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Reinventing development: utopias devised by committees and seeds of change in the real world

Marshall Wolfe*

International normative declarations on development combine two types of demands that derive from different views of human societies and their future. One type envisages equality for Third World *countries* within a reformed world order retaining sources of dynamism not very different from the present. The other type of demand, for 'another development', envisages equality for *human beings* within a world order governed by radically different social relationships, values and incentives. The mixing of these two types of demands, and the failure to make explicit their different theoretical and valorative premisses, while unavoidable in international forums seeking consensus, weakens the convincingness of the declaration either as packages of demands negotiable between governments or as mobilizing myths seeking to replace the waning myth of economic development.

The present paper prefers the values underlying the demands for "another development", but questions whether these values are going to be realized harmoniously and predictably once committees of thinkers hit on the correct combination of planning and exhortation. The paper then explores the mutations or "seeds of change" that can be detected in different kinds of central and peripheral national societies in relation to the real prospects for "another development". It concludes that the mutations point to a highly indeterminate future, in which the capacity of the dominant forces in the central countries to exercise hegemony for coherent purposes will probably decline. The future of Latin America is thus not predetermined by the region's present pattern of semi-development nor its insertion into the international order. The basic propositions of "another development" may acquire greater realism and political viability in the hands of new social forces.

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I

A new egalitarian world order for nation-States or a new egalitarian world order for human beings?

In the extraordinary recent flowering of normative declarations on development one can distinguish two main strands.¹ One strand consists of relatively concrete demands for egalitarian reforms in the international economic order. The other strand consists of relatively diffuse appeals for 'unified development', 'integral development' or 'another development' within countries, supported by a worldwide transformation of values and priorities. At first sight, the two strands complement each other, but the manner of their juxtaposition within the declarations suggests a series of compromises between quite different views of human societies and their 'development', a new phase in the long-continued efforts to define this elusive concept, with the holders of different positions contributing additional utopian-normative elements and seeking common ground with each other under the impact of the multifaceted international crisis of the mid-1970s.² Although the dichotomy between 'developed' countries and the Third World dominates the declarations, the differences in the preoccupations of their architects do not coincide with this dividing line.

The former demands envisage the achievement of equality by the Third World *countries* or by their *economic systems* within an international order continuing to derive its dynamism from production for export and from international flows of investment and technological innovation. They suppose that 'development' for the Third

¹The production of declarations and reports along these lines gathered momentum in 1974 and reached a peak in 1975. Since 1975, the flow has continued at a somewhat slower rate, and with considerable repetition of propositions and demands.

²For a discussion of earlier stages of this quest, see Marshall Wolfe, *El desarrollo esquivo: Exploraciones en la política social y la realidad sociopolítica*, Mexico, D.F., Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1976.

World countries can continue to mean what it has meant for the countries now rich and industrialized—mass production and mass consumption continually stimulating each other to new heights—but with the cyclical crises, struggles for markets, exploitation of the weak by the strong, ravaging of the human environment, and other disbenefits of such development tamed by some combination of global planning, bargaining, and good will.

It may be questioned whether an international economic order reformed by inter-governmental agreements while retaining central mechanisms and motivations of the present order can really function in this way, or whether the forces that are likely to dominate during the foreseeable future will really be disposed to make the experiment. At least, however, these are demands on which *governments* can base strategies and seek united action among themselves. They respond to a supposition that countries have common and internally harmonious interests voiced by their governments; that overcoming the poverty of a *country* and gaining it an equal voice in the international order are equivalent to overcoming the poverty of its *people* and gaining them an equal voice. Such demands do not really require the conscious intervention of the masses of a national population, who figure, in their demonstrated poverty, as justifications for the demands of their governments, as performers of economic roles, and as eventual recipients of the benefits supposed to flow from the new order.

The appeals for 'integral development' or 'another development' within countries raise problems of a quite different nature, that governments are hardly in a position to tackle, and that even the non-official intellectuals offering themselves as spokesmen for the Third World commonly evade when they seek consensus in declarations.³ The

posing of equality and elimination of poverty as objectives of development is not new, but the linking of these objectives with autonomous participation by the masses in the making and carrying out of developmental decisions, with the curbing of superfluous consumption and husbanding of the human environmental patrimony for future generations, and with the transformation of societal values makes up a formidable agenda.

The indispensable precondition for 'another development', in fact, is a worldwide conversion or change of heart, involving all the social forces that have a share of power along with the groups hitherto voiceless. The prizes for which classes and interest-groups have contended since the dawn of the capitalist order then become almost irrelevant. The mass of consumers in the rich countries and the rich in the poor countries must learn to live austere-ly. Political leaders, entrepreneurs, scientific-technological innovators, and the military must renounce the struggle for power and prestige in favour of co-operation and fostering of popular initiative. The centralized State with its bureaucratic and coercive mechanisms must give way to direct democracy and self-management at the level of the community and the enterprise. The groups controlling the transnational corporations must set themselves objectives of job creation and production of goods meeting basic human needs rather than maximization of profits. The impoverished masses must moderate their demands to what the national variant of 'another development' can afford. The declarations insist that the first steps in this direction must be taken immediately; human needs cannot wait. Their prescriptions for the future are in

that what is wanted is something quite different from previous concepts of development, not only in welfare priorities but also in an open-ended experimental pursuit of equality, creativity, and self-reliance. 'Integral development', 'unified development', and similar terms that came into vogue toward the end of the 1960s convey the supposition that the pursuit can be planned and subjected to universalist norms.

³The alternative terms emphasize different aspects of a common aspiration. 'Another development', introduced by the 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Report, implies

all-or-nothing terms; humanity is either to be saved or to be damned in its totality.⁴

Sometimes the declarations refer to the need for 'political will' and try to frighten the nationally and internationally dominant forces with warnings of catastrophe if they do not change their ways. Sometimes they shrink the enormous problems of planning for societal transformation into problems of devising correct methodologies and indicators of progress—problems whose solution can be entrusted to international experts and research projects. Even the declarations that try hardest to come to grips with the problems of power, values and national diversity—notably the 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Report—continually fall back on the passive voice in their recommendations through inability to identify a societal *deus ex machina* who might convert aspirations into action.

In fact, the proposals combining norms for economic equality between countries with norms for 'integral development' or 'another development' have the earmarks of concrete utopias devised by committees. They are concrete in their aspiration to construct blueprints of an attainable future. They are utopian in the immediatism and universalism of their formulations. Their origin in committees and forums that intentionally bring together representatives of different regions, different disciplines and different ideologies bars them from any serious effort to subordinate their conclusions to a coherent theory of societal change.⁵ It conduces to an over-generous inclusion of

objectives and prescriptions strongly supported by some participants and not seriously objectionable to the others and, more important, to an evasion of issues on which the views of participants or the organisms to which they belong are irreconcilably different—in particular, whether 'another development' is to come about by the conversion of the mighty or their overthrow, and whether the basic supposition of 'economic development', that increases in production of goods can and must outpace population growth throughout the foreseeable future, remains valid.

Under these constraints, the new proposals become attempts to devise a convincing new myth without altogether alienating the governmental devotees of the waning myth, at a time when the requirements for conviction and consensus are much more complex than the simple faith of the 1950s that correct economic policies will eventually enable all peoples to achieve the level of consumption of the industrialized countries.⁶

While the appeals for 'another development' now enter to a surprising degree into

grative theory—or of rival integrative theories—which would be accepted by wide sections of the intelligentsia and the centres of power, and which would explain the more significant aspects of the behaviour of society, provide a minimum capacity to predict, and afford a reliable basis for the formulation of rules and the development of institutions. The erosion, or disintegration, of the major paradigms which had been used to elucidate as well as guide national development and international relations is an important factor in our present uncertainties." (Philippe de Seynes, "The 'Futures' Debate in the United Nations", *CEPAL Review*, N.º 3, First half of 1977, p. 13.)

⁶Myths, according to the Brazilian economist Celso Furtado, are like lamps that illumine the field of perception of the social scientist, enabling him to see some problems clearly and leaving him in the dark as to others, while at the same time they afford him peace of mind, since the value judgements he makes are in his sight a reflection of objective reality. We are now, Furtado later goes on to say, irrefutably aware that the peripheral economies will never be *developed*, in the sense of resembling the economies that at present form the centre of the capitalist system. But how can it be denied that this idea has been of great use in mobilizing

⁴According to the Report of the 1975 Special Task Force Meeting of the Club of Rome, for example, the *complete* development of the potentialities of *all* men is necessary if inequalities are to be smoothed out and if the aim is to give *everyone* the chance of a healthy and self-respecting life. Strategies, policies and planning procedures for national and global development must be subordinated to these ends. (The italics are the present author's.) Taken literally, the first sentence is tautological. Taken as a mandate to planners it is staggering.

⁵In the search for a scheme of *global rationality*, we are severely handicapped by the lack of an inte-

inter-governmental declarations and while they are presented as demands of the dispossessed majority of the world's people they are, to a much greater extent than the accompanying demands for economic equality between nation-States, the brain children of circles of intellectuals and reformers meeting in differing combinations in one forum after another. They lack the dynamism of social movements fighting to advance the interests of their members and the discipline of coherent ideologies or theories of social change. In some versions, 'another development' serves as a euphemism for 'socialist development', while evading identification with current socialist models and strategies. The immense majority of the world's poor knows nothing of them nor of the international forums that endorse them, in spite of the reiterated attribution of authorship to these same poor. The world's middle classes hear just enough to make them uneasy. While significant fractions of these middle classes may feel a certain guilt and may even harbour a conviction that 'something must be done', the self-defensive reactions of the bulk of them to the crises that affect them directly indicate the unlikelihood of their voluntarily making sacrifices of the magnitude called for by 'another development'. The world's rich and powerful keep their own counsel, or manoeuvre to make the proposals innocuous by embracing them.

the peoples of the periphery and inducing them to accept enormous sacrifices, in legitimating the destruction of archaic cultural patterns, in *explaining* and making men *understand* that it is necessary to destroy the physical environment, in justifying forms of dependence that strengthen the predatory character of the production system? It may be asserted, therefore, that the idea of economic development is nothing but a myth. Thanks to this, it has been possible to divert attention from the essential task of identifying the basic needs of the collectivity and the possibilities opened up for man by the progress of science, in order to concentrate it upon abstract objectives such as *investment*, *exports* and *growth*. (See Celso Furtado, *El Desarrollo Económico: Un Mito*, Mexico, D.F., Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1975, pp. 13-14 and 90-91.)

When one examines the writings since the 1960s of the participants in the present elaboration of prescriptions for 'another development', one finds that the criticisms that can be levelled at their collective declarations have been made by many of them as individuals, naturally with differing emphases and from different theoretical approaches. The international and national relationships of domination and exploitation, the gap between pretensions and performance in international co-operation, the inhibitions on decision-making at the national level, the 'soft State', the pervasively corrupt State, bureaucratic inertia, the delusions of technocratic planning, the distortions of formal education, the forces making for mystification and ambiguity in policies are in full view.

In other words, their diagnoses show: (i) a low degree of governmental rationality and capacity to plan confronting complex and continually changing challenges; (ii) adherence by the dominant forces in most national societies to élitist values, implying the enjoyment of privileges precisely because they are privileges outside the reach of the majority, and satisfaction with 'nature's plan, that they shall take who have the power, and they shall keep who can'; (iii) susceptibility among the masses to mobilization and united effort in support of traditional parochial causes —national prestige, territorial aggrandizement, religious and ethnic quarrels. Within each nation-State, large or small, simple or complex in its social and economic structures, political contests are under way for a bewilderingly varied assortment of prizes that absorb the participants to the practical exclusion of the great question posed by 'another development': that of human survival on terms making survival humanly meaningful.

