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Latin America in the possible scenarios of détente

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There are a number of indicators which point to the possibility that some slackening may be occurring in the rivalries between the great powers which may lead to the final solution of the “cold war” and the beginning of a period of stable and lasting international peace. If international relations really are moving towards such a change, then what would the economic, political and ideological repercussions of this development be for Latin America? The author of this essay in social futurology puts this question and, after first of all setting out the salient features of the “cold war”, devotes the central part of this article to an analysis of the effects that such a détente in international relations would have on Latin America. Three different types of possible détente —co-operative, competitive and conflictive— are presented and the implications of each of them are considered with special attention to the likely consequences of the first one. Among these consequences, the author highlights the predominance of cosmopolitan and universalist attitudes in international relations, ideological “decentralization”, the expansion of markets, the weakening of the system of satellites, the prevalence of non-authoritarian régimes, etc. Finally, the author analyses the repercussions of détente on three key questions in the development of the region: its situation on the periphery, the contradiction between political and economic rationality, and Latin American integration.

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The presages or awareness of a historic change

Parallels between the anxiety felt in 1945 and 1975

Although their ranks grow steadily thinner with the passage of the years there are quite a few people alive today who cannot help having the disconcerting feeling that they have somehow already seen everything that we are experiencing today. Are we really passing through an identical process? The political leaders are not the same: they are perhaps different not only in their own character but also in the situations they are facing. The intellectual participants, however, in their efforts to find something meaningful to say in response to the demands of the moment, have been drawn into almost the same approaches to themes and concerns as those which prevailed around 1945. There was a decided and almost overwhelming leaning in those days towards the subject of peace, and this is being repeated today with the same existential anxiety. How can we organize peace in a viable and effective way in these different times? A comparison of the literature produced around 1945 and around 1975, which are the approximate dates of decisive moments in recent history, would naturally display important differences in some points, but underlying it all there would be the same fundamental concern: the conviction that all the problems of our time depend in the final analysis on the manner in which the organization of world peace can be achieved and perfec
Among economists—be they politicians or intellectuals—there can be doubt that the prime concern is the need to achieve a new form of organization of international economic relations. But at the same time it is obvious to everyone that this particular viewpoint raises anew some of the questions which were discussed most ardently thirty years ago, although they were subsequently forgotten and are now being analysed in different terms. The avalanche of frequently extravagant disquisitions on the different forms of federations and confederations is no longer present today in the same manner, although the idea discussed at that time regarding functional federations limited to a few purposes is reappearing today in a different guise but in all its former fertility. On the other hand, however, no one today can fail to stress—even though it be allusively or even elusively—the unavoidable problem of the concept and validity of national sovereignty. It is worth emphasizing this, because this is the clearest example of the phenomena of repetition referred to earlier and it clearly shows that, whatever the lines along which today’s concerns run, all culminate in the same fundamental nucleus of peace itself. Without the prior reassertion of peace, of a general state of peaceful coexistence, all kinds of technical proposals on specific problems are bound to be nothing more than steps into the void.

As the creative efforts deployed on behalf of peace in past decades led to the establishment of many institutions, there is nothing surprising about the fact that many projects and proposals for the future are now emanating from these same institutions and are in terms of them, thus consigning to oblivion the original efforts and groundwork which made them possible and which amounted in effect to an effort to build a lasting peace after a devastating war. Of course, the contents of the new range of projects and proposals put forward by different or reorganized institutions is perfectly justified, because the institutions now in being have to face problems which were either completely unknown before or were only vaguely glimpsed (contamination, exhaustion of resources, etc.). It is none the less true, however, that such problems, although perhaps new in appearance, depend for their solution on the existence of a stable peace.

Therefore, the theme which is once again before us is that of peace in all its deep significance, and this is why it imparts to the intellectual searching of the present day its marked relationship and affinity with the quest carried on in the late 1940s, in which some of us, with youthful daring, were enthusiastic participants. Proof of their parallel nature would not be difficult to find through a mere analysis of the titles of books, articles and papers, since throughout what is now a rich diversity of issues there appear time and again statements which continually remind us of the fundamental task which makes all the others of secondary importance and even to some extent superfluous. These present lines fall within this type of reminder, and perhaps this is their greatest significance, even though they are devoted to outlining other and more specific considerations.
The different conditions of the present setting

Are we at the beginning of a historical event of such magnitude as to represent a turning-point in our historical process? A change of such a nature that it leaves us at liberty to try out radically original approaches to building the future? The flights of imagination of some who have taken as their starting-point facts which really exist and are in no way imaginary incline us to assert that this really is such a turning-point and to look forward—either optimistically or pessimistically—to a completely new or novel future. Quite apart from the fact that all futures necessarily bring along with them something of the past, from which they are nourished and of which they are a continuation, however, more sober consideration of the changes we are undoubtedly living through and experiencing makes it neither permissible nor advisable to take any millenary attitudes. It is a well-known fact that while a considerable proportion of the components of the historical experience which we are living today appear to be new or at least not to have been experienced before in their present form, another no less important and decisive proportion is made up of facts known from long ago whose dead weight prevents us from gaining, as in science fiction, an advance view of the future.

Bearing in mind the empirically possible and determinable, it would be an act of blind ignorance to deny that today we are facing in all fields—politics, economics, culture—a situation very different from that which prevailed thirty years ago, and this state of affairs calls for an effort to find original answers which are naturally different from those we are used to. But perhaps it would not be desirable or viable to describe the novelty of this situation as a historical fact whose future is beyond our capacity of exact forecasting. The forecasting of what is possible must not be confused with divination or prophetic inspiration.

However, many similarities and parallels there may be between our concerns of today and those which prevailed around 1945, however, the starting point and the fields in which we desire to gain knowledge and take action are considerably different. Thus, although the theme of peace is once again the essential and fundamental field of our immediate aspirations for the future, there can be no denying that the conditions in which it arises today are different. It is important to add, however, that the most decisive point is that which is necessarily implicit in this assertion, for these different conditions in which the problem arises are at the same time determinants of the real tendencies which must be kept in mind in the evolution of history.

What are these conditions which are different or changed in the new setting?

In the summary form which will be followed in this paper, the following conditions could be examined, among others. Firstly, the need to study anew the foundations and forms of instrumental organization of a universal peace of the longest possible duration is not now the inevitable consequence of an agreement between victors and vanquished following a struggle which has caused clearly visible destruction whose reparation is a matter of life or death to the two sides in dispute: today, in the absence of this easily perceptible dramatic quality, it is merely the consequence of a stalemate. The protagonists in long drawn out, difficult and exhausting moves now see that at the end of their
complicated game there is no way out from a situation of deadlock.

This stalemate is not a static situation in which they can remain, however: on the contrary it is something which moves and changes unceasingly, with inevitable ups and downs—if this were not so and the stalemate could change into a lasting stage there would be no problem and this would not trouble the protagonists and onlookers, who would in this case be the assumed beneficiaries of a stable situation, be it pleasant or disagreeable. Both sides, however, realize that it is necessary to go beyond the stalemate, without breaking it withal, in order to create other general conditions of security. This means that there must be a new aspiration, if not for everlasting peace, at least for a minimum of organization which will make possible the forward planning which is the only procedure that can give all those involved a relatively permanent stage of peaceful coexistence. It is quite possible that the results of a stalemate may be less favourable for the common endeavour than the tangible consequences of a disaster. They would appear to call for larger amounts of reasonableness and for an intelligence which does not satisfy itself merely with what is visible and can scarcely be based on immediate emotional impulses or on the short-sighted defence of the short-term interests which have been achieved. Setting about the task of organizing a new peace after a stalemate is for many a risk which involves the possible sacrifice at some stage of the vested interests of the participants, no matter how precarious these may be in the present situation. There is no way of setting about reasoning regarding the building of the future, however, without taking into account as the first fundamental objective possibility everything that is signified by the emergence from a stalemate which cannot be continued indefinitely in the present circumstances, not only because it is unjust but because it is pragmatically unstable.

The second condition lies in the fact that in the course of the years spent in achieving such a stalemate there has simultaneously been a rise and crisis of the opposing systems, thus offering opposing arguments and stimulating contradictory sentiments on both sides. But anyone who does not want to view matters only in black and white must accept both the rise and the crisis in all their complexity. Among the supporters and protagonists of the two opposing systems, the more alert individuals are bound to perceive both these things more or less clearly or distinctly, and to the relatively dispassionate view of the historian the details of the rise and crisis speak for themselves. Both systems have had their undeniable triumphs but also have to live with the awareness of their own failures. The market economy countries, and above all their foremost exponent, display some notable ups and downs not only in the socio-economic, social and cultural fields, but also in the results of their international policy. The same is true of the opposing countries with centrally-planned economies, which show comparable successes and failures in the same fields, since there is no lack of notable successes in their international power plays. Nobody has a better awareness of the failures and faults which threaten to repeat themselves, however, than the leaders of these systems. It was of course to be expected that in the hour of truth of their impending task they should have a full consciousness of both the rise and the crisis of their systems in all their profundity, but it is not so safe and logical to expect the same thing from many of the onlookers
who, even in the centre of events, have not been able to experience themselves the different reasons for triumph and danger.

Another of the changed conditions among the circumstances which now make it essential to seek a more stable reorganization of world peace is undoubtedly the apparent breakdown of the "pax americana". It is a well-known fact that the historical forms of an effective peace —if not in the world at least in big areas of it— have been of different types. The types which are important to us at present, however, are those deriving from definite impositions of power. The most famous and lasting example —both while it actually existed and through its influences as an aspiration and a memory— is beyond any doubt that of the "pax romana", and it would by no means be inopportune —if it could be done here— to examine how it was possible and above all the factors which led to its downfall, that is to say, to examine the set of political, military and economic conditions which culminated in the radically changed picture of the later Middle Ages. The explanation based on the considerations of military weakening and the transition from a coastal trading economy to another economy based on settlements in the interior because of the exhaustion of the slave labour on which the original system was based is certainly the most stimulating for the analytical understanding of subsequent phenomena, including the most recent ones.

The "pax britannica" constitutes the form of organization of peace which is historically nearest to our own times, and it is not difficult to get an idea, from this viewpoint, of the facilities which were available to it for its installation and maintenance. Being as it was the immediate result of the industrial revolution in a world open to the possibilities of the country's expansion in vast tracts of the globe, it was able to maintain the necessary strategic vigilance for a long period through relatively simple mechanisms such as the old instrument of the balance of power, the banking monopoly, and the country's maritime position, backed up by a set of dispersed but well-situated strategic posts.

At the end of the Second World War, it fell to the lot of the United States —the victorious power which was economically, militarily and technologically richest and most powerful, and the State whose economy was most intact after the disasters of the war— to carry out on its own account a new experiment in universal political peace: the "pax americana". Since there appeared to be the necessary domestic political will in the country to carry this out, steps were indeed taken to put this venture into effect, for all concerned initially viewed it, regardless of whether or not it was to their taste, as a practical possibility. Thus, along with its economic and organizational functions this powerful republic also took on the role of world policeman.

Since this is not the place to go into details about what took place it is sufficient to note that the United States undertaking began in conditions which were very different, because of their complexity, from those faced by England at the beginning of its period of domination. Consequently, the burden of the enormous cost of the "pax americana" —sometimes made heavier as a result of its own success— soon began to make itself felt. The fact that it lasted a shorter time than that originally foreseen and suggested is something that can be explained in concrete terms, especially in the light of the dangerous repercussions that this exhausting experiment in the
external field began to have on the social consensus of domestic policy. Ignoring alike the satisfaction of some circles and the regretful anxiety of others, the breakdown of the "pax americana" is a straightforward fact which interests all of us equally, and it is a determining factor in our present tasks.

There is no point in any other speculation in this respect. There is justification, however, for two simple assertions which are very far from any possible suspicion of pretended futurological wisdom. Firstly, the fact that it was not possible to completely realize the idea of a very long "pax americana" does not in any way mean that the United States as a power has lost its attributes as a hegemonic figure. Obviously, it is still perfectly possible for this country to exert its hegemony when it sees fit in its various fields of interest, although this may be in a more or less reduced form, either by its own choice or because of a prudent awareness of the new limits.

But just as the United States century did not come to pass as promised, neither did the much-vaunted Soviet century (1917-2017) prove to be capable of achieving universal validity. Secondly, therefore, there are likewise no grounds for presuming that the Soviet Union wishes to take on in its turn the risky role of the world policeman. The very clear awareness of the enormous economic costs and serious political and military risks which had to be accepted by the splendidly endowed United States, which is rich in literally all classes of resources—including intellectual resources, of which it undoubtedly has an extremely prolific supply—makes it improbable that the Soviet leaders are preparing to repeat the United States experience and to try to fill in a serious manner the vacuum left by the United States withdrawal from such a difficult and thankless task. If this is so in the case of the Soviet Union, which is a leading power fully up to the level of its sometime adversary, then it is impossible at present and for a long time ahead to visualize any other power which might aim to take on the unclaimed role of effective universal peace keeper.

It would be impossible to leave out of this rapid overview of the changed conditions which influence the new resurgence of the problem of peace those which have arisen, with the passage of the years, on the very chessboard of the international game itself: that is to say, leaving metaphors aside, the various shifts which have taken place in the system of international forces. This is not the moment to take them into consideration in detail, however, and it will be necessary to return later to some of their components, such as the significance of the big expansion in what have been called transnational relations—i.e., those outside the international organizations proper—which constitute, in their various forms, a system of powers of various sizes that must of necessity be taken into account in any attempt to approach the organization of the future in an original manner.

What it really is important to refer to now, however, is rather the appearance and strengthening of new political powers which, after being absent for a long time from international politics proper, can be expected to aspire to manifest themselves either indirectly or directly in the years to come. The apparently paradoxical aspect of this is the fact that some of the new powers, although not all by any means, have been the result of policies followed after the organization of the peace of 1945, which did not seek to set up these powers as centres of international
decision-making, but as nuclei of economic expansion or, at the most, as a means of stabilizing economic activities. A typical case is that of the European Economic Community, which some people treat as an authentic political power even though, however great its economic power may be, it still lacks the decision-making organs for defining and putting into practice an international policy proper. The case of Japan is a different matter, but this is not the moment to go deeper into this.

Among the different or sharply modified conditions displayed by the world today in connexion with the new approach to peace, it is impossible to deny the significance of the active effervescence of the Third World. Already many years ago the most forward-looking intellects began to equate the north-south relationship with the then better-known east-west relationship. With the passage of the years the north-south relationship, equivalent to the distinction between rich countries and poor countries, to say nothing of military and political power aspects, has been moving into the foreground because of its economic dimensions which, quite apart from the principles of justice, raise questions of technical competence and concrete policies of all types, on whose success depends the possibility of world-wide co-operative co-existence. Not long ago, such a man as C.F. von Weizsacker, for example, insisted from the conflictive centre of the European experience that in planning a more stable peace it was necessary to take into account, along with the problems of the “military peace” between the first and second worlds, what he described as the great task of achieving a “social peace” on a world scale. “No such peace exists today, and there is absolutely no prospect that it will”. An important part of the peace plans must therefore be centered around the realities of the Third World and must bring a minimum of order into its “contradictory interests” vis-à-vis the others.

Indeed, the growing intensification of this intellectual and moral awareness has been due to the active participation of the Third World, which, by its spontaneous or concerted demands and various acts, has made clear its abandonment of a passive position which was only capable of attracting the attention of a few clear-sighted persons.

II

The lost illusions

Reasons and unreasons

particularly since the early years of the present decade, a negative tone of feeling has begun to appear among the internationalists who have been active either in the field or through writing (both these things at once in many cases) and who, on looking back on what has been achieved in thirty years of effort, declare that they no longer have the optimism that previously sustained them. As usually happens in similar cases of disillusionment, discussion has reopened on the reasons for this and mutual recriminations have begun to be
launched from the various positions. Realists and idealists are once more at loggerheads and sometimes venerable themes of political science are coming again in the field of theoretical encounters. In their disillusionment, the main blame for the continual conflicts and difficulties is being imputed to human weaknesses and to selfish and shortsighted attitudes of the various actors in international politics, especially the leaders in this field. The unfinished discussion has thus been renewed in the form of a vicious circle about where the changes should begin: whether they should begin with the reform of man or with the remodelling of society and its institutions.

The examination of the reasons for violence has been a critical case in recent years. Some have stressed the fallaciousness of the order, which although conceived as a perfect system always comes to naught in reality because of the persistence of frequently unforeseeable conflicts caused by the confrontation between interests and motivations. Others highlight as a cause the assumed anachronistic persistence of the prominent role played by policies of security in respect of the principle of sovereignty in a world which is interdependent in many factual respects far more decisive for the values of mankind than such policies. In such cases, priority belongs to well-being and "happiness" rather than to sterile ambitions for power. Finally, there are those who, in complete desperation, stress as the true cause the failure of the political and intellectual capacity of contemporary man to bring him out of his condition of sorcerer's apprentice and to enable him to dominate in some way the extremely complex situation brought about by his own scientific and technological creations. This negative feeling also extends to the various international organizations and the schemes of relations set up in the post-war period as the "true" foundations of peace, and criticism stretches from the monetary system down to the smallest departments of the United Nations.

Unlike what happened in the field of philosophical, scientific and political matters, however, where it is difficult to point to a final decisive position and recognize an abstract truth, the criticisms generated by disillusionment with the system of institutions in which we are still living frequently go beyond what is just and reasonable. This is not the time to speak at length on the achievements and failures of all these. Although they are in no way perfect—or could they ever be so—they nevertheless display in the ups and downs of their lives, depending on the various moments and circumstances, achievements which although only partial are still an effective contribution for the benefit of mankind. Reforms and complementary measures are called for without the slightest doubt. Even the most biting critics should not forget, however, leaving aside these or other limited achievements, what they have amounted to all together as a centre of information. Decisive success must today be considered as being the extent to which this information has had an instructive value, because without this there would not be the broadening of awareness of contemporary man which enables him to set about with new spirit the continuation of what has so far been achieved in the unfinished task of establishing a lasting and juster peace.

There is something in common among those who flaunt their lost illusions, leaving aside their different will to react. This common factor is the conviction shown by all, disillusioned or enthusiastic, that we are at the end of an
era, at the probable end of the structure of peace built up in the post-war period and in the immediate past, and which is still a reality present today. But in most cases, this situation remains without satisfactory explanation, although there is also general agreement—albeit not always for clear and objective reasons—that “all the present indications point to the 1970s being an even stormier period than the preceding decade” (W. Laqueur).

The opposing extremes

It can hardly therefore come as a surprise to us that such a situation, which is dominated in reality by an awareness of crisis, is also a time of extremes. I mean, of course, extremes as regards intellectual positions, since this is not the place to discuss the extreme positions which involve actual action. On the one hand, there is the extreme pessimistic view of total failure, while on the other side there is the optimistic view of the construction of a utopian future: such is the backward and forward swing between optimism and pessimism which typifies modern “futurology”.

At one extreme we now have the renewal of a Spenglerian tone which does not limit itself to predictions of the decadence of the West but also covers the civilization of the whole world and which, although on the one hand supported by followers of historical interpretations, also includes on the other hand representatives of the purest positivist “scientism”: from the predominantly Italian group which sees the prospect of a new Middle Ages to the group which uses the instruments of “global heuristics” to predict the great perils threatening us.

I do not intend, of course, to go into a long disquisition on this subject here, but simply to recall this matter because of its importance in later parts of this work.

The position of the critical intelligence, of the kind of intellectuals who had in mind the well-known warnings of the Schumpeterian interpretation, does not need now to seek support for its negative views in the legacy of oft-repeated doctrines. It is sufficient for it to point to what is developing or being attempted in the present political and economic conditions to maintain that the great techno-structures which are taking shape in the present picture will eventually lead, because of their small number and the enormous power at their disposal, to various forms of feudal organizations under which the other social groups will try to survive in larger or smaller geographical areas. Just as happened when the Roman Empire broke up, a new type of feudalism with its own special relationships of vassalage and protection will emerge. Comparison with this starting point makes it possible subsequently to extend or seek the parallels between the two types of “Middle Ages” in the whole range of their social and cultural manifestations. A new Renaissance whose features cannot as yet be clearly described may also be over the horizon. The comparison is not novel, and it had already been made a number of times before. The novelty
lies in extending the analysis of the great political and economic techno-structures of our time—the so-called technocratic era—to such futurological projections. The international field will be marked by the predominance of the production and consumption relationships of a few “trend-setting economies”. Whatever the way of life will be in the “neofeudal state”, however, it will be very far from that which gave rise to European liberalism.

Not only the critical intelligence, however, but also the most purely functional intelligence—that of scientific research workers—have taken paths which are not dissimilar in their results in certain aspects, although the main aim of this enterprise is to point out some perils which it is “still” possible to stave off. Moreover, it is also clear that the components of this group display a great diversity of orientations which it is not easy to put in order, although there is a quite acceptable summary. It would be necessary to include in any relatively complete statement of this—which is outside our theme at this moment—such matters as the renovators of classical controversies like the stationary economy of John Stuart Mill, passing through the various critics of the developmentalist idea, until we arrive, via students of ecological problems, of the population structure, and of the available resources, at those who believe in the global menace of economic development, regardless whether or not they are explicit supporters of the zero growth concept. This short reference is enough for the moment. The consequence, leaving the choice open as a matter of taste, is that there is a wide range of related visions of the breakdown of civilization, all of disturbing topicality. Which of these visions is to be preferred? The great historical canvas infused with the intense Hebelian drama of a twilight of the gods, or the cold obituary with which the technocratic intelligentsia threatens us on the basis of their complicated computers and their imposing curves taken from exponential mathematics? Whatever one’s preference, an outbreak of panic would make it very difficult if not impossible to face the future in a decided manner. Fortunately, however, it does not seem to us that the situation is really like that.

In contrast to these warnings of more or less serious disasters that are to be expected in the more or less near future, there are also those who go to the opposite extreme and spread utopian optimism. Just as in the years between the wars we find in various places the men of good will who inspired in that period the overall title of the numerous volumes written by a famous French novelist. They too are students or investigators, technocrats and persons of some experience in political and administrative affairs, and united in groups and committees to which they are elected or co-opted they bring their good will to the elaboration of projects containing suggestions or solving the most varied problems, from the reform of the monetary system or the new orientation which undoubtedly needs to be given to scientific or technological research, to the proposals for reformed international organizations or the establishment of “world authorities” in various fields such as food or the equitable exploitation of the resources of the sea. Frequently, the utopian nature of their views is revealed by the varied titles chosen—“towards another form of development” for example. Usually, it is the result of an ambitious or almost complete set of measures offered as the indispensable framework for a better future. These committees, with their various experts,
leave no aspect of the “desirable new order” untouched, and this makes reading of the “project” attractive and stimulating. Nor do they fail to inspire and enrich each other mutually. It would be wrong, however, to take the term “utopian” as a pejorative and final judgement on this rich harvest of projects, reports and memoranda set before us at present. Firstly, because men of good will, before and after the words of the Evangelist, deserve our greatest respect and gratitude. Like those who believe in Reason they continue to be the salt of the earth. Secondly, because the question of being utopian is a question of the total set of features or the “system” of the proposal, and it does not in any way affect the validity of many of its components, since these may be concrete proposals on particular points which are worthy of the most careful consideration and may possibly serve as the starting point for elaboration in detail. And thirdly, because the utopian position cannot be attacked in principle: a utopia is always a vision of the future and it does not mean that society is doing badly, as certain thinkers claim, because the lack of it may perhaps be indicative of a serious inadequacy in the interpretation of the present. In the present indecisive times, a few rays of utopian hope are by no means superfluous.

Sometimes, not everything is utopianism in this rich range of projects, because when they fix dates and specify time limits they give rise, on the contrary, to psychological problems of another type because of the postponing of expectations. What happens, for example, when in a serious report halfway between the immediate and the utopian a time-span of 30 to 40 years is mentioned for bringing down the difference in level between the rich and poor countries to the proportion of 3:1 which is precisely the proportion prevailing between the regions of one of the richest areas of the earth? We are indeed very far from utopia, but how can we avoid discouraging the impatient or avoiding the cynical declarations of those satisfied with these bare dates? It could well be, however, that the proposition is in itself technically correct. In this case, then why not set about its realization with all the energy necessary to give the lie to these opposed views?

