

# CEPAL Review

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## Review

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*Note:* The Spanish edition of CEPAL Review No. 13 contained, in addition to the above articles, an article by Mr. Sidney Dell. This was of a preliminary character, however, and it is planned to publish an abridged new version of it in English in the near future.

## Main challenges of social development in the Caribbean

*Jean Casimir\**

The author sees this article as a critical contribution to the work being carried out by the Caribbean Development and Co-operation Committee (CDCC) with a view to formulating a strategy for this sub-region (see the summary of this strategy in the section "Some CEPAL publications" at the end of this volume).

In his opinion, the feasibility of this strategy should be evaluated in historical terms, since the challenges of development are found within the peculiar structure of social forces in Caribbean societies. Thus, he analyses the basic trends which governments seek to reorient, and he outlines the discrepancies between manifest and latent development projects, projects and their implementation, and projects observed at different points in time.

After an introduction in which he presents the general background of his argument with respect to the CDCC strategy, he goes into an analysis of the main economic and socio-political aspects of the colonial period ('total extroversion') and independence ('extroversion modified'), ending with a more detailed description of the distribution of wealth, income and employment, and the causes of such distribution, in contemporary Caribbean societies.

He concludes by emphasizing the objectives which, in his opinion, should guide development strategy; thus, he observes that for CDCC the main problem is to increase the capacity of the countries to formulate and execute development policies, that is, to enhance their ability to mobilize resources — especially their labour forces — through appropriate institutions.

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## Introduction

In 1975, a political grouping of sovereign countries was created in the Caribbean with the expressed objective of strengthening the nation-building processes. The Caribbean Development and Co-operation Committee (CDCC) was established in conformity with resolution 358 (XVI) of the Economic Commission for Latin America, as a permanent subsidiary body of the said Commission at the ministerial level. Its constituent instruments have assigned to the Committee the function of coordinating all activities related to development and economic and social co-operation and the role of an advisory and consultative body to the Executive Secretary of CEPAL in respect of Caribbean issues.

In the principal documents of the Committee and most particularly in its Constituent Declaration, concepts consistent with the referred objective are expanded upon. The documents are based, among other principles, on national sovereignty, non-intervention in internal matters, and mutual assistance. The proposed co-operation is aimed at self-sustained development and self-determination, and these goals are to be achieved by using collective negotiation power to introduce structural changes in a series of institutions inherited from secular and yet unconcluded colonization.

Achievement of political independence, as a structural change and unavoidable condition for formulating and implementing a development project distinct from the colonial one, does not affect all of a sudden the arrangement of day to day intercourse. New subregional objectives transcend with difficulty the spheres of political rhetoric to become efficient parameters of social action. So the project of development proposed by the Committee must alter deeply rooted practices.

Re-orientation of the deployment of sub-regional affairs implies, in fact, the use of institutional instruments — which were adopted precisely under colonialism — in order to defeat colonial patterns of behaviour. It is necessary to analyse and dismantle these mechanisms of social intercourse and to identify the dimensions which have been articulated in spite of and beyond the colonial order. The

feasibility of promoting structural changes within the ideological and economic orders, consistent with the progress achieved at the political level, depends on the extent to which one can harness what was salvaged from colonial exploitation. Otherwise, the heteronomy of the various spheres of social action will continue, as in colonial times, to checkmate any attempt at endogenous development. In this article, social obstacles which restrain or prevent implementation of the political will expressed by the Committee will be registered, and the dimensions from which cumulative structural changes may originate will be signalled.

Life in the colonies is not equally disastrous for all colonized people, and the net result of adaptation to a régime of imposition varies from one social group to another. To aim at modifying institutions and practices which have ensured such a long life for colonialism implies challenging the orientation, not always overt, of the social forces which situated themselves with advantage within the mechanisms of spoliation. The time lag between the political will of the Caribbean governments expressed at the subregional level and the achievement of the proposed goals is due to the long process of readjusting different vested interests. The feasibility of an intra-Caribbean strategy for co-operation and development—beyond its logical consistency and the legitimacy of the agreed goals, and beyond the availability of technical resources or the global benefit for the nation-State considered as a homogeneous entity—is a function of the negotiated support granted to it by concrete and politically active social groups. National sovereignty, endogenous development or autonomy are goals which become reality while progress is achieved in their compatibilization with small or big advantages deriving from humble daily actions. It is at this level that these concrete and identifiable groups which survived colonialism with diverse fortunes have been articulating themselves since the most remote times.

Now, if one considers that the expression by national governments of the political will of the States is, as a stimulating factor for new social practices, susceptible to more or less

important successive modifications, one encounters another series of obstacles to the achievement of self-sustaining development goals. Governments are the result of political processes sensitive to a variety of impacts, among which foreign affairs and more precisely subregional affairs are not *per se* the most relevant. In fact, the electorate and the public in general respond rather to the smooth deployment of routine social interchanges, and international modifications are assessed basically in the light of the extent to which they solve or lessen customary and perceivable conflicts. Therefore, with or without an explicit change in the 1975 political will, a stronger or weaker effort to implement part or all of the proposed goals may be observed. To the inertia in social relations which can be expected to hamper the implementation of the CDCC development strategy must be added, as an additional obstacle, the volubility of the governments themselves provoked by their responses to the dynamic interplay between old and new political forces within the nation.

By 1980, five years had elapsed since the governments in question constituted themselves into a collective decision-making body. The resolution which they themselves proposed and endorsed unanimously makes this ministerial authority the milieu where subregional policies are harmonized for a more rational use of local and external resources. It is assumed that the Committee itself, composed of representatives of governments, speaking in their names, has access to local resources and is empowered to engage them. Besides, it is hoped that the increase in the negotiating power of the block will be accompanied by greater control over the amount and allocation of external resources. Among the latter is the assistance offered by the United Nations and its system of organizations, which should be easy to manipulate, since each and every one of the components of the United Nations system receives mandates from internally homogeneous governments.

The fact is that up to now internal resources earmarked for intra-Caribbean technical assistance have not been pooled together on any noticeable scale. Increasing processes of mutual help come to fruition mainly through

bilateral negotiations, beyond the sphere of the Committee's competence. As for the co-ordination of assistance originating within the United Nations system, even such a simple decision as the maintenance of the same political and geographic coverage for any subregional office of this system is not taken into account by those—other ministers of the Caribbean governments themselves—who instruct the United Nations organs.

While the logical consistency of the global development project formulated in 1975 by the CDCC must be acknowledged, there is need to stress that no clear mechanism has been set up at the national level to co-ordinate the implementation of that project. Thus, intra-sectoral compatibilization (for example, harmonization of a decision subscribed to by a country representative at a CDCC session and a decision subscribed to by a substantive Minister at the General Assembly of a specialized United Nations agency) and linkages between decisions taken at different points in time (for instance, creation of an overall Caribbean information system to be implemented a few years later by the creation of an agricultural information subsystem) are not properly taken care of. Moreover, institutions which are not in direct contact with the governments and which actually are the main actors in daily life are not even aware of the CDCC development project

and cannot therefore be expected to participate actively in its implementation.

