

CEPAL

REVIEW



UNITED NATIONS

FIRST SEMESTER 1976

CEPAL

Review

Director

RAUL PREBISCH

Technical Editor

ADOLFO GURRIERI



UNITED NATIONS

ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA

FIRST HALF OF 1976

CONTENTS

A critique of peripheral capitalism <i>Raúl Prebisch</i>	9
Situation and prospects of the Latin American economy in 1975 <i>Enrique V. Iglesias</i>	77
Styles of development in Latin America <i>Anibal Pinto</i>	99
Approaches to development: who is approaching what? <i>Marshall Wolfe</i>	131
Power and development styles <i>Jorge Graciarena</i>	173
Notes on integration <i>Cristóbal Lara Beautell</i>	195
Some CEPAL Publications	209

Power and development styles

*Jorge Graciarena**

This article makes a critical analysis of the various ways in which the concept of styles of development has been used, especially by those participating in the recent efforts to shape a unified approach to development. First of all, it briefly summarizes the main stages in the evolution of recent thinking on this matter, beginning with development strategies defined from a strictly economic point of view. It goes on to describe how social aspects — education, health, housing, social security, etc. — were gradually added, while more recently attempts have been made to incorporate elements of a sociological and political nature. Finally, a critical analysis is made of some of these attempts (especially those based on an analysis of the agents of development), and the article concludes with a definition of the concept of styles of development and an enumeration of the criteria which should be used as a guide in their analysis.

*Deputy Director, Social Development Division, CEPAL.

I. Introduction

This exploratory paper refers to some aspects — both methodological and substantive — of the idea of “styles of development”. Since the use of this concept has become familiar in recent years and the writers using it for different explanatory or instrumental purposes are already quite numerous, these notes, which merely aim to identify some specific problems and raise certain queries, deal first with some recent contributions in this field, mainly in connexion with the “unified approach”,¹ and then go on to explore some substantive aspects.

It may be noted that in the whole group of contributions in question there is nothing resembling any reasonable degree of methodological integration. On the contrary, comparison of them reveals a certain diversity, if not confusion, in the use of these synthetic categories or conceptual constructions. Possibly this discrepancy is inevitable, considering that the similarity of the terms used conceals marked differences in the theoretical and methodological assumptions, in the actual areas consider-

¹The most recent studies on the unified approach project include the United Nations *Report on a unified approach to development analysis and planning, Note by the Secretary-General (E/CN.5/519)*, 5 December 1974. On a more critical note is Marshall Wolfe's important contribution, contained in this same issue, entitled “*Approaches to development: Who is approaching what?*”. From a different but also critical angle is the valuable study of the unified approach by J. B. W. Kuitenbrouwer in *Premises and implications of a unified approach to development analysis and planning*, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (SD/BP/3), 9 July 1975.

red in the analysis, in the value judgements involved, and in the underlying ideological and intellectual origin. It is certainly not our intention to try to unify these differences, since such eclectic attempts generally prove fruitless. If observed closely, this very diversity may be the source of a new wealth of content and may stimulate us to gain a more thorough grasp of this elusive phenomenon of development. On the other hand, it could also involve considerable confusion between present and future, reality-based and value-based judgements, ideology and utopia, and not less between levels of analysis. To put so many different concepts together might bring serious disadvantages.

This is not the moment to investigate the origins of these concepts — an erudite undertaking which would be foreign to our purposes — but it is not out of place to say that the need for this has arisen mainly since the late post-war period, when development was seen to be a complex and fascinating process, full of facets and dimensions which it was necessary to synthesize. The original models, or at least the most widely disseminated ones (Domar-Harrod, for example), were economic and very simple². Shortly afterwards, sociologists, political scientists and historians joined

²This does not mean that the long tradition lying behind these synthetic concepts relating to both economic growth and social development has been overlooked. Their origins go at least as far back as Quesnay and Adam Smith and are also contained in the intellectual contributions of such notable figures as Ricardo Marx, Max Weber, Sombart and Pareto, who explained in various ways the growth dynamics of the capitalist "model" or "system". They all felt the

the movement started by the economists and thus began the proliferation of models and styles which is still vigorously continuing today. So far, the efforts made to establish and demarcate the theoretical location of these categories and to define their relations with other similar categories have been few and unsuccessful. Greater progress has been made in carrying out more specific studies identifying national and sub-regional types and models suitable for an empirical approach to the problem.

The United Nations' concern to find a "unified approach" to explain the development process goes back several years. As far back as 1970 the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly called for a fresh exploration to seek "a unified approach to development analysis and planning". Implicit in this request was "a judgement that the many previous attempts did not penetrate deeply enough into the reasons why the processes of economic growth and societal change... are having such ambiguous consequences for human well-being, and why the disciplines of development analysis and planning from which so much was expected a few years ago are demonstrating so limited a capacity to explain or direct these processes of growth and change³".

need for sufficiently broad categories capable at the same time of providing an insight into the essential nature of the complex overall development process.

³United Nations, *Report on a unified approach to development analysis and planning* (E/CN.5/477), 25 October 1972. For further information, see United Nations, *International Social Development Review*, No 3, 1971.

The result of this pragmatic concern, both in international agencies and in academic and intellectual circles, has been a considerable volume of studies of widely varying value which already form a copious bibliography. Many of the original problems persist, however, and the progress achieved falls far short of the hopes placed in these efforts. Indeed, it might almost be said that the frustrations seem to be increasing inasmuch as the original misunderstandings are growing instead of diminishing.

