


# POPULATION, SOCIAL EQUITY AND CHANGING PRODUCTION PATTERNS



**UNITED NATIONS**

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)  
Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE)

This text was prepared by the Latin American and Caribbean Regional Conference on Population and Development, (Mexico City, 29 April - 4 May 1993), co-sponsored by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE). The book was made possible thanks to the collaboration of the United Nations Population Fund. In addition to providing financial support, the Fund made valuable comments and suggestion on the text.

**ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN  
LATIN AMERICAN DEMOGRAPHIC CENTRE**

**POPULATION, SOCIAL EQUITY AND  
CHANGING PRODUCTION PATTERNS**



**UNITED NATIONS**

**Santiago, Chile , 1993**

LC/G.1758/Rev.1-P  
LC/DEM/G.131/Rev.1  
Serie E, No. 37  
September 1993

This text was prepared for the Latin American and Caribbean Regional Conference on Population and Development (Mexico City, 29 April - 4 May 1993), co-sponsored by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE). The book was made possible thanks to the collaboration of the United Nations Population Fund. In addition to providing financial support, the Fund made valuable comments and suggestions on the text.

Copyright © United Nations 1993  
All rights reserved  
Printed in Chile

Applications for the right to reproduce this work are welcomed and should be sent to the Secretary of the Publications Board, United Nations Headquarters, New York, N.Y. 10017, U.S.A. Member States and their governmental institutions may reproduce this work without prior authorization, but are requested to mention the source and inform the United Nations of such reproduction.

UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION

Número de venta E.93.II.G.8

ISBN 92-1-121186-7



## CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Introduction . . . . .	9
Chapter I    Demographic situation and trends . . . . .	15
A. Demographic situation and most important changes since 1950 . . . . .	15
B. Fertility . . . . .	20
C. Mortality . . . . .	26
D. Growth and age structures . . . . .	30
Chapter II    Population and changing production patterns with social equity	35
A. The ECLAC proposal for development in the 1990s: changing production patterns with social equity . . . . .	35
B. Pivotal points linking population dynamics with changing production patterns and social equity . . . . .	38
C. Population from the perspective of human resources . . .	39
D. Population and social equity . . . . .	41
E. Population and sustainable development . . . . .	49
F. Changing production patterns and population: final considerations . . . . .	51
Chapter III    Women in the region and the population issue . . . . .	53
A. General considerations . . . . .	53
B. The regional backdrop and changes in women's lives . . . . .	54
C. Women and population: some aspects of their relationship	55
D. Women's health and their right to control their own fertility . . . . .	57

E. Women in more vulnerable positions . . . . .	64
F. Future action . . . . .	67
<b>Chapter IV</b> Population, environment and territory in the perspective of sustainable development . . . . .	69
Introduction . . . . .	69
A. Population and natural resources . . . . .	69
B. Population and physical infrastructure . . . . .	70
C. Population, territory and the environment . . . . .	71
D. Population, environment and sustainable development in Latin America and the Caribbean . . . . .	78
<b>Chapter V</b> Population policy and programmes . . . . .	85
A. Strategies and their bases . . . . .	85
B. Evolution and current status of population policy in Latin America and the Caribbean . . . . .	89
C. Policy guidelines . . . . .	91
D. Population policy: an overview . . . . .	99
Appendix: The cost of programmes . . . . .	103
<b>Chapter VI</b> Population and the international environment . . . . .	107
A. International migration as a social process . . . . .	107
B. International migration in Latin America and the Caribbean . . . . .	109
C. Some repercussions of migration . . . . .	116
D. Globalization, regionalization and the future of migration . . . . .	121
E. Courses of action with respect to international migration . . . . .	122
F. The World Population Plan of Action as a tool for concerted action . . . . .	126
<b>Statistical annex</b> . . . . .	129
<b>Bibliography</b> . . . . .	143

## BOXES

	<i>Page</i>
Box I-1      Population size and growth by groups of countries in different stages of demographic transition (1990-2000) . . . . .	18
Box I-2      Knowledge and use of contraceptive methods and number of unwanted children among married women . . . . .	24
Box I-3      Latin America and the Caribbean: evolution of composition by age in the 1990s . . . . .	32
Box II-1      Undesired fertility by social sector . . . . .	45
Box II-2      Selected Latin American countries: demographic and social indicators by levels of poverty . . . . .	47
Box III-1      Female sterilization in Costa Rica . . . . .	61
Box III-2      Maternal mortality and abortion . . . . .	65
Box IV-1      Colonization, coca plantation and the environment . . . . .	74
Box IV-2      Some environmental repercussions of the growth of Latin American metropolitan areas . . . . .	76
Box IV-3      The air we breath . . . . .	77
Box IV-4      Deforestation, urbanization and institutional requirements for sustainable development in the Panama Canal basin . . . . .	80
Box V-1      Family planning and maternal and child health . . . . .	89
Box V-2      The foundations of the new population policy in El Salvador .	90
Box V-3      Various approaches to fertility reduction in Latin America . .	92
Box V-4      Mexico: a case of regional demographic policy . . . . .	94
Box V-5      Sex education in Mexico . . . . .	98
Box V-6      Information, education and communication programmes on population . . . . .	100
Box VI-1      Migration and crisis in Venezuela: the case of the Colombians in the 1980s . . . . .	115
Box VI-2      Macroeconomic importance of international remittances in three Central American countries . . . . .	120
Box VI-3      The Uruguayan scientific community and its interaction with emigrant countries . . . . .	125

## INTRODUCTION

In accordance with the guidelines and mandates it has received from member Governments, the secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean has focused in recent years on the analysis of how to approach development in the 1990s and beyond. Its core proposal has been cumulatively expressed in various documents, most recently in *Social Equity and Changing Production Patterns: An Integrated Approach*, which was submitted for consideration at the Commission's twenty-fourth session (April 1992).

Changing production patterns with social equity is the frame of reference and the linchpin for most of the Commission's work, as exemplified by recent contributions in the areas of external debt, the environment and education. The Commission's work on population also falls within this context. It is especially fitting, in view of the forthcoming International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, September 1994) and the Latin American and Caribbean Regional Conference on Population and Development (Mexico City, April 1993) to present the most recent results of the Commission's activity in this field.

The International Conference on Population and Development will take place in the larger context of the priority agenda of the United Nations for economic and social development, of which environmentally sustainable

development, the fight against poverty and the equality of women in the development process are key components. The discussion of the population variables presented herein therefore recognizes the crucial interrelationship between these three topics and population considerations as such.

### *Core elements*

The document is intended to contribute, first of all, to discussion and debate among member Governments on the topics of population and development, and it therefore seeks to portray the facts and trends objectively and to make further advances in interpreting them. The ultimate aim is to provide useful tools for policy-makers in the area of population, since such policies are essentially national in that they reflect each country's individual decisions. Moreover, it also seems useful to emphasize those aspects of population variables, such as problems concerning migration, which can most relevantly be addressed through regional and international cooperation.

The discussion of the topic is grounded in a solid basis of fact. This consideration is particularly important in view of the profound changes observed in Latin American and Caribbean population dynamics over the past two decades. These changes have been so far-reaching that projections of population size, growth and structure from the 1970s

and 1980s have proved very wide of the mark, and have demonstrated the need for constant revision. The initial results of the census round of the 1990s only reaffirm this need.

These changes in demographic behaviour have rich and varied dimensions. Life expectancy at birth – as an indicator of mortality – rose from 56 to 67 years between the early 1960s and the late 1980s, and the average number of children per woman fell from 6.0 to 3.4 over the same period. Equally significant changes have occurred in the proportion of children and elderly, in the percentage of the population residing in urban areas, in rates of female participation in the workforce and in other indicators. In a more qualitative sense, attitudes are shifting with regard to procreation; to the new models, composition and role of the family; and to changes in the social status of women.

These changes comprise a highly mixed picture of population dynamics by country, so that regional averages are of little use in depicting each country's individual situation. Thus, for example, while the average growth rate was about 2% in the 1980s, values by country ranged from less than 1% in some to over 3% in others.<sup>1</sup> Even more important is the heterogeneity within each country by social stratum, area of residence, educational level and, in many cases, ethnic group. In some countries, for example, infant mortality in segments with little education doubles and even triples the rate for those at the opposite end of the educational spectrum.

This process has been accompanied by a wide-ranging debate in the region on the relationship between demographic growth and economic growth, in an effort to identify causal relations and to draw policy conclusions from them. The debate can hardly be considered settled from the theoretical standpoint, since analysts are still finding causal relations in opposite

directions and, especially, of opposite signs. Indeed, population growth has been identified by some as the main obstacle, and by others as a stimulus, to economic growth.

In practice, however, it is widely agreed that policy decisions should reflect a pragmatic approach that avoids simplistic formulas of either sign. There is also broad consensus in recognizing that higher population size or growth increases pressure on the provision of basic services and the use of space and natural resources. It is also recognized that the quality of human resources, for purposes of development, is of equal or greater importance than their quantity, but that opportunities for training are reduced when the population's quantitative increase is significant.

This theoretical debate has influenced the discussion about how Governments should approach population dynamics vis-à-vis their economic development concerns. However, other factors are also important and should be taken into account at the governmental and, more broadly, the societal level. In United Nations forums, Governments have supported as an inalienable individual right the freedom to decide on reproductive behaviour, and have pledged to ensure its effective exercise. Surveys and other research have found that the majority of the population wishes to exercise this right, but that a large segment of this majority cannot do so, owing to a lack of information and material means. The existence of this unmet demand may constitute the most important grounds for concern and – when it is so decided – for public action through population policies.

Since the aforementioned unmet demand is found mainly in poor strata, socio-economic inequity extends to what could be termed demographic inequity.<sup>2</sup> Governments should therefore consider, among their initiatives to help poor

---

1 This variation in population dynamics is also reflected in other important variables, such as the ratio of natural resources to population size.

2 Demographic inequity is seen not only in terms of fertility but also in respect of migration and in the mortality variable, especially infant mortality.

individuals and families to improve their situation, measures directly aimed at overcoming demographic inequity.

Furthermore, the predominance of high-fertility reproductive patterns in poor strata in itself promotes the transmission of poverty from generation to generation. In poor families with many children, including households headed by women, the attention received by each child in terms of health, nutrition and education is deficient; this puts poor children at a disadvantage for successfully integrating themselves into the labour market once they reach adulthood, and hence they tend to remain trapped in the same condition of poverty as their parents. All of this implies that, within a sufficient time-frame, the facilitation of individual decisions on reproductive patterns, which is tantamount to overcoming demographic inequity, will directly help to overcome inequity in its broadest, socio-economic sense. The above-mentioned considerations on respect for individual rights and elimination of inequity are especially relevant to the study of the status of women, whose difficult social situation in both senses is particularly marked.

In sum, there is a clear compatibility between measures to help the poorest strata realize their desire for smaller families and the requirements of changing production patterns. Having fewer children will help these families and the State to concentrate resources and efforts on improving the quality of human resources, which is one of the pillars of changing production patterns with social equity.

Among the demographic changes recorded in recent decades are those relating to the population's territorial distribution. The pace of urbanization has accelerated, with the proportion of people living in cities reaching 71%. This has negatively affected environmental conditions in urban areas, and has been accompanied by equally significant effects on the occupation of rural areas. Consequently, the Governments of the region have expressed their wish to design

and implement policies to orient internal migration, but they have had to face the fact that, given the complexity of the causes of such migration, their chances of influencing spatial distribution lie not so much in direct action as in the influence of their economic and social policies in general on the determinants of migration.

Similar observations can be made in the case of international migration. For example, government concern over the loss of qualified human resources can be channelled most effectively through development policies that encourage people to remain in their home country, rather than measures that seek to regulate the flow of emigration directly.

#### *Population policies*

The foregoing considerations help to identify the possible range of population policies. First of all, the three traditional variables of population dynamics—fertility, mortality and migration—deserve government attention. This should be a double-edged concern: that the evolution of demographic variables be compatible with the development process in terms of production, social equity and sustainability, and that this evolution reflect the free exercise of individual rights. A broad area of complementarity exists between these two dimensions.

Second, since demographic phenomena are interrelated with socio-economic dynamics as a whole, population policies should be implemented in the context of development policy in general, and of social policy in particular. This approach more clearly distinguishes the specific fields in which population policy can have a relatively direct impact—such as actions relating to fertility—from those in which population policy works mainly through areas conventionally identified with other spheres of government action. Examples of the latter include morbidity- and mortality-related policy in the form of general actions in the health sector, and migration policy which, apart from government regulatory action, is

influenced by the broad spectrum of policies to promote development. The more direct nature of fertility control policies should not, however, be interpreted as a sign of disconnectedness from the entire package of social policies.

The implementation of a population policy conceived in these terms therefore precludes an autonomous, compartmentalized vision on the part of the policy itself or of the public institutions in charge of it. Population goals should neither be set independently of economic and social development policies nor be pursued by entities unrelated to government development agencies. Institutional arrangements should clearly identify those responsible for designing the policy and for following up and evaluating its results (for example, an inter-ministerial committee assisted by an ad hoc technical team). Above all, the capacity of bodies such as ministries of education and health, as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community organizations, should be tapped through invitations to participate in policy implementation with concrete programmes of action. The region has had varied experience in this area –including both successes and failures– on which Governments undoubtedly will want to capitalize.

The field of external migration also affords ample opportunity for international cooperation. Indeed, the bilateral conventions and other policy-coordinating mechanisms in force today are in need of improvements and amplifications which –without prejudice to the sovereign right of every State to regulate movements of foreigners in its territory– will help clarify the rights of the migrating population and minimize conflicts concerning this highly sensitive and fluctuating phenomenon.

International technical cooperation, both bilateral and multilateral, has played an important role in the region since the initiation of national population activities, particularly with regard to family planning, education on population issues and data collection. The rapidly changing constellation of demographic variables

and the heterogeneity of their behaviour among and within countries mean that, in the foreseeable future, population problems will be no less important and complex than in the past, and that the role of international cooperation will therefore remain crucial. The fact that some overall indicators, such as the region's average growth rate, have changed dramatically could erroneously suggest that the region deserves less attention and cooperation than it has been receiving.

In particular, neither international cooperation nor national efforts should be limited to the most direct and immediate actions in the field of population, but should meet the need to analyse, as fully as possible and on an ongoing basis, the region's shifting demographic reality. The latter constitutes a rich laboratory in which much can be learned about the complex linkages between population, development and the environment in a context of democratic progress for the benefit of the countries that make up the region and, to some extent, of countries in other parts of the developing world.

### *Contents of chapters*

The following chapters discuss in greater detail the facts, conclusions and policy considerations summed up in this introduction. Chapter I outlines the evolution of population dynamics at the regional and country levels, using a typology based on the descriptive scheme of the so-called demographic transition. Next, it focuses separately on changes in fertility and mortality, dwelling on topics of particular importance such as adolescent fertility, infant mortality and certain pending challenges, such as the persistence of maternal mortality, and then examines the implications of all of the above for the population's growth and age structure.

Chapter II describes the proposal on changing production patterns with social equity in a context of environmental sustainability and democratic development. In this context, it identifies the three main areas of linkage between

changing production patterns and population: human resources, with emphasis on quality; social equity; and environmental sustainability.

Chapters III and IV discuss two topics which –as noted earlier– constitute basic concerns of the international community and have priority on the United Nations agenda, namely, women and environmental sustainability. In both cases, emphasis is placed on the study of these topics' relationship to the population variable, and, especially on the fact that their linkage to population is difficult to separate from their connection with socio-economic dynamics as a whole.

The chapter on women and population takes up and further examines a number of topics, such as the exercise of reproductive rights and the situation of displaced and refugee women. The chapter on environmental sustainability expands upon previous studies on the environment and natural resources by viewing these topics in conjunction with that of the population's territorial occupation or spatial distribution. This approach reveals that, besides taking overall measurements of demographic pressure on natural resources, it is vitally important to analyse local ecosystems, which vary greatly in this regard and therefore lend themselves more easily to the definition and application of specific policy measures.

Chapter V deals with national population policy, briefly examining the foundations thereof and –without offering a detailed historical account– analysing various experiences in this field. Its main conclusion is that concerns should not focus exclusively on the implementation of specific institutional schemes, but should explore how to take advantage of pre-existing government bodies that could collaborate efficiently in policy design and implementation. After considering some potential policy guidelines, including target-setting, the chapter goes on to discuss programmes for more direct action on population variables, i.e., family planning programmes, in greater detail.

Lastly, chapter VI considers separately the topics which, while amply deserving of national concern, are inherently suited to international cooperation. International migration is the first of these. After discussing migration both within and outside the region in some detail, the chapter analyses its main implications for the development process and presents some reflections on possibilities for action offered by national policies and international cooperation. Lastly, it describes some aspects of the World Population Plan of Action, which was adopted and updated, respectively, at the two world conferences held thus far (Bucharest, 1974 and Mexico City, 1984).



## Chapter I

# DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION AND TRENDS

### A. Demographic situation and most important changes since 1990

---

#### *General considerations*

The population of Latin America and the Caribbean grew from 165 million in 1950 to around 460 million in 1992, accounting for approximately 8.5% of the total world population at the present time. The absolute increase of nearly 300 million persons is the result of high rates of demographic growth which in many countries were close to or higher than 3% up to the mid-1960s (see tables 1 and 2 of the statistical annex). Those rates resulted from constantly falling death rates –observed since the end of the Second World War or even earlier– and persistently high birth rates. These trends occurred –at least up to the mid-1970s– together with important changes in the area of production and sustained economic growth in most countries of the region. During that period, economic growth, along with the strengthening and expansion of the middle and wage-earning classes, was sufficiently great to produce such increases in the per capita gross domestic product as to generate high expectations in marginalized sectors of the population of gaining access to the fruits of development. These changes were accompanied by a rapid urbanization process that involved

massive population movements from rural areas to cities.

Towards the end of the 1970s, the increase in the population growth rate began to reverse itself. This phenomenon reflected a decrease in fertility which spread to most countries and, within them, from the better educated sectors in urban areas to the poorly educated sectors of rural areas.

The economic crisis which began to affect the region at the end of the 1970s led to a clear and sustained drop in the per capita gross domestic product between 1980 and 1989. That situation, although certainly not of the same intensity in all countries, deteriorated standards of living generally and increased levels of poverty and indigence (ECLAC, 1991e). It is important to note that, when the crisis was at its height, most countries were in a process of demographic transition which apparently was not affected by that crisis. However, the latter certainly did have important demographic effects in other areas, such as family composition, marriage, and migratory movements. During the 1980s, Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole had an average annual population growth rate of 2.1%, while a rate of 1.7% is expected for the 1990s, meaning an increase of 82 million persons. These growth rates are similar to those expected for the global average and for Asia, with higher rates expected only in Africa (2.9%). The persistence of

relatively high growth in spite of changes in fertility is explained mainly by the potential for population growth found in youthful age structures.

One of the characteristic traits of Latin American population distribution is its relatively high degree of urbanization, a fact which has distinguished it from other developing regions for many years. In 1950, nearly 60% of Latin Americans lived in areas defined as rural, but in 1990 less than 30% lived in those areas and, by the year 2000, it is expected that three quarters of the population will live in urban areas. However, the countries vary in terms of both the degree of urbanization reached and the persistence of a predominantly rural population profile in some of them, especially in the Caribbean and Central America. In general, this process, which is an integral element of the model of concentrational development which prevailed in Latin American countries, is thought to be one factor which has facilitated the process of demographic transition, in so far as it has allowed for the more rapid extension of educational systems, new cultural habits and modern technologies that promote reductions in mortality and fertility rates at little cost.

One form of demographic spatial mobility which has taken on growing importance consists of international migratory movements, both out of the region –mainly to the United States– and within it. The significance of this phenomenon is reflected in many ways, ranging from its demographic impact on less populous countries, or on specific areas of more populous ones, to its various effects on social and economic realities, including its implications for the free exercise of human rights (see chapter VI below).

#### *Demographic transition in Latin America and the Caribbean: typology by country*

The concept of demographic transition was derived from the observation of a process of demographic change in western countries, consisting in a gradual evolution from high birth and death rates

to low ones in response to the social and economic changes brought about by industrial modernization. The process took the form of various phases, beginning with a decrease in mortality rates. Subsequently, a more marked decline was seen in fertility rates, which ultimately led to low, zero, and even negative rates of natural growth. Although a universal trend towards demographic change according to the model or theory of demographic transition has been recognized, it should be noted that the correspondence to this model is empirical and that the process has been highly heterogeneous among different regions, countries and social groups within them. This fact has sparked sharp controversy, yet the concept of demographic transition is undoubtedly very useful for describing a population's demographic situation. For the practical purposes of this paper, therefore, it is used as a frame of reference for the particular pattern of change noted in Latin American and Caribbean populations.

Demographic transition is an integral part of the social and economic changes which have occurred in the region, although the relationship between that transition and those changes is complex and has not been sufficiently clarified. The process has been fairly heterogeneous, both among countries and within them, in terms of geographical areas and social sectors, in the sense that populations in different stages coexist. Countries in which women bear an average of 6 children during their reproductive lives contrast sharply with those in which they bear an average of 2 children; at the same time, there are countries in which life expectancy at birth is less than 60 years, while in others it is around 75 years.

The countries of the region are grouped below according to the stage of demographic transition through which they are currently passing. As in every classification effort, each group contains exceptions and a certain degree of heterogeneity, especially given that the countries currently in the same stage may be experiencing different intensities of

change in the trends of their demographic variables. Gross birth and death rates were used for this typology. Although those indicators do not reflect fertility and mortality levels accurately, they do

determine the rate of natural population growth and reveal, moreover, the influence of the population age structures (see diagram I.1). The other component of demographic change is international

Diagram I.1  
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: COUNTRY SITUATION ACCORDING TO  
STAGE OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION, 1985-1990

### Birth rate

H I G H		NICARAGUA 3.5 GUATEMALA 3.2 HONDURAS 3.2  EL SALVADOR 2.6 PARAGUAY 2.8 II	BOLIVIA 2.6 HAITI 2.3      I
	M O D E R A T E	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 2.5 MEXICO 2.4 COSTA RICA 2.5 VENEZUELA 2.3 SURINAME 2.2 PANAMA 2.2 COLOMBIA 2.0 TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 1.9	ECUADOR 2.5 PERU 2.2  III  BRAZIL 1.9 GUYANA 1.9
	L O W	JAMAICA 1.7 CHILE 1.7 BAHAMAS 1.5  MARTINIQUE 1.2 CUBA 1.1	IV  GUADELOUPE 1.3 ARGENTINA 1.3  PUERTO RICO 1.1 URUGUAY 0.8 BARBADOS 0.7

### Mortality rate

	LOW	MODERATE	HIGH
Rates per thousand:			
Birth:	HIGH: 32 - 45	MODERATE: 24 - 32	LOW: 10 - 24
Mortality:	HIGH: 11 - 16	MODERATE: 7 - 11	LOW: 4 - 7

Source: Latin American Demographic Centre CELADE, current population projections, United Nations *World Population Prospects. The 1992 Revision*, New York, 1992.

Note: The figures next to the country names correspond to the natural growth rate, expressed as percentages. The countries included are those for which the United Nations prepares population estimates and projections, which are those with at least 200,000 inhabitants.

## Box I.1

## POPULATION SIZE AND GROWTH BY GROUPS OF COUNTRIES IN DIFFERENT STAGES OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION (1990-2000)

Most of the population of Latin America and the Caribbean (75%) is undergoing a process of demographic transition, meaning that they are experiencing significant changes in their mortality and birth rates which will lead to moderate growth rates in the coming years (1.7%). However, there are still countries in the region with high rates of growth, owing to their high birth rates. For this reason, the countries of

groups I and II (in incipient and moderate transition), which represent 10% of the region's population, will contribute 16% of the increase which will occur during the 1990s. The countries at a more advanced stage of transition (group IV) represent 15% of the total population of Latin America and the Caribbean and will grow at rates of around 1% annually.

	Total	Groups			
		I	II	III	IV
Population (millions)					
1990	441	14	29	332	66
2000	523	17	39	393	74
Percentage of total	100	3	7	75	15
Annual average growth (%)	1.7	2.2	3.0	1.7	1.1
Increase (millions)	82	3	10	61	8
Percentage of increase	100	4	12	74	10

Source: J. Chackiel and M. Villa, Latin America and the Caribbean: the dynamics of population and growth (DDR/1). Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), 1992, paper presented at the Meeting of Government Experts on Population and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, preparatory to the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, Saint Lucia, 6-9 October.

migration which, given its relatively slight influence on growth and population structures and because trends are not easily foreseeable, was not taken into account in the typology.

The following groups were defined:

**Group I. Incipient transition.** Countries with high birth and mortality rates<sup>3</sup> that result in moderate natural growth rates of around 2.5%: Bolivia and Haiti. Given their high fertility rates, these populations are very youthful and show a high dependency ratio.

**Group II. Moderate transition.** Countries with high birth rates and moderate mortality rates, which translate

into high natural growth rates of around 3%: El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay. The decrease in the mortality rate, which has occurred mainly in the younger age groups, and a high fertility rate have produced a rejuvenation of the age structure of the population and, consequently, a higher dependency ratio.

**Group III. Full transition.** Countries with moderate birth rates and moderate to low mortality rates resulting in a moderate natural growth rate of around 2%: Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guyana, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and

3 In the following description, it is understood that all references are made with respect to values obtained in the region. Developed countries, in most cases, have lower fertility and mortality rates.

Venezuela. This group contains most of the population of Latin America. Its low gross mortality rate can be explained partly by the progress made by many of these countries in the area of health, but basically by the still-youthful age structure produced by recent decreases in fertility. This, in turn, has led to a lower dependency ratio. With few exceptions, most of these countries have also experienced an intensive urbanization process.

**Group IV. Advanced transition.** Countries with low birth rates and moderate to low mortality rates, which lead to low natural growth rates of around 1%: Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Chile, Cuba, Guadeloupe, Jamaica, Martinique, Puerto Rico and Uruguay. In this group, two sub-groups are evident. On the one hand, there are countries which have had low birth and mortality rates for a long time (Argentina, Uruguay and, to a lesser degree, Cuba), whose growth rates and age structures are similar to those of more developed countries. Argentina and Uruguay have higher gross mortality rates, due in part to their older age structures produced by their historically low birth rates. On the other hand, there are countries which, in recent years, have achieved important decreases in their birth and mortality rates but which, given their relatively young populations, still have higher rates of growth. Except in some Caribbean countries, demographic patterns have emerged within a context of marked urbanization, currently involving over 70% of the population.

#### *Demographic transition and modernization*

The regional population as a whole is undergoing a process of transition involving slower rates of growth. This phenomenon is attributable to an initial decrease in mortality rates, followed by a more marked decline in birth rates. This demographic transition seems to be related to the region's social and economic development and, within this context, to each society's historic realities.

Through various means, and to different degrees, in the second half of the

century the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean experienced significant social and economic changes which some social scientists tried to explain in terms of the theory of "modernization". This theory, although controversial in many aspects, is useful for describing the social changes that took place in the 1960s and 1970s, even though the concept of modernization may change over time and may, therefore, refer to different parameters than those of interest at that time. The strong, sustained economic growth achieved by most of the countries of the region, at least until the end of the 1970s, was the catalyst for changes in social structures that took the form of a higher proportion of service-sector labour, increases in the workforce's productivity and training, improvements in educational coverage and a geographic mobility that resulted in an accelerating process of urbanization (ECLAC, 1989).

ECLAC (1989) presented a classification of countries based on modernization indicators (proportion of service-sector labour, urbanization and education). Diagram I.2 lists the Latin American and Caribbean countries according to this classification and their current stage of demographic transition. The countries most advanced in both respects already had a predominantly urban population in 1950, and today record a per capita gross domestic product (GDP) higher than the regional average (over US\$2,000). Those in full demographic transition are a mixed group. Three of them have achieved an advanced, though still recent, modernization; Venezuela is a special case owing to its high per capita GDP and the dizzying speed with which it achieved a high degree of urbanization; but this situation is not apparent in the remaining two countries, as even Costa Rica has a mainly rural population. The rest of the countries in full transition show a partial, accelerated modernization; some have a per capita GDP above the regional average (Brazil and Mexico), and all are predominantly urban. Except in Paraguay, the modernization level of countries that are lagging behind in their

Diagram I.2  
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION AND MODERNIZATION

STAGE OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION	MODERNIZATION LEVEL IN THE 1960s AND 1970s		
	ADVANCED	PARTIAL AND ACCELERATED	INCIPIENT
ADVANCED	Argentina, Chile, Cuba, Uruguay		
FULL TRANSITION	Costa Rica, Panama, Venezuela	Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, México, Peru	
MODERATE		Paraguay	El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua
INCIPIENT			Bolivia, Haiti

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), *Transformación ocupacional y crisis social en América Latina* (LC/G.1558-P), Santiago, Chile, 1989. United Nations publication, Sales No. S.90.II.G.3; and J. Chackiel and J. Martínez, "Transición demográfica en América Latina y el Caribe desde 1950", Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), 1992, unpublished.

demographic transition is defined as incipient. All of these countries combine a low per capita GDP (and a mainly rural population in some of them) with the highest population growth rates and youthful age structures.

### B. Fertility

#### *Levels and trends*

Beginning in the mid-1960s, in some Latin American countries, an accentuation of the process of birth rate transition began to be observed, which gradually spread throughout the region. Since 1950 and before this process began, average birth rates remained around 6 children per woman and the range of variation of the total fertility rate among countries implied a difference of 4.5 children. In the period 1985-1990, the average fell to 3.4 children per woman and, even though these levels have fallen in all of the countries, the differences between extreme fertility values remain at 4 children per woman.

Given that the decrease in fertility is relatively recent and that the age structure of many countries is still youthful, the annual number of births in Latin America has increased from 7 million to 12 million between 1950-1955 and 1985-1990, which

has meant considerable increases in absolute terms in most countries. However, in some countries in the advanced stages of demographic transition, decreased fertility has already stabilized the number of births to some degree.

Important differences in the levels and trends of birth rates among countries are evident (see table 3 of the statistical annex and table I.1). In countries classified as being in incipient or moderate transition (groups I and II), the total fertility rate is still high (between approximately 4.5 and 6 children per woman). The trend, observed since the middle of this century and up to 1985-1990, is towards a decrease of between 1 and 2 children. Although there are groups of low fertility in every country, mainly among urban and better educated women—with averages of 2 and 3 children per woman—the greater part of the population has a high fertility rate, a phenomenon related to socio-economic and cultural factors and to the less extensive use of modern contraceptive methods.

In terms of the drop in fertility since 1950, the most important phenomenon has occurred among group III countries, classified as being in full demographic transition. In those countries, the total fertility rate, which was 6-7 children per woman in mid-century, dropped to 3-4 children, a decrease of 50%. Colombia and

Table I.1  
**LATIN AMERICA: TOTAL ANNUAL BIRTHS AND PERCENTAGE OF BIRTHS BY WOMEN'S AGE GROUPS DURING SELECTED FIVE-YEAR PERIODS, AND BY COUNTRIES GROUPED ACCORDING TO DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION STAGE**

Countries	Total annual births (thousands)			Percentage of births by women's age groups <sup>a</sup>					
				Central ages 20-34 years		High-risk ages			
	1950-1955	1985-1990	1995-2000	1950-1955	1985-1990	15-19 years 1950-1955	1985-1990	35 + years 1950-1955	1985-1990
<b>Group I</b>									
Bolivia	138	248	274	69.0	71.5	10.6	12.4	20.4	16.1
Haiti	148	224	258	64.1	71.2	8.3	8.0	27.6	20.7
<b>Group II</b>									
El Salvador	100	172	192	72.3	66.2	14.9	23.5	12.8	10.2
Guatemala	164	350	415	68.1	69.9	17.4	17.1	14.5	13.0
Honduras	78	189	217	68.1	70.1	15.3	16.5	16.6	13.4
Nicaragua	65	150	176	69.6	67.2	16.0	22.0	14.4	10.8
Paraguay	69	139	161	70.9	71.9	10.5	11.7	18.7	16.4
<b>Group III</b>									
Brazil	2 590	3 801	3 474	71.7	78.8	9.3	9.0	19.1	12.2
Colombia	607	802	802	69.1	74.0	13.1	15.5	17.9	10.5
Costa Rica	45	82	87	72.8	73.1	12.5	16.8	14.7	10.2
Ecuador	166	321	335	67.3	73.9	14.3	13.9	18.4	12.2
Mexico	1 333	2 400	2 466	71.0	72.0	12.6	18.3	16.3	9.7
Panama	36	62	63	69.6	72.1	17.1	18.5	13.3	9.4
Peru	384	636	670	67.3	72.8	13.8	12.4	19.0	14.8
Dominican Republic	129	213	208	68.7	76.4	16.5	13.8	14.8	9.8
Venezuela	263	519	539	70.4	73.9	15.5	14.4	14.1	11.7
<b>Group IV</b>									
Argentina	458	669	698	75.2	73.7	10.7	13.7	14.2	12.7
Cuba	182	182	181	76.4	69.8	10.2	26.1	13.4	4.1
Chile	239	301	309	70.7	76.5	10.4	13.6	19.0	9.8
Uruguay	49	54	54	75.1	74.4	12.2	13.8	12.7	11.9

Source: CELADE, current population projections.

<sup>a</sup> Percentage of births refers to the quotient obtained between births in the age groups under consideration and total births in each country.

the Dominican Republic have the greatest decrease, of 3.9 and 3.6 children per woman, respectively, in the period under consideration. In countries with the greatest change in birth rates, knowledge of modern contraceptive methods among women of childbearing age is practically 100% and use of them is over 45%, with the exceptions of Peru and Ecuador, which have the highest birth rates of the group.

Finally, among group IV countries, in advanced transition, with rates of up to 3

children per woman, two groups can be distinguished. On the one hand, Uruguay and Argentina have had low fertility levels since mid-century, which did not change significantly during the period, while in the other countries the decrease has been on the order of 2 and 3 children per woman. Among these, Cuba, Barbados and Martinique are outstanding, presenting total fertility rates below the replacement rate.

*Fertility by age group, in particular among teenagers*

Although fertility has declined among women of all ages, it has fallen most markedly among women aged 35 and over. This fact, coupled with the higher growth in the number of women aged 20 to 34, has resulted in a strong concentration of births within this central age group. This development has important consequences for maternal and child health, since most women are giving birth at ages that present the fewest problems in terms of possible risks to the mother and child (see table 4 of the statistical annex and table I-1). However, there is growing concern for the high number of pregnancies and births among mothers younger than 20 years of age. Although the general trend is towards a decline in the specific fertility rates of the age 15-19 group since the 1950s (see table 4 of the statistical annex), it is disturbing that by virtue of the increase in cohorts of adolescents—as a result of higher past fertility rates—the absolute number of corresponding births has risen in all countries. Nicaragua experienced the greatest relative increase in the number of births among women age 15 to 19 (more than 200%) between 1950-1955 and 1985-1990, while Uruguay showed the least (17%). In the remaining Latin American countries this growth fluctuated between 60% (Colombia and Chile) and 130% (Costa Rica and Paraguay) (see table I.1); in the Caribbean, the annual figure for births of teenage mothers doubled between 1955 and 1985, although it fell by the end of the 1980s in most of them (Chackiel and Villa, 1992).

In Latin America, the range of variations in the birth rate among 15- to 19-year-olds, in 1985-1990, ranges from 48 per thousand in Brazil to 160 per thousand in Nicaragua. Generally, rates in the countries of groups I and II are higher than those in groups III and IV, with the exception of Haiti, which has a low rate, second only to Brazil. Among those with the highest rates—over 100 per thousand—are Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, which are at the stage of moderate

transition. Together with Brazil and Haiti, already mentioned, the lowest rates, around or less than 70 per thousand, are found in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay (group IV) and Peru (group III).

Among the Latin American and Caribbean countries for which studies of teenage fertility exist, some have shown increases in recent years. Brazil is one such case, since its birth rate for women between 15 and 19 years of age seems to have increased slightly between 1970 and 1981-1986 (Henriques and others, 1986). An analysis of fertility rates in Chile between 1985 and 1990 shows an increase among 15- to 19-year-olds of about 15% (Irrázaval and Valenzuela, 1992). For other countries, such as the Dominican Republic and Panama (Wulf, 1986), data from surveys taken in hospitals, which indicate an increase in the proportion of births among teenage mothers, could point to a phenomenon similar to that observed in Brazil and Chile. Moreover, comparable data from Peru indicate that, even though the specific birth rate among 15- to 19-year-old women has remained nearly the same during the last 15 years, the birth rate among urban teenagers declined, while it rose among rural young women, from 115 to 137 per thousand (Ferrando, Singh and Wulf, 1989).

Fertility rates among teenagers vary widely according to their area of residence or social sector. Rural women and those with little education are more likely to have children than urban and educated women (United Nations, 1989). However, premarital pregnancies are more common among the latter, and some studies have revealed a recent increase in their fertility rates, especially in countries in groups III and IV. In sum, poverty and illiteracy lead to high rates of teenage motherhood, but, paradoxically, modern life also leads to such increases among teenagers in the upper classes.

Both for its social effects and its negative impact on the health of mothers and children, teenage pregnancies are a problem which requires further study and the search for effective solutions. Moreover, given its particular characteristics,



this phenomenon could lead to increases in unwanted pregnancies and abortions. To combat these, policies such as those recommended in chapter V should be adopted. Since pregnant teenagers and their children run the risk of health problems for social and biological reasons, adequate pre-natal care and mass immunization campaigns are needed to reduce such risk factors as low birth weight and neo-natal tetanus (United Nations, 1989).

#### *Determining factors for changes in fertility*

Since the formulation of the original theory of demographic transition, a relationship has been noted—in numerous empirical studies—between fertility rates and the behaviour of economic, social and cultural variables (as indicators of development). Therefore, these variables are considered to be determining factors of fertility.<sup>4</sup>

Studies have indicated that the socio-economic variables most closely related to fertility rates are education, the economic participation of women and place of residence. Other factors, such as the education and occupation of the parents and housing conditions, have also been analysed, since they all reflect the socio-economic level of the household surveyed (Chackiel and Schkolnik, 1992; United Nations, 1987).

Since the vast potential of education, as a determining factor, to affect human behaviour in general and reproductive behaviour in particular has already been recognized, education is felt to play a prominent role in changing fertility patterns. In 13 Latin American countries, a multivariate analysis has demonstrated that the effect of women's education as an independent variable emerges as the most powerful and significant, even taking into account other socio-economic characteristics of couples (United Nations, 1987 and 1990).

However, if these associations are to be interpreted as causal relations, it is

necessary to establish, *inter alia*, the mechanisms through which these associations operate. For over 30 years, it has been accepted that changes in fertility patterns do not result from a direct relationship between fertility and socio-economic and cultural variables, but that the relationship is, in general, mediated by a series of "intermediate variables" (Davis and Blake, 1956) or "proximate determinants" (Bongaarts, 1978). Socio-economic and cultural factors act upon the "intermediate variables", which, in turn, affect fertility patterns. Birth rates tend to fall as a result of circumstances which limit exposure to sexual relations, conception or gestation. Bongaarts identified as the four most significant variables the proportion of women in marriages or sexual unions, the use of contraceptive methods, abortion and lactation, since various empirical studies had confirmed that most variations in fertility rates could be explained in terms of these factors (United Nations, 1987).

The results of studies in Latin America and the Caribbean indicate that the use of contraceptives is the most important determinant of decreased fertility. In Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Trinidad and Tobago, contraception is responsible for over 50% of the decrease in fertility (Moreno and Singh, 1990). Information on the knowledge and use of contraceptives shows that, in those in full demographic transition (group III), the proportion of women who use contraceptives is high and is concentrated in the use of more modern methods, while in countries with high birth rates (groups I and II), fewer women use contraceptives (see box I.2). According to the latest available data, the percentage of women of childbearing age who use modern contraceptives is approximately 55% in Brazil and Colombia; around 45% in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Mexico and Trinidad and Tobago; 35% in Ecuador and Paraguay; and around 20% in Bolivia and

4 This does not preclude the fact that, at another level of analysis, fertility and its changing patterns are considered an independent variable in relation to economic and social development. This aspect of the relationship is analysed in another chapter.

## Box 1.2

### KNOWLEDGE AND USE OF CONTRACEPTIVE METHODS AND NUMBER OF UNWANTED CHILDREN AMONG MARRIED WOMEN

Research conducted in the late 1980s on the level of knowledge about and use of contraceptive methods in some countries of the region shows that there is a wide gap between knowledge about contraceptives and their use, especially in the case of modern methods. While

contraceptive use ranges from 30% to 66% in the region, it reaches levels of 75% to 80% in developed countries. The number of unwanted children, one of the indicators of the unsatisfied demand for contraceptive methods, was also estimated.

#### Percentage of women currently married between 15 and 49 years of age by knowledge about and use of contraceptives and number of unwanted children

Countries	Year of survey	TFR <sup>a</sup> 1985-1990	Percentage who know of some modern method <sup>b</sup>	Percentage who currently use some method	Percentage who currently use some method <sup>b</sup>	Number of unwanted children
<b>Group I</b>						
Bolivia	1989	5.0	68	30	12	1.8
<b>Group II</b>						
El Salvador	1985	4.5	93	47	45	1.1
Guatemala <sup>c</sup>	1987	5.8	72	23	19	0.7
Paraguay	1990	4.6	96	48	35	-
<b>Group III</b>						
Brazil <sup>c</sup>	1986	3.2	100	66	57	0.7
Colombia	1986	2.9	100	66	55	0.5
Ecuador	1987	4.1	90	44	36	0.7
Mexico	1987	3.6	93	53	45	-
Peru	1986	4.0	86	46	23	1.5
Dominican Republic	1986	4.0	99	50	47	1.0
Trinidad and Tobago	1987	3.0	99	53	44	-

Source: Annex A-3: Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), Newsletter, vol. 4, No. 2, Columbia, Maryland: Institute for Resource Development (IRD)/Macro International, 1991.

<sup>a</sup> Total fertility rate.

<sup>b</sup> Physical and chemical methods to prevent pregnancy.

<sup>c</sup> For women between 15 and 44 years of age.

Guatemala (DHS-Demographic and Health Survey, 1991). Although similar studies have not been conducted in Argentina, Chile, Cuba or Uruguay, as all of them currently have low birth rates, the practice must be widespread.

Abortion is another mechanism for reducing birth rates widely used in Latin America and the Caribbean. Because abortion is illegal everywhere in the

region except Cuba, reliable information with respect to the true magnitude of the phenomenon is practically impossible to obtain. However, there is reason to believe that the annual number of legal abortions practised in the region is very high with all the inherent health risks for women (Frejka and Atkin, 1990).

Moreover intermediate variables are not only affected by socio-economic

factors, but they can be changed through public and private measures or programmes, which have, in fact, been carried out in many Latin American and Caribbean countries since the 1960s (Chackiel and Villa, 1992). In other words, while it may prove effective to make contraceptive methods available, this must be accompanied by the motivation that arises from couples' desire to have fewer children. In turn, the number of children they want would be determined by economic, social and cultural variables.<sup>5</sup>

However, the motivation to use contraceptives is in itself insufficient, since contraceptives cannot produce practical effects unless they are generally available. While demand may stimulate supply, and vice versa, a larger proportion of small families will not be observed unless simultaneous progress is made in both the motivation associated with socio-economic conditions and the accessibility of birth control methods.

#### *Crisis and fertility: the 1980s*

Fertility trends in recent years are of particular interest, since they may reflect the effects of the crisis that hit most countries in the region in the 1980s. Experiences in this regard vary, but in general, the trend towards a decline in the average number of children per woman seems to have continued, and may even have intensified in some cases (Guzmán, 1992). This phenomenon may have been caused by the inertia of the modernization process that began in previous decades and took the form of progress in various social indicators (education, decreased infant mortality, greater access to the communications media) linked to changes in the population's reproductive behaviour. The crisis itself may have prompted couples to decide to postpone childbearing because of the need for

women to take jobs outside the home in order to cushion the fall in real wages and the rise in unemployment among heads of household. This reasoning is consistent with the findings of special surveys showing that low-income couples want fewer children.

#### *Future prospects*

Population projections made in past decades clearly demonstrate the limitations for projecting changes in birth rates. Although decreases were anticipated, it was not foreseen that fertility in Latin America and the Caribbean would fall by nearly 40% in the past 20 years.

As for the coming years, projections of lower birth rates are largely based on the levels and trends observed in the different countries. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the impact of development strategies and the continued expansion of mass communications in many countries of the region may lead ever-larger sectors of the population to regard the small family as an ideal, influenced by the more widespread assimilation of certain patterns of consumption and lifestyle, and improved access to birth control methods. Future birth rate decreases depend on this process.

Although an average of 2.8 children per woman is expected for the last five-year period of the century, according to available projections, it is also foreseen that, by around 2020, the region as a whole will reach a rate of 2.1 or replacement level—that is, the birth rate necessary for a population to maintain the number of its members. In an analysis by individual countries, those in groups I and II still have high total fertility rates of around 5 children and should arrive at replacement level 10 years later than the regional average. By 1990, the Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Martinique and Puerto Rico had already arrived at an average of two

5 In this regard the theoretical model of Easterlin and Crimmins includes, *inter alia*, a causal chain in which "modernization variables" (education, for example) act upon the "desired family size", which in turn affects the "motivation for fertility control" which, ultimately, becomes one of the determining factors of "observed fertility", through the use of birth control methods (United Nations, 1990).

children per woman, while the other countries in groups III and IV should have overall rates of less than 2.5 children by the year 2010 and several of them should reach their replacement levels around that same year. These changes will have important effects on population growth and age structures, according to the analysis presented in section D of this chapter.

### C. Mortality

#### *Levels and trends*

One of the most notable achievements in Latin America and the Caribbean since the Second World War has been the reduction of overall death rates, implying a significant increase in life expectancy at birth in most countries (see table 5 of the statistical annex). This indicator, which was around 52 years for the regional population as a whole in 1950-1955, rose an average of two years per five-year period, reaching 67 years in 1985-1990. It is estimated that a child born in the year 2000 will live to be 70 years old, which is the World Health Organization goal for the end of the century, called "Health for All by the Year 2000" (HFA-2000) (PAHO, 1982).

This gain of nearly 15 years of life expectancy at birth is mainly due to reductions of death rates in the early years of life and, especially, infant mortality, given that the decrease has been much less among older persons. The process of change did not follow the same curve nor did it begin from the same level in all countries of the region. The current extremes in Latin America are represented, on the one hand, by Haiti and Bolivia in group I, with life expectancies at birth of less than 60 years (54.7 years in the case of Haiti) and, on the other hand, by Costa Rica and Cuba, with averages of slightly over 75 years. With respect to the non-Latin Caribbean, the situation is similar to that in Latin American countries with low mortality, given that, for the period 1985-1990, life expectancies were

over 70 years. Guyana and Suriname are exceptions, with lower life expectancies; Guyana will be unable to reach the target of 70 years by the year 2000.

An analysis of the trends in groups of countries points up the significant gains in average life spans realized by countries which began with very low levels. Peru, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Honduras, which registered average life expectancies of 42-45 years in the early 1950s, are now achieving values of 61-64 years for that indicator. Bolivia, with an average life expectancy of less than 60 years, has also made significant progress, although it began at a very low level. None of these countries, which are characterized by incipient and moderate stages of demographic transition, will achieve the HFA-2000 goal of 70 years by the end of the century, although some will approach that figure.

Another group of countries, which began with higher levels of life expectancy in 1950-1955 (46-55 years), has achieved averages of 64-70 years for 1985-1990. Among these are group III countries, such as Brazil, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela; the first three of these will not achieve the goal of a life expectancy at birth of over 70 years by the year 2000, although they will be near that figure. Chile and Panama also began with averages below 55 years, but their progress was much more pronounced and led them to surpass the goal of 70 years in 1985-1990. In contrast, Paraguay began the 1950s with a life expectancy at birth of over 60 years, but has not achieved significant progress, scarcely reaching 67 years of life expectancy in 1985-1990.

Argentina and Uruguay, whose demographic transition was already advanced in the 1950s, achieved significant progress, especially in the 1960s, but did not achieve the same degree of success as Cuba and Costa Rica, which, beginning with lower life expectancies, surpassed 75-year life expectancies in the most recent period. What makes these two countries outstanding in the Latin American context is not so much the

magnitude of the absolute gains achieved but rather the fact that those gains were achieved when death rates were already fairly low, a stage at which further advances are more difficult.

Although, in general, levels and trends in death rates correspond to the stages of demographic transition used to classify countries, that correspondence is not always complete. Some countries, such as Paraguay and Costa Rica, have high life expectancies in terms of the stage of transition in which they are classified; other countries, such as Peru, have very low life expectancies compared to other countries classified in group III. These discrepancies are explained, in part, by the fact that birth and death rates are not always in the same phase of the transition process.

Comparison of the levels and trends of Latin American death rates with the same variables of Canada and the United States reveals that the gap in life expectancies has fallen from 17 to 10 years. Nevertheless, current levels of life expectancy in the region are similar to those obtained in Canada and the United States 40 years ago, when neither the current knowledge nor the means of preventing and treating a large number of diseases existed (CELADE, 1990). This circumstance implies that the region could have made even greater progress than it has to date, especially since the gains achieved by some East Asian countries (such as China and Korea) during the same period are nearly double those of Latin America, reaching a life expectancy at birth of 70 years (compared to 67 in the region), even though in about 1950 their mortality rates were higher (Chackiel and Martínez, 1992).

Estimates for different countries reveal a trend towards increasingly lower gains in life expectancy at birth. The 1980s, in nearly all countries, seem to have witnessed a lower net decrease in mortality than that observed in earlier decades. This phenomenon could reflect various problems associated with the economic and social crisis of those years, manifested in particular by decreased expenditure on health care and imports,

which led to a dearth of certain inputs for public health services (PAHO, 1990), but it also stems from the growing difficulty of achieving further progress once diseases that are relatively easy to treat and prevent are brought under control.

### *Infant mortality*

The magnitude of the decline in mortality has differed according to age group, with much greater decreases for newborn children. Thus, for example, it has been established that in two countries (Guatemala and Mexico), around half of the increase in life expectancy gained between the late 1960s and the early 1980s was attributable to reduced death rates in the first five years of life (Díaz, 1987; Rodríguez, 1989).

Table 6 of the statistical annex shows that for Latin America as a whole, infant mortality fell more than 50% between 1950-1955 and 1985-1990. In 1950-1955, no Latin American country had an infant mortality rate lower than 50 per thousand and only six had rates lower than 100 per thousand. By 1985-1990, 10 countries had rates lower than 50 per thousand and none had a rate over 100 per thousand. Only eight of the 20 Latin American countries, however, will achieve the HFA-2000 goal of a mortality rate lower than 30 per thousand. In the non-Latin Caribbean, most countries have rates lower than 20 per thousand. As in the case of life expectancy at birth, Guyana and Suriname are exceptions, with rates of 56 and 33 per thousand, respectively, in 1985-1990.

Among those countries with high infant mortality are Bolivia and Haiti, which belong to the incipient transition group, with rates bordering on 100 infant deaths per thousand live births. They are followed by Peru, which has a rate of 90 per thousand. Nearly 10% of total births of the region occur in these three countries, which also have the highest death rates. A second group, with infant mortality of around 60-70 per thousand during the period under consideration, is made up of Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala and El Salvador.

Nearly half the total births in the region during the period under consideration occurred in these countries. According to CELADE projections –prepared jointly with national entities– none of the countries in these two groups will achieve the HFA-2000 goal.

