



INFORME

SOBRE

"POLITICAS Y TENDENCIAS EN LA ASISTENCIA TECNICA
SUMINISTRADA A AMERICA LATINA POR LOS PAISES IN-
DUSTRIALIZADOS"

1952

DRAL/PNUD - CEPAL

28 MAY 1978

Nueva York, 21 Julio 1978

Los Gobiernos de América Latina reunidos en Panamá (26 noviembre - 2 diciembre 1977) solicitaron al PNUD y a CEPAL la contratación de consultores con el propósito de realizar un estudio sobre las políticas y tendencias de la asistencia técnica provista a la región por los países industrializados. Con tal fin, el PNUD y la CEPAL obtuvieron los servicios de los señores Paul Marc Henry, Mauro Couto, Carlos Tello, Ralph Getz y Juan Sánchez Arnau.

Bajo la dirección general del Sr. Henry, los señores Sánchez Arnau y Getz prepararon la documentación básica para Europa y Japón y para los Estados Unidos respectivamente.

El grupo de consultores en pleno, se reunió para revisar esta documentación y preparar el informe. El informe final fué escrito por el Sr. Sánchez Arnau, en base a instrucciones detalladas sobre su contenido y forma acordados por el grupo de consultores, quienes no han tenido oportunidad de revisarlo antes de su publicación. Debe hacerse presente que los consultores actuaron a título personal y por lo tanto, el informe no refleja, en forma alguna, los puntos de vista de las instituciones a las cuales ellos pertenecen ó con las cuales están relacionados. Asimismo, el PNUD y la CEPAL no asumen responsabilidad por los puntos de vista expresados en el informe.

Este estudio fué hecho dentro del marco del Proyecto "Cooperación Técnica entre Países en Desarrollo - RLA/76/005".

INDICE

	<u>Párrafos</u>	<u>Página</u>
INTRODUCCION	1 - 6	1
I. SITUACION ACTUAL DE LA COOPERACION TECNICA BILATERAL RECIBIDA POR AMERICA LATINA		
A. Aspectos Cuantitativos	7 - 20	3
B. Políticas seguidas por los países otorgantes de cooperación técnica	21 - 28	6
II. CAUSAS QUE EXPLICAN LA SITUACION ACTUAL	29	9
A. La cuestión de los países avanzados y las necesidades básicas	30 - 38	9
B. Problemas originados en los países beneficiarios	39 - 42	13
III. POSIBLES CURSOS DE ACCION PARA MODIFICAR LA SITUACION ACTUAL	43 - 49	14

CUADROS:

No. 1 "COOPERACION TECNICA BILATERAL BRINDADA POR LOS PAISES MIEMBROS DEL CAD"	16
No. 2 "COOPERACION TECNICA BILATERAL RECIBIDA POR LOS PAISES LATINOAMERICANOS"	17
No. 3 "COOPERACION TECNICA PRESTADA POR ESTADOS UNIDOS"	18
No. 4 "ASISTENCIA TECNICA RECIBIDA POR AMERICA LATINA"	19
No. 5 "COOPERACION TECNICA BILATERAL RECIBIDA POR LOS PAISES LATINOAMERICANOS"	20

GRAFICO

No. 1 "ASISTENCIA TECNICA RECIBIDA POR AMERICA LATINA DESDE ESTADOS UNIDOS"	21
---	----

ANEXOS:

- No. 1 "La Asistencia Técnica Brindada por Europa Occidental y Japón a América Latina", Centre International pour le Developpement.
- No. 2 "The Policy and Delivery of U.S. Bilateral Development Assistance to Countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1960-1977", Ralph E. Getz.
- No. 3 "Some Notes on U.S. Development Assistance" plus attachments I, II, III, IV and V. Marco D. Pollner.
- No. 4 Canada and Development Cooperation, 1971-72 to 1976-77.

INTRODUCCION

1. Este documento se refiere a la llamada "asistencia" ó "cooperación técnica", término cuya definición presenta diversos inconvenientes. Esta cooperación técnica se presta normalmente en forma de: provisión de becas, sea para estudiantes regulares de institutos superiores, sea para becarios (trainees) en institutos técnicos ó especializados; mediante el envío de expertos ó voluntarios del país donante u otorgante de la asistencia al país beneficiario y en la provisión de equipo para poder desarrollar los proyectos ó programas motivo de tal asistencia.
2. Hablar de cooperación técnica es hacer referencia a un conjunto de actividades de naturaleza y objetivos bastante disímiles, con límites imprecisos y afectada por el uso extensivo en la literatura sobre el tema, de nociones como la de "donante" y "beneficiario". Nociones poco apropiadas si se tiene en cuenta que en ciertas ocasiones el objetivo declarado de la cooperación técnica bilateral es aumentar las posibilidades de exportación del país donante, difundir el uso de su lengua ó abrirse acceso a nuevas fuentes de materias primas. Ello sin mencionar los casos en que los objetivos que se persiguen son de carácter político y sin negar el carácter positivo que tiene la cooperación técnica en general.
3. El conjunto de esta terminología ha quedado marcado por la situación de la post-guerra caracterizado por el quasi-monopolio de nuevas tecnologías de tentado inicialmente por los Estados Unidos y luego también por Europa y Japón, así como por el "retraso" acumulado por las naciones llamadas "periféricas".
4. La concepción misma de la cooperación técnica data prácticamente del punto IV del discurso del Presidente Truman en enero de 1949. El primer Programa Ampliado de Asistencia Técnica de las Naciones Unidas fué formulado por la IX Sesión del Consejo Económico y social en julio de ese mismo año. El Fondo Especial de Naciones Unidas, que extendió la asistencia técnica hasta

el nivel de pre-inversión, fué creado por la Asamblea General en 1959. El Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD) resultante de la fusión del Programa Ampliado y del Fondo Especial, data de 1966. Entre tanto, los países industrializados de Occidente pusieron en funcionamiento progresivamente programas bilaterales, es decir, de gobierno a gobierno, influídos esencialmente por la naturaleza cambiante de las relaciones políticas y económicas que debían existir en un momento dado, más que por un programa concebido racionalmente sobre la base de necesidades a largo plazo y en función de los intereses respectivos de ambas partes.

5. Hechas estas aclaraciones corresponde señalar que en este trabajo se intenta describir la situación actual de la cooperación técnica bilateral recibida por América Latina y el Caribe; señalar sus aspectos cuantitativos más relevantes y las grandes líneas de la política de los países que prestan dicha cooperación; tratar de identificar algunas de las causas que explican la situación actual y recomendar, en forma tentativa, algunos posibles cursos de acción para mejorar la posición de los países de la región en esta materia.

6. En una serie de anexos se presenta un cuadro algo más detallado de la cooperación técnica recibida por América Latina y el Caribe desde los Estados Unidos, Canadá, Europa Occidental y Japón.

I. SITUACION ACTUAL DE LA COOPERACION TECNICA BILATERAL RECIBIDA POR AMERICA LATINA

A. Aspectos Cuantitativos

7. Si bien los criterios de evaluación utilizados para calcular los flujos de cooperación técnica son de un valor relativo (ver a este respecto el documento "La Asistencia Técnica brindada por Europa Occidental y Japón a América Latina" páginas 3 a 5), las cifras disponibles, en la medida en que han sido recopiladas y procesadas utilizando criterios uniformes, permiten presentar un panorama aproximado de la situación actual de dicha cooperación técnica.

8. Entre 1961 y 1975 la cooperación técnica bilateral brindada por el conjunto de los países industrializados miembros de la OCDE a todos los países en desarrollo, creció a una tasa promedio cercana al 10% (9.53). A ello se ha debido que dicha cooperación creciera desde 777.7 millones de dólares para el primer año citado, hasta casi 3 mil millones de dólares (2,926,7) en 1975.

9. Este importante crecimiento ha hecho que la cooperación técnica creciera también en importancia relativa dentro del conjunto de la asistencia oficial para el desarrollo (AOD) brindada por los países industrializados, pasando desde algo menos del 15% a comienzo de la década del 60 a casi un 20% del total de la AOD en los años recientes. Debe notarse sin embargo que en los últimos años parecería estar produciéndose una declinación de la cooperación técnica como porcentaje del total de la AOD, posiblemente como producto de la creciente redistribución de ésta en favor de los países de más bajo nivel de ingreso, a los que se destinan primordialmente otras formas de asistencia (ayuda alimentaria, asistencia financiera concesional, etc.).

10. Debe señalarse también que pese a su fuerte crecimiento en valor y a su mayor participación relativa dentro de la AOD, la cooperación técnica multila

/...

teral ha tendido a crecer frente a la bilateral. A comienzo de los años 60 la cooperación técnica bilateral equivalía a un 85.5% del total de la cooperación técnica provista por los países industrializados; en 1975 ese porcentaje se había reducido al 73.2%, lo que dejaba un 26.8% para la multilateral.

11. En lo que se refiere a América Latina, cabe señalar que la cooperación técnica bilateral recibida por la región ha crecido desde 157.6 millones de dólares en 1969 hasta poco más de 245 millones en 1975 (Ver Cuadro No. 1). A pesar de ese crecimiento el porcentaje correspondiente a América Latina en el valor total de la cooperación técnica bilateral recibida por todos los países en desarrollo, está decreciendo en forma ininterrumpida desde 1971, habiendo caído desde el 12.1% en ese año al 8.4% en 1975, con un leve repunte al 8.8% en 1976.

12. En dicha disminución tiene un valor preponderante la caída del valor de la cooperación técnica prestada por Estados Unidos a la región, que bajó desde 129 millones de dólares en 1971 a 61 millones de dólares en 1977 (Ver Cuadro No. 2 y en el gráfico No. 1 la curva en dólares corrientes). Durante esos mismos años la cooperación técnica prestada por Europa Occidental, Canadá y Japón, creció en forma sostenida.

13. Entre 1969 y 1976 la cooperación técnica bilateral prestada a la región por el conjunto de los países europeos miembros del Comité de Asistencia para el Desarrollo (CAD) excepto Francia, pasó de 42.2 millones de dólares a 167.6 millones. Este crecimiento ha tenido lugar a una tasa anual promedio de casi el 22%, equivalente a la tasa anual promedio de crecimiento del total de la cooperación técnica brindada por Europa Occidental al conjunto de los países en desarrollo durante los últimos años.

14. La baja en los valores de la cooperación técnica brindada por Estados Unidos, y el incremento de la brindada por Europa Occidental, han dado origen a una importante inversión de la participación porcentual de ambos en el total de la cooperación técnica bilateral recibida por América Latina. Mientras en 1970 la proveniente de fuente europea equivalía al 32.5% del total de la recibida por América Latina, la proveniente de Estados Unidos llegaba a los dos

tercios de dicho total; en cambio, en 1976, fué la cooperación técnica europea la que equivalió a los dos tercios del total recibido por América Latina, mientras que la proveniente de Estados Unidos cayó al 30.3% de dicho total.

15. Debe mencionarse por otra parte que, pese al crecimiento registrado a precios corrientes por el valor de la cooperación técnica bilateral recibida por América Latina, a precios constantes, aquella ha caído en forma significativa en los últimos ocho años. Si se utilizan los índices de precios de exportación de los países industrializados (tal como son publicados por el Fondo Monetario Internacional) para deflacionar los valores corrientes de la cooperación técnica bilateral recibida por la región, se llega a la conclusión de que las cifras correspondientes a 1975 son inferiores, en valores constantes, a aproximadamente un 33.2% de la que América Latina recibía en 1971.

16. Pero mucho más revelador es, a este respecto, el Gráfico No. 1 que presenta la pronunciada caída registrada, en términos reales, por la cooperación técnica brindada por Estados Unidos a la región entre 1961 y 1977.

17. La importante caída a precios corrientes de la cooperación técnica bilateral provista por Estados Unidos a América Latina se ha reflejado en la disminución porcentual de la participación latinoamericana en el total de la cooperación técnica bilateral norteamericana. Así, del 21.8% en 1971 el porcentaje correspondiente a la región cayó en 1975 al 14.6% (Cuadro No. 3).

18. Resulta interesante señalar que los países europeos tomados en su conjunto destinaron a América Latina entre 1969 y 1976 un porcentaje de su cooperación técnica bilateral muy cercano a la que destina Estados Unidos actualmente (13%) aunque con diferencias significativas que van desde el 22.6% de Alemania hasta aproximadamente un 1.5% de los países nórdicos. Japón, por su parte, destinó a América Latina en 1975 el 14.5% de su cooperación técnica bilateral, porcentaje que contrasta significativamente con el 9.1% que le correspondía a la región en el período 1954-1971. Canadá, a su vez,

destinó en 1975 el 7.5% del total de su cooperación técnica bilateral, a América Latina.

19. Otro aspecto que debe señalarse de la cooperación técnica bilateral recibida por América Latina, es la fuerte concentración en los países de origen. Si se toman los valores acumulados entre 1969 y 1975, podrá observarse que Estados Unidos proveyó a la región, por sí solo, el 53.6% del total y que Alemania Federal proveyó el 31.2%. Esto implica que sólo dos países han brindado a la región prácticamente el 85% del total de la cooperación técnica bilateral recibida. Si a ellos se agregan los Países Bajos y el Reino Unido (que brindaron respectivamente el 4.3 y el 4.2%), se llega al 93.3% del total (Ver Cuadro No. 4).

20. También puede observarse una cierta concentración en lo que se refiere a los países beneficiarios de cooperación técnica bilateral en la región. Así, por ejemplo, entre cuatro países (Brasil, Perú, Chile y Colombia) recibieron entre 1969 y 1976 el 61.6% del total de lo recibido por la región desde Europa Occidental (excepto Francia). Por otra parte, entre cinco países (Brasil, Haití, Colombia, Ecuador y Costa Rica) absorbieron prácticamente el 43% de la cooperación técnica brindada por Estados Unidos a la región (sin contar el importante porcentaje de la misma que no aparece en las estadísticas discriminada por país de destino (Ver Cuadro No. 5).

B. Políticas seguidas por los países otorgantes de cooperación técnica

21. La cooperación técnica bilateral no es sino una parte de la Asistencia Oficial para el Desarrollo y, en consecuencia, la política seguida por los países otorgantes en esta esfera refleja aproximadamente su política general en materia de AOD. Esto resulta evidente en casos como el de los Países Bajos, en que la cooperación técnica es prestada en forma conjunta con asistencia financiera, hasta el punto que, a partir del año próximo, las estadísticas oficiales de dicho país no establecerán distingo entre uno y otro tipo de flujo. Pese a ello, existen varios aspectos de la cooperación técnica bilateral sobre los que pueden identificarse líneas de acción más ó menos autónomas.

22. Dado lo reciente de la expansión de la cooperación técnica en muchos países industrializados, el surgimiento de organismos y mecanismos institucionales que se ocupen del tema es también de reciente data. Como lo es, por otra parte, la definición de políticas precisas en este área. Ello no obsta para que exista un buen número de países donde ya existe una estructura institucional exclusivamente dedicada a la cooperación técnica, sea autónoma ó en el contexto de los mecanismos institucionales que administran el conjunto de la AOD. También han surgido en años recientes, varias instituciones oficiales exclusivamente dedicadas a prestar en forma directa dicha cooperación (Japón, Alemania Federal, Estados Unidos, etc.) ó que teniendo otras actividades principales se han integrado a la red de instituciones del país que brindan cooperación técnica.

23. En algunos casos, los organismos no gubernamentales (vinculados a las iglesias, principalmente) juegan un papel importante en esta prestación (Países Bajos, R. F. de Alemania), y ello los ha llevado a establecer mecanismos de consulta y coordinación que, a veces, están estrechamente ligados con los mecanismos oficiales. En unos pocos casos (Alemania Federal, especialmente) hay organismos no gubernamentales que actúan como agentes del Gobierno en la implementación de sus planes de cooperación técnica bilateral y en Estados Unidos, fundaciones y otras instituciones privadas cumplen un importante papel.

24. En lo que se refiere a las políticas seguidas por los distintos países industrializados en esta materia, no resulta fácil establecer rasgos comunes. / En muchos casos se la considera como una preparación a la introducción de inversiones de carácter privado ó público. Y en otros, se llega incluso a un concepto "interesado" de dicha cooperación, es decir, ligándola a objetivos estratégicos ó políticos ó a flujos financieros e industriales vinculados con el comercio internacional. Así, por ejemplo, en casos como el de Japón y Alemania Federal, resulta evidente el interés por contribuir a desarrollar, a través de la cooperación técnica, nuevas fuentes de producción de materias primas. En los casos de Francia, Japón y el Reino Unido, la existencia de algún tipo de vinculación con la promoción de sus exportaciones, se encuentra con bastante precisión en documentos oficiales ó de fuentes privadas.

25. Una característica de las políticas de AOD que repercute en forma muy neta sobre las orientaciones de la cooperación técnica bilateral de muchos países industrializados, es la decisión de concentrar su Asistencia Oficial para el Desarrollo en los países menos avanzados. En varios casos, especialmente entre los países nórdicos, esta tendencia ha resultado en una casi total exclusión de América Latina entre los beneficiarios de la cooperación técnica prestada por dichos países.

26. Algo semejante ocurre en el caso de Estados Unidos, cuya creciente tendencia a concentrar la AOD en los países de bajos niveles de ingresos está llevando a que en el programa de operaciones propuesto por la Administración al Congreso para 1979, sólo algunos países de Centroamérica y del Caribe, Bolivia y Perú figuren entre los que van a recibir la mayor parte de la AOD (y, en consecuencia, cooperación técnica bilateral) de fuente oficial norteamericana.

27. En otros casos, el criterio de concentrar la cooperación técnica bilateral en unos pocos países se ha debido más bien a razones que tienen que ver con la administración y costo de la misma, ó con factores de interés para el país que la presta. Por ejemplo, los Países Bajos han decidido elegir sobre la base de varios criterios previamente establecidos, unos pocos países en los que concentrar el grueso de su cooperación técnica bilateral. En el caso de América Latina, los "países de concentración" son Colombia, Cuba, Jamaica y Perú, a los que se agrega Surinam, debido a los lazos históricos de este último con los Países Bajos. En el caso de Francia, en cambio, los países escogidos para concentrar su cooperación técnica en América Latina (Brasil, Venezuela y México) responden a razones totalmente vinculadas con las posibilidades de incrementar las exportaciones francesas y, en el caso de Haití, a los lazos históricos y de lengua. Las mismas razones explican la fuerte concentración de la cooperación técnica de origen inglés en los países del Caribe. Razones como las antes apuntadas acerca del interés por desarrollar nuevas fuentes de materia prima, así como los vínculos comerciales existentes en algunos casos, pueden explicar que el 70% de la cooperación técnica de Japón a los países de la región, se concentre en Perú, Brasil, México y Bolivia.

28. Junto a la existencia de toda esta serie de criterios que tienden más bien a concentrar la cooperación técnica bilateral, puede observarse también a menudo que existen otros factores que llevan a dar una preferencia al financiamiento de muchos proyectos en pequeña escala, más bien que de pocos proyectos importantes. Entre ellos pueden citarse la ausencia de presupuestos plurianuales en los países otorgantes de cooperación técnica, las dificultades que existen muchas veces para conseguir expertos dispuestos a trasladarse fuera de sus países de origen por períodos muy prolongados y el hecho de que hay varios países industrializados que autorizan a sus Embajadores ó Jefes de Misión a decidir por sí solos en la financiación de proyectos de pequeña escala. Pero posiblemente tanto ó más importante que estas razones sea la tendencia en los países beneficiarios a diseñar proyectos de alcance limitado - y financiamiento más ó menos fácil - antes que grandes proyectos cuyo financiamiento requiera de largas y complejas negociaciones. En todo caso, cuando se diseñan proyectos de ese tipo existe una tendencia a canalizarlos hacia las fuentes multilaterales de financiamiento.

II. CAUSAS QUE EXPLICAN LA SITUACION ACTUAL

29. Entre las causas que explican la situación que se ha descrito más arriba debe prestarse particular atención a algunos aspectos de la política general de cooperación al desarrollo de los países industrializados proveedores de cooperación técnica así como a ciertos elementos que afectan la capacidad de absorción de dicha cooperación en los países en desarrollo.

A. La cuestión de los países menos avanzados y las necesidades básicas

30. En primer término, el cambio importante que se ha producido en los últimos años en la orientación de las políticas de cooperación en la mayor parte de los países industrializados debido al mayor énfasis puesto en los países menos avanzados y en la implementación de estrategias dirigidas a la satisfacción de las necesidades básicas de las capas de ingresos más bajos en los

países en desarrollo. Estos dos elementos se han conjugado para determinar una tendencia generalizada a la concentración de las distintas formas de AOD en los países considerados como más pobres.

31. El proceso que ha llevado a este resultado se inicia hace aproximadamente una década en forma casi simultánea en el Banco Mundial y en el Comité de Planificación del Desarrollo de las Naciones Unidas. El surgimiento de un elevado número de países recientemente independizados - lo que implicaba un crecimiento importante de la demanda de AOD y la evidencia de que ésta habría de crecer muy lentamente - llevaron a varios países industrializados y a algunos de los potenciales beneficiarios a favorecer una redistribución general de las corrientes de asistencia para el desarrollo, y en especial de las más concesionales de entre ellas, en favor de los que se dió en llamar "los países menos avanzados" y de aquellos con ingresos per capita inferiores a \$200.- a precios de comienzos de esta década. En la primera categoría, la Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas incluyó una treintena de países, de los cuales uno solo (Haití) es latinoamericano. Esta decisión tuvo repercusiones sobre la cooperación técnica que prestan la mayor parte de los organismos del sistema de Naciones Unidas, y en especial sobre las cifras indicativas por país de los programas del PNUD, donde desde comienzos de los años setenta se operó una importante redistribución en la canalización de fondos en el sentido antes señalado.

32. Por otra parte, en el marco del Banco Mundial, los préstamos concesionales de la Asociación Internacional para el Desarrollo (AID) quedaron prácticamente limitados a los países con ingresos per capita más bajos.

33. Cuando en 1973 los países productores de petróleo ajustaron los precios de dicho producto y la crisis económica vinculada al desorden monetario internacional repercutió de manera muy neta sobre los países en desarrollo importadores de petróleo y de alimentos, la Asamblea General decidió establecer también la categoría de "países más seriamente afectados", en la que se incluyó a una cuarentena de países, de los cuales sólo El Salvador y Honduras pertenecen a la región latinoamericana. Hacia estos países también se cana-

lizó una cierta asistencia financiera adicional y, en algunos casos, se les tomó en cuenta en el continuado proceso de redistribución de los fondos de la AOD multilateral y bilateral.

34. Este proceso de redistribución de los fondos de AOD ha venido a encontrar una nueva base de sustentación intelectual y política en las estrategias preconizadas por la mayoría de los países industrializados (y ahora también oficialmente por la OCDE) para canalizar toda política de desarrollo hacia la satisfacción de las necesidades básicas de los sectores más pobres de las sociedades de los países en desarrollo.

35. Si bien estas estrategias encuentran justificación en los mecanismos de distribución interna de la riqueza en muchos países en desarrollo y en la evidencia de la existencia de una importante fracción de la humanidad que vive aún en condiciones de extrema pobreza, ellas tienden al mismo tiempo a dejar de lado los reclamos de los países en desarrollo por la instauración de un Nuevo Orden Económico Internacional que permita enfrentar muchas de las causas que originan aquellas situaciones y a ocultar la evidencia de la insuficiencia de los flujos de AOD y la constante disminución en términos reales, cuando no también en términos nominales, de los compromisos de la mayor parte de los países industrializados. Por otra parte, hasta ahora no ha sido posible determinar ni cuáles son las necesidades consideradas básicas, ni diseñar estrategias que efectivamente puedan estar dirigidas a su satisfacción generalizada en plazos razonables.

36. De todos modos, el hecho concreto es que, incluyendo mayor ó menor porcentaje de uno u otro ingrediente (redistribución de la AOD hacia los países de más bajos ingresos ó hacia proyectos relacionados con la satisfacción de las necesidades básicas) prácticamente la totalidad de los países industrializados han procedido en los últimos años a canalizar sus flujos de cooperación para el desarrollo, incluyendo los de cooperación técnica, hacia los países con ingresos per capita más bajos. Esto, a su vez, está originando también una redistribución en materia de sectores de actividad favorecidos

/...

por los flujos de AOD, notándose en muchos casos una creciente tendencia al incremento de la asistencia a proyectos vinculados con el desarrollo rural. Lógicamente, esta política también reconoce excepciones cuando los intereses nacionales de los países proveedores de cooperación técnica así lo aconsejan.

37. Por otra parte, debe señalarse que en muchos países industrializados se tiende a ver a los países en desarrollo que no entran en las categorías antes analizadas, es decir a los llamados "países de ingresos medios", como capaces de resolver sus problemas de desarrollo recurriendo a fuentes privadas para obtener los recursos financieros y la tecnología necesarios. En otros términos, a considerarlos como países que no requieren de la cooperación externa oficial debido a que, a través de las inversiones privadas extranjeras, de los bancos y de los mercados de capitales de los países industrializados, pueden encontrar los recursos necesarios para financiar su desarrollo y resolver parte de sus problemas de balanzas de pagos, y en las corporaciones transnacionales, la tecnología necesaria para asegurar su desarrollo industrial. A ello se agrega, en muchos círculos de los países industrializados, la percepción de que América Latina ya ha alcanzado ó está próxima a alcanzar el desarrollo y de que sus problemas se originan principalmente en la mala administración de los recursos internos y en el desorden político. A esto debe sumarse el hecho de que usualmente se considera a América Latina como una región con una gran capacidad para desarrollar producciones competitivas con las de los países industrializados, lo que tiende a justificar muchas veces, y especialmente en estas épocas de elevada desocupación y crisis económica generalizada, el acceso a ciertas formas de cooperación que podrían reforzar su capacidad competitiva en determinados sectores.

38. El corolario de todas estas concepciones es que hoy en día la política global relacionada con la cooperación al desarrollo de dichos países de ingresos medios ha tenido como resultado la creciente marginación de los países de la región de toda forma de AOD, incluyendo la cooperación técnica. En este sentido, las negociaciones llevadas a cabo por América Latina en materia de financiamiento externo, de inversiones directas y de comercio internacional, generalmente no han sido ligadas a las negociaciones para obtener transferen-

cia tecnológica a través de asistencia técnica, lo cual ha generado la situación descrita.

B. Problemas originados en los países beneficiarios

39. Una consideración global de los problemas que se han expuesto en la primera parte no debe dejar de lado ciertas cuestiones originadas en políticas ó en condiciones vigentes en los propios países beneficiarios de la cooperación técnica. Y, en este orden de cosas, la primera constatación que quizás quepa hacer es que América Latina no ha estado hasta aquí en condiciones de presentar a los países industrializados un conjunto de propuestas que constituyan una alternativa a sus políticas actuales de cooperación para el desarrollo hacia los países de calificados "ingresos medios".

40. En segundo lugar, deben señalarse una serie de factores que a menudo impiden ó limitan las posibilidades de aprovechar ó utilizar recursos de cooperación técnica bilateral -y también multilateral- que muchas veces están disponibles. Entre esos factores debe citarse la ausencia, en la mayor parte de los países de la región, de programas nacionales de desarrollo tecnológico que permitan identificar áreas en que la cooperación técnica externa puede resultar deseable, ó fijar adecuadamente el orden de prioridades en que debe obtenerse aquella.

41. Otra característica que pareciera sugerir el análisis de lo que sucede en la región, es que en muy pocos países existe una adecuada centralización de la administración y, especialmente, de la negociación de la cooperación técnica externa; llegándose en muchos casos a la competencia entre distintos sectores de la Administración nacional. A ello se suelen agregar una serie de problemas prácticos que muchas veces afectan incluso a proyectos aprobados y en marcha, con posteriores repercusiones sobre la capacidad de algunos países para acceder a nuevos proyectos. Entre estos problemas cabe citar la falta de provisión de fondos suficientes para financiar los costos locales de proyectos, ó para asegurar su continuación una vez que haya finalizado la

cooperación externa, y las dificultades para designar contrapartes locales para su ejecución que satisfagan los requerimientos puestos por el país otorgante de dicha cooperación.

42. Sin embargo, el problema que mayor relevancia tiene en este terreno es la ausencia de mecanismos apropiados, en muchos países latinoamericanos, para generar proyectos, ó la insuficiencia de los existentes, lo que suele dar lugar a la elaboración de proyectos de baja calidad. A pesar de los importantes progresos que se han hecho en la región en esta materia, quizás continúe siendo ella una de las mayores limitaciones que existen en este área.

III. POSIBLES CURSOS DE ACCION PARA MODIFICAR LA SITUACION ACTUAL

43. Los posibles cursos de acción que puedan encararse para intentar modificar la situación antes descrita pueden separarse a nivel de la acción conjunta de la región y de la acción individual de los países que la componen.

44. En lo que se refiere a la acción colectiva, tal como se señaló antes, diera la impresión de que resultaría conveniente la elaboración de un conjunto de propuestas que constituyan una alternativa a las actuales políticas de los países industrializados en materia de AOD y que tengan adecuadamente en cuenta los intereses de los países que aquellos consideran de ingresos medios. Lógicamente tales propuestas no deben de modo alguno constituir un intento por seccionar al conjunto de los países en desarrollo, sino por complementar las políticas que ya han adoptado los países industrializados sobre los países de más bajos niveles de ingreso y en materia de estrategias sobre las necesidades básicas.

45. En este replanteo de políticas relacionadas con la AOD quizás sea un factor clave plantear la asistencia técnica como un problema de necesidades crecientes de transferencia de tecnología en condiciones adecuadas con las características de cada país y de cada proyecto.

46. Una vez elaboradas un conjunto de propuestas de esta naturaleza se podría llevar su discusión, luego de su compatibilización con el resto de los países en desarrollo, a los foros multilaterales, y especialmente a los foros que América Latina establezca para mantener su diálogo con Estados Unidos, las Comunidades Europeas, Japón y Canadá.

47. En el plano individual de los países de la región, además de procurar eliminar los obstáculos que limitan la capacidad de absorción de cooperación técnica a que antes se hizo referencia, parecería presentarse como una prioridad la elaboración de políticas nacionales relacionadas con la cooperación técnica externa, adecuadamente vinculadas a los planes y necesidades nacionales en materia de transferencia de tecnología.

48. Ello debería ser acompañado de una adecuada centralización en la negociación y administración de la cooperación técnica externa, así como en el establecimiento de mecanismos que aseguren la continuidad de las políticas y de las acciones relacionadas con su implementación.

49. Por último, cabría señalar la conveniencia de incorporar el tema de la cooperación técnica al marco de las discusiones bilaterales con los países industrializados, especialmente en el contexto de las comisiones bilaterales ó de mecanismos ad-hoc de consulta y negociación sobre este tema.

CUADRO No. 1

COOPERACION TECNICA BILATERAL BRINDADA POR LOS PAISES MIEMBROS DEL CAD*
(Millones de dólares)

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>
1. A todos los países en desarrollo	1.513.1	1.505.6	1.671.8	1.837.5	2.274.5	2.496.5	2.926.7	2.875
2. A los países latinoamericanos**	157.6	177.3	202.1	188.2	223.9	225.1	245.4	(254.2)
3. Porcentaje de 2/1	10.4	11.8	12.1	10.2	9.8	9.0	8.4	8.8

Fuente: OCDE, a partir de datos de diversas publicaciones.

* Alemania Federal, Australia, Austria, Bélgica, Canadá, Dinamarca, Estados Unidos, Finlandia, Francia, Italia, Japón, Noruega, Países Bajos, Reino Unido, Suecia y Suiza.

** Excluyendo asistencia técnica provista por Francia.

CUADRO No. 2

COOPERACION TECNICA BILATERAL RECIBIDA POR LOS PAISES
LATINOAMERICANOS

(En millones de dólares)

<u>DESDE:</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>
1. Países europeos miembros del CAD (Excepto Francia)	42.2	57.6	67.4	80.6	101.8	119.3	142.5	167.6	
2. Estados Unidos	112	116	129	102	113	95	84	77	61
2. Japón	0.9	1.6	2.9	3.8	6.4	8.1	12.6	18.5	
4. Todos países CAD	157.6	177.3	202.1	188.2	223.9	225.1	245.4	(254.2)	

Fuente: A partir de datos de publicaciones varias de la OCDE y para Estados Unidos, anexos estadísticos de los Memoranda sometidos anualmente por ese país al CAD y compilados para este trabajo en R. Getz "Policy and Delivery of US Bilateral Development Assistance" (unpublished).

CUADRO No. 3

COOPERACION TECNICA PRESTADA POR ESTADOS UNIDOS

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>
	(En millones de dólares)							
1. A todo destino	632	560	593	537	604	615	574	
2. A América Latina y el Caribe	112	116	129	102	113	95	84	77
3. Relación América Latina s/ el total (2/1)	17.7	20.7	21.8	19.0	18.7	15.4	14.6	

Fuente: Ver Cuadro No. 2.

CUADRO No. 4

ASISTENCIA TECNICA RECIBIDA POR
AMERICA LATINA

	<u>Valores Acumulados</u> <u>1969 - 1975</u> (En millones de dólares)	<u>Porcentaje</u> <u>del total</u>
Estados Unidos	751	53.6
R. F. Alemania	437	31.2
Países Bajos	61	4.3
Reino Unido	59	4.2
Japón	36	2.6
Bélgica	28	2.0
Italia	14	1.0
Austria	4	0.3
Suecia	3	0.2
Dinamarca, Finlandia y Noruega	5	0.4
Suiza	<u>1</u>	<u>0.1</u>
TOTAL PAISES CONSIDERADOS	1.399 =====	99.9 =====

Fuente: Cuadros Nos. 2 y 3.


GUADRO No. 5

COOPERACION TECNICA BILATERAL RECIBIDA POR LOS PAISES LATINOAMERICANOS
(Millones de dólares)

	Desde Europa Occi- dental excepto Francia. Valores acumulados 1969-1976	Porcentaje del total	Desde Estados Unidos. Valores acumulados 1975-1977	Porcentaje del total
Brasil	120.26	15.4	19	13.4
Perú	111.65	14.3	8	5.6
Chile	93.35	11.9	5	3.5
Colombia	78.57	10.0	10	7.0
Argentina	56.45	7.2	-	-
México	50.77	6.5	-	-
Bolivia	42.60	5.4	5	3.5
Ecuador	34.36	4.4	10	7.0
Venezuela	30.31	3.9	2	1.4
Jamaica	21.03	2.7	6	4.2
Costa Rica	21.00	2.7	11	7.7
Guatemala	17.66	2.3	9	6.3
Paraguay	16.75	2.1	8	5.6
Uruguay	12.48	1.6	3	2.1
Surinám	12.09	1.5	-	-
El Salvador	9.20	1.2	5	3.5
Honduras	9.02	1.2	7	4.9
Haití	6.70	0.9	12	8.4
Nicaragua	6.38	0.8	9	6.3
Cuba	6.30	0.8	-	-
Guyana	5.33	0.7	3	2.1
Barbados	5.38	0.7	3	2.1
Trinidad	5.02	0.6	-	-
Rep. Dominicana	4.14	0.5	3	2.1
Panamá	3.60	0.4	4	2.8
Bahamas	1.50	0.2	-	-
Bermuda	0.03	-	-	-
			142	
Cooperación técnica bilateral no discriminada por país de destino			80	
			222	
			===	

Fuente: Ver Cuadros Nos. 2 y 3.

GRAFICO 1. Asistencia Técnica recibida por América Latina desde Estados Unidos*
(En millones de dólares)



* Fuentes: Anexos Estadísticos del Memorando de los Estados Unidos al CAD, Examen Anual.

** Dólares ajustados por la aplicación de los deflatores de la cooperación técnica del CAD, según datos publicados en los Exámenes Anuales del CAD para 1975 y 1977.

CENTRE INTERNATIONAL POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT

LA ASISTENCIA TECNICA BRINDADA POR EUROPA OCCIDENTAL Y JAPON
A AMERICA LATINA

Contenido:

Introducción

- I. La asistencia técnica bilateral en las dos últimas décadas.
- II. Los países latinoamericanos como beneficiarios de asistencia técnica europea.
- III. Los programas de asistencia técnica de los países de Europa Occidental en América Latina.
- IV. La asistencia técnica brindada por Japón a los países latinoamericanos.

Anexos:

- I. Bibliografía
- II. Anexo Estadístico:
Tablas A, B, y C.1 a C.27.

Estudio realizado a pedido del Programa de las Naciones Unidas
para el Desarrollo.

Mayo-Junio de 1978

El presente estudio ha sido realizado por el Centro Internacional para el Desarrollo, a solicitud del Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, en el marco de un proyecto dirigido por el Sr. Paul-Marc Henry. El trabajo ha sido dirigido por el Director Ejecutivo del Centro, Sr. Juan Carlos Sánchez Arnau y en su elaboración también intervinieron los miembros de su "staff" Srs. Juan Carlos Valdovinos y Enrique Peñalosa.