Thus, not a few of the essential questions as to what the term "style of development" means still persist, and the efforts to answer them have been unsuccessful. It might rather be suggested — perhaps over-pessimistically — that some difficulties have increased and that the confusion regarding terminology is worse than before, partly owing to the active (and no doubt involuntary) contribution of the various inter-

national technical groups concerned with the unified approach project, which have contributed imaginatively and generously to the profusion of nouns and adjectives currently in use, as pointed out with some irony in the aforementioned study by Marshall Wolfe. There is something smacking of magic about these pretensions to solve substantive problems, underlain with complex theories of development, by means of a play of words and terms which probably do more to obscure them than otherwise. When the word *styles* was first used, not a few believed that this meant the end of a stage in the process of trial and error in development thinking based on value-oriented and ideological positions and expressed in obsolete terminology, and that a broad and promising avenue was opening up towards the future. This has not been the case, however, and the old problems have been cast in a new mould without this amounting to anything but a nominal change.

II. Some heterodox positions

When we refer to development styles (or models), a number of fundamental questions immediately arise: what does this concept mean, to what aspect of reality does it relate? What place does it occupy in the theoretical analysis of development processes? What are its fundamental and secondary elements and what kind of relations exist between them? In what time context does it fit? In other words, is it a static or a dynamic

concept, a synchronic or a diachronic problem? And — not to make the list too long — what is the best way of dealing with the problems involved? The questions do not end here, but these will suffice to show the sort of difficulties involved in examining the various documents and studies relating to the unified approach project.

Strictly speaking, the first problem is one of method, and relates to the

definition of the term, i.e., the significance given to it. I have searched unsuccessfully in the various studies analysed for a clear-cut definition or description of this central concept. There can be no denying that some highly interesting elements and lines of thought have emerged which might be useful in an attempt to reconstruct the basic ideas underlying the voluminous output on the subject. A whole series of ingenious classifications relating to a variety of possible viewpoints from which the development process may be analysed have also emerged. At any rate, it is known that the question of development should be dealt with by means of a unified approach, which should globalize and integrate the partial viewpoints of economic, social, political and cultural development. Whether or not this integration of viewpoints has been achieved is, to say the least, open to question. What is certain, however, is that beyond the formulation of good intentions and needs, there is still no clear definition of the substantive meaning to be ascribed to styles of development conceived as overall dynamic processes, which is the aim of the unified approach perspective.

To some, this might seem a formal and academic concern. I could on no account share such a view, however, because that would mean accepting that it was right to use such complex concepts without showing the theoretical context from which they derive or indicating methodically and systematically their basic elements and relations. In other words, I would have to admit that they could be given an exclusively empirical basis and that

the purpose of this effort could be reduced to serving the pragmatic aims of development planning. This is not the spirit in which the unified approach project was formulated, and still less that found in several of the studies on the subject. Nevertheless, the danger persists that the type of approach which is likely to predominate is that which M. Wolfe calls the technocratic-rationalistic style⁴, which is precisely a style that is divorced from methodological concerns and has a decidedly "practical" orientation.

It is difficult to imagine a unified approach to styles of development which does not involve the adoption of a theoretical (and value-oriented) position with regard to the actual process of development, i.e., with regard to the factors which generate, condition and curb its dynamism and the utilization of its results. The adoption of such a position, whether explicitly or implicitly, is inevitable, and since this is so, it seems reasonable to adopt it and formulate it explicitly, both because the ideas are clarified and obvious confusion is avoided in this manner, and also because, with a clearer understanding, more rational and efficient instruments can be forged with which to act on development.

One noteworthy feature of the literature on a unified approach and on styles of development is that there is rarely any attempt to explain the development process or to make a critical analysis of the economic, social,

⁴See *Approaches to development: Who is approaching what?*, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

cultural and other theories which provide partial and segmentary explanations of development and seem to be in the process of being refuted. In reality, the whole unified approach movement is, on the one hand, a reaction against the predominance in development thinking and action of theories based exclusively on economic assumptions, which came to the fore in the years immediately following the Second World War, while on the other hand it is also a reaction against disciplinary segmentation (as already noted), and no less so — although without saying so in as many words — against the wide variety of ideological approaches and concepts of development.

Criticisms of exclusively economic theoretical interpretations of growth were already in vogue in the mid-1950s and have become particularly sharp since then, to the extent that they have led to changes in development strategies and policies. This is evident from the attempts to integrate the so-called "social aspects" into the main body of development doctrines. The original concept of social aspects was extremely limited and included only education, health, housing and nutrition. Some time was to pass before it was admitted — and then only to a limited degree — that certain social dimensions not previously considered, such as the social classes, power relations, and the political nature of the State, are of fundamental importance in the orientation of development strategies, especially in Latin America. From that moment onwards, concepts such as political development models or styles began to be used, together with other terms such as "system",

"pattern" and "profile", which indicate a more comprehensive, synthetic and dynamic approach while bringing in new elements which were neither clearly expressed nor taken into account previously.

There is no point in investigating the origin and evolution of the broad vocabulary in use, nor how the transitions which led to an ever broader idea of development came about, because we are concerned with a different problem. However, it is not out of place to say that the transition has in some cases been so rapid that it has led to the other extreme, and instead of the economists' specific and restricted formulas whereby growth was dependent on the rate of investment and the capital-output ratio, the formulas in use now are so general and abstract that they have barely any specific meaning or practical application. For example, the statement that development is conceived as an overall process of interrelated societal changes is, by its very nature and vagueness, beyond discussion and could be accepted by the most antagonistic and opposite theoretical and ideological currents.

However, if the meaning of some of the individual terms used had to be defined — for example, the concepts of "change", "overall process" and "interrelation", it is quite possible that such agreement would rapidly disappear, to be replaced by theoretical differences with regard to other questions (for example, how the change comes about, what overall process means and, lastly, whether the interrelationship is symmetrical or asymmetrical in terms of the

circulation and transfer of resources and power).