If we take stock of what is contained in this paragraph we arrive at two different sorts of apparently unconnected conclusions. Firstly we have the acceptance of the unanimous conviction that we are faced with a turning-point in history, that it does appear to be a fact that the structure of peace achieved in the post-war period can hardly be expected to continue, and that we must therefore set about building another peace with renewed efforts. In this task it is also necessary to accept and take into account the fact that the actual conditions as they occur at present are very different from those to which brief reference was made earlier. But at the same time, we must take into account the fact that the intellectual circles among which we live are in a state of ferment, and that not everything in the debate between their extreme representatives is suitable grist for our mill, since some of them issue serious warnings about real perils which it would be suicidal to ignore, while others are putting forward serious proposals of undoubted potential value.

Most of those who declare to us their lost illusions, however, do not go on to tell us what the key to the present situation and its decisive structural elements are. Whether we like it or not, we are faced with a purely prospective exercise. What should our starting-point
be? What is the right time-scale? Are there not perhaps more fruitful intermediate positions between blind pragmatism concerning immediate matters and the "heuristics of totality"? What really interests us is what we "can do" in coming years rather than what we ought to do. The analysis of the causality of the possible lies in our immediate circumstances and not in remote scenarios, much as these tempt the controlled combination of our intelligence and imagination.

III

The experience of the cold war

The last sentence in the preceding paragraph is of course enigmatic and vague. This is because it comes at the end of a process of exposition in which, without wishing to, we have intertwined various planes or dimensions of both concern and thinking solely because they were there before us: the supposed crisis of a type of civilization, the crisis of a particular society (the contemporary industrial society), the transformation or persistence of certain socio-economic systems (capitalism and communism in the historical manifestations of them so far experienced) and even the reference to the different styles of development, i.e., the prevailing one and the "other" proposed or possible styles. These are all questions which differ in the breadth or scope of their content. In addition, prospective interests of very different duration have slipped in, from the global ones stretching many years ahead, to others of a much narrower or limited visual angle. None of such questions is to be disdained in itself, and it is essential to envisage from the beginning a justified debate on the selection of particular points. For this reason we shall now try to specify exactly what our subject is. The aim is simply, in fact, to restate the conditions for world peace while at the same time continuing and modifying the form of peace which has prevailed from the end of the war until now. Is there some decisive fact which points to a change and makes necessary a new view of the present interest? The thesis of this paper is that this is beyond doubt and that this change is in fact that which involves the transition from the structure crystallized de facto in the policies of the cold war to another whose features are for the moment unknown and which will necessarily be arrived at through the efforts of the policy of détente. But in addition, this situation brings with it a very clear intellectual obligation. What is the form of this historic change? What are its immediate consequences and the prospects for more distant ones? The view of affairs imposed by the obligatory acceptance of reality as it is and not as it should be calls for a prospective analysis covering a period which, while indefinite, must never be too long, because if it were it would involve a complete transformation of the data now in our possession. Does the adoption of this approach imply forgetting or denying the others referred to? Certainly not, but another element in this thesis is that most of these tasks, both in their formulation and the possible manner of realizing them, are necessarily conditioned by or dependent on the results of
the immediate intellectual and political effort to set afoot in a definitive manner the détente already begun or at least assumed. The aim, therefore, as in every scheme of prospective sociology, is to give the onlookers or minor protagonists in the matter a clear idea of what we “can do” rather than what we should do (Klages). What is within our reach in the situation of possible change which is developing? The idea of détente is for many of us a matter of fear, of antagonism and criticism: it must be acknowledged right away that it could hardly be otherwise and that such attitudes are determined mainly by the facts to which they object. But it is the duty of the intellect to free itself as far as possible from these restrictive factors and to submit the problematical situation in which we are all participating to the examination of critical reason — scientific reason, if you prefer. We must at least know what is happening to us, even though the conclusions may remain open to public debate.

The so-called “cold war” has been an experience we have all personally experienced, whereas détente is just a possibility. We must go slowly in some areas because in each case the instruments which are actually used or are most desirable are very different. What did the “cold war” consist of as a sociological phenomenon? What form has been assumed by its structure and by the modes and repercussions of its functioning? What has its historical formation been?

It is not possible, at the present moment, to attempt a detailed consideration of its origins and developments. This is a controversial point of historical research to which, for its proper execution, we would need to devote many pages which are not necessary for our present purposes. The accent of the interpretation would therefore naturally vary in accordance with the sources used. As a matter of imputation—who was responsible for taking the first steps—the presentation of the facts is blurred by perfectly natural justifications of one’s own innocence and of the guilt of the other side. Perhaps history will establish the truth one day. For the moment, however, our most accessible sources, which are those concerning the West, tell us for example that Roosevelt believed for a long time that his good intentions were shared by the other side and that it was therefore not necessary to renovate the traditional policy of equilibrium. It is impossible to presume what the other side really believed: all that we know is that it was something else. Now, such a transfer of responsibility does not in any way affect the internal logic of the historical process, and it should therefore be placed between parentheses in provisional form. The internal legality of the way events develop naturally led from Yalta to a confrontation between the powerful forces which had been thrown together as allies and were now reacting to the power vacuums and vacuums of influence which were emerging everywhere. The tension and the consequent confrontation had to take place, quite apart from what everyone’s intentions might be, as an inevitable result of the power relations in play, and this is sufficient for us from a sociological point of view.
Structural notes

From this point of view it is only possible to trace in their broad outlines some of the most characteristic features of this strange form of general coexistence which covered a period of approximately 20 years, from 1948 to 1968: the clarity with which it was perceived by both sides, the common silence on the significance of the perils of "total war", the inflexibility of the systems of ideas on which it was based, and the tremendous paradox of its economic consequences, which took the form of growth that was received with the greatest enthusiasm.

Thus, the way the cold war fitted together is a phenomenon which is easily visible and can be grasped with the greatest clarity. And the same is true both for the main protagonists and for the third parties involved. A situation arose in which, just as in the lasting social stratification of the Ancien Régime, everybody was perfectly conscious of the place he should and in fact did occupy. All the forms of internal or external, national and international conduct only exist and can be understood as obvious in the light of the inevitably present antagonism. This is so up to the point that when in certain years some countries define themselves as non-aligned, they do not need to declare the meaning of this nor ask what it means to abandon the ranks. The clear, sharp confrontation between the two superpowers brought with it a similar clarity or absence of doubt in the positions of allies and satellites, although sometimes among the latter there were those who were neither beloved nor sought. For this reason, it is necessary to bear clearly in mind the lineal expression of the profiles of the socio-political structure of the cold war in order to understand immediately the confusion produced when attempts to eliminate it or diminish it lead to the introduction of shades of colour in the depiction of its features. It is precisely these shades of colour that some circles deplore at the present moment.

In contrast with this almost diaphanous clarity regarding the fundamental assumptions about the peaceful coexistence thus initiated, there was an obscure awareness on the part of the beneficiaries of this peace both of its geographical limits and of its nature, which is really fragmentary and partial. In other words, there is an awareness of the fact that the indivisible nature of peace, which should cover the whole of mankind together, has been forgotten. It is a regrettable fact that human beings have always failed to heed the religious instructions to love their neighbour and have only regarded their "neighbour" in the strict sense of the very few members of their own more or less extensive group. It is also a fact that those who have been actual victims or surviving witnesses of past disasters subsequently tend to be relatively insensible to the troubles of others, especially when the latter are far away. It is just as true that there is a generalized and obvious moral insensibility, however. Scarcely any attention has been paid during the years of this peace generated by the cold war to the millions of human beings killed or harmed in the many "localized" conflicts or numbered among the victims of famines or other natural disasters. The experts know the approximate or exact figures involved, however, and when these are taken up and recalled by the spiritual authorities of our times—the philosophers or scientists—it is with the morally inexorable intention of rousing
the conscience of so many of us who are insensitive to the universal demands of a peace which can only be acceptable if it is full and indivisible. At a time when, through the first glimpses of détente, the organizational demands associated with a new peace are arising again for all of us, it is essential for the effective achievement of such peace to revive the permanent awareness that the peace sought for and desired can only be conceived as a single whole which is indivisible in its geographical extension and in its, so to speak, sectoral components: those corresponding to the political, economic and social aspects.

It is obvious that the second feature in the structure of the peace thus maintained by the tensions of the “cold war” scarcely calls for more detailed consideration, since it is so well-known that it is familiar to everyone. The fact that it has thus become just another subject of conversation is not without dangerous consequences, however. It is well known that the peace brought about through the cold war has led in its extreme manifestations to the classic apothegm si vis pacem para bellum, since it has consisted of the attempt—naturally altered and renovated in its progress—to reach an always fragile balance through threats so serious and terrifying that they raise the fear of one’s own annihilation, or rather, that of mutual destruction through the use of nuclear arms by the contending parties. The radius of the zones of inevitable death is undoubtedly superior to anything ever previously recorded in the history of warfare and it would appear that it can be measured with some exactness. It is these terrifying figures which have made it possible to speak of a holocaust for the whole of mankind in the strictest sense of the word. Man thus appears as the only being who has conceived and is now facing the suicide of his own species. As we have seen, persuasion by fear is the only means of continuing to induce him to preserve life. The topic referred to above is none other than that of the confidence aroused by this common perception of inexorable suicide. Up to what point can the pressure of such a limit situation work in any case? Even if it were feasible, such a digression would be beyond the scope of our intentions.

The fact is that the two superpowers—at any rate before the relative proliferation of nuclear weapons began—have so far been seeking, through the continually changing interplay of military parity, the balance that will ensure their own continuity and with this that of all their allies and satellites. But the confidence based on mutual military dissuasion through the terrible armaments available is purely technological and it has apparently silenced or pushed into the background the greater peril through which present-day man has passed and continues to pass: a peril which is not technological but psycho-social and in the final analysis a question of moral conscience. What it has been possible to avoid facing up to is the sociological menace of total war based on beliefs and not on types of armaments. Let us recall a brief typology in order to understand better the sense of these assertions. Thus, the fact which enables us to distinguish between the different types of struggles and conflicts which are apparently endemic among mankind is the limitation to which each one is subject from the very beginning. The old man-to-man combat, however violent it might be and however great the possibilities of death in it, had prescribed limits which were respected by all. Similarly, the inevitable violence of the dynastic and national wars which were typical of
the 18th and 19th centuries also had natural limits because of the recognition by the combatants of their own interests. It was not desirable to destroy the chances of continuation of a certain dynasty, nor was there any point for anyone in destroying the economic potential of the loser. For this reason, these wars were limited from the very start. In contrast, the so-called total conflicts are essentially unlimited. In struggles of this type the enemy is the incarnation of an absolute evil which must be completely extirpated. There can be no tolerance in his respect, and the destructive means used is unlimited until the “total” elimination of the enemy is achieved. In the history of the West, the most terrifying examples of this have been provided by the civil and religious wars.

But this same example of the religious wars which devastated Europe with arms which would be considered very primitive from today’s point of view provides a hopeful path for overcoming this type of antagonism, since the time came when tolerance became established, even though at the beginning it was only through the pragmatic and not very convincing principle of *cujus regio, ejus religio*. Eventually, however, this tolerance as a spiritual disposition became generally accepted as one of the fundamental human rights: that of freedom of conscience recognized by all liberally inspired political constitutions. But perhaps side by side with this same secularization the opposing religious ideas were converted into ideological conflicts whose violent totalitarian confrontation has culminated in the present times in an insurmountable conflict between economic and social systems, which are purely terrestrial forms of organizing society. Although this absolute confrontation seems less justified than its religious counterpart, since it contains no transcendental reference to salvation, the conflicts have not been any the less intense in our recent experience. Their nature of radical antagonism has prompted some philosophers of the history of our times to speak of the “civil war” unleashed in the West, because of its influence on the whole world. Such an ideological struggle appeared to be gradually giving way, up to the point that some hastened to proclaim the death of ideologies, although in fact these continued in vigorous life. What is important here, however, is that this ideological conflict constituted the most dangerous background, because of its moral character, for the confrontation between the naked power relations of the two superpowers—and of all the other countries—which is still the greatest difficulty even now that the process of détente appears to be starting.

This explains the fact that there has appeared among present-day writers the strange idea that détente can only be achieved when the military parity is accompanied by ideological parity. This formula is the result of analogical suggestion, of course, but as it is unintelligible in itself it brings out the uncertainty of the moment. It can be interpreted literally as a flatly inadmissible comparison. Parity in strategic or conventional armaments is something that can be calculated and kept in proportion both during a phase of increase and in one of decrease (disarmament), but it is incomprehensible to transfer this calculation to the field of ideas and to impose on them a proportionate limitation. No doubt this strange formula aims to declare something definite. Perhaps it is to be understood as the manner in which the old idea of tolerance returns once again in the present circumstances in new
clothing. In can also be interpreted as the renunciation, in a situation of parity, of the absolute and exclusive value of ideologies. At all events, the awareness of the mortal peril of radical ideological antagonisms shows a state of mind which is as healthy as it is timely, since neither tolerance nor the renunciation of any pretence of the absolute value of a doctrine signify the suppression of ideas or the permanent conflict which always accompanies their mutual presence. They do, however, signify a positive step in the selection of a morality of responsibility instead of a morality of conviction—to use Weberian terms—and of the corresponding policies. Never has it been so necessary as in our present complex world to follow a policy of responsibility which, instead of yielding blindly to an idea, value or doctrine, is capable of acting lucidly and measuring the immediate, secondary and relatively distant consequences of all actions and, while not pretending to make the largest number of people possible happy—in keeping with the now forgotten arithmetic—nevertheless tries to avoid, within the limits of its possibilities, the misfortune, misery and unhappiness of human beings.

The strategies of the cold war have avoided the final disaster of nuclear confrontation and have certainly avoided, without expressly setting out to do so, the moral degradation and complete depravation of human beings—even more serious than their physical destruction—that would occur in the agony of an ethically unlimited total conflict. In the years which have gone by, however, they have not prevented the repeated misfortunes of local wars which were already referred to when we were talking about the concept of indivisible peace. There is no need to make any excuses for this repetition since although some of these military conflicts originated in old unsolved historical disputes, others were waged tacitly on behalf of another power or arose through the contagion and copying of the struggles between the big powers, that is to say, as a result of the very structure of the cold war itself, as we shall see later. Quite apart from the human losses involved, these local wars several times forced the great powers to the brink of a breakdown of the sought-for coexistence, and above all they caused the countries involved, most of which were by no means rich, to waste on war materials the scanty resources which they should have used to keep the heads of their inhabitants above water by covering their most basic needs. It is scarcely necessary to repeat that these needs could have been satisfied several times over with only part of the resources spent each year by the powerful countries in their arms race.

It will therefore come as a surprise to nobody that there are few indeed who can accept today even as moderately satisfactory the peace which has reigned in the period dominated by the cold war. Quite apart from its basically unstable structure, the benefits obtained and the evils avoided scarcely compensate for the innumerable negative consequences which the human race as a whole still has to bear. Both the prophets of doom and the sincere utopian believers in good will continue to be justified for the moment.
The ideological pillars

At this point it is desirable to return to our path in order to bring out as briefly as possible another of the features of the structure of the cold war. Once again, this has to do with ideologies, and it may sometimes seem difficult to distinguish it from what has just been said, but in reality it concerns a different aspect, or at least a variation in the approach.

It is common nowadays among Dutch sociologists to use a term which originally grew up in the study of the political parties of that country and of their institutional assumptions. As the very special system of those parties—and of the social structures on which they are based—retained for many years a solid consistency immune to every attempt by the people to modify it, it was suggested by way of explanation of this phenomenon that it had been subject to a process of "pillarization", and this term was subsequently extended to any other social phenomenon which, for some reason or other, showed a similar petrified state of its structures. Such a fixity was in some ways invulnerable, but the sociologists in question did not have sufficient time to wait for the moment when, like the famous towers of Italy, they would give up to their great regret.

Although it is tempting to adopt this term because of its vivid descriptive value, the use of this neologism raises such syntactical and typographical difficulties that a determined rejection of it is indicated. This rejection, however, does not affect its content and the vividness of the reality which it tries to represent, since at the present moment the new feature of the sociological structure of the cold war to which we have just referred consists essentially of a process of rigidity to which both the institutions and the ideologies of the two main protagonists in the confrontation have been submitted.

A detailed analysis of this process of rigidity should simultaneously cover both social phenomena—i.e., the institutions and the ideologies—in order to determine for any given moment whether there were or not parallel tendencies and what the degree of reciprocity was. As it does not at present seem possible to make this type of analysis, it would appear to be preferable to consider only the ideology, since its configuration is more easily perceptible.

This is not, however, a critical study of the ideology itself, in which it would be possible to follow the line that its fixation is in keeping with its own logic: with the absence, for example, of an "intermediate stratum of experiences" (Freyer) in the development of its argument. What is most important for our present subject is the determination of the most simple or elementary extrinsic factors on which the ideological fixation in the tensions of the cold war depends. It can thus be sustained—with obvious simplification—that the ideological rigidity in question is due just as much to factors of external policy as to those of domestic policy.

The demands for fixation in the external policy relations seem to be very obvious, since the ideology is the indispensable banner under which the power displaying it carries out its attacks or defends itself. The symbolic elements involved in it must be traced in very broad outline, since any concession of shades and nuances would make identification impossible. Thus, the term "red"
has in different cases covered a very wide range of political positions. Moreover, this ideological rigidity in doctrine and its symbols strives to limit the possibilities of choices very narrowly. Anyone who has not made in time the right choice is described as imperialist, although this may actually be something very far from the mind of the person in question. The ideological fixation or inflexibility in the field of domestic policy is naturally connected with the demands of legitimacy. This does not, however, pretend to suggest that every “political doctrine” —in Mosca’s sense—is necessarily an ideology or a myth, nor that every legitimizing justification must also necessarily be rigid and inflexible. But in a case of tense confrontation like that of the cold war, ideological fixation is inevitable because in its positive doctrine of legitimation for domestic ends it includes in a kind of negative foreshortening the legitimizing doctrine of the enemy. It includes, therefore, all the fundamental exclusions: that is to say, the doctrine does not leave any loopholes at all that can be used by the opponent. The permanent negating presence of the opposing doctrine is what determines the rigidity of content of the assumptions of its own legitimacy.

The fact that ideologies put themselves forward as immovable pillars around which all external or internal policy must revolve has effects which are paradoxical in their double tendency, as in every similar process in social life. On the one hand, as happens in every fixation, there is the incapacity to adapt to certain alterations which actually take place in society or, even more serious, the incapacity to seek any timely “innovation”. On the other hand, the ideological rigidity serves at the same time as a blanket covering up the changes made and the possibilities of understanding them. Examples of this abound in recent years. But the most significant case on the whole lies in the famous argument about the supposed convergence between the opposed political and social systems, since the demands of legitimacy oblige both parties—although more vehemently in the case of one of them—to reject this discovery by certain circles of academics or intellectuals. These analyses of strict scientific data or of justified historical-and philosophical considerations shattered, from within the ideology itself, its irrenounciable legitimizing function.

Present-day internationalists frequently talk about the “messianism” of the superpowers. In the present atmosphere of secularization this term is not appropriate for designating the expansive impulse of these powers, but with some caution it would be possible to talk of their “missionary” attitude. The ideologies expound their respective missions, which it is not necessary to describe as they are very well known. Caution is called for, however, because sometimes indoctrination is not the result of the mission but is a sought-for instrument of bargaining-power. This is due to the intrinsic sociological structure of the cold war, because during its existence conflicts involving all types of specific policies have taken place as a function of the dominant ideologies. In these circumstances, military, political and especially economic support can only be obtained by ideological conformity, sometimes under the disguise of conversion. These facts are of the greatest importance to all those who ask, looking into the future, what will occur once détente has become stabilized or possibly even at the beginning of it. We will go into this later, but even before arriving at this stage the structure of the
cold war has already begun to display signs of its own exhaustion, which is the natural price of the rigidities already referred to. The gap between the pretensions of the ideology and the reality actually experienced has been perceived through a painful awareness of hypocrisy. It is this awareness of voluntary falsification which lies at the root of the recent protest movements—whether or not by young people—and of the ill-designated "countercultures". Moreover, it would not be out of place to recall that in the meantime the powerful heterodoxy of the Chinese revolution has also taken place.

**The irony of the "Belle Époque"**

By an ironical paradox of history—or quirk of Reason—the years of greatest difficulties and upheaval in the maintenance of the cold war have witnessed outstanding material enrichment, and not only in the so-called industrial countries. The reformed type of capitalism known as "neocapitalism" is flourishing in a manner which could not ever have been suspected by even the most optimistic at the time of the crisis—which was simultaneously a reality and a legend—of 1929. Moreover, socialism too, giving the lie to all the forecasts of failure to which it was condemned in advance because of its absence of calculability, can point to comparable successes. Both market economies and centrally planned economies show clear positive achievements which justify their declared emulation. On the side of the West there has been talk—no one knows with what degree of piercing irony—of a Belle Époque comparable to the few similar eras which preceded it. Of course, this is a Belle Époque which has been fully enjoyed only by a few, but nevertheless it has had positive aspects for others too who were more or less benefited by it. Nothing has been said of an era of this type on the Eastern side, although this would have perhaps been justified if one took into account merely the economic results and left aside the psychological question of the enjoyment of living. On both sides, whether or not fully aware of the facts, the people seem to be living quite happily the same paradox of enormous development in the shadow of catastrophe. This has not been paradise in the shadow of the swords, but nevertheless until a short time ago it was something which was very close to it.

It is in no way surprising that the magic term which spread everywhere like some "open sesame" of the moment was precisely that of development, although in its initial ambiguity it was confused with the concept of pure economic growth. Neither of these conceptual ideas, however, was really a historical novelty in itself.

The idea of development in its broadest sense was in a direct line of descent from the faith in progress which all the Euro-American peoples have shared since the Enlightenment. This idea is preserved almost intact in its oldest formula in one of the superpowers—the last great country which believes in the Enlightenment, it has been said—but even in the other superpowers it main-
tains similar dynamism through the complicated path of the German idealism which, in its last great Hegelian backwater, inspired the works of Marx in spite of the contradictions it contained.

The idea of growth is also dealt with directly or indirectly by all the figures of the classical school of economics, and this must be linked up—as it continues to be in some surprising aspects—with its consideration as a separate subject by subsequent economists. It is evident to all that as an economic idea it forms an integral part of the spirit of the Enlightenment and of its conception of progress. The special feature of the post-war period, however, is on the one hand the return to the idea of progress when the faith which had supported this had already been exhausted on almost all sides, either because of philosophical or moral disillusionment or because, as has been claimed in a convincing manner, the content of the aspirations or promises of that faith had already been completely fulfilled in the more specific contemporary historical circumstances.

The future was thus viewed through the outlook of progress when it had already ceased to exist as a common and indisputable belief.

But on the other hand—and this is what is most important today—this same ambiguity in the idea of development is what enabled it to convert itself with the same force into an ideology within the two dominating systems. Only when we look back from the present can we discern what passed unnoticed at that time. This is a task which only present-day historians can fulfill in all its complicated aspects. There is the fact, for example, that the idea of development as an ideology connected with both the dominating systems seemed at the beginning to be a mere concept of growth. Those were the years—as Myrdal points out somewhere—when the lay public was flooded with details of the competition to beat the figures for the production of copper or electricity, steel or cement, automobiles or radio and television sets, etc. These, then, were the years when the supreme indicator was that of the gross per capita product. This was an indicator which was sufficient and more than sufficient for any comparison, since it appeared to be capable, through its bare figures, of providing an interpretation of very different social phenomena. Only in the last few years has the validity of this almost absolute value begun to be doubted, as may be seen from the criticism of the obsession with production in general and the continuing effort to find the varied range of indicators needed for the analysis and understanding of real social life in all its complexity.

But be that as it may—the sense of a new critical awareness or the instrumental value of its means—the fact remains that the predominant use of the indicator in question shows the decisive significance of the growth aspiration as the major component in the idea of development sketched in the same ideological format by the supporters of the two declaredly opposed systems.

