

# CEPAL

## Review

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## CONTENTS

Introduction	7
Education in Latin America. Exclusion or participation. <i>Germán W. Rama</i>	13
A historical perspective of Latin American education. <i>Gregorio Weinberg</i>	39
To educate or not to educate: Is that the question? <i>Carlos H. Filgueira</i>	57
The role of education in relation to employment problems. <i>Juan Pablo Terra</i>	81
Development and education in rural areas. <i>Carlos A. Borsotti</i>	113
Pedagogical model and school failure. <i>Juan Carlos Tedesco</i>	133
Education and culture: A political perspective. Hypotheses on the importance of education for development. <i>Pedro Demo</i>	147
Styles of development and education. A stocktaking of myths, prescriptions and potentialities. <i>Marshall Wolfe</i>	157
Some CEPAL publications	175

## Styles of development and education

### A stocktaking of myths, prescriptions and potentialities

*Marshall Wolfe\**

In a number of articles, some of them published in *CEPAL Review*, the author has made a critical analysis of the development models which prevailed in Latin America during the 1950s and 1960s, their limitations—both as regards their results and as regards the assumptions on which they were based—and the new models proposed, especially during the last decade. The first chapter of this article is a brief summary of these ideas, necessary in order to tackle the main concern of the article, namely, the current problems of education, its trends, and the possibility and feasibility of its reorientation.

The article then goes on to deal with some specific topics connected with its central concern. On the one hand, it sets forth the principles on which the transformation of the educational models and conditions should be based, such as intellectual preparation for an uncertain future, the formulation of national projects and the identification of the social forces which could support them, the understanding of educational institutions and their clientele, and the capacity to get away from preconceived action formulas. On the other hand, it appraises some recent experiences in educational reform and considers the significance of non-formal education. Finally, it examines the role that could be played by three important 'clienteles' of the educational system in the event of its reform: young university-educated persons, teachers, and the poor or excluded.

As regards future trends, the author takes the view that, generally speaking, neither a situation of stable continuism nor one of thorough-going change will prevail, but rather policies of 'crisis management' whose consequences are very difficult to anticipate.

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## I

### New myths for old?

During the 1950s and early 1960s, 'development' and 'education' took shape in Latin America as ideological constructions, models or myths purporting to explain real processes of societal reproduction, growth and structural change and to show how to accelerate or manipulate these processes. The same constructions can be labelled 'models' for their use by planners to order their prescriptions and 'myths' for their wider dissemination so as to mobilize consensus behind certain directions of change and certain sacrifices.<sup>1</sup> The models or myths of economic development, social development and education followed parallel courses, the latter two sometimes competing with but more often dominated by the former.<sup>2</sup> Regional and global organizations, in particular ECLA, UNESCO and the OAS, promoted their standardization through innumerable meetings, reports and advisory services. The Project on Development and Education in Latin America and the Caribbean constitutes, among other things, a stocktaking at the end of the 1970s of their heuristic and operational power as models and their inspirational and mobilizing power as myths.

The model or myth of economic development envisaged a speeding up of capital accumulation, supplemented by financial flows and technological innovations from abroad, supporting a transition from predominantly agrarian export-oriented economies to predominantly urban-industrial economies

<sup>1</sup>Celso Furtado, *El desarrollo económico: un mito*, Mexico City, Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1975.

<sup>2</sup>Dr. Raúl Prebisch speaks of "...an attitude which is far from having disappeared, and which consists in selecting some partial and fragmentary aspects of development on which to preach 'sound-doctrine', sometimes, often in fact, in admonitory accents. The solution of the development problem, we were told over and over again, is a question of population." ... "Next it was the turn of education. Who can deny its significance, not only economic but also cultural? But in this fragmentary view of a global phenomenon it was often forgotten that the education problem could not be dealt with or resolved outside the context of development and\*of the inescapable need to speed up accumulation and alter the composition of capital." "Socio-economic structure and crisis of peripheral capitalism", *CEPAL Review*, No. 6, second half of 1978, p. 168.

oriented toward the domestic market, with continual enhancement of productive capacity and national economic autonomy leading to eventual ability to provide employment, incomes supporting adequate levels of consumption, and modern social services to the whole population. These advances would take place within basically capitalist systems controlling the means of production and sources of accumulation, but would require vigorous support and guidance by the State, making use of newly available and readily transferable techniques of planning.

The model or myth of education envisaged continually increasing enrolments in the formal educational system and continually increasing allocations of public funds to it, accompanied by reforms in educational content and distribution, leading to universalization of the basic 'tool skills' and to output of the 'human resources' needed for development, in correct quantities and qualities, according to the narrower economicist versions, or leading to this objective plus equalization of opportunities and enhancement of capacity to function as citizens and consumers in societies oriented by democratic political institutions, according to broader versions.<sup>3</sup> Educational planning linked with overall development planning would enable the State to intervene intelligently and harmonize educational output with the stage of development and with other priority demands on public resources.

At the end of the 1970s, a confrontation of the realities of 'development' and 'education' with these rationalistic and optimistic perspectives reminds one of folk tales in which a malevolent spirit grants wishes. The productive capacity of the national economies has grown enormously and the structures of production, distribution and consumption have been transformed and 'modernized', in the larger countries at least. The capacity of the State to implement as well as formulate development strategies has increased markedly —although this really means capacity to impose *some*

strategies consonant with the international and national distribution of power, and not others.

Allocations to formal education and the quantitative growth of the educational systems have, in many cases, exceeded the expectations of human-resource-oriented planners at the beginning of the period. Education has, on the whole, met whatever demands have been made on it for 'human resources', although several studies in the Project demonstrate that these demands have had little to do with the vision of the schools turning out packages of skills to fill predictable niches in the economic system.<sup>4</sup> Education has contributed very significantly to the kinds of societal modernization and social mobility that have taken place.

The parts of the national populations able to make themselves heard have identified themselves, on the whole, with what has happened in the name of development, modernization and education, and are hostile to any threats to their expectations to obtain more in the way of consumption and upward social mobility from the same processes.

Yet it is too evident to require elaboration that the national societies that have emerged from the real processes of growth and change are no more equitable, nor more stable, nor more autonomous, nor more capable of democratic consensus on national goals than before. Depending on the indicators used, one can reach different conclusions as to whether the masses of the population are any better off materially than before, but there can be no doubt that their *relative* deprivation, the visibility of this deprivation *vis-à-vis* the excesses of the consumer society, and their inconformity with deprivation have increased.

