

CEPAL

REVIEW



UNITED NATIONS

FIRST SEMESTER 1976

# CEPAL

## Review

*Director*

RAUL PREBISCH

*Technical Editor*

ADOLFO GURRIERI



UNITED NATIONS

ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA

FIRST HALF OF 1976

# CONTENTS

A critique of peripheral capitalism <i>Raúl Prebisch</i>	9
Situation and prospects of the Latin American economy in 1975 <i>Enrique V. Iglesias</i>	77
Styles of development in Latin America <i>Anibal Pinto</i>	99
Approaches to development: who is approaching what? <i>Marshall Wolfe</i>	131
Power and development styles <i>Jorge Graciarena</i>	173
Notes on integration <i>Cristóbal Lara Beautell</i>	195
Some CEPAL Publications	209

## Approaches to development: who is approaching what?<sup>1</sup>

*Marshall Wolfe\**

After several decades of thinking and action about development, controversy still persists over the objectives it should pursue and the means that should be adopted in order to secure it.

This article does not pretend to put forward a solution of its own, but simply tries to suggest an existential conception of development, which is viewed as an unceasing effort to impose a rational form based on a particular set of values on an actual situation which does not readily lend itself to this. It begins by analysing the difficulties of defining and orienting development, both from the academic and the political point of view, and goes on to enumerate some of the recommendations which have been made in this respect by the United Nations General Assembly and CEPAL. Subsequently, it makes a critical analysis of the uniform development requirements which emerge from these expressions of international consensus, notes their links with the present world order, and describes the position of the Latin American countries in this context. Finally, it distinguishes the main criteria which have been used to define the ends and means of development (the utopian-normative, the technocratic-rationalistic and the socio-political approaches) and concludes with a critical analysis of the agents of development.

\*Director, Social Development Division, CEPAL.

## 1. “Development” under question: the feasibility of national choice between alternative styles

International discourse since the 1940s has postulated that the term “development” refers to an intelligible process that can be furthered by rational action within the framework of nation-states — that is, by “planning”. The participants in the discourse have disagreed radically with one another concerning the nature of the national and international orders within which development is to take place, in their evaluations of what is happening, and in their prescriptions for action. Variants on the vision of linear progress, according to which the “developed” countries have both the capacity and the duty to help others follow in their own path, have continually clashed with variants on the vision of societal transformation, according to which the development of poor countries requires *inter alia* liberation from exploitative relationships that have made the “developed” countries rich and dominant. Nevertheless, arguments have proceeded within an implicit consensus that there can be only one kind of development: a process with certain societal preconditions, going through predictable stages,

<sup>1</sup>The present paper continues an exploration begun in “Development: Images, Conceptions, Criteria, Agents, Choices” (*Economic Bulletin for Latin America*, Vol. XVIII, N<sup>o</sup> 1 and 2, 1973).

requiring accelerated capital accumulation and technological-entrepreneurial innovation, leading to the formation of national societies and economies predominantly urban and industrial, imbued with "modern" attitudes towards the world and citizenship, capable of continually rising production of goods and services and, eventually, of ample satisfaction of the consumption demands of their members. It follows that there can be only one optimal way to develop; the task, then, is to define it, diagnose the deviations from it of the society in question, and prescribe means of setting that society on the correct path.

At present, while the international machinery deriving from this interplay of conflict and consensus over development continues to ramify and the list of internationally accepted requisites for development continues to lengthen, the view of development as a uniform definable sequence to which all national societies must conform under penalty of remaining poor and backward is being challenged from many different theoretical, ideological and valorative positions. Some critics question whether "development" is a meaningful concept and trace it to an ethnocentric supposition of the duplicability of the experience of a few "Western" societies during a certain period of history, or to a misleading analogy, deeply rooted in "Western" thought, between change in societies and "development" in living organisms. For example:

- "A fair amount of effort has been given to attempts at definition as well as to the argument that development 'in general' or 'as such' is a proper or sufficient goal of national

and international activity. But it is insufficiently pondered how strange and remarkable is our use of the term. We proceed as though 'everyone knows' what it means. And, to be sure, at a common-sense level everyone does. ... The common-sense meaning is clear: to be developed is to be Western. Or, if this seems ethnocentric, offensive, 'modern'. ... The defining characteristics of modernity in the West have not been achieved by an effort, consciously and nominally, 'to develop'. This is a post-hoc rationalization, a convenient fiction to give history 'meaning'. ... We do not know, with anything approaching completeness and certainty, how to make a pre-modern State modern. ... Even if we had such knowledge, it would not solve the problem of development if this is conceived as achievement of a certain set of now-known, defining characteristics which, if achieved, would make all nations 'developed'. For the most highly developed nations are in a period of rapid transformation. ... When developing countries seek to become developed through the use of administrative means currently favoured in industrialized countries, they will, if successful, be re-creating 'vanished civilizations'. ... The present enthusiasm for development is a wondrous thing: everyone is for it, but what it is — other than a transient pattern — is open-ended, baffling"<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>2</sup>Dwight Waldo, "Reflexions on Public Administration and National Development", *International Social Science Journal*, XXI, 2, 1969.

■ "The more concrete, empirical, and behavioural our subject matter, the less the applicability to it of the theory of development and its several conceptual elements. It is tempting enough to apply these elements to the constructed entities which abound in Western social thought: to civilization as a whole, to mankind, to total society; to such entities as capitalism, democracy, and culture. ... Having endowed one or other of these with life through the familiar process of reification, it is but a short step to further endowment with growth. ... It is something else entirely, however, when we try, as much social theory at present is trying, to impose these concepts of developmentalism upon, *not* constructed entities but the kind of subject matter that has become basic in the social sciences today: *the social behaviour of human beings in specific areas and within finite limits of time*. ... The model of Western Europe and its seeming direction of social change during the past half-dozen centuries... is made the trend of social change for all human civilization and, as countless studies of the so-called modernizing nations suggest, the stereotype for their individual analysis — and also their reconstruction"<sup>3</sup>.

The dismissal of "development" as an updated version of the "Western" myth of progress naturally cannot

satisfy political leaders and ideologists who start from the premise that the present situation and future prospects of their societies are unacceptable, however congenial they may find the discrediting of "Western" models. Rational action based on a valid interpretation of the society in question and aimed at a preferable future must be possible. If "development" as previously conceived is unattainable, undesirable, or meaningless for the society, then "true" development must mean something else. "Development" becomes a path to be chosen by each national society on the basis of its values rather than a mould to be imposed on it. The undercurrents of voluntarism in developmental discourse continually reappear in differing forms in response to political demands. Several related questions then come to the fore: Can "development" mean anything anyone wants it to mean? Do all of the national societies now on the world stage have the capacity as well as the right to "develop"? Can a society or agents acting in the name of a society choose images of the future different from those hitherto current, unconstrained by the society's past and present, and convert these images into reality through rational action? Under what conditions? If it is granted that development can and should mean different things for different societies and that the attainment of viable and acceptable national style of development<sup>4</sup> depends as much

<sup>3</sup>Robert A. Nesbit, *Social Change and History: Aspects of the Western Theory of Development* (London, Oxford University Press, 1969).

<sup>4</sup>See *Report on a Unified Approach to Development Analysis and Planning, Preliminary Report of the Secretary-General* (E/CN.5/477, 25 October 1972) which distinguishes between the "real style of development" of a

on political will as on economic and cultural preconditions, what is the relevance of international prescriptions laying down what "development" should be?

In the International Development Strategy adopted by the General Assembly in 1970 and in numerous other declarations within the framework of the United Nations, Governments have agreed on utopian-normative standards for development that have not been met convincingly anywhere in the world and have called for studies demonstrating how to bring development processes into closer correspondence with these standards. The international declarations juxtapose and try to reconcile propositions deriving from quite different conceptions of development. The most authoritative and coherent formulation — in paragraph 18 of the International Development Strategy — contains at least three

separable propositions: (i) that "the ultimate purpose of development is to provide increasing opportunities to all people for a better life"; (ii) that the more specific objectives associated with this purpose (rapid growth, structural change, more equitable distribution of income and wealth, expansion of social services, safeguarding of the environment) are "parts of the same dynamic process", simultaneously ends and means; (iii) that it is feasible as well as desirable to move toward all objectives at the same time and in a "unified" way. The Strategy spells out the social objectives that are to be unified in a formidable list of commitments expressed in general terms; elsewhere it concentrates on the more traditional economic objective of a rate of growth in production of at least 6 per cent annually and (in relatively precise terms) on the economic requisites for attainment of this objective.

---

national society (that is, what is actually happening, on the supposition that no society is static), and "preferred styles" (that is, what certain forces in the society want to happen). It is assumed that several preferred styles will normally be competing for attention within a given society and that overt preferences can mask quite different real preferences. In the present paper, the term "prevailing style" is used as equivalent to "real style", and refers to the variants of dependent capitalism prevailing in most of Latin America. The terms "original", and "value-oriented" refer to preferred styles that correspond to the criteria for styles combining "acceptability" and "viability" set forth in the "unified approach" report. "Styles of development" emanate from social systems, as conceptualizations of their processes of growth and change, and may or may not give rise to explicit strategies.

The above propositions are compatible with one another, but endorsement of any one of them does not require acceptance of all the others. The social objectives remain vulnerable to arguments that accomplishment of the "ultimate" purpose of development requires immediate concentration on rapid growth, that no society is capable of "unified" pursuit of all the other objectives set forth in the Strategy, and that governmental attempts to do so within existing political systems and resource limitations will simply paralyze the capacity — insufficient at best — to accelerate economic growth. The economic target, for its part, is equally vulnerable to arguments that policy concentration on very high rates of

economic growth unavoidably exacerbates societal tensions, heightens maldistribution of wealth and power, and distorts life styles in ways that will make the "ultimate purpose" ever harder to approach.

It is probable that international discourse concerning development will continue to vacillate between conceptions of development subject to the economic Kingdom of Necessity (however this may be envisaged) and conceptions of development as at least potentially a variable embodiment of societal values and choices<sup>5</sup>. Experiences up to the present strengthen the negative sides of both the arguments summarized above; the real processes of "development" are not incontrovertibly enhancing human welfare even in the high-income countries and their long-term viability is in doubt, while the attempts to formulate and apply original, autonomous, human-oriented styles of development continue to founder in their confrontations with reality or to survive at a price that leaves their promise unfulfilled.

The present paper will explore the value-oriented propositions in the more recent international declarations as elements for a coherent reconceptualization of development and for the definition of original styles of develop-

ment compatible with real national situations within the real world order. It will confront the elements with the central suppositions of development theories up to the present; with the characteristics of the world economic and political order; with the position of Latin America within this order; and with the different types of national societies and life-styles now emerging in Latin America. The exploration will treat conceptions, aspirations and societal images as capable of exerting real influence on what happens and as not entirely predetermined by economic laws or class interests, but it will avoid reifying them, or treating "development" as an ideal reality existing apart from what societies actually do, and to which they can approximate to the extent that they broaden their understanding of what it "really" is. The paper assumes that present international demands for a "unified approach to development", for "autonomous and original styles of development", etc., derive from a justified rejection of present trends and prospects, and present a challenge to all would-be analysts and agents of development that should not be ignored or evaded. It also assumes that the expressions of this challenge are susceptible to over-generalization, evasion of the more formidable difficulties, contentment with ritualistic reiteration of good intentions, and delusions that infallible and painless solutions to all problems are somewhere waiting to be discovered.

