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A cultural view 
of the ECLAC proposals

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This article argues that the ECLAC proposal for changing production patterns with social equity should take account of the cultural features of the region’s societies. It therefore examines the ECLAC proposal from a cultural standpoint, with special attention to the links between citizenship, economic development and modernity (section II). It then analyses the processes of internationalization of culture, the relation between cultural identity and citizenship, and the impact of the processes of internationalization of culture on the region (section III). It goes on to examine one of the most persistent problems in the project for modernity in Latin America and the Caribbean—the dialectics of the negation of the other—, which has decisive effects on the relations between the elite and the masses and on the pattern of integration and exclusion followed by development dynamics in the region (section IV). Next, it puts forward some reflections on the intercultural fabric running through the history and geography of the region, which is constantly renewed through the interaction and modification of the various cultures (section V). Finally, it proposes some policy guidelines which incorporate the cultural dimension into the development agenda and make it possible to enhance the systemic nature of the proposal for changing production patterns with social equity (section VI).
I

Introduction

This article seeks to contribute to the debate and reflections which ECLAC set in motion as from 1990 with its proposal for changing production patterns with social equity. This proposal calls for broad consensus among the various agents and for a democratic context if it is to be viable, and as the construction and extension of modern citizenship is seen to be an essential aspect of it, this warrants a special effort of reflection and proposals for action. Such citizenship involves, in turn, the existence of social actors with the possibility of self-determination and the capacity to represent interests and demands, with full enjoyment of their legally recognized individual and collective rights. Without this, it is futile to talk about building consensus, an integrated society, or stable democratic systems.

In defining the construction of modern citizenship as a function of the self-determination capacity of the agents of development, an increasingly crucial issue in our region and other parts of the world is the tension between cultural identity and modernity in the development process. In other words, what is involved is to take up the challenge of reconciling the special historical and cultural features of regions with the universalist vocation of development and modernity. As we shall see below, this tension not only affects the other developing regions but is also one of the most outstanding societal traits of these final years of the century. The tension between cultural identity and modernity is particularly strong in societies which are experiencing the so-called post-communist phase, and it is also felt with particular force in the most highly industrialized countries.

The hypothesis which led us to undertake this study is that the process of changing production patterns with social equity, as a development proposal for the countries of the region, cannot be approached without taking into account the main cultural features of our societies. These features are: the intercultural fabric which is the mainspring of our own form of openness to the world, and the need to get away from the dialectics of negation of the other as a fundamental requirement for attaining our social integration and the consolidation of a democratic culture. On this basis it is possible to construct a form of modern citizenship in which “the subject will be the desire of the individual to be a producer and not just a consumer of his experience and social environment” and modernity— as well as referring to economic, technological and social progress— will be above all “the demand for freedom and defense against everything that tends to turn human beings into instruments or objects” (Touraine, 1992, p. 272).

II

Changing production patterns
with social equity as a critical
view of access to modernity

The development of democracy in the region raises the following challenge: How can positive links be established between citizenship defined in the traditional sense (i.e., citizenship which gives priority to society’s capacity for self-determination and rational intercourse among its actors) and a dynamic of economic modernization with social effects that foster inclusion? And how can the construction of such citizenship be reflected in recourse by the social actors to their cultural heritage in order to innovate from their own history?
In this new scenario, the proposal for changing production patterns with social equity prepared by ECLAC for Latin America may be understood, in its cultural dimension, as a critical view of access to modernity. In our understanding, a critical view emphasizes the following aspects or values of modernity: respect for diversity of values and cultures; greater respect for each other’s rights in relations between dissimilar actors; greater openness to new scenarios and challenges, and renewed importance for technical progress as a means of increasing global communication and interconnection, promoting general well-being, and providing broader fields for the development of various kinds of potential.

As already noted, we are facing a new and extremely changeable international situation marked by a far-reaching revolution in science and technology, progressive globalization of markets and communications, and economic competition increasingly based on the incorporation and spread of technical progress. This evolving situation rules out any dream (or nightmare) of autarkic development for the region and forces it to look instead towards a form of incorporation in the outside world capable of meeting the demands of a globalized setting. As noted by Alain Touraine, “we are all passengers on the ship of modernity: what we really need to know is whether we are sailing as galley-slaves or as passengers with their own possessions, plans and memories” (Touraine, 1992, p. 236).

Naturally, instrumental rationality, efficiency of production, technical progress and response to aspirations for consumption are all elements of modernity without which it is impossible to talk about an advantageous international position for the region. These elements are not enough, however, to ensure the incorporation of the other elements involved in changing production patterns with social equity: that is to say, a higher level of social cohesion, environmental sustainability and the existence of stable democratic systems.

A reductionist reading of modernity which does not include, in a full and complementary manner, these elements of equity, sustainability and democratization would merely tend to foster processes of incomplete modernization destined to produce enormous differences between the fully integrated elites and vast marginalized and fragmented sectors of the population. In such a case, the latter sectors would be a hotbed of anti-development reactions, retreat into individual identities, and cultural “defensiveness”.

The proposal for changing production patterns with social equity is aimed at linking up, in cultural terms, with a concept of modernity which seeks to go beyond the limits of instrumental rationalization but also tries to break through the blockage imposed by inward-looking individual cultural patterns. In this sense, it shares a critical view of modernity: it seeks to reconcile individual freedom and modernizing rationalization with the sense of belonging to a community.

In this view of modernity individual identities are not doomed to come into conflict with modernization or changing production patterns. On the contrary, they can be an important element for furthering them if they can work as factors of democratic and consensus-based mobilization.

