th>Rural Areas Residents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>96.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Manual</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>88.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Manual</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ONUCEC, Colombia, tables 11 and 25

a/ The percentages cited in this table do not sum to 100 because certain categories (namely armed forces and unspecified) have been omitted from the table.

By contrast, in other urban areas of Colombia, recent male migrants have a somewhat higher ratio than residents in non-manual activities and a significantly smaller proportion in manual occupations. (N.D. The migrants have a greater proportion of their economically active population in the armed forces and in unspecified occupations.) However, the situation of female migrants is unequivocally inferior to that of residents in the sense that they, as did migrant women to Bogotá, have a considerably lesser proportion in non-manual activities. Finally, with respect to rural areas, the overwhelming proportion of both migrants and residents are understandably concentrated in primary activities (which were classified here as manual) and, further breakdown is necessary before inferring to the relative status of both groups within the primary sector. Nevertheless, it is of some interest that migrants, particularly females, enjoy a considerable superiority in non-manual activities.

/In short,
In short, when compared to the occupational situations of the resident population at their respective destinations, that of male immigrants to rural areas and to other urban areas would appear to be somewhat more favourable than that of migrants to Bogotá. Nevertheless, when the occupational structure of migrants to each of these destinations is compared, then it appears that male migrants to Bogotá enjoy a more favourable situation by dint of their higher proportion in non-manual activities. With respect to female migrants, the most notable feature is the consistency of their occupational structure, regardless of destination; about one-fifth of each group enter the non-manual occupations while the majority take up manual occupations which, as mentioned previously, are largely in service activities.

**Occupational Status**

The manual, non-manual approach to the assessment of relative occupational status leaves a great deal to be desired by way of refinement and detail. Within the manual, non-manual dichotomy, it is easy to point out instances of great heterogeneity within each class and even to demonstrate cases of "manual activities" having unquestionably higher status than "non-manual" ones.

One procedure commonly utilized to bring further specification and depth to the analysis of occupation is to classify the economically-active population into - employer, own account worker, employee and, unremunerated family worker. But again this taxonomy lends itself to ambiguity, particularly because of incongruities in the "own account" and "employee" categories.

35/ More specifically, "own account workers" are usually held to be of lower status than employees since it is felt that modernization of the economy brings replacement of small-scale individual enterprises by salaried employment. Nevertheless, self-employed professionals are grouped therein alongside street vendors, subsistence farmers and other. Moreover the "employee" category may include a domestic servant whose employer, an accountant or medical doctor is also in the same category.

/In an
In an effort to obtain at least some measure of further specification, certain categories in GHRCE's tabulation of occupation by category of occupation were regrouped along the lines shown in table 13. The first two categories shown therein (professionals and technicians, employers), are self-explanatory. "White collar employees" as utilized here includes employed managers and administrators as well as office and sales employees (excluding street vendors). The category of "blue collar workers" include all salaried employees in manufacturing, industry, artesanery, transport and mining. "Non-professional own account workers" contains mostly lower-status individual enterprises such as street vending, odd-jobbing, subsistence farming and artesanery. The "services" category includes both domestic and other types of services but the former are numerically overwhelming. Finally, the "other manual and unremunerated family workers" includes all construction workers, stevedores, porters, laundry employees, etc., as well as agricultural employees and all unremunerated family workers, whatever the latter's occupation.

Again no claim is being made that each of these categories is homogeneous nor that any category or group of categories can satisfactorily be defined as a stratum or class. The only assumption being made here is that, on the aggregate level, the persons included in a given category are the holders of a higher or lower status than those in another. More specifically, it is suggested that the aggregate levels one and two contain the highest average status positions, (although no ordinal relationship is posited between them) followed by white collar workers and then by blue collar employees. The status position of the last three categories is perhaps less clearly defined amongst themselves but they are surely of a lower aggregate level than the four first. Our primary interest in delineating these three sub-groups lay in their relevance for the investigation of the modalities of migrant adjustment to lower status positions rather than in the formulation of hierarchically-differentiated positions.

/Table 13
Table 13
(In percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex and occupational status</th>
<th>Bogota Migrants Residents</th>
<th>Bogota Residents</th>
<th>Other urban areas Migrants Residents</th>
<th>Other urban areas Residents</th>
<th>Rural areas Migrants Residents</th>
<th>Rural areas Residents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Professionals and technicians</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Non-professional employers</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. White-collar employees</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Blue-collar employees</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Non-professional own account</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Service employees</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Other manual and unremunerated family workers (including agric. employees)</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total %</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Female

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex and occupational status</th>
<th>Bogota Migrants Residents</th>
<th>Bogota Residents</th>
<th>Other urban areas Migrants Residents</th>
<th>Other urban areas Residents</th>
<th>Rural areas Migrants Residents</th>
<th>Rural areas Residents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Professionals and technicians</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Non-professional employers</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. White-collar employees</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Blue-collar employees</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Non-professional, own account</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Service employees</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Other manual and unremunerated family workers (including agricultural employees)</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total %</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CENCWE, Colombia, tables 6 and 27.

% Table exclude Armed Forces Personnel.
Cautioned by these remarks, we can proceed to a comparison of the relative occupational status of residents and migrants. In Bogotá's male population, residents hold an edge over migrants in each of the four higher status categories but the difference is statistically appreciable in only one of these - the non-professional employers. Amongst the three lower status groups, residents also have a higher proportion in self-employed occupations, particularly as handymen and petty merchants while migrants are disproportionately represented in services and "other manual occupations". Overall then, male migrants to Bogotá tend to be located in somewhat lower status levels and are much less likely than residents to live off their own business, whether as employers or as small entrepreneurs. The recent migrant's unwillingness or inability to launch his own business is readily understandable in light of his relative lack of knowledge of opportunities and markets, even at the lower commercial levels.

In other urban areas, the relative occupational status of male migrants' by comparison to residents tends to be somewhat higher than that of migrants to Bogotá. In Colombia's other towns and cities, migrants are again less likely to be employers than residents but they hold a substantial edge among professionals and technicians as well as a lesser majority in the white collar workers' category. Residents have a slight advantage amongst blue collar workers and are again considerably more likely to strike out on their own in lower status enterprises. In turn, migrants are again over-represented in other manual jobs and service occupations, as was the case in Bogotá.

Male migrants going to rural sections of Colombia are understandably less likely to own their land, either as employers or as subsistence farmers. The majority of both migrants and residents are employed by agricultural, ranching, fishing and hunting concerns but migrants, by reason of their aforementioned disadvantage in landowning categories, have almost two-thirds of their labour force in primary sector employment as compared to half of the resident men. Migrants also hold slight advantage amongst professionals and technicians, white and blue collar workers and in the services sectors.

/In brief,
In brief, considering the three currents of male migrants, it can be affirmed that although migrants to Bogotá have higher proportions than other migrant groups in higher status occupations, their occupational situation is slightly inferior to that of resident males in Bogotá. Meanwhile, male migrants to other urban areas hold an advantage of comparable dimensions over the resident population. The men migrating to rural areas have much lesser proportions of landowners, particularly in the minifundios and a much higher proportion of agricultural employees; moreover, they are also slightly more prominent in all of the higher status categories except that of employers. Overall, the relative distribution of migrants and residents by sector maintains considerable consistency in the various destinations; migrants are disproportionately represented in services and "other manual occupations" in each of the different destinations, while residents are more apt to be self-employed. Other differentials are all of lesser significance than this repartition of lower-status activities.

The consistently higher proportions of migrants in salaried employment coupled with the residents' predominance in entrepreneurial roles (which differential is most noticeable at the lower levels) would seem to speak well for the migrants' ability to enter the productive labour force. In an attempt to explain the migrants' higher activity rates on the basis of preconceived notions as to the migrants' purportedly inferior occupational status, one author asserts that - "natives of Bogotá prefer to obtain employment as salaried employees while immigrants are more apt to be self-employed. It is obvious that this difference affects activity rates since the former will, in the strict sense, be subject to the possibility of unemployment more than the latter, and the duration of unemployment will also be longer in the former case." 36/.

In actual fact, however, we have demonstrated here that the migrants' activity rates are higher despite their greater prominence in the supposedly more difficult-to-obtain salaried positions. Hence, there would seem to be little empirical validation for the notion that migrants are unable to obtain productive employment. Whether or not they tend to unduly inflate the labour market and depress wage levels is another matter, however, one which cannot readily be answered with present data.

In the female population, the occupational status of recent migrants to both Bogotá and to other urban areas is unambiguously inferior to that of residents. Female migrants to all of Colombia's urban places have significantly lesser proportions of professionals and technicians (except in other urban areas where migrants have a slight advantage), employers, white and blue collar workers than do residents. In fact, migrants have (with the one exception noted above) lesser proportions in all categories but services where they have almost twice the percentage of residents. In rural areas, female migrants again have a conspicuously larger proportion than residents in service categories; more than half of all economically-active migrant women are in service occupations as compared to one-fifth of residents. On the other hand, women migrating to rural areas have sixteen per cent of their total in professional and technical occupations (mostly as teachers and nurses) compared to only 5 per cent of residents, as well as a lesser advantage in the white collar workers' category. Migrants are prominently absent once more from both the employers and self-employed categories and in addition have much lesser proportions working as agricultural employees or in other manual jobs.

Thus, each female migrant group has a majority of its economically-active population in service activities, most of these being found in domestic employment. Moreover, as was the case with male migrants, women migrants have considerably lesser proportions than residents in high and low status own-enterprise. However, by contrast to the situation of male migrants who, in some cases, enjoyed a more advantageous occupational composition than residents, female migrants...
are consistently found in lower status occupations more frequently than residents with the only exception being the higher proportions of female migrants to rural areas found in non-manual occupations.

(iii) Proportion in Economically-Marginal Activities. In the context of large-scale movements of population, rapid urbanization and of the disassociation between the processes of industrialization and urbanization which is often decried in Latin America, perhaps the more important question which can be asked concerning the absorption of migrants into the employment structures at their destination concerns the extent to which migrants swell the economically-marginal sectors of the population. Indeed, given the particular composition and function of the tertiary sector which characterizes the Latin American economic structure, the high ratio of migrants engaged in service activities, particularly in personal services, would reinforce the notion that recent migrants demonstrate an inferior occupational status. Moreover, migration is commonly held to be in excess of employment opportunities and that consequently the migrants, who are in their majority unskilled, are shuttled off into economically-marginal activities. Seldom, however, has it been possible to conduct a direct test of this hypothesis on anything but a local basis and one of the merits of the OHUDEC tabulations is that they have been arranged so as to permit an approximative exploration of this question on a more general level.

For present purposes, marginal labour may be defined as "all those who live at the lowest income level - approaching subsistence levels - either because of the unproductive and non-essential nature of their occupations, or because work is irregular or unobtainable. Marginal labour, plus dependents, forms the marginal population".

The operational application of this definition is, however, variable, and to some extent, arbitrary. In the presently-utilized OHUDEC tabulations, marginal activities were grouped into three main categories: (a) self-employed individuals who sustain themselves as minifundo agriculturalists, as manual labourers and as street vendors, or in the services and unskilled artesantery; (b) unpaid
family workers in agriculture, in street vending and in manual labour; (c) domestic servants. Within the limitations imposed by census data, this grouping gives a fair approximation to underemployment and marginality.

Utilizing these cut-off points, the percentage of the economically-active 10 and over population of recent migrants engaged in marginal activities can be contrasted with the corresponding population of residents. Such a comparison, effected in table 14, highlights the fact that male migrants to Bogotá, to other urban areas and to rural areas all have a smaller proportion than do residents in marginal activities. The differential is minimal in the case of Bogotá, more substantial in other urban areas and greatest in rural areas. In each instance, the differential is largely constituted by the higher proportion of natives in self-employed marginal activities - a finding in consonance with prior observations made while discussing occupational status - but rural residents also have a substantially higher proportion in the unpaid family workers' category.

Incidentally, it can be noted that the proportion of males, whether migrants or residents who are engaged in marginal activities is sizeably smaller in Bogotá than in other urban areas and greatest in rural areas. This situation of course derives from our inclusion of subsistence farming as a marginal activity in our taxonomy.

A different scheme is proposed by Carmen Arretx in "La información y los estudios demográficos en América Latina" (CEPAL, Seminario sobre Utilización de estudios y datos demográficos en la planificación, Agosto, 1971, ST/ECLA/Conf.41/L.9). Therein it is suggested that by simultaneously controlling age, education, occupation and occupational category it is possible to arrive at a more adequate operational definition of underemployment. Unfortunately, such a tabulation was not available in the present instance.
Table 14
COLOMBIA: COMPARISON OF RECENT MIGRANTS AND RESIDENTS IN TERMS OF THEIR PERCENTAGE OF 10 AND OVER POPULATION IN MARGINAL ACTIVITIES, BY SEX AND DESTINATION, 1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Capital Migrants</th>
<th>Capital Residents</th>
<th>Other urban areas Migrants</th>
<th>Other urban areas Residents</th>
<th>Rural areas Migrants</th>
<th>Rural areas Residents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpaid family workers</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpaid family workers</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CINECOP, tables 8 and 26.
In the case of females, the relative ranking of migrants and residents in terms of their respective ratios in marginal activities is radically reversed—except in rural areas where a higher proportion of resident women engaged in subsistence farming counterbalances an otherwise unfavourable situation for migrants. Like their male counterparts, female migrants to Bogotá and to other urban areas also have somewhat lesser numbers in self-employed marginal activities but this difference is more than compensated by the predominance of migrant women in domestic services. But perhaps the most significant fact revealed by table 14 is that three-fifths of all economically-active migrant women, regardless of destination, are engaged in marginal activities, as compared to only one-fifth to one-tenth of all male migrants.

In brief, our classificatory scheme of marginal activities would suggest that a distinctly different view has to be taken of male and female migration. Contrary to what has usually been suggested, male migrants are actually less likely to be involved in marginal activities than residents. True, this finding may be a function of our operational criteria yet, in the absence of more adequate data, it commands considerable interest. On the other hand, female migrants undeniably swell the ranks of the population engaged in economically-unproductive activities.

C. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Taken collectively, what do these data on the volume and characteristics of migration flows suggest concerning population redistribution and concerning the adaptability and productivity of migrants?