Apart from the riches obtained in the shadow of the nuclear menace, there is another decisive factor which is manifesting itself today in a generalized manner. Declared political goals on the one hand, with the effectiveness of the Marshall Plan and the promises of Point 4 technical assistance, and on the other the tangible results of the various plans which confirmed the forecasts of a new historical interpretation, gave rise on all sides to an awareness of development as a reality which could sooner or
later be achieved. This awareness put an end to the long-standing resignation to misery, sickness and early death, and all over the world the aspiration for development offered itself as an apparently irreversible de facto situation and a hope for a future which had previously scarcely been dreamed of.

This de facto situation is what has been called a “revolution of expectations”, more profound in its realization than the transitory revolutions to which it gave rise and the efforts at appraisal and reform which it also generated. But with the “revolution of expectations” as a venturesome result, a still unfinished period of historical impatience began: an impatience which, whether one likes it or not, wants to obtain rapidly what in other times and places was the result of centuries of a laborious conjunction of historical conditions rather than the effect of a sudden change in expectations. When, under the influence of the intense intellectual experiences of recent years, a book appeared with the impressive title of “L’Utopie ou la mort”, its author, although pitiless in his warning to the rich, nevertheless felt that he must be quite prudent in his advice to the poor in their anxious situation of impatience.

Latin America as an example

There can perhaps be no better example than that of Latin America for the situation whose general lines and significance were described above. In recent years, Latin America has not had to go through any process of decolonization nor suffer the diluting impact of so-called europeanization. Unlike other parts of the world, Latin America offered no examples of political forms of rigid and anachronistic traditionalism nor systems of Weltanschauung as different and separate from the Western ones as those of some other age-old cultures. The fact that there were still certain racial differences did not mean that there remained any acute confrontations of a tribal nature anywhere in the region. All this is because for centuries Latin America has formed part of such a characteristic and clearly defined set of nations as the West. It can be and has been described from an economic viewpoint, or if you prefer, in some parts from the point of view of a process of more or less rapid “acculturation”. The fairest and most correct view, however, is the full historic view which gives equal weight to all aspects of life and culture. Within this, although it might be desired for some reason to put the era of the Viceroy in parentheses, so to speak, it cannot be forgotten that the series of events which gave rise to independence set in motion a number of infant nations whose governing minorities—despite the contradictions of social reality—were oriented by the political and economic ideas which were the common heritage at that time of all the countries with a European tradition. Or, to be still more precise, the set of events which gave rise to independence set the identical stamp of a certain liberal inspiration everywhere. It is neither necessary nor desirable to describe here the details of the history of a century of such inspiration and the advances and failures in the
various countries. This should, however, be briefly recalled before returning quickly to the years with which this paper is really interested.

At the time when the theme of development and its great promise was being taken up with some ceremony, various Latin American governments had already set afoot economic policies in that direction, at least from the time of the great turmoil of the First World War. This was a perfectly natural and understandable fact which is only noted here in order not to condemn to undeserved oblivion the politicians who, in the second half of the nineteenth century, laid the basis of the infrastructure —roads, railways, bridges, etc.— which still remains in an improved form in the majority of countries of the region. But it is not our purpose here to right the wrongs of repeated injustices. We are merely pointing this out in order to stress that the idea of development and of its various mechanisms did not suddenly drop from heaven and that it was already a domestic aspiration and political goal in many countries and their governments when even the most backward parts of Latin America were hit by the impact of the external stimulus of the Developmentalist ideal launched by the „centres“ themselves and by the international organizations which they established.

The declarations made in the richer countries, whether by officials or by influential intellectuals, revealed a clear and honest perception of scientifically comparable real conditions. Although they were also prompted by another type of impulses: some deriving from a vague awareness which is no longer held, and others prompted by humanitarian tendencies stemming sometimes also from a selfish but dissembled perception of the crassest self-interest. Be that as it may, the fact is that in the late 1940s there came together in Latin America both everything that was already being sought within the area and the great incitements coming from abroad. Latin America’s real good fortune at that time was to have an international organization, run however by Latin Americans, which clearly stated with doctrinal coherence what had hitherto been perceived here and there, but only in a fragmentary and assuredly confused manner. This is not the place to relate the whole story over again, and in any case all those concerned certainly know it well. To sum up, what was no doubt already in existence in various groping studies was formulated by the Economic Commission for Latin America into the programme which was to prevail all over the region for many years: the well-defined project of so-called “substitution industrialization”, accompanied, as its technical support, by a set of hypotheses, some of which still maintain their validity despite the passage of time, although others today seem more open to discussion or to modification in the light of new experiences.

The CEPAL line seems to have maintained its sway throughout the whole region for two decades, either through its explicit acceptance or by virtue of internal criticism within CEPAL’s own orbit which maintained it as a point of reference. With the passage of time, the criticisms have been of another type and, whether or not justified, some of them call for a brief halt by us in this study, not in order to enter into a doctrinal defence at this point, but merely to try to understand what has happened in the past. Nothing could be more natural and self-evident than that the development policies then recommended and undertaken were conceived within the prevailing economic “system”, which was
moreover “hegemonic” with respect to the region. What could be called the first generation had to undertake its development policy by formulating goals and constructing techniques to be carried out within the system that it had inherited, and it encountered strong resistance and opposition in this. It is also easy to understand its favourable inclination, more often than not unexpressed, towards the formulation of a kind of Welfare State, within the various possible forms available in the light of the realities which had to be faced. We are not referring only to imputations of an apocalyptic nature: other more discreet ones nevertheless run into equal limitations. It is many years since the interpretative theory of “economic styles” came into circulation in penetrating studies of European conditions, but this does not mean that it should be accepted unconditionally. Perhaps through forgetfulness or ignorance of its existence, new generations will, in the rapid passing of intellectual fashions, take up the concept of “styles of development” from a point of view just as obviously critical as it is full of constructive intentions. What the school of economic styles brought out—undoubtedly as a copy of the historical school in general—is that the “economic systems” with their typical styles are not abstract constructions set in motion one fine day, but concrete configurations of the historical process which are here visible and operating in all their imperious presence. It may be noted in passing that the so-called styles of development are no different. They are fragments of the historical reality which incarnates them, and they offer limited options at particular moments which can only with difficulty be overcome through the analytical construction of what appears to be possible. Although there is nothing against the interest of such intellectual paradigms, they do not represent fixed and unobjectionable points from which to launch accusations of error against people who were within a particular style of development rather than another one in specific historical systems.

It is precisely now, as a consequence of historical changes whose forms and dimensions cannot yet be defined, that Latin America is once again in a critical situation and is therefore open to new expectations.

It appeared that the Alliance for Progress was bound to represent a decisive step in the development process begun in the post-war period in the whole region, and so it did to some extent. It represented the external impulse of greatest political weight among all the influences feeding the “revolution of expectations” in the region. But on the one hand it was nothing but a solemn formalization of the economic orientations current in the region a few years ago and already mentioned above, while on the other hand it is very likely that it came late on the scene and suffered from the negative aspect of its origin as a defensive reaction to the events in Cuba in 1962. Even so, the successes obtained through it would have been greater if action had been taken more rapidly and with more flexible administrative machinery than that set up at the time. This, however, was not the decisive feature of its lateness. At that time, the circumstances of international politics were benumbing the United States’ interest in its neighbours to the south, who had ceased to be treated as a group in multilateral relations and had little by little come instead to be dealt with under traditional bilateral procedures. All this, however, does not mean that a balance sheet of its positive results is not called for.
It must be borne in mind, however, that during the 1950s and 1960s, quite apart from the results obtained in actual Latin American development, the whole region has been showing marked progress in the training of its economists, followed only a little behind by other specialists in social sciences, and particularly sociologists. These were years of vigorous intellectual effervescence which were bound to have perceptible consequences on critical attitudes.

No one denies that during the whole of this time Latin America kept up a sustained rate of growth which, although it varied from country to country and showed ups and downs, was nevertheless expansive on the whole. Taking the dominant indicator of the gross product, the advance made is very positive. The same is true of what happened in certain specific sectors, such as the industrial sector in particular, and it is also possible to point to progress of a social nature—above all in education and health—which is really quite satisfactory whatever the yardstick used.

Not everything is so satisfactory, however. The widespread use of expressions such as “dependent semi-development” shows the existence of harsh criticisms which we will not take into account here. There are many who agree that the “system” has functioned at the cost of producing a marked “structural heterogeneity” both in the economic and social aspects. Others, following less extreme or heterodox lines, have stressed that the validity of some of the already classic hypotheses of CEPAL does not mean that the process can go on for ever without variations. Substitution industrialization, for example, seems to stagnate when it reaches a certain level, the biggest obstacle lying in external factors. This is a point which brings in, through the relative marginalization in the merchandise market and the financial field of investment, consideration of the newly-confirmed validity of the hypothesis of “external strangulation” and the realities of growing indebtedness. These points are well known to all and are only mentioned here because, coinciding as they do with the world crisis—that strange “stagflation”—Latin America is faced with the still problematic prospects of the assumed breakdown of the cold war, the probable results being different depending on the result of the détente which has been begun. This is the precise subject of these exploratory pages.

IV

From the cold war to détente

Conceptual elements

Détente, in the specific sense which is the subject of this paper, is by no means an enigma incomprehensible to present-day public opinion. Everyone knows in principle what it is about: that there may be a relaxation of the power relations between the great powers which will reduce the strong tensions that exist between them, from which all the other countries suffer in turn to some extent.
It may be just a breathing space or the beginning of a prolonged period of common security. Over this general significance, however, there hangs like a symbolic misfortune the essential equivocacy of the French word which is generally used here, since détente, which comes from the verb détendre, also originally meant the act of loosing the crossbow, an instrument of war. This original ambiguity, which gives a good idea of the contradictory attitudes aroused by the concrete possibility of détente, continues to affect the word in other forms right up to today. But there is no call for haste. On the contrary, it is advisable to carry on step by step with the examination of the various aspects displayed by the subject of détente, depending on whether it is considered as a de facto situation, as a process which is in progress, as an ultimate goal or purpose, or as an intellectual problem, that is to say, purely as a matter for study.

A de facto situation is created by its mere presence, by its emergence as a new phenomenon in present conditions which is within the experience of everyone, whatever their favourable or adverse prejudices may be. As in every matter of immediate topicality, however, the dangers involved in its treatment are very great. The biggest danger, as always, is that of lagging behind events, which confront us without leaving us a breathing space. The academic is rather scared of having to compete with the journalist, who is more accustomed to the task. But he cannot abide by the historian's warnings regarding lack of distance and perspective either, since it is not so much a question of something in the immediate past as something in the immediate future. Consequently, the other danger which accompanies the foregoing and even derives from it to some extent is that of the emotional charge generated as a reaction to this phenomenon. Either sympathy or anxiety may be the dominant emotion: the good wishes extended to certain facts or the aversion to them because they are felt to be a possible threat to one's interests and convictions. Anyone who reads the daily papers can quickly accumulate many examples of both types. However, anyone who is only interested in principle in studying the matter must accept the only possible way, that of intellectual reflection with permanent awareness of the dangers which threaten, because it really is worth the trouble to try to form some clear ideas on a phenomenon which affects all of us equally, even though the effort may finally be a failure.

For this reason it is necessary first of all to stress energetically that détente, as an emerging presence in the present circumstances, is nothing more than that. It is a process which is on the move, but in no way is it a de facto situation with well-defined limits. It is therefore a movement which can succeed or fail and which calls for its study to be adapted to its nature as a form of transition towards something whose actual features are not yet clear to us and which may or may not coincide with our desires or dislikes. As long as the process lasts it cannot be anything but ambiguous, depending on the point of view from which it is approached. The fact is there, however, just like that of its apparent initiation.

What does détente signify as a goal, as the determining purpose of this movement, however? Which sense of détente obliges us, as its logical principle, to take it most seriously? Can we, as third persons, be mere indifferent onlookers or are we instead vitally interested participants in a common matter? There
is not the slightest doubt about the answers to these questions. The détente between two great powers of which we are not part interests us as participants because the common destiny depends on its results. What is involved historically is something more than the solution of a stalemate in such a way as to replace the exchange of threats with an exchange of mutually friendly gestures which is agreeable to look upon for a generously disinterested spectator. What is really involved is the passage from a type of peace which is basically unsatisfactory on account of its nature to another which is more universally convincing and durable. This transition consists of the replacement of the structure of peace based on the strategies of the cold war with a form of authentic co-operative coexistence which no one needs to enter with mental reservations. In brief, what is involved is the possible assertion of the suppositions underlying this new organization of peace of which we spoke at the beginning of this paper: an organization which is really universal and in which no country feels itself to be a prisoner of forced unilateral dependence, while no country is in a position either to use such dependence voluntarily to serve its own particular interests. This is a peace which goes beyond mutual and general fear of nuclear catastrophe and involves co-operation and common tasks which in more than one case also involve facing threats which, though distant, are nonetheless perilous for the whole of mankind.

It would be bordering on utopianism if we were to think of immediately dispensing with the realistic consideration of power relations, which are an inevitable necessity for a long time to come, or if we were to believe that the “world authorities” required in various fields of activity can be set up rapidly and completely within a short space of time. What all those who are interested in and familiar with the matter ask for is simply the achievement of a “minimum model” of peace adequate for the problems of our times. But even such an incomplete model would still demand prolonged and patient effort in order to bring it to fruition. Nothing gives a better idea of what is demanded by the objective of détente than the fact that the gradual replacement of the structure of the cold war with another more stable system is not just a question of a new organization of peace in its general lines, but a question of the conditions of possibility of what has been proposed almost unanimously in the various projects on a “new international economic order”. Since such an order is inconceivable as an isolated and dependent step, this gives the current proposal an indisputable utopian flavour. How could a new monetary system work, for example, if, as up to the present, the Socialist powers played no part in its operation? The same doubts apply to the realization of each and every one of the agreements which an intellectual analysis shows to be absolutely indispensable. How is it possible to organize, without general co-operation, a world authority to deal with the problem of food or the orientation of science and technology for the service of all; how is it possible to achieve stabilization of the trade in the various commodities to the mutual benefit of rich and poor countries, or the just distribution of the burdens of financial assistance, or the joint exploitation of the sea bed, etc.? These and other problems require, as an essential precondition for any attempt at their solution, the prior existence of a world-wide system of organization of peace which includes a toned-down or at least a
reciprocally moderated form of the naked power relations which still operate in accordance with the laws of the jungle on the international scene.

After these rapid and almost glancing references to the various aspects raised by détente, all that remains is for us to view it as an intellectual problem, as a straightforward subject of study. As such, it has the indefinite character of a process which has known origins but is limitlessly open as far as its termination and completion are concerned; moreover, it is a phenomenon whose perceptible reality is immediate and is therefore in intimate contact with us. In this double guise it calls for our interest in different ways and gives rise to methodological reflections, which will not however be gone into here. In its character of a process which is open to an unknown future it belongs to what used to be called a few years ago futurological research or, more modestly, in accordance with more recent trends, prospective studies. The reason for such changes in terminology goes deeper than just a passing semantic preference and it would be interesting to go deeper into its analysis at another time. For the present, it is sufficient to know that to many people futurology appears suspect either because its subject, as far as the pure future is concerned, does not exist as such, thus giving its title an excessively pretentious air, or because according to other people what appears to be a very new science is nothing but a return to what was always in fact the philosophy of history.

The title of prospective studies thus appears as more moderate and circumscribed, although the subject is the same. Be that as it may, détente as an intellectual problem is included without the slightest doubt in concern about the future, which is intrinsically uncertain. On the other hand, however, it is so rooted in the present that its possible tendencies are predictable by simply prolonging some distance ahead what is already known. Here, there is a difference in the time horizon which determines a particular methodological position. It is not possible to go into this in greater detail at the moment, but it may be noted that its long-term nature is a characteristic of any futurological research, as is shown by all contemporary studies made by the most varied techniques; this extended time dimension is considerably cut down, however, in the prospective studies which use the instrument of the construction of scenarios, especially in keeping with their sought-for or pretended degree of historical saturation. When, as in the case of détente, its open process has to pass from unlimited nature in principle to what is in fact a limited space of time if it is not to be deprived of any possibility of success in its aims —since if it is not achieved within a reasonable length of time it loses its significance— its prospective analysis also has to be carried out in the light of a length of time which is of course unforeseeable but is nevertheless relatively short. As in the case of the historically saturated scenarios, what is involved is a future which is fairly close, although not immediate. This is at once the attraction and the difficulty of this type of study.

Another characteristic of futurological studies which is usually effectively complied with is their global nature. The universe dealt with in them is the real universe of the whole world. In keeping with this requirement, the prospective study of détente would also have to be global and would also have to consider the effects of détente on the largest possible number of countries of
the world. The study proposed in this paper, however, is only fragmentary because it focusses its interest on Latin America. Pragmatic reasons make this necessary, although supplementary elements may be added later. In spite of this reduction in scope, however, it is a task which goes beyond the capacity of a single person—not only is it necessary to keep up with a copious bibliography but also to follow day by day the growing journalistic disputes over events—and can therefore only be carried out by a well-equipped multidisciplinary team. For the moment, we will content ourselves with the provisional tracing of a few fundamental lines.

By way of tailpiece to the above notes it seems that some reference should now be made to a question which, in other circumstances, would warrant a whole chapter. This question is not so important in itself at this moment, however, nor can it be answered here in a satisfactory manner. It would involve specifying how détente has been generated and noting if there are any phases of special interest in that progress. Just as in the case of the cold war in itself, however, this story is still to be written by competent specialists. There does not yet seem to be sufficient agreement among them on this point, and the papers which some of them are taking out of their archives give different dates for the beginning of détente. The only consensus on this point is that this process of détente began before the agreement on principles solemnly signed by Nixon and Brezhnev. Furthermore, the stages that would have to be gone over also include the ups and downs in the progress of the agreement on the limitation of strategic arms (SALT I which is now over and SALT II which is still pending), and these, because of their complicated technical nature, are beyond even the best-intentioned efforts of the layman in these matters.

In the following pages we will have to limit ourselves to designing three different types of questions of very different interest. The first group refers to the strict power relations during and after détente, which are of particular importance not only to politicians but also to professional internationalists. The other two groups are of more general sociological interest and refer to the consequences of détente in various fields and to the various scenarios that its possible forms may assume. It should be noted immediately that in both cases the writer has had to abide by and use the plausible assumptions and reasonable arguments—which therefore can be falsified in proving them—that may be found more or less precisely and clearly in the contemporary bibliography of books and periodicals available to any interested person.

**Power relations in the era of détente**

When following up some of the analyses which exist regarding the effective power relations during the process of détente or its assumed achievement, it is necessary to be on the watch for a double error which frequently creeps in. On the one hand, there is the belief that détente can put an immediate end to the lightho
existing politico-military power confrontations. On the other hand, there is the tendency to equate economic power with political power in the strict sense, that is to say, in the sense of constituting an autonomous decision-making centre in the international field. The content which is logically implicit in the movement of détente is assumed to go beyond a mere advance in nuclear disarmament and in the expansion of trade or other exchanges between the superpowers, but this objective, which is what interests all the others and is therefore applauded by them, is still far from showing signs of becoming a reality. It would therefore be necessary to add to the double potential error already mentioned the error which would result from a premature transposition of the desirable to the actually existing.

For years now, the fact that some minor countries have opted for or rather have declared in favour of a policy of rejecting any affiliation—a policy of non-alignment simply tolerated as inoffensive even when it was carried on as a rather crafty little game designed to further certain national interests—has lent credence to the belief that the so-called bipolar relationship has disappeared or is on the way to doing so. The strengthening of the power of other countries—particularly the economic power—also seemed to confirm, through the appearance of these other centres, the theory that the bipolar relationship was being replaced by another more complicated one. At the present time the announcements of détente—especially in view of the presence of the new China—are also interpreted by some as further indications of the dissolution of the previous historic bipolar axis. The analogy with certain moments in the past also gives grounds for thinking that there is a possibility that a new era of balance of power might arise, comparable to that imposed in Europe as a result of the Holy Alliance, which lasted almost intact until the First World War. Both these things are problematic, however. It is indeed doubtful whether the bipolar relationship, as the foundation of the balanced structure of the cold war, has disappeared or shows any immediate signs of doing so. Neither the existence of other nations with limited nuclear potential nor the emergence of Chinese power have altered the basic fact that the extreme capacity of dissuasion continues to be in the hands of the same two superpowers. Even the existence of the famous triangle of the United States, the Soviet Union and China reaffirms the original bipolarity, since all the relationships possible within it fundamentally exist only with reference to one or the other of the two superpowers. The assumed disappearance of the bipolar relationship will consequently be doubtful if not impossible for a long time to come.

Nor does it seem conceivable that, in the creation of new power relationships, it would be possible to form a power structure like the European one, made up throughout the history of that continent by half a dozen clearly defined powers. What are the powers which, in a known number and form, could make up in the next few years a balance of power similar to the peace arranged by Metternich? Here confusion arises between political and military power and economic power, this confusion being particularly obvious, for example, in the repeated references to the European Community. This Community is an undeniable centre of radiation of the economic power which it possesses but it is not yet a political community—it is not known when it will become such a
community— and much less is it a community with its own decision-making organs in the field of international politics.

The consequences of détente

Alongside the assertion—which could be sustained up to a certain point—that the dominant bipolar relationship of decisive power is supposed to have disappeared, there are other assumptions of objective possibilities which circulate with various degrees of certainty.

One of these is the supposed "deglobalization" of the political attitudes and positions of the hitherto antagonistic great powers. What is meant by this not particularly felicitous term is the loss of interest of each of these in being present in all parts of the earth—regardless of whether they are conflictive or not—where its hegemonistic pretensions of one kind or another may be affected. The plausibility of the argument runs along two different lines. One refers to the role of world policeman which one or other of the powers might take upon themselves, although in fact only one of them seems to have played this part, or to have been accused of playing it. In any case, this role appears to have become vacant due to its abandonment by that country, and there are no candidates—and perhaps never will be—for filling the vacancy thus left. In reality, intervention on the grounds of global interest was always limited in its literal sense by reasons of political prudence, that is to say, by the mutual granting of greater or larger areas of non-intervention. The validity of this argument lies in the reasons favourable to the continuation of these attitudes of moderation once the policy of détente continues more or less seriously, in spite of its ups and downs.

The theme of the supposed "deglobalization" can also be reached by another more indirect path: one which once again leads us to the already mentioned question of the renunciation by the great powers of their missionary attitude—some would say their messianic attitude—towards the other countries. The hypothesis thus brought into consideration would have to be formulated in this way: the abandonment of a measure of a global nature by the superpowers will bring with it a parallel abandonment of the superpowers' interest in imposing on the other countries their own conception of the world and of life. The question is by no means simple, and it cannot be denied that it is still a very thorny matter in some respects. The more or less rapid succession of hegemonic powers has always brought about the radiation of the powers' own cultures—their usages, ideas and literary creations—through their political sway, and in this sense the decline of one of the powers could be measured by the slow or rapid disappearance of its spiritual influence.

This does not mean, however, that the small countries have ever been condemned to permanent obscurity as regards their own values: the Scandinavian countries, for example, did not need to rise to the pinnacle of political power in order to secure the universal diffusion of Ibsen, Strindberg or Kierkegaard. Nor
is it necessarily true that the undeniable cultural influence which accompanies the triumph of power has always been something deliberately sought and pursued. On the other hand, it cannot be forgotten that the propagation of a doctrine -whether deliberately or by the mere fact of its presence- is subject to the tendencies to fatigue and tiredness which are well known and clearly formulated by students of modern propaganda techniques. The effects of a sustained missionary indoctrination campaign by a great power are subject to the same law, not only in other countries, as passive objects of the action, but also in the active centre itself. Consequently, the abandonment of a militant missionary position by one or other of the superpowers may have nothing to do with the abandonment of their policies in the global framework. Careful analysis of some present phenomena -both inside and outside the great powers- would perhaps confirm the principle of fatigue with visions of the world which have begun to cloy through repetition.

