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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA
SOCIOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

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I

THE VARIOUS APPROACHES

The purpose of the following pages is to consider the social aspects of the economic development of Latin America. But no sooner is this statement set down than we are in danger of being overwhelmed by the avalanche of words written and sooken on the subject at the present time. This abundance is bound to give rise to perplexity, for it shows that we are up against a controversial problem. And, for dealing with a controversial problem, we have to choose between three possible ways: to accept it resignedly as it stands and contribute without more worry to its perpetuation; to try to penetrate to its fundamental and therefore hidden hypotheses; or to endeavour to bring at least a little order into the confusion of its diverse implications. We cannot surrender to the convenience of the first of these courses, nor, nowadays, succumb to the fascination of the second. The only wise and feasible course is to face the requirement of clarity inherent in the third.

This means that, at the outset, we must recognize the extreme ambiguity of the expression "social aspects of economic development". As the literary recourse of a specialist wishing to collaborate harmoniously with other scientists and entering at his own risk on admittedly foreign territory, it is justified. But, taken literally, it leads to the dangerous inference that the term "aspects" may be taken as indicating mere epiphenomena or, even worse, secondary and even incidental matters. Again, if the noun is ambiguous, the adjective in no less so, and may be so familiar as to be overlooked, although there has of late been some criticism concerning the frequency with which social questions are presented as mere adjuncts to the economic. This presentation labels the subject as a side issue and makes a right understanding of it even more difficult.

However, the basic requirements for a right understanding are neither unknown nor difficult. We need only recall a commonplace of scientific methodology: the subject "society and economic development" (like anything relating to human life) can be approached from a variety of standpoints,
and in principle none is unjustified or wrong; all that can be said is that some are more appropriate than others. But the degree of their appropriateness is determined by what the scientist is concerned with at the time, or in other words, the nature of the problem to be solved. Let us, then, briefly examine our subject from the main standpoints.

A. THE EXIGENCIES OF PRAXIS

The key to a preliminary classification of these standpoints, which may subsequently be found to merit further subdivision according to different shades of meaning, is found in the primary consideration that governs them. In other words, we must ask ourselves whether the exigencies of praxis predominate, or the exigencies of knowledge. The predominance of the exigencies of praxis is evident in the direction followed by traditional social policy, motivated as it was by flagrant deficiencies in the life of society. A subject which in its early days had only a limited compass - the "social question" as known in the last decades of the nineteenth century - has expanded to include the whole range of the "social problems of a country", that is to say, all the inadequacies and maladjustments in its structure. Social reform, social welfare, social policy, are the varying names given to this activity in different countries and at different times, and many people mean nothing more when they speak of the social aspects of economic development: education, health, social security, family living standards, etc. - which explains why these aspects are taken to be "accessory".

1. Economic investments and human investments

In observing the evolution of social policy, we have to reflect for a moment on the fact, clearly brought out by its history in Europe, that the humanitarian aims of social policy must be considered in relation to the purposes of economic policy or, we might say, the possibilities of a given economic situation. In other words, what is now a matter of planning in the less developed countries previously existed as a problem in the more industrialized countries, and the new factor in planning - deriving from the idea of deliberate development - has been expressed (in its simplest logical terms) as follows: any economic development /implies a
implies a process of continued and successive investments. Now it may happen that not only economic investments in the strict sense, but also what have come to be called human investments, play an important part. Bolivia needs investments in its oil and its agriculture, but there is no denying that the economic development of that country is equally dependent on an improvement in the nutrition and health of its inhabitants and on a rapid "hispanization" of the indigenous sectors of the population. The emergence of this category of "human investments" has endowed the problem with a technical character and enabled it to be included within the compass of programming and planning. But, as happens with any advance in rationalization, there is also a darker side to the picture. The greatest success has been in strengthening the conviction that economic development is a comprehensive social process and, consequently, in setting a new problem for human effort and imagination: that of making social planning coincide with economic planning. The negative (or at least problematic) aspects consist, on the one hand, in the excessive emphasis laid on a Utopian element - balanced development - as an objective, and, on the other, in the resultant (though perhaps unintentional) diminution of the humanitarian character of traditional social policy, which, in its finest expression, is, above all, an endeavour to remedy human injustice and suffering.

The underlying aspiration in the formula "balanced" economic and social development is based on two specific conceptions: (a) that there are investments of a social nature which sooner or later prove profitable from the economic standpoint or which exert a positive influence in the direction of improved future productivity; and (b) that in any development plan there should be a definite ratio - both on humanitarian ground and from the point of view of yield - between economic growth and social improvement or progress, although this may be only one of the various /aims to
aims to be pursued. ¹/ The requirements concerning integration and ratio do not seem to be discussed, whereas the notion of balance seems nowadays to receive a great deal of attention.

The first objection has already been mentioned: the idea of balance brings a Utopian element into the conceptions of development, which gives it an "ideological" nature (in the technical sense), and this is incompatible with serious scientific study.

The second objection is that this attitude prejudices the very theory of economic development; in other words, some people maintain that is very problematical whether economic development can proceed in a balanced form and that, on the contrary, its mechanisms consist of a series of successive states of imbalance, each giving rise to increasingly complex and fruitful situations.

¹/ It is often advisable to back up one's own opinions by the recognized authority of the opinions of others. In this connexion I propose to make use of a clear statement of the case by the Berne professor Dr. Richard F. Behrendt (Die wirtschaftliche und soziale Revolution in den unentwickelten Ländern, Berne, H. Lang, 1959).

In any attempt to formulate the necessary criteria for priority in development planning, a distinction should be drawn between the following three problems:

1. The problems of the proportion between strictly economic improvements and social improvements.

2. The problem of the proportion between, on the one hand, numerical considerations (Rechenhaftigkeit) concerned with achieving the maximum yield through the use of the best technical process available, and, on the other, the deliberate planning of a gradual and lasting development which takes account of social continuity and stability. In the latter case it is important to avoid, as far as possible, over-abrupt breaks with the traditions and institutions of the environment in question, since this may well give rise to insecurity and conflict - psychological, social, political and even material.

3. The problem of the proper proportion between primary, secondary and tertiary activities and sectors.

Therefore, if recourse is had to certain academic divisions, it will be recognized that: (a) the first problem is particularly the concern of specialists in social policy or welfare; (b) the third belongs unquestionably to the sphere of activity of the economist; (c) the second, on the other hand, relates particularly to the main preoccupations of the sociologist and the statesman.

However, no one would deny the right of any person, by virtue of exceptional training, to concern himself equally with all three problems.
In addition, the transformation of the aims of social policy into "human investments", while to some extent legitimate, might lead to a dangerous error: that of considering such aims as functions coming definitely within the scope of economic development, which they certainly are not. The deficiencies which social policy has to face in the form of human problems are in principle independent of any economic repercussion and must be remedied at the level of what are regarded as permanent, paramount values. And, unquestionably, the first consideration must be the relative urgency of the problems.

This is obvious in regard to those that are of tragic urgency - poor and overcrowded dwellings, persistence of conquerable diseases - but it is nonetheless true of others for which more time may be allowed. Education is an outstanding case. A country's educational situation is of great importance to its economic growth; educational and economic indices are convergent, and any plan for economic development will show the occupational gaps that need to be filled by means of education. But education cannot be regarded as a mere function of development. It is independent in its aims and traditions and in its ultimate preoccupations, that are concerned with man as a being and are related, not so much to development itself - a neutral and intermediary mechanism - as to the kind of society to which development aspires or which it is intended to produce.

Furthermore, the deficiencies which social welfare corrects are typical examples of imbalance, and there can be no certainty that correction of them will not lead to other later manifestations of imbalance. Every "reform" and every improvement has its own special "social costs". It is not always an easy task to determine them, nor do we always see courage such as was shown at the end of the last century by some social Darwinists, who were inexorable in pointing out certain selective consequences of medical progress. It is these costs - secondary consequences - of intervention in the biological and psychological conditions of man that make it in principle impossible to compare social planning with economic planning, and make it difficult to imagine, for instance, a table of input and output of a combination of human factors. Nevertheless, the need for joint social and economic planning is a stimulus to creative imagination and,
imagination and, within certain limits, progress in this sphere may perhaps be possible in the near future. Everything suggests that the way will be found in so-called "operative research" and that the application of its techniques to social "decisions" may provide at least an efficient guide. But this is a task for the years to come; and, in any case, the difficulties in the way of a qualitative evaluation of the variables involved will mean that (even more than in the economic field) technical advice must ultimately yield to political "decision".

2. Typologies as instruments for knowledge and action

In the study of the social aspects of economic development, the exigencies of praxis have thus led to some highly theoretical planning. But even before this level is reached, other theoretical conclusions arising from initial attitudes based on pure knowledge are to be found, in similar contrast to the practical consequences (as we shall see later), as though reality wished to demonstrate once more the relativity of intrinsically sharp differences of conception.

In order to obtain an exact determination of "social deficiencies", it is necessary to be able to make use of quantitatively precise indicators or indices. For this reason, the need to possess, at the international level, homogeneous units for measuring standards of living in different countries recently led a group of specialists to establish a table of the main indicators, which now serves as a basis for the work of the United Nations.

It is important now to see how these and other indicators have been used in other countries, in order to find an answer to a theoretical question: that of the building-up of a typology of the economic and social situation in Latin America. There was a patent need for such a typology, in order to put an end to the danger of generalizations applied to the whole region: there were various ways of achieving this end, but the one adopted so far is undoubtedly original, in that it provides a link between the pure exigencies of praxis, which social policy has to face as a matter of urgency, and the desire to reach an interpretative understanding of economic development as the essential preoccupation of the sociologist.

/Two valuable
Two valuable attempts to compile such typologies are already available to those interested. The authors themselves are the first to point out certain problematical aspects; but it would be inappropriate here to use their words as a starting-point for a major methodological discussion, which would have to begin by analysing the distinction now currently made between indicators and indices (Lazarsfeld).

Suffice it to note a few points. In the first place, we have the question both of the "fidelity" and of the validity of the indicators selected; and, secondly, the question of the degree to which they converge, and of their significance. When there are very few indicators, the convergence is, of course, clear, but not when there are many. Thirdly, there is the question of the attribution of causes; the convergencies or correlations in themselves tell us nothing with regard to the causal connexion between the factors measured, and, finally, this is the most important point for purposes of interpretation. What are the reasons for the correlation, almost obvious in itself, between education indices and development indices? The problem of causes is still further complicated, of course, if many indicators are used.

However, these remarks in no way diminish the value of the results achieved by the typologies mentioned. That produced by Father Roger Vekemans is highly instructive for two reasons: because in his tabulation of countries he succeeds in showing how, by the mere action of the indices, conclusions are reached that are very similar to those which would be

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2/ See Henri Guitton, "Indices e Indicadores", Revista de Economía y Estadística, University of Córdoba, Year IV, Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4.

obtained from another kind of experiment — which amounts to a relative confirmation; and also because he throws into relief the further step required with regard to these typologies — to interpret them. The clearest case (to which reference will again be made later) can be formulated in the very words of Father Vekemans, and it undoubtedly constitutes the most difficult problem of historico-sociological interpretation which the Latin American scene now presents. Indeed, how are we to explain the difference in the situation of the components of Group IV (Mexico and Brazil) in relation to that of Group VI (Argentina and Chile, in particular)? How are we to interpret the fact that the two countries of the southern cone, which offer a relatively high economic and social complex, are none the less experiencing "a certain stagnation"? In other words, how are we to explain in this case the lack of convergence between the socio-cultural indicators and the indices of economic growth? It is from there that interpretations begin, and they may be of various kinds.

E. THE EXIGENCIES OF KNOWLEDGE

The practical needs in the matter of social policy in Latin America are so urgent that the legitimacy of the point of view we have considered, which derives its impulse from them, is self-evident. But this is not the only point of view, nor perhaps is it the one best adapted to meet the exigencies of knowledge. Here, the "social aspects" of economic development necessarily take on a very different character; it is no longer a question of social "deficiencies" or human investments, but of looking at the economic process as a part of the whole social situation to which it belongs. In this sense, just as in recent years economic science has been obliged to work out, wholly or partially, a theory of development (a subject which formerly had not received preferential attention (or at least not explicitly), so also sociology has found itself compelled to face the question whether it, too, could have something to say in the matter, either with the help of the economist or independently. Scientifically, the neatest solution would be one single theory. But, failing that,
it was hoped at least that the sociologist would be capable of working out a sociological conception of development, that is to say, a theory evolved from the standpoint of the social structure as a whole. And, just as the economist offers, or can offer, models for development which are at least a clear guide for practical tasks, so also the sociologist has been asked to provide models for the structural processes that accompany or precede the economic process.

These exigencies of knowledge, which have now reached their apex, began in a more modest way. It is significant that the earliest efforts to deal with the question gave preference to the study of "conditions" or of social "obstacles" to economic development. Here, the concern to point out the obstacles again defers consideration of the urgent practical problems and gives rise to something like resentful impatience on the part of the economist in the face of hindrances to his work. But as, finally, obstacles are nothing more than a vacuum in the system of conditions, the theory, keeping to its principles, attempts to confine itself to conditions.

1. The analytical point of view

Economic sociology, which has not been the subject of much systematic study, is now deriving considerable stimulus from the preoccupation with development. It is not surprising that economists and sociologists are now looking beyond the institutional framework of pure economic action and are studying economic institutions in themselves; property, division of labour, the employment pattern, as well as the forms of exchange and the social conditions of the various markets. And there is similar interest in the motives governing economic policy in respect both of production and of consumption. Once analysed, the economic institutions have to be related to other institutions, so as to see how they all function in the social structure as a whole.

With some variations in enumeration and terminology, this is the basic plan suggested by the recent contributions of economic sociology, prompted
by the awakened interest in the subject of development. If a factual analysis is to be made, of a country or a region – Ecuador or Latin America – all that is necessary is to apply, according to the case, either all or part of the arsenal of devices that make up the above-mentioned set of concepts. And the analysis will be more static or less so, more dynamic or less so, according to the extent to which the functional process is brought to light. Needless to say, this is the scheme which also, implicitly, serves as the guide in most cases for all known plans for empirical research of any serious value.

As all this takes time and is not yet at the stage of a definite programme, some attempt has been made here, too, in regard to urgent practical needs and immediate aspirations, to press on and meet the requirements alike of theory and of practice. Reasoning has been along these lines: from the standpoint of development or, we should perhaps say, of speeding up development, not all the institutional elements analysed by economic sociology are of equal value. Some are certainly more important than others. In view, then, of the need to make a selection from among them, which are the most decisive? Or, in military parlance, which are the "strategic" social elements in economic development? What can be done to influence them favourably?

The desire to answer this question results in the production of an outline for a study, in which three basic points claim pride of place by reason of their strategic value: (a) the general economic disposition, as a basic index of the dominant economic tenets and aptitudes; (b) the capacity for organization and innovation in economic affairs, which is not well described by the classic but ambiguous term "entrepreneur"; and (c) the capacity for successfully carrying out economic tasks.

Action can be taken under each one of these headings, with a view to promoting more dynamic activity. What is the real situation in Latin America, and by what means can these strategic elements be influenced? The study of them, therefore, has the same function of providing a bridge, a transition or link, as that formerly assigned to the typologies, but the other way round. The former was designed to meet practical needs in
what was at the outset a purely theoretical question; the latter conduces to the building-up of a theoretical structure upon what was at the beginning a plan for immediate action.

To endeavour to outline here the extensive content of all that is implied in the basic scheme for an analytical approach to the so-called "social aspects of economic development", would be to repeat what has been done elsewhere at other times. Still less, of course should a full and systematic exposition be attempted. However, so as not to abandon the analytical plane entirely and to give a little substance to the preceding abstract considerations, it is perhaps advisable to look at the various analytical schemes produced by the economist and translate their sociological implications into other terms. A recent study of the structural weaknesses in the Latin American situation, brought out as a supplement to a more specific investigation, affords an ideal support for these suggestions, without need to verify whether all economists agree with its conclusions. Moreover, here we are only concerned with indicating the most marked of the characteristics which constitute (according to the reader's choice) either obstacles, or negative social conditions, in the Latin American economic situation. The schema of this analysis keeps to the most strictly traditional lines followed by the "economist" and, for the sake of brevity, from now on that term will be used to cover everything relating to the content of his work.

As regards land, the economist provides data showing the inequality of distribution; and the mere fact of the continued existence, in sharp contrast, of vast rural properties (latifundios) side by side with small holdings (minifundios) permits the first sociological deduction or hypothesis of importance to be made: the virtual non-existence of an agricultural middle class of any significance. This explains the tendency towards the formation of a considerable rural proletariat, as soon as systems of production are modernized in one way or another.

4/ I refer to "Caracteristicas de la Economia Interna y su Desarrollo, 1929-59" (E/CN.12/563), prepared by ECLA, containing a brief outline and analysis of the various works recently brought out in this connexion by the Secretariat.
With reference to **capital**, the scarcity of which, in its strictly economic sense, is well known, the economist stresses the fact that, nevertheless, the shortage is perhaps greater as far as social capital is concerned. The social infrastructure is of course wanting in medical services and housing, but especially education.

Concerning **labour**, there are no problems in respect of over all supply, but there are marked shortages in skilled labour and in manpower at the supervisory level. The economist suspects that the ability of the workers is not so high as is claimed, and points out that the immobility of the labour market is largely due to general ignorance of employment opportunities. In fact, the economist is simply drawing attention, in one way and another, to a single and decisive social factor: lack of knowledge and general unpreparedness. In referring specifically to the situation of the professional and administrative grades, his complaint is the same and so are the causes he cites. The weakness in the higher ranks of the labour force is parallel to that of the supply of capital; the number of technically trained persons in the productive sectors is very small, and the entrepreneurs have had little training.

In the very complex matter of deficiencies in **public administration**, the economist points to the organizational and fiscal factors to which they are partly due, but again emphasizes as their ultimate cause the weakness of the educational system and the consequent inefficiency of the selection procedures.

With regard to **entrepreneurs**, although the economist acknowledges that there have been and still are considerable groups of entrepreneurs in Latin America, he nevertheless considers that their number is insufficient. For this, he adduces some interesting reasons. The first concerns the limited supply, due to the social structure; the second refers to the difficulties in the way of setting up new industries, due especially to the economic structure, that is to say, to its monopolistic features; and the third, of a psycho-social nature, relates to expectation of profit. It should be noted that the entrepreneur is referred to, throughout, in the traditional sense of the term.

/Although the
Although the data on distribution of income are not very abundant and are not systematically analysed, the patent fact of inequality stands out. There is inequality between the various economic sectors, in distribution among the various social strata and no less, between the different areas or regions of a single country. Lastly, although not much is known about consumption "propensities" or about the composition of the family budget, sufficient data have become available in recent years to allow one to suppose that it is gradually rising and that Engel's law applies.

This sociological interpretation of data provided by the economist could be extended further, but what is gathered into the foregoing very brief summary will suffice. The data are of interest in themselves and each constitutes a starting-point for a sociological exposition. But we are not concerned with that now; our task is to show where the views of the economist and the sociologist converge on the analytical plane. If we had followed the thread of some sociological analysis, we should have met with more or less the same phenomena, although it is natural that those singled out by the economist are those to which is ascribed the strategic value mentioned above.

2. The historical point of view

The analytical approach to the social aspects of development, be it that of the sociologist or of the economist, amounts to a cross-section at a particular moment in time, and is therefore dated. But it is very possible that the exigencies of knowledge cannot be satisfied by a synchronous study of this kind, to borrow a term from the modern anthropologists. The historical entity of Latin America in 1961 is something more than the components of its economic-social spectrum; what is can only be fully understood through what has been. What is it that has made Latin America what it is today? And could this have been brought about in some other way? Economic development is one of the components of her present situation, which is conditioned by a series of previous situations. And all of them, past and present, far from being hermetically sealed off from one another, constitute parts of the whole historical process and are open to its many influences.
Now this historical consideration is by no means merely a complement required by the points of view previously described. On the contrary, it is their raison d'être, their real justification. The most highly developed research techniques, the most rigorous analyses according to category, the most careful typologies, are no more than the instruments of a deep concern about life, a desire to understand what is happening here and now in a living situation, of which we are a part and whose future depends to some extent—however small—upon ourselves.

In a study of the social aspects of economic development in Latin America it is essential to try to understand how they came to be what they are, and therefore to engage in an exercise, whether modest or extensive, in historical sociology. And for this it is not enough to be content with so-called social history (much of which has yet to be written) although elsewhere it is beginning to combine the best methodological elements of history and social science. Decisive as it may be, it is insufficient, for the social process is only one of the streams in the historical current as a whole. What the Latin American has made of himself—his spiritual attitude and response to life—the happenings in his political struggles and the situations he has encountered have their influence at the present time, in the historical environment in which he is now placed and is striving to frame his aspirations for the future.

/II. DIAGNOSES
II

DIAGNOSES

To obtain knowledge of a contemporary society (Latin America in this case) is perhaps the real purpose of sociology. And the form the acquirement of this knowledge takes is to find out principles of guidance, which in the best of cases cannot dispense with a diagnosis, or at least a prognosis based on a series of alternative hypotheses. A diagnosis as an interpretation of a situation can only be achieved if one has an idea of its structure and the dynamic tendencies that are manifest in it. But both structure and tendencies come from a previous situation and perhaps point towards a new one, the possible attainment of which depends, among other things, upon the external condition of a certain set of circumstances. The path through contemporary considerations leads us back towards history, towards its permanent elements of continuity and circumstance or, we might say, contingency. In view of the concern now manifest to understand the contemporary situation in Latin America (a concern awakened by the idea of its economic development), it is important not to overlook the essential facts of its history which have exerted an influence up to the present time.

If these are not borne in mind irreparable misunderstandings will result. Two of them are of special interest to us here. The first – as it has often been necessary to point out – is that for centuries past Latin America has constituted a fragment, however marginal, of so-called Western culture and not merely in a passive way but by taking an active part in many sectors. It is true that, for better or for worse, Latin America is the product of a gigantic process of "transculturation" which because of its very vastness is still not completed. But it was also so advanced in the main centres that the destiny of the region very soon became linked with that of the West. Sociologically, this means that there is a continuity, or a logic if you prefer, in the evolution of internal situations, so that present-day problems (problems of development, for instance) are not the result of the juxtaposition now of a foreign and a non-traditional culture. Or, to put it another way, there is no break in the historical consciousness.
This is no reason for applying to the cultural situation in Latin America the concern of some thinkers who - in the age of decolonization - are convinced that the "Europeanization" of other regions or countries, whether achieved or in process, is a European problem. It cannot be maintained with regard to Latin America that what carries it on towards its future has no continuity with what has made it historically what it is. The second fact to which attention should be drawn is the tremendous impact on the history of Latin America (indeed, on the Hispanic world in general) of events taking place outside it more than once with adverse effects. As we know, the independence of the whole region, whether achieved peaceably or through violence, was due to Napoleonic ambitions. On the other hand, the consequences of its immediate antecedent (the French Revolution) are more difficult to specify and to assess although they may have been of incalculable importance. The immediate reactions provoked by the Revolution prevented the maturing of the Enlightenment movement, so full of promise, and led to the breakdown of a decisive phase in the historical continuity of Spanish America. The case of the Enlightenment - and of its failure - stands out as a clear example of the effects of an external set of circumstances. From that time onwards however, other influential circumstances of greater or lesser importance can be seen without difficulty. The stages in the politico-social history of Latin America are found to coincide with specific moments in European history (the only universal


6/ As Latin America has been a creator of styles and has hitherto always kept to one style or another, it is significant that such phases could well be designated by artistic or literary names, sometimes representing whole ways of life: the baroque, the romantic, the modernist, the social novel. The dating of the periods, though not imprecise, would not of course be quite sharply defined. This is a subject (of enormous interest from the standpoint of the sociology of culture) that has not yet been developed.

/history at
history at that time) until we reach the period of the world wars. The
significance of the two "Great Wars" in relation to Latin American economic
development and especially to its planning is a matter of common knowledge.

A. THE SO-CALLED REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION

The facts referred to above have a marked effect on the aspect of the
contemporary situation in Latin America. Firstly, because her acutest
problems arise from an internal evolution which puts to the test, above
all, her capacity for building up a culture, her desire to go forward
along her own particular lines. Secondly, because the need to find a
solution has again become pressing on account of external circumstances
and the almost unbelievable general speeding-up of the historical process;
and (although this seems only to apply to Hispanic culture as a whole,
and Latin American culture in particular on account of its slower rhythm
and of reasons which it is not for us to examine here) the accumulation
at one time of questions dealt with successively in other Western zones.
Such problems could have been faced and solved at their own particular
time if it were not for the unavoidable fact of the acceleration of the
historical process as a whole, an acceleration which is due not only, as
it might seem at first, to technological change (the most obvious reason)
but which is even more accentuated if that is possible in the sphere of
awakened consciousness. Urgency - awareness of urgency - is therefore
the essential characteristic of the Latin American scene today.

If we were asked to state in the briefest terms the decisive fact
in the present situation in Latin America, there would be only one
possible answer: the profound revolution through which the whole region is
passing. The term is, of course, used in the non-violent sense in which
it is applied to the Industrial Revolution, as a prolonged process which
brings about changes in all the basic elements of life: in ideas and
systems of production, living standards and social mobility, range of
occupations and power structures.

While the industrial societies properly so-called are already in the
second stage of their development, Latin America, caught within two
periods, is
periods, is still subjected to the stress of the first without being able to escape the repercussions (favourable and unfavourable) of the second. That this radical transformation in depth should here and there give rise to revolutionary situations (in the other sense of the term) is something that is perhaps not necessarily determined by the process itself, but that cannot be denied or prevented. In any case, it is not a matter for consideration here.

1. Validity and limits of structural dualism

Recourse is often had nowadays to the idea of structural dualism for the purpose of providing an intelligible explanation of the situation described.\footnote{The best book in this connexion: J. Lambert, *Le Brésil*, Paris, Armand Colin, 1953.} But this interpretation, valid though it is, being highly evocative and descriptive, is none the less insufficient. According to this thesis, the structure of Latin America is in fact formed by the coexistence of two different societies, coetaneous but not contemporary, the modern and the traditional, the "progressive" and the "archaic"; and the distinction between these two areas of human activity (for the most part separate watertight compartments, or reciprocally influencing one another) explains by itself alone the sociological drama of the region.

The idea of dualism is very precise in the economic field, whence it may have originated and even drawn the terms used to describe it. It means the juxtaposition in a given country – especially as a result of colonization – of two technico-economic complexes infinitely remote from each other. But even in the economic field the theory is not clear or unanimously accepted, inasmuch as there are some who maintain that, in the "underdeveloped" countries, the mule will not be replaced in one generation by the aeroplane, but that both mule and aeroplane will continue, for a long time yet, to fulfil necessary economic functions.
It would not be appropriate to embark here on a discussion of this highly technical and difficult question. Suffice it to quote the following opinion put forward by an economist: 

"...while dualism no doubt brings with it many social and psychological stresses, it has some compensating advantages and represents in a way an attempt by the economy of an underdeveloped country to make the best of its resources during a transitional phase." \(^8\)

The concept of structural dualism is not sociologically inexact either if we base ourselves on an ideal image of the sociologically most advanced countries. These are characterized, in all their social aspects, by being free from abrupt breaks or sharp delineations, showing instead a continuous process of change and gradual transition. This continuum is found between town and country, \(^2\) between income levels, different classes or strata, degrees of education, etc. However, while there is in actual fact a continuum of the image, it appears that it is fully realized in only a few countries, so that all the rest are dualist to a greater or lesser extent.

It would then be inaccurate to identify the idea of structural dualism as a characteristic peculiar to Latin America, even if we ignore two points to which reference has already been made: first, that the distances between the traditional and the modern in Latin America are due to her own internal development process and not to the sudden introduction in a primitive society of the economic institutions of foreign powers; and second, that what is important is not so much the differences and tensions between two different ways of life, as the thread of their continuity – in other words, their interpenetration, the reactions of the backward sectors and the efforts towards expansion of the more advanced. Thus, in a good many Latin American countries, dualism is being weakened and dissolved to a considerable extent by the general spread of "modern" aspirations throughout all areas.


2. The threefold change

Without attempting to deny that something similar is happening in other parts of the world (although not, of course, in the same historical context), it may be said that the transformation in depth which Latin America is experiencing is the result of a threefold process of change supported by movements which in part coincide with it and in part are independent.

(a) Economic change

In the first place, the economic change itself. It is a fact that, from 1929 to 1959, the increase in Latin America's total production followed an ascending curve, at a rate calculated by the economist to be 4 per cent per annum. It is true that the impression is less favourable when production is reckoned per inhabitant and that there are very marked differences between one country and another. But on the whole, during that period, Latin American development was sufficiently rapid to keep pace with population increase. It is true also that some dark patches begin to appear in the picture from 1953 onwards. It is not our task here, without full competence in the matter, to set out the main features of the economic scene. Sociologically, the decisive fact is that this economic movement has existed and still exists, and has aroused a general consciousness - sometimes confused, sometimes clear - of the problems inherent in it. A further step forward would consist in finding out what form some of the components of this new consciousness have taken. And, although the economic indices appear to be obscure on the subject and do not of themselves indicate the social and cultural hypotheses of the phenomenon, a patient interpretation of some of them would disclose something of their sociological significance. Here are some indications by way of illustration. It appears that there is a change in the composition of demand, which implies, in addition to the lesser proportion of exports therein, a change in the composition of the exports. The question is an economic one and can be challenged both as regards its interpretation and the policy it calls for. But there is no doubt that behind the phenomenon there are not only certain changes of circumstances but also /variations in
variations in attitudes and decisions, which imply changes in the collective economic conscience and the advent of new leaders. An economic index such as that of the long-term increase in current State expenditure in a good many countries, in addition to its strictly economic significance, also has a wide social significance, to which we shall have occasion to refer later. And, lastly, there is no point in stressing the social value of the indices, or the changes in the propensities to, or composition of, consumption as they belong indiscriminately to both the subjects under discussion. If the indices were more complete, they would enable us to penetrate, through the changes in consumption "habits", to the psychological stratum of personality, the variations in which are always closely (and sometimes fundamentally) connected with other variations of an institutional nature.

(b) **National integration**

The second factor in the threefold change which we are analysing is the conclusion of the process of national integration in the majority of countries. The fact that they can all count a century and a half of existence might make this statement appear incomprehensible or exaggerated. But if national integration is taken to mean that a considerable proportion of the citizens of a country are capable of taking part in some way in its collective activities, sharing, even to a small extent, in its common values and aspirations, it is obvious that some Latin American countries have not yet reached that stage, and for widely differing reasons - some because of the large numbers of their immigrants, others on account of that part of their original population which has resisted (or rather remained on the fringe of) the process of "transculturation" mentioned above.

For the latter type of countries it has been possible to speak of a cultural division into three sectors (the Indian sector, the sector in transition and the modern sector) and an attempt has been made to measure their significance in terms of volume and percentages. However, in the course of the last century, and especially within the last decades, the process of national integration has been very rapid and has sometimes /been brought
been brought about through events promoted with other ends in view. One result of the Mexican Revolution was, unquestionably, to speed up the advance towards national homogeneity; according to the above-mentioned calculations, in 1940 the purely indigenous sector represented only about 15 per cent of the population. And, though the movement has been slower in other countries, the tendency is the same. In the not too distant future yearnings for the picturesque will be forced to seek satisfaction in literary descriptions. In this connexion other events and figures that are still highly controversial from other points of view - such as the name of Vargas or the phenomenon of "Peronism" - have made their permanent mark. And it must not be forgotten that this process as a whole is linked with the rate of economic progress, under conditions and with effects applicable to both.

(c) Supranational integration

The third stage in this continuous process of transformation in Latin America is that of its own supranational integration. It is a much less clear and less sustained movement than the previous ones, but it undeniably exists as a permanent aspiration - vague, perhaps, yet felt to be inevitable. It is due to complex reasons which we cannot examine here in detail but which in their coalescence show very clearly that, at a certain moment, something which is the product of a heritage, a past, may unite with something which is an impulse towards a future determined by the stimulus of circumstance.

Nevertheless, the first point that must not be overlooked in considering this subject is the relative historical and cultural heterogeneity of the two great components of Latin America. Although the Portuguese sector does not stand entirely apart from this process, it is in the Hispanic sector that it has been most marked. The Hispanic nations are united in taking for granted their common bonds in the modern setting, though perhaps, they retain in their collective subconsciousness the painful scar of separation, and they still respond at every turn to the ideals of their heroes of the Independence, movement, epitomized above all in

/the lofty
the lofty visions of Bolivar. But, with the passage of time, they have had to forge their own destiny as nations, in a sustained and as yet uncompleted effort, which at times led them into conflicts with one another, and more often than not made them act with their backs turned towards each other. Nevertheless, the idea of integration never entirely died out; it was taken up at varying time by this or that group of intellectuals, this or that group of national politicians - and complicated in the latter case by aspirations, if not towards hegemony, at least towards leadership.