INTRODUCCION

En el presente trabajo se ha tratado de describir la asistencia técnica brindada por los países de Europa Occidental a los de América Latina, en primer lugar a partir de información estadística uniformada y procesada según los criterios de la OCDE y, en segundo lugar, sobre la base de información procedente de algunos de los países donantes. Se ha tratado de establecer cual es la importancia que la asistencia técnica proveniente de Europa Occidental tiene para América Latina, determinar las políticas actuales de los países donantes y, cuando ha sido posible, presentar algunas perspectivas del futuro inmediato en esta esfera.

Desde un inicio debe señalarse que este documento tiene una serie de limitaciones. Algunas de ellas se refieren a la definición de la materia que ha sido objeto de estudio: la asistencia técnica. Otras, a las condiciones en que debió llevarse a cabo dicho estudio.

En lo que se refiere a lo último, es necesario señalar que el tiempo disponible para realizar este trabajo fue excepcionalmente corto, particularmente si se tiene en cuenta la dispersión y variedad de las fuentes de información, así como la ausencia de información sobre determinados aspectos de los programas de cooperación de ciertos países. Tales limitaciones han impedido hacer un control detenido de la información, comparar adecuadamente la que proviene de fuentes alternativas o consultar con los responsables de los países que otorgan la asistencia técnica, algunas de las afirmaciones que se hacen a lo largo de este texto. Ello no implica, sin embargo, que los autores tengan mayores dudas acerca de dichas afirmaciones o sobre la veracidad de la información que presentan. De todos modos, todo trabajo es perfectible y si en el presen-

te caso se hubiera dispuesto de un margen mayor de tiempo se habría, logicamente, podido mejorar su calidad.

En lo que se refiere a las limitaciones derivadas de la definición de "asistencia" o "cooperación técnica" debe señalarse que, ésta se presenta en forma de provisión de becas, sea para estudiantes regulares de institutos superiores, sea de "stagiares" en institutos técnicos o especializados; mediante el envío de expertos o voluntarios del país "donante" u "otorgante" de la asistencia al país "beneficiario" y en la provisión de equipo para poder desarrollar los proyectos o programas motivo de tal asistencia. Ahora bien, las fuentes disponibles de información sobre asistencia técnica provienen casi exclusivamente de los países otorgantes y éstos tienen muchas veces a dar una amplitud extremadamente grande al término "técnica", como a la noción de "asistencia" o "cooperación". De tal modo que suelen computar como asistencia técnica tanto becas concedidas para estudiar las "bellas artes", como el envío de voluntarios para desarrollar funciones humanitarias (especialmente vinculadas con programas de salubridad) o la formación de personal técnico en el manejo de instrumental sofisticado en el marco de una operación de venta de bienes de capital.

En consecuencia, hablar de "asistencia técnica" es hacer referencia a un conjunto de actividades de naturaleza y objetivos bastante disímiles, cuando no contradictorios. Pero distinguir unos de otros al nivel de agregación en que es necesario trabajar en un estudio de este tipo, es prácticamente imposible. Para poder hacerlo habría sido necesario entrar a analizar cada proyecto, cada programa, el objetivo o el motivo real del envío de cada experto, sus resultados, etc. En consecuencia, lo único que puede hacerse aquí, es llamar la atención del lector sobre la amplitud, vaguedad e insuficiencia del término "asistencia técnica".

Dichas objeciones se refuerzan cuando se analizan más de cerca nociones como las de "donante" y "beneficiario" de las que se hace uso extensivo en la literatura sobre el tema. Tal como se verá al analizar la "asistencia" prestada por algunos de los países de Europa Occidental, el objetivo declarado de la misma, o el que se hace evidente a través de la orientación dada a gran parte de los proyectos, es aumentar las posibilidades de exportación del país "donante", difundir el uso de su lengua o abrirse acceso a nuevas fuentes de materias primas.

Todo lo cual no implica, de modo alguno, invalidar ni la totalidad ni la mayor parte de la asistencia técnica prestada por muchos países de Europa Occidental. El grueso de la misma tiene carácter esencialmente humanitario, sea de verdadera intención moral de contribuir al adelanto de los países en desarrollo. Pero no por ello debe dejar de señalarse que la amplitud de los términos utilizados en esta materia es demasiado grande, mucho más, en todo caso, que lo que los mismos sugieren.

Otra de las limitaciones con que se ha tropezado se refiere al tipo de información disponible. Básicamente puede decirse que hay una sobreabundancia de información dirigida al gran público, conteniendo poco material estadístico o alguno, pero presentado a un nivel de agregación muy elevado, que lo hace de poca utilidad para un estudio de esta naturaleza. Por ello ha sido necesario recurrir y hacer un uso extensivo de las publicaciones de la OCDE, única fuente de información estadística que presenta datos homogeneizados en cuanto a criterios de colección, clasificación y presentación, y con alguna desagregación, especialmente en materia de países beneficiarios. Esto ha comportado dos inconvenientes mayores: primero, que ha hecho que la mayor parte del análisis se basara en los aspectos

cuantitativos de la asistencia técnica y especialmente en su valor (en términos de costo para el país otorgante); y segundo, que ha obligado a referirse a ésta a partir de la noción amplia y difusa con que es considerada por aquel organismo y que se ha criticado más arriba. En consecuencia, este trabajo no incluye mayores referencias a los aspectos cualitativos de la asistencia técnica, omite toda evaluación de la misma y hace abstracción de su adecuación, oportunidad y costo desde el punto de vista de los países beneficiarios o recipiendarios. Estas observaciones no significan sin embargo, que deba restarsele importancia al ejercicio que se ha realizado: sin describir la realidad, y particularmente en términos cuantitativos, difícilmente se podrá llegar a interpretarla adecuadamente.

En lo que se refiere a la cobertura geográfica, cabe hacer tres aclaraciones. A todo lo largo del trabajo, cuando se hace referencia a América Latina, se está mencionando a los países latinoamericanos y también a los del Caribe de habla inglesa. En buena parte del análisis estadístico ha sido necesario, por razones que se explican más adelante, excluir cifras correspondientes a Francia. El caso de España, que no es miembro del Comité de Asistencia para el Desarrollo de la OCDE, y que en consecuencia no comunica al mismo sus informaciones estadísticas sobre la asistencia técnica que brinda a América Latina, ha debido ser tratado aparte.

I. LA ASISTENCIA TECNICA BILATERAL EN LAS DOS ULTIMAS DECADAS

La asistencia técnica tal como se la conoce hoy día es un fenómeno relativamente reciente. En muchos casos surgió como un factor asociado a otros aspectos de las relaciones entre Estados. Así por ejemplo, en el caso de Japón, surgió asociada a la fuerte emigración japonesa de la post-guerra hacia diversos países en desarrollo. En otros, ligada a las actividades humanitarias, particularmente en el continente africano; en otros, finalmente, como un apéndice de operaciones comerciales. Pero es recién a comienzos de los años sesenta que la asistencia técnica adquiere las características con que hoy se la conoce. Es a partir de ese entonces que comienzan a surgir en los países industrializados instituciones oficiales especializadas en administrar y dirigir los programas nacionales; que se crean mecanismos para recrutar y preparar expertos destinados a servir en los países en desarrollo; que surgen los primeros programas estructurados de becas; que se crean los servicios voluntarios, etc.

En este proceso, juegan un rol preponderante varios factores. En primer lugar, la creciente aspiración de los países en desarrollo por alcanzar niveles más altos de desarrollo tecnológico, por incorporar técnicas más evolucionadas y que respondieran más adecuadamente a sus aspiraciones de innovación siguiendo los patrones de consumo y producción de los países industrializados. En otros casos se trata simplemente del deseo de incorporar elementos humanos o de capital adicionales a sus posibilidades de desarrollo, de recurrir a la cooperación técnica como mecanismo de transferencia de conocimientos, pero sobre todo, de recursos. Pero fuera un caso u el otro, el hecho es que a principios de la década de los años sesenta comienza a hacerse evidente la existencia de una "demanda" creciente por este tipo de asistencia.

En segundo lugar, debe señalarse el rol jugado por Naciones Unidas en la promoción de la asistencia técnica multilateral y la creciente importancia que desde comienzos de la Primera Década de las Naciones Unidas para el desarrollo adquiere la llamada "cooperación internacional para el desarrollo" que aquella integra. La definición de objetivos concretos en la Estrategia Internacional para el Desarrollo, en especial en materia de transferencia de recursos, lleva a los países industrializados a institucionalizar sus programas bilaterales, a definir políticas y prioridades, a establecer organismos responsables de otorgamiento de este tipo de asistencia. En otros términos, a crear una cierta base de "oferta" para la creciente demanda originada en los países en desarrollo.

Hay sin embargo, en este proceso, otros factores que no pueden dejar de ser mencionados. Entre ellos, el control mutuo que se establece entre los países industrializados acerca del esfuerzo realizado por cada uno de ellos para cooperar al desarrollo del Tercer Mundo. Función en la que sobresalen el Comité de Asistencia para el Desarrollo de la OCDE y la presión ejercida por los países en desarrollo, especialmente desde la UNCTAD. También debe mencionarse la importancia que adquiere en algunos países industrializados la presión ejercida por diversos sectores intelectuales y por las iglesias, en favor del aumento de la asistencia en general, y de la asistencia técnica con fines humanitarios en particular. Hecho este último que lleva al surgimiento de un conjunto de instituciones no gubernamentales que están adquiriendo un rol creciente en los programas nacionales de algunos países europeos. Finalmente, debe señalarse también como causal de un crecimiento, en este caso más aparente que real, la tendencia a computar bajo el rubro "asistencia técnica" partes importantes de operaciones típicamente comerciales, especialmente programas de entrenamiento relacionados con la venta de plantas o equipos sofisticados.

Los efectos de este proceso, se reflejan con bastante claridad en las cifras del valor con que los países otorgantes de asis-

tencia técnica ponderan la asistencia que ellos otorgan. Dichas cifras se encuentran en diversos informes de la OCDE y de ellas se hará extenso uso en la presente sección y en las siguientes. De allí que, antes de entrar a analizar las mismas, sea necesario precisar su alcance.

1. Las estadísticas disponibles sobre asistencia técnica bilateral

La mayor parte de los países industrializados otorgantes de asistencia técnica publican regularmente información sobre sus programas y sobre los recursos volcados en la implementación de los mismos. Muchos de ellos, sin embargo, no publican información estadística regular sobre este tipo de asistencia. Sin embargo, todos ellos comunican dicha información, en forma detallada, al Comité de Asistencia para el Desarrollo (CAD) de la OCDE. Este último, a su vez, publica anualmente alguna información estadística sobre la materia, con un elevado nivel de agregación. Por otra parte, aunque en forma menos regular el CAD también publica un conjunto de tablas agrupadas con la distribución geográfica de los distintos tipos de asistencia prestada por los países industrializados que lo integran. Esta publicación ("Geographical distribution of financial flows to developing countries") permite distinguir los distintos flujos de asistencia ventilados por país de origen y de destino. Y entre esos flujos, los correspondientes a "cooperación técnica" según ha sido definida por la OCDE.

Dicha definición establece que debe considerarse como "cooperación técnica" la provisión de recursos con el objeto principal de:

- a) aumentar el nivel de conocimientos, habilidades, "know-how" técnico o aptitudes productivas de la población de los países en desarrollo; o
- b) aumentar la capacidad de los países en desarrollo para hacer un uso más efectivo de sus capacidades disponibles

como factor distinto de las transferencias destinadas a incrementar el stock de capital físico.

En términos más concretos, la cooperación técnica computada en las estadísticas de la OCDE se agrupa en los siguientes rubros:

- a) estudiantes y "stagiaires" de países en desarrollo que siguen cursos o "stages" en los países industrializados;
- b) expertos y voluntarios de los países industrializados que cumplen misiones en los países en desarrollo;
- c) equipo y material de demostración (excluyendo equipo que forme parte de un proyecto que contenga financiación de bienes de capital);
- d) programas culturales y sociales e investigaciones "orientadas" hacia el desarrollo;
- e) otros factores no desglosables.

Como puede observarse la inclusión de los programas culturales y sociales bajo el rubro de "cooperación técnica" no resulta fácilmente justificable, sobre todo si se tienen en cuenta que, sobre la base de las pocas informaciones disponibles, dichos programas alcanzarían a cerca del 25% del total de los gastos computados bajo aquel rubro. Por otra parte, la mayor parte de dichos programas están destinados a asegurar la difusión de la lengua o de determinados aspectos de la cultura del país que los financia, más que a asistir en el plano de los conocimientos técnicos a los países en desarrollo.

El primero de los rubros arriba mencionados (estudiantes y "stagiaires") puede estimarse, al menos con respecto a América Latina, que representa alrededor de un 10% del gasto total en "cooperación técnica" de los países europeos; el rubro "expertos y voluntarios", aproximadamente un 20% y la provisión de equipos un 40%. Pero éstas no son más que estimaciones efectuadas a partir de muestras representativas que no cubren necesariamente todo el universo estadístico que se analiza aquí.

Por otra parte, debe señalarse que los valores utilizados en las estadísticas de la OCDE en materia de cooperación técnica, son aquellos que reflejan los costos que dicha cooperación tienen para los países otorgantes; costos que, normalmente, están muy por encima del que servicios equivalentes (cuando los hay) pueden tener en el país beneficiario.

Hechas estas aclaraciones sobre lo que las cifras de la OCDE representan, cabe hacer una última observación. Esta se refiere a las cifras correspondientes a Francia. Estas incluyen la "cooperación técnica" brindada por la Metrópoli, a los Territorios y Dominios de Ultramar (DOM-TOM), los cuales, a efectos de la presentación de tales cifras, son considerados como si fueran entidades independientes. Este hecho introduce una importante distorsión en las cifras referentes a ese país, pues en muchos casos la supuesta asistencia brindada a dichas dependencias alcanza a cifras cercanas al cincuenta por ciento del total de la asistencia Francesa 1/, y, debido a su peso en el total de la asistencia brindada por el conjunto de los miembros del CAD, en las cifras globales o acumuladas. Por otra parte, es probable que debido quizás a falta de centralización en el cómputo de cifras de asistencia técnica dentro de la Administración francesa, una cierta parte de la cooperación técnica efectivamente brindada por ese país, no esté registrada en las cifras transmitidas a la OCDE y publicadas por ésta. Estas razones, han obligado en que en varios de los cuadros que se presentan en este trabajo, se excluyan las cifras correspondientes a Francia.

2. La importancia creciente de la asistencia técnica

En la Tabla 1 se presenta en cifras la evolución de la asistencia técnica brindada por los países miembros del CAD entre 1961 y 1976, y se comparan dichas cifras con las corres-

1/ Ver más abajo la sección correspondiente a la asistencia técnica provista por Francia a América Latina.

TABLA 1

Asistencia Oficial para el Desarrollo (AOD) y Cooperación Técnica (CT) bilateral
provisista por el conjunto de los países miembros del CAD a todos los países en desarrollo

	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>
1. AOD								
Desembolsos (millones dólares)	5.389.6	5.618.5	5.952.6	6.396.1	6.445.7	6.526.2	7.208.6	7.068.2
2. CT								
Donaciones (millones dólares)	777.7	747.3	870.6	953.6	1.062.4	1.233.3	1.313.9	1.466.8
CT/AOD (porcentaje)	14.4	13.3	14.6	14.9	16.4	18.8	18.2	20.7
	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>
1. AOD								
Desembolsos (millones dólares)	7.072.1	7.385.4	8.479.4	9.285.0	10613.8	12466.5	14995.5	15296.4
2. CT								
Donaciones (millones dólares)	1.527.9	1.531.8	1.655.0	1.837.5	2.274.5	2.496.5	2.926.7	2.875.0
CT/AOD (porcentaje)	21.6	20.7	19.5	19.7	21.4	20.0	19.5	18.7

Fuente: a partir de datos de diversas publicaciones de la OCDE.

pondientes al conjunto de la llamada "Asistencia Oficial para el Desarrollo" (AOD) 2/ .

De dicha Tabla se desprende que desde el primero al último de los años citados, la asistencia técnica bilateral creció en forma bastante regular en valores absolutos y que, en términos relativos, pasó a de algo menos del 15% a casi el 20% del total de la AOD concedida por los países industrializados. Sin embargo, deben notarse que en los últimos cuatro años dicha participación relativa parecía estar declinando, posiblemente como producto de la creciente redistribución de la AOD en favor de los países de más bajos niveles de ingresos, a los que se destinan primordialmente otras formas de asistencia (ayuda alimentaria, asistencia financiera concesional, etc.).

2/ La AOD ha sido definida por el Comité de Asistencia para el Desarrollo (CAD) de la OCDE, en los siguientes términos: "el conjunto de los aportes provistos a los países en desarrollo y a las instituciones multilaterales, por los organismos oficiales de los países industrializados, incluídas las colectividades locales y los organismos de gestión, y que considerados separadamente responden, a nivel de cada operación, a los criterios siguientes:

- a) son otorgados con el fin esencial de favorecer el desarrollo económico y el mejoramiento del nivel de vida de los países menos avanzados; y
- b) revisten un carácter de favor e incluyen un "elemento de liberalidad" por lo menos igual al 25%.

Este "elemento de liberalidad", ha sido a su vez definido como "siendo igual al valor nominal del compromiso financiero, disminuído del monto actualizado de la amortización y de los intereses previstos (sobre la base de una tasa de actualización del 10%)".

Sobre la base de esta definición, los países miembros del CAD computan como AOD las donaciones del sector público (en forma de asistencia técnica, ayuda alimentaria y donación de bienes de equipo); los llamados "préstamos blandos", incluyendo las renegociaciones de deuda originada en préstamos de esa clase; y las contribuciones a los organismos multilaterales, sea en forma de contribuciones a las Naciones Unidas, sea como suscripciones de capital de los bancos de desarrollo.

Si se toman en conjunto la asistencia técnica bilateral y la multilateral, puede observarse que se ha producido una duplicación del monto anual destinado a esta última en el corto período que va de 1969 a 1975 (Tabla 2), llegando a alcanzar la suma de ambas, los cuatro mil millones de dólares en 1975. Al mismo tiempo, resulta evidente el rol creciente que está adquiriendo la asistencia técnica multilateral, que casi se ha triplicado en el mismo período, para llegar a superar los mil millones de dólares en 1975, lo que equivale al 26,8% del total de asistencia técnica. Porcentaje éste que era de solo el 18,5% siete años antes.

Pero volviendo al análisis de la evolución de la asistencia técnica bilateral prestada por los países industrializados del CAD, en la Tabla A del Anexo Estadístico puede observarse que con la sola excepción de los años 1962, 1969, 1970 y 1972, dicha asistencia ha crecido en forma continuada y a tasas relativamente elevadas, que hacen que la tasa promedio para ese período se ubique cerca del 10% (9,53).

También podrá observarse que el valor acumulado de la asistencia técnica brindada durante los últimos siete años, supera los catorce mil millones de dólares, más de la mitad de los cuales corresponden a los tres últimos.

Evolución de la Asistencia Técnica Bilateral y Multilateral, 1969-75

(Desembolsos netos en millones de dólares)

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
Asistencia técnica bilateral proveniente de países miembros del CAD.	1.513.1	1.505.6	1.671.8	1.837.5	2.274.5	2.496.5	2.926.7
Asistencia técnica de origen multilateral*	342.5	401.9	423.3	486.6	553.5	736.9	1.076.2
Total de asistencia técnica recibida por los países en desarrollo.	1.855.6	1.907.5	2.101.1	2.324.1	2.828.0	3.233.4	4.002.9
Porcentaje de asistencia técnica:							
Bilateral	82.5	78.9	79.5	79.0	80.4	77.2	73.1
Multilateral	17.5	21.0	20.1	20.9	19.5	22.7	26.8

* En su casi totalidad proveniente de Naciones Unidas.

Fuente: a partir de datos de OCDE, "Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries" op. cit.

3. Europa Occidental como fuente de asistencia técnica

La misma Tabla A pone en evidencia el rol importante que ha jugado Europa Occidental en la evolución antes mencionada. Al comienzo del período comentado, los países de dicha región no sumaban más que un tercio del total de asistencia técnica brindada por los miembros del CAD. Esa proporción pasó rápidamente a ser algo más de la mitad del total y a partir de 1972 volvió a crecer rápidamente, para ubicarse en 1975 algo más allá del 70% (71,4%).

Si atendiendo a las razones citadas más arriba, se excluyen de este cuadro las cifras correspondientes a Francia, podrá observarse que la asistencia técnica prestada por el conjunto de los restantes países europeos, creció a lo largo de los tres lustros comentados, a una tasa anual promedio del 17,11%, pasando desde 58,4 millones de dólares en 1961 a algo más de 1.100 millones de dólares en 1975. En esta evolución, si se excluye el salto espectacular del 146,58% correspondiente a 1961-62, se distinguen claramente dos períodos de crecimiento: uno que cubre el decenio 1962-1971 con tasas promedio anual es del 15%, y otro que se desarrolla a partir de 1972, en que las tasas de crecimiento alcanzan un promedio del 21.87%.

Al mismo tiempo debe señalarse que el grueso de esta asistencia técnica se origina en un corto número de países. Si se consideran los valores acumulados para los últimos siete de los quince años considerados en la Tabla A, pueden sacarse las siguientes conclusiones:

- i) suponiendo que, en el caso de Francia, aproximadamente el 50% de su asistencia sean en realidad fondos del presupuesto francés utilizados en los DOM-TOM (véase al respecto la sección referente a la asistencia técnica francesa) el total de asistencia técnica bilateral acumulado entre 1969 y 1975, originada en todos los países miembros del CAD, superaría levemente los doce mil millones de dólares.

- ii) de esa cantidad, aproximadamente el cincuenta y siete por ciento (es decir unos seis mil ochocientos cincuenta y siete millones de dólares) se habrían originado en los países europeos;
- iii) manteniendo la hipótesis antes citada, Francia habría provisto el 31,5% del valor de la asistencia técnica bilateral originada en Europa Occidental, Alemania Federal el 28,2% y el Reino Unido el 15,5%. Es decir, que entre estos tres países habrían totalizado un poco más de las tres cuartas partes de la asistencia técnica de fuente europea;
- iv) entre los restantes países europeos solo Bélgica y los Países Bajos aparecen como fuentes importantes de asistencia técnica: el 8,7% del total comentado corresponde al primero de dichos países y el 6,7% al segundo; de modo que, sumadas las cifras correspondientes a los restantes países europeos (Austria, Dinamarca, Finlandia, Italia, Noruega, Suecia y Suiza), no se llega a un diez por ciento del total.

II. LOS PAISES LATINOAMERICANOS COMO BENEFICIARIOS DE ASISTENCIA TECNICA EUROPEA.

América Latina no es una zona particularmente beneficiada por la asistencia de distinto tipo prestada por los países industrializados al mundo en desarrollo. Así y todo, en materia de cooperación técnica, la participación de América Latina en el total de lo que brindan los países industrializados, parecería ser algo mayor mayor que con relación a otros tipos de asistencia. Ello estaría explicado por su mayor demanda de este tipo de asistencia y por su mayor capacidad de absorber asistencia técnica que la que tienen otras regiones en desarrollo.

Esto puede observarse con cierta claridad a través de la evolución reciente de la relación AOD/asistencia técnica, recibida por América Latina y por el conjunto del mundo en desarrollo. Mientras para el conjunto del mundo en desarrollo, la participación de la asistencia técnica en el total de la AOD está declinando desde 1973 y en 1976 representaba el 18.7% de dicho total, en el caso de América Latina la tendencia es inversa. Dicha relación subió desde 1971 a 1976 del 17,5 al 26,3% del total de AOD y parecería haberse estabilizado desde aquel entonces en alrededor del 25% (ver tabla 3)

Si se analizan las cifras brindadas por la OCDE, puede observarse (Tabla 4) que entre 1969 y 1975 ^{1/}, el valor total de la asistencia técnica recibida por América Latina desde el conjunto de los países miembros del CAD, creció en un 55,7% dado que pasó de 157.6 millones de dólares en el primero de dichos años a poco más de 245 millones al final de ese período. A ello se llegó a través de un proceso de altos y bajos que dejan como saldo una tasa anual de crecimiento algo inferior al 9%, que se aproxima mucho a la tasa de crecimiento anual promedio de la asistencia técnica para todo destino en los últimos quince años.

^{1/} Las cifras correspondientes a 1976 son estimaciones provisionarias.

TABLA 3

Asistencia Oficial para el Desarrollo (AOD) y la Cooperación Técnica (CT) recibida por los países latinoamericanos desde los países miembros del CAD* - 1969-1976

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>
1. AOD**	7113.9	702.1	587.6	586.6	614.2	683.2	806.6	
Desembolsos (millones de dólares)								
2. CT**	126.6	123.3	155.1	149.2	180.9	177.1	208.4	225.9
Donaciones (millones de dólares)								
3. CT/AOD	17.7	17.5	26.3	25.4	29.4	25.9	25.8	
(porcentajes)								

* Excepto Francia

** Ninguna de estas dos series incluye valores no desagregados por país en las estadísticas de la OCDE, por ello no coinciden con otras cifras que se presentan en otras tablas.

Fuente: a partir de diversas publicaciones de la OCDE.

Por otra parte, si se analizan los valores anuales de la asistencia técnica recibida por América Latina entre 1969 y 1976, no a precios corrientes sino deflacionados por los precios de exportación de los países industrializados (tal como son publicados por el Fondo Monetario Internacional), se llega a la conclusión que el valor de la asistencia técnica recibida por América Latina en 1975 es inferior, a valores constantes en aproximadamente un 33,2% a la que recibía cuatro años atrás.
(Tabla 4).

TABLA 4

Asistencia Técnica recibida por América Latina desde los países
miembros del CAD* - 1969/1976

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>
1. A precios corrientes	157.6	177.3	202.1	188.2	223.9	225.1	245.4	(254.2)
2. A precios deflacionados	321.6	341.0	367.5	313.7	311.0	252.9	245.4	(254.2)
1975 = 100**								

* Excepto Francia

** Utilizando los precios de exportación de los países industrializados según los publica FMI, "International Financial Statistics", May 1978

Si se concentra el análisis en la asistencia prestada a los países de América Latina por Europa Occidental, pueden observarse, algo acentuadas, las características que se citaban antes para la asistencia recibida por aquella región desde el conjunto de los países industrializados.

En primer lugar, debe señalarse el papel creciente que la asistencia técnica tiene en la asistencia de todo tipo (AOD) que América Latina recibe desde los países europeos. Mientras que la relación asistencia técnica/AOD recibida por América Latina desde todos los países miembros del CAD se ubica alrededor del 25%, en el caso de la asistencia recibida desde los países europeos, esa relación sube al 43.6% para el último año que se dispone de datos, 1975, habiendo llegado en 1973 a casi el 50%. (Ver Tabla 5)

TABLA 5

Asistencia Oficial para el Desarrollo (AOD) y Cooperación Técnica⁺ (CT) recibida por los países latinoamericanos desde Europa Occidental 1969-1976

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>
1. AOD								
Desembolsos (millones de dólares)	126.7	170.3	158.0	199.1	104.6	165.6	327.4	
2. CT								
Donaciones (millones de dólares)	44.2	57.6	67.4	79.5	101.8	119.1	142.8	158.0
3. CT/AOD (porcentajes)	34.8	33.8	42.6	39.9	49.7	44.8	43.6	

⁺ Francia excluida

Fuente: a partir de datos de diversas publicaciones de la OCDE.

Entre 1969 y 1975, América Latina sólo recibió el 5,62% del total de la AOD brindada por Europa Occidental al conjunto de los países en desarrollo. Esta baja prioridad concedida por Europa Occidental a la región latinoamericana en materia de asistencia oficial, se ve confirmada para todos los países de aquella región. Sólo Finlandia, que tiene niveles de AOD muy bajos, los Países Bajos y Alemania Federal, destinan, con el 18,4, el 16,2 y el 13,4% respectivamente, porcentajes superiores al 10% de su AOD a América Latina. ^{3/}

En materia de asistencia técnica, en cambio, la situación es algo distinta pues para el período 1968-75, América Latina se

^{3/} Ver Sánchez Arnau, J.C. "La participación europea en el financiamiento externo de América Latina", en preparación. CEPAL.

benefició con el 13% del total de la asistencia técnica brindada por Europa Occidental al conjunto de los países en desarrollo. Debe observarse, sin embargo, que la mayor participación de la región latinoamericana en este tipo de asistencia, se debe fundamentalmente a que Alemania Federal, que solo destina un 13,4% de su AOD a la región, le brinda en cambio el 22,6% de su asistencia técnica. (Tabla 6).

TABLA 6

Relación entre la Asistencia Oficial para el Desarrollo bilateral neta y asistencia técnica concedida por cada país europeo miembro del CAD, entre 1969 y 1975, a los países latinoamericanos y al conjunto de los países en desarrollo.

<u>% recibido por América Latina de:</u>		
<u>Provista por:</u>	<u>OAD Bilateral Neta</u>	<u>Asistencia Técnica</u>
Finlandia	18,4	3,9
Países Bajos	16,2	13,3
R.F. de Alemania	13,4	22,6
Suiza	10,3	4,1
Austria	8,0	11,4
Bélgica	4,1	4,6
Reino Unido	3,9	5,5
Dinamarca	3,3	1,7
Suecia	3,2	1,4
Francia	0,9	-
Noruega	0,8	2,2
Italia	-	9,2
TOTAL	5,62	13,0

Fuente: a partir de datos de la OCDE, "Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries". op. cit.

Sin embargo, debe también indicarse que Europa Occidental es la fuente principal de asistencia técnica bilateral para América Latina. Más aún, que la participación europea está siendo cada vez más importante en el total de asistencia técnica que recibe la región.

En la Tabla B del Anexo Estadístico, se presenta la evolución de la asistencia técnica prestada a América Latina por cada país en Europa Occidental miembro del CAD (excluyendo Francia). La suma de las cifras correspondientes a cada uno de dichos países, evidencia una evolución creciente desde los 42,2 millones de dólares en 1969 hasta los 167,56 millones en 1976. Ese crecimiento ha tenido lugar a una tasa anual promedio del 21,9%, equivalente a la tasa anual promedio del total de la asistencia técnica brindada por Europa Occidental al conjunto de los países en desarrollo durante los años más recientes. (Tabla A, columna 6). Este crecimiento acelerado ha hecho que la parte de Europa Occidental en el total de la asistencia técnica recibida por América Latina haya pasado de un tercio a prácticamente tres cuartos del total en los ocho años que van de 1969 a 1976.

Estas tasas de crecimiento anuales, hacen que para el conjunto del período el valor anual de la asistencia técnica de fuente europea recibida por América Latina se haya casi triplicado, mientras que la proveniente del conjunto de los países miembros del CAD solo aumentó en un 78%.

1. El monto y las modalidades de la asistencia técnica prestada por los distintos países de Europa Occidental

El análisis desagregado por país de origen de la asistencia técnica recibida por el conjunto de América Latina, evidencia una fuerte concentración en un grupo muy reducido de países y pone de relieve la importancia de los programas de Alemania Federal. Este último país ha brindado a la región latinoamericana, entre 1969 y 1976, algo más de quinientos treinta millones de dólares de asis-

tencia técnica, lo que equivale al 68,2% del total de ese tipo de asistencia proveniente de Europa Occidental, excepto Francia. El último año considerado, sin embargo, marca un alto al crecimiento casi descontinuado de la asistencia de origen alemán. Ello hace que en las cifras correspondientes a ese año Alemania Federal, con 94,43 millones de dólares, haya bajado su participación en aquel total al 56,4%.

En segundo lugar debe citarse el papel jugado por la asistencia técnica provista a la región por los Países Bajos. Los 92,6 millones de dólares acumulados por la asistencia de ese origen durante los ocho años considerados, representan el 11,9% del total de origen europeo y los 32,15 millones de dólares de la asistencia técnica holandesa de 1976, elevan la participación de los Países Bajos en el total de la asistencia técnica recibida por América Latina desde fuente europea al 19,2%. Estas cifras resultan más relevantes aún, si se toma en cuenta que en 1969, la región casi no recibía asistencia de este tipo desde Holanda.

El tercer lugar, en cuanto al volumen de la asistencia técnica de origen europeo, corresponde a la proveniente del Reino Unido. Con poco más de ochenta millones de dólares acumulados en el período considerado, la asistencia de origen inglés equivale al 10,2% del total recibido por América Latina de fuente europea. En 1976 esa participación aumentó al 12,7% del total.

Estas cifras evidencian que estos tres países totalizan el 90% de la asistencia técnica bilateral recibida por América Latina desde Europa Occidental. El único otro país europeo, cuyas cifras tienen alguna relevancia dentro de este contexto, es Bélgica, cuyos programas en la región están creciendo en forma regular y tenían en 1976 un valor de algo más de ocho millones de dólares, lo que equivalía a casi el cinco por ciento del total recibido desde Europa Occidental.

La información publicada acerca de cómo se descompone la asistencia técnica en sus distintas modalidades, es sumamente limitada. En lo que se refiere a la originada en Europa Occidental, sólo se

ha podido determinar, a partir de datos provistos por el Secretariado de la OCDE, el número de personas comprendidas en los distintos tipos de asistencia técnica provistos por cada país de esa región a los de América Latina en 1976. Dicha información se presenta en la Tabla 7.

TABLA 7

Asistencia técnica recibida por América Latina 1976

	<u>Estudiantes</u>	<u>"Stagiaires"</u>	<u>Personal de Coop.Técnica</u>	
			<u>Expertos</u>	<u>Voluntarios</u>
Alemania	645	5.518	1.048	308
Austria	190	34	49	129
Bélgica	1.066	43	45	191
Dinamarca	33	4	37	-
Finlandia	2	2	14	-
Francia	-	-	552*	-
Italia	151	458	78	235
Noruega	11	7	6	-
Holanda	190	39	552	78
Reino Unido	1.670	653	792	182
Suiza	27	-	-	-
Suecia	87	111	108	62
TOTAL	4.072	6.869	3.281	1.185

* DOM-TOM excluido.

Fuente: Secretariado de la OCDE.

De su análisis se desprenden las siguientes conclusiones principales:

- i) El elevado número de estudiantes latinoamericanos (in-

cluyendo los del Caribe, lógicamente) becados por el Reino Unido y por Bélgica, y en menor medida por Alemania Federal. Entre esos tres países absorben prácticamente el ochenta y cinco por ciento de los becarios latinoamericanos en Europa Occidental;

- ii) la enorme preponderancia de Alemania Federal en materia de "stagiaires", puesto que los 5518 latinoamericanos que siguieron cursos especializados en Alemania Federal en dicho año, equivalieron al 80% del total correspondiente a Europa Occidental;
- iii) el elevado número de expertos enviados por Alemania Federal a América Latina (casi un tercio del total europeo) así como por el Reino Unido, Países Bajos y Francia. Lamentablemente, no existe información sobre la duración promedio de sus misiones, lo que permitiría apreciar mejor la importancia relativa de cada uno de estos países en este tipo de asistencia;
- iv) al mismo tiempo, la presencia de 552 expertos franceses en América Latina, sin contar los DOM-TOM, permite suponer que el valor de la asistencia técnica prestada por ese país a la región, es algo superior a lo que reflejan algunas de las cifras publicadas por la OCDE;
- v) el número importante de voluntarios, provenientes principalmente de Alemania Federal, Italia, y el Reino Unido, hace que estos representen una cuarta parte del total de personal de cooperación técnica enviado por los países europeos a América Latina;
- vi) el énfasis puesto por algunos países europeos en determinados tipos de asistencia técnica : Bélgica y el Reino Unido en materia de becas; Alemania Federal e Italia en los "stages"; los Países Bajos y Francia en el envío de expertos.

2. La Asistencia técnica recibida por los distintos países latinoamericanos desde los países de Europa Occidental

En la Tabla 8, se presentan las cifras acumuladas de asisten-

cia técnica recibida por cada país latinoamericano entre 1969 y 1976, desde todos los países miembros del CAD y desde los de Europa Occidental.

TABLA 8

Valor acumulado de la asistencia técnica bilateral recibida por cada país latinoamericano en el período 1969-1976. (En millones de dls.)