What still further impedes a clear understanding of the idea of styles of development is the wide range of adjectival phrases applied to the styles for want of a theoretical definition, thus giving them a variety of meanings⁵.

The use of adjectives is neither a substitute for theory, nor is it a good way of identifying problems and their specific objects or distinguishing clearly between the levels of analysis to which they relate. The question that must be asked, then, is what relationship there is between the styles and other concepts from the theoretical arsenal of the social sciences with varying degrees of abstraction such as system, structure, régime, process, strategy, etc.

⁵For example, one of the studies on the unified approach project refers to the following types of styles: "value-oriented" and "eventual value-oriented styles"; "current world styles", "national" and "viable national styles"; "politically possible", "conventional", "preferred" and "prevailing style"; "original", "radically original", "innovative style" and "new style" (with respect to Cuba); and, lastly, "styles of polarized development". There may be more and further contributions to this repertory of terms which may be found in other studies. In any case, it is my impression that their number does nothing to clarify the concept of style, even if it is felt that there is no difficulty in understanding such a phrase as a conventionally-defined style of development. What does "conventionally-defined style of development" mean?

To what conventions does it refer, who imposes them and how, etc.? It is obvious in any case that development styles are not "spontaneously generated" nor are they distinguished by the qualifying terms applied to them.

In other words, to what level of analysis and theoretical structure does the concept belong? There are practical reasons for this concern, since the concept of style sometimes seems to correspond to that of system, while at other times it is much less general and can perfectly well be taken to mean strategy. Thus, when reference is made in general to the *prevailing* styles of development, this would appear to mean capitalism, which is a historical system in the current nomenclature of the social sciences. On the other hand, a reference to "national style", with a specific sense, cannot mean capitalism because it would be inaccurate, and this is also true in the case of "current" style or "viable" and "acceptable" styles of development, all of which are closer to strategies. I have doubts about the heuristic usefulness of a concept which becomes a kind of potpourri since it is applied at so many levels of analysis with so many different meanings; so that the central idea is difficult to grasp and lacks an explicit theoretical reference.

It may be useful here to revert to a problem referred to briefly above, which is connected less with partial disciplinary approaches and much more with the evolution of concepts and the area covered by the various terms used by development analysts. Until comparatively recently, economists and international agencies spoke of development strategies or policies in referring to fairly rational, coherent and integrated sets of measures for the promotion of growth (or development), which were considered to form groups relatively independent of the sources from which they originated and vaguely linked with

the non-economic conditions in which development was taking place. That is to say, the old division between the State and the economy was maintained, and the power components were dissociated from the development process and kept as constants. The State thus appeared as a relatively immutable entity that acted as a generating source of economic policies which could change without altering the nature of the State or its relations with society.

This approach had some advantages since, besides being simple, it enabled the economists to keep comfortably to an intellectual plane dominated by their own discipline. This position could not be sustained when, first on distinguishing between growth and development and later on incorporating the "social aspects" in the analysis, the demands for broader theoretical perspectives made themselves vigorously felt: so much so that in response to these demands other significant elements were added which had appeared only marginally in the previous analytical schemes. These were the international "system", historical trends and national structures which, together with the specific and concrete circumstances of the various regions and countries, determined their possibilities of development.

The next move was to pass on from the idea of strategies and policies to other more expressive types of concepts which would take into account the new "social" concept of development. The solution adopted to this end consisted largely of the addition of new elements, which led to the complete reformulation of existing ideas. The economic policies and strategies (conceived always in a

strictly limited neoclassic or neo-Keynesian context) were complemented with other elements, but what was basically incorporated was the dimension of the power of the State in the limited sense of a generating source of economic growth policies. For this purpose concepts were borrowed from other social disciplines, mainly sociology and political science, where there had long been discussion of political and social models or styles. These possessed some of the integrative characteristics sought, but were nevertheless charged with connotations it was desired to avoid, or at least leave aside. In order to adapt them to the aseptic and bureaucratic language of the international agencies, the political models or styles were rephrased and the obviously political connotations which many of them possessed were eliminated. The popular belief that if the symptoms are removed there is no longer any need to worry about the sickness itself did not work in this case. The differences disappeared from view, but their sources did not disappear. What role does power play in development? Who are the ones who possess power, what kind of power, how do they mobilize it, to fulfil what objectives, and to serve what interests? How is the concept of power incorporated in the whole theme of strategies and policies, and what theoretical meaning is ascribed to it?

This brings us to a crossroad with, on the one hand, the problem of power (what person or persons have power and how do they use it?) and, on the other, that of the generation of change or development (what person or persons promote change and with what pur-

pose?). Although established power is generally conservative, so in various respects is the idea of development when, for example, its "prevailing", "dominant", "current", "real" or "conventional" forms are referred to. In the concept of styles, the concurrence of power and development has to do with the generation of the latter, which is assumed to be promoted by one or more determinable sources of power. If this reasoning were correct, the logical question would be: what is that source of power, how does it operate and in what direction?

This brings us close to the philosophy of history. I shall avoid digressing on the movement and sense of history, however. Although our own concern is more mundane, it is worth mentioning that the division which was first pointed out centuries ago is as clear as ever: on the one hand there are those who feel that trust should be placed in individuals who have been "enlightened" (by God, Reason, an Idea or History), in great personalities and in key groups; while at the other extreme it is felt that an answer to the question can be found only by observing the historical-structural dynamisms of the economic and social bases and the development of the productive forces.