The details and vicissitudes of this whole movement are of course worthy of an attention which would be out of place here. Today, in view of the changing horizons opened up by the end of the Second World War and of the new dimensions taken on by world problems, the aspirations towards supranational integration in Latin America corresponds largely to the needs of the times. The shortening of distances due to the techniques of communication, the appearance of vast political configuration, the breaking-up of the nineteenth-century ideas of nationalism, the need (in a world tending towards uniformization) nevertheless to maintain the wealth and variety of the different cultural pattern, leads the Latin American countries to regard themselves once more as a unit, for the purpose of defending their interests, making their voice heard and asserting and showing the value of their own personality. However, in Latin America, as in other parts of the world, centuries of separation, together with certain deeply rooted ideas, place considerable difficulties in the way of political union. And any kind of integration would be impossible unless the idea of limited unions of a functional nature had already existed for some time. In one area or other of common problems (technical, cultural, economic, etc.) it has been found possible to enter into agreements which because of their technical nature do not arouse misgivings or offend long-standing emotional predispositions. A network of functional links of this kind is the efficient implement of integration, which would otherwise be impossible. In regard to what concerns us in this study, it is significant that it should have been
problems of economic development which led to the setting in motion of this kind of integration machinery, making a viable instrument out of what had previously been mere pompous rhetoric. The quiet and lasting work for the economic integration of Central America and the creation, through the Montevideo Treaty, of the Free Trade Area (the first steps towards a Common Market) show the extent to which Latin America is passing from dreams to realities.

B. THE DECLINE OF THE OLD STRUCTURE

This examination of the components of the threefold fundamental change which Latin America is now experiencing is obviously too rapid to be adequate, but it does throw into relief two points: fate seems to delight in facing us simultaneously with manifold problems that others have been able to solve at different times; and there is a vast task before us, calling for the use of exceptional resources. Where are these resources to be found? What kind of leaders are capable at the present time of controlling and directing them?

1. From the "hacienda" to commercial organization

Every social structure is wont to show, in its most diverse sectors and its most unexpected places, the trace and influence of one particular prototype. Present-day industrial societies bear the stamp of the factory system in relationships and ways of life far removed from and without apparent connexion with the factory itself. For a long time every facet of the social structure of Latin America bore traces of the formative influence of one fundamental institution: the "hacienda" (large cultivated estate). All the economic, social and political history of Latin America is largely the history of the consolidation and transformation of that particular economic and social unit. And consequently the story of the gradual downfall of the traditional structure is interwoven with that of the slow decline of this ancient institution. We say "decline" rather than "disappearance" because it still exists and its influence is still felt. The hacienda, needless to say, was not the only economic and social unit of any significance. In the economic field, it shared its importance with the silver-mining towns and the mercantile export centres, and from its earliest times (sixteenth century) it formed part, with them, of that peculiar economic set-up which continued for centuries without
centuries without substantial change until a few decades ago. In the
cultural and political sphere, it had to reckon with the activities of
State and Church, and to accept or endure the growing influence of the
towns. The differences between the Portuguese and Spanish parts of Latin
America are to be found precisely in the different influence exerted in
the course of their history by one or other of these elements. But neither
their specific character nor their particular line of development are of
concern to us here.

If it were possible, a more interesting exercise would be to trace,
from the point of view of the hacienda, the evolution of property rights
from the time when they were first consolidated in the seventeenth
century, through the failure of the eighteenth-century reforms, down to
the liberal-inspired disenfranchising trends in the nineteenth century which
were fatal to the residues of indigenous communal property and established
the concentration of property in the hands of the latifundio owners even
more rigidly than before. And perhaps still more interesting, in the
context of the present work, would be the economic history of the
haciendas, that is to say, the history of the successive variations in
their main products, from the indigo of early times, and the sugar cane,
to which nowadays constitute the basis of Latin American exports. But these
points of interest are in fact accessory to our main subject.

It suffices to recall the decisive fact: the complete emergence of the
hacienda, with all the characteristics which it subsequently maintained,
occurring in the seventeenth century. In other words, the vast geographical
entity of Latin America, which up to that time had only been touched from
without by an impulse confined to a few widely separated towns, began to
take shape from within. An excellent historical account tells us: "...around
the hacienda, rural life – previously little known – began to acquire form
and vigour...", and it adds in a paragraph highly significant for anyone
desirous of understanding later history: "in opposition to the great city,
the bastion of a State growing progressively weaker, the hacienda
represented the power of the large landowners, whose authority in fact was
measured by the number of workers and dependants they had around them and the
amount of land they possessed. At the end of the seventeenth century, the
/hacienda symbolized
hacienda symbolized importance and extent of rural life to a degree which permits us to compare it with the Roman villa during the decline of the Roman Empire. From the economic point of view, therefore, it was the hacienda that formed Latin America, which is still predominantly agrarian. And it did so in what was perhaps the only possible way, having regard to the geographical situation confronting a movement of colonial expansion which did not move forward in successive compact advances but which, within a very short time, manifested itself in dispersed settlements such as have persisted down to the present day. It formed Latin America, too, on a deeper plane: that of its social or, if preferred, its human substance. In Brazil, the work of Freyre gives an account of this formative process, sometimes lost sight of among the rich detail of the petite histoire—an account which has been accepted or criticized, according to differences of temperament or point of view, but which nevertheless paves the way for a continued analysis of this great task. There is nothing comparable in Spanish America though there are scattered fragments awaiting someone who will use them to build up a comprehensive picture. In what follows we shall merely attempt to give a very brief sociological outline as an aid in understanding the situation as it is today.

What has, in fact, been the sociological significance of the hacienda in the whole of Latin American life? What follows, we need hardly say, is in no sense an apology. As we know, a methodological requirement in the building-up of a type is purity of characteristics, which unfortunately, is never met with in practice. To begin with, the very term hacienda is a composite abstraction used to denote a richly diverse reality, varying according to regions, periods, and types of activity and known, moreover, by different names: ingenio, rancho, fundo (plantation, ranch, rural property), etc.

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/Having made
Having made the above point, we can go on to look at the sociological features of the *hacienda* that concern us here, listing them first, for purposes of clarity: (a) the *hacienda* was a centre of political and military power as well as of economic power; (b) it formed the nucleus of a widespread patriarchal system; (c) it was authority's epitome; (d) it gave rise to a particular human type or "character".

We can only touch very lightly on each of these features here. Since it first emerged in definite form, the *hacienda* has been something more than a unit of economic production. It was the means of establishing order in the vast empty tracts of agrarian land, and consequently became a nucleus of political power, tolerated, or used, according to circumstances, by the State authorities and sometimes granted or assuming on its own account a military significance. In frontier areas this military significance was inevitable, and in the Hispanic world the function in question was recognized from early times by various honorary titles; *capitanes, maestres de campo*, and the famous *adelantados* or provincial governors. This politico-military significance, which of course already existed in the Kingdom of the Indies, persisted well into the Independence. Carranza, for instance, remained a powerful landowner. The debased forms which the phenomenon took at the time of *caudillismo* have received special attention, as does anything spectacular. But few people have analysed the significance of this politico-military nucleus as a factor making for stabilization and continuity when the governmental and bureaucratic machinery of the Empire collapsed and the social framework had to be kept together during long years of anarchy and of fluctuating political structure following the emergence of the new nations. For that reason it is worth mentioning here the pertinent "suggestions" of a foreign observer, Frank Tannenbaum, as yet awaiting systematic development - an undertaking which is doubtless rendered more difficult by the persistent academic traditions of political history.

/*The *hacienda*
The *hacienda* was also something more than a form of property. It was the support of a family and the symbol of a name. From his territorial redoubt, the head of the *hacienda* sought and concluded alliances with other heads of families, and these family federations, with their recognized chiefs, extended over whole regions and to some extent "organized" them. As we know, however, the owner of the *hacienda* did not remain all the time on his estate; both in the Portuguese and the Spanish zones he used to take up residence in a town which might be the nearest one or sometimes might be the distant capital. Family relations and federations by relationship were therefore not confined to rural domains but, through the towns, extended over the whole country.

The *hacienda* thus became the support of the kind of family structure which continues to exist in the Ibero-American countries in more or less attenuated form up to the present day and which so surprises and disconcerts the outside observer. This family structure, comprising not only close family relationships but also complex bonds of friendship could be studied in terms of the functional theory so dear to modern times. It might perhaps also be maintained that, while nepotism was one of the disfunctional factors in such a situation, the network of "personal" relationships and bonds of friendship which it also involved was, on the other hand, a functional element or at least a latent structure which made possible on more than one occasion the suppression or attenuation of violence in politics that were nearly always passionate. This point could be made without introducing into the serious question of sociological consideration the aesthetic factor of the "charm" of this system of "personal" association.

But, if we admit that the *hacienda* was an economic unit, a political nucleus and the material support of a family and its circle, this means that it must be regarded as a closed social group, when account is also taken of the large number of servants which formed its base. And, like any other social group, it can resolve itself into a web of continuously repeated human relationships with a system of functions and duties involving in each case specific rights and obligations. To /detail these
detail these functions and duties is a matter for historical description. What concerns us here is the supreme, the principal function: that of authority. "Over each and all, from his eldest son to the least of his slaves, the chief of the hacienda exercises his authority, at once tyrannical and protective, in degrees varying according to complex factors and circumstances." 11/ "At once protective and tyrannical" signifies authoritarian and paternal. And this image of the relationships of subordination — protection and obedience, arbitrariness and graciousness, faithfulness and resentment, violence and charity — which in its origin is a replica of the characteristics of the far-off monarchical domination was maintained intact for a long time after the king had been replaced by a President of the Republic. The model of authority created by the hacienda spread and penetrated through all the relationships, of command, embodying in the paternalistic employer the notion of authority persisting in the popular mind.

No one would claim that this manifestation is peculiar to Latin America. The practical forms of domination (to describe it in Weberian terms) have always been a mixture of the legal, the traditional and the charismatic. Legal domination is only now beginning to be fully achieved within the combination of "secondary systems" of the advanced industrial societies. And complete adaptation to the sentimental vacuum left by the extinction of the paternal authority is a universal problem which each and all must face. In Europe — to leave aside the exceptional case of the United States — the transition has been slow and it was attenuated, among other things, by the gradual interposition of the machinery of government bureaucracies, which accustomed the people little by little to the existence of impersonal, objective regulations. The greater rapidity of the process in Latin America left widespread traces of nostalgia for the lost father-figure, and it is not surprising to see it still in the aspect of some of her political movements. The change was sometimes so abrupt that,

11/ G. Céspedes del Castillo, op. cit.
as in Bolivia, it seemed to take place from one moment to the next. And one of the most fascinating sociological enigmas still awaiting investigation is to discover what happened in the minds of the good Quechus and Aymaras who passed overnight from deep-rooted obedience to their paternalistic employer to intelligent compliance with trade union rules.

Lastly, the hacienda as a social unit (or social system in the language of today) has its particular character. But we must not make too much of this point if, as we should do here, we wish to avoid entering the boundless domains of cultural sociology and philosophical anthropology. The subject is obviously linked with that of the hierarchy of values in the traditional Latin American world, and it naturally fascinates foreign observers. The hacienda system is often spoken of as "feudal" which, technically, is absurd. It would be less so if the much wider term "seigneurial" were used. Then the figure which indicates the character type is the seigneur (seigneur of the hacienda, the livestock ranch, the plantation, etc.) and he is endowed with the special characteristics everywhere attributed to this type of man: a sense of being of the elect, even among devout Catholics; magnanimity and a noble bearing; dilettantism in the rare cases when he is a cultivated man; personal fearlessness; contempt of death; and a capacity for staking his life impossibly on a single card; all this to meet the demands of a duty held to be absolute. For the rest, compliance according to his status with the undefined requirements of noblesse oblige. The foregoing is, of course, an exemplary image; but when those qualities are deformed or debased, they serve to foment a vicious evil in Latin American society. Magnanimity becomes the ostentatious squandering of the señorito and virile indifference in the face of a noble death is transformed into an obsession for morally empty "masculinity". Even if we take the highest expressions, aesthetic, moral and religious, of this seigneurial existence, they are clearly not the best suited to the requirements of modern economy. But their influence on the pattern of the economic ethics of the Ibero-American should be looked into more closely. Similarly, little is known about the extension of the Weberian thesis of the Latin American scene; in other words, a duly objective, impartial and rigorous investigation into the

/influence of
influence of the Catholic Church, both in the formation of these fundamental
economic attitudes and in the actual development of Latin American economy,
has not yet been made. The seigneurial way of life has gone beyond recall
and with it some of its virtues and qualities. There may be some who deplore
its disappearance and think that with it a brilliant streak in the spectrum
of life's colours has vanished. But this is not the case; for what they
omit to say is that values which were at the origin of a form of life but
do not serve to form the structure of a new one are not capable of handing
on any originality of example. In Alfred Weber's words, a culture dies only
when it is incapable of reacting creatively in continuity of style to the
"aggregate of life" which the general advance of the historical process
 inexorably presents.

It is impossible to trace in detail here the history of the dissolution
of the hacienda system, or to be more precise, its transformation into other
types of economic operation and social relations. Passing over the details
we can, however, state that the causes were economic and proceeded from the
foreign market as well as from home markets. We could trace the thread of
known economic indices, relating either to exports or to changes in total
demand. But we must confine ourselves here to making one affirmation and
giving a few significant examples.

It is generally asserted that the hacienda broke up in proportion as
it became more and more "commercialized" or, in other words, as it took
on the characteristics of a profit-making concern. From this distance in
time we can see that the introduction of refrigeration in Argentina, in 1876,
was the first modern impetus in the transformation of the hacienda of the
pampas. A little later, the installation of freezing arrangements not only
led to technical advances in stock-farming methods but also gave rise to a
new social group which looked towards the towns and direct trade contacts
with Europe and which rapidly acquired wealth and powerful political influence.

It would be out of place here to attempt to trace all the repercus-
sions of this phenomenon. In another part of Latin America, far from the
one mentioned above, and much later on, there was the appearance of cash-
crop farming, arising out of a combination of economic and political

circumstances, and
circumstances, and its significance has been carefully analysed by R.N. Adams in his excellent study on Guatemala.\textsuperscript{12} In that instance, the main social effect was immediate: the uprooting from the haciendas of their permanent labour force, which became a part of the mobile proletariat, either rural or urban.

Lastly, among the studies of this kind in Brazil, a "type-study", has been produced on the changes in the structure of the traditional sugar plantation.\textsuperscript{13} In careful and concise sociological terms it explains the circumstances in which the old family plantation, managed by the seigneur, has become the modern factory operated by a limited company. The climax came with a crisis in the classic cultivation of sugar cane for export and the protective measures introduced by the Government with the establishment of the Instituto del Azucar y del Alcohol (Sugar and Alcohol Institute). The main point was that the new commercial concern no longer had the total freedom of the old plantation; it had in future to reckon with Government regulations (concerning volume of production, relations with contractors, market prices, techniques, etc.) with labour laws and with trade union action. This represents a complete transition from one age to another. Many such cases might be quoted, all related to the question of foreign markets.

But the home market, too, contributed towards the transformation of the hacienda by revealing everywhere its inadequacy. In many areas agricultural production under the traditional system was not enough to meet the continually increasing food requirements. The structural reforms we have mentioned (though we have spoken only from the economic point of view) were above all due to an awareness of this problem. The time for easy-going ways had passed once and for all. To realize something of this, it is enough at


times to take a look at the actual situation. We give below the observations of one who, without need of statistics, saw with the clear, kindly and penetrating eye of the philosopher, and set down his thoughts, in passing, in very characteristic style, at the end of a brilliant philosophical and literary essay: "For, Argentinians, we must make haste. Time is flying and, for America, there is little doubt that colonial life, even in its most progressive forms, is at an end. Colonial economy is on its deathbed and so, too, is the rest of that way of life. And the end of colonial life means the end of living *ex abundancia* - the wide open spaces are becoming peopled. The population is increasing; there is no longer plenty of good and free and much of the free land has been found to be not good. So long as there was land enough and to spare history could not begin .... But now the history of America, in the full force of the term, is about to begin." 14/

2. Paternalism, anxiety and impersonal organization

The German word *Sachlichkeit* is difficult to translate into Spanish and other European languages. "Objectivity" has many shades of meaning related to logic and gnosiology: *coseidad* (from *cosa*, thing) has a definitely metaphysical flavour. Yet some such word is needed to express at once the essence of the culture and of the social structure of the most advanced industrial societies: the pure and simple dominion of "things". Tasks are specifically defined within their material confines, as part of a comprehensive plan based on objective, and as far as possible, "scientific" data. Work, even in the most fragmentary or part-time form, is subject to precise regulations and failure to comply with them would break the whole chain of which it is a part. Human relationships are functionalized and they too depend upon the "thing" that each person does or represents. The whole of life advances as though upon rails (Freyre), directed by almost automatic pointsmen. Man in the industrial societies accepts - has become accustomed to - this rigidity, which is a direct outcome of "things",

and, even if he does not "rejoice" in his work, he does exactly what his job requires of him. Protected by the guarantees afforded by a complex system of social legislation, he concentrates his interest on the "enjoyment" of his ever longer leisure time. It is questionable whether this represents real fulfilment, and cultural criticism strives to point out and overcome its shortcomings.

However, that is not our concern here. Latin America is far from being an "affluent" or a "consumer" society. Her problems are still those of a society of producers whose aim is greater productivity. But such transitional problems are not less serious, and may sometimes involve great dangers from the social point of view.

We have already given some indication of the transition, when we outlined the change from hacienda to commercial undertaking. What concerns us now is to draw attention, however briefly, to some of the basic human problems involved in that change. In a final analysis, they can all be summed up in one: the vacuum created by the extinction or deterioration of the traditional paternalism - the unfortunate gap which occurs when one institution collapses before the next has come into being to replace it. The customs of the old paternalism afforded some sort of buttress (perhaps not very strong, but a support all the same) against psychological anxiety, the public or practically public organizations of today (whether State, municipal, or trade union) now provide assistance, unsentimental, impersonal, but perhaps materially more effective, because calculable and predictable. In the intermediate stage, which is not always short, there is nothing but anxiety and despair.

The customs of the paternalistic structure were based on three main beliefs: (a) belief in the warm value of personal relationships; (b) belief in help that would not fail in a time of crisis, and (c) belief in the unknown and, therefore, unlimited power of the chief. When these conditions cease to apply men have to make the effort to build up out of their own experience ideas and intellectual guidance to take their place. Where are they to find the trust of the protector or the kindness of the neighbour? To whom can they go in anxious times of illness, difficult periods of unemployment, or
unemployment, or troubles with authorities or with incomprehensible regulations? And above all, whom shall they follow, where shall they turn for advice in the disheartening chaos of a world in confusion? The best observers of the various countries of Latin America at the present time stress this fact, and all agree upon one word - "uprooting" - to indicate the psycho-social state of large masses of the population, both urban and rural.

One country, an especially important one, will serve as an example. Charles Wagley, in his admirable description of the Brazilian "revolution" since 1930,15/ rightly stresses the fact that the lower levels of urban labour, of which there are such vast numbers working in Rio and Sao Paulo in industry and in the building trade (which, incidentally, is on the increase), are not, strictly speaking, an "urban proletariat" in the European sense, that is to say, impregnated from head to foot with urban values, and that workers on the large plantations feel as uprooted as do urban employees, because they are now completely cut off from their traditional ways of life. Nevertheless, in this context it is of interest to note one decisive factor (because of the possibility of its becoming widespread) which is expressed as follows by Wagley: "For the time being, however, it seems that the effects of the Brazilian revolution are filtering through from the cities into rural zones mainly through the channel of the workers on large plantations. 16/

Concerning the significance still pertaining to the old image of seigneurial authority, to which we shall have to refer again later, and since we have already mentioned Bolivia, let us quote the opinion of someone who knows that country well and has written what is probably the best study to date of its agrarian reform: "Even today the pattern of paternalism persists

16/ Ibid., p. 217.
in the relations between *campeños* and the government. The *campeños* believe their problems will be resolved promptly if they can only set them personally before Don Herman or Don Victor*.\(^{17}\) And it is no secret that the President of Mexico is an almost sacred, untouchable figure.

The theory of structural dualism still affords a good basis on which to seek a preliminary interpretation of the situation in Latin America. However, we have preferred to trace in a little more detail the three main components of the transition through which Latin America is passing. But, above all, we have yielded to the temptation to look - perhaps a little too long, in view of the brevity of this study - at what has happened within a structure determined by privilege.

3. "Accelerated urbanization" and "demographic explosion"

It may be objected that, with all this, we have passed over in silence facts that are more important and that now deserve particular attention: the so-called "demographic explosion" and the phenomenon of "urbanization". But it so happens that neither can be fully understood without being seen in relationship to the characteristics and peripeties of the *hacienda* system which we have briefly outlined.

The marked increase in the population of Latin America is an acknowledged fact. The main rates of this increase, as generally accepted, and a complete examination of all its different facets, constitute a technical problem which does not concern us. Its relation to economic development is equally well known, the rate of economic growth remaining higher than that of population increase. Up to now, and over a long period, this has been so; but there is no guarantee that it will necessarily continue so in the future if things are left to look after themselves.

At any rate, Latin America is certainly not for the present an over-populated continent, except for a few countries and areas. The increase in population in many parts still serves as a stimulus to economic expansion,

\(^{17}\)  Richard W. Patch, "Bolivia: United States Assistance in a Revolutionary Setting", in: R.N. Adams et al., *op. cit.*, p.141
provided of course that the economy continues to develop. There is no need therefore for heated arguments about Malthusian theory, though the subject, outside the present sphere, does need to be discussed. On the other hand, what is important in the present context, where attention has been centred on the traditional system of the hacienda, is to recall the nature of the parallel process of industrialization and demographic expansion in Europe. For, at least in some European countries the beginnings of industrialization coincided with the "liberation" of the peasant population as a result of land reform.

To embark on the much discussed subject of urbanization, the present rapid increase in the urban population in Latin America is due not so much to natural increase as to a mass immigration from the rural areas which it is sometimes almost impossible to absorb. This means that the masses in question are compelled to leave their rural environment more on account of the deficiencies in the agrarian structures than on account of the attraction (which does, however, undoubtedly exist) of the incipient industrial system in the towns. Consequently, the problem of urbanization can be studied from a purely economic standpoint, requiring a speeding-up of the creation of industrial occupations capable of absorbing the surplus agricultural population; starting with this simple proposition the problem would then be complicated by numerous questions of a technical nature. Or - as is not infrequently done - it can be studied as a social problem, inasmuch as it manifests itself in many structural changes. But if it is mainly the result of the "expulsion" of impoverished peasants (as is the case in Latin America) what is happening, in economic parlance, is a mere transference of the problems of poverty from the country to the town, giving rise to the variety of pitiful situations with which social welfare has to deal.

Nevertheless, the universal indices of urbanization and the hypothesis of a correlation (which cannot be proved) between urbanization and economic development tell us nothing about the past and present relationship between town and country, between urban centre and hacienda, in Latin America. The inedia town (founded by the early settlers from Spain or Portugal) was not in principle, and exclusively, an economic centre (in the sense used in

/Neberian typology
Weberian typology). In the Spanish zone, especially, it was a political foundation and, although some of these towns were not without a commercial aspect, the town was a cultural centre. While the hacienda made Latin America materially, by organizing as best it could that vast geographical area, the town made Latin America by being the seat of its "spiritual power". And this is still the case today.

D.F. Sarmiento's brilliant book Facundo, in its sub-title "Civilization and Barbarie" with an exaggeration characteristic of every expressive formula - lighted upon the most absorbing and decisive theme in the whole political and social history of Latin America. To bring it up to date, with less passion and with the aid of modern research techniques (although its literary force would be lost in that way), is a task for future writers of social history, who will probably have to clear up a great many points. Here we can only use the theme as a link.

The indiana town, being more particular an administrative entity, had from the beginning, alongside its resident members of the rural aristocracy, its civil servants and its "doctors"; it also had its traders, from the powerful ones of the consulados (commercial courts) to those on a lower level, who organized the considerable smuggling, and, lastly, the small artisans and shopkeepers. Throughout the history of Latin America, there was one group, comprising the owners of the haciendas, the doctors and the traders, whose influence was decisive. And if there was one other thing which, because of its political effects, accentuated the basic divergence, it was the division that came into being between the modern, cultural licenciados or university graduates, and the less cultured, traditionalist rural "chiefs". The history of these two rival forces is the history of the ideologies prevailing until well into the twentieth century.

C. THE IDEOLOGICAL DISINTEGRATION

The gradual decline of Latin America's social structure, centred on the hacienda as its prototype and its symbol, was accompanied by a no less significant change in the sphere of thought: the change in a social configuration was paralleled by the disintegration of an ideology. When the former had completely collapsed, therefore, a complex intellectual perturbation was bound to set in and to spread.

/1. Liberalism
1. **Liberalism and independence**

The Independence movement was inspired by the desire for liberty, and for that reason, from the beginning, liberalism was identified with the substance and the _raison d'être_ of the new States. Much was made of the libertarian and constitutional ideas that came in particular from France and North America, and in this way unfamiliar formulæ (unfamiliar, having regard to the actual situation and the origins of the new historical organisms) were evolved, such as, for instance, the federal concepts that were destined sometimes to have a tragic influence in later years.

As we are not called upon here to trace the history of ideas, we may perhaps accept the above simplification, without dwelling upon a well-known fact: the term "liberalism" is in reality of Spanish origin, and in its formation, like that of its fellow constitutionalism, there are Hispanic strains, going back through the age of Enlightenment to the great scholastics and the age-old usages of some kingdoms of the Peninsula. But at the time of the Independence movement, "liberty", whether of the old or the new cast, was personified in the new political leaders and was the watchword adopted with one accord by the opponents of the "oppression" of metropolitan absolutism. The formative power of this initial stand has been decisive up to modern times for the destiny of Latin America. It is true that there have been military revolts, _coups d'état_ and numbers of constitutional changes; but it is also true that there has never been open denial of the ideals of the Independence movement, and that even under the most blatant adventurers the letter of the constitution still paid respectful tribute to the principles of liberalism.

The real history of Latin America takes place in the nineteenth century, and even up to then it was much closer than some people would believe to the history of the peninsula and yet the influence of the original climate of independent America is the only decisive difference. In the final count, for anyone who is familiar with national myths - and how can this myth be disregarded? - it
disregarded? It is the distance that separates the battle of Lepanto from the battle of Ayacucho. And yet, as myths are very far from being without foundation or influence, Spanish America, despite its periods of violence, has so far been able to avoid the tragic rupture between the two Spains announced in the well-known book by the Portuguese writer Fidelino de Figueiredo, inspired, perhaps, by another famous Portuguese, Oliveira Martins.

Now the fact that liberty, the democratic and constitutional aspiration, was one of the essential elements in the moral climate originally prevailing in Latin America gave rise to the first great paradox of her history: that for a long time she maintained side by side with each other in complete disaccord, the tenets of an ideology and the "beliefs" and actual behaviour of day-to-day life. Over a framework of agrarian structure and traditional life was spread the thin cloak of a predominantly liberal and urban doctrine. The hacienda owners, busy keeping order in their territories, for the most part followed the old ways; the "doctors" in the towns, for their part, strove to implant the grandiose visions taken from their books and, without of course despising the use of arms, preferred the printed and the spoken word.

The contrast was much less acute in Brazil, where a constant historical continuity made it possible to lessen the distances between the doctrines of the capital and the real life of the hacendados (hacienda owners). But in Spanish America, left to herself in the almost complete isolation entailed for the Americas by the Vienna treaties and the Monroe declarations, the contrast continued — often breaking out into tremendous violence — throughout the whole of the romantic era. In many parts, attenuations and compromises exerted a moderating influence; and where that happened (as in Chile) the real organization of the State began early. As a rule, however, the date of Monte Caseros is generally taken as marking the beginning of a new period.

The significance of this compromise, where it occurs (during approximately the same period), is the political formula in which it finds expression, namely, the distinction between the liberal and the conservative parties.

Around 1860,
Around 1860, the scene began to change and Latin America as a whole entered upon a period of greater stability. Nevertheless, its original structure persisted almost intact. The isolation was finally broken, regular and continuous trade with the outside world began, and, with the importance of exports in the trade balance, there began also the influence on the internal economies of the price variations in foreign markets — caused by the alternation between lean years and fat years, a factor which, according to Siegfried, has had such an influence on the inclinations of the Latin American mentality, in its sometimes fatalistic, sometimes optimistic, liking for games of chance (this subject has also been brilliantly treated by another Frenchman, R. Caillios). The profitable nature of exports changed the mentality of the hacienda owners and an increasing number of them allotted a small or large part of their land to agriculture and raising cattle for export — in most cases, undoubtedly, in operational conditions that were poor, economically speaking.

2. The "traditional political class"

What concerns us in the present study is to recall how, during this time, a new "political class" was coming into being and alongside it a new intellectual élite. Especially in its early stages, the influences of liberalism were political and doctrinaire; they stimulated religious controversies (clericalism and anticlericalism, particularly on the Spanish side) and caused divisions on questions which seem futile and unimportant when seen from the distance of the present. But although the economic side was not spared, the orthodoxy of the Manchester school spread much more easily, once the virulence of other doctrinal controversies had calmed down and, with the passage of time, other shades of European liberal opinion spread (especially English philosophical radicalism, and in particular the ideas of Bentham) ending up in the later years of the nineteenth century with the reign of positivism (whether or not of the purity of Comte) which had so great an influence on the "modernization" of Brazil, Mexico and Chile.

However, the decisive influence was the authority acquired by the "classic school" in economic science, with the result that both conservatives
and liberals made their policies conform to the rules of this one orthodoxy. For this reason it seems unjust to forget that this new political class - born of the union or harmonious coexistence of liberals and conservatives - not only pieced together the fragments of a State which, good or bad, had perished with the downfall of the Empire, but also, in a few decades, built up the economic infrastructure (ports, roads, railways, etc.) which has served Latin America almost up to the present day. It did so, of course, according to the ideas of the times, and by means of concessions which now seem like surrenders, and economic errors. Of course, too, disorder was rampant and privilege existed in certain interests. In some parts, the railways handed over to the States (Brazil) still constitute a problem because of the lack of interconnexion and the incredible variety of gauges, and in others, as in Argentina, the railways primarily served the private interests of the exporters.

With all its faults, this imperfect structure was the work of the "oligarchy" (using the term in its strict, neutral sociological sense) and it is still the basis for the undertakings of today. This must not be taken as an apology. What we have been trying to do is to bring out the fact that, over a long period, people thought and acted within the confines of a doctrine which, whether we like it or not, was exact and clear cut. And this applied both to the "left" and to the "right". It was not for nothing that Garcia Moreno, the personification of the extreme right, was also responsible for the building of the high road between Quito and Guayaquil, a marvel of engineering skill in its day.

3. The cosmopolitan élite and the moulding of the new ruling class

The opening-up of Latin America to the world, which was what occurred at this time, also brought with it a train of new ideas. The hacienda owners travelled; their children were educated by nurses and Fräulein; and - even if many of them squandered in Paris the wealth amassed by their labourers - a fair number helped to form or encouraged the existence of a cultural minority of physicians, engineers, professors and men of letters. Alongside this political class, or sometimes mingled with it, there arose the /great cosmopolitan
great cosmopolitan élite which has run Latin America and which, while it
might at times have been snobbish, preferring French to Spanish, and have
displayed little national feeling, nevertheless had considerable achievements
to its credit.

It is easy nowadays to criticize the "thinkers" of that time for their
incapacity for specialized work (they did not publish books on physics, logic
or history in the limited, rigorous, German style, such as they might have
written); but theirs was a different mission and they certainly carried it
out faultlessly. Foreign observers are puzzled by the aesthetic dilettantism
of these thinkers, but it is now clear from the work of José Gaos that they
could not have acted otherwise and that they accepted their lot in full
awareness. They form the long sequence of maestri naliones, builders and
educators of their peoples, which culminates — in time at least — with the
Hispanic figure of Ortega y Gasset, and without them the patient work of
specialization performed today by the new generations would not have been
possible.

Towards the end of that epoch the cosmopolitan élite began to meditate
on their own, and their meditations found expression in a brand of modernism
evolved by certain brilliant poets and writers who happened to be members
of the consular service and who thus carried into Europe their particular
literary style (known, for this reason as literature consular). The best
examples of these "cosmopolitans" were not, however, oblivious of the anxieties
and problems of their home countries. Alfonso Reyes was a cosmopolitan
figure of world-wide culture and interests, and yet a Mexican through and
through.