A sense of lost opportunities, of growth processes turning malignant, of squandering of irreplaceable natural as well as human resources, of contradictions forced underground, of urgent needs for new conceptions and strategies is pervasive, not only among the anti-capitalist sectors of opinion that never accepted the earlier

<sup>3</sup>The ECLA publication, *Education, human resources and development in Latin America*, United Nations, New York, 1968, sets forth, in different chapters, the narrower version, a broader version, and early doubts concerning both of them.

<sup>4</sup>See, in particular, Juan Carlos Tedesco, *Educación e industrialización en la Argentina*, UNESCO/ECLA/UNDP Project on Development and Education in Latin America and the Caribbean, DEALC/9.

models or myths, but also among the intellectual fathers of these models or myths, who now view the divergences between expectations and realities not as inefficiencies and lags to be expected in any period of transition and remediable by further growth, but as inherent characteristics or sources of dynamism of an imitative 'peripheral capitalism'<sup>5</sup> or 'transnational' style of development.<sup>6</sup> The gearing of the structures of political power, production and consumption to this style of development has narrowed the options that formerly seemed to be accessible to governments in Latin America, or left them with no visible alternative to serving, with varying degrees of resort to armed force and to social palliatives, the requirements of the style, at a time when the style itself, and the consumer society it has generated, are losing dynamism and confidence in their centres of diffusion.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup>See, in particular, Raúl Prebisch, "A critique of peripheral capitalism", *CEPAL Review*, No. 1, first hal of 1976, pp. 9-76, and "Socio-economic structure and crisis of peripheral capitalism", *CEPAL Review*, No. 6, second hal of 1978, pp. 159-252.

<sup>6</sup>For present purposes, the most satisfactory definitions of 'style of development' are following: "the way in which human and material resources are organized and assigned within a particular system (capitalist or socialist) with the object of solving such questions as what goods and services to produce, how, and for whom" and "the specific and dynamic modality adopted by a social system within a particular context and at a particular moment in history". Anibal Pinto, "Styles of development in Latin America", *CEPAL Review*, No. 1, first hal of 1976, p. 105, and Jorge Graciarena, "Power and development styles", *ibid.*, p. 186. The term became current in Latin America at the beginning of the 1970s, largely to explain and justify various national initiatives aspiring to overcome the 'excluding and concentrating' traits of the real processes of growth and modernization, without altogether abandoning the original models or myths of capitalist development guided and humanized by the State. More recent formulations have used the term somewhat differently, arguing that the ascendancy of a homogenizing 'transnational style' has made such options illusory and the differences between national styles mainly expressions of different capacities for successful adaptation to the ascending and penetrating transnational style. See Osvaldo Sunkel, "The interaction between styles of development and the environment in Latin America", *CEPAL Review*, No. 12, December 1980, pp. 15-50.

<sup>7</sup>See Marshall Wolfe, "Reinventing development: utopias devised by committees and seeds of change in the real world", *CEPAL Review*, No. 7, April 1979, pp. 7-40.

The larger countries of Latin America, comprising most of the regional population, by conventional yardsticks are now 'semi-developed', entitled to the label of 'middle class' among nations, and spokesmen for the original myth of development have repeatedly urged their governments to recognize that their levels of income and productivity give them already the material capacity to eliminate critical poverty and distribute the fruits of development with a reasonable degree of equity. However, this 'semi-development' seems to be a trap, in which the appetites of the groups holding a share of power, manipulated by the promotional and marketing features of the transnational style, block any significant redistribution as well as adequate domestic accumulation of capital for further growth. Short-term borrowing from commercial banks in the central countries, facilitated by an international conjuncture unlikely to persist indefinitely, is a precarious substitute for such accumulation.

Unrealized reformist and revolutionary warnings of imminent catastrophe for the prevailing style of development have a long enough history to warn one against underestimating its potential for adaptation and survival. Even if the dominant forces in the national societies remain willing and able to impose the price to be paid by the weaker sectors, however, the increasingly disruptive mutations in the world centres make the future meeting of the style's external requirements—financing, energy supplies, political guarantees, ideological models—problematic.

The contradictory impression of major quantitative achievements gone wrong and heading toward impasses applies as much to the educational as to the economic aspects of the style of development. At one extreme, the hypertrophy of higher education, deriving from factors diagnosed in some of the Project's studies, has gone far beyond an inequitable and self-perpetuating distribution of opportunities to acquire the qualifications needed and rewarded by the style of development, and it now amounts to an entrenchment of spurious education leading to spurious absorption into employment. At the other extreme, primary education of such poor quality as to be equally spurious confirms the marginalization of much

of the population from a style of development that, in any case, has little need for them. The educational systems have done something—probably much less than the mass communication media—to diffuse 'modern' consumerist values throughout the population, and to inculcate respect for certain symbols of nationality, but otherwise they have done little to support a common cultural frame of reference. As in the case of the economic systems, the momentum of growth of the educational systems, the resources invested, and the entrenchment of clienteles with fixed expectations seems to rule out the adoption of coherent alternatives, or major redistributions of educational resources, except at very heavy political and other costs.

It would be ingenuous to attribute the inequities, inefficiencies, contradictions and signs of probable future non-viability in the organization of production, distribution, consumption and education in Latin America today to misleading models or myths and misconceived strategies. The political and technobureaucratic actors have generally exaggerated their ability to understand and control the course of events. In the case of education, reformer-planners having the ear of power have recurrently fostered visions of bringing about major social changes through education in a hostile or uncomprehending environment and through instruments (teachers and bureaucrats) with purposes of their own. When real trends have continued to diverge widely from their calculations and to cast doubt on the relevance of their roles within the State, they have fallen back on rituals substituting for control, with declining faith in their efficacy, most notably in the elaboration and publication of fixed-term plans.

The models, myths, plans and strategies have had consequences, for better or worse, but it would probably be impossible to assess the extent to which present patterns would have been different in their absence. The remarkable increases in allocations to education since the 1950s, for example, would probably have taken place through social pressures and political calculations, even if the 'human resource' and related arguments had never been formulated,

and these arguments had little to do with the lines taken by educational expansion.

The unexpected and unwanted consequences of the dependence of educational expansion on the distribution of power in the society and the striving to confirm, or obtain differential social and occupational advantages have not discouraged convictions among reformer-planners, as well as sectors of the wider public, that education can be used to change society in a desired direction. Presumably the Project on Development and Education in Latin America and the Caribbean is committed to this viewpoint. Its studies confronting educational-developmental objectives with real trends in the uses different clienteles have tried to make of education should, in principle, point the way to more sophisticated and effective tactics for would-be agents of social change through education.