Such diagnoses have left some of their authors profoundly pessimistic concerning the possibility of future realization of their own democratic and humanitarian values. Others, on the basis of their evaluations of present power structures and the character-

istics of the classes benefiting from or exploited under them, opt reluctantly for essentially reformist approaches requiring enlightenment of the national élites and the dominant forces in the world centres, and assignation of leadership to strong States conceivably capable of representing the long-term interests of the national society. Still others conclude that a revolutionary democratization of societies throughout the world accompanying a transformation of values and of human nature itself must be possible because it is necessary. Still others try to construct workable blueprints for the transformation of their own societies and to demonstrate the non-viability of other paths to the future, eschewing universalism and relying on the force of rational demonstration to recommend the blueprints to national élites or political forces able to take power and apply them.

Even the more optimistic explorers seem from time to time to be floundering in a bog as they try to move from the multiform absurdities and injustices of present human relationships and public actions to some firm path leading to national and international orders capable of giving priority to satisfaction of the basic needs of all human beings. Overt rejection of this priority has been muted to a degree that would have been unthinkable a few decades ago. The proliferation of declarations and 'plans of action' demonstrates a consensus of respectable opinion: the world order is in crisis and must be transformed. But this consensus has the yieldingness of the bog rather than the firmness of a path supporting a vigorous advance in any one direction.

Economists have retained the central role in shaping the more recent proposals for 'another development', as well as the proposals for a new international economic order, which they (or other economists) held in elaborating the earlier myth of economic development. Certain economists have, in fact, taken the lead in the chorus of criticisms of the narrowness of the economic vision focussed on accumulation and investment

for acceleration of growth in production; in some cases, abjuring their own earlier prescriptions. One of them sets forth the reasons for their continuing central position as follows:

"In line with traditions that are now more than two centuries old, we economists have this slightly paranoid but socially useful bent of mind; we naturally accept the responsibility for taking a broad view of a whole country, and indeed of the whole world, and for thinking in dynamic terms of national and international policies. Place any economist in the capital city of an underdeveloped country and give him the necessary assistance and he will in no time make a plan. In this regard we are unique among the social scientists. No sociologist, psychologist or anthropologist would ever think of trying to do such a thing."⁷

This predisposition of economists meets the need of governments, international organizations and sectors of public opinion that have become sensitized to world crises to believe in the possibility of plannable, harmonious, universally applicable solutions. If the previous prescriptions for development have not worked satisfactorily, new and 'more comprehensive' prescriptions must be needed.

Since the early stages of diagnoses and planning for 'economic development', the dominant economists have invited the participation of other social scientists and specialists in social policies, but naturally on their own terms. The latter are now closer to the centre of developmental thinking than before, since the more innovative economists as well as political leaders have convinced themselves that the difficulties in the way of 'another development' are not primarily economic. Sociologists, anthropol-

⁷Gunnar Myrdal, *The Challenge of World Poverty: A World Anti-Poverty Programme in Outline*, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1970; and New York, Random House, Pantheon Books, 1970, p. 37.

ogists, political scientists and psychologists, however, cannot be much more at home in their new responsibilities than in the previous role assigned to them by economists of diagnosing and prescribing for 'social obstacles' to 'economic development'. 'Modernization', the main general concept advanced by a good many of these other social scientists to complement 'economic development', has turned out to be as elusive and ambiguous in relation to human welfare as development itself. 'Another development' calls for 'another modernization'. Social science theories that look to class conflict as the motor of societal change are still less assimilable to the demand for comprehensive plans governed by the norms of 'another development'. Whether the observer's attention centres on the international order, national political structures, classes, interest-groups, communities, families, or individuals whose responses are conditioned by these wider circles, he sees changes under way which will undoubtedly incorporate influences from the campaigns for egalitarian, basic needs-oriented and environment-oriented styles of development and which will influence these campaigns in return, but which are not susceptible to planning by any identifiable agents. The demand for social and political prescriptions for the management of these changes leads back to contradictions in which development policies up to the present have recurrently been entangled whenever they have ventured beyond a narrowly economic focus: standardized spontaneity, popular initiative channelled towards targets imposed from above, co-operative action expected between groups with conflicts of interests that their members perceive.

Social scientists in the Third World are somewhat more disposed than their counterparts in the 'central' countries to view the State as a coherent entity rather than an aggregation of bureaucracies and interest-groups, but they are even less inclined to attribute to the States now on the stage the degree of autonomy and benevolence need-

ed if they are to lead the way to 'another development'.⁸ In most cases, the State, whatever aspirations its technobureaucracy might harbour, would be the agent of forces incompatible with any systematic move in such a direction.

Assignment to the State of the task of constructing 'another development' (or, in another current formulation, 'exercising the right to choose a national style of development') thus in the real world may not bring about much more than an array of Potemkin villages masking the pursuit of group interests by the forces dominating the State. The greater the apparent autonomy of the State apparatus, the greater the opportunities for counterfeiting of achievements, concealment of failures, and proliferation of corrupt practices and special privileges among the 'servants' of the State.

Nor are the prospects much more promising for a withering away of the State through the accession to power of a social class destined to do away with exploitation, or through the generalized enlightenment of the population up to the point of achieving ability to manage its own affairs co-operatively and non-bureaucratically, through direct democracy. The present boom in construction of concrete utopias, in fact, has followed a fading of the faith that flourished in important proportions of different social classes in the industrialized countries from

⁸In a 1972 conference of Latin American and United States social scientists it is striking that the former generally attribute coherent purposes to the State, whether as 'the executive committee of the capitalist class' or as a semi-autonomous actor, while the latter see 'bureaucratic policy-making', in which components of the State apparatus can, up to a point, pursue different objectives in alliance with different interest-groups in the society (e.g., the 'military-industrial complex' and sectoral government agencies linked to organized labour, organized farmers, etc.), with an approach to unity to be expected only in the presence of a menace perceived as extraordinarily threatening to the interests of the whole society. See Julio Cotler and Richard R. Fagen, Ed., *Latin America and the United States: The Changing Political Realities*, Stanford University Press, 1974. Fernando Henrique Cardoso has diagnosed the Brazilian State in terms rather similar to the second view, in *Autoritarismo e Democratização*, Rio de Janeiro, Paz e Terra, 1975, especially p. 182.

the nineteenth century up to the 1940s: the faith that the Good Society would be achieved shortly after the coming to power of the proletariat or of a democratic-socialist intellectual élite. During the 1950s various observers of social change evaluated this fading away optimistically in terms of the 'end of ideology' and the clearing of the way for consensus on practical and incremental reforms. At present, even in the national societies in which material conditions, political culture, and discontent with the capitalist-consumerist style of development might seem most propitious, one now finds a predominant sense of the complexity and ambiguity of progress, in which each achievement brings new problems without fully overcoming the old ones, in which all the conceivable paths to a better future are round-about, with the pitfalls along the way easier to foresee than the happy ending.

There seems to be no plausible alternative to the conclusion that initiatives for deliberate modification of styles of development will have to continue to struggle through the bog of cross-purposes, ritual activities, evasions, and resistances, even if the preconditions for societal transformation become as favourable as can realistically be hoped for. Nor is it likely that whatever transformations occur will bring national societies any closer to uniformity, for better or worse. Some national societies may enhance their strength within the world order without enhancing the well-being of their members; others may do both; still others, unfortunately, may do neither. Some classes and groups within countries will lose present advantages, will be forced to change their ways of livelihood, will be left in or reduced to poverty whether or not the majority gains and whether or not the overall trend is toward equality. There can be no guarantee to any of the societal actors that their struggles and sacrifices will have results that can be defined in advance. In spite of the internationalization of 'plans of action', the transformation will continue to take place within the boundaries of nation-

States and States whose dominant forces are trying to make them into nations. In each State, the interplay of ideologies, strategies, power relationships, pressures and conflicts only tenuously related to 'development' will point to different possible outcomes. One of the most striking contradictions of the present situation is the discrediting of the nation-State as incapable of coping with the challenges it faces; and at the same time the renewed insistence on self-reliance and the right of the nation-State to choose its style of development free of external pressures; together with the continued proliferation of new States whose capacity for self-determination is much more questionable than that of the States whose leaders are convinced that integration in larger units is the only viable option.

Such explorations of the future as the two reports to the Club of Rome⁹ insist that piecemeal, intuitive, or common-sense tactics to cope with the crises of the future will be worse than ineffective; they will contribute to the disasters they are supposed to ward off. If this is correct and if one can see no prospect for responses that are other than piecemeal and mutually contradictory, what then? Are the concrete utopias devised by committees with their universalism and immediatism, their hospitality to all kinds of worthy causes, anything more than another ritual recognition that the situation is desperate?

One might vary the exhortation common to these utopias, to the effect that 'humanity must choose' between paths leading to survival and destruction, and urge their intellectual fathers to choose between the different conceptions of the human future that are now combined in their declarations. Do they envisage that a correct combination

⁹D. H. Meadows, D. L. Meadows, J. Randers and W. W. Behrens III, *The Limits to Growth: A report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind*, New York, Universe Books, 1972; and Mihajlo Mesarovic and Eduard Pestel, *Mankind at the Turning Point: The Second Report to the Club of Rome*, New York, Dutton/Reader's Digest Press, 1974.

of 'practical', 'concrete' reforms negotiable between present governments can set humanity on the path to what they mean by 'development'? Do they aim at images of the future that can inspire and mobilize social forces for a transformation very different from the optimal results of reforms that are now negotiable?

The mixture of propositions based on different theories and aimed at different publics weakens the convincingness of the declarations both as negotiable packages of demands and as mobilizing myths. While individuals and political movements referring their actions back to a coherent theory can choose, however, it is of the essence of the debate over future international and national orders that the participants must fall back on formulas affirming that humanity can have its cake and eat it, that equality for nation-States within a world order requiring economic growth dynamized by manipulated consumption demands and armaments expenditures can be reconciled with equality for human being within societies requiring radically different incentives and human relationships.

The international declarations and plans of action, in fact, reflect a real hybridization of policies, deriving from different conceptions of human needs and different conceptions of the economic Kingdom of Necessity, that is shaping the evolution of national societies and the international order itself. In the national societies most wedded to the necessity of rapid economic growth governed by the market, one finds the dynamism of this process increasingly entangled with elaborate and costly public services and regulations stemming from egalitarian, welfare and environmental preoccupations and from the power of interest groups disposed to tolerate the functioning of the system only to the extent that it incorporates their demands. In the United States as well as Europe these preoccupations and pressures are changing the functioning of the societies in ways that would have been inconceivable a few years

ago, without, however, displacing the private stimulation of consumption and the public allocations of resources supposed to maintain the previous dynamism.

At the same time, the increasing numbers of national societies whose dominant forces strive or pretend to strive for socialist-egalitarian styles of development with completely different sources of dynamism remain enthralled by growth for the sake of growth—or for the sake of national power—and are continually tempted or pressed to the reintroduction of market mechanisms, consumerist incentives, and privileged lifestyles for the higher bureaucratic and military élites.

At the international level the hybridization of policies deriving from the two conceptions of development generates further contradictions, or at least a juxtaposition of objectives incompatible without a comprehensive rationality and global planning capacity that are not in sight. The one approach requires that the 'rich' countries continue to expand their purchases of raw materials from the 'poor' countries, at high and stable prices, and welcome imports of manufactures. The other approach requires that the 'rich' countries use raw materials more sparingly and leave a larger share for direct meeting of the needs of the 'poor' countries; the latter should also expand their manufactures primarily to meet basic needs of their own people.