Little by little this cosmopolitan élite, of oligarchical origin, was
first supplemented, then completely or almost completely replaced in the
last few years of the immediate past, by a new group of leaders. To a large
extent, this was brought by the action of these elements themselves, not
merely through the influence of their personalities but also through the
work of the universities, which from the beginning were striving for reform
or innovation. But these new intellectual and professional groups differed

/from the
from the previous ones for two reasons - first, their very different origins and, second, the nature and quality of their education. The members of this new ruling class came from the new middle class that was then emerging - the sons of other professional people (perhaps themselves of humbler origin), or of well-to-do families in industrial and commercial circles, or even, later on, from the more prosperous levels of the proletariat. In their childhood and adolescence, they did not receive their education from nurses and governesses but entirely from State establishments of secondary and higher education. This twofold difference could not fail to have marked influences. To begin with, it diminished the cosmopolitan tendencies of those whose fortunes had enabled them from their youth to be plurilingual - tendencies fostered, moreover, by the frequency and ease with which they were able to travel abroad. Intellectual development was henceforward to be "of domestic origin" (if we may use in this connexion a current economic term), which meant, on the other hand, an accentuation of (even sometimes an exclusive concern with) the situation in the home country, as the only one known and experienced directly. But there is also no doubt that this education "of domestic origin" was bound to be slightly second-hand, i.e., without direct contact with the original sources. And, except in special cases and where the greatest efforts are made, this cannot but result in a lowering of the educational level. To put it more plainly, the men in question were no longer of the class educated, as often as not, at Oxford, Paris, Berlin or Harvard; they were hard-working students (at least, the best were: the others, obviously, are of no interest, and are to be found everywhere) of the Universities of San Andrés or San Carlos, to mention only two among such institutions in the various capitals or in the provinces. This brief excursion into sociology, then, enables us to see that there are undeniably significant compensatory elements. What was lost on the one hand in quality of education was, indeed, gained on the other in awareness of and interest in everything pertaining to the home country.

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18 This expression ought not to give offence; all culture, in the last analysis, is second-hand, and is becoming increasingly so.

/ The new
The new ruling class, more "provincial" but perhaps more genuine—than its predecessor, of course tries, at first, to be like the latter in every respect: in its tastes, its modes of thought and feeling, and its behaviour. In the course of time, thanks to the improved standard of living and also to the improved educational facilities afforded (especially in recent years) by the many systems of national and international fellowships, this new class, too, was able to look directly towards the outside world, without, however, being "cosmopolitan" in the same sense as its predecessor. Its interpretation of that world, though doubtless fascinating, does not concern us here. But there is another matter which does concern us: the fact that this change, which at the beginning involved an almost universal desire for assimilation, was replaced by an impulse towards differentiation. Things began to be viewed from a different standpoint. This change of outlook, focusing on the situation inside Latin America, led to the discovery of inadequacies. The attitude of calm assent was shaken, the status quo no longer accepted; and criticism, disgust, and finally in some cases, revolt, began. In a word, the generations of "protesters" made their appearance on the social and intellectual scene throughout Latin America.

This protest movement, which varied in volume according to the country and the circumstances, seems to have become particularly strong in the years preceding the First World War and the date that naturally comes to mind is 1910, the beginning of the Mexican Revolution. In fact it was certainly some years later, after the war, that it reached its peak, when it spread throughout Latin America, as did the social novel at the time of its predominance. In this connexion, for those interested in the sociology of culture, the period of the social novel is of equal interest, in its profound significance, with the periods of modernism, romanticism or the baroque. Of course—and this is no matter for polemics with learned historians of Spanish American literature—there were also at that time dadaism, creationism and ultraism, just as years later there have been existentialism of different shades, surrealism and neo-classicism. But perhaps the sociologist, even though not a Marxist, would try to explain these phenomena (the part that can be explained in sociological terms) 

/as being
as being the result of the same general and deep-rooted causes. In any case - to employ the terms in current usage - it is the "committed" literature rather than the purely literary writing that serves to describe a whole decisive period in the social history of Latin America.

This "committed" literature, what is known as the social novel, covers the whole of Latin America, without exception; but it is significant that it flourishes especially in the so-called "banana republics". As a typical example we may take Ecuador, one of the most beautiful and least-known republics of the whole continent, be it said in passing. Angel A. Rojas, in his Historia de la novela ecuatoriana, the literary and strictly critical merits of which are outside our province, preceded his accounts of the various stages of the genre, by a few brief sketches of the political and social situation, which, assuming we accept them for the moment as good ones, are of obvious interest to the sociologist. The period of the social novel, therefore, provides us with plentiful data - subject to confirmation and criticism, of course - on the confused political, economic and - especially - cultural situation of those years, which is also to be seen, without difficulty, in other Latin American countries in the same period. For various reasons, we can hardly follow these situations step by step. But, on account of what we shall see later, it is appropriate to bear in mind that, alongside the internal and external events which disturbed or - in the case of the latter - had repercussions on Ecuadorian life, there were never in the intellectual history of the republics so many widely differing spiritual and literary influences as at that time.

The result of this diversified experience was a splendid flowering of the social novel, its stylistic merits perhaps not entirely to our taste, but its powerful human qualities unquestionable. The chief authors, of the Guayaquil school especially (Aguilera Malca, Gil Gilbert, Gallegos Lara, Alfredo Pareja, etc.), are universally known and had a great influence throughout Latin America - not only in political matters. The title Guasipungo became a symbol of the whole of this non-conformist generation.

pledged to transform Latin America from its very core. Ecuador, we repeat, has been taken as a particularly representative example; but what the aforesaid generation stood for can readily be seen, though perhaps in less concentrated form, in other countries.

4. Digression concerning the University and the "intellectuals"

Needless to say, the members of the new ruling class were not all equally "protesters". Something should be said of the "constructive" ones, despite the ugliness of the term. It is also interesting to dwell for a moment on the sociology of the intellectuals, a subject which we shall have to consider later in another connexion. We have already had occasion to mention the university, which by its nature served as a minimum defence against one of the many unjustified accusations which used to be levelled with such ease against the old oligarchy. An institution like the university would in any case have to be considered in these pages, prompted by the widespread interest that is taken in the so-called social aspects of economic development. Indeed, a question which at the present time is in the forefront of people's minds (and rightly so) is the connexion between the desired economic growth and institutions for higher education.

There is no point in stressing here the famous vicious circle of state of education and state of economic prosperity. Economic growth is inadequate because it does not receive the necessary technical and intellectual support from the university; the university, on the other hand, is inadequate because the country which maintains it is not possessed of enough wealth. For many reasons — without quoting Galbraith's Affluent Society — it may be said that the circle is not as vicious as it seems; and it is now and then necessary to cut the Gordian knot in the most classic and expeditious way. However, although acknowledged examples may be quoted of historical developments that, at their most vigorous, have had little need of support from the university, there is no denying that such cases hardly ever occur today. The vast "apparatus", compounded of a variety of technical and scientific knowledge together with ability for management and administration, that is required for the modern industrial /or commercial
or commercial undertaking is far beyond the sphere of improvisation, and
not even the most brilliant entrepreneur of the old style would dare to
rely on his own capabilities alone for setting it in motion.

There are a number of easily solvable problems in this connexion,
for, as in the general field of education, it is not impossible to
calculate sufficiently in advance the type and number of experts
(including "all-rounders") required for a specific development programme,
given the hypotheses on which the plans are based. It is also not impossible
to indicate, in general, the type of professions to which greater preference
should be given, although it is well to avoid hasty conclusions prompted by
some of the popular preconceptions of our times, which might oblige us on
occasion to change the title of the well-known book by P. Calamdre:
instead of "Too many lawyers" we might, for instance, have to admit that
there were "too many engineers". Lastly, there are questions relating to
organization in the universities which bear some relation to economies.
Work is being done and still remains to be done on this and similar questions
at the present time. But in essentials one not infrequently comes across a
number of absurdities, and it is to be feared that some of the views set out
below will run counter to quite a few of the opinions expressed at the present
time.

The university is a venerable institution in Spanish America. As the
dates are in dispute, and as there is some slight national rivalry in the
matter, it is expedient to shift the responsibility to an outside authority.
"When the colleges were developing and growing, they aspired to become
universities. Less than half a century after the discovery, in 1538, the
college of the Dominican friars in the town of Santo Domingo was authorized
to call itself the University of Saint Thomas Aquinas; in 1540 permission
was granted for the creation of another university there — the University
of Santiago de la Paz ... In 1551, the Spanish crown decided to found
universities in the capitals of the two vice-royalties then existing: one
in Mexico City and the other in Lima; these were inaugurated in 1553."20/

20/ Pedro Henríquez Ureña, Historia de la Cultura en la América Hispánica,
We will leave aside all controversial matters, which do not concern us here. It suffices to quote the approximate dates. These "traditional" universities remained intact until the time of the Independence, when an attempt was made to transform them, even in the prevailing circumstances of struggle and conflict. The task then begun could only be carried to an effective conclusion later on, in calmer times. The details are unnecessary. The main point is that this new European type of university was intended, in accordance with the educational ideals then obtaining (and those of Bello, for instance, are by no means too antiquated), to meet the needs of the professions considered most important at the time. That they benefited at the same time the political and the ruling classes should be no matter for surprise to a sociologist.

No institution can escape the ageing process; thus in this case, too, the university belonging to an outmoded social system began to show signs of arteriosclerosis. About the second decade of the twentieth century, no one perceived these better than the students themselves. It was then that the famous Córdoba revolution took place, and the University Reform movement, which had started in Argentina, spread like wildfire through almost the whole of Spanish America. Now, while it is easy to put an end to an institution, it is by no means so easy to set it up again in stable and lasting form. The old mastodon fell to the ground at last. But that is no reason for concealing the fact that the results of the Reform were, and still are, problematical, and that since then the Latin American university - with some exceptions - has been swayed to and from by many different influences.

Latin Americans need not take offence at this statement. In our hazardous times it is a common occurrence for universities to pass through evil days, and this was foreseen some years ago by the philosopher Ortega y Gasset in one of his most completely fulfilled prophecies.21/ The generation to which we belong has hardly known any university in its healthy moments. The present writer experienced the crumbling of

21/ En el centenario de una Universidad. Lecture given by José Ortega y Gasset in 1932. The university in question was the Spanish University of Granada.
long-cherished illusions at the time when he went to work at the ancient German university — held in such high esteem by the Spanish-speaking peoples — and found it torn by the daily conflict between the clenched fist on the one hand and the arm uplifted in Roman fashion on the other. Thus then, the difficulties that beset the university (though the situation has improved in some quarters) cannot be easily remedied by mere organizational planning or surmounted by the hasty accumulation — mainly on paper — of numerous research centres quite beyond the scope of practical possibilities. Still less can they be removed by frequent repetition of the word Science, with a capital S, and of the term "research worker". Nor can they be diminished by persistent announcements of meetings proclaimed beforehand to be at a high level, when both level and personality can only be assessed after the event, in the light of achievements. Nothing could be worse than such prior announcements in the style of advertisements for cosmetics. The university represents the reverse of fraud; it is the painful expression of the truth.

But we are living in an age of "experts", and experts, though often welcome, are also often disturbing elements. I remember being much impressed by a long report on administrative reforms, doubtless urgent, in the modest country I was visiting at the time. Not only Frederick the Great, but also the best modern administrative services in the most highly developed countries, would have considered the recommendations of that report Utopian fantasies. We must try not to let the same thing

22/ "Any idler who has spent six months in a German or North American laboratory or college, any nitwit who happens to have stumbled upon a scientific discovery (we quote Ortega, writing, of course, in Spain) returns to his country as a nouveau riche of science; a parvenu of research; and, without fifteen minutes' reflection on the mission of the university, he proposes the most extravagant reforms. On the other hand, he is incapable of teaching his subject! because he does not even know it thoroughly." José Ortega y Gasset, "Misión de la Universidad", El Arquero popular edition, p. 42. Hard words, and yet so true. In future we should try to avoid weakening by misuse the serious term "research worker".
happen with the university, which has been placed in too "functional" a relationship with the needs of economic development. The problem of the university is of course easy to solve in theory, but it is not so easy in practice. It is purely a question of putting it "into good shape", so that it may cease to live below par, just keeping going (expression called from the works of Ortega).\(^{23}\)

To conclude this brief digression on a very important subject, it is appropriate, though it may not be essential, for the writer to affirm his full agreement with another professor in partibus, not because of identity of influences but because of undoubted similarity of experience. We must do all we can to raise the level of the university, so that it may be an effective instrument of economic and social development, but especially so that it may not cease to represent that *pouvoir spirituel* of which it can still be the concrete expression.

We should bear in mind that teaching is of the essence of the university and the two problems this circumstance poses are the level of such teaching, and the question of the teaching of the sciences, whose very numbers constitute a delicate problem (and there are more of them than those mentioned by Marías): "It is vital for the university to arrive at an appreciation of its dilemmas",\(^{24}\) and it can only emerge from its half-life and attain to its full stature "through a complicated series of renunciations; renunciation of its independent existence in many cases, or of great sections of its own structure in others, of all the functions which it cannot perform with thoroughness, all the advantages (social, political and economic, for instance) which it derives from living in an ivory tower or from its subservience to the State or to the

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\(^{23}\) No apology is made for the quotations, for it happens that the best books on the substance of the university are still the following: *Misión de la Universidad* by the Spanish writer José Ortega y Gasset (Madrid, Revista de Occidente, 1930; El Arquero popular edition); which has been so often used and so often silenced; Karl Jaspers, *Gegenstand*, *Die Idee der Universität*, Berlin, Springer, 1946; and Sir Walter Moberley (English), *The Crisis in the University*, London, SCM Press, 1949.

Opposition". These words, with their Weberian ring, are particularly dear to the writer.

But, supported now by opinions from outside, certain heterodox attitudes towards current modes of thought began to appear. There was also a relative heterodoxy, connected with the foregoing, concerning the problems of the general relationship between education and economic development. Economists and teachers, demographers and sociologists are tackling the subject jointly nowadays in all the developed or developing countries. And, as a result of their efforts, there has even come into being what amounts to a new discipline, known as "Economics of Education".

As a common starting point, of course, there is the conviction that degrees of development and levels of education are closely connected. The differences begin when we have to determine which of the various types and levels in the generally accepted divisions - primary, secondary, vocational, higher, etc. - are likely to be most decisive in achieving the aims of the desired economic development as quickly as possible. Here, demographers and economists can also offer us an image of the employment pattern required for a given future economic situation. As far as the "economics of education" are concerned, it is not difficult, either, to formulate its main content in outline, but not so easy to work it out in practice, or even in theory. On the one hand, education is, in economic terms, a capital "input" but, on the other, it is just as clearly an "output" of determined yield, a yield that is to be assessed in its strictly economic sense. Again, this connexion between "input" and "output" occurs not only in the relation between education as whole and a country's wealth, but within the educational system itself. Hence the existence of the problem to which we have been referring from the beginning — that of the calculation and integration of these investments in the general framework of any economic plan or programme.

In the foregoing, no remark has been made from the sociological point of view. What follows is not meant to indicate any disagreement concerning the significance of what has been said but, rather, to provide some qualifications or warnings, which it is best to set forth now in summarized form, without further justification:

(a) The sociologist is in full agreement with the teacher in considering that, despite the fundamental importance of education for economic development, it is not permissible to make the former a mere function of the latter, or, to put it another way, to assess education purely as an "investment". Moreover, the sociologist is inclined to say to the teacher that anything he — the sociologist — may have to suggest in the matter does not affect what has always been the particular — classic, as it were — or permanent mission of the teacher, even vis-à-vis the most radical historicists.

(b) Even in his official and strictly technical assertions, the sociologist warns us that nothing meaningful can be said on the subject of "education and economic development" unless we have beforehand a precise — or at least relatively clear — idea of the nature of the "industrial society" which is the aim in view or which may even be on the point of attainment. He would also be able to point to some dissident opinions — certainly acceptable to the teacher — for, in view of the nature of the industrial societies already existing or coming into being (the wealthy consumer societies), it is perhaps appropriate to draw attention to the efforts made by educationists to produce in those societies the largest possible number of people capable of intellectual and spiritual independence, and to guard, as far as can be done, against enslaving tendencies to extreme social conformity. We do not touch, apart from this brief reference, on the question of the training of those destined to occupy positions of authority; they are never the product of narrow specialization.

(c) The sociologist, abandoning now his function of expert, in order to resume, even though only for a moment, his old, and nowadays despised, role of cultural critic, would also recognize the existence of two dangers which may arise simultaneously: one, inherent in current opinions concerning education, consists in the possibility that following such counsel may produce a half-education (Halbbildung, as the Germans have it), and the other in the possibility of a hasty "acceptance", at second hand, of educational systems and procedures that have become out of date in their country of origin.27/

Earlier in this study we touched on the human aspect of the intellectual. And we saw him, in the role of non-conformist or protestor, which is by no means the only possible role for this kind of person. What may have been suggested in that reference is insignificant by comparison with what ought to be known about the subject in the Latin American world. The advisability of making a study of it was suggested some years ago in the ECLA programme study entitled Social conditions of economic development.28/ The present writer repeated that advice in other publications and in some of his academic activities. But little or nothing was done, until the list drawn up by the meeting of specialists held in Mexico at the end of 1960 again affirmed the usefulness of an investigation on the subject.29/

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27/ It would be inappropriate to give a whole bibliography on this question. Frequent and varying expositions of the first problem are to be found, ranging (to confine ourselves to the extremities of this continuum) from the Cartesian clarity of J. Bergum ("The House of Intellect") to the cryptic Hegelianism of Th. Adorno ("Theorie der Halbbildung" in Soziologie und moderne Gesellschaft: Transactions of the 14th Congress of German Sociologists, 1959). The second point is well illustrated by Francisco Ayala in his book "La Crisis Actual de la Enseñanza", Buenos Aires, Editorial Nova, 1958.


/Meanwhile, not
Meanwhile, not only has the subject been extensively dealt with in other parts, it has even in some cases been presented with a certain originality, and for that reason merits our attention. John Friedman, in an article, goes so far as to regard the role of the intellectual in the underdeveloped countries as something like the counterpart of the role of the entrepreneur, the importance of which is universally acknowledged. 30/ And merely because, as he believes, intellectuals are little inclined to talk about themselves — he is, of course, referring in particular to North Americans — 31/ the significance of their participation in efforts towards economic progress has not been generally recognized. It is true that what W. E. Moore so appositely called "entrepreneurial determinism" also exercises an influence.

30/ See J. Friedman, "Intellectuals in Developing Societies", *Kyklos*, Vol. XIII, fasc. 4, p. 513

31/ In the Hispanic world, self-analysis by intellectuals, from the standpoint of national circumstances, seems from its abundance to be almost an endemic malady. For Spain, we have not only to recall the obsessed '98 Generation; the tendency dates from much farther back, as Américo Castro has shown in this great book *La Realidad Histórica de España*. México, D.F., Editorial Porrúa, 1954. As for the Latin American countries, although at times they disown the Hispanic tradition, at others they follow the tendency and show their full participation in it. In the last decades, the theme of "Neoromanticism" started by Samuel Ramos, and later stimulated by the academic activity of José Gaos, has produced an extensive bibliography, with some books of great value, taking their inspiration from the most varied tendencies: Ortegan circumstantialism. Various manifestations of existentialism, psychoanalysis and other psychiatric trends. And similarly, with other countries. Let us mention one, apparently the farthest removed from this tradition of faultfinding dissection, Brazil, and a few of her writers, who are moreover, well known: Gilberto Freyre, *Casa Grande y Senzala*, Buenos Aires, Imprenta Mercatali, 1942 and the rest of his work: Paulo Prado, *Retrato do Brasil*, Rio de Janeiro, Briguet, 1944; Jorge Amado, the famous novelist, *O Paiz do Carnaval*, Rio de Janeiro, Schmidt, 1932; and finally, a book of the comparative type (an Iberian obsession; be it said in passing) by Vianna Moog, *Bandeirantes e Pioneiros*, Rio de Janeiro, Editora Globo, 1955.

/In opposition
In opposition to this "materialist" or economic determinism, Friedman offers a new, "idealist" or intellectual type of determinism. According to him, the intellectual has performed (and continues to perform) in the countries in process of development an important threefold function: (a) he makes known new social values; (b) he develops a new ideology of economic evolution; and (c) he shares in creating an image of the nation which can help to maintain a lively national consciousness and to promote vital enthusiasm throughout the whole social body, at every level. The author's experience leads him of course, to be primarily interested in those countries which are now in process of assimilating in a more or less individual fashion and more or less completely, Western culture, and especially its economic aspects. Not all his views apply to the Latin American peoples. One must again emphasize the fact that they are not experiencing, in any sense, this kind of cultural "transit". Nevertheless, his expositions, and some of his suggested outlines for research, are applicable to them. 32/

32/ For that reason it is worthwhile reproducing in this footnote the author's proposed outline for research (J. Friedman, op. cit., p. 540-41). It is given below, for anyone who may wish or be in a position to use it:
1) Classification of types of intellectuals and quantitative analysis of their number, occupation, places of residence, etc.
2) Social and regional origins of intellectuals.
3) Attitudes of intellectuals both to popular traditions and to those of the advanced culture of their country.
4) Changes of social position of intellectuals in conditions of accelerated cultural change: prestige, mobility, "alienation", reactions to "alienation".
5) Intellectuals in relation to the outside world: contacts, travel, attitudes, fundamental outlook.
6) Intellectuals in relation to politics and government: degree of participation, political tendencies, solutions proposed for national problems, characteristic types of action.
7) Attitudes adopted by intellectuals in the conflict between modern and traditional: art, literature, music, philosophy, science.
8) Assessment of the reaction of intellectuals to Western influence: attitudes; self-appraisal, efforts to define traditional values in new form, archaism, social criticism, recommendations.
9) The "unemployed intellectual" as a potential source of disturbance and originator of social movements of a radical nature.
10) Changes in the intellectuals' idea of themselves.
11) Natural propensity of intellectuals; potential sources of intellectual conflict, influence on public policy, receptivity to Western ideas.

/Before and
Before and since this article by Friedman, which we have singled out because his exposition of the problems is novel (and for some people, no doubt, exaggerated, a considerable amount of work has been done, in a variety of places, on the subject of the intellectual, especially in his relation to economic development.\(^{33}\)

(Cont. of footnote \(^{32}/\)).

12) Ideologies concerning social transformation, economic development, nationalism and others; degree to which accepted; influence on public policy.

13) Expressions of opinion indicating their own idea of their nation.

14) Radicalism in intellectual thought.

15) Origins and sources of "traditionalism" in intellectual thought.

\(^{33}\) The standard works on the sociology of the intelligentsia in Europe are the studies written by Max Weber, Karl Mannheim, T.H.ingley, Ortega y Gasset — which together form the whole of what is known as the sociology of knowledge — and other authors, who need not be cited as they are all fully covered in Heinrich Stiegitz's book, Der Soziale Austrag der freien Berufe, 1960. At the present time the American sociologist, Edward A. Shils, is actively engaged on a study of this subject, applying the great gifts we associate with the author of that excellent work The Torment of Secrecy, Fleneo (Iu.), Free Press, 1956. Further evidence is provided in the book Intellectuals between Tradition and Modernity: the "Indian Situation", Mouton, The Hague 1960, and in various articles that have appeared in periodicals, all of which might one day be brought together in a single volume, which would have to be of large dimensions. The periodical Comparative Studies in Society and History regularly publishes detailed articles on intellectuals in the East such as, for example, Y.C. Wang, "Intellectuals and Society in China 1860-1949", Vol. III, No. 4; Chanti S. Tangri, "Intellectuals and Society in nineteenth century India", Vol. III, No. 4; Serif Mardin, "Some Roles in an Early Phase in the Modernization of Communications in Turkey", Vol. III, No. 3, etc. For contemporary France, see the special issue of the Revue Francaise de Science Politique, No. 9, 1959, entitled "Les intellectuels dans la Société Française Contemporaine". There is no comparable literature on this specialized branch of sociology in Latin America although material can be found scattered under the usual chapter-headings of historical and literary studies. Reference has therefore been made, without making any attempt at appraisal, to Angel A. Rojas's book Historia de la Novela Ecuatoriana, op. cit., It is worth while mentioning an article which comes close to this kind of study, although it covers a short period only and deals with the "national image": the essay by Ezequiel Martínez Estrada, entitled La Literatura y la Formación de la Conciencia Nacional, which appeared in the Venezuelan periodical Política, No. 6, February 1960. Other similar works doubtless exist, which have escaped our notice.
5. The reshaping of liberalism

At this point, attention should be drawn to the relationship between the history of events and the history of ideas, showing how changes in the structure of society are accompanied by equally important changes in the world of thought. The breaking up of the old landed estates, which had set the pattern of social life in Latin America, at the same time spelled the decline of an ideology. Once again, however, we have made over-ambitious claims, for we shall not be in a position to prove our point and, as hitherto, we shall have to rest content merely with throwing out a few suggestions and outlining a few problems.

One of the matters discussed in the foregoing has been the origin, development and subsequent difficulties of a comprehensive and integrated pattern of social, economic and intellectual life; we have also touched upon the part played by successive generations and types of leaders; and the question of the past and present role of various groups of intellectuals has been raised as a subject for immediate and future study. Only indirect and passing reference has been made to the vital responsibilities devolving upon our universities as the last (or practically the last) bastions of intellectual influence in the the present-day world.

At a later date - but still with reference to the same set of problems - we shall discuss the political shape which the old system was bound to assume and the subsequent crisis (which has still not been overcome) arising out of the long-standing opposition between liberals and conservatives. This crisis was bound to arise sooner or later, if only for purely demographic reasons.

We should now make direct reference, though in summary form and by way of parenthesis, to be protected process of ideological decline, which reached its nethermost point after the 1920s.

The victim of this whole process is so well known as scarcely to need naming. I refer, of course, to the crisis of liberalism. The fate that overtook this way of life and thought was by no means confined to Latin America; all parts of the world were involved, particularly Europe where it had first taken root. Some of the great writers of world
history, which until very recently has been equated with European history as the main centre of interest, have endeavoured to reduce its meaning to the impact made by the idea of freedom, as carried into practice at various periods of all too brief duration. Scholarship is now felt to lead nowhere, but it is perhaps still worth fixing in our memories one of the last and most exciting manifestations of the will to interpret the world.

(a) The experience of Europe and Latin America

Only in three parts of the world which rose to a high level of culture (China, India and the West) was life inspired by freedom of the mind. But for us of the West, the Greeks, the people as a whole, were the first to serve once and for all as a classical model of man's striving for higher things. During later brief periods as well, man once again gave expression to these loftier impulses. This period of humanism was the decisive one in history. "But for humanism, there is no doubt that the history of the Botocudos, the Zulus or any other people would be on the same level of interest and importance and in the same relationship to God, but we would then fall into the error of exaggerated historical relativism. The purpose of the present work is to survey Western humanism against the background of world history".

Liberalism has been a basic tenet of the Latin American peoples since the days of Independence, and has shown a remarkable power of survival, but even at the outset it could not but be in a precarious situation, since it was an ideology in flat contradiction with the social system based on land ownership with its attendant customs and beliefs. It has therefore been claimed that this contradiction is the first, and perhaps the most striking paradox of the Latin American countries.

34/ Alexander Rüstow, Ortesbestimmung der Gegenwart, Vol. II, chapter on "The Road to Freedom", Rentsch, Zurich, 1952. Thinking along the same lines is to be found in the last great writings of Alfred Weber: Abschied von der bisherigen Geschichte (Berne, A. Francke, 1946) and Der dritte oder der vierte Mensch (Münich, R. Piper, 1953); and also in K. Jasper's philosophical theories expounded in his Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Gerschichte (Zürich, Artemis-Verlag, 1949).

/ The frailty
The frailty of liberalism in Latin America may be traced to such causes as the gulf between aspirations and the resources available for their fulfilment. But in all parts of the world the frailty of liberalism is the natural result of its Utopian character. However, the Utopianism of the liberal school of thought is at the same time its great attraction and sovereign asset. "Liberalism", as Ortega points out, "is the political principle whereby the public powers, even though omnipotent, impose restrictions on their own authority and endeavour, even at their own cost, to allow some latitude to those who do not think and feel as they do, i.e., as the majority, the stronger sector, does. Liberalism—a point that needs stressing today—is the highest form of generosity; it is the right granted by the majority to the minority and in it can be heard the voice of man's noblest aspirations. It proclaims the resolve to live at peace with the enemy, even with an enemy weaker than ourselves. How unlikely that mankind should ever be permanently capable of so fine, so paradoxical, so elegant, so acrobatic, so unnatural an achievement. Small wonder, then, that mankind is so readily led astray from this achievement." 35/

For various reasons, the "fear of freedom" is liable to arise at any time, but is is not the purpose of this paper to rehearse well-known interpretations of contemporary history. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that liberalism, though Utopian in its most attractive form, was vitiated at the outset by serious failings, while its course of development has been marked by practically inevitable errors. Its original fault, dating back to the period of Enlightenment, was to have attributed a practically angelic character to human nature. As Alfred Weber would have put it, it has two aspects of optimism, one of which is fruitful and immoral; this is the "Christian" belief in the perfectibility of man, in his capacity to lift himself, through Enlightenment (Kant), above his "state of sinful immaturity" so as to attain the adult stage of spiritual maturity. But the other aspect of

optimism was dangerous and, in the long run, fatal, for it overlooked the perverse and "demonic" aspects of human nature, the "dark powers" of evil. "It is perhaps the weakest feature of the eighteenth century that conceptually it never bridged the gap between its humanistic ideals about the remodelling of life and society and the brutal power-individualism of its States."

But apart from this original failing of liberalism or humanism, as a universal way of thought, it was inevitable that, in the course of the nineteenth century, its basic postulates should crystallize into a doctrine, with political, economic, educational aspects, etc., which were bound to become rigid and outdated with the passage of time bringing with it new sets of problems.

A typical case in point is economic liberalism and the orthodox and sometimes over-rigid forms it assumed. The same is perhaps true of political liberalism. Both cases may, possibly be described as particular illustrations of the old problem of natural law being embodied in the course of time in positive legislation.

The fact remains that, at a very early stage, attacks were launched against both the basic postulates of liberalism and the various doctrines in which it found expression. It is not our intention, nor, indeed, within our power, to tell the story of the attacks levelled against liberalism. However, so far as Latin America is concerned, mention should be made of the severest stage of the campaign against liberalism, when its detractors attacked not only one or other of its aspects, its achievements and failures, but its very essence. In short, we refer to the great surge of irrationalism which arose after the First World War. We shall single out only two of the most decisive ingredients of


37/ As Ortega has pointed out, the decline of liberalism has not yet been adequately described in any large-scale work. Some idea of the process may be gained from a few standard works, the best of which is perhaps that by J. H. Hallowell, The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology, London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Toubner, 1946. It would be pointless to try to single out a few works on this subject, which in fact is associated with the whole of European and American history in the past hundred years. /this irrationalism,
this irrationalism, both of which were calculated to discredit the two finest aspects of liberalism. On the one hand, an attack was made on the "enlightened belief" in the rationality of man, and, on the other, on the "concept of politics" as implying the peaceful coexistence of two schools of thought.

Man's rationality and his ability to rise through his own efforts above his state of sinful immaturity were regarded as a mere illusion. The many different forms taken by this negation are well known; they may be said to culminate in the exaltation of deception as exemplifies in myths (Sorel and his followers). The most extreme form of this negation is, however, to be found in Ernst Jünger's Heroischer Nihilismus, familiar to only a restricted circle of intellectuals. "One of the best means of preparing for a new and bolder life is to annihilate the values of the mind, which has finally become completely unfettered and interested only in its own narrow sphere, and to wipe out the educational work undertaken by man in the bourgeois period ... The best answer to the treason of Mind against Life is the treason of Mind against Mind; sharing in the work of smashing all such false idols may be regarded as one of the supreme and cruel delights of our age." 38/

Quite naturally, such pretensions going further than Nietzsche himself appealed little to the majority. Yet some of them found more widespread acceptance when watered down and expressed in more palatable form.

Let us turn once again to Ortega's contention that liberalism is the resolve to coexist with the enemy, or, in other words, the ability to see both sides and to compromise. Towards 1927 a doctrine was formulated which immediately had far-reaching repercussions and still has its followers in some parts of the world; this doctrine, based on the distinction between victors and vanquished and showing the influence of Pareto's thought,


/ was put
was put forward by a famous German lawyer who defined the essence of politics as the contraposition of friend and enemy: "The basic distinction in politics is the distinction between friend and enemy. It is this which vests human actions with political significance... The terms friend and enemy denote the extremes between mutual attraction and repulsion. The opposition between them may exist in both theory and practice without there being necessarily other types of opposition at the same time - moral, aesthetic, economic, etc. The political enemy is not necessarily morally depraved, nor a competitor in the economic sphere, for it may even be profitable to trade with this enemy. The important point is that the enemy is always the Other, the Outsider." 32/

Doctrines of coexistence with the weak are thus countered by doctrines of radical opposition to the enemy; the possibility of two-way contact and compromise (all of which are continuing processes) encountered by the vigorous affirmation of the irrevocable decision. The spirit of deliberation, the keynote of democracy and the standard guarantee of liberalism, is now challenged by the urge of rash minorities shaping the destinies of their peoples to take blind decisions. The consequences of this political irrationalism constitute one of the most painful experiences, one of the most ignoble spectacles, endured by mankind.

Europe, once the catastrophe was over, did not revert to the old Utopianism with its enthusiasms and hopes. Inevitably it rebuilt its existence on the ashes of liberalism or, as one of its thinkers has stated, on the remnants of a centuries-old culture which, after being salvaged at great cost from the earthquake, once again gave man something to which he could cling and a consciousness of basic values without which it is impossible to begin building the future.