These cleavages do have some administrative solution. But their global rationale must be found if any administrative solution is to be efficient. In other words, it must be demonstrated that they do not occur by omission or at random. They are linked with a given pattern of segmented societies and this pattern explains the difficulties in the art of governing the Caribbean, together with the ability of extra-regional decision-making centres to find their own way by manipulating appropriate clusters of social actions.

The feasibility of the CDCC strategy has to be assessed in historical terms. Challenges of social development are located within the peculiar arrangements of social forces which characterize Caribbean societies. In this article, the basic trends which the governments intend to reorient will be detailed and an effort will be made to map out the rationale for the discrepancies between manifest and latent development projects, projects and implementation, and projects observed at different points in time. The political leadership will be observed in conjunction with the interplay of Caribbean social forces and attempts will be made to explain how a project for development with so many difficulties of implementation could come into being.

## I

### Total extroversion

National States are emerging in the Caribbean in a constant challenge to the internal and external forces which consolidated themselves during the expansion and diversification of the plantation system, and which to a large measure are still maintaining the polarized effects of external relations on political, economic and ideological practices within the local societies.

The settlement of the plantation Caribbean was initiated through the seaports, and the projects of expansion and diversification originated abroad and were implemented in

close relation with the administration of the harbour. The plantation and supporting institutions were a creation of mercantile capitalism, and their dynamics a function of external connexions.

The predominance of foreign trade and of the productive activities it generated was the concomitant to the determining role played by the political and administrative apparatus, in relaying dependency relationships at the political, economic and ideological levels. The seaports, as local decision-making centres, became both the seat of public and private

administration and garrison towns. Other relevant units of settlement copied this basic model.

In this setting, wealth was produced by the total monopolization of all available human and natural resources to meet projects of development formulated by external metropolises. Whenever some difficulty arose in the supply of provisions and services for outward-oriented operations, independent pursuits could be tolerated either on provision grounds (subsistence agriculture) or because they offered maintenance services and handicrafts.

Such extroversion of the productive apparatus could establish itself in the economic geography only with a colonial state to implement and administer it. The Caribbean was conceived during the golden age of the plantation system as a set of colonies for exploitation. Projects of development were put into practice without the consent of the bulk of the population, and metropolises which lacked the military power to impose these projects would lose their colonies.

On the economic scene, the predominance of trade interests created a special context for the interplay of the elements involved in productive enterprises. In fact, management and employment were the only factors under the control of these enterprises. The plantation economy operated either with slaves, indentees,<sup>1</sup> or very cheap labour. In all these cases, the bargaining power of the labour force had to be maintained at its lowest possible levels and relationships between labour and management could not be purely economic.

Wages, as an economic relation between employer and employee, appeared in the Caribbean within the framework of public administration, management of import-export activities, management of plantations and enforcement of law and order. During this process

<sup>1</sup>Indentured servants were migrant workers, originally from Europe, who were brought to the colonies to work on plantations. They were semi-slaves, who committed themselves to work for three years in order to pay for their passage; for this reason, in certain territories they were given the name "36 months". The contracting of indentured servants developed primarily after the abolition of slavery. In this period, the bulk of the migratory movement came from India.

of underdevelopment, wages were basically limited to non-manual activities, although they also appeared in the hiring of the most highly qualified tradesmen. Nineteenth-century indentureship, as the source of a cheap bonded labour force, emerged precisely in an effort to obstruct the development of a labour market and corresponding economic bargaining between workers and employers. It was not related with the unavailability of salaried work.

Manual and non-manual labour played different roles in a plantation society. The first one was concentrated in the production of material goods. The second one was located in the services sector, and more specifically in the public and private administration of outward-oriented activities. Their normative and ideological context also varied. Originally, the legal framework of manual labour was provided by specific colonial codes, whereas non-manual work tended to respond to norms which were also valid in the metropolises. Manual work, being mainly a rural activity, was carried out in scattered settlements away from the surveillance of law enforcement officers, whereas non-manual activities, concentrated in urban milieux, implied some form of participation in decision-making and law enforcement. Normally, civil authorities dealt with offences of urban employees, while colonial military and para-military groups took care of workers' offences against rural codes. Finally, official languages would be used in the fulfilment of non-manual activities in view of their constant linkage with the outside world, while in manual activities vernaculars were used, apart from any negotiations with outsiders.

Outward-oriented practices of the colonial apparatus constituted the components of public life. Military and political relations, plantation activities and activities within the plantations, communication with the metropole and the metropolitans, formal and on-the-job training for the maintenance, ruling and expansion of the colony, in a word, the whole public and private administration of external relations, was consistent with the demands of mercantilism and the set of norms and values which ruled the empires.

Satisfaction of local needs such as food,

housing and clothing, family relationships, community intercourse, communication among peers, dealing with constant and overt imposition, the whole day-to-day living of colonized people, were practices based on the availability of local resources. More exactly, those resources which escaped the monopoly of the metropole and the metropolitans were harnessed at this level to ensure some form of orderly survival.

Therefore, while governor, merchant, planter, overseer and slave behaved according to codified official regulations in the fulfilment of their public duties, the way they lived their private lives, even though institutionalized, ran parallel to accepted colonial behavior. A domestic slave would have found it very difficult to live like a planter, in spite of being eventually quite knowledgeable of such a way of living. His actions as a slave and, say, a father corresponded to different rationales, which he manipulated constantly.

In the larger territories of the Caribbean, efforts to meet the needs of the population locally started in the framework of maroon societies before and alongside the establishment of plantations. Their subsequent development, either in the same context or on provision grounds granted to the slaves, preceded the peasant economy. Then, the entire subregion experienced an intense development of these inward-oriented activities as the transition from mercantilism to free enterprise capitalism provoked the loosening of the economic hold of external powers on the area. This resulted in a strengthening of the cultural framework regulating the private lives of the population.

Family enterprises in the agricultural sector still had to reckon with the monopoly of land resources, and in many cases they did not evolve beyond some form of *métayage* system. The State machinery worked to protect the landlords by ensuring their control on the natural resources, through a series of laws and regulations preventing the upsurge of a market economy. By legitimizing the concentration of the original set of natural resources, the colonial State set up by the same token the framework for the productive use of available human resources. Absorption of the labour force for

viable economic enterprises remained possible only within the outward-oriented relations or to service such relations. The rationale of socio-economic relations, concerned primarily with local demands, preserved its validity within the range of efficacy allowed by the monopolistic great estate sector and, most particularly, within the limits of the income distributed in the countries and not applied to the importation of goods.

In these circumstances, agricultural unemployment and underemployment developed as a structural element of the Caribbean economy, as a direct consequence of the seizure of both human and natural resources. Various forms of production started to intermingle under the burden of extra-economic constraints: self-subsistence economy supplemented with the collection of edible products, multi-crop peasant economy closely linked with both national and international markets, and several institutionalized arrangements which made possible the transfer to more and more archaic forms of production of some of the hazards of productive ventures. Inward-oriented activities initiated with own-account family ventures and self-employment had to evolve towards a more and more complex integration with the market economy, while legal impediments ensured that there was only the minimum development of a labour market.

