

CEPAL

Review

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The State, decision-making and planning in Latin America

*Carlos A. de Mattos**

In the first half of the 1960s, a planning orientation began to develop in Latin America which came into extensive use in a number of the countries in the region. The author contends that because of this orientation's utopian voluntarism, economic reductionism and formalism, it was not really very useful for public policy management and its impact on actual decision-making in these countries was generally very limited. However, independently of these experiences to a great extent, national decision-making processes were developed in various countries of the region as a function of the political schemes supported by the dominant social groups in these societies which can be regarded as genuine examples of capitalist planning.

The author asserts that planning will indeed be necessary in the future for the Latin American countries and discusses what type of planning would be viable in complex capitalist social formations. In this regard, he examines what the minimum conditions for successful planning in this type of capitalist system might be; the factors considered in this connection include the impact of these systems' dominant rationality, the weight carried by the ideology of dominant social groups and their respective political schemes, the State bureaucracy's attitude to them, and the limitations of existing social theories as a basis for decision-making and social action.

The article concludes with a discussion of the possible modalities of planning in countries having the characteristics which predominate in Latin America.

*Director of the ILPES Training Programme. A preliminary version of this article was prepared for presentation at the international seminar entitled "O Estado e o Planejamento: os Sonhos e a Realidade" held at Brasília from 16 to 19 September 1986 in commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of the Training Centre for Economic Development (CENDEC). The version presented here has been enriched by the valuable comments which the author received from Paulo Roberto Haddad, Roberto Pereira Guimarães and Héctor Pistonesi.

"...any intervention in complex social structures has unforeseeable consequences, and reform processes can only be defended in so far as they are based on exacting processes of trial and error which are carefully monitored by those who will have to bear the consequences".

Jürgen Habermas (1985)

Introduction

An analysis of the period that unfolded under the influence of the Alliance for Progress seems an appropriate starting point for the presentation of some observations concerning the subject of planning in Latin America, inasmuch as this was the period that saw the establishment of the main features that shaped a Latin American concept or modality of planning which then took hold and which even today continues to influence much of what is said and done in this field.

Although there were certainly instances of planning, conceived as such, in Latin America prior to this period (such as, for example, the planning conducted during the first two Perón administrations in Argentina, during the time of Kubitschek in Brazil, during the first National Liberation governments in Costa Rica, etc.), what is of primary interest here are the factors which actually defined and crystallized the Latin American planning orthodoxy whose development—at both its theoretical and practical levels—principally began in the early 1960s.

Until that time, the word "planning" generally had a connotation of something undesirable in the vocabulary of many governmental circles in Latin America; even the frequently used euphemism of "programming" did not totally eliminate this connotation. The main reason for this was that the word "planning" was commonly associated at the time with, on the one hand, the methods and procedures being used to build socialism in the Soviet Union during the early years of the Stalinist period—a process which was viewed with widespread aversion by most Latin American governments—and, on the other hand, with interventionist, *dirigiste* or protectionist strategies, all of which were highly controversial and largely unaccepted during this period.

Around 1960 this situation underwent a radical change; the conference held by the Latin

American countries at Punta del Este in 1961 and the consequent creation of the Alliance for Progress helped to bring about a decisive and singular formal legitimization of the term "planning" and even of the planner's trade, at least as they were understood at the time. This was a consequence, firstly, of the fact that in the final documents issued at the meeting, the countries recognized the need to formulate and execute national plans and, secondly, of the fact that the Alliance for Progress, as a mechanism for financial co-operation with the Latin American countries, made it a requirement that they should have economic and social development plans in order to qualify for such financing.

This was the setting in which a certain view of planning made its appearance, developed and became consolidated which, since that time, has had a decisive influence on most of what has been said and done in this respect. It is perhaps important to stress that in the Latin American circles directly associated with the subject of planning, this concept was accepted virtually without debate and that it developed within a curious environment of intellectual isolation; indeed, even as a stimulating discussion of the

role and alternative modalities of planning was taking place in other parts of the world—a dialogue which included an in-depth questioning of the concept that was adopted in Latin America—this debate was inexplicably ignored by many of the Latin American planners of the time.

So it was that a true Latin American orthodoxy of planning came to be established which, for a relatively long period of time thereafter, was the only approach to the work at hand that was accepted as valid. When this concept clearly proved to be inoperable in practical terms, the most frequent response was to relegate the corresponding assessments to the context of a generally insignificant discussion of the so-called "planning crisis", which tended to sidestep the analysis of those factors that had the most to do with the lackluster results it had produced.

An analysis of the main features or characteristics of this traditional modality of planning will lay the groundwork for the formulation of some hypotheses as to the reasons for the failure of the undertakings which were based on the above concept.

I

The main features of the Latin American planning orthodoxy¹

Three principal closely interrelated features will be examined in an attempt to describe and analyse the planning modality that came into vogue in most of the Latin American countries at the time of the Alliance for Progress. Firstly, there was a certain *utopian voluntarism* which was primarily manifested in the proposed orientation and content of the plans and which, in essence, was an outgrowth of the planners' ideology. Secondly, there was an excessive *economistic reductionism* deriving from an attempt to circumscribe the observation, description and explanation of social processes within the framework of economic theory so that, on this basis, policies might be designed for managing these processes. Thirdly, a pronounced *formal-*

ism marked the procedures that were recommended and adopted which was viewed as essential to the correct execution of planning tasks.

The *utopian voluntarism* attributed to the traditional form of Latin American planning was a consequence of the fact that planners tended to put their ideology before that of the social group which had effective control over decision-making. Basically, this meant that the orientation and content of the plans that were

¹The gestation and development, as well as the practical results, of this concept of planning in Latin America was explored in greater depth in an earlier article (de Mattos, 1979).

designed during this stage conformed to the aspirations and interests of the planners themselves more than to those of the decision-makers. This orientation and content fit in with the normative model that had been adopted, which served as the foundation for most of the plans produced during the period in question; in essence, this was a structuralist (or developmentalist) model which, having originally been outlined by ECLAC, was later adopted and carried forward by the Punta del Este Charter. This document—which was to play a fundamental role in the development of the traditional concept of Latin American planning—while including a specific enumeration of the central elements of the model, recommended its adoption in the belief that its implementation would provide the best means of overcoming the main problems facing the countries of the region.