During these anxious decades, Latin America, obliged to face up to its new and inescapable problems, and affected by ideas from abroad (it has continued and will continue to be influenced by Europe), went through the

32/ Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, Hamburg, Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1933, p.7

/most troubled
most troubled period of its ideological history. The doctrine on which reliance was ultimately placed, and with fruitful results, in Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Mexico, as can be gauged from the work of Leopoldo Zea, was positivism. This was the last doctrine which won general and widespread acceptance. Afterwards there set in a period, lasting almost to the present day, marked by the most varied, contradictory and extravagant ideologies and influences. An analysis of this great medley of intellectual movements would be one of the most difficult yet rewarding fields of research — when there is time to undertake it and the movements can be viewed in proper perspective. In a study of present-day Bolivia which points out some of the difficulties impeding the success of its revolution, we find the following statement: "The very magnitude of the task is, for the time being, a natural excuse for the delay in undertaking it. But it is generally recognized that ideological vacillation on the part of many thinkers has been largely instrumental in this delay, even more than internal party differences. The vehemence implicit in the nationalism of any young country, the remnants of certain German influences, every brand of Marxist claim, along with traces of liberalism and technical goals common to all peoples at this period — all these formed an assortment of ideas difficult to translate into clear firm, practicable decisions".40/

We all know how absorbing any intellectual work can become. The author of the foregoing lines, summing up the situation so briefly, spent several months perusing a large number of books, pamphlets, manifestos, etc., which although their literary merits or arresting contents fired him with enthusiasm, very rarely supplied him with a stock of clear ideas, affording him simple, effective guidance. A study of the conflicting trends of thought in other countries or in Latin America as a whole would probably yield similar results.

We shall try to avoid ambiguities as far as possible. However, in writing about intellectual movements, it is impossible not to cite terms and concepts which may appear exaggerated. It is not our intention to convey the impression of chaos and upheavals when we refer to the decline of ideologies. Nor do we cherish any romantic dreams of impossible "restorations". Let us be quite clear. When referring to the crisis of liberalism in Latin America, apart from affirming its basic postulates on which all Western culture finally rests, we have in mind the effort of re-elaboration and reconstruction necessitated by liberalism, in both the political and economic spheres, under conditions which, whether we like it or not, are very different from those obtaining in the nineteenth century. Such reconstruction may lead to completely opposite solutions in dealing with various points of doctrine or practical problems. This approach is to be found among many students of Latin American affairs. But it would perhaps be enough to cite only one author, a foreign observer who has endeavoured to analyse the latest political events in Latin America as deviations from traditional liberalism, in one or other direction; there are right-wing theories of the equidistant or third force, sinarquismo, Peronism, and so on, as opposed to the left wing Aprismo and Marxism.  

(b) The great paradox. From the Fondo de Cultura Económica to the work of ECLA

Assuming that the above-mentioned trend has been correctly described as an ideological disintegration, attention should be drawn without delay to one of the most interesting paradoxes in present-day Latin America. Over the period marked by this weakening and dispersal of beliefs, and more particularly over the past few decades, we find an opposite and equally decisive trend towards the increase of real and potential knowledge.

[41] William S. Stokes, "Democracy, Freedom and Reform in Latin America" in: Freedom and Reform in Latin America, 1959. The study, though somewhat discrete - it must be remembered that the author is a foreigner - is to be commended for its excellent bibliography, incomplete though it is. A further point of interest is that it expounds views which, whether they be right or wrong, coincide with R. Aron's theories, to be discussed at a later stage.

/Having regard
Having regard to the purpose of the present work, there is no need to justify the fact that it is confined to one single branch of knowledge - economics. Furthermore, economics is a field in which far greater advances have been made than in other branches of the social sciences, with the possible exception of anthropology, particularly in Mexico. It also has more general applicability.

The younger generation today has access to an infinitely greater body of economic knowledge than was available to those who are not so very much their elders. Generally speaking, economics was previously studied in the Latin countries (France, Spain, Italy and some of the Latin American countries) as a rather "peculiar" subject included in the curriculum of the faculty of law. The present author still remembers the old classic by Charles Gide which was his first textbook in economics. He can hardly claim to have learnt a great deal more since that time; but it must be acknowledged that this textbook had a fascination, an elegance and a clarity unequalled, alas, by those of today. Having paid this tribute, we must nevertheless admit that much ground has been covered since Gide's day. The reasons underlying the changes that have taken place in Latin America should be briefly listed, beginning with the statement that if any person of normal intelligence nowadays does not make a serious study of economics, this is merely because the subject has no attraction for him.

In the first place, mention should be made of the very large number of books that have been published in recent years. Whole collections of classic and modern works are now available in Spanish - sometimes not of the highest standard - and several specialist reviews keep the most exacting reader in touch with the latest problems and developments. In a humble office in Calle Madero, a group of Mexicans, under the leadership of a man of remarkable calibre, embarked some thirty years ago on the publication of short works on economics which ultimately came to be known as the Fondo de Cultura Económica, a very extensive collection that was able, in its most influential years, to break down the cultural isolation due to the war. Their example was followed in other countries, and even the title of the collection was taken over - a fact bound to puzzle anyone...
unfamiliar with Mexican fiduciary institutions. The Fondo soon ceased to specialize in purely economic activities and took on other work which cannot be discussed here. However, mention should be made of certain publications, for some reason not entirely successful, which endeavoured to quicken the sense of Latin American unity, such as the Tierra Firme series or the less ambitious Jornadas issued by the Social Studies Centre of the College of Mexico. 42/ In the second place, the study of economics is no longer confined to one small department of faculties of law but is being expanded in one country after another, where independent schools are being set up to investigate all its ramifications and trends. Of course these schools vary considerably according to the country and the conditions obtaining there, but their very existence, regardless of the standard of teaching, denotes an awareness of economic problems and the resolve to train the required specialists. 43/

Thirdly, mention should be made of the work done by ECLA. It will be readily appreciated why the present author would prefer to leave it to the economists to assess the technical aspects of this question. 44/

However, our ignorance is not such as to preclude some reference to five separate aspects of this work, some of them not strictly economic.

42/ The bibliography in J. Johnson's book comments as follows on these Jornadas: "The articles in the Jornadas provide valuable reference material on Latin America's external and domestic problems during the Second World War" (p.206).

43/ Cf. the report on The Teaching of Economics in Latin America (E/CN.12/546/Rev.1) by Howard S. Ellis, Benjamín Cornejo and Luis Escobar Cerda of the joint ECLA/UNESCO/OAS mission. This report was later printed by the Pan American Union in its Studies and Monographs series (N° 111).

44/ In the memoirs which we all plan to write when we reach the age of Mesonero Romanos (perhaps an unconscious urge to refute the demographers' prognostications of life expectancy) some attempts should be made to deal with one point - the reasons for the outstanding work done by ECLA, particularly in its early years, despite the fact that, being an "organization", it had bureaucratic tendencies.

/(a) A
(a) A theoretical aspect, mainly taking into account the opinions of the above-mentioned experts. No specialized knowledge is needed, however, to claim that here for the first time a group of men succeeded in rising above our traditional "simple-mindedness" and, without any fear of other people's opinion, sought to do their own thinking on their own problems and to work out what they considered the most suitable approach for the understanding and interpretation of those problems.

(b) An aspect which I shall describe as monographic, involving the assembly of an impressive body of data and material on the economic situation in Latin America - previously non-existent or difficult to bring together for consideration as a whole - as in the annual or six-monthly Estudios Económicos, the surveys of the economic structure of different countries, and the ECLA Boletín, a periodical containing a variety of articles on statistical, demographic, social and other subjects.

(c) A practical aspect, involving continuing training and information work; specialists are trained in programming and economic analysis, and technical advice is supplied, on request, for the studies of development conducted by the various governments.

(d) A political aspect, a term used innocuously to cover ECLA's proposals for integration, in Central America or in the broader field of a future common market.

(e) Last but not least, an educational aspect. For a professor in partibus, this aspect (may I be pardoned for the heresy) is perhaps the most important. It is my contention, regardless of the opinion of more learned experts, that, whatever the value, the success or the failure of the foregoing types of work, ECLA's educational work cannot be undone. The general public has gained awareness of a problem, and one of very great importance, and the most intelligent members have explored its essence.

45/ A technical account of this work and some of the above-mentioned points of criticism, though no assessment of its value, will be found in A. O. Hirschman's work, Latin American Studies, 1961, containing a bibliography. Another useful reference work is El Desarrollo Económico y América Latina, a collection of contributions edited by H. S. Ellis for the International Economic Association and published in Spanish by the Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, D.F., 1960; one of the contributions, by José A. Mayobre, sheds valuable light on one of the technical aspects of ECLA — programming techniques.
From now on there can be no sinking back into the blissful state of sancta simplicitas.

However, this defence of ECLA's educational work (in no way intended as self-praise) should not be pure eulogy. Some blame should be distributed as well. Our knowledge of economics has grown considerably in the past few years but, in the process, this branch of study has taken on a highly esoteric character. A famous economist (Adolph Löwe) recently remarked that anyone looking up a few pages on the subject may not be quite sure that it is not some obscure work on physics or mathematics. This esoteric tendency is not peculiar nowadays to economics - it is true of scientific work in general, including sociology and the other human sciences.

This development must be accepted as an inherent part of scientific progress. But there are two problems to be cleared up. In the first place, a dividing line has to be drawn between the strictly necessary and the product of pedantry, pseudo-originality or sheer bluff. In a fine essay on modern universities, Alfred Weber complained that even the traditional humanistic studies were being corroded by a hair-splitting approach. There is yet another problem so far as the social sciences are concerned. The philosopher is not the only specialist who is required to be clear; the content of the social sciences is of interest to all persons with a desire to know what is happening in the world about us, but more particularly to the political and other leaders of a country, who have to translate into a practical and reasonably comprehensible body of ideas the teachings and guidance of precise scientific research. Precision is essential in such research, but from time to time scientists should make an effort, preferably direct, to bring their findings within the reach of the layman.46/ Endeavours on these lines are absolutely necessary in the field of economics and sociology.

46/ Tribute should here be paid to Jorge Ahumada Corvalán's book En vez de la miseria, (Santiago de Chile, Editorial del Pacifico, 1958) which can be understood by any reasonably educated person.
6. The decline of ideologies

Such endeavours are essential in economic and social studies since it becomes daily more necessary to draw a distinction between objective scientific advice (on questions of ever wider general interest) and the wishful thinking of the strictly sociological ideologies. This is a question that calls for a slight digression, though still on the subject of Latin America.

A point frequently made over the past few years, by Bell, Lipset, Aron, Landshut, Schelsky and others, is that we are living in a period opposed to ideologies, that we are witnessing the decline of ideologies. It will be observed that the authors who write of this decline are European or North American. This attitude towards ideologies thus possibly exists in Europe and the United States of America. But do we find it in other parts of the world and, in particular, in Latin America, which is our immediate concern?

Without going into over-lengthy details, it may be said that there will in all probability be a decay of ideologies where countries have gone through one or other of the following experiences:

(1) Intellectual experiences, such as (a) mutual cancelling-out of ideologies as the result of a protracted process of mutual "unmasking"; (b) weakening of the ideological illusion born of the attainment of a turning-point in the development of the idea of progress or of the rise of a new conception of it; (c) disillusionment caused by a real and first-hand knowledge of the way of supposedly enemy peoples.

(2) Experiences resulting from the enjoyment of a relatively high standard of living, which keeps uppermost in the individual's mind readily accessible goals of personal comfort and satisfaction. To state the problem in Marxist terms, these experiences lead to the general adoption of a uniform petit bourgeois culture which aroused the indignation of the old social democrat K. Bednarik when considering the attitudes and aspirations of young workers in his country.

(3) Traumatic experiences resulting from an international or national catastrophe.

/If we
If we were to yield to the temptation to digress at greater length, it would be interesting to compare the above-mentioned and other authors to see where their ideas converge or differ. But to give a brief explanation for the so-called "post-ideological" phase in Europe and North America, it may be said that it is primarily due to the fact that on the spiritual plane Europe has to live on the ashes of the past, while on the material plane North America has to live on the affluency of the present. Of course this does not mean that the two cannot go together. But we should steer clear of any ideology of post-ideology, so reminiscent of the old "philosophy of philosophy" or "sociology of sociology".

What is certain, and needs stressing — so as to avoid being drawn into an over-academic discussion — is that Latin America is not confronted with the same post-ideological situation. On the one hand it is still in the final stages of "colonialism" (or should I say in the last stages of early youth?); it has still not lost the desire to try out any line of thought which it considers novel and it retains all its old faith in progress. On the other, it does not happen to have lived through any calamitous experiences and is remote from the centres of conflict, which it can view dispassionately. Last but not least, it has not yet reached the stage of affluence which automatically tones down so many conflicts, and precisely for this reason it is pursuing the aim of economic growth. Accordingly, we can refer to very few works reflecting the decline of ideologies in Latin America where the famous "take-off" has already occurred or is about to do so. Incidentally, "take-off" affords a good example to add to those already analysed by H. Freyde in discussing the growing influence of technology on everyday language.

7. Final digression on youth

Evidence of the survival of the ideological phase in Latin America would be found in any reasonably serious survey of Latin American youth. Research on this subject was advocated not long ago by Raúl Prebisch and its need has been urged by others of us, including the members of the Expert Working Group
Working Group on Social Aspects of Economic Development at their meeting already mentioned.\textsuperscript{47/}

We are not moved by any desire to bestow praise or blame on youth or to "put it in its place". We are merely interested in knowing what young people are like and what they want. We need to discover what is the attitude of young people between 14 and 21 years of age - "the transitional stage between two age-groups with differing attitudes towards society" - with regard to certain major issues, such as work and leisure, family and careers, politics, religion and culture, and how they view their future, depending on their social origin - urban or rural, middle or working class. The painstaking research conducted by Helmut Schelsky \textsuperscript{48/} on his own country is described in a valuable and widely discussed book, the contents of which are vividly conveyed in its title: "The Sceptical Generation: a Sociology of German youth".

What would a similar survey in Latin America reveal? Surely not a "sceptical" generation, though, seeking inspiration in Maimónides - after all an Iberian - one might perhaps speak of a "perplexed" generation, or a generation that has lost its bearings. This, admittedly, is no more than a supposition or, to be more scientific, a hypothesis. However, it would be worth while trying to confirm the hypothesis or, better still, to reject it if it is disproved by research.

\textsuperscript{47/} Op. cit., list of research projects, no. 12: "Estudio sobre el estado de la juventud latinoamericana (de los 16 a los 25 años). Su representación del cambio económico-social y su actitud ante el mismo".

\textsuperscript{48/} Helmut Schelsky, Die skeptische Generation, Duesseldorf, E. Diederich, 1957.
III

TOWARDS THE NEW SOCIETY

The two fundamental questions.

We are now witnessing the disappearance for ever of Latin America’s traditional "consistency". An attempt has been made in the foregoing pages to outline the main factors which have determined this momentous change - momentous, as is any turning-point, although we trust that in this case it is largely a matter of growing pains. It inevitably raises two fundamental questions. Firstly, what are the present-day foundations of the new system which is taking the place of the old and which was inherent in it from the earliest days of its decline? Secondly, what is the ultimate basis of the prise de conscience that will enable us to gauge the character of the immediate future ushered in by the new economic cycle?

It must not be thought that these questions are raised out of sheer intellectual curiosity. If appropriate answers can be found, it will then be possible to take effective action in one direction or another, not only by gearing all the energies of individual countries to the achievement of set goals, but also perhaps by marshalling outside forces as well, for, in these days of interdependence, the assistance they provide may be a decisive factor in success or failure.

Whenever history enters upon a new phase, the clearest thinkers are bound to wonder anxiously what groups of men will be called upon to shoulder the new responsibilities arising, and where those men are to be found. Any number of instances of this situation may be cited.

It will be enough to quote one example of special interest, not only on account of the man’s calibre, but also because the problems he analysed, for all their apparent similarity to our own, are actually very different and remote, even though so short a time has elapsed. When the young Max Weber set out (about 1895) to elucidate the problems arising out
arising out of Bismarck's system, he concentrated on one decisive question: who were to be the political leaders of the new Germany which was then heading, through large-scale industrialization, for an unknown destiny in both the political and economic spheres, and on which of her main classes was it possible to depend? His thorough analysis, which cannot be discussed in detail here, is a model of its kind. He shows how the old Junker class, accustomed to command, nevertheless found their economic interests at variance with the Wirtschaftspolitik that came to be imposed on the new State. As for the new bourgeoisie, it had been tamed by the old Kaiser and at that time had no urge for power, nor was it remarkable for its political judgment. The brand-new proletarian class was felt to be immature and, as yet, inoffensive. In the impasse created by this situation Weber already foresaw the greatest danger for Germany's political power. Needless to say, the situation is not the same in any part of the world today, including the Latin America of 1961. But Weber's approach to these major issues can still provide useful guidance.

To what groups of men can we look, in present-day Latin America, to steer our continent successfully through the changes by which it is now assailed? On what classes can we depend? On the land-owning class which ruled Latin America's destinies with some success for a considerable period? On the newer bourgeoisie class brought into existence by exports and industry? Or on the newest, the proletarian class, barely organized and with but slight experience of power?

The second question formulated at the beginning of this chapter is equally important. What is to be the basis of the prise de conscience which is the inevitable prelude to the new era ushered in by the 1960's?

I have elsewhere attempted to give a scholarly answer to the question why, in all parts of the world, economic development has become the ever-recurring theme of discussion, at learned international meetings, in newspaper articles, among students or wherever people gather together. 49/

One of the points brought out was the "necessary" character of economic development which, according to accepted theories, has nowadays become a world-wide movement forming part, alongside social and cultural development, of the general historical process of civilization. Economic development was defined in more precise terms as a trend stemming from the combined effects of technical power and scientific knowledge. Yet theory, sound as it may be, is perhaps not enough to explain mankind's present experiences. Were I not afraid of being upbraided for my incorrigible attachment to Ortega (though this is not discreditable), I would yield to the temptation to comment on his theory of wealth. For the philosopher, wealth is not something purely economic, for it relates to life as a whole; it means that man "has far greater opportunities in life than were open to him before. Enrichment can be equated with modernism; there can be no denying that every people reaches a stage when its established, traditional way of life is swept away by a current of modernism." My comments would bear more particularly on this idea of established custom. At a later point we shall discuss the significance of certain periods of social change.

However, in the present report, concerned as it is with economic development, it would be well to turn to the economist rather than to the philosopher. It was for this reason that I chose to borrow an economist's phrase at the beginning of the present chapter, leaving it in French. As used by André Marchal, prise de conscience implies the introduction of a decisive, dynamic element in changes of structure. It is the basis of the distinction between short and long periods in the sense defined in the following paragraph.

It is far from my intention to enter into details of a theory which could not but be controversial. But I have recourse to it here in order to express one of my convictions in economic terms. What was previously


regarded as a far-reaching change, the decay of a social system, now assumes the more harmless shape of a change in the length of an economic period. To put the matter in a nutshell, a "période longue" is now opening up for Latin America. Marchal's own words will justify this bold statement: "Alors que le processus de courte période était justifiable d'une analyse purement économique, en quelque sorte mécanique — étant donné que, seules les réactions instinctives étaient retenues — le processus de longue période est justifiable d'une analyse psycho-sociologique, puisqu'il s'agit de rendre compte de réactions volontaires, conscientes, des individus et des groupes". Where do we find this "prise de conscience", and what is its scope?

A. THE EMERGENT MIDDLE CLASSES

1. Studies of social stratification

For some years past, marked interest has been shown in Latin America in studies of social stratification. The pioneering work done by Theo R. Crevenna, through the publication of collective contributions of varying value and now outdated, was followed up by further research, but the subject still cannot be said to have been adequately explored. There are many reasons to account for this shortcoming. Indices and indicators are far from being uniform. We all know how the assessment of social stratification varies considerably, according to the objective or subjective character of the indices and indicators used; in addition, the whole subject is coloured by preconceived ideological views.

An equally serious source of error is the influence exerted, especially on the younger research workers, by the models of studies conducted in the scientifically more advanced countries, for they do not perceive how these techniques and the general approach are inevitably affected by the special problems connected with a very different social system. This has been the case with the ever-recurring theme of social mobility which, due to the academic influence has frequently been analysed in relation (naturally enough) with economic development, but without due consideration of the final purpose of the process.


/Furthermore, owing
Furthermore, owing to the worship of figures, to which we are all more or less addicted, and also because this type of research is easier for comparative purposes, much stress is naturally laid on tables of percentages, and all too little on political and social reasearch into the thoughts and feelings of the various strata. Or, to use the traditional terminology of the Marxists, we know little of "class consciousness", of the classes that may exist and of their degree of cohesion. Although we shall later discuss this matter with reference to a special sector of Latin American society, it must be acknowledged at once that a recent article \(54\) provides excellent quantitative terms of reference for any person desiring an over-all view of the question.

2. The middle classes and politics

The lack of precision of the concept of class and the controversies that have raged round it (in this respect the middle class holds the record) have led to the adoption of many different euphemisms such as "middle classes", middle sectors, intermediate groups, etc., to denote this important category. Similarly, the reputation for Machiavellianism attaching to the work of some leading social scientists tempts one to avoid certain other categories — the elites, political class, ruling class — although the use of these terms in their strictly neutral, scientific connotation will often prove necessary. \(55\)


\(55\) R. Aron has restored the proper meaning of the sociological concepts of "political class" and "ruling class". Italian writers, the direct heirs of Gaetano Mosca, are now working on this important subject, viewed from different angles. Cf., \textit{Inter alia}, Giacomo Perticone, \textit{La Formazione della Classe Politica nell'Italia Contemporanea}, Florence, Edizioni Leonardo, 1954; Pompeo Biondi, \textit{Potere e Classe Politica, Studi Politici}, 1, 1952; Eugenio Pena, \textit{La Democrazia e la Classe Politica, Occidente}, 12, 1956; Arturo Carlo Jemolo, \textit{La Classe Dirigente en Italia, Occidente}, 12, 1956, etc.

/It must
It must be admitted, not without some shame for us Spanish writers, that the first important reference book on the middle classes of Latin America was written by a North American teacher, John J. Johnson. This is no place to discuss it in detail. But one is bound to point out that its generous and optimistic mood cannot be shared by all. So far as the subject under discussion is concerned, Johnson considers that the future holds out great hopes for the action of the "middle sectors"; that their economic strength will enable them to play an important part in politics if they join forces with the category of senior officials; and that their century of political experience has taught them much of the art of compromise. However, the author is not blind to the many failings of this sector and on this subject, as also when discussing radicalism in Argentina, his criticism is very much to the point.

3. A riddle in Latin America's present-day development

Despite everything, his optimism is justified. At the outset of this report, reference was made, in connexion with Father Vekemans' observations, to a riddle which it is now time to discuss in detail, though without claiming to solve it. The fact is that studies of the social and economic typology of the Latin American countries have shown that some leading "modern" countries (judging by their socio-cultural indices) have nevertheless suffered latent economic stagnation in the past few years as compared with others having a lower set of "indicators". To put it briefly, there is a puzzling contradiction between the indices for economic growth and the "rates" of cultural progress. The countries in which this contradiction has been noted are, more particularly, Argentina and Chile, on the one hand, and Brazil and Mexico on the other.


a) Economic
a) **Economic explanations**

We could, of course, try to find a political explanation for this phenomenon, in the different complexion of the political classes referred to earlier (provided that the necessary studies are available, a matter by no means certain) but the events cited to bear out the explanation would be exceptional and valid only for Argentina. An economic explanation has also been given, of so penetrating a character as to carry conviction. This is ultimately a problem connected with the import substitution policy in respect of durable, intermediate consumer and capital goods, which was not feasible in either Chile or Argentina. Towards the end of the war, Argentina had two roads open to it: "to expand its exports or embark on import substitution in respect of intermediate and capital goods"; but, on the one hand, it was handicapped by limitations to the necessary expansion of agricultural and cattle-raising production, and, on the other, the extreme shortage of foreign exchange precluded any large-scale import substitution policy with regard to intermediate goods, which would have required a substantial contribution of foreign capital or the restriction of production in the sectors making most use of imported raw materials (with the danger of unemployment). Chile was in much the same situation as Argentina. Owing to limitations imposed by the narrowness of the market, it could not substantially modify its import substitution policy, and in order to increase the volume of its exports it would have had to introduce changes in its agricultural methods which it was not in a position to carry through. Although it had made further progress than Argentina in the field of agricultural research, the system of land tenure was a serious stumbling-block.

b) **Sociological hypothesis and problems**

Ahumada's explanation, although it has of course given rise to controversy in specialist circles, is not beyond the understanding of the layman. We shall therefore adopt it. However, it may not be the last word on the subject. In fact this may mark only the beginning of the

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/sociologist's investigations.
sociologist's investigations. Needless to say, economic progress is not a gift of the gods, showered like manna on a few chosen countries. It is the work of definite groups of men who one day set their hands resolutely to the task. Argentina and Chile, ahead of the rest of Latin America in the organization of the State—more particularly Chile—also had many years' start in the growth of their economies. A few years before the beginning of the twentieth century, the progress made by their economies was already apparent in such external factors as their standard of living and in the graph representing their respective rates of progress.

What kind of men were responsible for this forward movement? Is the succeeding generation made of weaker stuff that is showing signs of breaking down? These questions may possibly be cleared up by a theory relating to the character of each generation, a subject calling for most careful and complex research. The present author had some ideas on the subject, but he is glad to pay tribute to the clearer explanation furnished in a study by Bert F. Hoselitz.59/

In the following discussion of the "Hoselitz hypothesis", the reader need not fear that, following the latest academic fashion, this hypothesis will be made the subject of an exercise in axiomatization or logical positivism. In plain English, Hoselitz describes the above-mentioned phenomenon, but then introduces a new sociological argument when he states that "the two countries with the larger middle segment have shown less rapid growth than those with a much smaller middle group". His central point is brought out in the following remark: "Obviously, the decisive factor is not the relative size of the middle class, but its composition and the role it actually plays."60/


If we cast our minds back to the indices given by Father Vekemans, to Johnson's account of the action of the middle sectors in Chile and Argentina in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and to Germani's analysis of the question, the points of similarity will be readily perceived. We all know how writers referring to the vaguely defined middle classes are accustomed to draw a distinction between the "old" and "new" segments. Hoselitz naturally touches upon this point, which warrants careful analysis. For the time being we shall merely outline the main point (stated less emphatically, in the interests of objectivity); it may well be that the middle classes in Chile and Argentina are today more interested in a "change in income distribution than in genuine augmentation of total national output". A further quotation from Hoselitz himself will complete the account of his hypothesis: "... in an economy in which economic growth depends in large part upon private decisions, an upper class which looks mainly towards conspicuous consumption, and a middle class which looks not toward the augmentation, but towards redistribution of the social dividend as providing rewards for its members, fail to ensure maximum economic growth". 61/

Can the Hoselitz hypothesis be borne out by other data and observations? I shall merely comment briefly on the subject, which cannot be discussed here in greater detail.

The categories dealt with in the well-known works by Clark and Fourastié have already become part of the common heritage of economists and sociologists. However, gaps have been found in the logical sequence of the different known sectors, the most serious problems arising in connexion with the so-called tertiary sector. Complex elements which cannot be discussed here enter into its make-up and, in particular, its comparative percentage is sometimes far from being an unmistakable sign of economic progress.

The economic study referred to in the early part of this report 62/deals at one point with the phenomenon of unemployment "despite the fact that the 4 per cent rise in production for Latin America as a whole was

62/ ECLA, Característica de la Economía Interna y su Desarrollo, 1929-59 (E/CN.12/563).
sufficient to bring about an increase in productive employment from 1929 onwards". In some countries such as Argentina and Chile, where there has been little change in the per capita income, concealed unemployment is apparent mainly in the expansion of the tertiary sector. According to certain estimates for the 1950-58 period, the volume of the tertiary sector rose by approximately 27 per cent. The report goes on to state: "Whatever the explanation, the service industries will probably continue to expand rapidly after 1955, at least in Chile and Argentina." The report subsequently discusses the increase in current government expenditure, an increase which became particularly marked in Argentina. Thus, at times when the national output is stationary — with scarcely any income growth in the private sector and an increase in unemployment — strong pressure is exerted for an expansion of employment in the public sector.

While this is not the place for a detailed discussion of previous economic theories, they should be touched on briefly, so as to provide some guidance for the sociologist. Pareto's theory of the movement of the élites lays considerable stress on the respective parts played by speculators and rentiers. Speculators are the bold creators of new economic combinations and, under their rule, business is built up (some sectors flourishing while others are a failure) and the economy forges ahead. Rentiers, on the other hand, are less venturesome and merely wait for the interest to come in from their inherited wealth, leaving the economy to move quietly forward by the force of inertia.

Of course the situation has changed since Pareto's day. Nowhere do we now find the classical type of liberal State — a fact from which certain inferences should be drawn. Yet it is very tempting to use Pareto's formula to explain the succession of bourgeois strata in Chile and Argentina, as viewed by Hobsbwtz. Do we really find such widely differing outlooks among the middle sectors already mentioned? What kind of men are nowadays responsible for the extraordinary forward movement in Brazil and Mexico? Wagley, in the fine study referred to earlier, when discussing the modern upper class, points out that many of its new members are climbers and quotes a few pages of Gilberto Freire to portray their character. Freire calls


/them "transition
them "transition figures" and, after drawing attention to their widely differing social backgrounds, dwells on the psychological motives behind their dynamism. The transition from defenceless poverty to wealth and power always produces the same results: "In such circumstances moral controls break down and the old family surroundings, whether an Italian farm or in Brazil itself, exert no further influence behaviour." Like the "nouveau riches" everywhere, the group does not cling to any traditional values. The political connexions of these new classes form a most interesting study, and we shall revert to them later.

Does this phenomenon happen to be peculiar to the new Brazil? Writing of Mexico, Daniel Cosío Villegas, the last person in the world who could be accused of being a reactionary, makes the following seemingly rather nostalgic comment: "The new captains of industry and bank magnates end by forming not mere pressure groups (as they are termed in sociological jargon) but actual oligarchies, which in the Latin American social scene would have superseded the erstwhile land-owning oligarchy. Between the old and the new there are, however, two very important differences, one political and the other social. The old land-owning oligarchy was itself the ruling class throughout the whole of the nineteenth and well into the twentieth century, in almost all the Latin American countries. In these circumstances, it openly seized political power and certainly availed itself thereof to promote its own interests; but at the same time it did assume the attendant responsibilities. The new industrial and banking oligarchy wishes to influence governmental decisions, and actually does so, but without shoudering the responsibilities that such decisions necessarily involve. The social difference is no less important. In the course of time, the old land-owning oligarchy reformed itself from within: its members acquired culture and good taste, learnt to understand general problems which had nothing to do with the farming of their land, and were therefore able to indulge in the luxury of becoming patrons of arts and letters. The new oligarchy is still unduly crude and coarse, smacks unmistakably of money because it thinks of nothing else, and does not seem to understand anything that has no direct bearing on its business affairs." 64/

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I have quoted the distinguished Mexican historian at such length not only on account of his persuasive prose but also because the point he makes is so pertinent. Any trained sociologist who compares it with the previous remarks on Brazil will immediately sense a serious problem. These strong, aggressive groups, these climbers who are the driving force in present-day Brazil and Mexico, have nevertheless made their way thanks to a revolutionary situation or at least to serious social upheaval. They carry on the familiar tradition of capitalist adventurers and political opportunists who are in a hurry to amass disproportionate profits. "The shortage of entrepreneurs means that prospective profits have to be large for new firms to be established. This helps to explain delays in the development of some sectors, as well as the high profit margins, especially in manufacturing."

It may well be that Pareto's impassive cynicism is justified and that economic growth is impossible without a fair sprinkling of bold speculators; but sound, sustained development may also, possibly, give rise to another type of men. It is sometimes thought that the Latin American middle classes have so far been characterized not only by the dual efforts of "climbers" and "distributors" but also, in some countries, by the tragic weakness of an aimless bourgeoisie, demoralized by the enjoyment of "white" prosperity, to the dismay of its best intellectuals. This picture may not be quite correct. But where do we find the self-control and discipline of the true creators of modern capitalism, the energy and austerity of the young samurai who built up modern Japan?

The account of the lower middle class given by some of its observers is not encouraging. Reverting once again to Wagley's analysis of the situation in Brazil, we find that the lower middle class, compounded largely of old but partly of new elements, is beset by difficulties; its aspirations are constantly frustrated for various reasons, it has too great a tendency to look back to the past, and it has "not yet developed a middle-class ideology" which could provide incentive for its action as in Europe and North America. "In short, it does not constitute, ideologically speaking, a (genuine) middle class."