First, although the data on migration volume are unsatisfactory for the evaluation of overall movements within Latin American nations, gross indicators to point to widespread and variegated migratory flows. It is probable that around one out of every three Latin Americans is living in an administrative area other than that of his birth. The predominant direction of these moves is sure to be urbanwards but it cannot be overlooked that in the two countries for which we have data
on a nation-wide scale, Colombia and Costa Rica, ruralwards migrations accounted for more than one third and one-half, respectively, of all population flows.

As a result of the cumulative massive flow of migrants over the years, the demographic composition of receiving areas is severely affected by the incoming population. For instance, in Colombia, some 75 per cent of the capital's 30 and over population is made up of migrants, as is 60 per cent of the 30 and over population of other urban areas. Yet, even in rural areas, the effects of migration are appreciable since two-fifths of Colombia's rural population is also composed of migrants. In short, to a greater or lesser extent, practically all cities, towns, hamlets and agricultural areas are affected either by the influx of migrants or by the loss of outmigrants.

The consequences of these widespread movements are largely contingent upon the composition of migration streams, thus lending considerable interest to the study of the study of the demographic, economic and social characteristics of migrants. In Colombia, the age-sex composition of migrants exhibits patterns in conformity with those of other Latin American movements. That is, migration streams to Bogotá and other urban areas include a disproportionate amount of women and young people; migratory movements to rural areas again include a substantial segment of young people but there the similarity ends since men make up the majority of all rural migrants.

Investigation of the comparative marital status of migrants and residents showed that unmarried people are most likely to migrate. With the exception of female migrants to rural areas (who it may be surmised generally accompany their husbands), migrants of all age-sex cohorts and to all destinations, whether moving short or long distances, tend to have a significantly higher percentage of unmarried people than the corresponding categories of residents.

In short, judging on the basis of these demographic characteristics alone, one might well conclude that migrants are disproportionately selected from the more physically vigorous and unattached elements of the population. Hence, it could be postulated that migrants would be

/singularly well-equipped,
singly well-equipped, in quantitative and physical terms at least, to participate fully in the economic processes of their destination areas. Whether or not migrants are qualitatively capable of such participation, however, is another matter and one which was broached from several related standpoints.

In terms of literacy and education, the migrants going to Bogotá hold a substantial edge over those heading towards other urban areas and an even greater advantage over those destined to rural areas. Nevertheless, because of the differing educational standards of their respective receiving areas, the best-educated migrants (i.e., those going to Bogotá) have an aggregate educational level inferior to residents of the capital; migrants and residents of other urban areas have approximately the same level of general education while the least-educated migrants (those to rural areas) actually have a noticeable advantage over other rural residents. Nevertheless, the differences between migrants and residents in each case are of lesser consequence than differences between various groups of migrants.

How are these educational differences reflected in the employment structure of receiving areas? First of all, it is of some significance that recent migrants in Bogotá, other urban areas and rural areas have a sizeable advantage over residents in terms of their participation in economic activities. Yet, closer scrutiny of this differential reveals that the migrants' advantage is systematically concentrated into two categories - the 10-19 males and, females of all age groups. This would suggest that the higher activity rates of migrants are, in some aspects, dysfunctional, since they can be interpreted in the direction of a lesser proportion of young male migrants in school as well as a lesser proportion of unemployed housewives.

Given the aforementioned differentials in qualifications and in labour force participation by sex, it is imperative to focus separately on males and females in each of the destination areas in order to present a coherent summary of the manner in which migrants and residents are distributed throughout the occupational hierarchy.

//male migrants
Male migrants to Bogotá are unquestionably the best prepared of all migrant groups and obtain the most favourable job adaptation. Nevertheless, their employment situation is generally inferior to that of the resident population. For instance, they have a somewhat lower proportion of their economically-active numbers employed in non-manual occupations and in each of the four higher status occupational categories although the difference is significant only in the employer category where migrants are conspicuously under-represented. Indeed, one of the salient features of the migrants' occupational structure is that they are much less likely than residents to strike out on their own - whether as employers or low-status entrepreneurs. On the other hand, migrants are disproportionately found in service occupations and in other manual jobs. Hence, although the differences between male migrants and residents of Bogotá are small, they consistently show migrants to be situated at a somewhat lower level than residents in the occupational hierarchy. By virtue of the migrants' aversion to own account enterprises, however, this inferiority does not carry through to what was defined here as the marginal sector since residents actually have slightly more of their numbers in this lowest status group.

In other urban areas of Colombia, the occupational comparison of migrants and residents would apparently favour the former. On the one hand, migrants do have a higher proportion in service activities and in "other manual occupations" but to balance this, they also have a higher proportion of professionals, technicians and white collar workers and a lesser proportion of the generic "manual workers". As was the case in Bogotá, migrants to other urban areas are again less likely to be employers or self-employed. Lastly, a substantially smaller proportion of migrants are to be found in economically-marginal activities.

As concerns rural areas, the main distinguishing characteristic of the male migrant labour force lies in the relative absence of migrants from the landholding category - whether as employers or subsistence farmers; consequently, migrants are more consistently /categorized as
categorized as salaried employees. When branch of economic activity is considered, it is found that the migrants' occupations tend to be more diversified although both groups understandably have their largest proportions in agriculture. In addition, migrants have a higher ratio in non-manual and blue collar occupations as well as a noticeably smaller proportion in marginal activities.

Hence, it would appear that when compared to male residents at their respective destinations, rural migrants and migrants to other urban areas enjoy a favourable occupational situation with respect to residents whilst Bogotá's migrants are in the least favourable position. It should be emphasized, however, that these are relative terms and the diversity of the occupational structure at the three destinations hinders generalization. Yet, it can be affirmed that the clearest hierarchy visible exists at the level of comparison between various migrant groups. Indeed, when the migrant groups are compared amongst themselves, male migrants to Bogotá, by virtue of their higher proportions of professionals, technicians, white and blue collar workers, enjoy a privileged situation consequent upon a superior educational background; similarly, urban migrants hold a considerable advantage over the corresponding cohorts of rural migrants in the same categories.

Looking now at the occupational distribution of female migrants, it is evident that, even if we consider only the economically active population, women who migrate to Bogotá or to other urban areas, experience an employment situation which suffers by comparison both to that of male migrants and to that of resident females.

The main identifying characteristic of migrant women's employment in Bogotá and other urban areas is their domination of the services sector. This phenomenon in turn can literally be interpreted as a higher rate of employment in domestic services; unmarried females, whether or not they specifically come to the towns and cities in search of jobs as maids, are very likely to find themselves in this position rather soon after arrival. As a result of this channeling process, female migrants to these areas have lesser percentages in the
professional and technicians' and employers' categories, and in white and blue collar categories than do residents. In addition, since domestic service was classified in the current paradigm as an economically-marginal activity, women migrants are obviously more prominent in marginal activities.

The occupational distribution of women migrants to rural areas is somewhat more ambiguous. On the one hand, they have much lower activity rates than any other migrant group and they are again most prominent in domestic employment. On the other hand, they are much less likely than resident women to be engaged in tilling family-run minifundios and significantly over-represented in the professional category. In short, we could infer that female migrants to rural areas either enter the occupational structure at the highest levels as teachers and nurses or else at the lowest levels as domestic servants - with the latter condition being three times more frequent.

Viewed in conjunction, the present data therefore suggest that a natural funnelling of the better-equipped male migrants to the more economically-attractive destinations takes place in Colombia. The best-educated migrants evidently head towards the capital city and obtain the most favourable employment of any migrant group. Lesser towns and cities attract a somewhat less-educated group who are nevertheless capable of obtaining a level of employment which is, in some senses somewhat better than that of residents. Were we able to control for size of city, it is possible that a regular gradient in the training-employment complex characterizing various size-class cities would be uncovered. The least-educated migrants head towards rural areas but, on the aggregate level, are likely to exhibit a higher education and a slightly better occupational situation than residents of these zones.

Reflecting on the relative educational achievement of migrants and residents, their respective labour force participation rates and the types of occupations which they are able to obtain, it does not seem reasonable to continue asserting that male migrants are unable to compete for productive jobs with the native population of the /localities to
localities to which they migrate. We would ideally appreciate more comprehensive and detailed information before proferring conclusions, yet it can legitimately be inferred that, although the composition of the three male migrant groups differs greatly, the overall comparison of migrants and residents at their respective destinations in terms of their potential and practical contribution to the labour force is not unfavourable to migrants.

Nevertheless, in the long run, the most pertinent question to be asked of migration studies is perhaps not the relative composition of migrants and natives but whether or not the influx of vast numbers of migrants is eventually detrimental to both groups by virtue of the migrants' over-inflation of the labour market. In turn, this question cannot be examined in isolation from an analysis of the effective ability of existing structures at origin to productively assimilate potential migrants. These more encompassing concerns, although they cannot be broached with present data, serve to realign our findings within a broader perspective while pointing to areas of needed research.

Lastly, it is also obvious from this investigation that female migrants to any of the three destinations are the least-trained and least productive migrant groups. However, the problem cannot be envisaged from the rather narrow standpoint of economic productivity since it is evident that if these women draw up their roots and migrate in search of employment as domestic servants then this life is being subjectively evaluated as preferable to that prevailing in their home area. Moreover, the situation is unlikely to change until pervasive modifications are effected in the encompassing socio-economic framework permitting this type of migrant to receive a better education and obtain more productive employment.

/Chapter VII
Chapter VII

POPULATION, ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: THE
LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

1. Development and its components

Traditionally land, labour and capital have been considered to be
the basic factors of production on which the wealth of a nation rested
and it was the manipulation of these - seen respectively in broad terms
as natural resources (the availability of fertile land, forests,
minerals, marine products); people (including skills, inventiveness,
creativity and business initiative as well as their propensity to consume
and so provide an adequate and growing market); and wealth (aggregate
income levels, savings, investment and the stock of capital goods in the
economy) - which allowed a nation to "develop" or not. Successful nations
development was thought of in terms of the aggregate size of national
income, income per capita (although social and regional distribution were
virtually ignored), growth rates and international commercial performance.

In the past thirty years attention has turned successively to
certain variables and interrelationships as being crucial to the
development process. The roles of population, technology, resources
and output are important, not only in themselves but also as a result
of their interaction; it is the use that the population makes of
resources which affects levels and types of production, which in turn
determines the quality and range of consumption by the populace.
Moreover the use of resources depends on the society's perception of
what constitutes a usable resource and its ability to make its
perception operative through the application of technology to the raw
materials available. In the past two centuries this process of
interaction has been a cumulatively expanding one which in the affluent
nations especially has led to increased demand to new techniques for
developing natural resources, and to the improvement of transport
networks, as the industrially advanced societies widened their search
for agricultural land and raw materials to replace exhausted or
expensive resources in the already exploited areas. Constant
technological advance, too, has led to the discovery of new sources
of wealth and has in turn altered methods and types of production,
and created new forms of consumer goods and demand.
The schema 'population - technology - resources - output' (with the concomitant consumption) is a useful one in describing the basic structure and functioning of the development process, and the way it has continually expanded in the two hundred years since the industrial revolution. But, although the basic techno-economic ingredients are there, more is needed to explain first why such a pattern of growth should be taking place; to what extent this particular structure has improved the quality of life for mankind - and more to the point, perhaps, how it has differentially altered the quality of life for distinct sectors of mankind; and what disadvantages it has brought in its train.

The development process has, on the whole, been one of cumulative growth both in terms of technological "know how" and of the increased sophistication of production and consumption. But the uneven social and spatial spread of the benefits of such growth, together with the deleterious environmental effects of the destruction or wasteful use of natural resources, and the perpetuation on an ever larger scale of inadequate conditions of human settlement, have raised a number of issues which cannot be answered only - or even primarily - in traditional technical or economic terms. The attempt to explain why, despite the tremendous technical capacity available to mankind, the principal features of the process of development in the 1970's should still be inequality and imbalance - the division of the world into developed and underdeveloped, nationally, regionally, socially - requires the introduction of variables of a non-economic, non-technical nature.

Social and political factors, and spatial and environmental questions are now increasingly part of the calculus of the development process along with the more traditional variables as social scientists and planners seek: an approach which will both allow them to analyse the development process on the bases of a wider range of criteria, and to find answers to problems through a broader understanding of the implications of different policy decisions.

Analysis of the sociopolitical variables might help the planner to understand why, for example, economic activity and population are concentrated increasingly in a few large centres; why particular capital
- intensive forms of technology are being employed in labour-surplus situations, why luxury goods are being produced or imported when other criteria might suggest that the production of basic goods for a nutritionally deficient and inadequately sheltered and clothed majority of the population would represent a more socially just national investment. The combination of the sociopolitical with techno-economic variables should help the policy-maker or researcher to examine with much greater depth and understanding the working of a society by examining its motivations, its aims and principles.

In this quest for an integrated approach to development policy (which is still generally in the very early stages of its evolution) the spatial and environmental factors have important roles in demonstrating with particular clarity certain consequences of different types of development, in terms of the form and structure of human settlements, relationships between town and country, the spatial distribution of economic activity, and the spatial distribution of consumption of goods and services.

The environmental and spatial components are closely related in that they both provide physical indicators to the policy-makers of the functioning (for good or ill) of the society. The use of the natural environment through the development or despoliation of resources; the creation or not of a humanly acceptable urban or rural environment; or of a "livable" social environment form the practical evidence of the capacity of a society to provide for its citizens, by projecting the results on the ground, as it were, of the operation and interplay of other, less tangible, features of the system.

"Development" then is equivalent to the way in which all the variables of the system - population, technology, resources, production (and consumption), and the social, political, spatial and environmental factors - interact. In turn, development strategies require the selection and reconciliation of these variables and their interrelationships in order to achieve certain goals or principles.
2. The population factor

(a) Growth and size

"Population" is the initiating and operating factor (in the development process), the end to which all development is directed, and the element which suffers from maladjustments and contradictions in the functioning of the system.

The other variables stand in a dependent relationship to "population" constituted into organized societies; resources are a function of the perception of society, and the ability of man to make use of them through the application of technical knowledge, while the type and range of goods produced, together with the location of economic activity and human settlement, will depend in large part on the sort of society constructed to meet the requirements of dominant social groups.