The delicacy of this subject at present is due, however, to other reasons which only arise when the defence of a particular conception of the world implies the radical negation of another conception considered to be the absolute enemy and to be totally unworthy of acceptance or respect. This case was already referred to earlier when we mentioned the necessarily annihilatory nature of total conflicts, which are latent in the most decisive contemporary antagonism. But historical experience and the awareness of the disastrous moral results of such antagonism -the awareness of the senselessness of absolute confrontation- may break down, as at the end of the wars of religion, both the affirmative and negative attitudes. It is possible that something similar is occurring in our own days, particularly where the doctrinal confrontation includes technical problems which are suitable subjects for a dispassionate examination.

The moment which is recognized as being most critical and difficult in the achievement of détente, however, is that which involves linking a doctrine with a principle of legitimacy. Its complete abandonment -perhaps the position would not be so serious in the case of partial or fragmentary abandonment- would be equivalent to the destruction of that principle. If this fact, which is very well known, is recognized then it is difficult to speculate about possibilities. The prospective analyses required at this point must be very specific and must be followed up step by step and almost day by day, without denying in advance a certain horizon of flexibility, in view of the great variety of objective possibilities offered by the maintenance of a conservative position capable of maintaining forms in the midst of important changes of facts.

Regionalization

Internationalists who consider deglobalization as one of the consequences of détente see as the other face of the medal the tendency towards concentra-
tion through regionalization. This assumed regionalization is open to question, however, both as regards its possibility and as regards its significance, that is to say, in both ways. Let us begin by recalling that the suspicion that the present superpowers may lose their universal view is in itself doubtful or problematic. Indeed, what is happening is rather the contrary, and because of the increasing interdependence of the world this (globalizing) view is not only bound to continue in the positions of the great powers but will also obligatorily spread, as a condition of survival, to all the other countries, whether great or small. No one can avoid having to acknowledge that—to paraphrase the classical saying—no man is an island. Secondly, regionalization is not a novelty which may be encouraged by the abandonment by the other views, but a reality which already exists in the obvious presence of various blocs. There are of course blocs of a politico-military nature, like those already referred to, but there are also those of an economic nature which do not coincide fully with the others. At present, in addition to the Soviet-dominated socialist bloc (leaving aside for the moment China, which is also socialist) there is the bloc of industrial market-economy societies which is just as clearly defined. This brings us back to the tendency already noted to confuse or identify with each other the different forms of power in the strictly political and economic aspects. Thus, if the decisive triangle in the pure power relationship is that made up of the United States, the Soviet Union and China, the bloc based on economic trade relations among the great neocapitalist centres is also of a triangular nature, with the first-named country at one of the apexes while the others consist of the European Economic Community and Japan.

For some countries, particularly those of Latin America, it is above all this triangle which dominates their scene from the economic point of view. How long and to what extent will these blocs and their powerful influence last? The answer to this is one of the most important points in any prospective analysis at present. There is, however, an evident fact which can be brought out in advance, namely, the significance that the assumed regionalization could have as a result of the postulated détente. This is so because the persistence of these and other blocs and the regional fixing of interests and influences contradict or nullify the aims of the new forms of organization of peace as the nucleus of the hopes which all of us place in the effective realization of détente. Nobody could possibly believe that in the initial period of the process the blocs of the two types which dominate today and their respective hegemonic pretensions will melt away as if by magic, but the really worthwhile success of détente lies precisely, in the final analysis, in the mutual limitation of such pretensions so as to improve the manoeuvring capacity of all the other countries.

There therefore seems to be no need to stress what the assumed regionalization would involve. In its aspects of politico-military power it would bring with it the inevitable monolithic consolidation of the unfortunate zones of influence, without any possibility of escape. Within these zones, as internationalists point out, there would be a fixing of the various webs of domination which stretch out from the immediate neighbouring security cordon—the glacis of the fortress—and cover to various extents the territories extending up to
the frontiers of the other zones. In its economic aspects, the persistence of blocs —whose favourable or unfavourable influence cannot be ignored and must be examined in each case with the greatest objectivity— would involve the persistence also of the traditional obstacles to the diversification of trade, together with the continued deterioration of the international market in which all countries participate, regardless of whether they are great or small, socialist or capitalist.

In order to conclude this section aimed at situating in its proper place the play of power relations during the attempt to bring about détente, there remain two questions which particularly occupy the attention of specialists but which, without denying their importance, are only of secondary interest for the purposes of this paper. I mean, of course, that their detailed consideration is of secondary interest. One of them arises from the following question: which are the powers that benefit from the present circumstances, and what, therefore, is their situation in the immediate future? The reply usually gives three main beneficiaries, although there are other possible beneficiaries whose importance is less clear and which may be left aside here. The three beneficiaries in question are Europe, China and Japan, but although we do not wish to go further into this subject at present it should be remembered that when dealing with questions of power what is important is not just military capacity and the power of a solid economic structure, but also the political will of the leaders and that of the citizens, which provides support and at the same time guidance for them. If there is not a decided political will, then any reference to the other assumptions of power is ipso facto inoperative.

It is naturally China which gives rise to the greatest perplexity and consequently the most diametrically opposed opinions. There are disputes over whether China is already a superpower at the same level as the other two or if it is just a large power which, despite its lesser importance, has made a spectacular and decisive entry into the international arena. As an economic unit, it is far from occupying the third place in industrial production as yet, and great stress is laid on the long efforts that will be needed for it to reach first place in the indicators of the gross product in view of the immense size of its population and the as yet unforeseeable results of a system of equalitarian socialism which has so far been adhered to with vigorous fidelity. Although it has nuclear weapons, its military capacity appears for the time being to be defensive or of a containing nature rather than offensive and threatening. Moreover, it is stressed that despite its political influence on some Third World countries, China has shown little missionary spirit or messianic expansion today or in its long tradition extending back over thousands of years; instead it has played with great self-assuredness —considering itself the “centre of the world”— the repeated role of cultural attraction and has shown an outstanding capacity to assimilate its own invaders.

It may be noted in passing that the interest aroused on all sides by this country today —as we shall see later in the field of the ideologies— recalls that aroused by traditional China among the enlightened Europeans of the eighteenth century and continually renewed among those unfamiliar with it by every contact, however superficial, with some of the books of the best sinologists. The intellectual attraction exercised by China has been a constant reality which has
been revived now by the experience of its revolution and its successive embodiments, which are undoubtedly difficult to understand at a distance even with the aid of the clearest possible explanations. Returning to the realities of the present day, however, it seems indisputable that China is the great beneficiary of the present changes in the systems of power. Japan is very definitely an economic power with its own field of influence in Asia and great commercial and financial importance for the rest of the countries, but it is still under the protective nuclear umbrella of the United States, and it is not easy to predict how and when it will be able to act with full political independence in international relations.

As regards Europe—or rather the European Economic Community—it is not necessary to go over again what has already been stated and is well known. It is an imposing economic area, but it is not yet a unified political area with its own autonomous bodies capable of taking international power decisions.

The second question posed by the experts undoubtedly comes within the field of the sociology of power, which we have already been discussing in its main lines, since consideration of this question definitely involves that of the problem of whether the alterations in power relations felt to be likely in the era of possible détente really constitute a diffusion or a vacuum of power. Although detailed analysis of this problem would take us too far away from the subject, it can be argued, firstly, that the expansion of the "club" of the countries with nuclear weapons is a peril capable of smashing the voluntary mutual civility—the balance of dissuasion—of the two superpowers. A minor power could sell its arms of this type or part of its nuclear generating capacity to other countries involved in conflicts. Moreover, the fear has been voiced that even a modest stock of atomic arms would be sufficient to become an element of blackmail if some small countries became desperate about the conduct of the big powers. Apart from such possibilities, the power vacuum—which is a consequence of the renunciation or indifference of the superpowers—could also manifest itself in the outbreak of certain conflicts with a long historical background between medium-sized or minor countries, and even if only the so-called conventional weapons were used in these, the effects would be nonetheless destructive in view of the small area in which they would be employed. The supposed power vacuum also includes other well-known phenomena which could spread or spring up in certain situations and at certain times, such as guerrilla wars or acts of organized terrorism. War is a chameleon, as A. Aron so rightly said. We must leave these questions on one side, however, not only because they take us away from our subject but also because of the assumption already stated earlier that the true sense of détente—its success or failure—lies in whether or not its organization and achievement can lay the basis for a peace which makes such phenomena difficult or very unlikely.
Having thus completed this rapid incursion into the strict field of positions of force in present-day international relations, which only serves as a necessary background, we will try to take up those aspects of détente which affect us most directly both existentially and as regards their interest from the point of view of a social science without any tendency towards specialization. We already stated earlier what our immediate perspective now is: namely, one that attempts to determine how far it is possible to forecast the consequences of détente, that is to say, its likely repercussions in the various fields of domestic policy, ideologies and economic activity, insofar, of course, as this can be considered analytically as separate fields. Before we set about this, however, it is essential that we should make a methodological recapitulation. Firstly, it must be postulated from the beginning, setting aside all types of doubts, that détente is a process which is in progress although it is not yet fully complete. Secondly, the prospective analyses necessarily deriving from the efforts undertaken cannot be anything but purely exploratory: they define a framework of presumed situations whose conditions of objective possibility can only be specified through the execution of detailed empirical studies which are beyond our scope at this time. The proposals that can be put forward, however, are not purely speculative — in their literal sense — since they are based on experience of reality although they do not yet permit the causal imputations to which any interpretation of a scientific nature must pretend. It is not necessary to stress that the assumptions of our immediate examination and the proposals which contain them are already to be found in various forms of expression in the abundant literature which includes contributions by competent specialists of the most diverse affiliations and disciplines.

The search for a new identity

It is usual to indicate, as the most immediate repercussion of détente on the main protagonizing powers and their allies in the domestic political field, the need for an awakening of awareness of the actual functioning of their respective institutions: that is to say, the urgent need for an examination of their present political systems — organs, practices, procedures, etc. — and of the nature of the personality and political culture defined through them. There is thus affirmed, as a close possibility, what may be described in Anglo-Saxon terms as the search — reminiscent of a social psychology of Freudian heritage — for a new identity, that is to say, the attempt to find an autodefinition of themselves in the light of the modified circumstances.

The argument, which does not always proceed in this explicit form, starts from the old idea of the primacy of external policy over domestic policy. The profound change in the former which the proposed détente brings with it can hardly fail to be reflected in the latter, since this loses an important part of its goals and orientations. The structure of the cold war, with its vigorous limitation of the enemy and of
antagonistic doctrines, at the same time fixed the ambit of the internal confrontations: both the admissible and the inadmissible. The play of political ideas and organizations was restricted by the peril represented by the presence of the enemy. This is a concrete manifestation of old sociological propositions about the relationship between one's own group and an alien group. The alterations in the conformation of the alien reference group affect the nature and type of cohesion of the former. Insofar as the protagonists in the cold war are freed from the restrictions imposed by its rigid structures, they feel obliged, in response, to find new means of consensus. The formula of the quest for a new identity is none other than the formula of concern to find a new political consensus. The process of détente, and even more so its full achievement, imply a generalized crisis in the form of this consensus that has prevailed for so many years, and the crisis in this consensus brings with it the examination of the validity —felt to be self-evident until today— of various institutions.

This demand for the reflex review of a country's own political structure, implied as one of the immediate consequences of détente, is accentuated by the demands of historical developments, since it is felt that in the near future there is bound to be a renewal of the leading circles on both sides, on the one hand through the machinery of the electoral system, and on the other by the inexorable law of the vital cycle, which keeps bringing new generations to the fore.

The arguments put forward are completely plausible, that is to say, completely reasonable, as far as the propositions on which they are based are concerned. It is necessary to add to this form of sociological disquisition, however, that which derives from historical experience and reveals the general exhaustion of some institutions which now have many years of existence to their credit. Without a detailed history of the recent past covering economic, political, social and cultural matters—a history of an era which culminates in our times with manifest signs of deterioration and visible changes—it is very difficult to understand and even more so to prove the hypothesis in question which imputes to détente—perhaps an effect in itself—the necessary determination or conditioning of the very serious problems of political consensus in which the majority of States now find themselves. Such history could by no means form part of the work described in these pages, however.

This quest for a new identity is to be observed on all sides, almost without exception. Thus, it is to be seen both in the case of the United States and the Western democracies and that of the Soviet Union and even China.

The United States and the main industrial countries of Western Europe have in common the fact that they have offered for two decades what seems to be irrefutable historical proof of the equivalence or parity between riches and democracy and have served as the model which the theorists of modernization hold up so insistently before all the supposedly backward countries as the goal which they should seek. It must be recognized, however, that for the Europeans this model has not ceased to be novel. So much so that in view of the undeniable graphic expression of this situation in the bulb-shaped figure of its stratification by income or status, the sociologists of that continent, of the most varied affiliations to left or right, have spent a great deal of time on defining the sense of this type of
society: What denomination should be given to industrial societies from this point of view? Homogeneous? Made up of middle sectors? Made up of middle classes at relatively similar levels? The precise answer is not important for the moment. What is important, in contrast, is the fact that in this structure it seemed that the great social tensions of other days were disappearing from its surface and that as a result of their institutionalization or of compromise the various class differences and antagonisms which had shown up so acutely in the previous social history of these countries had been kept in the background, although not completely suppressed, of course. It is quite true that Western Europe had not yet fulfilled the hopes of all those who expected from it the realization of the first model of liberal socialism, although there had not previously been any concrete example of this in history, but at the same time even those persons accepted the approximation to this provided by such a social structure based on an economic system of a predominantly mixed character. In the last few years, however, the situation has proved less satisfactory, and signs of cracking up are appearing on various sides.

The present circumstances of the greatest democratic power, the United States, are known to all and this is no place to go into them in detail. The domestic repercussions of the Vietnam adventure, the bursting of unsuspected political scandals, and other inconsistencies in the United States régime keep up the impression of the urgent need experienced by the country to try to rehabilitate its flawed personality, which has been so prominent until today to all of us that, as has so rightly been pointed out, everything that went on in that nation—good or bad—had almost inexorable repercussions on the other countries. Take, for example, the effects of the rebellion of the young people and the various efforts at countercultures which sprang up there and spread in a more or less attenuated form to many other countries. What features is the sought-for new identity likely to have? What are the elements which will finally establish themselves and which are indicated by experts? A swing to the extreme right? Some form of radicalism? A reconstruction of the traditional more or less conservative “progressive” line in its democratic institutions? Only the coming years will show, but at the same time it is possible to make reasonable forecasts.

Generally speaking, all the industrial democracies are faced in the search for their own identity with the same problem which de Tocqueville’s futurological fears brought to our attention many years ago: the danger of a democracy which is on the point of converting itself into a tyranny of the majority and forgetting its great liberal component. It is also quite true, however, that at the other extreme from this danger is the peril that the liberal position may amount to the same thing as the exclusion of any capacity for running and governing the country. It would therefore appear that the next common effort to be made by all democratic systems is a task of restoration. Restoration is a word of ill repute in many circles, and it is therefore necessary to clear it from this misunderstanding, since what is involved is not the patching or whitewashing of the manifest flaws in the existing façades, but a process of strengthening the foundations as deeply as possible. It simply means reconstructing everything that past life has shown to be lasting and valid among the original inspirations: i.e., all the values and organizational
elements which have remained firmly established in the present system and are really quite numerous. This is why there has rightly been talk of the tasks of a new liberalism, as suggested by, *inter alia*, R. Darhendorf from his European point of view. Since we feel that this is one of the best summaries of this matter, let us recall that Darhendorf said that a liberal defence programme can be conceived today with the aim of safeguarding the beneficial effects of the “citizens” from the dangers of perversion involved in the attempt to make them too perfect. He went on to indicate some of the limits which are already being passed, such as the limits in education regarding the classical idea of equality of opportunity, the limits in political activity connected with an excessive conception of participation capable of immobilizing any political system, and the limits of a pretended sectoral democracy which only favours by this fragmentation the interests of particular groups. If these limits are not recognized, the liberal tradition is in danger of breaking up. “There is a suicidal tendency in ‘the citizen’—a death-wish which seems particularly marked at present.” In brief, the perils of the present democracies seem to be manifesting themselves as phenomena of erosion which the publicity of their regimes undoubtedly reveals quite clearly.

In contrast, it is said, the perils of the Soviet-inspired socialist systems lie in the possibility of more concealed explosive phenomenon, of the rapid release of suppressed latent tensions. A delicate question is raised by this form of approach, and it could only be accepted with reservations as the starting-point of an attempt to make forecasts. Those who are outside the almost esoteric circle of the Kremlinologists can only follow a few trails in seeking the possible courses that will be taken by the new form of political consciousness of the Soviet world as a consequence of détente. Among these are the indicators of the questioning minority either inside the country or in exile, but these indicators give little idea of the real extent of this. If we take literally the declarations made by a famous novelist, the volume of scepticism and of resigned or cynical acceptance of the official doctrines is of such magnitude that it is difficult to understand how repression manages to contain its effect. It is more reasonable to assume, however, that the majority of those who are protesting do not attack the system under which they were born directly and in itself, but only a more or less large number of its imperfections, which can only be appreciated when they have been experienced within the system. Another path is to be seen in the intellectual output of university academics of the satellite countries, who deal fundamentally with the still-unfulfilled promises of a transition to a situation of liberty in the imprecise phase of full communism or of the total suppression of any type of alien beliefs. The heterodox deviations most widespread in the West derive from this philosophical criticism. Thus, while the first path is based on statistics which are at present unknown or unsatisfactory, the second is situated at rarefied heights of metaphysics which cannot normally be reached by ordinary public opinion. The conditions of objective possibility—those which are of interest to us now—are perhaps located at a level which is less sublime but much nearer to daily desires. This permits the suspicion to be entertained, on the basis of the most elementary sociological analysis, that the conditions in the search for the new identity of Soviet power referred to lie
basically in the effectiveness of its own successes.

Setting aside all doctrines, the undeniable fact is that Soviet socialist policy has set up and maintained an industrial society on the same level of reality as the West, with its own special economic, educational and social achievements. This industrial society today shows quite a few problems, however, which are similar to those displayed in the West. There is no question of reviving the theory of convergence, of course, because regardless of whether or not this exists in certain aspects, what is of interest in the final analysis is that the internal transformations which have taken place in Soviet society have already made it necessary, and will make it even more necessary in the future, to make an effort to adapt to them, or rather, in conventional terms, to adapt the political and cultural superstructure to them. Consumerist tendencies among the population, the formation of new social strata in addition to the dominant bureaucrats, and the different aspirations of the new ruling groups, with the contradictions or antagonisms between their various interests, constitute the real conditions with which Soviet political orientation must cope in the coming years. It may also be necessary to take into account a possible conflict between the generations, or rather, in conventional terms, to adapt the political and cultural superstructure to them. Consumerist tendencies among the population, the formation of new social strata in addition to the dominant bureaucrats, and the different aspirations of the new ruling groups, with the contradictions or antagonisms between their various interests, constitute the real conditions with which Soviet political orientation must cope in the coming years. It may also be necessary to take into account a possible conflict between the generations, or rather, in conventional terms, to adapt the political and cultural superstructure to them.

China is not exempt from passing through a similar situation either, in spite of its experience of intense internal changes, with or without flowers. China too, against the background of détente and the substitution of its old rulers, will soon have to seek a new identity for itself and a new image in the international field in which it made its appearance so recently. In the case of China, however, any attempt at forecasting—at least as far as the writer is concerned—runs into the difficulty of balancing fascination and ignorance.

The layout of these possible changes in the internal field deriving from détente, although this can only be viewed as a process in action, with its corresponding advances and setbacks, explains the continuing ambiguity already referred to. It not only gives rise to political suspicions and fears among those who are still defending the positions established before détente, but is also viewed with very different eyes by those most directly affected. For this reason, this ambiguity is most obvious among the Western European countries which have always feared that they will be the first obvious victims of any disaster deriving from a lack of understanding. Therefore, their contradictory fears—and their corresponding political versions—bring out more clearly than elsewhere the ambiguities still inherent in détente. The “Finlandization” of Europe is thus just as threatening a spectre as the other menace baptised with the name of a Latin American country.

Be that as it may, the assumptions about a change in the political culture and personality of the main powers affected by détente, which appear to be held by many people, are fundamentally reasonable. The real future continues to be an unknown quantity, but the effects
of the objective possibilities of détente are discernible up to a certain point in the political field, the economic field and others, provided that the various forms or scenarios of détente, to which we will refer below, are kept in mind.

The ideologies and détente

There is perhaps no field where it is so easy and clear to sketch the almost immediate effects of détente as in the ideological field. All the positions of opposition and combat, all the antagonisms and disputes both within a country and in its foreign relations were covered by the ideologies prevailing in the two opposing superpowers. Regardless of whether or not there had been missionary incursions, the situation would have turned out exactly the same, because of the requirements for doctrinal justification contained in the structure of the cold war. Neither of the two forces could safely do without such self-justification, which was in keeping, of course, with the tendency of any powerful person or victor —of any person enjoying privileges, as shown by the experience of all past times—to give the others good moral reasons—philosophical or religious—for his enjoyment and use of that power, privilege or mere distinction. Social stratification has never existed alone, but has always been accompanied by its corresponding doctrinal support. In this case, however, this was even more marked than in possible antagonisms between different social strata. Since the situation represented was that of a complete and almost absolute counterposition between two opposing powers, the need for justification was even greater, because it was not only of value for use against the enemy as a reasoned argument for opposition and as a ground for calling for cohesion from domestic public opinion, but it also concerned all the assumed third parties who might in principle feel that they had no part in the dispute: thus, it presented the dispute as one which they could not avoid on any grounds, because of its importance to their own survival or advantage and interest. Therefore, as already stated, the structure of the cold war involved everybody in the dispute, and this was reflected in the same distribution of positions both in domestic and international policy. Such a distribution could hardly fail to be turned either for or against one or other of the ideologies of legitimation. It is therefore not sufficient to consider their polarity relationship, however important this may be, but rather the whole integral nature in which it is offered, since these ideologies, being pillars of a structure of coexistence, had to be accepted integrally by all those who entered into the game of keeping up the antagonism between them for one or another reason. Only a few minor discrepancies were tolerated here and there, and then only provided that they did not endanger the established concert of co-existence. Consequently, the sway of the two opposed ideologies was for many years almost absolute.

The question today is whether détente will necessarily bring with it, sooner or later, a loss of importance of
the ideological confrontation which has so far dominated. Now, the breakdown or mere dilution of its imperious influence may have two possible effects, which may be independent or combined. On the one hand, there may be a transformation of the ideologies which have been freed from their status of granite pillars, while on the other an ideological vacuum may be created among many of those formerly obliged to follow these ideologies with the most unquestioning fidelity. Finally, the ideologies may lose their importance as a decisive factor in the negotiation of economic advantages and political protection. The devaluation of the ideological confrontation would therefore leave both types of countries abandoned to their fate in an open field of doctrinal creation.

This question has aroused the attention of various specialists interested in forecasting the ideological horizon of tomorrow. It is quite true that this might not seem to be anything new, because for years now there has been talk of the end of the ideologies, but in these terms the problem was false because of its faulty expression. It is unlikely that the ideologies, as such, will disappear in the future: what is really involved is the modification or mere wear and tear even of these or other concrete ideologies. They have always been subject to this wear and tear, of course, like all human institutions.

The present approach is different, because it does not concern forecasting in general, but rather observing what is really possible in the ideological field when it begins to be penetrated by the effects of détente and of the slow (or rapid) dissolution of the structure which these power relations have maintained for a long period through every kind of means and mechanisms. Among the investigators of this ideological vacuum, in my opinion an outstanding place is occupied by the views of A.J. Vidich, a sociologist who describes it in this respect as "ideological decentralization", by which he does not in any way mean the return of the old nationalisms or the functional exhaustion of the present international organizations and systems through their growing rationalization, but the predomination of local or "parochial" interests in the modes of facing up to all these universal processes. It is not necessary to accept all the consequences which Vidich contemplates in order to recognize basically the valid significance of his proposal, which is, as already noted, that the smaller powers which were previously satellites will be left free, for good or ill, to create their own doctrines or ideological points of view.