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However, there is nothing inherently wrong with the middle class being still the most conservative sector of society in Brazil. Lucio Mendieta Nuñez, referring to the Mexican middle class, quite rightly takes a favourable view of its conservative strain, its interest in education and science and its respect for the highest ethical and religious values. It thus fulfils the twofold purpose that has to be served by the middle classes in achieving any sound economic development; on the one hand, it is the mainspring of innovation, the bold driving force for progress, while, on the other hand, thanks to its culture and education, it serves as the repository for those aspects of the country's traditions that are worth preserving.

The development of modern industrial societies has everywhere been accompanied by the very serious problem of moral erosion (Freyer). In the older countries the affects of this erosion have been attenuated by such factors as the very slowness of the process. In the young countries, on the other hand, the thin crust of morality is in danger of breaking up, with catastrophic effects. The destruction of the "protective strata" discussed by Schumpeter (perhaps scarcely applying to the United States of America) may have the same significance for Latin America as for Europe, to whose institutions it has so far been much closer. But whether or not this theory is correct, one thing seems certain. If there is one strategic element that should be carefully nurtured by Latin American society it is that social stratum whose salient features were defined by Max Weber as rational consciousness; the rationalization of the forms of life and a rational economic ethos.

However, this is by no means the only social group on which reliance can be placed. It has been made abundantly clear that what the middle classes are capable of achieving depends on the calibre and resolve of the

66/ La Clase Media en México, Revista Mexicana de Sociología, Nos. 2 and 3, 1955.
"political class" and on the guidance that can be provided by the "pouvoir spirituel" of the "ruling class". These factors will determine whether the spasmodic efforts of the climber (which may be necessary) will be expanded into a sustained endeavour on the part of other equally ambitious social strata, no less essential in the long run.

Needless to say, the urban and rural proletarian masses constitute another group which can be called upon; they do not, however, come within the scope of the present chapter. But, to return once more to the middle sectors, the old traditional bourgeoisie, one thing above all is apparent in these days of economic development - it cannot be brought about solely by observance of Louis Philippe's famous watchword: enrichissez-vous.

B. POLITICS AS A DRIVING FORCE AND A GUIDE

1. Technology and politics

Where, as we have already asked, do we find the ultimate basis of the prise de conscience (in Marchal's sense of the word) which is now ushering in a new "long" period in Latin America's economic life or, in more general terms, a new era in its life as a whole? The theory of cultural backwardness that was in vogue for some time helped to spread a belief in the decisive importance of the "technological" factor and, through its over-simplified approach, exerted an influence on practical politics. It has rightly been asserted that no one can fully grasp the nature of modern industrial societies without giving serious consideration to two phenomena which may appear widely disparate - technology and painting. To technology,\(^{68/}\) not so much because through its progress it surpasses other sectors of culture (a theory that is disproved by science) but because it leaves its mark on the manners, customs and language of the day, because it completely overthrows the nineteenth century concept of progress, and because its development affords an example of how to tackle problems in other fields, including the most recalcitrant branches of the social sciences. In the matter of painting, the

\(^{68/}\) An excellent summary of this question is provided by Hans Freyer, "Gesellschaft und Kultur", Propyläen Weltgeschichte, Vol. X, pp. 532 ff.
situation is more delicate and complicated, but Arnold Gehlen⁶⁹/ may well be right in maintaining, along with other thinkers, that some of the secrets of the age are unlocked by Picasso or Miró, Klee, Max Ernst or Mattia Moram.

No attempt has so far been made to analyse the present-day situation in Latin America by giving a sociological interpretation of the starkness of its modern paintings (those of Orozco, for instance, of Tamayo or Siqueiros, Portinari, Matta or even Jusep Torres Campalans). Yet almost excessive stress has been laid on the revolution in ways of thought and feeling that has been brought about by the latest technological advances. What may be termed a "technological interpretation" has been given of the prise de conscience in Latin America today. This interpretation obviously yields part of the truth, but by no means, the whole truth.

In his study of Guatemala,⁷⁰/ which can now suitably be quoted for a second time, Richard N. Adams had the intellectual and political courage to oppose the prevailing fashion for technological determinism. The people of Guatemala obviously do not spurn anything that can improve their lot through technological aid. Yet, as in the past, so doubtless in the present, their main hopes for the future are centred on a general reform of the traditional social structure; there is no cause for surprise that these hopes are cherished chiefly by the lower middle classes, by teachers and students, officials and office workers, small industrialists and landowners. Two paragraphs by Adams deserve quoting in full: "When we examine the process of change in Guatemalan society as a whole, two striking features leap to the eye. In the first place, the nation is in the throes of changing over from a discontinuous set of regional cultures to a continuously evolving and nationally centred culture. In the second place, this change-over is being initiated by political and social innovations, rather than arising spontaneously out of changes in production and technology."⁷¹/

⁶⁹/ Arnold Gehlen, "Zeit-Bilder", Frankfurt-am-Main, Athenäum Verlag, 1960, or the very full work by Sir Herbert Read.


⁷¹/ Ibid., p. 257
Later on, he states categorically: "...we must realize that in a
country like Guatemala people do not see their problems solely in terms of
technological aid and economic development. They are intimately involved
in the painful emergence of a new society with its new sources of power".\textsuperscript{72/}

Adams' discerning remarks concerning Guatemala are applicable
\textit{mutatis mutandis} to most, if not all, of the other countries in Latin America.
This means, to borrow the terms used by another economist, that, although due
importance should be attached to the problem of technology when considering
the historic role of the region's "autonomous forces", equal account should
be taken of population movements and particularly of the movement of ideas.
In answer to our second basic question, this means that the \textit{prise de
conscience} ushering in the new era must be chiefly of a psychological and
social character. To quote the words of Marchal: "C'est, en effet, la
\textit{prise de conscience} d'un désajustement dans les structures sociales - au
besoin en faisant intervenir la contrainte dont disposent l'Etat et les
groupes - qui peut conduire à une modification des structures économiques
et vice versa."\textsuperscript{73/}

\textbf{2. The problem of social change}

Much ink has been spilt in the attempt to define the question of
social change, but no agreement has yet been reached either as regards a
statement of its problems or a general scheme for their solution. The
classical schools of sociology (as direct heirs of the philosophy of
history) were, fundamentally, merely successive attempts to answer this
important question. At a later stage, sociologists usually avoided the
matter, either through extreme modesty or in obedience to an alleged
scientific conscientiousness, obliging such a taboo subject to be mentioned
only in inverted commas or with capital letters.

\textsuperscript{72/} \textit{Ibid.} p. 283
\textsuperscript{73/} André Marchal \textit{op. cit.} p. 103.
Furthermore, the functional school which has enjoyed such vogue in recent years - at least in North America and among its foreign admirers who in this respect are more Catholic than the Pope - despite its undeniable merits, has little to say on this point, since it is more interested in tensions and changes within a system designed to achieve an inner harmony that will justify its existence than in any radical transformation of a particular social system. Of course, the various approaches to the problem may be of great value for empirical research into these or other phenomena of change.\footnote{74/}

The question is all the more complex as economic development, by its very nature, must be regarded as one of the problems connected with social change and must inevitably be taken into account by economists, sociologists and historians.

a) A new power structure

Needless to say, this vast problem cannot be fully explored at the moment. But attention should be paid to one of its aspects which, by mere chance, is perhaps the most decisive and basic. In considering radical changes, (that is to say, a change-over from one system to another), one fact that is immediately obvious is an alteration in the power structure. Of course, this change in structure does not always need to be radical and revolutionary with one \textit{elite} being completely replaced by a "counter-\textit{elite}" (Lasswell); the membership of the "political class" and the "ruling class" (some combination of the new and old) only needs to be sufficiently new and vigorous to give the country a fundamentally different political and social orientation. In any case we then have a very real change in the power structure.

The power structure is a subject that has frequently cropped up incidentally in the foregoing pages. We have considered the transition from one historical system (that of the hacienda) to the industrial system with which the future lies. It would be well to touch, if only briefly, on the problems involved in changes in the power structure.

b) **Forms of government and electoral systems**

The old system of the hacienda did actually create a State in most of the Latin American countries, and in some of them it not only worked for many years with great efficiency but was also accepted as a legitimate source of authority; in other words the "system" worked out and adhered to "its own political formula" (Mosca). The political institutions evolved by these States were naturally modelled on the best then to be found in Europe and the United States of America. A presidential or parliamentary system was adopted; electoral procedures ranged from election by absolute majority to proportional representation; the law courts were organized in accordance with the strictest canons of the time and occasionally with such distinctive legal guarantees as the Mexican writ of prohibition; the administrative services mostly showed traces of French influence (in those days similar to the Spanish); and the basic codes (civil, mercantile, penal and code of procedures) promulgated one after another, were modelled on "continental law".

For students of Latin American political systems, some of these institutions raise a host of most important questions. And, in view of the familiar problem of Latin America's "instability", they naturally take a special interest in the influence exerted by electoral procedures and forms of government. 75/

But we must not go too deeply into these matters. It is necessary to revert to our main question, formulating it as incisively as possible on the purely theoretical level.

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75/ An interesting account of the whole question is given by Ferdinand A. Hermens, "Constitutionalism, Freedom and Reform in Latin America" in: F. B. Pike (ed.), *Freedom and Reform in Latin America*, Notre Dame (Ind.), University of Notre Dame Press, 1959. Allowance should, however, be made for Hermens' tendency (justified or not) to air his dislike for proportional representation.
c) **Liberals and conservatives**

Essentially, the old system operated through the existence of two main political parties, its "political formula" being the contraposition of two ideologies only — conservative and liberal. Needless to say, we cannot go into the ups and downs of these parties and schools of thought or into the various names by which they were labelled. As in any study of parties, it would be necessary to discuss, on the one hand, the doctrines they professed and, on the other, their structure. However, for the moment we must confine ourselves to a brief glance at past history.

As a rule, and as was to be expected, the conservative parties upheld the interests of the big landowners; they defended the traditional principles of education; they encouraged the maintenance of old customs and manners; they were generally in favour of the predominant role played by the Church, and not in spiritual matters alone. Accordingly, they were for the most part resolute supporters of the union of Church and State. The reforms they were bound to put forward were of a cautious character and preferably confined to legal and administrative questions.

The liberals, on the other hand, though not always avowedly anti-clerical, strove to curtail the Church's prerogatives, not only in the spiritual sphere but also in the matter of land and other property (the well-known "anti-mortmain" movement being the most striking case in point); they were in favour of modernizing education at all levels; they diffidently supported proposals for land reform; and they cherished somewhat vague ideals of federalism in the political sphere and of self-government so far as local administration was concerned.

The opposition with regard to certain problems of interest and other issues centred on technical points (it would nowadays be described as objective) — and was frequently not so radical as to preclude honourable compromises; eventually, on fiscal and economic issues they scarcely differed, both being guided by Manchesterism. However, their religious differences were always acute (even over what are now regarded as marginal problems); a parallel may be drawn between the liberal-conservative dichotomy of the Hispanic American countries and the traditions of the Mediterranean Latin countries — France, Italy and Spain.
So far as the structure of these parties is concerned, they undoubtedly belong to what is known in Anglo-Saxon terminology as the "caucus" type, where much depends on leadership. Traditional local leaders, maintaining close ties with one another, supported each other on such occasions as elections, through temporary organizations of party men who set in motion the well-known machinery of political gatherings, with oral or written statements of proposals and promises, but the members of these parties did no more than cast their vote or provide temporary support, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, for the actions of their leaders. The traditional parties of this type have existed and still exist in all parts of the world, and there is no reason to make excuses for their existence in Latin America, which can be explained on historical grounds. Three facts are, however, important.

The first is the symbiosis existing between the families from which these parties drew their support. Anyone bearing in mind the basic sociological contrast between town and country (between the "cultural-mercantile complex of the city" and the hacienda system) will immediately realize how these parties were recruited from the outset. From the early days of Latin American history, the Andalusian nobility had no scruples about engaging in trade; and merchants from Spain, Genoa, Venice, Pisa and Florence, once they had amassed a fortune, sought to establish their new social status by acquiring landed property. This pattern of development is to be found in all parts of the world (a typical instance being afforded by early Italian capitalism). The head of the hacienda also lived close to the town, and the urban tradesman (from inland or coastal areas) was anxious to purchase property and enhance his social status by establishing neighbourly relations with the old rural aristocracy. Analysis of the actual situation in each country will of course show that social classes cannot be classified in hard-and-fast categories, for there are so many variations in each. When, in addition to this natural symbiosis, we take into account the pragmatic symbiosis resulting from the fact that the members of many families were "strategically dispersed" between both parties, so as not to lose any opportunity for influence and power, it will be readily understood why the system worked so smoothly in many parts of Latin America with its relative social and political uniformity.
It is a decisive and undeniable fact (whether we like it or not, and only history will explain it) that the system worked for a long period with all the requirements that can be laid down by the strictest "functionalists" of today, such as integration, the achievement of aims, adaptation to the outside world, and the keeping of domestic tensions and conflicts continually in check. Sometimes, after long decades of anarchy, the countries themselves put forward the "fiction" of a structure holding out promise of peace and stability, regardless of the self-deception involved. A number of such instances may be cited in America, but perhaps the most famous was Cánovas del Castillo's restoration of the Spanish monarchy which—despite the "well-deserved criticism" of the last generation of Spanish thinkers laid the material bases for the "silver age" which these were later instrumental in establishing. However, some of those who benefited from the system began to realize that the time had come when this machinery no longer worked. It is to the credit of a conservative such as Roque Sáenz Peña, to mention only one instance, that he should have endeavoured, perhaps at a late stage and in the face of opposition from many in his party, to open the floodgates to the surging tide of a new age.

The third decisive fact—so weighty that Latin America is still feeling the effects of the problems to which it gave rise—is that this system one day broke down definitely and a serious political vacuum was created by the lack of anything to take its place, by the total lack of an adequate power structure geared to the tasks of the day. In other words, it became necessary to train a new ruling class, the direct heir of its predecessor, required by the completely changed situation in Latin America.

Colombia offers possibly the most complex or even tragic example of the repercussions on Latin American society of an ineluctable evolution, to borrow a term from de Tocqueville. If the scope of the present study permitted, we should dwell with sorrowful sympathy on this historic outcome, from which so much can be learnt. But let there be no mistake: Colombia's problems are common to all Latin America, though they do not occur everywhere in so acute and dangerous a form.

d) The breakdown of the system

The breakdown of the traditional two-party combination which accompanied the decline of the traditional hacienda system was the outcome of the far-reaching changes outlined above, the consequences of the emergence of the
new middle classes (urban and partly rural) the corollary of the decline of ideologies which accompanied or was bound up with these phenomena. It resulted from the inability to fill a political vacuum with the popular parties required of the times, when control could no longer be exercised by the caucus parties, despite their experience and (why doubt it?) their good intentions. It was the product of the conditions which gave rise (by design or by chance) to the growth of a new political class and the ruling class which it needed, whether it would or not, for its support and guidance.

It would be intellectually dishonest not to acknowledge the practical difficulties arising, though they cannot all be explored. Confining our attention to the problems of adaptation faced by all traditional two-party systems, it would be well to recall the teachings of one of the leading exponents of the problem, Maurice Duverger. We have only one example (and it is to be found in Europe) of a timely transformation of the traditional opposition between liberals and conservatives. This example is afforded by England, which can practically always be taken as a model in political matters. In masterly fashion it made the necessary transition from the nineteenth century two-party system to the already outdated twentieth century two-party system. But the social mechanism through which this result was achieved

76/ Duverger's own words are worth quoting, because of the clarity of his thought: "Au XIXe siècle, en Europe Occidentale, l'opposition des partis conservateurs et des partis libéraux a reflété un conflit de classe entre l'aristocratie et la bourgeoisie, dont l'analyse marxiste a donné une description convenable. Une tendance au bipartisme s'est ainsi manifestée clairement. Dans la deuxième moitié du siècle, le développement industriel et la croissance du prolétariat engendrent une troisième force politico-sociale, qui s'incarne dans les partis socialistes. Le bipartisme précédent tend alors à se transformer en tripartisme. Ce phénomène est observable à l'état pur en Grande Bretagne, en Belgique, en Australie, en Nouvelle-Zélande. Ailleurs, d'autres éléments interfèrent avec lui, mais sa trace demeure nettement perceptible." (Maurice Duverger, "Sociologie des Partis Politiques", in G. Gurvitch (ed.), Traité de Sociologie, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1960, p. 38). He then adds, although not all the finer points can be brought out: "Mais au fur et à mesure que la démocratie politique s'établit, qu'elle devient un régime installé, qu'un retour offensif du système aristocratique apparaît de moins en moins possible, l'opposition des conservateurs et des libéraux perd progressivement sa signification..." (Ibid., p. 39). These and other ideas put forward by the French teacher may be open to question, though it would be impertinent to challenge them here. There can, however, be no question in the relevance of his remarks to the subject under consideration - the decline of the old two-party system in Latin America.
also exerted an influence on other sectors, though not with the same results. This mechanism, even without needing to be absolutely identical, could not come into being in Latin America owing to the indiscipline and ideological confusion of its so-called left-wing movements (referred to above), the excessive number of parties thus created, and the ascendancy of certain leading figures who were zealous enough but suffered from "certa confusione nella testa". The sociologist, while striving to provide an explanation, does not claim to offer remedies for the future. Some sociologists, including R. Aron, ascribe certain of the difficulties confronting Latin American democracy to the consequences of this late development, thus making it comparable with constitutional democracy in France and Italy (not Spain for the time being); the danger of their parliamentary structure lies in the fact that the centre parties, which are the champions of traditional democracy, are flanked by extreme parties not compatible with the democratic system. The situation in Latin America may be very different as yet, but a word of warning is not out of place.

e) The political vacuum and the crisis of legitimate government

The gap in the power structure due to the failure of the historical political parties (successfully evolved by the hacienda system) to adjust themselves to a new situation creates a serious vacuum, as legitimate government is no longer firmly rooted. If any system is to be a driving force (and not merely able to survive) it must be both legitimate and effective - a point repeatedly stressed from the days of Aristotle to Max Weber and by all the "Machiavellian" political commentators. But while effectiveness is important, legitimacy is even more so. The old classes (the erstwhile oligarchies) may be capable of achieving a new form of legitimacy if they try to adjust their "political formula" to the requirements of the times. An old liberal can never, without being false to himself, desire the liquidation of anyone; and even a beginner in sociology knows how important a part was played by the "protective strata", as described by Schumpeter, 77/ during periods of change. But if people have

...no determination to change, they have no cause for complaint; all they can do is to resign themselves piously to the thought that God, for his inscrutable purposes, may sometimes blind those whom He wishes to destroy.

Peaceful endeavours to fill the power vacuum left by the decline of the long-established oligarchy have been made (though, of course, to a lesser extent in countries where the vacuum was suddenly filled by a revolution) by the new organizations (proceeding by trial-and-error methods and making many mistakes) formed by the most important productive forces in modern industrial societies and savouring somewhat of Saint-Simonian.

f) Digression on the military

But the predominance of the military is a phenomenon of Latin America and other parts of the world to ay which runs counter to the Saint-Simonian and Spencerian schools of thought and puts their prophecies to a severe test. This is a complex phenomenon affecting both the national and international life. The international aspects of the problem account for the tensions of the atomic age, even though for the moment (and, let us hope, for the future too) we are faced with no more than a cold war of nerves. Two contradictory factors likewise account for the emergence of the phenomenon at the national level.

On the one hand, old powers found it humanly impossible to adjust themselves overnight to changed circumstances and to assign a new role to the armed forces which had won renown for themselves, while, on the other, new countries, faced with the difficulties of improvising methods of government, turn to the army as the basic force for cohesion. There is nothing surprising in the fact that this system has aroused the liveliest interest among social scientists, regardless of their political views.

78/ Attention should be drawn to the almost simultaneous publication, by two sociological journals, of two special issues on this question. The Archives Européennes de Sociologie (Vol. II, No.1) has brought out an issue dealing with "Le Sabre et la Loi". The Revue Française de Sociologie (Vol. II, April-June 1961) has also published a special issue entitled "Guerre - Armée - Société". Both quote a large number of reference works on the subject, including recent and most interesting material published in North America.
Needless to say, we are interested solely in those aspects of this subject which bear on Latin America, in fact in the very restricted aspect with which this report is concerned. This digression on the military in Latin American politics is merely designed to provide basic background information on certain essential points. 79/

Edwin Lieuwen's thoughtful book 80/ published in 1960 has provided material for extensive commentary, though on differing lines. 81/ Although, of course, this book helped to aggravate the uneasiness of progressive Latin Americans, recent events have alleviated these feelings, if only for the poor reason that the same troubles are to be found all over the world.

To belabour the point once more, our analysis of this question is based on the fact that the break-up of the old social structure in Latin America left a power vacuum. Any such vacuum automatically offers a strong temptation to seize power, and it would be only human if chemists, architects and peaceful Greek scholars with obedient followers trained in the use of machine-guns were to feel confident that, once they took over the reins of government, their interesting fields of study would meet with general approval. Joking apart, however, we are not always confronted with an undisguised lust for power.

In the romantic phase of Latin American history, the military leader of the civil and international wars was a gentleman-at-arms of land-owning class, followed by an improvised band of supporters who, as in the case of Paez, finally became a hardened fighting force. But we are now living in less heroic times with a supposedly peaceful economy, and the military chiefs who seize power here and there, or influence their countries' decisions, are not self-taught warriors of the mountain

79/ For this reason, I shall not refer to the above-mentioned article by Germani and Silvert or to other similar works published at about the same time in Latin America and elsewhere.

80/ Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America, New York, Praeger, 1960. Another book being edited by John J. Johnson will expand further on the same subject, to judge from the announced title: The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries.

81/ One instance of differing assessment of this book is afforded by the two reviews published in the leading Mexican journal Foro Internacional, No. 1, July-September 1960.
or plains, but, more often than not, professional officers who have spent several years doing strictly technical studies. In addition, they come, practically without exception, from hard-working middle-class families, rather than from the land-owning aristocracy.

What has happened, at least in a good many cases? Without going into the question thoroughly, it should be said that the professional soldier is characterized by two very specific aspects of his training. For the time being, his is the only profession whose followers have been educated within a patriotic scheme of values. Geography and history, heroic myths and the virtues of sacrifice and discipline all converge to form in him an idea of his homeland as a single whole. Private interests exist, of course, as in any human group but, he of a sentimental or practical turn of mind, his over-all view of his country is that of an entity which not only has to be maintained and aggrandized as much as possible by the efforts of all, but which also demands the sacrifice of life itself in accordance with an age-old tradition.

On the other hand, the professional soldier in our time receives, for better or for worse, a technical training, which predisposes him to infection by the technocratic tendencies of our age. In the more powerful countries these technocratic leanings find immediate employment within the requirements of his own profession, but in the marginal countries (where, fortunately, there is no threat of mortal strife between neighbours) these leanings remain latent.

Socially and psychologically speaking, these two elements in the soldier's training decidedly condition his interest in politics, particularly in the inaptly-named "underdeveloped countries". This term is in itself a stigma which is a factor in the "will to greatness" that obsesses the career officer as it does other professional people.

Thus it happens, in a political situation that is stagnant and fibreless, that a career officer may feel himself capable of overcoming the basic faults which are responsible for the general frustration. The old oligarch naturally retains some of its capacity to command and its notion of national unity, but individual interests may play too important a part to allow it to act effectively. The new leftists, not only because...
of the urgency of their relentless daily problems, but because of their training and their idealistic dreams, usually have a rather limited concept of what national legitimacy really means, and scant instinct for power and command. Max Weber saw this as long ago as 1875, as was mentioned above, and it is no wonder that, faced with the imminent Nazi catastrophe, some highly intelligent Germans of every political colour believed that a temporary military dictatorship in the Roman style might have saved the Weimar Republic from its irreconcilable tensions.

Career officers, who are men from the middle class, may therefore think that their mission of stimulating development and thereby raising the national prestige implies first of all strengthening the weakened notion of legitimacy and improving efficiency.

Anyone who has shared the concerns of young military people for any length of time, as the author of these lines has done both through books and personal contacts, will have no doubts on this matter. And he may remember, perhaps admiringly, how the "technological potentialities" of some officers were enthusiastically put at the disposal of the organization of the Colonial Regiments, away on the border of the Santa Cruz forest.

By an irony of history, this effort on the part of military men seems always doomed to failure. Leaving aside cases of corruption, we find ourselves confronted by a more complicated situation; it would appear that, as a result of their action and after a certain length of time, the legitimacy that they so valiantly tried to shore up deteriorates irremediably, and scarcely anything is gained in the way of the desired efficiency, because modern technology has become enormously complicated and requires compromise, planning and concerted action which, even with the best intention, cannot be called into being overnight.

Experience reminds us again and again that there is no true govern-
ment where the civil authority is not paramount. For the present, however, it is not possible to dispense with the integrating and honourable role of the military authority. Meanwhile, it behoves the new ruling classes to find practical and human solutions to the problems of the social group

formed by
formed by the men of a country's armed forces. Education is important here, as it is in other spheres – an education adapted to our time – but it is also important to find an outlet for the undeniable "creative potentialities" of these men.

3. The new masses and the lure of demagogy

Besides the so-called "middle sectors", which have been active for some time in Latin American politics through their parties (defective though they be) and through their pressure groups, a large part of the working population has also been organized, despite the fact that until now trade union action has unfortunately met with more obstacles than assistance. These organized workers, however, trained to their objectives of economic betterment and political participation (the latter predominating sometimes over the former in the early period of their activity) still form an aristocratic and, as it were, privileged stratum within the proletariat.

a) "Displaced" elements

On the other hand, what happens when the new masses, "driven out" by the poverty of rural life or by fortuitous changes in the balance of rural economy, drift to the cities or go to swell the numbers of the rural proletariat working for the large-scale enterprises of modern farming? Local and foreign observers point out regretfully that in places like Lima or Rio, Santiago or Mexico City, these impoverished marginal masses of people are spreading apace; they are called by various names that have lost all local character as they become more widely used. Within the same category fall those unsettled people who are attracted here and there by cash-crop farming or drawn by the advantages of large enterprises producing for export. It is the concern of social politics to combat the multitude of personal problems presented by these people in their migrations and in their temporary "maladjustment". What we are interested in here is something else: the problem of their political integration or, to put it another way, the threat offered by their situation to the proper functioning of democracy at this particular moment of economic development.
It need hardly be said that the reasoning which follows is valid only for one who believes in a system of liberal democracy. The problem that arises is that the situation of masses such as these offers an ideal terrain for extremist decisions, and, surprisingly enough in this case, the extremism, far from being always of the same complexion, may be as far to the right as to the left. In the growing body of literature on the subject, reference is often made to the "authoritarianism" of the working class—a term the derivation of which we do not propose to investigate now. Whether the term itself is correct or not, it does shed some light upon a few of the perplexities that are bewildering contemporary man, provided he does not try to forget some of his most vivid experiences too quickly. But let us proceed step by step.

The modern organized industrialized proletariat, as its eventful political and trade union history shows, is not usually made up in any way by members of the right wing. This naturally applies more to Europe than to North America. Some groups of American workers vote in good conscience for the Republican party, because of conditions peculiar to that country which are easily explainable. Or, to take a more recent and more unusual example, the Tory vote of a supposed new working class has aroused astonishment in certain English observers. In any event, it is obvious that the proletariat tends by its very nature to be "progressive" rather than conservative. We are considering not only this, however, but also the constancy and relative "predictability" of these preferences on the part of labour.

This is a function of normal circumstances, within which it is no less normal that certain groups besides the workers, such as, for instance, the majority of intellectuals, should incline to the left. Sociologically speaking, this predictable behaviour is perfectly rational.

However, when these normal circumstances no longer obtain—in times of economic insecurity, troubles due to inflation, widespread unemployment, collapsing standards of living, war, etc.—the predictability of behaviour on all sides begins to be problematical.

/The irrational
The irrational becomes a sociological possibility. The experiences in Europe in the years marked by the spread of fascism and other disturbing phenomena (such as the curious agrarian movements in some Eastern countries) afford an example of such situations, which still have not been fully explained in all their complexity. But if that could occur in the case of groups and masses that had known some years of stability and often had powerful educational and cultural organizations behind them as well as political and economic institutions, what can be the situation of those masses, those genuine masses, uprooted and divorced from their cultural past?

b) "Mass situations"

It is not our intention here to go into the confused and complex subject of mass society, a subject abounding in the idées fixes of the holders of different points of view. It is, however, necessary to recall a few essential points. Let us not discuss the existence (denied by some thinkers) of a hypothetical mass society. While this has a certain utility (for cultural criticism, in particular) it undoubtedly constitutes a sociological category that is too general for the purposes of specific empirical research, of a political nature, for instance. On the other hand, the more precise category of "mass situations" may suitably be invoked to explain some of the psycho-social phenomena of what is called "collective behaviour".

These people, then, who have been "uprooted" from the traditional social milieu of Latin America and who flock to the callampas and favelas of its large cities, constitute a typical case of a condition which gives rise to "mass situations". That is to say, they offer conditions in which all the characteristics of these situations may be found: crowding together, which perhaps engenders a sense of power; a common lot, made

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82/ The present author endeavoured to elucidate this thorny topic in a short course of lectures given at the University of Cordoba, a portion of which is contained in the September-December issue (Year I, Nos. 4-5) of the Revista de la Universidad Nacional de Cordoba, devoted on this occasion to the subject of "Mass Society". In this connexion, I should like to draw attention to the interesting book by W. Kornhauser, "The Politics of Mass Society", Glencoe (III), The Free Press, 1959.
up of unfulfilled aspirations, daily frustrations and a feeling of insecurity; a consciousness of the distance that separates their way of life from that of the more fortunate beings around them. What political behaviour should we expect from these groups in such circumstances? Or, to put it another way, can the trend of their behaviour be predicted?

In another article attention has been briefly drawn to the seriousness of this situation in the Latin American countries which are in process of economic development.\(^{83}\)

The real difficulty resides in the uncertainty of any attempt at prediction. Seymour Martin Lipset, now a member of the Californian group, one of the most interesting of present-day American sociologists, is partly responsible for having launched this subject and for having coined in English the phrase "working-class authoritarianism"\(^*\) referred to above. It is worth lingering a few moments over his words, which obviously even he would not want taken as gospel. In short, what he says is that the social situation of the lower classes - who are in no way to be identified with the Lumpenproletariat in the Marxist sense - is characterized by their low education, low participation in political or voluntary organizations of any type, little reading, isolated occupations, economic insecurity and authoritarian family patterns.\(^{84}\)

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\(^{83}\) "Las Relaciones entre las Instituciones Sociales y Las Económicas: Un Modelo Teórico para América Latina", Boletín Económico para América Latina, Vol. VI, No. 1, March 1962, p. 37. The title of the article, influenced by the circumstances of the moment, is somewhat forbidding, to the detriment perhaps of its modest aims.

\(^*\) See, as a critical notice, the article by Miller and Riessman, "Working-class Authoritarianism: a Critique of Lipset", British Journal of Sociology, September 1961, together with Lipset's reply in the same issue.


/Leaving out
Leaving out (perhaps inadvisedly) the analytical transition, we find: (a) a striking correlation of these characteristics with anti-democratic attitudes; (b) a tendency towards authoritarianism which is bound up with a comparative lack of economic and psychological security; and, consequently, (c) a predisposition toward "extremist" movements (by which we mean political movements, though not to the exclusion of other types), which under certain conditions may change into the exact opposite, that is to say, into a total political apathy.

Lipset proposes a hypothesis which, to a believer in democracy, seems particularly important, and which should be tested in various circumstances. The hypothesis is this: "The proposition that the lack of a rich, complex frame of reference is the vital variable which connects low status and a predisposition toward extremism does not necessarily suggest that the lower strata will be authoritarian; it implies that, other things being equal, they will choose the least complex alternative." This means that when extremism represents an alternative of greater complexity, these groups will be inclined rather to oppose such movements and parties.

c) The persistence of the paternalistic image

It is not our intention to embark on a discussion of the theses of Lipset and his followers. It is enough simply to recognize his merit in daring to pose a problem, disconcerting in appearance, which not only

has independent theoretical value but is also extremely important in
stimulating reflection among Latin American students of these hazardous
times. 86/  Let us refer once more to the precision and clarity of the
oft-quoted study by Wagley. Both the workers on mechanized farms and
the crowded dwellers in the favelas are people who have been uprooted
and separated for some time from their traditional way of life. Now
one of the essential elements of this vanished way of life is the almost
mythical image of the patrão (paternalistic employer). It may be there- 
fore, that, in the "mass situations" in which these people live, their
strongest feeling is one of nostalgia for just such a "boss". But this
boss may - and in our time does - assume the stirring form of the dem-
gogue, so that, although the urban lower classes in Brazil continue to
be Catholic and do not have much international awareness, they "might
easily be swung to new charismatic leaders; as long as their plight
is serious, they will be vulnerable to extremist influences". 87/ What
is valid for Brazil is also valid for other countries, and these extremist
leanings may be to the right just as well as to the left.