The third group consists of countries with infant mortality rates of between 35 and 50 per thousand, including Paraguay, Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela. In 1985-1990, one in three children of the region was born in these countries. With the exception of Paraguay, all of them are expected to achieve rates lower than 30 per thousand by the year 2000. A fourth group includes countries which, in 1985-1990, had rates of between 20 and 35 per thousand: Argentina and Uruguay –countries in advanced transition– and Panama. Finally, there are Chile, Cuba, Costa Rica and most of the Caribbean countries, whose infant mortality rates are less than 20 per thousand. Just over 10% of births in the region occur in these last two groups, which have the lowest infant mortality rates.

The low levels of infant mortality mentioned above were achieved in very different contexts, although they share certain characteristics, such as mass vaccination and oral rehydration programmes, together with improved and expanded health services. Also, the positive role played by lower birth rates and the reduction of infant mortality, by reducing the proportion of high-risk births, must be taken into account. It is no surprise, then, that even in the context of the economic crisis of the 1980s, no interruption in the decrease of infant mortality was observed, although it declined at a slower rate. However, the advances achieved in Cuba, Costa Rica and Chile, has served as an incentive, for it demonstrates that even in a context of economic constraint, important changes can still be made.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the developed countries continue to show

notably lower levels; the risk of infant death in the countries of the region is three to fifteen times the risk in the developed countries that have made the most progress in the control of early mortality.

#### *Demographic transition and epidemiological transition*

The trends in mortality rates in the context of so-called demographic transition also form part of what has more recently been termed epidemiological transition, which refers not only to changes in mortality by sex and age, but also by cause of death (Frenk and others, 1989). This epidemiological transition closely follows the changes which have occurred in the organization of the health sector and in public health conditions, as well as to fertility, age structure and the urbanization process. The two transitions –demographic and epidemiological– are interrelated and form part of a phenomenon common to both: the process of social change.

The reduction of infectious diseases (diarrheas, acute respiratory infections and immuno-preventable diseases) has been one of the most significant factors of change in death rates.<sup>6</sup> Since control of those diseases has been associated mainly with reductions of infant and childhood mortality, those deaths due to chronic diseases in adulthood (cancer and cardiovascular disease) have become ever more important in the structure of deaths by cause, as have those related to violence (PAHO, 1990). This phenomenon is aggravated by the ageing of the population, which produces relative increases in the size of the older age groups, which are more prone to such diseases.<sup>7</sup> The new stage for Latin America and the Caribbean poses new challenges in the struggle to prolong life, within which a central role will be played by degenerative diseases, which are usually more difficult and costly to treat.

6 This phenomenon can be observed in all cases in which vital statistics are available for this type of research. See, for example, Yasaki, 1990; Ruiz, 1982; and Díaz, 1987.

7 In this context, it is important to highlight the need for a preventive focus for health programmes, since it is well known that many diseases of the elderly have their roots in adolescence.

The correlation between the structure of deaths by groups of causes and the level of mortality has been studied in several countries of the region with relatively reliable records on the basis of data from the 1980s (PAHO, 1990). Table I.2 shows that in Guatemala, a country with high mortality, communicable diseases still account for a considerable number of deaths (47% of total deaths). In contrast, in Argentina, Uruguay, Cuba and Costa Rica, only 5% to 8% of deaths are related to those causes. In contrast tumors and circulatory diseases account for a significant portion of total deaths in countries with low mortality. In Uruguay, for example two out of every three persons die of those causes. This is so, not only because those countries have considerably reduced mortality from communicable diseases, but also because they have larger proportions of elderly persons (see table I.2).

*Persistent challenges: infectious diseases, maternal mortality, death by violence, environmental health*

In many countries, diseases are reappearing which were thought to be under control and whose appearance and lethal effects are undoubtedly related to living conditions and the capacity of health service systems to treat the diseases. Outstanding examples include malaria, cholera and tuberculosis. Malaria not only persists or has become more prevalent in areas where it already existed, but it has reappeared in areas in which it had been eradicated. There has been an increase in the number of cases of malaria; and in several countries the number of deaths from the disease has risen (PAHO, 1990). Cholera has reappeared and had severe effects in Peru and, to a lesser degree, in other countries. Poor sanitation, compounded by lack of access to health services and insufficient health education, seems to have played a significant role in the spread of this disease and in its persistence and lethal effects. These phenomena indicate that epidemiological transition is not linear over time because of the persistence of poverty, which

renders its victims particularly vulnerable, especially in times of crisis.

An important task that still lies ahead is the study of the patterns of AIDS and the prospects for its spread among Latin American populations. AIDS is a disorder in which the importance of investing in prevention is clear, especially in view of the region's economic limitations and the high costs of treating it.

Much also remains to be done with regard to reducing maternal mortality, which is still alarmingly frequent in many countries. These rates remain high as a result of limited access to trained medical personnel at the time of birth and of the high rate of abortion. Death in childbirth is one of the main causes of death among women of childbearing age, especially in the countries of groups I and II with high fertility rates and poor health care conditions. Counting only recorded and published cases (although it is known that these cases are often under recorded or misdiagnosed), maternal mortality rates are 11 to 25 times higher in the region than in developed countries (Rajs, 1991).

The growing prevalence of deaths by violence is another serious problem faced by the societies of the region. This phenomenon is an important area for research and action in Peru, Guatemala, El Salvador, Colombia and other countries and is associated with political repression, ethnic discrimination, terrorism, drug trafficking and, more generally, with the lack of opportunity and prospects for a significant number of youths. From this standpoint, the growing incidence of deaths in traffic accidents is another undesirable consequence of modernization and economic growth.

Finally, the incorporation of the environmental dimension into health concerns is increasingly important, given the industrial and agricultural patterns which characterize the region, one effect of which is the seldom controlled discharge of a growing number of wastes of various kinds. This increases the exposure of broad sectors of the population to products which, owing to their toxicity, represent a threat to health and even to

Table I.2  
**PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION BY MAJOR GROUPS OF CAUSES OF DEATH AND  
 DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES**

Causes of death and demographic indicators	Uruguay 1985	Cuba 1986	Chile 1986	Costa Rica 1987	Gua-temala 1984
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>
- Communicable diseases	5.4	8.4	12.1	7.4	46.5
- Tumors	24.4	19.2	19.9	21.6	3.6
- Diseases of the circulatory system	43.9	43.7	30.0	28.7	6.6
- Peri-natal diseases	2.5	1.7	2.7	5.9	12.1
- Injury or poisoning	5.9	11.6	13.2	11.3	13.8
- All other categories	17.9	15.4	22.1	25.1	17.4
Life expectancy at birth (1985-1990)	72.0	75.2	71.5	74.7	62.0
<b>Population (1990)</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>
0 - 14 years	25.8	22.7	30.6	36.2	45.4
15 - 64 years	62.6	68.8	63.4	59.6	51.4
65 or over	11.6	8.5	6.0	4.2	3.2
<b>Deaths</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>
0 - 14 years	6.9	5.7	9.8	17.4	54.5
15 - 64 years	26.5	31.4	33.9	31.6	26.8
65 or over	66.6	62.9	56.3	51.0	18.7

Source: Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), "Población y transformación productiva con equidad; versión preliminar", Santiago, Chile, 1991, unpublished.

survival (PAHO, 1990). The high levels of contamination to which workers are exposed on the job (in mining operations, for example) are also very harmful.

The elements outlined above reveal the need for accurate measurements of mortality rates according to cause. In this regard, it is increasingly important to improve the quality of vital statistics. In general, direct measurement of adult and infant mortality levels is still necessary, given that many countries still operate on the basis of model-generated estimates.

#### **D. Growth and age structures**

##### *The situation in the countries of the region*

The region's average annual population growth rate has tended to decline in recent decades as a result of changes in fertility and mortality. After reaching a

peak of about 3% in the 1960s, the rate has fallen to about 1.7%.

Changes in the region's demographic components, basically in birth rates, are also producing changes in the age structure. Predictably, the general trend is towards ageing, understood as a proportional decrease in the number of children and a progressive increase in the adult and elderly population. This process is directly related to fertility and mortality trends, and therefore to their stage of demographic transition. Thus, the age structure also reflects each country's position in the process of demographic change. At any rate, modifications in the relative distribution of the population by age occur slowly and can only be clearly discerned in the medium and long terms.

In the initial stage of demographic transition, which corresponds to high birth and death rates, children and youths constitute a high proportion of the population



and there are very few elderly persons. In group I, the percentage of those under 15 years of age is around 42%, while those over 65 years represent around 4% (see table 7 of the statistical annex).

In the next stage, in which mortality falls and fertility drops only slightly (group II), the population becomes younger, with a greater proportion of children (45% in 1990). This phenomenon occurs because the death rate which decreases most is that which affects very young children, having the same effect as an increase in fertility. This results in a lower proportion of elderly persons (3%).

The countries of group III, in full transition, already show a lower percentage of the population under 15 years of age (36% in 1990). This proportion is still high as a result of high fertility in the past, which produces a large number of women of childbearing age. The lower proportion of children is offset by a higher proportion of persons in their middle years, while the percentage of those over 65 years of age is 4% (see table 7 of the statistical annex).

In countries in the most advanced stage of transition, the percentage of elderly persons is double that in countries in the initial stage. In this group, 28% are under 15 years of age and 10% are elderly (see table 7 of the statistical annex).

Trends in this area are slow to change. In 40 years, the population of Latin America and the Caribbean has passed from the first stage in 1950 (40% children) to a rejuvenation in the 1960s as a result of the gains made in reducing infant mortality, and finally to the third stage at the present time (36% children), i.e., a relatively young population with large proportions of children and young adults. By 2025 the age structure of Bolivia, for example, will still be younger than that of Uruguay at the present time. These projections may change if birth rates fall faster than has been expected until recently, a phenomenon which seems to be beginning to occur. Generally, age structures will change only in the medium and long terms.

Notable differences exist in the absolute and relative growth which will

occur in the various age groups in the 1990s (see table 8 of the statistical annex) and which determine changes in the demands to be met or which must be dealt with in countries which are entering into demographic transition, growth rates are high and similar for all age groups, which involve very young populations, absolute growth of the population of children under 15 will be up to 10 times higher than that of the elderly population. Conversely, as birth rates fall, the growth rate for children drops substantially, while the rate for the elderly maintains its high levels as a result of previous high fertility. Thus, in the group IV countries, the population of persons 65 and over grows at a rate of around 2%, while the rate for 0- to 14-year-olds is 0.5%. In absolute terms, this means that the number of elderly grows 30% more than the number of children.

#### *Future prospects*

Medium- and long-term projections of the trends analysed show lower population growth rates. From nearly 2% currently, they will drop to around 1% in the year 2010 and to lower than that figure by 2025 in most countries. Hypothetically, it is estimated that the region could arrive at a combination of fertility and mortality which could, on average, lead to each woman having about two children by around 2020 and that at least one of those children would be a daughter who would replace the mother in her reproductive function. If that were to occur, zero growth would be achieved and therefore a stable limit population which would change little thereafter. However, as a result of the still-young age distribution, that situation would be achieved only many years later, probably after the year 2050, with a regional population of around 800 million. In that year, according to a CELADE exercise in long-term projections, only Cuba, which already has birth levels below replacement levels, would achieve a negative growth rate.

In the period 1950-1990, the population grew 167%, reaching a total of 441 million people, as a result of the high growth rates of that period. However,

## Box I.3

### LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EVOLUTION OF COMPOSITION BY AGE IN THE 1990s

Of the total population increase which Latin America and the Caribbean will experience in the 1990s 81% will occur in the middle age groups (67 million persons), a large number of whom will be incorporated into the labour market and will enter their reproductive years. Those younger than 15 will absorb 10% of the growth (8 million persons) and the elderly, a similar percentage. The most relevant characteristic for the region is the coexistence of demands of varying age groups, given that, even though the effects of high past fertility are still being felt, the symptoms of older

populations are already beginning to be felt. These averages figures embrace considerable dispersion. Thus, for example, in Guatemala the under age 15 group will grow at a rate of 2.3% while the group of those over 64 will grow by 4.4%. In Brazil, meanwhile, the rates will be -0.3% and 3.3%, respectively. It is important to anticipate long-term changes so as to avoid the negative experiences of countries in more advanced stages of transition which have been unable to respond adequately to the elderly population's growing demands for social security and health services.

	Total	Age groups		
		0-14	15-64	65 and over
Population (millions)				
1990	441	158	262	21
2000	523	166	329	28
Percentage of the population				
1990	100	35.8	59.5	4.7
2000	100	31.7	62.9	5.4
Average annual growth (%)	1.7	0.5	2.3	3.0
Increase (millions)	82	8	67	7
Percentage of total increase	100	10	81	9

Source: J. Chackiel and M. Villa, Latin American and the Caribbean: the dynamics of population and growth (DDR/1). Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), 1992, paper presented at the Meeting of Government Experts on Population and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, preparatory to the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, Saint Lucia, 6-9 October.

according to current projections, which suppose a slow-down in growth rates, the population of the region will increase 60% in a similar period in the future (1990-2025), arriving at a population of 700 million. The relative weight of Latin America and the Caribbean in the world total, according to the United Nations (United Nations, 1992c), is on the order of 8.2% and will be the same in 2025. This figure contrasts with those for Africa, whose percentage is expected to rise from 12% to 19%, reducing the relative weight

of the populations of Europe and East Asia.

As a result of the expected convergence of birth rates towards replacement levels, the relative age distribution of the regional population will manifest a trend, also convergent, towards an older population. By the middle of the next century, the population younger than 15 years of age will account for about 20% of the total in most countries. Significant differences still remain, with children representing over 40% of the population in some countries,

and less than 30% in others. As a result of the anticipated changes in the age structure, the dependency ratio will tend to decrease at first –owing to the lower percentage of children– and will subsequently recover in part because of the increase in the number of elderly persons. At any rate, the region's current dependency ratio –70 persons at economically inactive ages for every 100 in their active years– will already reach values of around 50% by the year 2010, although countries such as Bolivia and Guatemala will still have ratios similar to those currently prevailing in the region (see table I.3). These trends will have a strong impact on demand for education, health and social security services and for employment.

The convergence of fertility trends with changes in the age structure means that in many countries of the region, the number of births is reaching its highest

values in history and will decrease in the future, with the consequent effects on demand for maternal and child care and other services related to infancy. However, in the countries of groups I and II, this phenomenon will not begin for another 20 or 30 years.

In sum, as a result of changes in demographic components, especially fertility, there will also be modifications in population composition by age and other related areas, such as, for example, epidemiological profiles, dependency ratios and the structure of demand for basic services. In the short and medium terms, these changes will imply coexisting demands because there will continue to be a sharp increase in the number of children and persons in their middle years, followed by an even greater rise in the elderly population.

Table I.3  
DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS FOR LATIN AMERICA AND  
SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1950-2025

Year and indicator	Latin America	Countries				
		Bolivia	Guatemala	Mexico	Brazil	Argentina
<b>1950</b>						
Pop. (thousands)	158 810	2 766	2 969	53 444	17 150	32 322
TFR <sup>a</sup>	5.9	6.8	7.1	6.2	3.2	2.8
e(0) <sup>b</sup>	52	40	42	51	63	72
r natural <sup>c</sup>	2.7	2.3	2.9	3.0	1.6	1.2
% pop. <15 years	40	42	44	42	31	30
Depend. ratio (%) <sup>d</sup>	78	82	88	80	53	64
<b>1990</b>						
Pop. (thousands)	430 182	7 171	9 197	149 042	32 322	40 193
TFR	3.1	4.6	5.4	2.7	2.8	2.3
e(0)	69	62	65	66	72	73
r natural	2.1	2.5	3.1	1.6	1.2	0.9
% pop. <15 years	36	41	45	34	30	26
Depend. ratio (%)	69	82	95	65	64	56
<b>2010</b>						
Pop. (thousands)	587 106	11 087	15 827	194 002	40 193	5 505
TFR	2.3	3.0	3.6	2.1	2.3	2.2
e(0)	72	69	71	71	73	74
r natural	1.2	1.8	2.3	1.0	0.9	0.6
% pop. <15 years	28	35	39	25	26	24
Depend. ratio (%)	51	65	76	47	56	54
<b>2025</b>						
Pop. (thousands)	686 450	14 096	21 668	219 673	45 505	51 362
TFR	2.1	2.4	2.7	2.0	2.2	2.1
e(0)	74	70	72	72	74	74
r natural	0.8	1.3	1.7	0.5	0.6	0.4
% pop. <15 years	24	29	33	22	24	21
Depend. ratio (%)	47	54	60	47	54	55

Source: J. Chackiel and J. Martínez, "Transición demográfica en América Latina y el Caribe desde 1950", Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), 1992, unpublished.

Note: TFR, e(0) and r natural correspond to the first five years of each decade.

<sup>a</sup>Total fertility rate. <sup>b</sup>Life expectancy at birth. <sup>c</sup>Natural rate of growth (percentages). <sup>d</sup> $((<15)+(65+))/(15-64))$ .

## Chapter II

# POPULATION AND CHANGING PRODUCTION PATTERNS WITH SOCIAL EQUITY

### A. The ECLAC proposal for development in the 1990s: changing production patterns with social equity

---

In compliance with its mandate to strengthen the development of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC has put forward a set of proposals in the document *Changing Production Patterns with Social Equity* (ECLAC, 1990b), which was considered and adopted by the Governments of the region at the twenty-third session of the Commission, held in Caracas. That basic proposal was broadened by subsequent studies which include *Sustainable Development: Changing Production Patterns, Social Equity and the Environment* (ECLAC, 1991a), *Education and Knowledge: Basic Pillars of Changing Production Patterns with Social Equity* (ECLAC/OREALC, 1992) and *Social Equity and Changing Production Patterns: An Integrated Approach* (ECLAC, 1992c). This last document was presented at the twenty-fourth session of ECLAC.

These proposals do not constitute a single recipe to be applied universally, but are instead a set of orientations offered to the Governments and societies of the region for addressing development issues in the 1990s and improving the lives of their populations. Their aim is to find answers to the questions of how the region can grow and become integrated with the world economy and how it can do so with greater levels of social equity, in the

understanding that the objective of development is the welfare of the population as a whole, while at the same time preserving the environment for present and future generations, in a framework of maintaining and reinforcing democratic systems.

The central and articulating idea of those proposals is that the absorption and dissemination of technical progress is the fundamental factor in ensuring the growing competitiveness of the region, gradually raising its productivity and creating more and better jobs. Competitiveness emerges, therefore, as a requisite for growth and equity. Genuine competitiveness is based on the systematic absorption of technical progress into the production process and creates more highly skilled jobs which use environmentally sustainable resources. In the medium and long terms, societies cannot aspire to levels of well-being beyond the evolution of their own productivity. Increasing productivity requires investment in new machinery and equipment, new techniques for organizing work and, basically, technical change and significant investment in human resources.

Competitiveness based on the absorption of technical progress constitutes a sharp break with the traditional spirit of profit-taking, because it is not founded on the low wages or the depredation of natural resources which characterized the comparative advantages of "spurious competitiveness" and which, in light of global economic trends are becoming

increasingly invalid and obsolete. Genuine competitiveness requires skilled human resources who are capable of progressively adding intellectual value and technical progress to the natural resource base of the region, preserving and enriching that base. This type of growth, focuses attention on the quality of the population of the countries of the region, a primordial issue both for changing production patterns and for achieving adequate levels of equity.

Changing production patterns must also be compatible with the conservation of the physical environment, and the environmental and geographical-spatial dimension must be fully incorporated into the development process. In this regard, those aspects of population growth and distribution which affect ecosystems must be taken into account. The task is to reverse the negative trends of natural resource depletion and continued deterioration resulting from pollution, while at the same time taking advantage of the opportunities to use those resources, on the basis of research and conservation. Today, environmental sustainability is related both to standards of living and quality of life. Besides the opportunities for achieving the required economic growth within a more vigorous, competitive and open context, the need to ensure a healthy life, both physically and mentally, for the whole population in an appropriate environment must be taken into account.

Achieving a better competitive position on these grounds presupposes a systemic approach, that is, action grounded in the vast network of linkages which influence the competitiveness of companies. Among other factors, that network includes technological, energy and transport infrastructures, the educational system, labour-management relations, the financial system and the institutional order, both public and private.

This approach also involves reaching a minimum consensus with regard to the contents, extent and necessary steps to be taken in order to achieve changing production patterns with social equity among the diverse sectors of society: that is, it requires a certain social cohesion.

Within this systemic approach, social equity acquires a new dimension. A more equitable society, with greater equality of opportunities and greater capacity for integration, with an effective citizenry both economically and socially, is no longer only an ethical and political necessity. The first is valid in itself and the second, because democratic stability will obviously always be threatened in societies with low levels of integration and high levels of poverty and frustrated aspirations. The novelty is that the need for social equity acquires complete validity within the area of economics itself, because it demonstrates the incongruence between the need for human resources capable of absorbing technical progress and a population living in poverty, with low levels of training.

In this resides the need to adopt an integrated approach of changing production patterns and equity which implies, on the one hand, opting for those economic policies which favour not only growth but also equity and, on the other, emphasizing productivity and efficiency and not only equity, in social policy (ECLAC, 1991c). Population policy plays a protagonistic role in this context.

Since empirical evidence exists in support of the possibility of achieving greater growth together with higher levels of equity, as has occurred recently in other regions, it is necessary to promote initiatives which involve complementarities between the two objectives. These include expanding productive employment with adequate wages, diffusion of technology, especially in agriculture and for small and mid-sized companies, increased savings, investment in human resources and the decentralization of development management. Such decentralization implies strengthening democratic processes, together with community participation in decision-making and in the implementation of development policy. Therefore, economic and social policy must no longer be thought of as belonging to separate worlds, but rather as complementary aspects of public policy which, as a whole, seeks both changing production patterns and social equity.

The incorporation of the more disadvantaged population groups into sectors of increasing productivity may be a lengthy process and will require the development of complementary measures. These may include extensive training programmes for small businessmen, workers and independent small farmers; the reform of regulation mechanisms which inhibit the formation of small businesses; the provision of social services (including population programmes) that are adapted to the needs of the poorest sectors and developing a policy of aid for the most vulnerable groups; promotion of organization for mutual aid and the adequate representation before the State of the needs of the least favoured, taking advantage of the redistributive potential of fiscal policy; and plans for minimum employment.

In the successful experiences of countries outside the region which have achieved competitiveness and social equity simultaneously, a fundamental role has been played by human resources, especially training and education in science and technology. In different ways, these countries have all made enormous investment efforts in that area, which is vital to achieving genuine competitiveness. In other words, the capacity to stimulate development necessarily involves improving the skills of the population.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, despite the significant efforts in the post-war period which have had significant results in terms of educational coverage, the current situation is far from satisfactory. An educational system cycle has run its course; there has been a drastic decline in the quality of education, in its relevance and in its capacity to integrate with and respond to the requirements of production. In-house training is at the embryonic stage; technical training is obsolete; and scientific research is insufficient and irrelevant to the production system.

Without profound change in the existing system of education and of the production and dissemination of knowledge, the region will not be

successful in the training of human resources required by changing production patterns with equity. According to the proposal elaborated by ECLAC and UNESCO, this profound reform of the educational and knowledge-producing system must also be inspired by the integral and complementary vision indicated above, i.e., it must be simultaneously articulated around the objectives of generating competitiveness, of seeking to inculcate the necessary abilities and skills for productive performance in the modern world, and of creating a responsible citizenry, in the sense of transmitting values related to social responsibility, solidarity and democratic training.

On the basis of these objectives, equity, in the sense of equal opportunities and compensation for differences, and performance, as reflected in the evaluation of productivity and of incentives for innovation, are highlighted as guiding criteria for educational policy. At the same time, integration, geared to strengthen the institutional capacity of countries, and decentralization, oriented towards greater autonomy for educational action and promoting the responsibility of agents *vis-à-vis* results, are proposed as the main guidelines for that reform.

The implementation of the guidelines for changing production patterns with social equity requires a minimum set of agreements among the diverse social actors with respect to policy contents, their scope and the necessary steps to be taken to implement them. In pursuit of those agreements, the building of long-term consensuses among the main actors of civil society –and between these and the State– will be relevant in order to gain legitimacy for the mechanisms and actions needed to encourage behaviour leading to the fulfilment of common goals and inhibiting the manifestation of exclusive sectoral interests, when these would conflict with collective objectives.

Moreover, the most marginalized sectors must have access to forums in which they can express their demands to existing institutions. This implies strengthening democratic and pluralistic contexts,

favouring participation and the deconcentration and decentralization of systems of government.

The idea is to advance towards a type of State which will revamp its style of intervention; will develop greater strategic capacity in competitiveness and innovation as well as social equity; will not replace economic and social agents but, on the contrary, will ensure the rules and framework for stability and growth; and will be able to counteract the socially negative effects of certain economic trends, through regulatory, protective and compensatory mechanisms in areas such as education, health (including reproductive health) and housing, which will broaden the opportunities of those who have little access to the marketplace.

### **B. Pivotal points linking population dynamics with changing production patterns and social equity**

The proposal for changing production patterns with social equity centres its attention on the existence of a productive population and a high level of economic and technical creativity in order to achieve genuine competitiveness. As it promotes productive undertakings, it also promotes the creation of a modern citizenry, which participates in decision-making and in the building of mechanisms of solidarity and social cooperation, reinforcing equitable and democratic societies. The consideration of population dynamics in all its dimensions –size, growth, age structure, mortality and morbidity, fertility international migration, spatial distribution, size and type of family and the status of women– is of enormous importance in the definition of public policy for achieving the objectives of changing production patterns.

Demographic transition in the region, as noted in chapter I, has been more intense than expected. In fact, the decline in mortality and fertility has been sharper than that projected in the 1970s. However, these indicators are still far from those of the developed countries.

Increasing urbanization and educational coverage, especially for women, and the greater participation of women in the labour market, the application of population policies at public or private levels in a number of countries and the globalization of communications, especially intense in recent years, are among the factors that explain the rapid drop in birth rates. The intensity of demographic transition is not linked to economic growth alone, as witnessed by the fact that it continued during the 1980s, and this makes the analysis of its causes more complex (see chapter I, part B).

In this sense, everything indicates that, precisely during those years, the crisis, greater poverty, reduced job security and more limited access to goods and services occurred simultaneously with continued trends toward decreasing birth rates and greater educational coverage. The combined effect of that greater educational coverage, even at the expense of quality, and the spread of the mass media tended to make aspirations more uniform and to draw the collective imagination of the region closer to that which prevails in developed countries. This may explain the existence of small families, even when some segments of the population found themselves in more precarious situations. This seems to be strongly linked to new aspirations with respect to consumption and well-being, and to survival strategies developed in response to the crisis. The continued international standardization of consumption patterns, stimulated by trade liberalization, the fluidity of communications and the rapid growth of international trade in services combine to reinforce aspirations with respect to consumption and standards of living which seem ever more difficult to satisfy in large families, and this leads couples to desire fewer children.

In light of these facts, and of the population issues involved in the proposal of changing production patterns with social equity, three pivotal points can be identified, which are discussed in the rest of this chapter: population and human



resources; population and equity; and population and sustainable development.

### C. Population from the perspective of human resources

Today's development debate places emphasis on the quality of human resources. The challenge facing the region consists in adapting its production structures to the trends of international markets through competitive efforts, grounded in the absorption of technology and increased productivity. This will only be possible if clear priority is given to education, job training and on-going skill-building throughout the population.

Raising the quality of human resources is also a necessary element in reducing poverty. Economic growth is not sufficient, as the experience of the region has demonstrated. It must be accompanied by more efficient and effective social policies which strengthen linkages with changing production patterns, in order to increase the social benefits of the resources allocated to these policies and the overall productivity of the economy.

The improvement of the quality of human resources as a pivotal point of both the modernization of production and the strengthening of democracy must be undertaken from a national perspective and within a framework of a political agenda based on consensus. The average educational level of the workforce, for example, rises slowly, and the crisis in public education systems has exaggerated the differences, in terms of access to quality of education, among the various social strata. The complexity of the new tasks required for development and the inadequacy of education with respect to meeting the needs of the production apparatus are creating a situation in which the minimum educational requirements for leaving poverty behind are rising. This seems to be demonstrated by the case of Chile, for example, where access to jobs

with wages or compensations which make it possible to overcome poverty requires at least 12 years of education. The scope of the task becomes apparent in Brazil, for example, where 70% of the urban economically active population (EAP) has less than 10 years of schooling.

The urgency of concentrating investment efforts on human capital can also be clearly seen in the fact that the challenge of improving competitiveness and the region's position in the international market demand a better-quality workforce. Social segmentation, in economies with severe inequalities such as those of the region, is also manifest in educational output of uneven quality, depending on income level. Correcting that inequality is the most important task facing Latin American societies, at a time when access to knowledge is becoming the main comparative advantage for individuals, institutions and nations. All indications are, moreover, that knowledge is even more highly concentrated than income, so that improving the conditions of access to education and knowledge for the most disadvantaged groups is the main task at hand, from the standpoint of redistribution. In the absence of decided efforts in that direction, the region will witness the consolidation of concentrated structures of income and opportunities for progress, making aid policy efforts all but useless.

From the point of view of the relation between population and development, a pragmatic approach must be taken which avoids simplistic associations between development and fertility levels,<sup>8</sup> exploring instead the possibilities of enlarging complementary spaces for those public and private agents involved in improving the quality of human resources as one of the pillars of changing productive patterns with social equity. What is important is the quality of the human resources available for technological change, innovation and creativity. In that context, countries with high demographic growth rates and levels

8 This issue is taken up again in chapter V, part A, where the bases for population policy are discussed.

of poverty are handicapped when it comes to improving the quality of their human resources, because the larger the population to be trained, the greater the amount of resources that will be needed.

Moreover, there is ample evidence of the advantages of small families, from the micro-economic and micro-social standpoint. The desire of couples to have fewer children is well known, and there are indications that family size, particularly in poor sectors, is inversely correlated with the educational level achieved by the children. Thus, family planning is justified in terms of improved health care for mothers and children and better child care and development, which have decisive effects on the quality of human resources.

The priority given to investment in human capital will affect demographic variables and, in particular, will tend to lower birth rates, facilitating changing production patterns. In fact, the decline in fertility will reduce the new cohorts of school-age, allowing for concentration on improvements in the quality of education and health care. Smaller family sizes will also make it more possible for the family to provide more affection and stimulation and better nourishment to the children, limiting the impact of the vicious circle of poverty on the most marginalized sectors.

Even though the quality of the population is central to the proposal for changing production patterns with equity, the size of the population that will be incorporated into the labour market and that will consequently require education and training is of great importance for the elaboration of development plans and programmes. This is particularly valid in the stage of transition which involves both demographic variables and the educational system, and in the organization of the economy itself.

Around 82 million persons will be added to the population of Latin America and the Caribbean during the last decade of this century (see box I.3). Of that increase, 80% will be between 15 and 64 years old, which implies the massive entry of persons into the labour market and the

child-bearing years. This poses a clear challenge to create jobs, but also essentially represents a favourable potential for development. For example, the lower dependency ratios arising from the increase in the proportion of the population in its active years will mean a lighter economic load for each worker. Moreover, lower mortality rates and advances in health care tend to increase labour productivity. Finally, greater control of fertility makes it easier for women to participate in the workforce and encourages greater equality between the sexes.

With regard to the creation of jobs, unemployment among youth merits special consideration. The rate of unemployment among youth is higher than that for the workforce in general, even though their educational level is higher than that of their parents. In most countries, unemployment among youth doubles, and in one case -Uruguay- triples the average unemployment rate for the active population as a whole. It affects urban areas proportionally more than their rural counterparts, women more than men, and the 15- to 19-year-old group more than the subsequent age bracket. Moreover, when youth do find jobs, they only do so in poorly paid positions, with scant chance of promotion. In spite of broadened educational opportunities, the knowledge received does not guarantee access to quality employment (see table II.1).

The young workforce is basically urban and will tend to grow, until it constitutes three fourths of the workforce by the end of the century. Early in the 1990s, the young urban workforce rose to 34 million persons, and stood at 14.5 million in rural areas. It is anticipated that, by the year 2000, the active youth population in urban areas will amount to more than 40 million persons, while the rural population will have fallen to 13.7 million.

In the absence of specific policy for this population group, it has been estimated that the rate of youth unemployment could rise to 12% by the end of the century, affecting around 6.5 million youth, as against 4.7 million in 1990.

Table II.1  
LATIN AMERICA: PROFILE OF YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT IN 1990<sup>a</sup>  
(Percentages)

	Rates of unemployment		Youth unemployment by sex		Unemployment by age	
	Total	Youth <sup>b</sup>	Men	Women	15-19	20-24
Brazil	3.5	6.6	6.2	7.4	6.8	6.5
Colombia	10.3	22.0	21.5	23.0	20.4	-
Costa Rica	6.0	8.3	7.6	10.0	11.2	6.2
Chile	5.7	13.1	13.4	12.4	15.9	12.0
Ecuador	6.1	12.7	10.2	16.8	14.6	12.7
El Salvador	10.0	18.6	17.0	20.5	19.2	18.0
Guatemala	2.3	4.0	3.1	6.3	5.0	4.2
Honduras	4.2	6.3	5.1	9.9	5.4	7.6
Panama	16.3	31.5	25.9	42.7	33.5	30.3
Paraguay	6.6	15.8	15.8	15.7	18.2	14.1
Uruguay	9.3	26.6	23.7	30.2	30.5	18.1
Venezuela	9.9	17.8	17.8	17.8	20.0	16.6

Source: Regional Employment Programme for Latin America and the Caribbean (PREALC), *PREALC Informa*, No. 30, Santiago, Chile, 1992.

<sup>a</sup> Brazil, 1987, Guatemala, 1989. <sup>b</sup> Workforce under age 25.

The numbers of adolescents and youth (between 15 and 24 years of age) who enter the workforce will exert strong pressure on the absorptive capacity of the productive apparatus. To the extent that the skills provided by the educational system remain unrelated to the demands of production, those who find jobs may find themselves relegated to underemployment, accentuating the trend towards their exclusion from the more dynamic activities.

Breaking that trend is a challenge of the first order, both for strict reasons of equity and in light of the imperative of productivity and competitiveness for all economies in question. Overcoming the underutilization of young people's labour and preventing their political marginalization is becoming an essential prerequisite for the changing of production patterns and the strengthening of democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean.

#### D. Population and social equity

Overcoming poverty in the region poses one of the main challenges to the effective

achievement of equity. To meet that challenge, it will be important to take into account both recent trends in poverty and the experience that could be derived from the results of efforts to restructure certain economies, together with the shortcomings, from the point of view of the behaviour of population variables, detected among countries and within them (see table II.2).

#### *Poverty trends and the economic cycle*

In the first half of the 1980s, the post-war trend towards poverty reduction, which lasted into the late 1970s in most countries of the region, reversed itself. In the late 1980s, this change of trend became even more pronounced, especially in the economically and demographically larger countries, as seems to be demonstrated by preliminary figures for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela (ECLAC, 1992a).

A 1990 estimate, based on data from household surveys, puts the Latin American population living below the poverty line at 196 million persons or approximately 46% of the total population (ECLAC, 1992a), in comparison to 43% in

Table II.2  
LATIN AMERICA (19 COUNTRIES): EVOLUTION AND COVERAGE OF POVERTY  
(Percentage of population and millions of persons)

	1960	1970	1980	1986	1990
Poverty (%)	51	40	41	43	46
(persons)	110	113	136	170	196
Indigence (%)	26	19	19	21	22
(persons)	56	54	62	81	93

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), *Magnitud de la pobreza en América Latina en los años ochenta* (LC/G.1653-P), Estudios e informes de la CEPAL series, No. 81, Santiago, Chile, August 1991. United Nations publication, Sales No. S.91.II.G.10; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *¿Se puede superar la pobreza? Realidad y perspectivas en América Latina* (E/CEPAL/G.1139), Santiago, Chile, 1980; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), *Latin American poverty profiles for the early 1990s* (LC/L.716(Conf.82/6)), Santiago, Chile, 1992.

1986. This means that the poor population grew at an annual average of 3.6%. The achievement of equity requires not only mitigating poverty but reversing its rising trend in the region.

In some countries, such as Chile and Uruguay, the incidence of poverty has again begun to decline. However, even in these cases, the reduction has been slow in comparison with the recovery of the rhythm of economic growth. There is a certain asymmetry between the evolution of poverty and the economic cycle: poverty increases sharply during recessions and declines slightly, if at all, when economic activity recovers. This asymmetrical behaviour was more marked during the 1980s because that period was not merely a time of change in the rhythm of economic activity. Strictly speaking, what occurred was in response to an adjustment process in the face of extremely adverse external conditions, which forced the model of development itself to change. More than a recession, what was occurring was a restructuring of production (and of profit and incentive flows) aimed at closing an exceptional external gap, which made it necessary to favour the production of tradeable goods, especially exports.

If this is the case, it is likely that poverty could again tend to decrease, particularly in

those countries that are further advanced in their economic reforms, in which the costs of restructuring seem to have been assimilated already. Thus, it is probable that the recovery of economic growth will be associated, more in the coming years than in the recent past, with the creation of productive jobs and wage increases, which could reverse the trend towards ever greater poverty, in those cases in which most of the economic reforms which redirect incentives abroad have already been implemented; the fiscal adjustment geared to balancing public accounts is beginning to bear fruit and is helping to lower inflation indexes; and prospects are increasing for greater access to foreign financing, especially foreign direct investment, eliminating net transfers of resources abroad and opening up more possibilities for investment financing and increases in productivity.

The repercussions of these costly adjustments in the labour market have aggravated distributive inequalities and poverty, because segments of the population whose entry into the workforce coincided with the decade of market restructuring have been marginalized in a way that could become permanent. For this reason, it is important to complement economic growth with youth training and retraining policies

designed to aid those segments affected by economic adjustment.

Poverty today is predominantly urban, in terms of the volumes of population affected, although in many countries the incidence and severity of poverty are greater in rural areas. The bigger the rural population (as in Bolivia, Guatemala and Honduras), the more people enter the workforce through independent activities, undertaken without professional or technical training. In these countries, the dissemination of modern activities is limited, and they have achieved neither the scope nor the linkages to have significant medium-term impact on occupational and wage levels. Productivity problems tend to be massive; they are linked to economic backwardness and therefore require structural policies.

In countries with a more advanced demographic transition and a higher per capita income, most of the economically active population is composed of wage-earners. Owing to the deep economic restructuring of the 1980s, the incidence of poverty increased among unskilled workers and, as a new phenomenon, began to affect around 10% of the professionals and technicians, both in the public sector and in private companies. In these cases, wages are a vital element in fighting poverty. Moreover, productive job-creation policies will have to take into account that employment in the public and manufacturing sectors will no longer play the same role as in the past and that labour markets have become more flexible, occasionally making jobs more precarious.

Both economic productivity and individual incomes are closely correlated with the educational level and degree of skill of the labour force. For this reason, efforts in the areas of education and training will simultaneously improve both competitiveness and equity. There is a sharp contrast in the region between the significant progress made in the area of educational coverage and the still huge contingents of the EAP with less than 10 years of schooling, a level which can be

considered a minimum qualification for jobs with incomes which will cover the basic needs of the family group.

Moreover, since demographic transition in the region is well under way and the decline in fertility is occurring more rapidly than had been foreseen until recently, those trends could mean that it will be possible to promote growth with social equity in more favourable demographic conditions than those foreseen previously. Lower birth rates will mean less pressure to create productive jobs during the 1990s and lower demand for social services. For example, demographic changes would make it possible to release resources for improving the quality of education and maternal and child health and nutrition. These significantly deteriorated during the 1980s, forming the basis for the reproduction of the poverty cycle. They are the two most important components of investment in human capital. Given that the number of pupils in the region will increase less than 10% during the 1990s and that fiscal revenues will increase more or less at the same rate as output (perhaps 50% by the end of the decade, if GDP grows at a rate of 4% during the rest of the 1990s), the balance will be available for improving the quality of education and maternal and child care.

This easing of demographic pressure is relative. The averages mentioned above are very different from those which will obtain in the incipient transition group (Bolivia and Haiti) or moderate transition group (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay), where total fertility is over 4.5 children. Both in these countries and in others in the more advanced stages of transition, empirical data demonstrate that fertility has declined unevenly, maintaining notably higher levels among women from lower income groups, rural areas and low educational levels.

Although the current decline in fertility rates, which improves conditions for changing production patterns with greater equity, has occurred intensely and beyond expectations, it has been far from homogeneous among countries and

within them. The relatively less developed countries, that is, those in greatest need of growth with equity, still have high birth rates, a situation which can be also found in the pockets of poverty throughout the region. Serious lags in demographic equity persist in all countries of the region. This means that the lack of policies geared to fulfilling the aspirations of a growing number of couples to have fewer children, as a complement to the public policies recommended in the proposal on changing production patterns with social equity, will accentuate the unevenness of levels of development and the dualities within the societies of the region, blocking efforts to stop the intergenerational transmission of poverty.

#### *Population and lags in social equity*

Changes in the reproductive behaviour of the greater part of the population reflects the economic and social changes experienced in the region since the Second World War. Several factors led to the growing desire for fewer children, and the realization of that desire was made possible by access to the means to avoid undesired pregnancies. Households belonging to different social strata and located in varying areas of residence chose to have small families, which led to the growing acceptance of birth control, the costs of which, in both market-based and subjective terms, decreased.

However, the decline in birth rates has not occurred with the same intensity in all social groups. Women in the poorest socio-economic strata have, on average, more children; analogously, the higher fertility rates in rural areas are found among small farmers, landless workers and ethnic minorities, who are excluded from the benefits of progress. A fact of singular importance is that many of the women of these sectors systematically declare that a high proportion of their pregnancies are undesired (see box II.1). Thus, family planning seems to have followed the lines of inequity; its unavailability to certain groups virtually prevents them from

exercising an essential reproductive right and limits the freedom of couples belonging to these groups to decide how many children they wish to have.

The differences in birth rates by social sector provide clear evidence of the inequity which prevails in the countries of the region. This situation is all the more compelling in view of the fact that, in some countries, pockets of high fertility represent a large portion of the population. Table II.3 presents recent data with respect to differences in fertility in the countries which conducted the Demographic and Health Survey. It can be observed that women with no education, as well as those who live in rural areas, have, on average, 5 or more children, while in five of the eight countries analysed the average birth rate among women with secondary education or higher is around 2 children.

Together with differences in birth rates, there is another important dimension, namely, high-mortality rates. The magnitude of the differentials in morbidity and mortality—in spite of the advances made—is one of the most worrisome dimensions of the lag in social equity. This means that the persistence of vulnerable groups who are exposed to lower probabilities of survival reinforces reproductive patterns which lead to high birth rates and may hinder efforts to improve the quality of the population, as expressed in the proposal for changing production patterns. The high mortality prevalent among vast sectors in the region is manifestly a factor of poverty, because even in those countries which have made the greatest progress in the struggle against mortality there continue to be abysmal differences by social group.

An empirical indicator of this inequity is life expectancy at birth: it has been found that, in the poorest groups of persons living in Central American countries, it is on the order of 10 years less than in groups which are not poor (see box II.2); these differences are mainly rooted in the incidence of infant and child mortality. As in the case of birth rates, estimates of infant mortality by area of residence and

## Box II.1

## UNDESIED FERTILITY BY SOCIAL SECTOR

The fact that low-income couples have high fertility rates does not mean that they do not wish to lower those rates. Recent research reveals that the fertility desired by women with low levels of education, as well as by those who live in rural areas, is much lower than the actual number of children they have had by the end of their reproductive period. For example, in Bolivia and Peru, all women interviewed declared that one out of every three children born to them was undesired, a proportion

which rises to 40% of total fertility among those with the lowest levels of education.

This reality shows an unsatisfied demand, especially among the poor, for population programmes which provide family planning and maternal and child health care. Thus, any policy measure designed to reduce fertility should contemplate the extension of family planning to rural sectors and to women with low levels of education.

## TOTAL FERTILITY RATES AND PERCENTAGES OF UNDESIED FERTILITY BY AREA OF RESIDENCE AND EDUCATION IN SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

	Bolivia 1989	Brazil 1986	Colom- bia 1986	Ecuador 1987	El Sal- vador 1985	Guate- mala 1987	Mexico 1987 <sup>a</sup>	Peru 1986	Dominican Republic 1986
<b>Total fertility rate<sup>b</sup></b>									
Total	5.00	3.53	3.34	4.33	4.22	5.60	3.80	4.12	3.80
Desired	3.20	2.83	2.81	3.59	3.08	4.90	-	2.64	2.80
Undesired	1.80	0.70	0.53	0.74	1.14	0.70	-	1.48	1.00
<b>Undesired fertility (%)<sup>c</sup></b>									
Total	36.0	19.8	15.9	17.1	27.0	12.5	58.9	35.9	26.3
<b>By level of education<sup>d</sup></b>									
i) Lower level	37.7	38.5	19.7	16.0	25.7	11.4	62.4	40.7	30.4
ii) Middle-low level	38.3	27.1	17.1	19.0	32.3	12.5	64.6	22.5	27.3
iii) Middle level	31.1	13.6	8.5	10.4	22.5	17.9	59.6	24.6	13.8
iv) Higher level	24.1	11.6	9.5	3.5	21.3	7.4	49.0	-	9.1
<b>By area of residence</b>									
Urban	35.0	16.1	12.3	16.2	-	14.6	63.3	-	21.9
Metropolitan area	-	-	-	-	26.9	-	58.5	26.2	-
Other urban	-	-	-	-	30.6	-	60.3	30.8	-
Rural	35.9	27.5	20.7	17.6	25.0	10.8	54.3	42.3	31.3

Source: National reports on Demographic and Health Surveys.

<sup>a</sup> In Mexico, questions were asked to estimate desired fertility. In this case, the figures represent the percentage of women, married or in consensual unions, who do not desire more children in the future. Consequently, the figures are not comparable with those for the other countries. The categories for area of residence are: metropolitan area: 20,000 or more; other urban, 2,500 to 19,999; and rural, fewer than 2,500 inhabitants.

<sup>b</sup> The total fertility rate was calculated for the three-year period prior to the survey. The desired and undesired fertility rates were calculated for the same period, taking into account whether the children had been desired or were the result of undesired pregnancies.

<sup>c</sup> This percentage represents the ratio of undesired fertility to total fertility.

<sup>d</sup> Educational levels range from lower to higher. The categories are different for each country. For Ecuador, Colombia, Bolivia and the Dominican Republic, the categories are as follows: i) no education; ii) primary; iii) secondary or middle; iv) higher or university. For Peru, the first two groups (no education and primary) are combined in one category. For Brazil, Mexico and Guatemala, the groups are: i) no education; ii) incomplete primary; iii) complete primary; iv) secondary or higher. For Bolivia, the groups are: i) no education; ii) primary; iii) intermediate; iv) secondary or higher. For El Salvador, the groups are: i) no education; ii) primary 1-3; iii) primary 4-9; iv) secondary or higher.

Table II.3  
LATIN AMERICA: TOTAL FERTILITY AND INFANT MORTALITY, BY AREA OF RESIDENCE  
AND EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF THE MOTHER, ACCORDING TO DATA FROM THE  
NATIONAL DEMOGRAPHIC AND HEALTH SURVEYS, 1980s

Country		Area of residence		Educational level of the mother				Total
		Urban	Rural	No educ.	Incomplete primary	Complete primary	Secondary or higher	
Total fertility								
Guatemala	1983-1987	4.1	6.5	7.0	5.6	3.9	2.7	5.6
Bolivia	1984-1989	4.0	6.4	6.1	5.9	4.5	2.9	4.9
Paraguay	1987-1990	3.6	6.1	6.7	6.2	4.5	3.2	4.7
Peru	1984-1986	3.1	6.3	6.6	5.0	3.1	1.9	4.1
Mexico	1984-1986	3.1	5.2	6.1	5.7	3.7	2.5	3.8
Dominican Republic	1983-1986	3.1	4.8	5.3	4.3	2.9	2.1	3.7
Brazil	1983-1986	3.0	5.0	6.5	5.1	3.1	2.5	3.5
Colombia	1981-1986	2.8	4.9	5.4	4.2	2.5	1.5	3.3
Infant mortality rate (per thousand)								
Bolivia	1979-1989	79	112	124	108	65	46	96
Brazil	1976-1986	76	107	...	...	...	...	86
Guatemala	1983-1987	65	84	82	86	61	41	79
Peru	1981-1986	54	101	124	85	42	22	76
Dominican Republic	1976-1986	72	71	102	76	57	34	68
Mexico	1982-1987	23	64	83	64	46	27	56
Colombia	1976-1986	38	41	60	----- 40 -----		28	39
Paraguay	1980-1990	32	38	45	42	33	22	35

Source: National Reports on Demographic and Health Surveys.

Note: *Educational level:* In the Dominican Republic, Colombia and Peru, the educational groups are the following: no education, primary, secondary and university; in Bolivia, the groups are: no education, primary, intermediate, secondary or higher; in Paraguay, the no-education group includes those with two years of schooling or less.

*Area of residence:* For Mexico, the urban category includes localities with more than 20,000 inhabitants.

...: Not available.

educational level of the mother for countries in different stages of demographic transition reveal important differences (see table II.3). Consideration of the ethnic origin of the population also reveals sharp contrasts: mortality among children belonging to ethnic minorities is notoriously higher than that for children of other origins. Research based on census data reveals, for example, that in Bolivia (1976) the infant death rate among the population speaking only Quechua was 218 per thousand live births, while for the

Spanish-speaking population, the rate was 137 deaths per thousand (PAHO, 1990). Moreover, in a 1988 study of indigenous reservations in Chile, an infant mortality of 45 per thousand was found, while, for the same period, the national value was 17 per thousand, and in the wealthiest neighbourhoods of Santiago the rate was slightly higher than 10 per thousand (UFRO/INE/FII/PAESMI/CELADE, 1990).

Generally speaking, inequalities in demographic behaviour mean that each social group follows its own trends in



## Box II.2

SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL INDICATORS BY LEVELS OF POVERTY<sup>a</sup>

Situations of poverty are characterized by significant differences among demographic indicators and others of a socio-economic nature; they reveal the acute features of the inequality which exists in the region. The example of three Central American countries

shows that dissimilar behaviours of fertility and mortality rates are reflected in the natural growth rate of the poor population and in the young age structure; as a result, the incidence of poverty among children and youth increases.

Indicator	Countries						
	Guatemala (1986-1987)			Honduras (1990)		Nicaragua (1985)	
	Indi- gent	Poor	Non- poor	BNU	BNS	BNU	BNS
% of population	48	25	27	78	22	69	31
% of indigenous persons							
per stratum	55	38	23	-	-	-	-
Birth rate (per thousand)	44	34	30	40	28	48	35
Death rate (per thousand)	10	9	7	8	5	13	11
Natural growth rate (per thousand)	34	25	23	32	23	35	24
Total fertility rate	6.7	4.7	3.6	6.0	3.2	6.7	3.7
Life expectancy at birth (years)	60	63	71	65	74	-	-
% of total births	56	22	22	83	17	75	25
% of total deaths	55	25	20	84	16	72	28
Age structure (per hundred)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
0-19	62	56	47	59	46	60	52
20-59	34	39	46	37	47	35	42
60 or over	4	5	7	4	7	5	6
Dependency ratio (per hundred) <sup>b</sup>	120	87	64	102	62	115	84
Average size of household (persons)	6.0	5.4	4.4	5.9	4.3	6.4	5.7
Gross rate of economic participation (per hundred)	26	33	43	31	38	-	-
Occupational structure (per hundred)	100	100	100	100	100	-	-
Wage-earners	41	54	53	43	55		
Self-employed	35	30	31	39	32		
Unpaid family workers 24	14	11	15	6			
Other	0	2	5	3	7		

Source: Guatemala: J. Chackiel and M. Villa, "Latin America and the Caribbean: the dynamics of population and growth" (DDR/1), Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), paper presented at the Meeting of Government Experts on Population and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, preparatory to the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, Saint Lucia, 6-9 October; Honduras: Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), Honduras: diagnóstico sociodemográfico y proyecciones de la población pobre y no pobre según distintas metas, 1990-2010 (LC/DEM/R.172), Santiago, Chile, 1992, and J. Gabrie, "Honduras, características sociodemográficas y económicas de la población según grado de pobreza, 1990", Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), 1991, unpublished; Nicaragua: M. Morales, "Nicaragua: características socio-económicas y demográficas según estado de pobreza", Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), 1991, unpublished.

