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Latin American youth between development and crisis

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The cycle of structural transformation and the intensive policies of modernization and social participation through education brought about a number of changes in social structures which worked to the benefit of the young generations.

The opportunities for upward social mobility were not the same for the different socio-occupational categories. However, despite these differences of opportunity, the children of lower-income families were able to find employment to a certain degree in higher posts.

The power structures tried to limit the effects of this social irruption by establishing different levels of quality in education or allocating higher-level jobs unequally, according to social origin.

The crisis accentuates the tendency for the processes of upward mobility to slow down and go into reverse. The young groups without education are displaced from the jobs market; those of low social origin who have acquired education are pushed in the direction of social exclusion; income and especially university attendance depend to a large extent on elevated social origin and are the best protection against the crisis; and lastly, instead of upward occupational mobility, jobs are beginning to be passed on from one generation to another. In some countries it is even becoming difficult for the children of manual workers to take over their parents' jobs, despite their better education; those who remain in the category are proportionately fewer than those who move into marginal occupations.

The author concludes that the crisis has accentuated the polarization of societies, for as the consequences of the exhaustion of the cycle of structural change grow worse, a situation arises in which the social relations are being established among comparatively solidified groups. The problem of youth as a whole is transformed, even more clearly than before, into the problems of young people in different and stratified social groups.

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Introduction

Today's Latin American youth has features which distinguish it from the youth of other regions and indeed from the Latin American youth of the past. It is standing at the confluence of two big historical processes: one is the cycle of structural transformation of Latin American societies, which began to change in the postwar period at different speeds and with different intensity; the other is the economic crisis of the 1980s, which has underlined the shortcomings of existing models of development. Youth has a crucial role in both processes. Because of its enormous weight in the region's age structure it was the first group to be incorporated in the modern forms of social organization; then, when the recession slowed or disrupted modernization, youth became an age group particularly affected by exclusion.

There has also been a great change in its own role. During the stage of structural transformation, of societies in flux, it had an important role among the political protagonists. Human settlements, cultural patterns and the forms of production and social organization underwent various changes which also created different or unequal opportunities of incorporation in society as well as in some of the social and political processes which sought to build some model of an alternative society. It is no coincidence that the period has been characterized by very great political instability and violent discords and that in all cases there has been considerable political participation by youth sectors.

In the majority of the Latin American societies the crisis arrives at a moment when change has already created a new social structure and future changes are not based on processes of incorporation but on processes of inter-relationship among the social groups and on productive change within the logic of a modern industrial economy. For the majority of the societies "forward retreat", as a mechanism of incorporation and postponement of conflicts, has run out of steam, and they have reached stages of organization, rationalization and agreement among different interests and groups which do not facilitate action by young people as

such: the inter-relationship is among groups in which youth participates through older people.

This process—in which stability and democratic recovery are paradigmatic—coincides with the economic crisis in a period fraught with risks. In the case of youth this means a double exclusion: on the one hand, it cannot take its place in society by finding employment and setting up a family; on the other hand, its participation is deferred, for the adjustment policies imply a great concentration of decision-making and policy implementation and they exclude for the moment the use of social mobility as a driving force in the search for new forms of social and political organization.

The picture has other complications associated with the effects of the external

debt—a considerable legacy from the older generation to the younger—and with the reduction of the margins of independence of the Latin American States, subjected as they are to conditions imposed by their creditors with which the States must comply in their respective national societies.

There is no doubt, in view of the inequalities of development and the varied nature of the problems, that the situation differs in some areas where the national constitution is still embryonic, as is certainly the case in Central America. The reduction of independence then takes the form of foreign intervention, or else the central problem remains the continuation of an authoritarian model of social and political imposition.

I

Change, crystallization and recession in social structures

In Latin America change has come about through the expansion of social structures and not—with exceptions—through a revolutionary process which altered the relative positions of the groups within a pre-existing social structure. Unlike European societies, which changed from a basis of culturally very integrated peasant and craft structures, in Latin America the whole of society was set in motion from a basis of fragmented situations towards new undefined social structures, with respect both to planning and to possible concrete action, owing to the very instability of a growth process in peripheral economies and to the lack of coherence between political and social goals.

The move was not from the traditional to the modern but rather—in politics, education and economics—from the local or subordinate-group subculture to the culture of the mass communication media, and from family or parochial institutions to all-embracing national ones. In this kind of change the dynamic prevailed over the static; social mobility over

social reproduction; the role of the State as director of the process over the role of social classes as proponents of plans; and the processes of incorporation through socio-cultural modernization over the processes of incorporation through production, which defines relations among groups in terms of work and the dispute as to what direction development should take and how distribution should be defined (Touraine, 1976).

The process is building new institutions, new social groups with new interrelationships, and it is consolidating them, thus setting limits on possible changes: the interests of the internal groups and the interrelationship with the international economic system mean that not all that is possible is probable, except at a very high social and cultural cost. Only those changes which arise from what already exists are probable.

The cycle of social fluidity led to a consolidation which echoed earlier oligarchical social structures or to consolidation of a social

order typical of the bourgeois European economy of the first half of the century, or lastly to some kind of social organization capable of progressive change which included the differentiation of social protagonists and a system of balance and conflict, either between groups occupying different positions in the production process or between groups defined more by culture and opinion than by their work or income status.

In either case, the groups and classes became consolidated. The capitalist business class was created as a result of action taken by the State, which provided the framework and instruments for its development. Once established, it became a social agent participating in alliances in some cases and confronting the State in others, while in yet other instances it tended to control the State. The proletariat had in the past been swollen by a continual and massive influx of recent entrants into industrial activity, which made it difficult for the proletariat to shape an identity as the basis for its social action; it then became, in its most modern part, a category linked to advanced technological production, with increasingly standardized and improved levels of education. Its growth became irregular and even began to decline, both as a percentage of the EAP and in absolute numbers in some countries (Delich, 1986; Lagos and Tokman, 1983). It was reconstituted to a large extent by the children of the proletariat itself, and this developed into a tradition of belonging to the working-class group. The situation was not entirely different among professionals and technicians. The rapid expansion of university rolls in the 1960s and 1970s went hand in hand with the increase in jobs which provided professionals with relatively high incomes; in the next decade the advance was slower. The rolls and jobs or incomes marked time or retreated. In the societies which began to modernize earlier, university students usually come from professional families which themselves have university education, or from strata culturally allied to the university class (Klubitschko, 1980).

As the cycle of expansion by means of the structural transformation of societies came to an end, this kind of mobility ran out of steam in the already modernized countries (ECLAC, 1986).

The number of posts in the middle and upper-middle ranges only increased, in the best of cases, in step with the population increase or the increase of the product. For example, once basic schooling had been provided for an already urbanized population, the increase in the category of teachers could not be higher than the increase in the school-age population. The demand for new workers was increasingly conditioned by technological change, which meant a relative reduction in the mere performance of tasks, together with an expansion in jobs requiring better educational or technical qualifications.

The cycle of structural change took place in the majority of cases within a framework of tension between processes which created and reproduced social inequality (ECLAC, 1985c) and others which aimed at social democratization. The contradictory effects of this situation became more evident in the crisis of the 1980s.