These shortcomings are associated with the extremely varied and partly incompatible pressures and preoccupations that impinge on the demands for normative approaches to the problems of

<sup>5</sup>Questions of this kind, of course, were debated in Latin America as well as other parts of the world long before the term "development" became current. Most of the present arguments were paralleled in Mexico, in particular, prior to and during the Revolution. See Arnaldo Córdova, *La ideología de la revolución mexicana: Formación del nuevo régimen* (Mexico, D.F., Ediciones Era, 1973).



development, and that can be reconciled, at the level of international discourse, only through eclectic compromise formulas. The main pressures and preoccupations can be set forth as follows:

(a) Since the beginning of international concern over development, certain currents of opinion have concentrated on the formulation of ever more inclusive formulations of human rights, including rights to defined levels of living and social services. The proponents of human rights have dealt in absolutes: rights are the same everywhere and should be enforceable immediately, whatever the specific circumstances of the society. It follows that only one style of development is acceptable — and that must be a style very different from any of those prevailing. The standards for rights have derived mainly from the high-income industrialized countries, in which it can be assumed that material capacity for honouring of the rights is present, and in which strong political movements and pressure groups demand that they be honoured. In most of the rest of the world neither of these conditions has been present. Governmental endorsement of rights requiring the commitment of important resources (e.g., universal education) has served partly as a symbolic substitute for action or promise of future action, and partly as a basis for demands on the high-income countries that they help finance observance of the rights they have endorsed. Development analysts and planners, for the most part, have treated the “rights” as non-binding expressions of good intentions, even

when, within their own production-oriented conceptions of development, they have given high priority to improvement of education, nutrition and public health. Within national societies arguments based on “rights” that are universal in principle become weapons of different classes or groups to strengthen their claims to a larger share of public resources that cannot be stretched thin enough to satisfy all the claims. The State confronts an incessant clamour from interest-groups and localities demanding that it “solve their problems” as a matter of right. Meanwhile, movements centring in the high-income countries continue to generate and obtain international approval for new formulations of rights, particularly in regard to public social services. The continuing confrontation of real development processes with “rights” that stand for international consensus on the content of a just social order is indispensable to the rethinking of development. However, permanent tension is to be expected between the universalistic pretensions of the rights formulations (with their derivation from certain types of societies and historical processes) and the quest for autonomous and viable styles of development under conditions in which no conceivable agents of development will be able to “take into account” all the desiderata that are thrust upon them.

(b) The high-income industrialized societies, in both the “capitalist” and the “socialist” variants, have encountered multiple crises — of values, of resources, of capacity of their dominant forces to accomplish their declared aims, of

capacity to maintain high levels of employment and consumption except at the price of inflation and environmental degradation — that have shaken their self-confidence and partly discredited them as models for “development”, “modernization”, or the “welfare state”. Their advances in planning, information systems and social science research have not saved them from drifting to the brink of such crises, then taking action in an atmosphere of improvisation and catastrophist publicity. The question comes to the fore whether they are not as much in need of a rethinking of development as the rest of the world, and even more inhibited in making the needed changes by the expectations and institutional rigidities that derive from their past successes. In the present context, it is worth emphasizing that their special preoccupations project themselves into the discussion of new styles of development for the rest of the world through the dominance of their academic and cultural institutions, and through the extent to which their shifts in resource use, consumption patterns, environmental standards, etc., affect what can actually be done elsewhere. The problems of “post-industrial” or “post-modern” societies unavoidably become intertwined in the developmental thinking of societies that have experienced the process of “industrialization” and “modernization” only in partial and distorted forms.

(c) The “developing” countries that have attained high rates of economic growth and “modernization” have not been able to convert these processes into generalized enhancement of welfare

and societal participation. The dominant forces in some of them remain convinced that they will eventually be able to do so and that there is no other practicable path to the “provision of increasing opportunities to all people for a better life”; consequently, they feel that the discussion of different styles of development is dangerous nonsense. Their critics argue that their present patterns of growth and modernization are accompanied by increasing tensions that cannot be repressed or managed indefinitely, and point to certain countries previously held up as developmental good examples for their high rates of economic growth that have since undergone economic and political disasters. There is no way of proving that either thesis is universally sound, but at best the path of rapid, concentrated economic growth seems open only to a minority among the developing countries, and for this minority its desirability and long-term viability seem less self-evident than a few years ago.

(d) The number of formally independent national units now on the world stage is much larger than at any time since the rise of the “modern” nation-state. Many of them are so lacking in what have been considered the basic preconditions for development, or even the basic preconditions for “national” independence, that they can only despair of matching up to the conventional development prescriptions. If they are not to resign themselves to permanent dependence on international aid combined with the proceeds of raw material exports (which may be real

possibilities for some but not for others), they must seek original paths to the future. They may rely on solidarity with societies in a like position, subordinating their "national" autonomy to the formation of units large enough to be economically and politically viable, or they may move toward a closed, austere, equalitarian national life-style, excluding stimuli toward consumption levels they cannot attain. In either case, or in trying to combine the two strategies, their political leaders and ideologists find no dependable precedents or prescriptions for what they are trying to do.

(e) Both the rich and the poor societies have awakened quite suddenly to the implications of present levels and geographical distribution of natural resources, as they interact with population and consumption growth trends. It is obvious, once the problem is stated, that the societies representing the overwhelming majority of the world's population will never be able to attain levels of per capita resource use remotely similar to those already attained by a few high-income societies in North America and in Europe. It is doubtful whether the latter societies will be able to maintain their present levels and patterns of resource use for much longer. For most of the world a viable style of development must envisage relatively modest levels of consumption of non-renewable resources, substitution of renewable for non-renewable resources wherever feasible, and adequate ecological controls to ensure that the latter really are "renewable". The probability emerges

that the low-income countries will gradually shift from maximizing exports of their non-renewable resources to husbanding these resources for their own use, in the face of increasingly desperate demands for them from the high-income countries. Paradoxically, the prospect also emerges that the low-income predominantly rural-agricultural countries will become increasingly dependent for food supplies on the high-income predominantly urban-industrial countries at a time when food production surpluses in the latter are vanishing.

(f) The conventional international approaches have assumed that "countries" develop and that development is closely associated with processes labelled "modernization" and "nation-building". It has been postulated that planned action at the national level to further these processes is both feasible and essential, that countries should depend on mobilization of internal resources as far as possible, but that they can rightfully and realistically demand financial and technical "co-operation" from the high-income "developed" countries. Enormous and labyrinthically complex international machinery has come into being on the basis of these suppositions. Factors such as those mentioned above, along with certain traits of the international co-operation machinery itself — the dubious applicability of many of the technical transfers, the failure of "planning" to respond to the hopes invested in it, the crippling indebtedness that has resulted from the conditions of financial transfers, etc. — have brought the basic suppositions into question. Experience has given increased plausibility to an alternative

viewpoint that has been argued (in several differing versions) since the beginning of the international development effort: that autonomous development at the national level is an illusion within the present world order, that the reality is an international market system that generates "development" (by the conventional economic criterion) at one pole and "underdevelopment" or "dependent development" (in the more qualified versions) at the other, within which imitative modernization simply internalizes the patterns of dependence and "nation-building" can be no more than a façade. Under such interpretations, the phenomenon is not simply one of exploitation of poor "countries" by rich "countries". The processes of polarization are not delimited by national frontiers, since "modernizing" interests in all countries identify themselves with the dominant centres and benefit from the system at the expense of the rest of the population. It follows that the rich countries are inherently incapable of helping others to "develop", as long as both adhere to the market order. Some versions go farther and question whether relations between "socialist" non-market societies of the centre and the periphery could overcome polarization and dependency as long as prevailing tactics of modernization and technological transfers are perpetuated. International technical and financial co-operation, then, unavoidably conforms to the traits of the dominant world order. It necessarily strengthens the ties of dependency and helps the dominant forces in the dependent societies evade the choices and sacrifices required for "authentic"

development, whether or not it brings them short-term advantages. Since the international co-operation movement represents a major intellectual and emotional investment as well as a source of livelihood for thousands of persons skilled in manipulating developmental symbols, and since there are very few societies where the dominant forces are prepared to renounce altogether the hopes and material advantages it has offered, however disillusioned they may be with it, its present crisis contributes another current to the quest for new conceptions of development. Like development itself, if international co-operation is judged futile or deceptive in the forms it has taken then it must mean something else.

The above pressures and preoccupations, taken together, suggest that the international debate over the meaning of "development" (or some other term designating hopes for a better future, if the term "development" falls into discredit) and the tension between determinist and voluntarist-normative views, between universalist views and culturally specific views, and between revolutionary-catastrophist views and evolutionary-linear-progress views will continue for the foreseeable future. The international impingement of basically incompatible viewpoints will continue to generate eclectic, compromise formulations of ends and means.

Each "country" by the fact of its formal independence has a recognized right to determine its own ends and means, but it cannot expect to do so with impunity if it defies the real constraints imposed by the international

order and its own endowment of human and other resources. It *should* not expect to do so with impunity if it disregards the values of social justice, human welfare, participation and freedom on which the international community has reached a consensus.

But are the "countries" real entities capable of making choices and claiming rights? Who speaks for them? Is "development", however conceived, really uppermost in the purposes of the spokesmen and of the masses of their populations?

If the quest for original styles of development oriented towards the "ultimate purpose" set forth in the International Development Strategy is to be more than a utopian exercise, it must not only seek to demonstrate the viability and desirability of such styles, but must identify potential agents of them and propose strategies in terms intelligible to these agents. In international discourse, this is the aspect most likely to be evaded. Statements are either couched in the passive voice, or use the term "we" in a manner that suggests that their authors are certified spokesmen for public opinion in the societies striving to develop. One of the most explicit formulations in an international document up to the present affirms that: "To achieve the desired objective, more radical measures... have to be adopted. Whether they are feasible or not depends heavily on the balance of political forces in the country concerned. ... Unless there is sufficient political commitment to the surmounting of these constraints,

efforts to combat poverty are destined to fail"<sup>6</sup>.

Formulations of this kind implicitly challenge the realism of most normative declarations. It is one thing to suppose that a well-meaning government is unaware of the things it ought to be doing, and quite another to suppose that it may be uninterested in or incapable of doing these things even after exhortation or scolding. If the "balance of political forces" is such that a government cannot apply the "radical measures" required for a value-oriented development strategy, what follows? One can fall back on warnings of dire consequences if the advice is not followed, as does the Committee for Development Planning document quoted above: "In mustering the political will and in organizing the required national consensus... Governments need to recognize that failing to act — or making no more than token responses to mass poverty and unemployment problems — is likely to yield even more disruptive outcomes"<sup>7</sup>.

<sup>6</sup>Committee for Development Planning, *Attack on Mass Poverty and Unemployment* (United Nations Publication, Sales No: E. 72. II.A.11).

<sup>7</sup>The same point of view is expressed with particular clarity in an address delivered by Mr. Robert S. McNamara to the annual meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (*Summary Proceedings*, Washington, D.C., 25 September 1972): "Governments exist to promote the welfare of all of their citizens — not just that of a privileged few ... absolute human degradation — when it reaches the proportions of 30 to 40 per cent of an entire citizenry — cannot be ignored, cannot be suppressed, and cannot be tolerated for too long a time by any government hoping to preserve civil order".

These warnings have not proved convincing in the face of historical evidence that the deliberate organization of radical structural changes in societies is a path with unpredictable consequences for the leaders and social forces entering upon it, and that if the values and perceived immediate interests of the forces controlling the State do not require such changes, it is safer and cheaper for them to allocate resources to an effective repressive apparatus.