<sup>a</sup> Guatemala, by income; Honduras and Nicaragua, by "basic needs unsatisfied" (BNU) and "basic needs satisfied" (BNS).

<sup>b</sup> (0-14 + 65 or over)/(15-64).

relation to overall growth and age distribution, with the result that their contributions to the growth and age structure of the total population are differentiated. Population dynamics play an important role in the reproduction of poverty from two angles: directly, because fertility and growth rates in the poor population are high and, indirectly, because those phenomena tend to retain children in living conditions similar to those of their parents, through the intergenerational transmission of poverty.

Higher fertility among poor families leads to the appearance of such phenomena as child labour and teenage pregnancy. Child labour, as a mechanism of family survival, sacrifices the children's education and may make them unable to qualify for better paying jobs in the future. Teenage pregnancy tends to transmit the mother's cultural and material shortcomings to her offspring.

Although various studies reveal higher fertility and mortality rates among lower-income groups, little research has been performed with respect to their impact on demographic growth and, therefore, their importance in terms of the increase of poverty. Household surveys in some countries have shown that high fertility plays a preponderant role in determining the high natural growth of the population. For example, total fertility among indigents in Guatemala is 6.7 children per woman and the natural growth rate is 3.4%, in contrast to a birth rate of 3.6 children and a natural growth rate of 2.3% among those who are not poor. Similar results were obtained by research in Honduras and Nicaragua, where the population dynamics of poor groups were analysed from the standpoint of unmet basic needs (see box II.2).

Differential demographic trends by social sector are a contributing factor to the absolute and relative increase in the poor population. A recent exercise in projection of the poor and non-poor population of Honduras (CELADE, 1992; Gabrie, 1991), on the assumption of zero social mobility and declining fertility and mortality, reveals that, between 1990 and 2000, there will be

an increase of 1.5 million poor persons, raising the percentage of poor from 78% to 80% of the total population (5.1 million in 1990). For that proportion to decline, upward social mobility will have to compensate for demographic growth. A hypothetical example, which gives an idea of orders of magnitude, contemplates a target for reducing the percentage of poor, by the year 2000, from the expected 80% to 66%. This would mean that the number of additional poor would be 700,000, instead of the 1.5 million projected, a result that could be obtained through socio-economic programmes to promote the upward social mobility of 800,000 persons.

That evolution of poverty is determined not only by differential demographic factors but also by other socio-economic factors is a thesis that is reinforced by the growth trends among poor sectors registered in the countries of the region during the 1980s (ECLAC, 1990a). In several instances, there have been increases in the number and percentage of poor of such magnitude that they cannot be explained solely in terms of demographic growth, but rather must also have followed from the "anti-equity" effects of the crisis. Of the 10 countries analysed by ECLAC, the total average annual rate of growth of the poor population was 3% or more in Argentina, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Uruguay and Venezuela, reaching a rate on the order of 9% in two of them, which is several times greater than the rate of demographic growth in general.

The incidence of poverty and indigence among children and youth is greater, as a result of the increased growth of the poor population. Moreover, poor populations have a high dependency ratio and, on average, more persons per household.

Owing to these characteristics of the age structure, the satisfaction of demands for health care and education must undoubtedly be given high priority for this population, given that the frustration of those demands is one of the fundamental bases of the vicious circle of poverty. However, the demands of the

rest of the age groups centre around employment and housing, two of the most elemental basic needs, and when these needs are not met, the reproduction of the spiral of poverty tends to occur in these groups as well.

Besides these equity-related concerns, the deficiencies noted above with respect to family planning and education, information and communication about sexual and reproductive matters seem to be associated with two other important problems: clandestine abortions, with serious risks for maternal health, and teenage pregnancies. Both clandestine abortions and adolescent pregnancies are part of the severe syndrome of inequity which characterizes Latin American and Caribbean societies and which has socioeconomic consequences at various levels. At least two levels can be distinguished in the case of adolescent fertility. First, there is the impact on the individuals involved, because births occurring during the teenage years are those most likely to be problematic, whether because of the biological risk they often involve, the fact that the parents are forced to drop out of school or leave their jobs, or the family conflict they may provoke. Second, at the level of society, adolescent fertility may represent significant losses of human capital as parents drop out of school or leave work and the collective level of productivity becomes harder to raise.

In order to prevent the reproduction of poverty, it is especially important to consider expanding educational and work opportunities for young women, which, together with better health, family planning and nutritional programme coverage, tend to improve living conditions and reduce family sizes. As can be seen from various studies, encouraging women to attend secondary school, especially rural women at the same income level, tends to lower their average number of children. As education is also useful for entry into the workforce, this results in greater job participation on the part of young women, later marriages and lower fertility, all of which favour lower mortality rates.

Promoting access to family planning for these sectors establishes a principle of citizenship, ensuring the exercise of the right of all social groups to decide, on the basis of adequate information and with complete freedom, how many children they wish to procreate. Access to family planning is also a requisite for equity and changing production patterns, as it contributes to the improvement of both the living conditions of the poorest sectors and the productivity of the labour force.

### **E. Population and sustainable development**

---

During the period 1960-1990, the total increase of the population was 224 million persons, 94% of which occurred in urban areas. After sustaining an increase of 10% during the 1960s, the rural population has stabilized at around 127 million. Thus, the demographic pressure on natural resources stems primarily from the fast expansion of the urban market, further stimulated by the technification of food and fibre production. Although the mechanization of agribusiness and the boom in livestock husbandry have raised the man/land ratio, it remains one of the lowest in the developing world. Pressure on land continues to be excessive, however, in areas of traditional minifundos, a phenomenon that is aggravated by land parceling as a result of inheritance, together with the expansion of agroindustrial export companies and stock-raising activities.

The extreme concentration of farm ownership and land use, another of the characteristics of the region, explains the apparent contradiction between the low man/land ratio and the persistence of steadily deteriorating areas. In fact, 75% of the rural families of the region have little or no land, which obliges family members to move and seek work elsewhere in order to survive, in conditions which do not always ensure the basic requirements for worker income and well-being. Easier access to land ownership and to credit and technical assistance would help raise small farmer income directly, by raising

the productivity of land use, and would alleviate the pressure exerted by small land-holders and minifundo owners on marginal land.

To that end, the suggestion has been made to improve the operation of the land market to allow the small farmer easier access to it. This would require a massive programme of title regularization, involving legal recognition of the land inhabited and occupied by indigenous peoples and, in some cases, recovering idle spaces and resources. Improving the efficiency of land use also involves making farm taxes depend on the productive value of the land, which, together with stimulating productivity, would also promote property deconcentration. Finally, it is essential that the financial system become more active in the land market; special modalities of savings and credit for land purchases would therefore have to be established. Together with these mechanisms, systems of technical assistance need to be organized to ensure that the land is used in accordance with its ecological characteristics, minimizing negative externalities.

The increase in the urban concentration of population meant that, by 1990, the region had 38 cities of more than one million inhabitants, two of which had more than 15 million. Besides requiring costly investments in drinking water, sewerage and social infrastructure, this phenomenon has accentuated the inadequacy of the physical environment in some of these cities. The combined effect of the lack of investment, demographic size, speed of growth, and the absorption of various types of technologies (such as fixed emissions sources, vehicles and high-density construction) has tended to deteriorate the quality of urban life. This can be seen clearly in the fact that, for example, the levels of concentration of air or water pollutants surpasses acceptable levels, or that few cities have sewage treatment facilities and that many of these systems cover only 50% of the waste produced.

Working for sustainable development does not mean either limiting the

possibilities for growth or under-utilization of the natural resources potential. The environmental challenge consists in stimulating growth modalities which will generate added value in economic terms, taking into account the real opportunity costs in natural resources and economic decisions. This means, for example, that production costs will include their environmental impact and that public policy will act as a tool to discourage environmental damage and provide incentives to economic and energy efficiency (see chapter IV). In that sense, economic reforms to encourage the growth of open economies, supported by market incentives, may well give rise to processes of environmental improvement, as long as they are complemented by adequate public regulation. Economic and energy efficiency are core elements for environmental policy; both are part of the above-mentioned reforms and both require strategic coordination among economic agents to complement the market in tasks for which it does not have advantages, such as externalities, public goods, technology development and the promotion of equity.

All of these concerns are embraced by the environmental issue, and therein lies the importance of adequate tools for transparent and socially agreed upon environmental oversight and regulation, which will encourage growth while preserving the environment. Air quality, sewage treatment and the absence of tensions arising from congestion and urban violence are typical public goods; reconciling competitiveness with environmental preservation requires technological innovation. Finally, the protection and improvement of the environment has clear redistributive connotations, because, in the typical cities of the region, the liquid and solid pollutants generated by industries or wealthier households end up in the settlements of lower-income families. Poor families live in the most contaminated areas, near dumps for urban and industrial wastes; they have less access to drinking water and sewage services, have virtually no parks and are

exposed to infectious diseases. Poor rural families, in turn, are forced to cut forests and work less fertile land, increasing soil erosion in order to survive.

To make headway towards sustainable development, the first requirement will be to promote education and citizen awareness with respect to the harmonic relationship between humans and nature and among persons themselves. It also requires a technically skilled public sector, with the financial capacity to strengthen its role as environmental regulator.

#### **F. Changing production patterns and population: final considerations**

---

The debate which links development to ups and downs in fertility trends in simplistic fashion, as directly correlated with whether or not poverty is reduced and equity attained, has been made obsolete by actual data. Just as the goal of economic growth is not opposed to the goal of social equity (instead, these are complementary aspects of the same process), so the relation between birth rates and development must be analysed within the framework of an overall systemic effort to achieve growth with equity, a challenge which, in light of today's globalized economy, must be addressed through a marked improvement in the quality of human resources.

There is no question of choosing one or the other, but rather of undertaking an integral effort which allows for national specificities. In some situations, it will be necessary to approach changing of production patterns by including population policy geared to reducing fertility rates. Making birth control methods available to poorer sectors is, moreover, congruent with another core objective of changing production patterns with social equity, namely, the strengthening of democratic regimes which will guarantee the exercise of citizens' rights and extend these rights to the population as a whole and will create the conditions for the full exercise of all liberties and rights.

Equitable distribution of knowledge and information and making available to

all citizens the means to achieve effective performance in the personal and social areas of life, that is, in the world of work, family life, culture, political participation and community life, is the prerequisite for the exercise of modern citizenship. This vision undoubtedly includes the creation of improved conditions for the exercise of the reproductive rights of couples, closing the gap between real and desired fertility, on the basis of informed and responsible options. Within this integrated approach to changing production patterns with social equity, country experiences in reducing fertility should be recognized as a facet of development efforts. In this sense, such diverse successful experiences as those of Mexico, Brazil, and Costa Rica may serve as reference points.

As in the case of fertility-reduction policies, the situation of the different countries within the process of demographic transition will be a very important factor for determining policy geared to changing production patterns with equity, whether in job creation, health care or education.

In countries in incipient and moderate demographic transition, it would be more urgent to expand social services rapidly in the areas of maternal and child health care, preventive public health measures, hygiene, nutrition and fertility reduction. An attempt should also be made to extend educational coverage.

In countries in full transition, emphasis on investment in human resources should be focused on social services, preventive and curative health care, making education and training systems more relevant to the demands of competition and reforming retirement plans and other mechanisms of institutionalized savings, in order to increase their contribution to domestic savings.

In countries in advanced transition, action priorities will reflect the needs of adults, especially with regard to employment and the social service demands of the third age.

At any rate, the establishment of policy priorities presupposes taking into account the internal differences in each country, since the heterogeneity among

spatial units and social and ethnic groups reveals the need for differentiated policy which will respond to that reality, in order

to effectively achieve the objectives of growth and social equity.

### Chapter III

## WOMEN IN THE REGION AND THE POPULATION ISSUE

### A. General considerations

---

Strictly speaking, a separate chapter in a document on the population issue should not have to be devoted to the situation of women, since they both affect and are affected by all the variables inherent in the topic, namely, human reproduction, territorial migrations, socio-economic development, and cultural, ethnic and generational elements. There are, however, two reasons for doing so: first, to underscore concern for the women of the region in certain areas which are basic to their being treated equitably but in relation to which they are still subordinate despite their obviously protagonistic role; and second, to ensure that the gender perspective begins to permeate the views held on various aspects of development, among them that of population.

At this time in history, in addition to major technological advances, momentous transformations are taking place in how societies themselves are being perceived. Ways of thinking seem to be changing, and these include how women and their behaviour are being viewed. The decline of the great ideologies that provided specific cosmographic views, together with secularization and its accompanying modernity, at least in the western model, are making room for new theories, different cultural models, changes in interpersonal behaviour and a different relationship between the public

and the private, and the economic and the ethical; they are also making room for a democratic vision in which a redefinition of the links between gender, modernity and culture will be a key factor.

This chapter is based primarily on the diagnostic studies on the situation of women in the region which ECLAC regularly carries out pursuant to its mandates in this area (Krawczyk, 1992). The findings of these studies have been used in the evaluations elaborated at the regular regional conferences on the integration of women, especially the fourth and fifth conferences, which were held in Guatemala (1988) and Curaçao (1991) (ECLAC, 1990c; 1991c; 1991d).

In addition to the recognized lack of statistical data concerning the situation of women, the same gaps in knowledge as ECLAC pointed out a decade ago unfortunately still exist. Accordingly, the core areas that need to be studied in order to elaborate a suitable conceptual framework for diagnosis and action on the situation of women and their integration into development are as follows: the precise definition of the type of social entity formed by women; the link between domestic units and the overall socio-economic structure; and sexual stereotypes and cultural norms (ECLAC, 1979b). Although much headway has been made in each of these areas, efforts must be redoubled to relate them with each other and thus get to the root of the problems that have to do with the position

occupied by persons –men and women– in society, including their relationship to power in a context of changing production patterns with social equity.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, another relevant topic from the standpoint of women is the gap that exists between *de jure* and *de facto* equality, particularly in view of the fact that the instruments and mechanisms that the United Nations has established to promote the status of women have been ratified by virtually all the countries of the region.

The ECLAC proposal for changing production patterns with social equity by definition includes the principle of respect for individual rights, especially the rights of women, to participate on an equal footing in the community and in decision-making, as well as in the right to have or not to have children in accordance with their own convictions. The quest for change and equity, which should include equity between the sexes, is receptive to today's innovative currents of thought and opens up possibilities for incorporating new ideas on how to build more equitable societies based on ethical concepts.

Current debate on the topic of women concerns the limitations of the idea of "the integration of women into development". Development was a framework into which the topic seemed to fit easily. The criticisms raised were based on the fact that, conceptually, such integration did not exist, but that it nearly always represented an appendage to the core concerns of development. Actions designed to integrate women were also called into question, since they often served to marginalize the topic, and women themselves, even further. Although it cannot be denied that the approach helped to clarify many key aspects of the situation, it has its theoretical and conceptual limitations: no matter how broad the concept of development is, its economic indicators always refer to the production of goods, and this necessarily disguises the majority contribution of women to reproduction and health services, taking care of the home, feeding and raising children –jobs that are done without pay (Elson, 1991).

The most common view of this issue is that women are already integrated and that what is needed is to improve the manner in which they participate; this refers not only to their position in society as a function of the socio-economic strata to which they belong, but also the role which is culturally assigned to them by virtue of the fact that they are women. It is now accepted that development in a broad sense, i.e., beyond economic growth, cannot be achieved without improving the status of women (United Nations, 1992a).

Lastly, a large number of women in the region are in a particularly vulnerable position. Special attention should be given to female heads of household, teenage mothers, elderly women, women migrants and, in particular, refugee and displaced women who are in the most precarious situation: they suffer from poverty, the risk of all types of harassment and discrimination and the relative or absolute impossibility of gaining access to education, suitable jobs or training and, in most cases, of exercising their reproductive rights (as the high incidence of abortion suggests).

## **B. The regional backdrop and changes in women's lives**

The changes that have taken place in the region within the space of just a few decades have completely transformed the profile of Latin America, not only in terms of economic and socio-political changes but also with regard to the cultural dimension and both political and personal relations. In a sense, not only has reality changed but also our approach to analysing it. The long, profound crisis of the 1980s has made it necessary to re-think the future in different terms, and our uncertainty about what lies ahead forces us to interpret reality with new criteria. It is in this context that the ECLAC proposal for changing production patterns with social equity offers a framework that is flexible enough to more appropriately embrace the topic of women, including concern for gender equity and making it



possible to take stronger action in conjunction with public, global and sectoral policies (ECLAC, 1990b).

As these changes have unfolded, the status of women in Latin America and the Caribbean has undergone a transformation of unprecedented proportions in recent decades. Women's growing presence in education and the workforce, the legal reaffirmation of their citizenship by giving them the right to vote, and the mounting social acceptance of women in politics and public affairs are all changes whose importance goes beyond their economic significance and which have begun to be manifested in changes in cultural behaviour patterns. The increase in life expectancy—which has given women what nearly amounts to a whole new life following the stage of childbearing and child-rearing—and the wider dissemination of family planning methods have provided Latin American women with new life choices and opportunities for exercising their rights within what is perhaps a broader sphere of activity than in other periods. While it is true that the Latin American and Caribbean region is very heterogeneous and exhibits striking country-to-country differences that influence the status of women and the pace of change, it would also appear that the trend towards change is irreversible (ECLAC, 1990c). These changes have an even greater impact on women in the region than the figures would lead us to believe. That sexuality can be separated from reproduction and that one can often, if not always, choose whether or not to have children are still very recent phenomena in Latin America. While it may be more visible among well-educated, middle- and upper-class urban strata, this pro-choice model is beginning to spread throughout all sectors of society.

Modernization has simultaneously led to the massive entry of women into education, gainful employment, shared communication codes and the dissemination of alternative models. It very much remains to be seen whether modernity really helps to change

traditional power relationships, whether it allows for new linkages between the public and private spheres and whether it contributes to the forming of more equitable interpersonal relations, especially between men and women.

### C. Women and population: some aspects of their relationship

---

Employment, education and health were some of the priority issues during the United Nations Decade for Women, and hence the main focus of attention. In addition to placing women's issues in a more global context, an effort should be made to highlight a number of factors which influence women's behaviour, status and position in society and which have had a significant impact on demographic variables, especially fertility.

#### *Employment for women*

Recent studies demonstrate that women's increasing participation in gainful employment has become a structural trend which will continue. By the end of the century, the 1950 figure of 10 million women in the economically active population (EAP)—which has already jumped to nearly 48 million in the 1990s—will have risen to 65 million. This means that, despite the decline in demographic growth rate, women's rate of entry into the labour will continue to increase substantially—at an annual rate of 3.2% for women versus 2.2% for men—in the near future.

One of the most outstanding trends in the labour market in the 1980s was the increased participation of women. According to CELADE estimates, women's rates of participation in the EAP rose significantly, moving from 18.83% in 1980 to 22.03% in 1990. This means that women accounted for 37% of the increase in the EAP between 1980 and 1990 (CELADE, 1992a). One key factor in the restructuring of the labour market was the expansion of employment in less productive activities,

including some in the services sector, in small firms and in informal activities. The supply of jobs in the tertiary sector is one of the fastest-growing, since demand for services is high partly owing to the fact that certain activities traditionally carried out in the home are now performed – as a market transaction – by service enterprises.

It is often said that women's employment influences their child-bearing behaviour, gives them autonomy, boosts their self-esteem, affords them financial independence and provides them with a sense of self-worth and control over their own bodies. This is certainly true in theoretical terms, but in the case of Latin American and Caribbean women, the problems inherent in the kinds of jobs these women have access to must be taken into account. Moreover, according to some authors, there are tremendous differences in the context in which women realize their productive and reproductive roles in the developing world and this plays a part in determining the interaction between such roles. It should also be borne in mind that in highly skewed societies, women are employed in two diametrically opposed areas: some women, in the modern sector and working-class women, in domestic service. Another factor which strongly influences women's choices is the compatibility of a given job outside the home with child-raising and child-care activities. The rest of society's perception of working women also has an important impact, although it is lessening.

Another issue which continues to be of deep concern is the under-reporting of the number of economically active women (both gainfully employed and unpaid workers) in official statistics. Such a state of affairs results from the specific ways that women are positioned in the labour force, the definition of economic activity, and the characteristics of the censal procedures, all of which are related to cultural assumptions concerning the sexual division of labour. Although efforts have been made to improve this situation ever since the beginning of the United

Nations Decade for Women, it has not changed significantly, except that there is now a greater awareness of the issue. The usual Latin American population censuses give a fairly valid portrait of the male labour force but a quite invalid one of the female labour force. This is much more so in rural than in urban areas. Other time-based studies show that women in developing countries work from 12 to 13 hours more per week than men (Wainermann, 1992).

Wage discrimination is another prominent issue. In the last five years of the 1980s, an analysis of household surveys taken in six countries of the region showed that the incomes of women with nine years of schooling were lower than those of men who had only five years of formal education, while at the same time the female EAP had a higher level of formal education (ECLAC, 1991c).

#### *Women's education*

The education of women has a very strong influence on demographic trends, as discussed in chapter I, part B. The increase in the population's educational level, coupled with an improvement in living conditions, has played a fundamental role in the decline of infant mortality and fertility. It is generally agreed that education influences reproductive behaviour, especially through the formation and dissemination of attitudes, values and beliefs regarding desirable family size. Nevertheless, education cannot be considered a direct tool for short-term policy design because its effects depend on how it interacts with the rest of the social system.

Regional school enrolment continues to rise, and the trend is towards parity between the sexes. Currently, over one half of all women between 15 and 19 years of age have completed primary school. Furthermore, around 45% of the students enrolled in higher education in 1985 were women, and in nearly half of the countries, women outnumbered men at this level. On the other hand, illiteracy rates for women still ranged between 19.2% and

48% in rural areas. Women in the region also have fewer opportunities to secure high-ranking academic posts, and they must have more years of education than men to qualify for the same occupations. A final point of importance is that the region's school textbooks continue to transmit images portraying women working primarily in the home, but are reluctant to show that women can play a much broader role, thereby discouraging their participation on an equal footing (ECLAC/PREALC, 1992).

There are some signs that the influence of education as a factor of upward social mobility is declining. As the coverage of education expands, the level of education required in order to actually improve employment opportunities and living conditions has risen considerably. It may be that other mechanisms—such as a greater knowledge about and access to contraceptives and information provided by the mass media—are now replacing education as the main factors influencing fertility rates. The fertility rates of less educated women are now falling, so that the difference between them and more educated women—which is especially striking in the correlation between the number of children desired—is not so huge (see chapter II, part D).

Education is the key to achieving a different type of place for women in society, and its contents must be reformulated to promote more equitable interpersonal relations. The influence of female educational levels on their reproductive behaviour and job opportunities has been quite well documented. There has thus far been little discussion, however, about the importance of gearing the education of women to the types of models that will prevail in the future. The type of education the region needs, for both men and women, is a participatory, flexible, non-hierarchical, non-authoritarian form of education designed to stimulate individual change, creativity, innovation and initiative. Women in the region have only found this type of support in women's movements, women's organizations or psychological

counseling. The type of education being proposed by ECLAC and UNESCO could not only prepare them much more effectively for new jobs, but could also endow them with greater capabilities in terms of decision-making, autonomy and liberty in all areas of their lives as citizens and in their family life. Thus, a way must be found to formulate an education system that is not gender-biased, in order to make a real improvement in women's participation in society.

---

#### **D. Women's health and their right to control their own fertility**

---

Women's health is determined by their socio-economic situation, biological factors and aspects relating to their status and role in society. Their rights, then, should be backed up by real access to health services and the protection of their reproductive rights, including the right to decide not to become pregnant and the right to have the best health care during pregnancy and childbirth. These rights, which have to do with privacy, must be integrated into types of public policies that allow the interested parties to be involved in their formulation as part of the democratic process. Demographic changes and the recognition of women's right to control their own fertility have a strong impact on her future development.

Demographic figures are perhaps the clearest indicator of one of the sweeping changes that have transformed women's lives in the past decade, for they show that, although there are still very profound differences from country to country and within each country, Latin America is undergoing a demographic transition characterized by a decline in fertility and mortality. The decline in fertility has also implied that pregnancies are increasingly occurring in the middle-age brackets (between 20 and 35 years of age), which has contributed to the decline in maternal and infant mortality. However, clear, significant reductions have not been seen in adolescent fertility rates (see chapter I, part B).

### *Contraceptives*

The situation with respect to reproduction, and the factors determining it have changed at a dizzying pace in the past few decades. All cultures have controlled fertility in one way or another in the past, but it seems that a new way of dealing with this issue is now being sought, in pursuit of freedom of choice for all people, but especially women; a deliberate separation of sexuality from reproduction (for women, since such a separation already existed for men); and an effort to find more effective methods of controlling fertility.

The statement by the World Health Organization that "the fact that women can control their own fertility is probably one of the landmark events in the history of women" (WHO, 1980, p. 13) and the statement in the Nairobi Strategies that "the ability of women to control their own fertility forms an important basis for the enjoyment of other rights" establish that women's right to control over their own fertility is now recognized, at least in principle (United Nations, 1985).

Women have thus gone from a situation in which their fertility was controlled without their having any further say in the matter, to one in which they have not only been given freedom, at least on paper, but almost total responsibility as well over the reproduction of new generations. This freedom is not strongly asserted, but a look at the way fertility is being regulated in the region indicates that, nowadays, nearly 80% of the time, the woman is responsible for contraception (PAHO/WHO, 1990). More recent information drawn from the Demographic and Health Surveys confirms that this responsibility is even greater (on the order of 90%) in certain countries (see table III.I).

Although it is common to refer to the "population" in connection with information on reproductive behaviour, in practice virtually all the available information comes from women, as they are the sole subjects of health and fertility surveys.

Existing figures on the contraceptive use in the region (see box I.2) show, first of

all, huge discrepancies among countries ranging from 30% in Bolivia and 66% in Brazil and Colombia. The variations depend mainly on such factors as socio-economic status, educational level, age, the country's stage of development and the prevailing health policy, since contraceptives are a health issue. According to some estimates, in the 10 years between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, contraceptive use went up from 36% to 49% in Latin America.

The contraceptive method used today are sterilization, drugs, the intrauterine device (IUD), implants, the condom and vaginal methods. Statistically, the most common traditional methods are rhythm and withdrawal. Clearly, of these methods, only withdrawal and the use of the condom place the responsibility for procreation essentially on the man, while all the others are dependent on the woman. Another fertility regulation method used in the region is induced abortion.

Of all these methods, the most widely used in Latin America and in other developing areas as well in the past decade has been female sterilization, which was as high as 36% in 1983 among sexually active women controlling their fertility (PAHO, 1990). Some countries of the region, according to more updated information, have more than surpassed the 1983 regional average, e.g., the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Brazil, which account for 65.8%, 63.8% and 40.4%, respectively, of all contraceptive users (see table III.2 and figure III.1). Male sterilization has begun to be practiced somewhat, but in Latin America, with the exception of Puerto Rico (where it was 4%), at a rate of less than 1% -in no way comparable to female sterilization. Box III.1 illustrates this trend in Costa Rica.

Given the scope of the issue, a few questions should be raised. It would seem important to discuss whether sterilization, as a means of limiting the number of children, is a contraceptive method comparable to methods which stop at birth-spacing. Under the proper conditions, sterilization is a more economical option and probably does not

Table III.1  
LATIN AMERICA (NINE COUNTRIES): PERCENTAGE OF CURRENTLY MARRIED WOMEN  
OF CHILD-BEARING AGE WHO USE CONTRACEPTIVES, BROKEN DOWN ACCORDING  
TO RESPONSIBILITY FOR USE

Country	Total users	Responsibility for use		Total users	Responsibility for use	
		Male <sup>a</sup>	Female <sup>b</sup>		Male <sup>a</sup>	Female <sup>b</sup>
Bolivia	30.2	1.3	28.9	100.0	4.3	95.7
Brazil	66.3	7.5	58.8	100.0	11.3	88.7
Colombia	64.8	7.8	57.0	100.0	12.0	88.0
Dominican Republic	50.0	3.0	47.0	100.0	6.0	94.0
Ecuador	44.2	2.6	41.6	100.0	5.9	94.1
Guatemala	23.1	3.3	19.8	100.0	14.3	85.7
Mexico	52.9	6.2	46.7	100.0	11.7	88.3
Peru	45.6	4.3	41.3	100.0	9.4	90.6
Trinidad and Tobago	52.7	17.3	35.4	100.0	32.8	67.2

Source: Institute for Resource Development Inc., Demographic and Health Surveys, 1985-1989, Columbia, Maryland.

<sup>a</sup> Includes the following contraceptive methods: condom, male sterilization and withdrawal. <sup>b</sup> Includes all other contraceptive methods.

Table III.2  
LATIN AMERICA (NINE COUNTRIES): USE OF A SPECIFIC CONTRACEPTIVE BY  
CURRENTLY MARRIED WOMEN OF CHILD-BEARING AGE  
(Percentages)

Country	Total	Users of some form of contraceptive												Total non-users	Total
		Modern methods								Traditional methods					
		Total	Birth control	IUD <sup>a</sup>	Injection	Vaginal meth-ods	Condom	Female		Total	Periodic abstinence	With-drawal	Other meth-ods		
								Male	Sterilization						
Bolivia	30.2	12.2	1.9	4.8	0.7	0.1	0.3	4.4	0.0	18.0	16.1	1.0	0.9	69.8	100.0
Brazil	66.3	56.6	25.2	1.0	0.6	0.5	1.7	26.8	0.8	9.7	4.0	5.0	0.7	33.7	100.0
Colombia	64.8	52.5	16.4	11.0	2.4	2.3	1.7	18.3	0.4	12.3	5.7	5.7	0.9	35.2	100.0
Dominican Republic	50.0	46.5	8.8	3.0	0.1	0.2	1.4	32.9	0.1	3.5	1.4	1.5	0.6	50.0	100.0
Ecuador	44.2	35.7	8.5	9.8	0.7	1.2	0.6	14.9	0.0	8.5	6.1	2.0	0.4	55.8	100.0
Guatemala	23.1	19.0	3.9	1.8	0.5	0.4	1.2	10.3	0.9	4.1	2.8	1.2	0.1	76.9	100.0
Mexico	52.9	44.8	9.8	10.2	2.8	0.6	1.9	18.7	0.8	8.1	4.4	3.5	0.2	47.1	100.0
Peru	45.6	22.9	6.5	7.3	1.3	1.0	0.7	6.1	0.0	22.7	17.7	3.6	1.4	54.4	100.0
Trinidad and Tobago	52.7	44.4	14.0	4.4	0.8	5.0	11.8	8.2	0.2	8.3	2.6	5.3	0.4	47.3	100.0

Source: Institute for Resource Development Inc., Demographic and Health Surveys 1985-1989, Columbia, Maryland.


<sup>a</sup> Intrauterine devices.

have side effects. None the less, when the method becomes so prevalent among sexually active young women, one wonders to what extent an irreversible decision—which it is for the vast majority of sterilized women—is really an effective exercise in free choice. If they were all women at the end of their child-bearing years who were at risk, it would be more understandable, but they are often young

women whose future should still hold many more “free choices”.

It is important to examine this process more thoroughly in the region; not only must the programmes being implemented and the type of education and information being provided to women be reviewed, but also a comparison must be made of the opportunities women really have to choose an alternative method. The most

Figure III.1  
LATIN AMERICA (14 COUNTRIES): PREVALENCE  
OF FEMALE STERILIZATION  
*(Percentages)*



## Box III.1

## FEMALE STERILIZATION IN COSTA RICA

Female sterilization is today the most widely used method of birth control in the world. It is estimated that nearly one third of women who control their fertility have undergone this treatment.

In Costa Rica, as early as 1964, 6.1% of sexually active women between 20 and 50 years of age who lived in the San José Metropolitan Area had been sterilized. Female sterilization occupies second place, after the birth control pill, as a means of controlling fertility in Costa Rica. This is important because, in the Latin American regional context, Costa Rica is one of the countries where contraceptive use is most prevalent; 70% of married women practice some type of birth control.

Sterilization is governed by provisions of the Penal Code, which classify it as a tort unless it is performed on a doctor's advice in order to save the patient's life. Despite the fact that illegal sterilization is punishable by from three to 10 years' imprisonment, sterilization is an undeniable reality.

In general, women who resort to this practice are over 30 years of age and have had more than two children -i.e., they opt for sterilization when they believe that they have already completed their maternity phase. Most operations -nearly 90%- are performed in State institutions such as that of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (CCDD) and are thus very low-cost; in most cases, patients are treated free of charge. In its initial phase, from 1965 to 1975, this practice mushroomed between 60% and 70%, following a major investment in technology by the CCSS in the late 1960s, making it possible to extend surgical care to the entire nation.

The second period, between 1976 and 1977, was marked by a decline in the number of operations, in reaction to demonstrations against the National Family Planning Programme and CCSS policies. Those who

protested against this procedure believed that a "massive sterilization campaign" was being waged "for the purpose of controlling births". As a result, certain restrictions were imposed.

The seemingly temporary nature of the measures taken and the scant attention paid to them led up to a third period, between 1978 and 1982, marked by an increase in sterilizations, although the pace was slower than it had been at first. In 1981, the percentage of sexually active women reported to have been sterilized was 18.3%, which was higher than the figure for 1976, when it was 12.1%.

A fourth period, between 1982 and 1986, showed a decline in operations after a national debate on the issue, which pushed the percentage of sterilized women down to 17.6% in 1986. Legal abortions were limited to those cases in which the patient's health was concerned and, even then, doctors, on a recommendation of the Physicians and Surgeons Association formulated in 1983, sought to avoid it.

In 1987, a number of private and public institutions in the health sector, together with interested individuals and groups, expressed their disagreement with the provisions of the Penal Code, denouncing them as antiquated. In view of these discrepancies and the valid arguments put forward, in 1988, a set of regulations was established permitting sterilization for therapeutic purposes; the final decision was placed in the hands of sterilization committees set up in private hospitals and clinics. These measures, which did not require amending the Provisions of the Penal Code, came into being without as much controversy as there had been in previous years -a sign of greater social acceptance of sterilization, which would seem to indicate that this practice will become more common in future.

common methods are the so-called modern ones, and the most common among them are "the pill" and female sterilization. What has been most striking is that in Brazil and the Dominican Republic, where over 90% of the women of child-bearing age are aware of these methods, the extent of contraceptive use is different. In Brazil, "the pill" and female sterilization are both widely used. In the Dominican Republic, female sterilization is much more prevalent (see figure III.2). The predominance of modern methods in countries like Brazil, the Dominican Republic and even in Guatemala, where contraceptive use is very low, proves that campaigns to promote the use of a given method are having an impact.

According to figures from recent Demographic and Health Surveys (see table III.3), the demand for contraceptives among women of child-bearing age ranges from over 80% (Brazil and Colombia) to barely more than 50% (Guatemala). In Bolivia, in particular, the demand has been largely unfulfilled; 35.7% of Bolivian women are in this situation, and it is worse in rural areas and among poorly educated women (Westoff and Ochoa, 1991). This means, in any case, that the trend is and will continue to be towards fewer births or perhaps, in certain strata, not having children at all.

Although the use of contraceptives in the region varies widely, is contradictory, and involves many different actors, so that information is at best piecemeal, there is undoubtedly a considerable unmet and very explicit demand for contraceptive methods (see table III.3). The vast majority of women have virtually no access to these methods, owing to the difficulty of obtaining information about them, and the high cost of more modern methods.

### *Abortion*

Although it is generally agreed that abortion is not an acceptable practice as a contraceptive methods, it is frequently resorted to in the world and, according to available estimates, in the region as well. Particularly distressing is its association

with disease, physical and psychological damage and death for many women, particularly poor women, who undergo what is most often an illegal procedure in very precarious conditions.

Induced abortion is one of the biggest unknowns, surrounded by the greatest ambivalence. According to some authors, as a means of fertility regulation, abortion is as old as humanity and probably occurs in all cultures. Throughout recorded history women have resorted to abortion to terminate unwanted pregnancies, regardless of moral or legal sanctions and often at considerable physical or psychological risk and cost (David, 1974).


At present, the only official statistics available are on legal abortions, in countries which, at various times, have promulgated more liberal laws on abortion that were generally enacted from the 1930s onward. However, there is no reliable information on illegal abortion, which rules out the possibility of forming any sort of well-founded opinion on the subject. Legislation on induced abortion throughout the world ranges from total prohibition to selective authorization at the pregnant woman's request. Thus, 10% of the world's population lives in countries where abortion is prohibited; 18% in countries where it is allowed only to save the pregnant woman's life and 39% in countries where it is authorized at the pregnant women's request.

Cuba is the only country in the region where abortion is performed as a State health care service, although it is recognized that "in no sense can abortion be considered a method of family planning" (Espin, 1990). In other Latin American countries, abortion is legal only for specific medical reasons, e.g., if the mother's life is in danger; for a limited number or, in some cases, a broader range of medical reasons; or for eugenic reasons. In some countries it is also authorized for legal, social or socio-medical reasons (Tietze, 1987).

The methods used by persons without medical training, especially common in countries where abortion is illegal, range from "witchcraft" to traditional, at times



Figure III.2  
LATIN AMERICA (FOUR COUNTRIES): KNOWLEDGE  
AND USE OF CONTRACEPTIVES



Source: Institute for Resource Development, Inc., Demographic and Health Surveys, 1985-1989, Columbia, Maryland.

Note: IUD stands for intrauterine device.

Table III.3  
**LATIN AMERICA (NINE COUNTRIES): DEMAND FOR CONTRACEPTIVES AMONG  
 CURRENTLY MARRIED WOMEN OF CHILD-BEARING AGE,  
 ACCORDING TO INTENDED USE**  
 (Percentages)

Country	Demand for contraceptives <sup>a</sup>			Users			Unsatisfied demand <sup>b</sup>		
	Total	Birth spacing	To limit births	Total	Birth spacing	To limit births	Total	Birth spacing	To limit births
Bolivia	69.8	17.5	52.3	30.3	6.5	23.8	35.7	9.5	26.2
Brazil	81.1	24.2	56.9	66.2	17.9	48.3	12.8	4.8	8.0
Colombia	81.0	22.1	58.9	64.8	15.4	49.4	13.4	5.1	8.3
Dominican Republic	71.2	20.8	50.4	49.7	9.6	40.1	19.4	10.0	9.4
Ecuador	70.8	23.8	47.0	44.3	11.6	32.7	24.2	10.8	13.4
El Salvador	73.8	22.3	51.5	47.3	8.1	39.2	26.0	13.9	12.1
Guatemala	53.5	22.1	31.4	23.2	5.1	18.1	29.4	16.4	13.0
Mexico	79.0	25.9	53.1	52.7	13.5	39.2	24.1	11.0	13.1
Peru	77.8	21.7	56.1	45.8	11.2	34.6	27.7	8.1	19.6
Trinidad and Tobago	71.1	28.6	42.5	52.7	18.9	33.8	16.2	8.3	7.9

Source: Institute for Resource Development Inc., Demographic and Health Surveys, 1985-1989, Columbia, Maryland.

<sup>a</sup> Includes contraceptive users, users of methods that were not effective, and other women who wish to use contraceptives but have not. <sup>b</sup> Excluding users of methods that were not effective.

toxic, medication and traumatic procedures designed to destroy the fetus leaving the job of expulsion to nature (Tietze, 1987). This type of abortion, which is performed with unsterilized instruments and in unsanitary conditions, causes such complications as hemorrhaging and sepsis, which, if not treated, are fatal for the woman (PAHO, 1990).

There are also obvious shortcomings in legislation on this matter, which is vital for the preservation of the physical and mental well-being of women. The prevalence of illegal abortion is reflected in high maternal mortality figures (see box III.2) and the fact that the number of reported spontaneous abortions is actually higher than would be expected, which suggests that illegal abortions are being concealed and reported as spontaneous. Socio-economic situation is also a significant factor, for women from the region's wealthy classes generally have abortions under the proper medical conditions.

### E. Women in more vulnerable positions

Women find themselves in vulnerable positions for many and varied reasons. Vulnerable groups include elderly women, migrant women, widows, displaced and refugee women, poor female heads of household and teenage mothers. In view of their special significance for the study of population, three examples are discussed below that combine a number of kinds of vulnerability: poverty, risk of all kinds of harassment and discrimination, and relative or absolute impossibility of gaining access to education, appropriate jobs or training or exercising their reproductive rights.

#### *Female heads of household*

Despite the limitations of the term "female head of household" –whose definition varies from country to country– or the ambiguity and lack of neutrality of

## Box III.2

## MATERNAL MORTALITY AND ABORTION

Female deaths following complications in labour, pregnancy and the post-natal period should be taken very seriously, for they are preventable and simply point up the fact that large groups of women in the region do not have proper access to basic health services and cannot exercise their most basic rights.

The measurement of maternal mortality is complicated by both underreporting and inaccurate reporting of the causes of death in vital statistics records and by the limitations inherent in the definition of the phenomenon itself. For purposes of making international comparisons, the World Health Organization has defined maternal death as death which occurs while a woman is pregnant or within 42 days after full term. According to estimates for the 1980-1985 period, there are 60 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births in Latin America and the Caribbean every year, while the figures in developed countries are only single-digit. Within the region, there are huge differences in how widespread the problem is: according to the official statistics available, only seven countries (out of a total of 24) have rates below 50 deaths per 100,000 live births, while rates in about the same number of countries are over 100 per 100,000 live births.

The problems of underreporting and inadequate classification of the causes of death make it harder to detect its specific causes; however, official statistics suggest that

abortion-related deaths are among the five most frequent causes of death among women of child-bearing age in Latin America and the Caribbean. According to information from the 1980s, of the total number of maternal deaths, induced abortion is the leading cause of death in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Jamaica, Uruguay and Venezuela. One reason for this is that many women deal with unwanted pregnancies by resorting to abortion despite the legal barriers and the health risks involved in having it done illegally. Hospital statistics show one abortion in the region for every two or three births (which, to some extent, can be attributed to the inability of family planning programmes to satisfy women's needs). Some studies maintain that many of the women who had induced abortions had used some form of birth control beforehand, but that in many cases the methods were not very effective or were used only occasionally, and that, in others, they were totally ineffective or had serious side effects.

At the end of the twentieth century, maternal death is an anachronism that should be prevented by society. In Latin America and the Caribbean, maternal mortality can be brought down to the lowest possible levels through comprehensive maternal health programmes, including family planning. Having this priority objective addressed is part of women's right to the safe, healthy exercise of their reproductive capacities.

Source: Rajs, Danuta, *Maternal Mortality in Latin America and the Caribbean*, Liège, International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP), 1991; E. Prada (consultant), *Family planning in Latin America (DDR/7)*, Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), 1992, paper presented at the Meeting of Government Experts on Population and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, preparatory to the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, Saint Lucia, 6-9 October; Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), *Health Conditions in the Americas 1990 Edition*, Scientific Publication series, No. 524, Washington, D.C., 1990.

the term "head of household", it is usually used to identify households which are headed by women. This identification is important, especially in developing countries, since such households tend to be poorer than those depending on a man for support and usually reproduce poverty from generation to generation. According to a number of studies, this is because female heads of household tend to have more dependents; women's wages tend to be lower; and these women have to act as breadwinners and run household,

which limits their choice of jobs and work schedules, since they have to fit them in with the care of their children. This is why they must accept lower wages to begin with.

Although figures are incomplete, there is general agreement that at least between 20% and 40% of the region's households are headed by women, which means, in practical terms, the absence of a stable couple. These households are made up, to a large extent, of single or separated, usually young women. They thus

represent one of the most vulnerable groups of women in the region, and have greater difficulty in fulfilling their role as mother. One of the most visible groups within this segment is that of teenage mothers, whose number is increasing in the region, and who combine the precarious position of head of household with extreme youth and poverty. Another growing phenomenon is that of households headed by widows, especially in urban areas.

Although the data are not entirely reliable, many researchers have found that the number of households headed by women is multiplying, owing to economic trends that force women to earn their own income, to an increase in poverty and to other demographic and social trends, including migrations, the death of a spouse, separation or divorce, and adolescent fertility (Buvinic, 1991).

#### *Teenage mothers*

As noted above, adolescent fertility figures in Latin America and the Caribbean are a real cause for concern (see chapter I). Teenage mothers make up a highly vulnerable group, because of the difficulty they experience in effectively completing their process of growth as persons, either affectively or intellectually, and are subject to premature tensions and responsibilities for which they are not prepared. Paradoxically, these young women are the ones least supported by the community, and thus they usually reproduce both the circle of poverty and the pattern of teenage pregnancy in their children (Buvinic, 1992).

In a group of nine Latin American and Caribbean countries, between 45% and 63% of women have had sexual relations before age 20, and from 30% to 50% have had their first child before that age (Singh and Wulf, 1990). As a result, illegitimacy tends to be more prevalent among adolescents or young adults. All births to teenage mothers (births out of wedlock, in particular) have an adverse impact on the health of the mother and child and on their chances for becoming fully integrated into

the society by becoming educated and finding a good job. The high proportion of unwanted children born to adolescents (figures vary from 20% to 50% of all births) is a reflection of the limited use of contraceptives, at national rates fluctuating between only 5% and 30%.

Although not much follow-up information is available on the situation of teenage mothers, in-depth studies do exist that illustrate certain situations. For example, research conducted in Chile and Barbados shows that, six to eight years after the birth of their child, 75% of teenage mothers in Barbados and 50% of those in Chile still live with their parents. The impact of the biological father's economic support or presence in the lives of his children may vary depending on cultural patterns; for example, in Barbados apparently the child's well-being is not affected by the father's absence, but the lack of his financial support is reflected in school achievement. In the Caribbean subregion in general, school drop-out rates and unemployment rates among teenage mothers are very high (Boland, 1992).

#### *Refugee and displaced women*

Estimates are that from 75% to 80% of all refugees are women and children, and the assumption is, although it is impossible to know for sure, that women make up around 40% of the total. The problems that most frequently affect refugee camps are those resulting from teenage pregnancy and abortion. The psychological problems caused by poor physical conditions, uprooting, loss of cultural identity and loneliness remain virtually unknown. Violence permeates the lives of refugee women and endangers their physical safety daily: this violence includes rape, harassment and abuse. Women are also discriminated against in their efforts to provide themselves with food, and their access to health care in most countries for cultural reasons (UNHCR, 1991; ECLAC, 1990a).

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has recently prepared some guidelines for an

integral policy to deal with the problems of women refugees. Recommendations include the physical reorganization of refugee camps to prevent attacks on unaccompanied women; participation of refugee women in expressing their needs and finding ways to meet them; establishment of committees in the camps with equitable representation of both men and women; training programmes to raise awareness among refugees and those in charge of the camps about violence against women; and job training and family planning programmes.

#### F. Future action <sup>9</sup>

It is inconceivable that any one social actor could respond to all the needs of women today in the region; not one entity in the countries has enough human or financial resources to do so. To incorporate women's concerns into global processes and design truly effective policies in favour of women, what is needed is to combine the efforts of, *inter alia*, national offices of women's affairs; ministries in charge of certain sectors, especially education, labour and health; non-governmental organizations; women's movements; and research centres and universities. Recommendations to Governments basically advocate providing the services women need to exercise their own rights with regard to access to health services; birth control information and methods for planning their families in accordance with their own desires and beliefs; consideration of women's life cycles; education to prepare them to participate equitably in society and exercise their rights as citizens; changes in the contents of formal

education and access to informal education; and jobs that offer equal pay for equal work and that are not restricted to specific areas.

The importance of decentralization must be stressed: for the training and empowerment of women as protagonists in political processes, local policies are an excellent, longstanding basis for action. Thus, when women's participation is assured at all levels of decision-making, the development of true democracy can take place, where all points of view are represented and women's position as social actors can be strengthened.

The most specific, highest priority actions should be aimed at prevention of teenage pregnancy, avoidance of abortion, sex education for young people of both sexes, genuine access to complete information about contraceptive methods and to the methods themselves, prevention of violence, strengthening of women's self-esteem, support systems for child-raising, and programmes for elderly women.

The issues of women is more complex than other issues that are addressed by economic or social policies, because it touches on the private life of the individual, because it includes a greater number of very intimate emotional components and because it is heavily weighed down by cultural, historical, religious and ideological factors. In the area of population, this also means that changes must be promoted to ensure that reproduction, which has thus far unquestionably been the couple's biological decision, will also become both the man's and woman's decision as regards procreation, child care, responsibility and the whole process of child-rearing.

<sup>9</sup> The suggestions contained in this section are based in particular on the recommendations of the Expert Group Meeting on Population and Women, held at Gaborone, Botswana, in June 1992, and the Meeting of Government Experts on Population and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, held at Saint Lucia from 6 to 9 October 1992, preparatory to the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development.

## Chapter IV

# POPULATION, ENVIRONMENT AND TERRITORY IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

### Introduction

---

Population/environment analysis requires a focus which, together with demographic trends, embraces issues related to the population's production and consumption patterns, takes into account those policy measures and technological advances designed to impede ecosystem degradation, and, in general, considers all aspects of the relationship, while avoiding oversimplifications. The analysis should include the spatial dimension as an indispensable element for understanding the interaction between demographic change and the ecosystem, and for identifying the problematic areas in that relationship and their solutions.

The integration of population and environment into the strategy of changing production patterns with social equity, and therefore into the perspective of sustainable development, presupposes three basic requirements. Goods and services capable of satisfying the needs of the population as a whole must be made increasingly available (notion of growth); the quality of life of all individuals associated with the process must be improved (notion of equity), and the progressive deterioration of the physical and biological foundations of the ecosystem, the basis for expanding the availability of goods and services, must be avoided so that they can be used by future generations (notion of sustainability) (ECLAC, 1991a, 1992c).

In order to identify the specificities of the relationship between population and the environment from the perspective of sustainable development, it is important to distinguish between natural resources (water, air and land) and the physical infrastructure constructed by the population.

### A. Population and natural resources

---

The concept of carrying capacity has been elaborated for studying the links between population and natural resources. It refers to the maximum population which a given territory can sustain, taking into account seasonal and random changes, without degrading the natural resource base that makes it possible to permanently sustain a certain level of well-being among that population. Several estimates have been made of the maximum number of individuals a territory can sustain, according to calculations of its agricultural potential. Critical areas have been observed, especially in Africa and Asia, where food production at current productivity levels is insufficient to provide a basic diet for the population (Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 1992, Hogan, 1992, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), 1991).

However, given the complexity and variety of functions which natural resources fulfill for the population –they

provide the basis for society, serve as the essential source of materials and energy for human activity, and act as the sink where the population finally deposits the wastes generated by its production and consumption activities<sup>10</sup>—the analysis of the interactions between demographic trends and the natural resource base must be undertaken with a broader, more dynamic and detailed focus than that based on the concept of carrying capacity.