What, then, are the cultural factors that can further the construction of a form of modernity understood in these terms?

A first factor is the conviction that true modernity can only come from an endogenous effort: that is to say, from the mobilization of the social forces that make society feel responsible for its actions and their results. This represents an effort to break away from what José Aricó called “querulous thinking”, which he explained as follows: “This is the kind of thinking that claims that Latin America cannot reach its goals because somebody condemns us not to reach them. The theories advocated this kind of dream, of a Europe that was never attained. The theory of dependence and the theory of underdevelopment sought to explain to us that the real source of all our ills was elsewhere. It was not due to shortcomings in our own governance, our own management capacity or our own development. I am not saying that dependency or underdevelopment do not exist: I am talking about the ideological and political utilization of these kinds of facile categorization. Under this approach, the reasons for our ills were sent abroad” (Aricó, 1992, p. 303).

A second factor is the idea that such an effort requires “manageable” levels of conflict and high levels of consensus and stability. Consensus does not deny the existence of conflicts, but it does propose a

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1 We refer to the proposal contained primarily in three central documents presented by ECLAC over the last three years (ECLAC, 1990, 1992a and 1992b).
system for their institutional solution through negotiation and compromise which excludes the negation of the other and always seeks to avoid the generation of any attitude of confrontation. The consensus-based culture therefore represents a significant change from the traditional political culture in most of Latin America and the Caribbean, since it includes at least three items which have been problems for the political culture of the region: recognition of the diversity of the various actors in society at large and the need to strengthen them; fostering of negotiations involving the establishment of compromises; and the transformation of agreements and compromises into shared cultural reference points.

In this context, citizenship is seen as a value which should unite the needs of both democracy and development. From this standpoint, citizenship and competitiveness are the two hubs of a virtuous circle: “To imagine that such a form of citizenship can become fully valid without an effective effort with regard to competitiveness is just as groundless in this decade of the 1990s as to think that competitiveness—which is necessarily of a systemic nature—can be maintained even though there are serious shortcomings in the area of citizenship” (ECLAC, 1992b, p. 18). Thus, citizenship must be seen as a source of positive interaction between democracy and development.

The modern idea of citizenship also has sociological and cultural connotations which are worth mentioning, however. Firstly, modern citizenship is associated with the processes of individual and group secularization through which: i) actors (individuals, groups and institutions) who imbue their options and forms of behaviour with a certain rationality are formed; ii) the processes of social change are institutionalized as a function of the expansion of political and social rights; and iii) roles and institutions are progressively differentiated according to their specific functions.

Secondly, the growing interaction of different cultural and social actors implies and expresses an institutionalized consensus based on relations of mutual recognition between different actors. In this sense, citizenship is closely linked with recognition of others as fellow human beings. Emphasis on socialization and education in modernization processes, for example, is not only crucial for the demands for increased production involved in such modernization, but also for the strengthening of democratic culture through the spread of values inherent in the construction of citizenship.

Thirdly, it is no longer a question of seeing citizenship merely as the satisfaction of rights previously conulated by authoritarian regimes, but rather as the crystallization of a set of demands for the elimination of all forms of discrimination in the market and in the political decision-making system. It is a question of attaining a solid and renewable manner of building up institutions which permits the conduct of negotiations among actors and individuals in accordance with established rights and rules of conduct: in other words, the building up of institutions consistent with an increasingly inclusive type of economic development.

The recent ECLAC proposal, in which ever greater importance is assigned to education and the production of knowledge within the growth dynamic, coincides with the effort to make economic development compatible with the construction of democratic and modern citizenship. As noted in the ECLAC document referred to earlier, “the prospective studies show that since knowledge will be the central element of the new paradigm of production, educational change will become a fundamental factor for developing the qualities of innovation and creativity, together with integration and solidarity, which are key aspects both for the exercise of modern citizenship and for attaining a high level of competitiveness” (ECLAC, 1992b, p. 113).

The growing importance of knowledge and education for development significantly affects the dynamics of a democratic order, since the material base of democracies no longer consists exclusively of a particular type of economy or production relationships, but also of the stock of knowledge, information and communication and the use made of those elements. How, then, can the central importance of knowledge for development in the region be combined with the building of citizenship and the very fabric of living culture in Latin America and the Caribbean?

This brings us to an essential point in our concerns: namely, the place of cultural identities in the dynamics of development and in the building of citizenship in present-day society.

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2 "The economic strategies and policies must be applied within a democratic, pluralistic and participatory context" (ECLAC, 1990, p. 15).
III

The internationalization of culture and citizenship

There are phenomena connected with the internationalization of economic, political and cultural life which make it indispensable today to rethink the cultural dimension of citizenship in both post-industrial societies and in developing countries. At least three of these processes, and their global nature, need to be taken into consideration: otherwise our reflections would lack some decisive elements.

Firstly, the reformulation of citizenship as a function of cultural identities is a matter which is increasingly present and important all over the world. In the industrialized world, and especially in the United States and Western Europe, international migrations are heightening the impact of minorities not only in demographic terms, but also in a socio-cultural, and hence also political sense. In the developing world, the impact of globalization on endogenous cultures has equally marked effects. The case of Islam is highly illustrative in this respect: not only does it show how a cultural factor affects economic and political relations, but it also shows how, in the Islamic countries themselves, the lack of social integration in the dynamics of modernization strengthens cultural integration through messianic traditionalism.3 In Asian, African and Eastern European countries too, their ethno-cultural variety increases social conflict as these societies open up to world markets and incorporate such values as freedom of expression and cultural assertion, thereby also intensifying demands for ethno-territorial and religious assertion. The cultural factor is not only a decisive variable within the countries but is also increasingly affecting international relations.