When one tries to formulate the lessons, however, one is tempted to hedge them with so many qualifications that their purport for policy is as obscure as the future itself. Albert Hirschman's image of the 'hiding hand' comes to mind. Major innovative policies are more likely to be pursued vigorously if their originators are convinced that the way ahead is straight-forward; the results may be beneficial on balance even if not what they hoped for. If, in the language of international advice, which shies away from over-concreteness, they had tried to 'take into account' all the perplexities that lie ahead, they might never have got started.

The model or myths of the 1950s relied on a number of suppositions that can now only be admitted, at best, with modifications so extensive as to change their nature, but when these are listed it is evident that if reformer-planners threw them overboard altogether, they would leave themselves without compass or rudder, uncertain of their own roles and without clear interlocutors in the society. The suppositions include:

1) That the national State is capable of applying coherent strategies representing some conception of the general interests of the society, with some degree of autonomy *vis-à-vis* the balance of forces in the society.

2) That 'planning' can help the State do this through application of an identifiable,

transferable, politically neutral body of techniques.

3) That the different classes and organized interest-groups in the society are accessible to rational demonstrations of what needs to be done, in the light of common values of national solidarity, equity and efficiency; and that the demonstrations themselves can be more than rationalizations of the interests of the dominant forces.

4) That quantitative indicators and targets can reflect real levels, trends and outputs sufficiently to serve as a basic framework for policy and planning, and that a reasonable degree of correspondence between quantitative and qualitative changes and outputs can be expected.

5) That capital accumulation and quantitative growth in production, incomes, formal education, public allocations to social services, etc., will eventually either lead semi-automatically to reasonably equitable distribution, democratization, social stability and national autonomy, or make such achievements possible through reforms planned and administered by the State.

6) That quantitative growth will eventually solve or facilitate solutions for unwanted by-products or distortions of the development process, such as widening gaps in consumption levels and life styles, or degradation of the environment and the quality of life, and that these phenomena can thus be ignored or given a low priority in policy and planning for the medium term.

7) That the 'developed' or 'industrialized' countries (capitalist or socialist) have achieved indefinitely sustainable processes of growth in production, education and general welfare and that the rest of the world can achieve similar results by adoption and creative adaptation of one of these models or parts of both.

At this point, one must turn to the new models or myths that are emerging from the parallel criticism and demystifications of 'development' and 'education' during the later 1960s and the 1970s and ask whether, or under what conditions, they will be able to influence the future directions of growth and change in Latin America, under the specific conditions summarized above, at a time when several

national initiatives to achieve radically different styles through combinations of State action with manipulated popular mobilization have failed and when receptivity to proposals for planned transformation is low.

This is not the place for a detailed discussion of these new models or myths, whose production, discussion and dissemination have practically become an institutionalized way of life. They range from the participatory and egalitarian socialist styles of development urged by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, the International Foundation for Development Alternatives, the Fundación Bariloche, and other institutions, through the Prebisch proposals for transformation through State-guided social use of the surplus<sup>8</sup> and the ILO schemes for development centred on the meeting of basic needs, to the pragmatically reformist World Bank-associated proposals for eliminating critical poverty. The different schemes for reshaping development itself generally include or imply different strategies for the transformation of education: 'conscientization', 'de-schooling', 'permanent education', 'non-formal education', etc.

From the standpoint of the potential influence of these schemes, whether as direct guidelines for policy or as mobilizing and inspirational myths, the following observations seem justified:

1) In their more widely disseminated versions they constitute 'committee utopias', emanating from international organizations or meetings of 'experts' that are inherently unable to agree on basic theories of social change and that are prone to mix terminological innovations resuscitating prescriptions previously current, practical reforms, and radical challenges to transformation of social structures, power relationships and values. Inter-governmental bodies have found it easy to endorse such compromise formulas without committing their members to anything specific.

2) They are unable to identify convincingly societal agents potentially able and willing to

<sup>8</sup>Raúl Prebisch, "Towards a theory of change", *CEPAL Review*, No. 10, April 1980, pp. 155-208.

carry out the transformations or reforms called for, often falling back on warnings of catastrophe if the prescriptions are not followed, or hopes that crises will enlighten the holders of power. The earlier models or myths of development called on governments, as the key agents, to do with greater vigour and coherence things not very different from what they were already doing. The new versions heap heavy responsibilities on agents vaguely identified or left implicit (the State, the planners, techno-bureaucrats, 'enlightened' public opinion, political movements, interest-group organizations) for seeking and doing quite different things, traumatically contrary to their previous practice.

3) The proposals commonly disregard the overloading of the State's present capacity to inform itself and act coherently in pursuit of relatively modest objectives, and also the present tension between continually rising demands on the State that it 'solve problems' and rising scepticism or rejection of the State as problem-solver or arbiter.

4) In spite of the concoction of 'committee utopias' and the exhortations to 'unified approaches' to development, a good many of the new schemes present as central focuses for policy specific 'major problems'. Each major problem tends to become inflated in the course of international discussions until its solution becomes synonymous with development. The competition for attention between the spokesmen for specific problems and solutions further overloads the State's capacity to synthesize or fix priorities, and encourages the substitution of ritualized recognition of the importance of the problems for action (education was, in fact, one of the first major problems to receive this kind of attention, but it was relatively easy to make the proposed solutions compatible with the models or myths of development then current).

5) The new models or myths combine incompatible technocratic and participationist conceptions of policy-making. The former leads to exaggeration of the potential planning has for controlling the future; the latter to exaggeration of the potential of 'conscientization' and popular creativity; both evade the realities of power and the limits of goal-oriented rationality.

The conceptions of the role of education in development associated with models or myths of the 1950s and 1960s generally envisaged, at least implicitly, a major contribution to the 'modernization' of values, motivations and life styles in the service of continually rising and diversifying production and consumption. Some, as in the versions of Everett Hagen and David McClelland, made these contributions more central than the direct training of human resources for the labour market.

The more radical among the newer schemes, with varying degrees of consistency, propose an educational contribution to an entirely different life-style: egalitarian, participatory, frugal, respectful of limits imposed by ecosystems, more concerned with cultural satisfactions and creativity than with consumption of non-essential goods, replacing boundless confidence concerning the fruits of technological and managerial innovation by caution and determination to subordinate such innovation to higher priorities and values. The Prebisch proposals for transformation, while retaining the previous emphasis on accelerated capital accumulation, technological innovation, and continually rising production, call for a frontal attack on the 'privileged consumer society' and its manipulation by the forces in power and their mass communication media.