A marked concentration of income persisted (Altimir, 1979; Di Filippo, 1984). In some cases it increased; in others it permitted a degree of access for some strata in the middle and lower-middle income range. As it became integrated in a productive industrial structure, this concentration acquired greater rigidity. Less than the whole of society was served by mechanisms of tertiary income distribution through universal social policies of standardized application (for example, pre-school and school services with food programmes and equalization of standards, national health insurance, or payments to meet the cost of the biological and social survival of families, waged or not). This type of benefits was enjoyed only by certain categories which obtained them by means of the corporative mechanisms which characterized social development (Mesa Lago, 1985). The process of concentration took different forms, depending on whether it was a question of rural or urban zones, or backward regions or growth poles (Cordero and Tello, 1984), so that there were different population groups whose inter-relationships with the development process were compartmentalized and whose avenues of mobility resembled parallel circuits; they not only had different points of departure and arrival but frequently no possibility of transfer from a lower to a higher level.

As the idea of a society in flux gained ground, so the notion of limits on expectations of individual or group mobility was disappearing from the collective consciousness of the lower social groups (Rama, 1964). This was followed by a genuine revolution in expectations. The power systems could control the distribution of incomes but could not set limits on the nation's aspirations for integration or on social modernization; as a result, some institutional systems —such as politics or education— underwent a substantial expansion of participation. (The countries which until more recent date denied the electoral franchise to illiterates or excluded the lower sectors from political expression through lack of inclination or authoritarianism were also the countries with the weakest education policies.) Furthermore, the increases in secondary and higher education were much greater than those recorded in developed countries at a similar stage; however, primary schooling had not yet been made truly universal, a fact which shows the degree of exclusion implicit in the social policies (Rama, 1983).

The imbalance between the processes of concentration and those of distribution worked to the detriment of the latter: for example, education was extended to lower social groups, but its standards were lowered (Tedesco, 1984). In addition, the periodic reversions to authoritarianism caused many disruptions of the democratic political mechanisms which threatened the concentration of power and income. These contradictions in the evolution of national societies in the 1960s and 1970s can be seen clearly in the indicators of structural change on the one hand, and on the other in the reappearance of authoritarian régimes, be they conservative or populist. There are comparatively few examples of democratic institutional continuity in full-participation societies.

The structural changes, which included the incorporation of youth in the period 1950 to 1980, can be seen from the following indicators (Rama, 1984):

a) *Population*: the population doubled in numbers and its density increased, with extensive settlement in the towns (the proportion of urban dwellers increased from 40

to 63 %) • The towns grew at a rate of about 5 % a year. This provided an opportunity for greater social interaction involving young people, whose share in the total population increased, especially in the towns.

b) *Education*: the period's most marked changes were found in education. The illiteracy affecting almost half the population aged 15 and over declined and became residual among the young generations (except in Brazil and some countries of Central America). Entry into primary school began to become universal, but only a little over half of the age group completed their primary education. Secondary education, formerly reserved for élites, massive explosion, as can be seen from the jump in the growth rate of attendance: in 1950 there were two graduates for every 100 young people aged 20 to 24; in 1980 it was one for every six young people¹ (Ibarrola, 1986; Tovar and Negretti, 1986).

c) *Employment*: the economically active population doubled (index 218). Primary-sector employment fell by 33.7% (losing 20 percentage points); in the secondary sector employment rose from 17 to 24.5%, and in the tertiary sector from 29.3 to 41.8% of the total active population. Not only did the employed population cease to be predominantly rural, but there was a regular increase in the proportion of non-manual workers in urban activities. The information for the 1980s (available for only a few countries) shows a minimum ratio of 63 and a maximum of 109 non-manual workers to every 100 manual workers. This situation is even clearer in the case of wage-earners. The ratio of non-manual workers in the secondary and tertiary sectors to manual wage-earners in the secondary sector or, to put it another way, of white-collar to blue-collar workers, varies, according to country, between 1:1 and 1.6:1. To sum up, Latin American societies not only ceased to be rural, they also ceased to be manual working-class.

d) *Formalization of employment*: the percentage increase in modern jobs in industry

¹In Mexico there were 29 895 graduates from higher education in 1950 and this figure reached 1 218 667 in 1984, increasing by a factor of 40 over that period. In Venezuela the number of graduates increased from 24 907 in 1961 to 307 133 in 1981, increasing by a factor of 12 in little more than 20 years.

and services boosted the proportion of waged activities. Own-account activities and unpaid family helpers declined as a percentage of total EAP; there was a percentage reduction (and in some countries an absolute one) in the active rural population, where own-account employment predominated, and the growth in the informal urban sector did not compensate for this decline. The category of wage-earners has become the biggest in the region's EAP, except in the countries where agriculture still dominates and modernization is in its early stages. The increase in the number of waged jobs implies in turn better educational qualifications and an increasing correlation between these qualifications and levels of job status.

e) *Income growth and distribution*: the per capita gross domestic product (GDP) doubled in the period 1950-1980, despite the substantial rate of population growth. The differences between groups of countries are very large. The agrarian countries in the early stages of modernization (Bolivia, Haiti and Central America except Costa Rica) had a growth index below 150. The countries of early and advanced modernization in the Southern Hemisphere had an index in the order of 150; it must be remembered that they started from the highest levels in the region. The indices osculated between 150 and 250 in the countries of rapid and unbalanced or partial modernization, which include (in ascending order) Peru, Paraguay, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Mexico. The same index of 250 is found in Costa Rica and Panama, whose societies modernized themselves in a very short space of time; the situation was similar in Venezuela, but with a lower index of per capita GDP increase (185). Brazil stands out among all the other countries, for its per capita GDP in the period 1950-1980 increased in step with an index of 350.

The type of income distribution structure was more homogeneous than the increases, maintaining a high degree of concentration in the top 10% and a state of impoverishment at least in the bottom 20%. The ECLAC studies (1985c) tend to indicate a reduction in the percentage of the population below the poverty line, although this reduction is smaller than might have been expected if the increase in incomes had been proportional. The situation in

the middle ranges is more complicated. In some countries —especially those of early modernization and some of rapid modernization— the strata immediately above the bottom 20% showed improvements in their share of income, thus establishing a mesocratic type of income distribution (Graciarena, 1979), owing to the increase in jobs in the modern sectors, the consequent social power of the workers in those sectors and the policies of expanding the market for industrial consumer durables and semi-durables. In many countries the middle strata in the scale, although showing no great change in their share in monetary terms, benefitted from the tertiary distribution of incomes resulting from the development of free or semi-free social services provided by the State (Tironi, 1982). Lastly, in the 1970s the countries which pursued policies of short-term neoliberal adjustment experienced sizeable declines in real wages and employment, which affected working and middle-class sectors.

It can be asserted as a general trend that the real increase in average, low and very low incomes did not depend on a change in the structure of income distribution, but fundamentally on the rate of increase in per capita GDP and also on the redistribution through tertiary incomes which had been brought about by the social policies of the State.

f) *Processes of incorporation*; in the urban employment markets there is a simultaneous integration of young people, rural migrants and women, a phenomenon which has no precedent in today's developed countries (Durstun, 1986). This process explains the explosive growth of the urban labour force, which —as Victor Tokman (1984) has indeed pointed out— was similar to the growth recorded in the United States in the period 1870-1903, in Sweden at the beginning of the century or in Japan between the two wars. However, in this case the EAP had a growing proportion of women and a very young average age and, most important, there was an enormous discrepancy between the education levels of the young and adult populations (Boucher, 1982; Vogel, 1979).