It must be broader, because the main causes of ecosystem degradation must be included. Since people throughout the world relate to the environment in different ways, considering population pressure on natural resources exclusively in terms of numbers is too simplistic to serve as the basis for an environmentally-sensitive demographic policy. It is obvious that numbers and the population growth rate place demands on the natural resource base, but the scope of those demands is linked to, among other factors, the production and consumption patterns of the population. These differ from country to country (and within countries), as is illustrated by a grouping of countries according to their level of socio-economic development: around 1985, the more developed countries, with 25% of the world's population, generated almost 75% of humanity's material wastes (UNFPA, 1991).

The approach must be more dynamic, because the highest sustainable population—which is determined by the territory it needs, the materials and energy it demands, and the amount of wastes it generates—changes with time, given the discovery of new resources, technological advances, cultural change and productivity increases.

The focus must be more detailed, because the natural resource base varies greatly throughout the territory; the ways it is exploited and capacity to absorb wastes differ notably from one region to another, and the population itself is

unevenly distributed. A general view may be misleading in so heterogeneous a framework.

### **B. Population and physical infrastructure**

The demand for physical infrastructure and its characteristics are directly related to the size and distribution of human settlements, and is closely linked to society's production and consumption patterns.

There are at least five areas of physical infrastructure that are important because of their relation to population and environment: i) the entire material network which makes it possible to locate, gain access to and extract water for its subsequent treatment and distribution to the population (in minimally drinkable conditions) and for agricultural and industrial use; ii) sewage collection and treatment systems; iii) systems for the collection and final disposal of solid wastes; iv) networks for the transport of persons and goods, including storage and distribution systems, and v) energy-generating installations. In all these areas, the construction, maintenance and availability of physical infrastructure affects the interactions between the population and its ecosystem, either reducing the negative effects of the population's activity on the environment (for example, sewage treatment in cities reduces the water contamination caused by dumping wastes into it) or causing environmental damage which affects the population negatively.

There are many elements of physical infrastructure which are not included in the five areas mentioned above, such as housing construction, industry, economic and social services, recreational facilities, technological capital, etc. Leaving them out does not imply that they have no relation to the population but, rather, that they are less clearly and perhaps more

<sup>10</sup> These functions give rise to the capacity to sustain life. The study of that capacity presupposes the concept of ecosystem. It is in ecosystems—composed of natural resources, physical infrastructure, populations of different species and the systemic relations between them—that these diverse functions unfold, with different characteristics and intensities.

indirectly linked to the environment, and therefore do not need to be treated specifically.

### C. Population, territory and the environment

The spatial distribution of the population of Latin America and the Caribbean is characterized by intense contrasts between large territories with very dispersed populations –or still uninhabited– and zones with dense populations (see table 9 in the annex). The region stands out in the developing world because of its large urban population (310 million inhabitants, approximately 71% of the regional population in 1990), the fact that one out of every three people resides in a city of one million or more inhabitants and because the urban system in each country is dominated by the principal city (CELADE, 1992d; Chackiel and Villa, 1992).

Countries can be grouped according to the way in which individuals are distributed throughout their territories. The most significant distinction is the difference between urban and rural areas. Following this criterion, at least four groups of nations are identified –similar but not identical to groups by demographic transition– in a spectrum which ranges from highly urbanized countries (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela) to nations with a low degree of urbanization (Guatemala, Haiti and Honduras), passing through those with large populations (Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru), whose percentages of urban population in 1990 was about average for the region. In any case, the importance assigned to the urban sector does not mean that its rural counterpart is insignificant (see table 10 in the statistical annex).

#### *Rural zones*

At least six countries of the region (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras and Paraguay) had predominantly rural populations in 1990, and in several others (Bolivia, Ecuador,

Nicaragua, Panama and the Dominican Republic), rural dwellers still account for more than 40% of the population. Environmental concerns and problems, and also the potentialities, associated with the rural reality of the nations of the region vary from country to country and even within each of them. Generally speaking, in rural areas with populations too numerous for available resources, there is a tendency to overexploit the supply of natural resources. This would explain why, in spite of the stagnation of rural population growth in the region, in some areas deforestation is still advancing and erosion is taking place, attributable, among other causes, to the intensive use of these resources by residents (UNFPA, 1991).

In rural areas with abundant natural resources in relation to their population, exploitation does not always coincide with local demand, but is rather oriented toward other markets which import materials and energy from those ecosystems. Because of that high external demand, the natural recovery capacity of resources is often overwhelmed, causing damage –at times irreparable– to those areas and their inhabitants. That problem is worse in rural areas well endowed with natural resources, chosen for large-scale commercial production and where –for want of appropriate assessment– mechanization and agrochemical products are used improperly, which ultimately leads to the rapid depletion of soils and water resources, also affecting the health of the population (ECLAC, 1991a). Environmental problems in zones rich in natural resources reached dimensions which had been unsuspected until recently, when alien species (livestock, fish, trees, etc.), destructive of ecosystem balance, were introduced on a large scale.

Notable inequalities in land distribution are found in older settlement zones, independently of the natural resource endowment. Resources are underutilized in some situations and overexploited in others. Problems produced thereby, especially erosion and water shortages, have been attributed to an excess of population in relation to available land.



With respect to erosion, it is necessary to note two additional factors. First, the concentration of extensive territories in the hands of a few families; the excessive size of landholdings has often led to an underutilization of the land's agricultural capacity and has contributed to such problems as inappropriate land management and the indiscriminate use of land for forage and stock pasturage, all of which caused the degradation of soils (Hogan, 1992). Second, the excessive fragmentation of landholdings: small farmers find themselves obliged to overexploit the land and, after it has deteriorated, to move to new lands—generally, of lower quality—continuing the erosion process (World Bank, 1992). With respect to water, besides the damage caused by its intense use by the population and agriculture, inappropriate management is often due to large-scale productive activities (mining, energy generation and agro-industry), which reduce flows through traditional channels, increase river sedimentation and pollute their waters.

Population movements in rural areas constitute an important cross between population and environmental variables. In several countries of the region (Brazil, Colombia, Chile and Mexico), the magnitude and diversity of temporary movements of workers have increased, due to the revaluation of primary production for export<sup>11</sup> and the expansion of agro-industrial centres. The temporal character of those movements is linked to the seasonal nature of farm activities or to the peculiarities of the exploration, exploitation and exhaustion of mineral deposits. A relatively novel trait of these flows is the growing participation of workers who habitually reside in urban areas and who move to rural zones that need manpower. Until a few decades ago, in contrast, nearly all workers who moved to participate in the exploitation of natural resources were from rural areas. The expansion of the urban percentage of

workers and the progressive extension of industrial activities to the countryside seem to be processes linked to this change in the composition of temporary worker flows.

Little information is available about environmental problems associated with temporary displacements, and knowledge about the social and demographic repercussions of those displacements is only conjectural. From an economic viewpoint, they seem to be an efficient solution to labour shortages, but they are tremendously deficient from the perspective of social equity, both with regard to working conditions (social security coverage, possibilities for trade union organizing, etc.) and wages.

Rapid processes of occupying certain large unpopulated areas of the region have, since 1950, been based on movements to colonize and occupy productive and demographic frontiers. From the perspective of environmental impact, those movements have become one of the most relevant forms of internal migration within the countries of the region.

The origin of those flows is diverse. At times they respond to central decisions and policies, and at other times, to spontaneous movements. The stability of those settlements has generally been precarious. Several phenomena have come together to cause the failure of a number of programmes for occupying the productive and demographic frontier, such as the intrinsic difficulties involved in colonization, the reproduction of exclusionary and concentrative patterns of land appropriation, the lack of external support and the massive expulsions of colonists by large forestry, livestock or mining enterprises which move onto their land. In fact, return flows or processes of colonist dispersion have impeded the rational and consensual occupation of those territories. Nor have living and working conditions for the colonists themselves been good, leading to high levels of morbidity. At times, the movement of colonists has

---

11 The sensitivity of this type of primary activity to fluctuations in international prices for the respective products causes migratory flows within the region to depend on world economic cycles.

opened new paths for transmitting diseases that had already been controlled.

In addition to those problems, the advance of pioneers has caused a series of alterations in the natural resource endowment, such as massive deforestation, pollution of some rivers and soil leaching. There are also environmental repercussions, often not considered, which arise from the expansion of the demographic and productive frontier. The destruction of biodiversity and the expulsion (if not the annihilation) of indigenous populations that have had an historically non-hostile relationship with the natural environment can lead to irreversible environmental damage in certain areas. Studies have documented the magnitude of these problems in certain countries where part of the colonizing drive was to plant crops to manufacture drugs (see box IV.1).

Available information supports the argument that the central responsibility for the degradation of colonized areas lies in the ways large enterprises exploit natural resources and occupy a territory (Hogan, 1992). Colonists normally cause less damage than the large-scale activities undertaken by forestry, energy and mining industries, both public and private, which are protected to some degree by laws which do not give due consideration to the environmental sustainability of development.

Environmental problems in rural areas are no obstacle to sustainable exploitation of natural resources. That kind of exploitation is very important for changing production patterns with social equity because it can provide populations with enormous benefits. The speed of technological progress in the area of sustainability –seen in some productive processes that up till recently deteriorated the environment and now no longer do so– can increase agricultural production and productivity and raise employment and wage levels for rural populations, which could alter labour flows and redistribute population (ECLAC, 1991a).

With respect to physical infrastructure for rural populations, large segments live without basic services, such as drinking

water, sewerage and electricity. The argument is that those services are excessively costly because those populations are too dispersed in countryside; moreover, quality and coverage shortcomings in those services have less impact on the well-being of rural populations and environment than in urban areas.

Apart from the problems associated with their dispersion, rural populations are disadvantaged in comparison with their urban counterparts in almost all commonly used social and economic indicators, a fact that underscores the importance of being concerned about rural dwellers, if progress toward higher levels of social equity is to be made. Intermediate technologies have been developed to meet some of the needs of the rural population without affecting sustainability; one illustration would be the use of alternative energy sources to relieve pressure on forestry resources.

#### *The urban environment*

The high percentage of the region's population living in urban areas makes the urban environment a priority concern. The relationship between urban populations and the environment demands special attention. Unlike rural populations with their high probability of achieving a natural relationship with the ecosystem, people living in urban agglomerations are less likely to do so because the geographic concentration of the population, and therefore the concentration of production and consumption, creates more demand for natural resources and generates more wastes than most ecosystems can absorb. For this reason, urban populations, especially in large cities, should "import" sustainability from other areas in almost all aspects of the natural resource endowment.

The urban system, therefore, is an element that should be considered in analysing the relationship between the environment and population in Latin America and the Caribbean, both for the environmental problems caused by cities

## Box IV.1

## COLONIZATION, COCA PLANTATIONS AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Colonists from the high plains and mesothermic valleys consider the Bolivian tropics an extremely fertile region, where they can apply the same agricultural techniques they used with no problem in their places of origin. That view (also widely held by middle classes, political leaders and technicians responsible for policy-making) conflicts with the precarious nature of subtropical soils, agricultural output significantly below expectations and the negative consequences of using agricultural techniques from other regions.

As time passes, the colonists learn that the deterioration of vegetation on the hillsides often causes flooding, that monoculture rapidly reduces soil fertility, and that the removal of tall trees contributes to soil erosion. Even so, for different reasons, there is no social awareness or action to care for their collective territory. Generally speaking, colonists do not feel that they are part of the territory in which they work; they perceive their residence there as temporary and plan on obtaining significant economic benefits rapidly. The rapid degradation of soils has generated a kind of itinerant agriculture which spreads erosion.

Environmental damage may be amplified by other factors. In Bolivia, the cultivation of coca is mentioned, not because it possesses special properties which damage forest soils, but because its cultivation is highly profitable, a fact

which has sparked an extraordinary growth –averaging around 10% per annum during the 1980s– of the area sown, displacing crops for daily consumption, such as maize, rice, citrus fruits and coffee.

Besides the social and health problems and dangers caused by the elaboration, trafficking and use of cocaine, a series of negative effects on the jungle ecosystem, society and culture is produced by extending coca plantations. The agricultural frontier has expanded uncontrollably, violating natural reserves and parks and indigenous settlements. In the same way, deforestation has been intense, hastening erosion. Also, the intensive use of land for monoculture rapidly exhausts fragile tropical soils. Also noteworthy are the harmful effects of logging, soil destruction, expulsion of indigenous peoples, water pollution, installation of infrastructure and the use of chemical products –all linked to the industrialization and export of cocaine.

Finally, it should be pointed out that the action of colonists contrasts sharply with the behaviour of indigenous groups who live in the jungle and practice a clearly conservationist policy with respect to tropical soils; they clear only the area they absolutely need to plant a few mixed crops (no monoculture). They destroy no fauna, nor do they burn trees.

Source: José Blanes and H.C.F. Mansilla, *Narcotráfico y medio ambiente*, Cuadernos del CEBEM series, No. 5, La Paz, Bolivian Centre for Multidisciplinary Studies, 1992.

and the large percentage of the population that lives in them.

Although urban population growth is implied by urbanization, they are different concepts. Since the natural increase of urban populations has normally been less intense than that of rural populations, the large increase in the urban proportion of the region's population –urbanization– produced between 1930 and 1990 is mostly explained by the net demographic rural-urban movement (see table 10 in the statistical annex). In turn, the growth in the urban population has basically come

from its own natural increase. On the other hand, to the extent that the urban percentage has grown, migration of rural origin, even though it did not directly change the urban percentage, did indeed affect the distribution of inhabitants among cities, giving rise to forms of concentration that in recent years have tended to slacken in many countries (see tables 11 and 12 in the statistical annex).

Another widespread trend in the large cities of the region is the demographic erosion of their central areas, basically attributed to population displacements

caused by changes in land use. This process has occurred simultaneously with the growth of the urban peripheries that have tended to receive flows from the city centres and poor families from zones progressively occupied for the residential use of high socio-economic strata.

Urbanization in itself does not constitute a threat to the environment. In theory, it has several advantages (increase of total land availability and economies of scale, for example), and its potential problems could be solved by taking suitable measures. Nevertheless, given the serious environmental degradation in several Latin American cities, produced by inadequate urban management and production and consumption patterns incompatible with sustainability, it is clear that the rapid expansion of cities can aggravate the situation (see box IV.2). There are at least five critical areas in which population and the environment of the large cities of Latin America and the Caribbean intersect: water, air, land, wastes and transport.

Drinking water has become a dramatic problem in several cities. In Mexico City and Lima, the growing demand for water has gradually exhausted nearby sources, making it necessary to bring fresh water from ever more distant locations. This is a serious disadvantage for the populations and territories that have exported it, without recompense and in unsustainable fashion, and has raised the cost of operating distribution networks. Since urban centres will continue to grow in the coming years, this problem must be faced now, in order to break the cycle of exhausting sources and then searching for new ones increasingly further away. Policy measures that seek to decelerate the growth of large cities may be useful, although they will be insufficient in any case, since water shortages are not limited to those settlements, but also afflict medium-sized cities and even rural areas. Moreover, the disappearance of nearby water sources is irreversible.

Given the current demand for water and the economic and political costs of transporting it over distances, the capacity to recycle it must be developed and

consumption patterns must change. The existence of serious deficiencies in domestic drinking water supply is recognized; a large proportion of the poorest population lacks water. Since the search for social equity inevitably involves providing those social groups with water, it should be concluded that the consumption patterns that have to be changed are those of the social groups that use water most intensely and often misuse it, since price systems do not sufficiently penalize excessive use.

The size of urban populations is an important factor in the emission of contaminant gases and particles into the air, but most research points out that the location of cities and industries and the excessive use of motor vehicles are the main causes of serious air pollution in several cities of the region, which is at levels hazardous to health, especially in Mexico City, Santiago, Chile, and São Paulo (see box IV.3).

Location is highly important, especially because of the wind currents, particularly if the orographic environment is conducive to thermal inversions. In the three cities mentioned, atmospheric ventilation is slight, which concentrates air pollutants. Increased numbers, coupled with the fact that minimum emissions standards are not monitored, have made motor vehicles a key factor in the degradation of air quality.

Even though the degradation of the atmosphere might seem to be a problem restricted to certain cities affected by a series of adverse factors, the fact is that the damage is more widespread and more serious. More widespread because numerous localities—of very dissimilar size—close to pollutant industries, are negatively affected by emissions from blast furnaces and other factories, both because of the effects on the health and quality of life of their inhabitants and because of damage to the productive capacity of the land. The problem is more serious because the degradation of the atmosphere involves not only air pollution but also other kinds of processes, such as the depletion of the ozone layer, which could have serious consequences for populations in the

## Box IV.2

SOME ENVIRONMENTAL REPERCUSSIONS OF THE GROWTH  
OF LATIN AMERICAN METROPOLITAN AREAS

Although the specific relation between each large Latin American metropolitan area and its water resources depends on its specific location, those cities share certain characteristics, such as the growing demand for domestic and industrial water supplies and the increase of wastes discharges into their sewerage systems. Because of this and the lack of planning and investment for a better use of available water resources and sewage treatment, nearby sources of fresh water have been exhausted and the rivers and coastal zones which receive the discharges of untreated sewage have become highly polluted.

By the end of the 1980s, 20% of the urban population of the region relied on public taps, wells or water trucks for drinking water. Most of that population lived in poor dwellings in minimally urbanized neighbourhoods. Since those people lacked running water and another important segment of the urban population had an inadequate supply, solutions were adopted, occasionally involving illegally tapping into the public system, which guarantee neither the quality nor permanence of the water supply thus obtained. One of the most dramatic situations occurs in Lima, where poor families with no access to the public drinking water system depend on water vendors and must pay as much as 17 times the price charged by the public company per cubic metre of water.

In spite of those common traits, cities differ greatly in their physical infrastructures. For example, in Santiago, Chile, the public drinking water and sewerage systems cover 90% of the

population; in Buenos Aires, the proportions drop to 60% and 40%, respectively. The low sewerage coverage inflicts serious damage on the aquifers nearest the surface.

Moreover, the expansion of large demographic and industrial concentrations has made it necessary to drain swampy areas and protect urbanized areas located on alluvial flatlands from inundations, which has indeed prevented serious floods. The run-off rate has risen because of the increase in paved area, and other hydrological changes have taken place. Examples of this are the expansion of Mexico City on the bed of Lake Texcoco, and that of Guayaquil, at the expense of the marshes of the Guayas estuary, and the landfills on the banks of Guanabara Bay, in Rio de Janeiro.

Finally, the control and regulation of river flows has developed hand in hand with the industrial and demographic growth of large cities. In several areas of Latin America, the demand for energy for industrialization and urbanization has led to a growing use of water resources to generate energy, which presupposes rapid growth in the number of hydroelectric power stations, significantly affecting river flows. It has been recently pointed out that environmental, demographic and sociocultural impact assessments need to be made when those plants are constructed, given the occurrence of ecosystem degradation, violations of the rights of indigenous peoples and forced migrations as a result of the installation of those energy sources.

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Water management in metropolitan areas of Latin America (LC/R.1156), Santiago, Chile, August 1992; Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE)/Centre for Demographic Studies (CEDEM)/United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), *Efectos demográficos de grandes proyectos de desarrollo* (LC/DEM/CR/G.23), San José, CELADE, 1990.

future.<sup>12</sup> Health problems associated with air pollution are only beginning to be investigated in the region, but data exist relating air pollution to respiratory

diseases, which mainly affect certain social strata (the poor) and specific age groups (children and the elderly). Also, that type of pollution, because of its

<sup>12</sup> Air pollution is a problem which is being faced more decisively and for which there are solutions that have proven to be efficient in other areas of the world. The possibility of monitoring fixed emission sources, of gradually introducing non-pollutant technologies and of modifying consumption patterns, such as the use of the automobile and public transport, provide authorities, in this case, with better policy instruments.

## Box IV.3

## THE AIR WE BREATHE

As long as debt and economic stagnation discourage the use of cleaner fuels and emission-controls on automobiles in the cities of Latin America, deteriorating air quality will call for emergency measures. During the winter of 1992, the authorities of Santiago, Chile (population 4.7 million) declared a state of environmental emergency, restricting traffic, closing some factories and suspending classes. The Special Commission on Pollution Control in the Metropolitan Area judged that pollution levels were hazardous to health and banned 40% of the city's 600,000 vehicles from circulation. In the industrial belt around Santiago, 103 major factories were idled.

In São Paulo, where 5,000 metric tons of pollutants are released into the air every day, automobiles are responsible for 90% of the city's pollution. Following the experience of Mexico City, local officials launched Operation Winter 1992 and planned on limiting automobile traffic from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. in an area of 100 square kilometres limited by the Pinheiro and Tiete Rivers. The goal was to remove 300,000 vehicles—a 20% reduction—from the city streets each day on a rotating basis according to license plate numbers. In a coordinated effort to integrate mass transit, compensating for the numbers of people transported in private automobiles, bus lines, the underground railway and trains guaranteed that 100% of their fleets would be in operation.

Source: D. Hogan (consultant), "Population growth and distribution: their relations to development and the environment" (DDR/5), Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), paper presented at the Meeting of Government Experts on Population and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, preparatory to the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, Saint Lucia, 6-9 October 1992.

serious consequences, has become a contributing factor in the decision to emigrate out of the large cities.

With regard to land, the tendency is to consider only those problems which exist in rural areas, such as soil erosion or loss of fertility. But the territorial spread of cities and changes in land use within them are also processes which impose conflictive relations between the population and the environment. Thus, given the historic placement of the principal cities of the region, their geographic growth has meant the loss of fertile river valleys to dwellings and industries and the degradation of some nearby areas. That horizontal expansion has meant that the population has been occupying land further and further from the centre of the city, land generally degraded by being used as a source of natural resources for the central city in the past.

Real estate speculation has stimulated urban expansion. As a result of changes in land use and of growing differentiation

among social strata in spatial terms, the value of certain areas has changed spectacularly, causing families to relocate, depending on their purchasing power. Besides these spontaneous movements, others have been promoted by authorities, such as the massive relocation of poor families from older settlement areas and those inhabited by the wealthy strata to the periphery (eradications). Owing to these intra-urban movements—together with natural growth and migrations from outside the cities—populations in certain urban peripheries have grown extraordinarily, overloading the available capacity of many basic services (education, transport, health, etc.), and in some cases worsening the deficit of drinking water and garbage and sewage disposal.

With respect to wastes, close to 60% of the urban population in the region live without sewerage to eliminate wastewater, and treatment systems are virtually nonexistent. Similar problems occur in the areas of garbage collection and



solid-waste treatment. Increased urban poverty and the expansion of cities into zones lacking minimum services have increased the use of rivers for the elimination of wastes, aggravating water problems. Undoubtedly, those deficiencies have played a major role in the transmission of diseases which are propagated by polluted water, such as cholera. Industrial wastes are even more hazardous.

Large urban agglomerations located on coastlines are examples of critical linkages between populations and water resources. The extensive damage caused by dumping untreated wastes into the ocean has been documented. Because of poor planning and a lack of resources—or to low priority in investment allocations—waste collection and treatment has become more problematic in nearly all coastal cities; there are many cases of ecological imbalance on their beaches. Industrialized cities (such as Guayaquil or Lima) suffer even worse degradation, because their wastes raise the toxicity of normal urban waste flows.

There is a broad consensus with respect to transport that the cities of the region were generally not designed for the demographic, territorial and vehicular growth of the last 60 years. As a result, street and public transport systems are in crisis. This problem, which is more intense in larger cities, has broad implications for populations and environment (especially for air quality). The lack of control over the number of vehicles has led to growing emissions of contaminant gases. Greater distances to be travelled and congestion of motor cars and buses have lengthened the time vehicles take to move within cities, thereby multiplying the emissions mentioned above. New streets, usually unpaved, increase dust in suspension.

#### **D. Population, environment and sustainable development in Latin America and the Caribbean**

To speak about the effective integration of population and the environment within

the perspective of sustainable development in Latin America and the Caribbean does not mean calling for limits on growth or underutilization of the potential of the existing natural resource endowment, especially considering the fact that a high percentage of the population of the region does not meet its basic nutritional, housing, health and educational needs. The first requirement for sustainable development is to increase the supply of goods and services for the whole population.

Latin America and the Caribbean have an enormous natural resource base, extensive fertile land and abundant water, mineral, livestock, forestry and fishery resources, still unexploited (ECLAC, 1991a). Moreover, some of the least populated land in the world is found in the region, such as the Amazon and Orinoco river basins, extensive zones in southern Patagonia and virtually virgin territories in Bolivia, Paraguay, Ecuador and Colombia, although some of these regions have been significantly populated over the last 40 years.

The region as a whole has an extensive natural resource endowment that could meet—depending on the capacity to exploit those resources efficiently and the prevalent consumption patterns—the demands of a sustained increase in the production of goods and services needed for development. Also, from the viewpoint of the region as a whole, one could reject the hypothesis that environmentally sustainable development is threatened by demographic trends. This second conclusion could be too general, and therefore misleading. Strictly speaking, a number of facts must be considered before making such a statement.

There is relative consensus that the conditions necessary for a sustainable exploitation of natural resources go beyond the mere comparison of the supply of resources and the population. Indeed, the sustainable use of the natural resource endowment requires that: i) the extraction and collection of materials, or the use of energy resources, be undertaken at rates which do not permanently surpass

the replacement capacity of ecosystems; ii) wastes be disposed of in the environment with an intensity that does not persistently surpass ecosystems' capacity to assimilate them; iii) the location and movements of people, materials and activities be undertaken in accord with the capacity of the corresponding territories. Those requirements are valid both for the natural situations as yet unaffected by human activity and those already managed by man.

Natural resources are distributed very unevenly throughout the region, both between countries and within them. Thus, the region's natural resource endowment includes the richest agricultural land, the driest desert (but rich in mineral resources) and the densest and least explored jungles in the world. Water is abundant for the region as a whole, but is scarce in some areas of Central America and the Caribbean and in certain regions of other countries (Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Peru); the devastation of periodic droughts is known in the North-East of Brazil. Mineral resources and the quality of agricultural lands are also distributed very unevenly. Income distribution is highly concentrated, which favours the appearance of wasteful patterns of consumption by the richer segments and forces the poorer strata to overexploit natural resources in order to survive. Similarly, the spatial distribution of the region's population is characterized by intense contrasts between zones of high concentration and vast territories with very dispersed populations or which are still virgin. Such contrasts can also be observed in the coexistence of areas with intense demographic growth and others with zero or negative growth.

The favourable situation of the region as a whole (in respect of population pressure on natural resources) is not valid for more specific areas where conflictive

relations do exist between the size, growth and distribution of the population and the environment. Because of excessive population concentrations in relation to available natural resources, there are territories, which may be part of one or more countries and which often have large populations, in which the demographic burden with respect to the natural resource endowment and physical infrastructure is great. Indeed, in some areas of the region, the size and growth rates of the population may be surpassing the regenerative capacities of available resources or producing irreversible alterations in the natural resource endowment. This would seem to be the case for most of the largest urban agglomerations of the region, for several medium-sized, fast-growing cities, numerous coastal zones, older settlement and densely populated rural areas and territories which, until recently, were inhabited only by indigenous communities and which, through colonization, have undergone extraordinary population increases.

In any case, attributing the degradation of those ecosystems directly and exclusively to population trends appears to be a simplification, since environmental damage normally involves several determinant factors.<sup>13</sup> In every area where demographic trends can be assigned a preponderant role in damaging the natural resource endowment and in the physical infrastructure crisis, demographic pressure is connected with other factors, such as unjust distribution of land and income, unsustainable production and consumption patterns, a lack of suitable policies and the presence of profitable business behind the overexploitation of resources (see box IV.4). Also, significant environmental problems have arisen apart from any direct influence by demographic trends in the affected

13 In that connection, Agenda 21 states that "...the major cause of the continued deterioration of the global environment is the unsustainable pattern of consumption and production, particularly in industrialized countries, which is a matter of grave concern, aggravating poverty and imbalances (...) This results in excessive demands and unsustainable lifestyles among the richer segments, which place immense stress on the environment (...) Changing consumption patterns will require a multipronged strategy focusing on demand, meeting the basic needs of the poor, and reducing wastage and the use of finite resources in the production process".



## Box IV.4

### DEFORESTATION, URBANIZATION AND INSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE PANAMA CANAL BASIN

The Chagres river basin is the largest in Panama. The Canal, the country's principal economic resource and the water supply for Panama City and Colón, with half the national population, depends directly on the reservoir of Gatún and Alajuela Lakes, which occupy 10% of the area of the basin. The last 40 years have seen rapid and uncontrolled growth which has destroyed natural resources. Today, the ecosystem is in crisis and deforestation is threatening to clog the lakes with sediment and pollute their waters. Given the high annual rainfall and the poor, clayish soils, the optimum use of this region would be to plant permanent crops and protective forests to guarantee water regulation. With between 3,000 and 10,000 hectares being deforested each year, the basin's forests will be totally destroyed by the year 2000, when Canal ownership passes to Panamanian hands.

Four major factors, spurred by population growth, have been responsible for this environmental deterioration: mining, industrialization, urbanization and road construction. Both rural-urban and rural-rural migration have produced environmental impacts in the metropolitan regions of Panama City and Colón. Migration of small farmers has brought different production systems to the region, leading to deforestation. Colonization intensified during the 1960s and 1970s, when natural growth rates were at their peak (above 2.5% per annum), and the Gatún Lake region and the western part of the Alajuela were deforested. Public and private investments stimulated extensive cattle-raising as the principal agricultural activity, supplemented by subsistence crops, fishing and wage labour. Today, 90% of the deforested land is used for cattle-ranching, the worst alternative from an ecological perspective.

While farm families have been the principal agents of deforestation, they may also be an integral part of the solution. Protecting the forests to guarantee water for the Canal and the metropolitan region will require measures for the survival of small farmers. Public policies which provide access to agricultural credit, reasonable prices for fertilizer, efficient technical assistance, roads and fair prices for agricultural products will permit these farmers to modernize their production methods, minimizing environmental damage.

Mechanized mining has had visible costs for the environment. Considering the construction jobs created, which depend on these raw materials, mining cannot be simply eliminated but requires more rational and modern techniques. This is also true for industrialization, which has developed without environmental controls; it is necessary to determine the types of factories which the area can support, where they may be established, who should control pollution standards, and how to do so. Urban growth has not been accompanied by adequate garbage collection and sewage services. The settling of the region has also led to extensive road construction, contributing to erosion and sedimentation problems. This construction requires the definition of criteria for determining where roads will be built and who will build them.

Solutions for the consequences of rapid growth and the occupation of these lands are hampered by administrative fragmentation and the large number of public and private institutions which operate with little coordination. The region does not have a single plan or management strategy acceptable to the various institutions. Environmental protection legislation is marked by the multiplication of laws and decrees, many of which are obsolete in relation to the magnitude of the degradation observed. The application of this legislation also faces a cultural obstacle, in that natural resources are considered unlimited and renewable. In this sense, it is also necessary to invest in formal and informal environmental education for the transformation of these values.

Finally, urban production and consumption patterns are the ones that cause the greatest damage to the ecosystem. Given the expected growth of urban populations, it is necessary to deepen the discussion about what, how and how much can be produced and consumed in ways compatible with sustainable development, bearing in mind both the unmet basic needs of a large segment of the population of Latin America and the Caribbean –which must be dealt with as part of the essential effort to combat poverty– and the individual liberties promoted by the strategy to change production patterns with social equity.

zones. This is not to deny that population expansion in other parts of the region could have been involved in causing or worsening that degradation.

The serious damage done to the forests and rivers in the heart of South and Central America has been caused most often by large projects for the intensive exploitation of the abundant natural resources (wood and energy sources) in the area. Some of the main problems related to the natural resource endowment in the Southern Cone of South America derive from large-scale mining projects (water pollution), construction of dams and reservoirs without adequate environmental-impact assessments and the introduction of alien species that destroy the balance of ecosystems. At the same time, much of the environmental degradation in the island countries of the Caribbean has been caused by large tourist installations.

The integration of the population and the environment into processes of sustainable development requires a series of distinctions, at least in territorial terms, in order to take into consideration the heterogeneity of the region. In older settlement rural areas where the population burden on resources is excessive, initiatives must be developed to improve population and land distribution, environmental protection programmes must be implemented, and projects to raise productivity must be promoted –employing idle manpower, introducing appropriate technologies, opening credit lines, generating training activities, etc. In rural areas where the ratio of population to resources is low, migratory displacements for purposes of colonization or demographic densification must not lead to the depredation of the natural resource endowment. To avoid that happening, programmes will have to be established for the rational exploitation of resources and for training and technological innovation, which will increase colonist productivity without damaging the ecosystem. Virtually every rural area in the region needs substantial investment to extend the coverage of basic services, disseminate

efficient and sustainable irrigation-water management practices and expand transport and communication networks.

Generally speaking, the region's rural population is predicted to rise only slightly, from 127 million in 1990 to 129 million in the year 2000, which means that demands on natural resources and the need to increase physical infrastructure will tend to stabilize. In countries where the demographic transition is either incipient or moderate, however, the rural population will grow significantly in absolute terms, which could place a burden on the natural resource endowment and physical infrastructure, aggravated by those countries' current levels of rural poverty and environmental degradation.

Unlike the relatively slower increase expected for the rural population, the urban population will grow intensely over the next few years, from 314 million in 1990 to 394 million in the year 2000. The rate will tend to be higher in the less urbanized countries –precisely the poorest of the region and those with the worst environmental degradation in rural areas. As a result, during this decade those countries will combine tremendous backwardness and secular agricultural problems with a growing number of urban deficiencies, aggravated by a rapidly expanding population.

Even though medium-sized cities grew more rapidly than metropolitan areas between 1950 and 1990 (ECLAC, 1992c), high rates of primacy and concentration of economic activities in most national urban systems –considered excessive by many governments– could prove to be obstacles to efforts to decentralize both policy and investment decision-making, as called for by the strategy for changing production patterns with social equity (ECLAC, 1992c). Large cities usually have the worst environmental problems. Therefore, it will be necessary to design programmes geared to modify current population distribution patterns by strengthening other localities whose economic advantages could be increased without

greater ecological risks. However, policies to redistribute urban population in Latin America and the Caribbean have been less successful than expected and, at times, have promoted the growth of some cities beyond planned limits.

The task of generating options for urban settlement –outside the largest cities– with economic, social and cultural attributes that will allow for fully incorporating the population into a process of sustainable development based on changing production patterns with social equity, cannot be done easily nor quickly. It is not enough that localities possess favourable natural conditions in terms of basic resources; the efficient intervention of different social agents will also be needed in the process of reconvertng productive spaces, together with important levels of investment –both public and private– in order to enhance the naturally attractive features of those places. The use of measures designed to deliberately reorient migratory flows toward selected localities does not invalidate the adoption of programmes for population retention or return, which will themselves be valid only to the extent that the areas of origin have the potential to become new places for development; when that requirement is not met, other measures will be necessary, such as the timely and systematic supply of information so that expelled persons –or potential emigrants– from certain places of origin will move to new socio-economic and cultural spaces and not to the areas of traditional concentration, such as large metropolitan areas. Once the new places have been established or are in the process of being consolidated, governments could implement promotion campaigns and even provide incentives so that the residents of highly concentrated areas will move to the new areas open for migration.

These initiatives will bear fruit only in the long term –which does not render them invalid, but governments must undertake certain tasks immediately. Most of the cities of the region urgently need to improve their urban management capacity and make substantial

investments in equipment for water supply, sewage and solid-waste collection and treatment, and roads. Besides helping to reduce pollution levels, improvements in the coverage or quality of services, which are problems that mostly affect the poor areas of the cities, would also allow for achieving greater social equity.

Given the magnitude and variety of the environmental problems detected in urban areas, immediate measures are needed. Although the latest available data indicate a steady decrease in the demographic growth rates of several large cities (Buenos Aires, Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, Chile), due to lower net fertility and migration rates –variables which have achieved moderate and low levels of stability (ECLAC/CELADE, 1993)– those cities can still be expected to expand in absolute terms. Because of the size they have reached, the serious ecological damage they represent and the lack of physical infrastructure, poor urban management and the horizontal growth that characterize them, projects and actions geared to raise the quality of life of the residents of those cities will present a tremendous challenge.

To these problems must be added the loss of population in the central areas of several of the more populous cities of the region –usually equipped with basic public services and physical infrastructure networks superior to those in the periphery– leading to an underutilization of available equipment.

More specifically, in urban areas where air pollution has become a health problem, measures need to be taken to redistribute population and the relocate industries, and both fixed and mobile sources of pollution need to be closely monitored. Individuals and enterprises must become aware of the costs implied by the pollution they produce. Decisions about the number and quality of motor vehicles also have to be taken to ease vehicular congestion. Finally, educational campaigns are relevant, designed to generate an anti-pollution culture that would define behaviour deserving social reprobation.

Finally, urban production and consumption patterns are the ones that cause the greatest damage to the ecosystem. Given the expected growth of urban populations, it is necessary to deepen the discussion about what, how and how much can be produced and consumed in ways compatible with sustainable development, bearing in mind both the unmet basic needs of a large segment of the population of Latin America and the Caribbean—which must be dealt with as part of the essential effort to combat poverty—and the individual liberties promoted by the strategy to change production patterns with social equity.

All measures taken, both in rural and urban areas, must be coherent with initiatives to promote decentralization and the participation of civil society. It has been repeatedly stated that the best way of facing environmental problems, which are usually centred in relatively well defined territories, is through organized community action at the local level. Each low-level political and administrative unit must play a decisive role in detecting and solving the problems of its ecosystem, which means that central powers must supply them with the necessary human, material and administrative resources.

## Chapter V

# POPULATION POLICY AND PROGRAMMES

The term population policy refers to a set of legal provisions, programmes and actions designed to modify the behaviour of demographic variables. The explicit or implicit nature of such provisions, programmes and actions, the institutional environment, and their forms of implementation and operating mechanisms depend on how population issues are conceived in each socio-political situation. Within that framework and subject to the limitations and potential of each country, population issues take on concrete form, priorities are established for resolving them and policies for dealing with them are designed as part of development efforts. From this standpoint, population policy acquires strategic potential with regard to human resource programming in each country and constitutes an effective vehicle for enhancing the degree of social equity, and, at the same time, satisfying a number of the requirements of sustainable development.

### A. Strategies and their bases

---

Prior to the first regional meeting on population, which was held in 1974 in San José, Costa Rica, and led to a series of international meetings on population policy, various concerns regarding population activities but also support for them were already being expressed.

Often, the positions taken were diametrically opposed; despite this divergence –occasionally reflecting ideological differences– the exchange of views undeniably enriched the debate on the topic (Argüello, 1991). Of this whole spectrum of arguments, two stand out, whose premises have given rise to somewhat different strategies. One refers to the quest for compatibility between trends in demographic growth and development; the second focuses on the need to make population initiatives consistent with the exercise of individual rights. Given the strong influence of these two orientations, it is important to outline them here.

#### *Compatibility between population growth and development*

This line of reasoning starts from the premise that development and demographic trends are interrelated, and stresses population growth in particular. It has often been pointed out that population growth has negative effects on opportunities for growth and economic development. Thus, the pressure exerted by demographic growth on health services, education, housing and urban infrastructure and the investment required to absorb the workforce by increasing the number of productive jobs are all arguments in favour of taking action to slow the rate of population

growth. Given that the desirability of continually improving people's state of health and life spans is generally accepted without question, the strategies cast from this perspective focus on fertility control. It is clear that what is either implicitly or explicitly at stake is a divergence between the reproductive behaviour of individuals (or of couples) and what is desirable for society as a whole, the outcome of which –if nothing is done about it– will be less than optimum. Increasingly, this diagnostic vision is coming to include the negative environmental consequences of demographic growth.

In the past and, to a lesser extent, today, this pro-policy line of argument has sparked a certain amount of controversy and, even among proponents of the same idea –namely, that population variables and development must be harmonized–, the problem is still perceived differently. However, allowing for differences in each country's economic and institutional context and the impact they have, there is broad agreement that a greater volume or faster rate of demographic growth increases pressure to provide basic social services and conserve the environment, appropriating for immediate consumption resources which might otherwise have been invested in greater future development. The theoretical stances taken in this controversy range from those which view a population increase as the chief obstacle to development efforts and a major cause of certain types of environmental damage, to those which minimize or dismiss those effects, arguing instead that obstacles to development are structural in nature and have nothing to do with demographic growth.

Unless their frame of reference is redefined, such extreme positions will not constitute solid bases for population policy aimed at achieving social equity and changing production patterns. Strictly speaking, as indicated below, there is ample opportunity for harmonizing structural objectives, which would involve society as a whole, and others aimed at improving the quality of

life. Their points of convergence must be identified and effectively used in order to further integrate population policy into development strategy, while fully respecting individual rights.

As can be observed in the government replies to the recent surveys on population policy taken by the United Nations Population Division (1988), slightly more than half the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean believe that their demographic growth and fertility rates are "too high". That seems to be the feeling even in some countries whose indicators are relatively low in comparison with regional averages. Accordingly, most countries whose rates are considered "too high" are taking some kind of action to bring them down.

#### *Population and individual rights*

Although population policy based on the effective exercise of individual rights was referred to as far back as the first regional and international meetings –and although it is obviously linked to the objectives of social equity in statements made by governments and in international forums on population policy and current development strategies– its role in the debate does not seem to have been stressed sufficiently. The demographic indicators of social inequality point up the extent to which the population is limited in its ability to truly exercise certain rights. Thus, for example, gaps in infant and maternal mortality rates are attributable to unequal access to pre- and post-natal care, family planning and health services in general, and disparities in income, education and living conditions.

Recent studies indicate that, contrary to what was argued or may have been valid decades ago, current differences in fertility rates are largely due to unequal opportunities to regulate reproduction in accordance with couples' desires (Bongaarts and Lightbourne, 1992). In other words, many of the distinctions in the number of children born per woman, which are made on the basis of place of

residence or educational level, are mainly attributable to the unsatisfied demand for contraception, and not to radically different ideals concerning family size among different population groups (see figure V.1). Likewise, it is obvious that disparities in health care, particularly among children, are still very pronounced (see *supra*, chap. II). Considering their repercussions, the elimination of these inequalities was identified as a top-priority item for inclusion in national plans of action during the World Summit for Children.

The exercise of the right to proper health conditions and the regulation of births on the basis of informed individual decisions is a solid basis for building a consensus or at least broad agreement on why population policy is necessary. The exercise of these rights directly enhances the well-being of couples—who can realize their aspirations—and ensures persons greater equity from birth; it also tends to strengthen women's influence over such important aspects of family life as their own health and that of their children (see box V.1). As will be discussed further in chapter III, the effective use of this right greatly influences women's opportunities to enter the labour market, and hence their autonomy, personal development and full economic and social integration.

*Population policy and the incorporation of demographic variables into plans, policies and programmes*

In addition to furthering the full exercise of individual rights, population policy will, by and large, have a positive effect on aggregate demographic variables and will tend to relieve the pressure of demographic growth on the demand for social services and the country's resources, in general. It may also be possible to bolster it by employing other measures aimed at increasing social equity, creating positive synergies for the achievement of various objectives. A population policy can simultaneously—and without being hopelessly contradictory—address the two concerns

outlined above, to make population dynamics compatible with both development and the effective exercise of individual rights. In this sense, El Salvador's latest population policy illustrates how different guiding principles can be combined and, at the same time, harmonized (see box V.2).


On the other hand, the incorporation of demographic variables into public plans, policies and programmes is a recommendation which has been made and reaffirmed since the first regional and international meetings on population. Given that population is significantly affected by economic and social change and, in turn, has an impact on growth and economic development, the environment and government action in social sectors, it is useful to consider trends in demographic variables, particularly in terms of population growth, composition and distribution, in order to enhance the effectiveness of economic and social policy.

This perspective does not necessarily lead to value judgments concerning current or projected demographic trends or the necessity or desirability of promoting measures to change their behaviour; it simply establishes that it is advisable and necessary to consider demographic variables for better informed and more efficient economic programming and public administration in any context, even in countries where "population policy" as such may be deemed unnecessary. For example, there could well be a country which feels it is inappropriate to take action, at least directly, with regard to fertility levels, although the evolution of that phenomenon is fully incorporated into the programming of obstetrical care and child-rearing services.


Acceptance of this precept fully justifies the universal appeals to maintain an adequate statistical base, which would involve regular census-taking, the recording of vital statistics, the conduct of surveys and the use of other sources of information that will help to incorporate population factors. In the same way, the

**Figure V.1**  
**INEQUITIES IN THE EXERCISE OF REPRODUCTIVE**  
**RIGHTS: TOTAL, DESIRED AND UNDESIED FERTILITY,**  
**ACCORDING TO EDUCATIONAL LEVEL**  
**AND PLACE OF RESIDENCE**

First round of surveys: 1975-1980



Second round of surveys: 1986-1989



Source: J. Bongaarts and R. Lightbourne, "Fecundidad deseada en América Latina y el Caribe: tendencias y diferenciales en siete países", *Notas de población*, año 20, N° 55 (LC/DEM/G.124), 1992, p. 99. The seven countries are Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Peru and Trinidad and Tobago



**Box V.1****FAMILY PLANNING AND MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH**

Couples may use family planning to determine when they will begin to have children, to space births as they wish and to suspend births once the desired family size has been reached. The practice may also help improve conditions for *child survival* and *lower maternal mortality*, because it allows very young and older women, whose children run the greatest risk of death, to better control the timing of pregnancy and birth. Adequate planning may also lead to longer intervals between births, which facilitate the mother's post-partum recuperation and contribute to better care and attention for newborns and small children.

Studies in a number of countries show that pregnancy in teenagers and in women nearing the end of their reproductive cycles entails great risk. Women with many children are also more likely to experience the death of at least one child. The studies found that women with more than six children run a 40% greater risk of losing the next child in infancy. Likewise, closely

spaced pregnancies increase the chances that a pregnancy will end in abortion or that the newborn child will die. The mechanisms operative in this relationship are multiple, and include "maternal exhaustion syndrome", or the physical weakening and loss of nutrients in the mother owing to successive pregnancies, which may cause premature births, low birth weight and nutritional deficiencies in maternal milk, which lower the newborn child's defences.

The general population seems to be well aware of these correlations: according to a World Health Organization study in several Latin American, Asian and North African countries, 90% of the 42,000 women surveyed recognized the risks involved in closely spaced births. The practice of contraception, therefore, will probably increase in so far as educational programmes on family planning demonstrate and highlight the benefits of spacing births for maternal and child health and survival at birth.

Source: E. Prada (consultant), Family planning in Latin America (DDR/7), Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), 1992; paper presented at the Meeting of Government Experts on Population and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, preparatory to the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, Saint Lucia, 6-9 October 1992.

introduction of demographic variables into various spheres of government activity calls for the establishment and maintenance of technical teams responsible for the follow-up, evaluation and analysis of demographic trends, all of which are considered basic to the programmes of action adopted by countries at the global level. Historically, international meetings and forums have included recommendations on the need to generate adequate information, train personnel and promote research in the field of population. Therefore, as the two lines of reasoning outlined above converge in more than one respect, it would be very useful to have the necessary data and human resources for the incorporation of demographic variables into public-sector plans, policy, and programmes at the time that population policy is formulated.

### **B. Evolution and current status of population policy in Latin America and the Caribbean**

Population policy in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean entered its contemporary phase with the Regional Preparatory Meeting held in San José, Costa Rica, in 1974, as a preparatory exercise for the United Nations International Conference on Population, held in Bucharest that same year, which adopted the World Population Plan of Action. Never before had the countries of the region devoted a special meeting to the issue. Since then the question has been taken up again at different times within the Latin American and Caribbean sphere. Representatives of the Governments of the region met again in Mexico (1975), in order to evaluate the results of the Bucharest

## Box V.2

## THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE NEW POPULATION POLICY IN EL SALVADOR

With the signing of the peace accords, El Salvador entered a new stage in its national life which will allow it to strengthen measures to hasten its economic, social and political progress. Some demographic problems can be identified: high birth rates, including a significant number of births to teenage mothers; limited family planning coverage; high rates of infant and maternal mortality; migration from rural to urban areas, which intensified during the recently ended war; and the migration of a large sector of the population abroad. The country's demographic dynamics have resulted in high rates of population growth (2.5% annually in 1990-1995), one of the highest population densities in Latin America (257 people per square kilometre) and problems with respect to the population's territorial distribution.

All of these issues are specifically addressed in the country's population policy, launched in 1988, which was proposed by the National Population Council and executed recently by the General Directorate for Population of the Ministry of Planning and Coordination of Economic and Social Development, in coordination with the Technical Committee on Population. Currently, that policy is in need of revision and updating to enhance the efficiency of actions in this field in light of recent demographic dynamics, and to achieve greater coherence with the objectives of the current Economic and Social Development Plan. In its social aspect, the Plan basically seeks to improve the population's quality of life by progressing towards the eradication of extreme poverty. With regard to human rights, the population policy considers the social processes which result from individual behaviours, attitudes and values and in which fundamental human

rights are at stake. Since the latter must be respected, the right to life and to personal freedom are the two basic principles underlying population policies and programmes.

Population policy should not be confused with economic and social policy; it has its own sphere of action, i.e., influencing demographic growth, structure and composition. It participates in diverse areas which are supported and complemented by sectoral activities in such fields as health, education, employment, nutrition, women and the family, and the environment. Population policy is pluralistic, involving the collaboration of various governmental, non-governmental and private institutions; it recognizes the importance of strengthening its basis for legitimacy through the broadest possible consensus, in which the opinions and interests of the different entities and of the citizenry as a whole are interpreted and incorporated. The aim is to consolidate a strong commitment to supporting and participating in the implementation of the relevant activities.

The actions proposed under the new policy include educational, informational and communications programmes on population; the improvement of health and nutritional conditions; programmes on family planning, spatial distribution and migration; and programmes designed for the displaced population and for the development of human resources. The proposal also contemplates actions to support the policy through training, research and dissemination activities; follow-up and evaluation; technical and financial cooperation by international organizations; and the consolidation of an adequate institutional framework.

Source: Extracted from the National Population Commission (CONAPO), "Política nacional de población de El Salvador", San Salvador, preliminary version, October 1992.

meeting. Later, the Committee of High-level Government Experts (CEGAN), an ECLAC advisory body, held two meetings, one in Bogotá (1975) and another in Quito (1979); the relationships between population and development were analysed at both meetings. Subsequently, the same body met in Havana (1983), immediately before the

International Conference on Population of 1984, which, this time, was held in Mexico City. This seems to have marked the close of a fairly intense cycle of meetings, which reopened with the new regional preparatory forum for the International Conference on Population and Development of 1994, and includes the Meeting of Government Experts on

Population and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, held in Saint Lucia (1992) and a Regional Conference on Population and Development, held in Mexico City (1993).

A point of consensus among countries in those meetings, which was explicitly adopted by the World Population Plan of Action, was that population policy is an integral part of socio-economic development policy; moreover, under the Plan, the purpose of population policy was to contribute to the harmonization of demographic trends with those of economic and social development. However, some of the original weakness shows through in those statements, which helps to explain why the impact of the agreements was limited. Although it was probably not deliberate, the idea of the inextricable linkage between population policy and development programmes became a strong argument for postponing decisions. In strange and paradoxical fashion, while that linkage was positive from the population perspective, it was a drag on economic and social planning (Macció, 1992).

These considerations help to put in perspective the scant progress achieved by population policy in the region since the 1970s, but there are many other specific reasons, including: i) inadequate definition of solid bases which would have provided long-term viability; ii) excessive emphasis on population growth, as a focus of concern, so much so that its true role in the relationships between population and development became distorted; iii) insistence on creating specific administrative superstructures; iv) the lack of synchronization between governments' terms of office and policy time-frames; v) insufficient mobilization of the social agents which would have promoted the inclusion of population issues in political platforms (Macció, 1992; Sojo, 1993). Many of these fundamental problems have not yet been resolved. The Mexican experience is one of the few that can be described as successful and enduring; other countries have achieved important advances even in the absence of such structured technical and adminis-

trative teams as the one in Mexico (see box V.3). In other cases, policies have been short-lived or remain in existence without truly fulfilling their functions.