Latin American planning was long marked by this early association; an assessment, prepared early on, in 1965, of the experience which followed along the lines of this concept recognized this in stating that "in the case of Latin America, planning has come to be regarded as the fundamental instrument for overcoming underdevelopment, a transition which entails far-reaching institutional and economic structural changes" (ILPES, 1966, p. 13). Within this context, the tendency since then in Latin America has been to identify planning with development planning and, at the same time, to associate the concept of development with the orientation and content of the structuralist model referred to above.

Within the framework of this concept, the figure of the planner tended to be idealized as an agent of social change and was assumed to have a measure of autonomy to act in this regard. The voluminous literature generated during this period bears witness to the fact that even planners tended to see themselves in this role and to believe that their work could actually lead to the sweeping changes they felt were necessary in Latin America.

So it was that, under the influence of this concept of planning, there was a tendency to forget that decisions concerning the orientation and content of real planning processes are independent of the planners' ideology, except in those cases where they are also decision-makers. Obviously, the idealization which this entailed

stemmed from an abstract analysis that tended to overlook the historical and structural factors influencing real decision-making processes and, particularly, the role played by the interests and ideology of the social groups taking part in them. Thus, there was an inclination to ignore the fact that the orientation and basic content of any real process of national planning are always influenced by the ideology of the dominant social groups and serve the interests of that ideology, which, ultimately, is expressed through the decisions taken by the various institutions of the State. In this context, planning experts or technicians, when they actually do plan, do so as a function of the prevailing political scheme and, hence, of the ideology of those who have effective control over decision-making. As stated by Octavio Ianni, "...planning is a process that begins and ends within the sphere of power relations and structures" (O. Ianni, 1971, p. 300). In other words, planning is an essentially political activity designed to give direction and consistency to a specific social process based on the normative orientations of the dominant classes at that point in time.

These considerations lead directly into the analysis of the second feature of traditional Latin American planning, i.e., its *economistic reductionism*, whose presence may be inferred from the fact that national systems tended to be observed, described and explained almost exclusively with reference to their economic dimension and that it was thought that their management could and should be undertaken primarily through the use of *economic policy tools*.² It should therefore come as no surprise that many of the definitions of planning commonly in use at the time were, in essence, definitions of economic planning only.

With this limited theoretical foundation, the diagnostic evaluations of the national situations for which the plans were intended often confined their analyses of resource shortages to the consideration of only those factors stressed by economic theory; this resulted in a failure to

²In most of his more recent works, in presenting and justifying his proposal concerning situational strategic planning, Carlos Mattos has stressed the limitations of economic categories and the need to work on the basis of an all-encompassing category which would permit the dynamics of a complex system to be comprehended in all its variety (see, in particular, Mattos, 1985).

look into the question of how specific processes were affected by the scarcity of such resources as political capacity, know-how, information, etc. It was thus impossible, within this context, to observe or consider the importance of those problems which Habermas (Habermas, 1973) characterized as a "legitimacy gap" or to evaluate their impact on the possible scope of national decision-making processes. Therefore, only a partial and unsatisfactory understanding could be gained of the functioning, in all its complexity, of each national system, and this foredoomed any attempt to guide social processes effectively on the basis of the decisions and actions deriving from this type of planning.

The economic focus of planning was founded on the conviction that it was possible to manage economic variables on a rational basis by using economic policy tools to reproduce projected behaviour in real situations and, by this means, to achieve the complete fulfilment of established objectives. The assumptions underlying this reductionism resulted in a failure to take into account the implications and magnitude of the social conflict which arose out of the dispersion, in terms of both ideology and power, characterizing the socio-political situation in these countries. Consequently, the turbulence and uncertainty typical of the dynamics of peripheral social systems were never fully comprehended and, therefore, their possible management fell outside the scope of action attributed to planning.

As part of this peculiar way of observing and explaining the dynamics of national systems, there was an equally peculiar perception of the social actors which played a major part in determining the orientation and content of specific social processes. The absence, or superficiality, of analyses of real decision-making processes made it possible to assume, without a great deal of debate on the subject, the effective existence of the social actors needed to implement the normative guidelines that had been proposed, it also being assumed that they possessed the necessary attributes to do so.

This manner of perceiving social actors is particularly important in so far as it related to the State. In a major work on the subject, Gurrieri analysed the concept of the State underlying the thinking expressed by ECLAC, asserting that "the State has always been dealt

with in a somewhat paradoxical manner in the writings of ECLAC: it is regarded as a decisive agent in the formulation and application of development strategies, but its true, changeable, nature is not analysed in depth. This paradox has been resolved by assuming the existence of an ideal planning and reformist State which would fully perform the function assigned to it" (Gurrieri, 1984, p. i). The same author went on to say that "this largely implicit image which ECLAC had of the State" comprised "the attributes of internal unity and consistency, autonomy from other economic agents, political and economic supremacy, technical and administrative capacity, and control over external economic relations. These features constituted the core of the ideal State-as-planner, whose supposed existence permitted the evasion of a direct and systematic treatment of the political problems of development" (*idem*, p. ii). This was the concept of the State adopted by the traditional school of Latin American planning and was what allowed it, for quite some time, to formulate plans without considering the impact of the ideology held by the groups in power; in other words, by virtue of the economic reductionism on which it rested, this type of planning based many of its analyses on an image of the State which was fictitious, but which was a functional part of the orientation and content of the plans that were produced. Furthermore, without the support of these assumptions, it would have been difficult to sustain the image of the planner and of planning as serving to further social change.

This concept of social actors and, in particular, of the State also stemmed from a form of analysis which shied away from considering the social and political factors influencing real processes; from this perspective, it was impossible to gain a deeper understanding of the nature and role of the State in the capitalist social formations of Latin America or to comprehend the motivations of the actors controlling the respective decision-making processes. The image of the State as "a battlefield between centres of State and private power, each with their own orientations and rationalities, which struggle to impose their own interests" (Gurrieri, 1984, p. ii), was never clearly perceived in the planning analyses of this period. The view of the State as a manifestation of a pact of domination supported by a network of alliances among various social groups striving to preserve the

respective social formation's cohesiveness in the name of a supposed general interest never figured in these analyses; this omission lessened the possibility of arriving at a better understanding of the main factors which affected the decision-making processes governed by the State and, in consequence, hindered progress towards a more realistic delimitation of what was actually viable as regards planning activities.