These factors helped to bring about the lower cost of labour and the exploitation to which workers were subjected. In the specific case of young people, they had access to non-

manual and manual jobs of average status and requiring educational qualifications, but the increase was made up largely of women in lower-level non-manual jobs (ECLAC, 1986).

At the beginning of the present decade the cycle of social change through structural transformation was showing signs of exhaustion. In the Southern Hemisphere countries of early modernization and in the countries of rapid modernization accompanied by social integration (Costa Rica, Panama and Venezuela) the population engaged in rural activities already represented a very small percentage; although migration to the towns continued, its input could no longer be significant in the formation of the lower urban stratas and the relative upward displacement of the next higher strata. In countries of rapid and unbalanced modernization—such as Brazil—the rural population had already stabilized in absolute terms between 1970 and 1980. Lastly, in countries of rapid modernization where urbanization prevailed over industrialization—for example, Peru—the marked informality of all productive activities denied the migrants the possibility of social participation at levels higher than those of the countryside.

In the urban employment structure of some countries—for example, Argentina and Uruguay—a comparison of censuses in the last decade tends to indicate "crystallization" of the employment structure: the distribution of jobs tends to be roughly the same 10 years later and the only change is in the higher average level of education of the strata (Arriagada, 1984; ECLAC, 1985a; Suvetri, 1986). Similar observations on the slow rate of incorporation of young people in middle- and high-status jobs are put forward as an example of frustrated modernization in Colombia (Parra, 1985). In countries such as Ecuador, Panama and Venezuela which underwent a virtual "social mutation" (Durston and Rosenbluth, 1984; Durston, 1985; Tovar and Negretti, 1986) it would seem difficult to maintain the intense growth of jobs in the modern services sector, especially in community and social services provided by the State. Lastly, Mexico and especially Brazil (Katzman, 1983) remained paradigmatic exceptions, with rapid growth of modern jobs in industry and in the modern services which support production.

Because of the growth rates of their economies, and especially of the industrial product, and in view of their sizeable rural and urban populations with minimum education during the initial stages of their development, these countries experienced a continuous process of incorporation in productive activities accompanied by a sharp polarization of the incomes of persons employed in low-status and high-status jobs. In Brazil this incorporation even exceeded the educational expansion, and this led to a reduction in the average level of education in many employment categories (Madeira, 1985). In Chile the double effect of the ending of change through structural modification and of the application of a neoliberal model with extreme economic openness encouraged a peculiar socio-occupational structure in which there was a decline in industrial manual-workers jobs and in middle-range technical and administrative State posts, and the incomes of the civil categories of public employees fell. At the same time, there was an increase, unusual in the region, of independent non-manual jobs (Martinez and Tironi, 1983).

Lastly, in the countries of agrarian structure and incipient modernization there was rapid urbanization and development of the modern apparatus of the State, without corresponding industrial development and with serious structural problems in agriculture. The countryside suffered the effects of capitalist forms of production for export, with a very concentrated ownership structure and a mass of peasants (indigenous in some countries); this fuelled a process of peasant impoverishment without the alternative of migration to urban jobs and it created explosive social conditions in the countryside (Torres Rivas, 1981; Rosenbluth, 1986).

The cycle of structural transformation, to the extent that it encouraged mobility throughout society and therefore some degree of satisfaction for each group, generated intra-generational and even inter-generational change with powerful elements of national integration and also of social conformity. In the countries of early modernization, in which the groups were already incorporated in societies incapable of generating a new stage of development, the

dispute over distribution and the development model occupied the political scene (Filgueira, 1983).

The crisis of the 1980s occurred at a time when the cycle of structural transformation was coming to an end. The mechanisms of incorporation in modernization (urbanization and education, for example) had been used to excess; however, no changes had been produced in the structure of production, ownership, technology and knowledge which would have made it possible for the region to be incorporated in the cycle of changes in science and technology and in the organization of

societies and cultures which was taking place in the developed countries (CEPII, 1984; CEC, 1983).

The crisis, caused by a cycle in which the over-abundance of capital flows "doped" the system with consumerism, struck societies which, save the exceptions mentioned above, had already exhausted the easy mechanisms of incorporation, and whose young people were being trained in accordance with a model of social-structure expansion which had ceased to be relevant. Furthermore, the expectations of these young people for incorporation in society corresponded to that model.

II

The forms of incorporation of youth

The decades between 1960 and 1980 saw changes in the conditions of incorporation of young people in society. On the one hand, their distribution among types of jobs changed, and gaps were created which could not be filled by the adult generations. In some cases these generations were unwilling to move from the countryside to the town or to change to new jobs. In other cases, although the willingness to change may have been there, they lacked the necessary educational qualifications and cultural baggage. Up to 1970, according to census figures, 49-8% of the rural EAP in 16 countries had not completed one year of schooling, and barely 2.3% had seven or more years. In these same countries the percentages of EAP in the national capitals were 8.1 and 39.6. Consequently, in the hypothetical case of a massive and total migration of the rural EAP, the majority of the people involved would be unemployable, given the education requirements of urban jobs (Terra, 1981).

On the other hand, the young people did have the education needed for the new jobs and, what is more, their education and their access to the mass communication media had conditioned them to participate in the social and symbolic

relationships entailed by their jobs and the associated social situations. The traditional education system of Latin America had been modelled on the system existing years earlier in the developed countries and it had been conceived for students of the upper-middle socio-cultural level (Tedesco, 1984). When it was extended to the whole population and embraced groups from different subcultures, it proved incapable, from the teaching standpoint, of transmitting knowledge; but it was very effective in the provision of prior social conditioning for symbolic integration in the modern world. The rural families understood it in this way: they had no interest in the school as long as their children's destiny was to remain in the countryside: but, when the situation changed and they were able to communicate with the urban world and came to see migration as a possible future for their children, they changed their attitude, especially with respect to their daughters, who migrated to the towns in greater numbers.

The special relationship of young people with the world of work in a time of change produced several different effects, which are analysed in the following sections.