Secondly, both advanced and developing societies face a common problem: namely, that modernization of production, if it aims to reach rising levels of competitiveness, now demands the formation of a hard core of intelligence. At the same time, however, in view of its own aspirations to democracy and national development, it also requires that this hard core should not be constructed in an elitist manner but should form part of a process of construction in which society as a whole participates.

Democratic construction of development does not seem to be viable when the field of negotiations and political consensuses is restricted to the elites. The very delegation of political authority from the governed to the governors obliges the techno-political elites, in the emerging scenarios of the “communications-based society” and the “knowledge-based society”, to mobilize the intervention capacity of the citizens at large by providing means for information, communication and the socialization of knowledge among the members of society.

Thirdly, the globalization of culture resulting from the culture industry and the cultural market has given rise to a number of phenomena which raise anew the question of the processes of national construction. One of the most urgent of these is the construction of a synchronic cultural time for national societies as a whole, in which events and decisions in one place immediately affect another, generating worldwide simultaneity of information. On the economic level, this means that there is a tendency towards the disappearance of national economies proper and the formation instead of an international economic unit which likewise functions in a synchronic manner. There would thus be a tendency towards the imposition of internationalized economic policies. In the same line of thinking, the reorganization of cultural scenarios and the constant crossing of identities demand that we ask ourselves about the orders that systematize the material and symbolic relations between the groups. Particularly important phenomena for a number of situations would be the

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3 Maxime Rodinson recently put forward quite a heterodox view in which he explains the spread of Islamic fundamentalism not so much as a return to a past which was in fact never so integral but rather as the result of the intermingling of crisis and exclusion in those countries. According to Rodinson, it is this crisis and exclusion which have led to a re-reading of the sacred texts in messianic terms and a re-founding of an integralist past as a basis for the legitimation of movements seeking a radical-integralist way out of the crisis (see Rodinson, 1993).
de-territorialization of cultural identities and the
tendency of transnational corporations to decentralize
their activities (García Canclini, 1990, pp. 288-289).

The above processes relocate the question of the
construction of modern citizenship in a line where
culture is of fundamental importance but at the same
time means that this construction must take place in a
situation of conflict. It is clear, for example, that ten-
sion exists between the cultural tradition and the in-
strumental rationale involved in the needs for the
reconversion of production and increased interna-
tional competitiveness of national economies. Mod-
ernization processes can take advantage of this
existing cultural stock, but they can also come into
conflict with it. The case of Japan, for example, is
highly illustrative of the dynamic relations between
the cultural stock and rapid modernization.

The modernity associated with the industrial
cycle has been a limited historical process, since it
has not achieved the full integration of society as a
product of its own activity. The limits of modernity
differ, however, according to the society in which
one lives or considers such modernity. In the ad-
vanced societies of the West, the construction of
citizenship has attained much broader conquests than
in Latin America and the Caribbean. In the Islamic
countries, on the other hand, it would seem that the
failures in the area of social integration have stren-
thened the development of a new type of anti-modern
communitarianism. In South-East Asia and Japan,
modernization has had elitist origins but has turned
out to be more inclusive in social matters than in our
own region, and it has enjoyed greater cultural leg-
imacy. In these regions, however, modernization is
seriously behind in terms of citizenship and recogni-
tion of cultures different from the ruling nationalities.

A singularly important phenomenon in the new
processes of internationalization of culture and poli-
tics is the generation of a number of "anti-modern
cultures" in many developing countries. At
the same time, however, it is also possible to observe
fundamentalist traits in the industrialized societies.
It seems essential to understand these phenomena in
order to be able to propose, in and for Latin America
and the Caribbean, the forms that should now be as-
sumed by the dynamics of modernization and univer-
sality in our region. This conflictive situation being
experienced by the various regions of the globe
mutes the optimistic expectations that identified the
end of the Cold War with a generalized and rapid

spread of modernity and democratic systems. We are
now witnessing even greater complexity in the rela-
tions between modernity and cultural identity, or be-
tween "modern" universality and special regional
features.

The various national or international conflicts
currently rending much of the developing world—this
kind of sixth continent which has emerged with the
post-Communist era and in which 17 new States have
made their appearance in less than three years
(Ramonet, 1993)—share a common pattern: the at-
temt to strengthen, found or re-found anti-modern
"identity-based" constructions. These are due to pro-
found disenchantment with the modernization pro-
cesses, which are seen by a large or even majority
sector of the population as being induced from out-
side: almost as a downright intervention in someone
else's history (Gouffenec, 1985).

This perception of modernization processes as
foreign bodies coincides with the economic crisis of
many developing countries and with the inability of
their States to meet the expectations of general well-
being and progress which they aroused at some time
in the past and around which they built up a capacity
for mobilization which they have now lost. These
modernization processes in crisis did not all have the
same inspiring principle, however. In order to illus-
trate the diversity of such principles we need only
look at the secular nationalist inspiration in India, the
State socialism of Algeria, the conservative pro-
Western line of Imperial Iran, the various kinds of
African one-party States, and the Communist models
in the Soviet Caucasus and the Balkans.

All these crisis situations, however, are due to
the difficulties in achieving integration by way of
economic and social modernization. They all experi-
ence difficulties in facing up to the challenge of
merging traditional culture with modernity, share the
emergence of a ruling elite seen as being divorced
from society at large, and have not succeeded in es-
stablishing broad, solid channels of democratic par-
ticipation.