In the final analysis, the utopian voluntarism and economic reductionism of the orthodox approach to planning in Latin America impeded and in-depth analysis of the political viability of the normative guidelines set forth in these plans; this was because the lack of knowledge about the nature of actual decision-making processes made it impossible to identify the *limits of possibility* which, in each specific case, placed constraints on these processes and on any policies arising out of them. Thus, planning made its appearance in the Latin American countries in a mythicized form, surrounded by a messianic aura which, in the end, caused it to be seen as utopian. As a result, regard for the very idea of planning began to decline, especially in the political arena.

The third feature was the *formalism* which prevailed during the period and which survives even today in planning as it is practised in some countries in the region; this feature marked both the procedures that were adopted and the institutional organization for directing the respective processes whose establishment or reinforcement was recommended.

With respect to planning procedures, a certain method of work came into general use which was basically inspired by the "stage-by-stage planning" originally proposed and developed by Tinbergen. The procedure adopted was based on a sequence of tasks which, in essence, involved preparing a diagnostic analysis, setting objectives and goals, forecasting the behaviour of economic variables, designing policies, and identifying and formulating programmes and projects. This process culminated in the preparation of a comprehensive economic plan which was regarded as providing the indispensable articulation and guidance for the process that was to be initiated.

Basically, this type of document — whose more distant antecedents were the procedures developed and used by Soviet planning in the

late 1920s— was produced by the technical teams of certain bodies created especially for this purpose. The resulting comprehensive economic plan, which had characteristics of a book-plan, was prepared entirely on an *ex ante* basis and referred to the economic system as a whole. It usually had a detailed quantitative content based on an itemized identification of the behaviour of a set of macroeconomic variables over a medium-term planning horizon. In its turn, this identification had been carried out with an eye to the fulfilment of established objectives, which frequently revolved around growth targets for the product. This mode of work was founded on the belief that it was possible to imprint the behaviour ascribed by the plan upon the economic system and this, in turn, involved the assumption that such behaviour would continue and remain valid throughout the established planning horizon. This also entailed an additional, implicit assumption that a considerable degree of national autonomy and internal stability existed within the system, all of which is difficult to accept, especially in the case of a peripheral social formation.

In practice, these procedures were quickly seen to be ill-suited to the dynamics of these systems' social processes; the excessive detail and rigidity of these plans invariably resulted in their rapid obsolescence; in fact, this occurred so rapidly that, in most cases, they had already become outdated by the time they were published because their projections were already seen to be entirely lacking in validity by that time. In other words, because of its excessive inflexibility, the book-plan proved to be an inappropriate tool for dealing with the situations of uncertainty and social turmoil characteristic of the Latin American countries.

Furthermore, some of the basic characteristics of these plans helped to reinforce planning's loss of prestige in that, since the plans lay down an array of rigid commitments in regard to the projected behaviour of a set of variables — behaviour which, even before the fact, could be seen to be unachievable — many of them were judged to be incapable of doing what they had promised to do.

The second aspect of the formalism displayed by traditional planning in Latin America relates to the basic proposal that was made in regard to the institutional machinery for the

production of such plans, i.e., the establishment of central planning bodies. This type of institutional arrangement also had its more remote antecedents in those which had been used in Soviet planning — from which, ultimately, it had been copied. It should be pointed out, however, that in the Soviet case, the existence of a central national planning office which, on the basis of a set of indices and indicators set forth in a comprehensive plan, could orient and direct the planning process was a logical response to the needs of a system in which the indicators provided by market prices had been suppressed. Immediately after the Second World War, a number of Western European countries had adopted analogous institutional procedures involving the creation, under a variety of names, of their own central planning bodies. Under the particular conditions of relative stability and consensus which reigned for a short time in these countries, such central planning bodies served the purposes for which they had been established. Later, when these initial conditions changed, these bodies gradually became less functional and, as a result, they also came to be of less importance in the countries' decision-making processes.

When the Latin American countries began to undertake planning, they hastily tended to imitate this type of institutional arrangement. This trend became even stronger during the period of the Alliance for Progress, when the truly important point was not so much to plan as to have a plan so that they could obtain the financing it offered. To this end, a body that would be expressly devoted to this task was needed, since the existing institutions in the bureaucratic apparatus of the State were assigned to specific and usually specialized functions, and therefore lacked the holistic viewpoint required for comprehensive planning as well as, in general, the necessary know-how. Thus the idea gained sway of establishing a central, national body to be responsible for the management of planning tasks; in practice, however, once this new type of body had been created, it was usually unable to achieve a satisfactory articulation with the other components of the State bureaucracy. One contributing factor to this problem was that, as the other public agencies came to perceive the sphere of duties assigned to the new institution as involving an appropri-

tion of functions which had previously been theirs, they embarked upon a determined struggle to prevent this from happening.

As a result of the discrepancy between the duties assigned to the central planning bodies at the time of their creation and those which they actually managed to call their own in the struggle for control over segments of the national decision-making process, in most cases a sharp separation of tasks began to emerge whereby design activities were divorced from implementation; in effect, while these bodies were primarily engaged in establishing general guidelines for this process and translating them into comprehensive medium-range plans, the other institutions of the public sector continued to perform their customary routine tasks of policy design and execution in their respective areas, and these functions were never wrested away from them. Under these circumstances, the central planning bodies were, for the most part, unable to gain a functional position within the bureaucratic apparatus of the State; nevertheless, most of them did manage to ensure their survival as organizations, albeit to the detriment of their influence on public policy decision-making; thus, in the long run, they were able to conduct only relatively insignificant activities from a political standpoint.

In the light of this experience, it might well be asked whether this type of institutional arrangement for guiding and directing national planning processes on the basis of central bodies created expressly for the purpose is really a suitable one for achieving a more satisfactory performance of such tasks. An analysis of the current configuration of the State bureaucracy in Latin America (taking into account its historical roots and its respective process of formation, the results obtained by the various attempts to bring about administrative reform, and the actual experience gained since the 1960s in planning and in public policy design and execution) provides sufficient grounds for calling into question the appropriateness of this type of organization for the important functions that were assigned to it. In order for central planning bodies to be capable of performing these functions properly, it would appear that conditions would have to be conducive to a thorough-going structural reform of the Latin American government apparatus which would allow these bodies to be endowed

with the authorities and power required in order to orient and direct the respective planning processes; this does not seem likely to occur given the situation as it now stands, however, and it would therefore be advisable to give some thought to more practical and flexible institutional arrangements.