86/ In this connexion, Glarecio Ary Dillon Soares has just published
an article (Boletín del Centro Latinoamericano de Investigaciones en
Ciencias Sociales, Year IV, No. 2), in which he applies the
elements of the argument outlined above to the actual state of
affairs in Brazil. He has promised a second part to this study.
Although supported by tables and calculations which are very
interesting in themselves, the article suffers somewhat from a
defect to which the earliest sociological research was prone
- tendency to lose sight of essentials under a mass of detail.
In Argentina, Gino Germani had to take the bull by the horns
(the bull in this case being Peronism) and therefore his book,
which also follows the trend indicated above, abounds not only
in ingenious interpretations (sometimes debatable, of course)
but also in valuable descriptions of electoral sociology in
Argentina, which it is a pity not to be able to reproduce and
comment upon at length (See G. Germani, Política e Massa, Be-
lo Horizonte, Edicao da Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos,
Universidade de Minas Gerais, 1960).

87/ Wagley, op.cit., p. 214.

(d) The parties
d) The parties of the masses

If the ruling classes do not concern themselves seriously with the problem — and not only through palliative measures of welfare aid — the possible thriving of "mass" parties will spell grave danger for Latin America, and this more particularly in the sphere of economic development, since, as has been mentioned elsewhere, such parties, however idealistic they may be, are from a technical point of view so erratic and dependent upon improvisation that they represent the very stuff of inefficiency.

How to incorporate these uprooted masses into the national political life in a responsible way is a task that we shall have to leave for the moment to better counsellors. It may be that political scientists will be able to solve the problem. There is a possible solution and one which might succeed as a short-term measure: panem et circenses. But in the long run their present-day substitute — tortillas and cheap movies — are bound to be fraught with danger. Economic development demands sacrifices but it also requires tangible results to keep up men's hopes from day to day. At a meeting in Mexico of the Working Groups on Social Aspects of Economic Development in Latin America, held in December 1960, this was a primordial and unanimous concern. This preoccupation was expressed in different ways, but the following opinion is perhaps most representative: "A policy of apportionment of investments should be adopted which would permit the production of goods for wage-earners to increase more rapidly than the production of other consumer goods and services." An outstanding Puerto Rican politician adopted as a motto for his followers the forceful expression "up with our sleeves". No one insists that leaders in other countries adopt the colourful Puerto Rican expression, but they should realize its meaning: economic development is an uphill task, always laborious. Nevertheless, it can be carried out successfully if those who attack the challenging slope together are able from time to time, in looking around them, to recognize and enjoy the tangible results thus gradually achieved.

C. THE IDEOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT AND THE NEW PARTIES

At this advanced point in his task, the author hopes for his own sake, as well as for that of his unknown readers, that in working out the pattern of his thoughts he has been able to maintain the thread of the central idea. Lest there be any misunderstanding, however, it might be well to link up what is to follow with what has gone before, by means of a brief review. Circumstances have been responsible for our taking the theme "the social aspects of economic development"; but since the ways of treating it were many, the selection of one particular treatment necessarily had to be dictated by the personal preferences of the author and the extent to which he was informed or uninformed on the subject. With a slender training in the matter of welfare or social policy, he would have inclined by vocation towards the more theoretical questions of sociology; he has already touched on these, however, and hopes to return to them with renewed emphasis later. Certain contingencies (there is always an element of chance in life) and perhaps the "unpunished vice" of intellectual curiosity, made him prefer a historic approach in this case, even though it was bound to be tenuous and hypothetical. In the eventful history of Iberian America - or rather Latin America - what has been the essential core of its politico-social vicissitudes? In this connexion it was fitting to describe the origin and decline of the hacienda system, since the hacienda was the basic structure, the evolution of which was accompanied by other factors no less essential, sometimes attracting them, sometimes bringing them to light.

In the first decades of the twentieth century the decline of the old system met with other, rising, forces that were militating in favour of its complete transformation. Some years later, at a complicated juncture in international life, a new and fundamental prise de conscience spread throughout Latin America, deriving its main impetus from that continent's fervent aspiration to economic development and coinciding,
as it were, with the beginning of its full adulthood. In the face of certain opinions, insistence upon the real and profound psychological nature of this *prise de conscience* (arising from a new "level of aspiration", in the language of modern psychologists) immediately throws into striking relief the political nature of the powerful instrument which in our own time will complete the transformation of Latin America. Indeed, the political system of parties, which succeeded to the old agrarian structure of the regions, is as outmoded today as the *hacienda* system from which it sprang.

Foreign observers tend to describe as a Latin American mania what they themselves like to judge as one form or another of state *dirigisme*. This, however, is not really the case. The fact is, rather, that we are witnessing the rise of new ruling classes - of another "political class", both dynamic and modern.

One would have to be blind not to see that the past few years have produced an accumulation of economic knowledge, both theoretical and practical, such as should enable the aspiration to development to advance from the stage of indefinite desire to that of definite achievement. Needless to say, economic development is not the sole problem that besets a nation, but it is one of those "privileged" questions of the present-day world, around which a multitude of other questions, seemingly remote and no less important, tend to cluster. In any case, development implies the need for clear-cut programmes and their systematic implementation - or, in other words, aims and methods, goals and the instruments for their attainment. The formula may vary, but it is evident that the new parties required by the future Latin American system, which is now taking shape, can only find their practical justification in the tenor of their respective proposals concerning this programming. In future, only the class that possesses a body of clear ideas on this problem will be supported as the authentic ruling class. In the last pages of this study an endeavour will be made to cover this ground, if only in a hurried and perhaps no more than thought-provoking way.

/1. Is
1. Is there only one formula for development?

Not long ago a French economist began an interesting article with the following apposite remark: "Après avoir exporté ses valeurs, l'Occident exporté aujourd'hui ses complexes. Inquiet de ne plus être suivi, il veut en effet être imité". We should, however (even those of us who have a taste for Gracian) be careful to avoid the dangerous snare of this subtlety. On the contrary, emphasis should be laid on the general agreement concerning the central argument of this section, even though in the title it is put in the form of a question. It would take a long time to recount the history of this conviction, and its story would fill a large volume which may never be written. We shall touch upon some of its elements in abridged form. For the moment the author trusts he may be excused for simply sketching some of the main lines of the aforementioned history, for the benefit, he repeats, of a public that is not made up of economists.

All of the increasingly abundant literature on economic development that has to be taken into account for one reason or another by recent bibliographers has been obliged to follow, straight or zigzag, one of the following three paths: (a) that of strict economic theory of development, from the venerable fathers of economic science, through the various phaseological theories of German thought, to the most modern post-Keynesian authors of one model or another, such as Harrod.

Jacques Austruy, "Existe-t-il un Mode Obligé de Croissance?", Revue d'Economie Politique, January-February 1961. The author bases himself on the reflections of another colleague, D. Villey, which I cannot resist quoting here: "En somme les Américains et nous autres Européens nous sommes les fils aînés de l'histoire, et nos cadets se révèlent furieusement atteints d'un complexe très à la mode: le complexe d'envie du frère puîné. Et le père de famille se demande alors s'il ne doit pas mettre des pantalons longs aux enfants au berceau pour les guérir de leur complexe. Mais le père de famille a lui aussi son complexe. Il est hanté par le besoin que les pays arriérés se mettent à imiter son propre genre de vie. Si bien que les backward countries se trouvent en mesure de pratiquer ce qu'on appelle outre-Atlantique le back-seat driving et qui consiste à conduire une automobile quoique assis sur le siège arrière par les conseils que l'on prodigue à celui qui tient le volant." (See the issue of the periodical quoted above, p.82) two things might perhaps be noted: first, that the complex is common to both, to East and to West - all "occidentals", in the final count; and, second, that Latin Americans, in all modesty, have in many cases done their best to free themselves from this complex. (See A.O, Hirschmann (ed.), Latin American Issues, Essays and Comments, New York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1961, p.12-23.)
Domar and other recondite econometrists; (b) that of the experience accumulated by historians (whether specializing in general, economic or social history) whose names need not be mentioned since they are as well known as they are numerous; (c) lastly, that of the modern typologies, of which one of the most often quoted contemporary authors is W. Rostow, together with a large group of opponents, from the mildest, such as R. Aron, to the most virulent and dogmatic, such as P. A. Baran.

Anyone who has made this experiment as an "amateur" will be convinced that the counsels of theory and history are very diverse, but also that he has at his disposal a valuable "working tool" on the efficacy of which he can rely in whatever he is setting out to accomplish. The worth of the classical writers - whose essential concern was not exactly the topic of development in its literal sense - rises or falls according to the validity of their general doctrine. Economic historians point to the extraordinary diversity of circumstances to which development is due in different countries: the spontaneous creative activity of a few private industrialists; or the influence of the State; or again the part played by the banking system, and the special "initiating" role of such widely differing sectors of industry as textile or silk factories, iron and steel works, lumbering, railway or shipping companies, etc., or a particular combination of those sectors.

On the other hand, how can we doubt the intellectual refinement of the most modern economic conceptions, the advances made in the "rationality" (predictability and computability) of the latest planning and programming techniques? With regard to the afore-mentioned models, to which the sociologist only objects from certain points of view, we may follow the initial thought of Professor Austruy when he says:

90/ By way of initiation for a reading public of non-economists, we give here a few very brief bibliographical references. For the history of economic theories of development, the following works may be very useful: B.F. Hoselitz et al., Theories of Economic Growth, Glencoe (Ill.), Free Press, 1960; G.M. Neier and R.E. Baldwin, Economic Development, New York, Wiley, 1957, Part 1; Benjamin Higgins, Economic Development, New York, Norton, 1959, Part 2; Celso Furtado, Desenvolvimento e Subdesenvolvimento, Rio de Janeiro, Editora Fundo de Cultura, 1961. For a brief historical outline of economic development in various countries there is nothing better than the admirable courses given in successive years by André Philip, Cours d'Economie et Politiques Sociales. For modern "typology" we refer to the book by W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1960. (The most severe criticism of this work by P.H. Baran and E.J. Hobsbawm, can be found in Kyklos, Vol. XVI, Fasc. 2, 1961.)
"Ils offrent un raccourci de certaines relations intéressantes à partir
d’hypothèses convenablement choisies. Ils ne permettent, en aucun cas,
de déterminer concrètement des critères économiques valables de rationalité
de l’investissement."

Reference was made to this last statement in the first pages of the
present study, without any attempt to claim strict accuracy for it. Never-
theless, the sociologist’s basic objection is to the problem contained in
the above-mentioned "hypothèses". What is incredible to anyone who has
made the foregoing excursion is the present-day insistence on proposing
as the only two possible models the Soviet and the so-called "Western".
(The former, in reality, is as Western as the latter - shades of Marx
and Engels, excellent Germans, or of Saint-Simon and Fourier, undeniably
French, and of others, Italian, Anglo-Saxon, Russian. It is, for good
or evil, a common heritage.) Only the prevailing state of affairs can
explain this shortsightedness. We have simply to glance at the history
of economic development in Japan, for example, to realize that here is
a people entirely outside the Western tradition. Is not something
similar, in its originality, happening today in the development of modern
India? And why can we South Americans not also claim to have made some
original contribution, of value despite its "marginality"?

The lessons of theory and history, the abundance of technical tools
available today, mean that we are faced with a number of options among
which we must make a selection. The only requirement is that the final
picture which is the result of these decisions must be clear and coherent.
In any "adult" policy it is realized that contradictory things cannot
be sought at one and the same time. Whatever the values that are chosen,
they must be in tune with one another, aims must harmonize with means,
and the secondary consequences of the action must be foreseen as far as
possible.

Subject to these conditions, why should we not think that the new
parties necessitated by the time, obedient to the general mandate of
"programming", will be capable of formulating a modern system of clearly
defined goals and procedures? Given the possibilities of economic

/development and
development and their human and cultural implications, the new "political class" which is now beginning to take charge of the destinies of the Latin American countries will find itself faced with a series of dilemmas, and, according to the choice it makes, specific lines of action reflecting the inevitable differences and differentiations will automatically emerge. In all probability, these specific lines of action will not be numerous, but the necessity of making a choice is unavoidable. Here, as in other sectors of life, we must accept our "compulsory freedom to choose".

However, the term dilemma as used above is not quite accurate, since it is not a matter of irreconcilable opposites but of options from among possibilities that can be brought into harmony by prudent compromise. Let us then consider these options in economic development, according to the essential nature of their problems: technical, political and sociological. Since time presses, this will have to be done without any expression of opinion on the substance of the question and without dwelling on any of its ramifications. It must also be borne in mind that, as in any classification, reality, being unamenable to logic, permits of the transition without difficulty from one purely analytical division to another.

(a) Development as a technical problem: economic options

The following are some of the options presented by the technical problem of development, it being understood, further to our previous remarks, that they should mostly be regarded not as methods that must be adopted unchanged, but merely as a list of the main procedures that have hitherto been advocated or are still being advocated,

(1) The first (and fundamental at this time) is the option dictated by our present "impatience" with history. On the one hand we must choose between the "big push", to be understood in a far broader sense than in its strictly technical and doctrinal connotation as an extreme form of acceleration, and other slower, more restrained approaches - leaving out of account, of course, the genuine hope pinned by some people on the gradual process of "community development" (which may none the less be useful in a supplementary way here and there), the more so since Latin America knew hundreds of years ago the venerable figure of

/Vasco de
Vasco de Quiroga and has also possessed since then the time-honoured institutions of the municipality and the parish. This economic option between the vigorous thrust and other slower forms of development (to demonstrate at least once the transitions that take place in real life between the most impenetrable analytical classifications) nevertheless gives rise to very complicated sociological problems. The "big push" not only involves violent change in certain sectors of the economy; it also implies a genuine social "upheaval" in regard to centres of population, the system of employment, and the accelerated training of efficient leaders. This is a question which has not as yet been sufficiently studied.

(2) The second option is between the expansion of the primary industries and exports (agriculture and mining) and the encouragement of general industrial production.

(3) The third technical problem in development is the delicate option between the sectors of industry that deserve greatest attention. The choice has to be made between light industries manufacturing consumer goods and heavy industries producing capital goods. It is a well-known fact that Soviet economic planning reversed the common European practice in this matter, giving the iron and steel industries priority over textiles. But there is no infallible recipe in this sphere. Heavy industry requires very special conditions, as regards resources, energy and professional qualifications, which are not to be found everywhere. Commenting on this point, R. Barre, in his exemplary and schematic analysis of the subject, admits that, wherever these conditions are found, the building-up of heavy industry gives great stimulus to expansion and "in the long run permits a much more rapid development of industries producing consumer goods".\(^{91}\) Barre agrees in this respect with the following view expressed by M. Kaplan: "Thus, if the data can be believed, and if the analysis has been correct, the greater rate of increase of industrial output in the U.S.S.R. has been due, basically, not to differences in U.S.S.R.—United States rates of investment, but rather to differences in the direction of investment".\(^{92}\)


It is for the economists, not for us, to deal with the complex ramifications of these problems.

(4) The fourth option in the technical problems of development (if we may properly speak of an option in this case) is the one which some people currently put in the form of a dilemma: namely the choice between "stability" and "development". This problem, coupled with one of the most alarming for the layman (the problem of inflation), has lately been the subject of heated discussion intellectually speaking, especially in the case of Chile, though the same applies also to other countries. It will suffice to refer here to a study by J. Grunwald, which, under an impressive title — The "Structuralist" School on Price Stabilization and Economic Development: the Chilean Case — sums up the full implications of this problem and refers to the most important works on the subject. However, some economists regard this option as, in fact, a 'false dilemma'. In the opinion of Dr. Raúl Prebisch, for instance, the economic development of Latin America is not incompatible with its monetary stability, provided that the various countries are prepared to introduce a few structural changes in their economies as part of an overall economic policy.

(5) A fifth option would consist in deciding between an immediate redistribution of the present national income (i.e., the sum total of wealth) and waiting until economic development has begun to yield definite results before attempting any redistribution of the increased income in such a way as to diminish the previous inequalities.

(6) A further option would be between a general, integrated economic policy and action tending to concentrate on some particular sector considered to have key or strategic importance. The form now taken by this option is reflected in publications on economic development (to which reference has already been made in the present study) as a choice between the so-called theory of balanced development and other theories stressing the dynamic importance of individual aspects of the process of development (Hirschman's theory being perhaps the most explicit).

(7) Again, another quite different option, to which a certain theoretical

\[93/\text{ In Latin American issues, Essays and Comments, pp. cit pp. 95-123} \]

\[94/\text{ Raúl Prebisch, "El Falso dilema entre desarrollo económico y estabilidad monetaria", Boletín Económico de América Latina, vol. VI, No 1 (Santiago de Chile, marzo de 1961), pp. I ss.} \]
importance is attached today, and which is implicit in other remarks contained in this study, should be stated more explicitly. When the resources available are scanty, the choice is between "social" investments (housing for the people, for instance) or even more costly investments in the "social infrastructure" (likely eventually to yield opportunities for economic activity proper), on the one hand, and, on the other, direct investment in the strictly economic sectors (factories, transport, etc.).

(8) In Latin America - perhaps to a greater degree today than in other underdeveloped areas - another option to be taken into account is that between "independent national development or else development based on the principle of integration within a given area or on some system of free trade between various countries.

(9) Nor can we overlook the possibility of an occasional choice between having recourse to foreign capital as a spur to development and the opposite extreme of drawing exclusively on domestic capital.

(10) Yet another option among the technical questions of development is that concerning the best distribution of certain economic-demographic situations, which is put in the following way, with a problematical note to it, in the economic recommendations made by the meeting of the Working Group held in Mexico City in December 1960: "We must also seek social integration through economic by trying to incorporate those regions in each country which have remained behind in the process, and it must be realized that an exaggerated stress upon a policy of regional equity might be incompatible with the acceleration of development of the over all economy".

(11) In some Latin American countries, various quarters have advocated appropriation by the State of certain industrial undertakings and sectors of production which in the so-called capitalist countries are in private ownership (telephone, electrical power and ship-building companies, companies for the manufacture of certain types of motor vehicles, or sectors such as oil, coal, steel, transport, etc.) - in short, certain public services, natural resources and economic activities regarded as fundamental. And so, even without sweeping changes in the

prevailing economic system, another option, still not clearly defined, has arisen. To take account of historical developments, this may be described as the alternative between public and private ownership.

(b) Development as a political problem: options with regard to sacrifice

The political problems of development likewise involve a series of no less vital options:

(1) It must first of all be decided whether preference is to be given to *laissez faire* or to State intervention; in other words, whether development is to be spontaneous or "induced" (an ugly word, if ever there was one!). The course of history has settled this question everywhere, and there are hardly any orthodox liberals of the old school left. Modern neo-liberals always speak of a market economy of a social character — *sociale Marktwirtschaft* — controlled and directed by a state of law. The only point open to discussion is the nature and limits of the permissible intervention: support of the purity of the market within the system; *ad hoc* interventions in response to national or international problems; general direction of the economy; strict programming or total planning by State machinery. Quite apart from the centrally administered economies of the Soviet countries, the State everywhere else is always a Welfare State, the only distinction being that, as Hyrdal has pointed out, its role in rich and powerful countries is very different from the part it plays in the poorer and less developed ones.

(2) The second political option — and this one is perhaps problematical, since it may be bound up with unavoidable economic realities — is the one between open or closed growth or, in other words, between dominant or satellite economies. It must be insisted that the choice is not a purely political one, yet there have been cases in history of obstinate preference for one of the alternatives, despite all the circumstances that appeared to militate against it.

(3) The third option consists in the choice between the claims of power and those of the general weal; the various ways in which this dilemma has been formulated throughout the centuries may seem incomprehensible to some people, obsolete relics of a former age. For the time being, however, this dilemma is still being put, to the great distress of those who are not interested in such disputes. This option does not appear to have much meaning for Latin American countries, and the matter can in any case be solved by more or less tolerable compromises.

\( / (4) \) The last
(4) The last political option connected with economic development is certainly the gravest of all, especially for the countries of America, since the point is to decide on whom the heaviest burden of sacrifice shall fall. In its extreme forms, the question is one of choosing between the sacrifice of a few and a sacrifice shared by all.

In theory there is no way of getting round this problem without subterfuge. All economic development inevitably brings painful sacrifices in its wake. We have no intention here of going deeply into a theoretical (and, in final analysis, practical) problem of this kind or of ferreting through the teachings of history, which would be a heavy task, and often a rather distressing one. What is more, the subject lends itself, sad to say, to all kinds of demagogy. Calm and objective analysis, avoiding such histrionics like the plague, but duly mindful of the above-mentioned chastening conclusion of relentless theory, can show that a relatively equitable distribution of sacrifices may be attempted, even if the result is not ideal. Economists may have various solutions to recommend but these are technical matters outside our present scope. Politically speaking, the problem is one of justice, and the choice may perhaps involve sacrificing some of the best proposals in the interests of what is presumably the supreme aim, namely national assent and cohesion.

(c) Development as a sociological problem

In the sociological sphere (if it is distinguishable from the political one in fact, though of course it is in theory) options and alternatives are likewise found:

(1) The first decision to be taken is whether economic development should go hand in hand with attempts at major or minor reforms of the social structure. There are many fields in which the State can act, the first and most vital being education. However, we will not go into detail on this point.

(2) It must also be decided, especially in the initial stage of development, whether a general spirit of discipline is to prevail, with the leaders themselves affording the first examples (history is full of instances of this) or whether we are to give ourselves up to the ordinary laxity and bonhommie to which the overwhelming majority of human beings are inclined. (Despite all fictions to the contrary, things are as they were with the worthy citizen of Seville who — the story goes — being upbraided by an Englishman for his laziness and given to understand that it was to months of labour that the latter owed his holidays abroad,
holidays abroad, replied, with simple logic: "But, sir, I was born in Seville". Nevertheless, the economists are right, where present industrial societies are concerned, and they are endeavouring to find the strategy capable of stimulating output and a sense of responsibility and of creating the ambitions which give rise to social mobility.

(3) Another alternative with regard to the sociological problems of economic development is the one which marks the distance between the apathy and indifference of the lower classes and, on the other hand, their decided support and enthusiasm. It should be mentioned that among the variety of representatives of the social sciences -- economists and sociologists, political theorists, educationists and psychologists -- there has never been greater unanimity than on this point. That is to say, all have borne witness to the fact that no lasting, effective economic development, at any rate in the long run, can be achieved unless it is supported by popular enthusiasm and participation. What such popular participation should be, from that of the smallest rural community to that of thickly inhabited cities, and how it is to be secured without the use of deceptive myths, are questions which cannot be discussed here. Suffice it to note the difference between the demagogue and the true statesman: the former encourages with the help of lies, and his successes can be spectacular, without a doubt; the latter stimulates and supports with the help of truth, though the road to his achievements, during his lifetime, is hardly marked by a series of triumphal arches. Let us hope that the new political class now in process of formation may consist for the most part of real statesmen.

(d) The various options and their incorporation in the ideologies of parties

The foregoing hasty enumeration of the chief options and alternatives in economic development makes no claim to originality. It is purely intended to show how, through a logical incorporation of some of these options, the new parties of the industrial era can build up new ideologies to replace the old, worn-out formulas, already remote from real problems of our time.

/These new
These new political parties and the ruling classes which will, as always, have inspired them will have ample material at their disposal if they wish seriously to confront the threefold process of social transformation in present-day Latin America: its economic development, the completion of national integration in each country and the initiation of the supranational structures which afford the only guarantee of its political and cultural survival in the troubled circumstances of the modern world. But, to confine ourselves to the problem of economic development with which we are here chiefly concerned, it should be pointed out that in economics the amount of knowledge already accumulated is sufficient to enable the big parties to select, from the wealth of its propositions, the basic elements of their ideology. This ideology of development (without which they will not enjoy popular support) may be expected to vary only in regard to the following points or, if preferred, in the greater or lesser emphasis laid upon them: (a) tempo; (b) mechanisms involved; (c) distribution of sacrifices; (d) greater or lesser intensity of its popular appeal. Within a liberal democracy (where extreme parties will of course exist) the prophecy may be ventured (and this has no connexion with theoretical or sentimental preferences) — that "bipartisme du XXᵉ siècle" will soon have to replace the old "bipartisme du XIXᵉ siècle", to borrow once more M. Duverger's expression.

Despite what was said earlier about the mistakenness of believing in the absolute need for certain forms of economic growth (and despite a certain admiring curiosity about the creative ability of Japan or India), we should not be moving with our times if, resisting the prevailing trend, we failed to give some attention to the models which claim predominance. By "some attention" is meant the minimum required for a practical examination of the question, which is the main purpose of these pages. We shall therefore consider first the Soviet and then the Western formula, though this must necessarily be done with the utmost brevity.
2. The Soviet Model

Concerning the Soviet Model, let us now turn our attention to the Soviet formula—held in veneration by some people and in horror by others—though we can only touch briefly on certain points.

a) The advance of the Soviet economy

A few decades ago the 1917 Revolution was repeatedly said to be failing in its aims in the very sector that concerns us, namely, economic development. It was generally prophesied that the production targets—qualified as unattainable by the other side—would never be reached, and that with this failure the whole politico-social system so recently set up would crumble. With the passage of time, however, almost all trace of this attitude has disappeared. On the contrary, the manifest economic success of the régime is admitted on all sides. There is no point in our producing a mass of indices and rates: economic and cultural indices, rates of annual increase in the gross product, indices of industrial production—coal, petroleum, electricity, steel, machinery—or indices of the annual productivity per inhabitant. It is both unnecessary and impossible to give these here. Even the expert may have difficulty in threading his way through a maze of figures which rarely coincide, while the layman is bound to be floored in the end by his inability to tackle the reconversion of real and nominal valutas and values. Suffice the sheer fact that there is general agreement on the positive achievements of Soviet economic development (though dark patches subsist, as in the case of agriculture, likewise generally recognized). The recent spectacular triumphs in the technical and scientific domain represented by the conquest of outer space have effectively stifled the gravest doubts of the most sceptical. However, the layman has to contend with an additional difficulty in the recondite sphere of economics, in that he cannot rely on academic interpretations contained in official documents for the purposes of comparison with those interpretations to which he is accustomed. As F. Perroux perspicaciously remarks: "La représentation de son système économique que chaque société préconise et répand par les voies de la pédagogie et de l'enseignement, est séduisante, singulièrement en ce qu'elle est trop logique. Ce serait un exercice excellent de comparer aux
b) **Convergence in the material aspects of the opposing systems**

In contrast to earlier and now out-of-date problems, others, more complicated and more profoundly theoretical, are now exercising the best minds, though as is natural, these do not as yet come within the sphere of popular knowledge. The point in question is that of the supposed convergence, sooner or later, of the two systems which now appear to be diametrically opposed – a convergence connected, on the one hand, with the extremely technical problem of so-called economic rationality, and on the other, with the practical mechanisms and solutions to which both economies have recourse.

Some years ago (the controversy may have begun with Max Weber's criticism of the theory of O. Neurath) it was thought that the chief stumbling-block in any socialist economy consisted in the difficulty of finding a basis for calculation. The essence of free economy was the rational basis of calculation which permitted the free operation of the market; the elimination of this market would preclude the continuation of what Weber called the "formal rationality" of the economic process. It would be out of place to summarize here the details of this prolonged and highly intricate controversy, which, moreover, now seems completely out of date.

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28/ The bibliography for this subject is overwhelming, and not only on account of its bulk. It would be impertinent to attempt here even a minimum selection. We need only recall the comparative tables (though some may consider them to be pro domo sua) contained in the well-known book by Rostow, *op. cit.*, p. 96-7. /It is
It is most probable that, in the first years, Soviet planners proceeded empirically, using the familiar method of trial and error; little by little, however, they perfected their methods, and today they possess a body of doctrine which, in respect of calculability, of economic rationality, gives the dominant procedures of the East and the West the same value. The publication of the book by Oskar Lange\textsuperscript{99} has, apparently, put an end to this question.

Nor are works of reference lacking on the subject of this convergence in the material aspects of the economic process as between the Soviet and the Western worlds. One of the most elaborate theoretical works is, perhaps, that of F. Ferroux, in his book \textit{La Coexistence Pacifique}, and more particularly in the second of its three volumes.\textsuperscript{100} On the other hand, it may be of interest to refer rapidly to another less familiar interpretation. In the opinion of Erik Boettcher,\textsuperscript{101} a recognized specialist in Soviet affairs, this convergence is a consequence of the fact that the U.S.S.R. is now in the intensive phase of its industrialization. In the first, the so-called extensive phase, the effort had to depend on a rapid expansion of the labour force in the modern sector of the economy. Because of events which Boettcher carefully analyses and which have reduced the available supply of manpower, reliance can no longer be placed on the earlier expansion, and the Soviet leaders will have henceforth to count mainly on a rapid average increase in worker productivity and on the stimulus of technological modernization.


\textsuperscript{100} An excellent summary is given in the article by Jacques Austruy, mentioned earlier.

\textsuperscript{101} Erik Boettcher. \textit{Die sowjetische Wirtschaftspolitik am Scheideweg}, Tübingen, Mohr, 1959, especially Chapter II. In other works by the same author, these ideas are reiterated and compared with those of other experts in Soviet economy. His general economic propositions are to be found in his article "Phasentheorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung", in: \textit{Hamburger Jahrbuch für Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik}, Year 4, with a tabular summary (p.31) of his whole theory. including, as
including, as may be expected, automation. According to Boettcher, the transition from the "extensive" to the "intensive" phase signifies profound changes in all aspects of Soviet life. It will approximate (and it is this point that interests us at the moment) the dominant features of the two opposing economic systems, both now in a similar intensive phase. Whether or not this theory is wholly admissible - and it has, of course, its critics - there is no doubt that it constitutes a substantial endeavour to demonstrate the possibilities of convergence with which we are now concerned.

c) **Convergence in the social structure**

There is also, as might be expected, another kind of convergence, which is currently of very special interest to the sociologist, namely, convergence in the social structure. For the time being, this exhibits the uniform physiognomy of all the advanced industrial societies; it also gives rise to hopes of a political nature, but these are less certain than those offered by a sober and objective verification of the above mentioned structural approach.

As regards the kinship in structural physiognomy, the point seems too obvious to require convincing proof. Much time moreover would be taken up in providing it. We should have to examine in detail the employment pattern, the distribution of income, the emergence of similar psycho-social types on the technical side (factories and workshops) or on the administrative side of industry, to consider the formation of the most important social strata, the extent of social mobility and the advent of "images" of the different classes; to explain the organization of the educational system and the trends in technical and general education; to approach in the manner of Alex Inkeles the problem of the psychological structure of "industrial" and the relationship between his status and the facts of experience, of psychic perception and the acceptance of one or other set of values. A no less essential matter would be to know how the élites are formed and what are their chief characteristics. Nor should we omit to inquire how the average Soviet citizen - the "poor fellow" (Ortega) like the rest of us - lives, endures and thinks.

There is an abundance of material, and the task has been carried out with varying degrees of success by different people. There is nothing astonishing in this coincidence. Modern industrial societies, be they Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon, German or Latin (apart from national and cultural idiosyncrasies), all
idiosyncrasies), all resemble one another in their social structure, though this does not, of course mean that there is strict conformity between them on all points. And this sort of social structure is sometimes achieved - for better or for worse - whatever the mode of the economic development.

See Pitirim A. Sorokin, "Mutual Convergence of the United States and the U.S.S.R. to the Mixed Social Cultural Type", International Journal of Comparative Sociology, Karwatak University, Dharwar (India), Vol. 1, No 2. Here, too, it would be senseless to hurry in selecting a bibliography on the subject; a start has been made by R. Aron, with his brilliant "journalistic" talent (as a few pedantic little sociologists would consider it), in his courses at the Sorbonne, concerning the formation of the elites; there is an interesting issue of the periodical Dedalus (Summer 1960): and, concerning the common man, readers can choose between the "impressionism" of Klaus Nehmert, Der Sowjetmensch, Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1958, and the complicated technicality of Alex Inkeles and R. A. Bauer, The Soviet Citizen, Harvard University Press, 1959. See also D. Granick, The Red Executive: a Study of the Organization Man in Russian Industry, New York, Doubleday, 1960. (Compare with White, Bendix and Bahrn.)