The close links between demographic and environmental questions too, are immediate and obvious. Man has had an enormous influence in changing the environment throughout history, and especially in the last two centuries, with the rapid expansion of the human species together with its technical capacity for production and destruction. In the past two decades the phenomenon of a fast-growing population which is making ever-increasing demands on the environment and the stock of available resources to support mankind, has become, from the preoccupation of a handful of specialists, a worldwide obsession.

Latin America, with the highest population growth rate of any major region in the world, is particularly sensitive to the claim that population pressure is one of the major reasons for the sharpening of environmental problems, and different governments have taken various positions between two extremes - acceptance of the need to reduce rapid growth by specific population policies, and an outright rejection of any suggestion that population expansion should be slowed. (It should also be noted that there are significant differences between policy statements and action at either end of the range of possible policy choices.)
This is not the place for a detailed assessment of the different positions and, it should be added, a discussion in generalized terms about the continent's population is not particularly useful, because of the enormous differences between countries not only in size but also in terms of population densities, rates, distribution and components of growth.

Densities remain low in most countries and this has generated a belief that the region, or at least some nations within it, needs people to populate the vast open spaces and develop and use the great richness and diversity of resources available. Moreover, as Victor Urquidi has pointed out, a population of 650 million in the year 2,000,"... places Latin America in a different world situation. There are many in the region who equate population to political power or at any rate to greater influence in world affairs". 1/ Nor can the question of frontiers be ignored when one government sees the rapid growth of population in its neighbour as a potential threat to its own integrity.

Although these may be valid - or at least, understandable - considerations, two other factors must also be taken into account when considering questions of national development. The first is the relationship between population densities and the level of economic development. The argument often put forward that in terms of the density of people per square kilometre, Latin America is comparatively underpopulated, is also fairly meaningless in a continent where geographic and climatic conditions are so variable and large areas are in fact not susceptible to viable occupation - in terms, at least, of present technologies and investment capability - while others are best suited to forms of exploitation (such as forestry or sheep farming) that require very low population densities. Considered in terms of the relationship between people and socioeconomic development - or, more simply, between the numbers to be fed, housed, clothed, employed and supplied with the basic social facilities, and the capacity of most

societies under their present economic and social structures to do so - Latin America at the moment has more people than it can provide for.

(b) The distribution of population

The second consideration is that the distribution of population is extremely uneven, with large numbers being concentrated in a few large metropolitan areas - usually the capitals - while at the same time population in the rural areas continues to grow rapidly because of high rates of natural increase. (The impact of millions of people concentrated in one or two geographically restricted areas on the environment together with the lack of development in the peripheral areas will be considered later.)

Although levels of urbanization vary widely among the different countries - ranging from the highly urbanized societies of Argentina, Uruguay and Chile to the predominantly rural societies of Paraguay, Bolivia and Ecuador in South America and Haiti, Honduras and Guatemala in Central America and the Caribbean - everywhere the levels are rising.

The combination of high overall population growth rates with a strong tendency for people to migrate - especially, though not exclusively, from the countryside and small towns to the big metropolitan centres - has resulted, in some cases, in growth rates of six or seven per cent annually, that is, a doubling of the population in large cities approximately every ten years.

2/ According to the Office of Science and Technology, AID, their Survey of 35 countries in the underdeveloped world, "... revealed a close inverse relationship ... between human population pressure and urbanization on the one hand, and the quality of the environment on the other". "Environmental Problems in Selected Developing Countries: Preliminary Survey", Washington, July 1971, p. 8 (mimeo).

3/ For example, in Brazil the average annual growth of cities of more than 500,000 reached 6.2% in the decade 1940-1950; 7.2% 1950-1960; and 6.8% 1960-1970 compared with percentage rates for all urban areas of 5.3; 6.4; and 6.1 respectively. See George Hartine and César Peláez, "Urbanization Trends in Brazil, 1940-1970", ECLA. Document presented in Río de Janeiro, Brasil, April 3-7, 1972, p. 15. A gradual long-term decline in metropolitan dominance may be under way but, if this is real, the trend will take a long time to work itself out because of the large increases in absolute numbers.
Two features of this process of hyper-urbanization should be especially mentioned. First, it is much more acute than in the affluent nations where, although there has been a similar centralizing tendency, the trend has not proceeded at such a rate as in Latin America. Here, the capitals or major centres, in several cases, account for between one-third and one-half of the population of the country, and through migration are continuing to attract each year a significant part of the population into their continually expanding boundaries.

The process is not accompanied by rates of industrial and commercial development which would allow the centre to absorb the flood of people from the periphery. The migrants as well as large parts of the population born in the cities have extreme difficulty in finding productive work which will provide them with the means to satisfy their basic social and physical needs for food, housing, health and education services in the big city centre. 4/ In Latin America as a whole the types of secondary sector activity characteristic of the affluent nations in the early phases of their industrial expansion, have been less dynamic in growth in incomes and employment and the tertiary sector has become more dominant. Neither the over-simplified claim that urbanization inevitably brings in its train social and economic advancement for the population, nor the contrary argument that the expansion of large and rapidly growing cities must lead to great social problems without sufficiently compensating economic advantages can be accepted in toto. 5/ In fact, the situation is complex, with important groups - composed mainly of the middle class and the unionized workers -

4/ Despite the fact that, as in Bolivia, 60 per cent of the nation's industry and 55 per cent of the industrial work force may be concentrated in the capital. See "Informe Nacional de Bolivia sobre 'El Medio Humano'", Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto de Bolivia, Comisión Interministerial Permanente, La Paz, March 1971, p. 4.

5/ See Pierre de Briey, "L'urbanization, le développement et le processus révolutionnaire dans le Tiers Monde", Civilisations, Vol. XVIII, No 3, 1968, pp. 342-352, in which both sides of the argument are set out in summary form.
able to take advantage of the possibilities that the city offers for wider employment opportunities and social mobility. At the same time, the more marginal groups still find themselves socially and economically restricted in a setting which is apparently more advantageous and dynamic. In such a situation the contradictions may become more obvious and the social paradoxes be brought out in the open as consciousness of disparities grows and expectations rise. This can, in turn, lead to demands for the improvement of immediate problems and the resolution - however transient and partial - of the most pressing grievances.

The greatest impact of the cities may lie, therefore, in the contradiction between the objective conditions of limited socioeconomic mobility and sharpened awareness of inequalities in the system. Such contradictions, depending on the flexibility of the authorities, and the resources at their disposal, will probably become more pronounced as the concentration of population continues and as migrants pour into the unplanned urban agglomerations of the continent, filling the central slum areas and contributing to the rapid growth of the 'barrios marginales' the 'tugurios', the 'callampas' or the 'favelas' that encircle the cities and account for perhaps a third of Latin America's urban population.

(c) Population and other development variables

As was stated above the role of "population" in the development process can be analysed effectively only in terms of its relationships with the other variables, technology, resources, output, and the spatial dimension (the population - environment relationship will be considered separately later). The way that population interrelates with other variables will depend in large measure on the structure and functioning of the society, on its institutions, the political system, and the relative influence of different social groups. Attitudes, values and norms of political, economic, social and cultural behaviour will help to determine how, for example, resources are used; which types of technology are employed; what ranges of products are provided for consumers; and how economic activity and human settlement are distributed spatially throughout the society. /In Latin
In Latin America one can see how the different variables interact in shifting and complicated patterns within the context of the dependent market economies of the continent. The choice of technology to exploit the enormous natural resources, the distribution of returns from such exploitation among different social groups - measured in terms of consumption, of the distribution of incomes and of employment opportunities - reflect in large measure the interplay of the two sociopolitical factors, dependence on the world centres and the market system. The spatial variable too, manifests the way these factors interact with the population variable, to create certain patterns of human settlement and location of economic activity.

The functioning of market economies has not noticeably led to equality among social groups at any stage of their historical evolution. In the affluent nations although the whole income pyramid has been raised, the gradual increase in aggregate national product has resulted, in most cases, in little narrowing of the economic, social or political gaps between the highest and lowest income groups. Even under the welfare state, certain minorities enjoy the choice of better forms of employment, social services, and cultural amenities, and exercise a predominant influence in political affairs.

These traits take more extreme form in most countries of Latin America. Income distribution is, throughout the continent, extremely uneven; employment opportunities for the majority of the population are restricted to manual work or unproductive and often demeaning occupations on the margins of the service sector; housing, food, clothing, health services, education, and social facilities are not shared equitably; access to justice and effective participation in decision making of a political and administrative nature depend on one's position in society.

Equally, decisions relating to the types of goods produced and the levels of production reflect the consumption requirements of the wealthier social groups so that, at the same time that many basic commodities are not available at acceptable prices for the majority of the population, industries are producing goods for the upper income groups at prices indicative of the oligopolistic structure of the protected industrial sector.

/In their
In their methods of production the owners and managers of enterprise in whatever sector are naturally more concerned with maximizing returns - or with internalizing profits and externalizing costs as it has been more precisely stated - than with maximizing social welfare conceived of in terms of the society at large. The consequences of these attitudes in environmental terms will be considered later.

Centre-periphery patterns of human settlement and development/underdevelopment are typical of the unbalanced nature of the region's evolution. There are several reasons for this.

First, as many writers on regional development from Myrdal, Hirschman and Perroux, to authors such as Corraggio and Roland commenting specifically on the Latin American situation have pointed out, there is a natural tendency in market economies - though not only there - towards the gradual centralization of economic activity within a limited number of favourably located urban areas. The operation of external urbanization and other economies of scale makes it imperative that to optimize profits firms should locate close to major markets, with access to all types of services and enjoying lower transport costs. The increasingly concentrated location of such economic activity attracts further population - the generally passive element in the process - and so the cumulative pattern described by Myrdal continues in motion.

The effects are not only felt in the economic sphere however. The favoured centre also attracts to it the social, political and cultural life of the nation, leaving the smaller towns and the rural peripheries increasingly drained of these assets and ever more dependent on the capital. Not only the relatively well off groups which seek the wider range of social, political and cultural opportunities of the city, but also the lower middle-class, the organized labour force and the groups at the margin of society hope to participate more effectively in decision-making and distribution of the fruits of development in the capital than in the smaller urban centres or the rural areas. The mere presence of the shantytowns on the outskirts of the city is a constant reminder to governments of whatever kind, of the needs of a rapidly growing population. Such a presence becomes even more obvious when...
the marginal groups - in conjunction with organized labour or not - are
mobilized socially and politically to make their claims more effectively
heard for housing, employment, education, health facilities, etc.

It seems unlikely that, without considerable changes in policy,
these cumulative tendencies towards an increasingly polarized
centre-periphery pattern will be reversed in the short- or even
medium-term. The creation of ministries of regional planning, the
formation of research centres and the continued preaching of
international bodies on the need to bring about a more dispersed
distribution of population, economic activity, social facilities and
political influence have only a superficial impact. The trends towards
centralization and the concentration of human settlement in a few
favoured locations undergo some modification through the growth and
evolution of the market system itself but the internal problems of
social, economic and political inequality on the one hand, and their
spatial equivalents on the other, have in themselves created
difficulties for most Latin American governments. In addition, however,
they have to confront the problems raised by their dependence on world
centres whose economic and political power can effectively curb the
ability of governments to deal with the factors underlying spatial
concentration among other shortcomings of their development processes.

Solon Barraclough has written that:

"The sovereignty of the state is seriously compromised when it
comes to the important decisions affecting national, social and
economic structure. Latin American nation-states are an integral
part of an international political and economic structure ...
The international concentration of economic and political power
has proceeded so far that when it comes to the decisions that
really count for national development the 'independent' but
underdeveloped nation often finds its areas of decision
circumscribed. Its 'sovereign power' is in some respects a
formalism": 6/

6/ See "Rural Development Strategy and Colonization", FAO/UNDP,
presented at the Latin American Seminar on Agrarian Reform and
Colonization, organized by FAO with the co-operation of the
Government of Peru (Chiclayo, Peru, 29 November-5 December 1971),
p. 3.

/The consequences
The consequences of direct foreign investment in the Latin American region have been noted elsewhere. In an earlier ECMA document, attention was drawn to the complex and widespread ramifications that emanate from such investment. These include the conflict between the entry of foreign currency and the need to service and repay the investment; the increased need for imported components; intensified pressure on the balance of payments; the diminution of local savings and credit resources available for domestic investments; the impact of new types of foreign investment on domestic consumption patterns; the possible incompatibility of this method of resource allocation with patterns aiming to meet basic necessities of the majority of the population; and finally the fact that foreign investment has reduced the effectiveness of customs and exchange measures designed to limit the consumption of expensive consumer durables. The document goes on to mention the often negative impacts on domestic technological development, on the balance of payments, and on the terms of trade of the receiving country, and notes the tendency towards increasing external indebtedness.

Most governments have accepted the need to pay a price in terms of the diminished capacity for decision making over the type of production undertaken; the kind of consumption patterns created; the location of economic activity (most foreign forms for obvious economic reasons prefer to establish in the larger urban centres); the contribution of industries to employment creation; and the effects on the natural and man-made environment, while seeking means to reduce the price and exercise control over some of these factors. When, for example, some of the industrialized countries express interest in transferring certain types of heavy industry elsewhere so as to limit pollution in their own territories, the Governments of poorer countries are generally willing to pay the price of increased pollution so as to attract these income-earning activities.

Moreover, it is now well-known that the emergence of the transnational corporation has restricted even further the maneuvering

space and bargaining capacity of even the largest nations in the continent. Greater emphasis is placed on the use of "sophisticated" techniques in the "modernized" sectors of the economy, however irrelevant or socially disruptive such practices might be in the wider setting of the national society. And concurrently with these financial and technical pressures, the cultural dependence of those groups with high purchasing power ensures a continuing though restricted market for most lines of foreign-styled consumer goods.

The complexity of the total development/underdevelopment process can be seen even in an examination of the interaction of two variables, population-in-society (that is, population in its societal setting together with its spatial manifestation) and resource use.