In conclusion, the praxis which developed in various Latin American countries along the lines of this traditional concept of planning—even though it gave rise to intense activity as regards the formulation of comprehensive plans and the creation of central planning bodies—

does not seem to have had any major impact on policy. In fact, although this experience undoubtedly made a number of positive contributions to the Latin American countries concerned (fostering a better understanding of the actual situations in the various countries, contributing to the modernization of the bureaucratic apparatus of the State, playing a decisive role in the upgrading of national information systems, etc.), it is no less true that, from the standpoint of its impact on actual decision-making processes, its results were extremely limited in most cases.

II

The possibility and need for planning in Latin America

The results of what was done under the aegis of the traditional concept of planning in Latin America provide grounds for re-opening questions such as the following: Is planning in capitalist social formations possible? and, if the answer is yes, then: Is planning in this type of national society necessary?

In discussing these issues, it will be helpful to compare the results of the above experience with the results achieved in those cases where progress was made in carrying out the policy schemes of dominant social groups on the basis of a relatively consistent set of decisions and actions. In this connection, the recent history of the Latin American countries provides specific examples of the relatively successful execution of short-, medium- and long-term public policies whose design and implementation were based on the fundamental guidelines of the political scheme advocated by the agents having effective control at that point in time over national decision-making. The above statement is not intended to suggest, of course, that what occurred could be characterized as the implementation of immutable political blueprints, since in the course of the contradictory dynamics of the respective social processes, these schemes necessarily had to undergo many corrections and modifications during the period when they were

in effect as a consequence of their confrontation with the interests and demands of other social actors.

Examples of experiences of this type are to be found prior to, during and after the above-mentioned period of the political legitimation of planning. Among others, there have been the decision-making processes associated with the execution of such political schemes as those of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico, the "Estado Novo" in Brazil and "*battlismo*" in Uruguay. Despite any flaws and limitations these processes may have had, when viewed from a long-term perspective each of them constitutes a concrete example of the fulfilment, to a greater or lesser degree, of the main guidelines of a national political scheme promoted by hegemonic social groups during the period in history when they held sway. As such, they can be classified as true instances of capitalist planning.

Based solely on the evidence provided by an historical analysis, it can be stated that, even though the procedures and work methods used in these cases by no means conformed to the precepts of the orthodox school of Latin American planning (indeed, in many of these instances, the word "planning" was not even mentioned), their result was a public policy pro-

cess characterized by a reasonable degree of internal consistency, each of whose components was designed and implemented with a view to the basic objectives of the prevailing political scheme. The processes that were shaped in this way exhibited the basic features of what is understood as planning.

In the final analysis, these processes—putting aside the messianic vision of planning referred to earlier—were based on a much more pragmatic and flexible concept. As such they appear to have conformed more closely to planning as we understand it within the environment of complex capitalist systems. In each of the cases mentioned, the methods that were selected proved to be reasonably appropriate to the characteristics of the decision-making process in question, taking into account the prevailing socio-political determinants in each case. Thus, for example, an analysis of experiences of this sort reveals that such procedures as negotiation, as a means to social consensus, were often used when possible. By these and other means, an attempt was made to increase the political viability of the main components of the political scheme as a way of creating conditions that would be more conducive to its realization. Viewed thusly, these experiences can be said to have been pioneering examples of strategic planning that were carried out using procedures which, in each case, were gradually refined as part of planning praxis.

If this conclusion is accepted (which implies acceptance of the proposition that, under certain conditions, planning is possible in capitalist societies of the sort found in Latin America), then the next step is to address the issue of whether or not there is a need for planning in such societies. A number of situations and factors which are currently having a strong effect on these countries provide a basis for the hypothesis that it will surely become necessary, with ever-greater frequency, to have recourse to planning procedures and techniques in order to give direction to the development process of the respective national systems. Indeed, it may well be argued that, even when the governments of these countries might not wish to do so, there will be many reasons why they will be forced to resort to some type of planning in order to manage and control these processes properly. It should be noted that an ever-present tenet

underlying the argument being presented here is the conviction that the free play of market forces is not capable of providing a satisfactory response to the problems arising in the contexts which will be examined in the following paragraphs.

There are at least three factors or situations which, in the author's opinion, will henceforth make it necessary to resort to planning more and more often. The first is a result of the rapid and inexorable increase in the complexity of national systems which stems from the increasing diversification of production and the constant evolution of their structures. This growing complexity has been making it increasingly difficult to deepen our understanding of the dynamics of these systems in their various dimensions and, consequently, to define actions which can offer a reasonable hope of producing the sought-for modifications and refinements in these dynamics. This situation cannot help but pose new and more difficult challenges for public management, thus creating a need to use suitable procedures for orienting and co-ordinating governmental actions and to ensure their consistency with a view to maximizing the effectiveness of the corresponding public policy packages.

This trend towards greater complexity has, first and foremost, been reflected in the State apparatus itself. The characteristics of this process and its implications in terms of public management were summarized by Bernardo Kliksberg in the following fashion: "The expanding Latin American State has been marked by a true 'explosion' of complexity. The scope of action of the public-sector apparatus has expanded considerably and its intervention in areas where it previously took action has become greater. The multitude of goals being pursued simultaneously poses difficult technical problems in relation to the compatibilization of objectives. At the same time, as it is faced with new responsibilities, the State has greatly diversified its means of action. In most of the countries of the region, a wide range of means are used, including instruments of direct regulation, such as legal provisions, and instruments of indirect regulation, such as the management of policies having a far-reaching effect on the economic structure (e.g., monetary, credit and fiscal policies, financial functions, industrial production,

marketing functions, etc.). The efficient management of this extensive array of heterogeneous operations with a view to maximizing objectives which, in turn, require constant attention in order to ensure their compatibility constitutes an organizational problem of extreme complexity" (Kliksberg, 1984, p. 21). Planning, with the aid of its arsenal of methods and techniques, appears to be the only suitable tool available for undertaking the task of efficiently managing the vast group of heterogeneous operations referred to by Kliksberg.

Moreover, as the modernization and industrialization of national systems progresses, a highly diversified and increasingly complex social pattern has been forming that is marked by a wide dispersion of power, all of which causes such societies to be more inclined towards social conflict. In this context, planning's forecasting methods can serve as useful aids to the functions of government, in that they can help to anticipate possible phases of social turmoil and thus furnish information needed for their control. The construction of future scenarios that include projections concerning the behaviour of the main social actors provides valuable input for the design of processes for attaining a social consensus which, in situations where power is dispersed, will open up suitable avenues for attempts to manage such social conflict. In supplying a basis for tasks of this sort, planning becomes an effective tool for ensuring the preservation and stability of national institutions, which is one of the basic functions of national States in capitalist societies.