This situation by no means signifies the disappearance of the polarized antagonism of the immediate past and the immediate transition to a world without conflicts and confrontations; on the contrary, the loss of influence of the traditional ideologies may give rise, in the attempts to replace it with something else, to "new styles of conflict and disorder". A final prospective analysis could only be carried out concretely in line with the special circumstances of each country. At all events, however, this is one of the most attractive subjects with which contemporary thinking must concern itself. What is the likely consequence of the ideological vacuum left behind by the two great opposing powers and their "parity"?
Perhaps the most immediate reflection of this ideological vacuum and of its implicit encouragement of new ways of thinking is to be found precisely in the sphere which is now of most interest to us: namely, that of the ideologies of development. Can we accept this expression? Partly yes and partly no: this is something which we should go into more deeply. The use of this expression can hardly scandalize us, however, in these days when we talk of development as a myth—the same used to be said about planning—and when there are complaints about the disappointments of development and it is felt to be elusive. It is worth stopping for a moment to consider what we are trying to say when we call development a myth, since the meaning of this expression is equivocal. The term myth can be interpreted in its strict Sorelian sense, in which case it represents a powerful source of mobilization capable of stimulating enthusiasm and efforts for the fulfillment of day-to-day economic tasks which would otherwise slip into a traditional routine. At the same time, however, this myth, in the form in which we have experienced it, has involved the confusion of development with growth. This is a purely economistic conception, as Celso Furtado so rightly pointed out. In the case of development as an ideology, three-quarters of the same thing has happened, although other new notes are to be observed also. Firstly, it is not correct to call development an ideology, inasmuch as it concerns a problem which is purely scientific and which is therefore formulated within a science whose propositions can in many cases only be ignored at one’s own risk and peril. Everyone knows, however, that the theories of social science often give rise, whether one likes it or not, to ideological effects which are alien to the studies involved and which cloak them like an aura and promote other, extraneous interests. This is not the place, however, to go into this constant threat to scientific reason. In the past, the demands of development have not been put forward as a mere turn of chance, but rather as the awakening of awareness at a particular moment of real problems which appear for the first time to be capable of a solution as well as being morally unacceptable. For this reason, the effective need for development—including even purely economic growth—continues to be acutely present in many places, no matter how equivocal its achievements may have proved and in spite of the disappointments which it may have produced.

It should not be forgotten, however, that the idea of development was encouraged and promoted from outside at very well-defined times in the countries held to be “backward” by other countries which were advancing at the head of the industrial process and which disseminated this idea in accordance with their own experience. The ideology of development was the political and doctrinal form assumed by the supposed solution to a technical problem under the influence of one or other of the dominating powers. The ideological nature of development lay in the manner in which this solution was presented as an exclusive and almost absolute truth within a historically defined system. As in the rest of the ideological struggle, there was only one choice between the two models offered. The ideological decentralization which is now postulated...
as a result of détente represents a challenge which is at once full of great opportunities and equally full of great perils, since the more open horizon now facing the countries' inventive capacity in the field of development, far from implying that there is room for untram­melled fantasy, means on the contrary that they must abide by the conditions of possibility offered by a reality which is very well defined in each case and depends on the prevailing conjunctures, on the experiments already made, and on ideals about the future image of society which are very different in each of the countries now wishing to take advantage of the facilities which previously did not exist. This means that, as regards the subject of styles of development, there can be no doubt that détente opens possibilities of new options which are no longer limited to the choice between the two principal models (a choice already broken by the Chinese experience), although the field of options continues to be limited, since, as already stated, our possible preferences for a particular style of development—regardless of whether it exists in reality or is simply a theoretical possibility—run into the difficulty that each of them depends for its realization on the framework of facilities and difficulties which, in a given situation and at a given time, are the obligatory prevailing conditions for a particular country or group of countries. The existing material and human resources, the established courses deriving from insertions of a geographical or political character, the persistent long-standing cultural traditions as regards customs and attitudes which make them up, and the level of economic organization from which one is starting are (among other factors) the effective conditions and current tendencies with which it is unavoidably necessary to comply. Something that might seem an ideal option, such as a frugal and equalitarian form of socialism, for example, may in certain circumstances be impossible to achieve, or possible only at the cost of great human sacrifices and sufferings.

Styles of development must not be imagined in an abstract vacuum, because they always form part, whether we like it or not, of historical economic systems that only permit reforms, adaptations or adjustments from within, although these can result in decisive changes. It is to be assumed that the era which is now opening for the developing countries as a result of the détente among the superpowers and the ideological vacuum or decentralization deriving from this will give rise not so much to an ardent formulation of new ideological postures as to the initiation of pragmatic and extremely flexible policies capable of intelligently combining the necessary elements that are really available and that must be used as the basis for each individual approach. A policy of continuous adaptation to real conditions attentively observed and if possible foreseen is therefore easier than an orientation towards radical changes. The imagination needed to carry through a process of vigilant negotiations and undertakings is just as great as that required by any other type of invention.

The repercussions of détentes in the field of economics constitute a completely untouched subject, assuredly because they show up less clearly than in the political and ideological spheres. By a curious and apparently casual coincidence, however, the beginning of the economic recession in the great industrial countries has gone hand in hand with the initiation of détente. Perhaps we can go further than just noting such a coincidence. The recession itself has
plunged its economic interpreters into a state of perplexity, as summed up in the strange term “stagflation” by which it is designated. The recession does not, however, have the anecdotal flavour of the dramatic moments of other crises, since nobody among the experts believes that the oil cartel has been a decisive cause in it, although this has represented a lesson which has been alarming to some and stimulating to others.

It must be confessed that a similar state of uncertainty is to be encountered in the attempts to make forecasts regarding the recovery and above all its causal relationship with détente. As far as is known, no economist holds the recovery to be impossible, although they do not coincide over the time-scales involved, which naturally vary from country to country. But although the recovery is viewed as a foregone conclusion for the great industrial countries, as far as we know any attempt to situate the recovery in the new conditions of détente is conspicuous by its absence, unless the explanation is that economists are not fully convinced of the possibility of a recovery, which scarcely seems likely.

In view of the relation between armamentism and industrial expansion in certain countries—although some feel that the causal influence of these two things has been exaggerated— one would be justified in thinking of the consequences of the planned disarmament—only partial, of course, but nevertheless more or less substantial—for the economic reactivation not only of the great powers but of all the other countries too. To what extent, for example, could some parts of the sums thus saved be used for the benefit of the neediest countries and social strata?

So far, the assumptions about the recovery have been of the strictest traditional nature. In this respect, they are positive, but they shed doubts on the credibility of any assumptions that may be made beyond these limits, for it is to be assumed that even in the new conditions of détente the great industrial countries will continue their customary path, concentrating most of their production achievements in their mutual trade, for example. As one of the strongest impulses of détente will be the mutual benefit of considerably more valuable trade between areas and countries which until now were antagonists, however, it is also to be assumed that if such purposes are realized they could hardly fail to result in a general expansion of world trade. A more universalized international market of this type could achieve greater dimensions from which all could benefit, provided that détente entered into a state of stable maturity. Some of the other assumptions that could be made, however, appear very problematical.

If we assume that there will be a new situation of prosperity in the industrial countries of both systems, will these countries increase by an equal proportion their aid and support to the less developed countries? The sceptical attitude of taxpayers, which has been very marked in recent years in some of the democracies, and their rejection of what they consider to be the dubious use made of the financial resources made available as aid to other apparently ungrateful countries, does not seem likely to be easily changed unless there is a boom of a spectacular nature.

It would be still more important to be able to glimpse whether the recovery will follow its old lines completely or if in some respect there will be an authentic prise de conscience of the perils and threats which the intensive intellectual activity devoted to this
subject makes likely for the future of the present industrial systems. It is quite possible that the most visible aspects of the threats to the ecological balance—which directly suffered—will be taken into account provided that they cannot be transferred to far-off and as yet less affected countries. Even though sensitivity to the fate of far-off fellow men may not be very marked, however, what has been termed the concern for the future may be more acute.

Minor restrictions such as those imposed as a result of the oil crisis are to be expected in some activities, as well as more vital interest in the question of the shortage of certain resources. It seems improbable, however, that there will be a fundamental psychological change which will modify in the next few years the prevailing tendencies of the older “consumer societies”, which are those capable of giving the newer societies of that type—avid for easily explainable consumerism—the demonstration effects which have so far been negative and the new models proposed for general imitation. History is a sluggard, as Ortega y Gasset used to say, and it is therefore very slow to change collective customs and personal habits. It is not necessary to agree with the prophets of doom in order to recognize that changes only usually take place in the face of imminent danger.

It does not seem that in the next few years the internal evolution of the economic machinery in the great industrial countries will be of such a nature as to oblige them to move towards this future “zero growth state” which has already been mooted in the great centres in a manner which is as suggestive as it is careless of the inevitable effect that this would have on the peripheral or semi-peripheral countries.

The first reasonable generalization that could be made about the likely course of events in the less developed countries, once the recession has been overcome, is naturally that they will return to the positions they occupied before it, in the same form as before. As the present considerations are being made on the assumption that a variable will be introduced by détente, however, it is to be assumed that this new state of affairs is bound to have some effect on the development of these countries. It cannot be forgotten—that such repetitions are unavoidable—that the main consequence of détente on the tenseness of the power relations between the superpowers—in the extreme case, of course—would be the abandonment of the lesser powers to their fate when the hitherto prevailing political and ideological affiliations lose the importance which they at present still have as regards negotiating capacity. Abandoned in this manner to the relatively independent orientations of their own fate, the opportunities thus opened up for them could be just as promising as they might be unfavourable and negative. Everything depends on their specific potential for creating policies which demand a certain definite dose of effective realism and imagination.

In the conditions thus described, it is at present only possible to draw in very vague outline the various situations of the developing countries. Those which are really semi-peripheral, that is to say, those which, in spite of the structural heterogeneity from which they still suffer to various degrees, offer along with a greater or lesser degree of industrialization other proofs of “modernity” and possess sufficient human and natural resources, will enjoy a negotiating capacity similar to that of other countries which have passed through or
are emerging from this phase, and they can enter into the voluntary dependent relationships which are characteristic of all these countries. Relatively small but very rich countries—the oil-producing countries are the outstanding example so far—will naturally enjoy much greater negotiating capacity, although they will be subject to the dangers of miscalculations which can produce irreparable long-term losses. The medium-sized or small poor countries, however, which have scanty resources and a long-standing accumulation of poverty, will be deeper than ever in the painful situation of depending on the benevolence of others unless they can find some way of integrating themselves successfully into groupings of greater size and economic potential.

Transnational relationships

This subject is almost astride the limits of the field of economics through which we are passing, but since it is nevertheless substantially within it, a very brief consideration is called for of the present and future significance of the so-called transnational relationships. It is by no means infrequent, in the case of any type of discovery or what is assumed to be a discovery, that its authors engage in abundant conjectures about its importance. Thus, in recent years internationalists have perceived that something more was happening in their field than was previously considered evident and usual. International life, from this new viewpoint, does not consist simply of the activity of a few actors, namely the sovereign States, but is also the result of the very diversified activities of other different actors which form a network, and sometimes a very dense network, extending across various national frontiers and linking the countries together horizontally. What they have discovered, in brief, is the existence of multiple transnational relationships of which the transnational corporations represent only one example, although without the rapid rise to fame of the latter perhaps interest would not have been aroused in these phenomena. In reality, once one begins to delve in this field, the novelty is considerably reduced on discovery of the existence of their numerous forerunners in previous areas, such as the well-known case of the hardworking “bourgeoisie conquérante” in nineteenth century economic activity. What cannot be denied, however, is that this discovery has on the one hand encouraged the detailed analysis of the various forms and manifestations of this phenomenon, while on the other it has given rise, by some swelling of its importance, to a theory of international relations which is different from the traditional one, although it does not always demand that the latter be replaced on the grounds that it is definitely archaic. Whether or not it is entirely correct, we nevertheless owe some valuable detailed studies to its stimulus.

The existence of transnational relations is not, as we said, a complete novelty, as is shown by the continually quoted example of the Catholic Church, which has played a prominent role in transnational relations between the jealous sovereigns of powerful States.
What is a novelty on the contemporary scene is the multiplication of this type of relations in the most diversified forms. In addition to those of a religious nature there are those of a scientific and technological nature, those which have revolutionary political aims, and those which serve economic and financial ends. Transnational relations make up a big family joined, almost at the last moment, by the old Sicilian mafia which had already lost its insular nature. What should be stressed, without pretending that this is any novelty, is the so to speak private nature of the actors involved, which, in the case of organizations and foundations, operate without any governmental or official character. Their web of connexions extending at any given time over different countries is sometimes just as powerful in its effects as that which can be put into effect by any government, however. Although this web involves numerous potential conflicts, it is held that all in all it is an integrating influence. In any case, different countries may be united through this web and through the identity of interests set up in spite of, or sometimes even against, the official policies of the governments. It is this agglutinative influence within world politics which is highlighted by the specialists in this matter, who look askance at the obstacles imposed by sovereignties. This is what leads them to wonder whether the classic paradigm of policies of security in the international field is not out of date and whether the time has not come to replace it with another whose basic content would be a kind of universal dissemination of the objectives of the Welfare State. Only a few people take this proposal very seriously, however, because although there is no hesitation about recognizing the importance of transnational relations at the present time, it is nonetheless evident that these relations still pass through the decision-making centres of sovereign States — although it is not known for how long to come— which are capable of regulating them, modifying them, and even making use of them when this fits in with their objectives. The urge to substitute one paradigm for another therefore seems somewhat over-hasty, although this does not mean any denial of the interest of the relations highlighted and the value of getting to know more about them.

As in other fields, it would be more useful to have at one’s disposal a more or less provisional typology rather than a mere listing or taxonomic classification. While waiting for something better, the typology offered in this respect by Karl Kaiser is fairly satisfactory. Let us content ourselves with noting that basically it is made up of the following types: multi-bureaucratic decision-making centres, multinational integration, and the transnational company proper. Whatever the content of the relations in question, it is possible to include them in one or another of these types, and of course those of an economic nature. The possibilities as regards international politics are clearly different in each of them, and it would not be difficult, if desired, to single out some of the most obvious examples of their present-day manifestations. Thus, regional economic integration projects are included in their various dimensions within the type of multinational integration. There would be justification for leaving this item with an etc., if only because the subsequent analysis of these transnational politics generally does not offer a new typology of particular interest for our present opportunities of action, that is to say, distinguishing between a transnational policy of
equilibrium, another involving effects of domination, and a third involving penetration controlled from the exterior. There is thus a reappearance at this point of the effective differences of power—political or economic—which some would have liked to forget or to put in parentheses, neither of these things being possible, of course.

If we had the opportunity, and if this were within our competence, this would be the moment to spend a little more time discussing some of these transnational relations of the greatest interest for us: the economic relations, or those which have as their result the transfer of scientific and technological know-how. Since this is not so, however, we must avoid this temptation and limit ourselves to dealing only with what is strictly necessary in connection with our subject.

The question of transnational companies or corporations has become a highly controversial issue on which new books and articles are continuously being written. Their formation and internal functioning, their effects on the host countries and their relations with their countries of origin are all subjected to close study. Before we proceed to any technical examination, it should be noted that praise and blame are heaped on them in equal proportions. To some, these companies represent in these closing years of the century the economic counterpart of the joint stock companies at the end of the nineteenth century, the only difference, of course, being their different fields of operation. The complaints from the host countries, and above, all the less developed countries, have to do with their own impotence in the face of the economic power of such organizations, sometimes greater than that of the State itself, and the difficulties of controlling them because their accounting complexity is beyond the normal knowledge and experience of the national civil services. There is no need to refer to the possibility of other types of intervention. Apart from these inconveniences and dangers, however, nobody denies the advantages that can be derived from the activity of transnational corporations: the production in the less developed countries of goods that would otherwise be unattainable and that can perhaps moreover be exported, and the teaching by technicians and entrepreneurs of the currently most advanced processes.

Similar arguments can be put forward, mutatis mutandis, as regards the dissemination of science and research methods in various disciplines through the transnational activities of well-financed foreign-based foundations or university centres.

There are of course many points of reference on which a less imaginative person can lean when trying to find ways of regulating the various transnational relations within a country. The common and oft-quoted example of the activities of the Catholic Church immediately suggests the instrument of the concordat, which can be extended by analogy as a form of agreement on matters other than those concerning the church. There are also those who recall as a model, in the strictly economic field, the juridical configuration given to joint stock companies in the mercantile codes that follow the tradition of continental European law, or the action exercised by Federal laws and the precedents accumulated by the Supreme Court in the United States as regards the scope of development of the corporation as a type of enterprise above all restrictions on interstate commerce.
Now, in the case of transnational corporations, their regulation through individual restrictive agreements of the concordat type would produce such a diversity of régimes that this lack of uniformity would make it impossible for these enterprises to exist because of their methods of financial operations, which naturally have to cover various national territories. And it immediately leaps to one's attention that in both types of law the type of juridical construction in question lacks the necessary supreme judicial competence in the case of transnational corporations. Where is the world authority that will make this possible at present? At the same time, however, among the present-day international organizations it should not be impossible to achieve a statute for transnational corporations which would be valid at least for the group of countries interested in participating in the preparation of the agreement. This is the point at which we must necessarily enter the more restrictive field of our subject, since we must now try to deduce what connexion the phenomenon of détente can have with that of transnational relations.

It should be borne in mind from the start that the activities of transnational corporations have so far been carried on in relatively limited areas of the world, and that this was originally an invention of the United States capitalist system, later gradually adapted by various industrial and financial groups of other countries and sometimes taking the form of an invitation to the less enterprising capitalists of the host countries to engage in a joint venture. At all events, the activity of the transnational corporations has tended to be limited to certain well-defined economic blocs.

It is consequently to be assumed that a lasting stabilization of détente would bring with it a much greater expansion of transnational relations in general and of transnational corporations in particular. That is to say, it would cease to have its motive centres in just a few countries and would extend to joint ventures aiming to serve the mutual interests of both the capitalist and socialist economies. This is the point, we may recall, where the initial ideas of détente really began. It is sufficient to take account of the effects of this inter-State expansion of the operations of transnational corporations to assume that there would be a corresponding increase in the possibilities of controlling such corporations, since there would be a matching increase in the number of those interested in signing an agreement on their international status. The same conclusion can be reached by another path, which is worth following even though it brings us to the border of a state of affairs which is still utopian. Détente is only of significance, as we already stated, if it more or less rapidly succeeds in laying the foundations of a universal peace which is less fragile than the present one. In this possible scenario of détente, of which we shall speak more later, we find the minimum conditions for an international community which, if fully achieved, would permit the establishment and functioning of various world authorities. This extreme case includes the authority to which the regulation and concrete supervision of transnational corporations would be entrusted.
Dependence

While we are still dealing with the frontiers of the possible, on which we touched in the previous paragraphs, it is interesting to deal with a final question which is more accessible to intuitive groping than to realistic precision, and which, in spite of the dangers of obfuscation surrounding it, cannot be left out of the aspirations of the forecaster. An ever-recurring theme in recent years has been that of dependence, which has been used by some to the limit of the truth which it contains, while it has been utilized by others as a simplified key to explain very diverse historical realities. The causal imputation of dependence made it possible to interpret very easily not only the existence here and there of certain peculiarities of development, but also to concentrate in it all the conditions said to be responsible for this. On the other hand, it also made it easier to find the immediate formula for a solution. Thus, it was said, all the present difficulties would be solved if only we could escape from the unfortunate state of dependence.

The historical facts are not nearly so simple, but it is not the aim at the moment to examine this subject in all its complexity. It is sufficient to observe that all that was taken into account was the type of hegemonic dependence as a unilateral relationship. There is not the slightest doubt that this really exists, but limiting oneself to pointing out the effects of domination involved—and not only in the political and economic fields—would be nothing but a mere tautological operation. The presence of hegemonic powers is one of the most persistent phenomena in history, but it has not always given rise to identical relations of dependence. What kind of dependence is involved in this particular case? In order not to draw the subject out too long, let us take, as an extreme concession, only the relations of dependence which are formed under the contemporary capitalist system. They undoubtedly vary from moment to moment and from country to country. What country escapes completely from one or another of their effects? Do they always constitute a limit which cannot be passed? Do they make it possible in every case to explain the various national peculiarities and all the phases and grades of development? The dependence in which France, Italy or Spain are at present to be found within their own "system", in their relative degree and with their different opportunities for manoeuvering, may be similar to the situation which will be found tomorrow in the case of Mexico or Brazil. These similar situations with their different historical backgrounds, however, cannot be completely explained by the relations of dependence which exist, ignoring the countries' own domestic capacity for utilizing, modifying or substituting these under suitable circumstances. The failure to recognize the various forms of dependence even within a single system is the factor which has made possible easy excuses for countries' own political and social deficiencies.

But what now arises in connexion with one of the possible scenarios of détente—and which must be considered in any attempt to look into the future—is the possibility that some time the present theme of dependence will become out of date because of the slow or rapid modification of its nature as a form of unilateral hegemonic depen-
dence. It will then be necessary, at least intellectually, to think about a novel form of this dependence as a plurilateral relationship and in its broadest form: that is to say, with even smaller possibilities of escape. The full achievement of détente as a lasting structure of peaceful coexistence would mean bringing out a world reality only perceived today as a background or as something in the distance: an interdependence of all places on earth so marked that it would only permit an effective dependence— that of common solidarity. But until the awareness of this moral comes out—as a reflection of facts rather than a product of philosophy—the opportunities on the way to détente will oblige each country to maintain a global attitude, formerly the exclusive preserve of the great powers, which not only does not avoid normal relations of dependence, but on the contrary seeks them everywhere as a means of finding a balance among the effects of domination which are most favourable to its own interests. Dependence appears to be unavoidable in any event, but because it is generalized it will be different from the hegemonic dependence which prevailed until now on both sides. Is this a concrete utopia?

The possible forms of détente and prospective studies

The time has now come to make a certain recapitulation of all the foregoing. This does not mean making a kind of classified repetition of the propositions made, but rather putting the reader on guard, through a brief reflection, against what is perhaps the greatest defect that can strike the attentive reader: that of a more or less acute contradiction between the various propositions, since some of those enunciated were of the strictest realistic type, while others were close to a barely disguised idealism. The reason is that the writer, when tackling the different themes which interest him, must naturally bear in mind the possibilities of different kinds which, whether he likes it or not or is aware of this or not, demand different attitudes from him. The impression of such contradictions and the consequent confusion can only be dispelled if everything that has been said is viewed in a context which is not yet explicit about the possible forms of détente and their political and economic implications.

Before setting out this scheme in the shortest and most flexible way which is feasible, however, two observations are called for in order to avoid possible misunderstandings. Both of these involve a similar temptation to engage in long digressions which would be quite out of order at this moment.

The first of these brings us to a constant feature of scientifico-social thinking in general and of any attempt at prospective analysis in particular: namely, the inevitable valorative relations in the construction of the object of study. What happens, in effect, is that whatever the attitude of the author or the attitude that others wish to impose on him—strictly neutral, an unrestrained participant, or merely pragmatic—in reality it is not possible to avoid estimative preferences and valorative
positions with regard to the ideals of the society in which the author lives or which is considered as a future society. These values, therefore, are not restricted to a particular field but cover the whole human conception of what is desirable. Consequently, it is not advisable to keep them hidden or merely implicit. Every statement about the future involves an option for one system or another of values, even though there may be painful misgivings about its possibility.

The second observation, which is related with the above but is not to be confused with it, concerns a characteristic of futurological or prospective studies which cannot have passed unnoticed by even the superficial reader of this type of "investigations". Generally speaking, all these show the same schematic order of horizons, scenarios or attempts to make forecasts, usually having as their starting point a situation which is considered, although usually only tacitly, as the most desirable or as the best for eliminating the condition which is considered to be the least desirable or worst, and passing through an extensive intermediate zone in their trajectory in which many of the known notes of the present reality oscillate towards one or another of the extremes; that is to say, a prolongation of what is being experienced now. This is a situation in which the conditions of its possibility are almost confused with those of its probability, inasmuch as the researcher starts off in his empirical analyses from an examination of the real tendencies observed at present.