The one approach implies that the poor countries and the rich should become even more interdependent. The other implies that countries in *both* groups should become more self-reliant and views the resulting constriction of certain lines of economic growth as a gain rather than a disaster.¹⁰ The

¹⁰See Lucio Geller, "Notas sobre Delinking y Relinking", Seminario-Foro del Tercer Mundo sobre Auto-Apoyo Colectivo, Lima, February 1976, for a relevant observation to the following effect: Everything that contributes to a break-up of the imperialist style of integration will point the way to self-reliance on the part of peripheral and central countries alike. It is needless to stress that self-reliance is not self-sufficiency; but it

one approach implies that tourists should visit the poor countries in large numbers and spend freely. The other implies that visitors should live austerely and place their skills at the service of the people they visit. Under the one approach, the transnational enterprises, properly watched and regulated but retaining their present profit incentives, are an indispensable instrument of development. Under the other, the transnationals can be tolerated only on condition of a transformation of their incentives and their functioning that would practically convert them into philanthropic foundations.

The centre-periphery relationships of dominance and dependency and the national styles of development or underdevelopment deriving from them have revealed too many anomalies and dangers to be able to mobilize the indispensable minimum of consensus, but the alternatives must continue to contend with the powerful momentum of what has been done and with their own conceptual and practical weaknesses. The central countries may well reduce their rates of economic growth over the long term as the Bariloche Foundation's Latin American World Model, along with other guides to the future, demands, not because of altruism, but partly because of ecological constraints, partly because of inability to find adequate substitutes for sources of economic dynamism—armaments and the automobile—that for one reason or another have to be curbed, and partly because of growing dissension over life styles and national objectives.

It is unlikely that under such conditions their dominant forces, trying to cope with

severe internal tensions, could or would pay much attention to the corollary demand that they compensate the Third World for past exploitation. Even if lower growth rates derive from harmonious changes in values, from popular preferences to work less and live more simply, the producers would hardly go on striving to produce goods to benefit the rest of the world, and they might learn to do without many non-essential goods they now buy from the Third World. An end to the armaments race, by itself, would render obsolete the oft-repeated projections demonstrating the central countries' dependence on imports of minerals from the Third World. The dominant forces in the central countries are already beginning to take up the arguments for Third World self-reliance as a defence against the claims made on them by the advocates of a New International Economic Order.

Behind the present proliferation of utopias devised by committees lurks a recurrent fear: however irrational and unjust the combinations of carrots and sticks by which the modern capitalist and socialist economic systems have kept human beings innovating, producing, and squabbling over distribution, do not the alternatives all lead to bureaucratic compulsion and eventual stagnation?

From the point of view of the present exploration, the values and suppositions underlying the demand for 'another development' are to be preferred to those underlying the demand for economic equality between nation-States. It does not follow that 'another development' will emerge harmoniously and predictably once the men of good will in the international forums hit upon the correct combination of planning and exhortation. The following passages translated from a recent essay by Alain Touraine point to the path to be followed in the next stage of this exploration:

"...A study conducted in terms of crisis leads up to recourse to a rescue plan for the planet envisaged as a vast social system, at the core of which a central

is not superfluous to note that the break-up to which we allude may result in some reduction of international trade between central and peripheral countries. Such a reduction will be highly advantageous in the long run if it is reflected in a contraction of exports from peripheral countries which sustain a consumer-society model in the central countries, and in a contraction of exports from central countries that consist of inputs and capital goods to sustain in peripheral countries an industrial structure at the service of minority interests.

authority, or, more simply, a coherent will, could propose reasonable solutions, beneficial, that is, for mankind as a whole, and at the same time technically feasible. When people shout 'Fire!', it means that they expect the firemen to come ... Conversely, to speak of mutation brings to the fore cultural changes and changes in social relations, particularly power relations; and this is meaningful only within real social systems, i.e., systems defined by institutions and powers.

"...The time has come to leave behind these interpretations of current change in terms of crisis. For if we were merely living through a crisis, the sole solution would be the emergence of an integrating force from the collectivity that the crisis is affecting ... Which could only lead—and this is the principal ideological function of the concept of crisis today—to the strengthening of a new ruling élite, acting at once on behalf of rationality and in defence of the entire collectivity. It may be thought that this is how things should be; or, on the

contrary, a different style of change may be desired.

"But the first essential is to recognize that the idea of crisis forms part of the ideology of power: it implies a reorganization of society at the top ... To speak of crisis is to adopt the standpoint of power; to speak of mutation implies studying the formation of a new cultural field, of new social relations and new social conflicts, which direct attention as much towards the appearance of new popular movements as towards the emergence of new forms of power."¹¹

Let us then look at the mutations or 'seeds of change' that can be detected in different kinds of 'central' and 'peripheral' national societies today, supposing that the firemen of a new international order are not about to arrive to resolve a crisis, but that the examination of seeds of change may tell us something about the prospects for a future susceptible to modification by movements oriented by the egalitarian and humanitarian values inspiring 'another development'.

II

Seeds of change in different types of national societies

1. *Hypotheses*

This section of the present paper will consist of an annotated listing of phenomena now visible in different types of national societies that throw light on future prospects for the international order and for 'another development'. The listing does not pretend to comprehensiveness. Its main purpose is to demonstrate the diversity and apparent indeterminateness of present trends and the inadequacy of current stereotypes concerning the roles and the potential responsive-

ness to utopian-normative prescriptions of the different types of societies.¹² The phenomena are labelled 'seeds of change' to suggest that their present visibility need not correspond to their future importance. Not all the 'seeds' will germinate and some of

¹¹See Alain Touraine, "Crise ou mutation?", in *Au-delà de la crise*, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1976, pp. 24-25 and 53.

¹²This section aspires to complement without duplicating the profound analysis carried out by José Medina Echavarría in three recent papers: "Latin America in the possible scenarios of détente", CEPAL

them will grow into feeble or purely ornamental plants. Intellectual fashions, personal values and preferences inevitably influence judgements concerning the future prospects of the 'seeds'. The listing unavoidably leaves out of account the historical dimension of the seeds of change and the influence on their potency of long-standing national projects or aspirations. The general hypotheses informing the presentation, already suggested in the previous section, are the following:

(a) The two dichotomies that have governed international discourse on 'development' —(i) between 'developed' (central, industrialized, rich, imperialist) countries and 'developing' (peripheral, poor, dependent, exploited, non-industrialized) countries; (ii) between 'capitalist' (market economy) and 'socialist' (centrally planned) countries— never entirely satisfactory simplifications of reality, are becoming more inadequate, not because of a generalized 'convergence' between countries on the two sides of either dichotomy, but because of the emergence of an increasing number of intermediate, anomalous patterns. A few of the 'developing' countries have become wealthier than the developed according to the conventional indicator of GNP per capita. Others have become highly industrialized and more wedded to the unrestricted operation of market forces than are most of the 'developed' countries today. At the same time, traits are coming to the fore in the 'developed' countries that are incongruous with previously accepted images of 'market economy' or 'centrally planned economy', including traits previously singled out by the spokesmen of the developed world as characteristic of 'under-development'.

(b) In the different groups of countries—whether classified by region, income

level, political system, or otherwise— internal social, cultural and political changes are interacting with the more strictly 'economic' processes and policies (in production, technology, marketing, finance, etc.) and with foreign policy tactics in pursuit of governmental views of national interests. The former changes seem to be exceedingly self-contradictory and ambiguous; no clear dominant trend is visible. The internal changes characteristic of each group of countries react on the internal changes of the rest through imposition, borrowing and deliberate rejection, further complicating the national patterns. They impose constraints on the capacity of governments in all types of national societies to adopt and apply coherent policies vis-à-vis the rest of the world.

(c) The proliferating discussion of norms for a new international economic order and for ideal styles of development at the national level coincides with a dearth of intellectually compelling theories of social change, of dynamic political leadership, and of wide popular support for any one development strategy. This applies to practically all countries at present, whatever their income level, their political-economic system, or their dominant ideology. It is a moot question whether the shortcomings of leadership should be attributed to the nature of present challenges and the erosion of confidence in the conventional wisdom on development and modernization, or vice versa. In any case, the continuing elaboration of all-inclusive normative declarations and 'plans of action' is in part a ritual substitute for real capacity to cope with change. Activities of this kind can be expected to exert some real influence on the directions of change and the ways in which men interpret it, but, filtered through structures exerting greater resistance to some actions than to others and transforming the meaning of certain actions, they may well have results as far from the intentions of their present sponsors as have all the great mobilizing myths of history.

(d) The guidelines to 'another development' vacillate between technobureaucratic

Review, N.º 2, Second Half of 1976; "Notes on the future of the western democracies", *CEPAL Review*, N.º 4, Second Half of 1977; and "Las propuestas de un nuevo orden económico internacional en perspectiva", *Revista Paraguaya de Sociología*, N.º 38, January-April 1977.

solutions—a centrally-planned world society corresponding to the image of 'space-ship earth'— and participationist solutions—local self-management, subordination of 'development' to local cultures and values, the withering away of the State— corresponding to Touraine's distinction between 'crisis' and 'mutation' approaches. A comparable ambiguity can be seen in the seeds of change that are going to be discussed. For better or for worse, a continuing tension between the two approaches to the organization of society seems more probable than the triumph of a technobureaucratic utopia or a participationist utopia.

(e) In such a listing of the seeds of change it may be permissible although not entirely satisfactory to leave in the background the framework of economic relationships and power politics which has received more attention in the debate over new international orders than the questions to be discussed in this section. Most of the problems and changes in attitudes to be discussed have emerged or become more pronounced during a long period of economic growth and national and international political patterns which, although conflictive enough, have been stable in comparison with the preceding decades of depression and world war. Their future relevance depends only in part on whether the central countries recover high and stable growth rates and whether their relations with the rest of the world become more co-operative or more conflictive. The terms of the listing, however, do reflect an expectation that the future will be a mixed one, of alternating growth generating inflation and recessions pushing up unemployment; of conflicts subsiding in some areas and springing up in others; of concessions by the centre to the periphery that the latter will continue to identify as too little and too late. The governments may well continue to play power games not too different from those of the past, but with their capacity to mobilize internal support for such games dwindling or precarious, and their attention continually

diverted by domestic contradictions. The degree and kind of attention that the leaders of the central countries can pay to the rest of the world may thus encounter narrower bounds, whatever the demands emanating from the latter and whatever the threats to hegemony presented by political changes in the periphery.

(f) The industrialized countries with capitalist or mixed economic systems and electorally democratic political régimes can be divided roughly into several sub-groups: the United States, set apart by the size of its economy, the world permeation of its life-style, and the reactions deriving from its eroding world hegemony; the large Western European States; the smaller Northern and Western European States; the industrialized Commonwealth countries of North America and Oceania; Japan; and the Mediterranean 'Latin' countries. Similar seeds of change can be identified in all these sub-groupings, but in widely differing combinations. The following discussion will focus on phenomena that are general but particularly characteristic of the United States, and will then comment on the other sub-groupings. The socialist countries, excluding the more recent non-industrialized Third World recruits, fall into two sub-groups: U.S.S.R. and its East European associates, on the one hand, and China, on the other. In the Third World a grouping by geographical regions coincides in the main with other relevant traits, although not with the increasingly important but persistently elusive distinction between national societies whose dominant forces identify them as 'socialist' and those whose dominant forces prefer other identifications. The discussion will lead to a consideration of the implications for Latin America, as a region of dependent semi-development, of its openness to the whole range of seeds of change identifiable in the rest of the world.

2. *The industrialized "market-economy" countries*

(a) Disillusionment with the capacity of the

welfare State to 'solve problems' and with the capacity of political parties to change the conduct of the State for the better has been on the increase since the 1960s. Resentment of high taxes, bureaucratic controls and attempts by the State to regulate behaviour for social goals generates sporadic political backlashes and passive resistance, while the occasions for such resentment continue to mount under the pressures to be described below. Rising incomes and consumption over several decades have cushioned social conflict but have not left the State in a stronger position to set national priorities and assign resources once these trends are interrupted. It becomes publicly evident that a wide range of policies supposedly devoted to national defence or human welfare have really become governed by objectives of propping up the economic system or fortifying the position of public functionaries, but that the range of policies accessible to the State can neither stop inflation nor secure full employment. The pursuit of semi-autonomous policies and pressure group tactics by military and intelligence establishments, by sectoral bureaucracies, and by large corporations in the 'planning system' (in J. K. Galbraith's term) becomes more widely known and resented.¹³ Continual exposures through the mass media of corruption and illegal manipulations reinforce other sources of distrust of the State and politicians.