<u>País</u>	<u>Total CAD*</u>	<u>Europa Occidental</u>	<u>Europa Occidental* CAD</u>
Argentina	62.04	56.45	90.9%
Bahamas	0.44	0.42	95.4%
Barbados	5.91	5.38	91.0%
Bermuda	0.03	0.03	100.0%
Bolivia	68.94	42.60	61.7%
Brasil	494.09	120.26	24.3%
Chile	116.57	93.35	80.0%
Colombia	121.16	78.57	64.8%
Costa Rica	44.50	21.00	47.1%
Cuba	7.47	6.30	84.3%
Grenada	0.16	0.10	62.5%
República Domin.	23.59	4.14	18.6%
Ecuador	70.83	34.66	48.9%
El Salvador	31.66	9.20	29.0%
Guatemala	49.19	17.66	35.9%
Guyana	17.97	5.33	29.6%
Haití	30.47	6.70	21.9%
Honduras	36.85	9.02	24.4%
Jamaica	43.18	21.03	48.7%
México	48.12	39.45	81.9%
Nicaragua	28.72	6.38	22.2%
Panamá	27.11	3.60	13.2%
Paraguay	41.08	16.75	40.7%
Perú	159.88	111.65	69.8%
Trinidad y Tobago	7.94	5.02	63.2%
Uruguay	22.56	12.48	55.3%
Venezuela	46.56	30.31	65.0%
Surinam	12.1	12.09	100.0%
América Latina	1619.12	770.03	47.5%
Total A. Latina sin Brasil	1125.03	649.77	57.7%

* Las cifras correspondientes al total CAD no incluyen un elevado porcentaje de la asistencia técnica bilateral provista por los E.E.U.U. que en las publicaciones de la OCDE se presenta sin desagregar por país de destino. En consecuencia el porcentaje correspondiente a Europa Occidental que se presenta en esta tabla está sobre estimado.

Fuente: a partir de datos de OCDE, "Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries" op. cit.

Estas cifras ponen en evidencia la fuerte participación europea en el conjunto de la asistencia técnica recibida por la región en su conjunto (47,5%) ^{1/}, que sube a 57,7% si se excluyen las cifras correspondientes a Brasil, principal beneficiario de este tipo de asistencia en la región pero que recibe el grueso de la misma desde Estados Unidos.

De esta misma tabla surge que la totalidad de la asistencia técnica recibida por Surinám y por Bermudas proviene de fuente europea; que Argentina Bahamas y Barbados, reciben más del 90% de esa misma fuente; y que Chile, Cuba y México reciben más del 80%. En lo que se refiere a los principales beneficiarios de asistencia técnica en la región, debe señalarse la ya mencionada elevada participación de asistencia europea en el caso de Chile, en el caso de Colombia (64,8%), e inversamente, la baja participación relativa de Europa Occidental en el total recibido por el principal beneficiario de la región, Brasil (24,3%).

En la tabla 9 puede observarse que para las cifras acumuladas entre 1969 y 1976, Brasil es también el primer beneficiario en la región en cuanto a asistencia técnica recibida de origen europeo, seguido de Perú, Chile y Colombia. Estos cuatro países reunieron ellos solos, más de la mitad de la asistencia técnica proveniente de Europa Occidental (51,1%). Si se les agregan los cuatro países siguientes en orden decreciente según el valor de la asistencia recibida, es decir, Argentina, México, Bolivia y Ecuador, se llega al 75,1% del total acumulado en dicho período.

En el último año considerado en esta Tabla, 1976, se han producido algunos cambios en el orden de importancia de los montos recibidos por los principales beneficiarios. Así por ejemplo, Perú, con 25.55 millones de dólares, ha superado las cifras correspondientes a Brasil (con algo más de 19 millones) al que casi también igualan los valores correspondientes a Colombia. La participación de Chile en las cifras correspondientes a ese año también descendieron, mientras aumentaban las de Bolivia y Ecuador, que han superado ambos las cifras correspondientes a Argentina y México.

1/ Ver sin embargo, nota al pie de la tabla 8.

TABLA 9

Asistencia técnica recibida por los países latinoamericanos
desde Europa Occidental*

	Total Acumulado 1969-1976 (millones de dólares)	Porcentaje del Total	Valores correspondientes a 1976 (millones de dólares)
Brasil	120.26	15.4	19.66
Perú	111.65	14.3	25.55
Chile	93.35	11.9	13.45
Colombia	78.57	10.0	19.07
Argentina	56.45	7.2	7.95
México	50.77	6.5	7.95
Bolivia	42.60	5.4	10.20
Ecuador	34.36	4.4	8.66
Venezuela	30.31	3.9	5.01
Jamaica	21.03	2.7	4.73
Costa Rica	21.00	2.7	4.80
Guatemala	17.66	2.3	4.16
Paraguay	16.75	2.1	3.95
Uruguay	12.48	1.6	2.18
Surinám	12.09	1.5	3.29
El Salvador	9.20	1.2	2.30
Honduras	9.02	1.2	2.32
Haití	6.70	0.9	1.40
Nicaragua	6.38	0.8	1.48
Cuba	6.30	0.8	3.10
Guyana	5.33	0.7	.83
Barbados	5.38	0.7	1.98
Trinidad	5.02	0.6	.62
Rep. Dominicana	4.14	0.5	1.44
Panamá	3.60	0.4	0.70
Bahamas	1.50	0.2	1.20
Bermuda	0.03	-	0.03
América Latina Total	781.93	100	157.95

* Excluyendo Francia.

Fuente: a partir de datos de OCDE, "Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries" en cit

Sobre la base de los cuadros que se incluyen como parte del Anexo C, presentando cifras sobre la evolución de la asistencia técnica recibida por cada país latinoamericano y de los datos de la Tabla 10, que resume aquellos cuadros, puede establecerse que existen tres tipos de situaciones respecto de la evolución de la asistencia técnica prestada por Europa Occidental a dichos países en los últimos años:

1. la de aquellos países donde dicha asistencia está registrando un fuerte crecimiento;
2. la de aquellos en que el crecimiento es lento o no muy alto a pesar de que los niveles de asistencia son bajos; y
3. la de aquellos países donde esa asistencia está registrando un estancamiento o una declinación.

En el primer grupo corresponde citar ante todo a Perú, Colombia y Bolivia. En el caso de Perú, la asistencia técnica de origen europeo ha pasado entre 1969 y 1976 de 4,3 a 25,5 millones de dólares; ello se ha debido principalmente al fuerte crecimiento de la asistencia de origen alemán, pero también de la proveniente de los Países Bajos y de Bélgica y, en menor medida, a los aumentos registrados, aunque a niveles considerablemente más bajos, de la asistencia técnica proveniente de Austria, Dinamarca, Finlandia y Suiza. Todo lo cual hace que Perú (junto con Argentina, Chile, Brasil y Colombia) sea uno de los países latinoamericanos que reciben asistencia técnica desde el mayor número de países de Europa Occidental.

El caso de Colombia es semejante al de Perú. La asistencia técnica de origen europeo pasó de 3,3 a 19,1 millones de dólares entre 1969 y 1976; ese crecimiento se debió principalmente al crecimiento de la asistencia proveniente de Alemania Federal y, a un nivel algo más bajo pero igualmente importante, de los Países Bajos. Bolivia, por su parte, dobló la asistencia recibida de fuente europea en solo tres años, de 1974 a 1976, pasando de 5 a 10 millones de dólares. En este caso también, el crecimiento de la asistencia de origen alemán es determinante, aunque deba

también tenerse en cuenta el aumento registrado por la proveniente de Bélgica y de Austria.

Ecuador, cuyas cifras de asistencia técnica de origen europeo pasaron entre 1969 y 1976 de casi dos millones de dólares a 8,7 millones, presenta una situación semejante a la de los tres países antes citados. También en este caso el crecimiento de la asistencia técnica provista por Alemania Federal ha sido determinante; en menor volumen, también creció la asistencia proveniente del Reino Unido, Países Bajos e Italia.

A niveles más bajos de asistencia recibida - entre 5 y 3 millones de dólares para 1976 - también han registrado aumentos de cierta importancia en la asistencia proveniente de Europa Occidental, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Guatemala, Paraguay y Cuba. En el caso de Costa Rica, Guatemala y Paraguay, ese incremento se ha debido principalmente a la asistencia brindada por Alemania Federal; aunque en estos tres países también se registró un aumento de la proveniente de los Países Bajos. La asistencia proveniente de Italia y Austria aumentó en el caso de Guatemala y Paraguay, así como también aumentó la de Bélgica y Reino Unido en este último país. En lo que se refiere a Jamaica, la importancia de la progresión de la asistencia alemana es determinante, debido al estancamiento que ha registrado la asistencia técnica procedente del Reino Unido, pero aquí también, la asistencia proveniente de los Países Bajos registró un crecimiento evidente.

Cuba, que registraba niveles muy bajos de asistencia técnica recibida de fuente europea hasta 1971, ha recibido algo más de tres millones de dólares de este tipo de cooperación en 1976, proveniente casi exclusivamente de Noruega, Suecia y Bélgica, así como de los Países Bajos, que se ha sumado recientemente a la lista de países europeos que cooperan en este plano con Cuba.

En el segundo grupo de países, es decir aquellos que presentan un crecimiento muy moderado o alto en términos relativos pero a partir de niveles bajos de asistencia técnica recibida desde Europa

Occidental, deben mencionarse la República Dominicana, Barbados, El Salvador, Haití y Honduras. Las cifras registradas con relación a estos tres últimos países y particularmente las correspondientes a Haití, contrastan con el hecho de que El Salvador y Honduras han sido ubicados en el marco de Naciones Unidas en la categoría de países más seriamente afectados, y Haití en la de países menos avanzados y, por consiguiente, están considerados como prioritarios en materia de asistencia externa.

Casi todos los países más grandes de la región están conociendo en los últimos años, y más particularmente a partir de 1974, un estancamiento en el valor de la asistencia técnica que reciben desde fuente europea. Los casos de Brasil, México y Argentina, son relativamente semejantes. La asistencia técnica brindada por Alemania Federal, creciente hasta comienzos de la década presente, se ha detenido y dado su influencia determinante en el total de la asistencia de fuente europea recibida por esos países; se han estancado los totales correspondientes a Europa Occidental. En el caso de Brasil se ha registrado también un estancamiento de la asistencia brindada por los Países Bajos y un cierto descenso de la provista por el Reino Unido.

El plafonamiento de la asistencia proveniente de ese último país también ha sido determinante en el estancamiento de la asistencia de origen europeo recibida por Venezuela, Nicaragua y Panamá, aunque en estos dos últimos países, también ha jugado un rol importante el estancamiento de la asistencia técnica brindada por el Reino Unido.

Este último factor, explica también el estancamiento de la asistencia técnica recibida por Guyana, Bermudas y Bahamas y contribuye junto con la caída de la asistencia proveniente de Alemania Federal, a explicar el descenso de la asistencia técnica de origen europeo en Trinidad-Tobago.

Chile y Uruguay, presentan dos casos semejantes de estancamiento, aunque a niveles distintos de la asistencia técnica reci-

bida desde Europa Occidental. En ambos casos, el plafonamiento de la asistencia de origen alemán juega un rol importante. Sin embargo, en el caso de Chile, también se registra, a partir de 1974, una desaparición de la asistencia técnica provista por Finlandia y Suecia; un estancamiento de la provista por Bélgica y un aumento relativo de la proveniente de los Países Bajos. Por su parte, el estancamiento evidenciado en el caso de Surinám, se debe fundamentalmente a un plafonamiento de la asistencia proveniente de ese último país europeo.

AMERICA LATINA: Cooperación Técnica recibida de los países europeos miembros del DAC (Excepto Francia)
(en millones de dólares)

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Argentina	3.4	6.0	6.1	7.5	9.3	8.0	8.2	7.55
Bahamas	-	-	0.1	0.1	-	-	0.1	1.2
Barbados	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	1.95
Bermuda	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bolivia	4.3	3.5	3.4	3.8	4.7	5.0	7.7	10.2
Brasil	8.3	10.0	13.4	14.4	16.9	18.4	19.2	19.66
Chile	6.4	11.3	9.1	10.2	13.1	13.0	15.8	13.45
Colombia	3.3	4.9	6.1	7.3	10.4	13.2	14.3	19.07
Costa Rica	0.7	1.1	1.8	2.3	2.8	3.7	3.8	4.8
Cuba	-	-	0.3	0.5	0.8	0.2	1.4	3.1
República Dominicana	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.9	1.44
Ecuador	1.9	2.3	2.5	3.1	4.0	4.9	7.3	8.66
El Salvador	0.5	0.5	0.5	1.1	1.3	1.2	2.3	2.3
Grenada	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Guatemala	1.4	1.6	1.3	1.7	1.9	2.0	3.6	4.16
Guyana	0.5	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.4	0.8	0.6	0.83
Haití	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.7	0.9	1.6	1.5	1.4
Honduras	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	1.2	2.5	2.32
Jamaica	1.4	1.3	2.0	2.0	2.9	2.9	3.8	4.73
México	2.0	3.0	2.6	3.4	5.0	7.0	8.5	7.95
Nicaragua	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.8	1.1	1.6	1.48
Panamá	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.8	0.7
Paraguay	1.2	1.0	1.7	1.4	1.7	2.4	3.4	3.95
Perú	4.3	5.5	9.0	10.2	14.5	19.6	23.0	25.55
Surinam	-	-	-	1.4	-	3.3	4.1	3.29
Trinidad y Tobago	0.6	0.2	0.7	1.0	0.6	0.8	0.5	0.62
Uruguay	1.0	1.0	0.9	1.1	2.0	2.2	2.1	2.18
Venezuela	1.4	1.8	3.4	3.1	5.5	5.0	5.1	5.01
Total America Latina	44.2	57.6	67.4	79.5	101.8	119.10	142.80	158.01

III LOS PROGRAMAS DE ASISTENCIA TECNICA DE LOS PAISES DE EUROPA OCCIDENTAL EN AMERICA LATINA

En este capítulo se hace un análisis de los programas de asistencia técnica de cada país europeo y de su aplicación en America Latina. Dicho análisis se ha hecho sobre la base de informaciones obtenidas, la mayoría de las veces, en los propios países otorgantes de esa asistencia. En algunos pocos casos se trata de informaciones extraídas de publicaciones generales sobre el tema de la cooperación técnica o sobre ciertos programas generales.

Lógicamente la información disponible es muy disímil de país en país, en algunos casos es incluso inexistente. De todos modos se ha tratado de prestar la mayor atención posible a los programas de aquellos países de Europa Occidental que son los principales otorgantes de asistencia técnica a la región: Alemania Federal, Países Bajos, Reino Unido, Francia, España. A cada uno de ellos se ha dedicado una sección de este capítulo. Las informaciones correspondientes a los restantes países de Europa Occidental se han agrupado en otra sección, a la que también se agregado alguna información sobre los programas de asistencia de las Comunidades Europeas.

REPUBLICA FEDERAL DE ALEMANIA

1. Marco Institucional y Orientación General

A causa de su amplitud en cuanto a volumen, diversidad geográfica y sectores que cubre, el programa de asistencia técnica de Alemania Federal es el más estructurado de los programas europeos. Ello ha dado lugar a la creación de un complejo mecanismo institucional, cuyas detalles quizás no sea relevante exponer aquí más allá de los rasgos esenciales.

El programa alemán está centralizado, en cuanto a la definición de políticas y orientación de la instrumentación, en el Ministerio Federal de Cooperación Económica, que fue establecido tempranamente, en 1961, si se lo compara con otros organismos semejantes de los restantes países europeos.

En lo que se refiere a la ejecución, dicho programa está sumamente descentralizado, aunque en ella juegue un papel muy importante la Agencia Alemana para la Cooperación Técnica. En la implementación de este programa, también debe señalarse la creciente participación de organismos no gubernamentales, especialmente las iglesias. Ya a comienzos de la década pasada, dichos organismos habían establecido un mecanismo de consulta para mejor coordinar su participación en los proyectos de asistencia a los países en desarrollo. Actualmente, muchos proyectos emprendidos por tales instituciones reciben apoyo financiero del Gobierno alemán y en algunos casos, incluso, tales instituciones actúan como agentes ejecutivos del Gobierno Federal.

Si se atiende a las cifras comunicadas por el Gobierno alemán al CAD en 1977, diera la impresión de que una parte muy importante de la asistencia técnica alemana a los países en desarrollo consiste en la provisión de equipo. Al mismo tiempo, también resulta evidente el énfasis puesto en desarrollar la asistencia externa, es decir mediante el envío de expertos y voluntarios,

sobre el otorgamiento de becas a estudiantes y a "stagiaires" en la República Federal.

Apuntando a las grandes líneas del programa alemán de asistencia técnica 1/, debe señalarse que está concebido siguiendo la idea de colaborar a desarrollar en los países en desarrollo mecanismos de "auto-ayuda". De allí, por ejemplo, la importancia dada al establecimiento de institutos de formación técnica; combinando así la mencionada filosofía con la reconocida capacidad alemana en el plano tecnológico.

El otorgamiento de asistencia técnica por parte del Gobierno Federal está sujeto a la conclusión de acuerdos bilaterales con los países interesados. El objetivo principal de los mismos es poner de manifiesto el interés del país en desarrollo por recibir la cooperación técnica alemana y regular las condiciones en que habrán de operar en el país los expertos de la República Federal.

En todo proyecto financiado por el Gobierno Federal, se requiere la participación del Gobierno del país recipendario, por lo menos en dos aspectos: la designación de una contraparte y la demostración de que estará en condiciones de continuar manteniendo el proyecto una vez que sea retirada la cooperación alemana.

Normalmente la asistencia alemana se presta en forma de donaciones, aunque en algunos casos, especialmente cuando existe algún interés en que el país beneficiario utilice criterios económicos en la determinación de sus requerimientos, puede que las donaciones sean reemplazadas por préstamos concesionales.

Recientemente se ha evidenciado también una creciente participación alemana en el financiamiento de alguna parte de los

1/ Una buena descripción, aunque algo desactualizada, de la asistencia técnica alemana puede encontrarse en J. White, "German Aid". Overseas Development Institute. London, 1960.

AMERICA LATINA: Cooperación Técnica recibida de ALEMANIA R.F. (en millones de dls.) TABLA 11

	Promedio 1969-71	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1969-76	
Argentina	4.46	6.5	7.8	6.7	6.4	5.81	46.61	7.51
Bahamas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Barbados	-	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	1.1	0.7	11.8
Bermuda	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bolivia	2.4	2.8	3.5	3.4	5.2	6.59	28.6	41.5
Brasil	9.33	11.8	12.8	14.1	14.8	14.96	96.46	19.5
Chile	7.36	7.5	9.0	10.7	12.9	9.15	71.35	61.2
Colombia	3.33	4.5	5.6	7.5	9.1	10.06	46.76	38.6
Costa Rica	1.1	2.0	2.3	3.2	3.1	3.4	17.3	38.9
Cuba	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
República Dominicana	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.8	0.93	3.43	14.5
Ecuador	1.93	2.5	3.1	3.8	5.4	5.07	25.67	36.2
El Salvador	0.3	0.7	0.4	0.4	1.1	1.21	4.71	14.9
Grenada	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Guatemala	1.43	1.6	1.8	1.7	3.2	2.74	15.34	31.2
Guyana	0.16	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.15	1.5	8.3
Haití	0.2	0.7	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.88	3.38	11.1
Honduras	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.9	1.8	1.21	6.11	16.6
Jamaica	0.53	0.7	0.8	1.1	2.1	2.71	9.01	20.9
México	2.10	2.6	3.3	4.1	4.6	4.58	25.48	53.0
Nicaragua	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.8	1.0	0.97	4.47	15.6
Panamá	0.13	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.45	2.15	7.9
Paraguay	1.23	1.2	1.4	2.1	2.7	2.96	14.06	34.2
Perú	4.96	6.9	9.0	11.5	13.3	16.42	72.02	45.0
Surinam	-	-	-	-	0.9	0.01	0.91	7.5
Trinidad y Tobago	0.13	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.14	1.64	20.6
Uruguay	2.7	1.0	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.59	9.99	44.3
Venezuela	2.0	2.5	4.7	4.0	4.0	3.73	24.93	53.5
Total Am. Latina	46.68	57.40	69.70	79.50	95.60	96.82	532.58	32.9
Tasa de crecimiento s/ a/c anterior								

El primero de ellos se refiere a la posibilidad de que se produzca una disminución de la asistencia dirigida a los países con mayores niveles de ingresos. La política actual de Alemania hacia estos países parecería ser la de poner el énfasis en proyectos relacionados con sectores en los que se utilicen tecnologías de punta y en proyectos destinados a atender las necesidades de los sectores sociales más rezagados. Un ejemplo de ello sería el caso de Brasil, en que la asistencia técnica se dirige al mismo tiempo hacia el sector de la energía nuclear y hacia proyectos ubicados en las zonas marginales del Nordeste brasileiro.

De todos modos, y teniendo en cuenta la existencia de compromisos ya adoptados, (en materia de investigaciones oceanográficas y energía nuclear, respectivamente) parecería que al menos en el caso de Argentina y de Brasil, las cifras de la asistencia correspondiente a los próximos años, habrán de aumentar, incluso es posible que en forma bastante considerable.

Por otra parte, debe señalarse que hasta ahora no existe ninguna política definida sobre el caso de los países de ingresos más altos.

Otros problemas que se plantean actualmente con relación a la asistencia alemana a la región, se refieren a la capacidad de absorción de algunos países. Así, por ejemplo, diera la impresión que los países de la zona del Caribe estarían llegando al límite de su capacidad de absorción en las condiciones actuales de su desarrollo y de la prestación de tal asistencia. Esto sería no solo valedero respecto de la asistencia bilateral alemana, sino también incluso de la asistencia de tipo multilateral, no concesional. Para estos países el perfeccionamiento de su integración económica parece plantearse como un requisito previo para el aumento de su capacidad de absorber nueva asistencia técnica.

Algo semejante en materia de capacidad de absorción estaría pasando con los países centroamericanos y con algunos países pequeños de América del Sur.

En lo que se refiere a Perú, que ha sido hasta aquí el segundo beneficiario de asistencia técnica alemana, es posible que ésta no pueda continuar creciendo, debido a las dificultades presupuestarias que este país encuentra para financiar la parte del gasto local de proyectos que incluyen dicha asistencia técnica.

En lo que se refiere a Haití, el único país de la región incluido en la categoría de "país menos avanzado", diera la impresión de que los niveles relativamente bajos de la asistencia técnica alemana se deben primordialmente a las dificultades existentes en ese país para designar contrapartes a los proyectos financiados desde el exterior.

En casos como los de Jamaica, Guyana y México, la ausencia de un convenio bilateral con Alemania Federal, es posible que sea uno de los obstáculos mayores para que este país pueda incrementar su asistencia técnica a los mismos.

Por último, debe señalarse que si bien no hay una política definida al respecto, es probable que en los próximos años se evidencie una creciente participación alemana en la financiación de proyectos que tengan que ver con el desarrollo de nuevas fuentes de materias primas, especialmente de origen mineral.

PAISES BAJOS

1. Política General

La política holandesa de ayuda externa es una de las más decididas en cuanto a su magnitud, y clara, en cuanto a sus objetivos. Ello se aprecia en el alto y creciente porcentaje del PNB destinado por Holanda a la AOD: 0.86% en 1976, osea, junto con Suecia, el más elevado de todos los países del CAD. En materia de objetivos se destaca la clara decisión del Gobierno Holandés de orientar su ayuda externa al desarrollo preferentemente hacia los países menos avanzados y dentro de éstos, a los estratos menos favorecidos de la población.

Esto último ha requerido de un control bastante directo por parte del Gobierno holandés sobre sus programas y proyectos de asistencia. Ha significado también innovaciones en cuanto al tipo de proyecto utilizado. Así, en un mismo proyecto suelen mezclarse lo que tradicionalmente se ha llamado asistencia técnica y asistencia financiera. En efecto, los proyectos suelen incluir por ejemplo, donaciones de equipos, envío de expertos y asistencia financiera. Por lo mismo, a partir de 1978, el Gobierno holandés dejará de hacer la distinción entre asistencia financiera y técnica como rubros separados de su presupuesto.

Otro rasgo particular de la política holandesa se refiere al otorgamiento de becas a nacionales de países en desarrollo para cursar estudios en Holanda. Existe en efecto, una gran preocupación por asegurar que los programas de estudio respondan efectivamente a las reales necesidades de los países en desarrollo. De este modo, la mayoría de los becarios siguen programas que han sido diseñados específicamente para ellos.

Aún más, se han creado algunos institutos educacionales y de formación exclusivamente para este propósito.

El gobierno holandés viene otorgando asistencia técnica a los países en desarrollo desde 1957, aunque sólo en años recientes ha habido una clara definición de criterios para la selección de los países beneficiarios. Durante una primera fase, al parecer, el principal criterio consistía en otorgar asistencia a prácticamente todos los países en desarrollo. Como resultado la asistencia holandesa se encontraba dispersa en pequeñas cantidades en un elevado número de países.

Junto a un considerable aumento de la cooperación holandesa -que se ilustra en la sección siguiente con respecto a América Latina- se produce un progresivo abandono de la política de distribución dispersa hasta llegarse a una expresa y conciente política de concentración de la asistencia en un reducido número de países que reúnen ciertos requisitos fijados de antemano.

Estos últimos son fundamentalmente los siguientes:

- a) El grado de pobreza y la necesidad de ayuda externa.
- b) La existencia de una estructura social y política que asegure que la ayuda efectivamente beneficie a los grupos menos favorecidos del país receptor
- c) La magnitud del impacto negativo resultante del alza de los precios del petróleo en 1973.

Subsidiariamente se han tomado en consideración también, otros factores, como ser el respeto por los derechos humanos y ciertos aspectos de la política exterior de los países beneficiarios o potencialmente beneficiarios.

2. América Latina como beneficiario

Entre 1962 y 1965, un período que corresponde plena-

mente a la primera fase a la que se aludió más arriba, la cooperación técnica holandesa a América Latina, era de escasa significación, aunque ya en esa época se apreciaba una tendencia al aumento.

Como se aprecia en la Tabla 12, a partir de 1970 se produce un rápido aumento de la cooperación técnica holandesa a la región, que, de un promedio de 1,93 millones de dólares durante el período 1969-1971, creció hasta alcanzar 28,66 millones de dólares en 1976.

Entre 1969 y 1975 América Latina recibió el 13,3% del total de la cooperación técnica otorgada por Holanda a los países en desarrollo.

Después de la República Federal Alemana, Holanda es el principal país europeo otorgante de asistencia técnica a América Latina, con el 11,9% del total europeo de dicha asistencia para el período 1969-1976.

Colombia, Cuba, Jamaica y Perú son los países que han sido elegidos oficialmente como destinatarios principales de la asistencia técnica holandesa en la región latinoamericana. Chile se encontraba en esa misma categoría hasta la implantación del actual régimen militar en 1973. Ese país sin embargo, ha seguido siendo beneficiario de la cooperación técnica holandesa, la cual, luego de bajar de 0,8 millones de dólares en 1973, a 0,3 millones en 1974, sumó en 1976, 1,65 millones de dólares.

Surinám, por último, debido a su condición de ex-colonia holandesa, se encuentra en una categoría especial y recibe también un porcentaje elevado de la asistencia holandesa a la región.

En 1977, los países latinoamericanos de concentración recibieron el 15,1% del total de la asistencia otorgada por Holanda al conjunto de los países de concentración. El 75% de esa proporción correspondió a Perú y Colombia.

	Promedio 1969-71	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1969-76
Argentina	-	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.88	1.56
Bahamas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Barbados	-	-	-	-	-	0.8	0.8
Bermuda	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bolivia	0.06	0.3	0.4	0.5	1.0	1.11	3.51
Brasil	0.36	1.1	1.4	1.7	1.7	1.72	8.72
Chile	0.16	0.5	0.8	0.3	1.1	1.65	4.85
Colombia	0.63	1.7	3.4	4.5	3.3	6.54	21.34
Costa Rica	-	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.5	1.3
Cuba	-	-	-	-	0.2	0.23	0.24
República Dominicana	-	-	-	-	-	0.38	0.38
Ecuador	0.03	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	1.59	2.29
El Salvador	-	-	-	-	0.2	0.27	0.47
Guatemala	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Honduras	-	-	-	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.7
Paraguay	-	-	-	-	-	0.06	0.06
Panamá	-	-	-	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.7
Perú	-	-	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.73	1.03
Puerto Rico	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.87	2.57
Reino Unido	0.03	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.61	2.21
Trinidad y Tobago	0.03	-	-	0.1	0.1	0.08	0.28
Uruguay	-	-	0.1	-	0.1	0.04	0.24
Venezuela	-	0.1	0.1	-	0.1	0.35	0.65
	0.5	1.9	2.9	4.5	4.9	5.24	20.94
	-	1.4	-	3.3	3.2	3.23	11.13
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	-	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.23	0.83
	0.03	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.85	1.75
Total Am. Latina	1.93	8.10	10.70	16.90	18.50	28.66	88.76
Tasa de crecimiento / año anterior							

Cabe destacar también, que como porcentaje del total de la asistencia técnica holandesa a los países de concentración, aquella correspondiente a los de concentración en América Latina, ha venido disminuyendo sistemáticamente en términos relativos, no obstante el ya mencionado aumento de las cantidades absolutas. Así, en 1973, dicho porcentaje fue de 22.7%, en 1974 de 18.54%, en 1975 de 18.3%, y en 1976, por último, sólo de 16.3%.

Existen varios países que, como Chile, sin ser países de concentración, reciben más de 1.0 millón de dólares por año de asistencia técnica holandesa. En 1976, por ejemplo, Ecuador, Bolivia y Brasil, recibieron respectivamente, 1.6 millones, 1.1 millones y 1.7 millones de dólares. (Ver Tabla 12)

3. Países de Concentración

3.1 Colombia

Colombia es el principal beneficiario de la cooperación técnica holandesa en la región. En efecto, entre 1969 y 1976, del total de dicha cooperación para América Latina, Colombia recibió el 24%. En 1977, Colombia recibió 8 de las 24 donaciones de cooperación técnica hechas por Holanda a América Latina.

Dicha cooperación, cabe destacar, representa el 17.6% de toda la cooperación técnica recibida por Colombia proveniente de los países miembros del CAD.

Desde el punto de vista sectorial, la cooperación técnica holandesa en Colombia se ha orientado preferentemente hacia proyectos de salud pública. Otros sectores beneficiados comprenden: asistencia al Centro de Desarrollo de Tecnologías Apropriadas de "Las Gaviotas"; la creación de algunas pequeñas empresas piloto y de entrenamiento; y, la creación de empresas comunitarias rurales. La asistencia en este último campo ha incluido la realización de estudios de mercado y de factibilidad, donaciones de equipos, apoyo legal y créditos.

3.2 Perú

Entre los años 1969-1976, Perú recibió un total de 20,9 millones de dólares por concepto de cooperación técnica holandesa, es decir el 23,5% del total de dicha asistencia para la región latinoamericana en su conjunto.

Durante igual período, la cooperación técnica holandesa recibida por Perú, representó el 13,1% de la cooperación técnica recibida por ese país proveniente de los países miembros del CAD.

En 1977, Perú recibió 10 de las 24 donaciones holandesas de asistencia técnica otorgadas a los países latinoamericanos.

La asistencia del Gobierno holandés a Perú, técnica y financiera (no se dispone de datos desglosados), estuvo concentrada en los siguientes sectores: agricultura y ganadería (25%); pesca (25%); creación de empresas de trabajadores (25%), y varios (25%).

Entre los proyectos específicos, cabe hacer referencia al otorgamiento de asistencia en materia de capacitación para funcionarios encargados de aplicar los programas peruanos de reforma agraria y de reforma educativa, y a varios proyectos destinados a la restauración de la industria del té.

Cabe señalar por último que, tradicionalmente, la cooperación holandesa al Perú se concentraba en la provisión de técnicas holandesas avanzadas, orientación que tiende a abandonarse actualmente como resultado de el nuevo énfasis de la política holandesa en orden a beneficiar directamente a las capas más pobres de la población de los países receptores.

3.3 Cuba

Cuba forma parte del grupo de países de concentración

elegidos por el Gobierno de los Países Bajos, sólo desde 1975.

La asistencia holandesa a Cuba, cuyo monto absoluto es relativamente pequeño, se ha concentrado preferentemente en el área de salud, particularmente para la creación de hospitales rurales, y de dos institutos de nutrición que habrán de consagrarse al mejoramiento de la dieta de la población cubana sobre la base de productos domésticos.

3.4 Jamaica

Al igual que Cuba, Jamaica ha sido elegido como país de concentración solo recientemente. Hasta la fecha la asistencia holandesa ha sido dedicada principalmente a la identificación de sectores de concentración y proyectos específicos.

3.5 Surinám

Habiendo sido colonia holandesa hasta 1975, Surinám se encuentra en una categoría especial. Ese país recibe un elevado porcentaje del total de la asistencia técnica holandesa a los países en desarrollo: 12,5% para el período 1969-1976.

En ausencia de cifras separadas de asistencia técnica y financiera y teniendo en cuenta la existencia de un elevado número de proyectos de corto y largo plazo en que intervienen ambos tipos de asistencia, es difícil evaluar exactamente la importancia del programa de asistencia técnica holandés en Surinám, pero que en todo caso no la refleja la cifra recién mencionada.

Cabe señalar por otra parte, que la asistencia holandesa representó el 93,3% del total de la asistencia técnica recibida por Surinám durante el período 1969-1976.

4. Cooperación a través de Organismos Regionales

Aunque de poca significación cuantitativa, en la medida en que gran parte de la asistencia holandesa a los países en desarrollo se administra directamente a través de conductos bi-

laterales, éste país ha canalizado una parte de dicha asistencia a través de organismos multilaterales latinoamericanos, particularmente la CEPAL, el ILPES y el CELADE.

5. La Cooperación Holandesa a América Latina - Principales Sectores 1/

5.1 1974

- agricultura, irrigación, ganadería y pesca: 38,4%
- energía, suministro de agua, comunicaciones, transportes y navegación: 21%
- enseñanza, incluyendo enseñanza agrícola: 16%

5.2 1976

- agricultura, irrigación, ganadería y pesca: 35,1%
- enseñanza, incluyendo enseñanza agrícola: 19,8%
- salud pública: 14,4%

6. Programa de Becas y Pasantías

La política holandesa en materia de becas y pasantías se caracteriza por su relativa modestia. En efecto, y a modo de ejemplo, puede señalarse que del total de los becarios latinoamericanos en Europa en 1976, sólo el 4,6% (190), eran becarios del Gobierno holandés.

En 1975, 438 estudiantes latinoamericanos recibieron becas del Gobierno holandés, las que correspondieron en un 30,3% a ciencias y técnicas, y en un 27,3% a economía y ciencias sociales.

Junto con lo señalado más arriba respecto de los esfuerzos del Gobierno holandés por adecuar los programas de estudio para becarios provenientes de países en desarrollo, cabe destacar igualmente, una tendencia reciente de la política holandesa en

1/ Asistencia técnica y financiera. No se dispone de cifras sobre la distribución sectorial de la asistencia técnica.

este campo, en orden a enfatizar la necesidad de desplazar el lugar de realización de los cursos preferentemente a los propios países en desarrollo.

7. Programa de Envío de Expertos

El número de expertos enviados por el Gobierno holandés a los países de América Latina, ha aumentado considerablemente. Mientras en 1962 sólo fue financiado por ese país el envío de 28 expertos a la región, en 1976, la cifra fué de 552. Cabe destacar que esa cifra representa el 21,3% del total de expertos enviados por Holanda a los países en desarrollo, durante ése año.

En gran medida dichos expertos se han dirigido a los países latinoamericanos de concentración y a Surinám. Así, en 1976, de los 552 expertos enviados a la región, 216 se dirigieron a Surinám, 97 a Colombia, 90 a Perú y 20 a Jamaica.

La mayoría de dichos expertos (62,3%) se desempeñaron en los siguientes sectores: educación, incluyendo educación agrícola y médica, 26,8%; agricultura, ganadería, pesca e irrigación, 21,1%; planificación económica, cuentas nacionales, estadística, fotogrametría, 14,4%.

Siguiendo recomendaciones hechas por el PNUB y en razón de factores tales como problemas de reclutamiento en los países desarrollados, la necesidad de reducir costos, etc., a partir de 1977, el Gobierno holandés ha comenzado a utilizar crecientemente expertos locales.

REINO UNIDO

1. Marco Institucional

Hasta Marzo de 1974, el programa británico de asistencia al desarrollo de los países de ultramar, incluyendo la asistencia técnica, era responsabilidad del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y concretamente, dentro de éste, de la Oficina de Desarrollo de Ultramar (Overseas Development Administration).