The first position corresponds to the postulation of "development agents", and the problem becomes that of finding out and identifying the kind of persons or groups that carry out this task and the manner in which they promote development. For years the main concern in Latin American social science was precisely this: to locate the *deus ex machina*, seeking among

Schumpeterian entrepreneurs or in the middle classes the existence of a national bourgeoisie with a hegemonic vocation and the capacity to promote modernization after the style of the central capitalist countries. The modernization theories follow these analytical lines.

A theoretical approach of this kind is "action-oriented" when it emphasizes the position of the actors (development agents) as the dynamic elements in a process aimed at fulfilling certain objectives defined by them, in specific circumstances and with limited resources. Structure and history may come to have only secondary importance, if any, in such an approach, which to a great extent is ahistorical. In this approach there is a voluntaristic component, often indicated in the past, which emphasizes the fact that social situations and processes do not have determining influence. Of course, history and structure do enter into this analytical context, but only as a distant backdrop which sets the stage but does not restrict the autonomy of the actors as central personages in the drama of development.

The essential problem is to determine first *how far* and then *in what manner* the historical-structural trends are incorporated in the development analysis scheme with respect to the actor-agents. It is precisely at this point that differences of opinion arise regarding the interpretation of the force of historical factors in social change (or in development).

At all events, the nature of a style of development depends in this approach both on the quality and on the guiding principles and aims of the "agents"

— which use certain means to pursue a number of objectives — and also on the acceptance (consensus) they win for their strategies. Hence, the style's "viability" depends on the social forces it can mobilize to overcome obstacles and resistance to its implementation or continuity.

There are, however, some methodological problems as regards the manner of inserting the concept of viability into this context and the meaning ascribed to it. The idea of *viability*, as used in the context of the unified approach project, gives rise to some difficulties when an attempt is made to reconcile it with so flexible a process as development. It is sometimes my impression that the dynamic elements involved in this idea of viability are not properly defined, since it appears rather as a static concept. Viability is closely linked with the available *means* for achieving the objectives of a development strategy, which will come up against resistance and conflicts that will modify its course. The viability of a development process would therefore be bound to undergo changes whenever the conditions of the process altered. The notion as to what the *means* are is of fundamental importance in order to understand their role in the formation and operation of the styles. As always, there are various alternative ways of analysing this question. If the means are considered not to be variables, the possibilities of a style persisting (its viability) will depend on the continuity of the existing historical conditions, and its adaptability to change will certainly be limited by the rigidity of the means.

It would be quite a different matter if the concept of viability were considered in a more dynamic context and the means were taken as a group of instrumental resources closely linked with the objectives but not exclusively dependent on them. The nature of the means would determine the possibilities of a style, but once this was established, and whenever necessary and possible, it could reformulate them, creating new means more flexibly adapted to the evolving historical and social circumstances. The advantage of this approach is that it makes the definition of means more flexible. Under this approach styles would be less dependent on the definition given, since they could partly recreate their own means.

This reasoning has its limits, however. The most important of these is the idea of *contradiction*, which stems from the lack of complete convergence between means and objectives. In such a case, the gap may tend to widen in the course of time, with the result that the style would eventually decline and be overtaken and replaced by another. This point will be referred to again later.

The problem of how to start from a correct theoretical approach is not solved by allocating the dynamics of development to the agents and attempting some classification of them without indicating what possibilities they have of exerting decisive influence or defining the strategies ascribed to them. Strictly speaking, the question is none other than finding out which are the key agents, i.e., *identifying* them so as to determine the values, interests and capacities with which

they will define and impose the development strategies they support and promote. The following questions then become almost unnecessary: How can the real agents be identified from among the many possible potential agents to be found in any society? What are their special characteristics: how can it be determined whether they are more capable or "strategic" than others, whether they have the necessary consensus (and coercive force) to impose their objectives in the face of the resistance they will inevitably encounter? What guarantee is there that their style is more acceptable than any of the other available in the "styles market" at any given time?

We are once again confronted by the theoretical and methodological problem indicated at the outset, for which there are few useful guidelines. Short of suggesting that the events are decided by historical chance, it is clearly necessary to have a theory which, besides affirming that all the existing agents (and the lists are long) are equally potential candidates for hegemonic power, maintains that among them one or more are "more equal than others" as in Orwell's fantasy.

This type of approach almost inevitably brings us to another question: What relationship is there between the agents and the power elites? I believe that the idea of agents is only meaningful if it is admitted that they and the power elites are one and the same thing (or very similar). If that is so, the crux of the problem is to establish first who they are, and then the kind and quantity of power resources they possess and how they are utilized. The State seems

to be the main supporting basis for the agents and power elites, and they promote their policies from it, although this may not be explicit. Notwithstanding its central importance when discussing a concept of "agent-promoted" development, very little is done in the unified approach project to distinguish the features and functions of the State, that is, its nature as an instrument of power and an economic agent under different styles of development involving different agents which have succeeded in imposing their hegemony and promoting development strategies pursuing their objectives and interests. Some provisional studies in the unified approach project analyse the problem of social and political structures within the context of development, but the analysis centres more on *nation-building*, on a very general scale as yet, without there really being an explicit concept of power in development. Be that as it may, these studies offer promising prospects for the future exploration of this important aspect.

Accordingly, what ought to be the focal point of this type of action-oriented approach is rather the concept of the role played by power in development, because the agents, in order to be effective and to be able to make their styles viable, must necessarily be a power elite, a dominating group, coalition or class, an "Establishment", or some other similar entity which controls the State apparatus. It seems essential, therefore, to endeavour to build up a suitable methodological approach recognizing the factors determining the agents' position of power and the autonomy ascribed to

them in the specific context of a nation-State and at a given point in time. This is a necessary requisite if any progress is to be made towards an explanation of the styles and their acceptability and viability in the development process.