The cleavages between outward and inward-oriented activities, public and private lives, are a consequence of the relative autonomy of the political structures within colonial societies. A colony is a territory where a metropole dictates what economic and political practices are to take place. With the decline of plantation economy and the new strategic role bequeathed to the subregion, the relative autonomy of the political structures was further consolidated.

To occupy a territory for basically strategic reasons implied the enactment of specific formulae of social and economic organization. Growth of the extroverted economic apparatus could take place according to the relevance of the products offered on the international markets. To alter this situation by introducing structural economic changes would create link-

ages between sectors and branches, accompanied by a close-knit system of social relations, oriented towards the internal control of government. A colony held for strategic reasons could cease, in this event, to be a loyal group of

subjects, i.e., subjects who are controlled from the metropole. Colonization or occupation cannot be compatible with intense social cohesion and the setting up of local parameters for the development of public life.

## II

### Extroversion modified

A series of violent conflicts took place all over the subregion during the second and third decades of this century. The State and the social forces with a manifest participation in determining its policy—that is to say the import-export merchants and other businessmen, including owners of the local press, the army, the civil servants, the planters and other landlords, intellectuals, trade unions and political parties—were forced to negotiate new social arrangements, whose outcome would be total or gradual self-government.

In view of the cleavages already mentioned between manual and non-manual workers and between private and public life, the bulk of the Caribbean population had until that period scarcely been exposed to administration and management. As self-government was becoming politically unavoidable, the need to prepare public administrators and private managers had to be met. In fact, newcomers to public and private administration had even to learn the language of these activities, to say nothing of the legal instruments through which they were co-ordinated. The dissemination of these norms and instruments through schooling, known as 'education', was initiated under colonial rules.

The replacement of the metropolitan administrators, managers and military personnel by locals, the increase in the service sector accompanying the establishment of foreign military bases, new plantations and activities in the extractive industries allowed for a gradual absorption of school-leavers and the expansion of the 'educational' system. The bi-polar division of the societies became a national feature.

National States succeeded colonial ones.

The main element which differentiates them is obviously government and its *alter ego*, opposition. In the Caribbean, as in any context, there is a need to distinguish between the State and government. The State inherited political forces deeply rooted in the extroversion of the local social systems, and having come into being, these forces grew and strengthened themselves through segmentation and disarticulation of the economic apparatus, and through cultural and political/ideological dependence. The dealers in products with monetary value—the import-export trade and the banking system—still constitute the cornerstone of most successful political alliances. Public administrators and private managers of outward-oriented relations—civil and military servants—are other relevant legacies of colonial times.

National governments emerged to face the challenge of satisfying local demands within a framework set up by outward-oriented relations. Whenever any of the social forces established since colonial or occupation times raised the problem of self-government, the issue of local needs moved *ipso facto* to the forefront of their preoccupations. Historically, social domination in and of the Caribbean, having abused extra-economic forms of coercion, has left unattended important ideological aspects and most particularly those dealing with the legitimization of States and governments. With the accession to political autonomy, governments and forces striving to control this position required some form of legitimacy, that is to say, an accepted project of development geared towards the satisfaction of local needs.

It must be understood in this connexion

that the issue of unemployment and underemployment becomes important with self-government and political autonomy. Large surpluses of labour have been fostered by rulers of colonized or occupied territories to satisfy the requisites of outward-oriented economic ventures. The opposite, that is to say full employment, is an important target in meeting local needs.

The political ladder is therefore the only dimension from which a switch from an outward to an inward-oriented economy can be promoted, in the light of the prevalence and the relative autonomy of power relations in the area. Usually, according to patterns inherited from colonization and occupation, power relations evolve beyond the influence of local economic and ideological practices; in the present context the freedom of action of political leaders is also strengthened by their hinge-like role between traditional (inherited) forces and emerging popular sovereignty. They are the chief negotiators in the nation-building processes and can be considered as real and rather stable institutions. In contexts where efforts are being made to localize main political parameters of Statehood and to lessen the impact of economic dependency on inward-oriented ventures, their manoeuvring facilities are increased.

Nevertheless, in view of the strength of external influences and the risks involved in capitalizing upon emergent political awareness and social mobilization to meet local needs, this freedom of action of the Caribbean leadership may either waste away in daily petty conflicts or resort to practices common during colonial and occupation times. Disruptive outbursts of historically oppressed or 'marginal' masses have already endangered what was achieved through self-government. Political leaders, and possibly their parties too, are innovations within the Caribbean political structures, inasmuch as they require some form of internal support. But this support demands in turn immediate inward-oriented actions, the effectiveness of which is higher whenever the outward-oriented relations are not affected.

The need to satisfy urgent demands in order to secure the support of popular forces competes with long-term policies aiming at

structural changes. The inherited structures of power in which governments are located are not conducive to internal control of the political and economic environment, and long-term strategies are therefore vulnerable. Those who aim at the control of the administrative machinery of the State have a difficult choice between paternalistic clientage and institutionalized social mobilization.

The belated political independence in the subregion had been negotiated by groups of intellectuals, supported by the urban middle classes or organized trade unions. But self-government, as achieved during this century, does not mean the government of activities primarily geared to local demands. This circumstance increases the efficacy of political clientage by obstructing the channels for the legitimization of political power. Progress and setbacks in the efforts towards self-propelled development have to be evaluated against the conditions in which the Caribbean nations acquired control over a public administration basically structured for promoting outward-oriented activities.

The instruments used to implement strategies formulated by governments are all designed along the lines of institutions typified by E. Braithwaite as "those derived from the European or initiating segment of the society".<sup>2</sup>

The proceedings of these institutions are carried on in official languages which, even though understood in most cases by the masses, are scarcely used for discussion and vivid dialogue. Overt political bargaining takes place in these same languages, the degree of mastery of which becomes an unmistakable indicator of social status.

This fact stimulates dependency by lo-

<sup>2</sup>"(The creole) institutions may be divided into two main groups: those derived from the European or initiating segment of the society (legislatures, courts of law, police systems, the established Christian churches, press/mass media, banks, commercial organizations), and those peculiar to the inner plantation: friendly societies and co-operatives that reveal themselves in sou-sou, gyap, landship (Barbados), la rose (St. Lucia), and the spectrum of religious organizations from pentecostal and revival, right through shango, vodun and cumfa." E. Braithwaite: *Caribbean Man in Space and Time, a Bibliographical and Conceptual Approach*, Mona, Sovacon Publications, 1974.

cating the criteria for correction beyond the control of the local population. Thus, definitions and concepts which do not reflect the subregional circumstances are being smuggled into the process of reflection, hampering the development of knowledge and hence efficient planning.

It follows that while the intellectual élites have generated the social criticism which made colonialism and occupation unacceptable, they do not possess or produce the necessary instruments of knowledge to design an inward-oriented policy, let alone to create the mechanisms to discuss it with the population and implement it.