Various Latin American and Caribbean countries
also display conflictive tensions in the relationship
between cultural identities and political democracy,
although in a very different way: the tension is be-
tween the desire of political parties and businessmen
to institutionalize the political system, on the one
hand, and on the other the desire for cultural and
social change on the part of important social move-
ments representing the ideas of ethical, symbolic/expressive, regional, cooperative, indigenous, women's, young people's, workers', and urban and rural local interest groups. This gives a new significance to the notion of citizenship, placing it at the intersection between the right to political representation and the right to use public spaces to assert cultural identities. Demands by society for more participation, information, communication or publicity are closely connected with the cultural identities of the lower-class or excluded sectors: Aymara and Quechua culture in the Andean regions, the culture of the "underdogs" in Mexico, or that of the urban marginal sectors in Rio or Caracas.

These cultural identities are constantly being re-defined in their interaction with modernizing forces. Some of their features are lost in the course of history, but others survive and are modified through their relations with the more universal tendencies with which they are linked. Today, their exposure to the latter is reaching unprecedented levels of intensity. The processes of internationalization, access to global communication, changes in the educational profile of the population, new relations between generations and the sexes, new patterns of behaviour and consumption: all of these give rise to an irresistible tendency towards conflictive dialogue and possible breaks with tradition. In this context, there is an increasingly urgent need to understand how these new intersections are being formed and their potential impact on the development process.

Assigning greater importance to the cultural dimension of development could re-create outlooks which can imbue politics—and policies—with a mobilization potential which could arouse and win over the social actors who are most withdrawn into their own identity. The question is, then, to penetrate the cultural fabric made up of the totality of representations and self-images circulating among those concerned, especially those for whom citizenship is so far more of a lack than a concrete fact. As we shall see below, the dialectic between those who are integrated and those who are excluded in our region has deep cultural roots which strengthen this pattern of exclusion and inequality and place great difficulties in the way of the construction of modern citizenship.

IV

The dialectics of negation of the other, as an impediment to citizenship

Understanding the conflictive relationship with other persons who are seen as different from oneself is essential in order to penetrate more deeply into the relations between culture, development and citizenship in the region: the dialectics of exclusion which have repeatedly cut across the path of modernization in the region since the end of the last century, and the dialectics of domination between the elites (political and economic/social) and society at large, have their historical roots (not so much as a sufficient condition, but rather as an indispensable precedent) in the dialectics of negation which go back to the times of conquest and evangelization and have been prolonged throughout our history in the form of negation of others, be they women, Indians, negroes, peasants or members of the marginalized urban poor.

Negation of the other has presented various aspects in the course of its past development. It differs, for example, depending on whether the encounter between cultures was with societies which already had a complex form of organization, such as the Andean societies or the Mayas, or with less complex or more scattered societies such as Amazonian, Mapuche or Caribbean communities. The dynamics of negation have also been very different when they have involved slave migrations from Africa, although in these cases they have been superimposed on the previous cases, giving rise to different scenarios, such as those observed in Brazil or much of the Caribbean. The details become even more complex in the case of the more recent migrations from Europe, which have merged with established republican societies and made the construction of national identities even more complex, as in Argentina and Uruguay. Moreover, as R. Adams has so rightly pointed out with respect to Guatemala—and this can be extended to
much of the rest of the continent—are these processes of socio-cultural change involve the transition of culturally special and relatively de-structured societies towards the formation of national cultures in which the weight and the always uneven evolution of socio-cultural relations militate against the full configuration of integrated modern societies. 4

The dialectics of negation have many twists and turns. In the case of the discoverer, conqueror, evangelist, colonizer, creole and, ultimately, white men in general, the negation has a dual action: on the one hand, the other person is seen as different from oneself, and then also he is seen as being of less worth and is automatically attributed the shortcomings of sinfulness, error or ignorance. In Latin American thinking, and even in its ideologies of progress and development, this automatic classification is still perpetuated today in the differentiation between the place of “reason” and the place of ritual. Other, different people—indians, natives, non-Westerners—are associated with ritual: magical reality, folklore, pre-scientific wisdom, spontaneous expressiveness or local art. “Reason”—the mastery of rationality, of “true” discourse, of science and development—is the preserve of the “white man” or Westerner: in other words, the voice of progress (see Bravo, 1992). Thus, the merging of native and of universal knowledge required in order to form “authentic” modernity is still absent.

In schematic terms, it may be said that colonizers, evangelists and the members of the dominant culture in general have respected the production and reproduction practices of the subjugated cultures: their systems of cultivation, community organization, survival strategies, etc. It has been seen, in this respect, that the autochthonous production rationale has not necessarily been at variance with the exogenous instrumental rationale. 5 The dominant culture has been reluctant, however, to recognize that history shows concrete examples of mutual enrichment between the spheres of ritual and reason. It forgets that the other culture is not only a majority presence in areas such as the Caribbean and the Andean region but also has been and continues to be an unavoidable presence in the most varied manifestations of culture and society.

Negation of the other by the political and economic elites also has other opposing and pendular facets. On the one hand, foreigners are seen as other, different persons, and the most traditionalist and authoritarian versions of Latin American political culture have often shown resistance to such aliens: people who threaten our identity from outside and undermine the nation like a virus brought in across the frontier. At the other extreme, Latin American creoles have themselves negated other, different persons within their own country (indians, half-breeds, etc.), while identifying themselves in an uncritical and emulative manner with non-native values, be they European or North American. This process of identification and differentiation has been very important and effective in the construction of real institutions.

On the part of the negated persons (indians, blacks, mulattos, slaves, women, half-breeds, marginal elements, peasants), the process of negation of the other also has more than one facet. On the one hand, it is internalized as self-negation: that is to say, as a truncation of one’s own identity in one’s own eyes. Bereft of the support that their own cultural identity could give them and of the sense of direction that such identity would give to their life, they drift like lost souls through a world in which they cannot recognize their place.