1. *The de-ruralization of youth*

Table 1 presents data from countries considered representative of various categories of modernization. Argentina represents early and rapid modernization: by 1960 only 12.3% of its youth worked in agriculture, and only a very small percentage could transfer to urban jobs. Chile, in the same category, still had a considerable proportion of rural population: one in four young people worked in agriculture in 1960, but in 1980 the figure was only one in 10. Panama represents modernization through adoption of a services economy: the number of rural workers in the total of young people in the EAP declined from four to two in 10. The next category is made up of countries with rapid and unbalanced modernization and is represented by

Brazil. In 1960 almost half (44.4%) of Brazil's young people worked in agriculture; in 1980 this proportion had declined to two in 10. Ecuador represents the situation which has been called rapid and partial modernization; as in the previous case, not only did it have groups excluded from modernization, but its dynamism was also heavily concentrated in tertiary activities and in particular in the State, without equivalent changes in the secondary sector. This is clearly the most remarkable case with respect to the reduction of the proportion of rural workers in the young EAP: in 20 years 30% of the young people transferred to the urban world. Lastly, the data for Honduras represent a category of incipient modernization, starting from an even greater rural preponderance than in the two previous countries; although this

Table 1

LATIN AMERICA (SIX COUNTRIES): CHANGES IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF YOUNG PEOPLE

(Percentages)

	Argentina		Brazil		Chile		Ecuador		Honduras		Panama	
	1960 (25-34) ^o	1980	1960 (25-34)	1980	1960 (25-29)	1980*	1962 (25-29)	1982	1960 (25-34)	1974	1960 (25-29)	1980
EAP with 7 and more years schooling	28.3	66.5	15.6	35.2	29.6	70.6	12.0	37.0	18.5	35.6	28.6	50.0
EAP with 6 or less years schooling	71.7	33.5	84.4	64.8	70.4	29.4	88.0	63.0	81.5	64.4	71.4	50.0
Jobs in non-manual urban and primary sectors	36.5	44.6	17.9	30.4	22.1	37.8	16.0	31.9	12.8	26.4	24.9	38.5
Urban manual jobs	42.7	44.3	32.9	40.8	48.9	38.5	28.9	32.2	21.8	26.6	25.1	33.7
Jobs in primary activities	12.3	8.3	44.4	22.6	24.0	11.5	52.0	22.9	66.0	44.8	39.8	19.2
Others	8.5	2.8	4.9	6.2	5.0	12.2	3.1	13.0	5.4	2.2	10.2	8.6

Source: ECLAC, on the basis of census data.

^oFor Chile, Panama and Ecuador the age-range considered is 25-29; for Argentina, Brazil and Honduras it is 25-34. This difference is due to the way the information is organized and does not affect the comparability of the figures.

*Data from the National Household Survey of October-December 1980 (National Statistical Institute).

proportion declined, it still stood at 44,8% of young people in rural jobs in 1974 (the same percentage as Brazil in 1960). This percentage has probably been maintained, despite the expulsion of people from the rural world, for lack of urban centres and activities capable of absorbing a larger flow of migrants.

2. *The world of urban manual workers*

This heading includes industrial workers, manual own-account workers—including street vendors—and service workers both on a personal and on an institutional basis.

The urban social world, which in the nineteenth century in France was seen as a world of "the working classes, the dangerous classes" (Chevalier, 1978), leading to Friedrich Engels' analysis of "The Condition of the Working Class in England" and to the historical constructions of E.J. Hobsbawm (1968), was perceived in Latin America in a way which linked urbanization with "the inevitable exclusion of increasing sectors of the urban population", for what was defined as dependent industrialization made it "impossible for the increasing migratory flows and the new working-class generations, born in the towns themselves, to find a stable and consistent place in the structure of roles and occupations in the new urban society which emerges with industrialization" (Quijano, 1970).

The processes of incorporation of young people in manual and non-manual jobs show that, far from fulfilling the prediction of increasing exclusion, the period from 1960 to 1980 saw an unexpected development of non-manual jobs—among vendors, professionals, and administrative and technical staff, all of which expanded very rapidly; and the manual EAP in secondary and tertiary activities including marginal activities, did not come to dominate the urban world. Moreover, with the exception of Brazil, in 1980 all the countries considered had virtually the same numbers of manual and non-manual jobs in the towns.

Another aspect of this phenomenon is that the world of urban manual workers did not manage at any point to incorporate as much as half of the young generation in question. The highest numbers of manual workers were found

in the early-industrialization countries, where the production pattern was based on small enterprises and labour-intensive technology. Up to 1960 Chile was in this situation, with 48.9% of its young people in this category. This figure indicates the weight of a proletariat, or urban working class, which certainly influenced political behaviour in this country in the following decades. In another early-industrialization country, Argentina, 42.7% of the young people were in this category and this figure reached 44.3% in 1980, possibly the highest level in the country's history. The big difference between these two countries is that in Chile in 1960 there were twice as many young manual as young non-manual workers; in Argentina the gap was much smaller. In both countries in 1980 the numbers of young manual and non-manual workers had reached parity.²

Other more recent industrialization processes show technological patterns with low labour input. Development itself is at a very low level in Ecuador, Honduras and Panama. The case of Brazil is instructive in several ways. Despite the great increase in total GDP and industrial GDP in the period 1960-1980, the urban manual EAP (including services) increased by only eight percentage points.

In both Brazil and Panama there was a decline of more than 20 percentage points in employment in primary activities in the period between the censuses and the category of manual urban workers increased by barely eight points. In Ecuador the gap was even greater, with a drop of 30 points in primary jobs and an increase of only four points in urban manual jobs; these figures would still be extremely significant even if it is assumed that the bulk of the weighty category of "others" in 1982 was accounted for by omissions in the registration of urban manual workers.

To sum up, the process of incorporation of young people illustrates the trends in the work market, both past and future. It is clear that there was not a steady increase in exclusion and in informal work, and that the towns of Latin

²The 1980 figures for Chile are distorted by the high percentage in the "others" category, which includes a large amount of unemployment.

America did not become "workers' worlds". It is also clear that they will be even less so in the future, whatever the industrial growth rate.

3. *The world of non-manual urban workers*

This heading includes white-collar workers, managers, dependent and independent professional and technical staff, office workers, sales people and own-account workers in trade (excluding street traders). All the persons included in this group have the common feature of being non-manual workers, even though the differences within the group are significant in terms of status and remuneration. The higher proportion of women in the subcategories of office workers and sales people, and to a lesser extent among professional and technical staff, depresses the average remuneration in these subcategories (ECLAC, 1986).

However, as in industrial societies (Lipset and Bendix, 1963), non-manual jobs in Latin America have enjoyed greater prestige than manual jobs, probably as a result of the recent urbanization and the prestige attached to office work in the status hierarchy of the oligarchical societies of the recent past. These jobs require a higher level of education, which is considered to be a very valuable asset in the region, as the social demand for it testifies (Filgueira, 1978). In general, their level of monetary remuneration seems to have increased (note must be taken of the region's characteristic association of higher income from work and higher levels of education; these occupations certainly provided greater job stability and social security than in the case of manual workers, especially rural manual workers (Mesa Lago, 1986). Lastly, the few available surveys indicate a strong tendency for the holders of these jobs to identify themselves as members of the middle classes, even though objectively they did not always meet the requirements of that status (Solari, 1964).

Up to 1960 the proportion of young people who obtained non-manual jobs was between one-eighth and one-sixth in Honduras, Ecuador and Brazil, and a little under one-quarter in Chile and Panama; only in Argentina was the proportion higher than one-third. Up to 1980 the countries tended towards uniformity, with a proportion of approximately one-third non-

manual workers (with the exception of Honduras, which had less than a quarter, and Argentina, which attained the remarkable figure of 44.6%).

This enormous expansion was influenced by both economic and social factors. The economic factors include the role of modern services —financial, administrative and technical— as an indispensable support for production in a capitalist system. The second factors include the development of social and community services, requiring a large contingent of professional and technical staff, the expansion of which has been linked to the national efforts to promote integration and the establishment of social rights of citizenship (Ecuador is a prime example of this).