The difficulties experienced by the intellectual élites and the academic community as a whole in seizing local circumstances through cumulative cognitive processes make it nearly impossible for them to find an adequate place for their full realization within the national societies. Out-migration of professionals, irrespective of their political loyalties, appears to be an uncontrollable trend. The divorce between the different creole and official languages is functioning as an apparently normal and natural form of control. It prevents dialogues and negotiations within the nations, and the implementation of plans and projects comes into conflict with the lack of popular participation and the shortage of highly qualified resources.<sup>3</sup>

On the one hand, one observes obstacles to central planning in economies with few relationships of complementarity between their component parts, while international donors

and transnational corporations, on the other hand, are progressing steadily in their planning, implementing strategies which may strengthen the subregional extroversion and postpone the use of available local resources for self-propelled ventures.

These circumstances, while consolidating the freedom of manoeuvring of rulers and opponents, do not stimulate the emergence of indigenous mobilization, and raise the question of the frontiers of social dialogue in the Caribbean as the main obstacle to development.

The frontiers of social dialogue have not yet fully caught the attention of the nations, and the problems raised in the framework of the Western concept of freedom of speech monopolize the awareness of the public in view of various constraints inherited from the still-recent history of colonization and occupation. Worldwide campaigns in favour of freedom of speech have created the habit of focusing attention on the opponents to established régimes, and legitimate concerns have been voiced on the matter. Nonetheless, it is striking that in Caribbean countries which are not known for contravening international norms of free speech, and where a very high level of literacy is already achieved, the reach of the media is still alarmingly restricted. Official opposition and independent media, while polemizing with respect to the population, have not been able to create an audience in the masses. It would seem that the media are not

<sup>3</sup>"Certainly, from the perspective of the total society, such a vocationally heterogeneous and inwardly turned population segment creates problems in administration and development. Action programs, aimed at the socio-economic amelioration of such people but based on uni-occupational models developed in modern Western countries, start with limited chances for success. Occupational pluralists in Jamaica will not reject the material aid that often accompanies such schemes but they do reject, as evidenced by their behaviour, the objectives and the intent of these programs. By their own logic, they find it impractical to develop fully one aspect of their economic life to the detriment of the others. The results of the action program designed to improve the Jamaican fishing industry through technological and organizational assistance are significant. In settlements such as Duncans, where fishing is balanced with or subordinated to other pursuits, newly introduced

fishermen's co-operatives —one element in the development program— failed to provide economic cohesion and stimulus and, therefore, died stillborn. In settlements such as Whitehouse, where fishing is more important because of land scarcity, new co-operatives when adapted to local conditions proved more viable and performed relatively substantial services for their membership. The error made by the central authorities was that they introduced one co-operative model designed for full-time fishermen in other parts of the world to all varieties of Jamaica "fishermen". Agricultural development programs on a national scale sometimes suffer similar results for a very similar reason —an incorrect assessment of the pertinent conditions of rural life." L. Comitas, "Occupational Multiplicity in Rural Jamaica (1964)", in L. Comitas and D. Lowenthal (eds.), *Work and Family Life - West Indian Perspectives*, Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1973, p. 172.

able to communicate with the nation as a whole, or not interested in doing so.

It would therefore appear that the relative autonomy of the political forces may be bordering on isolation. Parallel to segmented economic relation, one seems to find clusters of social dialogues, and most initiatives or changes in a given sector of national life do not

easily provoke reactions in society as a whole. Solidarity operates at limited levels and on limited issues, so the political élites—already vulnerable in relation to social forces operating since colonial and occupation times—can not readily utilize the potential of responses theoretically at their disposal.

### III

## Labour and wealth in a dependent context

Caribbean countries, with the exception of Cuba, have evolved gradually from colonization or occupation to their present status. Many of the characteristics of colonial or occupation times are still prevalent in their socio-economic structures and condition their alternatives for social development. There have been no cases of noticeable economic dynamism. Growth derives from the exploitation of new mineral products or from favourable modifications in the prices of traditional exports. No very significant change has been observed in the predominance of external trade, in the set of traditional buyers and suppliers, nor in the volume and value of intra-Caribbean exchanges.

Manufacturing and assembly plants have multiplied. Enclave industries are making use of cheap labour. Tourism continues to expand, most of the time through foreign investment, and in certain cases to the detriment of land ownership by locals. Intersectoral and inter-industrial relationships have not become significantly more integrated: fragmentation and extroversion of the productive apparatus continue to characterize the economy, together with their correlative underemployment of available manpower.

In countries where national governments are rich enough or possess the necessary political strength, public enterprises have been created in key infrastructural and energy-based branches. Nonetheless, in spite of the gradual formation of a rather large group of technocrats skilled in the management of public investments, the entrepreneurial activity of the State

has not overcome the obstacles to inward-oriented and self-propelled development.

Public administration and private management of Caribbean economic resources are still closely framed by parameters located at the international level but operated by local groups. This is reflected in the structure of external trade. In 1974, the value of total external trade was estimated at approximately US\$ 11 143 million, while the gross domestic product for the same year totalled US\$ 6 639.2 million.<sup>4</sup> Intra-regional trade, which is more intense among the CARICOM countries,<sup>5</sup> has not exceeded 8% of the external trade of these countries. Data for Haiti show that its trade with the Caribbean is minimal, not exceeding US\$ 0.4 million in 1974, but nevertheless covers a wider Caribbean market than the Dominican Republic, which has only traded with two CARICOM countries: Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago (see table 1).

The pattern of external trade is indicative of the Caribbean's outward orientation. The subregion tends not to produce in keeping with its own demand, and to consume according to external supply. The reality of this is stark when one looks at the alarming increase in food-import bills. Data for CDCC countries

<sup>4</sup>Figures are derived from data corresponding to 1974 given in *Economic Activity - 1977 - in Caribbean Countries* (CEPAL/CARIB/78/4). The figures refer to all the CARICOM countries, plus Bahamas and Suriname.

<sup>5</sup>Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM) intra-regional trade, i.e., trade among the West Indies Associated States (Antigua, Dominica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent), Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Grenada and Belize.

Table I  
CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES:<sup>a</sup> INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE

| Country                         | Imports<br>(million of US dollars) |                            |       |                            |       |                            |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------|-------|----------------------------|-------|----------------------------|
|                                 | 1970                               | Percentage<br><sub>b</sub> | 1973  | Percentage<br><sub>b</sub> | 1974  | Percentage<br><sub>b</sub> |
| Barbados                        | 13.5                               |                            | 21.8  |                            | 35.2  |                            |
| Belize                          | 2.4                                |                            | 3.6   |                            | 3.7   |                            |
| Grenada                         | 5.0                                |                            | 5.9   |                            | 5.7   |                            |
| Guyana                          | 18.9                               |                            | 38.7  |                            | 67.3  |                            |
| Jamaica                         | 9.1                                |                            | 35.3  |                            | 71.5  |                            |
| Trinidad and Tobago             | 13.4                               |                            | 20.5  |                            | 30.1  |                            |
| West Indies Associated States   | 19.3                               |                            | 25.1  |                            | 33.8  |                            |
| <i>Total CARICOM</i>            | 81.6                               | 5.5                        | 150.9 | 7.4                        | 247.3 | 7.1                        |
| Dominican Republic <sup>c</sup> | 1.7                                |                            | 2.6   |                            | n.a.  |                            |
| Haiti <sup>d</sup>              | 0.3                                |                            | 0.2   |                            | 0.4   |                            |
| <i>Grand total</i>              | 83.6                               | 4.6                        | 153.7 | 6.1                        | 247.7 | 6.8                        |

Source: *Economic activity - 1977 - in Caribbean Countries* (CEPAL/CARIBB/78/4); *Dossier de candidature. Soumis à la Communauté et au Marché Commun des Caraïbes* - Government of Haiti (CEPAL, May 1976); *UN Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1976*. Vol. I, Trade by Country. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.XVII.14, Vol. I.