There is also a kind of convergence or approximation à rebours, which has been dealt with in one of the boldest, most ingenious (and most criticizable) articles published in recent years. This is the study by Siegfried Landshut, "Die Gegenwart im Lichte der Marxischen Lehre", Hamburger Jahrbuch für Wirtschafts-und Gesellschaftsrecht, Year 1). In the view of this renowned sociologist, the profoundest predictions of Marx have come true precisely in the most advanced (non-Marxist) industrial societies of our time, rather than in Soviet Russia. ("Die Wahrheit der Marxischen Analyse: die Zukunftsgesellschaft als heutige Wirklichkeit" (The truth of the Marxian analysis: the future society qua contemporary reality). The sub-title is very thought-provoking.) The article contains three fundamental ideas: (a) "alienation", a basic Marxist concept, is already a reality in our industrial society, in its organizations and its masses (public opinion and technological progress are clear cases of independent forces, subject to an inexorable Elastengesetzlichkeit); (b) the prediction of Alexis de Tocqueville - the progressive levelling of all strata - has been largely fulfilled, which is to say, in Marxist parlance, that the prediction of a classless society is beginning to triumph in all the Western industrial societies: it should be observed that the celebrated class-consciousness is slowly dying out in various places because of the general rise in living standards and expectations and the formation of a broad layer of equivalent intermediate incomes; (c) simultaneously with this decline of the old "class" society, we are witnessing the withering of the principle of nationality and the ideology of the "political" State, the latter gradually turning into an administrative entity, serving a society which is capable of governing itself. "Political thought is now directed beyond the nation towards other complexes, wider in their scope ... To the extent that the bourgeoisie, the propertied and cultured class, becomes absorbed into the general "unitary society", the nation likewise ceases to be the soil from whence springs its greatness and its glory." (Ibid., p.51.) The critics will say how much of this - derives from intellectual fantasy and how much from observation (hasty, perhaps) of some features of contemporary European life.
Does this approximation or convergence in the social structure denote, however, a foreseeable liberalization of the Soviet world and its approximation, likewise, to similar forms of political life? The "economism" which is so widespread in our time inclines many people to believe so, and to think - sociologically speaking - that there is a correlation between economic welfare and liberal democracy. Since we shall have later on to consider this notion from the point of view of "Western democracy", it will be well to make some reference to the other economism (frowned upon as it is in this connexion) to the formal Marxist economism.

The names of many theorists suggest themselves, but the best-known theory on this subject is that of Isaac Deutscher, which, while amounting to a total interpretation of the Russian Revolution and more particularly of its Stalin phase, reaches the conclusion that Marx's expectations (the most authentic socialism) will be progressively fulfilled in step with the growth and development of the productive forces. Many of the mistakes and deeds of violence (grievous, for the most part) that occurred in the Stalin period can be explained in short, apart from some historical and personal contingencies, by the phase of industrialization that Russia was traversing at the time. However, the country's productive forces are now almost full grown, and it may be expected that, at a not far distant date, its political system will also attain to adult liberal democratization which it has not so far known.

It is understandable that thinkers and politicians of another persuasion should nourish and voice such a hope. But there is no guarantee that the "correlation" on which such convictions rest is a fact and has been absolutely proved in all times and circumstances. Nor should it be forgotten - since this hope implies other illusions and desires - that even though events may one day show our doubts to be groundless and this parallelism to be a certainty, it cannot therefore be assumed that the power conflict which now troubles us will be automatically settled. It is a matter of common knowledge that, since the days of Cain and Abel, the worst conflicts have always been those arising between brothers.
(d) Final parenthesis concerning "legitimacy" and "efficiency"

The foregoing considerations refer to objective situations which can readily be verified and accepted. And one would have to be blind not to recognize the power of attraction which these Soviet achievements, apart from the question of doctrine, exert on all sides and especially among the historically least favoured peoples in the broad zone of the underdeveloped countries. This is a lesson which does not seem to be as well learnt as it ought to be.

Neither is this the last word for those who in some sort are and feel themselves to be the heirs of old Europe. The best chronicles of its long history tend finally to explain the secret of its strength and the beauty of its creative work by the fact that Europeans have always known how to maintain a division between their chief powers: Church and empire, monarchy and nobility, third estate and bourgeoisie, intellectuals and men of law, letters and arms, science and religious beliefs.

The sociological precipitate of this incomparable tradition of the whole European world is the consistently differentiated structure of its ruling élites - a tradition only momentarily obscured during the ominous but short-lived periods when totalitarianism prevailed. (Croce, however, was writing freely in the years before Mussolini embraced Nazism.) There has always been a manifold variety in the ruling classes of Europe; this has not at all times made social life easy, and it has on occasion jeopardized the national cohesion. In this as in so many other respects, Latin America has often remained faithful to the European tradition.

One of Aron's merits in shaking up old concepts which were lying dormant on account of the timid hostility aroused by the so-called Machiavellians, has been to show where are the advantages (and disadvantages) of the political and ruling classes in the Soviet and the European worlds. The following are his remarks on the pouvoir spirituel: "À notre époque, le pouvoir spirituel est partagé entre ou disputé par trois sortes d'hommes, les prêtres, les intellectuels et les idéologues des partis. Un regard sur les régimes, soviétique et occidental, suffit pour apercevoir une différence fondamentale dans les relations structurelles des catégories /dirigeantes: selon
dirigeantes: selon la formule soviétique, se sont les idéologues du parti qui proclament la vérité suprême et enseignent ce qui est sacré. Les prêtres sont tenus officiellement en piètre estime et les intellectuels doivent souscrire à la vérité idéologique, plus ou moins étendue selon les moments et les hommes.**

Surely this is an apology pro vita sua, shared by another "humble and wandering" intellectual, if I may use an expression of Pío Baroja's. But what applies in the case of spiritual authority applies also in regard to other forms of power. Obviously no perfect régimes, no flawless moments, have ever existed - not even in the Athens of Pericles - but in Europe the whole effort has been directed towards maintaining a minimum of equilibrium as far as the Church is concerned and a separation between the powers: civil and military, temporal and spiritual, political and economic, administrative and parliamentary. The good times were those when this could be achieved: the bad were those marked by confusion or by the temporary predominance of one or other power. May the shade of Guizot bless these lines and the undoubted preferences emerging from them. There always comes a time when we are obliged to make a value judgment, unrelated to science - except, perhaps, the science of history, which, according to Ortega y Gasset, is the most fraught with the future for that etymological being man, whether he accepts it and understands it or whether he rejects it, without understanding it. The totalitarian formulæ, Soviet and other, may be more efficacious in many eventualities, but a man who is heir to the best European tradition will always prefer the possibility of dialogue or, to put it another way, he will prefer the perhaps intangible value of legitimacy to the pragmatism of efficiency.

But, lest we be tempted for a moment to forget the other forces and powers, it might be well to ponder the words of a young Marxist philosopher, author of a fascinating book: "The conversion of Marxism into a fetish, its debasement into a conventional apologetic ornament, suitable only for the facade of society, results in its becoming the poison of intellectual life

instead of being its life-blood. In the last resort, it can also be used as a precision instrument for beating heads. For the development of the instruments of theory, what is needed is not new "formulations" which can be learnt by heart, but rather an objective analysis possessing real technical value of the new — and likewise of the old — social phenomena. For this purpose, confidence must be had in the knowledge of scientists and in the socialist conscience of intellectuals; otherwise it is impossible to banish the mythology of spiritual life, the blindness and irresponsibility of politics, the superstition of moral life, or any other factors of retrogradation in human life.\textsuperscript{105/}

This young Polish philosopher is not speaking solely for his own circumstances, on the Eastern side. Europe, the United States and the whole of Latin America would have nothing to lose and everything to gain if this piece of theoretical reasoning were thoroughly absorbed both by the best elements of their ruling classes and by their true intellectuals.

This debasement of terms which we all deplore restricts their daily use; we blush to write them. The noblest words which man has invented are like knives dulled by use; the high concepts which they should enshrine become battered; a living reality which calls for clear-cut ideas is hardly more than nicked at. Unfortunately, no word has been more weakened in this way than "freedom". It must nevertheless be invoked once more, in the hope of perceiving its original meaning. And, since the name of Benedetto Croce has already been mentioned, we may perhaps conclude these remarks with a quotation from a brilliant passage by another illustrious Crocian, Carlo Antoni:

"Ma quale è oggi la verità, che ci deve guidare come una nuova stella polare della civiltà? Malgrado le aberrazioni e le confusioni, mi sembra di ravvisarla: è la verità che tutto ciò che nel mondo ha valore, quanto vi è di bello, di vero, di buono, di utile, è prodotto della libera attività di quell'universale spirito che si manifesta, si attua, si realizza soltanto negli individui cioè della libertà creatrice, che fa

\textsuperscript{105/} Leszek Kolakowski, \textit{Der Mensch ohne Alternative}, Munich, R. Piper, 1960, p. 56. Translated into German from Polish.
3. Remarks on the Western Formula

A mere statement of principle, a parenthesis concerning a preference within a value judgement, or an attenuation of Weberian rigorousness on which we modern, if not contemporary, generations are perhaps agreed, will not in themselves solve the substantive problem. With the closing of the parenthesis, therefore, it behoves us to return, as far as possible, to the neutrality of scientific analysis. Following our brief consideration of the Soviet model, let us now turn our attention to the "Western formula".

The scientific problem consists essentially in knowing whether the traditional democratic system is or is not compatible (and to what extent) with the requirements of economic development (and this is not only in general), but with particular reference to those countries that are in the early stages of their economic development or are endeavouring to speed it up. At the most abstract levels, that is, at the highest levels of theory, the solution of the problem would give rise to a strict philosopheme, since the proposition involved is to inquire into

the possibilities of convergence or harmony between political "rationality" and economic "rationality". But we do not propose to embark here on the analytical effort of clarifying this question, which has been literally stated in this manner by various writers; it seems wiser to keep to more solid ground and deal with matters closer to common experience.

a) The tradition of liberalism and formal democracy

Why insist on considering the "Western" formula? Why embark on what to people may seem a defence? We would point out that we are concerned here not with questions of value but with questions of fact. The first and most obvious fact is that we are and feel ourselves to be Westerners. To avoid triteness, however, let us recall a way of formulating the idea in stricter and more technical terms. In a footnote near the beginning of the present study, reference was made to the outline given by R. F. Behrendt of the kinds of proportion required in any economic development that is rationally planned, or "induced", to use an expression of doubtful elegance. According to Behrendt, the second kind of proportion required in economic planning is the proportion between, on the one hand, numerical considerations (Rechenhaftigkeit) concerned with achieving the maximum yield through the use of the best technical processes available, and, on the other, the deliberate planning of a gradual and lasting social development which takes account of "social" continuity and stability - that is to say, which takes account as far as possible of the institutions and traditions existing in the country in question. Now it is a fact that the Latin American countries possess and preserve their own traditions, including their long-standing preferences for personal and political freedom and for democratic participation - despite the difficulties and deficiencies which have obstructed this historic vocation.

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108/ The beginner's attention might be drawn to three books which, while widely differing in their political substance, are all exemplary in the precision of their ideas and the elegance of their style: Jaime Eyzaguirre (Chilean), Ideario y Pauta de la Emancipación Chilena, 1957; Mariano Picón-Salas (Venezuelan), De la Conquista a la Independencia, 1958; and Pedro Henríquez Ureña (Dominican), Historia de la Cultura Latinoamericana, 1947.
The second fact is patent from the very existence of these pages, whose author, an apprentice in many matters, has persisted in expressing opinions and judgment that will by no means be generally welcomed. In other words, it is the fact of so-called "formal democracy". The present author is in agreement with many of the criticisms of this concept and of the reality (uncertain at times) which it covers. However, so long as it exists in the smallest degree, so long as it is not just a hobby-horse for the writer or teacher but a reality, manifests, for instance, in the freedom of the worker to read the daily news, according to his choice, in the communist or the reactionary press, the fact subsists and it is with it that we are now concerned.

Lastly, there is the fact that, whether we like it not not, we are living in countries where, for the most part, there are several political parties and where there is also the possibility of continual exchanges between them and of a desire on their part for compromise in all spheres (numerous in our times, with so many practical problems claiming attention) where this is feasible. The foregoing simple facts, apart from any theoretical considerations or value judgments justify our acknowledged interest in the "Western formula" with regard to the problems of development. But let us consider, at some leisure, a few of the questions - not all rosy of course - arising in this connexion.

b) The new bibliography and international meetings on the subject under consideration

Over the past few years, a very extensive bibliography has grown up on the subject of democracy and development. It is not difficult to

understand why this has happened. The underdeveloped areas, about which so much is being said and written in these days, afford not only a natural field for economic experiments (and we need not speak of the different interests involved) but also a field for intensive political innovations in the strictest sense of this term. Ancient civilizations are finding themselves obliged to modernize their political façades to suit the economic changes they are undergoing. In the present case, we are chiefly interested (from the point of view of their intellectual signification, of course) in those countries that are following or trying to adopt "Western" models, or else are, as is most often the case (especially in Africa), obliged to solve conjointly and at breakneck speed the problems of their national organizations superimposed on still surviving tribal structures, and the problems of their political and constitutional organization, in addition to the problems raised by an economic structure suddenly placed in their hands.

Besides this abundant literature, a number of international meetings have been held to examine the subject, including a meeting organized in Munich, in 1960, by the International Institute for Differing Civilizations (INCIDI), to consider the question of the ruling classes in the underdeveloped countries, and a seminar held at Wageningen (Netherlands) to discuss the theme "Leadership in the Non-Western World." 110/ The present author had the privilege of attending a meeting at the University of Chicago (the North American Conference on the Social Implications of Industrialization and Technological Change) where, inter alia, the subject with which we are now concerned was discussed in an excellent atmosphere of intellectual harmony. 111/

110/ Detailed reports on both these meetings are contained in different issues of the above-mentioned periodical, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie. For the first meeting, see issue No. 1, 1960, and for the second, No. 3, 1960.

111/ Unfortunately, the categorical injunction printed in the margin of its documents, "not for quotation or publication", prevents me from commenting on or making use of these papers that would be most germane to our subject, including the contributions by David E. Alper and S. N. Eisenstadt. This is particularly regrettable in the case of the latter, in which questions were raised concerning the new bureaucracies that, exceptionally, might apply to the Latin American countries.

/At these
At these meetings, as in most of the books and articles referred to, ample information is offered on Uganda, Ghana or Dahomey, on Iraq, Lebanon or the Maghreb, on Lào, Burma or Indonesia, and so forth; but scarcely anything is said about Latin America. This does not indicate lack of interest, but rather a realization — perhaps unexpressed — that the situation there is very different. On the other hand, at the meeting in Mexico City (December 1960) to study the social aspects of economic development, interest in the subject was so lively that other matters were almost swamped — proof of an awareness shared by Anglo-Saxons and Latins alike. However, for various reasons which need not be considered here, the question could not be analysed as it should have been. Reference is made to the chief of these reasons in the statement contained in the report of the Working Group to the effect that objective scientific knowledge of political facts in Latin America still does not offer any sure basis for making specific recommendations, and even the theoretical aspects have not been sufficiently explored.\[112/\]

In studies on economic development, whether in our part of the world, or elsewhere, the biggest part has hitherto been played by the economists, as was to be expected. It would have been unfair to ask them to concern themselves in addition with other related questions, despite the importance of some of those questions and the encyclopaedic calibre of some outstanding economists (such as Shumpeter, to mention only one).

There is a growing interest in analysing the problem in some of its most important aspects and ramifications that are not technically economic, and this has led to co-operation with specialists in other branches, not only in the social sciences. It has also opened up useful channels for the study of a number of facets that have hitherto been overlooked. An instance of this is afforded by the above-mentioned intellectual activity, which has produced so much material in so short a time. But there is no doubt that the study of economic development in its political aspect is the most decisive and important of all. That this study has not so far been pursued with all the desirable thoroughness is due to certain characteristics of

political science, which it would be well to recall, if we may be permitted to make a few remarks on the sociology of science. For there is no question of this discipline being per se, for constitutive reasons, scientifically behindhand compared, not only with economics, but also with sociology itself.

To confine our remarks to the latter science, politics and sociology tend to flourish at very different moments in the social situations recorded by history. Political science (in its strictly scientific aspect, be it understood) has perhaps so far been, in contradistinction to sociology (which finds its greatest stimulus, at least as far as its major themes are concerned, in periods of storm and crisis), a science of quiet and secure times. A glance at an up to date political science catalogue will suffice to convince us that its most complicated research techniques and most strictly scientific themes - the pursuit, for instance, of the most unsuspected correlations - are to be observed in the countries of maximum political stability, such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom (perhaps, to a lesser extent), and, especially, the Scandinavian countries. Elsewhere (and we need not think only of those countries whose circumstances impose a discreet silence) the situation is very different. A courageous writer has not hesitated to announce the existence in his country of "un bilancio lamentoale: il sottosviluppo della scienza politica en Italia" 113

Let us not be blinded by vanity; let us rather admit, with similar modest courage, that Latin America (with the possible exception of Brazil) 114 also suffers from this sottosviluppo. In no other problem is this state of backwardness so apparent as in the one with which we are concerned. It is desirable - and every effort should be made to this end - that the aforesaid deficiency be speedily made good, with objectivity and by means of the most suitable research techniques. Moreover, there is no advantage if, under a mistaken illusion of being up to date in the most complicated of these techniques, we fail to tackle the most important problems by other and simpler methods.

114/ By way of example, it is sufficient to note the contributions (Brazilian, of course) to the Revista Brasileira de Studos Políticos, University of Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte.
(c) The supposed correlation between wealth and democracy

At this stage in the exploration of our subject — and the writer is aware of his own "underdevelopment" in this respect — it is necessary to revert to a correlation mentioned earlier. The idea that democracy and economic welfare are parallel phenomena is met with today in statements of such widely varying context, from the scientific publication to the demagogic speech, that even the most diligent scholar must fail to make a passably selective (still less a complete) collection of them. In fact, besides being time-consuming, such an undertaking would produce little of value. It is sometimes best to content oneself with the most satisfactory expression of an opinion; therefore, although, given man's fallibility, we can never be absolutely sure, it is fitting to refer, in what follows, to the finest attempt at formulating the question and testing it where possible.

Seymour Martin Lipset, in the book already mentioned,115/ has a chapter entitled "Economic Development and Democracy". While certainly an essay, this is supported by a number of tables and bibliographical references. It seems unnecessary to give any of the tables here. The main argument is as follows:

1. Democracy is directly related to the state of economic development. The more well-to-do a society, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy and consequently, a society divided between an impoverished mass and a small favoured elite results either in oligarchy (dictatorial rule of the small upper stratum) or in tyranny (popular-based dictatorship).

2. Economic development, producing increased income, greater economic security and widespread higher education, largely determines the form of the "class struggle" by permitting those in the lower strata to develop longer time-perspectives and more complete and gradualist views of politics.

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115/ S.M. Lipset, op.cit. Chapter II. A correlation more complicated in form is offered by Johan Akerman, "Political Economic Cycles", in: Kyklos, 1, 1946 an article which allows some insight into his book Ekonomiskt Skeende och Politiska Förfindingar (Economic and Political Changes). Lund, 1946; but apart from the language problem, one would have to possess the formidable training of the Uppsala scholar to be able to tackle his thesis.

//"A belief
"A belief in secular reformist gradualism can be the ideology only of a relatively well-to-do lower class," says Lipset. "Striking evidence for this thesis can be found in the relationship between the patterns of working-class political action in different countries and the national income, a correlation, that is almost startling in view of the many other cultural, historical, and juridical factors which affect the political life of nations." 116/

(3) However, wherever industrialization occurs rapidly, introducing sharp discontinuities between the pre-industrial and industrial situation, more rather than less extremist working-class movements emerge. Besides a countercheck, this provides confirmation of the possibilities, described earlier of so-called "mass situations".

Nevertheless Lipset, who can be called anything but a "sophisticated egghead", takes precautions against the deficiencies of this correlation believed to be beyond question, and in a brief methodological appendix he gives some explanations on the subject.

This sociologist, in an important study 117/published at a later date, repeats some of these ideas, but explains more explicitly where the real key to any possible deficiencies in the correlation may be found. His most incisive remarks should be quoted textually since they embrace the Latin peoples of different speech.

"The unstable political structure of the major southern and Latin countries of Europe - France, Italy and Spain - seems to be mainly due to economic and social factors retarding the growth of large-scale, modern industry. This failure has kept alive the tendency of the bourgeoisie to look to the traditional pre-industrial upper classes for models of behaviour."


117/ S.M. Lipset, "Party Systems and the Representation of Social Groups", in: Archives Européennes de Sociologie, Vol. I, No. 1, 1960. The article is highly interesting in itself; it also touches on other topics which are not of direct concern to us here.

/"Despite considerable
"Despite considerable social mobility\(^{118}\), the status-barrier between the bourgeoisie and the people, and the gradations within the bourgeoisie itself, are meticulously preserved. The business classes often preserve a semi-feudal outlook, emphasizing the stability of family property, and the firm takes the place of land in pre-capitalist society, providing the material basis for family prestige \ldots\). There is a traditionalist hostility to collective bargaining, or any form of labour legislation which would acknowledge the equality of the worker in the economic market. The working classes, therefore, unable to build strong, legitimate unions or secure permanent "citizenship" rights within industry, continue to maintain those attitudes of alienation from the body politic which are characteristic of workers in most countries during the period of initial industrialization.\(^{119}\)

This in some ways typically Anglo-Saxon image is noted here without comment, although it might perhaps not be acceptable, in some parts at least, to modern French and Italian sociologists. We must now return to the above-mentioned key to possible incongruities in the correlation in question. This is as follows: while it is true that the chances for democracy are greater in the more well-to-do countries because in those countries internal tensions are less (though some people may entertain doubts on this score), owing to greater equality in the distribution of income, to education and to the prestige conferred by the existence of a relatively large middle class, it must nevertheless not be forgotten that democratic systems depend above all upon societies belief in the legitimacy of the elite, and these two conditions may obtain either jointly or independently - a point upon which Lipset has not laid sufficient stress.

Democracy is first of all a belief, an illusion some might say, a principle of legitimacy. Without this belief the poor peoples would have made no attempt to attain it; but it is also an establishment which may one day vanish in the plenitude (real or potential) of prosperity. To take a

\(^{118}\) This statement should be called to the attention of the devotees of the subject of mobility.

very recent case, nothing is more significant in this regard than the intense economic development that has come about in France during a period of extreme political instability, sometimes coming near to destroying its democracy. The example offered by Italy is perhaps similar though less striking. The correlation between wealth and democracy is conclusively demonstrated in some countries (more particularly the Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon countries) but we do not really know to what extent this is due to wealth and to what extent to the continuing traditions of an admirable political education of long standing and to the secrets of basic temperament.

(d) Political instability

Nevertheless, there is some truth in the famous correlation between democracy and development, and we should not therefore dismiss lightly the idea that a general and fair distribution of relatively high average incomes is conducive to common sense and composure in political life. On the other hand, political instability is not synonymous with poverty. This brings us to the reproach often levelled against the Latin Americans (generally of Iberian stock) either by their own countrymen or by foreigners: political instability. It has even been said that in this part of the world there is a revolution every minute. If time allowed, we might very briefly summarize the various explanations offered of this notorious instability. The historians of course bring forward an abundance of theories - family rivalries, unavowable passions, legitimate but ill-fated ambitions, obvious cases of insanity, and, occasionally, mixtures of tragedy and farce. The sociologists base themselves on factors pertaining to "blood" or "spirit", as Sheler might say, but without neglecting their preference for purely "economic" factors. The most modern investigators resort to the evolvement of statistical formulae, the
preparation of tables of indices indicators, and the more figures they produce the happier they are. 120/

Although this instability is often a cause of alarm to foreign observers, and especially to nervous tourists or investors, the Latin Americans have hitherto (the reason for the italics will be seen later) generally accepted it with the utmost calm. On rare occasions there were genuine revolutions, and these "irregular" changes in the government of the country though doubtless deplorable from the standpoint of its constitutional law, allowed life to continue normally and took on an almost institutional character. While not identical, the situation here is comparable to that obtaining in France, with

120/ From the abundant bibliography on this subject we need take only a couple of examples. Although they are by North American authors, the present writer read them in Portuguese and is therefore unable to judge of their literary merit. The first, by Merle King, "Contribuição para uma Teoria de Inestabilidade do Poder e da Política na América Latina", Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos, Belo Horizonte, No. 5, January 1959, represents the classic historical-economic-sociological point of view. The second, by Russel H. Figgibbon, "Avaliação Estadística da Democracia na América Latina", published in the same periodical in 1957, is, as its title indicates, an attempt at measurement, by means of tables and graphs, on the basis of various interviews with individuals, many of them - the majority in some of the interviews - with high academic standing. Other studies of both types could be mentioned, and it is obviously unnecessary to refer to the work of national historians or of Latin American historians in general. The table reproduced below (op.cit., p. 11 - the list continues up to 1962) was drawn up by Merle King; it shows, by way of illustration of political instability since the Second World War, the governing authorities - including presidents - removed by irregular methods:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>October 1945</th>
<th>Venezuela</th>
<th>June 1950</th>
<th>Peru</th>
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<tr>
<td>October 1945</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>March 1951</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1946</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>May 1951</td>
<td>Panama</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 1946</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>March 1952</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1947</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>April 1952</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 1947</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>December 1952</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1947</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>June 1953</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 1947</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>May 1954</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 1948</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>July 1954</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1948</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>August 1954</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 1948</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>December 1954</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1948</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>January 1955</td>
<td>Panama</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 1948</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>September 1955</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 1949</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>November 1955</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 1949</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>November 1955</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

/its Cabinet
its Cabinet changes: behind the impenetrable complexities of the political game of chess at the Palais Bourbon, the French Civil Service went on calmly carrying out its duties, as if nothing had happened, maintaining, underneath so much apparent change, the real continuity of French life.

In the romantic period of Latin American history, revolutionary cliques - whether military or civilian - were responsible at times for the shedding of much blood, but without seriously affecting the fundamental structure of their countries. In later and more peaceful times, "Cabinet" revolutions affected daily life even less. But all this - and the point should be stressed - is past history, to which there is no return. And, just as in France, when the loss of popular prestige caused by frequent Cabinet changes happened to coincide with a grave national and international situation, the very survival of French democracy was jeopardized and there began a difficult interlude of which we have not yet seen the end, so in recent years our political instability has suddenly taken on a very different aspect. It is no longer possible to make light of instability, and this not only on account of dangers or fears which cannot appropriately be analysed here but also on account of a simple and decisive fact related to the question with which we are concerned. Economic development necessarily requires a minimum of political stability - that is to say, of political continuity. The economic growth now taking place is possible only within a framework of definite planning, and there can be no planning without an assurance of calculability - in other words, without the possibility of making the required forecasts. One of the foregoing remarks may perhaps give rise to misconceptions, which must now be cleared up: in modern democracies, political continuity does not mean the perpetuation of one or other political party but the pursuit of a policy (subject to such changes as may be dictated by circumstances in any plan or programme) agreed as far as possible by common consent or at least enjoying majority approval. We shall have later on to see what are the constitutional, technical and organizational difficulties arising, in more or less similar degree, in present-day industrial democracies or in Welfare States where these obtain. But, in offering the above explanation, we would emphasize as strongly as possible that the maintenance of political stability in Latin America is henceforth of capital importance.

/(e) The defects
(e) The defects of democracy

There is another aspect of political instability in Latin America which may likewise be distressing to contemplate. For, in the long run, this instability points to a defective state of democracy (though not, of course, in all quarters and at all times). Experience of this, in so far as it affects one of their dearest notions, has sometimes proved more painful to the Latin American mind than the accustomed acceptance of numerous changes in the membership of governments. Apart from this humiliation, his own experience of the defects of democracy in his continent also brings the Latin American up against the classifications proposed by national or foreign theorists for the political situation in the countries of Latin America - classifications liable to accentuate the aforesaid state of mind. Among the simplest of these classifications is the one which distinguishes between the different countries according to the predominance in them of one of the following four situations: stable democracy, stable dictatorship, unstable democracy, unstable dictatorship. But there are of course other more complicated classifications, using every variety of symbolism and allowing not the slightest loophole for delusion.¹²¹/

To deny the defects of democracy would be to behave like the proverbial ostrich. However, the good Latin American should not be left without some consolation and justification, and to this end we must call upon history. On the one hand, there is the history of Latin America itself, which includes some comparatively long periods when democracy has functioned in one or other of the countries with gratifying smoothness. On the other, we have the history of the development of democracy in those countries which offer the best examples of it today. At best (having regard to the experience accumulated over the centuries in Europe) the story would go back to far-off mediaeval times (we refer here to Aragon and England) and, after noting a whole series of ups and downs, would bring us almost to our own times with

¹²¹ See, by way of example, Table 5 in the last chapter of Almond and Coleman, op.cit., p.362 and 363. Although the present author would have liked to and had full permission to reproduce this table, there would have been no point in doing so without explaining beforehand the latest terminology invented by the authors of this book.
a description of democracy's latest achievements: universal suffrage (gradually evolved from the old electoral patterns), votes for women, types of "referendum", etc. It would also show that, even in the European example, equal progress was not always made everywhere; there was lagging on many occasions. To attempt such an account here would be superfluous, since it is to be found in any good books on political history, so long as they are not written ad usum Delphini. But in no case should such an attempt be made with the object of blinding ourselves to reality, which it is the duty of every adult to face squarely.

(f) **North American democratic stability**

Therefore, once the existence of defects is admitted, we may with advantage consider the structure of a more or less model case and that of another which, though less exemplary, may be instructive for our purpose. We will avoid the obvious temptation to select the United Kingdom, not only because this case is so widely known (despite its undeniable complexity and "singularity") but also because the present study is concerned with Latin America and there is no doubt that, taking the American continent as a whole, the model offered by the United States is spectacular.

The question is: How can the democratic stability of this country be explained? No educated North American believes or maintains that United States democracy is perfect, without blemish, that it has no need of improvement or rectification in many respects. For nothing human is perfect. But the intelligent North American cannot fail to wonder what is the reason for the political stability of this country, so vast in size and composed of such diverse elements. Many answers have, of course, been provided by political scientists and sociologists. We refer to one of these, not because of professional bias but because of its precision and conciseness. The author is a (presumably) young disciple of T. Parsons who has written one of the best and most authentic manuals of sociology from among the large (perhaps

/even excessive)
even excessive) number available in English. At one point in his work, the author asks the question propounded above, and offers an answer in accordance with the best teaching of his masters and, undoubtedly, with his own thought. The following is a summary of his reply, still further compressed by the present writer, who has, however, endeavoured to preserve its exact terms as far as possible.

To what can the stability of the "American" political system be attributed? Apparently, to the following series of facts: (a) there are very few citizens who have no means by which to express their wishes effectively enough to influence the government (of course, there is the thorny question of the Negroes, but this is now becoming less acute in the south and is also being counterbalanced by the fact that the votes of Negroes in the north benefit those in the south and by the work of organizations set up for their protection); (b) political desires are expressed not only at election times but also through the action of "pressure groups" and other kinds of organizations or methods of manifesting interests and aspirations; (c) the organized groups that compete and conflict in politics are not, strictly speaking, distinct segments of the population pitted against one another (there is, indeed, much overlapping in their membership); (d) the institutionalization of role responsibility in office; (e) all but complete

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122/ Harry M. Johnson, *Sociology: a Systematic Introduction*, London, Routledge, 1960, Chapter 14, p. 385-9. For the amateurs of sociological interpretations, it may be well to draw attention here to a study by the above-mentioned sociologist Talcott Parsons, which in itself justifies his title to rank as an authority and is also among the least esoteric of his undeniably difficult writings. This is an "occasional" work, a critical review of the well-known book by C.W. Mills, *The Power Elite*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1956. Starting from this "text and pretext", however, Parsons elaborates an original and interesting theory of the North American political structure. This was later embodied by Parsons in "The Distribution of Power in American Society", in his *Structure and Process in Modern Societies*, Glencoe (Ill.), Free Press, 1960. Probably of similar interest is another article, also intended as a critical review: David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems", *World Politics*, Vol. 9, 1957.

/consensus regarding
consensus regarding constitutional law, the party system and the electoral system (in particular, the almost mythical belief in the intangible value of the Constitution is universally known); (f) the ever-present possibility of the formation of "potential groups", that is, groups capable of mobilizing themselves, if occasion requires it, against actual groups and, consequently, of insisting upon observance of "the rules of the game". Naturally, Johnson also mentions the almost complete absence of religious conflict and the relative mildness of class conflict - a fact obviously making for the increased economic prosperity of the country.

With regard to the situation in Latin America the emphasis placed on various aspects of legitimacy is especially interesting. Since we have already referred at some length to the "materialistic" correlation between democracy and wealth, it is only fair now to turn to the "idealistic" version, which stresses the value of beliefs, the importance of long-accepted imponderables (value of the political system, value of legitimately constituted authority, value of the rules of the game, value of the dialogue between equals, value of the human significance of reasonable compromise).

(g) The case of Germany

With regard to the above-mentioned counterpart, our choice falls this time, without hesitation, not in America but in Europe. Let us take the case of Germany - a country in many respects no less admirable than the United States (comparisons would here be out of place) but whose democratic history has been, to say the least, scarcely edifying. Account should be taken not only of the disastrous years of the morbid Nazi régime, the origins of which may perhaps be explained by a complex of causes now widely known. We should also bear in mind the whole history of this unfortunate democracy since the melancholy days of the 1848 fiasco. What facts have we, to explain the situation, as precise as those listed above in respect of the United States? An article by Ralph Dahrendorf,\(^123\)/ one of the most promising sociologists of our time (more than promising, indeed), will help us to establish some essential points.

The social structure of Germany (we are speaking of the Federal Republic) has not hitherto been very favourable to the consolidation of democracy, notably for the following reasons:

(a) The continuous defection of the middle classes: the old one, in contradistinction to what had happened elsewhere, and despite its liberal ideas, was unable to act as the real support of the industrial revolution fomented in Germany (from 1871 to 1914) from above; the "new" middle class, hardly liberal, preferred to rely for the defence of its interests on the protection of the State.