The noteworthy feature of this characteristic lies in its inversion of the classical position of the philosophy of progress, in which the image of the best was the culminating point of its scheme of a historical process. Any attempt to consider in greater depth the reasons for this inversion of views would be an undesirable digression, so we must satisfy ourselves with the suspicion that it is perhaps due to the persistent gravitation of one idea, that of progress, in which we no longer believe nowadays, although we do not accept the total renunciation of it either. Be that as it may, this fact exists in the structure of any prospective investigation in contemporary thinking, and it therefore also imposes its demands for compliance on the modest essay which will be made in the following pages.

None of the futurological schemes which are already known or will continue to be developed in the future, however, have any intrinsic validity as such or even as systems of hypotheses, but only through the confirmation that may be given to them by a patient empirical investigation, in this case historically concrete. Even so, however, it is not possible to do without them completely and to refuse to accept them on a provisional basis, since they constitute the coherent framework which guides us in our search for the effective trends and their approximation to or departure from what is from the very beginning a pure mental construction of the possible. Only in this, their nature of intellectual constructions of objective possibilities, do they have validity in a first stage of the work as "ideal types"—something which, in the strictest methodological sense, they will only become later on when they are filled up with the historical meat which for the moment they lack.

Détente, it must be repeated, has been considered in its double capacity of a process which is in motion and a goal which is worthy of being pursued. Perhaps this goal will never be achieved: no one knows for sure. The only sure
and visible thing is that the process itself does not follow a straight line but moves back and forth, makes false steps as well as correct ones, and at the present time shows a twisting form of progress. The onlooker who follows its course in the daily press or in the scientific commentaries of various magazines sometimes loses his depth and flounders desperately in scepticism. In order to avoid such problems it is necessary to withdraw a reasonable distance from scientific knowledge and have the patience needed to view events without haste for a reasonable length of time. Nobody can guarantee the end of the adventure or that it will have a happy ending, but this is the risk that has to be run if it is desired to achieve a minimum of forecasting regarding the possibility of practical actions and concrete policies in keeping with a moral tone of responsibility. This means that the direct, indirect and secondary results of every action must be rationally weighed as much as possible.

The still uncertain progress of détente, which seems to be wavering on more than one occasion, enables its configuration to be visualized in three possible ways, which represent three scenarios for the immediate future that interest all of us equally, and not only the main protagonists. We must therefore keep in mind the following types of détente: co-operative, competitive and conflictive, with their respective characteristics, conceived of course in their dynamic form and not merely as static or permanent phenomena.

Co-operative détente

Co-operative détente represents the scenario in which détente reaches its full maturity and consolidation. It represents the moment of achievement of its objective, which, however, is not a full stop or conclusion but merely another step towards a new turning point in history. In its internal structure, the impulse for concord—in the terms of the humanist Luis Vives—may be conceived as so strongly predominant that some, making a play on the French words, have suggested that “détente” should be changed to “entente”: a more or less cordial entente in no way limited to the mutual advantage of the two super-powers interested in initiating it, but affecting also in a positive manner the whole group of other countries.

From a global viewpoint the horizon of such détente would offer three important effects as an objective possibility. First of all, there would be a growing generalization of attitudes guided by universalist points of view. That is to say, co-operative détente would not, as some people thought, signify the deglobalization of the political interests of the great powers and the loss of their universal outlook but would on the contrary bring with it more or less marked acceptance of that viewpoint by all the countries, which are forced at present to look after their own interests as a function of the possibilities offered by any action undertaken in various parts of the world. This position would represent a continual maintenance of awareness of the reciprocal demands of effective world interdependence.

This situation would consequently favour a general trend towards desatellitezation. This would not mean, of course,
that there would be a state of unconditional liberty, which is never possible in any type of social action, nor that there would be a definitive breaking of sympathies and differences and voluntary affinities between countries and systems, but simply that none of that would be obligatory any more. That is to say, the unavoidable effective situation of being a satellite in a political, economic and cultural field would not bring about any punishment for unfaithfulness when such a satellite, because it saw fit to do so, entered into the orbit of other centres of attraction for some reason. The traditional ally would not cease to be an ally because of circumstantial agreements with other powers, nor would the regular customer lose this status by entering into commercial and economic arrangements with other countries. The "desatellization" would simply mean more flexibility in the international behaviour of all countries, without there being any fear or threat of immediate conflicts. This generalization of a global attitude in the policies of the various countries would involve the presumption that there should be some identity of views by all countries as regards attaining new codes of rules of a worldwide nature, since the awareness of a very close interdependence would favour the establishment of functional authorities with worldwide competence to deal with all the questions and problems of indivisible common interest which can only be settled by the voluntary acceptance of universal decisions.

It is not possible to give an exhaustive description of the reflections of this general co-operative attitude in the economic field. But without going so far as to make the utopian assumption of radical transformations in an actual situation which will offer much resistance to change for a long time, there are some general consequences which can be taken as objective possibilities. Among them are the expansion of the market until it becomes more deliberately universal than it has been so far, and the recognition in that market of the right of all countries to seek and find the most favourable trade relationships, with the consequent predominance in the field of financial and credit assistance of multilateral relations rather than bilateral arrangements with possible non-economic strings attached. Finally, in the ambit of transnational relations—not merely those of an economic nature—it can be assumed that there will be a predominance of "cosmopolitan" attitudes rather than "nationalist" attitudes, to use the dichotomy favoured by certain experts. So far, the intellectuals and academics of the central countries who have been the advocates of the cosmopolitan position have tended to reproach the smaller countries with their "nationalist" attitude, forgetting how far and in what ways their own countries have fallen into this sin. Of course they had to be excused because of their progressive intellectual generosity, although this sometimes came rather too easy. Assuming a new situation of economic interdependence perceived and maintained as such by all those concerned, then the ideological counterposition falls on the side of the cosmopolitans.

It cannot be denied that the consideration of the possible forms that could be assumed by the internal policy structures is a delicate and tricky matter. It does not seem, however, that it would be pure nonsense to maintain that in a world climate of co-operative détente non-authoritarian political régimes would finally prevail. Of course this
proposition must be taken with the necessary grain of salt, however. The various authoritarian governments cover a wide range of forms between the two extremes of tyrannical domination and the dissolution of all power. Excluding Caesarism and anarchism as extremes, it would be reasonable to try to specify more accurately the various shades of this range and their corresponding types, taking into account the degree of citizen participation both in the taking of decisions and in access to sources of information.

Conflictive eras encourage or perhaps even impose Caesarist forms of government, while times of concord facilitate the establishment of democratic-liberal governments, on the understanding, of course, that the latter do not necessarily involve the loss of all authority or amount to the same thing as the renunciation of any effective capacity to rule. At all events, the possible scenario of co-operative détente is not compatible with the justification and legitimacy of rigorous authoritarian States.

Really consolidated détente is bound to bring with it, as already stated, a lasting period of ideological “decentralization”: a readying of the various countries, so to speak, for their capacity of choice and doctrinal preparation. This means the liberation from the imperious constraints of the two great ideological systems — already in de facto suspense since the reappearance of China— which are characterized not only by their polarized opposition to each other but also by their rigidly consistent nature which thus covers up all the alterations that have taken place in a reality which they claim to express faithfully. Ideological decentralization does not necessarily mean the end of ideology, since other different ideologies arise in response to the well-known reasons of justification and legitimacy. It simply means the possible loss of validity of some traditional ideologies as monolithic bodies, already seriously fissured in any case by irreversible processes of historical change. On the other hand, such a state of ideological decentralization does not constitute a condition which is desirable in itself and is totally free of qualifications and of its own dangers and disadvantages. This is not the place for a detailed investigation of this point, however. We will content ourselves with pointing out that the void left by these ideologies could invite an improvised flowering of various ideological substitutes — this would not be the first time this has happened — and within a general atmosphere of understanding and goodwill for co-operation, this could give rise to limited circles of internal conflicts and discords. In the competitive scenario, this peril would undoubtedly be more serious. In the assumed scenario of co-operative détente and new creative freedom, however, the liberation from compulsory alignments would be a positive and helpful condition.

It would be encouraging, because in the various places in which it would continue to be necessary to have concern for development this would no longer be oriented by interested outside influences, by the emotional impulses of its mythical wrapping, by acquiescence in changing intellectual fashions, and still less by the ready-made ideologies which only stress the success supposed to have been obtained through them elsewhere. Instead, it would be oriented by the application of instrumental knowledge and the bare and unvarnished experience accumulated on both sides, sometimes ending in triumph and sometimes in painful failure. It is impossible to do without the example of what others have done, but this example should only be
viewed in the light of a careful analysis of one's own needs, which may be different from those which the others faced, and these needs must be so classified as regards their urgency that there is no possibility of mistake in making a choice between the options offered. Depending on the particular circumstances of each case, it may be best to follow the line of the accumulative growth of the product or select the line of dispensing with this so as to cover, with modest and equalitarian frugality, the most pressing needs of the masses, always provided that one or the other option, or various intermediate options, are really possible.

This is so because there is no unconditional freedom as regards the invention of new styles of development, either. The opportunity offered by the assumed new liberty only exists in a here and now whose historical nature places them beyond any arbitrary decision. The liberation from the compulsive force of the dominating ideologies of development does not mean liberation at the same time from the economic systems of which those ideologies form part, since inclusion in one of those systems is usually due to historical reasons, although these systems can to some extent be modified from within and adjusted to the prevailing social conditions—permanent interests in conflict—if we recognize them for what they are and not what we would like them to be. The so-called ideological decentralization assuredly will not mean a carnival-like invitation to give way to the incessant urge to make up new ideologies of development put forward as original, but rather an invitation to seek flexible, agile, and pragmatic economic policies capable of being adapted to the special circumstances of each country within the system which—to the pleasure of some and the displeasure of others—it has fallen to their lot to live.

A scenario of co-operative détente is the prospective framework most favourable to the stimulation of the kind of intelligence suitable for the permanent adjustment of its own progress, partly chosen and partly imposed by necessity, and capable of bringing to the dramatic soil of its particular shortcomings—those which really exist and no others—the combination of means and ends most in keeping with the moral values held to be one's own. This is so even though one knows that one must sometimes accept the inconsistency between the demands of instrumental rationality and the demands of the material rationality of ends and values, which cannot be solved to the complete satisfaction of all. On the one hand there is flexibility and pragmatism, but there is also an escape from the fear of the taboo of reform: the taboo maintained by many in recent years through the existence of ideologies which have identical presumptions of absolute truth, thus consigning to oblivion everything that has been due in past history to the patient building up of successive timely reforms which, although they may themselves lack the luminous halo of the great radical formulas, capable of mobilizing great efforts, nevertheless do not have to be paid for with big doses of sacrifice and suffering.

The prospect of co-operative détente is therefore not just a mere opportunity for conservative action, but an opportunity for making the necessary changes with the effectiveness of intelligence rather than with the inevitable misfortune of emotional commitment. The fact that one ceases to worship the golden calf of the all-powerful indicator of gross income does not mean that it is no longer taken into account along with
other valid indexes and propositions of scientific reason, which is the most decisive instrument still available for successfully approaching a reality which is always elusive and is only partially covered by it.

As long as co-operative détente is consolidated or continues to exist, there are not only grounds for assuming that there will be an expansion of the universalist attitudes already mentioned, which favour the stability of the existing international organizations and the establishment of others as well as new world authorities, but also grounds for suspecting that there will be greater sensitivity to the demands for a single indivisible peace. A greater effort aimed at impeding or rapidly quelling localized conflicts is therefore to be expected, not only because of the fear of their repercussions on the other countries living in peaceful coexistence, i.e., the fear that they would spread, but because of a deep moral rejection of the ever-increasing toll of human lives sacrificed to no purpose, no matter how far they may still be from our own area.

The diplomatic activities now in progress—the signing of treaties and agreements, proposals for collaboration, gestures of good will and mutual gratitude, etc.—and very particularly the diplomatic vocabulary in which they are translated constitute the outward signs of a climate of co-operative détente. This may seem tautological: it was certainly already contained in the earlier assertion, but what is important now is its instrumental character for the study. Those interested in prospective investigation must follow step by step the various shades of the vocabularies being used, which frequently denote in a subtle manner, through the words employed, more than is indicated by the actual facts and actions. Prospective studies must make use in this case of what used to be called years ago the technique of content analysis. For this reason, when it is possible to observe in this vocabulary terms which imply disagreement, displeasure, open menace or protest, etc., this means that we are already in a different atmosphere: that which prevails in the scenario with which we will deal next. For the moment, it is not possible to go any further than this allusion: only the accumulation of empirical studies, which we at present lack, could provide us with proof of the validity of the above proposition.

**Competitive détente**

In the projection of a scenario of competitive détente, the imagination scarcely needs any encouragement, since in principle such a scenario simply constitutes the prolongation of the circumstances which we are currently experiencing. Only in principle, however, because in view of the assumption that this scenario is in an intermediate stage of the process of détente already outlined we must specify some of its particular features. Firstly, there is its inevitably greater mobility, and consequently its more accentuated instability. No historical situation is purely static—this would amount to a contradiction in terms—but the more intensive dynamism conceived as a feature of this
scenario is due to the tendency which it displays, as long as it lasts, to oscillate continually between the first and the third scenario, sometimes coming nearer and sometimes departing from what each of them represents. Thus, if we wanted to follow out in all its details what was implied in the metaphor taken from the theatre which inspires this terminology, we would be obliged to imagine a stage with rotating tableaux which appear in turn. In addition, however, the conceptual notes which define this scenario also stress its competitive nature and its gravitation towards the status quo. It must be understood that this type of détente will be competitive insofar as the conflicts and the tensions it contains are subject to or covered by —as in every competition— a certain minimum of common principles and aspirations, regardless of whether they stem from identical convictions or from parallel selfish interests. As long as these rules last, regardless of whether or not they are explicitly declared, the conflict and the struggle will be limited, although this does not mean that this limit can force its suppression; the suppression of the conflict would bring about agreement, which fundamentally typifies cooperative détente. Overstepping such limits, in contrast, would change the nature of the conflict from a relative one to an absolute conflict, a peril which is found in its full expression in the typical conflictive scenario. The movement of détente must consequently be manifested in the competitive scenario as a tendency to maintain the status quo, since the termination of that status quo would be equivalent to the liquidation of the scenario itself.

This greater possibility of imagining this scenario in its various components is not due only to the fact that it represents the continuation of the present conditions which we are all experiencing more or less acutely, but due rather to the greater facility with which the list of its elements can be deduced: in reality, they merely amount to an inversion of the facilities and difficulties contained in the outline of the co-operative scenario. A desire to completely reorganize the present basis of peace would run into the difficulty of the inclination to insist on the continuance of the obstacles, and the old pattern of security-oriented policy with national sovereignty as its nucleus would tend to impose itself as a model over all others. The concessions made at any time, because of their transitory nature and the oscillating nature of the advances and setbacks experienced, promote anxiety or scepticism in the sensitive onlooker. Consequently, any serious effort to increase the effectiveness of the existing international organizations and to try to ensure that they offer greater guarantees of equity must be viewed as improbable, and even when they are not flatly rejected the proposals for new institutions and for the establishment of world authorities with the necessary competence for solving problems recognized as being common to all countries today will tend to be the subject of long-drawn out examination and discussion, thus giving rise to technically unnecessary confrontations.

It would appear to be difficult, in such circumstances, to discern any decided common will to put an end to the so-called localized conflicts between minor powers: possible wars because of long-standing quarrels or of other new disputes in which the big powers oppose each other through stand-ins. Thus, the maintenance of the insensitivity regarding the need for an indivisible peace will tend to do nothing to impede the sacrifice of numerous victims.
To sum up, and to finish with this first aspect, everything points to the predominance in such circumstances of a generalized apathy which will tend to reduce the possibility of an energetic common will capable of uniting all in a joint direct confrontation with the most decisive world problems in the future.

In the economic field, the persistence in their present form of the existing economic and political blocs will continue to keep down the size of the world market and reduce the possibilities of a new division of labour at that level, keeping the traditional forms of dependence virtually unchanged through various hindrances on any policy which, without aiming to eliminate such forms of dependence completely, nevertheless attempts to escape from domestic economic difficulties by making use of more or less extensive new trade opportunities in various markets. The same will tend to occur with possible diplomatic combinations desirous of reducing absorptive satellization. In this respect, a marked preference for the procedure of bilateral relations will try to mute the broader mechanism of multilaterality, which is more suitable and holds out greater advantages for the developing countries.

Insofar as the horizontal tension between the biggest and richest centres—the fundamental tension between East and West—remains unsolved, there can hardly be anything but an increase in the vertical tension between North and South, between the rich countries and the poorer countries, and this increase, apart from its undoubted gravity, may even be used as a form of diplomatic tactics in order to divert attention for some time from the more fundamental divergence of the great industrial systems. In the North-South dialogue there will no doubt be an effort to offer concessions, provided these do not endanger the tacit common interests of the great centres. It is thus to be presumed that the countries which are less favoured in their development, faced with these unsatisfactory concessions, will tend to put forward exaggerated demands which are beyond any real possibility of fulfilment.

In a détente which is still competitive it may be conceived that the pull of the polarized ideologies will continue to exert some influence, although it will not retain the same capacity of attraction that it originally had. Perhaps for this very reason, an effort may be observed to fill up the most visible cracks in it with new shovelfuls of cement, even though this cannot prevent the repeated appearance of new heterodoxies which are all the less effective the greater is their internal improvisation and incoherence. In these conditions, the difficulties in working out well-articulated, flexible and readily adaptable economic policies favour the persistence in the plans of the majority of the countries of the contradiction which exists between the demands of the long-term goals and the pressing urgent needs of the shorter term. The lack of opportunities for effectively undertaking one or other of the pretended new styles of development will encourage rather than impede the flowering of ambitious projects in respect of a different economic order, which will retain the utopian tone so rightly described as being typical of all these products of groups and commissions.

In such confused circumstances, where there is continual oscillation in the orientations proposed, authoritarian-type governments can become the keynote in those countries which find it increasingly difficult to solve their domestic conflicts and contradictions, to
say nothing of those deriving from the international picture. Even in the traditional democracies which still exist—the only ones where these phenomena are within the scope of direct observation—it will not be difficult to find cases, as is already happening, of perilous swings of the pendulum from moments of general political apathy and lack of confidence in their own leaders to other moments when fear and insecurity about the maintenance of what has been achieved lead to nervous movements seeking energetic measures and to intolerant attitudes. These movements do not always coincide with the classical assumptions about the conduct of the various social classes.

The length of time that the present difficult situation can last within the competitive scenario which we have just outlined is of course indeterminate, but it is nevertheless subject to certain limits. Its days would appear to be numbered in this respect, since if a supreme effort is not made by all countries—and not only by the bigger and more responsible powers—to achieve a climate of authentic co-operation in which the bases can be laid for the more stable peace which is of equal interest to all, it will not be possible to avert the fate of a dreadful catastrophe in any of its possible forms. In other words, if the most important pressures continue to drag on in the competitive scenario without being solved, they will break the dikes which still contain them and flow out, perhaps very suddenly, towards the last of the scenarios dealt with in our analytical scheme.

**Conflictive détente**

The essential nature of conflictive détente is amply conveyed by the adjective used. In this scenario, détente enters a definitive crisis, increasingly acute, which stops it short in its progress and destroys all possibility of reaching its goals. This term of conflictive détente does not refer so much to the existence of conflicts, which are always possible in any circumstances, but to the higher degree of its intensity, to the moment in which quantity is transformed into quality, once again giving the conflicts involved a total and absolute character. This is a change which renews the terror of past historical experiences.

Once again the biggest danger in this dead-end situation is that it will lead to a nuclear holocaust. It is a situation which the experts say is quite possible if, in a confrontation of power relations, one of the three superpowers—the United States, the Soviet Union or China—feels that its survival is definitively menaced. Let us leave to these experts the precise analysis of the circumstances in question; it is sufficient for us to stress the horror of this desperate prospect.

Faced with this possibility, it would be necessary to try to renew the structure of the cold war, whose probability of dissolution as a form of lasting peace was the original reason for the effort to secure détente. In view of the different situation of power relations, however—not only because of the existence of China but also because of the appearance of other powers with
nuclear capacity—it is difficult to imagine how this situation could be maintained for as long as the previous one or to what moment of games theory the experts could resort in order to make this feasible. Would not this mean entering even further into the polar night of the soulless technicians which already tortured Max Weber many years ago?

Once the possibility of this prospect has been eliminated, there is nothing left in the conflictive scenario to fulfil the hopes of the human race. All that can be suggested comes entirely within the field of historical fiction, and unfortunately it involves more suppositions than such fiction, not less. Can we really be facing the possibility of the new Middle Ages to which we referred at the beginning of this paper? Can we really be on the threshold of this new neo-feudal society in which all peoples and all territories alike would end up as vassals of the technological concentrations, with their areas of indifference abandoned to the spontaneous and unordered settlement of their own conflicts, provided these did not menace the security and interests of the great “castles” and their powerful techno-structures? But however brilliant and sophisticated these constructors of historical fiction may be—and some of the aspects of their work should be taken with a grain of salt—their millenarian admonitions are no less gloomy than those which, by other means and with closer possibilities, fall without much effect on contemporary public opinion, in whose own experience they encounter the conditions for their possibility. Let us put an end, then, to the consideration of this possible horizon according to which, even if the possibility of survival is preserved, such survival will take place in conditions of unthinkable horror.

At all events, the analytical scheme of the possible forms of détente faces the various countries with an immediate future—in a mere matter of decades—which they cannot fail to consider with the greatest seriousness. At every moment, it opens up different opportunities or difficulties for their capacity of political and economic action, and it is desirable to get to know these alternatives for the future as well as possible through careful prospective study, if that capacity for action is to be successfully used. As in any futurological scheme, however, what is suggested only has the value of a project, a starting-point for a patient accumulation of empirical analyses of real tendencies which must be carried out simultaneously in the most diverse fields by different specialists capable of co-ordinating their work. Without this support in the form of concrete studies it is impossible to get away from what remains merely a speculative plan.

At present, there are germs of change everywhere, since the search for a new identity already referred to is not the exclusive preserve of the ruling powers. The smallest countries, too, are already striving to find this identity for themselves. Nor is there any shortage of intellectual efforts to put a little order and clarity into this field of future changes which are in progress. As the time available for this is shorter than might be thought, everything done from this point of view is of the greatest usefulness. Thus, a study which only came to our notice when we were writing this paper gives a very clear-cut framework for the execution of these prospective studies. In this study,
Marshall Wolfe\(^1\) offers a rich panoramic synthesis of the realities of the present-day world which, although it stresses in particular the different conditions of the social structure, also constitutes a successful invitation to pursue this type of realistic approach, without which no prospective study is of any value.

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**Latin America's position in the conditions of détente**

No great effort of imagination or analysis is needed to perceive the stage of painful uncertainty through which Latin America is passing because of the present oscillations in world policy, which are manifested in the changing aspects of the assumed process of détente and aggravated by the effects of an economic recession which affects each and every one of the countries equally. The subject of the present study makes it necessary, however, to leave aside the latter problem and deal directly with the various opportunities and obstacles facing the possible progress of détente, whether in the attempts to organize it, its achievement or its failure.

Although our interest is concentrated on Latin America, the examination of its situation would undoubtedly gain in depth and clarity if we could also carry out a general comparison with the problems of détente in other regions, or at least some groups of countries which show certain political, economic or social similarities with Latin America. In addition to bringing out the assumed similarities, this would also shed light on the different responses possibly needed to the same challenge. Consideration could be given to the group of Arab countries, for example, or perhaps the South-West Asian region. There does not seem to be much doubt about the favourable effects for the immediate future of Latin America that an effective and durable consolidation of détente would have. The present oscillations give rise to a good many critical attitudes not only on the part of the ordinary citizen, but also of public opinion in general and of those responsible for policies and the economy.

Even in the unlikely event of unanimous recognition of the historical sense of détente, there could still be some doubt as to the capacity of the region or of its most important countries to exert a positive influence on the development of détente. In principle, the diplomatic action required does not appear to be an impossibility, provided it were not held back by the deeply-rooted traditions of many foreign ministries which are extremely conservative about the orientation of their action. It does not seem likely that the stimuli of a situation which really does call for the most decided contribution to the construction of a firm and equitable peace under a new world economic order would remain unheeded, however, above all if a cosmopolitan and globalizing

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position takes the place of, or at least reduces, the traditional concerns dominated by security and by misgivings over sovereignty.