An expansion of this magnitude in such a short space of time poses the question of whether this development amounts to upward mobility. Those who say "no" observe that the bulk of the growth is found in the subcategories of lower status and income and that even among professional and technical staff there is a strong increase in the numbers of women, which is connected with the category's low status and income (in the case of teachers, for example). Those who say "yes" point to the connection between non-manual jobs and higher income from work, the formalization of work demonstrated by inclusion in social security systems, the seniority rosters, which open the way for promotions not available to manual workers, the less arduous everyday working conditions and, lastly, the social prestige which is still attached to this type of work.

Without going into the details of the topic, it is clear that in the initial stage of this expansion the fact of crossing the divide between manual and non-manual work constituted in itself a form of upward mobility, and that subsequently, as this mobility spread, internal differences acquired decisive importance; entry into the lowest non-manual subcategories could not therefore be seen as a social advance. However, for the generation which had crossed the divide for the first time in their family history, the change was certainly perceived, from the symbolic standpoint, as upward mobility.

4. *Uses and benefits of education*

The education data for the six countries chosen as representative of different categories of modernization show that in all the countries in the period 1960-1980 the percentage of the young EAP with post-primary education doubled, except in Ecuador where it tripled.

Table 2 presents the categories with seven years and more of education in Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and Panama; five years and more for Brazil and four years and more for Honduras. The differences in the number of years of education used in defining the significant categories correspond to differences in educational development among the countries of the region. They also illustrate the difficulty of correlating the education indicators with the indicators of economic growth: in two countries of rapid modernization and economic growth (Ecuador and Brazil) the achievements are very different; and Chile, despite its relative stagnation, has achieved education levels much higher than those of Brazil, despite this country's rapid economic growth.

The first and well-documented use of education was to facilitate migration by persons who had completed their schooling and abandoned their manual agricultural activities, whether waged or unwaged.

In both 1960 and 1980 the proportion of young people with seven and more years of schooling occupying manual jobs in primary activities was a very small percentage of the young EAP, and its increase from one generation to another was tiny. The expectation that the coming of mechanization and technology to the countryside would produce a supply of new jobs suitable for educated young people was disappointed; on the other hand, the supply of education for longer than six school years did not expand in the countryside itself, except in Chile, so that in the other countries such jobs would have been available only to young people who studied in urban centres but continued to live in the countryside.

The second use of education was to facilitate the incorporation of the category of non-manual workers. This category has very high growth rates and demands post-primary

education; except in Honduras, persons without such education are gradually being eliminated from this kind of job. In Argentina, for example, young people with incomplete primary schooling holding non-manual jobs made up 18.4% of the EAP in 1960, a figure which had fallen to 4.6% in 1980, despite the strong growth in the category.

Non-manual jobs are becoming more complicated, for one thing; for another, the supply of educated young persons exceeds the demand, and employers are thus able to insist on higher formal levels of education for the same work. It should be noted in this connection that the spread and prolongation of schooling tended to reduce grade standards. Lastly, the gradual acquisition of wages status by non-manual workers establishes a formal relationship between the education level and the requirements imposed by organizations for certain jobs. All this explains the cycle of "forward retreat" in the education systems of Latin America. Lower social groups are required to obtain levels of education formerly reserved for the higher groups, which in turn move up to a still higher level. This demand process is similar to the one found in developed and centrally planned societies. However, unlike them, it does not differentiate clearly between compulsory school courses and higher courses based on selectivity through the regular assessment of knowledge and admission tests for non-compulsory courses.

The third use of education was to facilitate the incorporation of the category of waged manual workers. This category receives higher incomes than the category of own-account manual workers, especially in the case of young people, who do not have a capital of knowledge and experience in the activity concerned. As in the case of non-manual jobs, employment in organizations at a certain level is accompanied by items of social protection (holidays, pension rights, health services).

As far as the young people of Argentina and Chile are concerned (early-modernization countries), the category of waged manual workers is smaller in percentage terms: there is an increase in the share of EAP of the non-manual category, and at the same time the

Table 2

**LATIN AMERICA (SIX COUNTRIES): YOUTH EDUCATION LEVELS
AND JOB CATEGORIES, 1960 AND 1980**

(Percentages)

	Argentina		Brazil ^a		Chile		Ecuador		Honduras		Pañfima	
	1960 (25-34)	1980 (25-34)	1960 (25-34)	1980 (25-34)	1960 (25-29)	1980 ^c (25-29)	1962 (25-29)	1982 (25-29)	1960 (25-34)	1974 (25-34)	1960 (25-29)	1980 (25-29)
EAP 25-34	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
7 and more years of education	28.3	66.5	15.6	35.2	29.6	70.6	12.0	37.0	18.5	35.6	28.6	50.0
Non-manual	16.6	39.3	10.5	24.2	14.9	33.4	7.7	24.9	9.1	18.3	19.8	33.9
Waged manual	3.7	20.1	3.4	8.5	9.8	22.0	2.5	8.2	6.5	11.9	7.0	14.0
Waged manual in primary activities	(0.2)	(1.3)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.8)	(2.2)	(0.4)	(0.8)	(1.4)	(2.6)	(0.3)	(1.0)
Non-waged manual	0.8	7.1	1.7	2.5	2.7	5.3	1.8	3.9	2.9	5.4	1.8	2.9
Non-waged manual in primary activities	(0.1)	(1.4)	(0.6)	(0.5)	(0.6)	(1.5)	(0.5)	(0.4)	(1.7)	(3.1)	(0.2)	(0.7)
0-6 years of education ^{1*}	71.7	33.5	84.4	64.8	70.4	29.4	88.0	63.0	81.5	64.4	71.4	50.0
Non-manual	18.4	4.6	7.3	6.1	7.2	4.4	7.7	5.3	3.5	7.7	5.1	4.3
Waged manual	41.5	19.5	34.6	33.3	51.0	17.5	38.7	23.1	30.2	24.5	21.9	23.1
Waged manual in primary activities	(8.0)	(3.8)	(13.2)	(8.9)	(17.5)	(5.0)	(23.5)	(9.7)	(17.6)	(13.3)	(8.1)	(7.4)
Non-waged manual	7.6	5.5	37.2	19.1	9.4	5.2	37.4	17.4	39.9	29.0	34.0	12.8
Non-waged manual in primary activities	(3.7)	(1.8)	(30.1)	(12.8)	(5.1)	(2.8)	(27.6)	(10.9)	(37.4)	(25.4)	(31.2)	(10.0)

Source: ECLAC, on the basis of census data.

^aThe figures for Brazil are for 5 years and more and 0-4 years of education respectively.

^bThe figures for Honduras are for 4 years and more and 0-3 years of education respectively.

^cData from the National Household Survey of October-December 1980 (National Statistical Institute).

Excluding the category of persons on whose status no information is available.

proportion of manual waged workers stabilizes or declines, with major reductions in youth employment. In the other countries, in contrast, the situation is varied: there is a very steep decline in the category of young people employed in agriculture, and increases in the categories of non-manual and manual waged workers in the total young EAP. However, common to all the countries is the increase in the proportion of better educated persons in the category of manual waged workers; in Argentina and Chile they are already more numerous than the less educated.

The future trends of youth employment—assuming that the crisis is overcome—underline the exhaustion of the cycle of structural mobility.