The experience of recent decades suggests, in general, that it is first of all necessary to acquire an appropriate political space within the normal State structure, complete with a separate hierarchy, a separate network of linkages and powers, and a separate line in the regular national budget, and to receive attention in the messages of the executive branch, without formal administrative procedures being necessary. On the basis of this type of integration and subject to review, it may be timely to consider the promulgation of one or more laws which will consolidate policy into an organic whole. Otherwise, the legal dimension may fall into a kind of political void.

Recent proposals, such as those of ECLAC related to social equity, provide an appropriate framework for the design of concrete action. From this perspective, it becomes clear that, beyond the adoption of general policy, the specific measures and programmes are urgently needed, which should perhaps be detached from the central authority, placed in the hands of target communities and eventually become self-managing. One approach along these lines is to use the notion of demographic reform, which implies taking advantage of current State structures as a springboard for possible action, in order to promote operating mechanisms that are more closely attuned to reality. The main idea is to use the regular institutional framework in each country in order to focus action on achieving explicit goals, according to a pre-established timetable which will coincide with the term of office of a given government (Macció, 1992). At bottom, this initiative is aimed at making population policy or activities as efficient as traditional economic or social-sector policies.

---

### C. Policy guidelines

---

Different conceptual approaches to the interrelationships between population

## Box V.3

## VARIOUS APPROACHES TO FERTILITY REDUCTION IN LATIN AMERICA

Latin American countries have used diverse strategies and instruments to achieve notable successes in controlling fertility. The two most populous countries, Brazil and Mexico, have greatly reduced their fertility rates in recent decades; their current rates are around half of what they were 20 or 30 years ago. These advances were achieved through quite different measures: Mexico implemented an explicit policy and passed a general law on population in 1973, which led to the creation of the National Population Council (CONAPO). Consequently, national population programmes have been formulated and implemented since 1976. In Brazil, on the other hand, fertility rates have fallen without the aid of a government family planning programme: the voluntary and commercial private sectors, particularly the Sociedade Civil de Bem-Estar Familiar no Brasil (Citizens for Family Welfare of Brazil) (BEMFAM), have played a decisive role in that process, especially among poorer women. In both countries, sterilization and the pill have been the most widely used methods; however, while family planning services and information in Mexico tend to be channelled through the national health care system, Brazil makes more frequent use of the mass media, which have proven quite effective in promoting programmes of voluntary sterilization, which is today the most commonly used method of contraception in that country. In Mexico, recent information campaigns on AIDS have helped spread knowledge of the condom as a means of both AIDS prevention and family planning.

Similar to the case of Brazil is that of Colombia, whose family planning activities began in 1966 with the creation of private institutions such as the Asociación Probienestar

de la Familia de Colombia (Association for Family Welfare of Colombia) (PROFAMILIA), which have gradually become involved in the activities of the national public health service, although explicit objectives or policies have not been promulgated since 1970. Nevertheless, that country has experienced one of the most remarkable changes in the extension of contraceptive use in the last 20 years. Colombia's success is characterized by the early expansion of service coverage to rural areas and to less educated women in urban areas through a "community distribution" system, which seeks to both satisfy and increase demand through information, education and communication.

Contraceptives are also widely used in Costa Rica, which created a National Family Planning and Sex Education Programme in 1968 and a National Commission on Population Policy in 1978. Although the latter has not specified a population control policy, it has generated conditions for reducing birth rates. The services of Costa Rica's National Family Planning and Sex Education Programme are characterized by broad availability and geographical coverage; their success is attributed to the constant improvement of the community distribution system and to the use of auxiliary personnel, such as midwives, to reduce the participation of doctors in contraceptive services. The country differs from Colombia and many other countries of the region in that the use of the pill and other reversible methods is more prevalent than sterilization because of more restrictive legal provisions requiring that sterilizations be justified by medical –and not merely contraceptive– reasons.

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), *Social Equity and Changing Production Patterns: An Integrated Approach* (LC/G.1701/Rev.1-P), Santiago, Chile, 1992, p. 192. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.92.II.G.5.

and development involve different approaches to the definition and coordination of population policy. At the same time, the incorporation of demographic variables into development plans, policy and programmes is fully justified and must be stepped up in all contexts in order to enhance the

effectiveness of public policy in general. However, the mere inclusion of those variables does not in itself produce population policy, construed as actions to modify the level or evolution of demographic variables. Beyond the generation and maintenance of the supporting data base, effective

incorporation requires the presence of technical teams responsible for the follow-up, evaluation and analysis of demographic trends, which have traditionally been set up as departments or units within development councils or national planning offices.

In some cases, these departments and units have not realized their full potential to strengthen their political impact, as studies of the interrelationships between population and socio-economic dynamics have been descriptive in nature or have focused on the elaboration of models for certain interrelationships between population and economic development, without including practical considerations on how to routinely incorporate that analysis into government activities. In this sense, although major activities to follow-up demographic trends have moved forward, efforts to determine the degree of social inequality reflected by demographic indicators –so essential to the identification of the more vulnerable groups, and a top-priority consideration in defining activities in the field of population– have been less energetic. Therefore, strengthening substantive activities and coordination among technical population committees –or their administrative equivalents– is a first step in making those activities more effective and achieving the basic objectives of an approach such as demographic reform.

It has already been argued that the principle of making demographic trends compatible with economic and social development is a valid premise for action in the area of population, even when full agreement does not exist on how and to what extent population growth is exerting pressure on resources and the environment. One especially vital area in harmonizing demographic trends with development is the spatial distribution of the population. According to information obtained by the regular surveys taken by the Population Division of the United Nations, the official opinions of most countries all single out this element as a problem which must be addressed; however, seldom has policy to that end

been designed and implemented with consistency and singleness of purpose (see box V.4).

Large population size, especially if it is growing rapidly, exerts greater pressure on resources. However, this does not mean that demographic growth is chiefly to blame for frustrated demands for social services or environmental degradation, or that, consequently, a reduction in the rate of growth will be the most effective, let alone a sufficient, means of solving these problems.

It is therefore believed that the most expeditious way to harmonize population variables with development and make them compatible is to seize on areas that reinforce or are synergetic with the whole spectrum of economic and social policy. One of those areas, referred to in various ECLAC documents, is strengthening human resources training which will help to boost productivity and the economy as a whole. Thus, promoting education –in particular, the education of women– not only corresponds to the objective of promoting changing production patterns, but also to the objectives inherent in social equity, in that it will benefit neglected population groups or groups whose needs have not been sufficiently addressed. Moreover, since the educational level of women is one of the factors which has been consistently and closely related to levels of infant mortality and fertility, the policy's foreseeable demographic consequences will be to narrow the gaps in mortality and fertility rates and to reduce the rate of population growth. Among other favourable effects, lower demographic growth will ease pressure on educational services, which will make it possible to extend coverage and improve quality, thus reactivating a cycle of positive synergies.

Other areas of mutual reinforcement are policy measures which are aimed at reducing social disparities in infant and maternal mortality and promoting and extending social security systems: there is evidence that reduced mortality rates have always preceded lower birth rates and, also, that the extension of social



## Box V.4

## MEXICO: A CASE OF REGIONAL DEMOGRAPHIC POLICY

In the late 1970s, Mexico's National Population Council (CONAPO) formulated a regional demographic policy as a general frame of reference for making regional action consistent with national goals aimed at countering the adverse effects which so-called demographic pressures could have on the country's future development and the population's well-being (Ocampo, 1982). These pressures arose from the "population explosion" - i.e., the accelerated demographic growth between 1940 and 1976, which tripled the Mexican population - and the "urban revolution", or increase in the percentage of the urban population, especially in large cities. Since nearly all of the Mexican states have experienced manifestations of demographic pressure which exceed the response capacity of their economic and social structures (CONAPO, 1991, p. 36), the regional demographic policy was devised to counter those effects. It involves two operational aspects, one related to natural population growth and the other to internal migration.

The policy seeks to harmonize natural growth in different areas by reducing regional differences in fertility and identifying target rates of fertility and demographic growth for each state, to be met by integrating family planning into federal, state and municipal programmes. With regard to migration, it recognizes that regional inequalities have led to a concentration of the population in cities, mainly in three metropolitan areas. Moreover, this unsuitable distribution of the population is likely to worsen in the future because as fertility decreases, social development will take on greater importance in determining regional population dynamics (CONAPO, 1991, pp. 47-48). It is felt that policy should help change the concentrational nature of current migratory patterns, assist the development of backward regions, and improve the balance among population, economic activity and natural resources. This implies the need to affect migratory flows and the factors that give rise to migration, through a strategy known as the "three R's": a) retaining the populations of the emigrants' areas of origin; b) reorienting migrants towards areas in which resources, infrastructure and comparative advantages are used most efficiently; and c) relocating workers in the federal public administration outside the Mexico City metropolitan area. The goal of guaranteeing state growth rates of not more than 4.5% a year has also been established (CONAPO, 1991, pp. 74-77). The "three R's" are

mutually supportive and consistent with the goals regarding natural growth. For example, a decrease in natural growth will help retain potential migrants without causing further demographic pressure on economic structures and local systems. Using data on inter-state migratory flows, it is possible to classify areas by the magnitude of their migratory inflows or outflows, and to group the zones of origin of migrants to the three largest metropolitan areas; this information is then used to define and assign temporal and spatial targets. At the same time, "integrated programmes" arise out of the effort to make these migratory targets compatible with one another.

The problems and action proposals identified in the Regional Demographic Policy have been restated, in updated form, in the National Population Programme for 1983-1988, the 1984 National Urban Development Plan and, most recently, both the National Population Programme for 1989-1994 and the Urban Development Programme for 1990-1994. These programmes seek to correct, through a series of measures, existing inequalities among the patterns of distribution of the population, resources and economic activities throughout the territory, with an emphasis on decentralization, improving economic and administrative efficiency and enhancing the quality of the environment.

The programmes have incorporated the findings of specific studies conducted recently by CONAPO on macro-regions and urban subsystems in Mexico. This has led to the identification, at municipal level and in close connection with the hierarchy of urban centres of areas with differing capacities to retain and absorb population, and critical areas with a severely limited capacity to settle them. These studies have led to the application of regional development measures, depending on the potential of each type of area, oriented towards "a more balanced country-wide distribution of the population" (CONAPO, 1991, p. 89). Moreover, in order to strengthen the regional demographic policy, population councils were set up in the 1980s under the governments of each of the states of the Republic; since 1990 these bodies have been in charge of systematizing the elaboration of annual population programmes whose strategies, activities and resources are compatible with national guidelines and state development plans.

**Box V-4 (concl.)**

On the basis of national economic growth trends and population redistribution measures, the National Survey of Migration in Urban Areas conducted by CONAPO in 1987 and the 1990 population census found changes in the behaviour of migration, including, in particular, a decline in the attraction of the three biggest metropolitan areas, in contrast with the greater

dynamism observed in the medium-sized and smaller cities. Moreover, the traditional rural-urban migratory flow has been superseded in importance by flows between cities, especially those originating in the Federal District (the heart of the metropolitan area of Mexico City).

Sources: National Population Council (CONAPO), *Política demográfica regional*, Mexico City, 1977, and *Informe sobre la situación demográfica de México*, 1990, Mexico City, 1991; E. Ocampo, "Política de población: marco institucional, principios, objetivos y metas", document presented at the Seminario Latinoamericano sobre Integración de la Política de Población a la Estrategia del Desarrollo, organized by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the National Population Council (CONAPO), Mexico City, 1982 (later published in *Análisis de políticas poblacionales en América Latina*, Universidad Central del Ecuador, Quito).

security services reduces one of the chief financial incentives for having numerous offspring, that of ensuring a degree of financial support in one's old age.

The exercise of individual rights related to demographic behaviour is at the core of population policy. This forms a solid basis for the consolidation and long-term viability of population policy as a component of economic and social policy as a whole. It is, moreover, a dimension with multiple linkages to the concepts of social equity and changing production patterns and which broadly coincides with the objectives of social and development policy in general. The possibility of exercising demographic rights increases the well-being of women and couples whose aspirations are satisfied, and strengthens the positive synergy of different policies to promote social equity and investment in human resources.

Together with the specific examples of reinforcement mentioned above, an area in which population policy can interact with other policy measures is that of reducing the transmission of poverty from generation to generation. Although the cycle in which precarious living conditions are transmitted is determined by many factors, actions designed to guarantee the exercise of demographic rights will help to undermine some of the mechanisms that perpetuate this phenomenon, by making the realization of the desired family size

possible. This is also an area in which integrated action is particularly important, given that its different dimensions and effects, either positive or negative, mutually reinforce each other.

#### *Institutional aspects and goals*

The most appropriate systems for developing policy vary according to national context, the bases for action in the population field, and the institutional and financial constraints in each country. Some countries have achieved significant success in certain aspects, on the basis of arrangements which range from a small population division within the national planning agency (for example, Colombia), to structured governmental organizations, such as the National Population Council, responsible for the definition, coordination and follow-up of population policy institutionalized in laws and national population programmes (Mexico).

There have been many efforts to create population units within planning ministries, efforts supported by different agencies of the United Nations and other bodies. Those units were created in order to promote technical and institutional capacities for incorporating demographic variables and elements related to human resources into development planning and to encourage the design and implementation of specific population policies. However,

those units were gradually weakened in many cases, as technical cooperation projects were terminated and governments judged that it was not advisable or feasible to incorporate those units into their planning agencies. Moreover, the technicians trained in those institutions frequently left to work elsewhere, and the complex models for interrelating economic and demographic variables proved to be problematic both practically and theoretically. This decline became more accentuated with the crises and recent changes that have occurred in planning ministries.

Apart from central administrative agencies, however, the successful cases have broad institutional support, in the sense of sustained political support in government and the sectors of civil society that express specific demands. The success of Colombia in extending family planning, for example, would not have been possible without the initiative of private agencies which, for the last 30 years, have promoted that type of programme, and without the support of national public health services in implementing and extending them.

Another important factor to be taken into account is the most adequate sequence for introducing and consolidating population policies. An initial minimal step is to ensure that economic and social plans, policies and programmes take population factors into consideration. If that is not done, it will be difficult to consolidate more complex and elaborate stages in institutionalizing policy. Technical population committees, units or departments or their equivalent, either within national planning agencies or in other central bodies, are crucial in promoting both the production of social and demographic data and the utilization and assimilation of those data, so that they can be considered in designing public policy and action in the socio-economic sphere. In many countries in which that type of unit already exists, it is necessary to strengthen their substantive and coordination activities, by allocating the necessary resources.

A basic and urgent step in carrying out demographic reform is to operate in policy terms within the existing institutional framework, using already established ministerial spaces to promote sectoral activities. Although relatively modest in comparison with specific institutions, such a programme presupposes a number of sectoral programmes within the executive branch, designed to achieve explicit goals within a given period of time (Macció, 1992). Many practical problems must be faced in executing this programme, beginning with the determination of the agencies that are to define priorities, goals and deadlines for achieving the proposed objectives. However, in many cases, it may prove to be a satisfactory and more realistic alternative, instead of attempting to create large administrative structures. It may even be a suitable option in the medium term for many countries of the region that are trying to reduce the State apparatus and concentrate subsidiary efforts in the social area through specific, non-universal and non-globalizing policies and programmes.

After consolidating certain administrative spaces and defining intervention needs in certain aspects of demographic dynamics, some countries might want to further institutionalize their population policy. In El Salvador, for example, over the last few years, the national population council and technical population committee have consolidated institutional spaces for decision-making and elaboration of national policy, and conditions are favourable for promulgating a national population law, which would increase support for future efforts in this area. To proceed in the inverse order, that is, pass laws first and elaborate and implement programmes afterwards, may be practical in some contexts, but it runs the risk, as exemplified in many recent cases, that initial efforts will lose force over time and laws and policy measures become obsolete.

Not every country has to go through those stages in that order. Rather, they are given here as reference points for defining strategies for institutionalizing policy. In some cases, consolidating advances at less structured and lower levels than national



population councils and laws will be the realistic option, adapted to current needs and constraints.

The definition of goals, already mentioned above, warrants special attention. The formulation of any policy measure presupposes defining one or more goals, setting a deadline, and identifying the tools for attaining them. Identifying goals, deadlines and means in the area of population, as in the economic sphere or any other area of public action, is advantageous because it makes it possible to mobilize resources and personal wills toward the achievement of certain objectives, even though they are not fully achieved. However, at least two reservations should be mentioned with regard to this issue. First, the general objectives for which goals are defined should fall within the competency and sovereignty of each country, in accord with the general rationale and overall direction of national policy. Some countries have set goals for general fertility, mortality and population-growth rates; however, there are probably contexts in which, from the perspective of individual rights and social equity, those goals were set only on the basis of differences in fertility and mortality rates, unmet demand for family planning services, or unwanted fertility. Such objectives will, in general, be in line with those for overall indexes, although they will not always coincide in magnitude, priority or chronology.

Second, independently of the criterion or indicator which will serve as the basis for the goals, it is worthwhile to emphasize the need to be alert to the ethical aspects involved in the pursuit of goals. Action should be based on respect for human rights and informed individual decisions, avoiding all forms of coercion. Even in those cases in which policy is based on meeting individual needs, for example, eliminating unwanted fertility, there is a risk that, in the effort to achieve

a certain goal with respect to the coverage of family planning services, there may be undue pressure to use a determined method (for example, sterilization) and a more needy segment of the population, perhaps the most difficult to reach, will remain without attention (for example, adolescent women or those in rural areas), which would reduce the efficiency of the policy in terms of its final goal, which is to improve social equity. If the goal is to increase the awareness and motivation of couples to regulate reproduction, there are other suitable tools, such as educational and informational programmes on population issues, which, when well defined, can fulfil that function efficiently, without infringing the free exercise of reproductive rights (see box V.5).

#### *Population programmes and family planning programmes*

The implementation of population policy usually calls for a variety of programmes, which may range from maternal and child care to spatial distribution programmes. Among these, family planning programmes are one of the major instruments of population policy. Even in those Latin American countries that do not have explicit policies, these programmes have developed significantly in recent decades. Many of the first programmes arose during the 1960s as a response to the concern of international agencies about high population growth rates, and at times in response to pressure from relatively small groups headed by doctors, who were calling attention to the increase in the number of abortions, often performed in precarious conditions, and who promoted family planning for public health reasons.<sup>14</sup> Over the years, emphases have changed to some extent; more importance is placed on maternal and child care and on reproductive rights, within the context of promoting women's rights. More recently,

14 United Nations Population Fund programmes are designed to fulfil one or more of the following objectives, depending on the policy of the country requiring support: a) to meet population-related and family planning needs; b) to disseminate knowledge on population issues and possible strategies for dealing with them; c) to improve the situation of women through education, training, and development of practical know-how and economic activities.

## Box V.5

## SEX EDUCATION IN MEXICO

The first sex education initiatives in Mexico date back to 1908, when groups of physicians and health professionals, inspired by the eugenics movement, offered biologically-oriented sex education to prevent health problems (venereal diseases, maternal and child mortality). A second attempt was led by a wing of the revolutionary movement which held the First Feminist Congress in Mérida in 1916, at which sex education was viewed in terms of the struggle for women's rights. In 1932, those two perspectives were integrated into the first sex education project, which was the programme of "revolutionary education" supported by the Calles administration.

The subsequent progress of these efforts was slow, with advances and setbacks. The introduction of modern contraceptive methods, and young people's questioning of the double standard of sexual morality in the 1960s, had not been supported by any formal sex education programmes in the country. It was not until the early 1960s that the need to change fertility patterns was perceived and gave rise, for the first time, to formal, nationwide sex education initiatives, which focused on reproductive and demographic issues. Many women received information on the functioning of their bodies and the control of their reproductive capacity, and most students were given textbooks and classes on puberty, human reproduction, contraceptives and sexually transmitted diseases.

Under the current educational modernization programme, reforms are being introduced into official sex education programmes at the basic and intermediate levels, whose scope has been broadened

somewhat with the inclusion of material on emotional development and personal relations, as well as on AIDS prevention, beginning in the sixth grade. A new course on adolescence and sexuality, to be given in the second year of secondary education, is significant in itself because it goes beyond merely biological concerns to cover such topics as sexual identity, expression, control and abuse of the sexual impulse. Together with family ties and heterosexual relations, the programmes highlight values and the strengthening of communication, self-esteem and assertiveness within a life plan. Full acceptance for the new programmes and their extension to marginalized and unschooled groups are problems yet to be solved, although non-governmental organizations have begun to achieve encouraging results in recent years.

Owing to the fundamental role of educational activities in many of the aspects of the current National Population Programme, the concept of "education on population issues" has been broadened, and four additional, interrelated areas or "conceptual fields" have now been included, as follows: i) population and development; ii) population and environment; iii) the family; and iv) sexuality. These four aspects are coordinated through a number of focal points that give them coherence and structure; one of the most important is that of gender equity. Thus, sexual education is now provided in a framework that allows for the treatment of human sexuality from the individual, family and social perspectives, taking into account the many crucial factors and implications at these three levels.

Source: Gabriela Rodríguez, "Educación sexual y políticas de población", *Demos: carta demográfica de México*, No. 4, 1991.

ECLAC has highlighted the contribution of these programmes to improving conditions of social equity, because the exercise of demographic rights is still characterized by clear differences between socio-economic strata.

Although relatively little progress has been made in institutionalizing population policy over the last few decades in Latin America, there are indications that family

planning programmes have been strengthened. Contraceptive prevalence (that is, the proportion of women who use some contraceptive) has risen from little more than a third, at the end of the 1970s, to more than 50% in the second half of the 1980s (see chapters I and II). Despite that progress, family planning programmes in the region are still deficient; coverage is incomplete, unmet needs and unwanted

fertility are high (see figure 1), and there is still much to be done to improve the quality of the services offered. Insufficient information about different methods and the limited variety of contraceptives available are some of the constraints most frequently mentioned in studies on the subject (Prada, 1992).

Other deficiencies are related to the trend to limit family planning programmes to the health sector. If family planning is understood as the personal right and duty of people to decide on the number of children they want in a free, informed and responsible fashion, then the complexity of that decision-making process should be recognized. Together with the availability of health services, it is necessary to consider the need for informational, educational and communication strategies about population issues that will meet people's basic learning needs, respecting and rescuing the cultural particularities of each community. Population strategies should also aim to promote the status of women, in order to overcome gender inequities (see box V.6).

Adolescent women need special attention. Many of them do not have stable partners, and a high percentage are sexually active or have children. In this context, adolescence should be one of the reference points for population policy and programmes and not only a target group for family planning. It is during adolescence that people decide about their fertility. Special programmes designed to communicate about population issues can adopt that focus, either preparing youth from their infancy for that period of their lives or working with parents and the community in general so that they have a positive influence on the decisions of adolescents.

Of all the conclusions which emerge from this diagnostic analysis and previous research, perhaps the most evident is the urgency of extending service coverage, especially to the most needy groups, by improving the variety of methods offered, information about different alternatives, and the quality of treatment people receive. (The cost involved in extending

coverage is discussed in the appendix to this chapter.) In terms of institutional organization, one proposal for expanding programmes that has been somewhat widely accepted is to offer integrated contraceptive services within the structures of government health agencies. This horizontal approach takes advantage of the infrastructure and organization of public health services and requires only low marginal costs to extend coverage. The main risk here, of course, is that population programme objectives will be lost among general health-care objectives. In Latin America and the Caribbean, different variants of this approach have met with considerable success. Cuba presents a case of an efficient family planning programme that is fully integrated into the regular structure of health services. In Mexico, many family planning activities are carried out through the services of the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS), although the General Office for Family Planning is fully autonomous, so the programme can best be described as a vertical activity inserted into a larger structure. The Ministry of Health, another official body, operates a programme within its health activities, but it is smaller than the IMSS programme. In Colombia, the situation is similar to that of Mexico, with the difference that private-sector programmes are much more developed.

When a vertical approach is taken or where regular health services are poor, other health services could be incorporated, such as cytological and breast examinations and testing for AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases. Another general recommendation, formulated in meetings of experts, is to improve programme administration, including the operation of information systems for management, which would allow for monitoring and assessing the achievement of programmatic health or demographic objectives (CELADE, 1992b).

---

#### D. Population policy: an overview

---

This document looks at population policies in the framework of the ECLAC

## Box V.6

INFORMATION, EDUCATION AND COMMUNICATION PROGRAMMES  
ON POPULATION

One of the main achievements of information, education and communication programmes on population has been to make political leaders and institutional officials sensitive to the links between demographic variables and economic and social development. These programmes have targeted specific audiences, providing information to help raise awareness and motivate attitudinal and behavioural changes which positively affect the quality of life and population dynamics. Their content covers a broad spectrum: sex education, reproductive health and family planning; population policy; analysis of demographic data; women, population and development and improving women's status; maternal and child health; population and the environment; factors affecting mortality; and programmes for specific groups (teenagers, youths, indigenous people, etc.). Teenage pregnancy is among the most critical problems, given its impact on maternal and child health, the mother's education, the organization of family life and employment.

The programmes were launched in Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1970s. Both formal and informal education and the mass media have served to disseminate information on demographic issues. The programmes were designed with the support of UNFPA and the collaboration of other United Nations organizations (such as UNESCO, FAO and ILO), non-governmental organizations (such as the International Planned Parenthood Federation and the Population Council) and bilateral aid agencies (such as USAID). Owing to the support of ministries of education, formal education on population has been developed further than informal education or the use of the mass media. After a period of awareness and training campaigns, which sparked intense national debates, population concerns were incorporated into programmes of study in the formal educational systems of 13 countries of the region, along with the relevant teaching materials and teacher training in their use. In some cases, this was done as a population policy measure; in others, it is a component of the educational policy set forth in development plans. Some ministries of education have formed special educational units within programming or educational planning departments, while others are beginning to coordinate their activities with ministries of health under an integrated strategy.

Informal education, for its part, targets those who did not receive initial schooling or were obliged to leave school, particularly youths,

teenage girls and women. A broad spectrum of governmental and non-governmental programmes have been set up: adult education, literacy campaigns, professional training, agricultural extension, health education, programmes for marginalized groups, popular education in workers' and employers' groups, and organizations of women and youth in rural and urban areas. The methodology of popular education has been used, with emphasis on self-management by marginalized urban and rural community groups, with a wide variety of means of expression, such as theatre, puppet shows, songs, group work, role-playing, research-action, etc.

Mass communication takes advantage of the mass media, from radio to the most advanced technologies, such as satellite communication. The modernization of communications has increasingly spread the socialization of concepts and behaviours on a global scale; yet large numbers of people throughout the world remain illiterate and an enormous contingent of children and youths are not covered by formal or informal education. The mass media must therefore be used to support the objectives of population policy, as in the communication campaign organized by UNFPA for World Population Day. Courses have been provided to journalists; daytime television dramas, popular songs, videos and comic strips have been produced. Both radio and the print media have a long history of use in such campaigns in Latin America. Communication for development, which revives indigenous forms of communication and information, has facilitated the incorporation of population concerns into the community development process, especially in rural and marginalized urban areas. UNFPA has recently steered its actions in this field towards support for communication strategies on population.

Information on population issues is still insufficient, and the messages broadcast are not always the most appropriate. Often the target population's social, ethno-cultural and linguistic particularities are unknown or ignored. Despite the progress made in formal education, population issues have not yet permeated all teaching practices, nor are they handled transversely in programmes of study; adequate linkage between the family and the school has yet to be achieved. To enhance the programmes' effectiveness, training education and communication activities must be better coordinated on the basis of four orienting factors:

**Box V-6 (concl.)**

- Diagnoses of specific population problems and of the target population's knowledge, attitudes and practice, with due regard to regional, local, community, socio-economic, ethnic and other differences.
- Basic agreement at the relevant levels –local, national, etc.– with respect to the interventions most likely to positively affect population dynamics. The resulting legitimacy will help ensure the continuity and linkage of activities, creating conditions for making population issues an ongoing community concern.
- Mobilization of the various agents influencing the communication "bell curve": formal and informal education, the family, the mass media and places of work and recreation in each locality.
- Monitoring and evaluation of the programmes' impact, with the participation of the target population itself.

Source: United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).

guidelines for development with social equity for the 1990s. This includes, in particular, the systemic character of development strategies and the need for greater integration between social policies and actions designed to achieve greater productivity and economic growth (ECLAC, 1990b; ECLAC, 1992c). The basic purpose of population policy is to contribute to the full exercise of fundamental individual rights and greater social equity. A related goal is to bring demographic-growth trends into line with development.

One of the lessons learned from the experience of policy implementation during recent decades in Latin America and from foreseeable short-term trends is that those governments that have not successfully implemented their policies should try to promote them from a practical perspective, closely attuned to the reality of their countries (Miró, 1992). Except for a few cases, the supra-ministerial administrative agencies that many countries set up to carry out development plans have lost operational efficiency. The approach mentioned here is relatively modest in terms of institutional demands and does not suggest that higher administrative structures be established, national policies promulgated, and general population laws ratified all at the same time. What is proposed is that existing institutional and administrative structures in each country

be used to promote action geared to reduce the social inequity observed in demographic data. To the extent that certain institutional spaces are consolidated and specific programmes are seen to be effective, the possibility of advancing toward more complex institutional arrangements and the passage of a law (or laws) which will ensure greater and more stable support for policy in this area can be explored.

The principle of respect for human rights, including those of a demographic nature, is fundamental within this orientation. Many inequities arise from obstacles to the exercise of certain basic individual rights, such as the right to control the number and spacing of births on the basis of free and informed decisions, and the right to have access to minimum conditions of health care and to survival, which are also necessary conditions for exercising any other basic right. Programmes designed to reduce inequalities in access to information and contraceptive methods and health care, especially for children, should be given high priority. Certain policy aspects are based on the harmonization of demographic trends with overall development efforts; initiatives designed to affect the spatial distribution of the population are a particularly clear example, but measures to increase investments in human resources and to preserve suitable environmental

conditions also fit within this category. Although individual decisions do not always spontaneously lead to results considered optimum from the viewpoint of society as a whole, this document emphasizes the broad possibilities for policy measures to mutually reinforce one another, for example, the synergy between policies for improving the quality of women's education, access to family planning and maternal and child health care.

Independently of the institutional arrangements adopted and the objectives assigned to specific policies, the recommendation is to define objectives that ideally should be limited to the term the respective government is in office, while duly considering the medium-term consequences related to demographic

inertia, and to specify the resources and tools needed to achieve those objectives (Miró, 1992). Moreover, the sovereignty of nations is reaffirmed regarding their right to define overall policy and determine the objectives for which goals are set, taking into account respect for human rights and avoiding every form of coercion. Also, it is clear that the cost of reducing inequities in the area of the exercise of reproductive rights and inequalities in maternal and infant health and survival conditions is fairly moderate. Programmes linked to population policy, far from competing with other social and economic areas, offer many opportunities for mutual reinforcement in achieving the objectives of sustainable development with social equity.

## Appendix

### THE COST OF PROGRAMMES

The purpose of this appendix is to present the orders of magnitude of the costs involved in family planning and basic

immunization programmes. Some of the most important figures are provided in the following table:

#### PROJECTION OF THE COSTS OF FINANCING DEMAND FOR CONTRACEPTIVE MEASURES BY THE YEAR 2000

Country	Unmet demand <sup>a</sup>	User demand <sup>b</sup>	Total demand <sup>c</sup>	Cost (% of GDP)		
				Unmet demand <sup>a</sup>	User demand <sup>b</sup>	Total demand <sup>c</sup>
	(Thousands of 1988 dollars)					
Bolivia	4 716	4 003	8 719	0.08	0.07	0.15
Brazil	32 964	170 486	203 450	0.01	0.04	0.05
Colombia	8 406	40 350	48 756	0.01	0.07	0.08
Ecuador	5 360	9 811	15 171	0.03	0.06	0.09
El Salvador	2 500	4 548	7 048	0.04	0.06	0.10
Guatemala	5 252	4 145	9 397	0.04	0.03	0.08
Mexico	45 217	98 876	144 093	0.02	0.04	0.06
Peru	11 454	18 938	30 391	0.01	0.02	0.04
Dominican Republic	2 584	6 633	9 216	0.04	0.09	0.13
Trinidad and Tobago	465	1 521	1 986	0.01	0.03	0.03
<b>10 countries</b>	<b>118 917</b>	<b>359 310</b>	<b>478 227</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.04</b>	<b>0.06</b>
<b>Latin America and the Caribbean</b>	<b>156 470</b>	<b>472 777</b>	<b>629 246</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.04</b>	<b>0.06</b>

Source: C. Westoff and L. Ochoa, Unmet Need and the Demand for Family Planning, *Demographic and Health Surveys Comparative Studies*, No. 5, Columbia, Maryland, Institute for Resource Development (IRD), July 1991.

Note: Estimates are based on the projected number of women by the year 2000 (of the "middle" projection made by CELADE on the basis of national data); the percentage of women living with partners in each five-year age group; and on the percentages of the different types of demand defined above, according to information available for the 1985-1989 period. The number of women is calculated for the different categories of demand on the basis of that data. An average estimated cost of US\$10 per woman attended was used. That average includes marginal costs for the provision of basic products and services, plus the prorated costs of information, data collection and institutional development, estimated at 2.9 billion dollars, at the global level, for the year 2000 (J. Kocher and B. Buckner, *Estimates of Global Resources Required to Meet Population Goals by the Year 2010*. Research Triangle Institute, North Carolina, March 1991; Staff Working Paper). Figures for Latin America and the Caribbean were obtained by a simple extrapolation based on the 10 countries mentioned in the table, which contain 76% of the population of the region. The projected GDP to the year 2000 assumed an average annual rate of growth of 4%.

<sup>a</sup> Unmet demand for contraceptive methods is defined as the proportion of women, living with partners, who do not practice any contraceptive method, but who wish to control their fertility in order to postpone or avoid pregnancy; this is the "latent demand", that is, the unmet demand for contraception. <sup>b</sup> User demand is simply the percentage of women, living with partners, who currently use some method and may be understood as the "actual demand" for contraception. <sup>c</sup> Total demand is the sum of both of these categories.



*Cost of maintaining current coverage of family planning services*

This hypothesis assumes that the proportion of women whose demand for contraception is currently unmet will remain constant until the end of the decade, a possibility that is undesirable from the point of view of the strategy. This may be thought of as the minimum effort which must be made if present conditions are not to worsen; for purposes of this proposal, it represents the lower threshold as far as family planning services are concerned.

Expressed as a percentage of GDP, this measure would entail a low cost of less than one tenth of a point, averaging 0.04% for the region as a whole. The population of the 10 countries selected represents around 76% of the total population of the region; an extrapolation of the estimated costs for the region as a whole yields a cost of some US\$473 million, or the equivalent of less than 3% of current public expenditure on primary education and less than 10% of the physical infrastructure investments in health care projected by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO, 1992a).

*The cost of covering unmet demand*

This is the cost in addition to what will be required to maintain current coverage rates, which would allow all women who wish to control their fertility to do so. The above table indicates that, in general, this cost represents a very low proportion of GDP. Extrapolating for the region as a whole, it is estimated at around US\$156 million, which is less than 20% of the resources required to improve the quality of education, according to ECLAC projections (ECLAC/OREALC, 1992).

*The cost of meeting total demand*

This hypothesis, is fairly close but not quite the ideal, from the point of view of women and couples. The ideal would be that all couples could have the size of family they want. That it is possible for all women who wish to use contraceptives to

do so is a necessary, but insufficient, condition for achieving the desired reproductive objectives. However, the positive effects on the health of mothers and their children and on the participation of women in the workforce, as well as on global demographic indexes, must be taken into account, apart from the benefits that would be obtained by releasing resources for promoting economic growth. If prevalence rates equal to estimated demand were achieved, all the countries in table 1 except Guatemala could achieve birth rates of between 1.5 and 2 children per woman, a figure below replacement rates in the medium or long term. Whether that happens or not depends on the efficacy of the combination of methods and the way they are used for purposes of the spacing or limitation of births.

The magnitude of the effort necessary to achieve that goal would be of some US\$630 million, which is only 0.06% of GDP. That figure is around a third of the value of the pre-school programmes recommended by ECLAC (OREALC, 1992), and around 10% of the investments in direct health care projected by PAHO (1992a). It is possible that costs have been underestimated in these calculations, especially for countries in which the use of contraceptives is still limited and where physical and human infrastructure is insufficient to extend coverage. In those situations, higher fixed costs in initial investments could be expected. However, even if the highest unit cost estimates are used (US\$ 21.80 per user, according to Destler and others, 1990), the orders of magnitude are very small, lower than any of the sub-programmes proposed by ECLAC (ECLAC/OREALC, 1992, pp. 205 and 209).

It would, however, be an error to consider these policies and programmes as competing with educational or other programmes proposed by ECLAC: they are consistent with the countries' intentions to reduce demographic pressure on social services and are in line with efforts to improve the quality of education. In concrete terms, supposing that total coverage of demand were to produce a



drop in birth rates to the levels desired by couples, within 11 or 12 years the costs of primary school programmes would drop 20% in comparison with the "middle" fertility projection, which was used as the basis for the calculations presented above.

*The cost of making basic immunization universal*

Many programmes designed to reduce inequities in infant mortality are very helpful in ensuring the exercise of certain fundamental rights, such as enjoying minimum health conditions and being able to survive the first years of life. Some of those programmes are also worthwhile from the narrowest possible economic standpoint; for example, the eradication of infectious diseases such as poliomyelitis and tetanus through massive vaccination campaigns is justifiable, even if only in terms of the saving of resources that would not have to be spent on future treatment (Musgrove, 1989). However, these campaigns must be undertaken integrally, given that the risk factors of morbidity and mortality are many, and that these campaigns make sense only when combined with other measures geared to improving access to environmental sanitation and additional primary health care programmes.

The case of Brazil can be used to illustrate the costs of making vaccination coverage for small children universal. Some estimates indicate that the unit cost of providing vaccine against the four diseases included in the routine immunization programme (measles, tuberculosis, poliomyelitis and the "triple" which covers diphtheria, whooping cough and tetanus) is some US\$13 (in 1988 dollars) per person (Domínguez, 1989). The estimated cost of covering all children from birth to age 5 in that country by the year 2000 is some US\$252 million, or 0.06% of GDP, a figure close to that required to meet total demand for contraception. Total health costs offer the last parameter of comparison: according to official figures, the total cost of controlling communicable diseases in the mid-1980s was 0.1% of GDP, and nutritional programmes cost 0.2% of GDP (Vionne and others, 1988). If the rest of that sector's programmes are added, total health costs amount to 1.8% of GDP.

In conclusion, both family planning and child health care programmes, which contribute directly to reducing the most extreme socio-economic inequities and ensuring the most elemental human rights, are fairly low-cost, when compared within any reasonable set of parameters.

## Chapter VI

# POPULATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

### A. International migration as a social process

---

In the international context, the movement of persons between different countries is perhaps the most obvious manifestation of population in the international context. Throughout history, such movements have been a force for change, whose effects have been felt not only in the countries of origin but also in those of destination. Spatial mobility plays a vital role shaping international relationships, along with the patterns for trading goods and services and exchanging ideas.

The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, both as origins and destinations, have long experienced many of the consequences of external migration. Some of those repercussions, such as the loss of professionals and technicians, can be obstacles to the task of changing production patterns with social equity, in so far as they have reduced the capacity to adopt new technologies which would allow them to build up their international competitiveness. Other types of migration, such as flows between neighbouring countries, may be the seeds of more dynamic regional cooperation. Emigration provides a considerable source of income for some countries of origin through remittances received from persons living abroad.

The effects of international migration are varied and can be evaluated from

different perspectives, and the factors which cause it are no less diverse. Generally, contemporary migratory movements are caused both by inequalities in development processes, in an ever more interactive world, and social and political conflicts which threaten the lives of persons. Due to a combination of both types of factors, a growing proportion of the population has become migrant. War, human rights violations, political instability and, clearly, poverty and the lack of opportunities for a better life all trigger migration. In the absence of violent confrontations, coercive situations or circumstances which force expulsions—or situations of emergency migration—, movement between countries is caused by essentially economic conditions. It can thus be inferred that, even if the socio-political future of Latin America and the Caribbean could guarantee democratic stability, external migration will continue, in response to the multiple effects of the globalization of markets and international trade, together with the persistence of serious inequities in development patterns. Greater interconnection among the economies of the world may increase the mobility of the factors of production, including the labour force. Incentives to emigrate would tend to increase as differences in salaries and living conditions become more apparent.

International migration is a social process with diverse forms, causes and

consequences. Many countries have proposed migration policies, which are rather narrowly designed and implemented, and have ended up being very specific initiatives or simply statements of intention. Efforts are currently being made to go beyond conventional controls or exclusively humanitarian measures and include the handling of migratory pressures among countries' economic, political and security objectives. Thus, some policies are being geared towards satisfying the specific demands of labour markets, in order to fill temporary or relatively permanent vacancies in certain economic activities through selective immigration and temporary moves of the population. In other cases, the trend would seem to be towards clamping down on the entry of aliens and, at the same time promoting trade agreements among groups of countries.

The effectiveness of migration policy based on either the above or other criteria, will depend on the course taken in international negotiations and consensuses. Safeguarding peace, strengthening democratic forms of government, respect for human rights and the liberalization of trade patterns are some of the elements which must be taken into account. Within this debate, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are faced with the responsibility of analysing the full spectrum of opportunities and initiatives, the implications of which are directly related to the implementation of their strategies for changing production patterns and integrating into international markets. Possibilities for action with respect to international migration include three complementary areas which, given their relevance to the region's experience in recent decades, should provide food for thought.

An initial area in which action can be taken concerns incentives to migrate. The tendency to migrate has increased in many countries of the region, and this has aroused interest in finding ways to make the population stay. The task presupposes an in-depth evaluation of the factors which lead to the decision to emigrate, in

order to identify the variables that should be acted on. It is possible to prohibit emigration, but such measures, beyond violating human rights, require complex enforcement mechanisms in order to be effective. For this reason, measures, if they are to be effective, must seek to make emigration unnecessary and guarantee the right to remain in one's own country. Clearly, the success of action along these lines will depend on the capacity to generate real and equitable options for the national population. None the less, the advantages and disadvantages of a possible decline in emigration will also have to be analysed.

A second policy area covers regional initiatives, which could be made a part of economic integration schemes. This path should lend to the discovery of innovative formulas for the training, recovery and efficient use of human resources, capitalizing on the prospects that might become available through the formation of broader socio-economic environments than those provided by each isolated country. The promotion of common activities in the areas of production and technological development, within the regional framework, could enlarge operational scales and lead to forms of population mobility that would not necessarily reduce the potential of the participating countries.

Finally, attention must be paid to movement out of the region, a phenomenon which has been on the rise. The drain of qualified personnel towards the industrialized countries and the protection of the human rights of fellow citizens who are abroad without papers, are cause for concern. Initiatives in this area, whether or not they are included within migration policy, must involve the conclusion of international agreements which will define the conditions under which persons can migrate, guarantee non-discriminatory treatment, and safeguard the interests of the country of origin. Naturally, the measures selected in order to achieve these objectives must not inhibit the free movement of persons.

## B. International migration in Latin America and the Caribbean

### *The great diversity of migrants*

The general heading of international migration encompasses a diverse set of movements, the characteristics of which differ as to cause, repercussions, the legal status of the participants, the duration of the movements and the flow patterns which link places of origin and destination. Given such diversity, it is useful to distinguish several categories of migrants and of persons who move only temporarily: a) immigrants admitted legally and persons accepted as temporary residents; b) alien workers hired under agreements; c) illegal immigrants; d) asylum-seekers and refugees. Given that this is a simple typology, the empirical information available can provide only a few illustrations of the categories established.

*Legal immigrants* are persons who enter a country in conformity with regular entry procedures or by virtue of special provisions. The 1980s were marked by a significant increase in immigration to traditional countries of reception. During that decade, the United States, for example, received some 6 million legal immigrants—almost as many as in the first decade of the twentieth century, at the height of immigration to the United States—37% of whom were originally from Latin America and the Caribbean. Although 7 out of every 10 of those persons came from Mexico and the Caribbean, a comparison of data for the 1980s and the 1970s reveals that the most notable relative increases were among natives of El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guyana, Haiti, Guatemala and Peru (see table VI.1).

Although Latin American and Caribbean migration to Europe and Oceania has increased in recent years, it is still low in absolute terms, and the United States is still the chief destination of those who emigrate out of the region. The great influx to the United States during the 1980s, however, might have been affected

by the naturalizations granted under the Migration Control and Reform Act of 1986 and by programmes to reunite earlier immigrants with their families. Moreover, emigration out of the region is only one aspect of international movement, for another significant part of legal movement occurs among the countries of the region itself; although the data in this regard is still insufficient and difficult to compare, migration among neighbouring countries fulfils a special role. This type of movement is rooted in history and is particularly prevalent in areas where borders tend to be ill-defined because of settlement or traditional trading patterns.

Furthermore, in the 1980s, the number of persons who, without being immigrants, were admitted into a country other than their own country of origin or nationality for a certain period of time increased sharply. This form of temporary residence exists in nearly every country, especially in some of the more developed countries, where an international élite of foreign students, technicians, professionals, scientists and administrators who work in "global" enterprises or international organizations has sprung up. Although modern forms of production have eased the "tyranny" of localization factors—making it possible to link up units located in various parts of the world—and in spite of advances in telematics, there are still activities which require the spatial concentration of administrative, programming, research and process design activities. An indication of the importance of these types of temporary residence is the virtual tripling of the number of visas granted by the United States to non-immigrants between 1974 and 1989 (a greater increase than in the number of legal immigrants, whose numbers rose by slightly more than one third during those two decades); in 1989, the United States also admitted more than 300,000 foreign students, 20% of whom were originally from Latin America and the Caribbean (Pellegrino, 1992).

Some countries maintain the practice of hiring *guest workers*. For some time, agreements have been signed between

Table VI.1  
UNITED STATES: IMMIGRANT POPULATION, 1970-1989

Regions and countries of origin	Immigrants admitted (thousands)			
	1970-1979	%	1980-1989	%
<b>Total</b>	<b>4 231</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>5 811</b>	<b>100.00</b>
Mexico	609	14.39	662	11.39
The Caribbean	732	17.30	839	14.44
Cuba	271	6.41	163	2.81
Dominican Republic	139	3.29	225	3.87
Haiti	58	1.37	122	2.10
Jamaica	136	3.21	205	3.53
Trinidad and Tobago	63	1.49	37	0.64
Other	65	1.54	87	1.50
Central America	118	2.79	264	4.54
El Salvador	29	0.69	96	1.65
Guatemala	23	0.54	45	0.77
Honduras	16	0.38	37	0.64
Nicaragua	11	0.26	30	0.52
Panama	20	0.47	29	0.50
Other	19	0.45	27	0.46
South America	260	6.15	394	6.78
Brazil	14	0.33	21	0.36
Colombia	72	1.70	107	1.84
Ecuador	47	1.11	47	0.81
Guyana	40	0.95	91	1.57
Peru	25	0.59	50	0.86
Other	62	1.47	78	1.34
Canada	113	2.67	114	1.96
Europe	827	19.55	655	11.27
Asia	1 453	34.34	2 681	46.14
Africa	83	1.96	163	2.81
Oceania	36	0.85	39	0.67

Source: J. Chackiel and M. Villa, Latin America and the Caribbean. The dynamics of population and growth (DDR/1), Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), 1992; paper presented at the Meeting of Government Experts on Population and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, preparatory to the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, Saint Lucia, 6-9 October.

countries which believe that they have excess labour and those with labour shortages and abundant capital. Generally, these contracts are associated with temporary and unstable jobs, held by a casual and replaceable labour force. In spite of these limitations, the reciprocal benefits of that type of labour agreement may mean that they will continue in the future. The United States, for example, granted legal admission in 1989 to 390,000

alien temporary workers –22% of whom were from Latin America–, many of whom worked in agriculture or were received as part of exchange programmes (Pellegrino, 1992).

Virtually all countries harbour *illegal immigrants*. This designation is used both for persons who steal across borders to elude entry controls and those who fulfil the entry requirements but remain in the country longer than the time permitted or

work without the necessary authorization. By taking advantage of amnesties for migrants for marrying citizens of destination countries, those immigrants can become legal. However, illegal immigration is frequently confused with irregular entries; thus, the mass media periodically cover the dangerous tactics employed by groups of Mexicans, Caribbeans and Central Americans to enter the United States. Illegal immigration is not confined to industrialized countries; it also occurs in developing nations, as a result of inequalities in labour conditions or the existence of authoritarian political regimes. There are at times elements of illegality in the migration of Haitians to the Dominican Republic or the Bahamas, of Salvadorians to Honduras, of Colombians to Venezuela, and of Bolivians to Argentina.

Estimates of the numbers of "illegal aliens" are not particularly reliable. Although several conjectures have been made as to how many have gone to high-immigration countries, the calculations, done with varying degrees of sophistication, are controversial. One approximation is obtained on the basis of the effects of "voluntary legalizations" or amnesties for migrants; thus 270,000 foreigners—mainly Colombians—legalized their status in Venezuela between 1980 and 1981 (Torrealba, 1992); around 3 million persons (three quarters of whom were Mexicans) requested legalization of their residence in the United States between 1982 and 1987 (Percy and Warren, 1992). Those were more or less threshold figures on illegal immigration into those countries. There are indications that illegal migration has been on the increase in recent years. In reaction to the factors which cause it, it apparently feeds on itself through "migratory spirals" which, in addition to forming part of the survival strategies of the migrants—mainly workers with few skills—also serves the interests of unscrupulous employers in the countries of destination.

Illegal migration involves numerous and serious problems. Reactions in places

of destination are stronger and stronger, as witnessed by the growing xenophobia in industrialized countries. Although this type of reaction is less drastic among neighbouring countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, immigrants are still far from being truly accepted, as witnessed by more than one example of tension and resistance at the border.

Particularly complex are the problems faced by the countries of origin of illegal migrants in safeguarding respect for the human rights of their citizens who are exposed to social and economic marginalization. Many of these migrants, fearing deportation, not only accept poorly paid jobs but also have no access to social welfare systems and suffer various forms of discrimination. At the same time, the risk of their possible return (or repatriation), especially on a massive scale, would force countries of origin to find ways of integrating them, which naturally would involve the use of unbudgeted and often unavailable resources.

During the 1980s, there was also an increase in the number of *asylum seekers* and *refugees*. Although not all requests are based on real situations of persecution on political, religious or ethnic grounds, many of these people come from countries where economic frustration is combined with political instability. Refugees are persons who, faced with the risk of losing their lives, are displaced to localities outside their native countries, where they are temporarily received and afforded a degree of security. Refugee migration among developing countries is part of a tradition of humanitarian assistance for persons from countries with historical ties (Suhrke, 1993). It has been estimated that, around 1990, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean harboured some 300,000 persons as refugees, nearly all originally from the rest of the region. That figure represents a fraction of the total number of displaced persons in the different countries, which swelled during the 1970s and 1980s, particularly in Central America; it is estimated that, during the 1980s, more than 2 million persons—around

10% of the subregion's total population—have been forced to abandon their place of residence (UNDP, 1989).