According to the earlier conceptions, education would be helping societies to modernize along lines already tested and found good by the experience of the 'developed' countries—lines self-evidently harmonious with human nature once freed from the trammels of traditionalism. The newer conceptions are obviously far from looking on the 'developed' countries as models to be imitated. In fact, they originate partly in protests from within these countries against the disbenefits and dangers of their prevailing style of development to themselves as well as the rest of the world. The newer conceptions share some degree of belief in a Rousseauian 'natural man', open to transformation once freed of societal blinkers; in the rehabilitation of peasant cultures, and in the success of socialist systems such as the Chinese in changing human nature, but basically they are calling for an educational contribution to the transformation of life-styles against the



mainstream, in the direction of social orders that have no convincing precedents.

They may well be right, and the alternative may well be societies even more unjust, repressive, wasteful and irrational than the present patterns. The contributions such conceptions demand from education are obviously central to their long-term approximation to reality. Such contributions are not too hard to define in ideal terms, as Paulo Freire, Iván Illich and others have done. They are even beginning to enter into official policy formulations in incongruous combinations with the longer-standing educational objectives.<sup>9</sup> It is much harder, however, to envisage them as possible outcomes of the reform of existing educational systems than were the contributions to human resource development and modernization previously envisaged.

Somehow the expectations, social interactions and interventions in the environment of whole societies must change. The material and cultural aspects of new life styles will call for new kinds of creativity and adaptability, including the invention and

diffusion of what Illich has called 'tools for conviviality'. Even if one expects the major changes to be as conflictive and contradictory as in the past, forced on the national societies by painful demonstrations that continuism is impossible, the ideal role of education would be to help the social groups experiencing the changes to cope with them. When one tries to envisage possible paths to such an ideal role, however, one has to fall back on the conclusion that the role of education will continue to be ambivalent, highly dependent on changes in other areas and contributing as much to the persistence of outworn attitudes as to their transformation. A belief in the capacity of education to lead the way to new styles of development might be a useful myth, generating energies for a larger contribution than would otherwise be forthcoming, but it is a myth that today it would be hard to advance convincingly. The difficulty of educating for a style of development that may never become a reality exceeds that of educating for specific human resource demands that cannot be forecast with any confidence.

## II

### Some principles for the future

The next stages in thinking about development and education, with a view to possibilities for transformation not only of the models or myths but also of the realities, will need to recognize and incorporate an unavoidable tension between several principles. These can be summarized as follows, at the risk of seeming to exhort would-be reformer-planners to 'take into account' a paralytically indigestible combination of desiderata:

1) Intellectual preparedness for an indeterminate future that cannot be projected

with any confidence from trends up to the present. This future can be expected to confront crises of many kinds and of external as well as internal origin, calling for flexible and imaginative responses and a continuing readiness to set aside preconceptions that conflict with emerging realities. As was suggested above, an ascending 'transnational' style of growth and modernization, quite different from the images of development formulated a quarter-century ago, is encountering contradictions that may prove insuperable, practically simultaneously with its achievement of a position of dominance in Latin America and its defeat of several national attempts—all of them weakened by contradictions of their own—to achieve radically

<sup>9</sup>See Rodrigo Vera Godoy, "Disyuntivas de la Educación Media en América Latina", UNESCO/ECLA/UNDP Project on Development and Education in Latin America and the Caribbean, DEALC/19.

different styles. For the present, educational as well as other policies cannot avoid subordination to the expressions of this style in the objectives of the groups holding power and the expectations of the clientele of the policies. These constraints are bound to change, probably repeatedly, through the reactions of power-holders and clientele to the crisis, but the directions of change cannot be foreseen any more clearly now than the present conjuncture could have been foreseen two decades ago.

In a more restricted sense, education fitting the coming generation to cope with change—including the inculcation of basic scientific knowledge—will be more relevant for the dynamism and adaptability of the 'transnational' style than education imparting the skills now in demand.

2) The quest for national projects, myths, or images of the future capable of inspiring a major developmental and educational effort, and for social forces capable of identifying themselves with such projects and imposing them on reality. (For present purposes, a 'national project' can be defined as a combination of objectives and strategies, deriving from the generalized models or myths of development, but adapted to national characteristics and incorporating an image of the national future conceived as possible, desirable, and capable of mobilizing wide support.) This has been one of the leitmotif of the Project's research; the evolution of education in Latin America up to the present has been stimulated and influenced, if not guided, by a series of such national projects.<sup>10</sup> Without national projects pointing to possible and desirable futures, the steering of any course through the real indeterminate and conflictive future becomes out of the question, even if history affords no reason to expect that the future will correspond closely to any blueprint. Education, in particular, would be condemned either to a continuation of inorganic growth—increasingly ritualistic and void of content, determined by the occupational

interests of educational bureaucrats and teachers and the credentialist interests of clientele—or to drastic curtailment determined by financing difficulties, political suspicions, and the impossibility of keeping up the 'spurious absorption' of its products.

Yet the second part of this desideratum—the identification of social forces willing and able to identify themselves with the Project—is just as important as, and harder to meet than, the formulation of plausible and attractive national projects. At present, the latter effort is falling into discredit through proliferation and inflation of declarations of objectives, tied weakly or not at all to strategies and ritualistically endorsed by governments. The 'national projects' remain those of ideologists or technobureaucrats, receiving a precarious hearing from political leaders themselves precariously in power, and practically ignored by the major social forces struggling to adapt to and extract advantages from the prevailing style of 'development'.

3). The effort to understand objectively and draw operative conclusions from the historical evolution of institutions and clientele, their present structures, the interests and tactics of the actors in them, and the constraints and opportunities all of these present for policy and planning. In most countries, the educational institutions and clientele are quite different from those of the 1950s, have much greater weight in the societies, and present more acute contradictions. The forces controlling the State, educational bureaucracies, teachers, students and their families are probably all more sensitive than before to the impact of educational policies on their own interests, expectations for the future, and images of the Good Society, if they have any. In many cases, a series of disruptive but ineffectual reforms has left them wary or hostile toward innovation. This applies not only to the much-criticized upper and middle strata but also to the marginalized groups, repeatedly called on to 'participate' in initiatives that shortly are abandoned by their promoters or suppressed by the State.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup>See, in particular, Gregorio Weinberg, *Modelos educativos en el desarrollo histórico de América Latina*, UNESCO/ECLA/UNDP Project on Development and Education in Latin America and the Caribbean, DEALC/6.

<sup>11</sup>See José Rivero Herrera, *La educación no-formal en la reforma peruana*, UNESCO/ECLA/UNDP Project on Development and Education in Latin America and the Caribbean, DEALC/17, especially p. 41.