In the same vein, the preparation of scenarios concerning the future evolution and possible positions of national systems furnishes background information which can be used to help lessen the uncertainty associated with decisions taken by the various types of social actors. This holds true both for those who are called upon to take political decisions that affect the system as a whole and for private-sector actors who thus gain information that may allow them to minimize risks. Planning methods and techniques also serve as indispensable aids to governmental action in that they make it possible to confront the voluntarism of the national political schemes of hegemonic social groups with the results of socioeconomic projections, thereby providing information about how the political viability of alternative strategies might be increased.

The second situation which, in this author's opinion, points up the need for planning is a consequence of the process of insertion of national units in an increasingly internationalized system. This situation, which is reflected in the unceasing growth of *linkages* in the areas of finance, production, technology, consumption patterns, etc., between the systems of the periphery and those of the centre, has naturally given rise to an increase in national systems' vulnerability to external factors and decisions and, hence, to a gradual and irreversible reduction of their decision-making spaces. As they confront the problem of development within this context, the governments of the peripheral countries will need to know well ahead of time what the position and role of each national system in its respective international context is going to be so that they will be able to choose avenues through which they can minimize the adverse impact of exogenous factors and decisions. Using these types of projections as a basis, they will have to increase the co-ordination and effectiveness of their decisions in an attempt to produce consistent public policy packages that will allow them to maintain and, in so far as possible, expand their respective system's decision-making space. Herein lie the role and usefulness of planning as a tool to help deal with the consequences of the internationalization process in each national setting.

The third factor is that planning appears to be an appropriate instrument for the peripheral countries to use in attempting to control and manage the impact of the so-called second industrial revolution. This phenomenon, which is giving rise to revolutionary changes in science and technology (especially in microelectronics, microbiology and nuclear energy) may reach the point where it will have terribly adverse repercussions on these countries.

In a recent study on the implications of this phenomenon, Adam Schaff analysed its possible consequences for Third World countries: "What repercussions will the second industrial revolution have on these countries? ...the answer is not certain: the consequences of the present industrial revolution may be disastrous or beneficial. In all probability, they will be both, and this is likely to mitigate the impending danger" (Schaff, 1985, p. 105). Despite the door which this statement appears to open, the author's subsequent analysis demonstrates that the reali-

zation of many of its possible benefits will depend upon what the affected countries themselves are able to do.

There is sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that, thus far, the interplay of market forces has not operated in a way favourable to these countries, and there are no convincing reasons to believe that this may change in the future. In order to control the impact of these revolutionary changes on the national systems of the periphery, it will be necessary to anticipate the future by attempting to determine, beginning now, what each of these systems' mode of insertion in the emerging world context may be over the medium and long term. This task goes

far beyond the scope and potentials of the routine, piecemeal management tasks carried out by various institutions in each country's government service. In order to take decisions that will give these countries some chance of successfully confronting the consequences of this phenomenon, their governments will have to have the information that can be provided by projections concerning possible future scenarios. Such data can only be produced by using the methods and techniques now offered by planning, and the implementation of the resulting directives would appear to be possible only by means of its procedures.

III

Planning possibilities in peripheral societies

The fact that affirmative answers have been offered here in respect to the questions of the possibility and necessity of planning in capitalist countries may in some way seem to imply that planning decisions and actions have an unlimited scope. Based on the conclusions drawn in the preceding section, the next step is therefore to consider the question of what is and what is not possible in these types of countries.

In this connection, it is important to establish the fact that, fundamentally, the context of a planned process is always circumscribed by the influence of a series of factors which set certain *limits of possibility*³ in any given situation. These limits should not, however, be regarded as being rigid or immutable, since the ongoing confrontation among the interests and demands of various social actors which naturally arises during the implementation of any political scheme continually generates contradictions that either expand or narrow the planning framework in each instance. Nevertheless, at each given point in time when decisions and actions are taken, this framework does have certain limits as to

what can be done and what cannot, limits which must be taken into consideration if the corresponding schemes are actually to arrive at a stage where they can be effectively executed. At least three types of factors must be considered in this regard.

Firstly, in dealing with the processes which take place within capitalist countries, one factor that must be taken into account is that the actual viability of decisions and actions will be influenced, above all, by the *dominant rationality* in this type of society, no matter what its specific and individual features may be. In other words, these processes are ultimately shaped by sequences of decisions and actions which are moulded and framed by the "rules of the game" of this dominant rationality. Certain definitive features of capitalist societies form a backdrop that always lies behind any type of decision; at the same time, these features also figure as potentials and restrictions as regards each decision-making process. The fact that a significant portion of the means of production are privately owned, the important role of the market in the allocation of resources and the determination of prices, and the impact of the maximization of profits as a central factor in economic calculations and, hence, in the behaviour of private-

³A more detailed examination of the concept of limits of possibility in capitalist societies was undertaken in a previous work dealing with the subject of social action on a subnational scale (de Mattos, 1982).

sector agents are some of the elements that play a fundamental role in shaping the orientation and content of the processes of social action which are possible in this type of country.

Ultimately, this type of influence—which relates to the definitive features of the social formation in question—constitutes the most rigid factor in determining the range of possibility in any decision-making process that affects the system as a whole; that is, this factor is the most difficult one of all to modify and the one most unlikely to be superseded. The State, as will be discussed later, plays a basic role, as a guardian of the society's cohesiveness, in seeing that the rules of the game are observed.