In some respects, the constraints set by the dominant world order now

---

"To underprice capital for the wealthy and make credit expensive for the poor; to allow liberal access to scarce resources for the privileged, and price them out of reach of the deprived; to provide subsidies for the powerful, and deny them to the powerless — these are wholly self-defeating approaches to development. Such policies lead a nation inevitably toward economic imbalance and social instability." The "powerful" and the "privileged" might answer that the State exists precisely to look after their welfare, that there is no infallible way of guaranteeing economic balance and social stability, but that they have in mind ways that are more likely to work for them than those demanded by Mr. McNamara ... or they might see fit to agree with him publicly and follow their own counsel privately. A remark by Dudley Seers is apposite: "A familiar joke in the international scene today is the attempt by the 'progressive' economist, domestic or foreign, to sell land reform or industrialization, or more effective tax collection, or wider educational opportunity, or greater independence from a foreign power to a government whose *raison d'être* is precisely the *prevention* of such developments, or at least limiting them to the greatest extent possible". ("The Prevalence of Pseudo-Planning", in Mike Faber and Dudley Seers, Ed. *The Crisis in Planning* (Chatto and Windus for Sussex University Press, London, 1972).)

seem less rigid than they did a few years ago. At least, the present multifaceted crisis is changing their character in ways that make their future problematic. Nevertheless, certain elements in the world order remain so pervasive that no country can embark on a developmental path radically incompatible with them without the certainty of enormous difficulties and sacrifices. The dominant life-styles and consumption aspirations may prove even harder to change than the centre-periphery patterns of political, financial, trade, and technological dependency to which so much attention has been devoted. Prescriptions such as that advanced by the Development Planning Committee for the elimination of mass poverty and unemployment may be viable only at the price of protracted social struggles with unpredictable results, involving the emergence of an entirely new power structure. Under other circumstances, the quest for value-oriented autonomous styles of development may make real policies even more confused and self-contradictory than hitherto, and may terminate in disaster for régimes embarking on the quest without the will or the capacity to handle the consequences.

Value-oriented styles of development will require not only agents capable of setting the society in motion in the desired direction and mobilizing popular participation and support. They must also meet minimum performance standards in terms of resource mobilization and allocation, production and distribution of goods and services, enforcement of priorities, etc., without generating unmanageable

societal resistance. The circumstances under which such styles become politically possible also ensure considerable inefficiency and cross-purposes during a transitional period of learning by experience. There is no reason to expect existing interest-groups to take the virtues of the new styles for granted, and real shortcomings are bound to reinforce their skepticism or hostility. The proponents of a new style will be under continual temptation to fall back on propaganda, intolerance of criticism, exaggeration of achievements and concealment of mistakes, if they

have a monopoly of power, and on compromises whose costs make the original objectives unattainable, if they do not.

If one assumes that nation-states will continue to be the basic framework within which processes identifiable as "development" will be attempted and will succeed or fail, the final question is whether and under what conditions social forces will become dominant that will make the required choices, accept the required sacrifices, and hold to the thread of rational purpose.

## 2.

### The setting within which developmental choices present themselves

#### (a) *Central elements in the international consensus on value-oriented development*

The most comprehensively normative-utopian among the many international formulations of criteria for development is the Declaration on Social Progress and Development approved by the United Nations General Assembly in 1969 as resolution 2542 (XXIV). The Declaration proposes, in considerable detail, the "elimination" of all the ills that afflict mankind and the provision of all the services that any sector of mankind might require, within a setting of freedom, equal rights, and participation of "all members of society". This Declaration is the culmination of a series of attempts to define "social development" as a reality separate from

"economic development" and hospitably includes such a wide range of the meanings that specialists in the different sectors of public social action have attached to the term that it is of little help towards distinguishing the central elements in the international consensus. The unanimous approval of such a sweeping text, which if taken literally would call for transformation of the practices and priorities of all the organized societies of the world, and the minimal attention that has been paid to it since, even in the secretariats of the international agencies, are worthy of note.

The pursuit of universalist "social"

standards for development could hardly go farther. Since then international efforts have taken a somewhat different direction, also foreshadowed in various earlier initiatives: towards the definition of a "unified approach" to development, conceived as a societal process in which "economic" means cannot be satisfactorily separated from "social" ends, and in which the meaning of what is done depends on the characteristics of the society in which it is done and the overall purposes of the dominant forces in the society.

The International Development Strategy mentioned above states that: "...qualitative and structural changes in the society must go hand in hand with rapid economic growth, and existing disparities — regional, sectoral and social — should be substantially reduced. These objectives are both determining factors and end-results of development; they should therefore be viewed as integrated parts of the same dynamic process, and would require a unified approach". Another General Assembly resolution of the same year — 2681 (XXV): Unified approach to economic and social planning in national development — specifies "the need to include in such an approach components which are designed: (a) To leave no section of the population outside the scope of change and development, (b) To effect structural change which favours national development and to activate all sectors of the population to participate in the development process, (c) To aim at social equity, including the achievement of an equitable distribution of income and wealth in the nation...". It hedges these general prescriptions by a clause

to the effect they "should be borne in mind in development analysis and planning processes ... according to the particular developmental needs of each country".

Most recently, the fifteenth session of the Economic Commission for Latin America in 1973 adopted as resolution 320 (xv) the "Quito Appraisal" of the International Development Strategy, which goes some distance farther in stating criteria for "integrated development" or "human development". Such development, according to the Quito Appraisal:

— Aims at a "new type of society", or "a social system that gives priority to the equality and dignity of man and respects and fosters the cultural expression of the population". "Social participation in all forms of the development process must be increased in order to achieve a juster society".

— Is incompatible with "traditional" social and economic structures and requires "qualitative and structural changes". The Appraisal does not define the "traditional" structures, but states that the needed changes "include the control and sovereign utilization of natural resources, the reform of land tenure systems..., the establishment of such forms of public or mixed ownership of property as each country may consider appropriate..., and any other type of substantive reform needed to secure that objective".

— "Cannot be achieved through partial efforts in particular sectors of the economy or the social system, but only through concerted progress in all aspects." "The very concept of development must be improved and the



fragmentary approach to economic growth and human development discarded... it is necessary to take an integrated view of all the social, economic and political determinants."

— Should not be identified with economic growth, which "has frequently failed to bring with it qualitative changes of equal importance in human wellbeing and social justice" and has coincided with "the continued existence of serious problems such as mass poverty, the incapacity of the system of production to provide employment for the growing labour force, and the lack of economic and social participation of broad strata of the population". However, "accelerated, harmonious and independent growth is essential to the success of these qualitative and structural changes".

— Should be self-sustaining and independent at the national level. However, when "a country simultaneously tackles all aspects of development and promotes the structural reforms needed to achieve integrated development, experience indicates that imbalances occur in the initial stages which make it difficult to continue the process. The social injustices and tensions which have accumulated over the years manifest themselves in demands which domestic resources cannot meet. In order to correct these imbalances, the international co-operation received by such a country should not be subject to restrictions...".

The Appraisal assumes that endorsement of the above criteria for "integrated development" by the Latin American countries is compatible with "a high degree of heterogeneity in their economies and societies" and also with

"different approaches to the development process, with each model having different options or methods of implementation", and with the pursuit of "medium and long-term policies... whose basic principles, both political and economic, differ substantially. Hence, there is no single model to which the appraisal can refer".

Taken together, the above criteria and suppositions constitute elements for a conception of development that is both value-oriented and "structural", but compatible with diverse combinations of ends and means. They call implicitly for a considerable amplification of action by the State, informed and given coherence by values and the pursuit of structural change. They assume that such action is compatible with the character of the internal social forces controlling the State. They assume that full "participation" by all strata of the population is not merely compatible with "integrated development" oriented by the State, but is an essential component of such development.

The Appraisal states that "the developing countries have adopted internal policies and made efforts to attain the goals and objectives stipulated" in the International Development Strategy. However, "imbalances", "tensions", and "demands which domestic resources cannot meet" have endangered or frustrated the efforts of the countries embarking on structural changes, this indicating a contradiction between the ideal of integrated policy and the ideal of full participation. The Appraisal indicates that up to the present the role of the international order has on the whole been negative: "the necessary

co-operation has not been forthcoming from the developed countries to complement (internal) efforts"; "countries undertaking structural changes in conformity with the IDS sometimes have to face hostility and economic aggression from abroad". Nevertheless, the Appraisal falls back on future international co-operation, governed by a "dynamic set of rules", to be achieved through united action of the developing countries, to resolve the contradictions between integrated policy aimed at structural change, limited resources, and the need for broader participation, or at least reduce to manageable proportions.

The criteria for integrated development advanced by the Quito Appraisal are more focussed and coherent as well as more flexible than those of earlier international declarations; they represent a clear advance over the conceptions of "economic development" as a process with its own inexorable laws and requirements, to be somehow tamed and humanized by "social development" governed by detailed universal norms derived from the social legislation and

services of high-income countries. Inevitably, considering the circumstances of its adoption, while the Appraisal calls for far-reaching changes in the role of the State and of national social forces, in the international order of relations between States, and in the relations between economic processes and human purposes, it does not face up to the questions of basic compatibility with the national and international order and of the capacities of these orders for self-transformation. It is open to the criticism that it requires a *deus ex machina* at the national level to bring order out of the clash of purposes and strategies of different groups and the complex repercussions, not necessarily wanted or intended by any group, of the economic, social, political, and demographic processes that are now working themselves out in each national society, plus another *deus ex machina* at the international level to meet the needs that cannot be met nationally, or that can be met only at a price — in terms of privations and compulsion — incompatible with the criteria.

(b) *Central elements in the previous international consensus on "development" as a process with uniform requirements*

As was indicated above, the interminable international discussions on development during the past three decades never arrived at clear agreement on the meaning of development and how to attain it, but in spite of the continual confrontation of propositions deriving from Marx and from Keynes and of practices ranging between the extremes of "central planning" based on State

ownership of the means of production and "market economies" restricting State intervention to a minimum of regulation and infrastructural investment, a partially explicit international consensus emerged on the requirements of "development" for societies labelled "underdeveloped" or "developing" or simply "poor". It is these requirements that are now coming under question, in

regard to their feasibility or their desirability or their meaningfulness, although even the most radical challenges can hardly reject them wholesale, or evade their central premise on the indispensability of much higher levels of productive capacity.

They can be summarized as follows:

*(i) Accumulation.* Development supposes high rates of capital investment so as to increase future capacity for production of goods and services. For most national societies, accumulation must come mainly from domestic resources; main reliance for their mobilization and allocation may be placed either on the State or on individuals responding to economic incentives.

*(ii) Industrialization.* No country can attain "development" as long as it remains predominantly rural-agricultural, although export-oriented agriculture may support considerable increases in per capita income and make accumulation possible. The literature often uses "industrialized" as a synonym for "developed".

*(iii) Agricultural modernization.* "Traditional" systems of land ownership and rural social relationships are associated with low productivity, immobilization of human resources, unresponsiveness to market incentives. According to different conceptions the changes may be limited to modernization of incentives and productive techniques, or may involve revolutionary changes in property and power.

*(iv) Standardization of consumer demands.* With many variations and qualifications it has been assumed that

development requires the bringing of continually wider strata, and eventually the whole population, into a national market for consumer goods, in which the rewards of sacrifice in the early stages of accumulation will be increasing capacity to acquire a wider range of industrially-produced goods, with rising production and consumption continually stimulating each other. The culmination of development is then mass private ownership of automobiles, television receivers, and electrical appliances.

*(v) Entrepreneurship.* Development requires special kinds of responsiveness to economic incentives, capacity to organize large-scale production, innovate, and take risks. This function, according to different conceptions, may best be carried out by private entrepreneurs seeking profit, by managers acting on behalf of the State and compensated by power or pride in contributions to the good of society, or by a combination of the two.

*(vi) Technological and scientific diffusion.* Development requires continual technological innovation, based largely on scientific research. In view of the technological superiority of the rich countries over the poor and their vastly greater research capacities, the needs of the latter can be met mainly by selective borrowing. This requires "technical assistance" furnished by "experts" from the technologically advanced countries.