*The development of two broad migratory patterns*

The most recent census information on the region indicates that immigration represents no more than 10% of the total population in any one country, and is less than 3% in most (see table VI.2). The data refer to persons who reside in countries other than their countries of birth and probably do not include a certain number of "illegal aliens" or temporary movements. The data illustrate the development of two broad international migratory patterns among the population of Latin America and the Caribbean: one related to exchanges within the region, and the other related to movement out of the region. If the Mexicans counted in United States censuses are excluded from extraregional migration, it will be seen that similar numbers of migrants are involved in both patterns (some 2 million persons in the early 1980s).

*The intraregional migratory pattern*

Judging from the increase in the percentage of the Latin American and Caribbean population included in censuses taken by countries of the region other than their countries of birth, that pattern is of special significance. It is, however, nothing new; its structural roots go fairly deep and reflect the region's economic and social heterogeneity together with the temporary effects of expansionary and contractionary economic cycles and of the socio-political contingencies of the different countries. In some cases there is a fairly continuous flow of migrants between neighbouring countries in a kind of extension of internal migration; in other cases, migratory flows are related to changes in circumstances and fluctuate over time. According to the most recent data, two thirds of the 2 million Latin Americans and Caribbeans residing in countries of the region other

than their countries of birth live in Argentina and Venezuela.

For a long time, Argentina has had sizeable Paraguayan, Chilean, Bolivian and Uruguayan communities. In Argentina, immigrants from neighbouring countries, attracted by job opportunities in agriculture, manufacturing, construction and services, have tended to stand out more as the percentage of immigrants from Europe has declined. In Venezuela, the main flow, stimulated by the oil boom during the 1970s, was from Colombia. These are not the only two cases of intraregional migration; there have been other very significant, if less abundant, migratory flows. For instance, migration of Nicaraguans and Salvadorians to Costa Rica between 1973 and 1984 rose considerably, reflecting the serious socio-political changes that affected Central America; on the other hand, economic expansion in Paraguay during the 1970s, brought on by the execution of large hydroelectric works and an intense process of colonization, prompted the return of Paraguayan emigrants from Argentina and an increase in immigration from neighbouring countries. The greatest intraregional emigration in absolute terms occurred among Colombians around 1980: some 600,000 were counted in censuses in other Latin American and Caribbean countries (90% in Venezuela); at that time a total of 270,000 Chileans (three fourths of whom were counted in Argentine censuses) held second place among intraregional emigrants (CELADE, 1989). These figures, while high, represent less than 3% of the total populations of the countries of origin. Uruguayan emigration—basically towards Argentina—was a different case altogether. In the early 1970s, it was as high as the mortality rate (Fortuna and Niedworok, 1985).

Without more up-to-date information, it is difficult to put forward well-founded hypotheses about the behaviour of intraregional migration during the so-called lost decade of the 1980s. However, it would stand to reason that, in such a widespread crisis, the intensity of migration would have abated. Since the effects of recession seem to have been

Table VI.2  
**THE AMERICAS: PEOPLE SURVEYED IN THE CENSUSES OF COUNTRIES  
 OTHER THAN THEIR COUNTRY OF BIRTH AROUND 1970 AND 1980**  
*(Thousands)*

Country of presence	Census		Born abroad		Born in Latin American and Caribbean countries		Born in neighbouring countries <sup>c</sup>	
	Date	Popu- lation	Popu- lation	Percent- age <sup>a</sup>	Popu- lation	Percent- age <sup>b</sup>	Popu- lation	Percent- age <sup>c</sup>
Argentina	1970	23 390	2 193	9.4	...	...	580	...
	1980	27 947	1 858	6.7	747	40.2	734	98.3
Bolivia	1976	4 613	58	1.3	43	74.1	37	86.1
Brazil	1970	93 139	1 229	1.3	72	5.9	67	93.1
	1980	118 675	1 111	0.9	109	9.8	86	78.9
Colombia	1964	19 735	74	0.4	38	51.4	31	81.6
Costa Rica	1973	1 872	46	2.5	37	80.4	27	73.0
	1984	2 415	89	3.7	74	83.1	51	68.9
Cuba	1970	8 569	130	1.5	32	24.6	29	90.6
Chile	1970	8 884	89	1.0	30	33.7	25	83.3
	1982	11 330	84	0.7	38	45.2	30	79.0
Ecuador	1950	3 203	24	0.8	17	70.8	17	100.0
	1982	8 073	75	0.9	54	2.0	41	75.9
El Salvador	1971	3 554	22	0.6	20	90.9	17	82.1
Guatemala	1973	5 160	38	0.7	28	73.7	23	85.2
	1981	6 054	40	0.7	30	75.0	25	83.3
Haiti	1971	4 330	6	0.1	3	50.0	3	100.0
Honduras	1961	1 885	51	2.7	47	92.2	46	97.9
Mexico	1970	48 226	191	0.4	25	13.1	7	28.0
	1980	67 396	269	0.4	36	13.4	4	11.1
Nicaragua	197	1 878	21	1.1	16	76.2	12	75.0
Panama	1970	1 428	57	4.0	29	50.9	16	55.2
	1980	1 825	48	2.6	32	66.7	16	50.0
Paraguay	1972	2 358	80	3.4	64	80.0	61	95.3
	1982	3 029	169	5.6	150	88.8	144	96.0
Peru	1972	13 539	67	0.5	23	34.3	19	82.6
	1981	17 005	67	0.4	24	35.8	16	66.7
Dominican Republic	1970	4 010	32	0.8	22	68.8	20	90.9
Uruguay	1975	2 788	132	4.7	37	28.0	33	89.2
	1985	2 955	103	3.5	32	31.2	32	100.0



Table VI.2 (concluded)

Country of presence	Census		Born abroad		Born in Latin American and Caribbean countries		Born in neighbouring countries <sup>c</sup>	
	Date	Population	Population	Percentage <sup>a</sup>	Population	Percentage <sup>b</sup>	Population	Percentage <sup>c</sup>
Venezuela	1971	10 722	583	5.4	221	37.9	181	81.9
	1981	14 517	1 075	7.4	651	60.6	514	79.0
Barbados	1980	249	19	7.6	2	10.5	2	100.0
Guyana	1980	73	6	8.2	1	16.4	1	100.0
Jamaica	1960	1 610	22	1.4	7	31.8	5	71.4
Trinidad and Tobago	1970	945	61	6.5	10	16.7	8	80.0
Canada	1971	21 568	...	...	...	...	...	...
	1981	24 343	3 843	15.8	265	6.9	...	...
United States	1970	203 235	9 619	4.7	1 725	17.9	760	44.1
	1980	226 546	14 080	6.2	4 232	30.1	2 199	52.0

Source: J. Chackiel and M. Villa, *Latin America and the Caribbean. The dynamics of population and growth* (DDR/1), Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), 1992; paper presented at the Meeting of Government Experts on Population and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, preparatory to the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, Saint Lucia, 6-9 October.

<sup>a</sup> With respect to the total population. <sup>b</sup> With respect to the population born abroad. <sup>c</sup> With respect to the population born in Latin American and Caribbean countries.

greatest in those countries that had been among the leading countries of destination in previous decades, it can only be assumed that those same countries became somewhat less attractive. The final census information for the early 1990s, which comes from only three countries – Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela – suggests that the number of immigrants within the region has stabilized somewhat (see box VI.1). Moreover, there are indications that mobility is taking new forms – of variable duration – which are distinguished by their reversibility, and which do not involve a change of residence but rather a sort of territorial extension of living spaces, such as the frequent movement of the Uruguayan population across Uruguayan borders. This type of movement, which is an alternative to the more conventional forms of international migration, will probably step up in future, especially if it is adapted to the new models for structuring the

region's economic spaces (trade agreements and market integration formulas).

Although the region's economic and social problems grew worse during the 1980s, democratic systems were restored in several countries during that same period (for example, those of the Southern Cone). This has helped to ease the pressure to migrate and has also drawn back part of the population which had been forced to live abroad. The situation was different in Central America, where socio-political convulsions continued to cause mass involuntary displacements; however, towards the end of the decade and within the framework of institutional changes promoted by the peace accords, a process of return to the country of origin began to occur which, in some cases, was assisted by repatriation programmes.

Migration in the Caribbean Basin has its own peculiar characteristics. One of these is the considerable international

## Box VI.1

MIGRATION AND CRISIS IN VENEZUELA: THE CASE  
OF THE COLOMBIANS IN THE 1980s

According to census figures, between 1981 and 1990 the number of Colombians resident in Venezuela rose from 508,000 to 530,000, accounting for somewhat more than half of the foreigners surveyed in the census. These figures, compared with those for earlier periods, suggest that Colombian immigration declined considerably during the 1980s (in 1971, around 180,000 Colombia-born persons had been counted). Even though it was not significant, the growth of the Colombian population in Venezuela between the last two censuses reconfirms traditional migratory patterns, because the number of Colombians in 1990 shows that entries throughout the 1980s were at least equivalent to the number of Colombians who died or returned during that same period.

The return process seems to have affected a specific segment of persons, owing to the behaviour of several immediate components of the crisis. The latter has been associated with reduced oil income and tighter international credit, which directly affected the financing of production, contributed to the devaluation of the local currency, and stimulated inflationary processes. As usual, one of the most sensitive sectors was construction, which absorbs a large segment of the Colombian non-agricultural labour force: unemployment indexes more than doubled national unemployment between 1981 and 1986, which could have been one of the

main incentives to return. Other factors that may have triggered this process were the devaluation of the bolivar, which affected certain groups in particular by lowering their incomes in relative terms. However, the low unemployment rates in agriculture, the slight impact of the drop in purchasing power which is to be expected among workers integrated into poorly paid activities, and the deterioration of the employment situation in Colombia staunch the return flows, even though the situation of Colombians in Venezuela had apparently become more uncertain.

Moreover, the dynamics of employment, expressed in the persistent demand for workers in the agricultural and domestic service sectors, together with the implementation of coal mining programmes in specific zones, such as Guajira, would explain the continued movement across the border, and hence the slight increase observed in the total number of Colombians in 1990. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that these census figures mainly refer to persons legally admitted into the country. The general trend in illegal immigration may have followed the same course as legal immigration, although it is probable that, in those cases, the number of returnees would have been lower, given the low expectations and opportunities for upward social mobility in their country of origin for a very poorly trained population.

Source: Central Statistics and Informatics Office (CENI), *Cifras preliminares del censo de 1990*, Caracas, 1992; R. Torrealba, "Mercados de trabajo y migraciones laborales entre Colombia y Venezuela en el contexto de la crisis venezolana: 1980-1986", *Las migraciones laborales colombo-venezolanas*, G. Bidegain (ed.), Caracas, Latin American Institute for Social Research (ILDES), Universidad Católica Andrés Bello (UCAB), Nueva Sociedad, 1988.

movement of persons –that is, recurring movement where the intention is clearly to return, or seasonal moves as part of a process of movement to some other destination– favoured perhaps by geographical proximity. The Bahamas, for example, in addition to receiving an enormous wave of immigrants who wish to reside there, has also served as a temporary destination for a large number

of persons from other Caribbean countries and territories, particularly Haiti.

Another peculiarity of the Caribbean is that international emigration is a decisive demographic component in several countries, such as Dominica and Grenada. Still, despite the intensity of the movement within the subregion, only some 300,000 persons left their countries to reside elsewhere, according to census

data from around 1980, i.e., only 1% of the total population (Simmons and Guengat, 1992). In contrast, the number of migrants out of the region was substantially higher. Thus, in 1980 the United States census included more than a million persons born in Cuba, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados (CELADE, 1989).

### *The extraregional migratory pattern*

Latin American and Caribbean emigration to the United States became very pronounced beginning in 1950. Mexico and the Caribbean countries have historical migratory ties with the United States, characterized by fluctuations which reveal a high degree of sensitivity to economic and political circumstances, as well as to changes in the United States immigration laws. The movements forming this migratory pattern are complex, involving persons with various degrees of training, legally admitted migrants, illegal aliens, temporary workers, and refugees or displaced persons. More than 8 million Latin Americans and Caribbeans were counted in the 1990 United States census; that figure represents 43% of the total alien population in that country (see table VI.3). Slightly more than half were from Mexico and one fourth were from the Caribbean, predominantly Cubans, Jamaicans and Dominicans; the others were equally divided between Central and South Americans. If the assumptions concerning a possible slowdown in intraregional migration during the 1980s are valid, the figures from the latest United States census would indicate that the extraregional pattern, even excluding Mexican migration, has become more prevalent. In fact, between 1980 and 1990, the number of Latin Americans and Caribbeans counted in the United States census virtually doubled; however, it is probable that the latest data are affected by the results of the amnesty granted by the Migration Control and Reform Act of 1986.

Although more than 4 million Mexicans were counted in the 1990 United

States census—twice the number recorded 10 years earlier—accounting for slightly more than one fifth of the total alien population there, the greatest increase occurred among the Salvadorians, whose numbers grew fivefold during the 1980s. The relative increases in the numbers of other Central Americans were also sizeable: the number of Nicaraguans and Guatemalans more than tripled, while the number of Hondurans grew by a factor of 2.8. The numbers of Peruvians and Guyanese grew at similar rates. Meanwhile, the numbers of persons native to Haiti, Bolivia, Paraguay, Dominican Republic and Brazil more than doubled. In contrast to these cases, the increase in the number of Cuban-born persons was rather small, although Cubans, with nearly 737,000 persons, continue to occupy second place among those from the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean and represent the highest proportion of naturalized citizens.

The above figures would seem to indicate that the region is becoming a population "expeller". That conclusion, however, is exaggerated. In fact, according to the current demographic projections for Latin American countries, allowing for the implicit limitations of the data on which they were based, the net annual negative balance of regional migration amounted to some 375,000 persons for the 1985-1990 five-year period, equivalent to a rate of barely one per thousand. Even though the population loss seems to be more acute in certain parts of the Caribbean subregion, the "expeller" image of the region as a whole is generated, in fact, by the effects of emigration from a small number of countries. Moreover, part of that exodus is not permanent in nature.

### **C. Some repercussions of migration**

International migration has profound effects on the economy, culture and society of countries of both origin and destination, which vary over time and according to the type and orientation of

Table VI.3  
UNITED STATES: POPULATION BORN IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN  
INCLUDED IN CENSUSES OF 1980 AND 1990

Country of birth	1980		1990		Intercensal rate of growth (per hundred) 1980-1990
	Population	Relative distribution (%)	Population	Relative distribution (%)	
<b>Regional total</b>	<b>4 383 000</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>8 407 831</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>6.5</b>
<b>Latin America</b>	<b>3 893 746</b>	<b>88.8</b>	<b>7 610 872</b>	<b>90.5</b>	<b>6.7</b>
Argentina	68 887	1.6	92 563	1.1	3.0
Bolivia	14 468	0.3	31 303	0.4	7.7
Brazil	40 919	0.9	82 489	1.0	7.0
Colombia	143 508	3.3	286 124	3.4	6.9
Costa Rica	29 639	0.7	43 530	0.5	3.8
Cuba	607 814	13.9	736 971	8.8	1.9
Chile	35 127	0.8	55 681	0.7	4.6
Ecuador	86 128	2.0	143 314	1.7	5.1
El Salvador	94 447	2.2	465 433	5.5	15.9
Guatemala	63 073	1.4	225 739	2.7	12.8
Haiti	92 395	2.1	225 393	2.7	8.9
Honduras	39 154	0.9	108 923	1.3	10.2
Mexico	2 199 221	50.2	4 298 014	51.1	6.7
Nicaragua	44 166	1.0	168 659	2.0	13.4
Panama	60 740	1.4	85 737	1.0	3.4
Paraguay	2 858	0.1	6 057	0.1	7.5
Peru	55 496	1.3	144 199	1.7	9.5
Dominican Republic	169 147	3.9	347 858	4.1	7.2
Uruguay	13 278	0.3	20 766	0.2	4.5
Venezuela	33 281	0.8	42 119	0.5	2.4
<b>The Caribbean and other</b>	<b>489 254</b>	<b>11.2</b>	<b>796 959</b>	<b>9.5</b>	<b>4.9</b>
Barbados	26 847	0.6	43 015	0.5	4.7
Guyana	48 608	1.1	120 698	1.4	9.1
Jamaica	196 811	4.5	334 140	4.0	5.3
Trinidad and Tobago	65 907	1.5	115 710	1.4	5.6
Other	151 081	3.4	183 396	2.2	1.9

Source: Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), (Investigación de la Migración Internacional en Latinoamérica, IMILA) (LC/DEM/G.74), Santiago, Chile, Boletín demográfico series, year 22, No. 43, Santiago, Chile, January 1989; S.J. Lapham, *The Foreign Born Population in the United States: 1990*, Washington, D.C., Office of the Census, undated.

migratory flows. The consequences of international migration acquire a special connotation where what were once positive migratory balances start to become negative. This has occurred in a number of countries of the region, suggesting not only a decline in their capacity to attract population from abroad but also a greater tendency to emigrate. Two aspects warrant special attention: the

emigration of skilled labour, particularly towards developed countries, and the remittance of funds by those who have emigrated.

*The emigration of professionals and skilled labour*

Together with the effects of economic and political conditions in the countries,

the relationships among education, training and employment affect the migratory behaviour of skilled labour. The efforts undertaken in the area of human resources training have helped to increase the supply of professionals and technicians in many countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. Domestic demand for such personnel, however, has not been sufficient to allow for their effective use; this is reflected not only in the low wages offered, but also in the modest research installations and equipment and the scant opportunities available for advanced training following the initial course. These circumstances inhibit the full development of qualified personnel and, to a large degree, force them to migrate to the developed world.

When such persons migrate, "brain drain" occurs, which amounts to a form of reverse transfer of technology. To the extent to which talented persons, in terms of knowledge and human capital, head for the more developed countries, those countries benefit from the potential increase in productivity without having borne the higher costs involved in training that labour force. The problems which this type of migration poses for developing countries are complex, but some of its effects are obvious and can be expressed in terms of economic and social loss; there are other dimensions, however, which have not yet been adequately explored. By respecting the internationally recognized right of the free movement of persons, countries of origin find it difficult to avoid the harmful effects of such movement. The crux of the problem lies in the need to strengthen local capacity to retain talent, and use those persons effectively to satisfy the demands of technological development and changing production patterns and offer them incentives and opportunities to encourage them to stay, without sacrificing the principles of social equity.

The overall effects of the loss of skilled labour and talent cannot be measured solely by the volume of emigration, because in some countries that figure may be fairly low. A more accurate assessment

is obtained by considering the characteristics of those who leave, given that they may be young persons who, in addition to being highly trained, have potential which can be used for a long time. The type of work done by these emigrants prior to their departure must also be taken into account, because their absence could mean the virtual disappearance of certain specialties (Rodríguez, 1982). Knowledge of these variables would make it more feasible to evaluate the economic and social consequences brought about by the loss of human resources.

Undoubtedly, the emigration of talented persons makes it impossible to recover, through their individual contributions to their societies of origin, the direct costs of training them (Chaparro, 1971). The loss will be greater if those who emigrate do so permanently or for a long period of time, particularly in the case of professionals whose training has involved higher-than-average expenditures. Another overall effect is the loss of a productive resource, because the society of origin, having lost talent and skilled labour, can no longer use it to improve its productive capacity (Sierra and Petrucelli, 1979). The contribution of such personnel included both leadership talents, creativity and dynamism—attributes normally found in more highly trained persons—and the services which they would provide, particularly in certain strategic occupations or occupations in which there is a shortage of talent. The emigration of skilled and talented human resources may generate very great social and economic losses in relatively less developed countries, which normally face the most serious shortages of trained personnel. Such losses will be greater when emigration is more intense and sustained over time, when it occurs with a low rate of return, and involves persons in the ages of maximum intellectual productivity and who are specialized in vitally important areas (Martínez, 1992).

In spite of the concern expressed by the Governments of the region, the

available information indicates that the emigration of talent to industrialized countries, particularly the United States, continues. Even though the numbers of Latin Americans and Caribbeans have declined among the total legal entries into that country, the number of professionals, technicians and the like doubled between 1970 and 1980, totalling 155,000 persons. According to data provided by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, an annual average of around 10,000 professionals, technicians and the like were admitted during the second half of the 1980s, although the figure would be higher if the persons accepted within the system of family preferences are included. Recently, a small though growing number of professionals from the region has been noted in Spain and Portugal. It has been estimated that, between 1961 and 1983, some 700,000 professionals and other highly trained persons from Latin America and the Caribbean have emigrated to the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom (Russell, 1993).

The migration of qualified human resources also occurs within the region and is increasing. According to census data from the early 1980s, some 75,000 Latin American professionals and technicians were counted among the foreigners in 11 countries of the region; 10 years earlier that figure had been 40,000. Until 1980, Venezuela, Argentina and Brazil were the main countries of reception to which three quarters of those migrants flocked. On the other hand, Colombia, Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Peru were the main sources from which talented personnel emigrated.

### *Remittances from emigrants*

Another obvious implication of contemporary international migration involves the remittance to countries of origin of the savings generated by emigrants abroad. The importance of an inflow of foreign currency for several developing nations is not to be overlooked and, for that reason, is generally perceived as a potentially significant source of investment. At the global

level, it has been estimated that those remittances grew steadily throughout the 1980s, reaching a total of more than US\$71 billion in 1991, exceeding official development assistance, which amounted to 51 billion in 1988 (IOM, 1992). In some countries, the value of remittances sent through official channels –only a fraction of the total– is equivalent to a significant portion of the value of foreign trade; in Colombia, for example, they were equivalent to 8% of the value of merchandise exports and 10% of the value of imports (Russell, 1993). Estimates of family remittances to El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua, combined are estimated to have risen fivefold between 1980 and 1989, and tenfold in El Salvador, where they amounted to 15% of the GDP (see box VI.2) (ECLAC, 1991b, 1992c).

One question which arises in connection with the topic of remittances from emigrants is how they should be used. Debate on this issue has covered the whole gamut of opinions –some intend that they should be put towards consumption, in order to satisfy daily needs; others say they should be used for productive investment. There are no set conclusions and the findings of the studies indicate that the controversy is still unresolved. According to one line of argument, the funds remitted would be spent rationally, which would promote savings and private and productive investment. The remittances would not have harmful effects on income distribution or imports, nor would they give rise to conspicuous consumption or build inflationary pressures. This source of income would thus contribute to the economic development of the emigrants. Governments, according to this position, should encourage an increase in such remittances inasmuch as possible, by facilitating transfers within a framework of macroeconomic and foreign-exchange stability (IOM, 1992).

There are, however, numerous objections to these arguments. If remittances from abroad are to be sizeable, in absolute and relative terms, the country must implement measures designed to

## Box VI.2

MACROECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCES  
IN THREE CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES

During the 1980s, the crisis of Central American economies took the form, *inter alia*, of a serious deterioration of the terms of trade, making it impossible to generate the foreign currency necessary for achieving such economic growth as would satisfy the basic needs of the majorities. There was a trade deficit throughout the decade and long-term capital inflows declined sharply. However, this drop was accompanied by a change in the composition of the sources of foreign currency. Thus, unilateral transfers increased in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and more radically in El Salvador. Specifically, family remittances grew more than fivefold in these countries as a whole. As a result, those remittances in relation to GDP rose systematically; by 1989, they were equal to 15% of GDP, while in Guatemala and Nicaragua, they represented around 3%.

Between 1980 and 1989, as income from other sources collapsed, inflows obtained from family remittances compensated for around 66% of the drop in the availability of foreign currency. Whereas in 1980 remittances to El Salvador were equivalent to 5% of all exported goods and services, by the end of the decade they had reached 97%; in Nicaragua, such inflows rose from 2.2% in 1980 to 17.4% in 1989, in relation to the value of total exports, and in Guatemala during the same period the increase was from 6% to 16.4%. By 1989, remittances provided El Salvador with foreign currency equal to 58% of its imports; in Guatemala, the figure was 15% and, in Nicaragua, 8%. Finally, although in Guatemala family remittances increased by less than external debt service, in El Salvador, since 1988, total remittances were greater than expenditures in that area.

## EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA AND NICARAGUA: SOURCES OF FOREIGN CURRENCY, 1980-1989

(Millions of US dollars)

	1980	1985	1989
<b>El Salvador</b>			
Goods exports	1 075.3	679.0	497.0
Unilateral transfers	105.3	445.5	1 036.0
Family remittances	73.8	231.5	759.4
Long-term capital	174.3	99.0	138.0
<b>Guatemala</b>			
Goods exports	1 519.0	1 065.4	1 191.0
Unilateral transfers	108.9	172.4	318.1
Family remittances	107.6	171.6	248.1
Long-term capital	246.5	244.2	166.0
<b>Nicaragua</b>			
Goods exports	250.5	301.5	292.0
Unilateral transfers	133.3	95.3	228.8
Family remittances	11.0	27.4	59.8
Long-term capital	558.0	789.6	345.0

Source: ECLAC (1991b), *Informe del Seminario sobre Remesas Internacionales y Pobreza en Centroamérica* (LC/MEX/L.156), Mexico City, ECLAC subregional headquarters in Mexico.

encourage the emigration of vast contingents of labour, including skilled labour and talent. Moreover, it is argued that, in countries with larger-scale economies, the stimulus of the remittances

will tend to be diluted, particularly when the transfer channels are informal and do not involve the regular financial system (Montes, 1987). Moreover, it has been observed that the flows of remittances can



be highly unstable, because its maintenance requires a steady stream of emigration and those emigrants must earn a relatively high income, which can only be guaranteed under favourable conditions of employment. In addition to these factors, it is potentially harmful for families to become dependent on such income, for it could lull them into passivity at times when the labour market is tight. At the macro-social level, this connection could reinforce the dependency of national economies and heighten their vulnerability to foreign pressures. Finally, the remittance mechanism requires the emigrants to remain abroad for an extended period of time and to maintain close ties with their families in their countries of origin (Martínez, 1992).

#### **D. Globalization, regionalization and the future of migration**

---

Although the root causes of international migration are mainly economic and political, it is difficult to tell which ones exert a stronger influence: the effects of both are intertwined and reinforce each other. In large part, countries' institutional instability is explained by weaknesses in their productive structures and inequities in their systems for distributing the costs and benefits of progress; such deficiencies narrow the range of possibilities for consolidating democratic, participatory systems. Similarly, authoritarian forms of organization, and the conflictive social and political relationships that go with them, severely constrain efforts to redefine development strategies. These conditions must be considered within the broader context of international relations, the asymmetries of which become more apparent at a moment in history marked by a rapid transition towards the globalization of economic activity. In this context, the persistence of international disparities in the area of income and living conditions seem to be the underlying agents which spark migration across national borders. Therefore, it is difficult

to foresee, in the short term, a decrease in international migratory pressure.

In today's world, population movements across borders can be expected to increase, either from developing countries to the industrialized nations (South-North migration) or within the Latin American and Caribbean region itself (South-South migration). In order to reduce migration—either in countries of origin or of destination—, it would be necessary to analyse the influence of international economic and social disparities on that variable. The most obvious answer to these inequities is economic development and greater social equity within each country. However, the impact of such solutions would be felt only in the long term; its immediate—and even relatively medium-term—effects would tend to stimulate rather than slow down migration. This is due to the disruptive nature of development, in so far as it encourages workers to abandon subsistence activities and reintegrate into new economic areas, and creates aspirations to consumption which cannot be satisfied within the country on a large scale.

History also seems to show that economic growth, sustained over a relatively brief period, such as a decade, would not be sufficient to bring about a significant decline in migration through its impact on income alone. It is probable, for example, that a slight increase in income in Mexico would, in the short term, encourage emigration (either legal or illegal) to the United States, particularly since many of those who migrate earn less than the national average; presumably a slight increase in their income could serve to finance their emigration. In the long term, however, the availability of productive jobs, with increasingly higher wages, together with equitable access to better living conditions in the country of origin, is the most effective way to reduce migratory pressure. The free trade agreement with the United States might be expected to generate sustained economic growth in Mexico, by increasing opportunities at home; however, that will take time and



any assumption that all incentives to emigrate would be lost overnight is simplistic. More than one change in migratory trends would occur, if this type of trade liberalization were to effectively promote sustained growth over a period of several decades (Weintraub, 1992).

One characteristic of today's world is the globalization of economies and politics, which has promoted the consolidation of regional structures. Although the European Community is the most conspicuous example of such an arrangement, the integration of markets has become a common aspiration, as is exemplified by the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), the Andean Group, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Central American Common Market (CACM). These new types of relationships among national economies testify to an internationalization of aspects which, until only a short time ago, were supposed to be the exclusive concern of domestic economic policy, and suggest a decline in the importance of domestic border controls (ECLAC, 1992c). Although trends in international trade seem to be pointing in this general direction, they have become most pronounced within groups of countries, whose common borders have become more closed. Judging from current events, the concept of mobility of productive factors has not been extended to include labour either.

Trade and other economic integration agreements can create jobs and help reduce differences in wages, but taking the first steps in these initiatives is no easy matter. Establishing links between extremely dissimilar economies, such as those of the region and of North America, is a difficult process which can only come to fruition in the long term. The task of harmonizing policies and norms among relatively homogeneous countries should be less complicated, although there is a risk that different integration systems, such as those currently in effect and those projected, could be an obstacle to

compatibility, particularly if the process of integration distorts the comparative advantages of the countries of the region itself (ECLAC, 1992c). In any case, Latin America and the Caribbean must decide how to respond to proposals of customs unions and free trade zones. In doing so, the repercussions of such an economic arrangement on potential migratory pressure will have to be considered.

The analysis of the migratory dimensions inherent in the trends towards economic globalization is still in its infancy. Until recently, migration was absent from the concerns of political decision-makers and of a wide range of institutions for technical and financial cooperation, but that omission cannot continue in future. Since migration and development are two sides of the same coin, attitudes and thinking about the issue will have to change. Thus, just as it has gradually become clear that development must be sustainable from an environmental point of view, the migratory consequences of strategies, policies and projects for development, investment and trade must also be perceived as issues of vital importance.

#### **E. Courses of action with respect to international migration**

---

Since migration forms part of an intricate network of economic, social and political relationships among various countries, and is not only a discrete or homogeneous phenomenon, it is hardly realistic to suppose that it can be controlled by removing its external symptoms (the movement of persons) (Lim, 1993). Even more serious are the risks involved in such control as regards the full exercise of human rights, which include freedom of movement and freedom to stay in a place. However, since the rules for international migration are the prerogative of sovereign States, it is for them to decide who may reside in their territories and under what conditions. This recognition must be based on a delicate balance between respect for individual freedoms and the representation of the collective rights of the nation.

In practical terms, the adoption of a migration policy in a democratic society is a complex task because its design must take into account the legitimate reasons persons have for wanting to cross borders, the obligations inherent in legal systems which guarantee the right to due process, economic interests and relationships with other countries (Meisner, 1992). Since the task of defining actions to be taken concerning migration has remained within the scope of each State, conceptualization of the issue has tended to be unilateral, which has affected the possibility of taking into account the above-mentioned considerations.

#### *Observations concerning migration policy*

A government that wishes to formulate an international migration policy in the spirit of changing productive patterns with social equity must recognize that in order to integrate the country into a world as interconnected as today's, it will have to expose its population to the risk of movements abroad. The true challenge lies in finding ways to make that mobility work in favour of changing production patterns. Retaining population in countries of origin is not a question of prohibiting exit or entry; thus, a policy of "closure" to the rest of the world, for the sake of some autonomous national project, will be doomed to failure not only because migration is a historical trend but also because such a policy would impede technological development, both in the areas of training and of research.

Policy proposals must favour improved working conditions, which do not always mean wage increases, but rather the creation of other incentives which may help to discourage emigration. Complete information on the actual costs and risks of emigration, the consolidation of civil liberties and the adaptation of technologies to the regions of origin (which encourage the creation of jobs) are some of the factors to be considered. Permanent and temporary moves to the more developed countries can be counteracted by measures which facilitate

the return of emigrants, or at least their involvement in national or regional projects. With regard to less qualified personnel, the task that lies ahead concerns the basic premises of changing productive patterns with social equity, in that it involves the effective incorporation of the workforce into sectors of growing productivity. The creation of training alternatives within a flexible labour market and real access to services which make it possible to satisfy basic needs are essential requirements for keeping the less qualified labour force in the country of origin.

The possibility of establishing a general agreement on migration policy which, like GATT, could serve as a framework for reaching agreements on the mobility of the labour force, should be explored. Such an institution would make international coordination possible and would allow for the harmonization of criteria and norms for entry and exit permits, the treatment of alien workers, the political rights of migrants and other aspects which require international consensus (Straubhaar, 1992). This would make unilateral migration policies more compatible, by removing the ambivalences and constant changes in national norms on the entry of persons, which ultimately are largely responsible for illegal migration, with all of its serious consequences for the status of persons.

As for those living illegally in countries of destination, the strategy should involve the signing of international, and even bilateral, agreements or treaties. Mass repatriations, for which there are precedents, involve serious risks for the countries of origin and for the migrants themselves. In order to avoid the repercussions of a collective return and with respect to this type of "uncontrolled" movement, agreements must offer genuine opportunities for the legalization of the status of illegal aliens and include contributions to the countries of origin so that they can execute projects which would allow them to retain or resettle their population. In the case of those groups residing in the country of origin who receive

remittances from emigrants, whether legal or not, and without any prejudice to human rights, governments could design programmes to provide guidance on how to invest those resources.

Intraregional mobility can be conceived of as contributing to integration. Extending economic spaces beyond the borders of each country leaves the door open for cooperation projects in which training and specialized skills can be pooled, particularly in areas which countries are glaringly unequal. The expansion of operational scales is a prerequisite for small- and medium-scale economies, whose interconnection would lay the groundwork for the coordination of productive programmes, the establishment of compensatory health and social security mechanisms, and joint initiatives in specialized training or in systematizing the dissemination of knowledge and technologies. Those same conditions will strengthen negotiating capacity with countries outside the region, both with respect to the recovery of human resources and the acquisition of scientific and technological advances.

#### *Transfers of human capital and financial remittances*

Chief among the effects of the international migration of Latin Americans and Caribbeans are the transfer of human capital abroad and the financial remittances sent by emigrants to their families in the place of origin. The migration of professionals, scientists and technicians, even if it occurs among developing countries, reflects differences in salaries and compensation for intellectual work. So-called "structural tensions" are at the root of these emigration processes, suggesting failure to adapt the educational system to the real needs of economic and social development (Portes, 1977). An initial recommendation concerning this imbalance is that countries should give higher priority to the programming of human resources, so as to reduce the number of persons who cannot find work suited to their abilities.

In considering the initiatives which could be taken with respect to the emigration of qualified personnel, it is clear that measures that force people to stay (such as refusal to grant or renew passports, of special taxes on exit visas or foreign-exchange controls) violate individual rights. Historically, they have also proved to be ineffective, for, by not taking into account the attraction the more developed countries hold, coercive procedures can end up discouraging people to return. Qualified personnel can be more successfully retained by offering a number of incentives, e.g., by creating adequate working conditions and encouraging participation in decision-making about scientific policy, involvement in innovations or technological adaptations, and the fluidity of international communication. Clearly, the idea is to create a social and cultural climate which will guarantee the integration of individuals into a collective project (Pellegrino, 1992).

With respect to the return of persons, it is worth looking into initiatives, such as those undertaken by the International Organization for Migration. In 1974, it launched a Programme for the Return of Talent which has made it possible for more than 13,000 persons to be reabsorbed into Latin America. In future, the focus should be on developing concrete projects which can be more effectively implemented if they are conceived of as regional or subregional initiatives (see box VI.3). The following aspects, among others, should be noted: labour market surveys, mechanisms for the coordination of education, and norms for hiring personnel. Similarly, the promotion of region-wide programmes in areas such as university instruction, technical training and training in specific technologies, together with academic exchange programmes, would help raise national potential to recover experts. Projects to promote the intraregional mobility of students and professors have great potential.

Under certain circumstances, professionals and technicians residing

## Box VI.3

## THE URUGUAYAN SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY AND ITS INTERACTION WITH EMIGRANT COUNTRIES

Simultaneously with the movement to restore democracy in Uruguay between 1984 and 1985, ties began to be forged between emigrant communities and population groups residing in Uruguay, particularly in the areas of science and technology. The relatively small scale of this process, the intense emigration from Uruguay and certain circumstances at the time cast this experience in a unique light. This does not detract from an initiative which, with certain adaptations, could be replicated in other countries in order to recover the contribution of talent which had left the country.

In 1985, the National Repatriation Commission was established; by combining governmental and private efforts with external financial resources, it helped to facilitate the reabsorption of the returnees through job, educational and scientific programmes. Ties between academics residing in Uruguay and outside the country led to the establishment of the Basic Sciences Development Programme, designed to encourage the return of professional emigrants and to promote a restructuring of scientific activities in Uruguay. At the same time, emigrant Uruguayan scientists established societies through which they could maintain regular contacts with their

colleagues living in Uruguay. The work of these societies is very broad; it includes the issuing of statements on scientific and technological policy which have contributed to the national debate and decision-making in this area, the establishment of training programmes outside Uruguay, the definition of criteria for the screening and hosting of candidates for scholarships abroad, the organization of regular visits to Uruguay and the planning and implementation of joint projects.

In short, emigrant academics have become a link between Uruguay and the scientific and technological initiatives of the more developed countries. While the contributions of the emigrant scientific community have been valuable, it would be premature to assume that the institutions they have established will become permanent. In any case, their initiatives are an example of a novel form of recovering talent in specialized areas which Uruguay would otherwise have lost. Thus, this experience of "extending the border" and regularly receiving messages on modernization is worth being considered by other countries as an innovative approach to the problem of the emigration of talent.

Source: A. Pellegrino, "La movilidad de profesionales y técnicos latinoamericanos y del Caribe" (LC/DEM/R.175), Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), 1992.

abroad can collaborate in the coordination of national initiatives and foreign programmes, providing channels for the transfer of knowledge and information. The establishment of exchange programmes and scientific and technological cooperation programmes can be used to recruit the services of some emigrant professionals and technicians, on a temporary or periodic basis. This will be more cost-effective if the persons are invited to participate in productive projects in efforts to achieve economic integration among the countries of the region must understand that population mobility is inseparably linked to those processes and the freedom of movement

of the labour force in particular, and of persons in general, must be established as an integral part of exchange. This would include not only the exercise of professions, but advanced job training in scientific and technological areas as well (CELADE, 1991).

The data presented on remittances from abroad reveal just how complex their analysis is. The debate continues and is contributing information which, by highlighting some of the relationships between migration and development, becomes a useful input for the identification of policies adapted to the interests and reality of each country. Although it is true that the emigration of

economically active persons may, at least temporarily, ease pressure on the domestic labour market, and that remittances from abroad provide a source of income, there are also well-grounded suspicions with regard to the risks involved in a strategy that encourages the population to leave the country. One of the greatest dangers arises from the growing trend on the part of many of the developed countries to close their borders, which must then deal with the vicissitudes of illegal migration and instability in work contracts. Moreover, it is very likely that the operation of remittance mechanisms, either through regular or informal channels, will reinforce long-distance family ties and consolidate the migratory chains on which emigration feeds.

It must also be recognized that, if growing remittances contribute to family survival and the satisfaction of certain basic needs of groups living in poverty—besides representing a significant portion of the foreign currency obtained by those countries—that type of transfer will continue to justify—if not encourage—migration from less developed countries to stronger economies. Since remittances are part of contemporary reality, their existence cannot be ignored and, for that reason, must be viewed as a palliative among poverty-reduction measures but never as a substitute.

Therefore, it would be worthwhile for those countries which receive remittances to make an effort to offer guidance to recipient families, especially the poorest families, on how to use that income in order to satisfy their basic needs and benefit from planned savings and training programmes, in order to strengthen their management and project execution abilities. In this way, those groups could make more efficient use of their labour force, consolidating their hopes for a better life and making a greater contribution to the national economy. However, perceiving the remittance mechanism as a relatively permanent source of income which is a stimulus to the economy implies the continued acceptance of the development gaps

which separate the migrants' countries of origin from those countries in which funds are acquired, and the postponement of the objectives of changing production patterns with social equity.

#### **F. The World Population Plan of Action as a tool for concerted action**

---

International migration is only one issue on the global agenda for population. Reflecting the concern of the international community with respect to population dynamics and their relationship to development processes, the United Nations has held a series of encounters in which the debate of the issues has been accompanied by efforts to reach a consensus on measures that can be taken to make headway towards the common objectives of social well-being and material progress. An outstanding result of this effort is the World Population Plan of Action (WPPA), formulated at the United Nations World Population Conference (Bucharest, 1974) and ratified at the International Conference on Population (Mexico, 1984), at which time recommendations were updated and added in view of development thus far. One year after the formulation of WPPA, the Second Latin American Meeting on Population was held. Like other intergovernmental meetings held subsequently, it provided an opportunity to reflect more specifically on many of the proposals and resolutions adopted at Bucharest with a view to defining guidelines for the implementation of WPPA in the region.

The objective of WPPA is to harmonize demographic trends with those of economic and social development; it recognizes the sovereign right of each nation to formulate and implement population policy, and declares that such policy is an integral part of socio-economic development policy, and should be designed and implemented so as to fully respect basic human rights, including the right to life and reproductive rights. WPPA seeks to promote measures and

programmes to influence population trends, including growth and distribution, and to elucidate demographic variables and their interrelationship with development processes. Within its specific field, it seeks to improve the status of women.

The recommendations concerning goals and policy for population growth are fairly general and invite countries to consider the possibility of adopting policy, in accordance with the principle of respect for national sovereignty. Governments which seek moderate or low growth are encouraged to pursue that end through a combination of low birth and mortality rates. Given its general nature and the fact that it is not very demanding, this recommendation seems to have been implemented in most countries of the region, even though the adoption and institutionalization of policies has generally been inadequate, as noted in chapter V. Most countries, even those which are not explicitly seeking to reduce their demographic growth, have experienced declines in both fecundity and mortality rates.

In contrast to the others, the recommendations with respect to morbidity and mortality are more specific: they redefine quantitative goals for certain variables. As a general objective, increasing life expectancy at birth to 74 years, by the year 2000,<sup>15</sup> is proposed. High-mortality countries should achieve a life expectancy of 60 years of age by that time and a maximum infant mortality rate of 50 per thousand. Current projections indicate that Latin America and the Caribbean may achieve an average life span of around 70 years by the year 2000, that is, four years short of the world goal; all countries, however, including those with high mortality rates at this time are expected to surpass the minimum goal of 60 years—with the possible exception of Haiti—and only seven of them would have attained values higher than the global target of 74 years. With regard to infant mortality, the region is expected to attain values around 40

deaths for every thousand live births by the year 2000, a figure which is below the global target; more than half of the countries will have rates lower than the minimum goal of 35 per thousand. The WPPA also specifies goals for maternal mortality, urging reductions of at least 50% in countries where it is higher than 100 maternal deaths for every 100,000 births; although current data in this area are incomplete and fairly imprecise, few countries of the region have higher rates than that. Nevertheless, and although the mortality risk related to giving birth is relatively low, the Population Conference of 1984 reaffirmed the importance of this recommendation, given that this is one of the causes of death which is completely avoidable through adequate pre- and post-natal care.

Another WPPA recommendation that is of great interest because of the centrality it assigns to the objective of social equity in development strategies is that of reducing or, if possible, eliminating the differences in morbidity and mortality within countries and between regions, and social and ethnic groups. WPPA does not establish quantitative goals in this regard and the information available suggests that this objective, as proposed, is not being attained in the region as a whole. Although morbidity-mortality rates have been improving in most socio-economic groups, the rate of change has, at times, been more rapid in the more fortunate groups of the population, which has widened gaps between groups. Although this has not occurred in all contexts, severe differences in mortality still persist among social strata in nearly every country, which may be several times higher in the lowest socio-economic strata, in comparison with the more well-to-do groups.

WPPA establishes quantitative goals concerning procreation and the creation of families, the status of women, population distribution, and internal and international migration. Although major strides have been made in certain

15 Compare these goals to those set forth in "Health for All by the Year 2000", referred to in chapter I.C.

countries of the region –such as the integration and coordination of family planning programmes with other general health care services, and the establishment or strengthening of programmes for the return of emigrants–, most of the recommendations are still valid and many of the objectives are far from having been achieved; examples of areas which have experienced setbacks include the promotion of women's rights, the adoption of measures concerning international migration, and measures designed to achieve less concentrated spatial distribution of the population.

The World Population Plan of Action of 1974 has functioned as a useful frame of reference for shaping demographic policy and initiatives. Some of the limitations are attributable to the excessive generality of many of their objectives. The establishment of quantitative and uniform goals at the global, or even regional level, may not be realistic. Moreover, since they contain neither proposals concerning

instruments necessary to achieve them, nor indicators of progress, the goals seem, in retrospect, to be more a statement of intentions than viable recommendations, which can be implemented and evaluated according to explicit parameters. On the other hand, within the context of current development strategies which place special emphasis on *equity*, its policy will probably favour the indicators related to demographic *inequality* more than aggregate demographic indexes. With respect to the spatial distribution of the population, it is worth reiterating the predominantly urban character of the countries of the region and the diversification of the patterns of internal mobility, in which context rural-urban migration, which received so much attention in WPPA, is tending to become less relevant than it was in the past. These elements must be borne in mind as instruments such as WPPA are brought up to date or reformulated in the future.

## **STATISTICAL ANNEX**



Table 1  
**LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL POPULATION, 1950-2000**  
*(In thousands)*

Country or territory	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
<b>Regional total</b>	<b>165 121</b>	<b>216 615</b>	<b>283 204</b>	<b>358 930</b>	<b>441 072</b>	<b>522 972</b>
<b>Latin America</b>	<b>158 810</b>	<b>209 211</b>	<b>274 538</b>	<b>349 198</b>	<b>430 182</b>	<b>510 939</b>
Argentina	17 150	20 616	23 962	28 237	32 322	36 238
Bolivia	2 766	3 428	4 325	5 581	7 171	9 038
Brazil	53 444	72 594	95 847	121 286	149 042	172 777
Colombia	11 946	15 939	21 360	26 525	32 300	37 822
Costa Rica	862	1 236	1 731	2 284	3 034	3 798
Cuba	5 850	6 985	8 520	9 679	10 608	11 504
Chile	6 082	7 614	9 504	11 145	13 173	15 272
Ecuador	3 310	4 413	6 051	8 123	10 547	13 090
El Salvador	1 940	2 570	3 588	4 525	5 172	6 425
Guatemala	2 969	3 964	5 246	6 917	9 197	12 222
Haiti	3 261	3 804	4 520	5 353	6 486	7 959
Honduras	1 401	1 935	2 627	3 662	5 138	6 846
Malvinas (Falkland) Islands	2	2	2	2	2	2
Mexico	27 297	36 530	50 328	67 046	84 486	102 555
Nicaragua	1 109	1 502	2 063	2 802	3 676	5 169
Panama	839	1 105	1 487	1 956	2 418	2 893
Paraguay	1 351	1 774	2 351	3 147	4 277	5 538
Peru	7 632	9 931	13 193	17 295	21 550	26 276
Dominican Republic	2 353	3 231	4 423	5 697	7 170	8 621
Uruguay	2 239	2 538	2 808	2 914	3 094	3 274
Venezuela	5 009	7 502	10 604	15 024	19 321	23 622
<b>The Caribbean</b>	<b>6 309</b>	<b>7 402</b>	<b>8 664</b>	<b>9 730</b>	<b>10 888</b>	<b>12 031</b>
Anguilla	5	6	6	7	7	8
Antigua and Barbuda	46	55	66	61	65	70
Netherlands Antilles	116	137	162	171	175	178
Aruba	57	59	61	60	61	63
Bahamas	79	110	170	210	255	295
Barbados	211	231	239	249	257	268
Belize	67	91	120	146	189	229
Dominica	51	60	70	75	72	71
Grenada	76	90	94	89	91	94
Guadeloupe	210	275	320	327	390	437
French Guiana	25	33	49	69	98	130
Guyana	423	569	709	759	796	883
Cayman Islands	6	9	10	17	27	40
British Virgin Islands	6	7	10	12	16	21
United States Virgin Islands	27	33	64	98	107	109
Jamaica	1 403	1 629	1 869	2 133	2 420	2 677
Martinique	222	282	326	326	360	391
Montserrat	14	12	11	12	11	11
Puerto Rico	2 219	2 358	2 718	3 206	3 530	3 853
Saint Kitts and Nevis	44	51	47	44	42	41
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	67	80	87	98	107	117
Saint Lucia	79	86	101	115	133	152
Suriname	215	290	372	352	422	500
Trinidad and Tobago	636	843	971	1 082	1 236	1 365
Turks and Caicos	5	6	6	7	12	17

Source: Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), current population projections; United Nations, *World Population Prospects: The 1992 Revision*, New York, 1992.

Table 2  
**LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: AVERAGE ANNUAL RATES OF GROWTH, 1950-2000**  
 (Percentages)

Country or territory	1950-1960	1960-1970	1970-1980	1980-1990	1990-2000
<b>Regional total</b>	<b>2.71</b>	<b>2.68</b>	<b>2.37</b>	<b>2.06</b>	<b>1.70</b>
<b>Latin America</b>	<b>2.76</b>	<b>2.72</b>	<b>2.41</b>	<b>2.09</b>	<b>1.72</b>
Argentina	1.84	1.50	1.64	1.35	1.14
Bolivia	2.15	2.32	2.55	2.51	2.31
Brazil	3.06	2.78	2.35	2.06	1.48
Colombia	2.88	2.93	2.17	1.97	1.58
Costa Rica	3.60	3.37	2.77	2.84	2.25
Cuba	1.77	1.99	1.28	0.92	0.81
Chile	2.25	2.22	1.59	1.67	1.48
Ecuador	2.88	3.16	2.94	2.61	2.16
El Salvador	2.81	3.34	2.32	1.34	2.17
Guatemala	2.89	2.80	2.77	2.85	2.84
Haiti	1.54	1.72	1.69	1.92	2.05
Honduras	3.23	3.06	3.32	3.39	2.87
Malvinas (Falkland) Islands	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Mexico	2.91	3.20	2.87	2.31	1.94
Nicaragua	3.03	3.17	3.06	2.71	3.41
Panama	2.75	2.97	2.74	2.12	1.79
Paraguay	2.72	2.82	2.92	3.07	2.58
Peru	2.63	2.84	2.71	2.20	1.98
Dominican Republic	3.17	3.14	2.53	2.30	1.84
Uruguay	1.25	1.01	0.37	0.60	0.57
Venezuela	4.04	3.46	3.48	2.52	2.01
<b>The Caribbean</b>	<b>1.60</b>	<b>1.57</b>	<b>1.16</b>	<b>1.12</b>	<b>1.00</b>
Anguilla	1.82	0.00	1.54	0.00	1.34
Antigua and Barbuda	1.79	1.82	-0.79	0.64	0.74
Netherlands Antilles	1.66	1.68	0.54	0.23	0.17
Aruba	0.34	0.33	-0.17	0.17	0.32
Bahamas	3.31	4.35	2.11	1.94	1.46
Barbados	0.91	0.34	0.41	0.32	0.42
Belize	3.06	2.77	1.96	2.58	1.92
Dominica	1.63	1.54	0.69	-0.41	-0.14
Grenada	1.69	0.43	-0.55	0.22	0.32
Guadeloupe	2.70	1.52	0.22	1.76	1.14
French Guiana	2.78	3.95	3.42	3.51	2.83
Guyana	2.97	2.20	0.68	0.48	1.04
Cayman Islands	4.05	1.05	5.31	4.63	3.93
British Virgin Islands	1.54	3.57	1.82	2.88	2.72
United States Virgin Islands	2.01	6.62	4.26	0.88	0.19
Jamaica	1.49	1.37	1.32	1.26	1.01
Martinique	2.39	1.45	0.00	0.99	0.83
Montserrat	-1.54	-0.87	0.87	-0.87	0.00
Puerto Rico	0.61	1.42	1.65	0.96	0.88
Saints Kitts and Nevis	1.48	-0.82	-0.66	-0.47	-0.24
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	1.77	0.84	1.19	0.88	0.89
Saint Lucia	0.85	1.61	1.30	1.45	1.34
Suriname	2.99	2.49	-0.55	1.81	1.70
Trinidad and Tobago	2.82	1.41	1.08	1.33	0.99
Turks and Caicos	1.82	0.00	1.54	5.39	3.48

Source: Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), current population projections; United Nations, *World Population Prospects. The 1992 Revision*, New York, 1992.