The second factor refers to the orientation and content of the prevailing political scheme; as a concrete expression of the hegemonic social group's ideology, this scheme either explicitly or implicitly relates to the type of future society to which this group aspires. To use the words of Touraine: "To say that a society chooses its future is to say that it gives priority to selected options that are suited to the interests of a governing class, which may be more or less open or closed and more or less subject to certain types of institutional coercion. But this class is the one which defines, in the name of overall progress and of its own interests, the basic options" (A. Touraine, 1974, p. 172). At any given point in time, the decisions and actions involved in a planning process must be viewed in the context of the fundamental options referred to by Touraine, and in accordance with them. Nonetheless, this sort of factor is more flexible than the first type mentioned inasmuch as the political scheme—because it is the sphere in which the outcomes of the struggle among the interests and demands of the various actors of civilian society are mainly expressed—never involves an immutable normative package; rather, at all times it is subject to modification, even while its essential content is preserved. In discussing this aspect, a major study on Latin American planning stated: "...if the political system operates through the medium of continuous and successive negotiations among various social sectors, then the prevailing political scheme becomes subject to changes in direction of varying significance, although in such cases there is probably a more or less immutable fundamental basis or orientation to which adjustments of various

types are made" (Solari, *et al.*, 1980, p. 8). Obviously, when social confrontation produces a radical change in these essential features, then a different political scheme emerges which conforms to the ideology of a different social group and which is therefore directed towards a different set of aspirations and intentions.

Moreover, the State itself, as an arena for confrontation among the interests and demands of an array of social forces, is never entirely tied to an immutable political scheme; as Oszlak observed, "the State can no longer be regarded as a monolithic entity at the service of an invariable political scheme, but should rather be seen as an internally differentiated system in permanent flux which is affected, also differentially, by the demands and contradictions of civilian society" (Oszlak, 1980, p. 18).

Despite such possible variations, so long as the contradictions generated during the implementation of the scheme do not result in its total elimination and its consequent replacement by a new scheme, the decisions and actions shaping the planning process will necessarily be influenced by the orientation and basic content of this scheme. Viewed from another angle, the ideology of the coalition of forces that is in power will be what determines which decisions can be taken and which cannot at each specific point in time. This therefore places additional limits on possible actions in a given planning process; consequently, any proposed decision which goes beyond the limits established, either explicitly or implicitly, by the prevailing political scheme will be doomed to be no more than a dead letter.

A complementary question is what the basic orientation and content of a political scheme might be under present conditions in a capitalist society. In very general terms, and taking into account the configuration of the power structures which have formed during the historical evolution of capitalism in the Latin American countries, the least that might be said in this regard is that the political schemes supported by these power structures will tend to be particularly sensitive to the ideology and interests of the economically dominant social groups within the context for which they are formulated. This framework was largely ignored by traditional planning theory in Latin America, and this is what allowed it to postulate, without any serious objection being raised, the fiction of a type of

planning which served to further developmental social change and to idealize the figure of the planner as a relatively autonomous agent of such change; this is also what led to the assumption that it was possible to bring about sweeping processes of social change by and through the government by means of planning.

In reference to this same question, it is also important to determine the nature of the role played by the bureaucratic apparatus of the State. Oszlak stressed that "the bureaucracy is not merely a tool of those who exercise the power of the State" (Oszlak, 1979, p. 238) and drew attention to three basic roles which are customarily assumed by the State bureaucracy: "1) a sectoral role, in which it acts as if it had 'broken off' from the State and serves to represent its own interests as a sector *vis-à-vis* the State; 2) a mediating role, in which it expresses, adds, neutralizes or promotes interests on behalf of economically dominant sectors; and 3) an infrastructural role, in which it provides the know-how and effort required to achieve ends of general interest, which are usually expressed in the formal objectives of the State (*idem*, p. 239). Obviously, any analysis attempting to identify the substantive characteristics of the decision-making processes occurring in capitalist social formations cannot fail to stress the *mediating role* of the bureaucracy, in which it, "appealing to the general interest and shrouded in its legitimizing aura ... is biased in favour of the satisfaction of the interests of the economically dominant classes" (*idem*, p. 239).

Ultimately, any decision-making process involving the two types of influence considered thus far (i.e., the dominant rationality of the system and the ideology of hegemonic social groups) will tend to consolidate its nature as a reproducer—and, hence, as a conservator in the strict sense of the word—of the definitive features of that social formation. Whether we like it or not, planning invariably tends to perform this function of reproduction and conservation in both capitalist and socialist societies of the types known in the world so far.

A third kind of influence, which is actually inherent in the two already mentioned, relates to the fact that the external framework to which national systems are linked also places definite and inescapable restrictions on decision-making in such systems. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, it

is impossible to ignore the fact that with each passing day these systems are more and more clearly becoming *parts* of a supranational system and that increasingly strong production, financial, technological and other linkages are forming systemic nexus which narrow the scope of decision-making in each national milieu.

As in any type of system, the parts are sharply constrained by the dynamics of the whole, especially in the case of the weaker and/or more dependent components. This means that the possibilities for action in each national system are also affected by the dominant rationality of the world system to which they are linked. As a result, at this level, too, it must be remembered that there are "rules of the game" which set limits on what can and what cannot be done; indeed, it may even be observed that the international community itself has gradually been establishing arbiters whose mission it is to ensure that each national component abides by these rules as much as possible.

In summary, the three aspects considered in this discussion play a part in determining and consolidating concrete limits on the definition of the content and possible scope of planning processes within capitalist economies. As a corollary, it therefore seems entirely justified to assert that so long as the definitive features of the system do not change, the effect of the above-mentioned factors must be considered when identifying, designing and proposing the policies of this process; only thus is it possible for proposed strategies and actions to have a reasonable degree of viability and, consequently, for effective planning processes to be conducted.

The situation as it has been outlined here might seem highly restrictive and appear to support an overly pessimistic and immobilist view of change and, hence, of the prospects for an improvement in the social conditions now prevailing in the countries of the region. However, the nature of social system dynamics indicates that the possibility of bringing about change is generally greater than might be expected. As noted before, in each specific case and at each point in history, the contradictions generated by the implementation of the prevailing political schemes tend to open up opportunities for the emergence of other political schemes with different orientations and contents and to heighten the social struggle surrounding them.

IV

The necessary conditions for a successful planning process

As suggested earlier, planning is basically a procedure for achieving consistency in decision-making processes with a view to ensuring the required level of co-ordination among the activities that are directed towards the fullest possible attainment of the main objectives of a political scheme. Nevertheless, although the fact that planning is done may increase the likelihood of success, it obviously does not ensure it. In other words, in each specific case, a whole range of factors are at work which cause the respective processes to have a greater or lesser chance of success. The factors which, in this author's opinion, have the greatest impact on the successfulness of such a process are discussed below.

Firstly, one type of condition for success is associated with the limits of possibility affecting the decisions and actions involved in each given process. The foregoing considerations indicate that, in order for a planning process to have a likelihood of success, the political scheme that is its basis must have been designed within the framework of the limits of possibility in the respective system.