The category of non-manual workers, which has expanded rapidly, will not be able to continue to grow at the same rate. Within the category, there will be a greater polarization between jobs of high and low status, partly because of the expansion of the category and partly because of the increasingly technical nature of the tasks. This polarization will be linked with requirements not only for post-primary education but for post-secondary or post-university as well.

The size of the waged manual category indicates that there will be a bottleneck in structural mobility affecting the new generations coming from rural families and from families of manual urban own-account workers. Furthermore, the effect of technologies that require less labour could be very great in this sector, and this would produce a percentage reduction and an increase in selectivity based on education level.

Faced with the crystallization of the employment structure, the reply of Latin American societies, sharply stratified by income and power, has been to seek ways of controlling mobility which does not yet amount to a structural transition.

Some mechanisms have emerged as a response to the "excessive" expectations of upward mobility through education. One of them, historically, was to keep the rural population on the margins of education.

Another, ancient in some countries and presented as "modernization" in others, is to transfer the costs of primary education to local institutions, whose resources are proportionate to the incomes of the local residents; the quality of education thus differs according to locality, and is lower in the poorest. Yet another mechanism has been to prevent the standardization of the quality of education in the basic course and to create relatively excellent academic routes which operate from the pre-school to the university levels, quite separate from an education, usually provided by the State, considered to be "education of the poor".

However, even if the education systems were standardized and offset the relative disadvantages of the pupils with fewer socio-cultural resources, there would still have to be selection all the way from the basic levels, which would correspond to some extent to the technical nature and therefore to the status of jobs in a differentiated society, be it capitalist, socialist, or modelled on some kind of utopia.* Once the structural change has been completed, the aspirations and expectations will necessarily cease to be those of job mobility for all. Theoretically they could be, on the one hand, those of standardization of basic services and resources—food, health, education—which would provide similar training and opportunities for all in each new generation; and, on the other hand, changes in income distribution so that people in the lowest categories will have enough to meet personal needs, including culture, changes which would probably substantially reduce the incomes and power of the highest categories.

*It is significant that the studies of upward mobility and education deny that the latter does not provide opportunities of the former—taken to mean access to high-status jobs. The argument would assume that the top posts should expand at the same rate as the levels of higher education, university for example, which would mean an impossibility, unless, paradoxically, there was a reduction in the expansion of education. The argument still focuses on expectations of undefined structural change and assessment of the value of education not in terms of culture and learning but as a passport to posts with higher income and intellectual status, all of which can form part of the mesocratic illusion of social mobility.

III

The manifestations of the youth crisis

The exhaustion—or at least the "easy" stage—of the structural transformation coincided in the region with the recession resulting from external debt and the economic policies pursued to counter the recession.

The position of young people in relation to the work market underwent a sharp reversal. Having been the main beneficiaries of the earlier model of expansion, they became the group most seriously harmed by the recession. This phenomenon had the following characteristics:

a) The State cut expenditure sharply—especially social expenditure—halting the policy of expanding employment in the social and community services which were one of the foundations of the expansion of the tertiary sector.

b) Productive and service enterprises were faced with a reduced demand and stopped taking on new staff. Moreover, when they began to expand their production in 1985—in some countries or sectors—they did so with their existing workforce, whose distribution and efficiency has had to improve to cope with the crisis.

c) The expansion of education which might have formed part of the policy to combat recession did not come about, owing to the necessary reduction of fiscal expenditure. However, the education system with its pre-existing structures and with impaired efficiency did accept an increasing volume of young people who prolonged their studies because of the difficulty of finding work.

As a result of this situation, young people under 25 account in many countries for approximately half of open urban unemployment, and first-time job seekers are coming to represent one-quarter of unemployed persons, as is happening for example in Uruguay (ECLAC, 1985a).

In the countryside, various indicators seem to suggest that the opportunities of migration to the towns have declined and that there is an increase in the numbers of young people with

decent education engaged in farming activities. These activities increased their production as a result of the crisis, but they did not undergo significant structural or technological changes which would have furnished better employment opportunities for the more educated young people who remained in the countryside.

The information on one country, Chile, is illustrative of this, for the cycle of transformation had been completed in Chilean society; the efforts to modernize through education had been among the most intensive in the region, yet the unemployment figures, already high before the crisis, were pushed by it to the highest levels in the region.

Data for 1980 and 1984⁴ show that the already high proportion of students in the group increased still further, from 66.8 to 71.7% for the 15-19 age range, and from 18.7 to 19.6% for the next age range, aged 20 to 24 (table 3). This increase was in step with a percentage reduction in the category of active persons aged 15 to 19, which declined to 14.9% from an already low level of 18.3%. This strengthens the mechanism of reducing the pressure exerted on the work market by a young generation which represents a very high proportion of the total working-age population.

The status of student in 1980 (table 4) was already relatively accessible for the various socio-occupational categories in the 15-19 age range (50.4% of children of domestic employees and 85% of children of employers). Faced with a smaller jobs market, the collective demand for study increased: practically all the categories increased their participation in education (69% of children of domestic employees and 95% of children of employers in 1984).

⁴The tabulations on which this section is based use data for 21 of the country's main towns and were prepared by the consultant Arturo León as part of a study sponsored by the Unit for the Integration of Women in Development of KCLAC's Social Development Division.

Table 3

CHILE: TYPE OF YOUTH ACTIVITY, 1980 AND 1984

(Percentages)

	1980						1984					
	Both sexes		Men		Women		Both sexes		Men		Women	
	15-19	20-24	15-19	20-24	15-19	20-24	15-19	20-24	15-19	20-24	15-19	20-24
Students	66.8	18.7	68.1	20.4	65.6	17.0	71.7	19.6	74.7	22.6	68.6	16.6
Domestic helpers	8.5	18.7	0.6	0.3	16.2	36.1	7.9	17.7	1.0	0.6	14.9	34.2
Retired and inactive	6.4	4.1	7.6	5.4	5.3	3.0	5.5	4.8	6.8	6.0	4.3	3.6
Active	18.3	58.5	23.7	73.9	12.9	43.9	14.9	57.9	17.5	70.8	12.2	45.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the National Statistical Institute (INE), National Household Survey October-December 1980 and 1984.

In 1984 the continuation of studies in the 20-24 age range was determined more by social origin. Two upper categories —non-agricultural employers and middle-range wage sectors— kept more than 40% of their children in that age group in education; another three categories —middle-range independent sectors, traditional craftsmen, and persons active in the primary sector— did so for some 20% of their children; the upper level of the working-class category kept 13% in education. The lowest-status jobs —lower working-class level, marginal workers, seasonal workers and those employed in programmes of the PEM/POJH kind— kept less than 10% in education. The lowest figure (1.8%) was for domestic employees.

In 1984 education opportunities increased for the employers and middle-range sectors, which had the common feature of receiving non-waged incomes» and for the working-class and sub-working-class categories. The sharpest decline was in the middle-range waged sectors. These apparently contradictory developments can be understood when it is remembered that the lower socio-occupational categories have high proportions of their children in these age groups in free secondary education. The children from the higher categories have already

completed their secondary schooling, and their higher education is paid for; consequently, the middle-range waged sectors, which suffered large declines in their incomes, had difficulty in financing the cost of education.