*(vii) Universal education.* Development requires many kinds of specialized "human resources" and a population capable of grasping and responding to "modern" incentives. This requisite

can be attained only through the universalization of primary education and the expansion of many kinds of secondary, technical and higher education, along lines for which the "developed" countries offer models.

*(viii) Provision of social services and social security.* Modernization, urbanization, and associated changes accompanying development require a widening range of public services and protective mechanisms, in addition to education, to alleviate social tensions and enable individuals to function as "human resources", consumers and citizens. Views differ as to the priority to be given to such services and mechanisms, but even the most concentratedly economic conceptions of development admit their unavoidability. Once again, the "developed" countries offer models for the organization of social security, social welfare, public health, family planning, etc., that can be introduced and adapted to the extent that the stage of development permits.

*(ix) Continually expanding participation in world trade.* Development requires a high level of imports to meet the demands of industrialization and agricultural modernization, and rising incomes mean a demand for consumer goods that cannot be satisfied from domestic production. Thus exports must continually rise to pay for imports, the prices of exports must not undergo pronounced slumps, and, ideally, exports of manufactures must gradually gain in importance relative to raw materials, although volume and prices of exports of the latter will continue to be of crucial importance.

*(x) Rising net financial flows from*

*"developed" (rich) countries to "developing" (poor) countries.* Only in exceptional circumstances can the preceding requirements be met through the unaided mobilization of internal resources and through foreign exchange derived from exports. The development of poor countries requires some combination of financial grants, low-interest loans, and direct investments coming from the rich countries, with the needed proportions depending on the initial situation and development strategy of the poor country.

Different schools of thought have advanced many additional requirements for "development", ranging from the taking of power by a class capable of imposing determined modes of accumulation and production to the transformation of child-rearing practices in the family, as more basic than any of the above. Consensus on those listed, however, has been fairly general. Even the proponents of different priorities have had to argue, in order to get a hearing, that their proposals would contribute to the attainment of these requirements. It was accepted that the future world, to the extent that more and more national societies conformed to these requirements, would become more homogeneous, less conflict-ridden, and more capable of supporting satisfactory levels of welfare for most of its population.

In the course of national and international efforts to meet the requirements, and as a result of unplanned social and economic processes pointing in the same direction, most human societies have changed enormously since the 1940s. A different world order has emerged, in many respects more

interdependent, imposing more complex constraints on change in national societies than ever before. In other respects, paradoxically, the possibilities for autonomous voluntarist action, for better or worse, have widened, and also the possibilities for societal changes or breakdowns escaping from the control of any power centre, national or international. The deliberate political and economic constraints imposed by the world centres on the development of the periphery may be weakening, and the capacity of the centres to offer

the periphery coherent and attractive models for change is weakening more incontrovertibly, but other constraints inherent in the partial and distorted attainment of the development requirements listed above are becoming more formidable. The next stage in the present exploration will be to try to summarize certain central features of the world order that have emerged in the course of the struggle for development, to which declarations such as the IDS and the Quito Appraisal are reacting.

*(c) Characteristics of the present world order in relation to the conventionally-defined requirements of development and the possibility of autonomous national choices of styles and strategies*

An interpretative description of the world economic and political order in its present state of flux, in which the events of each year confound the expectations of the preceding one, would be a risky undertaking and beyond the pretensions of the present discussion. The most that can be done is to single out certain features that seem particularly relevant:

*(i)* Continual changes in the dominant preoccupations in the world centres are generating corresponding changes and increasing diversity in the forms of control, advice and co-operation through which the governments and interest-groups of these centres try to deal with the peripheral societies. A certain loss of confidence in previous prescriptions, or even of interest in the very theme of aided development, in the main centres coincides with increasing sympathy and support in certain smaller high-income

countries for original and autonomous styles of development elsewhere. A kind of vicarious utopianism has appeared which, although it may under-estimate or misjudge the real difficulties of value-oriented development in poor and dependent countries, does something to widen the options open to them. At the same time, the "visibility" of more specific developmental problems is shifting and dominant currents of opinion in the world centres continually urge, through the international organizations, new priorities on the peripheral societies. The most conspicuous examples are the rise of worldwide campaigns, backed by significant resources from the world centres, relating to "population" and the "environment". Equitable income distribution and full employment have similarly come to the fore, although without a comparable disposition in the world centres to

allocate resources to their attainment. With increasingly coherent tactics, the spokesmen of the peripheral societies seek to adapt the campaigns and resource availabilities deriving from the changing visibility of problems to their own conceptions of needs, *especially* for more favourable terms of trade and aid.

(ii) While the disproportion in per capita wealth and in power between the world centres and the periphery is certainly not diminishing the forms of dominance and dependency are changing and becoming in some respects ambivalent. The spread of industrialization and its increasing dominance by transnational corporations whose national affiliates are capable of self-financing transforms the previous patterns of exchange of raw materials for manufactured goods and renders obsolete the previous conceptions of "foreign investment". The latest technological innovations in the centres are increasingly remote from the needs and capacities of the peripheral societies, or possibly even from those of the centres (as in the case of supersonic transport) but the search for technological alternatives progresses very little. The low-income predominantly rural countries find themselves increasingly dependent on the high-income urbanized countries for food supplies, but the latter countries rather suddenly find that their own life-styles, with their reliance on automotive transport and high consumption of electrical energy, have led them into a trap of dependence on peripheral societies as well as an environmental nightmare. Economic aggression has become a more diversified as well as a more menacing weapon

than heretofore, and some of the peripheral societies are becoming able to use it as effectively as the centres. Both have the capacity of making "normal" functioning in other countries impossible by withholding supplies.

(iii) The processes of "development" or "modernization" in the peripheral countries, to the extent that they have taken place, and the rather compartmentalized economic and social programmes undertaken in their name, have invariably been characterized by polarization between groups able to "modernize" and benefit materially, and larger groups that do so only "marginally" or suffer absolute deprivation. In one way or another all of the programmes counted on to enhance welfare and generalize development — from industrialization and agricultural modernization to education, public health and social security — seem to contribute to this polarization, or "structural heterogeneity". Policies proposed specifically to improve the relative positions of the more marginal groups, such as community development, regional development, and agrarian reform, conform to the same pattern of polarized gains, or remain puny and impotent, or encounter structural resistance that destroys them. The problem is not simply that some parts of the national populations progress while others stagnate. The forms of "progress" impinge on the latter groups in ways that prevent them from "stagnating". The momentum of what has been done, the expectations of all social groups, and the differential access to power of the modernized groups make basic changes in the pattern of

polarized growth problematic, conflictive and costly, even if dominant political forces have a clear strategy for change, which is rarely the case.

(iv) As polarization emerges more clearly as a key characteristic of "developing" societies, and to some extent even of societies previously identified as "developed", and as wider strata of the population "participate", at least to the extent of becoming conscious of the impact of change processes and seeking means of defending themselves, the compatibility of "development" and "participation" and the viability of democratic institutions and processes comes under question. Whether the aim is to maintain the prevailing polarized style of development — if it is judged the only viable style — or to transform it, authoritarian and technocratic solutions come to seem unavoidable. The national armed forces, preferably guided by social scientists and planners, are measured for the role of *deus ex machina*, whether they want it or not, and even by sectors of opinion with no stomach for authoritarian rule. In the minds of groups seeking means of implanting a preferred style of development, it comes to seem more practicable to apply Disraeli's saying, "We must educate our masters", to the armed forces than to the people. Within the present world order, military leaders are trying to impose an extraordinarily wide range of styles of development in different countries, as a consequence of the failure of previous régimes to reconcile "development" and "participation". Such régimes present the likelihood of more coherent and original policy choices — sometimes to the point

of arbitrariness — than the régimes dependent on open political bargaining and compromise, but it remains to be seen whether such choices will be more consistently enforceable than the previous ones. Within the pattern of partial frustration of development, or unsatisfying "dependent development", the long-term trend may be cyclical rather than consistently in the direction of military-authoritarian solutions: the failure of political compromise leads to military takeovers, but the inability of the military and their technocratic-ideological advisers to cope with the complexity of the processes leads back to open political competition.

(v) The identification of the "modern" sectors of the populations of the peripheral societies with the standards of their counterparts in the advanced societies becomes more complex and ambiguous as this identification clashes with the crises of standards in their countries of origin. Interest-groups or organizations (from chambers of commerce to trade unions), political parties, academic structures, transnational corporations, bureaucracies, brands of manufactured consumer goods, mass media content: all these experience world standardization and simultaneous reactions against standardization. The polarized peripheral societies import ideological "antibodies" along with the traits of the "affluent" societies and also develop their own antibodies that are re-exported to the high-income societies and enter into their cultural-political conflicts. In this sense, a world society is taking shape, characterized not by the harmonious incorporation of standardized high production and high

consumption previously looked to as a consequence of "development", but by a self-contradictory combination of increasing assimilation of this pattern and increasing rejection of or frustration with it. In the *peripheral* societies the non-incorporation or marginalization of part of the population exacerbates

this contradictory process in two ways: by heightening the defensiveness of the "modernized" strata towards their privileged position, and by heightening the ideological rejection of dependent development. The two reactions can, of course, coexist conflictively in the same individual or the same policy formulation.

#### (d) *The position of Latin America within the world order*

For all the wide differences between Latin American countries, which will be discussed below, the region as a whole presents certain common features that differentiate it from the remainder of the so-called Third World and imply that its links with the world order are more complexly internalized, however precarious or unsatisfactory the resulting styles of development may be judged:

(i) The dominant classes in Latin America have been culturally and economically identified with the "Western" or European order since the sixteenth century. The colonial experience is remote in time, and since the nineteenth century national elites have formulated strategies for national "progress" or "development", based on their own views of the relevance to their countries of the economic, social, and political doctrines current in the world centres. Their strategies have included the deliberate stimulation of national identification along European lines, the improvement of quantity and quality of population through immigration of Europeans, the expansion of educational systems modelled on those of the "advanced" countries, and the taking advantage of the international

division of labour through exports of raw materials. While these strategies have changed over time to include industrialization, Latin American integration, etc., and while the favoured models among "advanced" countries have shifted, dependence of the elites on doctrines current in the world centres, combined with low valuation by the elites of the masses of the population as "human resources" for the kind of national advancement envisaged, has continued. Reactions of "indigenism", insistence on unique national paths to the creation of a new civilization, etc., have also been a recurrent theme since the nineteenth century but have lacked the support of vigorous non-European cultures and religions comparable to those of Asia and parts of Africa; they have exerted a significant influence on national development policies only in a few countries and for short periods.

(ii) Urbanization, dependent modernization, industrialization, and elaboration of the bureaucratic machinery of the welfare state have reached a point at which sizeable minorities of the population in most countries and possibly a majority in one or two are fully identified with the life-styles and



expectations of the modern consumer society. Expectations include not only access to expensive durable goods but also "modern" suburban housing, foreign travel, and higher education. At prevailing per capita income levels, satisfaction of these tastes for minorities that are much larger than the previous elites implies patterns of income distribution, patterns of distribution of public expenditures on services and urban infrastructure, and patterns of saving, investment and production that are just as remote from conventional conceptions of developmental priorities as they are from the publicly endorsed principles of social justice. The initiative for implantation of the new life styles has come mainly from the world centres through the transnational corporations and through standardized mass media content, but they have been readily internalized by the population strata having any capacity to do so. Similar processes have been at work in other regions of the Third World, of course, but for the most part the proportions of population affected are smaller, and the culturally or politically based resistance stronger<sup>8</sup>.