This problem cannot be solved, however, without first finding an answer to some other questions: What

are the structural and ideological factors that generate the central forces of the development process? Who stimulates and guides it? Towards what viable objectives and goals, with what means and resources, in the face of what conflicts, and for the benefit of whom? In the following pages some exploratory suggestions are put forward in this connexion.

III.

New formulations of some fundamental problems

It seems clear that in turning from consideration of development strategies and policies to consideration of styles of development there is a qualitative jump which is not always fully recognized. Previously the central problem was more limited and more concrete, since only strategies and policies were involved. It was above all a question of understanding the mechanisms for stimulating economic growth and its main short-term targets, within a limited historico-social framework determined by constant structural parameters. This intellectual and practical position has recently been labelled "developmentism".

With the inclusion of the idea of styles and models, there is a considerable, largely qualitative change in the intellectual goal. The object now is nothing less than to embrace the entire development process in a broad and comprehensive intellectual framework so as to be able to view the constellation of its circumstances and elements

suitably integrated in a theoretical scheme. Such a theory should explain how a specific society is mobilized and uses its resources to attain not only economic growth but also other goals which are permanent human values (human rights, personality development, creativity, social justice and equity, individual and family welfare, conservation of the environment, etc.). This is the position of the United Nations, and it is the task facing those who must define what development styles are.

Some authors maintain that in Latin America there are currently two polarized types of development which are so opposed that their features may be considered as corresponding to different economic and social systems. They delimit what appear to be the "objective possibilities" or real alternatives existing at present in the region.

The first has been called the "associated development model", thereby

stressing its dependent relationship with the central capitalist countries and their big transnational corporations. In this model, the power structure consists of a coalition primarily composed of a civil and military technobureaucracy which controls the State apparatus in association with the large national and foreign companies which occupy a dominant position in the modern sector and consequently in the whole economy. A variety of upper middle level groups, including middle-level businessmen, top executive and professional people, also participate in the coalition, although in a somewhat accessory capacity. The political style is generally authoritarian and demobilizing, since the "hibernation" of the mass of the people is promoted through the disarticulation of their autonomous political and social organizations. Open dissent is directly repressed. The central economic objective is accelerated economic growth, for which all available resources are articulated and mobilized so as to maximize capital formation and the profitability of companies, attract foreign investment and contain the wage and distribution pressures of the large groups which are left behind in a process involving high income concentration. The long-term political objective in "national greatness", and many social goals which, in another perspective, would deserve more immediate attention, are subordinated to this.

The central objective of the type of development at the other pole is "social development" or "popular participation", which is given priority over economic growth. A monolithic and

authoritarian State, without political pluralism, is the nucleus of this development style and is also the main motive force (at least in the initial stages). Mass participation is widespread and increasingly equalitarian in production, consumption and income distribution. The formula for economic and social organization may be either State capitalism or socialism in the strict sense⁶.

From a methodological point of view, this theoretical scheme goes well beyond what we have so far been considering under the heading of styles of development. The two types outlined do not fit easily within the same economic and social system (capitalism or socialism), which is one of the prerequisites of the idea of styles, viewed here as variations of intra-systematic historical configurations. They are, however, useful because they are concrete and also because they relate very closely to the concerns underlying the analysis of styles.

Anibal Pinto has adopted a somewhat different approach in drawing attention to some dynamic factors of a "scheme of supply and distribution", in which particular importance is attached to the question of "for whom" in the definition of what he calls a "political style of development". His approach is nevertheless more economic than political because of the emphasis

⁶Various sources may be consulted on these models, including F. H. Cardoso, *O Modelo Político Brasileiro*, (São Paulo, Difusão Européia do Livro, 1972), chapter 3; and J. Cotler, *Unified Approach to Development Analysis and Planning, Case Study: Peru*, (United Nations, UNRISD/72/C.69, August 1972).

placed on the central importance of the concept of income distribution in the definition of the "scheme" and because of the other factors taken into account, as will be seen below.

The *most relevant dynamic factors* of the model mentioned by this author are contained in the following questions:

(a) What are the nature and origin of the *main stimulus to demand* (external or domestic demand, its volume, and degree of diversification)? This is related to income distribution and its tendencies towards concentration (the groups which accumulate more and those which accumulate less), as regards its influence on the structure of demand.

(b) *What is the key production sector?* In other words, what is the "spearhead" sector which imparts orientation and dynamism to the productive system and the supply of goods? How is the latter structured?

(c) What is the *main structural contradiction* (or predominant structural feature) *of the dynamics of the economy?* The idea here is to locate the main source of economic conflict, which is also the fundamental key for estimating the possibilities of continuity and future economic viability of the style.

The author goes on to state that there are two main "motive forces" which may act jointly or exclusively: (a) an ideology fostered by the State and a political apparatus; (b) nationalism⁷.

This scheme has a number of features which appear to me to be of great impor-

tance: in the first place, because the dynamic character of the model stems from both the nature of the factors chosen and the manner in which they are conceived, and because it is situated in a historical framework of well-defined phases; secondly, because of the incorporation of political variables; and finally because of the significance attached to the concept of contradiction which rapidly leads to a more general idea of conflict transcending the economic dimension.

Consideration of the problem of models constitutes a positive contribution inasmuch as they represent, albeit from differing points of view, an attempt to provide a theoretical framework for the problems of Latin American development, using national societies at a specific historical moment as a reference.