The negated underdog is always on the fringes of the social spaces in which the main collective projects are formulated and decided upon and resources are assigned. This lack of access largely defines the oppressed culture. 6 On the part of these negated persons, too, strategies are developed for preserving their different features, as is clearly seen in the areas of music, art, dances, religious ritualism and syncretism, systems of cultivation and survival, community links and demands for territorial spaces and the use of native tongues.

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4 Quoted in José Medina Echavarría, 1980, pp. 119-120.
5 John Murra’s studies on the Andean production rationale, its multicyclical organization at various ecological levels, and its linkages with processes of macroregional and non-mercantile distribution show that the Andean culture had a highly rationalized system of production which still persists and is reproduced today (Murra, 1975). For an analysis of this question, see Rivera Cusicanqui, 1992, pp. 83-108.

6 “Oppressed culture is the name given to cultures which lack institutions responsible for producing knowledge and rules or strategies for negotiating, changing and adapting the societal projects of their members” (Casimir, 1984, p. 67).
Negation of the other in the region is most clearly and persistently reflected in discrimination against indigenous and Afro-American races. Racial discrimination against the negroes of Afro-American cultures did not disappear after the abolition of slavery: "The negative view taken of negroes, seen as the essential explanation of the disastrous picture presented by some Latin American republics in the nineteenth century, was further strengthened when, with the passage of time after abolition, it became clear to simple-minded racists that negroes were not a backward factor because they were slaves, but because they were negroes" (Romero Fraginals ed.), 1977, p. 49). Moreover, there are few mechanisms that recognize old and new dynamics of indigenous extraction, and the upsurge of new indigenous movements and mobilizations stems from demands to fill this gap. In various countries of the Americas, Indians form the majority of the population, "but their language is not the official language, their culture is not the dominant culture, nor are their institutions the basis for the organization of the State". It is not by chance that in much of the region the indigenous movements, which are increasingly interlinked with each other, call forcefully for major cultural reforms and demand the establishment of multicultural and multinational States.7

The dialectics of negation of the other precedes the dialectics of exclusion. In many countries of the region, economic and social differences are still accompanied by differences based on colour or language. The master-servant relationships with domestic staff in middle- and upper-class households, or with agricultural or factory workers, persist in spite of the supposed equalitarian mission of modernity, and they are living proof that such dynamics are still an unresolved challenge in most of our societies.

This negation/exclusion of the other involves a dual rejection of the more democratic and integrative sense that modernity may claim to give. On the one hand, there is the rejection by those who assume universalist values of modernization but instead of associating them with the specific cultural identities of the region despise those identities and ape the elites of the industrialized countries. At the other extreme to this feeling, the rejection of modernity is expressed in those who see it as a threat to their cultural roots and take refuge in inward-looking ideologies opposed to change and to the opening-up to world exchanges. Thus, the attitude of the former, who refuse to look within their societies, is complemented and strengthened with this essentialist attitude which refuses to look outwards. In both cases there is strong resistance to essentially modern features, that is to say, to social dynamics, intercultural tensions, and the uncertainty typical of modernization processes. This resistance is usually based on rigid values often reflected in a conspiratorial and undemocratic political culture.

Understanding the cultural dimension provides us here not only with an explanation of the origins of exclusion but also of the spectres that still loom over us. The long initial insensitivity to these ethnic and cultural differences has given rise to many sequels, but mostly truncated: truncated integration, truncated modernization, truncated democratization. Obviously, the original fault is not sufficient to explain the failure of so many other projects. If we do not understand this difference—and the difference within ourselves—, however, we will hardly be able to deduce a project for the future from our identity.

As long as a cultural rationale based on this dialectic of negation of the other is in force, there will also be negation of mutual social links: everything that is "different" will be devalued, satanized, repressed or silenced. This negation of mutuality of rights and identities means, in turn, that those who formulate discrimination and put it into practice (whether they be conquerors, colonizers, evangelists, white men, rich men, members of oligarchies, political, business or trade union leaders, military men, public technocrats or "modern" operators) arrogate to themselves the exclusive possession of the truth, sound judgement and correct reasoning. The discriminator thus becomes both judge and jury in the discrimination process: he creates the discrimination, reproduces it, and awards himself the exclusive right to decide on the hierarchies established by it.

As a constituent cultural feature in the region, negation of the other is ambiguous in its concrete historical development. Such ambiguity is marked by the transformation of the person who negates and the victim of such negation, whose relationship has been complex and ambivalent over the course of time; negation is also linked with some features of acceptance and adoption of the characteristics of the other

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as one's own. A classic example of this ambivalence is provided by the role of the Catholic Church in the region, which in various phases of modern and present-day history has provided doctrinal bases both for anti-modern, elitist and anti-equalitarian political ideologies and, on other occasions, for modernizing, democratic and tolerant ideologies. Another form of ambivalence was observed last century, in the quest for legal institutions based on emulation of the French, English and United States constitutions, at a time when the masses of the various countries in the region were suffering from marked exclusion in political and cultural terms.

This exclusive and hierarchical tradition has been fed with constant violation of the rights of the masses by military leaders in the heat of civil wars and in crusades for the extermination of the indigenous population, with furtive prolongation of negro slavery and the use of very low cost labour for the hardest and most degrading tasks.