(iii) The national populations represent a wide range of differing degrees and forms of participation in or "marginalization" from the "modern" society. Social stratification has become more complex and the proportions of the population in "middle" or "upper" positions has increased in most countries, although the meaning of these positions is far

from uniform. The predominant character of the lower strata has changed with urbanization, increasing spatial mobility and access to mass communications, and with the partial disintegration of "traditional" rural power structures, but without any generalized decrease in the polarization between them and the fully "modernized" minorities. At the same time, the obstacles to national integration are less complex than in most other parts of the Third World. The national populations are not divided along linguistic, cultural, religious, caste or tribal lines in such a way that any developmental process involving differential advances and polarization between internal regions, urban and rural populations, and social classes generates conflict between readily self-identifiable groups, as in much of Africa and Asia and a few of the small Caribbean countries. The prevalence in the region of the latifundio-minifundio complex and exposure to the changing demands of export agriculture have prevented peasant cultures and forms of community organization from acquiring the capacity for resistance to change that they have exhibited in other regions, although these factors continue to be of some importance in the zones inhabited by linguistically separate "Indian" peasants. In general, the impact of present change processes on rural groups results in their disintegration and "marginal" incorporation into the lower strata of the national society, or in some cases in the appearance of modern forms of self-defence such as peasant unions, rather than in traditionalist, messianic, or cultural-

<sup>8</sup>See Anibal Pinto, "El Modelo de Desarrollo Reciente de América Latina", *Revista de Economía Latinoamericana*, Caracas, 32, 1971.

nationalist reactions. The rural population, while in most countries large and still growing, is a dwindling proportion of the whole, is in the main accustomed to wage labour and market relationships, and is continually drained of its more dynamic elements by out-migration. While it would be risky to extrapolate present trends into the long-term future, they suggest a continuing conflictive combination of homogenization of cultural attitudes and consumption expectations with polarization of incomes and of capacity to participate in the "national" society. The attention of all groups and strata will increasingly concentrate on the State as the most likely source of aid in meeting expectations. Localistic and *regionalistic* rivalries will continue to be prominent, but will centre on the distribution of central public resources rather than on separatism *vis-à-vis* the nation-state.

(iv) The per capita income statistics, which show the Latin American countries in an intermediate range between Europe and North America, on the one hand and Africa and Asia on the other, with some overlapping at the ends of the range, obviously combine the very different situations of the well-to-do "modern" minorities and the remainder of the population. However, the predominant traits of poverty in Latin America, except in some of the smaller and more rural countries, are intermediate between the traits of poverty in the high-income countries and in the very low-income countries. Poverty amounting to acute physical deprivation or semi-starvation and complete lack of access to educational and health

services is still the lot of millions of people in Latin America, but it is less prevalent than in much of Africa and Asia. The predominant characteristics of poverty are changing with urbanization and the expansion of State assistential action. Insecurity of employment and income, overcrowded housing in squalid environments, inability to stretch the family budget to cover a minimum "decent" standard of living, including purchases of manufactured consumer goods, the frustrations of limited and discriminatory access to educational, health and welfare services, come to the fore. In the larger countries, present income levels would permit the relief of extreme physical deprivation through State subsidies, special employment programmes, etc., without major changes in the style of development, but this would hardly affect the dimensions of poverty as a condition of relative deprivation and discrimination.

(v) As might be expected from the relatively high levels of urbanization, the prolonged internalization of the "Western" model of nation-state, and the relative weakness of alternative focusses for loyalty (ethnic or religious group, tribe, local community), a conscious acceptance of the State as final arbiter, as responsible for "solving problems" and "meeting needs", and as a legitimate target for blame if problems are not solved has become more generalized than in most other parts of the Third World. The State's assumption of responsibility for planning development, the influence of international standards, and the forms of political competition continually press the State to promise more than it can

perform, bearing in mind the resources and administrative mechanisms at its command and the capacity of different social forces to resist, evade, or distort public policies. The objectives of channeling resources into investment for rapid economic growth, helping the modernized urban strata to satisfy their consumption demands, and helping to raise the productivity and levels of living of the remainder of the population continually conflict with each other in practice, however reconcilable they may be in the proposals of planners. Policies that camouflage the real sources and distribution of public resources, that rely on chronic inflation, and that alternate manipulated self-help participation of the masses with repression become unavoidable. Different "problems" and "solutions" assume prominence with changes in régimes, then recede into the background, apparently because the State's solutions have proved ineffective while the growing dimensions of the "problems" do not have the catastrophic effects predicted (the wasing and waning public visibility of urban "marginal" settlements is an interesting example). For the most part, the political systems of the region have demonstrated considerable resilience and adaptability, underlying their surface instability, in juggling problems and responding to pressures. When the contradictions generated by a given direction of policy or political compromise seem insoluble, the dominant forces somehow reassert themselves to preserve the main features of the prevailing style of "development".

When one moves from generalizations about Latin America as a whole to

the examination of specific national situations, the societies fall into groups that suggest interesting hypotheses concerning the long-term viability of this prevailing style.

(i) The national societies at the highest levels of urbanization and per capita incomes, with inequalities in incomes and in distribution of services somewhat less pronounced than elsewhere, with low or declining rates of population growth, and with relatively extensive, formalized and long-continued political participation, have encountered the most disruptive and persistent political and economic crises of the region. In Cuba these crises led to a revolutionary transformation of the society and the emergence of an entirely different style of development. While pre-revolutionary Cuba is hardly comparable, in its extreme economic dependency on a single crop for a single market and in the associated political dependency, with the countries next to be mentioned, the pre-revolutionary Cuban society and economy were predominantly "modernized" and urbanized, the country was less heterogeneous structurally than the majority of Latin American countries, with extensive political participation and unionization, and it had relatively well-developed although notoriously inefficient educational and social security systems. The inability of the State to reconcile the pressures on its resources manifested itself in an eventually non-viable combination of corruption, repression, bureaucratism and violence. In two other relatively urbanized, modernized and participatory societies, Chile and Uruguay, inability to meet conflicting

demands or maintain satisfactory rates of economic growth has resulted in the disintegration of previously highly stable systems of political bargaining and the attempted restoration of the viability of the conventional style of development through authoritarian suppression of incompatible demands and pressures. In a fourth relatively urbanized and modernized society, that of Argentina, the outcome of a similarly prolonged crisis is still in doubt. The Argentine economy has shown more resilience, partly, no doubt, because of its greater size and diversification, but inability to mobilize consensus behind a coherent national strategy or to attain a stable system of political participation within the limits of the prevailing style of development has been as pronounced as in the other countries mentioned.

The attainment of respectable ratings in the conventional indicators of development and modernization — per capita income; urbanization; education; cultural homogeneity; population structures with declining fertility, low mortality, and moderate percentages in the youthful “dependent” age group — thus do not guarantee a more stable social order nor continuing progress in the direction of the “advanced” Western model. The examples cited suggest, on the contrary, that the attainment of such ratings in dependent societies can be associated with a prolonged crisis in which the economy, the political system, public services, and social relationships are less and less able to meet the demands made on them. Two cautions are appropriate, however: firstly, a comparison of ideal,

stable, socially integrated “advanced” Western societies with the apparent impasses of the “semi-developed” or “dependently developed” societies may be misleading or premature: indeed, the former societies may be entering impasses of their own not radically different from those of the dependent societies; secondly, the societies just described all have unique characteristics that may explain in part their difficulties, and they reached their situations of “semi-development” at specific historical conjunctures that are not likely to be repeated; thus it would be risky to affirm that they point to the future of the societies next to be described.

(ii) Five countries comprising more than two-thirds of the population of Latin America, while differing widely among themselves, correspond best to the generalized picture of polarized development and structural heterogeneity. All of them have relatively large populations — ranging from about 12 million to about 100 million — growing at rates around 3 per cent annually, and extensive national territories, parts of which are only beginning to be opened up for exploitation. Each has at least one urban centre of 2.5 million or more inhabitants growing by more than 5 per cent annually. Each has experienced considerable and diversified industrial growth and agricultural modernization, very unevenly distributed by internal regions. Each has an extremely heterogeneous population — compared to the first group of countries although not compared to the typical national societies of Africa or Asia — in regard to degree and forms of incorporation

into the "modern" economic and social order. In each, rapid modernization has increased the relative size of the groups enjoying the higher income and consumption levels, widened the gap between their levels and styles of life and those of the rest of the population, and introduced new elements of insecurity and partial breakdown of previous life styles in the rest of the population, whether or not absolute levels of living have deteriorated. All of these societies have experienced crises of political participation in recent years, but up to the present the dominant forces have managed to overcome the crises without long-term interruption of economic growth or transformation of its polarized character. It has proved feasible either to exclude the greater part of the population from political participation or to manipulate such participation so as to prevent the articulation of demands incompatible with the style of development.

Among these five countries, Venezuela comes closest to the first group in degree of urbanization, *per capita* income level, and various indicators of modernization, and it is in the same population size range as Chile and Cuba, but it differs profoundly in the rapidity with which the present configuration has been reached, the role of oil revenues in supporting polarized development while permitting simultaneous rapid growth of social services and public works employment, and the continuing high rates of population growth and rural exodus. Venezuela at present seems particularly exposed to the kind of prolonged crisis of participation and conflicting preferences

encountered in the first group of countries, but also particularly well endowed with potential means of postponing or evading the crisis.

In Brazil, the size of population and territory, the extreme diversity of internal regions, the dynamism of the economy, and the capacity of the dominant forces to exclude pressures incompatible with the style of development imply potentialities qualitatively different from those of the other countries with somewhat similar patterns of modernization, polarization, population growth, etc. Brazil has a bigger capacity to take advantage of opportunities for aggressive incorporation in the world economic order than any other country of the region.

Mexico also has enjoyed special advantages for rapid growth in having a relatively large population, an abundant low-cost labour supply, proximity to the United States market and tourist trade, and a unique system for the channeling of political participation. However, the ratio of resources to population, the size of the internal market, and the capacity to exclude incompatible pressures are less favourable to continued growth than in Brazil. To judge from past experience, however, the political system has a high capacity to absorb major structural changes without unmanageable crises.

In Colombia, economic growth, is more diversified spatially than in the other countries of the group, but it is less dynamic, and the crisis of political participation and conflict over the style of development itself is nearly as pronounced as in the first group of countries.

In Peru, the processes of polarized economic growth and dependent modernization that characterize this group of countries took their present shape more recently and are more limited in scope. The conditions for their continuation also seem more problematic. The population is smaller than in the other countries of the group except for Venezuela. Only about one third of the population lives in centres with 20,000 or more inhabitants, while the other four countries have percentages between 40 and 60. The "modern" sectors of production, the internal market for their goods, and the population groups fully committed to the prevailing style of development are correspondingly smaller and more concentrated in the single metropolitan agglomeration. Cultural heterogeneity is greater than elsewhere and "traditional" social relationships and modes of production more persistent. While the natural resource endowment is relatively promising and there is a good deal of unoccupied land, barriers of topography and climate hinder the expansion of settlement and exploitation of new resources more than elsewhere.

It would be risky to draw a cause-and-effect relationship between these factors which make the viability of the conventional style of development particularly doubtful — or at least make its probable costs in terms of dependence, marginalization, and repression of the majority that cannot be incorporated particularly formidable — and the coming to power of forces that propose radical changes in the conventional style in order to counteract polarization and dependency, promote national

cultural integration, and implant harmonious forms of participation to forestall unmanageable political competition.

(iii) The remaining eleven countries of Latin America share the features of smaller population size and lower levels of urbanization. Only one out of the eleven (Panama) has as much as 40 per cent of its population in centres with 20,000 or more inhabitants (a little below the regional average). The others are all below one third; four are below one fifth. Only one (Ecuador) has even as much as half the population of the smallest country in the second group. One might expect countries with these traits to be less advanced in the path of polarized development than the larger countries in the second group, less capable of meeting (at least on their own) the conventional requirements for "development" listed above, and more dependent for economic growth on the fortune in the world market of one or two raw material exports. The reality corresponds on the whole to this expectation, but the small countries show widely differing combinations of advantages and disadvantages internally, in their links with the world order, and in their links with their larger neighbours. With one or two exceptions, all of them have acquired a "modern sector" and a developmental momentum implying constraints on radical changes in the style of development similar to those noted above, although possibly weaker. Several of them have overall configurations that make one hesitate to include them in the category of "relatively less developed".