On the whole, natural resources in the peripheral areas of the Latin American countries tend to be inadequately employed; either underutilized or wastefully exploited. With a few significant exceptions (which will be discussed in more detail shortly) farmland has been concentrated into large privately owned and only partially worked holdings or has been subdivided into tiny parcels almost incapable of supporting satisfactory standards of living. In both cases the level of farm management has been extremely low. Forests, a great potential source of domestic wealth and export-earning capacity, are wont to be ignored, treated as a barrier to economic "development" and burnt; or if utilized, are exploited carelessly for short term profit, and not replaced.

Mineral wealth too has been subject to wasteful exploitation for quick returns to such an extent that the enormous wealth of the continent - petroleum, copper, bauxite, tin, iron-ore, silver - has, under conditions of dependence, contributed much less than its potential to Latin American development throughout history. Marine resources which were ignored in most countries until fairly recent years have increasingly been subjected to the operations of large-scale commercialized (and often foreign) fishing fleets which have brought virtually all fishing grounds within range of their "vacuum cleaning" operations.

/Whether Latin
Whether Latin America's natural resources have been ignored or underutilized, or, as is the case increasingly in recent decades, subjected to wasteful and predatory exploitation, the combination of the societal and spatial elements has been the important determining factor. Short-term profits, distance from markets, shortage of transportation and communications facilities and indifference or lack of capacity for control on the part of central authorities are all elements in the type of resource use experienced in the continent.

It is also worth noting that, as a logical consequence, when farming, forestry, mineral and marine resources are exploited in the peripheral areas, the benefits are rarely enjoyed in the area of their extraction. Usually, and in accord with the logic of the dependent market system, further processing, which yields much more income, takes place either in the central region of the country, or in the international centre - the industrialized nation from which the foreign enterprise is operating.

The impact on population of this pattern of growth without development is obvious. Stagnation and neglect in the agricultural sector, combined with the latifundio/minifundio structure of land-ownership has stunted opportunities for employment in the face of pressures created by the continued high rates of population growth in the rural areas. The position has become even more acute with the transference of profits to the cities to seek richer fields of investment in property speculation, construction, and the consumer goods industries. And this has contributed to drain the capacity of the rural economy to absorb or to provide a tolerable livelihood for the population remaining on the land. The failure in those cases to develop a diversified economy has led to a restriction of employment possibilities and so to high levels of unemployment and underemployment not only in farming but also in the economic activity of small market towns.

However, even where the agricultural sector has experienced rapid growth, highly capitalized and mechanized methods have meant that, as in the industrialized nations, entrepreneurs have been able
to dispense with a large proportion of the present labour which had
earlier worked the land under different technical and social
circumstances. In this sense the push factors in the rural areas
have, whether under conditions of stagnation or of expansion, been
as important as the pull factors exerted by the supposed attractions
of the city. Equally, in the manufacturing sector, even when attempts
are made to decentralize economic activity, and some large-scale
enterprises are sufficiently independent and footloose to have moved
to peripheral locations, the highly capital-intensive operations
of such firms have little impact on the area of relocation except
perhaps in terms of polluting the immediate countryside. Similarly,
when exploitation of mineral deposits or forests is expanded and
modernized, the employment of highly-mechanized and capital-intensive
methods may produce a net drop in employment.

The relative underdevelopment of the peripheral areas is closely
related to the hypertrophied growth in the metropolitan centres.
Because of the lack of opportunities for investment in diversified
development in rural and small town regions - the occasional large-
scale projects which do take place involve considerable quantities of
labour and capital only in the construction phase - capital is
transferred to the urban areas where the opportunities are more
wideranging and the returns on investment much higher.

Although conclusive evidence is lacking, it is probable that the
peripheries of most Latin American nations have, over a long period,
subsidized the growth of the urban centres, and especially of the
metropolis; the canalization of investment finance privately and by
public institutions has promoted the industrial development of the

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2/ A.B. Hofman, "El Fenómeno de la Concentración y Centralización
Espacial en América Latina: Elementos para una Discusión",
presented at the International Seminar on Regional and Urban
Planning in Latin America, ILPES/ILDIS, Viña del Mar, Chile,
17-22 April, 1972.

/cities, but
cities, but even more has provided the funds for the growth of the urban infrastructure and for the highly profitable real estate development of certain areas of the capitals. It is only in recent years that a number of central governments have begun to reverse the flow through regional development policies aiming to promote agricultural development, the decentralization of industrial activity, and rural public works schemes. Here again, however, it is difficult to estimate the extent of such financial movements, or, for that matter, the extent to which the profits from such investment return more or less promptly to the source.

3. Population and environment

(a) Interrelations of the variables

The main concern in the following pages is to examine the interaction of population and environment within the framework of the sociopolitical conditions outlined in the earlier sections. This does not discount the fact that there are many variations of the dependent market system in Latin America with more or less state intervention being one of the principal features of such variations. For the majority of Latin America's population, forced to migrate into the crowded and rapidly growing cities, packed onto hillsides, or dispersed over marginal lands, "impact on the environment" is a largely involuntary one - and one which reacts on it directly. Rapid demographic growth rates, decried as one of the major causes of environmental deterioration, together with an unbalanced distribution of that population, are only the final and most obvious causative factors of environmental problems.

/(b) Environmental
(b) Environmental problems - examples

The evidence of despoliation and disruption of both the natural and man-made environments is widespread throughout the continent and the impact of such human activity has been clearly documented in numerous cases 9/.

In the agricultural sector 10/ for example, inadequate farming practices, associated with prevailing systems of land tenure and the response of landowners to prevailing social and economic incentives have led to neglect of millions of hectares of good agricultural land and abandonment of marginal areas. Overgrazing has ruined natural pasture land and has led to consequent wind or water erosion; slash and burn techniques for land clearance have deforested large areas; and in zones of commercial forestry, attempts to replant the cutover areas are rare. Again the results can be seen in the widespread erosion, the permanent denuding of hill country, the consequent silting up of rivers, and the creation of conditions leading to recurrent flooding over large areas.

The results of such bad management are apparent in Chile where 20 million hectares or 20 per cent of the nation's agricultural usable land is eroded to some extent, and the rate of erosion continues at 40,000 hectares a year. The consequent silting up of rivers and ports

9/ See especially "República de Chile: Informe para la Conferencia de Naciones Unidas sobre el Medio Ambiente Humano", Santiago, Chile, May 1972, p. 877. Much of what is stated in "Informe Nacional: República Argentina", Conferencia de Naciones Unidas sobre el Medio Ambiente Humano, (mimeo). It is also a commentary on the physical depredation to the Argentinian countryside of inadequate and destructive practices which continue to the present. It should be added, however, that no systematic balance-sheet, based on adequate research and clear definitions of problems, covering Latin America as a whole, has been drawn up as yet. General discussions (including the present text) thus fall back on "examples" culled from different sources, of widely varying importance and verifiability.

has put various types of industrial activity in danger, reduced the value of dams, caused loss of life together with running large areas of good agricultural land 11/.

In Argentina, too, overgrazing of the pampas has destroyed thousands of hectares of pastureland as well as in the Chaco and Patagonian regions. The resulting erosion has affected 20 million hectares of which 20 per cent is considered to be severe. Population pressure in rural areas of Mexico has caused problems of an even greater scale, with 150 million hectares eroded and from 150 to 200 thousand more seriously affected each year.

In other countries too, rural population pressure has destroyed hillsides and other marginal lands as minifundistas apply primitive, intensive methods on land cleared of forest and unsuitable for such farming. The position is most severe in lateritic soils and in tropical countries such as El Salvador where the spread of subsistence agriculture has occurred at the expense of deciduous forests. Increased population densities have forced the minifundistas to change from shifting to permanent working of the land, while fallow has been decreased to three to five years with consequent widespread soil destruction and erosion. The wider effects of this are seen in, for example, the case of the dam "Cinco de Noviembre" on the Lempa River which, it is estimated, will lose 40 per cent of its storage capacity in the next twenty years as a result of erosion-created silting. Moreover vegetation removal has increased the soil temperature and has altered or destroyed animal habitats, so that 19 species of mammals have been exterminated in the country.

This type of problem derives in large part from the inequitable land tenure system combined with rapid population growth and disastrously inadequate or inappropriate land management. But even the use of new "super" techniques and modern farming methods can have unforeseen and undesirable secondary effects.

11/ See "República de Chile: Informe ..., op. cit., p. 9."
The disasters that can result from ill-planned expansion of irrigation (salinization of soils or spread of schistosomiasis), indiscriminate use of chemical fertilizers (clogging of water courses) and over-application of pesticides (destruction of natural predators which help to keep the ecological balance) are now well-known throughout the world, and Latin America is not exempt. Heavy agricultural mechanization can have a destructive impact on forest ecosystems as has happened in the Matto Grosso of Brazil 12/.

In other words, the application of land use methods which aim for quick, short-run results whether for sheer exploitation or for apparently more "virtuous" development goals have led to the deterioration of the natural ecology of many agricultural and forestry areas.

The forests of Latin America have been among the heaviest sufferers from methods of "development" employed over the centuries. In Brazil, states such as Minas Gerais and São Paulo now have less than 10 per cent of their area in forest, with much of the denuded area being exposed to erosion. Moreover it has been estimated that 500,000 tons of timber are lost each year through wasteful cutting methods. The failure to replace timber lost through cutting, fire or disease also demonstrates an exploitative short-term approach and it is probable that Chile loses 50,000 hectares of forest a year this way.

The above are the most obvious examples of the deterioration that has occurred in the natural environment of the continent, but there are others, less conspicuous but unfortunate, such as the extinction of 70 per cent of Brazil's fauna in the large areas of cutover forest - with 44 animals on the list of endangered species; the threat to other species caused by the opening of roads in Colombia which upsets the natural ecology of adjacent areas and allows access to hunters of the jaguar and tapir; or the sheer overexploitation of

certain fish species such as the yellow fin tuna, the Peruvian bonito and the shrimp, hake and anchoveta species of the Caribbean. Mining too, has contributed its share of depredation and pollution through poisoning of adjacent land, pit and strip induced erosion, and river and coastal contamination.

In the man-made environment - in human settlements generally, but especially in the physical structures of large and densely populated metropolitan centres - the impact of unbalanced growth and population pressure has also been felt, at times severely.

The pollution of air, land and water in cities such as Santiago, Lima, Buenos Aires, São Paulo and Mexico City particularly, but in many other centres where population and/or industry are concentrated, has proved at times to be almost as intense as the worst experienced in the industrialized nations. For example, in Santiago de Chile the sulphur anhydride and dust content of the air in the city during the winter is higher than the internationally accepted levels. Car exhaust pollution, too, at times passes these permitted limits despite the low per caput levels of ownership. And an estimated 65 tons of dust per square kilometre fell on the city in 1969. Other cities share such problems; sulphur anhydride, suspended and unsuspended dust affect variously most of the continent's great conurbations.

Domestic heating and private rubbish burning are responsible for a certain portion of the air pollution, but the worst contamination is caused by industry and the motor vehicle. In São Paulo 10 tons of sulphur compounds are discharged daily in the Capuava area, while the population of São Caetano do Sul is exposed to pollution by sulphuric acid and calcium carbide, from oil refineries and iron foundries. Small centres such as La Oroya in Peru with 35,000 inhabitants, also suffer from the emission of sulphur, lead and arsenic gases of a metallurgical factory in the locality, while potato crops, olive trees and other fruits in certain Peruvian rural valleys have been destroyed by atmospheric sulphur dioxide.

It is in the large cities, however, where motor traffic, and in particular the private car, have had the most deleterious effects. And the impact is worsened when combined with special climatological conditions as in Mexico City, Caracas and Santiago. The air pollution of Mexico City, for example, is to a considerable degree, caused by the automobile. During 1963, the forty per cent of the nation's 1.6 million cars which are concentrated in the capital discharged into the atmosphere of the valley 4,304 kilos of hydrocarbons and 37,077 kilos of particles each day. But similar problems are caused especially in the narrow, crowded streets of virtually all the city centres where layout was planned in colonial times for totally different usages. The centre of Lima which has to cope with 300,000 vehicles in circulation is one of the most extreme examples of this problem.

Similarly the contamination of rivers and of water systems has followed from the lack of balanced development in the continent. The cities provide the most obvious examples of contamination of water courses of whatever size - the Río de la Plata of Buenos Aires, the Mapocho in Santiago, Lima's Rimac, the Bogotá, and Guanabara Bay in Rio - all serving as receptacles for sewage and other kinds of waste. Outside the big centres, however, industrial complexes have caused pollution in smaller cities such as Chinbote in Peru where, before the 1970 earthquake, a steel mill and fish meal plants had totally contaminated the bay nearby. And in a continent where only about ten per cent of sewage is treated, it can be expected that any human settlement will contribute to the problems of water pollution.

It has been implicit in the above description of the depredation of the natural environment and the contamination of the man-made, that an interaction is occurring between environment (as the passive, receiving element), and population within a certain systemic framework (as the active element). This is too simplistic a statement of the situation. Within the population variable some sectors are more active, others less so depending on their social and political position within society.
Without going into detail, it is obvious that everyone contributes more or less equally to some forms of pollution. But in a wide range of some of the worst forms of environmental destruction and pollution it will be equally obvious that certain groups are more culpable than others. On the one hand, many of the problems caused by the minifundistas working on marginal lands can be traced back beyond the immediate cause - the peasant - to a system of landholding which reserves the best lands to wealthy landowners who may or may not work them efficiently. The peasant then has the choice either of trying to cultivate the almost unworkable margins, or of contributing to different forms of environmental disruption by joining migrant movements to colonize virgin lands or to find himself a living in the urban areas.

But it must be recognized that the peasant, the marginalized poblador, the unionized worker, or even much of the middle class are not responsible for the large scale destruction or contamination which is caused by mining operations, industries and the motor vehicle.

There is an element of social injustice in this as well. Generally the groups directly or indirectly responsible for the pollution are those which suffer it least. Much of the industrial pollution for example is caused by factories producing consumer durables for conspicuous consumption but it is the lower income groups working there and living in the industrial areas - not the wealthy and politically influential living well away from such districts - which have to breathe the fumes and use the polluted water. Similarly, the privately-owned automobile which is responsible for a large part of the urban smog usually causes the most severe problems in the city centres and away from the wealthier suburbs. And this has the added side effects that the car-using minority groups who also generally have a larger say in decision-making, are not under pressure to improve public transport services which are generally dirty, noisy and inefficient.