Table 3  
**LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: OVERALL BIRTH RATES BY FIVE-YEAR PERIODS,  
 WITH COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES GROUPED ACCORDING TO STAGE OF  
 DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION, 1950-2000**

Countries	Five-year periods									
	1950- 1955	1955- 1960	1960- 1965	1965- 1970	1970- 1975	1975- 1980	1980- 1985	1985- 1990	1990- 1995	1995- 2000
<b>Latin America</b>	<b>5.9</b>	<b>5.9</b>	<b>6.0</b>	<b>5.6</b>	<b>5.0</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>3.9</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>3.1</b>	<b>2.8</b>
<b>The Caribbean <sup>a</sup></b>	<b>5.2</b>	<b>5.1</b>	<b>5.5</b>	<b>5.0</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>3.2</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>2.8</b>	<b>2.8</b>
<b>Group I</b>										
Bolivia	6.8	6.7	6.6	6.6	6.5	6.2	5.5	5.0	4.6	4.1
Haiti	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.0	5.8	5.4	5.2	5.0	4.8	4.6
<b>Group II</b>										
El Salvador	6.5	6.8	6.9	6.6	6.1	5.7	5.0	4.5	4.0	3.6
Guatemala	7.1	6.9	6.9	6.6	6.5	6.4	6.1	5.8	5.4	4.9
Honduras	7.1	7.2	7.4	7.4	7.4	6.6	6.2	5.6	4.9	4.3
Nicaragua	7.4	7.4	7.4	7.2	6.8	6.4	6.0	5.6	5.0	4.5
Paraguay	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.4	5.7	5.1	4.8	4.6	4.3	4.1
<b>Group III</b>										
Brazil	6.2	6.2	6.2	5.3	4.7	4.2	3.8	3.2	2.8	2.4
Colombia	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.3	4.7	4.1	3.5	2.9	2.7	2.5
Costa Rica	6.7	7.1	7.0	5.8	4.3	3.9	3.5	3.4	3.1	3.0
Ecuador	6.9	6.9	6.9	6.7	6.1	5.4	4.7	4.1	3.6	3.2
Guyana	6.7	6.8	6.2	6.1	4.9	3.9	3.3	2.8	2.6	2.3
Mexico	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.7	6.4	5.0	4.3	3.6	3.2	2.8
Panama	5.7	5.9	5.9	5.6	4.9	4.1	3.5	3.1	2.9	2.7
Peru	6.9	6.9	6.9	6.6	6.0	5.4	4.7	4.0	3.6	3.2
Dominican Republic	7.4	7.4	7.3	6.7	5.6	4.7	4.2	3.8	3.3	3.0
Suriname	6.6	6.6	6.6	5.9	5.3	4.2	3.4	3.0	2.7	2.4
Trinidad and Tobago	5.3	5.3	5.0	3.8	3.5	3.4	3.2	3.0	2.7	2.5
Venezuela	6.5	6.5	6.5	5.9	5.0	4.5	3.9	3.5	3.1	2.9
<b>Group IV</b>										
Argentina	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.4	3.2	3.0	2.8	2.7
Bahamas	4.2	3.7	3.9	3.3	3.0	2.6	2.6	2.2	2.0	1.9
Barbados	4.7	4.7	4.3	3.5	2.7	2.2	1.9	1.6	1.8	1.9
Cuba	4.1	3.7	4.7	4.3	3.5	2.1	1.9	1.8	1.9	2.0
Chile	5.1	5.3	5.3	4.4	3.6	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.6
Guadeloupe	5.6	5.6	5.6	5.2	4.5	3.1	2.6	2.5	2.2	2.0
Jamaica	4.2	5.1	5.6	5.8	5.0	4.0	3.6	2.7	2.4	2.1
Martinique	5.7	5.7	5.5	5.0	4.1	2.7	2.1	2.1	2.0	1.9
Puerto Rico	5.0	4.8	4.4	3.4	3.0	2.8	2.4	2.2	2.2	2.1
Uruguay	2.7	2.8	2.9	2.8	3.0	2.9	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.3

Source: Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), current population projections; United Nations, *World Population Prospects. The 1992 Revision*, New York, 1992.

<sup>a</sup> Includes: Anguilla, Antigua, Aruba, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Turks and Caicos, and the United States and British Virgin Islands.

Table 4  
**LATIN AMERICA: BIRTH RATES BY AGE, WITH COUNTRIES GROUPED ACCORDING  
 TO STAGE OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION, 1950-55 Y 1985-90**  
*(Rates per thousand)*

Countries		Age groups							TGF
		15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	
<b>Group I</b>									
Bolivia	1950-1955	100	275	307	281	222	120	46	6.8
	1985-1990	86	237	247	197	138	73	23	5.0
Haiti	1950-1955	77	207	284	273	217	132	71	6.3
	1985-1990	55	196	240	214	162	96	36	5.0
<b>Group II</b>									
El Salvador	1950-1955	142	314	332	263	162	64	15	6.5
	1985-1990	139	247	210	155	102	48	4	4.5
Guatemala	1950-1955	174	313	321	280	209	93	27	7.1
	1985-1990	133	276	277	229	157	70	13	5.8
Honduras	1950-1955	151	305	320	286	212	116	21	7.1
	1985-1990	118	279	261	204	164	77	7	5.6
Nicaragua	1950-1955	170	353	356	273	211	95	29	7.4
	1985-1990	169	270	260	201	140	56	14	5.6
Paraguay	1950-1955	95	283	324	293	222	119	24	6.8
	1985-1990	79	196	216	191	144	74	16	4.6
<b>Group III</b>									
Brazil	1950-1955	83	264	302	251	189	98	44	6.2
	1985-1990	48	170	181	131	78	30	3	3.2
Colombia	1950-1955	128	287	323	280	214	92	28	6.8
	1985-1990	74	159	146	104	63	27	7	2.9
Costa Rica	1950-1955	119	334	331	261	203	83	15	6.7
	1985-1990	98	182	165	123	75	26	3	3.4
Ecuador	1950-1955	140	294	320	278	213	105	32	6.9
	1985-1990	83	222	206	153	101	44	11	4.1
Mexico	1950-1955	115	300	322	287	200	100	26	6.8
	1985-1990	93	209	177	126	82	28	5	3.6
Panama	1950-1955	145	283	278	208	136	63	23	5.7
	1985-1990	91	185	159	105	62	22	5	3.1
Peru	1950-1955	130	283	317	278	205	113	45	6.9
	1985-1990	72	188	203	161	121	45	10	4.0
Dominican Republic	1950-1955	166	335	340	300	211	107	22	7.4
	1985-1990	79	216	195	140	85	28	8	3.8
Venezuela	1950-1955	155	330	308	239	167	70	24	6.5
	1985-1990	79	191	177	125	78	34	8	3.5
<b>Group IV</b>									
Argentina	1950-1955	62	160	172	128	76	26	7	3.2
	1985-1990	71	158	162	115	63	20	4	3.0
Cuba	1950-1955	67	234	231	158	90	33	7	4.1
	1985-1990	85	123	93	48	24	8	1	1.8
Chile	1950-1955	84	224	255	212	148	77	20	5.1
	1985-1990	67	158	147	99	54	18	2	2.7
Uruguay	1950-1955	60	150	148	104	60	20	4	2.7
	1985-1990	61	135	133	91	49	15	1	2.4

Source: Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), current population projections.

Table 5  
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH,  
WITH COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES GROUPED ACCORDING TO  
STAGE OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION, 1950-2000

Region and countries	Life expectancy			Five-year increase		Life expectancy
	1950-1955	1970-1975	1985-1990	1950-1955 to 1970-1975	1970-1975 to 1985-1990	Year 2000
<b>Latin America</b>	<b>51.8</b>	<b>61.3</b>	<b>66.7</b>	<b>2.4</b>	<b>1.8</b>	<b>69.8</b>
<b>The Caribbean<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>63.1</b>	<b>67.6</b>	<b>2.8</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>70.3</b>
<b>Group I</b>						
Bolivia	40.4	46.7	58.8	1.6	4.0	64.5
Haiti	37.6	48.5	54.7	2.7	2.1	59.4
<b>Group II</b>						
El Salvador	45.3	58.8	62.4	3.4	1.2	69.1
Guatemala	42.1	54.0	62.0	3.0	2.7	68.1
Honduras	42.3	54.0	64.0	2.9	3.3	68.2
Nicaragua	42.3	55.2	62.4	3.2	2.4	69.2
Paraguay	62.6	65.6	66.9	0.7	0.4	67.9
<b>Group III</b>						
Brazil	51.0	59.8	64.9	2.2	1.7	68.0
Colombia	50.6	61.6	68.2	2.8	2.2	70.7
Costa Rica	57.3	68.1	75.3	2.7	2.4	77.1
Ecuador	48.4	58.9	65.4	2.6	2.2	68.2
Guyana	52.3	60.0	63.2	1.9	1.1	67.7
Mexico	50.8	62.9	68.8	3.0	2.0	72.0
Panama	55.3	66.3	72.1	2.8	1.9	73.5
Peru	43.9	55.5	61.4	2.9	2.0	67.9
Dominican Republic	46.0	59.9	65.9	3.5	2.0	69.7
Suriname	56.0	64.0	68.8	2.0	1.6	72.1
Trinidad and Tobago	58.2	65.7	70.1	1.9	1.5	73.1
Venezuela	55.2	66.2	69.7	2.8	1.1	71.3
<b>Group IV</b>						
Argentina	62.7	67.3	70.6	1.1	1.1	72.3
Bahamas	59.8	66.6	71.1	1.7	1.5	73.9
Barbados	57.2	69.4	74.6	3.1	1.7	76.8
Cuba	59.5	71.0	75.2	2.9	1.4	76.3
Chile	53.8	63.6	71.5	2.5	2.6	72.7
Guadeloupe	56.5	67.8	73.6	2.8	1.9	75.9
Jamaica	57.2	68.6	72.5	2.9	1.3	75.1
Martinique	56.5	69.2	75.4	3.2	2.1	77.3
Puerto Rico	64.8	72.5	74.3	1.9	0.6	75.9
Uruguay	66.3	68.8	72.0	0.6	1.1	73.0

Source: Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), current population projections; United Nations, *World Population Prospects. The 1992 Revision*, New York, 1992.

<sup>a</sup> Includes: Anguilla, Antigua, Aruba, Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Turks and Caicos and United States and British Virgin Islands.

Table 6  
**LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INFANT MORTALITY RATES, 1950-1955, 1970-1975, 1985-1990 AND PROJECTIONS FOR 2000, ANNUAL BIRTHS: 1985-1990, WITH COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES GROUPED ACCORDING TO STAGE OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION**  
*(Rates per thousands)*

Region and countries	Mortality rate			Five-year period		Rate for year 2000	Annual births 1985-1990	
	1950-1955	1970-1975	1985-1990	1950-1970	1970-1985		Thousands	Percentage
<b>Latin America</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>11.5</b>	<b>9.0</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>11 514</b>	
<b>Caribbean <sup>a</sup></b>	<b>124</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>12.8</b>	<b>7.0</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>203</b>	
<b>Total</b>							<b>11 717</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Group I</b>								
Bolivia	176	151	98	6.3	17.7	67	248	
Haiti	220	135	97	21.3	12.7	72	224	
<b>Total</b>							<b>472</b>	<b>4.0</b>
<b>Group II</b>								
El Salvador	151	99	59	13.0	13.3	36	172	
Guatemala	141	95	59	11.5	12.0	37	350	
Honduras	185	94	63	22.8	10.3	45	189	
Nicaragua	167	100	71	16.8	9.7	42	150	
Paraguay	73	55	49	4.5	2.0	44	139	
<b>Total</b>							<b>1 000</b>	<b>8.5</b>
<b>Group III</b>								
Brazil	135	91	63	11.0	9.3	48	3 801	
Colombia	123	73	40	12.5	11.0	33	802	
Costa Rica	94	53	16	10.3	12.3	12	82	
Ecuador	140	95	63	11.3	10.7	49	321	
Guyana	119	79	56	10.0	7.7	39	21	
Mexico	114	68	41	11.5	9.0	28	2 400	
Panama	93	43	23	12.5	6.7	19	62	
Peru	159	110	88	12.3	7.3	63	636	
Dominican Republic	149	94	65	13.8	9.7	46	213	
Suriname	89	49	33	10.0	5.3	22	11	
Trinidad and Tobago	79	42	24	9.3	6.0	15	32	
Venezuela	106	49	36	14.3	4.3	30	519	
<b>Total</b>							<b>8 900</b>	<b>76.0</b>
<b>Group IV</b>								
Argentina	66	49	32	4.3	5.7	25	669	
Bahamas	80	32	26	12.0	2.0	17	...	
Barbados	132	33	12	25.8	7.0	9	4	
Cuba	81	39	15	10.5	8.0	13	182	
Chile	126	70	18	14.0	17.3	15	301	
Guadeloupe	68	42	14	6.5	9.3	11	7	
Jamaica	85	42	17	10.8	8.3	11	57	
Martinique	65	35	11	7.5	8.0	9	6	
Puerto Rico	63	25	14	9.5	3.7	12	65	
Uruguay	57	46	24	2.8	7.3	16	54	
<b>Total</b>							<b>1 345</b>	<b>11.5</b>

Source: Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), current population projections; United Nations, *World Population Prospects. The 1992 Revision*, New York, 1992.

<sup>a</sup> Includes Anguilla, Antigua, Aruba, Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Turks and Caicos and United States and British Virgin Islands.

Table 7  
**LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: RELATIVE POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN  
 COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES GROUPED ACCORDING TO STAGE OF  
 DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION, BY LARGE AGE GROUPS, 1950-2000**  
 (Percentages)

Region and countries	1950			1990			2000		
	<15	15-64	65 +	<15	15-64	65 +	<15	15-64	65 +
<b>Latin America</b>	<b>40.4</b>	<b>56.1</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>35.8</b>	<b>59.5</b>	<b>4.7</b>	<b>31.7</b>	<b>62.9</b>	<b>5.4</b>
<b>The Caribbean</b>	<b>39.5</b>	<b>55.9</b>	<b>4.6</b>	<b>31.2</b>	<b>62.3</b>	<b>6.5</b>	<b>30.2</b>	<b>63.0</b>	<b>6.8</b>
<b>Group I</b>									
Bolivia	42.0	54.9	3.1	41.4	55.0	3.6	38.1	57.7	4.2
Haiti	36.8	58.0	5.2	40.2	55.7	4.1	39.9	56.3	3.8
<b>Group II</b>									
El Salvador	42.8	54.2	3.1	43.5	52.7	3.8	38.9	56.7	4.4
Guatemala	44.1	53.4	2.6	45.4	51.4	3.2	42.9	53.3	3.7
Honduras	44.7	53.4	1.9	44.6	52.2	3.3	41.2	55.4	3.5
Nicaragua	44.0	53.0	3.0	47.9	49.1	3.0	43.6	53.2	3.2
Paraguay	42.9	53.9	3.2	40.4	56.1	3.6	38.3	58.2	3.6
<b>Group III</b>									
Brazil	42.0	55.5	2.5	34.7	60.7	4.7	29.1	65.3	5.6
Colombia	42.7	53.7	3.7	35.3	60.5	4.2	30.4	64.9	4.7
Costa Rica	43.3	52.9	3.7	36.5	59.3	4.2	33.1	61.8	5.1
Ecuador	41.9	53.5	4.6	39.3	56.9	3.8	34.8	61.0	4.2
Guyana	48.4	48.3	3.3	33.4	62.8	3.8	29.3	66.4	4.3
Mexico	43.0	52.8	4.2	38.0	58.3	3.7	33.8	61.7	4.5
Panama	41.0	55.1	3.9	35.0	60.3	4.8	31.5	63.1	5.4
Peru	41.6	55.0	3.5	37.6	58.6	3.8	33.6	61.8	4.6
Dominican Republic	44.5	52.3	3.2	37.9	58.7	3.4	33.9	61.9	4.3
Suriname	47.5	48.4	4.1	34.0	61.8	4.2	30.9	64.0	5.1
Trinidad and Tobago	43.0	53.0	4.0	34.0	60.5	5.5	30.5	64.0	5.5
Venezuela	43.6	54.6	1.8	37.2	59.1	3.7	32.4	63.1	4.5
<b>Group IV</b>									
Argentina	30.5	65.3	4.2	29.9	61.0	9.1	27.2	62.9	9.8
Barbados	38.1	55.2	6.7	24.5	63.7	11.8	22.2	66.7	11.1
Cuba	35.8	59.3	4.9	22.7	68.8	8.5	23.4	67.3	9.4
Chile	36.7	59.0	4.3	30.6	63.4	6.0	29.4	63.9	6.7
Guadeloupe	43.1	51.8	5.1	27.0	64.1	8.9	27.4	62.8	9.8
Jamaica	41.7	54.0	4.3	33.2	60.2	6.6	28.6	65.0	6.4
Martinique	42.4	53.1	4.5	24.1	65.9	10.0	25.3	63.4	11.3
Puerto Rico	42.8	52.0	5.2	26.0	63.5	10.5	24.6	64.3	11.1
Uruguay	27.9	63.9	8.2	25.8	62.6	11.6	23.9	63.5	12.7

Source: Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), current population projections, and United Nations, *World Population Prospects, 1990* (ST/ESA/SER.A/120), New York, 1991, United Nations publication, Sales No. E.91.XIII.4.

Table 8  
**LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: RATES OF AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH IN  
 COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES GROUPED ACCORDING TO STAGE OF  
 DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION, BY LARGE AGE GROUPS, 1960-2000**  
 (Percentages)

Region and countries	1960-1970			1970-1980			1980-1990			1990-2000		
	<15	15-64	65 +	<15	15-64	65 +	<15	15-64	65 +	<15	15-64	65 +
<b>Latin America</b>	2.7	2.7	3.5	1.7	2.9	3.3	1.1	2.6	3.0	0.5	2.3	3.1
<b>The Caribbean</b>	1.3	1.5	3.3	-0.7	2.2	3.3	-0.6	1.8	2.4	0.1	1.4	1.4
<b>Group I</b>												
Bolivia	2.4	2.3	2.8	2.6	2.5	2.6	2.1	2.8	3.4	1.5	2.8	3.7
Haiti	2.1	1.5	1.0	1.6	1.8	1.1	1.8	2.1	1.1	2.0	2.2	1.4
<b>Group II</b>												
El Salvador	3.6	3.1	4.1	2.2	2.4	3.4	0.8	1.7	3.4	1.1	2.9	3.6
Guatemala	2.8	2.8	3.5	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.9	3.9	2.3	3.2	4.4
Honduras	3.5	2.6	4.2	3.4	3.2	4.8	2.8	3.9	4.3	2.1	3.5	3.4
Nicaragua	3.3	3.1	2.2	2.9	3.2	3.1	2.8	2.6	4.4	2.5	4.2	4.1
Paraguay	2.6	3.1	3.1	1.9	3.7	3.1	2.7	3.4	3.4	2.0	3.0	2.6
<b>Group III</b>												
Brazil	2.5	2.9	4.5	1.2	3.1	4.0	1.2	2.5	3.6	-0.3	2.2	3.3
Colombia	2.8	3.0	3.1	0.8	3.2	3.4	0.7	2.7	3.2	0.1	2.3	2.8
Costa Rica	3.1	3.6	3.3	1.1	4.0	3.9	2.2	3.1	4.5	1.3	2.7	4.1
Ecuador	3.3	3.1	2.5	2.5	3.4	2.7	1.6	3.3	3.1	0.9	2.9	3.2
Guyana	2.0	2.3	2.8	-0.8	1.9	1.8	-1.5	1.8	0.2	-0.2	1.7	2.4
Mexico	3.4	3.1	2.3	2.4	3.4	2.4	0.8	3.4	2.8	0.8	2.5	3.9
Panama	3.1	2.8	3.0	1.9	3.4	2.9	0.7	3.0	3.6	0.7	2.3	3.1
Peru	3.0	2.7	2.9	2.2	3.1	3.1	1.2	2.9	2.8	0.9	2.5	3.8
Dominican Republic	3.3	3.0	3.0	1.4	3.5	3.0	1.2	3.0	3.0	0.7	2.4	4.2
Suriname	2.7	2.4	2.0	-2.5	1.0	0.9	0.2	2.9	1.1	0.7	2.0	3.6
Trinidad and Tobago	1.2	1.5	2.4	-1.0	2.2	3.5	1.6	1.8	1.5	0.4	2.0	1.5
Venezuela	3.4	3.5	5.2	2.4	4.3	4.5	1.5	3.1	4.1	0.6	2.7	3.9
<b>Group IV</b>												
Argentina	1.0	1.5	3.8	1.9	1.3	3.3	1.3	1.2	2.4	0.2	1.5	1.9
Barbados	0.0	0.2	2.5	-1.8	1.3	2.8	-1.7	0.9	1.4	-0.6	0.8	-0.2
Cuba	2.8	1.3	4.0	-0.3	1.9	3.4	-2.4	2.2	2.0	1.1	0.6	1.9
Chile	2.1	2.2	2.9	0.0	2.5	2.6	0.8	2.1	2.4	1.1	1.6	2.6
Guadeloupe	1.4	1.6	0.9	-2.8	1.8	4.5	-1.1	1.0	2.3	0.8	0.4	1.6
Jamaica	2.5	0.1	4.0	-0.2	2.4	3.1	-0.5	2.7	1.3	-0.4	1.8	0.8
Martinique	1.2	1.5	2.9	-3.7	1.7	4.8	-1.2	0.9	2.2	1.1	0.2	1.8
Puerto Rico	0.0	2.3	3.7	0.1	2.3	3.6	-1.1	1.3	3.7	0.4	1.1	1.5
Uruguay	1.0	0.9	1.9	0.0	0.3	2.1	0.2	0.6	1.6	-0.2	0.7	1.5

Source: Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), current population projections, and United Nations, *World Population Prospects, 1990* (ST/ESA/SER.A/120), New York, 1991. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.91.XIII.4.



Table 9  
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: LAND AREA, TOTAL POPULATION AND  
POPULATION DENSITY BY COUNTRY OR TERRITORY, 1950-1990

Country or territory	Area (thousands of km <sup>2</sup> )	Population (in thousands)					Population density (inhabitants per km <sup>2</sup> )				
		1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990
<b>Regional total</b>	<b>20 522.8</b>	<b>165 121</b>	<b>216 615</b>	<b>283 204</b>	<b>358 930</b>	<b>441 072</b>	<b>8.1</b>	<b>10.6</b>	<b>13.8</b>	<b>17.5</b>	<b>21.5</b>
<b>Latin America</b>	<b>19 984.2</b>	<b>158 810</b>	<b>209 211</b>	<b>274 538</b>	<b>349 198</b>	<b>430 182</b>	<b>8.0</b>	<b>10.5</b>	<b>13.7</b>	<b>17.5</b>	<b>21.5</b>
Argentina	2 766.9	17 150	20 616	23 962	28 237	32 322	6.2	7.5	8.7	10.2	11.7
Bolivia	1 098.6	2 766	3 428	4 325	5 581	7 171	2.5	3.1	3.9	5.1	6.5
Brazil	8 512.0	53 444	72 594	95 847	121 286	149 042	6.3	8.5	11.3	14.3	17.5
Colombia	1 138.9	11 946	15 939	21 360	26 525	32 300	10.5	14.0	18.8	23.3	28.4
Costa Rica	51.1	862	1 236	1 731	2 284	3 034	16.9	24.2	33.9	44.7	59.4
Cuba	110.9	5 850	6 985	8 520	9 679	10 608	52.8	63.0	76.8	87.3	95.7
Chile	756.9	6 082	7 614	9 504	11 145	13 173	8.0	10.1	12.6	14.7	17.4
Ecuador	283.6	3 310	4 413	6 051	8 123	10 547	11.7	15.6	21.3	28.6	37.2
El Salvador	21.0	1 940	2 570	3 588	4 525	5 172	92.4	122.4	170.9	215.5	246.3
Guatemala	108.9	2 969	3 964	5 246	6 917	9 197	27.3	36.4	48.2	63.5	84.5
Haiti	27.8	3 261	3 804	4 520	5 353	6 486	117.3	136.8	162.6	192.6	233.3
Honduras	112.1	1 401	1 935	2 627	3 662	5 138	12.5	17.3	23.4	32.7	45.8
Malvinas (Falkland)											
Islands	12.2	2	2	2	2	2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Mexico	1 958.2	27 297	36 530	50 328	67 046	84 486	13.9	18.7	25.7	34.2	43.1
Nicaragua	130.0	1 109	1 502	2 063	2 802	3 676	8.5	11.6	15.9	21.6	28.3
Panama	77.1	839	1 105	1 487	1 956	2 418	10.9	14.3	19.3	25.4	31.4
Paraguay	406.8	1 351	1 774	2 351	3 147	4 277	3.3	4.4	5.8	7.7	10.5
Peru	1 285.2	7 632	9 931	13 193	17 295	21 550	5.9	7.7	10.3	13.5	16.8
Dominican Republic	48.7	2 353	3 231	4 423	5 697	7 170	48.3	66.3	90.8	117.0	147.2
Uruguay	177.4	2 239	2 538	2 808	2 914	3 094	12.6	14.3	15.8	16.4	17.4
Venezuela	912.1	5 009	7 502	10 604	15 024	19 321	5.5	8.2	11.6	16.5	21.2
<b>The Caribbean</b>	<b>538.6</b>	<b>6 309</b>	<b>7 402</b>	<b>8 664</b>	<b>9 730</b>	<b>10 888</b>	<b>11.7</b>	<b>13.7</b>	<b>16.1</b>	<b>18.1</b>	<b>20.2</b>
Anguilla	0.1	5	6	6	7	7	50.0	60.0	60.0	70.0	70.0
Antigua and Barbuda	0.4	46	55	66	61	65	115.0	137.5	165.0	152.5	162.5
Netherlands Antilles	0.8	116	137	162	171	175	145.0	171.3	202.5	213.8	218.8
Aruba	0.2	57	59	61	60	61	285.0	295.0	305.0	300.0	305.0
Bahamas	13.9	79	110	170	210	255	5.7	7.9	12.2	15.1	18.4
Barbados	0.4	211	231	239	249	257	527.5	577.5	597.5	622.5	642.5
Belize	23.0	67	91	120	146	189	2.9	4.0	5.2	6.4	8.2
Dominica	0.8	51	60	70	75	72	63.8	75.0	87.5	93.8	90.0
Grenada	0.3	76	90	94	89	91	253.3	300.0	313.3	296.7	303.3
Guadeloupe	1.7	210	275	320	327	390	123.5	161.8	188.2	192.4	229.4
French Guiana	90.0	25	33	49	69	98	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.8	1.1
Guyana	215.0	423	569	709	759	796	2.0	2.7	3.3	3.5	3.7
Cayman Islands	0.3	6	9	10	17	27	20.0	30.0	33.3	56.7	90.0
British Virgin Islands	0.2	6	7	10	12	16	30.0	35.0	50.0	60.0	80.0
United States											
Virgin Islands	0.3	27	33	64	98	107	90.0	110.0	213.3	326.7	356.7
Jamaica	11.0	1 403	1 629	1 869	2 133	2 420	127.6	148.1	169.9	193.9	220.0
Martinique	1.1	222	282	326	326	360	201.8	256.4	296.4	296.4	327.3
Montserrat	0.1	14	12	11	12	11	140.0	120.0	110.0	120.0	110.0
Puerto Rico	8.9	2 219	2 358	2 718	3 206	3 530	249.3	264.9	305.4	360.2	396.6
Saint Kitts and Nevis	0.3	44	51	47	44	42	146.7	170.0	156.7	146.7	140.0
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0.4	67	80	93	103	116	167.5	200.0	232.5	257.5	290.0
Saint Lucia	0.6	79	86	101	115	133	131.7	143.3	168.3	191.7	221.7
Suriname	163.3	215	290	372	352	422	1.3	1.8	2.3	2.2	2.6
Trinidad and Tobago	5.1	636	843	971	1 082	1 236	124.7	165.3	190.4	212.2	242.4
Turks and Caicos	0.4	5	6	6	7	12	12.5	15.0	15.0	17.5	30.0

Source: Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), estimates of current population, and United Nations, *World Population Prospects: the 1992 Revision*, New York, 1992.

Table 10  
LATIN AMERICA : INDICATORS OF DEGREE AND RATE OF URBANIZATION, 1930-1990 <sup>a</sup>

Countries	Degree of urbanization (percentages) <sup>b</sup>							Rate of urbanization (per thousands) <sup>c</sup>					
	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	1930- 1940	1940- 1950	1950- 1960	1960- 1970	1970- 1980	1980- 1990
Argentina	57.2	60.5	65.3	72.0	78.5	83.0	85.9	5.6	7.7	9.7	8.6	5.6	3.4
Bolivia	24.5	27.0	30.0	33.5	38.2	44.7	52.4	9.8	10.5	11.0	13.2	15.7	16.0
Brazil	24.0	26.4	36.0	44.9	55.9	67.3	73.9	9.5	30.9	22.3	21.7	18.6	9.4
Colombia	24.5	30.6	38.1	48.5	57.4	64.2	69.5	22.2	21.9	24.1	16.9	11.2	7.8
Costa Rica	20.0	26.0	33.5	34.2	38.7	43.1	46.7	26.1	25.4	2.0	12.2	10.9	8.0
Cuba	51.0	53.7	56.3	58.5	60.2	68.0	74.8	5.2	4.7	3.8	2.8	12.3	9.5
Chile	49.5	52.4	59.9	68.1	75.1	81.2	84.6	5.7	13.4	12.9	9.7	7.8	4.2
Ecuador	22.0	25.0	28.5	34.4	39.6	47.1	56.3	12.9	13.0	19.0	13.8	17.5	17.9
El Salvador	28.0	31.5	35.7	37.0	39.4	43.0	46.8	11.7	12.6	3.5	6.3	8.8	8.5
Guatemala	20.0	22.0	24.5	32.5	34.4	37.2	38.1	9.5	10.8	28.3	5.6	7.9	2.3
Haiti	10.0	11.3	13.0	16.0	19.7	24.5	30.6	12.2	14.1	20.9	20.9	21.6	22.4
Honduras	12.0	14.5	17.6	22.0	28.0	34.8	40.7	18.5	19.3	22.4	24.4	21.8	15.6
Mexico	33.5	35.1	42.7	50.8	59.0	66.4	72.7	4.7	19.5	17.4	15.1	11.8	9.1
Nicaragua	25.5	30.0	35.0	39.6	47.0	51.1	55.3	16.4	15.3	12.4	17.1	8.5	7.9
Panama	30.0	33.5	35.9	41.4	47.2	49.6	52.9	11.3	6.7	14.2	13.2	4.9	6.4
Paraguay	30.0	31.8	34.6	35.6	37.0	41.5	47.4	5.7	8.5	3.0	3.8	11.5	13.3
Peru	26.5	30.5	35.5	46.3	58.1	64.2	70.0	14.0	15.3	26.5	22.6	10.1	8.5
Dominican Republic	17.5	20.0	23.8	30.2	39.3	50.1	58.6	13.1	17.5	24.1	26.1	24.3	15.8
Uruguay	63.0	67.0	72.5	78.0	82.0	85.1	88.8	6.1	7.9	7.3	5.0	3.7	4.2
Venezuela	27.0	33.5	47.0	62.0	75.0	83.0	87.5	21.5	33.9	27.7	19.0	10.1	5.3
<b>Latin America</b>	<b>32.0</b>	<b>34.7</b>	<b>41.6</b>	<b>49.4</b>	<b>57.7</b>	<b>65.6</b>	<b>71.2</b>	<b>8.3</b>	<b>18.1</b>	<b>17.1</b>	<b>15.5</b>	<b>12.9</b>	<b>8.1</b>

Source: M. Villa, "Urbanización y transición demográfica en América Latina: una reseña del período 1930-1990", *The Peopling of the Americas. Proceedings. Veracruz 1992*, vol. 2, Liège, International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, 1992.

<sup>a</sup> "Urban" population defined according to criteria used by national statistical offices. Estimates prior to 1950 are approximate and figures for 1990 (except for Venezuela) are those projected by CELADE. <sup>b</sup> Expressed as the percentage of the total population living in localities defined as "urban" by national statistical offices. <sup>c</sup> Average annual rate of growth of urbanization (urban percentage); its value is identical to the difference between the rates of growth (calculated exponentially) of the urban and total populations.

Table 11  
LATIN AMERICA: POPULATION CONCENTRATION IN LARGE CITIES,<sup>a</sup> 1950, 1970 AND 1990

	Cities with 1 million or more inhabitants in:			Cities with 5 million or more inhabitants in:		
	1950	1970	1990	1950	1970	1990
Number of cities	7	18	38	1	4	5
Population (thousands of persons)	17 099	56 803	132 245	5 042	32 899	66 057
Percentage of total population	10.72	20.51	30.26	3.16	11.88	15.11
Percentage of urban population	25.77	35.63	42.61	7.60	20.64	21.28
	Cities with 1 million or more inhabitants in 1990:			Cities with 1 million or more inhabitants in 1950:		
	1950	1970	1990	1950	1970	1990
Number of cities	38	38	38	7	7	7
Population (thousands of persons)	26 931	69 008	132 245	17 099	38 648	67 840
Percentage of total population	16.88	24.91	30.26	10.72	13.95	15.52
Percentage of urban population	40.59	43.29	42.61	25.77	24.25	21.86
Average annual growth rate (per thousand)	47.05	32.52		40.77	28.13	
Index of urban predominance (per thousand) <sup>b</sup>	3.22	-0.79		-3.04	-5.19	

Source: J. Chackiel and M. Villa, "América Latina y el Caribe: dinámica de la población y desarrollo" (DDR/1), Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), 1992; paper presented at the Meeting of Government Experts on Population and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, preparatory to the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, Saint Lucia, 6-9 October.

<sup>a</sup> Does not include the city of San Juan, Puerto Rico. <sup>b</sup> Corresponds to the average annual rate of growth of the percentage of the urban population living in cities with one million or more inhabitants.

Table 12  
**LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CITIES WITH ONE MILLION OR MORE  
 INHABITANTS IN 1990: ESTIMATED POPULATION, AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE  
 OF GROWTH AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL AND URBAN POPULATIONS  
 OF EACH COUNTRY**  
 (1950, 1970 AND 1990)

Countries and cities	Estimated total population (in thousands) <sup>a</sup>			Average annual rate of growth (percentage)		Percentage of total population			Percentage of urban population <sup>b</sup>		
	1950	1970	1990	1950- 1970	1970- 1990	1950	1970	1990	1950	1970	1990
<b>Argentina</b>	17 150	23 962	32 322	1.67	1.50	100.0	100.0	100.0	65.3	78.4	86.3
Buenos Aires	5 042	8 414	11 509 <sup>c</sup>	2.56	1.57	29.4	35.1	35.6	45.0	44.8	41.3
Córdoba	416	787	1 136	3.19	1.84	2.4	3.3	3.5	3.7	4.2	4.1
Rosario	532	809	1 084	2.10	1.46	3.1	3.4	3.4	4.7	4.3	3.9
<b>Bolivia</b>	2 766	4 325	7 171	2.24	2.53	100.0	100.0	100.0	37.8	40.7	52.3
La Paz	265	516	1234 <sup>c</sup>	3.33	4.36	9.6	11.9	17.2	25.4	29.3	32.9
<b>Brazil</b>	53 444	95 847	150 368	2.92	2.25	100.0	100.0	100.0	36.0	55.8	74.9
São Paulo	2 423	8 064	17 395	6.01	3.84	4.5	8.4	11.6	12.6	15.1	15.4
Rio de Janeiro	2 864	7 040	10 714	4.50	2.10	5.4	7.3	7.1	14.9	13.2	9.5
Belo Horizonte	365	1 589	3 598	7.35	4.09	0.7	1.7	2.4	1.9	3.0	3.2
Porto Alegre	459	1 521	3 124	5.99	3.60	0.9	1.6	2.1	2.4	2.8	2.8
Recife	661	1 781	2 492	4.96	1.68	1.2	1.9	1.7	3.4	3.3	2.2
Salvador	403	1 140	2 401	5.20	3.72	0.8	1.2	1.6	2.1	2.1	2.1
Brasília	37	526	2 362	13.27	7.51	0.1	0.5	1.6	0.2	1.0	2.1
Fortaleza	256	1 030	2 088	6.96	3.53	0.5	1.1	1.4	1.3	1.9	1.9
Curitiba	137	814	2 031	8.91	4.57	0.3	0.8	1.4	0.7	1.5	1.8
Goiânia	41	490	1 679	12.40	6.16	0.1	0.5	1.1	0.2	0.9	1.5
Campinas	101	483	1 659	7.82	6.17	0.2	0.5	1.1	0.5	0.9	1.5
Manaus	110	280	1 215	4.67	7.34	0.2	0.3	0.8	0.6	0.5	1.1
Santos	238	656	1 199	5.07	3.02	0.4	0.7	0.8	1.2	1.2	1.1
Belém	233	651	1 029	5.14	2.29	0.4	0.7	0.7	1.2	1.2	0.9
<b>Colombia</b>	11 946	21 360	32 978	2.91	2.17	100.0	100.0	100.0	37.1	57.2	70.0
Bogotá	676	2 371	4 851	6.27	3.58	5.7	11.1	14.7	15.3	19.4	21.0
Medellín	341	1 006	1 585	5.41	2.27	2.9	4.7	4.8	7.7	8.2	6.9
Cali	270	847	1 555	5.72	3.04	2.3	4.0	4.7	6.1	6.9	6.7
Barranquilla	305	516	1 019	2.63	3.40	2.6	2.4	3.1	6.9	4.2	4.4
<b>Costa Rica</b>	862	1 731	3 015	3.49	2.77	100.0	100.0	100.0	33.5	39.7	47.1
San José	183	438	1 016	4.36	4.21	21.2	25.3	33.7	63.3	63.8	71.5
<b>Cuba</b>	5 850	8 520	10 608	1.88	1.10	100.0	100.0	100.0	49.4	60.2	74.9
Havana	1 147	1 745	2 099	2.10	0.92	19.6	20.5	19.8	39.7	34.0	26.4
<b>Chile</b>	6 082	9 504	13 173	2.23	1.63	100.0	100.0	100.0	58.4	75.2	85.9
Santiago	1 332	2 837	4 734 <sup>c</sup>	3.78	2.56	21.9	29.9	35.9	37.5	39.7	41.8

Table 12 (concluded)

Countries and cities	Estimated total population (in thousands) <sup>a</sup>			Average annual rate of growth (percentage)		Percentage of total population			Percentage of urban population <sup>b</sup>		
	1950	1970	1990	1950-1970	1970-1990	1950	1970	1990	1950	1970	1990
<b>Ecuador</b>	3 310	6 051	10 587	3.02	2.80	100.0	100.0	100.0	28.2	39.5	56.0
Guayaquil	253	694	1 674 <sup>c</sup>	5.05	4.40	7.6	11.5	15.8	27.1	29.0	28.2
Quito	206	501	1 241 <sup>c</sup>	4.44	4.54	6.2	8.3	11.7	22.0	20.9	20.9
<b>Haiti</b>	3 261	4 535	6 513	1.65	1.81	100.0	100.0	100.0	12.2	19.8	28.3
Port-au-Prince	144	461	1 031	5.82	4.02	4.4	10.2	15.8	36.3	51.5	56.0
<b>Mexico</b>	28 012	52 771	88 598	3.17	2.59	100.0	100.0	100.0	42.7	59.0	72.6
Mexico City	3 148	9 765	20 192 <sup>c</sup>	5.66	3.63	11.2	18.5	22.8	27.2	31.4	33.3
Guadalajara	403	1 513	3 161 <sup>c</sup>	6.61	3.68	1.4	2.9	3.6	3.4	4.9	4.9
Monterrey	356	1 229	2 970 <sup>c</sup>	6.20	4.41	1.3	2.3	3.4	3.0	3.9	4.6
Puebla	227	413	1 267	2.99	5.60	0.8	0.8	1.4	1.9	1.3	2.0
<b>Nicaragua</b>	1 098	2 053	3 871	3.13	3.17	100.0	100.0	100.0	35.0	47.0	59.8
Managua	110	378	1 012	6.17	4.92	10.0	18.4	26.1	28.6	39.2	43.8
<b>Peru</b>	7 632	13 193	21 550	2.74	2.45	100.0	100.0	100.0	35.5	57.4	70.2
Lima	973	2 928	6 247	5.51	3.79	12.7	22.2	29.0	35.9	38.7	41.3
<b>Puerto Rico</b>	2 219	2 718	3 530	1.01	1.31	100.0	100.0	100.0	40.6	58.3	73.9
San Juan	468	703	1 390	2.03	3.41	21.1	25.9	39.4	51.9	44.4	54.0
<b>Dominican Republic</b>	2 353	4 423	7 170	3.16	2.42	100.0	100.0	100.0	23.8	40.3	60.4
Santo Domingo	219	838	2 203	6.71	4.83	9.3	18.9	30.7	39.2	47.1	50.9
<b>Uruguay</b>	2 239	2 808	3 094	1.13	0.48	100.0	100.0	100.0	78.0	82.1	85.5
Montevideo	1 143	1 167	1 197	0.10	0.13	51.0	41.6	38.7	65.5	50.6	45.3
<b>Venezuela</b>	5 009	10 604	19 735	3.75	3.11	100.0	100.0	100.0	53.2	72.4	90.5
Caracas	676	2 047	4 096 <sup>c</sup>	5.54	3.47	13.5	19.3	20.8	25.3	26.7	22.9
Maracaibo	230	617	1 146	4.93	3.10	4.6	5.8	5.8	8.6	8.0	6.4

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), *Dinámica de la población de las grandes ciudades en América Latina y el Caribe*, paper presented at the Meeting of Experts on Population Distribution and Migration, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia, 18-22 January, 1993.

<sup>a</sup> Population figures are estimates and therefore do not exactly coincide with census data. <sup>b</sup> Figures for national totals correspond to the percentage of urban population in the respective country. <sup>c</sup> According to the latest available census figures, whether final or preliminary, the population in these cities in 1990 was less than estimated by the source. Thus, for example, in Mexico, the final 1990 census data indicate that the population of the Mexico City metropolitan area was 15 047 685, that of the Guadalajara metropolitan area was 2 987 194 and that of the Monterrey metropolitan area was 2 603 709.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alan Guttmacher Institute (1992), *Perspectivas internacionales en planificación familiar*, vol. 18, No. 2, June.
- (1991), *Perspectivas internacionales en planificación familiar*, special issue.
- (1989a), *Perspectivas internacionales en planificación familiar*, vol. 15, No. 3, September.
- (1989b), "Las salvadoreñas adoptan la P.F. tarde; esterilización es el método más común", *Perspectivas internacionales en planificación familiar*, special issue.
- (1989c), "Fecundidad y uso anticonceptivo en Costa Rica, 1987", *Perspectivas internacionales en planificación familiar*, special issue.
- Argüello, Omar (1991), "Desarrollo económico, políticas sociales y población", *Notas de población*, year 19, No. 53 (LC/DEM/G.117), Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), August.
- Boland, Barbara (1992), Population dynamics and development in the Caribbean (with special emphasis on adolescent fertility, international migration and population policy and development planning) (DDR/2), Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE); paper presented at the Meeting of Government Experts on Population and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, preparatory to the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, Saint Lucia, 6-9 October.
- Bongaarts, J. (1978), "A framework for analysing the proximate determinants of fertility", *Population and Development Review*, vol. 4, No. 1, March.
- Bongaarts, J. and R. Lightbourne (1992), "Fecundidad deseada en América Latina y el Caribe: tendencias y diferenciales en siete países", *Notas de población*, year 20, No. 55 (LC/DEM/G.124), Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), June.
- Bonilla, Elssy (1990), "Working women in Latin America", *Economic and Social Progress in Latin America. 1990 Report*, Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Washington, D.C.
- Buvinić, Mayra (1992), "Proyecto Conjunto del Consejo de Población y el Centro Internacional de Investigaciones sobre la Mujer (ICRW) sobre estructura familiar, jefatura de hogar femenina y pobreza", Washington, D.C., August.
- (1991), *The Vulnerability of Households Headed by Women: Policy Questions and Options For Latin America and the Caribbean* (LC/L.611), Mujer y desarrollo series, No. 8, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
- Callovi, G. (1992), "Regulation of immigration in 1993: pieces of the European Community jig-saw puzzle", *International Migration Review*, vol. 26, Summer.
- CELADE (Latin American Demographic Centre) (1992a), *Latin America: Economically Active Population, Period 1970-2000* (LC/DEM.G.118), Demographic Bulletin series, Year 25, No. 49, Santiago, Chile, January.

- \_\_\_\_ (1992b), Family planning programmes in Latin America: present situation and new challenges, Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE); paper presented at the meeting of the group of experts on family planning and family health and welfare, Bangalore, India, 26-30 October.
- \_\_\_\_ (1992c), Honduras: diagnóstico sociodemográfico y proyecciones de la población pobre y no pobre según distintas metas, 1990-2010 (LC/DEM/R.172), Santiago, Chile.
- \_\_\_\_ (1992d), Latin America: notes on population, environment and development (IESA/P/AC.34/INF.6), paper presented at the United Nations Expert Group Meeting on Population, Environment and Development, New York, 20-24 January.
- \_\_\_\_ (1991), "Población y transformación productiva con equidad; versión preliminar", Santiago, Chile, unpublished.
- \_\_\_\_ (1990), "La mortalidad en las Américas: progresos, problemas y perspectivas", Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), unpublished.
- \_\_\_\_ (1989), IMILA: Investigation of International Migration in Latin America (LC/DEM/G.74), Demographic Bulletin series, Year 22, No. 43, Santiago, Chile, January.
- \_\_\_\_ (1979), "Las políticas de población en América Latina 1974-1977" (DC/19), Santiago, Chile, June, unpublished.
- Chackiel, J. and J. Martínez (1992), "Transición demográfica en América Latina y el Caribe desde 1950", Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE); paper presented at the Fourth Latin American Population Conference on Demographic Transition, Mexico City, 23-26 March.
- Chackiel, J. and M. Villa (1992), Latin America and the Caribbean: the dynamics of population and growth (DDR/1), Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE); paper presented at the Meeting of Government Experts on Population and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, preparatory to the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, Saint Lucia, 6-9 October.
- Chackiel, J. and S. Schkolnik (1992), "La transición de la fecundidad en América Latina", *Notas de población*, year 20, No. 55, Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE).
- Chaparro, F. (1971), *Emigración de profesionales de América Latina: síntesis de la situación*, Washington, D.C., Organization of American States (OAS).
- CONAPO (National Population Commission) (1992), "Política nacional de población de El Salvador", San Salvador, preliminary version.
- CONAPO (National Population Council) (1991), *Informe sobre la situación demográfica de México, 1990*, Mexico City.
- \_\_\_\_ (1977), *Política demográfica regional*, Mexico City.
- CONAPOFA (National Population and Family Council) (1987), *República Dominicana: Encuesta Demográfica y de Salud DHS-86*, Santo Domingo, Institute for Resource Development (IRD), December.
- David, Henry (1974), "Abortion research in transnational perspective: an overview", *Abortion Research: International Experience*, Henry David (ed.), Lexington, Lexington Books.
- Davis, K. and J. Blake (1956), "Social structure and fertility: an analytic framework", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, vol. 4, No. 4.

- Davis, K. and M. Bernstam (eds.) (1991), *Resources, Environment, and Population: Present Knowledge, Future Options*, New York, Population Council; supplement to *Population and Development Review*, vol. 16, 1990.
- De Barbieri, Teresita (1991), *Género y políticas de población. Una reflexión*, Mexico City, Institute of Social Research, National Autonomous University of Mexico (IIS/UNAM).
- Destler, H. and others (1990), "Preparing for the twenty-first century: Principles for family planning service delivery in the nineties", Washington, D.C., United States Agency for International Development (USAID), November, unpublished.
- DHS (Demographic and Health Survey) (1991), *Newsletter*, vol. 4, No. 2, Columbia, Maryland, Institute for Resource Development (IRD)/Macro International.
- Díaz, E. (1987), *Causas de muerte en Guatemala, 1960-1979*, Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE).
- Domenach, H. and M. Picouet (1992), *La dimension migratoire des Antilles*, Paris, Economica.
- Domínguez, M.A. (1989), "Economic analysis of the vaccination strategies adopted in Brazil in 1982", *Health Economics: Latin American Perspectives*, Scientific Publication series, No.517, Washington, D.C., Pan American Health Organization (PAHO).
- ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) (1992a), *Latin American poverty profiles for the early 1990s (LC/L.716(Conf.82/6))*, Santiago, Chile.
- (1992b), *Embarazo en la adolescencia: aspectos psicosociales y familiares (LC/R.1112)*, Santiago, Chile, February.
- (1992c), *Social Equity and Changing Production Patterns: An Integrated Approach (LC/G.1701/Rev.1-P)*, Santiago, Chile. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.92.II.G.5.
- (1992d), *Report of the Meeting of Specialized Agencies and Other Bodies of the United Nations System on Future Activities to Promote the Integration of Women into Latin American and Caribbean Development (LC/L.712)*, Santiago, Chile, October.
- (1992e), *Major Changes and Crisis: The Impact on Women in Latin America and the Caribbean (LC/G.1592-P)*, Santiago, Chile, September. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.90.II.G.13.
- (1991a), *Sustainable Development: Changing Production Patterns, Social Equity and the Environment (LC/G.1648/Rev.2-P)*, Santiago, Chile, May. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.91.II.G.5.
- (1991b), *Informe del seminario sobre remesas internacionales y pobreza en Centroamérica (LC/MEX/L.156)*, Mexico City, ECLAC subregional headquarters in Mexico.
- (1991c), *Women in Latin America and the Caribbean: the challenge of changing production patterns with social equity (LC/L.627(CRM.5/4))*, Santiago, Chile, July.
- (1991d), *Women in Caribbean development: gender equity in changing production patterns (LC/L.628(CRM.5/5))*, Santiago, Chile, August.
- (1991e), *Magnitud de la pobreza en América Latina en los años ochenta (LC/G.1653-P)*, Estudios e informes de la CEPAL series, No.81, Santiago, Chile, August. United Nations publication, Sales No. S.91.II.G.10.
- (1990a), *Refugee and Displaced Women in Latin America and the Caribbean (LC/L.591)*, *Mujer y desarrollo* series, No. 4, Santiago, Chile, November.