While the juridical construction of citizenship in the region has tended to copy constitutions conceived in very different social and cultural contexts, the traditional dictatorships have indulged in repeated violations of those constitutions. The fabric characteristic of the hacienda system, the plantations and the mining enclaves, together with the persistence of traditional family relationships of a patriarchal nature, have made possible this dissociation of citizenship, and this dissociation has not been completely overcome with the transition from oligarchic societies to more modern structures of production.

In this respect, the transition to modernity still has a long way to go. In many societies of the region, especially in relations between the sexes and in many kinds of work (in domestic service, in rural areas, and even in part of modern urban employment), master/servant relationships continue to strengthen the reproduction of a system of domination which derives from this dialectic of negation of the other: others who are not only different from oneself, but also inferior. The culture of servitude and degradation continues to act as the cultural axis for the reproduction of inequality in many areas of economic activity and social relations.

However, the present-day history of the region is made up of ebbs and flows, and the defeats suffered in the struggle for further citizenship also forge "citizenship utopias" which now seem to be gaining strength with the renewed value placed on democratic systems. As José Martí poetically said, "our gaping wounds are the liberties we lack". The region is filled with a culture of struggles for citizenship in which the struggle for the inclusion of the other in a system of shared rights has been notably present, one way or another. In the twentieth century, much of the development and formation of the workers' and peasants' movement and the women's movement has been centered on obtaining citizens' rights at the political and social level.

The so-called national popular regimes have made possible significant advances in the areas of political citizenship (such as suffrage for those previously excluded from it) and social citizenship (access to education, health, land of one's own and other basic social rights). However, the creation of complex systems of intermediation, such as bureaucratic clientage, corporatism and the formation of States where sinecures and fieldmows are ripe, undermined the capacity for building citizenship in the national popular projects and also tended to subordinate cultural identities and social interests to the dynamics of a political system with a high degree of concentration of power.

The failure of these efforts to build democratic citizenship, and the traumatic effects left by subsequent military dictatorships in the region, have combined today to bring about an authentic revaluation of democracy as a political system and way of life. For the first time, democratic rules have come to occupy a place in the shared feelings of sectors holding different political ideas. In the political consciousness of many, these rules no longer figure as mere circumstantial instruments: instead, they now have an ethical value of their own. Many of the actions of the various social movements during the last decade have been aimed at expanding democracy as a system of broad, shared rights. This reconstruction of democracy has made it possible to resume the search for extended citizenship.

In this context, demands for greater rights are also being put forward by various cultural and regional groups. A new area of conflict among citizens, in which acceptance of the other stands out as a central issue, is now entering the arena of public discussion more forcibly. The struggle by ethno-cultural majorities and minorities for a greater public presence, women's movements and their demands on all levels, communitarian and localist movements, are all signs that today democracy cannot dispense with the building of citizenship, with its important cultural element.
All this may lead to a change in the widespread expectations of social integration. Such integration is no longer sought solely in terms of access to material goods, but is increasingly conceived as a balance between access to material goods and broader access to symbolic goods. Together with the demand for housing, health attention and more diversified consumption, there is now a specially forceful demand for information, useful knowledge, transparency of decisions, greater communication in the workplace and in society as a whole, and mechanisms for political representation and public visibility. This greater access to symbolic goods is stimulated both by the current democratization processes, which open up channels of public participation, and by the ever-greater impact of the cultural industry, which integrates society in terms of symbolic consumption.

The disparity between the slower-moving trend towards integration in economic and social processes (promoted by changing production patterns and social rationalization) and the heightened trend towards such integration at the symbolic and cultural level (as a result of the democratic political opening-up process and the cultural industry) could become an important core issue in the next few years in the struggle for citizenship in many of the societies of the region. This more favoured place for symbolic exchanges will be strengthened by the so-called “knowledge-based society”, in which the dissemination of knowledge is a central element for the construction of a form of citizenship in which “others” can be equals.  

If the knowledge-based society challenges us to broaden our Weltanschauung and open up our sensitivity, then this presence of others should represent an asset that can be developed. If, instead of negating the identity of the other, we recognize it as being present even within ourselves, then our Weltanschauung will be broadened. Our world will not collapse if we open our minds to the idea of identity-in-difference: on the contrary, it will be enriched with new contents. Abandoning negation of the other and instead recognizing the other as part of a collective identity which also includes ourselves may be the symbolic means of transforming past negation into forward-looking assertion. It goes without saying that this is not a synthesis which will take place spontaneously or all at once, but one which can only occur through a conflictive process strewn with obstacles. The process itself, however, will bring cultural enrichment and help to build shared citizenship.

V

The intercultural fabric as a force of modernity

Another central element running through the cultural substrate of the region is what we have called here the intercultural fabric, understood as the intercultural penetration or “active assimilation” of the culture of modernity from one’s own historico-cultural heritage. The concept of intercultural fabric expresses both the idea of permeability among cultures and the idea of the coexistence of various past periods in the present of our region. In this sense, Latin America and the Caribbean is a region with a special fabric, because it combines multiple cultural flows; because from its origin it has incorporated syncretism as part of its dynamics of culture and identity; because the modern and the non-modern coexist and mingle both in its culture and its economy; and because the consciousness of most Latin Americans is itself made up of linguistic or cultural mixtures.

Beneath the concept of modernity in the region there is a profound underlying error, because while we have so frequently wanted to interpret modernity as the abandonment of all exclusive particularisms or

8 This must be understood as the dissemination of knowledge in the broadest sense: i.e., the acquisition of productive skills, critical capacity, self-esteem as a function of one’s own potential, self-awareness as a citizen, greater openness for the assimilation of information and values, etc. This corollary of the foregoing reflections thus coincides with the proposals made in the ECLAC document (ECLAC, 1992b) in the sense that the spread of education knowledge and knowledge must “synergically” further both competitiveness and citizenship by spreading what are termed the “codes of modernity”.