Education has acquired, for different sectors, a wide range of functions for personal livelihood, social mobility, guaranteed entry into preferred areas of employment, etc., that beneficiaries will not readily abandon, whatever their incongruities with the ideal functions of education. Mass pressures for certain uses of the educational systems will continue long after the impracticability of such uses for the greater part of the amplified clientele has become obvious, as in the case of the devalued and segmented higher education of today. The administrative, planning and teaching personnel have acquired credentials in certain ways of doing things that ensure that they and not others will do what is to be done and receive the rewards; they cannot take lightly any devaluation of these credentials.

Educational diagnoses, like development diagnoses, may well lead to the conclusion that present structures should be scrapped and replaced, but they should incorporate a realistic appraisal of feasibility and cost, and of the possibilities for using or neutralizing ongoing institutions and interests. If one proceeds from the expectation that mutations in the prevailing style of development will intensify frustration and insecurity in most of the population, it may be an asset to preserve a measure of stability and capacity to change without leading to unrecognizable results in those familiar landmarks, the schools.

4) The effort to conceive alternatives, for very specific educational problems as well as for the system as a whole, with a maximum of freedom from preconceptions, stereotypes, and 'packaged' prescriptions, especially those deriving from international organization and advisers. The limited contribution of educational planning bodies up to the present to this kind of thinking, in spite of their generally reforming orientation and their relative marginalization from political and administrative responsibilities, deserves note.<sup>12</sup> One reason, presumably, has been that the innovations they have envisaged have

constituted 'packages' associated with their own credentials as planners, achieved through regional courses and meetings.

A recent thesis on technological development is relevant at this point: When an innovation is "offered in the international market major interest groups study the manner to influence the definition of a technological package based on this item". The recipient society or organization, it is assumed, must adapt to the 'package' and can legitimately be evaluated for its capacity to innovate and adapt successfully within the requirements of the 'package'. "The feedback is technique-oriented, not oriented to cultural or organizational purposes or opportunities." "The data and evaluation components of technological packages are perhaps one of the most subtle and effective instruments of dependence."<sup>13</sup>

In the case of education, the role of technological innovations has been minor, both in the sense of technologies of teaching and in the sense of teaching of technologies, in spite of a broad consensus on their importance. The conceptions of 'human resource development' and 'modernization', however, were transmitted as packages, and the newer conceptions, associated with very different images of development and the role of education within it, are being transmitted in the same way. Naturally, whatever the yardstick used, the educational systems have received low marks for their contribution to development, and the societies have received low marks for their ability to adapt to the 'package'.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup>Warren Crowther, *Technological development, development styles and environmental problems*, E/CEPAL/PROY.2/ R. 35, October 1979. Crowther also states: "... educational and information technologies are... the most obvious vehicles of alien values which contradict real development, and it is imperative that national projects and policies are most explicit and realistic about the political power and ideology which such vehicles represent".

<sup>14</sup>For example, educational systems and even educational reformers in Latin America have hardly taken into account the full implications of adoption throughout the societies of technological innovations that do not require literacy for the reception of information, entertainment and cultural stimuli. The transistor radio and television presumably make literacy less essential for participation in political life and even for the acquisition of technical

<sup>12</sup>N. Fernández Lamarra and I. Aguerro, *La planificación educativa en América Latina*, UNESCO/ECLA/UNDP Project on Development and Education in Latin America and the Caribbean, Fichas/I.

This last principle of innovativeness taking nothing for granted and refusing to be overrated by conventional wisdom is particularly hard to apply in a judicious way, and would be meaningless without reference back to the other three principles. Its spurious counterpart is the 'Adamism' identified by José Medina Echavarría as a constant propensity of Latin American discourse on development: the quest for originality, terminological if not substantive, and the neglect of lessons from previous reforms, aborted or domesticated.

For actors within the machinery of the State, innovativeness concerning general objectives may be acceptable and even conducive to personal advancement, and so may identification with packaged reforms backed by international blessings and funds. Detailed questioning of the way things are done, whether

certain things are worth doing at all, and whether different things, making present credentials occupationally irrelevant, should not be done instead, are more dangerous to the questioner, and if carried too far might make a public administration, dependent on routinized and standardized solutions, unable to function at all.

Standardized and bureaucratized ways of doing things may be unavoidable without being tolerable, and one of the most fruitful tactics for would-be reformer-planners should be to seek means of reducing the scope of these ways at the base, by freeing teachers and communities to experiment, to take what they find relevant from the prescriptions now current, without committing the whole system to transform itself, in full awareness that many teachers and communities would make erratic use of their new freedom, or no use at all.

### III

## Some lessons from the studies

The studies carried out within the Project have had more to do with the third principle than with the second, and have treated the first and fourth only incidentally. That is, they have concentrated on the ways in which national school systems have actually evolved up to the present and the role of social and economic demands in this evolution. One cannot conduct research into what does not yet exist, and the outstanding common characteristic of the systems studied has been the primacy of demands from the forces able to make themselves heard in the societies, combined with the bureaucratic momentum of educational growth once under way, over national educational projects, reforms and innovations, packaged or otherwise.

Peru is an extremely interesting exception among the countries studied in its creative but

apparently short-lived outburst of educational reforms conceived within a national project relatively coherent in its objectives if not in its execution, juxtaposed to or competing for attention with other radical reforms in systems of agricultural and industrial production and in popular participation guided from above. The two studies carried out for the Project<sup>15</sup> emphasize the contradictoriness of the process, combining technobureaucratic authoritarianism and denial of the legitimacy of class or interest-group struggles with stimulation of the entry of wider population strata into struggles to control their own livelihood. The main lesson seems to be one previously taught by Mexico's socialist education of the 1930s: the extreme vulnerability of educational innovations to shifts

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information; at the same time they may provide stimuli for the acquisition or preservation of literacy without the intervention of the schools.

<sup>15</sup>José Matos Mar, *Educación, lengua y marginalidad rural en el Perú*, UNESCO/ECLA/UNDP Project on Development and Education in Latin America and the Caribbean, DEALC/10; and José Rivero Herrera, *op. cit.*, *La educación no formal en la reforma peruana*.

in the outlook of the power-holders, the force and complexity of societal resistances to such innovations, and the incapacity of such innovations to bring about self-sustaining changes in the society.

However, the experience of the Peruvian reform is very suggestive in relation to the principles summarized above. The reform was able to link itself to a national project and showed abundant creativity in devising new educational forms. Could it have consolidated itself better if it had applied a strategy incorporating an objective understanding of the relevant actors, in particular the teachers and the clientele of traditional education, and if it had restrained its fragmentation of new approaches? In such a case, in the absence of the 'hiding hand', would the reform strategy have been too cautious and 'realistic' to have had a significant impact?