/Such a
Such a situation could account in part for the lack of adequate action against air, land and water pollution, against congestion, and noise caused by industry and the private car, all problems created by affluence and a form of development copied from the industrialized world 1/h./

(c) **Environmental problems and social consequences**

One of the basic premises of this discussion has been that there is a constant interaction among the different variables making up the development/underdevelopment process. And this remains valid for the population/environment nexus. We have so far looked at one facet of the relationships, the impact of the population (in society) on environment. But expressing this relationship between population and environment by the symbols P and E - it can be argued that the link is more than just P --- E; it is more realistically stated as P - - - E or P --- E in which the population factor - acting through society, and using its technological instruments on available resources to achieve particular patterns of output to satisfy culturally determined styles of consumption for distinct social groups - makes certain impressions on the natural and man-created environment. But, in turn, any changes in the natural or man-made environment will react on the population, so that a return social impact from E to P occurs.

In the rural areas the impact has shaken up most groups. The effects of population pressure, unequal land distribution, environmental disruption, and of "modernization" have been widespread and variable.

1/h/ In "Environmental Problems of Urban Development", E. Novaes, E. Neira and J. Van Fleet, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, June 1971, pp. 12-13, (mimeo), the authors, commenting on transport problems, note that "... the problems seem to be inevitably determined by a consumption pattern that results more from the presence of demonstration effects than from the real acquisitive power of the population". In addition, private automobile ownership has adverse effects on public transport systems; "under such circumstances urban transport today presents severe congestion problems and contributes extensively to air pollution". However, the authors see little chance of resolving the contradictions between a national growth dependent on the development of the automobile industry and the problems thus created by the urban environment.

/Few rural
Few rural settlements or even small centres enjoy even the most rudimentary facilities for their inhabitants while outside such human settlements, the highly dispersed nature of much of Latin America's rural occupation results in primitive material conditions of life.

Basic necessities such as adequate housing, potable water, electricity, education and health services are scarce - for example in 1970 potable water supplies reached only 24 per cent of Latin America's rural population, and only about 3 or 4 per cent of the rural populations of Haiti, Bolivia and Brazil; and, although such figures tend to be somewhat arbitrary, over 80 per cent of rural dwellings in Guatemala, Nicaragua and Honduras are estimated to be "deficient".

Apart from the obvious human suffering, such conditions lead to a general debility among the population, further weakening their ability to produce sufficient for themselves or for the rapidly expanding urban areas. The most immediate and evident result has been the outmigration especially of the younger and more dynamic elements in the population, leaving behind in general the older, more conservative and less educated "leftover" groups, often without satisfactory means of economic support, without acceptable social

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15/ See for example the case of Panama where the rural population is either dispersed or "... agrupada en pequeños caseríos sin ningún plano propio instalados por lo general en áreas poco aptas para la agricultura, de topografía accidentada, y alejados de las principales vías de comunicación", in Atlas de Geografía Médica, Dra. L. Herrera, Ministerio de Salud, República de Panamá, 1970.

16/ "Si el 65% de la población total del país, es la que vive en el medio rural ubicado en pequeñas localidades que caracterizan a esta como una población eminentemente dispersa, la misma que carece de los servicios básicos como son: de salud, educación, vivienda, agua potable, alcantarillado, transporte, etc., surge de por sí que las condiciones del medio ambiente son deficientes...", "Breve Consideración sobre la Problemática del Medio Ambiente Humano: Caso Ecuatoriano", Junta Nacional de Planificación, Quito, Ecuador, n.d., p. 9.
facilities, and although the situation is beginning to change - for the most part still lacking sufficient knowledge and political influence to express their needs and their discontent effectively 17/. The situation is a fluid one, and a number of writers have claimed with considerable conviction that the intensified relations between town and country will be the means to the awakening of the latter. But a number of questions still must be asked before any definite statement can be essayed. For example, in the economic sphere, to what extent has the infiltration of new ideas led to changes in production techniques, to an improvement in land use and productivity? Or, a more complex social issue, have new values created by the closer urban-rural links altered the relationships between the campesino and his patrón? Do the less privileged social classes exercise more or less political leverage than in the days when the periphery was more isolated? If they do, what is the nature of such leverage at local and regional levels? Is there a move towards greater participation? Or have there merely been changes from one source of authority to others, for example, from the old patrón to the new such as the "hombre-nexo" who acts as the link-man between the urban decision-making centre and market, and the countryside?

Some answers can at least be suggested. The migration flow to the cities has not yet resolved the agricultural crisis that afflicts most Latin American countries 18/. In spite of the large scale movements of people to the urban areas, rural population continues to expand at a rate of about 1.5 per cent annually throughout the

17/ See "Problemas de Población y Desarrollo en América Latina", ST/ELA/CONF.45/L.1, Grupo de Expertos sobre el Programa de Población de la CEPAL, Santiago de Chile, 11 al 14 de diciembre de 1972, p. 53 ff. which examines the arguments over the effects of migration on local communities.

18/ Denis Lambar, in an article published in Civilizations, Vol. XV, No 4, 1965, p. 48, argues that in Latin America, the drift from the land entails almost inevitably a lowering of agricultural productivity.
region, and rises to over 2 per cent in some of the smaller, less 
urbanized countries. (This, however, should not obscure a situation 
in which some frontier regions are being colonized rapidly and 
population is growing as a result of migration, while older areas 
of rural settlements are stagnating, or, in providing the new dynamic 
areas with agricultural labour, are actually losing population.)

Nevertheless, with the penetration of the mass communication 
media into the most remote areas, and with the constant to and fro 
nigratory movements between rural and urban areas, the great majority 
of those living in peripheral areas are inevitably brought into 
contact with new ideas, values and styles of living.

Moreover, the effects of these cultural influences are 
reinforced by a series of other factors, including for example: the 
appearance of new consumer goods in the rural areas and small towns of 
the periphery which, because they cannot be produced there, increase 
dependence on the national market; the increasing influence of 
national political movements emanating largely in the cities and 
which conflict with local traditional forms of leadership; the 
initiation of policies of agrarian reform which bring agricultural 
experts, public servants and politicians out from the cities to train, 
educate and try to incorporate local communities more into the main 
stream of national life; and the opening up of peripheral and once 
remote communities by roads and public transport services which, 
however inadequate or decrepit, not only bring new forms of living 
or new types of land use (for example, for recreational purposes), but 
also allow people in erstwhile isolated communities to travel and 
communicate with much more facility.19/

"Modernization" of the countryside and small towns is thus 
introducing powerful new forces into once traditional and scarcely 
changing areas, making communities aware of different styles of life, 
and arousing new needs and expectations. As in the urban areas such

19/ See for example, El Cambio Social y la Política de Desarrollo 
Social en América Latina, CEPAL, Naciones Unidas, Nueva York, 

/tendencies lead
tendencies lead to a paradoxical situation in which the contradiction between the cultural demonstration effects and what is economically achievable by the majority of the people are brought more and more out into the open. Up to a point, migration — especially of the younger, more dynamic and qualified groups — may relieve the problem by transferring it to the urban centres, but with the continued growth of the rural population together with the constant problem of finding adequate employment the situation remains unstable.

The return social effects of environmental disruption and degradation are even more striking in the urban areas, if only because the problems are so much more concentrated and visibly apparent in the marginal barriadas which ring the urban centres of the continent and account for a considerable proportion of the urban population.

Such conditions are often associated with rapid national population growth. But that this is only one factor is illustrated by the situation of Argentina where low rates of population growth have not allowed Buenos Aires to escape the problems associated with an increasingly unbalanced distribution of that population. The very size of Greater Buenos Aires, with more than a third of the nation's population:

"... constituye una realidad económica y social cuyos costos son difíciles de mitigar. Por un lado, las distancias entre la vivienda y el empleo ocasionan un considerable desperdicio de tiempo en desplazamientos; por otro, la rapidez del proceso de urbanización producido entre 1947 y 1960, y la ausencia de una acción sostenida en materia de construcción de viviendas, generaron un hábitat rudimentario ..."

"Un estado de déficit crónico se ha vuelto característico. Gran parte de los habitantes metropolitanos se ven constreñidos a habituarse a interrupciones en la provisión de agua, al aislamiento por falta de líneas telefónicas, a desgastarse en interminables viajes diarios y recrearse en las riberas contaminadas.

"Finalmente, la
"Finalmente, la desordenada apropiación del espacio urbano, y la imposibilidad de atender simultáneamente todas las necesidades, han acrecentado de tal modo las urgencias en el dominio de los equipamientos colectivos que la generalización de los "déficits" parecería constituir hoy otro rasgo característico de la vida metropolitana." 20/

Large urban centres, in particular are subject to the heavy strains of demands generated by the concentration of population, and economic, social and other activity in the metropolis. Land is intensively used for multistory buildings and densely packed commerce, industry and government administration. (Although much of the use, because of specialization of activity and inadequate city planning, is intensive for certain limited hours only.) Water supplies, too, come under heavy pressure for the multiple (and often wasteful) uses demanded of them, as do other physical resources, including the city's air. Heavy demand for all these have raised costs of utilization 21/ and have caused major problems of physical decay and deterioration in the big urban areas.

But such physical amenity problems imply an environmental deprivation deeper and more complex. The impact of pollution, congestion, noise, and the lack of privacy is also likely to affect the inhabitants of the city in a wider sense by limiting their capacity to develop their full potential in work and to enjoy their leisure. cramped and noisy conditions will subject many of them to nervous tensions and stresses which affect them individually, and in their familial and community relations 22/.

20/ "Informe Nacional: República Argentina", op. cit., p. 5.
21/ See the Organization of American States, "Urbanización y el Medio Ambiente Humano en América Latina", Secretaría General de la Organización de los Estados Americanos, México D.F., 6-11 September, 1971, p. 4., which also cites Simon Kuznets as saying that more resources are needed to give the same satisfaction in terms of housing, drainage, water, intraurban transport, etc., than in less densely populated areas. This suggests that some measure such as threshold analysis would help to give a closer approximation to the real economic costs and benefits of concentrated metropolitan growth.

22/ See the comment along these lines in Human Settlements, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, New York, vol.1, No.3, July 1971, p. 12.
Yet it is not easy to generalize when discussing the social, economic and cultural implications of the type of physical development now taking place in the hyperurbanized centres of Latin America. Studies made of the groups moving to the cities and settling there in central city slums or in the shantytowns that ring the urban areas suggest that no facile conclusions can be made about them socially or politically. It is still not clear to what extent migrant groups are capable, under differing circumstances, of adjusting to the distinct situations posed by city life, of participating actively in the wider society, of finding employment, or of forging new family and community ties.

The more fortunate middle class groups find employment in the service sector, swelling the ranks of both private and state bureaucracies, carrying out functions which often, at best, are only marginally productive (and are often counter-productive because the principal aim of such bureaucracies, logically enough, is to create work opportunities rather than solve problems quickly and efficiently). The less fortunate marginal populations, lacking the basic minimum training to enter service sector activity in offices or shops, seek to create their own opportunities in the tertiary sector \(^{23}\). They become street sellers of whatever commodity or service they can find, domestic servants for the middle class, or unskilled labourers in the city's infrastructure and especially in the construction industry which, "... is especially sensitive to changes in the rhythm of economic growth and to fluctuations in public sector spending. It is a sector to which unskilled urban labour unable to find work elsewhere gravitate, and one whose labour is not easily absorbed by other economic activities in the case of a recession in construction

\(^{23}\) For a more detailed analysis of this phenomenon see 

/spending". \(^{24}\)
spending. 24/ And some turn to petty crime. The unionized labour force in the modern sector, as might be expected, remains fairly stable in size, offering little access for the marginal groups.

Some authors, nevertheless, argue that city conditions represent for the migrants an improvement in terms of access to employment, and to health and education facilities in particular. Deterioration in the man-made environment is therefore of lesser importance in comparison with the new social, economic and political fields which open up to them and their children in urban surroundings 25/.

A somewhat different picture however, emerges from studies carried out in a number of poblaciones marginales in Santiago, Chile, where the author found among those she interviewed:

"... la reducción del campo de percepción social y la dualidad de la orientación perceptiva del mundo social, entre algunos de los problemas destacados. Lo primero se manifiesta en la manera vaga, inorgánica y difusa en que se percibe el mundo no inmediato y directamente referido a la vida cotidiana, mientras que ésta se percibe con nítida claridad, con elementos precisos, que permitan una definición clara del comportamiento. Lo segundo, se manifiesta en que la vida diaria dentro del propio mundo de la marginalidad se percibe y se define con elementos realistas y, en cambio, se recurre a elementos de contenido mágico para definir el resto del universo social.

De este modo se puede señalar de una manera provisoria que no solamente se encuentra entre los marginados la presencia de traumas en la formación de la personalidad psíquica, fisuras que dan paso a la inseguridad, a las desviaciones de tipo delictivo en algunos casos o predisposiciones a un cuadro psicótico, sino que la situación de marginalidad afecta un nivel más profundo de la psicología individual y de grupo." 26/


The two views are not, of course, mutually exclusive; the tendencies are heterogeneous and levels of political, social and economic involvement, and cultural understanding will vary according to the opportunities offered by different cities, to the social flexibility of the society, to the social and cultural backgrounds of the migrants and even to the generation of pobladores.

It can be argued that, at least, the migrants are no worse off than they were in the rural areas. By jumping more into the mainstream of national life which is represented by the cities they have created severe strains on family and community life which have led to the sharpening of a whole range of social problems. But in return for these social costs of marginality, the populations in the unfavourable barriada environments may enjoy certain benefits in terms of the de facto power to wring concessions from the authorities over immediate problems such as housing, water, power supplies, etc.

And various writers have lauded the positive qualities of the shantytowns. Beneath the superficial appearance of environmental squalor, they argue, the barriadas represent a chance to exercise self-help among groups of people who have, on the whole, adapted well to the exigencies of city life. Their desire to be self-reliant and to form a stable social entity in the larger society is usually manifested soon after they have taken land for settlement (admittedly the taking is usually by illegal means). They construct their own housing much more cheaply than the planners are able to, develop many of their necessary services, form their own local organizations, and apparently settle down to integrate into the life of the wider society.