En 1974 a esa oficina se le confirió nuevamente el status de Departamento Ministerial separado. Dicho cambio "no afecta a los programas de ayuda como tales y no involucra cambio alguno en los criterios de ayuda del Reino Unido, que seguirán siendo la necesidad relativa de ayuda económica y su valor en términos de desarrollo de los pueblos concernidos"^{1/}

El nuevo Ministerio cuenta con algunos componentes funcionales relativamente autónomos, que juegan un papel importante en la identificación e implementación de proyectos: el Instituto de Productos Tropicales, el Centro de Investigación de Pestes de Ultramar, la División de Recursos Terrestres y la Dirección de Informes de Ultramar. Participan también en la ejecución de los programas de asistencia, en calidad de órganos de ejecución, otros Departamentos Ministeriales, Universidades y varios institutos autónomos, sobre todo de investigación científica.

Cabe aquí hacer referencia también al programa británico de voluntarios en el que juegan un rol destacado cuatro aso-

^{1/} "DAC Annual Review, 1974, United Kingdom Memorandum"
Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1975, pág. 5

ciaciones no gubernamentales: el Instituto Católico de Relaciones Internacionales, el Servicio Voluntario Internacional, la Asociación de Naciones Unidas y el Servicio Voluntario de Ultramar.

Por último, cabe hacer mención a que el Consejo Británico tiene atribuciones importantes sobretudo en materia de asistencia educacional.

2. Objetivos y criterios

Las actividades de cooperación técnica británica se orientan de acuerdo a criterios distintos, segun el tipo de asistencia y el sector de que se trate.

Así, en materia de formación profesional y en general tratándose de programas para becarios extranjeros en Gran Bretaña, se han aplicado los siguientes criterios:

- que el beneficiario este en condiciones de hacer contribuciones sustanciales al desarrollo económico y social de su país en un plazo razonable;
- que no haya ni en su país ni en su región, posibilidades equivalentes de formación;
- que el programa a seguir por el beneficiario lo habilite para asumir responsabilidades mayores a las que tenía antes de seguirlo, que aumente sustancialmente su eficiencia o que lo habilite para entrenar a terceros;
- que por lo general, se trate de estudios de alto nivel, es decir, de postgrado o nivel equivalente. 2/

2/ "DAC Annual Review, 1973, United Kingdom Memorandum"
Her Majesty's Stationary Office, pág. 18

Cabría agregar a este respecto también, otro criterio, no siempre explicitado, a saber la utilidad de estos programas como mecanismo de promoción de exportaciones. De acuerdo a un estudio efectuado por el Board of Trade de Gran Bretaña, a juicio de las tres cuartas partes de las empresas encuestadas, los programas de formación para extranjeros constituían un mecanismo "muy valioso" para la promoción de las exportaciones británicas.^{3/}

Más recientemente, como resultado de las nuevas orientaciones de las discusiones sobre el desarrollo, se han modificado en medida importante los criterios tradicionales empleados por el Reino Unido dentro del contexto de la asistencia técnica. En efecto, ya en 1973, el gobierno británico veía a sus proyectos en sectores específicos, como una parte de un programa global de ayuda a un país, dirigido en la medida de lo posible a contribuir a la creación de empleo y a beneficiar especialmente a los estratos más pobres de la población. Puede decirse que estos cambios culminaron en cierta medida, al ser recogidos sistemáticamente en un libro blanco publicado por el Ministerio para el Desarrollo de Ultramar en 1975, titulado "The Changing Emphasis in British Aid Policy: More Help for the Poorest."

La política allí anunciada involucra una reorientación geográfica y en cuanto a estratos sociales de la asistencia británica al desarrollo. Concretamente se plantea la decisión de enfatizar los programas para los países menos desarrollados, y dentro de éstos a los estratos menos favorecidos. Por tal razón, se postula en primer término, y junto a otras innovaciones, un creciente énfasis sobre el desarrollo rural.

^{3/} Board of Trade, "Exports and the Industrial Training of People from Overseas," 1969, Her Majesty's Stationary Office;

Este último es considerado como una "estrategia diseñada para mejorar tanto la vida económica como social de los pobres en las áreas rurales y no debiera equipararse a una nueva formula para expresar la idea de un aumento de producción agrícola"^{4/} Desde el punto de vista operacional lo anterior se traduce en una creciente importancia a los llamados "proyectos integrados de desarrollo rural".

Los efectos de esta reorientación están evidentes en el último memorandum presentado por el Reino Unido al CAD de la OCDE;^{5/} contiene información acerca de la proporción de los desembolsos por concepto de proyectos bilaterales de ayuda al desarrollo, de beneficio directo para los estratos más pobres de la población rural. La Tabla 13 recoge parte de esta información.

TABLA 13

PROPORCION DE LOS DESEMBOLSOS POR PROYECTOS BILATERALES DE
AYUDA AL DESARROLLO DE BENEFICIO PARA LOS POBRES EN ZONAS
RURALES

	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u> (porcentajes)
De completo beneficio para los pobres rurales	20.6	24.4
De beneficio parcial para los pobres rurales	<u>29.6</u>	<u>35.6</u>
	50.2	60.0

Fuente: "DAC Annual Review, 1977", United Kingdom Memorandum.

^{4/} "DAC Annual Review, 1976", United Kingdom Memorandum
Her Majesty's Stationary Office, pag. 17.

^{5/} "Ibidem 1977

Sin embargo, estos nuevos criterios no han impedido, a partir de 1974, un importante refuerzo de la asistencia técnica brindada por el Reino Unido a los países árabes exportadores de petróleo, como medio de hacer frente a la creciente demanda de capacitación de sus recursos humanos.

3. América Latina como beneficiario

Como indica la tabla , la posición de la región latinoamericana como receptora de asistencia técnica del Reino Unido, es claramente secundaria.

TABLA 14

ASISTENCIA TECNICA RECIBIDA POR AMERICA LATINA DEL REINO UNIDO DURANTE EL PERIODO 1972-1976, MONTOS GLOBALES (EN MILLONES DE US \$) Y PORCENTAJE DEL TOTAL DE LA ASISTENCIA TECNICA BRITANICA

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>
Total AT británica	152.00	178.00	179.00	214.00	230.00
A. Latina	8.10	10.40	13.80	13.60	13.54
%	5.33	5.84	7.60	6.35	5.89

Durante el período 1972-1976, América Latina ha recibido como promedio, solo el 6.22% (5.5% si se toma el período 1969-75), del total de la asistencia técnica otorgada por el Reino Unido a los países en desarrollo. Si bien ha habido hasta 1974 un aumento de las cifras absolutas de los programas británicos de asistencia técnica hacia la región, en términos relativos, la situación no ha variado sino escasamente.

Las variaciones porcentuales que muestra el cuadro entonces, particularmente el alza que se aprecia en 1974, deben ser interpretadas a la luz de lo señalado reiteradamente por el Gobierno británico en los memorandums que somete anualmente al CAD, en orden a que las fluctuaciones de los desembolsos anuales a países determinados no necesariamente reflejan un cambio en la política hacia los mismos. Durante los años 1974-76 en cambio, se apreció un claro estancamiento de la cooperación técnica británica. Dicho estancamiento podría interpretarse como una consecuencia de la reorientación de la política general de asistencia técnica al desarrollo del Reino Unido, que favorece a los países de más bajos ingresos.

Aparte lo ya señalado respecto del estancamiento de la asistencia técnica otorgada a América Latina por el Reino Unido, cabe destacar igualmente, un cierto grado de concentración en cuanto a países beneficiarios.

En efecto, una proporción significativa del total de la asistencia otorgada por este país a América Latina, esta destinado a las antiguas posesiones coloniales británicas en la región.

De este modo, como se aprecia en la Tabla 15, Jamaica recibió, durante el período comprendido entre los años 1969 y 1976, el 13.83% del total de la asistencia técnica británica. Barbados recibió casi el 5% y Trinidad y Tobago una cantidad similar (4.62%). Guyana por su parte el 5.26%. El porcentaje de esos cuatro países sumados equivale a cerca del 30% del total de la asistencia técnica británica a América Latina durante el período indicado.

Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, y México fueron durante el período que se examina, los restantes paí-

AMERICA LATINA: Cooperación Técnica recibida de INGLATERRA (en millones de dls.) TABLA 15

	Promedio 1969-71	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1969-76	%
Argentina	0.16	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.11	2.01	2.95
Bahamas	0.03	0.1	-	-	0.1	0.7	1.02	0.44
Barbados	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.48	3.38	4.96
Bermuda	-	-	-	-	-	0.03	0.03	0.04
Bolivia	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.5	-	0.87	1.27
Brasil	0.46	0.8	1.2	1.4	1.5	1.25	7.55	11.08
Brasil	0.53	0.8	1.2	0.9	0.7	1.69	6.89	10.12
Chile	0.40	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.8	1.32	4.02	5.90
Colombia	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.7	2.0	2.94
Costa Rica	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.03
Cuba	-	-	-	0.1	0.1	0.07	0.27	0.15
República Dominicana	0.1	0.2	0.5	0.7	1.1	1.05	3.95	0.40
Ecuador	0.2	0.4	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.57	3.87	5.80
El Salvador	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.1	5.68
Grenada	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Guatemala	0.46	0.5	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.58	3.58	5.26
Guyana	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.07	0.17	0.25
Haití	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.5	0.25	1.65	2.42
Honduras	0.93	1.1	1.8	1.4	1.2	1.12	9.42	13.83
Jamaica	0.2	0.3	0.7	1.0	1.6	1.14	5.34	7.84
México	-	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.28	1.73	1.73
Nicaragua	0.13	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.06	0.96	1.41
Panamá	-	-	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.22	0.62	0.92
Paraguay	0.3	0.6	1.0	1.5	2.0	1.29	5.49	8.06
Perú	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Surinam	0.36	0.7	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.35	3.15	4.62
Trinidad y Tobago	-	-	0.1	0.1	-	0.08	0.28	0.41
Uruguay	0.06	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.01	0.01	1.48
Venezuela	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total Am. Latina	4.82	8.10	10.40	13.60	13.60	13.54	69.01	
Tasa de crecimiento s/ año anterior								

ses que recibieron proporciones importantes del total de la asistencia técnica británica a la región. Este grupo recibió, en efecto, aproximadamente el 46% del total. Es decir que si se suma este grupo de países con el anterior, se aprecia que 10 países en la región, recibieron la mayor parte de la asistencia británica, el 76%.

Llama la atención la no correspondencia entre las cantidades desembolsadas y la capacidad de absorción de asistencia técnica de los diferentes países de la región. Así, Chile recibió una proporción del total casi igual a la de Brasil, y superior a la de México. El Salvador por otra parte, con casi el 6%, está levemente por debajo de lo recibido por México, mientras que Venezuela recibió solamente el 1% del total.

Esta falta de correlación es de lamentar si se tiene en cuenta que el Reino Unido tiene una larga tradición científica y técnica en no pocos campos de indudable interés para muchos países latinoamericanos. Es el caso de la medicina y la agricultura tropical por ejemplo, cuestión que no pareciera estar beneficiando suficientemente a los países de la región.

Tratándose de los restantes países de la región, en cambio, la asistencia técnica se caracteriza por una gran dispersión de cantidades pequeñas y hasta insignificantes. Es posible que ello se deba a la facultad que tienen Embajadores y Jefes de Misión del Reino Unido de autorizar el financiamiento de pequeños proyectos sin necesidad de someterlos a la aprobación previa de sus autoridades.

FRANCIA

Posiblemente Francia sea el cuarto país en orden de importancia entre los de Europa Occidental en lo que se refiere a la asistencia técnica a America Latina. Sin embargo, resulta particularmente difícil probar la veracidad de esta afirmación por dos tipos de problemas que presenta la mayor parte de la información disponible sobre la cooperación técnica brindada por ese país.

El primero de ellos es que toda la información agregada relativa a Francia que se incluye en publicaciones de la OCDE, comprende bajo la denominación de "asistencia técnica a los países en desarrollo", los gastos efectuados por el Gobierno francés en sus territorios y dependencias de ultramar (DOM-TOM). La utilización de las cifras desagregadas, país por país, que publicó recientemente la OCDE, han permitido determinar que algo más del 46% de la "asistencia técnica francesa a América Latina" en 1975, correspondía a gastos efectuados en los DOM-TOM. Este hecho, y las posibles variaciones que sufre el gasto en tales territorios de un año a otro, ha hecho imposible utilizar las cifras publicadas por la OCDE sobre Francia en este trabajo. Por otra parte, para años anteriores al citado, algunas de las cifras publicadas por la OCDE, diera la impresión de que no reflejan la totalidad de la asistencia técnica que Francia puede haber prestado a países de la región.

El segundo problema se refiere a la fuerte participación que parecería tener en el gasto total en "asistencia técnica" de origen francés, el desarrollo de acciones culturales y de aquellas relacionadas con la difusión del idioma y de la cultura francesa.

Estos dos factores, limitan considerablemente toda posibilidad de análisis siguiendo los criterios que se han utilizado en este trabajo para tratar el caso de los restantes países europeos.

Para evitar parte de aquellos problemas, la información que se presenta más abajo se limita a las acciones de cooperación "cultural, científica y técnica" de la Dirección General de Relaciones Culturales, Científicas y Técnicas del Ministerio de Asuntos Extranjeros, que no son exclusivamente de carácter técnico y, que, a su vez, es evidente que no cubren la totalidad de la cooperación técnica que puede estar brindando hoy día Francia.

La acción desarrollada por dicha DGRCST esta dirigida esencialmente hacia la satisfacción de las necesidades esenciales de los países en desarrollo. De allí la prioridad que pareciera darse en el programa de asistencia francés al sector agrícola y al de la medicina y, por otra parte, a la formación científica y técnica.

En esa acción tienen un papel importante docentes y "expertos de cooperación técnica" enviados a los países en desarrollo y el esfuerzo dirigido a la formación de docentes y de **cuadros** científicos y técnicos en estos países.

Los efectivos de la DGRCTS son principalmente docentes (13.833 en 1975) y expertos de cooperación técnica (2.952) la mayor parte de los cuales, cumplían funciones en los países del Norte de Africa (12.502 y 2.505 respectivamente). No habiendo sido posible determinar cual es la importancia de las donaciones de equipo dentro del gasto de cooperación técnica francés.

En los últimos diez años el valor total de la asistencia técnica francesa (DGR CST) ha aumentado muy lentamente en valores corrientes y es muy posible que haya disminuído bastante en valores constantes. En 1967, llegaba a los 567.5 millones de francos, en 1976 a los 896.65.

América Latina como beneficiaria de la Asistencia Técnica francesa

Si bien no existe información adecuada, a los fines de este trabajo, sobre la distribución geográfica del gasto en asistencia técnica efectuada por el Gobierno francés, puede utilizarse como referencia los créditos presupuestarios que son asignados a la DGR CST. La parte de dichos créditos que en el presupuesto francés de 1976 correspondieron a América Latina, fueron 77.5 millones de francos (unos 16.2 millones de dolares). En 1977, dichos créditos aumentaron a 79 millones de francos (es decir, unos 16.8 millones de dolares). Entre 1973 y 1978, los créditos correspondientes a la región han aumentado en un 121.63% lo que esta muy por encima del aumento del 56.47% que benefició al conjunto del presupuesto de la DGR CST. Ello ha hecho que la parte correspondiente a América Latina pasara dentro de ese presupuesto 9.24% al 13.09% en el período indicado. Esto ubica a America Latina, en segundo lugar (después del Magreb) entre las áreas geográficas en que se divide el presupuesto de la DGR CST.

Debido a la limitación de los fondos disponibles, el Gobierno francés ha decidido concentrar sus operaciones en America Latina en algunos países y en algunas operaciones: "Así es que tres países han sido considerados como prioritarios (en el sentido del programa de acción prioritario No. 9 del VII Plan -Asistencia al esfuerzo francés a la exportación) Brasil, México y Venezuela, a los cuales se debe agregar Haití, que goza de una situación privilegiada como único Estado francófono del continente". ^{1/}

En cuanto a las áreas privilegiadas de intervención en la región deben señalarse la pedagogía y la enseñanza del idioma francés, la agricultura, la salud pública y la enseñanza científica y tecnológica.

En materia de agricultura la acción parecería dirigirse hacia la enseñanza en universidades e institutos de agronomía; hacia la enseñanza en la reforma de las estructuras agrícolas y en la investigación agronomica aplicada. En 1976, la DGRCSST había enviado a América Latina 130 cooperantes para trabajar en esta area.

En materia de salud pública, diera la impresión que las acciones no estan suficientemente definidas, pese a que este sector empleaba 117 expertos franceses en la región en 1976.

En materia de administración pública, el programa de la DGRCSST comprende envios de misiones y organizacion de cursos dirigidos a la modernización de diversos sectores administrativos y a la formación y reciclaje de funcionarios de nivel superior, especialmente en México, Brasil y Venezuela.

En materia de enseñanza científica y tecnológica se han realizado numerosas acciones en Brasil, México, Venezuela (establecimiento de un Instituto Universitario de Tecnología, y en Perú en el campo de las matemáticas. En Haití, (país al que el presupuesto francés destinó en 1976 créditos por 3 millones de francos) se lleva a cabo una importante operación de formación profesional organizada conjuntamente por Francia y la OIT, y destinada a la formación de técnicos calificados y a asegurar la formación permanente.

Por último, corresponde señalar que uno de los programas más importantes que se han aprobado recientemente en la región se refiere a la prospección minera en el Perú y que ha sido establecido a solicitud del Gobierno de dicho país.

LA ASISTENCIA TECNICA BRINDADA A LATINOAMERICA POR ESPANA

I. Política General

Por razones de afinidad cultural, de idioma, etc., la asistencia técnica española se canaliza principalmente a la región latinoamericana. La prestación de asistencia técnica significativa a la región por el Estado español sin embargo, es de reciente data. Solo se puede hablar de una política española en este terreno, a partir de finales de la década pasada.

Como se indicará mas detalladamente a continuación, se trata de una asistencia técnica muy concentrada en la promoción de la formación profesional.

Desde el punto de vista institucional, la política española de asistencia técnica es definida básicamente por dos organismos: el Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, a través de la Dirección General de Cooperación Técnica Internacional, y el Instituto Iberoamericano de Cooperación.

A la Dirección General de Cooperación Internacional (creada en 1970), le corresponde programar, impulsar y coordinar la ejecución de las actividades de cooperación técnica internacional. El Instituto Iberoamericano de Cooperación (hasta 1977, el Instituto de Cultura Hispánica) a su vez tiene las siguientes atribuciones:

- Estudiar la realidad iberoamericana con el propósito de contribuir, mediante el mutuo conocimiento entre los pueblos iberoamericanos, a la formación de una conciencia comunitaria;

- impulsar el estudio, defensa y difusión de la lengua castellana y de la cultura iberoamericana;
- intensificar una acción cultural y científica coordinada entre todos los países iberoamericanos;
- articular una cooperación tecnológica e industrial y llevar a cabo una cooperación de estudio e investigación en las áreas económica, comercial, y financiera entre todos los países iberoamericanos;

En la ejecución de los programas y proyectos de asistencia técnica española intervienen: Ministerios y organismos públicos tales como el Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia, el de Trabajo, el de Agricultura, el de Obras Públicas y Urbanismo, el de Industria y Energía, el de Comercio y Turismo, el de Transporte y Comunicaciones, el de Presidencia en materia de planificación, desarrollo regional, etc.

La asistencia técnica española está regulada bilateralmente, mediante acuerdos gobierno a gobierno. Estos acuerdos son fundamentalmente de dos tipos, a saber: convenios básicos de asistencia técnica y convenios complementarios de cooperación (o convenios sectoriales).

1. Particularidades de la asistencia técnica otorgada por España a America Latina

Los indicadores cuantitativos disponibles con respecto a la asistencia técnica otorgada por España a la región latinoamericana son en general escasos, lo mismo que la información detallada (desglose de la asistencia por proyectos, por ejemplo). A falta de dichos indicadores, un análisis de la

situación reciente desde el punto de vista de los convenios de asistencia técnica suscritos entre España y los países de América Latina, puede servir de base para extraer algunas conclusiones tentativas.

La Tabla 16 describe la situación actual en materia de convenios de asistencia técnica, tanto básicos como sectoriales.

Cabe destacar en primer término, el carácter relativamente reciente de la inmensa mayoría de los convenios de asistencia técnica. En efecto, sobre un total de 72 convenios, solo 5 son anteriores a 1970.

Cabría afirmar en principio, que no hay países en los cuales esté concentrada la asistencia técnica española de manera particular, salvo quizá los casos de Venezuela (país con el cual, aparte del convenio básico, existen 6 convenios sectoriales), de Ecuador (6 convenios sectoriales) y de Perú, Chile y Argentina (convenio básico, mas 4 convenios sectoriales cada uno).

En lo que respecta a los convenios sectoriales de asistencia técnica, se aprecia una considerable concentración en tres sectores: turismo (10 convenios), formación profesional (13 convenios), y energía atómica (5 convenios). En otras palabras, 28 convenios sobre un total de 42, es decir el 66%, corresponden a dichos sectores.

Sin duda el sector de mayor concentración es el de la formación profesional. Desde 1969 hasta la fecha, España ha enviado un total 379 expertos a América Latina dentro del marco de los proyectos de formación profesional. De ese total, 282 han cumplido misiones de 12 o más meses y 97 han cumpli-

do misiones de corta duración, es decir de entre uno y seis meses.

Durante igual periodo 654 becarios latinoamericanos han seguido cursos de perfeccionamiento y especialización en España. Por último, también durante el período en cuestión, 73 directivos de instituciones latinoamericanas han viajado a España en misiones de conocimiento y estudio de las instituciones españolas de formación profesional.

La asistencia técnica española a la región latinoamericana se ha concentrado especialmente en la formación profesional. A ella ha destinado el Gobierno español mas de mil millones de pesetas en los últimos años. Los principales sectores de atención han sido los siguientes:

- a) Asistencia para la creación de instituciones nacionales de formación profesional (Paraguay, Bolivia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Costa Rica.)
- b) Cooperación con instituciones y organismos latinoamericanos de formación profesional y técnica (Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Venezuela, Chile, Republica Dominicana, Brasil, Perú.)
- c) Cooperación con universidades latinoamericanas (Brasil, Chile y Bolivia.)

La asistencia técnica multilateral a Latinoamerica se canaliza fundamentalmente a traves de la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA), el Acuerdo de Cartagena, el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID); el Instituto Latinoamericano de Planificación (ILPES) y la Comisión Económica para América Latina (CEPAL). La asistencia canalizada a traves de

CONVENIOS DE ASISTENCIA TECNICA ENTRE ESPAÑA Y LOS PAISES DE AMERICA LATINA

BÁSICO		COMPLEMENTARIOS
Argentina	1972	Salud (1969); Higiene y Sanidad Veterinaria (1971); Carreteras (1971); Energía Atómica (1966)
Bolivia	1971	Formación Profesional (1977)
Brasil	1971	Higiene y Sanidad Vet. (1971); Regadíos (1974); Energía Atómica (1977)
Colombia	1964	
Costa Rica	1971	Formación Profesional Marítimo Pesquera (1975); AT CIPET e INA (1977)
Chile	1969	Turismo (1971); Energía Atómica (1972); Formación Profesional (1975); AT UTFSM (1975)
Dominicana	1973	Turismo (1971); Regadíos (1974); Investigación Recursos Hidro-eléctricos (1977); Recursos Mineros (1977); Formación Profesional ***
Ecuador	1971	Turismo (1971); Formación Profesional (1975)
Guatemala	1977*	Formación Profesional (1977)
Honduras	1974	Turismo (1976); Formación Profesional (1977)
Nicaragua		Turismo (1972)
Panamá		Formación Profesional (1977)
Paraguay	1974	Turismo (1971); Formación Profesional (1977)
Perú	1971	Energía Atómica (1976); Turismo (1968); Formación Profesional (1976); Informática (1976)
El Salvador		Turismo (1968); Formación Profesional (1974)
Uruguay	1974	Turismo (1969); Asesoramiento Ministerio Trabajo (1977)
Venezuela	1973	Turismo (1976); Formación Profesional (1977); Recursos Hidráulicos (1976); Formación Profesional Marítimo Pesquera (1973); Oll (1977)
México **		
Cuba**		

* Ad. Referendum

** Se está negociando actualmente

*** Pendiente de Firma

Fuente: Centro Iberoamericano de Cooperación "Relaciones España-Iberoamérica en el Marco de la Ciencia y Tecnología para el Desarrollo" - Madrid, Marzo, 1978.

estos organismos, presenta una tendencia al aumento. En el caso de la OEA por ejemplo, ha experimentado un aumento considerable, luego de la firma de un acuerdo de cooperación entre el Gobierno español y ese organismo en 1967. Así, España ha contribuido US \$50.000 al fondo de Asistencia Técnica de la OEA. Ha apoyado igualmente, proyectos integrados en diversos países, ha otorgado becas de post-grado, organizado seminarios y realizado cursos dentro del marco del "Programa Especial de Capacitación" (PEC) de la OEA. Los cursos del PEC versan sobre materias tales como edafología y biología vegetal, especialización forestal, hidrología y cooperativas agrícolas, desarrollo turístico y otras. Actualmente se organizan 11 cursos por año. Recientemente la OEA ha solicitado al Gobierno español, que sean aumentados a 20 por año.

3. Perspectivas futuras

Puede estimarse con certitud que en el futuro inmediato el gobierno español continuará haciendo esfuerzos sostenidos para incrementar la asistencia técnica dirigida hacia Iberoamérica. A tal efecto se apoyará fundamentalmente en dos factores: las afinidades de lengua, cultura y costumbres y la correlación entre las necesidades tecnológicas de la región y el tipo de tecnología que ha sido implantada en los últimos años en España.

Basandose en este último aspecto es que las autoridades españolas tendrían la intención de dirigir sus esfuerzos prioritariamente hacia "las tecnologías de proceso, propias de la industria básica, con el fin de explotar mejor los recursos naturales y las tecnologías de producción propias de las industrias de bienes de equipo, para lograr así un equipamiento adecuado y, por consiguiente, una infraestructura sólida que sirva de plataforma para lograr un desarrollo industrial autónomo, equilibrado y armónico en los países iberoamericanos.

En este plano se podría citar los siguientes sectores prioritarios, en un orden que no debe prejuzgar ninguna preferencia: Siderurgia y Metalurgia, Energía, Electrónica, Química, Agricultura, Minería, Alimentación, etc. La industria de bienes de consumo podría actuar de momento de base de compra "know-how" en países mas avanzados, tratando de asimilar los conocimientos necesarios para, en su día, poder crear tecnologías propias en algunos sectores previamente seleccionados." 1/

1/ Centro Iberoamericano de Cooperación, "Relaciones Espana..."
op. cit.

OTROS PAISES EUROPEOS

La asistencia técnica prestada por los restantes países de Europa Occidental a los de América Latina, no es, desde el punto de vista de su valor (siempre en términos de costo) muy importante. Por otra parte, es justamente para estos otros países para los que no ha sido posible encontrar mayor documentación o información sobre la asistencia técnica que brindan a la región. De todos modos, en las páginas siguientes se encontrará alguna información especialmente acerca de los programas que los países indicados desarrollan en América Latina.

BELGICA

A pesar de que Bélgica destina un porcentaje muy pequeño (4,6%) de su asistencia técnica para los países latinoamericanos, la cooperación técnica belga tiene para la América Latina cierta importancia. Entre 1969 y 1976 el valor acumulado de la asistencia técnica belga a la región fué de 36,15 millones de dólares, cifra que representó el 4,6% del total proveniente de los países europeos del CAD. Para 1976 el mismo porcentaje fué de 4,9%.

La asistencia técnica belga a la región ha venido aumentando sostenidamente. En 1969 el valor de ésta fué de 2,2 millones de dólares; para 1976 ya había aumentado a 8,25 millones.

Los países latinoamericanos que más se beneficiaron de la cooperación técnica belga durante el período 1969-1976 fueron: Perú (7,1 millones de dólares), Chile (5,9), Brasil (3,96) y Colombia (3,31). Juntos estos cuatro países recibieron el 54,3% del valor total de la cooperación técnica a la región en el período señalado. (Ver Tabla 17)

Hasta ahora el programa belga de cooperación técnica en América Latina se ha caracterizado por un enorme énfasis en el

	Promedio 1969-71	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1969-76
Argentina	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.39	2.99
Bahamas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Barbados	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bermuda	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bolivia	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.61	2.61
Brasil	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.76	3.96
Chile	0.46	0.6	0.8	0.6	1.0	0.89	5.29
Colombia	0.23	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.61	3.31
Costa Rica	-	-	0.1	3.4	3.1	3.4	1.73
Cuba	-	0.1	0.2	0.1	-	0.6	1.0
República Dominicana	-	-	-	-	-	0.03	0.03
Ecuador	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.13	0.93
El Salvador	-	-	0.1	0.1	-	0.07	0.27
Grenada	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Guatemala	-	-	0.1	-	0.1	0.18	0.38
Guyana	-	-	-	-	-	0.01	0.01
Haití	-	-	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.9	2.7
Honduras	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.08	0.18
Jamaica	-	-	-	-	-	0.02	0.02
México	0.13	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.87	2.37
Nicaragua	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.07	0.17
Panamá	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.12	0.22
Paraguay	-	-	-	0.1	0.1	0.13	0.33
Perú	0.46	0.7	1.0	1.1	1.5	1.40	7.1
Puerto Rico	-	-	-	-	-	0.05	0.05
Trinidad y Tobago	-	-	-	-	-	0.04	0.04
Uruguay	-	-	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.19	0.49
Venezuela	-	-	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.28	0.78
Total Am. Latina	2.28	2.70	5.30	8.50	10.20	14.09	36.96
Tasa de crecimiento / año anterior							

otorgamiento de becas de estudio. En 1976 Bélgica otorgó 1.066 becas a nacionales de países latinoamericanos, siendo así el segundo mayor otorgante de becas entre los países de Europa Occidental (el primero es Inglaterra). Las becas belgas a latinoamericanos representaron en 1976 el 21% del total de las concedidas por países europeos miembros del CAD a los mismos. La concentración de los becarios en 1976 fué en las Ciencias Sociales y en Medicina, pero la distribución sectorial es muy amplia.

El programa de becas belga está dentro de un marco relativamente tradicional de la asistencia técnica.

El programa belga de envío de expertos a América Latina es también de cierta envergadura. En 1976, 236 expertos belgas fueron enviados a la región. Se concentraron en los campos de la agricultura, salud, educación y servicios sociales.

Se prevee para un futuro cercano un incremento de la cooperación técnica belga hacia América Latina en el ámbito agro-industrial.

ITALIA

Italia cuenta con un programa de ayuda externa relativamente modesto y aparentemente no muy estructurado. La mayor parte de la cooperación técnica, como la de los demás medios de ayuda oficial italiana, está concentrada en el Mediterráneo africano, así como también, aunque en menor cuantía, en algunos países al sur del Sahara.

Entre 1969 y 1975, América Latina recibió el 9,2% de la cooperación técnica italiana al mundo en desarrollo. Desde 1969 hasta 1976, el valor de dicha cooperación fue estimada en 18,49 millones de dólares. Esta cifra representó el 2,3% del total provisto a la región por los países europeos miembros del CAD (2,5% en 1976).

Sin embargo, la asistencia técnica italiana a América Latina

a América Latina ha declinado progresivamente. En 1967-1968 era del 5,4%, en 1973 del 3%, y en 1976 sólo llegó al 1,4%.

El porcentaje danés dentro del total de asistencia técnica otorgada en el período 1969-1976, por los países europeos del CAD a la América Latina, fué apenas de 0,6%, y sumó un total de 4,6 millones de dólares.

Como característica general de los programas de cooperación técnica danesa, es de hacer notar la importancia relativamente baja del programa de becas. Desde mediados de los años sesenta se inició una política dirigida a acabar con las becas, sobretudo aquellas de duración prolongada fuera del país de origen.

El porcentaje recibido por la América Latina del personal en los diferentes programas fué bajo, como puede apreciarse en la siguiente tabla:

TABLA 18

Personal de los Diferentes Programas Daneses Asignado a la América Latina en 1973

	<u>Número de Personas</u>		<u>Porcentaje América Latina</u>
	<u>Mundo</u>	<u>América Latina</u>	
Estudiantes (recibidos con beca en Dinamarca)	68	9	13.2
Pasantía de entrenamiento (a seguir en Dinamarca)	364	34	9.3
Expertos Educativos	184	11	5.9
Personal Operacional	286	27	9.4
Asesores	165	8	4.8
Voluntarios	517	-	-

NORUEGA

En la tradición escandinava el Programa de Ayuda Externa Noruego es particularmente dinámico. La región latinoamericana no es sin embargo zona de prioridad dentro de ese programa. Sólo un 0,8% de toda la AOD y un 2,2 de la asistencia técnica noruegas van a América Latina.

La cooperación técnica noruega a América Latina comenzó en 1973, año en que tuvo un valor de 0,3 millones de dólares, para alcanzar 1,12 millones en 1976.

Para los años 1969-1976, la cooperación técnica noruega a América Latina representó el 0,3% de toda dicha cooperación provista por todos los países europeos miembros del CAD. El mismo porcentaje para el último año del período mencionado se elevó a 0,7%.

La cooperación técnica noruega a la región se concentra fuertemente en Cuba, que recibió en los últimos años 1,99 millones de dólares, lo que equivale al 75,9% del total asignado a la región.

SUECIA

El programa sueco de cooperación externa, incluyendo por supuesto también la parte destinada a asistencia técnica, tiene muy pocas actividades en América Latina. Entre 1969 y 1975, sólo el 1,4% de toda la cooperación técnica sueca estuvo destinada a la América Latina. Más aún, tanto el valor absoluto, como el valor porcentual, de esta cooperación vienen en descenso desde 1973.

El valor de la asistencia técnica sueca en 1971 era de 0,3 millones de dólares, aumentó hasta 0,7 millones en 1973, para luego comenzar a bajar paulatinamente. Esto se debió a la política sueca de concentrar su ayuda externa en los países

más pobres, de los cuales en la región latinoamericana sólo Haití hace parte.

Entre 1969 y 1976, América Latina recibió 2,83 millones de dólares en cooperación técnica sueca, o sea el 0,3% del total proveniente de todos los países europeos miembros del CAD.

La mayor parte (66,5%) de esa cifra estuvo dirigida a Cuba. Es de hacer notar que Suecia fué el primer país miembro del CAD en suministrar asistencia técnica a Cuba.

FINLANDIA

Aunque entre 1969 y 1975 el 18,4% de la AOD finlandesa fué dirigida a la América Latina, sólo un 3,9% de la cooperación técnica de dicho país va a la región.

Entre 1969 y 1976, Finlandia otorgó 1,91 millones de dólares a la América Latina por concepto de cooperación técnica. La cooperación técnica finlandesa a la región ha aumentado muy poco. De 0,3 millones de dólares en 1972, pasó a 0,71 millones en 1976. El énfasis relativo de la cooperación técnica finlandesa a la región está en el envío de expertos.

SUIZA

Durante el período 1969-1975, la cooperación técnica suiza a la América Latina apenas llegó a sumar 0,9 millones de dólares, representando así el 0,1% del total de la cooperación técnica proveniente de los países europeos del CAD.

El porcentaje latinoamericano como parte de toda la asistencia técnica suiza oscila alrededor del 10%, como puede apreciarse en la siguiente tabla dividida por programas.

TABLA 19

América Latina en el Programa Suizo de Cooperación, 1976

Técnica: Desembolsos en miles de Francos Suizos.

	<u>Donaciones Coop. Tec.</u>	<u>Institutos Suizos en PED</u>	<u>Expertos</u>	<u>Becas</u>
Total Bilateral	56,929	13,361	9,741	2,130
América Latina	9,841	1,288	512	366
% América Latina	17.2%	9.6%	5.2%	17.1%

Concentración por países

El programa suizo de cooperación técnica en la América Latina, se concentra en Perú y Bolivia. Dicha concentración se nota claramente a través de la concentración de los diferentes programas en 1976:

- a) Donaciones de cooperación técnica. De este programa Bolivia recibe el 32,3% del total latinoamericano; Perú el 29,4%.
- b) Institutos suizos en PED. De este programa Perú recibe el 39,2% del total latinoamericano; Guatemala el 22,5% y Bolivia el 9,3%.
- c) Expertos. De este programa Bolivia recibe el 47,2%; Perú el 30,2% y Cuba el 10,1%.
- d) Becas. De este programa Bolivia recibe el 15,3%; Perú el 14,4%; Ecuador el 14,2% y Trinidad y Tobago el 12%.

Proyectos

En la América Latina la cooperación técnica suiza se ha

dirigido especialmente a sectores tradicionalmente muy desarrollados en Suiza: formación agrícola, mecánico-agrícola, industria quesera, producción lechera, formación hotelera y técnicas bancarias.