The theme of projective sociology consists fundamentally of making the intellectual effort to indicate the framework of the possible alternatives for effective action in this situation—that of détente moving towards a new structure of universal peace—with rigorous application of that category of objective possibility directed towards a clarification of the future instead of an interpretation of the past. Careful and empirical examination of the real tendencies existing at present, of the different combinations in which they can be interwined, and of the foreseeable results constitute the methodological procedure that must be followed in seeking to define the objectively possible, although it is not always possible to achieve any guarantee of its probability. The prospective analysis on which this type of sociological research is based cannot go any further, even in the case of maximum success, than a sober indication of what we can do at a given moment—what can be done as an objective possibility—and it can never be expected to indicate what we ought to do, even assuming unconditional freedom of action. What can be done here and now in the light of the relatively foreseeable circumstances of tomorrow is the only thing that determines the subject of our interest and shapes the object of such a sociological orientation, which now assumes the form of an invitation against the undefined background of the situation of détente in which we find ourselves, for better or for worse, and from which the only thing definitively excluded is a purely passive resignation or an attitude of indifference. This is not the place, however, to try to engage in an even relatively satisfactory elaboration of this type of sociology, since we do not have the time or the capacity for this, and we must confine ourselves to this statement of the declared conviction of its urgency, the call to embark upon an interdisciplinary task to be carried out by determined teams.

It is worth adding, however, that although it is quite true that scientific analysis in itself only enables one to seek what can be done, it does not prevent one from going beyond its frontiers and trying to indicate also what it would in any case be worth undertaking, since no-one can close his eyes to the fact that what it is worth trying to do, even if viewed as impossible, may give us in the future the conditions of possibility for what one could then do in reality. Interesting though this reflection is, however, we must return to the specific subject of this study. As we are trying to tackle the question of the situation of Latin America against the background of détente, it would appear that the easiest manner of advancing without running into obstacles would consist of particularizing with respect to our region the general assumptions included in each of the three previously designed scenarios which constitute, let us repeat, the possible framework of the experiences through which we seem obliged to pass, whatever happens, in the space of a few decades. This convenient procedure, however, would be similar in the final analysis to the frequent and evil practice of giving a description in words of a statistical table which is printed opposite the same text. The reader not only deserves to be spared such a duplication, but he also deserves to have a suitable field for stimulating mental exercise left to his personal capacity.
Still less would the author wish to repeat the opinions rightly or wrongly maintained by him in former works, and perhaps still relatively valid, which form the framework of this renewed attempt at an overall view. The only novelty that they offer is the extension of the old theme of the relations between power and development in the international field: a theme which appeared to be unavoidable after a long and winding road which started from a more limited consideration of "social aspects" of such economic development and ended with the examination of the various forms of planning and their linkage with the political systems.

The aim of avoiding monotonous repetitions and taking the easiest course still does not prevent us from running into very serious difficulties of conceptual articulation, both in the thinking itself and in its exposition. Facing up to such risks, and without abandoning at any time the purely exploratory and schematic nature of these lines, it seems advisable to stick to a few nuclei of very significant problems which have existed since the first instants of the birth of Latin American independence and can perhaps only be solved jointly and satisfactorily within the context of historic change promised by the era of détente. These three nuclei of questions would be the following: that of the initial appearance of the so-called peripheral situation; that of the primary manifestation of a permanent contradiction between political ideas and the real conditions of the social structure, and that of the breaking up of a historic body which has kept on losing fragments ever since that time. Their presence at the present time —naturally modified and with varied shades of significance—determines the ambit of the decisive problems which Latin America can attempt to solve or at least set about trying to solve, taking advantage of the liberty of opportunities perhaps offered by a stabilized détente and the beginning through this of a new universal order. There is no need to say that the detailed consideration of these assumptions of the past and of the objective possibilities of their transformation would have to be based on an accumulation of historical knowledge which it is not feasible to establish at the present moment. Without this basis, there is the obvious danger that the propositions formulated would assume an apodictic complexion very far from our intention. But there is no other way but to face this risk in setting forth the main lines, since in any case the errors which may slip in are more stimulating than the false image of certainty that other conclusions of a deductive nature might give.

The periphery and the semi-periphery in the world economy

With the aim of interpreting certain current features of underdevelopment, a lively controversy arose a few years ago about the temporal ambit of capitalism and about whether or not, in certain places, there were still survivals of the feudal state which had preceded it. There is not the slightest interest in engaging in this controversy yet again now and recognizing that some of the
protagonists in it were right, although this does not oblige us to accept all their conclusions. In this situation of urgency with which we are faced, it is preferable to replace the term “capitalism” with the term “market economy”. It must be recognized in this respect that capitalism first came on the historical scene towards the end of the fifteenth century and is still in full operation, although it includes economic systems of various types or, rather, both industrial countries which are capitalist in the strict sense and also countries or States with a socialist form of organization. When, in the last years of the 1940s, a theory to explain the condition of underdevelopment of our countries was put forward, it brought out the distinction, long repeated and now known to all, between the centre and the periphery within the same inclusive system, i.e., the confrontation between the central countries and the peripheral countries. The fact of recalling this does not mean there is any desire to enter into a controversy about the validity of the interpretation underlying this separation, however. It played its part and it did so very effectively, inasmuch as it gave rise to the will to overcome the problem in question. With the passage of the years and from the historical point of view from which this study is being written, however, it has appeared advisable to add to this division into two parts a new element: that of the semi-peripheral countries or systems. In this sense, it may be affirmed that in the centuries of existence of the world capitalist market there have always been, side by side with a historically variable centre, various other historically varying countries, some of them semi-peripheral and others peripheral with respect to the centre.

With regard to Latin America and its relation in particular with the possible situation of détente, we only need to bring out two points which should perhaps be stated right now despite the inconvenience of such advance treatment. The first of these refers to the fact of the general economic significance of the moment of Independence, while the second concerns the possibility of recognizing the present semi-peripheral nature of a few Latin American countries.

The first point can best be stated in the words of another writer, who said that the independence of the Latin American countries did nothing to change their peripheral status: it simply eliminated the last vestiges of the semi-peripheral role of Spain, finishing with some pockets of non-intervention in the world market in the interior of Latin America. It does not seem to us that the use of this very correct formula assumes or even has anything to do with the complete doctrinal acceptance of the study in which it occurs, despite the many valuable suggestions made in it. The general economic significance of the particular moment of Independence in history has been brought out quite clearly. Independence was not just the political breakup of an empire, but the transformation of an economic whole both in its totality and in each of its parts. This was an economic whole which already had a markedly semi-peripheral character with respect to the European centre: that is to say, it was a few steps behind the centre, but not very markedly so. Specifying exactly when and at what moment this condition arose (1648 with Westphalia or with the delay in the arrival of the Enlightenment, etc.) would simply lead us into inappropriate

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historical digressions. The decisive factor is that the segmentation of a semi-peripheral whole as a result of Independence transferred all its parts into a definitely peripheral situation in which they remained, beginning with Spain itself, for over a century at the end of which time not only the latter country but also some of its former viceroyalties have now reached, with slight differences of time, the status of semi-peripheral countries (this description is also true, although not mutatis mutandis, of the Portuguese expansion: yet another of the constant differences between the Portuguese and Spanish worlds).

It is worth recalling that the situation of being a semi-peripheral country—unlike that of being on the periphery proper—has always meant being at a relatively smaller distance from the centre and in progress towards it, although the final step does not seem to be pre-determined by any historical law: that is to say, it does not constitute a necessary phase. It should be borne in mind, however, in this respect that in the middle of the era of industrial capitalism the enormous outward thrust of Germany and the United States was due to their skill in combining for their own political ends the capacity of both their peripheral and semi-peripheral internal regions. Let us leave the study in detail of this and similar phenomena to the economic historians, however.

Nor is it for us to describe the steps taken in Spain to bring the country out of the markedly peripheral situation with respect to the European centre into which it had sunk as a result of its complete severance from its overseas possessions. It cannot be ignored that in the midst of the political upheavals of the nineteenth century in Spain it could still fall back on some isolated areas of industrial activity which, with various ups and downs, saved it from disaster. This is not the time to judge the relative importance of the various mechanisms which permitted it within a few decades to regain its semi-peripheral status, and still less to predict the possibilities of their continuing and the extent to which they will be capable of taking the next step. Its conditions have been quite different, of course, from those experienced by the Latin American countries in their long and still uncompleted efforts to emerge from the peripheral position in which they were placed by their definitive break with their colonial past.

The story of the adventures and misadventures of the new nations, abandoned in their far-off peripheral position since the beginning of the nineteenth century, has been told in recent times quite adequately and from various points of view. It is only because it now appears to us to be moving towards its conclusion that we feel that it is worth making a few rapid references to it before taking up once again the subject of our particular interest.

Those who still feel obliged to point to the structural heterogeneity of the region and of its various countries should remember how far off its beginnings were, since there was an immediate counterposition of the coastal cities—of a political-administrative nature and the decisive nucleus formed in agriculture by the structure of the haciendas, which were only gradually converted—and even then not in every case—into enterprises. The structural heterogeneity is not the special result of an advanced phase of capitalism, as in the case of some Asian countries, which suggested to contempo-
rary economists the famous and unduly generalized theory of dualism. Nor can fundamental changes be seen if one only observes the type of world market now supplied with new exports, since the form of trade functioned in the same way in the mercantilist period as in that following the Manchester free-trade era. The only difference is that the latter helped to outline with lasting theoretical pretensions a form of international division of labour which some claim still exists today.

The only thing which has varied since then with the passage of time has been the various products which have served as a basis for the export economy, and this only interests strict economic history and in no way affects the fundamental structure of the countries. The resulting configuration was of countries which depended on the exterior in their economic life and were therefore subject to the changing fortunes of a market which was outside their control.

Within this general picture, however, a point of great importance was the succession which occurred in the main hegemonic centre —first England, then the United States, with their different styles of economic and above all financial activity. But the economic bloc to which countries inevitably had to belong, made up of the two countries in question plus the industrialized countries of Europe, has remained almost unchanged until today, and the picture of Latin America's trade relations has hardly been broadened by modern Japan and by the scanty and peculiar trade with the Socialist countries. The term of dependent semi-development used to refer to our countries is of course quite true, leaving aside its implicit critical content, and the whole thesis of dependence is no less free of any controversial orientation. In order to be true, however, every critical attitude can do no less than make a historical-sociological analysis of the most unvarnished type in order to understand what really happened and indeed could not happen in any other way. Any other approach means giving oneself up to the kind of history-fiction about what might have happened if conditions had been different: an intellectual exercise which is no doubt interesting but lacks any interpretative value. No-one can seriously deny that once the Latin American countries had achieved relative maturity, they ceased to perceive all the perils of their economic structure. This is demonstrated by the fact that such perception imposed itself as an unavoidable necessity in the experimentation with new economic policies in the two periods when the phenomenon assumed an acute and almost compulsive form: i.e., during and immediately after the two World Wars.

Now the decisive point is that what seemed to the countries to be an obligatory attitude for survival was converted from 1945 onwards into a conscious and strenuous aspiration to find their possibilities of action on a justified theoretical basis.

The so-called developmentalism —a term which is sometimes used today in a pejorative sense— is the first generalized expression of a deliberate will of rebellion on the part of our countries with a view to overcoming their peripheral situation. It is quite unnecessary, of course, to recall the extremely well-known role played at that time by the ideas of CEPAL.

Once the policy of import substitution had been put into effect, some form or other of substitutive industrialization was initiated everywhere with greater or lesser success until its possibilities were
exhausted and the countries ran into the world recession. The twenty years between 1950 and 1970, which elapsed, it will be recalled, in the shade of the nuclear threat did not constitute for Latin America a Belle Epoque similar to that enjoyed by the great industrial countries, but they did signify a period of general progress in more than one aspect. In the economic field, this progress can be measured by the well-known indexes of growth of average well-being, despite the exceptions which of course appeared to be unsuspected. Alternatively, this progress can be represented by the figures for the total product or the increase in capital formation. Whichever of these is taken, it is evident that the changes were very great, and this is unjustly forgotten by some people.

The above should not be confused with an expression of triumph, however, for the price that had to be paid for the undeniable advance of the Latin American countries was the acceptance within the system of a concentrated form of growth which was manifested in the visible structural heterogeneity of its results. The question of up to what point such structural heterogeneity was not something common in the past and even the present economic structure of other countries, and the way in which it could be avoided, is something which falls outside both our competence and our present interest. Unfortunately, it is not possible to pass over such negative aspects with indifference, reflected as they are in marked differences in income distribution and in the employment structure: it was not possible to reduce them, as was hoped, through the various social policies, nor did they respond to the illusory hopes placed in the educational reforms which were actually carried out almost everywhere but which, because of their orientation, produced unexpected negative and secondary effects. The deplorable fact of the “brain drain” brings out the considerable deployment of energy and intellectual capacity by our countries in past decades, which was less glorious in these results however, than a novelistic boom capable of crossing the frontiers of its own language.

All the foregoing purely allusive references were merely designed to lead up to what is now most important to us within our theme regarding the détente in world power relations, since at the end of the short period referred to we find that the group of Latin American countries, originally all placed in the same peripheral position at the moment of Independence, are tending to show considerable differences between each other because of the fact that some of them are reaching or already have reached the status of semi-peripheral countries with respect to the world market. Now, assuming of course that what was already stated regarding the relative attitude of indifference of the central countries with regard to the fate of the peripheral countries really takes place and the peripheral countries are thus left to their fate except in cases of flagrant misery or disaster, the question arises of what kind of future awaits the Latin American countries which are in this position, from the point of view of their development.

It has been pointed out that during the process of détente, and above all in the possibly longest period of its competitive scenario, the relations of the great centres with the other countries will differ depending on whether the latter are fairly large countries at an advanced stage of development, with sufficient resources and some capacity of organization, or small but rich countries...
with strong negotiating power, or small or medium-sized poor countries which are obliged to continue in a markedly peripheral condition. Once the value of the ideological element has been reduced or has disappeared as an influence in the negotiations for aid and support of which they could previously take advantage, the situation of the peripheral countries proper will tend to get worse until such time as they can feel that they are protected by the institutional system of a new order of world peace.

In the circumstances just described, which, far from being purely imaginary, are based on amply objective assumptions, the prospective interest turns towards the possible attitudes of these new semi-peripheral countries—which make up what has been called by A. Pinto the “developed periphery”—with regard to the other more backward countries of the region. They can hardly be accused of narrow selfishness if they take advantage of the best opportunities for greater and more beneficial trade with the more economically and financially powerful central countries, just as they have already done through the various ways of initial substitutive industrialization, so that if political fortune accompanies their economic and social development they can enter in due course into similar relations—within their proportions of dependence, of course—to those at present prevailing between the various industrialized countries and the United States, for example. In the course of this expansion they will have better possibilities of overcoming the structural heterogeneity which still affects them and of reducing their pockets of poverty, perhaps more rapidly than older nations were able to do in the course of their evolution. The problem is not whether or not they seize the possibilities for progress which now appear to be offered to them, but whether at the same time they maintain their interest in helping the weaker neighbours of the region and sharing with them the destiny of a community in which all were equal at the beginning. The breakdown of this equality, in each case as a result of different factors, undoubtedly burdens the semi-peripheral countries of Latin America with a serious responsibility which should be examined immediately.

The structural differences within individual countries have always existed, but only as a national problem which domestic policy had to face for reasons both of justice and security. The structural differences between different countries, on the other hand, still form an international question, albeit between closely related countries, and for this reason its solution is less clear. The great historical challenge for all the countries of Latin America, and more so for the semi-peripheral countries than for the rest of the peripheral countries which are not so well endowed with resources and have small domestic markets, is that they should be able to respond with energetic political will and institutional creativity, in the more complex conditions implied by the détente among the great powers, to the specially difficult situation created for the countries that are weaker in comparison with those which are progressing more strongly within the same area of culture and common interests. Will the more responsible countries of Latin America be capable of giving a lesson to the rest of the world? To put the same question less arrogantly, will they be able, through the example of their own intra-zonal and in the last analysis international relations, to contribute to the great reform of the world market and world power relations by freeing them from the law of the
jungle to which they have been subject for centuries? Are there sufficient indications that they are disposed to undertake this task, beginning with themselves and, while not displaying unthinkable altruism, of course, nevertheless showing a sincere concern for the fate of others?

The diffusion of ideological perplexities

Another essential note of the constellation of events which affected Latin America at the time of its Independence and which not only continues to exert influence now but will also certainly do so in the region's future destiny—perhaps even more acutely in coming decades—is the contradiction, which can hardly be expressed briefly in a few instants, between the political ideals proclaimed and the actual conditions of their possibility, i.e., a continually renewed lack of agreement between ideology and practice, or, expressed with greater analytical precision, a permanent maladjustment between economic rationality and political rationality. This is a theme which, even isolated from any form of context, could hardly be exhausted in a few pages and which now arises in an extreme form and with some degree of dramatism in view of the prospect of the assumed détente which, it is held, will sooner or later bring about a crisis in the ideologies imposed on the world during the last few decades. This is a crisis which hardly any of the big countries will be able to avoid, involved as they are in trying to outline the identity with which they are to face the future: a search which also drags along with it the smaller powers and among them naturally Latin America as a whole.

Of course this question can only be examined schematically. Even so, however, it would be completely pointless if we did not recall—accepting them at least provisionally—some of the assumptions of a prospective nature already mentioned: firstly, the loss of value of the traditional ideologies as instruments of political and economic negotiation; secondly, the appearance as a consequence of this in the formation of other ideologies of an autonomous ambit, the so-called ideological decentralization; thirdly, the more direct manifestation of this process in the doctrines on development, i.e., the fact that its first prey will be the very idea of development prevailing so far; fourthly, the greater significance of the political ideologies as a result of the general search for new identities, i.e., for one's own politico-cultural personality, and finally, the equivocal nature of the assumed ideological decentralization because it is not in itself an unmixed blessing, since in addition to its liberating opportunity it also contains the possibility of being an eventual source of numerous conflicts.

Let us return, however, to what comes next in our historical thread, without feeling obliged to engage in the systematic application of the above assumptions.

The starting-point, let us repeat, can be formulated in just a few words: liberalism is the founding ideology of Latin America and has had such force
that it still remains, even though only in
the form of an unsuccessful aspiration.
Obviously, in this case the term
liberalism must be understood not so
much as a definite political or economic
doctrine—both of which have existed in
the past—but as an attitude to mankind,
as a conception of personal disposition.

In the early years of our nationhood,
liberalism was not only a first and
perfectly understandable “anti”, but also
a politico-economic concept matured in
the vigorous enlightened meetings of the
later eighteenth century in Latin Ameri­
ca, which represented the culmination of
the oldest and most lasting spiritual
tradition of the West. There is no need
to repeat yet again what everyone
knows. In its capacity as a weapon of the
civil insurgent revolution, however, it
needed to take shape immediately as an
institutional organization, beginning
naturally with the most important thing:
the political constitution as a fundamen­
tal code. The content of the constitution
and of the legislation derived from it
fitted only with difficulty into the social
structure which it aimed to regulate and
from which it must receive continued
support, however. This structure was as
historic a product as that of the
enlightened urban intellectual strata
themselves, and it showed an agrarian
type of organization which was the
result of slow penetration into the
sparsely populated interior. The contra­
diction between the system of political
ideas and the social reality was bound to
become obvious immediately; the
different forms that it took according to
the different countries and moments
constitute the backbone of the interpre­
tation of our history up till today. No
attempt will be made to repeat it now in
all its shades and variations. The impulse
towards political rationality breaks down
for the first time because of its abstract
composition with the progress of
economic rationality, which is the only
one possible for a long period. There
have been moments, however, according
to the varying fortunes of the countries,
when it has appeared that a conciliation
has been reached in the eyes of the
opposed interests, as in the political
outlet of the traditional two-party
Liberal and Conservative system (with
different names in different countries).
On the one hand, this conciliation was a
consequence of the electoral systems,
which were at once satisfactory to the
Liberal conscience and useful to
Conservative interests. On the other
hand, it was also the result of the nature
of the parties themselves as a conglomera­
tion of notables who belonged by birth
or assimilation to the same social class
and were often also related to each
other. Fundamentally, what permitted
this apparent conciliation was the fact
that the political system so constituted
represented, without any conscious
striving after this, the only possible
expression of a basically outward­
oriented economy. It was thus able to
persist in a large number of countries, in
spite of all the difficulties, until—when
the prolongation of the nineteenth
century into the following century came
to an end with the First World War—it
became increasingly difficult to keep
such an economic system alive. Now,
when the decided turn in favour of an
inward-oriented economy became
evident, the prevailing political régime
had scarcely changed in its structure and
had remained fossilized in a two-party
system which was completely foreign to
a definitively changed social and
economic reality. A detailed history of
this would no doubt bring out the
diversity of the shades involved and of the
exceptional efforts made in some
countries, but it would not modify the
analytical scheme, which is now accepted.

When the idea of development is disseminated as a conscious aspiration and as a programme, the “developmentalism” thus created finds itself without a fit and proper political strategy. Once more the instrumental reason of the economy comes to the fore. To tell the truth, developmentalism carried implicit within it concrete political orientations, at least in the spirit of the first generation, although understandably these were not declared in an explicit and well-defined manner. The economic view of developmentalism required certain very precise assumptions regarding the type of State in whose territorial dominions the proposed development would be carried out. It was either openly declared or left as an implicit assumption that what was needed was a State capable of broadening the field of its competence and willing at the same time to be not only a regulator of economic activity but also a participant in such activity and even, when necessary, a subject of it in its capacity as an entrepreneur. In brief, the image of a mixed economy with a strong public sector corresponded exactly with the view of developmentalism. As it was never entirely blind to the diversity of social interests, however, the same State had also to be, to a greater or lesser extent, a benefactor, a welfare state, although on a modest scale in its initial pretensions. The States which actually existed at that time, however, lacked the necessary capacity and the appropriate institutional organization (with a few exceptions, of course).

On the other hand, the developmentalist inspiration could hardly fail to take into account also the specific action of the so-called middle classes, whose existence in the desired form is a problem that is still being debated. What is certain is that it was never thought that those classes and their accompanying entrepreneurial attitudes should be a mere carbon copy of what was represented by the nineteenth century bourgeoisie in the developed countries, but this did not mean that the concern to find the motive elements—classes, groups and individuals—for economic growth based on industrialization was incorrect for this reason. Where were its social supports to be found? It may be that these were lacking, just as the administrative capacity of the State for supporting this task was lacking, but the subsequent criticisms of a supposed “national bourgeoisie”, very similar to the stereotype cast in the previous century, do not seem convincing in view of the possibility—which indeed has actually occurred—that there were entrepreneurial types of another character which were relatively indifferent, in their technocratic approach, to the political concerns of their predecessors in economic history. But this is not the place to re-open this discussion.

Be that as it may, the basic fact is that in the moment of initial developmentalism it was bound to run once again into the inveterate contradiction between the political constitution and the socio-economic structure.

Nothing is more striking in this respect than the role which the idea of planning had to play when it was finally able to free itself from its first wrappings as “programming”. The planning bodies, whatever the name given to them, appeared everywhere as technocratic-looking spare wheels which did not fit in anywhere in the prevailing institutional system. This does not signify the least criticism of their work, of course, but in this almost phantasmal character they not only were unable to link up securely
and efficiently with the prevailing administrative organization but were even less able to do so with the political system as a whole. Where the representative régime remained, there was no manner of achieving a clear linkage with the system of parties or with the parliamentary mechanism. The parties offered neither clear positions as regards economic development nor well-defined programmes choosing between the various options. Consequently, the parliamentary activity failed to deal with questions of economic policy in the rigorous and scientifically based debates required for this. The two sets of options, that of political representation and that of economic planning, each went their own way. The excuse or consolation that an institutional arrangement such as that indicated between the representative system and the planning system scarcely existed either in the democratic industrial countries which served as a model (except in the case of the French efforts) cannot absolve our region from its responsibility for failing to try to solve with any degree of originality the persistent contradiction between instrumental or technical reasoning and the broader demands of political reasons. There can therefore be little surprise that the first of these went its own way, with unexpected results.