(b) Warnings of many kinds that previous patterns of growth in incomes and consumption will not be viable in the future, supported by visible disbenefits of these

¹³For example, the dominance of the 'planning system' of large corporations in the United States over the 'market system' in the rest of the economy, the symbiosis of this private planning system with the public bureaucracy, and the relative impoverishment and exploitation of the rest of the society, as interpreted by Galbraith, have much in common with the interpretations of dualistic or structurally heterogeneous development in Latin America. See John Kenneth Galbraith, *Economics and the Public Purpose*, Boston, Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1973.

patterns, intensify public insecurity. The most influential of these warnings up to the present have referred to ecological and demographic limits to growth. These warnings have been accompanied by prescriptions that suppose a high level of State capacity to plan and of public capacity to change life-styles through some combination of mass conversion and technocratic regulation. However, these very capacities have quickly come under question in diagnoses of the social and political limits to growth. The latter diagnoses, while their direct influence is relatively restricted, give intellectual justification for the popular distrust of the welfare State.¹⁴

(c) Middle- and working-class life-styles and consumption goals begin to change, although the standards of the high-production, high-consumption society remain predominant. The unforeseen consequences of mass access to what have recently been labelled 'positional goods' generate simultaneous disillusionment with these goods and more frantic striving for incomes guaranteeing access to goods still conferring special advantages.¹⁵ The influence of the 'work

¹⁴"... the most significant limits to growth ... are limits set by the already overstrained capacity of human beings to conceive, design, manage, support and adapt to extremely complex systems of human interdependence. In short, it is the political limits that are likely to constrain the continuity of physical growth well ahead of all other factors." (Rufus E. Miles, Jr., *Awakening from the American Dream: The Social and Political Limits to Growth*, New York, Universe Books, 1976, p. 2.) "The core of the problem is that the market provides a full range of choice between alternative piecemeal, discrete, marginal adjustments, but no facility for choice between alternative States... By contrast, the political mechanism, through which preferences between alternative States could in principle be posed, has not yet developed a satisfactory system for such decision... Consequently, the capacity of both the market and the political system to meet expectations tends to be overestimated. They cannot deliver on what the public takes to be their promise." (Fred Hirsch, *Social Limits to Growth: A Twentieth Century Fund Study*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1976, p. 18.)

¹⁵'Positional goods' are goods whose utility to the individual is negatively affected by increases in the

ethic' and the prestige of durable consumer goods begin to decline. Leisure, vacation travel, sexual contacts, and a wide range of 'do-it-yourself' activities become more highly valued and socially acceptable. Alternative life-styles, some of them approximating to the ideals of 'another development', take shape among minorities; an apparent widening of the range of choice contradicts the bureaucratization of the societies. Publications that, in many variants, predict doom for consumerism, argue for alternatives, and offer guidelines, reach a broad public. At the same time, in certain medium-sized high-income countries in which the welfare State has reached its closest approximation to satisfaction of material needs and provision of abundant leisure to the whole population, the apathetic response of the majority to the apparent opportunities for creative life-styles troubles social scientists and political ideologists.

(d) Aggressively egalitarian and libertarian movements emerge among racial and linguistic minorities, women, youth, homosexuals, etc. The movements in question, particularly among the youth, either have a cyclical character, rising and falling rapidly in followings and militancy, or undergo continual metamorphoses in demands and tactics. The manner in which the mass communication media disseminate information on them and emphasize their more extreme or picturesque features exacerbates these latter traits. Descriptions and interpretations quickly become dated, as in the case of the identification by some social scientists in the late 1960s of a profound revolution in the values and behaviour of the educated youth; the ferment of youth subsided by the early 1970s, but now may be on the rise again. The movements in question affect the functioning of society and the State in several quite different ways:

(i) They exert pressure on the State to guarantee rights and offset social or biological handicaps by regulations and compensatory services, as in the cases of 'affirmative action' to guarantee women and minorities parity in employment and education. These measures place unprecedented responsibilities on the welfare State and introduce serious rigidities into the functioning of public services and private enterprises;

(ii) Some of them resort readily to extra-legal tactics such as disruption of essential services, boycotts and tax strikes that hamper the functioning of the State and contribute to its discredit as either impotent or repressive.

(iii) They generate a wide range of initiatives for personal or group secession from the prevailing life-style and the political and economic systems;

(iv) The clash in life-styles, the cultural shock caused by certain libertarian demands, and the frictions produced by bureaucratic regulation of group rights excite organized resistance, counter-mobilization, and extra-legal disruption by other elements of the societies, including the police.

(e) The traditional political roles of the middle and working classes shift to some extent. The more highly educated and upper-income elements of the middle classes become more open to new life-styles, egalitarian and reformist policies, and global issues such as environmental protection and limits to growth. A large part of the working class, particularly the better-off and better-organized elements, remains culturally conservative, becomes less open to the appeals of socialist and social reform ideologies, and concentrates on particularist demands. The impingement on its values of the middle-class cultural revolution, and the impact on its immediate interests of continual technological innovation, loss of dynamism and dwindling employment in traditional heavy industries, and internationalization of production and labour markets under the aegis

number of persons having access to them (e.g., automobiles, suburban homes, higher education). See Hirsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-31.

of the transnational corporations, place it on the defensive. It thus exerts pressure on the State to stimulate production along traditional lines, to restrict imports, and to exclude foreign labour.¹⁶ It is generally negative toward environmental and energy-saving regulations that might curtail employment.

(f) The complexity of the public services required by high-consumption, highly urbanized, highly mobile societies means that a wide variety of specialized occupational groups either negotiating directly with the State (police, firemen, postal employees, teachers, doctors, etc.) or engaged in activities so central to the functioning of the society that their demands impinge necessarily on the State (transport, power and communications workers) become able to enforce demands by tactics disrupting the life-styles and expectations of large sectors of the population. Their increasing readiness to resort to such tactics, and the decreasing capacity of the State to prevent this by legal prohibitions and repression, coincides with widespread dissatisfaction over the declining quality of the services and the inability of the State to run them efficiently.

(g) Mass formal education shares conspicuously in the disillusionment with the achievements of the welfare State. The apparent capacity of the schools to socialize youth and inculcate tool skills declines, in spite of increasingly prolonged and costly compulsory periods of schooling, during a period in which the capacity of the family to perform these functions is also declining. The impression gains ground that the

schools are serving a custodial function (freeing parents for work and keeping children off the streets) more than an educational function. The egalitarian objectives discussed above force additional responsibilities on the schools while widely publicized research fortifies scepticism as to the capacity of the schools to contribute to such objectives. At the same time, the 'massification' of higher education devalues its role in selection for preferred occupations, leads to further prolongation at post-graduate levels, and contributes to the cycles of youth protest. 'Scholarly research' becomes increasingly formalized as a means of employing and also screening the products of higher education. Some of the eligible youth abandon education in rejection of these patterns.

(h) Fertility rates decline with unexpected rapidity to levels below replacement, with consequent accelerated aging of the national populations.¹⁷ This has a series of repercussions on the societies that will become progressively more important:

(i) The numbers of young people passing through the school systems in the 1960s and then entering the labour market in the 1970s have been exceptionally high owing to the so-called 'baby boom' of the later 1940s and the 1950s. With the present slowdown in economic growth their absorption into the labour force is lagging. Unemployment rates for the active population under 25 years of age are much higher than rates for the rest of the active population. The more highly educated youth have difficulties in finding jobs matching their expectations, and the least educated cannot find jobs of any kind. However, the numbers

¹⁶Celso Furtado points out that the large corporations have a choice of two tactics to increase profits, to the extent that the State permits their use: exporting production to subsidiaries in countries with low labour costs and importing labour from the same countries. The immediate interest of the organized workers in the high-wage countries, except in periods of very rapid economic growth and full employment, in which they are not interested in jobs in the lower range of skills and wages, is to exert pressure on the State to prevent the corporations from using either tactic. See Celso Furtado, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-48.

¹⁷In the countries with relatively high fertility rates in the recent past, such as the United States, this does not preclude the likelihood of a stationary population before the end of the century, even if the present trend continues. In Germany (the Democratic Republic as well as the Federal Republic), however, and in a few other European countries in which a recent drop in the birth rate follows a relatively long period of low fertility, the population is now beginning to decline.

entering the school systems have been falling for some time, and projections for the future are now being revised downward.¹⁸ The numbers entering the labour market will also shortly begin to fall. Presumably the excess of young entrants over demand will dry up and be replaced by an excess of demand over supply, although the groups that have experienced prolonged unemployment may continue to present serious problems of adaptation. Whether the lesser numbers of youth will result in labour shortages will depend partly on future rates of economic growth and styles of technological innovation and partly on the participation rates of women, immigrants, and the upper age groups;

(ii) The unexpectedly rapid aging of the population is already producing important shifts in needs for different social services, with unused capacity in the schools and overburdened services for the aged. The importance of geriatric medical care rises and that of pediatric care declines. The market for consumer goods, recreational services and housing also changes. Within the norms of the consumer society, industry and advertising must adjust and try to manipulate the changes;

(iii) The increase in the relative size of the upper age groups and the continual amplification of social security benefits and coverage over recent years generate unexpectedly formidable rises in social security costs, bringing abruptly to the attention of the societies the ominous

implications of the future burden. This trend combines with the broader disillusionment with the welfare State and the quest for alternative life-styles to encourage rising evasion of labour laws and taxes, particularly through self-employment and artisan-type activities. Complex conflicts of interests and aspirations between the population of active ages and the upper age groups, or between sectors of both groups, are emerging. With recession the position of older workers becomes more insecure; if their jobs disappear they are unlikely to find new ones. Some of the aging continue to press for early pensioned retirement, while others demand the abolition of fixed-age retirement and legally-guaranteed equal access to jobs, because of the frustrations of inactivity at reduced income levels. Increased employment of the aging will presumably become necessary to compensate for the decline in young entrants to the labour force and relieve the social security burden. During the transition period, however, this will generate other frustrations among the younger employed whose prospects for better-paying jobs and promotions become clogged. It will also add to the complexity of bureaucratic protection of equal rights. Even without the re-entry of the groups above present retirement ages, the average age of the labour force will rise, and warnings are now heard that this will mean a crippling of innovativeness and labour mobility;

(iv) According to some prognoses, the industrialized countries are falling into a demographic trap, in which the devaluation of the family and the increasing burden of the aged on the young will lead to fertility rates permanently below replacement levels and to impoverished and decadent national societies. It seems equally likely, however, that future fertility rates, with universally accessible and acceptable

¹⁸In the United States, projections for total school-age population (5-24) in the year 2000 have been revised downward from 125 million to 79 million, only slightly higher than the present figure. The proportion of high school students going on to higher education is declining, and this, together with the decreases in size of the age groups, indicates that higher enrolment may be only 13 million in 2000, as against the 17 to 22 million once expected. (See "The Future Revised: Education's Big Boom is Ending but Studies to Get More Diverse", *The Wall Street Journal*, 8 April 1976.)

contraception and abortion, will fluctuate abruptly with changing cultural fashions, economic conditions, and degrees of optimism or pessimism concerning the future, resulting in unprecedentedly uneven age profiles of the population. It is also probable that the populations of the industrialized countries will increasingly be replenished, whether their dominant forces permit this or not, by waves of migrants from other parts of the world. For national societies adjusting to the ecological, political and social limits to growth and to the demands for human equality the present demographic trends are not necessarily negative, and it is simplistic to assume that an aging population must be stagnant. However, the trends obviously call for comprehensive readjustments in work patterns, in sources and uses of income, and in social interactions, for which there is at present no consensus.