27/ For more detailed examples, compare the statements made in various national reports to the Stockholm Conference, and especially:
(b) "Breve Consideración sobre la Problemática del Medio Ambiente Humano: Caso Equatoriano" , op. cit., pp. 11, 17 and 18.
(c) "Informe Nacional de Bolivia sobre "El Medio Ambiente Humano"", op. cit., pp. 4-5.
This is doubtless a valid description of some situations, but in the dynamic conditions of Latin American urban life, a number of unanswered questions still remain. How long will such quietism last? The present stability could break down with the next generation which has been led to expect more from society. Its "felt needs" will undoubtedly begin on a higher level of expectation and perception than those of the older migrant generation.

A somewhat broader question of policy-making can also be raised here. It is no doubt true that the _barriadas_ of Latin America are a "better than nothing" answer, especially for the policy-makers and planners - who are, in any case, usually presented with a _fait accompli_ when land is taken for a squatter settlement. It is undoubtedly better than nothing for the _pobladores_, who find a measure of satisfaction in such settlements, that the authorities have not been able to give them. And it is of value to the middle class which can continue to receive a disproportionate share of public housing allocation. Yet this misses the larger issue that policies of prevention through effective regional development, agrarian reform, and the decentralization of economic activity could open the way to obviate such forms of growth with all their deleterious environmental consequences. Objectively, the squatter settlements represent neither prevention nor satisfactory cure; they are by definition a spontaneous response to social breakdown.

Although the serious practical difficulties impeding effective planning are recognized, the question of the _barriadas_ is raised here to remind planners and policy-makers that it exists, not in isolation, but as part of a wider and integrated network of cause and effect.
4. Policies for integrated development

In considering the viability of a development strategy incorporating environmental objectives in Latin America the first step might be to analyse the possible consequences of allowing present trends to continue without interruption - or at most, with partial and short term policy interferences in different sectors of the system as individual crises emerge. Without attempting to make a detailed extrapolation of every aspect of the continent's development/underdevelopment path it seems logical to expect that the tendencies towards concentration of population and economic activity will continue and that such concentration will be exacerbated by medium to high rates of population growth at least in the next decade or so. In the rural areas migration will probably do no more than partially alleviate the pressure of population on the land, although some relief may be gained through the colonization of new areas. This, however, will have environmental consequences, often of a negative nature.

Moreover the indiscriminate import of technology and its use without careful consideration of the human and natural environmental consequences, will have increasingly adverse effects of the type already described. It seems logical to expect that the destruction and waste of natural resources will continue apace, while inequalities in the sociopolitical structures will lead to widening gaps between the rich and poor groups in society.

None of these imbalances among the variables seems likely to result in any short-term or dramatic breakdown; the existing system has shown a considerable degree of flexibility in dealing with crises. But it is possible to predict that the uninterrupted depletion of the natural environment together with the contradictions inherent in the man-made and social environment, will make the maintenance of the present pattern, increasingly costly economically, socially and politically.

28/ Part of the following outline is based on the structure elaborated in "A Project on Global Energy Planning", by the Group of Experts in the European Center of the Carnegie Endowment, La Mainaz, France, May 4-5, 1973 (typescript).
Many governments in the continent realize the difficulties in trying to solve social problems by ignoring them and have made institutional arrangements to introduce a certain degree of order into development through the formulation of national plans. There is less evidence to show that such plans, even in the stage of formulation (leaving aside for the moment the discrepancies between formulation and implementation) are founded on an approach to questions of development in which the variables are considered as related parts of a total system.

But the elaboration of development strategies depends on more than the avoidance of disruptive conflicts and the mere harmonizing of the different variables in the development process; to be coherent, planning requires the statement of certain norms and goals demanding social and economic changes if they are to be attained. And in turn, such a positing of principles and aims requires the weighting and selection of certain alternatives in accordance with the goals decided upon.

Emphasis laid on improving the natural and social environment, to take one example, might well call for an adaptation of technology so as to conserve resources, to provide more employment, and to change consumption patterns of society, so that, instead of the use of scarce capital resources for the production of private motor vehicles, investment would be diverted into providing improved public transport services and intermediate (and cheaper) forms of transport - such as bicycles - to serve the majority of the population. Such a policy would be aided, too, by forms of urban planning which, among other things, allow people to live closer to their work and to social and cultural facilities, and so help to create a sense of community within the corpus of the larger urban entity.

Taking the environmental factor as the starting point in peripheral regions the planner and policy-maker could come to the conclusion for example that a significant change in life styles and socioeconomic structures is a necessary prerequisite for assuring development on the basis of a higher level of regional self-sufficiency.

/The adoption
The adoption of such a norm would involve much more emphasis on the conservation of resources through multiple use and recycling; on the planned use of local resources - timber, stone, clay, etc. - for building, roads and other infrastructural work; the development of small indigenous locally-run enterprises such as agro-industrial and handicraft industries based on medium or low technology of an inexpensive nature and adapted to local requirements and capacities (but not excluding the use of other levels of technology where necessary for large-scale projects); and it would require the stimulation of latent creativity and initiative within the local community through education and extension services, and through broadening the social bases of participation in decision-making.

Acceptance of a strategy such as this might help to open the way for a much more concerted form of development, allowing for the conservation of scarce resources (in, for example, the transport sector where much of the expensive infrastructure of motorways, railways, and terminals could be at least postponed) while making more effective and balanced use of the available factors of development.

To sum up, an important - an essential - step in the planning process is the statement of ideal objectives based on certain norms and principles which are considered crucial for the achievement of more balanced patterns of development. Such normative planning is required to clarify goals and principles among the policy-makers and to detect the inadequacies and contradictions of existing styles of development. But it is obviously not the final condition for planning in societies where the many constraints imposed by socioeconomic, political or, to a lesser extent, physical obstacles have to be taken into account.

Feasibility studies will be necessary to try to reconcile the differences between desirable goals and the limitations imposed by the real situation. The constraints on action in most Latin American countries are formidable. Obstacles raised by special and influential groups, the conservatism of government authorities, the deadweight of custom and of traditional attitudes, administrative inefficiency
and the sheer lack of qualified human and financial resources are all part of the systemic limitations which the policy-maker is bound to consider in trying to reconcile normative goals with the practical realities of a given situation.

Past experience indicates that Latin American planners have not had conspicuous success whether in finding a satisfactory compromise or in reconciling the different variables which might help to produce more integrated development policies. Attempts to regulate or alter existing tendencies have included:

- policies to slow down population growth, although these have thus far been talked about rather than actively implemented.

- anti-pollution legislation aimed at preventing the physical deterioration of urban and industrial environments\(^{29}\), but, as with population policies, such activity has been undertaken in isolation without regard to socioeconomic factors which are the major determinants of environmental conditions.

- regional development policies, using a technical approach borrowed from the affluent nations (which have, themselves, had only partial success despite the wealth of human and financial resources available) that have attempted to slow the growth of the great urban concentrations by channelling economic activity and people into alternative growth poles, created essentially according to a calculus of private economic costs and benefits.

- agrarian reform programmes which have in many cases resolved themselves into "pilot projects" or colonization schemes instead of large-scale redistribution aimed at reconciling greater social equity and economic efficiency. In few cases has an agrarian reform bringing about major economic, social and political change in the rural areas been successfully introduced.

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- urban reform, zoning, and housing policies whose impacts have been inadequate compared with the scale of demands imposed by the unbalanced regional development which has taken place in the countries of the continent. It is difficult to calculate how far housing policies have fallen short of needs 30/, but the visual evidence leaves little doubt that the influx of migrants into the urban centres, has made a mockery of most housing programmes - and, for that matter, of urban transport, zoning, social service or public utility schemes.

The reasons for the lack of success experienced in most planning endeavours throughout Latin America seem fairly clear. First, the need to select among the various factors to evolve strategies of integrated development has not generally weighed very heavily in the total scheme of governments' intentions. Instead "development" for most policy-makers, has been considered a matter essentially of promoting economic growth, of expanding the production of goods, and of raising the gross national product, rather than in terms of the production and distribution of goods and services to satisfy the social, cultural and environmental needs of all the population. And where, in addition, there are conflicts between private and community goals in the growth process it is usually the latter which lose.

Looked at in a slightly different way, it can be said that the failures have resulted from a subordination of non-economic goals by the powerful socioeconomic interest groups which control the political and administrative machinery. The organizations to which advisers and planners offer their suggestions have little power to change this even if they believe in the ideal schemes offered by the experts.

But even if such obstacles can be overcome and the stage of implementation reached, policies often lose their value by being put into practice individually with little reference to other associated

30/ Human Settlements, July 1971, op. cit., p. 16. See also World Housing Conditions and Estimated Housing Requirements, United Nations Publication, Sales No 65.IV.8, p. 32.
issues. The examples quoted earlier indicate that such policies have been conceived of and implemented as isolated measures with limited aims and not as integral and interrelated parts of a larger national strategy.

Or, alternatively, in cases where the problems are seen in their wider context, existing socioeconomic obstacles inhibit effective action being undertaken. Two examples, representing environmental problems at the extremes of urban modernization and rural stagnation, both identifiable in different variations in a good many Latin American countries, will help to illustrate the problems.

First, the crowded centres of the great urban agglomerations have experienced levels of air pollution too high to be ignored. Eventually the authorities conduct studies, pass laws, and set up regulatory mechanisms to deal with the problem. It turns out, however, that important industrial concentrations have already been established on the side of the urban area from which the prevailing winds come. Their output of fumes can be reduced to some extent but not eliminated, and their relocation would require prohibitive costs; and would be resisted by both entrepreneurs and workers. The urban public transport system too, is a major contributor to pollution, and this is an even more intractable problem. Most of the vehicles are old and in poor condition. Transit fares are very low, and it would be difficult or politically dangerous to raise them very much in view of their importance in the budgets of the urban masses. The bus companies can function at a profit only by using old vehicles with a minimum of maintenance. Effective regulations to keep excessively polluting vehicles off the streets would paralyse the transit system, and confront the authorities with unmanageable protests. The attempts to combat air pollution by regulation, therefore, are likely at best to hold it within limits more tolerable than would be the case without regulation. A drastic reduction in pollution would require thoroughgoing changes in the patterns of urban growth, and even in urban income distribution.

/Second, certain
Second, certain particularly impoverished groups of cultivators on marginal lands raise goats and make charcoal to obtain a little cash income. Goat grazing and charcoal burning are destroying what little forest cover remains in the hills and causing disastrous erosion. The cultivators themselves are aware of this, but cannot dispense with their supplementary livelihood. Regulations prohibiting goat grazing and charcoal burning thus can be enforced only by repressive means and at the cost of intensifying the poverty, or driving off the land, thousands of families already at the margin of subsistence. An acceptable and effective solution to the apparently straightforward problems of deforestation and soil destruction thus requires capacity on the part of the authorities to resettle or offer alternative livelihood to the families in question, and this in turn requires effective agrarian reform, employment and educational policies.

Public agencies are not necessarily unaware of the causative factors but, because of a lack of capacity to confront the much broader set of problems involved in an adequate response, they have to fall back on palliatives; broader responses run inevitably into the rigidities and contradictions of the whole system. When, to these difficulties are added problems of sheer lack of statistical and other data, and the fact that the societies of Latin America are subject to the constantly changing (and mainly exogeneous) pressures from changing technology which tend to conflict with other development goals, it is understandable that governments see few alternatives to short-term "solutions".

In fact, stop gap policies seem so far to have justified themselves by keeping the most urgent problems of underdevelopment at bay and by creating minimum living conditions sufficiently flexible to allow most of the population to adjust somehow to their circumstances. Given this situation, the natural - almost inevitable - tendency of governments is to avoid policy responses of a large-scale nature which might alienate powerful interest groups while not having the counter advantage of attracting immediate support from the disadvantaged sectors of
sectors of society. In any case, basic changes are not likely to be felt in the short term and few governments act in terms of the longer period, beyond their own expected tenure of office.

It is through an understanding of problems deriving from the socioeconomic system itself that general development strategies have to be evolved and in turn, converted into effective operational plans. Some of the groundwork has already been done in Latin America, and, to judge from the generally favourable response to the concept of integrated development or the "Unified Approach" to development strategies set out by the Economic Commission for Latin America 31/ there appears to be at least formal agreement to consider planning in a broader perspective. More specifically, some governments have accepted in principle - or have anticipated - the recommendations of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment that the environmental factor should be included integrally within the total design of development planning.

Although a start has been made, it would be unrealistic to expect that governmental response to the arguments for a "unified" or "integrated" approach to development will be more than tentative for some time.

In the meantime some of the more important conditions for the implementation of integrated development strategies in the different nations of the continent can be briefly outlined so as to give some appreciation not only of the reality which is to be reconciled with normative goals, but also of the major areas to which the arguments for new approaches might be directed. Such conditions will include:

- the political determination of governments to initiate such policies, which in turn depends on persuading the influential social and economic groups of their value and viability
- the operational efficiency and organizational flexibility of the administrative machinery of government


/* the financial
- the financial capacity of government and the trained manpower available to it and

- the ability of planners to carry out national development strategies not only in terms of the wishes and cultural values of different social groups (which by itself may imply merely a passive acceptance of what is being offered) but also with the active - and at times, the necessarily aggressive - participation of those affected by the plans. The whole question of popular participation in particular is a complex one and its attainment depends in large measure on the education of all concerned in the policy changes. This does not imply, hopefully that people will be manipulated to gain their acceptance of the planners' schemes; just the opposite, that it might involve experts and people jointly working out methods to formulate and implement policies. And this would require mutual education, through contact of both sides in an effort to change attitudes and reduce as far as possible the inevitable incomprehension and mistrust that is likely to arise 32/, of course, such conditions involve the need for change, based in part at least on compromise to break down political, cultural and social constraints and open the way for the elaboration of "scenarios" of integrated development.

The final condition to be noted in the dependent market societies of Latin America is that of national autonomy. The implementation of integrated strategies is going to depend on the ability of national, regional and local authorities to act with a considerable degree of freedom from external pressures. And this, in turn, will depend largely on the extent to which the other conditions are achieved.