<sup>a</sup>CARICOM countries, Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

<sup>b</sup>Percentage of total imports.

<sup>c</sup>Figures for Dominican Republic represent imports from the only CARICOM countries with which a trade relationship exists, i.e., Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.

<sup>d</sup>Figures for Haiti represent only imports from CARICOM countries and cover the periods 1970/1971, 1972/1973 and 1973/1974.

reveal that between 1965 and 1970 the food-import bill increased by approximately 60%, and between 1965 and 1971 by 83% (see table 2).

Distribution of income in the region is generally biased in favour of the services offered in public and private administration and management. The qualitative and quantitative importance of white-collar and other non-manual occupations therefore remains significant. The proportion of white-collar workers in the total paid employees is indicative of this persistent prevalence of administration and management over productive activities. Data available for Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago show that 52% and 43% respectively of paid employees are non-manual. In other cases, the published tables do not allow this distinction to be made. The total number of non-manual workers, paid or otherwise, is equivalent to 30% in St. Lucia, 34% in Grenada, and 48% in Barbados, for example (see table 3).

Table 2  
CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES:<sup>a</sup> TOTAL IMPORTS, FOOD IMPORTS AND RELATIVE CONTRIBUTION OF FOOD IMPORTS TO TOTAL IMPORTS, 1965 AND 1970-1971

(Millions of East Caribbean dollars)

|   | 1965 <sup>b</sup> | 1970  | 1971  |
|---|-------------------|-------|-------|
| Total imports                                 | 3 361             | 6 684 | 7 769 |
| Food imports                                  | 641               | 1 034 | 1 172 |
| Food imports as a percentage of total imports | 19.1              | 15.5  | 15.1  |

Source: *Agricultural Statistics of the Caribbean Countries, 1976*, CEPAL/POS/76/5.

<sup>a</sup>CDCC countries: Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, Guyana, Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname.

<sup>b</sup>No data available for Haiti.

Table 3  
NUMBER AND PROPORTION OF NON-MANUAL AND MANUAL WORKERS IN SELECTED TERRITORIES

| Country                | Non-manual<br>(white-collar<br>and<br>services)<br>(%) | Ma-<br>nual<br>(%) | Other<br>(%) | Total   |
|------------------------|--|--------------------|--------------|---------|
| Barbados               | 48   | 50                 | 2            | 82 486  |
| Grenada                | 34   | 64                 | 2            | 25 799  |
| Jamaica                | 52   | 48                 | n.a.         | 424 600 |
| Trinidad and<br>Tobago | 43   | 57                 | n.a.         | 369 600 |
| St. Lucia              | 30   | 68                 | 2            | 26 068  |

Source: *Jamaica: Labour Force 1976*, Department of Statistics, Jamaica; *Trinidad and Tobago: Labour Force, CSSP*, Publication No. 36, Central Statistical Office, Trinidad; *University of the West Indies: 1970 Population Census of the Commonwealth Caribbean*, Vol. 4, 1976, Economic Activity Census Research Programme.

The proportion of the labour force absorbed by the primary sector is relatively high, although it varies from one country to another.

Thus, the proportion of workers in the agricultural sector in comparison to those employed in the overall economy ranges from 16.3% in Trinidad and Tobago to 35.6% in the ECCM countries. The proportion for Jamaica is 34.1% (1970) (see table 4).

The patterns of agricultural production which have evolved in the subregion are the result of forms of adaptation to the historically persistent monopolization of land resources.

Recent census data and agricultural statistics show that a high percentage of farms cover less than 5 acres each. These occupy only a minimal part of the cultivated land, while farms of 500 acres and above are very few in number but cover extensive areas of such land. The trend is consistent throughout the Caribbean. The data for the English-speaking Caribbean show that holdings of 5 acres and less represent between 75% (Dominica) and 89% (Barbados) of the total number of holdings, yet occupy only about 15% of the total area of cultivated land. The situation is similar in Haiti, where holdings of 6 acres and less occupy 25% of the cultivated land but represent 89% of the total number of holdings (see table 5).

Table 4  
EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURE BY COUNTRY: 1960 AND 1970

| Country             | Year | Total<br>employ-<br>ment | Agricul-<br>ture<br>(%) | Industry<br>(%) | Services<br>(%) |
|---------------------|------|--------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Barbados            | 1960 | 84.6                     | 27.0                    | 36.6            | 36.4            |
|                     | 1970 | 84.6                     | 17.9                    | 28.6            | 53.5            |
| Guyana              | 1960 | 160.3                    | 37.1                    | 28.6            | 34.3            |
|                     | 1970 | 159.4                    | 29.6                    | 25.7            | 44.7            |
| Jamaica             | 1960 | 569.7                    | 40.4                    | 23.9            | 35.7            |
|                     | 1970 | 495.8                    | 34.1                    | 24.6            | 41.3            |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 1960 | 259.9                    | 21.6                    | 29.7            | 48.7            |
|                     | 1970 | 232.2                    | 16.3                    | 31.9            | 51.8            |
| ECCM countries      | 1960 | 121.0                    | 48.0                    | 22.6            | 29.4            |
|                     | 1970 | 109.7                    | 35.6                    | 22.7            | 41.7            |
| <i>Total region</i> | 1960 | 1 195.5                  | 35.7                    | 26.6            | 37.7            |
|                     | 1970 | 1 081.7                  | 28.5                    | 26.4            | 45.1            |

Source: N. Abdulah, *The Labour Force in the Commonwealth Caribbean: A Statistical Analysis*, University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1977.

Table 5  
 AGRICULTURAL HOLDINGS: SIZE AND PER-  
 CENTAGE OF CULTIVATED LAND

| Country             | Percentage of all farms |                | Percentage of farmland |                |
|---------------------|-------------------------|----------------|------------------------|----------------|
|                     | Less than 5 acres       | Over 500 acres | Less than 5 acres      | Over 500 acres |
| Antigua             | 91.1                    | 0.3            | 26.7                   | 42.2           |
| Barbados            | 98.3                    | 0.2            | 13.4                   | 31.3           |
| Dominica            | 75.2                    | 0.3            | 13.2                   | 32.2           |
| Grenada             | 89.7                    | 0.1            | 23.9                   | 15.0           |
| Guyana              | n.a.                    | n.a.           | n.a.                   | n.a.           |
| Haiti <sup>a</sup>  | 89.0                    | n.a.           | 25.0                   | n.a.           |
| Jamaica             | 78.6                    | 0.2            | 14.9                   | 44.9           |
| Montserrat          | 92.7                    | 0.7            | n.a.                   | n.a.           |
| St. Kitts           | 94.5                    | 0.4            | 15.0                   | 56.6           |
| St. Lucia           | 82.5                    | 0.2            | 18.0                   | 33.8           |
| St. Vincent         | 89.0                    | 0.1            | 27.0                   | 24.2           |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 46.5                    | 0.3            | 6.9                    | 31.1           |

Source: *Agricultural Statistic of Caribbean Countries, 1976*, CEPAL/POS/76/5; George Beckford (ed.), *Caribbean Economy*, University of the West Indies, ISER Publication, 1975.