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as a sort of “exhaustive westernization” of our region, in so doing we have tuned our back on the element of modernity which is most closely related with ourselves: the capacity to dynamically integrate cultural diversity within a shared societal order. Both the “pure” Indians who have managed to defend their identity by re-creating their cultural roots and the recently arrived Korean immigrants or the descendants of Spanish, Italian or German migrants bear the mark of being “different” –either as a form of denigration or as a liberating impulse–, so that day by day they build their own specific identities on the basis of cultural interactions with other cultures having a Western basis. In Latin America and the Caribbean, this concept of cross-breeding as an “intercultural fabric” has been enshrined in many figures and has been given various names: ladinization, cimarronization, creolism, chenko, etc.

Like negation of the other, syncretism or the intercultural fabric, which is the obverse of such negation, is not just an original event: it is also living history, and although its source lies in the encounter between different cultures—which are always renewing themselves— it spreads out to embrace all kinds of things. The peasant migrant struggling to survive in the big city is an expression of spatial syncretism; the intercultural mixtures generated by modernity are another aspect of cultural syncretism; opening up to world markets and structural heterogeneity also have connotations of intercultural fabric; and even the populist tradition represents a syncretic fabric in which features of modernity are intermingled with pre-modern political cultures.

In this respect, various hypotheses on the Latin American identity warrant critical consideration (J. Vergara Estévez and J. I. Vergara, 1992). The first of them is the hypothesis that the technological changes taking place all over the world mean that concern for local identities is outdated and that, if there really is a Latin American identity, then the dynamics of greater openness and technological penetration doom it to gradual dissolution. A second questionable hypothesis is that our region is marked by its lack of an identity and that the problem is therefore how to be full-blooded Europeans or North Americans. At the other extreme, the ultra-Indianist and Hispanist hypotheses are also exclusive in so far as they ignore the phenomenon of the intercultural fabric as the basis of our historical identity.

In contrast with these positions, whether they be of negation or unilateral assertion, the thesis of cultural syncretism has a much sounder historical base. According to this thesis, the Latin American identity must be understood in the light of the combination of cultural elements coming from Amerindian, European, African and other societies. The cultural encounter is seen as having produced a cultural synthesis which is manifested in artistic productions such as eighteenth century Latin American baroque or the muralism of our own century. This intercultural fabric is also expressed in music, rites, popular celebrations, dances, art and literature, and it permeates strategies of production and survival mechanisms.

This identity in the form of intercultural fabric has been considered from the point of view of both its limitations and its potential. With regard to the former, it has been noted that this identity has never been fully formed nor assumed. This is the position taken by Octavio Paz (1978) and Roger Bartra (1987), for example. In the metaphor of the development of an insect used by Bartra, the Latin American identity would be of the nature of a larva, doomed never to mature to the full. In the second case, it is asserted that the intercultural identity constitutes a cultural core from which we can enter and leave modernity in a versatile manner, and with which –if we assume to the full the condition of intercultural fabric– we could have a heritage from which to counteract the excessively instrumental or “de-historicizing” bias of the waves and ideologies of modernization.\footnote{García Canclini (1991) is an example of the first case, and Morandé (1984) of the second.}

Thus, the intercultural fabric is, at one and the same time, our way of being modern and our way of resisting modernity: our condition for cultural openness to exchanges with others and our way of incorporating modernity always in a syncretic manner. It is at once identity and disidentity, or identity and the problem of identity. The clearest reflection of this is offered by the great cities of the region: Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro, Caracas and Lima are outstanding metaphors of this history made up of mixtures.
This cannot be explained solely as the effect of the special pattern of modernization of the national economies. These are phenomena which repeatedly manifest, with the irrepressible force of identity, a syncretic cultural state. Both in the truncated or unequal development defining the maps and contrasts of the cities, and in the new heterogeneity which involves both fragmentation and diversity, and in which multiple and precarious relations of belonging arise, this intercultural fabric stands up to the homogenizing assault of modernization.

Just like the relation with others, this cultural condition forces us to rethink the challenges of modernization and of the construction of citizenship in cultural terms. How, then, can we capitalize on the region's experience in the history of intercultural mixtures so as to turn it into a comparative advantage in the new concert of an interconnected and globalized world?

How can we make use of our long and conflicted syncretic history in order to take on more advantageously this challenge which is now being faced by the industrialized societies too, and which consists of rethinking the content of citizenship on the basis of the progressive coexistence of different ethno-cultural identities? Assuming our own intercultural fabric is perhaps today the most authentic manner of doing this in the midst of a process of modernity marked by a type of diversity which is increasingly complex in terms of identity.

VI

The cultural dimension in the proposal for changing production patterns with equity

If we look at the path followed by the region since the end of the last war up to the present day, we see that there have been profound changes in all fields which give a completely new sense to modernization, equity, citizenship, the conflicts in course and the patterns of linkages between the State and society. In this context, it seems inconceivable that any development proposal could be based on rejection of modernity. It is much rather a question of “configuring the content of modernity so as to make it compatible with equity in economic and social matters and with citizenship in the political and institutional field” (Rosales, 1993, p. 156).

When legal and political equality is obstructed by the diversity of cultures, a severe dissociation takes place in which it is difficult to reconcile three requisites for expansionary modernity: the political representation of different actors and demands in an institutional framework; the balanced and reasoned participation of actors in the decision-making system; and greater equity in the results of economic development. Indeed, our region’s experience is an eloquent illustration of this difficulty.