(i) The industrialized countries become increasingly dependent on foreign labour to perform lower-paid manual work. The characteristics and circumstances of entry of such labour differ according to the country concerned, but it has become important throughout the industrialized world. In some countries it is composed mainly of migrant workers under contract for fixed terms, without families; in others of illegal migrants with or without families; in others of permanent immigrants mainly with families and selected by the host government according to some criterion of employability; in still others of migrants deriving rights of entry from the former colonial status of their homeland. The migrant workers come mainly from 'semi-developed' countries rather than from the 'least-developed' countries whose excess labour force is physically and educationally ill-adapted to the demand. The semi-developed countries consequently face a drain of labour in times of prosperity, offset by remittances to families from workers abroad, and an intensified unemployment problem in times of recession.

(Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Mexico, and the Caribbean island countries are those most affected.) Whatever the circumstances of their entry, the migrants gradually gain a permanent foothold in the labour force and the society of the host country, under disadvantageous and sometimes conflictive conditions, and their presence changes the outlook and conditions for solidarity of the working class. Economic recession and rising unemployment make it probable that the entry of migrants will be curbed during the immediate future, but these factors do not altogether offset their willingness to accept incomes and working conditions that are no longer acceptable to the host country's own labor force.

Two quite different kinds of migrants are also contributing to the increasingly multi-ethnic character of the populations of the industrialized countries: professionals and technicians entering the labour force at middle or even high income levels, and political exiles whose insertion into the labour force is often unrelated to their previous experience. The numbers and national diversity of political exiles have increased rapidly, and they are beginning to have important catalytic roles both in the organization of other migrants and in the evolution of political movements in the host countries.

(j) Modernization of agriculture, shifts in the structure of industrial production and other factors have brought about wide variations in rates of economic growth, income levels and demands for manpower in different internal regions. In the European countries here considered, with nearly full employment from the late 1940s up to the mid-1970s and with slow growth in the labour force offset by the importation of labour, these disparities have not generated unmanageable tensions in the urban zones of rapid growth and immigration, but they are generating increasingly militant demands for autonomy and for a larger share of public resources on the part of declining regions

and occupations, especially but not exclusively where the regional population is culturally or linguistically distinct from the national majority. Questions of the unity of the nation-State and the basis for claims to self-determination, which seemed to have been resolved in Europe, have thus been reopened with unexpected violence.

In the United States the consequences of uneven regional growth and changes in livelihood have been quite different. Exceptionally rapid modernization has expelled from agriculture a population with relatively low educational and skill levels, and in large part hampered by racial discrimination. A 'marginalized' population in extreme poverty by national norms has thus concentrated in the great cities, bringing about a sometimes violent competition for jobs, services and housing between the new urbanites and the longer-established urban working class; the mushrooming of an extremely costly public welfare system that unintentionally generates disincentives to employment and stable family life; and the flight of much of the middle-class urban population to the suburbs. As the new urbanites become increasingly able to compete with other urban groups in enforcing demands through the vote and through organized action, city government enters upon a crisis of continually rising costs and static resources. The simultaneous entry of millions of foreign workers, first in agriculture and later in the lower-paid urban occupations, places additional strain on the national capacity for adaptation to economic, demographic, and cultural change.

(k) Crime, especially violent crime, increases markedly in quantity and visibility. This trend is associated to some extent with the urban crisis referred to above, but appears also in countries in which this crisis is not acute. While speculation on crime requires particular caution, in view of temptation to sensationalism and the unreliability of indicators, it is plausible that the rise in visible crime reflects the declining legitimacy of the State and the social order

that also manifests itself in the militant libertarian-egalitarian demands and the quest for alternative life-styles. The 'respectable' elements of the societies vacillate between demands for drastic repression and demands for broad reforms aimed at the social causes of crime, with declining confidence in the effectiveness of any solution. There follows resentment against the State for inability to cope with the problems; increased distrust of ethnic groups associated with violent crime; and generalized refusal on the part of the marginalized urban population to accept the role of deviants from a just social order. Resistance movements and links with political militance emerge in the prisons, increasingly overcrowded and discredited in their rehabilitative and punitive functions.

(l) Reactions of different sectors of public opinion to trends in the rest of the world become increasingly confused, self-contradictory, guilt-laden, and resentful. The concern of parts of the middle classes and parts of the labour movement over world poverty, human rights, population growth, environmental and related problems becomes stronger, but mingles with rising disillusionment over the efficacy of 'aid' (military as well as economic and social); resentment over aggressive economic and other policies of Third World governments; uneasiness concerning the domestic repercussions (particularly the impact on employment) of the activities of transnational corporations in these countries; and hardening of stereotypes concerning the oppressiveness, corruption and incompetence of Third World governments and dominant classes. Small but conspicuous political movements identify themselves with Third World revolutionary struggles and even try to reproduce these struggles in their own countries.

Distrust of the motives of the home government in supporting and distributing 'aid' in the face of apparent governmental incapacity to solve domestic problems is probably most pronounced in the larger industrialized countries, particularly in the

United States in the aftermath of the Vietnam war. In certain middle-sized countries in Europe and in certain Commonwealth countries the more articulate current of public opinion seem to favour the kind of transformation in the Third World that is summed up in 'another development' and to support relatively openhanded government co-operation in such initiatives. In the European countries in question this sentiment coincides with the achievement of relatively egalitarian welfare-oriented societies under democratic socialist governments. Elsewhere, particularly in Canada and Australia, nationalist reactions against economic, political and cultural dominance by the world centres have generated a degree of self-identification with the Third World, without, of course, overcoming the confused, suspicious, or censorious attitudes noted above.

(m) Japan, ever since it entered the modern world order, has contradicted current theories of development and modernization, constituting an astonishing example of what can be achieved by a country with an unfavourable resource endowment and a social structure very different from that associated with capitalist development elsewhere. At present, it also constitutes a *reductio ad absurdum* of expectations concerning the benefits of very high economic growth rates. Most of the seeds of change discussed above are visible, but their specific traits and their probable consequences are far apart from those noted in Europe and the United States.

One sees at present: (i) Apparent proximity to the ecological limits of growth in terms of air and water pollution and intensified overcrowding of population combined with mass ownership of durable goods; (ii) Exceptionally rapid incorporation of the population into a consumer society, with a particularly traumatic consumer shift from products moderate in space and energy demands to the automobile; (iii) Rapid increase in resistance by the working class to the low wage levels that facilitated export-

oriented economic growth; (iv) Demographic transition to low fertility accelerating through the 1950s, resulting in a present labour force nearly stationary in size; (v) In consequence of these four trends, an urgent need to export further industrial growth to countries with more abundant manpower, low wage levels, and more incipient pollution problems (in contrast to Western Europe, which has imported workers to take the less attractive jobs, Japan is exporting the jobs; in the United States the two tactics have been followed simultaneously); (vi) A boom in mass tourism, mainly to countries with lower costs of recreational services (the impact of European tourism on the Mediterranean and of United States tourism on Mexico and the Caribbean has its counterpart in Japanese tourism in Southeast Asia); (vii) Most recently, a sharp decline in the rate of growth in production, the appearance of appreciable unemployment for the first time since the early post-war period, and the weakening of traditions of job security in enterprises.

The vulnerability of the economy to external shocks and the improbability of recuperation of growth rates matching those of the past are presumably important stimuli to anxiety and distrust of the capacity of the State to cope; however, these factors are offset by a high degree of social discipline and by social sources of personal security unmatched in the United States or Europe. At the same time, violent rejection of the existing order by political movements with an appreciable following among the youth takes particularly extreme forms, and frustration at the shattering by external and internal factors of the dream of permanent full employment and consumerist development may well exacerbate this tendency.

(n) In the European Mediterranean countries overall trends and patterns differ from those of the rest of Europe, in ways that are of particular interest to Latin America. The countries in this group are Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. France has certain traits in common with the group in spite of its

higher income level; Yugoslavia in spite of its socialist economic and political system; and Turkey in spite of its lower income level and more predominantly rural population. The countries in question are economically and socially semi-developed or unevenly developed. Their more backward internal regions are suppliers of labour not only to the more developed parts of the same countries but also to the rest of Europe. Tourism from the rest of Europe is an important factor in their economic growth and in their social changes. Tourism, as in Mexico and the Caribbean, demands at the same time considerable investment in modern facilities expected by tourists, the preservation of a 'traditional' culture and artisanal activities, and relatively low wage rates in service occupations. These countries are undergoing rapid and uneven modernization, with more disruptive socio-cultural consequences than in the rest of Europe; differences between the life-styles of internal regions and social classes continue to be wide. The demographic transition to low rates of population increase is only recently completed or is now under way. Politicization is relatively intense, with Marxist working-class parties; neo-Marxist and anarchist intellectual currents and youth movements; clerical, traditional-reactionary and neo-Fascist movements; and national-separatist movements, all showing greater vigour and mass support than elsewhere in the 'developed' non-Socialist world. The capacity of the State to act as arbiter is increasingly precarious, for different reasons in each country. The political role of the military is prominent but ambiguous, sometimes shoring up the existing order, sometimes pressing for radical change.

The resemblances to Latin American patterns are obvious, and a good deal of mutual political-ideological-cultural interaction might be expected. In the Mediterranean countries, however, the relative size and influence of the organized working class are greater and the dimensions of the marginalized rural and urban groups in

critical poverty smaller; the political game is more structured; the influence of parties with mass memberships and coherent ideologies is stronger; the appeal of populism and charismatic leadership is weaker; and the capacity of the military to act autonomously in pursuit of self-determined political missions is somewhat more limited. Industrialization in most of the Mediterranean countries is more advanced both quantitatively and qualitatively; the national bourgeoisie has a higher degree of control of the major enterprises; and some transnational corporations are based in Mediterranean countries.

In the cyclical swings between authoritarian and democratic-pluralist régimes characteristic of both regions, Latin America has in recent years been moving in the direction of authoritarianism in the presence of conflicts otherwise unmanageable by the dominant forces, while the Mediterranean countries have been moving in the opposite direction. Popular frustration over economic recession and rising unemployment, swelled by the reflux of workers from the rest of Europe, at a time when the societies were on the verge of mass consumerism and the workers were refusing to accept previous wage levels, may be particularly important here, whether in providing impetus toward structural transformations or in bringing about a reversal of the political cycle. However, the Mediterranean countries are complexly committed to a world order and a European order that penalize deviations from pluralist democracy in politics and from openness to international market forces in the economy. The leaders of the mass political movements ideologically committed to structural transformation are evidently well aware of the constraints presented by the international order and by the consumption expectations of different classes within the countries. Thus, their programmes and tactics become more cautious to the extent that governmental power becomes a real possibility for them. At the same time, smaller movements at both ends of the

political spectrum that refuse to accept the constraints increasingly resort to disruptive or terrorist tactics.

3. *The socialist 'camps'*

Seeds of change in the 'Second World' of industrialized countries whose dominant forces identify them as socialist and view development from a Marxist-Leninist perspective can be discussed with relative brevity. The present section focuses on the probable implications for Latin America of internal changes in national societies in the rest of the world. Latin American interactions with the Second World, in spite of the presence in the region of one country committed to Marxist-Leninist socialism, are relatively restricted. Even the currents of opinion that seek radically different styles of development now find more in common with similar currents in the First World and in the remainder of the Third World than in the institutionalized socialism of the Second World. The appeal of the industrialized socialist countries as models for the Good Society seems to be static or declining in spite of their demonstrable achievements and their deliberate competition for acceptance as models.