<sup>a</sup>Less than 6 acres.

With the persistent concentration of available land resources in very few hands, the basic arrangements for agricultural production have remained relatively unchanged. Several organizational modifications have taken place, but they do not seem to favour an increase in employment nor a more balanced distribution of income. While multi-crop subsistence agriculture, production of staple commodities for local markets, and production of export commodities by small landholders are progressing and intermingling, one does not observe the emergence of a strata of small independent farmers among the original group of self-employed agricultural workers.

On the contrary, available data seem to indicate a serious stagnation in the situation of inward-oriented agricultural ventures. The Report of the Tripartite Economic Survey of the Eastern Caribbean (January-April 1966) states, in relation to Barbados, the Leeward and Windward Islands:

"At present agriculture is almost entirely orientated towards the production of export crops. There is a highly organized institutional framework serving these crops, while nothing comparable exists for foodcrops and livestock. The most critical deficiency in this field is normally in the marketing arrangements, in sharp contrast to the export crops, which are usually also supported by schemes supplying fertilizers, spraying, research, extension services and credit facilities. Foodcrops receive little or none of this type of support".<sup>6</sup>

In Montserrat, the same report registers an interesting involution: after the hired labour which followed emancipation came sharecropping systems, which gave place during the 1950s to cultivation on plots rented for short periods. It is quite common to observe the resurgence of new forms of plantation, through the disguised dislocation of the original productive unit and effective control of the marketing processes. In certain countries, monopoly in the marketing of the export staple allows all operating risks to be transferred to a myriad of apparently independent and autonomous producers, who become in fact, "wage earners paying their own wages". The situation in St. Lucia is a case in point.<sup>7</sup>

In other areas, the rural labour force has been involved in a variety of economic practices which have brought them, sometimes

<sup>6</sup>G.V. Doxey et al., *Report of the Tripartite Economic Survey of the Eastern Caribbean, January-April 1966 - Summary of the Report*.

<sup>7</sup>A report prepared for the Caribbean Development Bank states in the case of St. Lucia, for example: "It is clear that this sector (small-farm sector) operates not simply at a distinct disadvantage but at the mercy of the estate sector, in terms of the availability of land, capital, farm inputs such as fertilisers and irrigation facilities, and infrastructural facilities such as roads. (...) Given the long history of exploitation and of poverty within the small farm sector, the current exodus from Agriculture in general and Bananas in particular is not surprising. (...) It can be said that this decline is to be explained (at least immediately) by the poor marketing arrangements, low returns in relation to costs, communication gaps and blockages in the relationship of the small farmer to Geest Industries and the Banana Association, and finally the powerlessness (real and perceived) of the small farmer vis-à-vis the above two organisations". Weir's Agricultural Consulting Services Limited, Jamaica, *Small Farming Study in the Less Developed Member Territories of the Caribbean Development Bank*, Vol. 1 (a), Country Reports, Bridgetown, Barbados, Caribbean Development Bank, 1975, pp. 76-77.

during one single day, from one type of organization to another: from typically self-subsistence peasant economy, to family exploitation linked with the national market, and to wage-earning work on plantations (or in urban trades). Each member of this segment of the labour force combines forms of economic behaviour corresponding to different models of production. Such cases have been studied in Jamaica and Barbados,<sup>8</sup> and are common in most countries.

One also observes, on the same piece of land, combinations of different forms of economic organization operated by totally different entrepreneurs. In certain flat lands of Haiti, planters are willing to establish sharecropping contracts with independent peasants, if they agree to produce sweet potatoes. The furrows which separate the beds prepared for receiving the stems of sweet potatoes are utilized by the planters to plant sugar-cane shoots.<sup>9</sup>

These examples, as well as the fact that a large proportion of paid employees are non-manual workers, stress the need to investigate forms of absorption of the labour force which escape the institutional mechanisms governing

salariated relationships and collective bargaining. The demand for manpower in the Caribbean is satisfied through channels located beyond the reach of the institutions designed to ensure some form of income distribution. The vulnerability of agricultural entrepreneurs in relation to external and outward-oriented socio-economic forces is worsened on the one hand by the availability of agricultural products originating in industrialized countries, and on the other by natural disasters such as droughts, floods and hurricanes. The economic geography of the Caribbean is becoming increasingly marked by food shortages, and recently cases of famine have occurred in some countries.

The inherited outward-orientation of public and private administration of available resources creates a context for the development of labour relations whereby the working population is forced to have recourse to a number of stratagems to survive. The scope of internationally accepted concepts and of traditional labour organization does not embrace the new occupational categories which have appeared. The present methods and techniques of manpower planning are not suitable for dealing with the present problem of unemployment and underemployment.

The satisfaction of local needs in the Caribbean was originally secured through independent own-account activities, whose purest expression is peasant forms of production. These patterns of activity with characteristic mechanisms for absorption of the labour force are not only prevalent in the countryside but have also spread to the urban areas, giving rise to what is known as the informal sector. Moreover, the evolution of inward-oriented economic patterns, under the stringent conditions laid down by the asymmetric relations between developed and underdeveloped countries, have fostered the multiplication of traditional forms of employment and provoke the emergence of unknown relations between archaic and modern enterprises.

Nowadays, most self-employed workers are persons available for any agricultural, industrial or service activity. Their employment situation was typified by L. Comitas in

<sup>8</sup>"A functioning peasantry, in any rigorous sense of the term, does not exist in contemporary Jamaica and perhaps never existed in the past. Over the years, following Emancipation, large numbers of poor rural Jamaicans found it necessary to combine several economic activities in order to subsist. Affected by the insecurities of own-account cultivation on minuscule, sub-standard fields, by the labor demand of plantations and large farms, and by the irregularity of other wage employment, these people developed a way of life based on a system of occupational multiplicity which maximizes as well as protects their limited economic opportunities and which in turn influences the nature of their social alignments and organization." L. Comitas, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-169

In the case of a Barbadian community, one reads in J. Handler: "Aside from small-scale cane farming, many people are likewise engaged in other cash-producing activities, including the raising of income-producing livestock (...) the cultivation of minor cash crops, wage labor on the lands of other small farmers, and even occasional employment in the village's small pottery industry. People also follow a number of other occupational pursuits, some of them not directly associated with land use. (...) Chalky Mount is a community consisting neither of a landless rural proletariat nor of a peasantry". J. Handler, "Some Aspects of Work Organization on Sugar Plantations in Barbados (1965)", in L. Comitas and D. Lowenthal, *op. cit.*, pp. 97-98.