LAS COMUNIDADES EUROPEAS

Los servicios de la Comisión de las Comunidades Europeas han prestado, a solicitud de los interesados, su asistencia técnica a los siguientes mecanismos de integración regional latinoamericana:

- i) ALALC, en el terreno de la política regional, de la información, de problemas de unión aduanera (especialmente nomenclatura aduanera) y de estadísticas.
- ii) Grupo Andino, en materia de planes de exportación, de formación de especialistas en programación industrial (en los sectores metal-mecánico, vehículos y petroquímica) y desarrollo de estadísticas.
- iii) Mercado Común Centroamericano, en el terreno de la nomenclatura aduanera, laboratorios aduaneros y valores en aduana (especialmente a través de la formación de personal).
- iv) INTAL, en materia de tratamiento de la información jurídica, de la integración entre empresas y de la pequeña y mediana empresa.

Por otra parte, la Comunidad dispone desde 1976 de fondos propios que le permiten proveer, en ciertos casos, asistencia financiera y técnica directa. En 1977 los fondos disponibles para países en desarrollo que no fueran ACP llegaban a 45 millones de unidades de cuenta. Estos son para ser utilizados en ayuda alimentaria y en la promoción de la cooperación y de la integración regional entre países en desarrollo.

En 1976, 2 millones de unidades de cuenta fueron destinados a Bolivia y en 1977 unos 10 millones a varios países latinoamericanos, sin que haya sido posible determinar que parte de esos montos corresponden a asistencia técnica.

el 15% del mineral de hierro, el 30% del cobre, el 16% de la bauxita y el 7% del petróleo importados por Japón estaban relacionados con sus actividades de asistencia técnica. 2/

En lo que se refiere al valor (en términos de costo) de la asistencia técnica japonesa, debe señalarse que es aún relativamente modesta: más baja, por ejemplo, que la de los Países Bajos o Bélgica; aunque debe reconocerse que en los últimos años ha crecido a un ritmo relativamente importante. En 1961 la asistencia técnica provista por Japón al conjunto de los países en desarrollo, fue de 2,4 millones de dólares; recién en 1967 superó los 10 millones anuales y desde entonces comenzó a aumentar a un ritmo fuerte para llegar a los 87,2 millones de dólares en 1975. (Ver Tabla A del Anexo)

En lo que se refiere a la distribución geográfica de la asistencia técnica japonesa, cabe señalar que el 65% de la misma está concentrada en los países asiáticos. Sin embargo, la parte proporcional correspondiente a América Latina, ha crecido algo en los últimos años: si se toman los valores acumulados para el período 1969-1976, se observa que la parte correspondiente a América Latina se elevó al 11,6%, desde un 9,1% que le correspondió en el período 1954-1971.

No resulta fácil determinar la distribución sectorial de la asistencia técnica japonesa, particularmente porque la información sobre la misma es presentada haciendo referencia a los diversos programas en que aquella se descompone, varios de los cuales incluyen proyectos que alcanzan a varios sectores.

Los principales de los programas antes mencionados son los siguientes:

- 1) Programa de Enseñanza Especializada Técnica y Profesio-

2/ Ver A.J. Caldwell, "The Evolution of Japanese Economic Cooperation" 1950-1970 "Development Research Project" discussion paper No.11. Princeton University, New Jersey.

En el Programa de Instalación de Centros de Enseñanza, el gobierno japonés provee el equipo y materiales necesarios para el establecimiento y operación de los Centros, manda expertos y emprende el entrenamiento de los nacionales que habrán de reemplazarlos. El gobierno del país beneficiario debe aportar el terreno y los edificios, proveer el personal que habrá de reemplazar a los expertos japoneses, y pagar los costos de operación del Centro.

En México ha venido funcionando desde hace ya algunos años la Escuela Nacional de Telecomunicaciones, creada con la asistencia japonesa. Dicha escuela fué entregada al gobierno mexicano en 1975, pero algunos expertos japoneses continúan aún hoy con la supervisión de la misma.

En Perú, el programa japonés ha operado desde 1975 el Centro de Enseñanza sobre el Procesamiento del Pescado.

En Paraguay, una Escuela Politécnica, a ser organizada por el programa japonés, se encuentra en estado de planeación.

4) Programa de Cooperación Agrícola.

En 1975 las acciones de este programa en América Latina se limitaron a un proyecto de asistencia para la implementación de cultivos por el sistema de "paddy", en la hoya del río Ribeira, en Brasil.

5) Programa de Desarrollo de Producciones Primarias.

En 1975, en Chile se hizo un prospecto preliminar para el mejoramiento de las técnicas para el refinamiento del cobre.

En Bolivia, también en la etapa preliminar, se llevó a cabo una prospección para la recuperación de zinc y otros minerales a partir de las escorias de mineral de hierro.

6) Programa de Voluntarios Japoneses en Ultramar.

Este programa se estableció siguiendo el modelo de los Cuerpos de Paz de los Estados Unidos. Existen sin embargo diferencias importantes con aquel, en especial porque los voluntarios japoneses son siempre técnicos especializados que perciben salarios relativamente altos.

La importancia del programa en la América Latina no es mayor. Sólo 11 voluntarios fueron enviados a la región en 1975, todos a países de América Central.

7) Programa de Otorgamiento de Equipos.

Este programa comenzó en 1964. En 1975, 38,9% de los fondos de este programa se destinaron a la América Latina (109 millones de yen). Como porcentaje de la ayuda japonesa a la región, este programa se hace cada día más importante, sobretudo en lo que se refiere a la donación de equipos de telecomunicaciones. Un muy reciente ejemplo de las actividades del programa, fué la entrega de equipos de alta tecnología en telecomunicaciones por un valor de 100.000 dólares al gobierno de Colombia en Mayo, 1978.

8) Programa de Prospecciones para el Desarrollo.

Bajo este programa se hacen prospecciones básicas de programas de desarrollo. En 1975 las actividades en América Latina incluyeron prospecciones sobre los siguientes proyectos:

Argentina	-	desarrollo de recursos minerales.
Bolivia	-	levantamiento de mapas topográficos. construcción de una refinería de zinc.
Brasil	-	construcción de un nuevo ferrocarril. creación de una sede industrial costera para la operación de una refinería petrolera y una planta de fertilizantes.
Chile	-	desarrollo de recursos minerales.
Colombia	-	desarrollo carbonífero.
Costa Rica	-	desarrollo de dos puertos.
Ecuador	-	energía eléctrica a largo plazo.

Perú - recursos minerales.

Nicaragua, Panamá Venezuela y Colombia - prospección para la identificación de proyectos.

Salvador, Honduras, Panamá y Venezuela - prospección para la identificación de proyectos y análisis de posibilidades para desarrollo industrial.

9) Programa de Cooperación Médica.

En América Latina este programa se ha limitado a algunas prospecciones preliminares. En 1975 éstas tuvieron lugar en Bolivia, Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala y Brasil. En Brasil también se hicieron algunos arreglos para cooperación en medicina geriátrica.

BIBLIOGRAFIA

Por razones de presentación y para aligerar el texto, se ha citado solo en algunas ocasiones la fuente de obtención de la información, por ello se incluye a continuación esta lista bibliográfica.

La documentación que ha sido consultada para la elaboración de este trabajo es algo más amplia que la que se indica más abajo, pero puede considerarse que esta ha provisto la mayor parte de las informaciones que se volcaron en el mismo.

GENERAL

Coopération pour le Développement, "Examen 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977." OCDE.

"Flow of Resources to Developing Countries" OECD, 1973

"Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries - Data on Disbursements 1969 to 1975", OECD 1977.

ALEMANIA FEDERAL

"German Aid", John White, ODI, 1964.

"Germany - DAC Questionnaire", Edition 1977.

"German Development Assistance Policy 1976". Memorandum submitted by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for the DAC Annual Review 1977. August 1977.

DINAMARCA

"Denmark's Cooperation with Developing Countries", 1965-68
The Board of Technical Cooperation for Developing Countries.

"Denmark Development Assistance - Annual Reports", 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DANIDA.

ESPANA

"Relaciones España-Iberoamérica en el marco de la Ciencia y Tecnología para el Desarrollo", Centro Iberoamericano de Cooperación. 1978.

FRANCIA

"L'Assistance Technique en 1973 - Evolution des Effectifs et des Couts", Secretariat d'Etat aux Affaires Etrangères. Septembre 1973.

"Memorandum annexe sur la Cooperation Technique et Culturelle", Memorandum 1977 France au CAD.

"Relations Culturelles, Scientifiques et Techniques", Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Bilan 1973

"Relations Culturelles, Scientifiques et Techniques" Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Bilan 1974-1975.

"Raport Parlementaire", Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. 1977 - 1978.

JAPON

"Annual Reports 1975, 1976, 1977", Japan International Cooperation Agency.

"The Evolution of Japanese Economic Cooperation, 1950-1970", Discussion Paper. Woodrow Wilson School, New Jersey, Estados Unidos 1970.

"The Japanese Aid", John White, OAI, 1964.

"Technical Cooperation of the Japanese Government-Annual Report 1971", Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency.

PAISES BAJOS

"Development Assistance Policies of the Netherlands", 1966.

"Projektlijst", Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Den Haag, 1978.

"Programmes Nederlandais de Cooperation Technique", La Cooperation des Pays Bas avec les pays en voie de développement. Septembre 1976.

"Note sur la Coopération Bileteral au Développement de la qualité de l'Aide Neerlandaise", La Coopération des Pays Bas avec les Pays en voie de Développement.

"La Politique Neerlandaise de Coopération au Développement en 1974, 1975, 1976", La Coopération des Pays Bas avec les pays en voie de développement.

"Netherlands Development Cooperation Policy 1978", Cooperation between Netherlands and Developing Countries.

"Exposé des Motifs Accompagnant le Budget de 1977", La Coopération des Pays Bas avec les Pays en voie de Développement.

"L'Aide au Développement des Pays Bas 1970, 1971, 1972-1975".

REINO UNIDO

"Exports and the Industrial Training of People from Overseas", Board of Trade, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1969.

"An Account of the British Aid Programme", 1972, 1973 1974, 1975.

"British Development Policies", ODI Review, 1966.

"United Kingdom Memorandum", DAC Annual Aid Review, 1977.

SUIZA

"Statistiques de l'Effort Suisse d'Aide en Faveur des Pays en Développement", 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976. Departement Politique Federal. Délégué à la Coopération Technique.

"La Suisse et la Coopération avec les Pays en Voie de Développement", Francine Hubert de Perrot, Librairie Droz, Genève, 1964.

ANEXO ESTADISTICO

Tabla A: Asistencia técnica bilateral provista por los países miembros del CAD a los países en desarrollo, 1961-1975.

Tabla B: Asistencia técnica prestada por los países de Europa Occidental a América Latina, 1969-1976.

Tabla C.1 a C.27: Asistencia técnica recibida por cada país latinoamericano desde cada país de Europa Occidental miembro del CAD (excepto Francia) y de Japón, 1969-1976.

Fuente: a partir de datos de diversas publicaciones de la OCDE y especialmente de "Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries". Paris. 1977.

BIBLIOGRAFIA

Por razones de presentación y para aligerar el texto, se ha citado solo en algunas ocasiones la fuente de obtención de la información, por ello se incluye a continuación esta lista bibliográfica.

La documentación que ha sido consultada para la elaboración de este trabajo es algo más amplia que la que se indica más abajo, pero puede considerarse que esta ha provisto la mayor parte de las informaciones que se volcaron en el mismo.

GENERAL

Coopération pour le Développement, "Examen 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976. 1977." OCDE.

"Flow of Resources to Developing Countries" OCDE, 1973.

"Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries - Data on Disbursements 1969 to 1975", OCDE 1977.

ALEMANIA FEDERAL

"German Aid", John White, ODI, 1964.

"Germany - DAC Questionnaire", Edition 1977.

"German Development Assistance Policy 1976". Memorandum submitted by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for the DAC Annual Review 1977. August 1977.

DINAMARCA

"Denmark's Cooperation with Developing Countries", 1965-68
The Board for Technical Cooperation for Developing Countries.

"Denmark Development Assistance - Annual Reports", 1973, 1974
1975, 1976, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DANIDA.

Tabla A p.1

ASISTENCIA TECNICA BILATERAL PROVISTA POR LOS PAISES MIEMBROS DEL CAD A LOS PAISES EN DESARROLLO

	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
	en millones de dólares										
1. Asistencia técnica bilateral:											
Total CAD	777.7	743.3	870.6	953.6	1062.4	1233.3	1313.9	1466.3	1513.1	1503.6	1671.8
2. Países europeos miembros CAD	261.5	409.5	479.4	551	603.7	661.4	706.8	764.4	821.3	870.5	990.8
3. De los cuales:											
Alemania	29.2	49.5	74.4	85.7	93.6	105.7	115.1	128.9	148.8	190.0	206.6
Austria	0.5	0.6	0.7	1.6	2.6	2.8	3.2	2.6	2.3	2.7	3.0
Bélgica	27.0	21.3	23.6	27.7	32.5	37.9	40.4	39.4	44.8	51.2	57.4
Dinamarca	0.7	0.8	1.2	2.1	3.2	4.3	6.3	8.0	10.4	11.7	17.5
Finlandia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Francia	203.1	265.5	298.0	342.0	348.6	381.5	402.7	421.3	432.0	425.7	488.9
Italia	-	5.4	5.2	10.1	11.2	10.9	10.2	11.2	13.2	14.6	15.7
Noruega	-	0.5	0.7	1.0	1.4	2.0	2.3	3.0	3.8	4.3	5.8
Países Bajos	1.0	1.7	3.4	7.9	14.8	18.4	20.9	30.3	30.3	38.5	42.1
Reino Unido	-	60.9	67.7	70.4	88.8	85.2	91.8	99.3	104.7	109.2	129.9
Suecia	-	2.4	3.5	1.2	5.8	11.4	12.4	18.6	29.6	20.6	21.2
Suiza	-	0.9	1.0	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.8	1.4	2.0	2.7
4. Japón	2.4	3.6	4.5	5.8	6.0	7.6	11.0	13.7	19.0	21.6	27.6
5. Tasa anual de crecimiento de "Total CAD" (1)		-4.42	17.13	9.53	11.63	16.09	6.33	11.64	3.16	-0.49	11.04
6. Tasa anual de crecimiento de "países europeos miembros CAD" (2)		146.58	25.97	15.21	22.06	9.72	8.65	12.82	13.46	14.25	12.84
7. Relación entre "países europeos" y total CAD (2/1)		33.6	55.0	55.0	57.8	56.8	53.6	53.7	54.2	57.8	59.2
							15.00				

porcentajes

Fuente: a partir de datos de diversas publicaciones de la OCDE

1972 1973 1974 1975 Total acumulado 1969-1975

1. Asistencia técnica bilateral:
Total CAD

1837.5 2274.5 2496.5 2926.7 14225.7

2. Países europeos miembros CAD

118117 1445.2 1619.2 2092.5 9020.4

3. De los cuales:

Alemania	236.7	299.2	380.6	475.5	1936.6
Austria	4.2	5.9	6.9	9.3	34.30
Bélgica	72.7	104.7	118.8	153.2	602.8
Dinamarca	21.5	23.2	26.6	29.0	139.9
Finlandia	4.6	6.4	10.0	10.1	31.1
Francia	573.3	685.4	732.8	986.8	4324.9
Italia	19.7	27.5	28.1	35.8	154.6
Noruega	8.5	9.5	15.6	19.2	66.7
Países Bajos	58.2	73.5	97.6	113.2	453.4
Reino Unido	152.1	178.1	178.7	213.9	1066.6
Suecia	26.6	27.5	19.3	42.5	187.3
Suiza	3.6	4.3	4.2	4.0	22.2

4. Japón

35.6 57.2 63.5 87.2 311.7

5. Tasa anual de crecimiento de
"Total CAD" (1)

0.91 23.8 9.76 11.23

Tasa anual promedio
9.53

6. Tasa anual de crecimiento de
"países europeos miembros CAD" (2)

21.22 24.88 16.66 24.74
21.87

17,11

7. Relación entre "países europeos"
y total CAD (2/1)

64.3 63.5 64.8 71.4

TABLA B

ASISTENCIA TECNICA PRESTADA POR LOS PAISES DE EUROPA OCCIDENTAL A AMERICA LATINA 1969-1976


	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	Valores Acumulados 1969-76	% del Total correspondiente a: Valores Acumulados 1976
	Millones de Dólares									
Alemania	34.8	47.1	52.8	57.4	69.7	79.5	95.6	94.43	531.33	68.2
Austria	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.3	1.6	1.5	2.82	6.72	0.8
Bélgica	2.2	2.2	2.5	3.6	5.2	5.1	7.1	8.25	36.15	4.6
Dinamarca	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.1	2.27	4.67	0.6
Finlandia	-	-	-	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.3	.71	1.91	0.2
Italia	0.3	0.7	1.0	2.1	3.3	2.5	4.4	4.19	18.49	2.3
Noruega	-	-	-	-	0.3	0.2	1.0	1.12	2.62	0.3
Países Bajos	-	2.0	3.9	8.1	10.7	17.2	18.6	32.15	92.65	11.9
Reino Unido	4.4	5.0	6.1	8.1	10.5	11.4	13.2	21.39	80.09	10.2
Suecia	-	-	0.3	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.4	0.23	2.83	0.3
Suiza	-	-	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.2	-	0.9	0.1
1. Total países europeos miembros CAD*	42.2	57.6	67.4	80.6	101.8	119.3	142.5	167.56**	778.13**	100.0
2. Total CAD	126.6	123.3	155.1	149.2	180.9	177.1	208.4	225.2		
Porcentaje de Europa sobre CAD (1/2)	33.3	46.7	43.5	54.0	56.3	67.4	68.4	74.4		
Tasa anual crecimiento países europeos miembros CAD		36.5	17.0	19.6	26.3	17.2	19.4	17.6	21.9	

* Excluyendo Francia.

** Estas cifras son algo superiores a las que se presentan en otros cuadros de este trabajo pues incluyen las cifras correspondientes a "varios" y "sin ventilar".

[illegible]

[illegible]



Países Miembros CAD

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	Total acumulado
Alemania	1.7	2.8	2.7	2.8	3.5	3.4	5.2	6.6	28.6
Austria	0.1	0.1	0.1	*	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.6	1.3
Bélgica	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	2.6
Dinamarca	-	-	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Finlandia	-	-	-	-	-	*	-	*	*
Italia	*	*	*	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	1.2
Noruega	-	-	-	-	-	*	*	-	*
Países Bajos	-	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.5	1.0	1.1	3.5
Reino Unido	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.1	3.0
Suecia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Suiza	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.1	0.1	0.2
Total Europa	4.3	3.5	3.4	3.8	4.7	5.0	7.7	10.2	42.6
Países miembros CAD	6.4	6.6	7.7	6.9	9.1	7.6	10.7	13.9	68.9
Japón	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.6	2.0	1.7	5.3

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	Total acumulado
Alemania	7.6	8.5	11.9	11.8	12.8	14.1	14.8	15.0	96.5
Austria	*	*	*	*	*	-	0.1	0.2	0.3
Bélgica	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.7	4.0
Dinamarca	-	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Finlandia	-	-	-	-	*	0.1	*	*	0.1
Italia	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.6	2.4
Noruega	*	*	*	*	0.1	0.1	0.1	-	0.3
Países Bajos	-	0.6	0.5	1.1	1.4	1.7	1.7	1.7	8.7
Reino Unido	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.8	1.2	1.4	1.5	1.2	7.5
Suecia	-	-	-	-	0.2	0.1	-	*	0.3
Suiza	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Total Europa	8.3	10.0	13.4	14.4	16.9	18.4	19.2	19.7	120.3
Países miembros CAD	23.9	23.4	30.1	27.3	30.3	30.5	29.3	29.3	494.1
Japón	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.9	1.4	2.0	2.9	3.2	11.9

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	Total acumulado
Alemania	2.8	3.5	3.7	4.5	5.6	7.5	9.1	10.1	46.8
Austria	-	-	*	-	-	-	-	0.2	0.2
Bélgica	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.6	3.3
Dinamarca	*	*	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	0.2
Finlandia	-	-	-	*	-	*	*	*	*
Italia	*	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.3	1.5
Noruega	*	*	*	*	*	-	-	-	*
Países Bajos	-	0.7	1.2	1.7	3.4	4.5	3.3	6.5	21.3
Reino Unido	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.8	1.3	4.0
Suecia	-	*	-	*	0.1	*	-	-	0.1
Suiza	*	*	*	*	0.1	*	*	*	0.1
Total Europa	3.3	4.9	6.1	7.3	10.4	13.2	14.3	19.1	78.6
Países miembros CAD	11.4	9.0	12.2	11.5	16.8	17.7	18.4	24.1	121.2
Japón	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.4	1.4

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	Total acumulado
Alemania	0.7	1.0	1.6	2.0	2.3	3.2	3.1	3.4	17.3
Austria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bélgica	*	*	*	*	0.1	*	*	0.1	0.2
Dinamarca	-	-	-	-	*	*	*	*	*
Finlandia	-	-	-	-	*	*	*	*	*
Italia	*	*	*	-	*	*	0.1	0.1	0.2
Noruega	*	*	*	*	*	-	-	-	*
Países Bajos	-	*	*	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.5	1.3
Reino Unido	*	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.7	2.0
Suecia	-	-	-	-	-	*	-	-	*
Suiza	*	*	*	*	*	-	-	-	*
Total Europa	0.7	1.1	1.8	2.3	2.8	3.7	3.8	4.8	21.0
Países miembros CAD	2.7	3.1	4.8	4.3	4.9	6.1	11.2	7.4	44.5
Japón	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.5	1.2

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	Total acumulado	
Alemania	-	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Austria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bélgica	-	*	*	0.1	0.2	0.1	*	0.6	1.0	1.0
Dinamarca	*	-	*	*	0.1	-	-	0.7	0.8	0.8
Finlandia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Italia	*	*	*	0.1	*	*	*	0.3	0.4	0.4
Noruega	-	-	-	*	0.1	0.1	0.8	1.0	2.0	2.0
Países Bajos	-	-	*	*	*	*	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.4
Reino Unido	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Suecia	*	*	0.3	0.5	0.4	*	0.4	0.2	1.8	1.8
Suiza	*	*	*	*	*	-	-	-	*	*
Total Europa	*	*	0.3	0.5	0.8	0.2	1.4	3.1	6.3	6.3
Países miembros CAD	*	*	0.3	0.7	1.1	0.3	1.9	3.2	7.5	7.5
Japón	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	Total acumulado
Alemania	5.2	9.7	7.2	7.5	9.0	10.7	12.9	9.1	71.3
Austria	-	-	-	-	*	*	-	*	*
Bélgica	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.8	0.6	1.0	0.9	5.3
Dinamarca	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.1	*	*	1.6
Finlandia	-	-	-	0.3	0.4	0.1	-	-	0.8
Italia	*	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.6	0.1	0.1	*	1.2
Noruega	*	*	*	*	*	*	-	-	*
Países Bajos	-	*	0.5	0.5	0.8	0.3	1.1	1.6	4.8
Reino Unido	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.8	1.2	0.9	0.7	1.7	6.9
Suecia	-	-	-	0.1	-	0.1	-	*	0.2
Suiza	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	-	*
Total Europa	6.4	11.3	9.1	10.2	13.1	13.0	15.8	13.4	93.3
Países miembros CAD	10.5	14.4	12.2	12.3	14.3	14.2	17.7	15.8	116.6
Japón	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.9	1.3	3.1

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	Total acumulado
Alemania	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.8	0.9	3.4
Austria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	*
Bélgica	*	*	*	-	*	*	*	*	*
Dinamarca	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Finlandia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Italia	*	*	*	-	*	*	*	*	*
Noruega	-	-	-	-	*	-	-	-	*
Países Bajos	-	-	*	*	*	*	*	0.4	0.4
Reino Unido	*	*	*	*	*	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3
Suecia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Suiza	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total Europa	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.9	1.4	4.1
Países miembros CAD	5.2	3.2	4.2	2.3	2.4	1.7	2.0	2.6	23.6
Japón	-	-	-	0.1	-	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.4



	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	Total acumulado
Alemania	1.8	2.0	2.0	2.5	3.1	3.8	5.4	5.5	25.7
Austria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bélgica	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.9
Dinamarca	-	-	-	-	*	*	-	-	*
Finlandia	-	-	-	*	-	*	-	*	*
Italia	*	*	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	1.3
Noruega	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.1	0.1	0.2
Países Bajos	-	0.1	*	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	1.6	2.3
Reino Unido	*	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.7	1.1	1.0	4.0
Suecia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Suiza	*	*	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	0.1
Total Europa	1.9	2.3	2.5	3.1	4.0	4.9	7.3	8.7	34.7
Países miembros CAD	6.9	5.3	7.7	8.2	10.1	9.0	11.6	12.0	70.8
Japón	-	-	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.2	1.0

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	Total acumulado	
Alemania	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.7	0.4	0.4	1.1	1.2	4.7	
Austria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Bélgica	*	-	-	-	0.1	0.1	*	0.1	0.3	
Dinamarca	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Finlandia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Italia	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.2	0.2	0.4	
Noruega	-	-	-	-	-	*	*	-	*	
Países Bajos	-	-	-	*	*	*	0.2	0.3	0.5	
Reino Unido	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.6	3.8	
Suecia	-	-	-	-	-	*	-	*	*	
Suiza	*	*	*	*	-	-	*	*	*	
Total Europa	0.5	0.5	0.5	1.1	1.3	1.2	2.3	2.3	9.2	
Países miembros CAD	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.3	4.5	3.7	3.9	5.3	31.7	
Japón	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.6	2.3	

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	Total acumulado
Alemania	1.4	1.6	1.3	1.6	1.8	1.7	3.2	2.8	15.3
Austria	*	*	*	0.1	*	0.1	*	0.7	0.9
Bélgica	*	*	*	*	0.1	*	0.1	0.2	0.4
Dinamarca	-	-	-	*	*	-	-	*	*
Finlandia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Italia	*	*	*	*	*	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3
Noruega	-	-	-	-	-	*	*	-	*
Países Bajos	-	-	*	*	*	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.7
Reino Unido	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Suecia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Suiza	*	*	*	*	-	-	-	-	*
Total Europa	1.4	1.6	1.3	1.7	1.9	2.0	3.6	4.2	17.7
Países miembros CAD	4.4	5.6	6.3	6.8	7.1	5.3	6.8	6.9	49.2
Japón	-	-	-	-	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.6	1.3

[illegible]

٧٠٠

[illegible]

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	Total acumulado
Alemania	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.9	1.8	1.2	6.1
Austria	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	0.1	0.1
Bélgica	*	-	*	*	*	*	0.1	0.1	0.2
Dinamarca	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*
Finlandia	-	-	-	-	-	*	*	-	*
Italia	*	*	*	-	-	*	*	-	*
Noruega	-	-	-	*	*	-	-	-	*
Países Bajos	-	-	-	*	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.4
Reino Unido	*	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.5	0.2	1.6
Suecia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Suiza	*	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total Europa	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	1.2	2.5	2.3	9.0
Países miembros CAD	3.4	3.5	4.6	4.7	5.8	5.2	4.7	5.0	36.8
Japón	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.4	0.5

[illegible]

MEXICO.....8.19.....

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	Total acumulado
Alemania	1.6	2.6	2.1	2.6	3.3	4.1	4.6	4.6	25.5
Austria	-	0.1	*	-	*	1.1	1.1	0.3	2.6
Bélgica	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.9	2.4
Dinamarca	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Finlandia	-	-	-	-	-	*	*	-	*
Italia	*	*	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	1.2
Noruega	*	*	*	*	0.1	*	-	-	0.1
Países Bajos	-	*	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.6	2.2
Reino Unido	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.7	1.0	1.6	1.1	5.3
Suecia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Suiza	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Total Europa	2.0	3.0	2.6	3.4	5.0	7.0	8.5	7.9	39.4
Países miembros CAD	2.2	3.2	4.0	4.2	6.0	8.0	10.2	10.3	48.1
Japón	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.7	2.3	7.7

.NICARAGUA.....G.20.....

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	Total acumulado
Alemania	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.8	1.0	1.0	4.5
Austria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bélgica	*	-	-	-	*	*	0.1	0.1	0.2
Dinamarca	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Finlandia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Italia	*	*	*	-	*	*	0.1	*	0.1
Noruega	*	*	*	-	-	-	-	-	*
Países Bajos	-	0.1	*	*	*	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3
Reino Unido	*	*	*	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	1.2
Suecia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Suiza	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Total Europa	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.8	1.1	1.6	1.5	6.4
Países miembros CAD	2.2	2.4	3.3	3.5	3.8	3.2	3.7	6.6	28.7
Japón	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	Total acumulado
Alemania	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.4	2.1
Austria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bélgica	*	-	-	-	*	*	0.1	0.1	0.2
Dinamarca	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Finlandia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Italia	*	*	*	-	*	*	*	*	*
Noruega	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Países Bajos	-	-	*	-	0.1	*	0.1	*	0.2
Reino Unido	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	1.0
Suecia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Suiza	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total Europa	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.8	0.7	3.6
Países miembros DAC	4.3	4.2	4.3	3.4	3.7	1.7	2.1	3.4	27.1
Japón	-	-	-	-	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.7	1.5

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	Total acumulado
Alemania	1.2	1.0	1.5	1.2	1.4	2.1	2.7	3.0	14.1
Austria	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	0.1	0.1
Bélgica	*	*	*	*	*	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3
Dinamarca	-	*	0.2	-	-	-	-	-	0.2
Finlandia	-	-	-	-	-	*	0.1	-	0.1
Italia	*	*	*	0.1	0.1	*	0.2	0.2	0.6
Noruega	-	-	-	-	-	*	*	*	*
Países Bajos	-	*	*	0.1	0.1	*	0.1	0.3	0.6
Reino Unido	*	*	*	*	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.6
Suecia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Suiza	*	*	*	*	0.1	0.1	-	-	0.2
Total Europa	1.2	1.0	1.7	1.4	1.7	2.4	3.4	4.0	16.7
Países miembros CAD	3.2	4.1	4.9	4.6	6.1	4.8	6.8	6.6	41.1
Japón	-	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.6	2.2

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	Total acumulado
Alemania	3.5	4.4	7.0	6.9	9.0	11.5	13.3	16.4	72.0
Austria	*	-	-	*	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.8
Bélgica	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.7	1.0	1.1	1.5	1.4	7.1
Dinamarca	*	*	-	*	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.5	0.8
Finlandia	-	-	-	-	*	*	0.2	0.1	0.3
Italia	*	0.1	*	*	0.2	0.3	0.7	0.4	1.7
Noruega	*	-	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Países Bajos	-	0.4	1.1	1.9	2.9	4.5	4.9	5.2	20.9
Reino Unido	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.6	1.0	1.5	2.0	1.3	5.5
Suecia	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	-	0.2
Suiza	*	*	*	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.6
Total Europa	4.3	5.5	9.0	10.2	14.5	19.6	23.0	25.5	111.6
Países miembros CAD	10.5	9.7	16.8	16.2	21.6	24.0	29.2	31.9	159.9
Japón	0.2	0.2	0.8	1.0	2.0	1.8	2.2	4.1	12.3

[illegible]

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	Total acumulado
Alemania	*	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.1	1.6
Austria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bélgica	*	-	*	-	*	*	*	*	*
Dinamarca	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Finlandia	-	-	-	-	-	*	-	-	*
Italia	-	-	-	-	*	-	-	-	*
Noruega	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	*
Países Bajos	-	-	*	*	*	*	*	-	*
Reino Unido	0.6	0.1	0.4	0.7	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	3.1
Suecia	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	*	0.1
Suiza	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	-	*
Total Europa	0.6	0.2	0.7	1.0	0.6	0.8	0.5	0.6	5.0
Países miembros CAD	1.3	0.7	1.1	1.3	0.9	1.0	0.9	0.7	7.9
Japón	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.1	0.3

[illegible]

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	Total acumulado
Alemania	1.3	1.6	3.1	2.5	2.5	4.7	4.0	3.8	24.9
Austria	*	-	-	-	-	-	*	*	*
Bélgica	*	*	*	*	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.8
Dinamarca	-	-	-	-	-	*	-	-	*
Finlandia	-	-	-	-	*	*	*	-	*
Italia	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.1	1.7
Noruega	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*
Países Bajos	-	-	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.8	1.7
Reino Unido	*	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.1	*	1.0
Suecia	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	-	0.1
Suiza	*	-	*	*	-	-	-	-	*
Total Europa	1.4	1.8	3.4	3.1	5.5	5.0	5.1	5.0	30.3
Países miembros CAD	4.4	3.8	6.4	5.1	7.5	7.0	6.2	6.2	46.6
Japón	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.1	0.2

AMERICA LATINA: Cooperación Técnica recibida de Canadá.

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1969-75
Argentina	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bahamas	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Barbados	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	1.6
Bolivia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Brasil	-	-	0.2	*	*	0.1	0.2	0.5
Chile	-	-	-	-	-	*	*	*
Colombia	-	-	-	*	0.3	0.3	0.9	1.5
Costa Rica	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.1	0.2
Cuba	-	-	-	-	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.8
República Dominicana	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ecuador	-	-	-	*	*	*	*	*
El Salvador	-	-	-	*	*	0.1	0.2	0.3
Grenada	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Guatemala	-	-	-	0.1	*	*	*	0.1
Guyana	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.3	3.2
Haití	-	-	-	-	*	0.4	0.8	1.2
Honduras	-	-	*	-	-	*	0.1	0.1
Jamaica	0.7	1.0	1.3	1.4	0.9	0.6	0.4	6.3
México	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nicaragua	-	-	-	-	*	*	-	*
Panamá	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Paraguay	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Perú	-	-	*	*	0.1	0.6	0.7	1.4
Surinam	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Trinidad y Tobago	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	2.6
Uruguay	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Venezuela	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total América Latina	1.9	2.3	2.8	2.7	2.6	3.0	4.5	19.8

* Menos que la mitad de la menor unidad de valor utilizada
- Nulo

Fuente: OCDE, "Geographical distribution of financial flows to developing countries".

A P P E N D I X 2

U.S. BILATERAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE COUNTRIES
OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
1960 - 1977

A Compendium of
Statistical and Policy
Information

by Ralph E. Getz

July, 1978

for United Nations E.C.L.A., Washington and U.N.D.P., New York

P R E F A C E

The purpose of this report is to place in the hands of the concerned persons of the Western Hemisphere a dossier on the politics, reality, and context of U.S. Bilateral Assistance extended to the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.

The compilation of this information would not have been possible without the collaboration and encouragement of international development professionals in Washington, D.C. and in New York.

U.S. Government personnel, particularly those of the balance of payments unit of the Department of Commerce, willingly provided information and statistical data knowing that it was to go to decision-makers of the region. Their helpfulness is gratefully acknowledged.

The statistical data was tabulated for inclusion by Lynn Distelhorst of Washington, D.C., whose support in this is deeply appreciated.

The staff of the Washington Office of ECLA provided proficient support services to assure the completion of the work.

Ralph E. Getz
Mohican Hills, Maryland, U.S.

EDITOR'S NOTE:

Only a part of the materials referred to in the subsequent outline of this Appendix are actually included in it.


INTRODUCTION

- A. ONE VIEW OF THE PREDISPOSITIONS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
- B. THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS AND LATER U.S. ASSISTANCE TO LATIN AMERICA
 - 1. Antecedents
 - 2. Quantitative Aspects
- C. PRESIDENT CARTER'S LATIN AMERICAN POLICY AS RELATED TO U.S. ASSISTANCE
- D. AID FLOWS AND RELATED CONSIDERATIONS
 - 1. DAC and Other Assistance, Worldwide
 - 2. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the World

JULY 3, 1978

IMF Survey


Official Aid Fell in 1977 as Proportion of DAC Nations' GNP



March 1977

Figure 1. Net Financial Flows to 86 LDCs, 1968-1974


Billions of U.S. Dollars



Sources: IMF data from *International Financial Statistics*, International Monetary Fund, relevant issues. Grant data from *World Debt Tables*, Vol. I, Oct. 31, 1976, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, p. 125. All other data from *World Debt Tables*, Vol. I, p. 30.