A problem which is no less important but naturally more formal is that of the *level of analysis*. The methodological position underlying the idea of style is rather confused, since as was shown above the term often refers to potential or concrete situations of very different scale. This is the case, for example, when reference is made to a "world" style, to a "national" style, and finally to situations whose scope is more restricted and which belong to the order of circumstantial strategies. Thus "style" appears at times to be an equivalent for "system" (capitalist, socialist), "structure" or "régime"; at other times, on the other hand, it would appear to mean something like a stage in the development process, as in the case of "outward-looking development", "import substitution" or "internationalization of the market", which

⁷See A. Pinto, "El modelo político latinoamericano" in *Política y desarrollo*, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1968, pp. 60-64.

might be (and have been) described as "prevailing" styles of development (economic and political).

The upshot of all this is that the problem of the relation between systems and styles, of how to relate styles to economic and social systems, still remains. If it is accepted that the latter are more general and abstract conceptions, it may perhaps be said that *a style is the specific and dynamic modality adopted by a social system within a particular context and at a particular moment in history*. It may be observed that this proposition relates to a structure (or social formation) rather than a style. However, the idea of style has a different origin, although in its present version it is somewhat akin to the concept of structure. In any event, what is signified in the idea of structure is something more static and not focused, as style is, on the development strategies and policies promoted by a political will in particular historical and structural conditions.

From this point of view, it may be supposed that a "style" is a kind of integration of development strategies with the power factors which enable them to be carried out within an economic and social system existing at a historically determined time and oriented towards certain goals. This idea of linking strategies with power in the framework of a historico-social formation should certainly not be abandoned, because it introduces a greater sense of reality into the concept of style. In my opinion, the idea of style should be an auxiliary element in concrete reflection upon national development. Inasmuch as they represent desired and perhaps potential styles, utopias are important, if they are sufficiently specific, for understanding a historical situation and its possible tendencies, but they should never be confused with the concrete styles which point more towards historically identifiable realities.

IV.

Suggestions for a characterization of styles

After a summary review of the historico-concrete aspects of the concept of style, it now seems necessary to return to the problem of its dynamic content. What ultimately promotes a style? It has already been pointed out that this question leads us directly to an old controversy, stemming from the philosophy of history, which has run through the social sciences from the very beginning. At a risk of superfluity, I shall

recall the two fundamental positions: there are those who postulate that the leading figures and power élites (or strategic groups) act autonomously in formulating and imposing the objectives and policies which define a style, while at the other extreme there are those who concentrate on the role of the socio-economic structural base and the trends of historical circumstances, both internal and external, in the configuration of a development style.

These are the two extremes in the argument over the generation of styles. The complexity of the problem allows for a great variety of intermediary positions. A reasonable question which should be raised is the following: what optional styles are possible and viable, bearing in mind the historical circumstances and the structural features existing in a society which is organized according to a specific economic and social system? In other words, what are the frameworks and sets of objectives arising from specific social class and power relationships in a society which condition the orientations and variations of its viable strategies and policies?

If it is argued that it is the agents of development or "strategic groups" which are responsible for defining and implementing a style, there would be good grounds for replying that even so they would inevitably have to act within the conditions and limits established by historico-structural parameters, and on no account in a social vacuum in which everything is possible and nothing probable. There remains another aspect of the problem: should greater importance be attached to the agents or to the historico-structural processes of development? This opens the way for an essentially mistaken theoretical and ideological argument if stated antinomically, since neither agents nor structural processes can be understood in isolation. Their relationship is basically dialectical, and it is only in the framework of the whole made up of the two of them that is possible correctly to state the dilemma in which, without good reason, they are opposed.

Still at the risk of repetition, it should

be made quite clear that the concrete, real style is always one of a number of historically possible and potentially viable alternatives. The choice and implementation of one of the possible alternatives is a political act, the decision of a political will formed by the dominant coalition of groups which represent social forces with sufficient power to be able to impose their choice over the other options. In sum, the style is a product neither of chance nor of the "logic of history" nor yet of "structural conditioning" working blindly and inexorably. This is because it has flesh and blood (individuals and groups), as well as a social and political will which acts in a specific historical dimension and is guided by ideologies. The importance of individuals and groups, their lives and needs, goes beyond their status of "supporters of the structure" and mere passive agents of history. In turn, both history and structure are more than frameworks which condition the set of alternatives, because — and this must be repeated — in a national situation which is historically concrete and conditioned, *there is always more than one possible choice.*

What makes any one of these choices viable is the emergence of a dominant class or coalition, the agent of development of the hour which will have to confront and impose itself upon other groups with conflicting interests and overcome real contradictions which stand in the way of harmonizing and carrying out its social project. *Hence the central importance of conflict as an attribute of a style.* What kind of structural conflict typifies it? Between whom and over what? What are the real object-

ives and the concrete consequences of a style, which become sources of conflicts? To answer these questions it is necessary to define largely what the *nucleus* of a style is, what gives it its main direction⁸.

How can development be approached as a whole, and the fragmentary and often conflicting approaches of different disciplines be overcome? What kind of synthesis is a style? What is its essential content? The opposition between economic and social development was not exclusively the consequence of the division between economics and sociology as separate disciplines. It was also connected with a broad ideological spectrum ranging from the "economistic" position of those who thought that economic growth would necessarily produce economic modernization and, by its mere presence, the transformation and development of society, to those at the other extreme who believed that both economic growth and social

development represented successive stages or phases, and that the latter could only be achieved after and on the basis of the advance of the former. A different opposition is to be found in the "political science" or "sociological" view upheld by those who believe that political development (or political revolution) must necessarily precede any economic and social transformation, or by the partisans of progressive but gradual social reform, or even progressive conservatism.