<sup>9</sup>Serge Larose, *L'Exploitation Agricole en Haïti, Guide d'Etude*, Martinique, Centre de Recherches Caraïbes de l'Université de Montréal, 1976.

the quotation given earlier in this article.<sup>10</sup> Cases studied in Barbados by J. Handler<sup>11</sup> show that own-account activities and occupational multiplicity are intimately linked with wage labour. In other words, insufficient remuneration and the restricted number of wage-earners are stimulating the constant renaissance of traditional forms of employment and making it impossible to group the whole labour force in relations typical of market economies.

Further indicators reveal the disparity of employment and remuneration in the various sectors. A comparison of wages highlights not only the wage differentials by sector, but also by types of work, whether manual or non-manual. Data showing wage indexes by occupation for the English-speaking Caribbean indicate the great disparity between some territories: the wage of a professional (accountant) may be as little as three times that of a manual worker (Jamaica) or as much as twenty times that of the latter (St. Kitts-Nevis) (see table 6).

The increase in the number of enclave industries and the development of extractive activities do not seem to modify the employment problem, but they do accentuate the wage differentials. This disequilibrium between manual and non-manual work may well increase through their impact, since they are concomitant with the development of modern services like banking, consultancy, auditing, advertising and mass communication, and the like.

From these data, it appears that a most significant innovation has been introduced in the mechanisms of absorption of manpower. Since own-account ventures are embryos of economic enterprises, they offer at the same time both material goods and labour services. This flexibility allows the smooth operation of seasonal and cyclical variations in the demand for wage-earning labour, particularly in the agricultural sector, and the need for the real wages received during a given period to correspond to the total amount of goods and services necessary for subsisting from one cycle to another is obviated. This increase in the alter-

native economic practices available further defuses the bargaining power of manual workers by demanding their attention on different issues, apparently inconsistent one with another, and hampering the formation of institutionalized instruments of income distribution. The unit for the analysis of the labour force becomes dual, thus leaving common economic theories and labour legislation completely at a loss as regards understanding and regulating labour relations.

Furthermore, the separation between production units and marketing enterprises gives the latter a favourable position for protecting their rate of returns. The growing predominance of commercialization not only increases the precariousness of productive activities so polarized, it also influences the mean rate of profit capable of attracting local investments as well as the level of risks an entrepreneur is ready to face. Lucrative activities become those which offer rates of return and security similar to those of commerce. Long-term projects capable of modifying national productive structures are not attractive to private enterprises, and the State machinery becomes the instrument responsible for changing the economic environment.

Since stable and well-paid employment is to be found among white-collar workers involved in public and private administration and management, industrial ventures which aim at servicing the local market are geared towards satisfying the white-collar sector of the labour force, which controls the core of the local purchasing power. A structural impediment to the multiplication of productive employment geared towards satisfying local needs then arises from the total income distributed to the white-collar sector of the labour force. The amount of money earmarked for payment of wages in inward-oriented productive sectors must be less than the total income of white-collar workers, less the profit of the enterprises and the money transferred to foreign-based owners of patents and technologies.

So, even in cases of State-owned enterprises geared to the needs of local consumers, there is a limit to their absorption of the available labour force. An excess of monetary resources owned by the State and managed by

<sup>10</sup>See footnote 8.

<sup>11</sup>J. Handler, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-126.

Table 6  
 CARIFTA STATES, 1973: WAGE INDEXES BY OCCUPATION  
 (Wage of general labourer = 100)

| Country                   | General labourer | Mechanic | Accounted |
|---------------------------|------------------|----------|-----------|
| Jamaica                   | 100              | 213      | 328       |
| Trinidad and Tobago       | 100              | 172      | 589       |
| Guyana                    | 100              | 227      | 731       |
| Barbados                  | 100              | 174      | 577       |
| MDC mean <sup>a</sup>     | 100              | 196      | 530       |
| Belize                    | 100              | 158      | 1 167     |
| St. Lucia                 | 100              | 333      | 1 250     |
| Grenada                   | 100              | 299      | 690       |
| St. Vincent               | 100              | 429      | 842       |
| Dominica                  | 100              | 259      | 844       |
| Antigua                   | 100              | 299      | 690       |
| St. Kitts-Nevis           | 100              | 239      | 2 041     |
| Montserrat                | 100              | 282      | 658       |
| LDC mean <sup>a</sup>     | 100              | 273      | 974       |
| CARIFTA mean <sup>a</sup> | 100              | 238      | 772       |

Source: ILO Report of the Preparatory Assistance Mission for vocational training in the Caribbean region. Table 3.1. ILO Caribbean Office, 1977.

<sup>a</sup>Unweighted.

governments cannot easily be invested in productive ventures without disrupting the whole scale of salaries and jeopardizing the outward-oriented activities, which sustain the daily socio-economic practices. Under the present circumstances, an excess of State-owned monetary resources calls for an extension in the social services, i.e., a further increase in the services sector.

The mechanisms which concentrate most of the income distributed within the urban areas, and the subsequent difficulties in expanding inward-oriented industrial activities, thus leave very narrow margins for accommodating other economic initiatives. Own-account productive activities, maintenance services, and all forms of retail trade remain, with the public services, as the main channels of income distribution.

The difficulty of multiplying the employ-

ment of manual workers and the complete lack of dynamism of own-account agriculture on the one hand, and the impossibility of expanding white-collar employment at a pace similar to the production of school graduates on the other, join together to produce an uncontrollable movement of out-migration. Depopulation is reaching levels which are quite embarrassing in the poorest countries. It is urgent to assess the number of nationals living abroad, for it would seem that some countries of the area have a majority of the salaried labour force working outside their national borders, in conditions which escape the control of national institutions. The Caribbean has partly or totally become a net exporter of both qualified and unqualified workers.

The living conditions of Caribbean workers outside their countries of origin is an object of concern. It is known that the bulk of

Caribbean migrants are far from entering the middle strata of their host country, yet their salaries are reduced by a substantial portion

which is remitted to their families at home for consumption purposes. So pauperization abroad or at home is a serious threat.

## Conclusion

In summary, the major role played in the internal economic processes by the social groups responsible for the activities of the Caribbean seaports is an indicator of the distance to be covered in an effort to meet local needs with local resources. Collective self-reliance is a formidable challenge for the subregion. Its political and intellectual élites have emerged or strengthened themselves with accession to self-government and independence, but their search for legitimization is hampered by institutions and instruments for social dialogue inherited from ill-recent colonization or occupation. Long-term policies aiming at structural social changes and re-orientation of economic activities are limited in their implementation due to the resistance of traditional administrative practices framed by long-standing outward-oriented relationships. In contrast, short-term measures consistent with the dependency structures have an efficacy which indeed reproduces the segmentation and low level of cohesion within the subregion, but nevertheless offers respite in cases of conflicts and crises, while know-how and planning for self-reliant development remain embryonic.