- (1990b), *Changing Production Patterns with Social Equity: The Prime Task of Latin American and Caribbean Development in the 1990s* (LC/G.1601-P), Santiago, Chile, March. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.90.II.G.6.
- (1989), *Transformación ocupacional y crisis social en América Latina* (LC/G.1558-P), Santiago, Chile. United Nations publication, Sales No. S.90.II.G.3.
- (1984), Report of the Latin American Regional Preparatory Meeting for the International Conference on Population, held within the seventh session of the Committee of High-level Government Experts (Havana, Cuba, 19-19 November 1983) (E/CEPAL/SES.20/G.19), Santiago, Chile, February.
- (1979a), Contributions to the diagnosis and promotion of the integration of women into the development of Latin America and the Caribbean (E/CEPAL/CRM.2/L.3), Santiago, Chile, October.
- (1979b), Report of the First Meeting on Population of the Committee of High-level Government Experts (E/CEPAL/1072), Santiago, Chile, March.
- (1977), Regional Plan of Action for the Integration of Women into Latin American Economic and Social Development (E/CEPAL/1042/Rev.1), Santiago, Chile, November.
- (1975), Report of the Latin American Preparatory Meeting for the World Population Conference (E/CEPAL/AC.68/3), Santiago, Chile.
- (1975a), Report of the Second Latin American Meeting on Population (Mexico City, 3-7 March 1975) (ST/ECLA/Conf.54/L.9/Rev.1), Santiago, Chile, March.
- ECLAC/CELADE (1993), *Dinámica de la población de las grandes ciudades en América Latina y el Caribe*, paper presented at the Reunión de Expertos sobre Distribución de la Población y Migración, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia, 18-22 January.
- ECLAC/OREALC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean/UNESCO Regional Office for Education in Latin America and the Caribbean) (1992), *Education and Knowledge: Basic Pillars of Changing Production Patterns with Social Equity* (LC/G.1702/Rev.1-P), Santiago, Chile. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.92.II.G.6.
- ECLAC/UNDP (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean/United Nations Development Programme) (1980), *¿Se puede superar la pobreza? Realidad y perspectivas en América Latina* (E/CEPAL/G.1139), Santiago, Chile.
- Elson, D. (1991), Gender issues in development strategies (SWID/1991/WP.1), Vienna, United Nations Office at Vienna; paper presented at the Seminar on Integration of Women in Development, Vienna, 9-11 December.
- Espín, Vilma (1990), *Mujeres en Cuba: familia y sociedad*, Discursos, entrevistas, documentos series, Havana, Imprenta General de las FAR.
- Escobar, Silvia (1988), "Comercio en pequeña escala en La Paz", *La mujer en el sector informal: trabajo femenino y microempresa en América Latina*, Mayra Buvinic and Marguerite Berger (eds.), Caracas, Editorial Nueva Sociedad.
- FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) (1992), Potential population-supporting capacity of lands: environmental aspects, paper presented at the United Nations Expert Group Meeting on Population, Environment and Development, New York, 20-24 January.
- Ferrando, D., S. Singh and D. Wulf (1989), *Adolescentes de hoy, padres del mañana: Perú*, New York, Alan Guttmacher Institute.
- FMC (Federación de Mujeres Cubanas) (1990), *Mujer y sociedad en cifras 1975-1988*, Havana, Editorial de la Mujer.

- Fortuna, J. C. and N. Niedworok (1985), *La migración internacional de uruguayos en la última década*, Geneva, International Organization for Migration (IOM).
- Frejka, T. and L. Atkin (1990), The role of induced abortion in the fertility transition of Latin America, paper presented at the Seminar on Fertility Transition in Latin America, organized by the Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), the Centro de Estudios de Población (CENEP) and the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP), Buenos Aires, 3-6 April.
- Frenk, J. and others (1989), "The epidemiological transition in Latin America", *International Population Conference, 1989*, International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP) (ed.), Liège.
- Gabrie, J. (1991), "Honduras: características sociodemográficas y económicas de la población según grado de pobreza, 1990", Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), unpublished.
- Guzmán, J. M. (1992), *Crisis, Adjustment and Fertility During Latin America's "Lost Decade": Facts and Speculations*, Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE).
- Henriques, M.E. and others (1986), *Adolescentes de hoje, país do amanhã: Brasil*, New York, Alan Guttmacher Institute.
- Hogan, D. (consultant) (1992), Population growth and distribution: their relations to development and the environment (DDR/5), Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE); paper presented at the Meeting of Government Experts on Population and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, preparatory to the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, Saint Lucia, 6-9 October.
- IOM (International Organization for Migration) (1992), "Migración y desarrollo", Tenth IOM Seminar on Migration, Geneva, September.
- Irrarázaval, I. and J. P. Valenzuela (1992), *La ilegitimidad en Chile. ¿Hacia un cambio en la formación de la familia?*, Documentos de trabajo series, No. 188, Santiago, Chile, Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP).
- Isis International (1990), *El malestar silenciado: la otra salud mental*, Ediciones de las mujeres series, No. 14, Santiago, Chile, December.
- Krawczyk, M. (1992), Women in Latin America and the Caribbean: potential leadership in the area of population (DDR/6), Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE); paper presented at the Meeting of Government Experts on Population and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, preparatory to the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, Saint Lucia, 6-9 October.
- Lapham, S. J. (undated), *The Foreign Born Population in the United States: 1990*, Washington, D.C., Bureau of the Census.
- Lim, L. L. (1993), Growing economic interdependence and its implications for international migration, paper presented at the Reunión de Expertos sobre Distribución de la Población y Migración, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia, 18-22 January.
- Macció, G. (1992), Population policies in Latin America: feasibility and opportunity (DDR/4), Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE); paper presented at the Meeting of Government Experts on Population and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, preparatory to the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, Saint Lucia, 6-9 October.

- Madrigal Pana, Johny (1989), "La esterilización femenina en Costa Rica, 1976-1986", *Perspectivas internacionales en planificación familiar*, Alan Guttmacher Institute, special issue.
- Martínez P., J. (1992), La migración de mano de obra calificada dentro de América Latina (LC/DEM/G.126), Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE).
- Mauldin, W. and J. Ross (1991), "Family planning programmes: efforts and results, 1982-89", *Studies in Family Planning*, vol. 22, No. 6, November-December.
- Meisner, D. (1992), "Managing migrations", *Foreign Policy*, vol. 86, Spring.
- Mesa-Lago, Carmelo (1990), *La seguridad social y el sector informal*, serie Investigaciones sobre Empleo, No. 32, Santiago, Chile, Regional Employment Programme for Latin America and the Caribbean (PREALC).
- Miller, Billie (1992), Adolescent pregnancy in the Americas and the Caribbean (ESD/P/ICPD.1994/EG.III/11), paper presented at the Expert Group Meeting on Population and Women, Gaborone, 22-26 June.
- Miró, C. (consultant) (1992), Population policies: past and future perspectives (DDR/3), Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE); paper presented at the Meeting of Government Experts on Population and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, preparatory to the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, Saint Lucia, 6-9 October.
- Montes, S. (1987), *El Salvador 1987: salvadoreños refugiados en los Estados Unidos*, San Salvador, Instituto de Investigaciones y de Derechos Humanos, Universidad Centroamericana "José Simeón Cañas".
- Morales, M. (1991), "Nicaragua: características socio-económicas y demográficas según estado de pobreza", Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), unpublished.
- Moreno, L. and S. Singh (1990), *Fertility Decline and Changes in Proximate Determinants in the Latin American Region*, Princeton, Princeton University.
- Musgrove, Philip (1989), "Is polio eradication in the Americas economically justified?", *Health Economics: Latin American Perspectives*, Scientific Publication series, No.517, Washington, D.C., Pan American Health Organization (PAHO).
- Ocampo, E. (1983), "Política de población: marco institucional, principios, objetivos y metas", *Análisis de políticas poblacionales en América Latina*, Universidad Central del Ecuador, Quito.
- Ottone, Ernesto (1991), "Modernidad y ciudadanía: el desafío educativo del siglo XXI", Santiago, Chile, unpublished.
- PAHO (Pan American Health Organization) (1992), *Prevención de la mortalidad materna en las Américas: perspectivas para los años noventa*, Comunicación para la salud series, No. 2, Washington, D.C.
- (1992a), "Plan regional de inversiones en ambiente y salud", document presented at the Second Ibero-American Summit of Heads of State and Government, Madrid, 23-24 July.
- (1990), *Health Conditions in the Americas*. 1990 Edition, Scientific Publication series, No. 524, Washington, D.C.
- (1982), *Health for All by the Year 2000. Plan of Action for the Implementation of Regional Strategies*, Official Document series, No. 179, Washington, D.C.
- Pellegrino, A. (1992), La movilidad de profesionales y técnicos latinoamericanos y del Caribe (LC/DEM/R.175), Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE).

- Percy K., E. and R. Warren (1992), "Demographic dimensions of Southern migration to and from the United States since the 1970s", *El poblamiento de las Américas*, International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP) (ed.), vol. 2, Veracruz.
- Portes, A. (1977), "Los determinantes de la emigración profesional", *Revista paraguaya de sociología*, Year 14, No. 39/40, May-December.
- Portocarrero, Patricia (ed.) (1990), *Mujer en el desarrollo: balance y propuestas*, Lima, Centro de la Mujer Peruana Flora Tristán.
- Prada, E. (consultant) (1992), Family planning in Latin America (DDR/7), Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE); paper presented at the Meeting of Government Experts on Population and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, preparatory to the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, Saint Lucia, 6-9 October.
- Rajs, D. (1991), *Maternal Mortality in Latin America and the Caribbean*, Liège, International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP).
- Rodríguez, G. (1991), "Educación sexual y políticas de población", *Demos: carta demográfica sobre México*, No. 4.
- Rodríguez, L. (1989), México: contribución de las causas de muerte al cambio en la esperanza de vida, 1970-1982 (LC/DEM/G.73), Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE).
- Rodríguez, T. (1982), *Las migraciones internacionales en Chile*, Washington, D.C., Organization of American States (OAS).
- Ruiz, M. (1982), *La mortalidad en Venezuela por sexo, edad y causas, 1968-1978*, Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE).
- Russell, S. S. (1993), Migration between developing countries in the African and the Latin American regions, paper presented at the Reunión de Expertos sobre Distribución de la Población y Migración, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia, 18-22 January.
- Sierra, G. and J. L. Petrucelli (1979), *Proceso de las migraciones internacionales de uruguayos (1960-1975)*, Montevideo, Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO)/Information and Research Centre of Uruguay (CIESU).
- Simmons, A. B. and J. P. Guengat (1992), "Recent migration within the Caribbean region: migrant origins, destinations and economics roles", *El poblamiento de las Américas*, International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP) (ed.), vol. 2, Veracruz.
- Singh, S. (1992), Adolescent reproductive behaviour and women's status (ESD/P/ICPD.1994/EG/ EG.III/10), paper presented at the Expert Group Meeting on Population and Women, Gaborone, 22-26 June.
- Singh, S. and D. Wulf (1990), *Adolescentes de hoy, padres del mañana: un perfil de las Américas*, New York, Alan Guttmacher Institute.
- Sojo, A. (1993), "La singularidad de las políticas de población en América Latina y el Caribe en las postrimerías del siglo XX", Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), unpublished.
- (1992), "La inserción laboral de la mujer latinoamericana: entre la crisis económica y los retos de la transformación productiva con equidad", Santiago, Chile, inédito.
- Straubhaar, T. (1992), "Allocation and distributional aspects of future immigration to Western Europe", *International Migration Review*, vol. 26, Summer.

- Suhrke, A. (1993), Safeguarding the right to asylum, paper presented at the Reunión de Expertos sobre Distribución de la Población y Migración, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia, 18-22 January.
- Thapa, Rita (1992), Working notes on women's participation and perspectives in health issues (ESD/P/ICPD.1994/EG.III/DN.6), paper presented at the Expert Group Meeting on Population and Women, Gaborone, 22-26 June.
- Thiam, B. (1992), The demographic consequences of environmental degradation: impact on migratory flows and on the spatial redistribution of the population, paper presented at the United Nations Expert Group Meeting on Population, Environment and Development, New York, 20-24 January.
- Tietze, Cristopher (1987), *Informe mundial sobre el aborto*, Madrid, Institute for Women's Studies.
- Torrealba, R. (1992), "Migración y crisis en los países andinos: los años ochenta", *El poblamiento de las Américas*, International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP) (ed.), vol. 2, Veracruz.
- UFRO/INE/FII/PAESMI/CELADE (Universidad de La Frontera/National Institute of Statistics/Fundación Instituto Indígena/Programme for Support and Extension in Maternal and Child Health/Latin American Demographic Centre) (1990), *Censo de reducciones indígenas seleccionadas: análisis sociodemográfico* (LC/DEM/G.96/OI93), Santiago, Chile, Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE).
- UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (1989), *Displaced persons, refugees and returnees in the context of economic and social development in Central America*, Guatemala City, May.
- UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund) (1991), *Population, Resources and the Environment: The Critical Challenges*, New York.
- UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) (1992a), *Progress Report on Implementation of the UNHCR Policy on Refugee Women* (ES/SC.2/55), Geneva, August.
- (1992b), *Progress Report on Implementation of the UNHCR Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women* (ES/SCP/74), Geneva, July.
- United Nations (1992a), A gender perspective on population issues. Discussion note (ESD/P/ICPD.1994/EG.III/DN.2), Vienna, United Nations Office at Vienna; paper presented at the Expert Group Meeting on Population and Women, Gaborone, 22-26 June.
- (1992b), *Population and women: a review of issues and trends*. Background paper (ESD/P/ICD.1994/EG.III/3), Vienna, United Nations Office at Vienna; paper presented at the Expert Group Meeting on Population and Women, Gaborone, 22-26 June.
- (1992c), *World Population Prospects. The 1992 Revision*, New York.
- (1992d), *Global Population Policy: Database 1991* (ST/ESA/SER.R.118), New York.
- (1991a), *World Population Prospects, 1990* (ST/ESA/SER.A/120), New York. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.91.XIII.4.
- (1991b), *Socio-economic Development and Fertility Decline: An Application to the Easterlin Synthesis Approach to Data from the World Fertility Survey. Colombia, Costa Rica, Sri Lanka and Tunisia* (ST/ESA/SER.R/101), New York, United Nations Department of International Economic and Social Affairs.

- (1990), *Socio-economic Development and Fertility Decline: A Review of Some Theoretical Approaches* (ST/ESA/SER.R/102), New York, United Nations Department of International Economic and Social Affairs.
- (1989), *Adolescent Reproductive Behaviour*, vol. 2, Population Studies series, No. 109/Add.1, New York, United Nations Department of International Economic and Social Affairs.
- (1987), *Fertility Behaviour in the Context of Development. Evidence from the World Fertility Survey*, Population Studies series, No. 100, New York, United Nations Department of International Economic and Social Affairs.
- (1985), *Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women*, New York, United Nations Department of Public Information.
- (1984), *Report of the International Conference on Population, 1984* (E/CONF.76/19), New York. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.84.XIII.8.
- (1979a), *Review and Appraisal of the World Population Plan of Action* (ST/ESA/SER.A/71), Population Studies series, No. 71, New York. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.79.XIII.7.
- (1979b), *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women*, New York, Department of Public Information.
- (1975), *Report of the United Nations World Population Conference, 1974* (E/CONF.60/19), New York. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.75.XIII.3.
- Vianna, S. and others (1988), "El impacto de la crisis económica en los servicios de salud: el caso de Brasil", *Crisis económica y salud: la experiencia de cinco países latinoamericanos en los años ochenta*, Philip Musgrove (comp.), Washington, D.C., Pan American Health Organization (PAHO).
- Wainermann, Catalina (1992), *Improving the Accounting of Women Workers in Population Censuses: Lessons from Latin America* (WEP 2-21/WP.178), World Employment Programme Research Working Papers series, No. 178, Geneva, International Labour Organisation (ILO).
- Weintraub, S. (1992), "North American free trade and the European situation compared", *International Migration Review*, vol. 26, Summer.
- Westoff, Charles F. (1991), *Reproductive Preferences: A Comparative View*, Demographic and Health Surveys Comparative Studies series, No. 3, Columbia, Maryland, Institute for Resource Development (IRD), February.
- Westoff, Charles and Luis Hernando Ochoa (1991), *Unmet Need and the Demand for Family Planning*, Demographic and Health Surveys Comparative Studies series, No. 5, Maryland, Institute for Resource Development (IRD), July.
- WHO (World Health Organization) (1992), *Women's Health: Across Age and Frontier*, Geneva.
- (1980), *La salud y la condición de la mujer* (FHE/80.1), Geneva.
- World Bank (1992), *World Development Report, 1992*, Washington, D.C.
- Wulf, D. (1986), "Embarazo y alumbramiento en la adolescencia en América Latina y el Caribe: una conferencia memorable", *Perspectivas internacionales en planificación familiar*, special issue.
- Yasaki, L. (1990), *Causas de morte e esperança de vida ao nascer no Estado de São Paulo e regiões, 1975-1983*, Coleção Realidade Paulista, São Paulo, data Analysis System of the State of São Paulo (SEADE).



## ECLAC publications

ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE  
CARIBBEAN

Casilla 179-D Santiago de Chile

### PERIODIC PUBLICATIONS

#### CEPAL Review

*CEPAL Review* first appeared in 1976 as part of the Publications Programme of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, its aim being to make a contribution to the study of the economic and social development problems of the region. The views expressed in signed articles, including those by Secretariat staff members, are those of the authors and therefore do not necessarily reflect the point of view of the Organization.

*CEPAL Review* is published in Spanish and English versions three times a year.

Annual subscription costs for 1993 are US\$16 for the Spanish version and US\$18 for the English version. The price of single issues is US\$10 in both cases.

The cost of a two-year subscription (1993-1994) is US\$30 for Spanish-language version and US\$34 for English.

#### Estudio Económico de América Latina y el Caribe

1980,	664 pp.
1981,	863 pp.
1982, vol. I	693 pp.
1982, vol. II	199 pp.
1983, vol. I	694 pp.
1983, vol. II	179 pp.
1984, vol. I	702 pp.
1984, vol. II	233 pp.
1985,	672 pp.
1986,	734 pp.

#### Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean

1980,	629 pp.
1981,	837 pp.
1982, vol. I	658 pp.
1982, vol. II	186 pp.
1983, vol. I	686 pp.
1983, vol. II	166 pp.
1984, vol. I	685 pp.
1984, vol. II	216 pp.
1985,	660 pp.
1986,	729 pp.

1987,	692 pp.	1987,	685 pp.
1988,	741 pp.	1988,	637 pp.
1989,	821 pp.	1989,	678 pp.
1990, vol. I	260 pp.	1990, vol. I	248 pp.
1990, vol. II	590 pp.	1990, vol. II	472 pp.
1991, vol. I	299 pp.	1991, vol. I	281 pp.
1991, vol. II	602 pp.		

(Issues for previous years also available)

#### Anuario Estadístico de América Latina y el Caribe / Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean (bilingual)

1980,	617 pp.	1987,	714 pp.
1981,	727 pp.	1988,	782 pp.
1982/1983,	749 pp.	1989,	770 pp.
1984,	761 pp.	1990,	782 pp.
1985,	792 pp.	1991,	856 pp.
1986,	782 pp.	1992,	868 pp.

(Issues for previous years also available)

#### Libros de la CEPAL

- 1 *Manual de proyectos de desarrollo económico*, 1958, 5th. ed. 1980, 264 pp.
- 1 *Manual on economic development projects*, 1958, 2nd. ed. 1972, 242 pp.
- 2 *América Latina en el umbral de los años ochenta*, 1979, 2nd. ed. 1980, 203 pp.
- 3 *Agua, desarrollo y medio ambiente en América Latina*, 1980, 443 pp.
- 4 *Los bancos transnacionales y el financiamiento externo de América Latina. La experiencia del Perú*, 1980, 265 pp.
- 4 *Transnational banks and the external finance of Latin America: the experience of Peru*, 1985, 342 pp.
- 5 *La dimensión ambiental en los estilos de desarrollo de América Latina*, Osvaldo Sunkel, 1981, 2nd. ed. 1984, 136 pp.
- 6 *La mujer y el desarrollo: guía para la planificación de programas y proyectos*, 1984, 115 pp.
- 6 *Women and development: guidelines for programme and project planning*, 1982, 3rd. ed. 1984, 123 pp.
- 7 *África y América Latina: perspectivas de la cooperación interregional*, 1983, 286 pp.
- 8 *Sobrevivencia campesina en ecosistemas de altura*, vols. I y II, 1983, 720 pp.
- 9 *La mujer en el sector popular urbano. América Latina y el Caribe*, 1984, 349 pp.
- 10 *Avances en la interpretación ambiental del desarrollo agrícola de América Latina*, 1985, 236 pp.

- 11 *El decenio de la mujer en el escenario latinoamericano*, 1986, 216 pp.
- 11 ***The decade for women in Latin America and the Caribbean: background and prospects***, 1988, 215 pp.
- 12 *América Latina: sistema monetario internacional y financiamiento externo*, 1986, 416 pp.
- 12 ***Latin America: international monetary system and external financing***, 1986, 405 pp.
- 13 Raúl Prebisch: *Un aporte al estudio de su pensamiento*, 1987, 146 pp.
- 14 *Cooperativismo latinoamericano: antecedentes y perspectivas*, 1989, 371 pp.
- 15 CEPAL, *40 años (1948-1988)*, 1988, 85 pp.
- 15 ***ECLAC 40 Years (1948-1988)***, 1989, 83 pp.
- 16 *América Latina en la economía mundial*, 1988, 321 pp.
- 17 *Gestión para el desarrollo de cuencas de alta montaña en la zona andina*, 1988, 187 pp.
- 18 *Políticas macroeconómicas y brecha externa: América Latina en los años ochenta*, 1989, 201 pp.
- 19 CEPAL, *Bibliografía, 1948-1988*, 1989, 648 pp.
- 20 *Desarrollo agrícola y participación campesina*, 1989, 404 pp.
- 21 *Planificación y gestión del desarrollo en áreas de expansión de la frontera agropecuaria en América Latina*, 1989, 113 pp.
- 22 *Transformación ocupacional y crisis social en América Latina*, 1989, 243 pp.
- 23 *La crisis urbana en América Latina y el Caribe: reflexiones sobre alternativas de solución*, 1990, 197 pp.
- 24 ***The environmental dimension in development planning I***, 1991, 302 pp.
- 25 *Transformación productiva con equidad*, 1990, 3rd. ed. 1991, 185 pp.
- 25 ***Changing production patterns with social equity***, 1990, 3rd. ed. 1991, 177 pp.
- 26 *América Latina y el Caribe: opciones para reducir el peso de la deuda*, 1990, 118 pp.
- 26 ***Latin America and the Caribbean: options to reduce the debt burden***, 1990, 110 pp.
- 27 *Los grandes cambios y la crisis. Impacto sobre la mujer en América Latina y el Caribe*, 1991, 271 pp.
- 27 ***Major changes and crisis. The impact on women in Latin America and the Caribbean***, 1992, 279 pp.
- 28 ***A collection of documents on economic relations between the United States and Central America, 1906-1956***, 1991, 398 pp.
- 29 *Inventarios y cuentas del patrimonio natural en América Latina y el Caribe*, 1991, 335 pp.
- 30 *Evaluaciones del impacto ambiental en América Latina y el Caribe*, 1991, 232 pp.
- 31 *El desarrollo sustentable: transformación productiva, equidad y medio ambiente*, 1991, 146 pp.

- 31 ***Sustainable development: changing production patterns, social equity and the environment***, 1991, 146 pp.
- 32 *Equidad y transformación productiva: un enfoque integrado*, 1993, 254 pp.
- 33 *Educación y conocimiento: eje de la transformación productiva con equidad*, 1992, 269 pp.
- 33 ***Education and knowledge: basic pillars of changing production patterns with social equity***, 1993, 257 pp.
- 34 *Ensayos sobre coordinación de políticas macroeconómicas*, 1992, 249 pp.

## MONOGRAPH SERIES

### Cuadernos de la C E P A L

- 1 *América Latina: el nuevo escenario regional y mundial/Latin America: the new regional and world setting*, (bilingual), 1975, 2nd. ed. 1985, 103 pp.
- 2 *Las evoluciones regionales de la estrategia internacional del desarrollo*, 1975, 2nd. ed. 1984, 73 pp.
- 2 ***Regional appraisals of the international development strategy***, 1975, 2nd. ed. 1985, 82 pp.
- 3 *Desarrollo humano, cambio social y crecimiento en América Latina*, 1975, 2nd. ed. 1984, 103 pp.
- 4 *Relaciones comerciales, crisis monetaria e integración económica en América Latina*, 1975, 85 pp.
- 5 *Síntesis de la segunda evaluación regional de la estrategia internacional del desarrollo*, 1975, 72 pp.
- 6 *Dinero de valor constante. Concepto, problemas y experiencias*, Jorge Rose, 1975, 2nd. ed. 1984, 43 pp.
- 7 *La coyuntura internacional y el sector externo*, 1975, 2nd. ed. 1983, 106 pp.
- 8 *La industrialización latinoamericana en los años setenta*, 1975, 2nd. ed. 1984, 116 pp.
- 9 *Dos estudios sobre inflación 1972-1974. La inflación en los países centrales. América Latina y la inflación importada*, 1975, 2nd. ed. 1984, 57 pp.
- s/n ***Canada and the foreign firm***, D. Pollock, 1976, 43 pp.
- 10 *Reactivación del mercado común centroamericano*, 1976, 2nd. ed. 1984, 149 pp.
- 11 *Integración y cooperación entre países en desarrollo en el ámbito agrícola*, Germánico Salgado, 1976, 2nd. ed. 1985, 62 pp.
- 12 *Temas del nuevo orden económico internacional*, 1976, 2nd. ed. 1984, 85 pp.
- 13 *En torno a las ideas de la CEPAL: desarrollo, industrialización y comercio exterior*, 1977, 2nd. ed. 1985, 57 pp.
- 14 *En torno a las ideas de la CEPAL: problemas de la industrialización en América Latina*, 1977, 2nd. ed. 1984, 46 pp.
- 15 *Los recursos hidráulicos de América Latina. Informe regional*, 1977, 2nd. ed. 1984, 75 pp.



- 15 *The water resources of Latin America. Regional report*, 1977, 2nd. ed. 1985, 79 pp.
- 16 *Desarrollo y cambio social en América Latina*, 1977, 2nd. ed. 1984, 59 pp.
- 17 *Estrategia internacional de desarrollo y establecimiento de un nuevo orden económico internacional*, 1977, 3rd. ed. 1984, 61 pp.
- 17 *International development strategy and establishment of a new international economic order*, 1977, 3rd. ed. 1985, 59 pp.
- 18 *Raíces históricas de las estructuras distributivas de América Latina*, A. di Filippo, 1977, 2nd. ed. 1983, 64 pp.
- 19 *Dos estudios sobre endeudamiento externo*, C. Massad and R. Zahler, 1977, 2nd. ed. 1986, 66 pp.
- s/n *United States - Latin American trade and financial relations: some policy recommendations*, S. Weintraub, 1977, 44 pp.
- 20 *Tendencias y proyecciones a largo plazo del desarrollo económico de América Latina*, 1978, 3rd. ed. 1985, 134 pp.
- 21 *25 años en la agricultura de América Latina: rasgos principales 1950-1975*, 1978, 2nd. ed. 1983, 124 pp.
- 22 *Notas sobre la familia como unidad socioeconómica*, Carlos A. Borsotti, 1978, 2nd. ed. 1984, 60 pp.
- 23 *La organización de la información para la evaluación del desarrollo*, Juan Sourrouille, 1978, 2nd. ed. 1984, 61 pp.
- 24 *Contabilidad nacional a precios constantes en América Latina*, 1978, 2nd. ed. 1983, 60 pp.
- s/n *Energy in Latin America: The Historical Record*, J. Mullen, 1978, 66 pp.
- 25 *Ecuador: desafíos y logros de la política económica en la fase de expansión petrolera*, 1979, 2nd. ed. 1984, 153 pp.
- 26 *Las transformaciones rurales en América Latina: ¿desarrollo social o marginación?*, 1979, 2nd. ed. 1984, 160 pp.
- 27 *La dimensión de la pobreza en América Latina*, Oscar Altimir, 1979, 2nd. ed. 1983, 89 pp.
- 28 *Organización institucional para el control y manejo de la deuda externa. El caso chileno*, Rodolfo Hoffman, 1979, 35 pp.
- 29 *La política monetaria y el ajuste de la balanza de pagos: tres estudios*, 1979, 2nd. ed. 1984, 61 pp.
- 29 *Monetary policy and balance of payments adjustment: three studies*, 1979, 60 pp.
- 30 *América Latina: las evaluaciones regionales de la estrategia internacional del desarrollo en los años setenta*, 1979, 2nd. ed. 1982, 237 pp.
- 31 *Educación, imágenes y estilos de desarrollo*, G. Rama, 1979, 2nd. ed. 1982, 72 pp.
- 32 *Movimientos internacionales de capitales*, R. H. Arriazu, 1979, 2nd. ed. 1984, 90 pp.
- 33 *Informe sobre las inversiones directas extranjeras en América Latina*, A. E. Calcagno, 1980, 2nd. ed. 1982, 114 pp.
- 34 *Las fluctuaciones de la industria manufacturera argentina, 1950-1978*, D. Heymann, 1980, 2nd. ed. 1984, 234 pp.
- 35 *Perspectivas de reajuste industrial: la Comunidad Económica Europea y los países en desarrollo*, B. Evers, G. de Groot and W. Wagenmans, 1980, 2nd. ed. 1984, 69 pp.
- 36 *Un análisis sobre la posibilidad de evaluar la solvencia crediticia de los países en desarrollo*, A. Saieh, 1980, 2nd. ed. 1984, 82 pp.
- 37 *Hacia los censos latinoamericanos de los años ochenta*, 1981, 146 pp.
- s/n *The economic relations of Latin America with Europe*, 1980, 2nd. ed. 1983, 156 pp.
- 38 *Desarrollo regional argentino: la agricultura*, J. Martin, 1981, 2nd. ed. 1984, 111 pp.
- 39 *Estratificación y movilidad ocupacional en América Latina*, C. Filgueira and C. Geneletti, 1981, 2nd. ed. 1985, 162 pp.
- 40 *Programa de acción regional para América Latina en los años ochenta*, 1981, 2nd. ed. 1984, 62 pp.
- 40 *Regional programme of action for Latin America in the 1980s*, 1981, 2nd. ed. 1984, 57 pp.
- 41 *El desarrollo de América Latina y sus repercusiones en la educación. Alfabetismo y escolaridad básica*, 1982, 246 pp.
- 42 *América Latina y la economía mundial del café*, 1982, 95 pp.
- 43 *El ciclo ganadero y la economía argentina*, 1983, 160 pp.
- 44 *Las encuestas de hogares en América Latina*, 1983, 122 pp.
- 45 *Las cuentas nacionales en América Latina y el Caribe*, 1983, 100 pp.
- 45 *National accounts in Latin America and the Caribbean*, 1983, 97 pp.
- 46 *Demanda de equipos para generación, transmisión y transformación eléctrica en América Latina*, 1983, 193 pp.
- 47 *La economía de América Latina en 1982: evolución general, política cambiaria y renegociación de la deuda externa*, 1984, 104 pp.
- 48 *Políticas de ajuste y renegociación de la deuda externa en América Latina*, 1984, 102 pp.
- 49 *La economía de América Latina y el Caribe en 1983: evolución general, crisis y procesos de ajuste*, 1985, 95 pp.
- 49 *The economy of Latin America and the Caribbean in 1983: main trends, the impact of the crisis and the adjustment processes*, 1985, 93 pp.
- 50 *La CEPAL, encarnación de una esperanza de América Latina*, Hernán Santa Cruz, 1985, 77 pp.
- 51 *Hacia nuevas modalidades de cooperación económica entre América Latina y el Japón*, 1986, 233 pp.
- 51 *Towards new forms of economic co-operation between Latin America and Japan*, 1987, 245 pp.

- 52 *Los conceptos básicos del transporte marítimo y la situación de la actividad en América Latina*, 1986, 112 pp.
  - 52 ***Basic concepts of maritime transport and its present status in Latin America and the Caribbean***, 1987, 114 pp.
  - 53 *Encuestas de ingresos y gastos. Conceptos y métodos en la experiencia latinoamericana*, 1986, 128 pp.
  - 54 *Crisis económica y políticas de ajuste, estabilización y crecimiento*, 1986, 123 pp.
  - 54 ***The economic crisis: policies for adjustment, stabilization and growth***, 1986, 125 pp.
  - 55 *El desarrollo de América Latina y el Caribe: escollos, requisitos y opciones*, 1987, 184 pp.
  - 55 ***Latin American and Caribbean development: obstacles, requirements and options***, 1987, 184 pp.
  - 56 *Los bancos transnacionales y el endeudamiento externo en la Argentina*, 1987, 112 pp.
  - 57 *El proceso de desarrollo de la pequeña y mediana empresa y su papel en el sistema industrial: el caso de Italia*, 1988, 112 pp.
  - 58 *La evolución de la economía de América Latina en 1986, 1988*, 99 pp.
  - 58 ***The evolution of the Latin American Economy in 1986, 1988***, 95 pp.
  - 59 ***Protectionism: regional negotiation and defence strategies***, 1988, 261 pp.
  - 60 *Industrialización en América Latina: de la "caja negra" al "casillero vacío"*, F. Fajnzylber, 1989, 2nd. ed. 1990, 176 pp.
  - 60 ***Industrialization in Latin America: from the "Black Box" to the "Empty Box"***, F. Fajnzylber, 1990, 172 pp.
  - 61 *Hacia un desarrollo sostenido en América Latina y el Caribe: restricciones y requisitos*, 1989, 94 pp.
  - 61 ***Towards sustained development in Latin America and the Caribbean: restrictions and requisites***, 1989, 93 pp.
  - 62 *La evolución de la economía de América Latina en 1987, 1989*, 87 pp.
  - 62 ***The evolution of the Latin American economy in 1987, 1989***, 84 pp.
  - 63 *Elementos para el diseño de políticas industriales y tecnológicas en América Latina*, 1990, 2nd. ed. 1991, 172 pp.
  - 64 *La industria de transporte regular internacional y la competitividad del comercio exterior de los países de América Latina y el Caribe*, 1989, 132 pp.
  - 64 ***The international common-carrier transportation industry and the competitiveness of the foreign trade of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean***, 1989, 116 pp.
  - 65 *Cambios estructurales en los puertos y la competitividad del comercio exterior de América Latina y el Caribe*, 1991, 141 pp.
  - 65 ***Structural Changes in Ports and the Competitiveness of Latin American and Caribbean Foreign Trade***, 1990, 126 pp.
  - 66 ***The Caribbean: one and divisible***, 1993, 207 pp.
  - 67 *La transferencia de recursos externos de América Latina en la posguerra*, 1991, 92 pp.
  - 67 ***Postwar transfer of resources abroad by Latin America***, 1992, 90 pp.
  - 68 *La reestructuración de empresas públicas: el caso de los puertos de América Latina y el Caribe*, 1992, 148 pp.
  - 68 ***The restructuring of public-sector enterprises: the case of Latin American and Caribbean ports***, 1992, 129 pp.
  - 69 *Las finanzas públicas de América Latina en la década de 1980*, 1993, 100 pp.
  - 69 ***Public Finances in Latin America in the 1980s***, 1993, 96 pp.
  - 70 *Canales, cadenas, corredores y competitividad: un enfoque sistémico y su aplicación a seis productos latinoamericanos de exportación*, 1993, 183 pp.
- Cuadernos Estadísticos de la C E P A L**
- 1 *América Latina: relación de precios del intercambio*, 1976, 2nd. ed. 1984, 66 pp.
  - 2 *Indicadores del desarrollo económico y social en América Latina*, 1976, 2nd. ed. 1984, 179 pp.
  - 3 *Series históricas del crecimiento de América Latina*, 1978, 2nd. ed. 1984, 206 pp.
  - 4 *Estadísticas sobre la estructura del gasto de consumo de los hogares según finalidad del gasto, por grupos de ingreso*, 1978, 110 pp. (Out of print; replaced by No. 8 below)
  - 5 *El balance de pagos de América Latina, 1950-1977*, 1979, 2nd. ed. 1984, 164 pp.
  - 6 *Distribución regional del producto interno bruto sectorial en los países de América Latina*, 1981, 2nd. ed. 1985, 68 pp.
  - 7 *Tablas de insumo-producto en América Latina*, 1983, 383 pp.
  - 8 *Estructura del gasto de consumo de los hogares según finalidad del gasto, por grupos de ingreso*, 1984, 146 pp.
  - 9 *Origen y destino del comercio exterior de los países de la Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración y del Mercado Común Centroamericano*, 1985, 546 pp.
  - 10 *América Latina: balance de pagos, 1950-1984*, 1986, 357 pp.
  - 11 *El comercio exterior de bienes de capital en América Latina*, 1986, 288 pp.
  - 12 *América Latina: índices del comercio exterior, 1970-1984, 1987*, 355 pp.

- 13 *América Latina: comercio exterior según la clasificación industrial internacional uniforme de todas las actividades económicas*, 1987, Vol. I, 675 pp; Vol. II, 675 pp.
- 14 *La distribución del ingreso en Colombia. Antecedentes estadísticos y características socioeconómicas de los receptores*, 1988, 156 pp.
- 15 *América Latina y el Caribe: series regionales de cuentas nacionales a precios constantes de 1980*, 1991, 245 pp.
- 16 *Origen y destino del comercio exterior de los países de la Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración*, 1991, 190 pp.
- 17 *Comercio intrazonal de los países de la Asociación de Integración, según capítulos de la clasificación internacional uniforme para el comercio internacional, revisión 2*, 1992, 299 pp.
- 18 *Clasificaciones estadísticas internacionales incorporadas en el Banco de Datos del Comercio Exterior de América Latina y el Caribe de la CEPAL*, 1993, 313 pp.

#### Estudios e Informes de la C E P A L

- 1 *Nicaragua: el impacto de la mutación política*, 1981, 2nd. ed. 1982, 126 pp.
- 2 *Perú 1968-1977: la política económica en un proceso de cambio global*, 1981, 2nd. ed. 1982, 166 pp.
- 3 *La industrialización de América Latina y la cooperación internacional*, 1981, 170 pp. (Out of print, will not be reprinted.)
- 4 *Estilos de desarrollo, modernización y medio ambiente en la agricultura latinoamericana*, 1981, 4th. ed. 1984, 130 pp.
- 5 *El desarrollo de América Latina en los años ochenta*, 1981, 2nd. ed. 1982, 153 pp.
- 5 ***Latin American development in the 1980s***, 1981, 2nd. ed. 1982, 134 pp.
- 6 *Proyecciones del desarrollo latinoamericano en los años ochenta*, 1981, 3rd. ed. 1985, 96 pp.
- 6 ***Latin American development projections for the 1980s***, 1982, 2nd. ed. 1983, 89 pp.
- 7 *Las relaciones económicas externas de América Latina en los años ochenta*, 1981, 2nd. ed. 1982, 180 pp.
- 8 *Integración y cooperación regionales en los años ochenta*, 1982, 2nd. ed. 1982, 174 pp.
- 9 *Estrategias de desarrollo sectorial para los años ochenta: industria y agricultura*, 1981, 2nd. ed. 1985, 100 pp.
- 10 *Dinámica del subempleo en América Latina. PREALC*, 1981, 2nd. ed. 1985, 101 pp.
- 11 *Estilos de desarrollo de la industria manufacturera y medio ambiente en América Latina*, 1982, 2nd. ed. 1984, 178 pp.
- 12 *Relaciones económicas de América Latina con los países miembros del "Consejo de Asistencia Mutua Económica"*, 1982, 154 pp.
- 13 *Campesinado y desarrollo agrícola en Bolivia*, 1982, 175 pp.
- 14 *El sector externo: indicadores y análisis de sus fluctuaciones. El caso argentino*, 1982, 2nd. ed. 1985, 216 pp.
- 15 *Ingeniería y consultoría en Brasil y el Grupo Andino*, 1982, 320 pp.
- 16 *Cinco estudios sobre la situación de la mujer en América Latina*, 1982, 2nd. ed. 1985, 178 pp.
- 16 ***Five studies on the situation of women in Latin America***, 1983, 2nd. ed. 1984, 188 pp.
- 17 *Cuentas nacionales y producto material en América Latina*, 1982, 129 pp.
- 18 *El financiamiento de las exportaciones en América Latina*, 1983, 212 pp.
- 19 *Medición del empleo y de los ingresos rurales*, 1982, 2nd. ed. 1983, 173 pp.
- 19 ***Measurement of employment and income in rural areas***, 1983, 184 pp.
- 20 *Efectos macroeconómicos de cambios en las barreras al comercio y al movimiento de capitales: un modelo de simulación*, 1982, 68 pp.
- 21 *La empresa pública en la economía: la experiencia argentina*, 1982, 2nd. ed. 1985, 134 pp.
- 22 *Las empresas transnacionales en la economía de Chile, 1974-1980*, 1983, 178 pp.
- 23 *La gestión y la informática en las empresas ferroviarias de América Latina y España*, 1983, 195 pp.
- 24 *Establecimiento de empresas de reparación y mantenimiento de contenedores en América Latina y el Caribe*, 1983, 314 pp.
- 24 ***Establishing container repair and maintenance enterprises in Latin America and the Caribbean***, 1983, 236 pp.
- 25 *Agua potable y saneamiento ambiental en América Latina, 1981-1990/Drinking water supply and sanitation in Latin America, 1981-1990* (bilingual), 1983, 140 pp.
- 26 *Los bancos transnacionales, el estado y el endeudamiento externo en Bolivia*, 1983, 282 pp.
- 27 *Política económica y procesos de desarrollo. La experiencia argentina entre 1976 y 1981*, 1983, 157 pp.
- 28 *Estilos de desarrollo, energía y medio ambiente: un estudio de caso exploratorio*, 1983, 129 pp.
- 29 *Empresas transnacionales en la industria de alimentos. El caso argentino: cereales y carne*, 1983, 93 pp.
- 30 *Industrialización en Centroamérica, 1960-1980*, 1983, 168 pp.
- 31 *Dos estudios sobre empresas transnacionales en Brasil*, 1983, 141 pp.

- 32 *La crisis económica internacional y su repercusión en América Latina*, 1983, 81 pp.
- 33 *La agricultura campesina en sus relaciones con la industria*, 1984, 120 pp.
- 34 *Cooperación económica entre Brasil y el Grupo Andino: el caso de los minerales y metales no ferrosos*, 1983, 148 pp.
- 35 *La agricultura campesina y el mercado de alimentos: la dependencia externa y sus efectos en una economía abierta*, 1984, 201 pp.
- 36 *El capital extranjero en la economía peruana*, 1984, 178 pp.
- 37 *Dos estudios sobre política arancelaria*, 1984, 96 pp.
- 38 *Estabilización y liberalización económica en el Cono Sur*, 1984, 193 pp.
- 39 *La agricultura campesina y el mercado de alimentos: el caso de Haití y el de la República Dominicana*, 1984, 255 pp.
- 40 *La industria siderúrgica latinoamericana: tendencias y potencial*, 1984, 280 pp.
- 41 *La presencia de las empresas transnacionales en la economía ecuatoriana*, 1984, 77 pp.
- 42 *Precios, salarios y empleo en la Argentina: estadísticas económicas de corto plazo*, 1984, 378 pp.
- 43 *El desarrollo de la seguridad social en América Latina*, 1985, 348 pp.
- 44 **Market structure, firm size and Brazilian exports**, 1985, 104 pp.
- 45 *La planificación del transporte en países de América Latina*, 1985, 247 pp.
- 46 *La crisis en América Latina: su evaluación y perspectivas*, 1985, 119 pp.
- 47 *La juventud en América Latina y el Caribe*, 1985, 181 pp.
- 48 *Desarrollo de los recursos mineros de América Latina*, 1985, 145 pp.
- 48 **Development of the mining resources of Latin America**, 1989, 160 pp.
- 49 *Las relaciones económicas internacionales de América Latina y la cooperación regional*, 1985, 224 pp.
- 50 *América Latina y la economía mundial del algodón*, 1985, 122 pp.
- 51 *Comercio y cooperación entre países de América Latina y países miembros del CAME*, 1985, 90 pp.
- 52 **Trade relations between Brazil and the United States**, 1985, 148 pp.
- 53 *Los recursos hídricos de América Latina y el Caribe y su aprovechamiento*, 1985, 138 pp.
- 53 **The water resources of Latin America and the Caribbean and their utilization**, 1985, 135 pp.
- 54 *La pobreza en América Latina: dimensiones y políticas*, 1985, 155 pp.
- 55 *Políticas de promoción de exportaciones en algunos países de América Latina*, 1985, 207 pp.
- 56 *Las empresas transnacionales en la Argentina*, 1986, 222 pp.
- 57 *El desarrollo frutícola y forestal en Chile y sus derivaciones sociales*, 1986, 227 pp.
- 58 *El cultivo del algodón y la soya en el Paraguay y sus derivaciones sociales*, 1986, 141 pp.
- 59 *Expansión del cultivo de la caña de azúcar y de la ganadería en el nordeste del Brasil: un examen del papel de la política pública y de sus derivaciones económicas y sociales*, 1986, 164 pp.
- 60 *Las empresas transnacionales en el desarrollo colombiano*, 1986, 212 pp.
- 61 *Las empresas transnacionales en la economía del Paraguay*, 1987, 115 pp.
- 62 *Problemas de la industria latinoamericana en la fase crítica*, 1986, 113 pp.
- 63 *Relaciones económicas internacionales y cooperación regional de América Latina y el Caribe*, 1987, 272 pp.
- 63 **International economic relations and regional co-operation in Latin America and the Caribbean**, 1987, 267 pp.
- 64 *Tres ensayos sobre inflación y políticas de estabilización*, 1986, 201 pp.
- 65 *La industria farmacéutica y farmoquímica: desarrollo histórico y posibilidades futuras. Argentina, Brasil y México*, 1987, 177 pp.
- 66 *Dos estudios sobre América Latina y el Caribe y la economía internacional*, 1987, 125 pp.
- 67 *Reestructuración de la industria automotriz mundial y perspectivas para América Latina*, 1987, 232 pp.
- 68 *Cooperación latinoamericana en servicios: antecedentes y perspectivas*, 1988, 155 pp.
- 69 *Desarrollo y transformación: estrategia para superar la pobreza*, 1988, 114 pp.
- 69 **Development and change: strategies for vanquishing poverty**, 1988, 114 pp.
- 70 *La evolución económica del Japón y su impacto en América Latina*, 1988, 88 pp.
- 70 **The economic evolution of Japan and its impact on Latin America**, 1990, 79 pp.
- 71 *La gestión de los recursos hídricos en América Latina y el Caribe*, 1989, 256 pp.
- 72 *La evolución del problema de la deuda externa en América Latina y el Caribe*, 1988, 77 pp.
- 72 **The evolution of the external debt problem in Latin America and the Caribbean**, 1988, 69 pp.
- 73 *Agricultura, comercio exterior y cooperación internacional*, 1988, 83 pp.
- 73 **Agriculture, external trade and international co-operation**, 1989, 79 pp.
- 74 *Reestructuración industrial y cambio tecnológico: consecuencias para América Latina*, 1989, 105 pp.
- 75 *El medio ambiente como factor de desarrollo*, 1989, 2nd. ed. 1991, 123 pp.

- 76 *El comportamiento de los bancos transnacionales y la crisis internacional de endeudamiento*, 1989, 214 pp.
- 76 ***Transnational bank behaviour and the international debt crisis***, 1989, 198 pp.
- 77 *Los recursos hídricos de América Latina y del Caribe: planificación, desastres naturales y contaminación*, 1990, 266 pp.
- 77 ***The water resources of Latin America and the Caribbean - Planning hazards and pollution***, 1990, 252 pp.
- 78 *La apertura financiera en Chile y el comportamiento de los bancos transnacionales*, 1990, 132 pp.
- 79 *La industria de bienes de capital en América Latina y el Caribe: su desarrollo en un marco de cooperación regional*, 1991, 235 pp.
- 80 *Impacto ambiental de la contaminación hídrica producida por la Refinería Estatal Esmeraldas: análisis técnico-económico*, 1991, 189 pp.
- 81 *Magnitud de la pobreza en América Latina en los años ochenta*, 1991, 177 pp.
- 82 *América Latina y el Caribe: el manejo de la escasez de agua*, 1991, 148 pp.
- 83 *Reestructuración y desarrollo de la industria automotriz mexicana en los años ochenta: evolución y perspectivas*, 1992, 191 pp.
- 84 *La transformación de la producción en Chile: cuatro ensayos de interpretación*, 1993, 372 pp.
- 85 *Inversión extranjera y empresas transnacionales en la economía de Chile (1974-1989). Proyectos de inversión y estrategias de las empresas transnacionales*, 1992, 257 pp.

- 86 *Inversión extranjera y empresas transnacionales en la economía de Chile (1974-1989). El papel del capital extranjero y la estrategia nacional de desarrollo*, 1992, 163 pp.
- 87 *Análisis de cadenas agroindustriales en Ecuador y Perú*, 1993, 294 pp.
- 88 *El comercio de manufacturas de América Latina. Evolución y estructura 1962-1989*, 1993, 150, pp.
- 89 *El impacto económico y social de las migraciones en centroamérica*, 1993, 78 pp.

#### **Serie INFOPLAN: Temas Especiales del Desarrollo**

- 1 *Resúmenes de documentos sobre deuda externa*, 1986, 324 pp.
- 2 *Resúmenes de documentos sobre cooperación entre países en desarrollo*, 1986, 189 pp.
- 3 *Resúmenes de documentos sobre recursos hídricos*, 1987, 290 pp.
- 4 *Resúmenes de documentos sobre planificación y medio ambiente*, 1987, 111 pp.
- 5 *Resúmenes de documentos sobre integración económica en América Latina y el Caribe*, 1987, 273 pp.
- 6 *Resúmenes de documentos sobre cooperación entre países en desarrollo, II parte*, 1988, 146 pp.
- 7 *Documentos sobre privatización con énfasis en América Latina*, 1991, 82 pp.
- 8 *Reseñas de documentos sobre desarrollo ambientalmente sustentable*, 1992, 217 pp.

### كيفية الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة

يمكن الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة من المكتبات ودور التوزيع في جميع أنحاء العالم. استلم منها من المكتبة التي تتعامل معها أو اكتب إلى : الأمم المتحدة، قسم البيع في نيويورك أو في جنيف.

#### 如何购取联合国出版物

联合国出版物在全世界各地的书店和经售处均有发售。请向书店询问或写信到纽约或日内瓦的联合国销售组。

#### HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS

United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva.

#### COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES

Les publications des Nations Unies sont en vente dans les librairies et les agences dépositaires du monde entier. Informez-vous auprès de votre libraire ou adressez-vous à : Nations Unies, Section des ventes, New York ou Genève.

#### КАК ПОЛУЧИТЬ ИЗДАНИЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ ОБЪЕДИНЕННЫХ НАЦИЙ

Издания Организации Объединенных Наций можно купить в книжных магазинах и агентствах во всех районах мира. Наводите справки об изданиях в вашем книжном магазине или пишите по адресу: Организация Объединенных Наций, Секция по продаже изданий, Нью-Йорк или Женева.

#### COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS

Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas están en venta en librerías y casas distribuidoras en todas partes del mundo. Consulte a su librero o diríjase a: Naciones Unidas, Sección de Ventas, Nueva York o Ginebra.

Publications of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and those of the Latin American and the Caribbean Institute for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES) can be ordered from your local distributor or directly through:

United Nations Publications  
Sales Section, — DC-2-866  
New York, NY, 10017  
USA

United Nations Publications  
Sales Section  
Palais des Nations  
1211 Geneve 10, Switzerland

Distribution Unit  
CEPAL — Casilla 179-D  
Santiago, Chile

## LIBROS DE LA CEPAL

35

Third edition

Printed for United Nations - Santiago, Chile - September 1993 - 1 600

ISBN 92-1-121186-7 - E.93.II.G.8 - 00800 P