Discussion has now moved to the problem of income distribution. On this subject there are many who defend the view that it is imperative for growth to be consistent with increasingly equitable distribution. They are opposed by those who argue the contrary, i.e., that it is first necessary to enlarge the cake before sharing it out and that it is impossible to do both at once.

It is clear that this is not merely a formal problem, since it is of considerable relevance to the economic and social conflicts and struggles which, as stated earlier, are the nucleus of styles. Perhaps nothing helps to identify more clearly the internal contradictions of a real style than the fundamental conflicts which arise in the implementation of its strategies. It does not matter whether these conflicts are latent or open, so long as they relate to the main objectives. *In order to characterize the situations which typify a style, it is of the greatest importance to know the sources of conflicts which are reflected in the confrontations of incompatible or irreconcilable interest, in social differentiation which are neither legitimized nor institutionalized, and in the contradic-*

⁸The idea of "contradiction", in the sense of a style's lack of consistency, may be a mere problem of logical incoherence or it may be a symptom of ideological incoherence reflecting one or more latent, underlying conflicts which make it impossible to attain a satisfactory level of agreement among the various policies and objectives. The need to reach a political compromise by conciliating opposing interests makes it difficult, if not impossible, for policies and their goals to be completely compatible. In our opinion, however, this does not imply that a style does not exist, since style does not depend — as will be seen — upon internal consistency, but on the contrary is identified by its structural tensions and conflictual confrontations, by which its real nature as a historical entity may be distinguished.

tions at the heart of the fundamental social processes.

The sources of conflict are not always the same, nor do their original potentially or actually antagonistic positions and attributes remain constant. The key questions therefore appear to be the following: What are the problems facing a development strategy and what are the requirements for overcoming them? Who wins and who loses (workers, businessmen, the military, technocrats, national or foreign capitalists)? What is transferred among them (wealth, income, power, prestige, education, etc)? Does growth tend towards increased concentration or conversely towards increasingly equitable decentralization? Where are the important decisions taken, who takes part in them and how? From what source and by what institutional means is the current development strategy promoted?

These questions barely do more than illustrate the type of problem to which priority must be given in the conceptualization of styles. The social sciences (and those who make use of them: technocrats and planners) must be in a position to anticipate and foresee both the stability and continuity of a style as well as its crises and final collapse. In a sense, the stability and continuity of a style is little more than the neutralization, postponement or overcoming of its basic crises and conflicts. *From a dynamic and integrated viewpoint, a development style is therefore a dialectical process involving power relations and conflicts between social groups and classes, which arise from the dominant forms of capital accumulation, the structure and trends of income distribution, historical circum-*

stances and foreign dependence, as well as from values and ideologies. All this takes place among other types of structural conditioning (technology, natural resources, population) which must be analysed as an integrated whole delimiting the historical possibilities of a style.

In another sense, *a style is the strategy of a coalition of social forces which impose their objectives and interests until it comes to an end as a result of its implicit contradictions.* A historically outdated style is replaced by another which better reflects the new social forces emerging from the process and the alliances and conflicts which arise between some of its components when they have accumulated sufficient power resources to constitute a dominant coalition capable of formulating and carrying out new projects and objectives more attuned to their interests. It should be noted, however, that the succession of styles does not entail discontinuity of the existing social system but rather may merely reflect different combinations and arrangements of its basic constitutive elements.

Although they are used in different contexts with varying abstract and concrete meanings, when styles and models refer to real configurations they have a very close relationship — perhaps of dependency — with the particular existing form of power and with the orientations of the dominant groups. *However, it is not always possible to infer from them with mathematical precision what type of development strategy they will put into effect*⁹. Nevertheless, in a more specific sense, real (or dominant)

⁹Here it is a question of *conditioning* and not *determination*. We emphatically reject any

styles or models consist essentially — as was pointed out above — of development policies in action, together with the contradictions and conflicts which are being produced deliberately or not.

In this dialectical context particular importance must be attached to the *position and role of the State*, its organization and essential functions, and the position of the groups or elites which predominate within it and attempt to establish or maintain a given style of development. Obviously, the strategy of a style arises (and is carried out) within the framework of the conditions and in the midst of the conflicts which make up its historico-structural possibilities, since they delimit the objectives, means and resources which may be used and the interests and objectives which will benefit.

In Latin America, the national State is an essential part of the machinery which promotes development and contributes to the definition of the dominant style: indeed, it is even more essential than in the "countries of original capitalist development".¹⁰

mechanistic causal link between the "historico-structural situation" and the filiation and nature of a style. The future, far from being predetermined, is open and may follow courses which are difficult to predict *but remain within certain historical bounds which delimit what is circumstantially possible*. In this sense, the social system functions as a historical matrix which conditions the diverse elements of "the possible", reducing the alternatives to those which are compatible with its continuity (although not with its immutability).

¹⁰See M. Kaplan, *Formación del estado nacional en América Latina*, (Santiago, Editorial Universitaria, 1969), *passim*.

Because of this special feature, it may acquire a pre-eminent position which allows it some autonomy, in establishing its policies, with regard to the claims of its dominant groups. This may be explained by the transfer of power to the State as the highest political institution, power which is largely appropriated by the various technocracies which plan and execute its strategies. Thus, the national State and its strategies must be regarded as the context within which styles acquire concrete meaning and historical dimensions.

There remains for our consideration the "unified approach" to development styles. It has by no means been forgotten, and much of the foregoing should perhaps be viewed as a contribution — sometimes tangential, sometimes more direct — to the discussion of this problem, focused on the possibility of integrating viewpoints and conceptions on development. The unified approach is an attempt to go beyond the interpretations which have hitherto been dispersed in a multiplicity of fragmentary, unrelated approaches, largely as a result of the disciplinary "diaspora" and different ideologies and values.