(b) Capitalism in Germany lacked the dynamism that characterized it in other countries (such as England and the United States) in so far as it was directed by State action. In this way (having regard to the differentiation and relative autonomy of the various institutions and élites mentioned earlier) there came about in Germany a certain confusion and imposition of authority. "In Germany, the State was the institution that set the dominant tone" Shumpeter, while in bourgeois societies, on the other hand, that tone was set by economic forces.

(c) The tendency in Germany was to settle social conflicts not by means of discussion and compromise but by authoritarian methods - Utopian and totalitarian elements still, apparently, very difficult to banish.

(d) The intellectuals were for the most part inclined towards "alienation", or, in current parlance, they displayed relatively little interest in the commonwealth - with notable exceptions, of course. "In Germany, it is rare to meet intellectuals who are conscious of being members of their own society and prepared, in consequence, to face the realities of its structure with the proper critical perspective." The dreadful experiences of the Hitler régime, the war and the post-war period have brought about profound changes in the German social structure and therefore in the prospects of a truly democratic policy, which, apparently, is now beginning to take shape. At any rate, according to Dahrendorf, the possibilities have never been greater, and the future will show whether he is right in his prediction.

124/ Ibid., p. 113.

/In this
In this rapid summary, other facts and many subtle shades of thought presented by the German sociologist have been left out of account. What interested us was not so much to point the contrast with the foregoing interpretation of North American democratic stability, as to show the desirability, for Latin Americans, of reflecting on certain of the points referred to: for instance, on the role of the middle classes, whose dynamic autonomy is essential; even with the best conceived economic planning - in a democratic State, of course -; on the significance of the intellectual element to which reference has been made on different occasions: neither "adventurer capitalists" nor docile party hacks.

Many are the roads that lead to the achievement of "a democracy", and everything inclines one to think - to entertain more than a pious hope - that the "new" political classes in Latin America will be capable of explicitly including in their doctrines the precepts necessitated by planning for economic development and displaying a capacity for compromise in their dealings with one another; but we cannot overlook the possibility of difficulties arising, if they do not succeed in securing enthusiastic popular support for proposals and aims which are generally acceptable to the bulk of the nation. R. Aron has drawn attention to the fact that the Ibero-American democracies, notwithstanding the prevalence of presidential régimes, really belong to the Latin - French or Italian - type rather than to the Anglo-Saxon type. (He has made this point on several occasions, to which we need not refer.) This similarity brings with it certain common perils, and here a literal quotation is advisable:

"La démocratie de type latin est celle qu'affaiblit le non-ralliance au régime d'une gauche communiste ou communiste et d'une droite autoritaire ou réactionnaire. Or, manifestement, telle est la situation dans toute l'Amérique du Sud, aux prises avec d'extremes difficultés économiques et sociales. Là même où la phase des coups d'Etat militaires est dépassées, la phase suivante sera celle d'une guerre froide entre modérés et extrémistes - des deux bords - non celle d'une stabilisation constitutionnelle." 125

127 See R. Aron, La Démocratie à l'Epreuve du XXe siècle, Calmann-Lévy, Paris, 1961. Although resulting from a "symposium" and therefore written in the popular and sometimes almost familiar debating style that characterizes such meetings, this study is not without value for people interested in the problems we are now considering.
We have thus come full circle with these observations on political stability in Latin America and, through no design of ours, with a return to the old pessimistic tone. Aron's remarks are extremely incisive and their basic - sociological - content is, of course, debatable. What is important is that they should be discussed - their absolute or relative rightness does not concern us here -, that they should be examined as objectively as possible by those Latin American leaders or intellectuals who are most conscious of their present responsibilities. Careful consideration of such statements - be they strictly accurate or not - may afford valuable guidance to the new ruling groups.

Now, this democracy we have been discussing is a phenomenon that has not remained unchangeable throughout the two hundred years or so of its existence. What has happened, during all this time, to democracy and the political organs through which it finds expression? What is the nature of democracy in the most advanced industrial societies of our day? The first of the above questions may seem inopportune, as being too abstract, too theoretical; the second - much more concrete - is, on the other hand, of the greatest interest to Latin American countries at the present time.

(h) Changes in the structure of democracy

At the risk of being tiresome, we would repeat that it is only possible here to touch rapidly on essential points. It is generally acknowledged that - pending the appearance of a work transcending it -- the best description extant of the changes that have taken place in the structure of democracy over the past few decades is that given by G. Leibholz,\footnote{Gerhard Leibholz, Strukturprobleme der modernen Demokratie, C.F.Müller,1958.} which, despite an understandable emphasis on the experiences of his own country - Germany -, is generally applicable to all other countries. To avoid the temptation of examining some of the technical questions that crop up, I prefer not to take this work as my reference but rather to have recourse to the general lines of another, by the same author.\footnote{Gerhard Leibholz, "Die Bedrohung der Freiheit durch die Gesetzgeber", in Freiheit der Persönlichkeit, Kroner, Stuttgart (series of broadcasts by a team of lecturers), 1958.} This one is not
intended for "experts" and colleagues but for the general public, and its main purpose is to point out some of the dangers inherent in the whole process as far as the maintenance and defence of individual freedoms are concerned. This is a subject to which it may only be worth while reverting later on, and then only in one contest.

In the development of the situation with regard to individual freedoms, the following three stages may be noted: first, monopolization of legislative power by Parliament; second, replacement of liberal, representative democracy by the radical or egalitarian democracy of the party State; and third, the stage of the ever more marked development of the so-called Welfare State. Observing our promise to avoid the subject of safeguards for the individual, however, the two main concepts which we have to compare, in connexion with the evolution of democracy, are those pertaining to the second of the above-mentioned stages: that is to say, the old liberal and representative democracy, on the one hand, and the modern radical and egalitarian democracy of the party State, on the other. The terms in which this contrast is expressed are not, perhaps, altogether satisfactory, and it is therefore not easy, without going into detailed technicalities, to explain the significance of the differences between the two forms of democracy. They affect the actual internal structure of Parliament, co-operation between the traditional legislative and executive powers, and relations between Parliament and society in general. At the risk of making undue generalizations, let us try to explain as briefly as possible what this complex of relationships implies: in the first place, an increasing predominance of the executive and administrative branches over Parliament; in the second place, changes in the internal life of Parliament, in the "representation" and behaviour of the parties — of the parliamentarians themselves in the strict sense of the term — and the encroachment of administrative matters on Parliament's traditional sphere of activity; in the third place, the loss or diminution of Parliament's exclusive privilege of political participation, as other forms of participation have slowly developed within society itself.

/Although the
Although the term "party State" is clear enough when definite political principles - not always existing everywhere - are accepted, mistakes may arise from the ascription of the quality of "representative" - without precise explanations - to the first form of democracy, since the second form possesses it in no less a degree.

Consequently, despite his predilection for exaggerated and even paradoxical expressions, the interpretation given by Siegfried Landshut may clarify the subject for us from the sociological standpoint. In so far as democracy and parliamentary life may be considered as equivalent, the historical phases of the latter can help to explain the situation. According to Landshut, there is a first phase which he describes as that of the democratization of parliamentarism. The elements of this process are so well known that it is almost superfluous to recall them: the continual expansion of the electorate; the transformation of parties, from the flexible associations of notables which they were at the beginning into the disciplined and comparatively rigid organizations which they constitute at the present time; the transformation of the electoral system, from the original type of election by simple majority into the proportional representation type which now largely prevails.

The second phase, however, has been much less explored, and it is of particular interest to sociologists, precisely because it is characterized from the sociological point of view by changes in the social structure coinciding with the development of industrialization. These industrialized societies have seen a gradual levelling of many of the earlier social differences - incomes, living standards and forms of culture and group living - a fundamental consequence of which has been a decline of political imperatives in parliamentary democratic government. To some people this expression may seem exaggerated; it therefore needs to be carefully examined. From the political standpoint, the consequences of changes in the social structure have produced the following political phenomena, among others:

128/ S. Landshut, "Wandlungen der parlamentarischen Demokratie", Hamburger Jahrbuch, Year 4, pp. 150-162.
(a) "The increasing levelling-out of social differences leaves even less room for a multiplicity of parties."\textsuperscript{129} One result of this may be a dwindling of the significance attached to ideologies; this theory, maintained by various thinkers, was referred to earlier in this study.

(b) Increasing preoccupation with the manifold State activities affecting the citizen, in the spheres of economics, health, social security, education, etc., has led to "an atrophy of the political sectors of modern parliamentary democracies and a corresponding hypertrophy of the administration."\textsuperscript{130}

(c) The fact that a greater part is being played by individuals in a number of private organizations – whether or not pursuing purely material interests – focuses attention more and more on the political significance of such interest groups", which certainly look "mainly towards the executive as the centre of the State activity."\textsuperscript{131} (But this does not occur always or everywhere: e.g., the case of the United States of America.)

However, the general thesis is clear and should not be overlooked, even in its apparently most extreme statement, namely, that the whole process signifies the simultaneous socialization of the government, on the one hand, and nationalization of society, on the other – all the more so when this process tends to be rounded off by awareness of the inadequacy of the traditional national and domestic policy, which leads to demands on all sides for supranational integration and the maintenance as far as possible of universal solidarity within the community of nations. It is very possible that all industrial societies – whether of one persuasion or the other, to return to a subject mentioned earlier – are moving in this direction, although no one can foresee either the rapidity of the movement or the variations which may occur in the general trend.

\textsuperscript{129} Ibid, p. 157
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid, p. 159
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid, p. 161

/Significantly enough,
Significantly enough, if we look at a catalogue of the latest publications on political science, we find an intense preoccupation with certain subjects that have a direct or indirect bearing on the chief problems referred to above. The inclinations of the different academic and national traditions exert an influence, as is natural. In addition, the North Americans — who invented the term —, the Italians and the French are constantly adding to the studies on pressure groups. And the English and the Germans, who also do not despise these groups, are probably outstanding, the former for meticulous studies of parliamentary organization\(^{132}\) and the latter for research on parties and their parliamentary interconnections through fractional groups and technical committees. Nor should we be surprised at the revival of an old idea: the so-called representation of professional interests,\(^{133}\) which aroused passionate interest a few years ago and is now being studied more thoroughly and with a fuller knowledge of the facts.

(i) **Pluralist democracy**

Despite all that has just been said, we shall be told — and rightly so — that we have not yet met with a formula expressing concisely the complex of ingredients comprised in modern democracy. Such a formula exists, however, and, whether or not its terms are happily chosen, enjoys general acceptance today. This formula is pluralist democracy.

An attempt at describing its content systematically and in detail would be out of place, not only as putting a further strain on time and patience but also as requiring a logical statement of each and every one of the phenomena mentioned above.

Nevertheless, we would recall very briefly that pluralist democracy consists essentially in the political acceptance of the social reality as a complex of highly diverse groups, each with its individual interests and therefore prone to conflicts and disputes with the other groups, but

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\(^{133}\) J. H. Kaiser, *Die Repräsentation organisierter Interessen*, Berlin, Duncker und Humboldt, 1956; a valuable work which supersedes all earlier ones on the same subject.

/all complying
all complying with a common standard so as to seek the most fitting agreement and compromise in each case which arises — in consideration, of course, of its temporary character. This pluralism of interests and convictions, this outcome of tolerance, can only be attained if there is that agreement on fundamentals so skilfully discussed and explained by a great German-American authority on political science.  

Although, generally speaking, pluralist democracy now obtains in one form or another in the most advanced Western countries, it is perhaps in the Scandinavian countries that it has reached its fullest perfection. Anyone wishing to acquaint himself with it in such an advanced form would do well to have recourse to the experience of these Nordic countries, which have been so fortunate in this respect — although we should of course avoid the temptation to indulge in servile copying, to try — in the same way that we have covered our hot regions with Alpine chalets — to disguise our worthy Araucanos as Laplanders.

(j) Democracy and planning

Notwithstanding the foregoing remarks on the most immediate concerns of present-day sociological and political research, it is a strange, not to say startling, fact that hardly any research has been conducted on a most important matter connected with modern democracy — at least from the Latin American point of view —; the question of the relation between democracy and economic planning. For the very reason that it is so strange, we should be hard put to it to explain or interpret this lack. We shall therefore not attempt to do so.


135/ Bibliography on the subject is not scarce. There is a concise and very instructive study by Gunnar Heckscher "Pluralish Democracy; the Swedish Experience", Social Research, December 1948. On the other hand, I am unacquainted — a common misfortune for intellectuals in our part of the world — with another book by this author which has been translated into French, bearing the extremely explicit title: Démocratie Efficace: l'Expérience Politique et Sociale des Pays Scandinaves, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1957.
Since the illustrious Karl Mannheim — the greatest of present-day sociologists since Max Weber — launched the theme of "planning for freedom", passionately devoting himself to the defence of the "third way", of what he called a militant democracy, it must be admitted that little progress has been made in this direction. His premature death, or the missionary spirit which dominated his last days — far removed from the intellectual intensity of his earlier years — prevented him from completing his task himself, as did also, perhaps, its severely technical character. Since then, a great deal has been said on the subject of democracy and planning and not with least cogency by its detractors.

Not long ago Gunnar Myrdal\textsuperscript{136} took up the subject, but without making much progress as regards practice; he did, however, draw an important distinction, which has not been duly followed up. Within the generalized trend towards the Welfare State, beside that dominant in the Soviet orbit, he distinguished two different forms of planning, according to whether the countries considered were wealthy — and his experience, of course, lay chiefly in Scandinavia — or underdeveloped. And Friedrich, likewise in the realm of general ideas, evolved a definition embodying the nodal point of planning in pluralist democracies:

"Planning, as the pluralist organization of a community, represents the direction and co-ordination of that community's activities under an over-all programme, with particular reference to the use of economic resources. This direction is achieved in conformity with the will of the community as expressed through the Constitution and the representative bodies." \textsuperscript{137}

Since, here and there, the Welfare State has come into being, the fact should not be overlooked that the recognition of its existence has given rise to various problems, depending on the intensity with which its presence is felt or, again, on certain intellectual propensities. A very few examples will suffice. An Englishman like Richard M. Titmuss,\textsuperscript{138} reflecting the


\textsuperscript{137/} Ibid., p. 97.

temperament of his nation, prefers to take the most uncompromisingly practical topics – the English public health service, the family and industrialization, the pension system, exchanges of population, etc. – and to distil from his examination, as it were involuntarily, the delicate constitutional and legal problems involved in the launching of a Welfare State. On the other hand, a German like Ernst Forsthoef 139/ prefers to go straight to the point and define, in abstract and systematic form, some of the most serious problems posed by the Sozialstaat to jurists. Drawing on another work by the same author, we give below an outline of these problems, at least in so far as they concern us at the moment.

(a) There is an inconsistency between the constitutional structure of modern States – that is, parliamentary States – and the tasks proposed for them and imposed upon them. The matter of programming, whether in developed or in less developed countries, must obviously be included under this point and is of particular importance to us in Latin America.

(b) With the continual increase in the tasks devolving upon the administration, the practice of litigation, that is to say, the defence vis-à-vis the State of the rights of the individual, is becoming increasingly difficult – all the more so as the Welfare State, by reason of its distributive function, has to employ special procedures which, being subtle and complex, elude the traditional forms of legal control.

(c) The advent of the Welfare State inevitably implies an increase in the Civil Service. Our first reaction to this bureaucratic expansion is one of misgiving; we would like to see it curtailed as far as possible. But here we come across a paradox that cannot be ignored: the best safeguard for the individual vis-à-vis such a bureaucracy consists precisely in the fact that it is of the strictest integrity and therefore enjoys the greatest possible authority.

None of these questions – which at a superficial glance might seem to be mere legal technicalities – can be evaded in any serious analysis of the relationship between economic planning and democracy. The past few years have seen a distinct advance in the Latin American countries towards a general

139/ E. Forsthoef, Verfassungsprobleme des Sozialstaats, 1953.

/recognition of
recognition of the importance, from the point of view of the region's economic development, of a thorough reform of their administrative systems. Stress was laid on this matter in the discussions and recommendations of the Working Group which met in Mexico City in December 1960 to study the social aspects of economic development, as may be seen from the Group's Report, to which we have already referred on various occasions. A vigorous educational campaign has been carried out in this connexion - establishment of a number of schools of administration, seminars, publications, etc. - and evidence is not lacking that serious investigation has begun in several countries, under the sponsorship of international organizations.

Mention was made above of the question of litigation; it might therefore not be out of place to make a passing reference to a matter of concern to some Latin Americans - a concern shared by the author of the present study, himself formerly a jurist. In attempts to improve the situation with regard to our government services, which - with some exceptions, of course - is not very encouraging, it is customary to take as a model the North American public administration, which has developed so remarkably and so admirably in recent years. There can be no objection to this inspiration; since, however, our administrative tradition is based on the Continental - and especially the French - pattern, the case presents some difficulties, apart from the high degree of sociological interest inherent in any problem of "reception" (cf., in the legal sphere, the famous "reception" of Roman law). The danger - even if it is only imaginary - is that what we assimilated previously may not be sturdy enough to enable us, in the new process of "reception", to save what is most valuable in the old tradition - its legal content, that is to say, administrative law itself. That venerable institution, law, has now fallen on such evil times everywhere that it would be deplorable if here, too, in its administrative branch, its true essence were to disappear. Hence the fear entertained by some people that, with the precipitate reception of the aforesaid public administration system, the essential preoccupation - essential from the legal standpoint - with the question of litigation may remain a capitis deminutio because attention is devoted primarily to the question of efficiency and is overwhelmed by such things as diagrams and schemes for "organization and control". However, to
avoid any misunderstanding, we would stress the fact that there is no objection in principle—quite the contrary, in fact—to the reasonable and well-assimilated "reception" of the techniques carefully developed by North American talent in an important discipline.

The foregoing question remains wide open to investigation and it presents a challenge to the younger generation. Some admirable research has been done, but, as far as we are aware, no definitive work has yet been published which describes technically the problems of economic planning in parliamentary democracies. Our countries, it appears, were the first to institute the so-called development corporations (or bodies with similar names). The idea of programming, once it had become general in those countries, also produced a crop of councils and boards. These bodies do not simply exist; they are concerned with a variety of parties, trade unions and interest groups. How can all these activities be co-ordinated, so as to achieve, through Parliament, a harmonized direction, representing, in accordance with Friedrich's definition, the national will?  

(k) Is there only one form of democracy?

The question put in the above heading might seem presumptuous and out of place in the present study if we did not categorically deny in advance any intention of considering it in its philosophical substance or its complete politico-sociological content. The last great philosopher who ventured upon the theme of the value of democracy in all its radical profundity was obliged to enlist the help of Reason (Vernunft) with a capital R, to defend democracy against the irrational alternatives offered by our times. Although we must resist the temptation to follow some of his brilliant—and, of course, complex—analyses, we may refer to one of his penetrating ideas—that democracy is not principally a pretension of man vis-a-vis the State, but a pretension of man vis-a-vis himself, the

140/ Some interesting material on this subject has been collected in a book by the Chilean economist Luis Escobar Cerda, Organización para el Desarrollo Económico, Editorial Universitaria S.A., Santiago de Chile, 1961. However, the task is only at its beginning.
fulfilment of which is precisely what enables him to take part in democracy; and this pretension can be perceived from the following three standpoints: consciousness of responsibility, veneration for great men, ability for self-education.141/

The lure of politico-sociological considerations - the relations between political systems with economic structures and with historical or ideological traditions - with respect to each country is easier to evade, at least for the reason that something has already been said on the subject in the present study. Let us return, then, to our original question in its simplest connotation and as a mere question of fact. There is an obvious parallelism between the question asked at the beginning of this paragraph and another question set forth earlier: Is there a single unitary model for economic development? In view of this parallelism, we may ask: Is there also a single model for democracy? The answer is negative in both cases. But the stubborn persistence - particularly on the part of textbooks - in taking as a model, in its own setting, the venerable English - or perhaps Anglo-Saxon - definition can only lead to an irremediable hopelessness. The subject has suddenly acquired great importance because of the interest now taken by politicians and scientists in the possible connexion between democracy and economic development in the newer countries. Perhaps, for this reason, and to guard against the rather emotional impatience of some Latin Americans, the Working Group in Mexico City was wise recognizing the subject in all its simplicity and even in recommending some research in this connexion: What forms of democratic government are the most appropriate for societies at different levels of economic and social development?142/

142/ Op. cit., p. 65. This is the fifth of the proposed research subjects.
Once more we come up against the fact that the situation in the Latin American countries is, as might be expected, very different from that obtaining in the bevy of new States; and, consequently, some of the concepts and recommendations of current research are of little use to us — for instance, the general theoretical questions considered by R. Braibanti in his above-mentioned study: "The relevance of political science to the study of underdeveloped areas". 143/ We venture to give below a few other brief examples.

Reference was made elsewhere to a classification of political systems of the new countries used by a group of young North American research workers. 144/ There are apparently three "standard models of political systems": (a) the so-called "mobilization" system or type; (b) the "consociational" system; and (c) the system of "modernizing autocracies". These various types are not difficult to explain, but such an explanation is unnecessary at the moment. (We shall merely list, by way of illustration, the characteristics of the first type: (a) hierarchical authority; (b) total loyalty; (c) tactical flexibility; (d) unitarism; (e) ideological specialization.) It is interesting to note that each type corresponds to a different form of economic development.

Broadening the horizon a little, a further interesting classification is to be found in another book, also mentioned earlier. 145/ Its authors prefer a dichotomic distinction: (a) oligarchies, which are or can be modernist, colonial and racist, conservative and traditionalist; and (b) democracies, which in turn correspond to one or other of the following types: political, tutelary and resulting from the liquidation of the colonial

143/ R. Braibanti and S. S. Spengler, op. cit., p. 139.
145/ See Almond and Coleman, op. cit.
system. If time allowed, it would be worth while to examine in some detail cases where the Spanish language had fallen into disuse, or else one of the so-called tutelary democracies which are also of interest to some Latin American countries.

The Brazilian professor Helio Jaguaribe — who attended the meeting in Mexico City — has ventured to tackle the subject with reference to the Latin American world, following up the connexion, referred to above, between political forms and methods of economic development. His undeniably original and discerning study146 is perhaps unnecessarily complicated by some questions of a geopolitical nature and it strikes here and there an extremely pessimistic note. In Professor Jaguaribe’s view, there are three viable models or types: the model of national capitalism or capitalistic nationalism; the model of State capitalism; and the type of "developmentistic" socialism. As will be seen, the classification here is politico-economic in character. A more attenuated and systematized expression of his thought is contained in the report of the above-mentioned Working Group: "In all probability, the structure of political models applicable to Latin American countries would include, inter alia, various combinations of the following preponderant factors:

(a) National entrepreneurial bourgeoisie and or technocratic middle classes.

(b) Parliaments with a predominance of parties supporting economic development as a fundamental political value on the basis of nationalist aspirations, or with a predominance of centralized political groups having a profoundly reformist outlook under the leadership of the technocratic group formed by the middle classes, and

(c) States responsible for the programming and control of an economic development activity carried out mainly by national entrepreneurs, or States performing themselves

146 El desarrollo económico programado y la organización política (ST/ECLAC/CONF.6/L.C-2b y Add.1)
the function of entrepreneur on account of the insufficiency of private enterprise.\footnote{147/}

While it was necessary to mention these opinions, it would be out of place to indulge in polemics. Our task for the moment is simpler; it does not aspire to offer even moderately satisfactory analyses, for these can only be attempted in a special study - which has to be carried out some time.

In our view, Arnold Bergsträsser\footnote{148/} is right in stating that, at this point in the twentieth century, there are still four fundamental types of rule existing side by side: primitive, class, constitutional or rule of law, and totalitarian.

Since gaining their independence, the Latin American countries have been, or have wanted to be, constitutional States, governed by the rule of law, although traces of their earlier class rule have persisted here and there. They have also been, or have wanted to be, democratic States. Because that democracy has not always functioned well, this is no reason for calling it in question. But in most cases there has been an endeavour to get nearer to democracy; and it is essential that, in the coming decades, which will be decisive for Latin America's economic growth, attempts be made to give it substance - in each country, according to its particular characteristics -, even if the almost mythical ideal of the Anglo-Saxon model is not reproduced point by point. In regard to economic development and programming, it is hardly probable that the old "liberal-representative" democracy in Leibholz's classification can prove an effective instrument at the present time. Pluralist democracy, typical of the most modern industrial countries, can only now begin in some of the Latin American countries, if they are fortunate; that is to say, if they are in full take-off or are getting under way.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[147/] Boletín Económico para América Latina, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 64
\item[148/] See A. Bergsträsser, \textit{Führung in der modernen Welt}, Rombach, Freiburg, 1961.
\end{footnotes}
Democracy as a participation phenomenon

Some people may think that the system of the so-called "dominant party" - not to be confused with the "one party" - is the most effective instrument for maintaining a programme and enlisting popular support. By the foregoing, we mean that form of the classic parliamentary system in which we have a majority coalition exercising a modifying influence in both directions. The essential point, however, is that the paradigm of democratic political life is not single but plural. If, as has already been said, the economists have tried to define in an original way, "from within", the problems inherent in the Latin American situation, this is because, as is natural, they had in mind the fundamental concepts of their science, which are equally valid everywhere. The politicians and their advisers - the social scientists - have to bear in mind that there are also fundamental principles of democracy, if real meaning is to be attached to the term. These principles are well known, but they should perhaps be recalled briefly.

In the first place, there must be a minimum of representation, whatever the electoral procedure and the party system, and of respect for the sanctions - no re-elections, etc. - of public opinion. In the second place, there must be safeguards for the individual person and such safeguards must be maintained; without this liberal element, any democracy is bound to perish. And in the third place, there must be opportunities for effective social participation, in a greater or lesser degree.

Sociologists, while admitting the importance of the first and second of these principles, will be particularly anxious to stress the paramount value of the third. Sociologically speaking, democracy is, indeed, a manifestation of participation. This manifestation is not confined to election times, to the casting of a vote or the temporary fulfilment of other purely political functions; real democratic participation by the citizen extends throughout society and is expressed in a variety of group activities. The painful experiences of the past few decades have been needed to bring about a revival in one form or another - adapted, of course, to present circumstances - of some of Durkheim's ideas, expressed with such vigour in the preface to the second edition of his classic work.
De la division du travail social. Nowadays, we speak rather of the structural importance of what are known as the intermediate groups, in the social and a fortiori in the political field. As the present author expressed it elsewhere, 149/

"... it may be maintained that it is only possible to speak of full and real participation in those cases where the individual is genuinely involved, i.e., where he has direct or first-hand experience of the things that are important to him and from which he forms, even without meaning to do so, his own opinion. An individual is genuinely involved in his family, his occupation, his firm, in the trade union, the producers' association, the parish, etc. An individual cannot act readily and judiciously when confronted with general, abstract situations, unless he is prepared for them by a gradual broadening of his limited, specific outlook. The means by which this gradual broadening of the outlook on life can be brought about is active participation in intermediate groups, of steadily increasing size, from the tiny family nucleus, at one end of the scale, to the entire State and its international connections, at the other. Real and fairly responsible political participation is thus achieved through these various groups. That participation is direct in so far as the individual takes part in private decisions which, whether he wishes it or not, have general political repercussions; it is indirect in so far as he forms his general political opinions as a result of contact and exchanges of ideas and experience with the other members of his group."

Such is the importance conceded today to this fact of democracy as a participation phenomenon that attempts have been made in a number of surveys to gauge it in different countries. And sometimes with surprising results. The vigour of economic development – deriving from that popular support so often mentioned – depends on the degree of effective participation existing at all these intermediate levels. And this brings us to a question about which nothing has been said up to the present: the vigour of trade union life. The importance of this fact, even from the standpoint of economic development, has been forcefully pointed out by some contemporary sociologists – André Philip, Goetz Briefs, etc. 150/

149/ Lectures at the University of Cordoba, Argentina, mentioned earlier.
150/ See an excellent general account by Alfred Christmann, "Die Gewerkschaften in der industriellen Gesellschaft" in Hamburger Jahrbuch, Year 5.

/A. Philip
A. Philip said recently\(^{151}\) that there was coming to pass a transition from "participation democracy" to libertarian - or liberal - democracy. We need not discuss the felicity of the terms chosen. The second of them is meant to convey the idea that, as a result of modern working conditions - in the most highly industrialized societies, of course - the individual is in a position to participate to an ever greater extent in a large variety of organizations. While liberating himself, man also concentrates more narrowly on his interests and responsibilities. Perhaps for this reason political democracy may be becoming steadily weaker and more uncertain as far as purely "political" participation is concerned, but it does not, on that account cease to be a democracy. In his own words:

"I wonder whether, instead of lamenting over the indifference, passivity and apathy of the masses, it would not be better to consider that this weakening implies a kind of liberation of the individual; we shall thus attain to a democracy which, though perhaps allowing of less participation, will, on the other hand, allow of greater controls, determination of limits and definition of spheres of action."

He adds the following, which is of particular interest for our present purpose:

"There can be no economic democracy without the provision of a continuing education for the whole population - a continuing education in keeping with conditions in the modern world... education for a people increasingly interested in ideologies and philosophies of life and increasingly interested in definite technical realities at the same time as in the values in which they are reflected.\(^{152}\)

It was thus through the trade unions that was bound to arise the burning problem of economic democracy,\(^{153}\) that is to say, the problem

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\(^{152}\) Op. cit., p. 155. The affinity should be noted with the ideas of other authors referred to in the present study, such as Landshut.

\(^{153}\) The journal of the Institut Solvay (1961 Abs. 1-2) contains a number of contributions to a symposium held in Geneva (May 1960) on this subject. Some are very valuable. But for a Latin American, the most interesting perhaps is that by Alain Touraine, "Situations ouvrières et Types de Démocratie Economique" - not only, of course, because he expressly mentions some Spanish-American phenomena (loc. cit., p.40)

/- as various
- as various definitions agree - of the extension to the economic sphere of the democratic principles which first appeared in the political sphere. But we have made so many digressions that one more would be unpardonable.

(m) **Moral integrity.** Latin America "fará da sê"

Would it be possible, or rather, are we able at this stage to tackle a last, thorny question? Up to now, the conviction has prevailed that the democratic system is capable of promoting economic development, and in some sort not only because of value judgments but also for technical reasons. These reasons provide at once for the prerequisites of growth, i.e., a sustained and adequate rate of growth, and the equitable and humane distribution of the fruits thereof. No one would deny in principle that the human intelligence is capable of determining the procedures required for democratic programming. It would, doubtless, be more difficult, though by no means impossible, to reconcile planning and democracy. Intellectuals may be provoked to great impatience at times by the delays and obstacles which their ideas encounter when applied to the complex situations of real life, though the experience of practical men may in due course contrive to damp down the intellectual's inherent intolerance. What may happen, however, is that a moment will come when the general conviction prevails that the democratic system is a failure, that Western ideas are exploded. The future is in the lap of the gods; and there is no point in our striving with Proteus now, to wrest his secret from him - the elusive sea-god will always escape us, so we had better give up any idea of prophecy.

Although the future is unforeseeable, we can in any case bear in mind the causes that may lead us to some such gamble with fate - as rejecting democracy. In these last remarks on the viability of the democratic system, let us emphasize once more the significance of its two indispensable buttresses: legitimacy and efficiency. The democratic system can perish if it is wasted by inefficiency. But it can also perish if the vital force of its legitimacy is sapped by pernicious anaemia. It is important not to be mistaken about these two dangers; the second is much more serious and relentless than the first. There is always a hope that, even at the eleventh hour, men may arise who are able to turn inaptitude into efficiency, who are able, if need be, to perform a final, saving operation. On the other hand, the

/complete evaporation
complete evaporation of beliefs, the moral collapse that may result from the dissolution of faith - the psychological disintegration of a whole society - can only lead to hopelessness and "extremism". Men cannot live without the stimulus of a lofty example. And, sometimes, ruling groups through their corruption may poison democracy instead of affording an example of devotion and steadfastness. But there is perhaps no deeper form of such corruption - for the very reason that it slowly and inexorably undermines - than the power, Machiavellism of public men, whether of their own country or of a foreign dominating country. It has rightly been observed that the Machiavellism of the Prince corrupts, at most, his little Court; but the mass Machiavellism of the great modern leaders saps, equally and inevitably, the moral fibre of all individual citizens. And democracy is basically a question of ethics, as has been so clearly explained by the philosopher Jaspers. Psychological disintegration implies, at the most, mere selfish resignation, content to gratify its most "human" and immediate interests, and, at the least, escape to an "ivory tower", represented, perhaps, by one of the world religions. Let us, then, face this possibility - as is fitting for adult, mature beings - and at the same time let us hope, and, still more firmly determine, that it be not translated into fact. In one of the most fateful moments in the history of Spain, her greatest leader was in a position to say: Spain "fará da sé". He did not, however, do so, and therefore did not shatter the mystery that history preserves throughout its long course by reason of its secrets. Why should not that same hope be repeated here? We have no doubt that, in the era which is now dawning, Latin America, too, fará da sé.