For the case of the region, the foregoing pages posit the need to incorporate the cultural dimension into the project for economic development and the construction of a modern and broader form of citizenship. The weight of our cultural marks makes this operation essential, even though in principle we lack the tools for tackling it. There are, however, emerging indications that may weaken the past resistance experienced in this area, such as the following:

i) Processes of establishment of democratic institutions which had never before covered such a high proportion of the countries of the region and which are making the broad masses more sensitive to the values of tolerance, acceptance of others, and consensus.

ii) Broad social experiences of the furtherance of order and stability, in spite of the socially regressive costs of the crisis and the economic adjustment.

iii) The spread of a cultural industry which favours socio-cultural cross-fertilization and opens up technical possibilities for making the public spaces more permeable to submerged cultures.

iv) The need to incorporate the sectors excluded by the current pattern of modernization into the sphere of politics and the exchange of positions, in order to ensure greater governance, economic stability and institutional continuity.

These are some of the elements that can help overcome the dialectic of negation of the other and strengthen the intercultural fabric in the construction
of citizenship. These elements must be incorporated into the current ECLAC development proposal, because of their importance in the systemic articulation of that proposal: in our region, in view of its history, economic development requires the cultural construction of consensuses that will ensure continuity and dynamism.

There are also unresolved queries and serious problems in the relation between cultural features and the viability of changing production patterns, however. How can the “agents of development” whose existence is assumed in the proposal for changing production patterns with equity be reconciled with the real cultural identities of the region? Are the agents of development (economic, social and political actors) culturally prepared for promoting that process?

In order for the very wide range of socio-cultural actors existing in the region to have a significant incidence in the construction of a consensus for development, it is necessary to get away from the “rent-seeking mentality” and generate a modern entrepreneurial ethos and an ethic of solidarity, as well as seeking mechanisms for the unification and politicization of the demands of the masses.

A strategic link could be established between the aspirations of the actors to equality of rights and opportunities and the central lines of the proposal. The efforts to enhance the importance of the social actors in decision-making processes and in the new directions of modernization could be centered on this linkage between the demand for rights and recognition and the demand for incorporation into the new dynamics of productive development. The mechanisms of democratic exchange, which are essential for consensus, and those of incorporation into modernity must in turn set in motion mechanisms for the assertion of collective identities in order to make their demands and potential more clearly visible.

Democratic consensus for the promotion of sustained development calls for cultural strength, that is to say, an extended awareness of the cultural identities assumed and the need for reciprocity as regards rights and commitments. The important thing is how to further this cultural strength and what policies may serve this end.

This transformation of stigmas into cultural potentials will probably need more than just sectoral policies in the fields of culture, the cultural industry and mass communication. The possibility of mobilizing these media in order to spread a culture of tolerance and intercultural synthesis must undoubtedly be exploited to the full. However, the spread of these values will also have to gain “permeability” in a very wide range of actions, routines and institutions making up the social fabric. Within this framework, the need for a form of cultural strength which will promote consensus to guide development in a direction in keeping with the lines of the proposal and will at the same time permit the incorporation into that direction of the values and identities characteristic of our societies means that at least four conditions having high systemic effects must be pursued.

Firstly, education and knowledge, which are the driving forces of changing production patterns with equity, must be capable of combining the construction of a modern form of citizenship with the spread of an entrepreneurial ethos to society at large, all this in keeping with the cultural and economic possibilities and profiles of each country.

Secondly, progress must be made in the construction of extended citizenship through policies adapted to the various national contexts which seek to further an institutional culture based on contracts, standards of conduct and rights which are increasingly shared by the actors involved. There is growing consensus between the agents of development and social analysts on the idea that cultural values affect institutions, while the latter, in turn, have a decisive effect on the behaviour of the economy. It follows from this that there is a need to incorporate, from the level of basic education onwards and in a generalized manner, both a creative relation with instrumental rationality and productive skills and a process of socialization of values and forms of behaviour which strengthen the sense of citizenship and of legal and democratic institutions. This socialization should not be restricted, however, to basic education but could also be fostered through a system of institutions for training, vocational education, and adult education.

Thirdly, there is an urgent need for the application of a policy of recognition, promotion and integration of the sectors which are suffering three-fold exclusion: cultural discrimination (due to ethnic factors or clear educational lags), economic and social exclusion, and marginalization from mechanisms of political representation and participation. Such a policy should imbue a series of integration initiatives, both on the symbolic level (through growing participation by those sectors in the decision-making
system, especially on local matters) and on the material level (through the promotion of productive, community and training activities to strengthen the competitiveness and organization of the excluded sectors). Substantial political backing could be given to these kinds of actions through the implementation of national pacts for overcoming poverty.

Fourthly, and independently of the policy lines described above, there should be full awareness of the fact that all cultural policies must be integrated with and adapted to the changes taking place in the emerging informatized societies. In the final analysis, cultural policy (or policies with a systemic impact which also involve the cultural dimension) must promote maximum flexibility, creativeness and adaptability with regard to the central pillars of these emerging societies, namely, communication (connected with the cultural industry, the cultural market and the communications media); management (increasingly connected with the interactive information networks), and consumption (adapted to the needs and cultural patterns of our societies).

In short, what is needed is to take a systemic view of the relations between economic and cultural matters: to recognize that cultural values and practices affect the institutions and the behaviour of the economic agents, and that the dynamics of the economy, in turn, affect the possibilities of building a cultural environment compatible and in keeping with the challenges of modernity.

In this respect, there is probably a good deal of truth in the oriental proverb that by merely setting out on a journey one is already half way to one's destination.

(Original: Spanish)

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