Our small contribution here is perhaps limited to indicating some of the main difficulties of the problem. In the first place it must be pointed out that a "unified approach" involves a number of interrelated aspects and levels, in the field of practical action and integrated planning, methodological and theoretical questions and — equally important — in the field of value judgements, ranging from basic assumptions about society and social justice to more specific pos-

itions on ends and means, the particular combination of which constitutes the substance of the ruling development style.

In a similar vein, it may be suggested that there are three facets to the problem: the pragmatic, involving the planning of development policies; the epistemological, stemming from differentiation among disciplines; and the ideological, focusing on the question of ideologies and social values.

In fact, the gordian knot of the unified approach lies in the need for thought and action regarding development to be reasonably integrated. What is really being integrated in a unified approach to development? It must be, without any doubt, the conception of development, because this alone is a conceptual construct and therefore an ideal entity which provides a compact overall view of a multitude of partial processes. The real processes are the social situations and actions, as well as the policies which promote and orient development, and they are what may be more or less unified on the basis of that conception.

This is one level of reality. At the other are the states of mind and thoughts of individuals, their perception of their interests and values, which is what orients and conditions their attitudes to development. The predominant tendency at this level is towards the interest-based evaluation and, consequently, the ideo-

logical judgement of the orientations and consequences of development.

A unified approach should strictly speaking begin by integrating these two levels, which would require a relatively high degree of complementarity and correspondence between social awareness and political action. There are many interactions between the two levels, but what is vital in order to build a bridge to link them globally is a concept of development which ultimately can only be ideological. It seems impossible to avoid the need for a value base linked to the existential situation, whose function is to integrate individual awareness and social action around the only thing which can unite them, namely, a coherent collection of values professed and carried out by collectivities which represent the dominant social forces.

Politics reappears here as a central component of any conception of styles of development. The values may vary, but styles must distinguish and decide as regards how much, how, what and for whom, since these are the alternatives normally facing a development process and the choice rests with the political order. The function of choosing between them is institutionalized, and it is the business of the political apparatus, more than of any other institutional order, to choose the direction of development and promote progress along the chosen path.

V.

Guidelines for the identification of a "concrete" development style

By way of summing up, some guidelines are provisionally suggested for identify-

ing the nature and basic elements of a real (actual, dominant, prevailing, etc.)

style, using a historico-structural perspective which differs from the approach emphasizing the role of agents of development. They are as follows:

(a) A real style, from this point of view, is not merely one or more strategies of development (plans, programmes, etc.) with a more or less coherent collection of policies and with instruments and objectives which are legally sanctioned by the State and promoted by some "agents of development". Over and above all this, it is what emerges from political and social practice, as a result of the inevitably conflictual confrontation between that strategy and the other possible (and sometimes partially or potentially feasible) alternatives guided by the pressures of the non-beneficiary sectors or groups and of those who are definitely harmed or are for some reason in opposition to the current style.

(b) There are a number of fundamental elements in an analysis of this type: (i) the State, as the source which generates policies, and the political régime (dominant coalition plus political resources) which formulates (or chooses) the style and promotes it in an attempt to impose it on society through a strategy whose policies, both in means and objectives, are supposedly appropriate; (ii) the different social groups and classes which have power resources, promote their interests and propose alternative policies; (iii) the conflicts which stem from the incompatible (or irreconcilable) aspirations of the various groups either within or outside the circles of political power and of State administration, whose claims, divergencies and antagonisms increase or restrict the

possibilities of carrying out the current development strategy; (iv) the structural features, ideological frameworks and historico-social circumstances and trends which limit the possible objectives and condition the rules of the game; (v) the possibilities of legitimizing a style through varying combinations of consensus and coercion. In other words, this emphasizes the nature of the support which the style receives and the degree of participation in it by the majority groups and the "power factors".

(c) Among the *conditioning* elements the following appear to be fundamental: (i) the geographical size, population and natural resource endowment of a country; (ii) the level and trend of technological change and (iii) the combination of international economic and political circumstances and the way and extent they influence the structure and dynamics of a country's economic and political life.

(d) Finally, there remains to be defined what may be considered *the direction* of the main movement of a style. What identifies it as definite style and how is it distinguished from other actual or possible styles? What is a style's central project? What national and group interests are promoted, what conflicts emerge and what resources (how much and in what way) are used first to impose the style and then to implement and maintain it? Who wins and who loses? All the above elements are significant for this diagnosis, to an extent which varies according to their nature and circumstances, on condition that after they are identified an intellectual effort is made to synthesize them, bringing out what is essential about them as a whole. In some

cases a style may centre upon an overt "national project", which may be the ideal of "national greatness and power", "freedom from foreign dependence", the creation of a new equalitarian style of social life, the imposition of "savage" capitalism to provide the greatest possible stimulus to economic growth and maintain a hegemonistic régime, or "national integration".

Whatever its nature, a national project of this kind contains all the elements indicated above. In addition to being a national undertaking, it is a hegemonistic project on the part of certain social sectors and classes, which define it (and also the style) in a way which agrees with their particular interests and in accordance with a specific form of insertion into the inter-

national order. The analysis of it may therefore be a starting point from which to discover the degree to which it has an integrating effect on the strategies devised and carried out by the State and other power centres, as well as to identify the possible main direction of the style, i.e., what the fundamental objectives of its long-term strategies may be, taking into account its concrete possibilities at the internal and international levels.

Without wishing to exaggerate the significance of the distant future for present circumstances, I believe that it is in the convergence of both, in the influence of long-term demands on the here and now, that the answer must be sought to the elusive problem of the connexion between time in the intellectual formulation of a style.