32/ Solon Barraclough, "Rural Development Strategy ...", op. cit., p. 28 referring especially to the rural situation, writes of the need for 'full campesino participation' in development policies, and continues, "... all rural development strategies will remain inadequate until the hard political decisions are taken to move directly towards development goals in spite of the powerful interest groups opposed to sharing their power and privileges with the campesinos and other hitherto powerless groups".

/5. Conclusions
5. Conclusions

One of the themes that this report has attempted to stress is that, although there are close and interacting relations between population and the environment, such links cannot be considered except in relation to their situation within the wider sphere of societal development. These relationships, in turn, raise further implications for both elements in the development process.

For population, the confrontation with the other development variables may help to clarify one of the issues that has been a source of contention: whether population is a negative or positive element in the achievement of societal goals. A widely diffused position at present seems to be dominated by the supposition that people are a nuisance, a drain on resources and a barrier to progress.

This is not particularly helpful to countries in which potentially the human resource is by far the most valuable available to society. Within the framework of a long-term policy to slow population growth, there seems to be much greater value in considering the positive attributes of people - as producers, decision-makers, contributors to culture and civilization - rather than as rats in a granary, predatory, destructive, and in the final analysis, dispensable. And the latter attitude is particularly inapposite in the "developing" world where the consumption of the world's resources per capita is extremely low compared with that of the affluent countries.

Looked at globally, development objectives will obviously have to involve a slow down in the rates of population growth and the achievement of a more balanced spatial distribution but not every nation in the world can or must proceed at the same pace. In Latin America reductions in the growth rate and changes in the distribution of the population will come - if at all - as a consequence of development and not as part of a policy package labelled "zero economic growth; zero population growth". To reiterate what has been stated earlier in the report, it is precisely through the relevant employment of all the development variables that conditions of greater security will be created in the lives of Latin American
rural and urban masses. Such conditions will then allow for changes in attitudes so that children are seen by society as human beings, and not primarily as forms of social security, additional wage earners and props in one's old age.

Similarly the population-environment relationship ought to be considered in the wider context of the society as a whole. To equate population pressure simplistically with environmental despoliation is, in Latin America, a partial and superficial approach which fails to take into account the systematic pressures which result in the misuse of natural resources in rural areas, however thinly populated, and the degradation of both the man-made and natural environments in the urban centres. Questions of spatial imbalance and inappropriate technology, and production-consumption patterns have already been discussed and their role in the population-environment-population relationship has been pointed out.

It might, therefore, be most useful to put the relationship more clearly into its global setting by asking the following question: Who (or which groups in society) is producing a poor environment for whom? And this subserves a series of related questions. Who is responsible for the pollution caused by the private automobile, and for the inadequate transport services? Who benefits most from the minerals extracted from the countries of Latin America, and who suffers from the manner of their extraction and the appropriation of the returns? Who (or what pressures in society) is responsible for the continuous stream of migration from the poor environmental conditions of the periphery to the often equally poor conditions at the centre? The answers to these will require an approach which is somewhat broader in nature than has been demonstrated in most analyses up to the present.

To conclude, a final comment on the role of the environment itself should be made. As the Pounex meeting emphasized on a number of occasions,
of occasions, environmental questions and economic growth ought not be treated as mutually exclusive alternatives; rather, they should be complementary ingredients of Latin American development programmes. The environmental factor has the potential to bring into focus the socioeconomic and physical structures of the countries of the region and so broaden the basis for unified development strategies.

But this will occur only if the environment is integrated into development policies aiming to promote the wellbeing of the society as a whole. If it comes to be seen as something extraneous to the daily problems confronting the legislator or planner, or as merely a fashionable issue likely to compete for scarce resources with other demands of apparently greater immediate urgency, it will be either ignored, or, to satisfy national prestige - or loan and credit requirements - will be added as little more than verbal decoration to already decided policies.

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/Chapter VIII
Chapter VIII

POPULATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA: SELECTED ISSUES

1. Introduction

All human rights refer to the "population" - the human race - but for present purposes it will not be helpful to confront the theme in these all-inclusive terms. In the following notes attention centres on rights relating to two demographic variables - fertility and spatial distribution - and on two kinds of rights - the right to receive services and the right to self-determination or self-defence against dictation from the society or the state. A good deal of the discussion concerning these two rights is also relevant to rights bearing on the third main demographic variable, mortality - that is, on the preservation of life - but consensus on the latter is more pronounced and more deeply rooted in universally accepted human values than are the rights relating to fertility and spatial movements of population. In view of the brevity of these notes, it seems preferable to concentrate on the two latter variables.

The following features of the Latin American setting are particularly relevant to the discussion:

(1) A proliferation of formal guarantees of human rights - enshrined in international declarations and in national constitutions - has proceeded in semi-isolation from development planning and policy formulation, on the one hand, and from the continual unplanned accretion of laws, regulations, bureaucratic mechanisms and public resource allocations responding to short-term needs and particularistic pressures, on the other. Development planners, for the most part, have treated the "rights" as non-binding expressions of good intentions, even when they have done their best to plan for the rapid expansion of educational, health, and other social services. Politicians and administrators, struggling to cope with immediate problems, have paid only intermittent attention to the
differing general principles urged on them by the human rights proponents and the planners. Recent governmental endorsements of "Integrated development" and "human development" indicate an intention of bringing the different strands of policy-making into closer harmony, but the practical consequences and means of acting on this intention have not yet been spelled out 1/.

(2) The formulation and implementation of policies aimed at development or at the safeguarding of human rights take place in stratified national societies in which incomes, access to employment, access to public services, and capacity to participate in decision-making are very unevenly distributed, and in which the public sectors lack the financial and administrative resources needed to meet their commitments for promotion of development and social justice. Consequently, rights that are universal in principle are observed in proportion to the awareness of different classes or interest-groups of the relevance of these rights to their own situations and in proportion to their capacity to exert organized pressure for their observance. Arguments based on "rights" become weapons of different groups to strengthen their claims to a larger share of public resource that cannot be stretched thin enough to satisfy all the claims. The State confronts an incessant clamour from interest-groups and localities demanding that it "solve their problems" as a matter of right 2/.


2/ "The State, particularly in its socially-motivated activities, comes to resemble a harassed nursemaid trying to meet all the needs and regulate all the activities of its children, too overwhelmed by the multiplicity of its tasks to judge which deserve priority, which are beyond its current abilities, and which are not worth doing at all." (Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin America.) United Nations publication, Sales No. E.70.II.C.3, p. 9.

/(3) Within
(3) Within prevailing patterns of social stratification, with large parts of the population living in poverty and participating only "marginally" if at all in the political process, policy formulation and implementation take on elitist traits that are particularly significant in the case of policies bearing on reproductive behaviour and migratory movements. The minorities that participate in decision-making interpret these factors, as they manifest themselves in the masses, in terms of their own views of national development priorities and family welfare, and in terms of standardized solutions that can be applied to large numbers of people so as to produce changes that will show up in statistical indicators. The underlying interpretations are very diverse. They lead different sectors of opinion to look favourably on high fertility or low fertility, on rapid urbanization or stabilization of the rural population on the land. The wide differences in real circumstances of the countries of the region justify the differing views to some extent, but differences in ideological premises are probably a more important factor. Whatever the population objectives that are advanced, the articulate minorities are predisposed to view the masses as pawns in a strategy for development, revolution or maintenance of the existing order. It is hard for the planners and ideologists to descend from global theorizing and strategy-making concerning the "role of population in development" or the "role of population in revolutionary change" to the real needs and choices confronting millions of individuals and families, which should be the focus of a "human rights" contribution to population policy.

2. Fertility and family planning

In the numerous international and national declarations of rights that have been endorsed during the past two decades, rights to receive services from the State have been spelled out in particular detail - rights to universal schooling, health care, social security, housing, nutrition. More recently, internationally influential sectors of opinion have insisted on the right of the family to decide on the number and spacing of children and on the duty of the State to provide family planning services enabling it to act on this information. As far as
the dominant sectors of opinion in Latin America are concerned, endorsement of this "right" has been a good deal more grudging and conditioned by suspicion of the motives of its proponents than in most other parts of the world, but by now most of the governments have accepted the first clause if not the second.

The growing international insistence on the right to family planning services has two different aspects: the straightforward endorsement of a right of access to a service contributing to family welfare and self-determination, and the expectation that governmental acceptance of the duty to provide family planning services to the whole population will further the broader objective of reducing rates of population increase \(2/\). While agreement or disagreement with this expectation does not affect the validity of the right, it has a good deal to do with the relative importance attributed to it.

It has already been suggested that the publicly-endorsed "universal" rights to services in most Latin American countries are not universally and equitably honoured, for lack of public resources, lack of administrative capacity to use them efficiently, and relative incapacity of the neediest strata of the population to articulate forceful and realistic demands. When a new right calling for allocation of scarce public resources is admitted it must enter into the competition, subject itself to tests in relation to wider development objectives, and struggle against the pressures making for distortion of distribution and content to which all the social and infrastructural services are subject. What priority is it to have in relation to a number of older-established rights that are not fully honoured? Is the social demand for it so

\(2/\) The resolution on human rights aspects of family planning adopted by the International Conference on Human Rights in May 1968, like several other international declarations on population questions, juxtaposes a condemnation of rapid population growth as "impairing the full realization of human rights" and an affirmation of the basic human right of couples "to decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and ... to adequate education and information in this respect". Up to the present, such declarations have not posed the problem of a possible clash between human rights objectives if, as Kingsley Davis and various other demographers have argued, family planning based on free decisions does not prove an effective means of slowing population increase.

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strong that immediate large-scale implementation is politically expedient? Is the provision of the service, under conditions of high fertility, a prerequisite to the realization of other human rights? Is the State justified, from the standpoint of its overall objectives and priorities, in not only furnishing services to the groups actively demanding them, but in campaigning to bring the problem and the services to larger groups that are unaware or apathetic? If it chooses the latter alternative, is the State administratively capable of meeting the full potential demand? It can be argued that the availability of external resources earmarked for family planning exempts this service to a large extent from the need to compete with other social services for domestic resources, but governments can hardly accept the implied dependency in such a delicate area of national policy.

The social demand for family planning is undoubtedly on the increase, but it is a long way from the universality of demands for educational and health services. During the coming decade pressures from the urban population for free family planning services are bound to become stronger, but if the public agencies simply respond to the demand without anticipating or stimulating it, access to such services will not become universal for a long time, and, as in the case of other social services, the rural population will be served last and least. As long as the "human rights" case is not fortified by governmental conviction that lower rates of population growth are essential to development, and that family planning programmes can be an effective means of lowering them, the programmes can expect only modest shares of public resources. There is as yet no firm consensus either in governmental circles or in general public opinion on the role of population increase in development, although the weight of opinion seems to be swinging toward advocacy of lower rates of increase. The differences in national situations are so wide that it cannot be demonstrated that population increase plays the same role or calls for the same kind of public action throughout the region.

For the present, the strongest part of the case for active State promotion of family planning information and services as a right is linked to redistributive policy. In typical national situations of
uneven modernization the better-off parts of the population already have access to family-planning, whether the State approves or not, while the low-income masses that can least afford large families have little or no access, nor, in the case of most of the rural population, even an awareness of the possibility of fertility regulation 1/. This agreement is stronger on paper, however, than as a determinant in public resource allocation.

The conventional formulation of the "right" here being discussed - the right of the couple or of the woman alone to decide freely on the number of children wanted and to act effectively on the decision - implies a right to reject family planning or to use the service so as to have more children rather than fewer, even if the State is determined to reduce the rate of population increase and even if it is objectively evident that additional children will be disastrous for the family's welfare. (Conversely, of course, the formulation implies a right to practice contraception even if public policy favours rapid population increase.) At this point, the definition of "rights" and "duties" becomes more complicated. Does the family or the individual really have a right to unlimited reproduction, if it is demonstrable that this will be harmful to the interests of society and will damage the life-chances of all the children of the family? If not, what can society do about it? If compulsion is ruled out as neither legitimate nor practicable, to what extent is the State justified in using incentives, penalties, and tactics of indoctrination? These questions have been little discussed in the Latin American context, except in the form of rhetorical rejections of any interference in free choice, and up to the present they have not had much practical importance, in view of the lack of consensus on population policy objectives and the weakness of the State in implementing any complex policy aimed at societal change. The State already intervenes in family life in many ways - through marriage and

divorce laws, compulsory education, tax policies, social security, etc., - and has converted certain "rights" into obligations. Once a sufficient degree of public consensus is reached concerning desirable fertility levels, it would be absurd to expect society to renounce all tactics designed to exert pressure on the decisions of families or women. The trouble is that the range of tactics meeting the combined criterion of legitimacy in terms of values, public receptivity, public administrative capacities, and reasonable unit costs is not promising. Promotional campaigns would be essential, but the capacity of the State in most countries of the region to mobilize the masses of the population behind determined developmental objectives is low, and is likely to be overtaxed by campaigns having other, more pressing objectives. Proposals for penalties on large families through taxes, deprivation of public services, etc., would be unacceptable in terms of rights and unenforceable in situations of mass poverty, in which many families cannot pay taxes and receive hardly any services from the State. Financial inducements for smaller families would be prohibitively costly, hard to administer on a relevant scale, and in all probability politically impracticable.

Although the question of rights to use or reject family planning services is thus far not very relevant at the societal level because of lack of coherent policies and lack of capacity to apply compulsion, it is already acquiring some importance to individual women through the extension of family planning within maternal health services. These services commonly aim to introduce women to the desirability of using contraception or undergoing sterilization at a time when they are likely to be most receptive - immediately after childbirth. If the personnel of the services are convinced of the necessity of limiting the number of children in low-income families or of reducing population increase rates in general and if their relations with clients partake of the usual feelings of middle-class paternalism and professional authority toward the lower-class and the "ignorant", the woman's right to make a free decision on the basis of informed understanding of the alternatives is likely to get short shrift. Recent controversies in

certain high-income
certain high-income countries and also in India concerning the requirement of sterilization as a condition for receipt of public assistance or hospital care point to an abuse that can become more serious to the extent that official and professional opinion becomes more assured of the necessity of fertility regulation. Such abuses cannot be obviated altogether by legal protection of the woman's rights as long as the present traits of social stratification do not undergo far-reaching changes. They are one aspect of a much wider problem. Relations between the "marginalized" masses and the official or private sources of aid and professional services are a contradictory mixture of resigned dependency, the quest for a "patrón" capable of eliciting benefits from the authorities, demands backed up by what has been labeled "representational violence" (demonstrations, seizure of public buildings, blocking of highways, etc.), and wholesale rejection of the tutelage of a public order in which the masses have no effective voice. It is obviously desirable that couples and women needing family planning services participate in an organized way in the planning and delivery of the services, but this desideratum requires major advances in a more general struggle for informed participation by the masses in the decisions that affect them.