Just as happened with regard to the middle classes or middle strata, a discussion has been going on for a number of years about an assumed link between "scientific developmentalism" and political populism. There can be no doubt that the connexion appears to be quite clear. It can be objected, however, as some people have done, that developmentalism and populism have really been two sides of the same coin. When looked at more closely, both appear as adverse and mutually incompatible orientations: one more example of the lasting contradiction referred to so many times.

It seems obvious that populism is a residue of the original liberal aspiration, expressed in this case with new and old "antis", but in its economic aspect it never advanced beyond the stage of being merely a first vague sketch—among many others—of an ideology of development.

The essential characteristic of populism, as far as sociological analysis is concerned, is not so much its doctrine as the fact that everywhere it involved a régime of clientage, although it cannot be claimed that this clientage was exclusively a political weakness of Latin America, since it had already had a long prior history in the Mediterranean area (there are cases which have been closely studied, using such nomenclature, in Greece and Southern Italy, but these examples can also be extended to other countries of the area). Now, the régime of clientage is the typical political expression of situations of limited development put forward in democratic guise. By this very fact, however, they always constituted in their functioning, obscuring their political successes, a decisive obstacle to the installation of an authentic democracy and an efficient process of economic expansion, since the régime of clientage, although never claiming to be so, was at all times a serious hindrance to the normal functioning of both a rational State—of law and impersonal bureaucracy—and of economic enterprises of the same type. In the economic field, it is sufficient to recall its general propensity to place aspects of consumption before productive requirements. In this sense, the pretended bracketing of populism with developmentalism was from every point of view an unfortunate move.
In view of the conflict of interests necessarily brought about by the action of development, which development itself was not capable of resolving in the short time available to it without the aid of suitable political activity capable of continuous commitments only provisionally acceptable from stage to stage and in any case prevented by the persistent institutional instability, the final resort in the face of these difficulties was always the perhaps inevitable authoritarian solution. This is a resort which, even in the event of success, does not establish a lasting agreement between political rationality and the economy and indeed tends to display in itself, in all its various manifestations, the continuity of the contradiction which goes beyond any historical judgement.

We have already noted earlier the futurological forecast regarding the reduction of the influence of the dominant ideologies as a consequence of détente, which is expected to begin to manifest itself in the intermediate, oscillating stage of the competitive scenario, without any need to wait for the final achievement of détente. This reduction or loosening in no way signifies the elimination of all ideological rivalry, however. On the contrary, the general spread of a state of perplexity in this field seems to be a circumstance through which a considerable number of societies will have to pass, possibly for some time: a state of perplexity which Latin America has certainly already experienced in recent years because of the generation gap in its circles of intellectuals and rulers. The phenomenon has been generalized, and it will be taken up by the history of ideas at the right moment, but it also offers the fascinating feature of appearing in its most marked form precisely in places whose distance and isolation would give grounds for suspecting them of being closed to the winds of change from the exterior. It is therefore not necessary to wait for the moment of the assumed “ideological decentralization” to know this experience for the first time. The economic development of Latin America took place within a system which naturally imposed its own style everywhere, and in contrast the pretensions of the opposed style should have been the dominant option in the logical structure of the cold war. So they were, to a good extent, but this did not mean that they were not accompanied by their own heterodoxies and by the remnants of other old ideologies of the region, such as anarcho-syndicalism. Something similar took place on the right, although in a more concealed form. But at the beginning of the assumed process of détente, the economic and social experience of the Chinese Revolution began to gain influence, in its dual aspect, side by side with the Soviet model. In principle, these will be the stimuli of ideas which will continue to act when the awaited moment of the ideological “decentralization” or autonomy arrives, once the polarized counterposition of the ideological systems which have so far been dominant is broken. Those interested in forecasting must, of course, set out from these bases.

As regards the concept of development itself, the crisis through which it is passing is not a novelty either if such development is understood as a pure mechanism of incessant economic growth measured by the rates achieved year by year. To tell the truth, the much-reviled “initial developmentalism” cannot be accused of showing blindness or short-sightedness in this respect: from the very beginning there was an awareness that development is also something else, although the elaboration of this
aspect frequently figures as a mere appendix or sometimes a mere decorative ritual. At all events, however, it was always present. In years gone by, the intellectual leaning towards an excessively narrow economistic view has been observed in the most diverse places, whether as immanent realistic criticism or in the form of more or less utopian proposals. This does not mean, however, that economic growth in itself is a complete error and that the calculations of its possibility can cheerfully be thrown overboard like any other kind of rebellion against the principles of formal rationality of economic science. In this sense it is not very probable that the suggestions of "another kind of development"—whatever the moral motivations behind them—will produce any immediate sharp changes of orientation, at any rate in Latin America. Although there is full agreement about the deplorable effects of the "consumer society" it is unlikely that it would be possible to cut off at one fell swoop the expectations that this still arouses in many countries which, because of their less privileged position, are anxious to possess goods which are considered completely usual in other countries: a desire stimulated by the "demonstration effects" of a culture to which Latin America inevitably belongs by historical tradition and geographical contiguity. Of course it seems certain that there is every day greater understanding that the satisfaction of such aspirations should be preceded as far as possible by the fulfilment of the primary and elementary needs of the most under-privileged sectors of the population. This is a task which is in no way impossible under the present system, although it is difficult to achieve unless, through reforms from within, it is possible to find the necessary compensatory mechanisms. It is simply a question of looking for these really seriously.

The moment of "ideological decentralization" assumes that possible circumstance of détente in which the two pillars of the opposing doctrines lose their dogmatic rigidity not only as a result of their respective internal tendencies towards change, but also because of the fact that in the new perspectives of power relations they cease to be the instrument of negotiation and compromise, of support and aid, which the minor powers were forced to accept regardless of whether they were in the orbit of the great powers as satellites or as allies. There can be no doubt that some will consider such a condition unlikely, but what is really of interest in any attempt at forecasting is not so much mere appearances as what may be contained in the empirical analysis of the actual tendencies which are perhaps in progress, despite their oscillations and lags. What is important in such a case is to forecast also with some foundation of objective possibility what the predominating response may be in Latin America. It may happen that these circumstances of liberation may encourage a return to a kind of ideological witches' sabbath in the region or, on the contrary and more likely, they may give a stimulus, through the "breaking of the straitjackets of all the ideologies", to the beginning of an era of flexible policies marked by a will to maintain permanent adjustment to the expectations offered by a changing reality.

As long as the background of competitive détente lasts, the play of external influences will be approximately the same as at present. It should not be forgotten, however, that it was forecast that at a stage of relative maturity of détente all the interested powers will set out enthusiastically in
search of their new identity or image—this has already manifestly begun—and that Latin America, necessarily involved in the same process, will be bound to be singularly sensitive to what happens in the countries in the same historical vein as it, although at the same time there will still be other influences at work which are more difficult to define because of the internal reasons for their formation in the countries or cultures from which they stem.

In such a situation, the decisive query once again concerns the persistence of the original contradiction between political reasons and economic and instrumental reasons. Will Latin America be capable of putting an end to this old contradiction when it finds its new identity and finally reconciling in this affirmation of its personality both its economic requirements and the stabilization of its political institutions?

Concerning the assumed existence of a Latin American community

The last point in the various considerations drawn together in these pages also refers to the historical significance of the moment of Independence. In this case it does not concern a new and distinct attribute or keynote, however, but its very substance. Independence naturally conveys the idea, on its political surface, of the definitive cutting off of a colonial relationship lasting three centuries, but it also implies at the same time in its deeper sociological sense the breaking up of a historic body which, in spite of its geographical extension, kept its various parts more or less integrated. What is of importance to us now is the immediate result of this division and the consequences of the way in which it took place. The separation left the North American area intact, but in the southern part of the hemisphere it broke it up, in contrast, into numerous pieces. As a result, we have on the one hand, in terms which were first of all literary but today are in popular use, the United States of America, and on the other hand the disunited States of South America. Consequently, the trauma caused by the breaking up of a historic body is more serious among us and remains in evidence even today both in the difficult and equivocal relations of the various parts with the old centre and in the unsatisfied longing for their reunification with each other. Since the beginning, this longing has taken the form of doctrinal declarations which no one denies but which no one tries to comply with either. It therefore persists simply as an ideal and as solemn rhetoric.

Now, both the writer and the reader can hardly fail to have realized immediately the equivocacy of the description given, since what appears in its broad lines is really the decomposition—no other term is possible—of the great historic Spanish body. In no way is it a question of the breaking up of a broader totality of a similar nature which, because of its different origins, never existed in history. Brazil also separated from Portugal, but it maintained itself as another politically intact geographical area having nothing to do with the fragmentation of the historic Spanish-
speaking body. For this reason, the disunited States of South America would have become such even if the fragmentation of the Hispanic body had not taken place in the way in which it did. In this sense, it can be maintained that we are faced once again with an essential and decisive note of the constitution which was created at the moment of Independence and continues to exert its influence right up to the present. This is a note which cannot be forgotten or put on one side when we are dealing with an aspect of the theme which is peculiar to these pages: that of the role of the pretended Latin American community in the circumstances of an assumed world détente. To what extent can the real existence of such a community be affirmed?

The theme finally comes to be presented in this manner by virtue of a number of complicated historical chances. The most important thing in this respect, however, is that this new presentation is being made now for economic reasons, since from 1945 onwards the objectives of development became the predominant problem of the whole region. The question assumes this character not only by virtue of its intrinsic importance, but also because of the fact that its consideration and study include and concentrate many other questions which up to the present seemed to be distant and isolated compared with the concerns of politicians and intellectuals. The theme of integration—that of the reunification of the lost whole— is one of those covered by the new conception of economic development. It could therefore be stated, at the moment of such enlightenment, that the problem of seeking a supra-national form of organization of Latin America consisted basically in the fact that it arose at a time when in many cases the implied national integration was still not complete.

Now, after quite a few years of progress, the problem no longer arises in the same form. With regard to the immediate future, it consists of determining as correctly as possible the set of facilities and difficulties presented, against the background of détente, in the search for a full or partial regionalization of Latin America which will permit it to act as a single body in the world, first economically and eventually politically. What are the favourable or adverse aspects in the task of setting afoot a Latin American community? Is regionalization the best solution to deal with the economic problems being faced? In what sense is regionalization also a political requirement? All these queries arise within the much broader framework of the assumed détente and its consequences: a new world system of peace and of economic order.

Let us very briefly compare the conditions in which the European Economic Community was set up with those which may make possible a similar attempt in Latin America. On the whole the Latin American conditions do not seem to be inferior; specifically, however, some are apparently more favourable and others obviously unfavourable at the present time or in a situation which prolongs the present state of affairs without substantial changes (an excessively long and oscillating process of détente, to say nothing of possible failure). Here is an outline picture.

We must not fail to mention what appears as an advantage for Latin America in this comparison: namely, the region's linguistic unity (or near-unity, taking Portuguese into account) and the support provided by many cultural traditions which are common to all the
countries or very similar in them. This is a topic to which all speeches made on solemn occasions refer, of course, and it would be worth examining in greater detail if this were the time to do so, for all topics rise up like a challenge as regards what they may contain or lack that is reasonable. In the present case, we need make only two small observations. One is limited to recalling that the problem in question is primarily one of organization, where, if necessary, any "lingua franca" could serve as an instrument and it is not necessary to base the whole matter— as in such questions as national integration— on assumed cultural identities. All this must be accepted with a grain of salt, in order to avoid unlimited digressions. The other observation is more decisive and does not bring with it the peril of new temptations to go into digressions. The veriest tyro in sociological theory knows or ought to know that community of languages and even of culture does not necessarily mean that it is accompanied by the tendencies or the operative forces capable of culminating without other help in a different type of "communication". It does, however, undoubtedly contain some favourable conditions of possibility, that is to say, features which are obviously favourable provided they are made use of along with other means such as political will or an efficient capacity of institutional creation. Let us now leave this old topic, however, although it is not without a certain mythical and emotional force.

The European Economic Community was attempted and achieved after a war which represented the second attempt at suicide by the old world. The antagonisms which repeated among Nation-States the tragic episode of the no less annihilatory quarrels among City-States in the times of the Greeks were in no way the tensions of a recent past. It is necessary to go back to the times of the Carolingian Empire to follow step by step the series of struggles between the great nations of Europe which were doomed to culminate in two successive universal conflicts. Neverthe­less, a moment came— between the two most determined opponents in this painful story— in which it proved possible to make a clear turn of 180 degrees. The fact that this took place perhaps because of the instinct of survival in the face of serious menaces rather than because of a sincere act of contrition does not in the least diminish its value as a triumph of responsible intelligence over passion. Nor is this triumph reduced by the fact that it was sustained from the outside. The capacity of invention and the courage of the men who set afoot the idea of the Community is something which cannot be adversely affected by those who subse­quently emulated them.

Nobody can pretend that Latin American history is an impeccable model compared with the European example and can be consequently described as though it had been a paradise of peaceful co-existence among the various countries in the region. There have been conflicts and oppositions between them at all scales of gravity, even up to full-scale war. To ignore this fact now would be as wrong as it would be unnecessary. These conflicts left behind them scars which remain in history books and in the tacit orientations of foreign ministries. Even the greatest pessimist could not convince us, however, that such tensions existed so intensely and so repeatedly as in Europe. The cases of "revanchism" or "irredentism" are exceptional and very difficult to find. The quarrels which still exist can be solved with goodwill through the usual diplomatic channels,
as has happened on various occasions. And although the passage of time has stimulated the deliberate accentuation of national forms and a curious alternation, unstable for this very reason, in the efforts by certain States at leadership, neither of these constitutes a definitive impediment to a will to reach agreement on many questions. In short, on the political side the possibilities of a total or partial Latin American community of the European type encounter more facilities than obstacles.

In contrast, it is in the strictly economic field that the disadvantages weigh against such a community, unlike the European case. The European Economic Community—so far it has not extended beyond that region—was established between countries of advanced industrial development which were at relatively close levels to each other. In other words, it took place between societies of marked structural homogeneity, if we leave aside the agricultural differences, which have given rise to laboriously concluded agreements that have continually had to be reviewed because of their precarious and circumstantial nature. The decisive factor has always lain in the industrial field and in the vigorous mutual trade. In Latin America, in contrast, not only is the level of industrial progress nowhere near so high, but instead of the European structural homogeneity there is the well-known Latin American heterogeneity, not only between the different nations, but even within each of them. Let us recall in passing that the nucleus of the European Community lay in the apparently more modest Coal and Steel Community. And although history neither requires nor permits literal repetitions, this fact gives a concrete example of what is demanded of the capacity for institutional inventiveness.

Finally, as everyone knows, the idea of the European Economic Community enjoyed from the beginning the stimulus and decided support of the United States, which was then at the highest point of its hegemonic power in the West.

To sum up this brief comparative picture of the favourable and unfavourable elements in the respective situations of Europe and Latin America, it does not appear that there is any really insuperable and definitive obstacle in the latter case. The region's conditions are undoubtedly more difficult, but it can take advantage immediately of the obviously favourable ones while it learns, both from its own by no means insignificant experience and from that of others, what needs to be done to overcome through inevitably laborious efforts the features which appear to be adverse or less favourable. This minimal comparative exercise, of course, in no way reduces the need to persevere with the decisions already taken, whose broadening is a clear historical requirement.

In effect, regionalization appears to be—in its economic content, of course—the most suitable way of solving many of the problems of Latin America as a whole. The only immediate question raised by it is that of determining the manner in which it should be carried out, its dimensions and the instruments that can be used. It is also necessary, of course, that it should be possible to specify at the same time the conditions of its possibility not only at the present moment but also in the light of the various backgrounds and scenarios of the assumed détente, whether in its present fluctuations, in its stabilized situation or in its frightening breakdown. In the last case, of course, every forecast would necessarily be a sombre one.
From now on it will be necessary to go close to the limit of what it is permissible to deal with in this study, since a good deal of what remains to be considered concerns technical questions which are beyond our competence or involve a particularization of the general ideas expressed earlier whose repetition should be avoided as undesirable. Finally, it should not be forgotten that this study did not pretend to do anything else but formulate, as a programme, a compressed outline of the object and frame of reference of an essay in projective sociology.

Without pretending that this is a unanimous view, it would appear that at least the majority of economists feel that Latin America at present shows a series of common and fundamental economic problems—apart from those peculiar to each of the countries—which suggest that it would be desirable and even essential to find solutions of a collective nature to them. On the one hand there is the need to go past the phase of substitutive industrialization which has already been completed as a whole and advance beyond the limits which have been encountered, thus solving the “great backwardness of some dynamic sectors” which require an expansion of their market in various ways, many to some extent mutually incompatible. On the other hand, there is the question of the persistence of the old problem of external strangulation, which is the cause of intolerable indebtedness in the majority of the countries and continues as a tenacious challenge to the capacity of invention or discovery of financial instruments—in addition to those which already exist—for promoting the most suitable satisfaction of investment needs and of the acute problems of the balance of payments, regarding which it is rightly said that it is urgent to establish a timely “safety net” capable of coping with possible balance-of-payments crises. Finally there is the persistent lag in technological instrumentality due to the difficulty, even in the economically most advanced countries, of establishing unaided, in an independent and separate manner, the bases needed for scientific research and for the technical use of the results thus obtained. The tremendous costs involved in pure and applied research activities are beyond the financial possibilities of any of the individual countries today.

It is only fair, however, on the other hand, to acknowledge the notable progress made by the region, in spite of these problems, in its productive capacity and in its “increasing significance as an importer from the central countries”. In both cases—that of the problems and that of the advances made—it seems inevitable to take the path of regionalization, or rather, the various possible paths available for joint action. Now, to what extent do the real assumptions needed to warrant this step exist? We must therefore add a few more words to the foregoing reflections.

Nobody who is interested in these questions can fail to take account today, in any broad political-economic view, of the very acute statements made by H. Jaguaribe, although obviously it is not necessary to follow him completely in all his conclusions. Let us now examine the points of coincidence between these views and some of the concepts already put forward in this study which, because we were following different lines of thinking, came out separately at various points.

The distinction between countries which are economically peripheral and others which are semi-peripheral with respect to the world market and the great industrial centres—a complementary distinction, made necessary by the passage of time, to the classic dichotomy established by CEPAL—does not cover all cases, because the division between viable and non-viable countries, which is perhaps implacable in its literal tenor, is not purely economic. This distinction and the smoothing down of its rough edges, of course, obviously signifies that some countries, because of their economic structure and size of market, can hardly escape unaided from their peripheral state, whatever their degree of political consensus and the capacity of their leaders and intellectual élites, while other countries in a semi-peripheral state, with bigger markets, more resources and a relatively higher degree of industrial development, could continue their own independent way if they so desire, thus managing sooner or later, if conditions are favourable, to achieve a position equivalent to that of other States which no-one considers underdeveloped. The unavoidable problem lies in knowing whether everything in this approach—which is not incompatible with that of joint action—would be favourable, and if such countries can free themselves from the repercussions which the fate of their peripheral neighbours would tend to have on them. Moreover, this is to say nothing of the awareness of moral and political responsibility aroused by their own privileged state in respect to the less fortunate fragments of the historic body of which they once formed part and which it may be possible to reconstruct in the future.

In the foregoing examination of this historic body, as regards its past and present form and the process of its break-up, it was unthinkable not to refer—in passing and without any deliberate intent—to the special position occupied by Brazil at the moment when Independence took place. This special position persists today and therefore makes it impossible to ignore the reasons for Brazil's ambiguity with respect to the rest of Latin America, as so truly analysed by a citizen of that country. It might therefore appear, in that case, and for those reasons, that the reconstitution of the great historic body which was broken up at Independence could only take place in a piecemeal manner because of historical influences and language differences. It can be assumed, however, that the suppositions of objective causality underlying the regionalization approach are not in principle any different for Brazil than for the other countries which are also in a semi-peripheral position or in one close to it.

As the statement now being commented upon points out, the decisive question would consequently be that of clearly determining the present limits and the most suitable instruments for achieving one or another form of regionalization. If this is not achieved, then whatever the conditions in the near future in the hemisphere and in the world, the Latin American countries would be an easy target for the age-old game of "divide and rule", especially if their foreign ministries continue to stick to their traditional inclination for policies of security and are not capable of complementing them—there can as yet be no question of eliminating them completely—with the emerging example of an international policy of well-being. Only under this latter policy is it possible to begin the suggested gradual replacement of the foreign transnational corporations with others which are completely Latin American, or at least
to secure a balanced presence of both types of corporations, as a more realistic projection seems to make advisable.

In the intellectual debates which preceded the organization of the peace after the last war, one of the most useful concepts then formulated was that of the functional federations for well-defined limited purposes, as against the dreams of broader federations which were impossible both then and now. Such terminology has been gradually disappearing, and it is hardly to be found today at all. Even so, the original concept still preserves its instrumental fertility, since it refers to agreements or facts on strictly defined objectives which leave intact the countries’ full autonomy regarding other matters (the word sovereignty was used then and can still be repeated today). In our region, the clearest example of this possibility is to be found in the field of scientific and technological research, although this does not mean that we should limit its application solely to this field, since the principle of functional federations for limited purposes can be extended to other objectives of an economic and social nature. Governmental agreements of this type, once more made a subject of general interest by the contemporary concern with the so-called transnational relationships, offer the great advantage of being capable of various overlappings and interconnexions. That is to say, agreements of this kind are not in principle mutually incompatible. Consequently, their final linking together, no matter how difficult it may be, can cover areas of very extensive content and with different participants.

It must not necessarily be assumed that the intellectual inspirers of the Andean Pact had that far-off concept of limited federations for limited purposes in mind, but it must be acknowledged that in reality the Andean Pact does incorporate this concept in the most felicitous manner. In this sense the Andean Pact—whatever its immediate variants—is a clear example of what can be achieved by effective institutional inventiveness aimed fundamentally at three clearly delimited purposes: the expansion of a market, the stimulation of planned industrialization, and the indispensable aid to the comparatively less favoured countries. It is an effective example of a federation for limited objectives whose existence does not exclude the possibility of the establishment of other similar federations nor prevents any form of mutual overlapping which it might be desirable to have along with such delimitation.

Is this the only possible form of so-called joint action which is not incompatible with the parallel exercise of separate lives? Obviously not. But even recognizing the possibilities of its expansion—a total agreement on all the most decisive problems taken together, for example—we are still far from the lasting “romantic aspirations” to integral regionalization. In other words, we are still far from the impulses towards the full reconstruction of the old historical body, fatally broken up in the double sense by the contingencies of past events.

Now, although we have discussed our subject with a minimum of digressions it must still be acknowledged that these few reflections leave untouched our real specific subject. What are the conditions of possibility of such a regionalization at various levels of amplitude, assuming that there is a détente which, in the most likely of its scenarios, scarcely modifies the present circumstances? In such a case should we expect something positive from external stimulus or only, in contrast, hindrances and difficulties?
From the economic bloc in which the region is inserted, it is not possible to expect any special interest in its favour other than the normal self-interested desire for an increase in traditional trade relations, without much interest in who it is who actually carries them out. From the hegemonic power, even in the event of the steady progress of competitive détente, it does not appear that it is reasonable to expect any positive stimulus and assistance for either form of Latin American regionalization, although of course this will receive its verbal blessing. As regards its general and economic policy vis-à-vis Latin America, it is to be assumed that it will prefer to return to bilateral agreements, which are easier and more direct than dealing with collective bodies, no matter how flexible their machinery may be. There is likely to be a certain distant indifference, without any hostility unless suspicions are aroused that joint action is afoot which will tend to lead to a radical break with the accustomed alignment. Consequently, regionalization is a task which can only be carried out by the forces of the Latin American countries themselves, guided by a pragmatic policy capable of foreseeing the necessary stumbling-blocks in time. Only if a relatively high degree of progress and security were achieved in détente would it be reasonable to imagine different conditions in which the hegemonic centre would be freed of its prime preoccupations and could give itself up, in a climate of co-operation, to an authentic dialogue with its neighbours to the south on the basis of greater negotiating capacity of the latter, whether reunited or still separated.

This would be the moment in the futurological projection when Latin America, acting as a single unit, could freely express the impulses of its personality through a policy which affirmed only its own aspirations, free from all negative residues.