Guyana seems to be another exception, but the study prepared for the Project<sup>16</sup>, with a focus on the values and occupational preferences of secondary students, does not throw light on the extent to which a well-defined national project advanced by the Government represents a real commitment by forces in the society, or the extent to which the educational strategy goes beyond the formal inculcation of the values and symbols of the national project. One suspects poor correspondence between the symbols and the students' observations of the social order. If farming and fishing, for example, are really unskilled low-wage occupations in Guyana, as the text accepts, it is not surprising that secondary students reject them, however much teachers and schools texts insist on their importance. Without a change in the technological level of the occupations and in their remuneration, propaganda through the schools on the importance of food production would probably result mainly in scepticism concerning the seriousness of the national project. This conclusion may be of general relevance for the inculcation of official national projects through the schools.

<sup>16</sup>Sar B. Khan and Una M. Paul, *Social values of secondary students and their occupational preferences in Guyana*. UNESCO/ECLA/UNDP Project on Development and Education in Latin America and the Caribbean, Fichas/8.

In a third case, Ecuador, one finds a pronounced contradiction between the well-developed capacity of the planning agency to diagnose and criticize both the national style of development and the educational system, and the persistence of developmental and educational patterns in which the deficiencies and distortions common to most of the region seem to be particularly pronounced. Here the question of the efficacy of planning bodies as agents of societal change comes to the fore. In settings in which the prospects for conventional planning, aspiring to control the future, are mediocre, can the function of social criticism or denunciation, carried out by the planning agency over an extended period help change the consciousness of the dominant forces and thus national educational policies?<sup>17</sup>

Throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, all of the groups pressing for access to more education have shaped their tactics on the basis of the presumption that education in schools with formal selection mechanisms leading to formal certificates or credentials is 'real' education. While some of the clientele, particularly in higher education, have tried to do away with certain selection mechanisms, they have retained the conception of the end product as the credential entitling its possessor to a certain level of employment. The supposed sources of demand for qualifications imparted by education, the employers, have supported this bias by basing their selection procedures on level of formal education and status of the institution attended, with much less attention to the matching of specialized qualifications to the job in question. Legal restrictions on the exercise of a wide range of occupations, some requiring only modest skills, have strengthened credentials.

Thus, innovations, centering on education outside the schools or dissociated from formal credentials generally face an apathetic or hostile environment, whatever conceptions of the developmental functions of education inform them, and even in settings where the family or

<sup>17</sup>JUNAPLA, *Desarrollo y educación en el Ecuador (1960-1978)*. UNESCO/ECLA/UNDP Project on Development and Education in Latin America and the Caribbean, DEALC/20.

community insists on functions for teachers other than teaching children, as in rural Ecuador or Peru. The environment would presumably be much more receptive in situations of revolutionary transformation, in which the whole system of stratified credentialism linked to the distribution of power has become obsolete, but the example of Cuba suggests that these situations would be transitory, followed by a return to educational selectivity and formal credentials, presumably more directly relevant to the kind of society being constructed. Also, non-formal educational initiatives aiming to 'conscientize' disadvantaged groups to understand and struggle against their disadvantages can gain a precarious hearing; but the incompatibility of these with the structures of power usually results before long in their suppression.

One study prepared for the Project suggests important qualifications to the above generalization, and also suggests that non-formal education, or 'incidental education', as the study in question calls it, may take root where it has not been looked for: in the efforts of members of peasant movements, trade unions, etc., to acquire the kinds of specialized knowledge and skills that will help them cope with emerging challenges and opportunities, permitting a kind of immediate relevance not achieved either by the formal educational system or by the more ambitious non-formal educational schemes devised by intellectuals, such as those of Peru.<sup>18</sup>

In the absence of situations in which non-formal education can be associated with the reality or at least the hope of societal transformation, or in which organized groups have to improvise to meet real new opportunities, the social strata envisaged as the main beneficiaries of such education would be justified in viewing it as a disguise for inferior education perpetuating their disadvantages, aimed at making the poor into conformist and productive poor, as Aldo Solari has indicated, while enabling the State to evade the major redistribution of educational resources that

would be needed to meet the proclaimed objectives of social equality and integration.<sup>19</sup>

One can also raise the question of potential societal receptivity to educational innovation in a broader sense. The more radical proposals for innovation, whether or not they envisage doing away with the school, reject the conception of 'education' as a process of information, indoctrination and socialization taking place in formal settings during a fixed part of the life-span, in favour of an 'educational society' in which education would have as permanent and pervasive a role as religion has had in many societies up to the present.

These conceptions offer an inspiring intellectual frame of reference, but suggest certain doubts, in addition to the doubts as to whether they correspond to the real capacity of reformer-planners to influence what is going to be done in the name of education in Latin America during the foreseeable future. Do they represent a tactic (presumably unconscious) of educators aspiring to become the priesthood of 'another development'? Is a society centred on self-education possible or desirable? Could such a society avoid falling into ritualistic celebration of its own culture? Is there any historical evidence that the masses of the population would respond creatively over the long term? Would not 'permanent education' be as demanding as 'permanent revolution'? The experience of the national societies, such as the Scandinavian, that have achieved the widest range of opportunities for continued self-education seems to show that receptivity and creativity have their limits.

Altogether, it seems plausible to expect that educational content, objectives and distribution in Latin America will retain a considerable measure of continuity, with most innovation taking place within formal school settings and with some mechanisms of selectivity and terminal credentials. Educational change, as in the past, will more often lag behind than spearhead societal change. For the immediate future, the prospect for most countries of the region is not one of transition, whether harmonious or

<sup>18</sup>Rubén Maidana, *Educación y reforma agraria en Honduras: el fenómeno de la educación incidental*, mimeo.

<sup>19</sup>Aldo Solari, "Development and educational policy in Latin America". *CEPAL Review*, No. 3, first half of 1977, pp. 59-91.

violent, to coherent new national projects, setting different tasks for education and bringing a redistribution of power and resources permitting accomplishment of such tasks. The prospect is rather for an exacerbation of the contradictions already visible in educational

expansion, with continual shifts in policies aiming to palliate or suppress the contradictions, within a wider setting in which all aspects of the transnational capitalist style of development and the consumer society will become more unstable or more precariously rigid.