Ref: CBO Issue Paper, "I.F.I.'s: Background and Budget Options for Fy 1978

Figure 3. Sources of Net Financial Flows to Non-Oil LDCs for 1974, by Income Group, in Millions of U.S. Dollars



Sources: IMF data from *International Financial Statistics*, International Monetary Fund, relevant issues. Grant data from *World Debt Tables*, Vol. I, Oct. 31, 1976, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, p. 125. All other data from *World Debt Tables*, Vol. I, p. 30.


from CBO Issue Paper
 "I.F.I's: Background
 Budget Options for FY 1978"
 March 1977

D. AID FLOWS
1. DAC and Other Assistance, Worldwide
The Problem of Developing Country Indebtedness

Foreign loans by major U.S. banks
(as of December 1977)

Country	Total claims	Claims on:			Maturity distribution of claims		
		Banks	Public borrowers	Other private	One year and under	Over one to 5 years	Over 5 years
(million dollars)							
Group of Ten and Switzerland							
Belgium-Luxembourg	6,659	5,490	396	772	6,369	205	83
Canada	5,933	3,664	625	1,643	4,823	765	325
France	8,916	6,380	789	1,746	6,958	1,426	530
Germany	5,654	2,380	504	2,769	4,479	995	184
Italy	5,372	3,130	1,243	999	3,271	1,746	354
Japan	12,268	4,944	246	7,079	8,383	3,625	262
Netherlands	2,826	2,304	9	513	2,481	212	132
Sweden	2,150	925	438	785	1,118	748	283
Switzerland	2,323	1,432	41	849	2,089	180	53
United Kingdom	31,504	21,898	3,079	6,528	25,267	4,738	1,499
Subtotal	83,610	52,551	7,375	23,688	65,242	14,645	3,710
Non-Group of Ten developed countries							
Australia	1,465	438	114	912	632	666	167
Austria	938	788	100	49	815	99	23
Denmark	1,665	572	448	645	813	737	114
Finland	1,398	422	324	651	649	580	170
Greece	1,757	197	681	877	541	977	238
Iceland	59	13	34	11	21	23	14
Ireland	557	111	221	224	290	235	30
New Zealand	595	54	328	212	267	268	59
Norway	2,068	132	268	1,667	602	1,113	352
Portugal	584	369	143	71	503	76	4
South Africa	2,277	425	924	927	1,186	969	121
Spain	3,559	1,050	1,093	1,416	1,455	1,879	224
Turkey	1,465	793	479	191	1,121	343	1
Other	247	51	23	168	192	50	1
Subtotal	18,640	5,423	5,185	8,028	9,094	8,021	1,523
Eastern Europe							
Albania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bulgaria	527	329	172	25	269	235	21
Czechoslovakia	192	160	28	4	131	51	10
East Germany	979	563	354	62	476	438	64
Hungary	896	327	563	6	417	390	88
Poland	1,313	743	501	69	542	724	57
Romania	226	103	92	35	200	30	0
U.S.S.R.	1,551	823	709	18	727	711	112
Yugoslavia	1,149	427	284	438	330	731	87
Subtotal	6,837	3,477	2,705	660	3,094	3,316	441
Oil-exporting countries							
Algeria	1,540	382	927	230	321	937	282
Ecuador	1,040	156	479	404	632	293	113
Gabon	184	2	174	7	53	124	7
Indonesia	2,199	286	1,166	748	1,026	987	186
Iran	2,202	993	737	471	1,041	898	262
Iraq	92	24	66	2	44	48	0
Kuwait	536	399	9	127	457	73	5
Libya	58	39	15	4	58	0	0
Nigeria	128	81	3	43	101	23	3
Qatar	72	11	37	24	31	22	19
Saudi Arabia	591	207	43	341	485	91	14
United Arab Emirates	664	232	299	132	363	261	39
Venezuela	5,373	608	2,075	2,690	3,593	1,403	378
Subtotal	14,686	3,425	6,037	5,227	8,209	5,166	1,313
Non-oil-exporting developing countries							
Latin America and Caribbean							
Argentina	2,639	598	1,238	803	1,669	900	69
Bolivia	446	50	194	200	233	183	27
Brazil	11,992	3,364	2,992	5,631	4,062	6,599	1,328
Chile	821	256	359	204	520	282	17
Colombia	1,293	464	366	461	855	376	61
Costa Rica	424	54	148	221	227	166	30
Dominican Republic	283	29	145	109	116	143	23
El Salvador	188	51	52	84	141	42	4
Guatemala	226	24	13	188	143	76	7
Honduras	253	64	41	147	145	100	7
Jamaica	247	16	147	84	92	134	21
Mexico	11,213	1,982	4,801	4,434	5,418	4,697	1,097
Nicaragua	562	174	204	183	360	154	46
Paraguay	33	1	1	30	26	7	0
Peru	1,831	450	995	383	1,021	686	123
Trinidad and Tobago	44	1	37	5	22	10	11
Uruguay	203	53	85	65	134	66	1
Other	830	710	38	81	793	35	2
Subtotal	33,535	8,349	11,863	13,322	15,985	14,664	2,881

(continued on page 2)



1. DAC and Other Assistance, Worldwide

Source: DAC, 1977 Review

\$ million.

	1973	1974	1975	1976	Countries and territories	1973	1974	1975	1976	Countries and territories	1973	1974	1975	1976
II. Africa (cont'd)														
	89.64	74.98	25.96	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IV. Asia (cont'd)	6.06	6.35	9.19	9.84
TOM Africa Unallocated	2.67	11.48	0.48	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Iraq	3.87	4.72	5.44	6.90
DOM/TOM Africa Unallocated	0.19	0.27	0.48	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Israel	7.20	10.09	12.64	17.58
EAM Unallocated	5.25	5.06	5.75	41.78	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jordan	1.24	1.32	1.39	1.39
EAM Unallocated	2.25	1.99	3.28	3.54	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Kuwait	5.75	6.68	7.37	11.71
Africa Unspecified	0.00	0.00	3.02	24.19	39.43	24.19	35.31	41.74	0.00	Lebanon	0.52	1.11	2.21	2.29
Africa Unspecified	9.38	10.22	12.15	15.35	41.74	35.31	41.74	41.74	0.00	Oman	0.42	0.59	1.05	1.11
Africa Unspecified	16.76	14.33	22.24	3.90	723.77	383.08	653.69	723.77	0.00	Qatar	3.93	5.21	6.03	5.89
Africa Unspecified	2.66	3.39	3.75	7.00	383.08	344.62	344.62	383.08	0.00	Saudi Arabia	4.04	4.95	7.12	14.85
Africa Unspecified	2.46	4.50	4.35	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Syria	0.28	0.59	0.48	0.93
III. America, total														
	1,090.21	1,191.58	1,546.55	1,755.71	461.05	488.20	653.69	723.77	0.00	United Arab Emirates	6.36	10.00	17.01	19.14
N. and C. America	163.27	182.59	239.87	305.82	197.55	209.48	344.62	383.08	0.00	Yemen	4.93	6.98	9.19	18.75
Bahamas	58.34	55.46	70.93	85.48	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Middle East Unallocated	11.76	9.01	10.75	14.76
Belize	14.85	20.59	27.41	71.70	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	South Asia	131.32	174.09	282.01	425.42
Cuba	3.01	4.18	4.64	4.71	0.51	0.55	0.66	0.68	0.00	Afghanistan	24.13	21.76	25.06	29.99
Dominican Rep.	48.85	48.59	74.73	75.51	1.05	1.29	3.81	3.68	0.00	Bangladesh	11.66	29.65	58.27	64.01
El Salvador	38.16	37.46	56.89	62.21	1.07	1.32	3.81	3.68	0.00	Bhutan	0.19	0.52	1.83	2.23
Guadeloupe	0.05	16.31	5.26	6.17	1.32	1.74	4.42	4.42	0.00	Burma	8.11	12.30	15.09	20.18
Guatemala	887.50	984.81	1,271.36	1,408.13	6.71	8.15	15.23	11.73	0.00	India	47.29	57.30	94.29	171.32
Haiti	9.57	13.69	11.13	14.02	4.39	5.57	11.71	13.75	0.00	Maldives	0.35	0.55	0.78	1.19
Honduras	0.07	0.09	0.26	1.13	5.41	5.57	11.71	13.75	0.00	Nepal	12.67	14.01	24.65	22.54
Jamaica	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	48.98	53.95	86.25	94.05	0.00	Pakistan	13.22	20.37	32.23	77.13
Martinique	10.31	12.30	19.83	17.09	8.58	7.63	11.43	11.16	0.00	Sri Lanka	12.02	16.66	25.72	33.53
Mexico	7.89	9.42	13.70	19.16	7.00	6.52	11.78	17.36	0.00	South Asia Unallocated	1.66	0.93	4.06	3.30
Netherlands Antilles	15.69	17.20	23.14	25.86	7.72	7.62	10.24	13.21	0.00	Indus Basin	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Nicaragua	30.93	33.13	48.78	48.02	7.88	7.73	9.93	12.13	0.00	Sikkim	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Panama	12.10	12.87	19.46	21.86	56.14	60.44	106.05	116.05	0.00	Far East Asia	340.38	298.24	335.74	348.08
St. Pierre and Miquelon	0.00	0.00	0.95	5.59	9.73	13.10	22.15	27.99	0.00	Brunei	0.12	0.14	0.14	0.07
Trinidad and Tobago	20.02	19.76	25.40	26.45	9.73	13.10	22.15	27.99	0.00	Hong-Kong	1.60	1.63	1.70	2.65
West Indies Unallocated	8.59	13.43	7.04	1.98	5.62	4.92	6.25	10.76	0.00	Indonesia	58.19	80.76	83.77	109.86
Anguilla	12.87	14.97	23.55	27.66	6.40	4.07	4.86	6.02	0.00	Kampuchea	6.92	8.47	3.62	2.12
Antigua	1.01	0.63	0.73	0.73	3.92	3.64	4.27	5.17	0.00	Korea Rep.	16.38	17.15	22.09	38.89
Cayman Islands	28.60	34.47	33.11	40.55	1.93	2.19	2.39	1.97	0.00	Laos	42.27	29.65	14.95	5.73
Dominica	13.19	13.00	19.73	24.11	6.94	1.07	1.97	2.60	0.00	Macao	0.12	0.03	0.02	0.02
Grenada	1.99	2.08	2.71	5.56	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Malaysia	18.84	24.24	26.17	26.15
Montserrat	17.66	19.75	25.85	26.45	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Philippines	24.05	29.51	35.42	40.23
St. Kitts-Nevis	1.31	1.40	3.39	4.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Singapore	7.14	8.01	6.86	7.44
St. Lucia	0.00	0.31	2.53	6.36	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Taiwan	2.01	1.39	1.31	1.21
St. Vincent	35.61	39.39	55.12	55.70	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Thailand	41.04	40.31	42.48	40.34
Turks and Caicos Isl.	45.75	49.94	58.82	67.31	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Timor	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Virgin Islands (BR.)	4.98	6.59	8.70	18.09	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Viet-Nam, Dem. Rep.	0.78	0.27	9.15	32.24
N.C. America Unallocated	10.31	10.58	12.69	14.57	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Viet-Nam Rep.	116.65	42.73	47.32	0.00
DOM NC America Unallocated	21.71	23.51	33.21	30.55	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Far East Asia Unallocated	4.07	13.22	40.55	41.00
TOM NC America Unallocated	11.55	14.56	16.30	19.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Mekong Delta	0.19	0.70	0.14	0.07
DOM/TOM NC America Unallocated	12.95	19.02	24.55	29.32	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Asia Unspecified	33.57	32.86	28.57	41.66
located	7.89	10.59	11.44	14.43	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Oceania, total	151.49	173.40	174.66	152.84
South America	4.56	5.10	6.57	10.98	193.80	209.77	249.06	284.74	0.00	Cook Islands	0.17	1.17	1.00	0.91
Argentina	0.05	0.35	4.17	9.16	13.01	12.44	12.93	12.93	0.00	Fiji	7.30	7.83	8.64	10.57
Bolivia	14.01	24.60	29.20	31.65	13.13	11.16	16.02	21.80	0.00	Gilbert Islands	2.07	2.25	2.26	2.64
Brazil	44.17	40.37	41.09	38.16	38.21	40.43	41.55	44.91	0.00	Nauru	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Chile	104.79	119.47	159.84	164.62	19.37	19.07	24.68	23.87	0.00	New Caledonia	22.24	15.53	36.01	27.39
Colombia	0.78	1.41	4.01	6.13	21.59	24.79	27.45	36.69	0.00	New Hebrides	1.34	6.08	2.08	14.46
Ecuador	19.22	23.35	31.42	32.70	12.70	12.96	18.98	19.84	0.00	Niue Island	0.07	0.18	0.14	0.09
Falkland Islands	0.23	0.32	0.48	0.54	0.12	0.18	0.21	0.46	0.00	Pacific Islands (U.S.)	1.41	2.21	2.30	2.37
Guiana (FR.)	0.00	0.00	0.29	0.35	31.40	25.47	24.21	33.31	0.00	Polynesia (FR.)	19.91	16.09	36.18	37.93
Guyana	35.58	41.60	63.02	59.68	21.40	25.47	24.21	33.31	0.00	Papua New Guinea	88.60	108.84	72.53	40.99
Paraguay	1.68	1.89	2.43	2.23	3.01	2.57	3.72	3.71	0.00	Solomon Islands (BR.)	3.88	4.40	5.79	5.76
Peru	5.58	4.41	7.91	9.59	7.91	6.65	10.72	10.29	0.00	Tokelau Islands	0.07	0.12	0.07	0.10
Surinam	12.13	12.73	19.60	24.16	1.22	4.62	5.44	4.46	0.00	Tonga	0.64	1.84	1.32	1.56
Uruguay	19.40	15.56	28.14	50.16	10.41	10.25	9.26	9.25	0.00	Tuvalu Islands	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.17
Venezuela	5.45	7.15	9.13	12.74	4.94	5.33	7.08	9.25	0.00	Wallis and Futuna Isl.	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.72
South America Unallocated	41.17	47.60	60.18	84.86	1.02	4.84	11.35	15.54	0.00	Western Samoa	1.78	3.71	4.64	4.45
DOM S. America Unallocated	13.31	14.98	16.92	18.90	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Oceania Unallocated	1.96	0.37	1.59	1.68
America Unspecified	15.40	19.58	32.56	38.53	69.68	68.95	60.01	55.93	0.00	TOM Oceania Unallocated	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
IV. Asia, total														
	78.97	93.52	110.02	97.21	577.17	592.82	759.93	963.70	0.00	World Unspecified	506.51	736.06	793.19	658.13
Middle East	25.74	28.24	34.31	40.51	71.89	87.62	113.60	148.52	0.00					
Abu Dhabi	81.39	24.00	33.88	92.10	0.97	0.00	0.07	0.07	0.00					
Bahrain	9.24	12.37	6.25	5.51	0.97	1.20	1.79	1.75	0.00					

INTRODUCTION

D. AID FLOWS

1. DAC and Other Assistance, Worldwide

216

*Development co-operation*TABLE F.1. TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION EXPENDITURE
OFFICIAL BILATERAL DISBURSEMENTS BY INDIVIDUAL DONORS ^a

\$ million.

Countries	Average 1965-1967	1970	1973	1974	1975	1976
Australia	7.91	12.92	102.13	126.26	98.31	66.63
Austria	2.88	2.74	5.91	6.86	9.32	11.16
Belgium	36.95	51.26	104.67	118.82	153.24	142.79
Canada	18.17	41.17	58.55	60.23	60.12	66.34
Denmark	4.60	11.70	23.20	26.58	28.77	32.05
Finland	..	..	6.43	9.99	10.11	10.93
France	377.60	438.20	685.44	732.81	999.11	1,051.61
Germany	104.79	190.05	299.25	380.57	469.44	442.26
Italy	10.77	14.61	27.51	28.13	36.78	32.69
Japan	8.20	21.61	57.24	63.47	87.17	108.11
Netherlands	13.84	38.50	75.09	97.62	113.23	178.89
New Zealand	..	..	7.40	10.56	14.62	15.38
Norway	1.87	4.30	9.50	15.55	19.18	25.68
Sweden	9.91	20.62	27.50	17.85	42.54	48.68
Switzerland	1.34	2.05	4.34	4.17	4.04	4.75
United Kingdom	88.61	109.31	178.11	178.74	213.85	230.05
✓ United States	507.67	578.00	613.00	625.00	580.00	407.00 ✓
Total DAC countries	1,195.11	1,537.04	2,285.27	2,503.21	2,939.83	2,875.00
Index 1970 = 100	77.8	100.0	148.7	162.9	191.3	187.0
EEC	14.11	11.28	14.59	18.91	20.96	..


^a. Grants, apart from a few loans by Canada, United Kingdom and United States in certain years.Source: DAC, 1977 Review

INTRODUCTION


D. AID FLOWS AND RELATED CONSIDERATIONS

2. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the World

The Components of U.S. Assistance in the Past



Reference: The New York Times



INTRODUCTION

A. AID FLOWS

2. U.S. Assistance to Latin America

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT



**Congressional Presentation
Fiscal Year 1979**


MAIN VOLUME

February 1, 1978

U.S. Development Assistance in Relation to Other Donor Countries

Net Flow of Official Development Assistance in 1976

(Billions of Dollars)



Total Proposed \$19.3


¹Development Assistance Committee of OECD (17 countries): Austria, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K., as well as the United States.

²U.S.S.R., People's Republic of China, and Eastern Europe.

Source: DAC Chairman's Report: 1977 Review (draft).

Economic Assistance Programs as a Percent of the Federal Budget

U.S. Economic Assistance is less than 2% of the FY 1979 Federal Budget




Based on Recommended Budget Authority.

7. Security Supporting Assistance

Security Supporting Assistance (SSA) is currently the largest single component of the U.S. bilateral economic assistance program.

Comparison of FY 1979 Bilateral Development Assistance, Security Supporting Assistance and P.L. 480*

(Millions of Dollars)




*The only component of U.S. foreign economic assistance larger than Security Supporting Assistance is the request for the International Financial Institutions for FY 1979 in the amount of \$3,504.6.

More than 90% of SSA will go to four countries--Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Syria--in support of the U.S. diplomatic effort to secure peace in the Middle East. Most of the rest will go to countries in southern Africa to facilitate a peaceful transition to majority rule.

A.I.D. Development Assistance Programs Proposed for FY 1979 by Function

(Millions of Dollars)




Total Proposed \$1,669.6 Million*

* Excluding Operating Expenses, Foreign Service Retirement Fund and Contingency Fund.
Including these three the total is \$1,962.4 Million.

A.I.D. Functional Development Assistance and SAHEL Programs Proposed for FY 1979 by Region*

(Millions of Dollars)




Total Proposed \$1,354.4 Million

*Includes Food & Nutrition, Population, Health, Education and Human Resources, and Selected Development Activities.

FOOD AND NUTRITION: Proposed FY 1979 Program by Region


(Millions of Dollars)



Total Proposed \$673.2 Million

POPULATION PLANNING: Proposed FY 1979 Program by Region


(Millions of Dollars)



Total Proposed \$205.4

HEALTH: Proposed FY 1979 Program by Region


(Millions of Dollars)



Total Proposed \$148.5 Million

EDUCATION AND HUMAN RESOURCES: Proposed FY 1979 Program by Region

(Millions of Dollars)




Total Proposed \$109.0 Million



SELECTED DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES: Proposed FY 1979 Program By Region

(Millions of Dollars)



Total Proposed \$128.2 Million

2. U.S. Assistance to Latin America

139H


U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND CREDIT SALES
FY 1979 Proposed Programs
(in thousands of dollars)

	Economic Assistance Programs				Military Assistance Programs					
	Total Economic Assistance	A.I.D.	P.L. 480	Peace Corps	Int'l. Narcotics Control	Total Military Assistance	Military Assistance Grants (MAP)	Foreign Military Training	Military Credit Sales	Excess Defense Articles
LATIN AMERICA (CONT'D)										
Paraguay	9,973	8,137	75	1,311	-	450	-	150	300	-
Peru	41,997	17,338	16,020	-	1,589	7,050	-	550	6,500	-
Latin America Reg. Canal Zone Schools	36,624	35,285	-	799	540	-	-	-	-	-
	4,400	-	-	-	-	4,400	-	4,400	-	-
NEAR EAST - TOTAL	3,355,556	1,829,000	288,104	5,467	500	1,232,485	45,000	6,985	1,180,000	500
Afghanistan	24,696	21,350	1,166	1,080	500	600	-	600	-	-
Algeria	2,278	-	2,278	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bahrain	236	-	-	236	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bhutan	183	-	183	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Egypt	957,067	750,000	206,667	-	-	400	-	400	-	-
Gaza	1,217	-	1,217	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Israel	1,790,400	785,000	5,400	-	-	1,000,000	-	-	1,000,000	-
Jordan	234,297	93,000	8,797	-	-	132,500	45,000	2,000	85,000	500
Jordan-West Bank	1,397	-	1,397	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jordan Valley Irrig.	50,000	50,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lebanon	26,305	-	655	-	-	25,650	-	650	25,000	-
Morocco	77,088	8,698	20,299	1,556	-	46,535	-	1,535	45,000	-
Oman	579	-	-	579	-	-	-	-	-	-
Syria	113,924	90,000	23,924	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tunisia	53,243	12,034	13,628	1,381	-	26,200	-	1,200	25,000	-
Yemen Arab Republic	15,176	11,448	2,493	635	-	600	-	600	-	-
Near East Regional	7,470	7,470	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
EUROPE - TOTAL	544,493	12,000	40,663	20	-	491,810	68,900	5,410	417,000	500
Austria	60	-	-	-	-	60	-	60	-	-
Cyprus	5,531	5,000	531	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Finland	50	-	-	-	-	50	-	50	-	-
Greece	122,000	-	-	-	-	122,000	-	-	122,000	-
Malta	20	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	-	-
Portugal	71,700	-	40,000	-	-	31,700	27,900	3,300	-	500
Spain	170,000	7,000	-	-	-	163,000	41,000	2,000	120,000	-
Turkey	175,132	-	132	-	-	175,000	-	-	175,000	-
UNALLOCATED	131,608	-	131,608	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
OTHER PROGRAMS	1,221,217	942,770 ^{1/}	201,389	18,903	9,455	48,700	48,500	200	-	-
WORLDWIDE - TOTAL	7,597,492	5,315,687	1,358,000	100,917	40,000	2,281,805	180,500	32,805	2,067,500	1,000

^{1/} Includes International Organizations and Programs - \$282.2 million, American Schools and Hospitals Abroad - \$8.0 million, Disaster Relief - \$25.0 million, Contingency Fund - \$5.0 million, Operating Expenses - \$263.0 million, Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund - \$24.8 million, Sinai Support Mission - \$11.7 million, UN Forces in Cyprus - \$8.7 million, Middle East Special Requirements Fund - \$5.0 million, Private Voluntary Agency Development Projects funded from Security Supporting Assistance - \$3.0 million, and A.I.D. Interregional Programs - \$306.4 million.

5.

139D



U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, MILITARY ASSISTANCE, AND CREDIT SALES
FY 1978 ESTIMATED PROGRAMS
(in thousands of dollars)

	Economic Assistance Programs				Military Assistance Programs						
	Total Economic Assistance	A.I.D.	P.L. 480	Peace Corps	Int'l. Narcotics Control	Total Military Assistance	Military Assistance Grants (MAP)	Foreign Military Training	Military Credit Sales	Military Excess Defense Article	
LATIN AMERICA - Cont'd.											
Colombia	39,499	-	4,162	1,918	1,239	32,180	-	1,180	31,000	-	
Costa Rica	8,740	7,095	278	1,367	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Dominican Republic	17,344	10,590	3,943	1,061	-	1,750	-	750	1,000	-	
Ecuador	14,400	-	3,900	2,196	535	10,500	-	500	10,000	-	
El Salvador	9,716	6,633	1,694	1,389	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Guatemala	23,671	17,406	4,708	1,557	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Guyana	8,977	6,810	2,167	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Haiti	31,434	15,340	15,344	-	-	750	-	250	500	-	
Honduras	28,243	19,085	4,400	1,633	-	3,125	-	625	2,500	-	
Jamaica	22,641	11,454	10,059	1,128	-	210	-	210	-	-	
Mexico	15,502	-	-	-	15,292	2,900	-	400	2,500	-	
Nicaragua	20,104	15,985	154	1,065	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Panama	24,125	20,818	1,807	-	-	1,500	-	500	1,000	-	
Paraguay	13,808	11,414	149	1,145	-	1,100	-	600	500	-	
Peru	60,393	22,876	24,990	-	1,577	10,950	-	950	10,000	-	
Uruguay	25	25	-	-	-	100	-	100	-	-	
Venezuela	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Latin America Regional	26,701	25,269	-	710	722	-	-	-	-	-	
NEAR EAST - TOTAL	3,330,397	1,787,174	280,792	5,556	500	1,256,375	55,000	5,875	1,195,000	500	
Afghanistan	26,662	18,621	6,139	877	500	525	-	525	-	-	
Algeria	3,260	-	3,260	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Bahrain	551	100	-	451	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Bhutan	110	-	110	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Egypt	935,785	750,750	184,835	-	-	200	-	200	-	-	
Gaza	1,055	-	1,055	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Israel	1,792,200	785,000	7,200	-	-	1,000,000	-	-	1,000,000	-	
Jordan	232,623	93,000	7,523	-	-	132,100	55,000	1,600	75,000	500	
Jordan-West Bank	1,735	-	1,735	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Lebanon	79,183	20,000	8,583	-	-	50,600	-	600	50,000	-	
Maldiv Islands	22	-	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Morocco	76,580	4,090	24,281	1,909	-	46,300	-	1,300	45,000	-	
OMAN	492	-	-	492	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Syria	107,224	90,000	17,224	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Tunisia	57,188	12,724	17,211	1,128	-	26,125	-	1,125	25,000	-	
Yemen Arab Republic	8,378	5,540	1,614	699	-	525	-	525	-	-	
Near East Regional	7,349	7,349	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	

U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, MILITARY ASSISTANCE, AND CREDIT SALES
FY 1978 ESTIMATED PROGRAMS
(in thousands of dollars)

Total Economic & Military Assistance	Economic Assistance Programs				Int'l. Narcotics Control	Military Assistance Programs				
	Total Economic Assistance	A.I.D.	P.L. 480	Peace Corps		Total Military Assistance	Military Assistance Grants (MAP)	Foreign Military Training	Military Credit Sales	Excess Defense Articles
EUROPE - Total	890,083	331,500	41,125	3	-	517,455	73,000	7,455	435,000	2,000
Austria	60	-	-	-	-	60	-	60	-	-
Cyprus	15,573	15,000	573	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Finland	60	-	-	-	-	60	-	60	-	-
Greece	176,500	-	-	-	-	176,500	33,000	2,000	140,000	1,500
Malta	9,503	9,500	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Portugal	368,835	300,000	40,000	-	-	28,835	25,000	3,335	-	500
Spain	144,000	7,000	-	-	-	137,000	15,000	2,000	120,000	-
Turkey	175,552	-	552	-	-	175,000	-	-	175,000	-
UNALLOCATED	100,689	-	100,689	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
OTHER PROGRAMS	1,447,967	1,087,146	182,000	17,836	12,1851	148,800	146,600	2,200	-	-
WORLDWIDE TOTAL	8,115,357	4,133,743	1,342,000	92,804	41,910	2,504,900	315,700	34,600	2,151,000	3,600

1/ Includes International Organizations and Programs - \$231.7 million, American Schools and Hospitals Abroad - \$23.8 million, International Fund for Agricultural Development - \$200.0 million, Disaster Relief - \$37.3 million, Romanian Relief and Rehabilitation - \$13.0 million, Italy Relief and Rehabilitation - \$25.0 million, Contingency Fund - \$5.0 million, A.I.D. Operating Expenses - \$227.1 million, Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund - \$24.2 million, Sinai Support - \$12.2 million, UN Forces in Cyprus - \$9.1 million, Middle East Special Requirements - \$23.2 million, and A.I.D. Inter-regional Programs - \$255.5 million.

OTHER U.S. OVERSEAS PROGRAMS
FY 1977 Actual
(in thousands of dollars)

	Total Activity	Total Ex.-Im.	Export - Import Bank			OPIC			Commodity Credit Corp. Exp. Sales	Housing Guarantees
			Loans	Guarantees	Medium-Term Insurance	Short-Term Insurance	Loans	Guarantees		
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN - TOTAL	2,069,067	1,683,965	111,639	343,445	210,106	1,018,775	6,075	-	84,619	42,400
Antigua	7,718	7,718	-	-	-	7,718	-	-	-	-
Argentina	90,839	90,839	15,523	41,767	18,620	14,929	-	-	-	-
Bahamas	17,055	17,055	-	-	536	16,519	-	-	-	-
Barbados	8,142	7,642	-	7	-	7,635	-	-	-	-
Belize	2,550	2,267	-	-	20	2,247	-	-	500	-
Bolivia	63,067	54,089	15,740	12,347	13,305	12,697	-	-	283	-
Brazil	480,513	245,923	56,404	43,730	11,660	134,129	-	-	8,978	-
Cayman Islands	314	314	-	177	77	60	-	-	234,590	-
Chile	41,973	41,973	-	4,075	8,401	29,497	-	-	-	-
Colombia	69,508	69,508	33	12,270	12,797	44,408	-	-	-	-
Costa Rica	43,284	43,202	128	11,037	6,534	25,503	-	-	82	-
Dominican Republic	29,648	25,688	524	2,943	1,960	20,261	-	-	3,960	-
Ecuador	124,099	123,131	-	28,128	20,157	74,846	-	-	-	-
El Salvador	17,097	15,597	185	2,820	2,556	10,036	1,500	-	968	-
Guatemala	59,864	59,864	6,200	8,901	8,103	36,660	-	-	-	-
Guiana-French	23	23	-	-	-	23	-	-	-	-
Guyana	20,678	16,733	-	4,435	2,292	10,006	-	-	-	-
Haiti	652	652	-	-	-	652	-	-	3,945	-
Honduras	30,642	29,437	227	6,870	4,851	17,489	575	-	-	-
Jamaica	50,027	34,532	-	1,542	275	32,715	-	-	630	-
Mexico	214,867	214,867	10,113	38,557	41,940	124,257	-	-	495	15,000
Nicaragua	45,181	44,686	3,848	6,373	4,937	29,528	-	-	-	-
Panama	70,491	45,486	-	3,609	4,451	37,426	-	-	-	-
Paraguay	7,356	7,356	-	408	4,912	2,036	-	-	7,605	17,400
Peru	218,233	134,137	2,714	73,352	16,343	41,728	-	-	-	-
St. Lucia	4,000	-	-	-	-	-	4,000	-	-	10,000
Surinam	13,569	13,569	-	225	209	13,135	-	-	-	-
Trinidad and Tobago	40,168	40,168	-	-	326	39,842	-	-	-	-
Uruguay	21,685	21,685	-	691	3,078	17,916	-	-	-	-
Venezuela	254,913	254,913	-	39,181	21,503	194,229	-	-	-	-
Virgin Islands-British	66	66	-	-	-	66	-	-	-	-
West Indies-British	6,038	6,038	-	-	-	6,038	-	-	-	-
West Indies-French	2,086	2,086	-	-	171	1,915	-	-	-	-
West Indies-Netherlands	12,721	12,721	-	-	92	12,629	-	-	-	-

NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA - TOTAL	Total Activity	Total Ex.-Im.	Export - Import Bank			OPIC			Commodity Credit Corp. Housing Exp. Sales Guarantees	
			Loans	Guarantees	Medium-Term Insurance	Short-Term Insurance	Loans	Guarantees	Insurance	
	1,061,564	835,814	95,749	175,592	107,197	457,276	-	-	162,776	12,974 50,000
Afghanistan	2,450	2,450	-	-	-	2,450	-	-	-	-
Algeria	149,409	149,409	82,343	39,386	11,830	15,850	-	-	-	-
Bahrain	9,152	9,152	-	-	1,118	8,034	-	-	-	-
Egypt	16,967	1,236	-	-	-	1,236	-	-	15,731	-
Iran	144,324	127,699	-	4,664	22,458	100,577	-	-	16,625	-
Iraq	14,131	14,131	-	-	-	14,131	-	-	-	-
Israel	141,511	108,576	2,356	74,577	-	31,643	-	-	7,935	25,000
Jordan	91,277	30,477	-	22,054	802	7,621	-	-	60,800	-
Kuwait	107,911	107,911	-	1,462	56,825	49,624	-	-	-	-
Lebanon	27,195	12,195	-	-	48	12,147	-	-	-	15,000
Libya	9,389	9,389	-	-	2,137	7,252	-	-	-	-
Morocco	59,407	46,433	-	25,785	-	9,598	-	-	12,974	-
Oman	20,441	5,441	11,050	-	280	5,161	-	-	15,000	-
Qatar	11,795	11,795	-	-	1,604	10,191	-	-	-	-
Saudi Arabia	187,470	144,340	-	6,057	7,212	131,071	-	-	43,130	-
Syria	1,476	1,476	-	-	-	1,476	-	-	-	-
Tunisia	19,903	6,348	-	1,607	760	3,981	-	-	3,555	10,000
United Arab Emirates	47,317	47,317	-	-	2,123	45,194	-	-	-	-
Yemen Arab Republic	39	39	-	-	-	39	-	-	-	-
Unallocated	5,189	5,189	-	5,189	-	-	-	-	-	-
World wide Total	6,862,119	5,397,022	747,267	1,020,745	425,508	3,203,503	6,325	-	694,426	644,346 120,000

1/ Discount loans of \$473 million were also extended in FY 1976.

2/ \$254 million of short-term insurance was authorized but unshipped in FY 1977.
Amounts are included above.

3/ Includes all forms of insurance.

NOTE - Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

SUMMARY OF PROGRAM BY COUNTRY AND APPROPRIATION
(in thousands of dollars)

REGION: LATIN AMERICA

COUNTRY	Total			Food and Nutrition			Population Planning			Health			Education and Human Resources Development			Selected Development Activities			Other Programs		
	1977	1978	1979	1977	1978	1979	1977	1978	1979	1977	1978	1979	1977	1978	1979	1977	1978	1979	1977	1978	1979
Bolivia	35,190	24,683	28,900	19,403	22,683	21,185	-	-	-	4,253	300	5,445	11,486	1,625	1,970	48	75	300	-	-	-
Brazil	424	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	424	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Chile	100	-	-	51	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	49	-	-	-	-	-
Colombia	717	-	-	108	-	-	240	-	-	-	-	-	369	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Costa Rica	5,764	7,095	12,550	5,500	250	8,000	214	295	500	-	-	-	-	-	-	50	6,550	4,050	-	-	-
Dominican Republic	565	10,590	12,600	270	10,325	335	-	-	-	177	125	7,000	68	90	5,090	50	50	175	-	-	-
El Salvador	2,334	6,633	6,417	854	4,814	200	763	950	990	-	652	450	231	-	4,400	486	217	377	-	-	-
Guatemala	13,845	17,406	11,210	4,269	16,360	5,817	290	300	360	107	156	4,523	5,480	400	300	49	190	210	3,650	-	-
Guyana	6,297	6,810	8,090	6,200	6,710	5,090	-	-	-	-	-	2,900	-	-	-	97	100	100	-	-	-
Haiti	20,723	15,340	16,886	11,477	5,855	8,970	670	975	1,400	8,300	5,075	1,000	-	677	3,036	74	2,758	2,480	202	-	-
Honduras	7,143	19,085	20,992	6,541	16,890	18,847	288	230	350	120	375	425	-	660	740	194	930	630	-	-	-
Jamaica*	17,157	640	21,817	13,961	-	20,480	686	640	950	-	-	97	2,460	-	240	50	-	50	-	-	-
Nicaragua	1,012	15,985	5,460	-	7,222	4,270	643	500	650	299	190	-	-	7,990	380	70	83	160	-	-	-
Panama	13,034	20,818	16,055	9,700	20,000	15,000	449	475	505	-	-	-	2,840	293	500	45	50	50	-	-	-
Paraguay	1,041	11,414	8,137	410	10,606	6,909	301	400	550	-	-	-	282	358	457	48	50	221	-	-	-
Peru	16,961	22,876	17,338	15,665	21,785	12,325	193	205	780	-	-	-	1,054	836	1,321	49	50	2,912	-	-	-
Uruguay	121	25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	96	-	-	25	25	-	-	-	-
Caribbean Regional	6,946	16,900	22,398	6,900	11,100	2,493	-	-	-	-	-	2,260	-	675	845	46	5,125	16,800	-	-	-
Central America Regional	2,749	1,087	865	2,241	500	480	-	-	-	-	-	-	508	587	385	-	-	-	-	-	-
Latin America Regional	23,250	25,269	35,285	5,896	7,009	8,594	2,908	-	7,000	1,305	1,711	2,185	10,675	10,553	11,826	2,466	5,996	5,680	-	-	-
Total	175,373	222,656	245,000	105,446	162,109	138,995	7,645	4,970	14,035	14,561	8,584	26,285	35,973	24,744	31,490	3,896	22,249	34,195	3,852	-	-

PROGRAM SUMMARY (In thousands of dollars)							CP 79.12
Fiscal Year	Total	Food and Nutrition	Population Planning	Health	Education and Human Resources Development	Selected Development Activities	Other Programs
1977							
Loans	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Grants ...	23,250	5,896	2,908	1,305	10,675	2,466	-
Total ..	23,250	5,896	2,908	1,305	10,675	2,466	-
1978							
Loans	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Grants ...	25,269	7,009	-	1,711	10,553	5,996	-
Total ..	25,269	7,009	-	1,711	10,553	5,996	-
1979							
Loans	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Grants ...	35,285	8,594	7,000	2,185	11,826	5,680	-
Total ..	35,285	8,594	7,000	2,185	11,826	5,680	-

RESOURCE FLOWS (In thousands of dollars)						CP 79.08
Program	FY 1977 (Actual)	FY 1978 (Estimated)	FY 1979 (Proposed)			
A.I.D.*						
Loans	-	6,500	3,500			
Grants	17,127	26,780	30,671			
Total A.I.D.	17,127	33,280	34,171			
P.L. 480**						
Title I	-	-	-			
Title II	-	-	-			
Total P.L. 480	-	-	-			
Total A.I.D. and P.L. 480	17,127	33,280	34,171			

*A.I.D. levels represent actual and estimated expenditures.