In 1980 the social integration of young people aged 20 to 24 was already showing signs of exclusion, as is pointed out in the study by Javier Martínez in this issue of the *CEPAL Review*. The proportion of unemployed and first-time work seekers was 12.7%; when marginal employment is included —PEM and POJH jobs and domestic work— the total for all active and inactive young people was 20.5% (table 5).

The situation deteriorated sharply as a result of the economic policies introduced to combat the crisis. Unemployment increased to 18%; when marginal employment is included it totalled 28.2% of young people. This increase was due to the reduction in the number of employed persons (own-account workers, manual workers, white-collar workers and employers) which declined from its former 38.1% to 29.8%, while inactive young persons (students or domestic helpers) held their share at slightly above 40%. To put it another way, in

Table 4

CHILE: SOCIAL ORIGIN OF STUDENTS, 1980 AND 1984

(Absolute numbers and percentages)

Occupation of head of household	Total	Non- agricul- tural em- ployers	Middle- range waged sectors	Middle- range indep- en- dent sectors	Tra- ditional crafts- men	Working class (upper level)	Other working class	Mar- ginal workers	Domes- tic em- ployees	PEM POJH	Agricul- tural EAP
15-19	493 819 (70.7)	12 781 (85.0)	97 971 (82.8)	57 196 (70.3)	32 677 (67.4)	106 970 (69.5)	51 113 (62.5)	18 759 (53.0)	8 647 (50.4)	9 881 (64.7)	10 749 (62.2)
1980											
20-24	108 793 (24.1)	5 865 (45.2)	41 322 (40.9)	11 604 (21.3)	7 458 (21.8)	13 491 (15.1)	4 462 (9.1)	973 (6.1)	103 (1.8)	1 089 (9-6)	2 049 (19.2)
15-19	460 006 (74.7)	21 561 (90.5)	85 632 (82.2)	44 293 (81.2)	28 585 (74.9)	78 928 (71.8)	45 357 (71.7)	21 480 (62.2)	U 145 (69.0)	28 334 (65.2)	11 078 (62.8)
1984											
20-24	131 289 (23.2)	8 970 (48.8)	38 962 (35.5)	16 783 (29.8)	4 324 (14.7)	15 439 (16.7)	6 263 (12.3)	2 773 (9.0)	1 449 (9.2)	2 574 (6.8)	2 680 (14.3)

Source: EO-AC, on the basis of figures from the National Statistical Institute (INE), National Household Survey, October-December 1980 and 1984.

Table 5
CHILE: SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF YOUNG PEOPLE AGED 20 TO 24,
1980 AND 1984
(Percentages)

	Both sexes		Men		Women	
	1980	1984	1980	1984	1980	1984
Unemployed	7.9	11.0	10.9	13.4	5.1	8.7
First-time job seekers	4.8	7.0	5.5	7.5	4.2	6.5
PEM/POJH	2.6	5.5	3.2	8.7	2.0	2.4
Female domestic employees	5.2	4.7	0.3	0.3	9.7	9.0
Own-account workers and unpaid family members	5.4	5.1	8.5	8.1	2.5	2.3
Manual workers	15.0	11.4	26.7	19.6	4.0	3.5
White-collar workers	17.1	13.0	18.2	12.9	16.1	13.0
Businessmen, professional and technical staff	0.6	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.4	0.3
Students	18.7	19.6	20.4	22.6	17.0	16.6
Domestic helpers and inactive	22.8	22.5	5.6	6.6	39.1	37.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the National Statistical Institute (INE), National Household Survey, October-December 1980 and 1984.

1984 out of every 10 young persons aged 20 to 24 two were studying and two performing household chores, three were employed in relatively formal activities and three remained unemployed and found only marginal access to the work market.

The lower the educational level of young people, the higher their rate of exclusion (table 6). In 1984, 33.7% of those with no more than basic schooling were unemployed or employed in marginal jobs; the proportion declined slightly for those with secondary education (31.8%) and fell sharply for those with higher education (7.8%). Between 1980 and 1984 the exclusion of this last group increased by 1.7%, while the exclusion of young

people with secondary education (who account for three-quarters of the age group and were the most seriously affected by the crisis) increased by 9.4%.

The members of the higher-education category protect themselves against the crisis by continuing their studies (73.2%). Those with primary and to a lesser extent those with secondary education (31.7 and 24% respectively) remain largely excluded from education and the work market, occupying themselves with domestic tasks which facilitate the social survival of the families and the employment of other members of the household. Only one-tenth of this group manages to continue in the education system.

Table 6

**CHILE: EDUCATION LEVELS AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES OF YOUNG PEOPLE
AGED 20 TO 24, 1980-1984**

(Percentages)

	1980			1984		
	Primary (1)	Secondary (2)	Higher (3)	Primary (D)	Secondary (2)	Higher (3)
Unemployed	7.9	9.2	1.9	10.6	12.7	2.1
First-time job seekers	1.5	5.7	4.0	4.1	7.8	5.0
PEM/POJH and public manual workers	3.3	3.0	0.2	8.0	6.0	0.6
Domestic employees	13.4	4.5	-	11.0	4.5	0.1
Own-account workers and unpaid family members	7.2	5.7	2.3	7.7	5.5	1.1
Private manual workers	20.4	16.8	1.2	11.4	13.4	0.3
Public and private white-collar workers	5.5	19.4	17.6	2.0	15.1	10.6
Employers, professional and technical staff	-	0.4	1.3	-	0.2	0.6
Students	4.6	11.4	66.7	13.6	10.6	73.2
Domestic helpers and inactive	36.1	23.9	4.6	31.7	24.0	6.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Column distribution	14.9	70.1	14.9	11.5	74.8	13.7

Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the National Statistical Institute (INE), National Household Survey, October-December 1980 and 1984.

One of the most remarkable aspects of the non-marginal employment of the education categories is the reduced access to manual work of young people with primary education (from two to one in 10) and the reduced access of those with secondary education to white-collar and manual jobs. In 1984 it is practically impossible for young people with only primary education to become manual workers; with such limited recruitment and such an ample labour supply, it is necessary to have something more than basic education to become a manual worker.

The last aspect of this picture is obtained by studying the social integration of young people according to the socio-occupational categories of the heads of family (table 7), i.e., studying upward and downward mobility in the new

generations faced with an employment structure which rejects them.