The tension between the right to receive services, the right to self-determination in their use, and the State's interpretation of the best interests of the society takes a different form in the case of abortion. The known facts on the incidence of illegal abortions in Latin America indicate an enormous demand on the part of urban women from all social strata, a demand unlikely to be entirely obviated by family planning services, since women motivated to practice contraception would continue to seek remedies for lapses or failures. The demand for legalized abortion as a right, spurred by women's movements in other regions, has hardly touched Latin America as yet, however, and would undoubtedly encounter formidable societal

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resistence. The proponents of family planning as a human right seem to have avoided the question for tactical reasons 5/.

Various proposals have been made outside Latin America by crusaders for "zero growth rates" concerning the mass application of techniques of fertility control that would altogether rule out free choice - e.g., the dissemination of sterilizing agents through foods or water supplies. For the immediate future, fortunately, Latin American Governments will have neither the will nor the capacity to apply such techniques of "population engineering". If the techniques themselves, however, become easier of application, and if in the future Governments should be seized with a conviction of desperate urgency in the slowing down of population growth, entirely new questions of rights and values would have to be confronted. Would the right of the family to decide on the number of children then be judged a luxury that society cannot afford? If the technique were applied equitably to the whole of the population would it be an interference with basic rights of a different order than, say, compulsory vaccination or fluoridation of drinking water?

3. Spatial distribution, migration, environmental protection and resource exploitation

The bearing of human rights on fertility control has been the subject of a great deal of polemical and hortatory literature. The bearing of human rights on spatial movements of people and settlement patterns has, in some of its aspects - particularly that of migration across national boundaries - also been extensively discussed, but it has received much less attention as a broad problem area, the contours of which are bound to change with rapid population increase and spatial

5/ "No government representative appears to have characterized voluntary abortion as a 'human right' ... Given these views, it is unlikely to be fruitful to take up the issue in the early stages of developing the family planning right." (Daniel G. Partan, Population in the UN System: Developing the Legal Capacity and Programmes of UN Agencies, Law and Population Monograph Series Number 7, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, Mass., n.d., p. 10).

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concentration. The subject will come increasingly to the fore, in the
two aspects of rights to receive services and rights to self-defence
against societal dictation, to the extent to which development policies,
which have up to the present practically disregarded the spatial
dimension, strive to incorporate objectives relating to human settlement,
geographical distribution of economic activities, husbanding of natural
resources, and preservation of an ecological balance.

It is now generally accepted that present patterns and trends
of spatial distribution of population and land use have many
disadvantages for development and human welfare. With relatively
sparse populations, most of the Latin American countries combine the
ills of excessive concentration in huge urban agglomerations; soil
exhaustion and excess labour force in the older agricultural zones;
and destruction of soils and forests in thinly settled zones now in
process of occupation. As the national population density increases
and the consumption level rises these problems are exacerbated. Elaborate
regulation of population behaviour and movements become unavoidable
to insure that millions of unco-ordinated individual and group actions
do not add up to irreparable damage to the long-term interests of the
society as a whole. Up to the present, consensus on the role of
spatial distribution of population in development has been insufficient
to serve as frame of reference for comprehensive policies bearing on
distribution patterns. National policies commonly favour a slowing-down
of the growth of the largest cities, discouragement of out-migration
from rural localities and small towns, and planned colonization of zones
hitherto empty of population. (Concrete actions in pursuit of these
policies have been piecemeal, and generally offset by other measures
stimulating continued concentration.) The more realistic policy
formulations do not call for a sharp reversal of trends, but for changes
in proportions: the larger cities will continue to grow, but hopefully
more slowly; the rural areas will not absorb the whole of their natural
increase, but hopefully a larger share; the zones of colonization will
not be occupied in a disorderly flood of people, but hopefully at the
pace at which infrastructural investments can be afforded and

/destruction of
destruction of natural resources minimized. Hopefully, the propensity of the population to migrate will respond to a combination of moderate incentives and disincentives.

However, if the population continues to grow at present rates while traditional ways of livelihood lose viability and the increasing dominance of urban markets and consumption patterns make the whole population more homogeneous culturally and more mobile, this cannot be counted on, even if public measures become more consistent and better planned than heretofore. To what extent is the State then justified in interfering with the rights of individuals to live where they want and as they want? To what extent is it capable of doing so effectively and equitably? The State already possesses some legal instruments adaptable to this purpose. Their use for control of population movements has been limited up to the present by the low priority given to spatial distributional objectives by the dominant forces in the Governments, on the one hand, and by the capacity of the groups affected to defend their immediate interests by various tactics of pressure or evasion, on the other.

The following tactics are relevant, but they all have shortcomings in terms of feasibility and legitimacy in the real situations prevailing:

(1) The State can deliberately refrain from allocations expanding the supply of housing, jobs, and social services in urban centres that are judged over-populated. Since the larger cities are invariably favoured over the rest of the population in such allocations, the apparent denial of "rights" might really be a step toward more even treatment for the population as a whole. However, the population of the larger cities normally has a more widely diffused consciousness of rights vis-à-vis the State and greater capacity to exert organized pressures than the rest of population, so that the political viability of a policy of this kind is questionable, while the economic viability would depend on a simultaneous transformation of structures of production and distribution.

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(2) The State can introduce systems of job permits and residential permits for the urban population, making it an offence for migrants to stay in the cities without such permits. Measures of this kind are well-known in other parts of the world, and present systems of identification documents offer a readily available administrative framework. However, the use of a system of permits to control cityward migration would require a more efficient and incorruptible administration than can be expected in most national situations. In practice, the impact on the rate of city growth would probably be small, and the main result would be to place part of the urban population - in general the poorest and most marginalized strata - in a situation of illegality, exposed to job discrimination and exactions from the police. Even the present systems of identity documents and social security records, as they are applied to population groups with little education or awareness of legal rights, lend themselves to abuses.

(3) The State can, representing the interests of the society as a whole, prohibit residence in certain zones or under certain sub-standard conditions, and evict the population involved. This legal power has commonly been used for the clearance of urban slums and shantytowns and for the eviction of rural settlements in the way of dam-building projects. It has also been used to some extent to prevent rural land use that is judged excessively destructive of soils and forests - cultivation of erodable slopes, goatgrazing, charcoal-burning. The compulsory resettlement of rural groups that are too sparsely settled to be reached by educational and health services and by police action is sometimes also attempted, particularly in the case of forest-dwelling Indian tribes, and in zones in which the authorities are determined to prevent contact between peasants and guerrilla movements.

Up to the present, interventions in human settlement such as these, while limited in scope and haphazard in objectives, have accumulated a deplorable record of unilateral action, unfulfilled promises, and bureaucratic incapacity to envisage the impact on human lives of "progressive measures". Cultivators displaced by dams have, /at best,
at best, faced long delays in receiving promised compensation or equivalent land grants; shantytown dwellers whose settlements have been eradicated have commonly either been left to fend for themselves or have been herded into public housing inaccessible to their sources of employment. Marginal peasants for whom goats represent the only form of capital and source of cash income have sometimes been forbidden to keep goats without the offer of any compensatory source of livelihood. In many cases, the groups confronted by such measures have been able to defend themselves in one way or another, but the defensive tactics naturally focus on immediately perceived interests and, if successful, leave the real damages to society - including themselves - to be perpetuated.

(4) The State can direct urban groups to planned residential areas or new towns, and rural groups to zones of agricultural colonization. Legally obligatory relocation of individuals and families, as a policy instrument for spatial redistribution of population, is hardly conceivable in Latin America, but semi-compulsion sometimes has been attained by removing families from their previous homes and leaving them no practicable alternative to acceptance of space in a housing project or colonization scheme. Measures of this kind are unacceptable in terms of human rights, and experience indicates that they are also ineffective and prohibitively high in financial costs per family resettled. "Planned" paternalistic resettlement schemes in Latin America have a consistent record of failure.

In spite of the drawbacks and dangers of policy instruments such as the above it is to be expected that as State responsibilities for development widen and population increase intensifies existing problems, a great deal of interference with the preferences and free choices of individuals, families, and local groups will be unavoidable. From a developmental viewpoint the justification of such measures will depend on their coherence and consistency with the style of development aimed at, and on their capacity to contribute significantly to national objectives at bearable costs. It is obviously absurd for the State to interfere with the choice of the people concerning
residence and livelihood through measures that are at cross-purposes with one another, that commit major resources to accomplish minor objectives or that exempt the powerless whose activities bring about the more serious environmental damages. From a human rights viewpoint, the justification for such measures will depend on the capacity of the State to apply them equitably and in full consultation with the groups affected, to seek a sympathetic understanding of the full human implications of the measures being considered, and above all to respect its obligation to provide opportunities for livelihood and human relationships that are equivalent to or better than those of which the group is being deprived. Ideally, the group affected should gain through the process of change itself in capacity to understand and defend in an organized way its own interests, long-term as well as immediate, and to relate these interests to a coherent interpretation of the interests of the wider society. The remarks made in the preceding section concerning the difficulty of attaining authentic popular participation in decision-making in societies with prevailing relationships between bureaucracies and professionals on the one hand and the masses of the population on the other obviously apply also to measures bearing on spatial distribution, environmental protection, and resource use.

The discussion up to this point has centred on issues that arise within Latin American national societies. It is well-known that population increase and spatial mobility, interacting with political upheavals and unevenly distributed economic growth, are generating on a rising scale several kinds of population movements across national frontiers that raise issues of human rights:

1. Where job opportunities and wage levels, or access to land for cultivation, differ widely on the two sides of a frontier, migrants — mainly originating in the underemployed rural population — cross from the less promising to the more promising country. Until recently, such migratory currents were on a modest scale and were tolerated or welcomed by the authorities of the recipient countries as sources of cheap labour, particularly for seasonal agricultural work. In
work. In this stage, the principal human rights issues relate to exploitation of the migrant workers, generally with even less access to social services, social security, protective legislation or union organization than the rural citizens of the recipient countries. With the increase of national population, the scale of such migrations has grown and receptivity has dwindled. Migration of unskilled workers to countries outside Latin America, previously of considerable importance to Mexico and some Caribbean countries, has been practically cut off or deprived of legality. Within the better-off Latin American countries, the national labour force, itself rapidly expanding and suffering from insufficient employment, becomes more resistant to low-wage competition from abroad. The concentration of alien agricultural workers and squatter-cultivators in thinly populated frontier zones excites preoccupations over national security. In some of the large cities the growth of slums and shantytowns populated mainly by alien migrants occasions prejudice, sometimes with racial overtones. Since large parts of the populations of the countries of emigration are desperately poor, with dwindling capacity the survive by subsistence agriculture and seasonal wage labour, and frontiers are long and practically unguardable, the recipient countries cannot cut off such migration at the border. Attempts to hunt down and deport the migrants who have slipped through, under prevailing conditions in the frontier zones, are bound to involve arbitrariness and brutality, followed by resentment in the country of emigration. Thus far, this kind of problem has occasioned protracted negotiations and a few violent confrontations between individual countries. More effective regional recognition of the rights of illegal migrants as human beings is needed, but as long as prevailing styles of development continue to generate an excess of labour, under-employed or in low-productivity occupations, a "human rights" approach to this problem can hardly amount to more than a treatment of symptoms.

(2) The plurality of political regimes in Latin America, the occasional violent shifts from one kind of regime to another, the emergence of developmental strategies that clash with the status expectations, property holdings and consumption patterns of certain
social classes and groups, and also the growth of movements that reject the existing order in favour of revolutionary or terrorist action, is generating on an unprecedented scale movements of refugees, exiles and voluntary migrants motivated by insecurity, deprivation of previous source of livelihood, or rejection of the personal consequences of the prevailing national development strategy. While the migrants discussed above come mainly from the poorest strata of the population, migrants in the second category, whatever their political complexion, come mainly from the middle and upper strata, are relatively well-educated, and include important proportions of professionals, university students, and would-be entrepreneurs. The Latin American countries have well-established norms concerning the rights and obligations of political exiles, but once politically-motivated movements across national frontiers become large-scale and heterogeneous such norms become hard to apply and irrelevant to some of the real problems. The first category of migrants poses the basic issue of rights to minimum livelihood and human dignity. The second category poses a wide range of more specific issues with which the individual countries are likely to be grappling for a long time to come: rights of alien professionals to practise their professions, rights of students to finish their education, rights of aliens with capital to compete with local enterprises, rights of exiles to act on their political beliefs. In the nature of things, middle-class migrants are in a better position to make themselves heard, to grapple with regulations, and to take advantage of services than are the others.

4. Concluding note

The present paper does not offer "solutions" to the problems it poses, and the forbearance is deliberate. It would be ingenuous for a brief survey covering a region of great internal diversity to pretend to offer universal practical recipes for the treatment of symptoms of basic maladjustments in the processes of economic growth and social change, or to propose additions to the innumerable guarantees of rights in laws and constitutions. The dominant forces in the various national societies are now trying to deal with the symptoms as
symptoms as well as the underlying causative factors, guided by
widely differing conceptions of the nature of development and of
priorities for human welfare, constrained by widely differing
combinations of pressures and sources of political backing, always
confronting "a flood of generalized advice ... so voluminous and
heterogeneous as to overstrain their capacity to digest and choose":6/
The present paper has outlined some of the requisites for choices
giving due weight to human rights within policies bearing on fertility
and spatial movements of population, and some of the measures proposed
or applied have tried to bring out the complexity of the problems and
the impossibility of applying simplistic, universal prescriptions. The
choices that emerge must strive to reconcile different values and
developmental objectives, all legitimate in themselves, presenting
themselves differently in each national society, none attainable in
full in societies struggling to cope with present processes of growth
and change.

6/ "Report on a Unified Approach to Development Analysis and
Planning: Report of the Secretary-General" (A/CONF.5/477,