#### IV

### The clienteles of education and prospects for positive change: bureaucratization and creative resistance

Under these conditions, a continuing struggle by national educational authorities and planners to achieve or maintain a reasonable degree of efficiency in the educational system in relation to relatively traditional objectives, ranging from the universalization of literacy, through the diffusion of common national values and cultural symbols, to preparation for participation in a technological society, will be legitimate and desirable. Such efforts will partake of the centralization and standardization that have been justifiably criticized. The State is unable to function otherwise, particularly under prevailing conditions of overlapping crises and overloading with demands. Creative resistance to such centralization and standardization is also necessary, and it may be worthwhile to speculate as to how such creative resistance might come into being and help reshape the educational systems without a utopian triumph over their bureaucratic antagonists.

Let us take a look at three clienteles of the educational systems —the university-educated youth originating in the middle strata, the teachers, and the marginalized or excluded poor— as potential sources for such creative resistance. It goes without saying that this look, directed to questions that have been the object of so much controversy, will be dangerously superficial, and arbitrary in its emphasis.

The hypertrophied and segmented systems of higher education are particularly impervious to any kind of coherent policy emanating from

the State, other than authoritarian purging and curtailment. The earlier functions valued by the forces controlling the State —socialization of élites and formation of higher-level professionals and technicians— were long ago privatized and withdrawn into enclaves within higher education. The later functions of providing stratified outlets for pressures for upward social mobility and of postponing to the next generation the direct struggle with the middle strata over income distribution have been overwhelmed by the growth and proliferation of institutions.<sup>20</sup> One finds separate specialized education for the economist technobureaucrats (largely abroad), the military, the church, even the critical intellectuals (these last expelled from the universities to research centres such as CEBRAP or abroad). The gap between future élites and counter-élites and the mass of students from the middle strata has widened; the environment for a common language or framework of ideas is lacking. Meanwhile, the possibilities for 'spurious absorption' of the output of higher education are reaching their limit. Authoritarian régimes are beginning simultaneously to cut both the supply (by restricting higher educational enrolment) and the bureaucratic labour market.

Presumably both the forces controlling the

<sup>20</sup>See Germán W. Rama, *Condicionantes sociales de la expansión y segmentación de los sistemas universitarios*, Buenos Aires, mimeo, 1980.

State and the clienteles of higher education find the situation frustrating, but a minimum of consensus on acceptable ways out of the trap is not in sight. Here if anywhere the possibility of constructive change depends largely on the capacity of the clienteles of learn through experience and formulate their own projects. However, the contradictions of higher education derive so complexly from the contradictions of the style of development itself that the likelihood of the clienteles—especially those now losing their precarious foothold in the privileged consumer society—taking the lead in changing the style of development may be somewhat better than the likelihood of their making realistic demands for reforms in higher education.

The educated and frustrated youth have repeatedly been nominated for the honour of leading the way to alternative styles of development, through their supposed capacity for criticism, mobilization and action not altogether determined by their social origin and their expectations for personal gains. Experience in Latin America and elsewhere warns against over-generalization on 'youth' as a category, and also suggests that significant minorities among the educated youth are capable of taking a leading role, but only in relatively exceptional conjunctures and for brief periods.

Their capacity to criticize the society and act on their criticisms is likely to be as superficial as present higher education itself, which cannot support an adequate understanding of national or world trends or options; or as segmented, since the different combinations of institutional quality and class origins of students lead to different reactions and demands. Resentment and frustration over inability to achieve personal goals are poor and dangerous foundations for criticisms of the style of development. Mobilization is likely to take forms easily repressed by the State or self-destructive because of the violence of the internal conflicts it generates, its manipulation by factions, and the divorce between its demands and tactics and those of other sectors of the society, including those sought as allies by the mobilized youth. As long as 'spurious absorption' into public employment remains a viable option, the pattern of 'compulsory revolutionary service' in the

universities, followed by conformism in the bureaucracy, is likely to persist.<sup>21</sup>

The fact that minorities among many generations of students since the 1920s or even earlier, long before the massification of the universities, have mobilized to demand reforms in the universities as well as the societies suggests further questions: Are student movements capable of learning from history? Is anyone trying to teach them the lessons? What lessons?

The major differences between the situation of the students in these earlier periods and today are the greater numbers involved, the degree of segmentation of institutions, the collapse of selectivity mechanisms, and the prospect of a reversal imposed by the forces controlling the State after decades of continually widening access for the urban middle and lower-middle strata of the population. The private white-collar service-sector occupations characteristic of the transnational style of development may absorb greater numbers, with no practical necessity for prior university-level education, but they can hardly absorb a higher proportion of the youth facing exclusion, who are continually increasing in numbers through demographic growth and the momentum of previous middle-stratum expansion. One can expect a good many of the governments to devise mechanisms of mobilization and regimentation (including extended military service and civilian 'youth services') to replace the universities' function of delaying the entry of youth into the labour market and giving them at least the illusion of mobility and social usefulness, but

<sup>21</sup>For an unsparing diagnosis of the contradiction between student activism and middle-strata aspirations, see chapter III of Carlos Guzmán Beckler, *Colonialismo y revolución*, México City, Siglo Veintiuno Editores "qualms of conscience are then soothed away through political activity. This activity is more verbal than anything else. Nevertheless, the idea of 'democratizing' the universities and 'opening them up to the people' figures in all the slogans and battle cries, especially in the last twenty-five years. In view of form of the social structure, it is impossible for a member of the underprivileged strata to get to the university, since he will have difficulty in getting past the third grade in primary schooling, if he gets that far.

Consequently, this 'opening up to the people' really means still more advantages for the bourgeoisie, who are the people who actually do get to the university" (page 174).



with quite limited effectiveness. Continuing resistance to these trends by youth of the social strata in question seems inevitable, in the university setting and elsewhere, but proposals from outside for infusing coherence and creativity into this resistance are bound to seem ingenuous. Creative resistance will require changes in values, or possibly a return to basic values of democracy and solidarity now discredited by ritualistic incantations, a diffusion of alternative national projects deserving support, and a realistic appreciation of the painstaking effort of converting such projects into reality. The most damning criticism of higher education is that it has contributed so little to these requisites for creative resistance.