Moreover, it is harder to identify the significant internal seeds of change in the socialist countries and assess their capacity for growth than in the case of the countries discussed above. The dominant forces are better able to control or conceal their manifestations. For some time the Second World will probably be able to transmit to the Third World a narrower and more coherent range of messages, and to accept fewer stimuli to change from it, than will the industrialized market-economy countries, but sudden changes in the messages and stimuli or an increasing diversification and contradictoriness cannot be ruled out.

The Second World is notoriously divided into two rival camps that agree in very little except in their rejection of capitalist organization of production and in the indispensability of Marxism-Leninism as a theo-

retical framework for policy. Yugoslavia seemed for a time to offer another model of particular interest to semi-industrialized Third World countries, but its external influence has waned. Yugoslavia's experience in decentralized workers' management and the combination of market incentives with socialist central planning has been ambiguous; and the seeds of change now visible suggest that the national society has not overcome the sources of tension common to the semi-industrialized labour-exporting tourism-dependent Mediterranean countries.

The first major camp, that of the U.S.S.R. and its European associates, seems to have entered a period of routinized imposition of stereotypes concerning the style of development and the level of human welfare achieved. Reform initiatives that seemed promising during the 1960s have been ruled out as dangerous to the system of political domination, and the national régimes and societies have evolved with varying degrees of rigidity or flexibility within the limits of the system. The countries are moving haltingly toward the achievement of consumer societies similar to those now undergoing cultural mutations elsewhere. This trend has several features: (i) a raising of consumption levels and introduction of durable consumer goods officially planned and controlled; (ii) an infiltration of cultural-recreational tastes and aspirations, particularly among urban youth, that is disapproved but largely uncontrollable; (iii) a proliferation of illicit or unrecognized systems for the production and distribution of consumer goods and services that parallels the phenomena of 'black' labour escaping regulation and taxation in the market-economy welfare States. Under these conditions, cultural influences, including forms of dissidence, from the richer consumer societies are better able to penetrate the socialist societies than the latter are to exert counter-influences. The long experience of austerity does not seem to have generated creative life-styles, but a hidden appetite that emerges to the extent

that real consumption opportunities appear.

Several factors hamper the movement toward the consumer society: (i) the lagging productivity of agriculture, making the achievement of a varied diet precarious, increasingly dependent on external supplies, and politically neuralgic; (ii) the low capacity of the planning system to improve consumer goods production, distribution and responsiveness to consumer tastes; (iii) chronic problems of work incentives and societal participation associated with a long history of routinized and centralized mobilization and exhortation; and (iv) the need to devote relatively high proportions of the national income to armaments and heavy industry related to armaments in order to meet prevailing conceptions of the obligations of a world power and match a rival enjoying a much higher per capita income level.

In the European parts of this socialist camp low birth rates over a long period are now resulting in nearly stationary and aging labour forces and the beginning of labour transfers from less industrialized socialist countries or peripheral zones of the same countries, supplementing previous flows of rural labour into industry. Pressures on women to enter the labour force have been constant, and the high participation of women, along with urban housing shortages, has contributed to the low birth rates.

Recent trends of particular importance in the smaller countries of this camp include: (i) increasing reliance on mass tourism from Western Europe as a source of foreign exchange; (ii) increasing receptivity to transnational enterprises offering technological innovations and exportable products in exchange for an entry into new markets and a low-wage, dependable, relatively well-qualified labour force. Both trends point to increasing dependence on cultural and technological innovations from the market-oriented consumer societies.

In the second camp China stands alone, with a unique combination of advanced industrial-technological capacity, huge population, low income levels and peasant

majority that differentiates it both from the first socialist camp and from the increasing number of small non-industrialized Third World countries whose dominant forces have chosen variants of Marxism-Leninism as frames of reference for policy. In recent years the Chinese socialist style of development has manifested an innovative capacity greater than that of the first socialist camp, with periods of consolidation-bureaucratization alternating with periods of revolutionary ferment generated by poorly understood combinations of stimuli from above and pressures from below. It is much better shielded from the heterogeneous influences emanating from mutating consumer societies than is the Soviet-Central European style. The sheer impossibility of substituting diversified industrial consumer goods incentives for shared frugality in a population such as the Chinese, the smallness of the groups even aware of other life-styles, and the capacity of the leadership to generate compelling national objectives should combine to preserve the coherence of the style for some time to come, although not necessarily with the kind of conflictive innovativeness with which it has been associated.

The Chinese style of development, or rather the idealized versions of it current abroad, has two facets associated with the alternation mentioned above and appealing to completely different currents of opinion in the rest of the world: (i) the frugal, egalitarian, resource-conserving, orderly, peasant-based social order, generating innovations in local participation and labour-intensive production but otherwise conformist, zealously practising family planning, attractive to frustrated developmentalists of many political complexions; (ii) the 'cultural revolutionary' challenge to political gradualism, bourgeois life-styles, bureaucratization and imperialism, accompanied by an apocalyptic vision of the future, inspiring the Maoist movements outside China and especially attractive to minorities among university-educated youth.

China has also been crucially important

to the advocates of 'another development', both as a source of concrete prescriptions for rural transformation and as the only plausible demonstration (other than Tanzania) that a real national society might set out seriously to realize their frugal egalitarian utopia. The seeds of change now visible in China, and particularly the Chinese revelations of the origins in political factional struggle and the high costs of certain manifestations of technological voluntarism and anti-élitism, suggest that China, like the U.S.S.R. before it, will decline in plausibility as a utopia, or as a scene of Manichean conflicts between champions of 'good' egalitarian-participatory and 'evil' technocratic-centralist policy lines. The warnings of the Chinese themselves that their experience is not a model for the transformation of other societies will have to be taken to heart.

China will retain enormous interest for study of the interplay of political, economic and cultural factors in the socialist transformation of real societies, especially in regard to the management of communications between national centre and periphery in circumstances in which mobilization of the masses has a high priority, peasant cultures and values are undergoing complex mutations, and messages travelling in both directions are bound to become exaggerated and distorted by factors unrelated to their original purpose.

4. Regions of the Third World other than Latin America

It is legitimate to insist, in considering the application of the principles of 'another development' to Latin America, that the relatively urbanized and industrialized position of the larger countries of the region, and their complex involvement in the present international order, imply quite different options and constraints from those facing the poorer predominantly rural parts of the world. The present paper has already suggested that mutations in the central market-economy countries are particularly relevant

to the possibilities for transformation in Latin America. However, it would be equally over-simplified to suppose a clear-cut dividing line between 'semi-developed' Latin America and the rest of the Third World. In differing ways, most of the other Third World countries are also complexly involved in the international order. The aspiration to endogenous rural-community-oriented styles of development in a good many of these countries has stronger justifications than in Latin America, but it is not clear whether the resistances to such styles from the unevenly modernized social, political and economic structures will be any less formidable.

The Third World national societies outside Latin America can be classified according to several criteria, all of which have some relevance for present purposes: (i) according to the size of the populations and their economies, and thus to their weight within the world order; (ii) according to geographical and cultural proximity and consequent intensity of interactions; (iii) according to endowment with or lack of raw materials in sufficient international demand to give them strong bargaining positions; (iv) according to political régimes (stable or unstable authoritarian, one-party mobilization, negotiated balance between ethnic-religious-linguistic groups, democratic-pluralist); (v) according to levels of per capita income, urbanization and industrialization (that is, approximation to patterns of semi-development); and (vi) according to the system or style of development preferred by the forces controlling the State (liberal-capitalist, State-capitalist, socialist, various hybrids). At present, a comparison of classifications according to these different criteria would show more incongruities than regularities. In particular, the adoption by forces controlling the State of a capitalist or socialist or hybrid strategy for development has become increasingly divorced from the objective conditions. The worldwide reproduction of the European model of the nation-State accompanying the liquidation of colonialism, in regions in which traditional

political loyalties had quite different bases (dynastic-absolutist, feudal, tribal, etc.) has been fruitful of anomalies.

For present purposes, the following five-fold semi-regional classification may be most suggestive: the Arab States (including those of North Africa) and Iran; Africa south of the Sahara; the South Asian States with huge populations and particularly low incomes; the States of Southeast Asia; the island mini-States of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the Caribbean. Each group is internally heterogeneous but has common traits not shared to the same degree with the rest of the Third World, and interactions within the groups—conflictive as well as co-operative—are more intense than interactions with the Third World as a whole.

(a) In many respects the Arab-Iranian group has more in common with Latin America than have the other groups: long traditions of urban political-economic-cultural dominance, very wide differences between countries in stages of economic growth, in degrees of urbanization-modernization, and in political régimes, combined with strong cultural-linguistic ties, well established mechanisms for group action, and also deeply-rooted sources of intra-group conflict. The larger countries, including oil exporters such as Iran as well as importers such as Egypt and Morocco, have reached patterns of dependent semi-development similar to those of Latin America. The upper-income strata have broadened and diversified; the gap between them and the lower strata in the income distribution has widened; 'modern' consumer societies for minorities have emerged; and a marginalized under-employed labour force is expanding.

The degree of voluntarism and diversity in governmental choices of styles of development is a good deal higher than in Latin America. However, the non-capitalist development strategies that have emerged in several countries have been relatively centralized, bureaucratized, oriented to the introduction of advanced technologies in

industry and agriculture, heavily dependent on imported equipment and specialists in the oil-exporting countries and on external financial aid in the others. The advocates of 'another development' have not found congenial innovative and participatory styles in this group of countries.¹⁹ In any case, countries in this group seem to have a high propensity toward the exertion of pressures for change in the international order as a whole, owing partly to oil resources and consequent availability of funds that governments can allocate with fewer constraints than elsewhere, partly to strategic geopolitical location, and partly to the contradictory combination of militant solidarity and violent factionalism that derives from the Israel-Palestine problem.

(b) In Africa south of the Sahara questions of national identity and viability are particularly prominent, with the region fragmented into a large number of relatively small States, most of them with very short histories within their present boundaries, few of them internally homogeneous, few of them with human or material resources sufficient for 'development' as this has conventionally been understood. Thus, external aid and regional solidarity, the latter partly to insure that 'aid' will not perpetuate dependency and conflict between clients of different industrialized States, are particularly necessary and particularly difficult to obtain and manage. Initiatives for regional unity coexist uneasily with centrifugal pressures within countries, with the emergence in some countries of erratic personal rule and also with aspirations to autonomous national styles of development, usually labelled 'socialist', and intended to bypass the impracticability of conventional development styles and supply cultural-psychological compensations. Political-bureaucratic-military élites (with roles not clearly differen-

¹⁹In assessing the purportedly socialist as well as the market-economy countries in the group, Samir Amin observes that the Arab world is already markedly urbanized; its *petite bourgeoisie*, a reactionary class

tiated) have a relatively free hand to choose such styles because of the weakness of other social forces. At the same time, the weaknesses of the State machinery, the limitations of communication between the élites and the mainly rural masses, the dependence of the economies on raw material exports and external subsidies, and the adoption by the élites of consumerist ways of life that require concentration in their hands of the proceeds of the exports and coercion of the peasant producers result in real styles that various analysts identify as 'bureaucratic-capitalist' rather than 'socialist'. Only one of the national strategies, that of Tanzania, has attracted the advocates of 'another development' as a potential model for participatory egalitarian transformation, and even here the constraints of economic dependence, meagre resource endowment, and faulty communications between innovating élite and masses remain inhibitive. While a few of the African countries (Nigeria, Zaire, Zambia) have achieved relatively strong positions as suppliers of important raw materials, none of them as yet has been able to industrialize to a significant degree or to achieve a relative weight in the region comparable to those of some Arab and Latin American countries in their regions.