Within this context, it suffices to read the CDCC Overall Work Programme to have a prospective view of the main challenges for social development during the next decade, as diagnosed by the political leadership of the subregion.

It should be recalled that the representatives of the member governments stressed during their second session at Santo Domingo in March 1977 that horizontal co-operation, that is to say, mutual assistance among the Caribbean countries, is the cornerstone of their strategy. It follows, then, that the greatest challenge for the years to come lies in the implementation of such an innovation in the art of governing underdeveloped countries. The

onus of social development rests with the governments and their ability to make the sacrifices required both in granting assistance to neighbouring countries and receiving it from them. The common denominators which were defined at the creation of the CDCC will have to continue to be articulated alongside the variety of political and ideological standpoints of the subregion, and be gradually expanded.

The principal problem affecting the majority of Caribbean countries which was emphasized by the Committee was the "lack of experience, resources and adequate institutions for formulation and implementation of economic and social development policies designed to attain full and productive employment of the labour force" (CDCC Work Programme). The fate of the Caribbean during the 1980s is linked to its success in mobilizing its resources and most particularly its labour force in productive ventures through "adequate institutions". It is in fact a question of reversing the whole process of extroversion and hence the problem of bargaining power within and outside the countries.

The first chapter of the Work Programme deals with technical co-operation among the Caribbean countries, where a policy of sharing the capacities and experiences of the countries themselves is viewed as "an essential prerequisite for collective action aimed at substantive changes of mutual benefit". Preliminary steps toward implementation of this mandate have been taken with the creation of the Caribbean Documentation Centre; and other measures such as programmes for the removal of language barriers and the creation of Caribbean Councils for Science and Technology and for Social and Economic Development are being studied. Scientific ideas geared to local circumstances are to be diffused throughout the subregion, and its balkanization is gradually to be cancelled out. Emphasis is laid on four

specific areas of prime concern in the inward-oriented development process: housing, food production, public health and education.

At this level of detail, difficulties arise in view of the number of specific vested interests that are affected. The same problems of compatibilization among the Caribbean governments alluded to earlier have to be solved in each case, and this clearly means that they must be tackled at the level of the society at large. The Caribbean must become the basic frame of reference of the populations in the 1980s. Advances in this direction can be seen among countries which have been occupied by the same colonial powers. The challenge consists in crossing these traditional boundaries.

The set of modifications aimed at in the agricultural economy of the subregion implies active participation by the rural populations in the development process. Taking into account the traditional position of rural dwellers in Caribbean societies, social mobilization of that stratum seems far more difficult to achieve than any other goal. Governments will not be able to enlarge the scope of measures designed to favour the rural populations without profound changes in the ideological structures of the subregion. Institutions and attitudes inherited from colonial and occupation times viewed non-urban dwellers as ignorant or irrational human beings. Such is the prevalence of these outward-oriented ideologies that discrimination against rural adults is not perceived as an issue. To destroy the paternalistic approach, to infuse into the national societies respect for the rural populations —incidentally, the bulk of the Caribbean people— and to ensure their accession to the status of valid partners for development would be a major achievement.

Beyond much-needed projects for structural economic changes such as land reform, employment, upgrading of agricultural outputs, etc., on the one hand discrimination must cease against languages, religions, forms of family organization and patterns of co-operation pertaining to rural dwellers, while on the other, programmes of formal and life-long education must systematically teach town dwellers not only the validity of rural standpoints, but the very existence of such stand

points. Before the end of this century, reciprocal exchanges of ideas between the two segments of Caribbean societies, and communication between the different peasantries of the subregion, must materialize if development is to be achieved at all.

The goals set up for the industrial sector—substantial growth in manufacturing, correction of external disequilibria through import substitution, and subregional trade—call for re-allocation of social groups traditionally involved in other activities like commerce and speculation. A renewal in the Caribbean economic élites is in sight, and the role played by the State as an entrepreneur is not unrelated with the corresponding trends which will have to be accelerated. Parallel with this, several modifications must be made in the labour market, and most particularly in the remuneration of manual workers, if the purchasing power of the population is to evolve along with industrial development.

Maritime transportation and the exploitation of marine resources are another important area where innovations in social relations will have to be faced. Fishermen and seamen in general constitute one of the most deprived strata in the subregion. Betterment in their living and working conditions, as well as upgrading of their skills, must take place during the next decade. Implementation of a Caribbean-wide development policy is inconceivable without their involvement.

At the international level, the constituent documents of the CDCC refer to four different contexts within which the patterns of social relations maintained by the member countries are to be reoriented and intensified. The Committee's work programme is compatible with the common interests pursued by:

- (1) the developing countries in general;
- (2) the Latin American countries, with special reference to relations with countries in the sphere of action of the CEPAL Offices in Mexico and Bogotá;
- (3) the Caribbean countries, with special reference to relations with less-developed countries affected by their limited population and territory.

Moreover, the Committee grants due con-

sideration to the diversity of situations within the countries themselves.

New terms of social negotiation are needed to modify the weight given in international relations to the traditional partners of the Caribbean and to correct the asymmetrical processes of development within any given country. The negotiations of the CDCC member states with others and the negotiations between those making up each member State, translated into the policy formulations and political activities implied in the work programme, assume an awareness of specific interests and the sharing of knowledge, norms and values by the population at large. Social cohesion within the Caribbean determines the orientation of governmental activities and the extent to which progress is feasible. Significant changes in the traditional system of international loyalties must be accompanied by the emergence of self-reliant citizens capable of supporting national foreign policies.

In their present state, the Caribbean social sciences would never be able to meet these challenges. The next decade should therefore witness a complete reform in these sciences. Research must unearth the rationale of the local forms of living, and teaching must be subject to relevant findings on the local societies. Progress must be made in the study of the labour force, manpower planning, and the role of women in development, while migration and other population trends must be clarified. Furthermore, the social scientists will face the need to find for themselves a proper place in the Caribbean societies, thus controlling their own out-migration process.

The educational system has been the main

vehicle of cultural dependence. The years to come will reap the results of ongoing efforts aimed at enhancing the relevance of formal education to the specific conditions of the sub-region. Conflicts may arise with the mass media if the approved CDCC Work Programme of Life-Long Education is not implemented. This at present comprises proposals for the Caribbean-wide production of printed and audio-visual materials and the creation of a subregional network of centres for cultural retrieval and animation, which will contribute to the process of mobilization and participation of the mass of the population. The main avenues and instruments of dialogue should thus be created during the next decade, and hopefully less obstacles should stand in the way of social mobilization and cohesion. The urgency of greater involvement of the populations in the series of issues raised by the Committee will probably provoke a higher rate of expansion in life-long education as compared to formal education.

The use of local languages for discussing and negotiating local problems could be institutionalized during the next decade and the problem of teaching official languages as second languages solved. Retrieval of oral literature will assist in the fight against illiteracy, and the mass media will have to consider a re-orientation of their messages in view of the formidable increase in their audience. The capability of the countries to harness their potential to combat cultural dependence will be a major issue of the ideological conflicts to come. There will be a need to create adequate institutions to prepare the countries for these ideological conflicts.