Despite the apparent obviousness of this statement, an analysis of the reasons for the interruption of many such processes in Latin America that have been inspired by forward-looking policies suggests that the main cause was that the basic lines of the political scheme in question had exceeded the bounds of the system's dominant rationality. This can clearly be seen in a number of cases where political schemes proposed revolutionary changes, inasmuch as they sought to advance beyond what was permitted by the prevailing rules of the game. Their inviability became apparent sooner rather than later because one or more of the definitive features of the system ultimately prevailed; at that moment, the presence of the State made itself felt as the State asserted its role as a factor working to preserve the cohesiveness of the society in question and successfully ensured the continued reproduction of this social formation.

If we accept the proposition that, as O'Don-

nell puts it, "the State or political activity as such simultaneously guarantees the capitalist relations of production, the articulation of classes in society, the systematic differentiation of access to power (or system of domination), and the generation and reproduction of capital" (O'Donnell, 1978, p. 1167), we gain some idea of the scope of the State's role as an arbiter whose function is to preserve the "rules of the game" and to reproduce the basic features of a capitalist social formation. The recent history of Latin America provides abundant empirical evidence in support of this assertion.

Secondly, in order to increase the likelihood of a planning process' success, i.e., in order for the set of public policies which shape this process to permit the basic objectives of the corresponding political scheme to be more fully attained, the social groups in power must be truly hegemonic; to express this idea in terms of Gramscian analysis, whether through the predominance of the functions of political direction (consensus) or of domination (coercion), these groups must have an effective capacity to take the required decisions and actions in order to progress towards the achievement of the objectives being pursued. In other words, this means that the groups exercising the functions of government must have an effective *capacity to govern*.⁴ If they do not, it would be difficult to initiate a real planning process, much less one having any reasonable hope of success.

In addition to the capacity to govern, however, both the basic normative guidelines that are proposed and the policies decided upon for their implementation must have the necessary

⁴Gurrieri has clearly defined the scope of this concept; he stated that the capacity to govern "manifests itself in three spheres: a) the State apparatus' technical, administrative and managerial efficiency and effectiveness, which are important aspects in the individual performance of each one of its units and in the articulation of the whole; b) the political capacity to unite the wills of many and to organize society, especially through the articulation of the government and the State apparatus with social agents; c) the economic and financial capacity to further, to stimulate and to guide the process of change" (Gurrieri, 1986).

permanence and continuity to permit the maturation and consolidation of the changes advocated by the political scheme in question. The planning process can have a good chance of success only if the political scheme's basic guidelines and the corresponding policies are maintained over a suitably long period of time. The experiences of the PRI in Mexico and of "batllismo" in Uruguay are good examples in this respect.

A third condition, which is complementary to the one just discussed, is the need for an adequate degree of compenetration and acceptance of the basic lines of the political scheme that is to be promoted by the State bureaucracy. In view of the constraints usually affecting action by the State bureaucracy and the roles it plays (Oszlak, 1979), if the political scheme does not enjoy the necessary degree of acceptance at this level, it would seem unlikely that acceptable progress towards its implementation can be achieved. In addition, however, the State bureaucracy must have an adequate implementation capability, especially in cases where the political scheme provides for major changes and alterations in the prevailing situation.

Finally, a fourth aspect which constitutes an important condition for the success of a planning experience is that the causal connections adopted as the basis for identifying and recommending given actions must be compatible with the laws of realistic change. In the final analysis, any proposal for action is founded on the theoretical assumption that if "A" is done, there can be a reasonable presumption that "B" will occur. Nonetheless, it is a recognized fact that the social sciences do not offer us any theories that permit us to comprehend how a national system as a whole functions in all its complexity. On the contrary, social theories are at present made up of proposals having a highly ideological content and, in essence, they provide no more than fragmentary inputs, in that they relate to parts or dimensions (economic, social, political, etc.) of the system. Consequently, each time a social agent chooses a given causal connection as a foundation for decisions and actions, the agent is in fact making a selection that is based on ideological factors, and the only elements among which the agent can choose are partial or fragmentary explanations.

The implications of this statement can be

illustrated with an example taken from the theory of development and regional planning. In this field, two contradictory explanations are to be found for the same phenomenon, namely, that of regional disequilibria. On the one hand, neoclassical theory argues, in essence, that in a situation where market forces are free to work and where no restrictions are placed on the internal movement of factors, interregional income inequalities originating in an initial disparity in resource endowments will tend to be reduced. The policy implications of this argument are obvious. On the other hand, Myrdal asserts that: "the main idea which I wish to get across is that the interplay of market forces usually tends to increase, rather than decrease, inequalities among regions" (Myrdal, 1958, p. 38). This statement's implications for policy-making are patently contrary to those of the neoclassical explanation. Clearly, both cannot be correct. Nevertheless, as shown by Latin America's recent experiences, both explanations have been chosen as a basis for action, thus giving rise to opposed and contradictory decisions and actions in different countries.

It would appear relevant at this point in the discussion to consider the meaning and scope of the concept of "bounded rationality" introduced by Herbert Simon in his studies on the behaviour of organizations. According to O'Donnell's interpretation (1978, p. 1176), this bounded rationality is to be observed in the following form: "...whether or not they are placed at the apex of the institutional system of the State, human beings are subject to severe cognitive limitations relating to their own shortcomings and to the multidimensionality of society. This means that theirs is a 'bounded rationality': in other words, they cannot really seek or find optimal solutions. Their attention span is limited, the number of problems they can deal with is small, their search for information involves increasing costs, the criteria guiding such searches are biased by unconscious factors and operational routines, and information is far from free-flowing. Consequently, the typical method of decision-making is by trial and error, based on the discovery of suboptimal (merely 'satisfactory') solutions which presuppose a rudimentary theory of the causal connections that govern the problems they seek to solve". Given that, in the increasingly complex societies in

which we live, these are the conditions under which decisions must be taken, it is to be concluded that, depending upon the degree of accuracy of the causal connections chosen as a basis for the social process of decision-making and action, in the best of cases the most that can be hoped for is some approximation of the results sought.