(c) The larger South Asian States are, in terms of per capita income and absolute size of populations at extremely low levels of productivity and consumption, the 'least-developed' in the world. (For present purposes, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh belong to this group; Sri Lanka, in spite of its geographical location, has more in

common with the next group to be discussed.) If international aid were distributed according to a uniform means test, the countries in this group would receive most of it. At the same time, all of them have industrial sectors and export activities which, while small in relation to their populations, are fairly large in absolute terms or compared with those of other Third World countries. In India, in particular, the combination of an enormous population, a substantial industrial base, and strong political and administrative institutions supports a position of considerable importance in the world order, in spite of the extreme poverty of the majority. Structurally heterogeneous development, as in Latin America, has generated its own market and its own vested interests in perpetuation of the same style. In South Asia, the conservative character of the forces dominant over the rural majority props up this line of development politically while hampering it economically. Up to the present, socialist-reformist aspirations of the national régimes have led to bureaucratization and the construction of complex systems of special privileges rather than to major changes in economic and social realities, as was documented in Gunnar Myrdal's *Asian Drama* (1968).

The warnings now current of critical poverty deteriorating into mass famines apply more plausibly to South Asia and to parts of Africa than to other regions of the Third World. In Africa, the populations threatened are relatively small, and although relief action is hindered by their geographical remoteness and other factors, famines can be arrested by international aid without unmanageable costs. If the international sources of aid do not act or act ineffectually, as in the Sahel and Ethiopian droughts of the early 1970s, the international repercussions of famines in isolated thinly populated areas are weak. In South Asia, the overall capacity to increase food production faster than population is not yet exhausted, as the statistics of the most recent years show, but the governments have permanent difficul-

integrated into the capitalist system, is highly developed; its rural areas are dominated by the kulaks, beneficiaries of the bourgeois land reforms; and all this is reflected in profound deculturation, great moral and intellectual disarray, in short, all the signs of lumpen-Europeanization. And he goes on to add that hope lies simply and solely in the fact that the manifold contradictions bred of this dependent development can no longer be overcome. (See Samir Amin, *La nation arabe: nationalisme et luttes de classes*, Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1976, pp. 150-151.)

ties in managing production incentives, prices to the consumer and distribution networks so as to reconcile their various objectives, and remain dependent on subsidized food imports to meet shortfalls. Various prognoses indicate that over the long term only a comprehensively planned combination of agrarian transformation, population control, and very large-scale external aid will be able to prevent an unmanageably wide gap between food needs and food supplies.²⁰ Even in the short term, a few bad crop years might face the international food distribution system with a crisis that it would not meet, particularly if production were to slump in the United States, the U.S.S.R., and South Asia simultaneously. A famine decimating the populations of some or all of the countries in this group would follow. The shock for the international order and for the region itself would be severe, but the consequences are hard to assess, and the kind of chaotic general collapse sometimes predicted seems unlikely. One might expect an exacerbation of several different trends in the central countries as well as in South Asia—toward horrified rejection of the prevailing international order and consumerist styles of development, toward greater national selfishness and insistence on population control as the only solution, toward more repressive régimes protecting the lives and property of the better-off South Asians with assistance from some of the central countries, and toward protracted revolutionary struggles aimed at the implantation of egalitarian austerity. The past experience of China as well as India demonstrates that famines in peasant populations do not by themselves bring about either the collapse or the transformation of the pre-existing social and political order.

The poverty of the masses of South Asia and the increasing implausibility of expect-

tations that industrialization and agricultural modernization can overcome this poverty have been crucial to demonstrations of the necessity of 'another development'. At the same time, conceptions of rural community potential for endogenous self-reliant development stemming from Gandhism have been nearly as influential as the Chinese experience in shaping the more concrete prescriptions. It must be remembered that in the 1950s the Government of India hoped to combine development through industrialization with large-scale programmes of rural community development, using trained change agents to stimulate innovation, cooperation and self-help in the villages. Neither these programmes nor the more recent introduction of high-yielding crop varieties (the so-called Green Revolution) seem to have brought the rural societies any closer to the ideals of social equality and collective effort. The rural power holders, through their links with the national power structure, have consistently been able to manipulate the rural programmes, whether the latter were participationist or technocratic in orientation. Arguments for endogenously-inspired collective rural development are now being made with renewed fervor, and local initiatives corresponding to the ideals continue to appear, but the way to multiply these initiatives to a scale matching the needs for rural transformation without their undergoing bureaucratic standardization or capture by local vested interests seems no clearer than before.

(d) The national societies of Southeast Asia have in common medium size, relatively satisfactory ratios between land and population that are now endangered by high rates of population increase, and peasant majorities which, except in some war-devastated or otherwise disadvantaged internal zones, have not reached the depths of poverty and precarious food supply in which their counterparts in South Asia are submerged. Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka belong to this group. Indonesia

²⁰See, for example, the scenarios in Mihajlo Meszarovic and Eduard Pestel, *Mankind at the Turning Point*, *op.cit.*

has many traits in common with it in spite of its larger population and the higher proportion of this population in critical poverty. Singapore and Hong Kong, as city States without a rural hinterland, are comparable to certain rapidly industrializing urban centres of the other countries, but not to the countries themselves.

Southeast Asia now comprises States that have embarked vigorously on dependent capitalist styles of development (the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Hong Kong, as well as Indonesia) and States with Socialist styles closer to the Chinese than to the Soviet model (although not necessarily in their political affiliations) that have emerged following prolonged and very destructive periods of warfare. Two countries fall outside this dichotomy; Burma has a self-isolated 'military socialist' régime *sui generis* that has excluded dependent industrialization and urban consumer-society modernization and has relied on the peasant majority's ability to produce surpluses of rice, without, apparently, achieving significant innovations in social relations or production. Sri Lanka since the 1940s has achieved a range of social services and consumption subsidies unique among low-income non-socialist countries. The experience of Sri Lanka is of considerable interest for 'another development'. First, it has demonstrated that redistributive policies for the satisfaction of basic needs can be materially and administratively feasible in a poor country with a rural majority. Secondly, it has demonstrated that such policies can emerge from open political competition for mass support, at formidable costs of several kinds but without necessarily incurring the breakdowns that have been common to populist régimes in countries with considerably higher income levels. Thirdly, it has demonstrated that, within a dependent capitalist raw-material-export-oriented economic framework, the inhibiting effects of such policies on accumulation and production incentives, while formidable, can be bearable and compatible with a certain

amount of economic growth over an extended period. Lastly, on the negative side, Sri Lanka has demonstrated that neither political democracy nor development planning offer effective ways of overcoming the shortcomings of the welfare State, in the absence of a transformation of social structures, values and incentives. Political and economic difficulties have been recurrent and increasingly severe, but no practicable and widely acceptable alternatives to the present system seem to be in sight.

In the market-economy countries of Southeast Asia income concentration seems to be on the increase; minority consumer societies are becoming highly conspicuous, with the expected accompaniment of growing underemployed rural and urban marginal strata. The rise of mass movements of educated youth rejecting the style of development and trying to mobilize the disadvantaged urban and rural masses against it has been particularly pronounced in these countries; while movements of this kind have been repressed and silenced in various countries, their reappearance is probable.

In the three socialist countries, and particularly in Vietnam, the aftermath of war and the paucity of external aid have left no alternative to a frugal, self-reliant, disciplined style of development, and the war itself generated forms of mobilization and control attuned to such a style. The fact of victory against overwhelming odds has given this style considerable potential attraction for seekers of 'another development' in other relatively small and poor countries, but it is not yet clear whether the Southeast Asian socialist countries will over the long term achieve innovative and participatory patterns and exert influence distinct from the Chinese and Soviet models.

The geographic position of Southeast Asia and the declining ability of central countries to enforce hegemony over it gives the dominant forces of the countries, whether capitalist or socialist, a good deal of latitude in modifying the terms of external dependency by varying their relationships

with China, the United States, the U.S.S.R., and Japan, so that the possibilities for innovations in styles of development are relatively favourable. The deliberate self-isolation of Cambodia and the forced transfer to agricultural labour of its urban population show the degree of voluntarism now feasible for the régimes of small countries in zones falling outside the sphere of influence of any one central power. The experiences of Burma and Sri Lanka are less extreme but much longer-continued demonstrations that original paths can be pursued without external sanctions. In the more aggressively market-oriented countries one finds governmental initiatives designed to counteract the polarizing and marginalizing forces of the style of development (through agrarian reforms, employment creation, participatory mechanisms, conciliation of the disaffected youth, campaigns against corruption and concentrated wealth) and tactics aimed at accommodation with socialist neighbours, combined with the maintenance of régimes sufficiently authoritarian to smother internal conflicts, guarantee stable rules of the game and offer a dependable low-wage labour force to transnational enterprises. It is significant that several of these countries have recently been favoured areas of external investment, because of their resource endowment, because of confidence that their dominant forces can maintain order, and because of expectations of growing internal markets for consumer goods. The same is not true of the South Asian countries, because their problems have increasingly seemed insuperable within a peripheral capitalist framework. It is likely that Vietnam will be able to attract similar transnational interest if its authorities find this desirable.

(e) The scattered island mini-States of the Indian and Pacific Oceans and the Caribbean have in common plantation economies, now in many cases undergoing a transformation to tourist economies; ethnically heterogeneous populations deriving largely from successive importations of plantation labour; weak national identities;

dependence on external stimuli and constraints so pronounced as almost to rule out the possibility of autonomous styles of development. These disadvantages may paradoxically, as in the case of some African States, stimulate an intellectual and popular striving for 'something else' in the form of endogenous life-styles, cultural nationalism, xenophobia and charismatic leadership to compensate for the lack of preconditions for conventional development processes and strategies. The mini-States are extreme cases in the present crisis of the nation-State and the international order made up of nation-States. The number of very small units continues to increase at a time when the separate viability of even the larger nation-States is called in question. The mini-States depend for protection of their rights and support of their precarious economies on a system of international organizations and meetings continually becoming more complex, which places on them heavy burdens of representation and diversion of their attention from internal tasks, and which they complicate further by their efforts to participate.

5. Latin America: a future open to choice or hazard?

The preceding pages have implicitly posed the questions: What are the alternatives open to Latin America in a world of national societies undergoing such diverse and mutually contradictory mutations? What will be the range of alternatives in a few years? To what extent is the future predetermined by Latin America's peripheral semi-development, and by the commitment of its dominant social forces to the consumer society and to the new international division of labour that the transnational enterprises are shaping?

The current personification of the countries of the region as an international middle class within the capitalist world order is an analogy that cannot be pushed very far. A 'middle class' composed of imitative, struc-

turally heterogeneous national societies implies internal contradictions and tensions, a precarious balance between the worlds of 'rich' and 'poor' countries, quite different from the supposed progressive and stabilizing roles of middle classes within national societies. It is evident, however, that the special relationships—cultural as well as economic and political—between Latin America and the central market-economy countries make the mutations in these countries of crucial importance for assessment of the feasibility of major changes in Latin American styles of development. Even the smaller and poorer Latin American countries have appreciable 'modern' urban superstructures and classes looking to the First World for models. The governments of the First World are more disposed and better able to hinder the emergence of radically different styles of development in Latin America than in Africa and Asia.

Thus, the internal as well as the external balance of power suggests that in most of Latin America during the immediate future, demands for equality for nation-States within a reformed international economic order will continue to have the upper hand over demands for equality for human beings within transformed national societies. The blueprints for 'another development' will still play a mainly ornamental role in inter-governmental deliberations concentrated on bargaining tactics and justifications for demands vis-à-vis the central countries. These deliberations, moreover, may become increasingly divorced from real capabilities as 'transnationalization' of the national societies advances.

If the First World should recover and maintain sufficient prosperity, self-confidence and technological innovativeness during the remainder of the twentieth century, one might envisage two plausible futures for the countries of Latin America. Either might be accompanied by political struggles as persistent and disruptive as those of recent years, but without basic changes in the internal distribution of

power. Either might be accompanied by considerable gains in national income levels and in the stock of productive capital without any narrowing of the income gap between Latin America and the central countries or any significant reduction in technological and financial dependence.