Analysis of the occupations of the heads of the families of excluded young people (table 8) shows the systematic correlation between exclusion and social origin. In the lower part of the scale, unemployed heads of family or those working in emergency work programmes (PEM/POJH) have almost half of their children socially excluded and only 12.5 % in education; in the upper part, the employers have exactly the inverse distribution. In the middle ranges, exclusion declines and continued education increases, in accordance with a very clear pattern of social stratification: the categories of marginal workers and poorest manual workers have a third of their children excluded, and the

Table 7

CHILE: SOCIAL CATEGORIES OF PARENTS AND OF CHILDREN AGED 20 TO 24, 1984*(Percentages)*

N. N.	Parent categories	Total	Unem- ployed first-time job-seekers PEM/POJH	Domes- tic em- ployees, marginal workers	Other working- class	Manual workers	Tra- ditional crafts- men	Middle- range independ- ent sector	Middle- range waged sectors	Non- agricul- tural em- ployers
Child N. categories ^v										
Unemployed		12.6 71 417	23.9 24 196	11.0 5 131	15.2 7 741	12.9 11905	8.1 2 370	14.3 8 037	7.9 8 692	6.2 1 131
First-time job seekers		8.5 47 861	10.2 10 389	7.4 3 463	11.9 6 056	5.6 5 202	7.5 2 201	8.9 5 000	7.9 8 630	4.1 753
PEM/POJH		5.8 32 848	13.6 13 812	7.5 3 491	6.8 3 475	6.0 5 596	6.0 1 752	1.3 737	3.0 3 300	-
Domestic employees		1.8 10 571	1.4 1 382	8.4 3 925	1.8 892	1.5 1405	3.1 905	1.5 839	0.4 487	1.7 306
Own-account workers and unpaid family members		4.6 25 900	2.8 2 813	15.3 7 121	1.3 655	2.6 2 420	5.8 1 713	9.0 5 066	1.5 1661	8.5 1 556
Manual workers		12.6 71 013	10.4 10 554	14.4 6 724	21.2 10 774	24.6 22 771	18.4 5 424	6.9 3 892	4.8 5 214	1.0 176
Businessmen, technical staff, public and private white- collar workers		13.9 78 815	9.7 9 830	5.7 2646	12.1 6 146	11.0 10 204	19.8 5 828	13.9 7 852	26.9 29 473	18.0 3 247
Students		23.2 131 289	12.5 12 744	9.0 4 222	12.3 6 263	16.7 15 439	14.7 4 324	29.8 16 783	35.5 38 962	48.8 8 970
Domestic helpers and inactive		16.8 95 354	15.4 15 658	21.3 9 922	17.3 8 831	19.0 17 572	16.7 4 891	14.2 8 023	12.0 13 166	11.9 826
Total		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Column distribution		100.0	18.0	8.3	9.0	16.4	5.2	10.0	19.4	3.3
Absolute values		(565 068)	(101 378)	(46 692)	(50 834)	(92 513)	(29 408)	(56 226)	(109 614)	(18 376)

Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the National Statistical Institute (INE), National Household Survey, October-December 1984.

categories of higher-status manual workers and craftsmen a quarter; the middle-range independent sectors —underlining the polarization within the category— also have a quarter excluded, but at the same time they keep almost a third of their young people in education. Lastly, the middle-range waged sectors keep their children in the education system in order to save them from exclusion, train them for a very competitive work market and delay the moment of confrontation with the realities of employment.

Two clear facts emerge concerning exclusion and they are also related to social stratification. The first is that the higher the position of the heads of family in the status scale, the lower the proportion of their children in marginal occupation. The second is that the majority of those in such occupations come from families of the unemployed and first-time job seekers.

The social effects of the economic policies introduced to combat the crisis, in conjunction with the exhaustion of the cycle of structural change and the tendency for a status hierarchy to

be re-established in the relations between social groups, show a continuation of social stratification and an accentuation of its polarization. If it is remembered that the three lowest categories of heads of family represent more than a third of the total, it can be understood that a large proportion of the new generations will form part, not of a low social stratum, but of a separate stratum of society. At the other end of the scale, the categories of heads of family whose children remain relatively protected against the crisis represent little more than a fifth of the total. Exclusion also affects seriously the middle-range categories of manual and independent workers, and it is therefore difficult to avoid the feeling that the crisis affects *youth* as such. However, and as has been shown, the crisis arrives at the culmination of a process of recomposition of social stratification and polarity.

Of course, this is not the situation throughout the region, with respect either to the level of unemployment or to the intensity with which the effects of the crisis are concentrated in the lower group. In situations of full participation these latter groups receive a

Table 8

CHILE: SOCIAL ORIGIN OF EXCLUDED YOUNG PEOPLE AND STUDENTS, 1984

Children aged 20 to 24	Heads of family	Unem- P EM ' POJH	Mar- « inal workers	T Lower- level manual	TT Upper- level manual	men	Middle- range ind<- pendent sectors	w.jj, Middle- mnm wa es sectors	Pm pio ers
Unemployed and first-time job seekers		34.1	18.4	27.2	18.5	15.6	23.2	15.8	10.3
PEM/POJH and domestic employees		15.0	15.9	8.6	7.5	9.1	2.8	3.4	1.7
Subtotal excluded		49.1	34.3	35.7	26.0	24.7	26.0	19.2	12.0
Students		12.5	9.0	12.3	16.7	14.7	29.7	35.5	48.8

Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the National Statistical Institute (INE), National Household Survey, October-December 1984.

relatively more equitable share of expenditure. However, it must be assumed that in the various countries social position has become more decisive with respect to the destiny of each

category of young people; this leads to the conclusion that in the present context it may be more accurate to speak of different classes of youth rather than of a generational unit.

IV

Some final thoughts

Just as the process of economic growth in earlier decades was dominated by expansion of the productive and urban consumer markets, the decisive element in the social processes affecting youth was incorporation in the modern employment system, and in urban education and culture. In both cases the crucial factor was the growth rate: economically, this did not produce any great changes in income distribution, while socially there were changes in the distribution of cultural capital. This imbalance was possible within the framework of change in the structures of production, employment and satisfaction of social needs fed by urbanization and modernization and by the need to legitimize power systems affected by the permanent integration of new sectors in the social system.

The economic and social processes were conditioned by the structural transformation which began in the region in the immediate post-war period. This transformation created mobile societies, in which young people were the particular beneficiaries both of changes in the production structure—with new jobs available only to the better educated—and of the deliberate and spontaneous processes of social modernization and national integration.

This change was not governed by considerations of equality of opportunity or the creation of social homogeneity; those objectives, when they did guide social policy, came into conflict with the former power structures and the type of economic development based more on growth than distribution. However, the majority of the youth group did receive some satisfaction, for all of them, in some way or

another, shifted their positions in the social universe.

Up to the 1980s, in contrast, societies were already crystallized in some countries; in others, the "easy" transformation had run its course, and in still others the structural change had been very weak, owing to economic and social constraints.

The possibilities of future development became linked, economically, to the capacity to expand markets through changes in income distribution in accordance with the model of the developed countries, and socially, to the formation of new generations with basically standardized levels of physical, health and educational development capable of meeting the complex technical and cultural requirements of the new forms of production and society which already characterized the developed countries.

It was at this stage that the region's economic crisis occurred, slowing the process of structural change and crystallizing the social stratification emerging from a transformation not governed by considerations of equity.

The young generations suffer the effects of the crisis not only in the shortage of jobs and the deterioration of social services: as the recession imposes itself on the dynamics of the situation, it is no longer defined by age group but by social origin, which in turn is heavily polarized by the concentration of income and power in the previous period.

The democratic political systems which consolidated themselves or emerged as a means of responding to this concentration must grapple with the problem of how to change the

distribution and lay the foundations for the social rights of citizenship against a background of crisis. One of the main challenges, no doubt, is how to initiate a new style of development, beginning with youth policies and capable of

establishing a new legitimacy for democracy. This is the dilemma expressed in the reply of a young person to an opinion pollster in a Latin American country: "I am for democracy, but is democracy for me?"

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