Three of the countries in this group have extensive territories and resource

endowments in relation to their small populations. All of these three are on the South American continent, juxtaposed with much larger countries belonging to the first and second groups. One of them, Ecuador, which has the largest population and second highest level of urbanization among the small countries, has a pattern of resource endowment, regional diversity, and economic and cultural heterogeneity similar to that of Peru. It also has the possibility of oil revenues on a scale that might enable it to reach a configuration similar to that of Venezuela or, under the guidance of dominant forces with a coherent strategy, support an original style of development with less traumatic accompaniments than would appear in the more urbanized and "modernized" countries. Bolivia has a particularly high ratio of unexploited land and natural resources to population, but particularly formidable and varied difficulties of topography, internal regionalism, cultural heterogeneity, lack of capital, and weakness or incoherence of the forces controlling the State apparatus that hinder it from using these advantages. Anomalously, it also manifests, to a degree unmatched even in the countries of the first group, a chronic crisis of organized demands from different groups and classes that can be reconciled with the real style of development only precariously and intermittently. In Bolivia, the societal obstacles to the implantation of a radically original style of development are relatively weak and the character of the demands on the State suggest that such a style might be the only way out of an impasse of permanent instability

and economic weakness. However, the capacity to devise and impose the necessary style or to mobilize capital, natural resources and human resources behind it is also weak. In Paraguay, the ratio of land to population is favourable, and problems of topography and cultural heterogeneity unimportant. With a low level of urbanization (a little over one fifth of the population in centres with 20,000 or more inhabitants) and with Argentina absorbing as migrants a high proportion of the population groups that would otherwise contribute to urban growth and modernization, both the pressures making for polarized development and the demands deriving from it seem to be moderate.

The other small countries — two in the Caribbean, six in Central America — are grouped in a way that makes them less dependent on large neighbours, more capable of group action, but also more narrowly constrained politically as well as economically by the world order. One of them, Panama, has a unique entrepot role that has permitted a relatively high level of urbanization and dependent modernization which, through the high visibility of the tie to one of the world centres, stimulates a nationalist reaction implying a certain degree of viability for an original and autonomous style of development. Another, Costa Rica, with relatively low urbanization and an economic base as narrow as the neighbouring Central American countries, along with an extraordinarily high rate of population growth, has attained a degree of modernization, cultural homogeneity, diffusion of social services, etc., that resembles those of the highly urbanized

countries of the first group, with sizeable problems of political participation and reconciliation of demands on public sector resources, but without an unmanageable breakdown of consensus or interruption of economic growth. The case of Costa Rica cautions against determinism concerning the limitations of small dependent societies. As in Uruguay in the past, certain historical circumstances permitted the emergence of a democratic and welfare-oriented national style that could not have been expected from the country's small size and dependence on exports of a few raw materials. In Costa Rica as in Uruguay, the prominent role of education has ambivalent implications for the future of the style; it stimulates occupational demands and modernized consumption patterns that the economic base cannot support beyond a certain point, but it may also prepare the youth to face the choices and fill the roles required for creative innovation in the style.

The remaining small countries, with their predominantly rural populations, high rates of population growth, low educational levels, dependence on agricultural exports, modest reserves of land and unexploited natural resources, external political constraints, and restricted or intermittent political participation might seem to have small possibilities for either polarized development or for the implantation of more original styles, at least in the absence of more effective solidarity among themselves. Nevertheless, most of them have attained rates of *economic* growth that compare favourably with those of the larger countries, have acquired minorities of some importance

identified with the "modern" consumer society, and are making some effort to extend social service and participation schemes to the rest of the population. The main obstacle in the way of their continuing along this path — assuming that the markets for their exports remain reasonably favourable and are supplemented by new sources of revenue such as tourism — may be their very high rates of population growth, eventually resulting in accelerated urbanization and unmanageable demands for services and jobs.

The above brief survey of national situations suggests that it is unlikely that any of the societies can incorporate the entire population into the "modern" life style at satisfactory levels of consumption and services, but it may be economically feasible for most of them to expand the incorporated part of the population considerably and at least to keep the levels of living of the rest of the population from deteriorating. This assumes that there is no major breakdown in the world economic and political order. If present favourable trends in raw material demands continue, the economic feasibility of continuation of the present style will naturally be strengthened, along with reluctance of the nationally dominant forces to undertake the risks of major changes. The likelihood that the style of polarized development will prove non-viable lies more in the contradiction with expanding political participation than in economic contradictions. The least manageable participation may be that of the relatively incorporated parts of the population, with their attempts to respond to ever-changing "advanced"



consumption models rather than that of the excluded or "marginally" incorporated groups with their relatively modest demands. Thus, paradoxically, the closer the approximation of the societies to the models of modern urban life styles, the more difficult it may become for them to resolve struggles over distribution of resources and strategies of development through open political processes.

It may be, however, that this kind of analysis misses the most important factors — in particular, the factors mobilizing political will behind a determined development policy or preventing the implantation of a coherent policy. The differing situations and trajectories of the national societies

cannot be explained satisfactorily on the basis of their demographic structures, social structures, resource endowment, degree of urbanization, etc., although there is sufficient correspondence to justify the above grouping. In each country, a long chain of cultural and historical processes and unique "accidents" shape present patterns and make certain developmental choices more accessible than others — victory or defeat in wars, revolutions generating national myths as well as changes in class relationships, the emergence of charismatic leaders capturing the lasting loyalty of major parts of the population, the persistence of traditional political affiliations and localistic sentiments under change conditions.

### 3.

## Policy approaches to the challenge of "unified", "original", and "value-oriented" or "human-oriented" styles of development

The present paper supposes — with reservations — that development is a legitimately identifiable process subject to certain uniformities and preconditions, but that these uniformities and preconditions are not rigidly binding nor a satisfactory basis for prediction of the future. It also supposes that human reason and human values can and should try to shape the future into national styles different from those prevailing up to the present<sup>9</sup>. "Develop-

and Planning (*op. cit.*, pp. 9-10): "Development" is "a perceived advance toward specified ends based on societal values" and also "a system of interrelated societal changes that underlies and conditions the feasibility of the advance". "The first sense assumes human capability of shaping the future for human ends. It also implies that the existing society has the right and the ability, through general consensus or through agents claiming to represent the best interests of the society, to make choices and enforce sacrifices in the name of development." "The second sense assumes that development is an intelligible phenomenon susceptible to diagnosis and objective propositions concerning the interrelations of factors and the probable wider consequences of changes in or action on key components of the 'system'."

<sup>9</sup>This position is set forth in the *Report on a Unified Approach to Development Analysis*

ment" cannot mean anything anyone wants it to mean, but, if it is to continue to serve as a focus for human aspirations, it must embrace a certain range of differing combinations of ends and means. Three main kinds of approach to the definition of these ends and means can be distinguished: the utopian-normative, the technocratic-rationalistic and the socio-political. Up to a point, these are complementary. The pursuit of more acceptable and viable styles of development must be referred to images of the future social order — in other words, to a "utopia" — and to norms setting limits on the means to be used. The quest for more rational and efficient techniques for mobilization and allocation of resources, provision of services, and accomplishment of whatever objectives the society sets itself is unavoidable, whatever caveats may be entertained as to the lengths to which this quest should be followed and the virtues of the market or of participatory democracy. Finally, social and political forces, however these may be defined, must choose the utopias and norms and create and apply the technocratic-rationalistic planning and administrative mechanisms.

For obvious reasons, the utopian-normative and technocratic-rationalistic approaches have received a good deal more attention in official and semi-official international discourse than the socio-political. The fact that such discourse is conducted by government representatives or by "experts" addressing themselves to governments, as the opening section of the present paper points out, promotes the supposition that the governments stand for rational,

benevolent and coherent entities preoccupied with development and the welfare of all their people, anxiously seeking advice on how to accomplish these ends, and capable of acting on the advice. If their behaviour does not correspond to this image, they deserve scolding for corruption, for the pursuit of irrelevant objectives such as military power, for slackness and evasiveness in pursuing their declared policies (in Gunnar Myrdal's words for being "soft States"), but the supposition remains that the "government" or the "State" has sufficient autonomy to do better if "it" wants to, or if "it" is sufficiently alarmed at the dire consequences of not doing better. Non-official academic and ideological discourse, particularly in the "developing" countries, shows a different world, in which external domination and internal distribution of power determine what governments can do, in which the governments are commonly incoherent aggregates of diverse personalistic, bureaucratic and other purposes, and in which it is naive or intellectually dishonest to expect them to act differently on the basis of moral exhortations or rational arguments.

The utopian-normative and the technocratic-rationalistic approaches have to a large extent been pursued separately, by different groups in the national governments and the intergovernmental organizations, but the advocates of each have tried to borrow strength from the other. The proponents of universalistic social norms have aspired to guide the technocratic planners and administrators, and have commonly exaggerated the power of the planners and the results to be expected

from "convincing" them of the importance of social justice or placing spokesmen for the "social" point of view in planning bodies. The planners and administrators have commonly tried to justify their techniques and enlist wider support by hinting at eventual contributions to the attainment of social justice.

In recent years both of these approaches — although numerous institutions continue to elaborate and teach them along previous lines — have been increasingly frustrated by confrontation with socio-political realities and increasingly complicated or adulterated by attempts to adjust them to these realities or adjust the realities to them. Apologies for both approaches fall back continually on what might be labelled the "bureaucratic passive voice" or on the wistful assertion of a "growing awareness" in order to evade the obligations to identify the socio-political agents to whom they are addressed. Enough has been said about the utopian-normative approach in previous sections of this paper. Its shortcomings when pursued in isolation (or its illegitimate uses as an evasion of reality) are cruelly exposed in a world in which the dimensions of injustice, insecurity and violence continue to grow while the list of "rights" to which all human beings are entitled by the votes of their governments continues to lengthen. The confrontation of the technocratic-rationalistic approach with recalcitrant realities is more complex, since its practitioners are more intimately involved in the machinery of the State, the demands of classes and groups, and the need of the political leadership for

"solutions" to "problems". One result has been an extensive literature on the "crisis in planning"<sup>10</sup>. As in the case of "development" itself, if the meaning previously attached to planning is discredited, it is assumed that "planning" must mean something else, and the alternatives proposed range from a continuous, diffused rationalizing activity in which the whole society participates, to the formulation of operational guidelines for short-term choices between projects. Public administration as a "discipline" shows a similar loss of confidence and diversification of prescriptions, combined with a similar clinging to faith that it must mean *something* generalizable and applicable to the rationalization of what the State does in the name of society. One critic has retorted: "If planning is everything, maybe it's nothing"<sup>11</sup>.