**P.L. 480 levels represent actual and estimated value of shipments.

B. SPECIFIC U.S. POLICIES

2. Executive Branch Policies

b. Cabinet and Sub-cabinet level

The Study containing the policy and country
allocation options recommended
to the President.

DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION COMMITTEE *

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE STUDY

OCTOBER 1977

* Note: The DDC is a sub-Cabinet level Committee required by law and chaired by the Administrator of U.S.A.I.D. Members of the Committee include: the Executive Office of the President, and, the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, State, and Treasury.

PART I: THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEVELOPING
WORLD: THE ROLE OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

A. The United States Stake in the Developing World

The United States has vital economic, political, security, and humanitarian interests in the less developed countries. In many respects their development is basic to the realization of U.S. interests.


Looking at these interests in a negative way, we can see that if present trends in world hunger, population growth, environmental degradation, energy shortages, resource depletion, nuclear weapons, proliferation, and armed conflict continue unabated, the world by the end of this century could become increasingly unstable, suffer economic stagnation, and be a much more dangerous place in which to live.

Close to seven billion people will be crowded into it, compared to half that number today. Average standards of living could well drop significantly not only for the inhabitants of the poor countries, already living at subsistence, but for most of us. Many more people throughout the world would be malnourished and die early of hunger and disease. Political freedom and respect for individual rights could be confined to only a corner of the earth, and under increasing attack. Such circumstances of poverty and economic and political tension have throughout history bred violence, domestically and internationally.

There is no way that we in the richer countries could avoid being affected by these global problems, any more than those in the poor countries can. Indeed all the world's people have a clear stake in changing this picture for the better. And the shape of the world to come will depend on the effort we begin to make now. If we delay action, the future costs, in terms of both human suffering and resources, could accelerate sharply.

In this effort the developing countries must play a major role. Without their commitment and cooperation little will be achieved. The United States must, therefore, support those efforts which contribute to economic, social, and political advancement of the developing world. In this endeavor, foreign assistance constitutes one range of instruments which can be used to help shape the future in ways more compatible with our interests; it can be used to affect the way LDC governments approach a whole range of issues--from their actions to address global human problems of food and population growth; to their interest in making peace with their neighbors, their cooperation in the development of nuclear weapons, and their actions with respect to the international economic system.

...



U.S. Economic Interests

From a more traditional economic perspective, accelerating LDC growth will make them better trading partners and will contribute to increasing U.S. income and jobs. LDCs are important sources of critical raw materials for the United States. They are also important markets for our products; in 1975, for example, we exported \$29 billion in goods to the non-oil LDCs--three times the 1970 figure, three times our exports to Japan, and \$3 billion more than our exports to all of industrial Europe. In addition, the LDCs provide important opportunities for investment. In 1975, \$6.4 billion--45% of the United States direct investment abroad--was invested in the LDCs. Accumulated United States investment in the LDCs in 1975 totaled \$35 billion, about one-fourth of our total foreign investments in that year. Therefore, a fundamental element of our foreign policy is the expansion of an open international economic system which emphasizes the increasingly more important role of the LDCs.

...

U.S. Political and Security Interests

In terms of our political and national security interests, LDC cooperation is essential for global and regional stability and to maintain peace. Conflicts within and among smaller nations often have a way of involving major powers, and we need LDC cooperation to control nuclear proliferation and arms build-ups. United States security depends on our economic and military strength and that of friendly nations, including key LDCs.

...

U.S. Humanitarian Interests

Finally, and no less important, the United States has a deep and abiding humanitarian interest in helping to alleviate the suffering of the approximately one-quarter of the world's population living in destitution and desperation. Our humanitarian concern and historic record of generosity reflect the most profound and firmly held beliefs of the American people.

...

B. Perspectives and Context of United States Assistance

...

-11-

But President Carter's addresses at the United Nations and at Notre Dame outlined new American objectives in the Third World. Secretary Vance's statements at the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) in May, 1977, and at the OECD the following month, have extended and amplified the President's remarks. At CIEC the Secretary of State pledged support for:-

- A substantial increase in American foreign assistance over the next five years;
- Favorable treatment for LDC exports in the multilateral trade negotiations;
- Efforts to reach a successful agreement on a Common Fund, and other commodity arrangements;
- Agreement on a system of national held food reserves.

At both CIEC and the OECD, moreover, the United States proposed a basic human needs approach to development assistance and gained acceptance of this approach from other donor nations.

...

C. Diversity of Development Instruments

The U.S. has many tools with which to promote its objectives in developing countries. The full range includes:

- trade, including commodity stabilization agreements and special arrangements to lower tariff and non-tariff barriers;
- private capital flows;
- technology transfers;
- non-concessional financial assistance (Export-Import Bank credits);
- IBRD and Regional Development Banks' hard windows with borrowing authority on the world's commercial markets;
- concessional economic assistance, through both bilateral and multilateral channels (bilateral economic aid, Security Supporting Assistance, PL 480 food aid, and multilateral concessional assistance via the soft windows of the international banks and the United Nations development organizations);
- concessional military assistance (MAP);
- Foreign Military Sales (FMS).

...

Foreign Economic Assistance

Foreign economic assistance, however, remains a fundamental means of fostering development. It is particularly important to those countries which, because of their low levels of national income, institutional and technical advancement, and relatively slow growth rates, are unlikely to attract much private capital flows. For countries with per capita income of less than \$520 (one-third of the world population), ODA comprised a crucial 24% of total annual investment in 1974. Moreover, ODA represented 78% of their total net public and private flows. In contrast, for developing countries with per capita incomes above \$520 (10% of the world population) total ODA was equal to only 5% of total investment and 33% of total public and private capital flows. ...

APPENDIX B - KEY ELEMENTS OF A BASIC
HUMAN NEEDS (BHN) STRATEGY

APPENDIX B
PART I

Key Elements of a BHN Development Strategy

1. The developing country must design programs and policies which assure that the supply of goods and services consumed by the poor is adequate to satisfy basic needs for productive subsistence. This includes:
 - goods produced by the private sector, such as food;
 - services supplied by the public sector, such as health and education.
2. These programs and policies must be designed so that the poor have access to the increased supply of these goods and services.
3. This requires programs and policies which increase the amount of income of the poor. This can be done through increased or more productive employment or transfers of income. The latter can be accomplished either through internal redistribution or transfers from abroad, and could be in cash or in kind (PL 480 Title II).
4. Generally, the emphasis has to be on increased and more productive employment rather than transfers. Otherwise the policies would tend to compromise overall growth of both output and income.
5. Increased and more productive employment can be achieved through policies which--promote the fuller utilization of labor,--enhance the access of the poor to other resources, i.e., land and capital,--increase investment in human resources.
6. Increased incomes and increased supplies are equally basic to the success of the strategy. Increased income without increased supply of goods and services will only result in increased scarcity and higher prices of these goods and services. Increased supply without increased income in the hands of the poor, however, is meaningless; this concern with the supply side distinguishes BHN from other strategies which also aim at promoting growth with equity.
7. The balance between policies which promote income growth and those which expand supply is not easy to achieve. For this reason it is important to promote policies which enhance employment of the poor in the

production of the things they consume. For example, policies which increase food production by small farmers tend to simultaneously increase both the supply of critical goods consumed by the poor and their income.

8. The precise combination of goods and services that satisfies basic human needs of the poor would vary depending on a country's stage of development, cultural characteristics and other structural elements. Within this range of goods and services there are a few elements--usually identified with provision of adequate nutrition, health, education, potable water and shelter--which could be viewed as the core for productive subsistence.

9. Quantitative norms for minimum levels of availability of these goods and services can be established which may have wide applicability among developing countries, after proper allowance for climatological conditions, tradition, etc. These norms could be used to measure progress in reaching BHN objectives.

10. The proper balance between different kinds of goods and services consumed by the poor must be decided by individual developing countries. However, the adoption of a basic human needs strategy by a particular developing country does entail that it provide for increased supply of those core elements over time.

The DCC Study

PART II: DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

-3-

A. Description of Foreign Assistance Programs

Bilateral Development Assistance (BDA)

BDA is programmed at \$1.2 billion in FY 1977, and accounts for about a third of U.S. bilateral assistance and somewhat less than 20% of total U.S. economic assistance programs. Estimated BDA expenditures in recent years were 8% of ODA flows to developing countries and 2.8% of total flows to these countries. Although in many cases BDA accounts for only a small portion of total flows to a recipient country, it can serve as a catalytic agent for development and when combined with PL 480 and multilateral assistance, provides substantial resource transfers.

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 mandated that AID direct its development assistance efforts to helping the poor majority in developing countries. As a result of this "New Directions" mandate, funds have been committed increasingly in functional areas particularly important to broad-based participatory development, with heavy emphasis on agriculture and rural development, population, health and education and human resources. Between FY 1974 and FY 1977 the funding committed for agriculture and rural development has increased from \$275 million to \$519 million, which accounts for about half of bilateral development assistance. For FY 1977 population and health activities are programmed at approximately \$225 million and education at approximately \$100 million. Finally, some \$60 million is programmed for other important areas such as energy, science and technology (emphasizing appropriate technologies), environment and some urban development. The Housing Investment Guarantee Program averages about \$120 million per year for shelter programs in largely middle-income countries.

The program provides development assistance to approximately 50 countries, including 27 countries in Africa, 7 countries in Asia, 4 countries in the Near East and 14 countries in Latin America. About half of AID's funding is concentrated in the twelve largest country programs. About 85% of total program commitments are for low-income countries (defined as countries with a per capita GNP below \$520 in 1975 prices) and about 60% of total program commitments are for countries with a per capita GNP below \$200 in FY 1978.


...

Other Programs Administered by AID

Reimbursable Technical Assistance. The Foreign Assistance Act authorizes any U.S. Government agency to furnish services and commodities to friendly countries, international organizations and certain non-voluntary relief agencies on a reimbursable or deferred payment basis. Reimbursable programs are used to stimulate sales of services or commodities related to the economic development of friendly nations, and in some cases to facilitate access to natural resources of interest to the U.S.

Three categories of countries are the target of these programs: (1) countries in which AID programs are being phased out; (2) AID graduate countries; and (3) non-AID developing countries, particularly the oil nations. Thus, this program is utilized by countries which need development inputs, primarily related to technology transfer, but are able to finance these inputs themselves.

...



A. Strategy Options

1. Alternative Concessional Development Assistance Strategies

Given primary emphasis in support of BHN strategy, and setting aside for the moment SSA and IDLI hard lending, there are questions about the BHN strategy that should be employed using the concessional development assistance instruments--IDLI soft, U.N., BDA and PL 480--to best promote U.S. interests.

Options

There are three basic alternatives:

- (a) Concentrate on key developing countries of importance to the U.S., irrespective of level of development. Under this option, the programs would emphasize, but not be limited to, a relatively small number of key countries. These countries would range from the poor (India, Philippines) through middle and higher income (Caribbean, Brazil, Mexico). The key criteria would not necessarily be the country's poverty or its commitment to growth with equity programs, but rather its economic or political significance to the U.S. (e.g., raw materials, regional stability, illegal migration).
- (b) Concentrate on Global Problems. Under this approach, the U.S. would concentrate on one or two critical global economic or social problems of concern to all countries, and focus its development assistance program on their long-term solution. World hunger and health, including family planning, are possible target areas. Activities in other fields would be sharply cut back. These global efforts would be undertaken in areas, countries, or institutions where "payoff" on the specific long-term problems is greatest, regardless of per capita income or other economic and political considerations.
- (c) Concentrate on poor countries in support of Growth with Equity/BHN. Under this option, assistance would be provided to a broad spectrum of LDCs, with priority placed on the poor countries. The objective would be to improve production and employment as well as the basic services for the poor majority. Funding would be concentrated on countries with domestic policies favorable

to equitable growth, with the more populous ones receiving larger allocations assuming their commitment to BHN.

Implications of Options

Option 1 lays emphasis on the importance of our economic and political relations with particular LDCs and recognizes that many middle income countries have significant problems in meeting basic human needs of their people.

The main difference between Option 1 and Option 3 is degree of emphasis on middle-income countries. Option 1 implies continuation of significant bilateral development assistance programs, with a general BHN focus, in key countries, and contemplates the resumption of programs in others. Decisions on U. S. assistance would not be determined solely on the recipient's development strategy, however. Under this option stronger emphasis would be given to PL 480 Title I as opposed to Titles II and III. To the extent that it is easier to accomplish concentration within bilateral programs, this option would tend to favor such programs over multilateral approaches.

Option 3 also envisages concentration in particular countries but it puts more emphasis on the need for concessional assistance in poorer countries and countries' commitment to BHN objectives. It allows but gives less emphasis to programs in middle income LDCs, on the assumption that the impact per dollar of additional concessional assistance in meeting basic needs or addressing global problems will be greatest in the low-income countries.

Option 3 envisages a balanced expansion in both bilateral and multilateral concessional assistance instruments.

Options 2 and 3 could focus basically on the same objectives in terms of addressing global problems in whose solution LDCs play a key role. However, Option 2 adopts a sectoral approach whereas Option 3 adopts a country approach and a wider range of BHN programs. The choice of Option 2 would imply more stress on international programs, with new international initiatives and/or strengthening of existing international institutions such as U.N. agencies with functional specialization (e.g., WHO, FAO). Under the global

I.B. SPECIFIC POLICIES

2. The Executive Branch

c. The Bureaucracy

(2) Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination (A.I.D.)

A STRATEGY FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE

BILATERAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination
Agency for International Development

March 1978

PREFACE

120

This paper was first drafted in the summer of 1977 in order to serve as a background paper on bilateral development assistance for the Development Coordination Committee (DCC) Foreign Assistance Study (October 1977). The current version has been revised to take into account comments received from other AID bureaus and USG agencies but retains the same basic structure and content as the version which contributed to the DCC study.

Subsequent decisions and initiatives by the Administration and the Congress reflect the development assistance strategy set forth in the paper: to support the achievement of self-sustaining equitable growth oriented toward the satisfaction of basic human needs. The DCC study and a Brookings Institution study, An Assessment of Development Assistance Strategies (October 1977), provided bases for recommendations to the President by his Policy Review Committee. The President decided in November 1977 to seek a substantial increase in U.S. development assistance over the next five years in support of a strategy which concentrates first on meeting basic human needs of poor people in low-income developing countries, with the flexibility to direct

i

U.S. programs towards meeting basic human needs of the poor in middle-income developing countries, when funds allow....

ii

• • •

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to set forth a strategy for U.S. bilateral development assistance capable of effectively supporting developing country efforts to satisfy, through sustained and equitable economic growth, the basic human needs of their populations. This strategy does not imply a change in the "new directions" approach; rather it is a further evolution of that approach.

The basic objectives of the strategy are to enable the poor in developing countries to meet their basic human needs by expanding their access to resources and productive employment and increasing their influence on the decisions that shape their lives. The development community is coming increasingly to regard this approach as the key to the long-run solution to the world food problem, the reduction of population growth rates around the world, and the resolution of other problems of development that command international attention and compassion.

After a discussion of the relations between basic human needs, development objectives, U.S. interests, and the need for development assistance, the paper identifies a strategy for more effective assistance in support of basic human needs-oriented development, indicates some steps and issues for its implementation, and proposes an outline of programs for the major sectors of assistance. ...

II. A Strategy in Support of the Basic Human Needs Approach

A. From New Directions to Basic Human Needs

Significant elements of the bilateral programs administered by AID and its predecessor agencies have addressed basic human needs. PL 480 food aid, jointly administered by AID and USDA, has often had an immediate impact on the nutrition of the poor. Furthermore, there has always been an important component of technical assistance for agriculture, health, population, and education in the programs of AID and predecessor agencies. During the fifties and sixties technical and some capital assistance to these fields focussed on building national institutions, such as those for agricultural education and extension. In addition, general program, industrial, and infrastructure assistance financed a broad range of capital and intermediate good imports and physical infrastructure projects, some of which--e.g., assistance for fertilizer plants and for development of power and transportation networks--was undoubtedly necessary to progress in fields more directly related to basic human needs.

AID shares credit for significant basic needs-related technical assistance and breakthroughs in agricultural technology, nutrition and public health. While the relative distribution of the benefits flowing from the new high yielding grain varieties is an unsettled issue, the resulting (along with food aid) absolute increase in food supplies in some parts of Asia, for example, has undoubtedly reduced the incidence of famine (which by definition affects the poorest), exerted some favorable effect on nutrition, and permitted expansion in employment-generating programs where food supply has been an important constraint. Over the years public health programs supported by AID have contributed significantly to sharp declines in the incidence of communicable diseases, notably malaria. In nutrition, the work of AID on the fortification of staples, maternal and child feeding, and other areas has also focussed largely on the nutritional problems of the poor.

Notwithstanding these and other positive contributions to meeting basic human needs, progress was not sufficient to meet the basic needs of large segments of the poor in LDC's. These circumstances led to efforts during the seventies within AID and by Congress to make development assistance programs more responsive to the needs of the poor.

Particular emphasis was placed on improving the access of the poor to resources and related services and institutions so as to provide opportunities to "better their lives through their own effort" (Section 102 of the Foreign Assistance Act as amended in 1973 and subsequently). This reorientation toward the "New Directions"

involved a number of challenging conceptual and practical problems and required a high degree of innovation on the part of AID and host country institutions. Experience acquired from these efforts has implications for enhanced effectiveness and broader application in future programs.

B. Features of a Basic Human Needs-Oriented Assistance Strategy

1. The size of the problem


Because "basic human needs" has come to be considered as an organizing principle for development based on equitable growth only fairly recently, strategy details in varying country settings will be evolving further for some time. The elaboration of the World Bank World Development Program and the UN Third Development Decade will be important at the global level. At the country level, the best role for bilateral development assistance (levels, parameters, emphases) in supporting basic needs-oriented strategies may become clear only after some time and considerable experiment. Nevertheless, there are some broad principles concerning a bilateral assistance strategy which should remain valid as we elaborate and progressively apply a basic needs approach to an increasing number of country situations. These principles relate to the major constraints to development in general and to meeting basic human needs in particular.

services; in a third, inadequate physical infrastructure and the scarcity of capital investment in productive enterprise may be critical constraints. The programming of development assistance must, therefore, be country specific and flexible enough to assist in dealing with the concrete problems that must be resolved if basic human needs are to be met. Each country (with donor participation as appropriate) must first identify the major obstacles to progress and determine how assistance programs can promote or accelerate development in ways that can be defined and measured.

...

B. Allocation Criteria: Need vs. Commitment

Among the most important issues are country allocation criteria and guidelines. We propose that these criteria be based primarily on need and commitment as measured against long-term basic human needs objectives. Country need varies greatly, depending heavily on the number of people below a poverty line or whose basic needs are not being adequately met, the country's overall per capita income level, assistance from other donors, and the extent to which the country needs help in strengthening institutions and human resources to meet basic needs objectives. Commitment to basic human needs objectives and the policy measures and programs needed to achieve them also vary greatly, and depend on a host of economic, political, social, and other



factors.* Assistance allocations would in general be a function of both need and degree of commitment to equitable growth in support of basic human needs objectives.

This raises few problems where need and commitment are both low or both high, or even where need is low and commitment is high. Many developing countries, however, combine great need with relatively weak current commitment to measures needed to achieve basic human needs objectives. This conflict obviously raises difficulties, particularly since the need criterion relates largely to particular groups of poor people, whereas the commitment criterion relates largely to governments and their policy priorities. For example, in a country with weak commitment but high need, this approach implies modest assistance to support the eventual emergence of policies and institutions more favorable to basic human needs goals, assistance to entities within the country more strongly oriented to meeting basic needs, and assistance for programs which directly help meet basic human needs goals (e.g., low cost rural health systems) for at least a limited group within a fairly short period.

If country commitment is strong enough to assure that the benefits of development assistance will actually serve the intended beneficiaries or that assistance will actually support rather than subvert progress

* Need and commitment are the over-arching allocation criteria set forth in Section 102(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act. Section 102(d) uses the terms "commitment and progress" as well as "greatest need." Recent progress reflects the effectiveness of past commitment. The term "commitment" in the text above is meant also to include its effectiveness, or recent progress towards accomplishing such basic needs objectives as reduction in infant mortality. For proposed criteria and factors to assess commitment and progress, see Proposed Criteria and Factors for Assessing Country Performance (A Report Pursuant to Section 102(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act, January 31, 1978; transmitted by AIDTO A-35, 2/3/78.)



including the institutional aspects of infrastructure (e.g., institutions for rural electrification), and this experience should continue to be exploited.

Infrastructure financed as part of a basic needs strategy should normally be associated with other complementary measures to accelerate production and incomes. Otherwise, notwithstanding adequate physical and institutional access, infrastructure will not be used by poor people to better their lives (for example, living near a road only facilitates expanded economic activity; other measures to improve access to resources are normally also required).

...

C. Assistance for Middle-Income Countries

Because the need criterion relates primarily to poor people rather

than to governments or countries, a basic needs-oriented assistance strategy does not rule out assistance to countries which have reached middle-income status (per capita GNP above \$550 in 1976 prices).

Although these countries do not have extremely low per capita incomes, some have a great many very poor people. However, because of the greater capacity of middle-income LDCs to mobilize internal resources and to reallocate an increasing share of their own resources to meeting basic human needs, external concessional assistance allocations would generally represent a smaller proportion of the total resources required for various programs. The co-existence of a relatively high national per capita income in a middle income country and of large numbers of low-income people provides prime facie evidence of a highly skewed distribution not only of income but also of wealth and opportunities and of previous weak commitment to equitable growth policies. This in turn might imply strong political and other constraints on the government's ability to carry out basic needs-oriented programs, and limit the scope for outside assistance.

In view of these considerations, U. S. bilateral development assistance to middle-income countries should be governed by the following criteria:

-- Assistance to middle-income countries would continue in the context of rising overall real aid levels but would have lower priority than aid to poor countries.

-- The function of assistance to middle-income countries is not primarily to transfer resources but to stimulate demonstration

efforts to help design and establish policies and institutions and train people for basic human needs-oriented programs in rural and urban development, basic health and educational services, etc.

-- As a basic condition or self-help element, the recipient countries will be allocating or increasing the allocation of major budget resources to equity-oriented development efforts--far in excess of aid amounts.

-- The programs are planned with a limited time horizon, i.e., the time needed to make the necessary policy, budgeting, and institutional changes and put planned systems into operation.

-- Aid is provided on relatively harder terms in recognition of the middle-income countries' actual or expanding income and resource base.

-- Since the middle-income countries may have much greater staff and institutional capacity to plan and implement programs, they may assume greater responsibility for detailed planning and implementation.

Programs should generally concentrate on agriculture and rural development, education, health, nutrition, and population, although more emphasis could be given in the more urbanized middle-income countries to programs for planning assistance, training, and institutional strengthening dealing with broad problems affecting the poor in major urban areas, such as: improvement of public service delivery systems, urban environmental control and energy planning, employment generation in medium and small-scale urban industry, and tax administration. These

II A. NEW DIRECTIONS*

1. Background

NEW DIRECTIONS: A NEW FOCUS

In the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, the Congress provided a very specific statement of the objectives of U.S. bilateral development aid. This statement was a major reorientation of U.S. bilateral aid policy--away from a strategy of promoting growth through large development projects in industry and infrastructure, to programs intended to benefit directly the poorest peoples in developing countries. In the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975, Congress strengthened the provisions of the "New Directions" policy and also applied them to the Public Law 480 food aid program.

The New Directions mandate was a reaction to the apparent failure of past assistance efforts to reach the poorest groups within recipient countries. Although many developing countries' economies grew significantly in the 1960s, growth in per capita income was often accompanied by a worsening distribution of national income. 1/ Although economic growth raised mean incomes, the shares of total national income going to the poorest segments of the populations declined. It is important to realize that although they are relatively worse off, average incomes even for the poorest have in most cases risen to some degree. As a rule, however, it has been found that the income distribution deteriorates up to a point where per capita GNP reaches about \$350 and then gradually improves with continued growth. 2/ Because most developing countries have per capita GNPs below this level, they are presumably in a stage of deteriorating income distribution.

The basic precept of the New Directions in bilateral development assistance is that:

1/ Hollis Chenery and Moises Syrquim, Patterns of Development 1950 - 1970, Oxford University Press, 1975; Irma Adelman and Cynthia T. Morris, Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries, Stanford University Press, 1973.

2/ See Montek S. Ahluwalia, "Income Distribution and Development: Some Stylized Facts," American Economic Review, May 1976.

* From: Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Budget Issue Paper, "Bilateral Development Assistance Background and Options" February 1977.

"United States bilateral development assistance should give the highest priority to undertakings submitted by host governments which directly improve the lives of the poorest of their people and their capacity to participate in the development of their countries.

"Greatest emphasis shall be placed on countries and activities which effectively involve the poor in development, by expanding their access to the economy through services and institutions at the local level, increasing labor-intensive production, spreading productive investment and services out from major cities to small towns and outlying rural areas, and otherwise providing opportunities for the poor to better their lives through their own effort." 3/

The guidance for the use of bilateral development funds is quite detailed, both in terms of objectives and means. In the area of food and nutrition, aid is to be focused on projects designed to increase the productivity and income of the rural poor, particularly small farmers, who constitute the majority of population in most developing countries. 4/ Population planning and health assistance is to be used primarily for the extension of low-cost, integrated delivery systems for providing basic health and family planning services. 5/ Assistance in the area of education and human resources development is intended to expand and strengthen non-formal methods of education, as well as to increase the relevance of formal education to the needs of the poor. 6/

3/ Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Sec. 102(b)(5) and Sec. 102(c), (as amended in 1973).

4/ Ibid., Sec. 103(b), (as amended in 1975).

5/ Ibid., Sec. 104(b), (as amended in 1975).

6/ Ibid., Sec. 105(b), (as amended in 1975).

NEW DIRECTIONS AND OTHER DONORS

The United States is not alone in adopting a New Directions-type theme for developmental aid. Other donor countries and international agencies have also adopted aid policies intended to benefit the poorest LDCs and the poorest groups within LDCs. The DAC strongly encourages such policies and now measures its members' aid performance not only in terms of how much they give but also in terms of how much of this assistance is directed towards helping "the poorest." ^{9/} The DAC and its members have not, however, been able to agree on standards by which performance in assisting the poorest can be measured. For most DAC members, assistance loans for the poorest LDCs have become slightly more concessional and the character of assistance projects has shifted to smaller-scale, rural activities. These changes indicate increased assistance to the poorest only if the loans and projects reach the poorest groups within the recipient countries--a result which is difficult to demonstrate or to measure. The DAC and most of its members tend to emphasize the criterion of how much assistance is going to the poorest LDCs, in part because this is far easier to measure than how much is going to the poorest peoples. ^{10/}

The increase in assistance to the poorest LDCs seems to be closely associated with total increases in assistance. While aid is apparently not being reduced to other countries, a large portion of new or additional aid is going to the poorest recipients. Between 1974 and 1975 the amount

^{9/} All but two members of the seventeen DAC members have officially embraced policies which would give priority either to helping poorer peoples within LDCs or the poorest states among LDCs. The two abstainers, however, are also two of the largest donors: France and Japan. Paris and Tokyo have not been induced to direct most assistance to the "poorest," despite the official proddings of the DAC organization and other donors.

^{10/} Several definitions are used for the poorest LDCs: those most seriously affected (MSA) by the rise in petroleum prices, those with per capita income less than \$250, and those with per capita income less than \$350.

1

of aid extended by all donors to countries with per capita GNPs of \$250 or less increased by more than \$2 billion. The donor countries having the best records for increasing aid to poor countries are also those that have most increased their overall levels of aid in recent years. Canada and Sweden, for example, have two of the highest rates of growth in total foreign aid and also two of the highest proportions of aid to the poorest LDCs. The United States, which has had only a very moderate real increase in assistance, has also had only a moderate shift towards the poorest LDCs. This may be partly because the U.S. program, more than others, emphasizes assisting the poorest groups rather than the poorest states. Nonetheless, in 1975 approximately half of U.S. food and bilateral developmental aid--the two programs subject to New Directions--went to LDCs with per capita incomes of less than \$300.

The agreement among Western aid donors that more aid should be provided to the poor does not appear to have significantly increased the amount of coordination among major aid donors or substantially changed the distribution of Western aid. The common theme has not been translated into common practice because too much confusion exists about who the poor are, about the amount of assistance actually being redirected to them, and about the best use of foreign aid to improve their lives.

II. AN ISSUE

A. NEW DIRECTIONS

2. Implementation

5

AID's efforts to implement the New Directions mandate are evidenced in the functional categories to which funds are allocated and the kinds of projects now receiving emphasis. Agriculture, rural development, and nutrition activities receive the largest share of our bilateral assistance funds, just over 50 percent of the proposed fiscal year 1979 development assistance budget. These funds are used for programs to alleviate hunger and malnutrition in developing countries and are directed primarily at increasing the productivity and income of poor farmers who work small plots of land. Funds for population and health programs receive approximately 28 percent of AID's budget, with programs again focussed primarily in the rural areas where access to adequate health and family planning services are the most limited. Education and training are important components of many AID projects and activities, and 8 percent of the AID budget is allocated specifically to education and human resources development.

New Directions emphasis can also be noted in the channels through which our foreign assistance is delivered. The United Nations Development Program, the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, the World Food Program, and other United Nations agencies which receive voluntary contributions through AID channels share a basic human needs philosophy in their approach to development. AID also relies in many cases on U.S., international, and host country private and voluntary organizations (PVOs) for assistance in project implementation. The PVOs, whose programs frequently emphasize small-scale participatory development activities, make an important contribution toward assuring that assistance is effectively utilized by poor people, and that the recipients themselves contribute to planning and implementation.

AID is also increasingly making use of Peace Corps volunteers to provide needed skills for implementation of New Directions projects at both the local and regional levels. A recent survey of Peace Corps

6

programs has indicated that Peace Corps volunteers participate in AID-supported programs in approximately 30 of the 36 countries where both AID and the Peace Corps have field missions. The personnel-intensive nature of local-level development projects has become increasingly apparent. AID's close coordination with both the Peace Corps and PVOs appears to the Committee to represent a viable method of strengthening AID's project implementation capability.

Source: House Report 95 - 1087, April 25, 1978.

C. POOR COUNTRIES

14

RELATIVELY LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Section 208 of the Humphrey bill,¹ discussed in detail by the Ad Hoc Group, notes that the countries on the U.N list of "least developed countries" are characterized by extreme poverty, very limited infrastructure, and limited administrative capacity. The section would permit certain exemptions from the normal methods of providing U.S. economic assistance in order to allow special help for such countries.

¹ H.R. 10691. For fuller discussion of this bill, see "A Memorial to Senator Humphrey," below.

15

The Committee supports such a policy in general but did not specifically include it in H.R. 12222 because several of the exemptions are already in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and the impact of others would be minimal or are unknown.

There are 30 countries on the U.N. list of least developed countries, 15 of which are recipients of U.S. assistance. The criteria for inclusion on the list are 1972 per capita income of \$125 or less, literacy rate below 20 percent, and manufacturing output equal to 10 percent or less of gross national product.

Three of the five exemptions for relatively least developed countries contained in Section 208 of the Humphrey bill are already in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Section 102(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act provides that assistance to such countries may be on a grant basis to the maximum extent possible. Section 110(a) waives the requirement that such countries make a significant contribution to the cost of a project. Section 110(b) waives the requirement that no grant assistance be disbursed for a project exceeding three consecutive years without further justification to Congress and efforts to obtain increased sources of financing within the recipient country.

A fourth provision of section 208 of the Humphrey bill would permit waiver of procurement requirements. As the President has already specified exemption from source/origin requirements for procurement in other developing countries, it was determined that the impact of such an exemption would be marginal.

The final provision of section 208 of the Humphrey bill would provide what is termed retroactive terms adjustment. In 1972 the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development recommended that official development assistance to the 30 least developed countries should be on a grant basis. The United States has accepted that policy.

At the same time, the developing country group known as the Group of 77 has been supporting the concept of debt relief for developing countries. As first discussed, the concept seemed to entail relief of all foreign debt for all developing countries. Over the past several years, the focus has been narrowed to official development assistance for the least developed countries. In fact, the middle-and-higher income countries are not, for the most part, interested in debt relief, as most of them have access to international commercial markets and can adequately support their external debt. At the March 1978 meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) the United States announced its support for the concept of debt relief for the least developed countries. This brought to twelve out of the fifteen the number of major aid donors to indicate support for some action on debt relief for the developing countries, with some countries going much further in forgiving the debt of all developing countries. Further progress in the North/South discussions and depoliticization of the debt issue will be assisted by U.S. actions implementing the announced U.S. policy.

As formulated in the Humphrey bill, the U.S. aid administrator would be authorized on a case-by-case basis to waive interest payments on past indebtedness and permit payments due on principal to be directed into local development efforts. This provision would affect

16

\$551 million owed by fifteen countries, with the annual payment due over the next five years averaging about \$17 million.

The committee supports Administration policy in regard to this provision of the Humphrey bill. It urges the executive branch to determine how such a policy would be implemented and what legislative authority would be required, and whether this policy should also cover loans extended under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954.

The committee notes that 95 percent of the external debt of the 30 least developed countries has arisen from official development assistance. While forgiveness would cost the United States little, the benefit to the respective countries would be significant if the policy were carried out in concert with other donor nations. These countries have almost no access to commercial lending markets. However, to the extent that an individual country does, the executive branch should not allow debt forgiveness if the primary effect would be to benefit private lenders.

Source: House International Relations Committee,
House Report No. 95-1087, April 25, 1978

II. AN ISSUE D. POOR PEOPLE
A View by the House Committee on
International Relations

Much remains to be accomplished even in the developing countries with higher per capita incomes. Rural as well as urban unemployed and underemployed must be integrated into the national economies. The economies are lacking in the managerial skills necessary for stability and continued growth, and the United States has much to offer in this area.

Many of the more advanced developing countries are facing second generation development problems. It is the modern sector that was most severely hit by the four-fold increases in oil prices in 1974. Alternative energy sources must be adapted to relieve balance of payments pressures and to permit continued industrialization. The emergence of modern sectors also has brought the poverty of the countryside to the cities.

17

The concept of directing U.S. bilateral assistance to the poorest countries is based on the assumption that the more developed countries have internal resources which could be directed toward developing the traditional sectors of their economies if the governments make the correct political decisions. This thesis needs to be further tested and evaluated. In any case, even countries which are making the proper commitment to development need substantial managerial and technical assistance which the U.S. should consider providing.

The forms of U.S. assistance to the middle-income countries need to be better defined. Many possibilities short of grant assistance are available—reimbursable development programs, programs in science and technology, housing guaranty programs, access to capital markets, support for U.S. exports, and other trade and commodity policies—and serious consideration needs to be given to how these policies and programs can be further developed to assist middle-income countries.

The committee therefore requests the Agency for International Development to report to the committee by February 1, 1979, on the future of U.S. development assistance programs toward middle income countries, particularly in reference to Latin America. The review should focus on the relationship between present allocation criteria for development assistance and the objectives of meeting the basic needs of poor people. It should address the second generation development problems of middle-income countries and investigate what on-going or potential mechanisms can be utilized to assist their development efforts.

*Emphasis (underlining) supplied

Source: House Report 95-1087, April 25, 1978.

MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES

Concern has been growing among members of the committee, particularly those on the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, that U.S. bilateral development assistance is being reduced or terminated on countries classified as middle-income at a time when these countries still have a great need for external assistance to support their economic development efforts. The committee calls on AID to review its development objectives toward middle income countries, particularly in Latin America, and the resources which the United States is willing to devote to their development. The development of these countries is in the direct interest of the United States.