In short, no matter how consistent decisions may be, no matter how well co-ordinated the actions taken, no matter how strong the capacity to govern, and no matter how great the penetration and acceptance of what is to be done

by the State bureaucracy, if the causal connections that are selected are not compatible (and, in fact, they never are entirely so) with the real dynamics of change of social systems, the results obtained can never approximate those that were sought. Under these conditions, it must be concluded that uncertainty continues to be an inherent feature of any process of decision-making and action within the context of complex social systems and that, in the final analysis, many of them can only be carried out on the basis of carefully-conducted exercises of trial and error. This brings us back to the statement made by Habermas cited at the beginning of this article.

V

The future of planning modalities of the past

The considerations examined thus far tend to support the conclusion that a more pragmatic and measured attitude should be taken to the modality, role and prospects of planning when contemplating its possible application to situations such as those found in the countries of Latin America. Everything seems to indicate that the time when a planning problem could be approached as some type of exercise in science fiction has now passed. Nevertheless, there is good reason to think that some type of planning will be necessary for the management and control of the national systems of the periphery, especially since they are in the midst of a situation which will surely tend to become more and more adverse with each passing day. Given these considerations, it is fitting to explore the question of what type of planning is possible now.

This question is particularly relevant in view of the fact that during the past few years—surely as a consequence of the frustration caused by the results it has produced in practice—a marked revival has taken place in the generation of proposals for new planning modalities and procedures. Despite their apparent novelty, however, most of these proposals can still be readily identified with the general approach put forth by Faludi more than a decade ago (Faludi, 1973). The review prepared by

Bromley sheds a great deal of light on this matter (Bromley, 1983); in this work, he listed and analysed a wide range of planning modalities which are now under discussion in Latin America. The proposals he mentioned cover a vast spectrum, ranging from concepts in which the idea of anticipating the future is virtually absent due to their heavy emphasis on a "day-to-day" perspective, to those which, because of their excessive utopianism, are of little use in dealing with the plethora of current problems within the framework of the very real conditions in capitalist social formations. In many, we can see the reappearance of the old vice of utopian voluntarism, while others mark the emergence of new formalistic rituals. Neither the one nor the other, as Bromley observed, appears to offer productive options for application in cases such as those of the Latin American countries.

It is very likely that the type of planning which can actually be practiced during the coming years will be a pragmatic combination of the "two types of planning capacity" identified by Van Arkadie in a recent paper: on the one hand, there is a "routine planning capacity", which refers to the capability for planning and controlling the execution of projects and programmes as it has traditionally been conducted by the various specialized agencies of the State (agricul-

ture, industry, public works, energy, health, education, social security, etc.); on the other hand, there is a "strategic planning capacity", which includes "a relatively limited range of tasks that are identified as requiring the attention of policy-makers at the highest level" (Van Arkadie, 1986, p. 8). If this proposition is accepted, the implication is that a planning modality will be being adopted which, essentially, tends to reproduce the method of work that was in fact utilized in many of the relatively successful capitalist planning experiences referred to earlier, albeit with refinements which may be deemed advisable as a result of advances in our understanding of these processes and of the lessons to be learned from planning praxis as such.

Routine planning decisions and activities are part of the customary duties of the public agencies which came into being and developed in response to the appearance of new problems and the opening of new fronts of action as a result of the increasing diversification of production in the various countries. Originally, the tendency was to conduct these activities on the basis of extremely fragmentary and disconnected processes; in most cases, this modality continued even during the "boom" of traditional planning in the period of the Alliance for Progress. Hence, even though policy co-ordination was one of its main functions, traditional planning did not manage to gain effective control over the routine activities of the State.

Nonetheless, it is also true that during the past few decades the efforts made to modernize and rationalize government service in a number of countries, in combination with the concerns which have arisen out of a better understanding of the structural interdependence of the parts of the system, have to some degree brought about a de-feudalization of the national subprocesses of decision-making. Consequently, there has been a tendency to gradually channel routine decisions and actions into more consistent frameworks. These have primarily been established in areas relating to the allocation of financial resources through directives issued by the agencies in charge of managing the public treasury and/or budget. Thus, even if it is still in a somewhat rudimentary form, a more effective co-ordination of routine activities is being achieved; to the extent that this is being done, it becomes possible to speak of a greater degree of planning at this level.

Even though it does not, for the time being, appear reasonable to think about the possibility of making radical changes in the structure which originates routine decisions and measures, it is logical to think about gradually achieving a greater co-ordination of decision-making at this level within the framework of the normative guidelines of existing political schemes.

Strategic decisions and actions, on the other hand, concern aspects of central importance in political schemes whose fulfilment is seen as being essential in order to ensure the schemes' continuation and their more effective implementation. The justification for emphasizing these aspects was quite clearly stated by Van Arkadie when he said that: "in the real world of politics, it is precisely by concentrating attention on a limited programme that a government gains a chance of having some impact upon economic events. Focusing attention on what is actually important is the way to make effective use of the government's scarce *political* resources" (Van Arkadie, 1986, p. 9). Perhaps the only additional comment that need be made in regard to this assertion is that, in practice, strategic actions have an impact on both economic and non-economic aspects.

At this level, selectivity and prioritization are essential. When power is dispersed and when, as underscored by Van Arkadie, the scarcity of governmental political resources is a widespread phenomenon, efforts absolutely must be concentrated on those aspects which are of fundamental importance in ensuring that progress is made towards implementing the political scheme. In discussing some approaches to a renewal of administrative reform, Kliksberg makes an assertion along the same lines: "patterns of reasoning oriented towards the careful selection of priorities must be integrated into a conceptual framework. An effort must be made to determine those types of problems which are of the greatest strategic significance in relation to major national goals, which can have a multiplier effect within the government apparatus, and whose attack is feasible. The search for 'easy' solutions should be supplanted by a rigorous selection of integral problem areas whose modification is essential to the overall development effort" (Kliksberg, 1984, p. 48).

This is the proper level for any actions suggested by an analysis of possible future scenarios

whose purpose would be to seek a better position for these countries in terms of the problems posed by their growing articulation with an ever-more interdependent world system and by the revolution in science and technology. It will primarily be through strategic action that a repositioning of these countries within an increasingly adverse context can be achieved.

Obviously, the approach to planning tasks which has been outlined here does not reflect the

more ambitious contributions recently being made in the field of planning modalities. Nevertheless, it is this author's opinion that under the prevailing conditions in the Latin American countries, this is an appropriate—and, to a point, proven—way of addressing the problems of orienting, governing and ensuring the consistency of the sequence of actions decided upon by actors having political control over decision-making with a view to the fulfilment of the basic guidelines of their political scheme.

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