<sup>10</sup>See, in particular, Mike Faber and Dudley Seers, Ed., *The Crisis in Planning* (Chatto and Windus for Sussex University Press, two volumes, London, 1972). See also section III of "Report on a Unified Approach to Development Analysis and Planning", *op. cit.*

<sup>11</sup>"Despite intermittent disaffection with planning — the contrast between the plan and the nation mocked the planners — it was difficult for national elites to lose sight of the promised land. They so wanted an easy way out of their troubles. Besides, they soon discovered that the non-operational quality of planning could be helpful. ... Formal planning may be useful as an escape from the insurmountable problems of the day. ... If groups cannot be indulged in the present, they can be shown the larger places they occupy in future plans. Formal planning can also be a way of buying off the apostles of rationality by involving them in tasks that take them away from the real decisions. ... If formal planning fails not merely in one nation at one time but in virtually all nations most of the

From the standpoint of the present paper, the utopian-normative and technocratic-rationalistic approaches can

time, the defects are unlikely to be found in maladroit or untalented planners. Nor can a failure be argued rationally by saying that the countries in question are not prepared to behave rationally or to accept the advice of rational men called planners. That is only a way of saying that formal planning, after innumerable iterations, is still badly adapted to its surroundings. It cannot be rational to fail. To err is human; to sanctify the perpetuation of mistakes is something else. If governments persevere in national planning, it must be because their will to believe triumphs over their experience. Planning is not so much a subject for the social scientist as for the theologian". (Aaron Wildavsky, "If Planning is Everything, Maybe It's Nothing", *Policy Sciences*, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 4, 1973.) A similar conclusion was foreshadowed several years ago in Albert O. Hirschman's well-known comment on the planning activities of CEPAL: "... CEPAL's design has a utopian ring for societies where simple ministerial changes frequently mean total reversals of policies and where the policy makers themselves take pride in being unpredictable... CEPAL's detailed projections where all economic sectors are made to mesh harmoniously are in a sense the twentieth — century equivalent of Latin America's nineteenth century constitutions — and are as far removed from the real world. They are a protest, both pathetic and subtle, against a reality where politicians relying on brilliant or disastrous improvisations hold sway, where decisions are taken under multiple pressures rather than in advance of crisis and emergency situations, and where conflicts are resolved on the basis of personal considerations after the contending parties have revealed their strength in more or less open battle rather than in accordance with objective principles and scientific criteria". ("Ideologies of Economic Development in Latin America", in A.O. Hirschman, Ed., *Latin American Issues: Essays and Comments* (New York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1961.)

escape from the blind alley of verbalism and ritual action only to the extent that their proponents relate them to socio-political approaches that identify agents and propose strategies consonant with the values, interests, and capabilities of these agents. This position, however, is vulnerable to criticism from several directions; it certainly does not offer any straightforward or universally "applicable" "solution" to the problem of advancing towards original and value-oriented styles of development. The kinds of agents of development that are sought and the range of choice attributed to them in the shaping of a style of development naturally depend on the conception of development and the interpretation of the nature and functioning of human societies. There is no *a priori* reason to assume that the agents "needed" for an acceptable and viable style of development will emerge in any given society, or that, if they do emerge, they will be able to accomplish their "historic mission", or that if they do accomplish such a mission, the society will be unequivocally and permanently better of than before.

Nor does it seem necessary to assume *a priori* that the same kind of agent, whether collective and acting out a predetermined role, or individual and with a large measure of free will, must play *deus ex machina* in all societies, as most schools of theory and ideology assert. The would-be intellectual agents of development — the last of the five categories distinguished below — might well assume that any of the categories can be decisive in certain conjunctures but marginal or even illusory in others. The five categories are as follows:

(i) Social classes and groups that fill key roles in the "working out" of a conventionally-defined style of development, on the basis of their relations to production and their collective views of their own *interests*: entrepreneurs, investors, technological innovators, technicians, "middle classes", workers, etc. Collective agents such as these can fill their roles more or less adequately, or can find that the economic and social structure or the terms of dependency are incompatible with the filling of such roles adequately, but the associated conceptions of development do not allow for major creativeness or voluntarism in changing the style, whether the underlying conception is Marxian or non-Marxian. A large part of the discussion of styles of development in Latin America up to the present has consisted in attempts to identify plausible collective agents, to measure the adequacy of existing classes and groups to fill roles defined on the basis of previous examples of "development", and to explain why the classes and groups have rarely seemed to carry out the tasks assigned to them: take, for example, the persistent expectation that an "industrial bourgeoisie" would remove a "landlord oligarchy" from its path by promoting agrarian reforms. The discussion has tended to reify the classes and groups looked to as collective agents, and in many cases, the agents to be discussed next seem, instead of "representing" them, to have brought them into being or into a distorted kind of self-consciousness for their own purposes.

(ii) Individuals or small groups that articulate the demands of larger groups

or classes, act as brokers, and mould public opinion: politicians, leaders of trade unions and other interest-group organizations, journalists, religious leaders, etc. In view of the relative lack of coherence of the larger groups or classes, agents of this kind are able to play relatively autonomous roles, but at the price of limited and precarious real capacity to enforce demands and influence change processes. Their apparent importance is likely to be suddenly inflated and deflated, as in the case of populist leaders elected to the presidency with large popular votes and then easily forced out of office. Their influence may depend more on their ties with the kinds of agents next to be discussed than on the groups they aspire to represent. As "agents of development" their effectiveness is limited not only by these factors but also by the importance of brokerage and manoeuvring in their roles. They are likely to view the advocacy of a "style of development" as an additional tactic to lend plausibility to the role or to reinforce more concrete objectives, rather than as an overriding purpose.

(iii) Individuals or small groups holding power deriving from control of armed forces, ownership of capital, or representation of one of the dominant world centres. Since the power of these potential agents does not depend on ability to mobilize support from part of the population and build coalitions, they might be expected to be in a position to act more coherently (or arbitrarily) in pursuit of a style of development than the agents in the second group. Their *applicable* power, however, is limited by several aspects of their own situations: (a) Their

primary power rests on a specific conjuncture and can suddenly disappear; the military leader can be ousted by his subordinates, the capitalist can be crippled by a financial crisis, the world centre may be diverted by internal problems or its overall political strategy may shift so as to undermine the position of its representative. (b) The power holders' values and conceptions of their own roles do not usually extend to the implantation of an original style of development; they are more concerned with the preservation of existing order and warding off threats to their privileged position. (c) Their detachment from the representation of large classes or groups limits their capacity to induce the population to act in accordance with their objectives. Once they set themselves the task of implanting a coherent style of development, they must enlist the aid of agents of the second type, attempt to fill these roles themselves, or find effective means of isolating the population from political appeals and interest-group *representation*.

(iv) The chief of state or national executive: the individual or collective entity formally responsible for public decision-making, appointment of public functionaries, broad choices concerning allocation of resources, formulation of guidelines for development. This entity is the conventional target for developmental advice, the modern successor of Machiavelli's Prince. Utopian-normative and technocratic-rational prescriptions are formally addressed to the Prince; a good deal of the more recent socio-political discussion addresses the question: How to give him advice

that he can use, on the assumption that he is playing a difficult game with limited "political resources" and inadequate information?<sup>12</sup> In practice, the Prince may turn out to be elusive, even in authoritarian settings; his formal representation decides very little and absorbs hardly any of the advice showered on him; the real sources of decisions are dispersed and hidden<sup>13</sup>.

<sup>12</sup>In particular, Warren F. Ilchman and Norman Thomas Uphoff, *The Political Economy of Change* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1969). According to their "simplifying assumptions", "first, the statesman has at his command limited resources, in varying amounts and types, with which to implement choices affecting the character and quality of the polity's collective life; second, as a result of the division of labour that defines authority roles in a society, the statesman alone has the resource of authority at his disposal; third, the statesman wishes to remain in authority; and fourth, the statesman, to realize his valued ends, will make choices that formally aim at increasing the productivity of his political resources" (p. 33). "In the face of frequent mutual exclusiveness of demands and the persistent scarcity of resources, the statesman has various options. He may choose to meet some demands wholly or in part. Some demands he will ignore or explicitly reject. Sometimes when a demand from the sectors cannot be met, the statesman may seek to substitute resources that he thinks will be temporarily acceptable; ... He may employ coercion to remove the effects of certain demands, or he may institute education to remove the causes. ... Given the necessity of choices, the statesman must figure out on whom, how much, in what combination, when, where, why, and for what return the regime's scarce political resources should be spent" (p. 38).

<sup>13</sup>"There is, as a rule no single and invariant 'locus of sovereignty'. Sovereignty is shared among various groups in different constellations at different times. ... The

(v) Individuals or small groups aspiring to explain the functioning of a society articulate images of preferable future societies based on their values and on their diagnosis of the existing situation, formulate corresponding strategies, and enlist support from one or more of the preceding types of agents. A well-known remark by John Maynard Keynes summed up forty years ago the potentialities, shortcomings, and dangers of their influence on the other agents: "...the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.

Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas. Not, indeed, immediately, but after a certain interval; for in the field of economic and political philosophy there are not many who are influenced by new theories after they are twenty-five or thirty years of age, so that the ideas which civil servants and politicians and

even agitators apply to current events are not likely to be the newest<sup>14</sup>."

These last "agents of development" include the proponents of the utopian-normative and technocratic-rationalistic approaches discussed above, to the extent that these try to confront the socio-political application of their prescriptions. They notoriously offer a bewilderingly wide range of prescriptions, none of which have as yet been incontrovertibly successful in their contacts with reality. They fall into three roughly distinguishable groups: the planners, the reformist-meliorists, and the revolutionaries.

The planners, as the most conspicuous representatives of the technocratic-rationalistic approach, have already been discussed. For a brief period the impression gained ground in circles concerned with development that neutral techniques had been devised or were on the point of being devised that could be "applied" by any government taking them seriously so as to bring forth a predictable product — "development". This impression has gone by the board, and the planners have been scolded repeatedly — and have scolded themselves — for their isolation from political realities and the inadequacy of their techniques.<sup>15</sup> They have tried to

<sup>14</sup>John Maynard Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (New York, Harcourt Brace and Co., 1936, p. 383-4).

<sup>15</sup>The following remarks by Dudley Seers are representative: "... his approach is likely to be static. The planner's university education is not likely to have provided him with much help in thinking about how economies operate at different levels of development (and with different institutions). He is hardly

---

existence of a cabinet (or a junta) may conceal the extent to which the decision-making process is, in fact, dispersed". (Colin Leys, "A New Conception of Planning?" *Crisis in Planning*, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 60.)

define their relationships to political agents, to associate themselves with "participation", to find means of transforming rather than furthering the prevailing style of economic development. The question then arises, as Wildawsky suggests in the quotation above, whether they retain any plausible case for remaining a "discipline" with common techniques, offering definable services to public policy, whether they are not merging into the other categories of intellectual agents of development. To the extent that the planning approach remains distinct, and its practitioners do not resign themselves to ornamental roles and academic exercises, it supposes the possibility of completely rational management of human affairs in pursuit of quantified goals... if only the correct prescription can be discovered and the right agents convinced of its

correctness and marshalled to apply it.<sup>16</sup>

The reformist-meliorists have in common a distrust for utopias, infallible technocratic prescriptions, and catastrophist demonstrations that a prevailing pattern of growth and change cannot continue because it functions unjustly and inefficiently. They aspire to understand socio-economic-political structures so as to work within them for value-oriented ends, on the supposition that these structures are never going to be perfectly rational and oriented to human welfare, on the one hand, nor irremediably oppressive and incompatible with value-oriented development, on the other. National consensus on societal goals is not to be expected.<sup>17</sup>

---

prepared, therefore, to look at the economic, let alone the social, realities and ask how the resources of the country might be mobilized for change — as some politicians would really like him to do... It is especially likely... that the planner will fail to understand the extent to which political realities determine the geographical patterns of government expenditures or the sources of foreign aid. ...His social life brings him into contact with the (usually articulate) residents of the capital; so indeed does his official life. ...Yet the population of the capital is very different in income, occupation, etc., not merely from that of the countryside, but also from the public in other cities. ...the planner will tend to incorporate in his model the myths prevalent in the capital about the consumption and production functions of the rest of the country. ...Perhaps most significant of all is the planner's attitude to the quality of the statistics he is using ... the

---

economics student is taught to handle numbers as if they were objective facts, instead of being, as they usually are, nothing more than enlightened guesses". ("The Prevalence of Pseudo-Planning", *The Crisis in Planning*, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 25-28).