The teachers constitute another clientele of the school systems that should, in principle, be capable of creative resistance to centralization and standardization, recognizing the challenge to adapt education to the setting in which they find themselves and to force problems on the attention of the higher authorities. In most countries of the region, primary school teachers are now one of the largest occupational categories, and their numbers give them a potentially powerful voice as an organized interest-group. Evidently, however, the repetitious task of teaching, under unfavourable physical and cultural conditions, confronted by unrealistic and erratic bureaucratic norms, without convincing and inspiring opportunities to participate in a national project, encourages routinization or an organizational concentration on wage and job-security demands rather than creative resistance. One of the Project's studies suggests that even where the teachers have acquired important functions of community leadership and intermediation with the authorities this has been at the expense of their time and interest devoted to teaching.<sup>22</sup> There have been no recent counterparts to the heroic role played by Mexican rural teachers during the 1930s. The primary school teachers, after all, belong to the lower reaches of the middle strata

that have sought upward mobility through education, and their 'professionalization' through the inclusion of teacher-training in the universities, has fostered the quest for advancement through formal credentials without giving them training relevant to their future working conditions or stimulating creativity.

To the extent that the forces controlling the State can acquire and adhere to a clear and realistic idea of the role of education in their national project, the problem of linking the teachers to this project should not be so intractable as the problem of transforming higher education but, as the difficulties of the Peruvian reform illustrate, effective solutions will require patience and a thorough understanding of the motivational and ideological differentiations among the teachers so as to enlist allies, neutralize opposition, and overcome inertia. For the reformer-planner, confronting the enormous mass of poorly trained and motivated teachers and working with the limited resources the State can be expected to make available, tactics of 'leavening the dough' seem most promising: creation of innovative training centres and refresher courses, mass distribution of texts stimulating thinking and opening new perspectives for teachers generally starved of reading materials, etc. The indispensable precondition is a national setting that stimulates or at least permits interaction between the teachers and forces proposing to transform the style of development.

The Project's studies confirm what was already pretty well known —that educational systems have not been able to incorporate the children of the rural workers and peasants except in token fashion, and that further quantitative expansion along present lines does not promise to remedy this. Such a situation, although intolerable in terms of the professed values of the educational systems, does not generate perceived 'problems' or threats for the future to anything like the same extent as the hypertrophy of higher education. The groups in question may be able to formulate autonomous conceptions of their educational needs, as peasant communities have done for generations, but they cannot force them on the attention of

<sup>22</sup>Proceso pedagógico y heterogeneidad cultural en el Ecuador. UNESCO/ECLA/UNDP Project on Development and Education in Latin America and the Caribbean, DEALC/22.

the State. In any case their conceptions are bound to lag behind the changes in social and economic patterns that the children will confront. A 'concentrating and excluding' style of development does not require education, beyond a rudimentary literacy, for these groups and would be unable to allocate occupational and other rewards to the recipients if it were forthcoming. Up to a point, the 'regressive absorption' of part of the population into casual labour and personal services at minimal incomes, facilitated by lack of education, is just as compatible with the style as is the 'spurious absorption' of other parts into bureaucratic employment on the basis of educational credentials.

Naturally, the educational efforts of the State respond to other considerations also, including political values and international standards calling for universalization of primary education as well as the need to absorb the output of teacher-training institutions, and the disadvantaged strata are not altogether barred from making educational demands and devising their own educational tactics. In most cases, however, these factors are not strong enough to bring about a major reallocation of resources and rethinking of methods.

Stated baldly, the proposition that one or two years of schooling in a language they do not understand when they enter the school will be useful to peasant children is too implausible to obtain any credence; yet rural educational policies amounting to this have persisted and extended their coverage over several decades in various countries. Even in settings in which the language barrier between teacher and pupil is not present and the average period of schooling is longer, the incongruity of the schooling with the living conditions and cultural background of the children and a teaching schedule based on the unrealistic supposition that the children will complete the full primary course reduce the likelihood of imparting permanent literacy. The studies of Ecuador and Peru indicate that 'education' of this kind can consolidate itself as a ritual, in which some actors pretend to teach and others pretend to study, without any sufficiently coherent reaction from the families of the children to force a change.

Other studies demonstrate, through the

widely differing examples of Costa Rica, Paraguay and the English-speaking Caribbean countries, that a better approximation to universal primary education is possible in poor and predominantly rural countries through conventional schools. These are all small countries in which the impact of the 'concentrating and excluding' style of development has been relatively late, limited and different from the impact in the large countries.

In the latter, vested interests supporting the maldistribution of educational resources and bureaucratic rigidity of the system would hinder a genuine shift of priorities to primary education for the disadvantaged strata, even if the forces controlling the State were genuinely determined on this. At the same time the capitalist modernization of agriculture and the consequent marginalization of much of the rural population pose two completely different functions for primary education: a) qualification of an agricultural labour force to use machinery and modern productive techniques; b) preparation of the remainder of the rural youth to migrate and seek non-agricultural employment. The first function does not require universal primary education, and the dominant forces are likely to be too ambivalent about the second to allocate major resources to it. For one thing, they would prefer a reduction in the rate of cityward migration, although they have no clear policies for keeping the excess population on the land; for another, most of the migrants will enter the urban economy in unskilled 'informal sector' occupations requiring only a minimum of literacy that most of them can probably pick up in the course of urban living.

If the style of agricultural modernization should regain its dynamism and count on favourable export markets, one might expect a continued slow expansion of rural primary education, responding to the mixed motives and pressures noted above, with many localized projects for reform but no major changes in the deficiencies of content and distribution. Under such conditions, the generally deplored late entry into the school might make sense for the rural entrant. If a year or two of schooling is the most that he can expect, it is more likely to leave something lasting if it is experienced immediately prior to entry into the labour market.

If the present crises were to bring about a drastic shift in structures of power at the national level, with new régimes dependent for survival on mobilization of rural as well urban masses, one might expect an accompanying shift in educational priorities and approaches: mass literacy campaigns drawing in the educated youth; a strong, probably over-optimistic reliance on rural primary schools as centres of community mobilization and cultural change; a drawing of individuals from the disadvantaged strata into leadership positions requiring them to improvise their own education. Such a transformation is easier to envisage in some of the poorer, smaller and more rural countries than elsewhere.

For the majority of countries, an immediate future of 'crisis management' seems more probable than either stable continuism or transformation. One aspect of crisis management might well consist of policies designed to keep the rural population on the

land and obtain from it more adequate supplies of basic foods. The manageable dimensions of urbanization, on the one hand, and the combination of rising food shortages, prohibitive costs of imports, and breakdown of modern large-scale agriculture because of high energy requirements and other factors, on the other, might force the State to allocate resources to the promotion of modernized versions of labour-intensive peasant agriculture. Such policies would, among other things, provide clearer justifications and content for rural primary education. They might also give the peasants more leverage for influencing the education of their children and for devising 'incidental education' bypassing the schools. At this point, however, one is tempted to stray into speculations useful to the planner-reformer only to the extent that they stimulate him to prepare for an indeterminate future, or alternative futures.