One future would be a projection of present styles of development, accompanied by an intensification of the efforts that have been made intermittently during the past half-century to counteract the 'concentrating and excluding' logic of these styles and democratize the consumer society. Governments would strive to capture somewhat larger proportions of increments in the national income and curb the consumption of the upper income strata to some extent, so as to raise the rate of productive investment. They would continue to respond to the employment pressures of educated youth and the pressures of organized workers to raise their share of income, but they would also allocate resources and seek more effective policies to bring the under-employed, under-educated and under-nourished masses into some kind of productive and participatory relationship to the national society. It hardly needs demonstration that the achievement of an ideal welfare State reconciling the multiple objectives and heterogeneous pressures is unlikely. Nevertheless, present national income levels and the apparent capacity of the State to intervene in the economy and administer social services support arguments that a good deal more can be done along these lines than has been, without drastically curtailing the consumption of the rich or preventing capital accumulation. In a prosperous and expanding world economy, the governments of the central countries and the transnational enterprises might be expected to look benevolently on welfare State policies in the periphery—if only as acceptable alternatives to more radical policies—and to give them some support through their credit and trade policies. The two safety valves of expansion of bureaucratic employment for

the middle strata and public works employment plus consumption subsidies for the poor might then continue to function for some time and permit the maintenance of formally democratic political procedures.

Such a future can be criticized as unjust, wasteful of societal resources, unsustainable over the long term and uninspiring in comparison with the vision of 'another development', but it may continue for some time to be the only practicable path for governments seeking to mitigate the human cost of a style of development that they cannot transform. Neither the advocates of 'another development' nor the ideological enemies of dependent capitalist semi-development have as yet been able to demonstrate plausibly how real social forces and real governments might be able to manage affairs differently. The more difficult immediate questions for such a future then lie in the willingness of the dominant forces in Latin America to give more than lip-service to welfare objectives and in the ability of the State to secure a certain degree of autonomy in pursuing such objectives. The following quotation sums up the reasons for doubt whether the national societies, if the internal and external distribution of power remains unchanged, will be able to advance even this far in the direction of 'another development':

"For example, is the Mexican State — a State constitutionally and rhetorically committed to social justice; massively involved in the development process; overseeing an economy that is profoundly penetrated and multinationalized; with a modernizing industrial sector, export-oriented agriculture, currency tied to the dollar, inflationary pressures, and balance of payments problems — any more 'autonomous' from domestic anti-egalitarian class forces today than forty years ago? Could even the most progressive Mexican régime imaginable consistently decide in favor of impoverished *ejidatarios* when the interests of Mexican and international

agribusiness are at stake? The answers are obvious for the Mexican case ... but they may not be much less controversial for any régime, no matter how 'progressive' its expressed commitments, as long as these kinds of developmental rules and class alliances guide the process of accumulation and distribution."²¹

The other plausible future, under the supposition of confirmed world hegemony by the present centres, has been described most implacably by Helio Jaguaribe:

"In the new emerging class of international 'executives', who are coming to be recruited from the local middle classes of countries under United States hegemony, through a previous educational and training program that makes their standards of work and behavior conform to the American executive patterns, we can see something equivalent to the Roman class of *equites*, who were also, after some time, recruited from the provincial middle classes through a previous process of Romanization. The new *equites* are likely to form a dependable, efficient, and honest bureaucracy, much better qualified to manage the provincial affairs than the relatively inept local élites, who were led to choose the dependent way because of their own incapacity for autonomous development. The provincial form of dependency would, therefore, improve both the self-support of provinces and their dependence on the metropolis, enlarging, along the way, the employment conditions for the local middle class, to which the new international executive careers would be opened. ... However, ... all available evidence, from both historical

²¹See Richard R. Fagen, "Studying Latin American Politics: Some Implications of a *Dependencia* Approach", *Latin American Research Review*, XII, 2, 1977, pp. 14-15.

and current practices, indicates that the process of incorporation of dependent peoples into a more powerful and culturally advanced society is made at the expense of the great unskilled masses of the former. ... In a cybernetic society, where unskilled labour is almost unnecessary and where the cost of education is so high ... it is likely that the great 'demographic surpluses' of the provinces will be condemned to gradual extermination. ... The provincial administrations of the near future will probably be led to establish internal controls for population movement, obliging the rural masses to remain in the countryside, and thereby create a sort of reserve of natives, whose admission to the modern sectors of their countries will be contingent on the real increase in demand for labor in the cities. Malnutrition and the lack of appropriate sanitary conditions and medical care will gradually reduce these populations."²²

An indispensable precondition for either of these futures is the persistence of world centres transmitting coherent messages to the dominant forces in the semi-developed periphery and able to exercise hegemony for coherent purposes. The discussion of seeds of change has indicated that this precondition cannot be counted on, even if one leaves aside the strictly economic vicissitudes that now confront the centres, the energy shortages, the ecological constraints, and the precariousness of 'competitive détente' between the First and Second Worlds. The central countries are unlikely to provide a stable supportive environment either for the gradual consolidation of welfare States in the periphery or for the imposition of political and economic

systems discarding welfare pretensions and governed solely by criteria for efficient use of resources for the benefit of the power-holders. The conception of development as a striving to catch up with the world leaders will no doubt persist for some time but will become less and less tenable.

The prospect, then, is for a highly indeterminate future in which the central countries will transmit continually changing combinations of stimuli, shocks and inhibitions to the rest of the world (and, of course, to one another) and in which the rest of the world will make equally confused and shifting responses as one pressure or another comes uppermost. In spite of governmental aspirations to stabilize the periphery, the centres will not be able to avoid destabilization. The sudden impact of revelations in certain central countries of bribery by transnational enterprises and of subversion by intelligence agencies, both byproducts of domestic political struggles and resistances to the prevailing style of development illustrate the unpredictableness and diversity of the accidents, in the road ahead of any central strategy for domination.

While the governments of the central countries will go on minimizing the scope of confrontations and making whatever concessions they feel they can afford, their actions will continue to respond more to domestic considerations (e.g., protecting supplies of key raw materials; satisfying the demands of the military-industrial complex and the organized workers; curbing the tactics of the transnational enterprises sufficiently to keep them from nullifying governmental employment, balance-of-payments and other objectives) and to rivalries among themselves than to the needs and demands of the periphery.

At the same time, the increasing diversity and militancy of the domestic social forces intervening in central-country politics, culture, and economic organization introduces wider opportunities for social forces in the periphery, in power or out, seeking more advantageous terms of depen-

²²See Helio Jaguaribe, *Political Development: A General Theory and a Latin American Case Study*, New York, Harper and Row, 1973, pp. 383-384.

gency or freedom from interference in transforming the national style of development. They can find alternative allies in different sectors of the State apparatus of the former countries, in their legislative bodies, in their political parties and trade unions, and in a wide range of organized groups promoting causes from environmental protection to human rights and equality of the sexes. An increasing internationalization of ideological-promotional movements and interest groups may co-exist uneasily with the increasing penetration of transnational enterprises, increasingly imitative consumerism, and increasing dependency through indebtedness — and also with rising insistence on nationalism and self-reliance in styles of development.

Some few of the smaller industrialized countries of Europe and some of the 'high-income dependent' countries outside Europe will probably advance farther in vicarious utopianism, the promotion of 'another development' in the Third World, albeit in practice having to concentrate their hopes and their aid on a few promising national societies. Even in these latter cases, it is unlikely that popular support for 'another development' will become strong enough to permit any government to undertake aid on a scale seriously depressing domestic levels of living, as the universalist versions of 'another development' imply.

In the case of Latin America, the influence of mutations in the central market-economy countries will undoubtedly continue to be stronger than the influence of mutations elsewhere. Interchanges with other Third World regions, while they are on the rise, are practically restricted to the sectors of government concerned with international affairs and development policy, certain intellectuals and social scientists, and the leaders of certain political movements. The proportion of the Latin American population, outside the Caribbean sub-region, that feels kinship with or interest in the social changes of Africa and Asia must be small.

The capacity of the two socialist camps to influence the course of development in Latin America depends partly on their demonstration of the viability of non-capitalist development, as their reality is filtered through the mass media and the consciousness of different sectors of opinion; partly on the strength of disciplined social movements identifying themselves with one camp or the other; and partly on the ability and willingness of the two camps to offer material and technical aid to governments and movements. In the first respect, in recent times China has offered a model more accessible to very poor predominantly rural societies than to relatively urbanized societies. In the other two respects, the U.S.S.R. has had the advantage, in view of the greater organizational cohesiveness and working-class base of the parties looking to it for guidance and in view of its greater industrial and technological capacity.

In Latin America during the immediate future it is improbable that, except in Cuba, the two socialist camps will exert a stronger influence than in the past. The two facets of the Chinese experience will continue to edify different sectors of opinion, whatever their fate in China, but the possibility of direct borrowing has nearly disappeared. Soviet trade relations and technical cooperation will probably have an appreciable but deliberately restricted role in a good many countries. The irradiation of Soviet internal social trends, however, in the absence of unforeseeable changes in their present patterns, will be weak, possibly serving mainly the advocates of peripheral capitalism in their efforts to demonstrate the absence of any better alternative.

Since the beginning of the 1960s Cuba has had an important and deliberately cultivated role in posing a radically different style of development, corresponding in many respects to the objectives later proposed for 'another development', as both possible and necessary for Latin America. The Cuban experience deserves a more detailed assessment than it can be given in

the present context.²³ On the one side, Cuba has demonstrated that a socialist alternative can be viable and capable of satisfying basic needs of a previously marginalized population to an extent unmatched elsewhere in Latin America. On the other side, it has achieved this at a price, in terms of extreme austerity in consumption, centralization of economic and political power, integration into one of the world socialist camps, and expulsion of the large minority of the population unwilling to accept this style of development, that is higher than social forces likely to take power in any other country of the region may be willing or able to pay. Marxist-Leninist ideological orthodoxy, central planning of the economy, and integration with the Soviet camp will not be able to isolate Cuba from the 'seeds of change' that have been discussed above, and may prove as inhibiting to necessary future transformations as the peripheral capitalist ties of dependence of the remainder of Latin America.

The argument pursued in this paper does not imply that the future of Latin America can or will be passively subject to destabilizing mutations of the central countries, or that the repercussions of these mutations will soon outweigh the deliberate efforts of the centres to shore up peripheral capitalism and temper its harshness by subsidizing welfare State initiatives. It is even possible that variants of the market economy and the consumer society will be

able to maintain themselves successfully in Latin America, on their own terms, after their decomposition is farther advanced in the centres, because of the greater capacity of the dominant forces in Latin America to repress the contradictions. It is also quite likely that the visibility of extreme inequality and exploitation in Latin America, the failure of efforts to transform styles of development, the associated repression, struggles against repression, and expulsion of dissidents to the centres will have a significant impact on mutations in the centres themselves, providing tactical lessons, rallying issues, and grounds for denunciation of the transnationals and the consumer society. In one way or another the peoples of Latin America are bound to be active participants in shaping a future that will be confused and conflictive, not predetermined by the region's present insertion in the international order or the present inability of counter-élites to offer convincing alternatives.

The argument does imply that the debate over 'another development' is only beginning. The inherent compulsion of the present system of international organizations to cast 'another development' in a universalist and immediatist mould of strategies and plans of action to be agreed on by governments tends to devalue it as an inspiring myth and relevant utopia by inflation and evasiveness; but the basic propositions will recur, with changing terminology and emphasis, taken up by new social forces and movements acquiring greater realism and political viability, as the various hybrids of the welfare State and the repressive State lose credibility.

²³See *Aprectaciones sobre el estilo de desarrollo y sobre las principales políticas sociales en Cuba* (CEPAL/MEX/77/22/Rev. 2), May 1978.