<sup>16</sup>"If planning is a universal tool, planners find it reasonable to ask why their countries cannot live up to the requirements of rational decision-making. If planning is valid, they feel, nations should adjust to its demands rather than other way round. To save planning, planners may actually accept the blame. For if better behaviour on their part would make planning work, the solution is not to abandon plans but to hire more talented planners." (Aaron Wildawsky, *op. cit.*).

<sup>17</sup>"There is no such thing as a collective national 'objective function'. There is rather a complicated mix of goals, which may be understood partly in terms of a limited number of themes around which there is something like consensus or for which there is at least a substantial majority support, but which for most of the



Uncertainty is a permanently unavoidable concomitant of human affairs, and development is an open-ended process calling for flexible tactics to take advantage of opportunities as they present themselves. The reformist-meliorists prefer to act in societies with open political competition and articulate interest-groups, but they are not surprised nor moved to withdraw from attempts to influence policy if these conditions are not present. They do not see revolution as a precondition to an acceptable style of development, but if revolutions occur they view them as new concatenations of challenges and opportunities, to be studied sympathetically. The reformist-meliorist outlook permits a subtle appreciation of the complexities of policy-making and the ambiguities of most change processes in terms of their impact on human welfare, but it also supports a certain Panglossian smugness, a predisposition to find reasons for affirming that all is for the best, if not in the best of all possible worlds, at least in as good a world as humanity has any reason to expect, and that incremental reforms combined with human genius for muddling through will gradually make it a little better.<sup>18</sup>

---

time is fluid and changing. At different moments, different groups have priority and different perceptions of self-interest and collective interest dominate. The planner's problem is to be able to build plans around a limited number of goals, isolated from the rest, for which a necessary minimum of support appears to be assurable during a necessary minimum period." (Colin Leys, "A New Conception of Planning?", *Crisis in Planning*, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 72.)

<sup>18</sup>Albert O. Hirschman has labelled this approach "reform-mongering", and has

In practice, reforms and spontaneous developmental processes that have been hailed as shining examples have so often later collapsed or stagnated that the reformist-meliorist approaches, like the technocratic planning approaches, are less credible than a few years ago. At best, they offer no comfort to the international demands for an immediate end to poverty and injustice. Nevertheless no convincing real alternative is at hand for the international organizations and the "experts" aspiring to influence policy within concrete national situations — however much intellectual allegiance they may owe to utopian-normative and technocratic-rationalistic schemes.

The revolutionary or "counter-planning" outlook — to the extent that it is not contaminated by technocratic or reformist-meliorist hopes — starts from the premise that the existing socio-political order is radically incompatible with a value-oriented style of development, or with full unfolding of the human potential. Therefore — depending on the diagnosis of the stage this order has reached, the way it functions,

---

been one of its most avowed and ingenious practitioners. See, in particular, *A Bias for Hope: Essays on Development and Latin America* (New Haven and London; Yale University Press, 1971). The writings of Aaron Wildavsky, John Friedman, and Albert Waterston, along with most of the contributions to *Crisis in Planning*, *op. cit.*, offer variants on the approach. The most explicit formulations of it come from the English-speaking countries. Elsewhere, there seems to be more reluctance on the part of persons concerned with development policy to acknowledge it as a guiding principle and as a virtue, although their practical tactics cannot help following it.

and the constraints imposed on national action by the world order — the primary task is either to demolish it or to promote its ripening to a point at which demolition will become feasible. The agents that have been previously assessed — classes and groups, their mobilizers and spokesmen, holders of primary power, the personified State or national executive — and the policies advanced by technocrats and reformist-meliorists are then assessed in terms of their potential contributions to demolition, the accomplishment of stages of “development” leading to ripeness for demolition, or the strengthening of the existing order against demolition. The place of the agents in an eventual value-oriented style of development and the concrete policies required recede to a secondary level of speculation or become confused with the immediate instrumental role of agents and policies. In relation to national societies undergoing polarized and dependent “development” the revolutionary outlook is bolstered by the obvious and persisting lack of correspondence of the existing situation with human values, and the abundant evidence that the best-intentioned technocratic and reformist-meliorist schemes are either ineffectual or contribute to the polarization between classes and groups. At the same time, the outlook is fragmented and frustrated by the failure of the societies to meet the preconditions for revolution set by the theories underlying the revolutionary outlook. The “proletarian” class that should be the grave-digger of the existing order is not growing markedly in relative size nor organizational coherence and seems more disposed to uphold the order

than to overturn it. The “marginalized” or “sub-proletarian” strata whose well-being seems most incompatible with perpetuation of the existing order, in their ambiguous relations to the systems of production and employment and to the State, respond poorly to coherent revolutionary appeals. Moreover, the pervasiveness and complexity of present economic, political and cultural interdependence with the world centres suggests that demolition of the existing order at the national level will either be altogether impracticable or will imply costs in terms of societal disruption, repression and enforced closure of the society, that would make posterior value-oriented development problematic.

To the extent that this last constraint is acknowledged the national revolutionary must take into account international as well as national “ripeness” for change.

The revolutionary rejection of the existing order as a framework or starting point toward a style of development deserving support can obviously lead to a wide range of different tactical conclusions. The revolutionary can concentrate on the task of immediate demolition, or at least of making the existing order unworkable, on the assumption that this will help generate the preconditions for transformation.

Or he can try to redefine the preconditions, experiment with tactical alliances, and await favourable conjunctures in a manner indistinguishable from the reformist-meliorist approach except in the underlying suppositions. Or he can try to create and mobilize support for a utopia so compelling that its appeal will outweigh unfavourable objective

conditions. And the reformist-meliorist tactics may, in the end, even find some variants of the revolutionary outlook

positive in their capacity to generate a dynamism that their own views of needed changes require but cannot muster<sup>19</sup>.

#### 4.

### In lieu of conclusions

The above exploration of approaches to development, starting from the question "Who is approaching what?", has encountered many different would-be agents acting within many different combinations of opportunities and constraints, in pursuit of an objective that is continually being redefined, falling back on verbal and organizational rituals for lack of ability to foresee and control the course of events, and sometimes violently rejecting reality for its failure to conform to their concepts and values. One finds, internationally and nationally, a chorus of agreement on the need for "unified", "human-oriented" approaches to development, combined with real concentrations of power, resources, and public attention on aims that are either irrelevant to such approaches or obviously incompatible with them. One finds that the promotion of "development" has become an industry in which supply creates its own continually diversifying demand for "experts", in which conferences beget conferences and declarations beget declarations, in which major "problem areas" incorporating different conceptions of developmental priorities continually hive off organizationally, receive symbolic recognition in "years", inflate themselves to cover all aspects of "development", and spawn infinitely ramifying co-ordinating mechanisms.

Under these conditions, explorers sent out with instructions to find a "unified approach" to development risk assuming two folkloric roles at once — that of the blind men describing the elephant and that of the mice discussing how to bell the cat.

Such an exploration is inevitably unsettling to the proponents of utopian-normative, technocratic-rationalistic and socio-political approaches, to the revolutionaries as well as the reformists. At the end, all on them can be expected to retort: What positive, practical proposals do you have? The present paper, of course, does not set out to demolish previous How to Develop prescriptions and then propose an infallible new one, nor to reject previous societal candidates for the honour of leading the way to development and then nominate different agents who can

<sup>19</sup>... there is a special justification for the direct search for novelty, creativity, and uniqueness: without these attributes change, at least large-scale social change, may not be possible at all. For, in the first place, the powerful social forces opposed to change will be quite proficient at blocking off those paths to change that have already been trod. Secondly, revolutionaries or radical reformers are unlikely to generate the extraordinary social energy they need to achieve change unless they are exhilaratingly conscious of writing an entirely new page of human history". (Albert O. Hirschman, *A Bias for Hope*, *op. cit.*, p. 28.).

really do the job. As was indicated at the beginning, this paper is a personal by-product of a continuing policy-oriented research project that has formulated certain proposals, without pretension to the discovery of a developmental panacea. These proposals which in the main select and re-combine ideas already current in international developmental discourse, are being published elsewhere.

This paper does not argue that any of the approaches it describes are illegitimate or altogether on the wrong track, although it does suggest that each of them in different ways lends itself to over-simplification and mystification. It really points to an existential approach to development, in which the would-be agents should cultivate an awareness that theirs is a possibly Sisyphian task of trying to impose a measure of value-oriented rationality on realities that will remain permanently recalcitrant to such rationality. All societies that survive will have to strive to "develop", in the sense of enhancing their capacity to function over the long term for the well-being of their members. None will ever reach a blessed terminal state of "being developed". Apparent success may, in the long term, lead into a trap of relative incapacity for further innovation. From this point of view all national societies at all points of time and at all levels of poverty or prosperity confront a certain range of accessible alternatives with different combinations of advantages and disadvantages. The capacity of their dominant forces to choose specific alternatives depends not only on objective conditions but also on their subjective appreciation of

these conditions and on the momentum of what has already been done. Choices or failures to choose are continually closing doors and opening different ones. If opportunities are not seized, if choices do not correspond to realities, if capacity for adaptation and innovation fail, then in the words of W.H. Auden, "History to the defeated may say alas, but cannot help or pardon". Neither can the international development movement.

The international demand for a "unified approach" is aimed at interpretations and strategies of development more directly oriented to social justice and the meeting of basic human needs than heretofore. Such interpretations and strategies will not be any more "unified" in a literal sense than their predecessors. In fact, they are bound to be more diversified than the strategies concentrated on maximization of investment and production, in their striving to reconcile multiple objectives, respond to differing national potentialities and values, and enlist creative popular participation. The change of focus from a "unified approach" to exploration of the viability and acceptability of differing "styles of development" within specific national settings recognizes this. The attempt to introduce the theme of "styles of development" into international discourse, however, is not immune from the temptation to seize upon verbal novelties, new packaging for old prescriptions, token solutions that do not match the magnitude of the problems to which they are addressed or the intentions of the power structures that would have to apply them. The present

paper from its vantage point within international developmental discourse, has been — perhaps obsessively — preoccupied with this temptation. It looks back over a quarter of a century of international reports speaking of successive “growing awarenesses” of the need for more “balanced” or “comprehensive” approaches to development. If awareness had really grown at such a rate the international community should have attained total enlightenment by now.

Ideally, the “unified approach” should embrace the whole human race and the international community should attach a positive value to diversity in styles of development, if only for the sake of experimentation and cross-fertilization, as long as they do not diverge grossly from the international consensus on human rights and values. Within these limits, each national society should be free to pursue its own style and to count on the co-operation it needs to do so. In practice however, no national society is in a position to evolve its own style without careful attention to external constraints and manoeuvring within the limits of the practicable. The meeting of needs through international co-operation remains precarious, inhibiting, and in part illusory; national societies striving to develop cannot dispense with such co-operation, but neither can they lean on it, particularly when they leave the conventional paths. Finally, the very conception of “national

societies” “choosing” styles of development is of dubious applicability to many of the countries now on the world stage. The recognition of the legitimacy of alternative styles of development and of the possibility of value-oriented choice is a step forward from the conception of a single path to be discovered and followed, under penalty of permanent backwardness, but it leaves more questions than it answers. The present paper is intended mainly to stimulate would-be agents of development to preoccupy themselves with these questions, and it is appropriate to return to some of them at the end: Who is to choose a national style of development? Who gains and who loses? Are the dominant social forces able and entitled to commit a society to a given style? Will styles of development corresponding to the international norms for social justice set forth above, within the limits of austerity and sacrifice set by national resources supplemented by problematic external co-operation, really be acceptable to the articulate and organized population groups whose acquiescence will be essential, or even to the ideologists and planners who are calling for more equitable and autonomous styles? Will national societies in the real world be able to attain the degree of consensus and rational organization called for except at a price that will distort the new style into something quite different from the image of the just and free future society informing it at the beginning?