The Agency should reassess its criteria for allocating bilateral assistance. The committee is aware of the shortcomings of per capita income as a measure of economic development and does not consider that a particular figure of per capita income necessarily indicates a particular level of development. The experience of Latin America illustrates that in countries whose development has produced two separate economies, the modern and the traditional, per capita GNP reflects the performance only of the modern sector. It says very little about the tragedy of the rural poor. A per capita income figure of \$550 or more inadequately expresses the fact that half the Hemisphere's population has an annual income of \$125 or less and one third of the people live on \$70 or less each year.

III. ALTERNATIVES

2001

D. NEW DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING STRATEGIES

An illustrative example -- extracts from
Mr. Robert E. Culbertson's paper entitled:

"AN A.I.D. DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE STRATEGY
FOR
LATIN AMERICA
1980-1999" *

*/ Compiler's note: These extracts and the accompanying summary budget projections for aid appropriations are included solely to illustrate how a different technical basis for programming results in changed country allocations. The extracts do not represent U.S.A.I.D. policies or decisions. Mr. Culbertson is presently an Associate Assistant Administrator in A.I.D. and directs the Office of Development Program in A.I.D.'s Bureau for Latin America. The extracts are included with Mr. Culbertson's personal permission. R.E.G.

Introduction

The paper that follows outlines a Strategy for A.I.D. in the countries of Latin America, for the balance of this century, and a program budget for the next ten years. This strategy emphasizes eradication of the absolute poverty of the poorest half of the peoples of the Region, and, in addition, deals with the problems that these essentially middle-income countries face in their attempts to avoid slipping backwards in the development process as it becomes more technologically demanding. The strategy confirms the phase out of the A.I.D. Missions in Uruguay and Chile, but proposes that A.I.D. Missions, focusing on rural poverty, be maintained in Colombia and Ecuador and that Appalachia-like, "depressed area" Poverty Programs be developed with Mexico and Brazil. Also proposed is a cooperative Advancement of Science and Technology program, administered from four regional offices and AID/W, in which all of the countries of the Hemisphere may share. This program aims to deal directly with the issue of achieving enough technological advances to keep pace with the new problems development itself generates, including how to increase exports so as adequately to service external debt.

215

SUMMARY

I. The Problem

Although the economies of the countries of Latin America have achieved substantial growth, as evidenced both by an average annual 5% growth rate and by GNP per capita levels of over \$550 a year, extreme poverty remains increasingly prevalent in all of these countries. This problem of the persistent poverty of the majority is one that the countries of the Region have not yet been able to solve. The situation is aggravated by the external aid agencies using misleadingly high per capita income levels to justify reducing or cutting off aid, thereby crippling further the efforts to fight poverty.

GNP per capita data mask the fact that, in reality, over half of each country's population, and the majority of the hemisphere's total population of 300 million have per capita incomes below \$125 per year; the poorest one-third less than \$70. Economic growth per se never has reached the rural poor. In fact, the gap between the urban industrial and the rural sectors continues to widen. For the majority of Latin Americans the realities of life include underemployment, low calorie intake, high infant mortality, low life expectancy, high morbidity, illiteracy, and high fertility. The results of pervading poverty are growing pressures from, and in behalf of the poor; to which the various power structures are responding variously -- some by concessions, some by repression, and some by progressive efforts to achieve more equitable growth, though none of these have yet met with any real success.

External aid has not so far helped, either, to restructure economic machinery so that it provides more benefits to more people. Where major restructuring has been tried, as in Chile and Peru, the results have been economic disaster. Growth has proven to be a fragile thing, especially when the effort is made, awkwardly, to skew its benefits toward the poor majority. This dilemma of growth without equity is no longer tenable. It is also a dangerously misleading model for the more recently developing countries of Africa and Asia.

Despite the view of some that, with resources reflected in GNP per capita rates in excess of \$500, the countries of Latin America should be able to solve their own problems alone, they cannot resolve this dilemma by themselves.

The reasons why they can't solve them alone are:

(1) Substantial economic and social evolution-cum-revolution, are required to effect the essential structural changes. But Latin American societies are typically traditional, the poor have little voice, it is not easy to get a national consensus (especially among

those whose influence counts) to change structures rapidly at what they regard as their own expense. While important enlightened elements exist who can see that the costs of change now are less than if the lid were to be kept on too long, these elements do not yet reflect a preponderant view, and their influence has had only spasmodic positive results thus far.

(2) Even where there is national consensus for change and progress toward a more egalitarian society, the countries of the Region do not command the technological tools necessary to eradicate absolute poverty, and to meet Basic Human Needs without endangering the growth gains they have made. This short-fall in economic skills has been demonstrated in Chile under Allende, by Peru today, and by Cuba and Jamaica, to mention only the most obvious cases. Technical inadequacy relates to the core problem of rural poverty. Neither they, nor we, yet know how increased incomes and living standards can be brought to all the rural poor through the concerting of better farming and marketing methods, rural infrastructure, education, and health measures, etc. A.I.D.'s 35 years of experience in these areas has given it clues, and superior R&D approaches and methodologies that can be of value in cooperating on rural project design and management. But essential technological break-throughs in these areas, needed for success on a national scale, do not yet exist. Thus the Latin American countries are not in a position to solve their poverty problems alone, even where they want to.

(3) The invoking of a GNP per capita means test as a measure for extending or withholding economic aid has become a deterrent to adequate external assistance, both from the I.F.I.'s and from A.I.D. Both the amounts have, as a result, been inadequate and the terms hardened.*

Yet, the inadequacies of per capita income as a measure of the welfare of a country's inhabitants, or its development, are clearly evident in the case of Latin America. Per capita income fails to reflect real income distribution. It hides the poverty of the Region's majority. It fails to provide a reliable indicator of a government's will to deal with poverty by mobilizing resources and investing them in equity producing development programs. Per capita income tells us nothing about the quality of a government's administrative structure and its technical capacity to design and implement programs for meeting basic human needs, either way -- high absorptive capacity or low. Natural resources wastage, environmental pollution, urban poverty problems, unemployment, energy costs, and lack of scientific and technological resources needed to break increasingly sophisticated development roadblocks, cannot be measured by per capita income.

* Moreover, loan repayments to the U.S. now exceed the annual A.I.D. lending level to Latin America. Receiving more than we lend will increase until A.I.D. loan levels rise.

Likewise, per capita country income tells nothing about the importance of particular countries or regions to the U.S. The use of per capita income as the principal decision-making tool for economic cooperation isolates U.S. development assistance from vital national objectives and provides decision-makers with an overly simplistic method for differentiating among LDCs. In many cases, per capita income provides distinctions among countries where there are not in fact significant differences, and it masks important development problems in some countries, of vital concern to the United States whose highlighting, and our attention to them, are critical. The results of the per capita means test, less external aid on harder terms have further impaired an effective attack on poverty.

(4) The "Second Generation" Science and Technology Problem:

While the huge, indigestible, residual poverty problem is their biggest headache, the Latin American countries are also encountering, increasingly, more sophisticated and difficult "second generation" problems as they move along the stages of development. In general, these problems relate primarily to the need for higher levels of technological capability than the countries' own growth experiences have been able to provide them. Foremost among these problems is that of how to manage an economy so as to keep it growing and stable, while engaging in social reform. Equally unavoidable technological problems that arise as development progresses include resources conservation and development, urban growth and blight, national technology levels in both public and private sectors equal to fostering the design and production of goods competitive in world trade, environmental problems, inadequacies in science and technology education, inadequate R&D institutions and programs in Science and Technology, and inadequate capabilities to plan and organize national science and technology up-grading programs.

(5) Special Problems, identified particularly with the larger countries, such as Mexico and Brazil, are of critical concern both to them and to the U.S. and cannot be solved without our help. They include the growing problem of labor force migration to the U.S. which is in reality a problem of the inadequacies of development in the Latin American countries. Even the largest countries have failed to solve their rural poverty problems. In fact Mexico and Brazil alone account for half of the poorest of the poor in the hemisphere. Their job creation efforts, especially Mexico's and the Caribbean countries are falling far short of meeting the needs of the new entrants into their labor markets. The surplus of close to two million people a year heads north, and west. This flow will grow until significant new advances are made in Latin American economic development, especially in Mexico.

(6) The Debt Burden Problem: Also of mutual critical concern is the growing external debt burden of the larger countries (as well as of countries like Peru and Jamaica) and the implications of this problem in terms of the world-wide need for restructuring international manufacturing and trade patterns so as to allow these LDCs to earn enough through exports to meet their debt servicing requirements -- all in the context of the permanence of high oil prices. Countries like Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Jamaica are victims of the irony that at the very moment in history when they have come to wish to alter course toward meeting the basic human needs of all their peoples, they are progressively constrained from doing so by the need to expend upwards of 30% of their export earnings on external debt servicing.

II. Why Solving These Problems is Important to the U.S.

We believe that there are several reasons.

(1) First, because unattended poverty is a violation of human rights and we have accepted, as a nation, the obligation to protect and promote such rights, including economic human rights wherever they are endangered. Half a hemisphere, our hemisphere, below the poverty line is not an acceptable situation in this regard.

(2) We have strong, literally vital, ties to Latin America -- a binding common heritage; crucial trade, investment, security, and cultural relationships; and they have many vital resources that we must import.

(3) The U.S. exports more to Latin America than to the rest of the developing world combined; almost as much as we export to the European Economic Community. U.S. direct private investment in Latin America represents over 70% of our investments in the entire developing world.

(4) In the years ahead, the Latin American countries will assume growing importance as leaders among the countries of the developing world, strongly influencing how the new international economic order evolves.

Large issues are at stake as the world economic order inexorably changes to accommodate permanently high oil prices and a global restructuring of industrial production and trade to permit oil-dependent LDC's to export enough to service their growing external debts.

These are issues of tremendous import to the U.S. We cannot simply close casually the chapter on economic cooperation with these countries while they struggle to continue to defeat poverty and to produce and export themselves into basic economic health.

. . .

IV. The Strategy:

A.I.D. will continue to work in the three poorest countries, Haiti, Bolivia and Honduras, with a sharp focus on poverty, using all the weapons in A.I.D.'s arsenal. In this effort still greater attention than at present will be given to rural education and health, family planning, and to a renewed and revitalized participant training program. In addition, the Science and Technology Transfer program identified below and described more fully in the complete report will be added. It will, in these countries, be administered by the resident USAID staff.

In the "less poor" countries where we now have Missions, the country programs will also be sharply focused on poverty, using a limited number of gifted DH staff to design and implement significant experimental and demonstration projects that can show the way to larger investments by others. Secondly, a Program to deal with these countries' second generation problems through Science and Technology Transfer will be launched, where desired by the country. This program, described in the main report, would be managed by four regional offices and AID/W as described in the main report. All nations can participate.

We propose that the USAID phase-out in Uruguay be completed, but that the phase-down in Colombia be stopped, and that the limited staff complement now there be reformed to the pattern of a lean, skilled, poverty problems team, focusing on that country's major poverty pockets. We also propose that the Ecuador program be built back to the same level and conformed to that kind of focus on poverty in the Ecuadorean highlands.

In both the poorest and in the "less poor" countries we expect also to develop non-projectized, but hard-hitting assistance packages focused on high impact, host country basic needs initiatives. A reinvigorated participant training program will apply in these countries as well.

With respect to the largest countries we propose, in principal, to deal with their poverty problems, too, by appropriate means. This appears not practical in Argentina nor necessary in Venezuela, but highly important, feasible, and necessary in Mexico and Brazil. Half of the poorest of the poor in the hemisphere can't be ignored. How we will work on Poverty Problems in Mexico and Brazil without reestablishing USAIDs, which we do not propose, is dealt with in the main report. Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela would be offered the full Science and Technology Transfer Package.

In addition, means will be sought by A.I.D. in concert with other U.S. Government agencies and the private sector to rationalize the unfavorable debt-export ratios of countries whose economic stability is seriously threatened thereby: Mexico, Brazil, Peru, Jamaica, Guyana, and others.

In summary, the top priority objective is to leave no poverty pocket unturned in the hemisphere. We target all of the poorest people of Latin America, wherever they live.

Second priority is to help countries deal more effectively with the increasingly complex technical problems that development and economic growth themselves generate and threaten to cause serious setbacks in growth and in ability to meet BHN.

Third, we propose to face up to two over-ridingly important issues, of as great domestic concern to the U.S. as to our neighbors:

- (1) Labor Force Migration to the U.S. and
- (2) the threat of untold grief from failure to address the external debt-export ratio issue in key countries whose economic health is essential to the international economic system. Chronic illness in this area must, as much in our interests as theirs, give way to sound, permanent solutions.

In the Appendix will be found more detail on Program Components and rough cost estimates for the period 1980-89.

BUDGET PROJECTION
TABLE

Following are tentative estimates of Latin America country program budgets for the period 1979-1989, divided into Poverty Program, Science and Technology and P.L. 480 elements. These country-by-country estimates are the minimum amounts we believe required to carry out the strategy outlined in the report.

PROPOSED A.I.D.
PROGRAM BUDGET
FOR LATIN AMERICA

1980-1989

A.I.D. APPROPRIATIONS

COUNTRY	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Bolivia	29	39	44	51	56	65	72	73	71	70	70
Haiti	17	27	33	38	39	40	44	45	43	41	47
Honduras	36	40	45	50	51	53	57	55	54	57	56
L.A. Regional	35	60	65	65	65	65	75	75	75	75	75
Andean Regional	25	6	25	6	30	0	10	12	12	15	15
Belize	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caribbean Regional	22	29	30	36	35	36	39	36	29	32	35
Central America Req.	17	15	5	10	10	5	5	5	5	5	10
Chile	0	0	0	22	22	22	22	16	13	8	7
Colombia	0	15	15	15	20	18	21	21	21	21	21
Costa Rica	12	19	21	26	22	19	25	21	21	20	20
Dominican Republic	13	24	27	29	28	22	25	20	22	22	22
Ecuador	0	12	15	18	21	15	19	19	14	18	20
El Salvador	9	24	24	27	22	24	21	23	18	20	20

COUNTRY	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Guyana	8	12	13	12	12	12	8	10	8	10	8
Surinam	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guatemala	11	18	22	25	23	25	18	20	18	23	21
Jamaica	29	27	26	30	26	27	22	21	24	22	23
Nicaragua	5	16	17	17	18	19	20	15	17	12	16
Panama	16	21	27	26	27	25	26	25	26	25	27
Paraguay	8	11	13	14	16	15	16	14	16	12	13
Peru	17	24	22	27	30	22	23	26	22	23	24
Uruguay	0	2	3	-	3	-	3	-	2	-	2
Trinidad	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Argentina	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Brazil	0	60	40	62	-	62	20	70	-	70	70
Mexico	0	70	40	82	20	92	20	82	82	30	82
Venezuela	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTALS L.A. REGION (including shelf)	309	571	573	689	606	681	612	705	614	632	705

III. ALTERNATIVES

E. A. ORGANIZATION AND COORDINATION OF ASSISTANCE

3. Offering Countries

President Carter's decisions on the Administrative Organization of U.S. Entities responsible for Development Assistance

the committee was informed that the President has made specific, important decisions concerning coordination and organization of foreign assistance efforts by the Executive branch. Most of the reorganization proposed in the Humphrey bill can be undertaken under existing Presidential authorities without further legislation. The committee has been advised officially by the Development Coordination Committee that the President's decisions include:

(1) A new foreign assistance agency should replace AID and should include some foreign assistance functions now discharged by other agencies.

(2) The Administrator has been designated as the principal advisor to the President on development policies and programs. He will also be the Executive Branch's chief spokesman to the Congress on development assistance. This will enable both the President and the Congress to have one main focal point for responding to their inquiries on overall development matters.

(3) The Administrator will have a voice in all economic decisions having a major impact on developing countries. This will enable development issues to receive greater attention in all councils of the U.S. government and make certain that the development impact of all decisions is given adequate weight.

(4) The Administrator, in close consultation with other agencies, will prepare annually an aid policy statement that will attempt to show the relationship of all aspects of U.S. foreign assistance to our country's goals, and relate the assistance and goals to other U.S. policies that affect developing countries. This annual policy statement, when approved by the President, would provide general guidance to all agencies involved in assistance programs in preparing their budgets and managing their programs. Also, it would provide the basis for a comprehensive and coordinated approach to the Congress concerning all requests for funding foreign assistance programs.

(5) All operational issues concerning our development assistance efforts would be dealt with in the Development Coordination Committee (DCC). Many of these issues are now handled through other coordinating committees in the Executive branch.


Source: Report of the Committee on International Relations on H.R. 12222, Report No. 95-1087, April 25 1978.

(6) The Treasury should continue to supervise U.S. relations with the multilateral development banks while strengthened coordinating mechanisms are tested in the coming year.


The committee has been advised further that the Presidential decisions included decisions to place responsibility over the Peace Corps and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation within the new foreign assistance agency; to establish within the new agency an international development institute to support the Peace Corps and private and voluntary organizations which assist developing countries; to give the enhanced Development Coordination Committee the responsibility for reviewing international financial institution projects and advising the U.S. executive directors on development policies relating to the institutions and for reviewing Public Law 480 allocations; to establish within the new agency a semi-autonomous foundation for technological collaboration with developing countries to improve U.S. support for private and public research on problems of concern to developing countries; to give the new agency responsibility for reviewing and advising on policies and proposed budgets for all U.N. activities with development missions, while retaining management responsibilities in the State Department; and to give the new agency substantial autonomy from the State Department, including having the new agency submit its budget directly to the President.

AID Organization - January 1978

(After Reorganization)



AID Organization - January 1977



III. ALTERNATIVES

E. ORGANIZATION OF ASSISTANCE

3. Offering Countries

Original Proposal for Reorganization contained in The Humphrey Bill, April 25, 1978.

The reorganization proposed under the Humphrey bill would establish a new development agency, the International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA), replacing the Agency for International Development (AID). The IDCA would be an independent agency, its Administrator reporting directly to the President. The Administrator would be responsible for effective and efficient administration of U.S. foreign assistance programs and would coordinate the formulation of overall U.S. development policies. Within the IDCA would be the bilateral assistance program now run by AID, the contributions to international financial institutions now coordinated by the Department of the Treasury, the voluntary contributions to United Nations technical and humanitarian agencies now coordinated by the Department of State, and the development and relief aspects of the Public Law 480 Food for Peace program now coordinated by AID, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. An International Development Institute would be established within IDCA as the main force of U.S. government support for public and private voluntary programs involving development. The Peace Corps would be transferred to the Institute from ACTION, while maintaining substantial administrative autonomy.

Source: House Report No. 95-1087, Report of the Committee on International Relations on H.R. 12222, April 25, 1978.

APPENDIX 3

Some Notes on U.S. Development Assistance

(Preliminary Draft plus
Annexes I, II, III, IV and V)

Marco D. Pollner ★

★ These notes and annexes have been prepared as informal background material for the study on Technical Cooperation from Developed Countries to Latin America. The views expressed are personal and do not necessarily reflect those of UNDP or CEPAL.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Some Notes on U.S. Development Assistance

(pages 1-8)

Annex I:	Note on Development Assistance Strategies	(5 pages)
Annex II:	Note on U.S. and World Development	(2 pages)
Annex III:	Note on Development Assistance in the 1970's	(10 pages)
Annex IV:	Note on Technology for Developing Nations	(4 pages)
Annex V:	Note on Private Voluntary Organizations	(2 pages)

Some Notes on U.S. Development Assistance ★

By mid-1978 the outlook for U.S. foreign assistance was bleak indeed. Major legislation aimed to revamp an outmoded, outdated foreign aid machinery lay dormant in the Senate. The Humphrey Bill designed to respond to the challenges of the 80's and beyond, to replace institutions and methods of assistance dating back to the early 60's, would have to await the next session of Congress. Under the leadership of Senator Church, slated to become Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, speedy action could result in a new foreign assistance concept and institutional framework by mid-1979.

Yet the existing institution, which for some 17 years has guided U.S. foreign assistance was not about to lie down and die. AID and its new Administrator were, in fact, beginning to implement some of the measures envisaged under the proposed reorganization. The Development Coordination Committee was strengthened and so was the position of the AID Administrator in that Committee, in the White House and vis-a-vis other cabinet members.

Meanwhile Congress was struggling to approve the Foreign Aid Bill for fiscal year 1979, stunned by the effects of Proposition 13 which sent shock-waves throughout the land. More than a taxpayers' revolt, Proposition 13 --approved by an overwhelming margin in California in June 1978-- was a blow to growing government expenditures many of them to the poor, the ethnics, the underprivileged. This mood was rapidly spreading, and the House --in an election year-- had its ear finely tuned to its constituencies. Even earlier, congressional reluctance to go along with the Administration in meeting U.S. commitments to the international financial institutions had been evident. Massive cuts were proposed, which prompted The Washington Post --often a critic of the perquisites of these institutions-- to publish two unprecedented editorials defending the World Bank and the regional banks, such as

★ These notes and annexes have been prepared as informal background material for the study on Technical Cooperation from Developed Countries to Latin America. The views expressed are personal and do not necessarily reflect those of UNDP or CEPAL.

the Inter-American Development Bank.

With respect to Latin America, the signing of the Panama Canal treaties were supposed to mark the beginning of a new era of relations between the United States and its neighbours to the South. However, more cynical voices said that it was merely the end of an old era. Indeed, at international meetings "Latinos" complained as vehemently as ever against U.S. trade policy, the difficulties of access to markets, the limitations of the U.S. system of preferences, the increasing signs of U.S. protectionism, and other policies affecting major traditional export commodities such as tin, copper and zinc.

Latin America, as the middle-income region among developing regions was faced with additional problems, as certain forms of aid were no longer available, because countries had reached the cut-off level for concessional aid but were not yet capable of handling the much tougher conditions of commercial or conventional assistance. It is symptomatic that for fiscal year 1979 only four South American countries appear as recipients of U.S. aid. Indeed, one-third of total U.S. aid to the region is concentrated in the Caribbean countries with a total population of only 15 million. In terms of its relative share Latin America and the Caribbean represent only 18% of U.S. aid for 1979, \$245 million of a total of \$1,354 million.

What are the factors that contribute to the continuous difficulties in obtaining congressional approval for foreign aid? For the difficulties are not new, nor did they originate with the oil crisis of 1973. Domestic inflation and its effect on the American consumer is undoubtedly a contributing element, as well as the recognition that the sustained economic growth of the 60's is no longer to be taken for granted, are factors which put foreign aid into a new perspective. Still the total amount Americans spend on foreign aid is so small, compared to many domestic welfare or defense programmes, that the economic impact is negligible. Yet despite earnest representations by "developmentalists" that the U.S. now spends only 0.25 per cent of its GNP on foreign aid (compared to 0.50 in the past) and ranks pretty much near the bottom compared to other donor nations, these

arguments seem to fall on deaf ears. It has been said that the American political process is one of accommodation and it is this ingredient that seems to be missing in foreign aid. The reason is simple; unlike domestic legislation there are no constituencies to whom Congress has to respond, or who indeed ask Congress to act. This lack of grassroot support for foreign aid may be the key to its difficulties with Congress.

Why is there so little support across the country for foreign aid? Evidently, the political trade-offs are not operating or not as directly as in the case of domestic legislation where accommodations and mutual support among members of Congress is possible. The degree to which the electorate is informed and aware of the implications of foreign aid, is another element. And so is the extent to which those wishing to support foreign aid are organized and heard by their Congressman. Much has been said about the ineffectiveness of foreign aid, but is the public aware of the constraints imposed by Congress on the Administration, which cannot help but hamper an efficient delivery? Americans are a generous people as demonstrated by the huge amounts donated annually to charitable causes at home and abroad. Why then should one assume that they do not wish to help less privileged people in other countries? The answer would seem to lie more in the way the foreign aid is perceived and how the individual can make his views known.

It is well to remember that in the early years of foreign aid, in addition to the humanitarian motives, the perceived threat of communist influence contributed to broad support of the programme. Later, with the preoccupations for domestic welfare and the Viet-Nam War, support declined for foreign aid. At the present juncture, Americans may not be adverse to helping others, particularly their neighbours in Latin America and the Caribbean, but they may question whether the type of aid should not be tailored to better fit the current realities.

These new realities are spelled out in a report prepared by a group of experts for the Brookings Institution and submitted to the Department

of State in October 1977.^{1/} This is but the latest of a series of reports commissioned over the past ten years in an effort to change the direction and operation of U.S. development assistance.^{2/} Already in 1969, Robert Asher^{3/} anticipated many of the concepts still under discussion today, and in 1972 R. Poats^{4/} suggested new forms of technical assistance, to name only two highlights of the abundant literature on development aid.

Many of the concepts contained in the Brookings report are reflected in the Humphrey Bill. At the same time AID has proceeded to act on some of the recommendations, and the position of its Administrator as head of the Developing Coordinating Committee has been strengthened. The U.S. is committed to directing its development efforts "in ways which make more effective the incorporation of the rural poor and the urban unemployed in the economy."^{5/} However, it is not yet clear how to do this technologically. This uncertainty tends to lend strength to the doubts expressed by the Brookings report in excessive reliance on this approach. Furthermore, AID and apparently Congress are beginning to question the validity of GNP per capita measure and are looking to the World Bank for other measurements.

The question of aid to the poor in the "middle-income" countries, particularly Latin America, is viewed with concern by the U.S. Congress. In 1978 the House International Relations Committee specifically addressed itself to the question of continuing external assistance needs to these countries, particularly in Latin America. To this end, it asked that a better way than the "discredited per capita GNP method" be found by which

-
- ^{1/} The Brookings Institution, "Interim Report: An Assessment of Development Assistance Strategies", October 1977.
 - ^{2/} "Development Assistance in the New Administration", Government Printing Office, 1968; "Partners in Development" (Pearson Report), 1969; "U.S. Foreign Assistance in the 1970s: A New Approach" (Peterson Report), 1970.
 - ^{3/} Robert Asher, Development Assistance in the Seventies: Alternatives for the United States, 1970
 - ^{4/} Rutherford M. Poats, Technology for Developing Nations: New Directions for U.S. Technical Assistance, 1972.
 - ^{5/} Abelardo L. Valdez, Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean, AID, June 1978.

to measure these needs. A report on the subject is to be presented to Congress by February 1979.

Other concerns regarding Latin America and the Caribbean are the increasing development tension and stress which contribute to the flow of illegal immigrants into the U.S. For many countries immigration has become a safety valve, easing social and economic pressures at home. Although in 1973 Congress gave AID a clear mandate to work directly with the poor, the level of bilateral assistance for the region has not been sufficient to launch a comprehensive attack on the problem of poverty. In his testimony to the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, the Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean of AID reported that AID was drawing out of the region \$70 million more on loan repayments than were being funded in new loan projects. At current AID levels, this trend will continue for at least the next decade.^{1/}

The specific problems facing Latin America are of concern to the 16 million citizens of Hispanic descent in the U.S., which makes this country the fourth largest Spanish-speaking nation in the Western Hemisphere. As stated by Mr. Valdez, North Americans have very strong ties with Latin America "as strong as our historical ties with Europe and for many of the same reasons" and that Hispanic Americans will, in the future, be taking an increasingly active role in making and conducting the foreign policy of the U.S.

The current policy of the AID on technical assistance will continue to give emphasis to the poorest of the poor, but will probably undergo certain changes as to the manner in which this aid is to be given. It is recognized that direct aid to the poor will not necessarily contribute to raising the level of well-being in the long run, and that some other means must be found to achieve these ends. Furthermore, under the Congressional mandate --which has a rather narrow interpretation-- most of the aid was concentrated in rural areas. Nevertheless, the large pockets of urban poor cannot be neglected and thus a more balanced approach is being explored. One of the possible changes would relate to

^{1/} Abelardo L. Valdez, Statement to the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, U.S. Congress, June 1978.

broadening the existing sectors in which U.S. aid has been concentrated, namely agriculture, health and education, to include also elements of export development and industrial programs which would create employment.

With regard to the perspectives of U.S. aid to Latin America, and for that matter overall U.S. aid targets, the goal is to reach a larger dollar amount by 1982. Mention is made of doubling the total aid or, using another standard, increasing the percentage of GNP which stands currently at 0.25 to 0.50. While a useful figure for reference purposes, neither the U.S. Administration nor the Congress attaches particular importance to the GNP percentage. This is because U.S. aid in absolute terms is far superior to that of any other country. Nevertheless, it is also true that the advocates of development aid have not been very successful in persuading Congress to allocate larger amounts. In this respect the non-governmental organizations and the private voluntary organizations could play a larger role as could the developing countries themselves. There are not many occasions or fora where the views of individual developing countries are clearly heard regarding specific policies and priorities of technical and financial assistance from the U.S.

As regards Latin America, it is not anticipated that there will be any substantial increases; indeed it is foreseen that the value of aid will remain at current levels, which implies that in real terms it will be declining. In contrast other developing regions of the world are expected to show substantial increases in the volume of aid received.

As regards to future trends of bilateral versus multilateral aid, it appears that Congress clearly favours bilateral aid for a number of reasons, including the ability to use it as leverage for different purposes. It should however be noted that the congressional position refers to overall development aid which includes both financial and technical assistance. It is in the area of financial aid where the major obstacles lie with respect to Congress. As regards contributions to the UNDP no major congressional objections are anticipated. Another trend in foreign aid relates to the role of the private and voluntary

organizations which are considered a useful tool to provide aid to the poor in developing countries, without the often cumbersome process of government intervention. Indeed, in countries where a government does not have or does not wish to enact special programs directed at the poor, these voluntary agencies may play a useful role. Furthermore, they may work through local voluntary organizations in the developing countries and thus establish a parallel channel of aid to the official government to government process. It appears that future U.S. development assistance will rely more heavily on these organizations whose operations are to be included under the proposed International Development Foundation. This reflects some disenchantment with the effectiveness of official aid, as well as a feeling that the government should reduce its role somewhat, evidencing a desire towards an increase of assistance handled through private and voluntary organizations. The growing role of the PVO's can be appreciated by the fact that about 25-30% of AID funds are directed to local private organizations.

With regard to the policy under which aid is given, some changes have taken place in recent years. It is felt that the previous conditions or strings attached to aid were detrimental and should not be continued in the future. Examples of such tied-aid were program loans or balances of payment support which required certain economic policies by the receiving countries. Aid should be given in response to the request by the receiving country and not imposed by the U.S. Countries would presumably request assistance in line with the priorities of their development programs. The U.S., as mandated by Congress, is ready to offer assistance in a number of sectors and should make its position clear to the receiving countries as to what type of aid is available.

Another innovation relates to the use of U.S. personnel or services under the technical assistance program. The receiving countries may choose personnel as well as services either from the U.S., from the receiving country itself or from another developing country which is eligible to receive U.S. aid. In certain cases, such as for French speaking experts for Haiti, exceptions can be made and personnel may be

contracted from other developed countries. In the case of assistance through multilateral organizations such as CABEI, ECIEL or CEPAL, the contribution is made to the research center or institution without conditions, leaving them free to contract for personnel and services anywhere.

In view of the relative narrow scope of sectors to which U.S. aid is directed, a process of consultation with other donor agencies has been established. Likewise, the program planning and investment planning process is being refined to respond to the needs of the receiving countries.

★ ★ ★ ★

Separate notes presenting extracts or summaries of relevant publications dealing with the subject matter discussed in the preceding pages are attached as Annexes.

Annexes:

- I. Note on Development Assistance Strategies
- II. Note on U.S. and World Development
- III. Note on Development Assistance in the 1970's
- IV. Note on Technology for Developing Nations
- V. Note on Private Voluntary Organizations

Note on Development Assistance Strategies

In October 1977, the Brookings Institution presented a report to the State Department entitled "An Assessment of Development Assistance Strategies",^{1/} which addresses itself to the questions of the central development problems facing the poor countries, the lessons from over two decades of foreign aid for future development assistance strategies, and the purpose and contents of such a strategy.

The study, prepared by a group of experts, points out that the gap between the poorest and the richest developing countries is now about three times larger than it was in 1950. An early appreciation of this fact led the U.S. Congress to legislate "New Directions" in 1973 for the U.S. development loan and grant programs. It seeks to use U.S. assistance to enlarge participation of the poor and would concentrate U.S. resources on support of food, agriculture, population, health and education, and human resources development. Two approaches, one to broaden productive employment and rural development, and the other to alleviate human misery through provision of basic services and commodities to the poor are envisaged in this connection.

The Brookings study feels that support of basic human needs should be treated as a shift in emphasis and not as a new strategy. Economic growth remains the underlying means to satisfying human needs. The Brookings report, furthermore, feels that the U.S. by restricting its assistance to projects which affect the poor directly, would risk providing only temporary help to a smaller number of poor people than could otherwise be reached.

The report indicates that underestimation of the force of nationalism in shaping development policy could have serious effects as development becomes the centerpiece of nationalistic politics in

^{1/} Brookings Institution, "Interim Report: An Assessment of Development Assistance Strategies", October 6, 1977.

an increasing number of nations. The U.S. should make clear its standards and policies and respond promptly and effectively to requests that meet its criteria. It should also be clear that the U.S. is not imposing its values and interest on an unwilling recipient. Furthermore, the report concludes that any decisions on development assistance levels should not be based on their imagined impact on negotiations relating to the New International Economic Order. As to human rights, the report favours a case-by-case approach in which the seriousness of violations, the direction of change, and the relevant importance of different rights, become critical matters for judgement.

The Brookings report recommends that the U.S. should join other donor nations in the long-range commitment to help developing nations achieve a major advance against poverty by the end of the century. This would involve a substantial increase in the level of U.S. aid through bilateral and multilateral channels. At the same time, it should be made clear that the success of such an effort depends on the policies followed by developing countries. The report also recommends a long-term program of technological cooperation with both poor and middle income countries.

The report recommends that the bilateral development assistance programs should be directed to the low income countries, but that technological cooperation with middle and high income countries should be encouraged. As regards the effectiveness of U.S. bilateral assistance, the report notes that legislation and legislative history under which AID functions is sixteen years old, complex and extensive, and that it contributes to the reputation for AID's inefficiency, rigidity and slowness. The practice of concentrating on small projects, each subject to congressional approval, contributes to this critical view. In the past, large field missions played an important role in shaping the domestic economic policies of receiving countries. Now, if these countries need technical counsel they would rather contract it directly or request it from an international organization. Thus, a non-interventional style of U.S. assistance is suggested which would let eligible

countries know (a) what aid is offered, (b) according to what criteria, (c) under what conditions, and (d) that the request is to be initiated by the host country.

The report recommends that projects and programs should fit into a sectoral or regional framework that would promote growth and equity; that staff productivity be increased by combining small projects into larger programs; that present legislation be revised and requirements that inhibit action be eliminated. Furthermore the U.S. should seek local intermediaries to execute programs and define the criteria which would govern its aid.

The strong traditional operational orientation of AID reflecting concern for congressional reaction has discouraged research and development, the results of which are necessarily uncertain. The consequence is that insufficient U.S. resources are now devoted to research and development on problems of concern and importance to developing countries. There is a lack of American institutional bases to help developing research and development institutions in the developing nations, and to carry out relevant research and training in the U.S.

AID's closeness to the Department of State as well as its exposure to congressional criticism, may create some pressures to bias operations in favour of short-term political, as opposed to long-term developmental, goals. Some major donors have aid agencies that are separate from their foreign office.

The Brookings report recommends the establishment of a Development Cooperation Agency --which would be AID's successor-- and an International Development Foundation which would be concerned with research, development and training. The Development Cooperation Agency (DCA) would continue support of delivery systems and other operational programs including technical assistance. The DCA would receive foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State, but would be an independent agency reporting to the President. Projects would be carried out under contract

with other executive departments, universities and private contractors as is the case with AID. The DCA would maintain close liaison with the proposed new International Development Foundation. The IDF would help to expand knowledge of the development process by strengthening research, development and training capabilities in the developing nations and in the U.S. The Foundation would serve as a central source of knowledge concerning research needs and priorities on selected development programs. It would help build capacity in the developing countries for research, training and experimentation through support of training in the U.S. for the staff of local institutions.

The IDF would also help private and public foundations and private and voluntary organizations (PVO's) to become more effective. The PVO's have pioneered new approaches in schools, hospitals and anti-poverty activities over the years.

The Brookings report recommends that U.S. financial support for private voluntary organizations should be increased, but under more rigorous criteria than at present. The IDF would be responsible for U.S. support to PVO's.

The report recommends strong U.S. support for international financial institutions, in particular the World Bank group. Multilateral aid as a percentage of total official development assistance was 30% in 1976 compared with only 17% in 1970. The U.S. contribution to multilateral institutions now averages about one-third of their total funds.

Because of inflation, the real value of U.S. Official Development Assistance (ODA) has declined to half of what it was during the 1950's. In terms of GNP, U.S. aid fell from 0.50% in 1965 to 0.25% in 1976. As a result, U.S. is now in twelfth place out of 16 donors, in terms of aid relating to GNP.

According to the Brookings report, several reasons explain this erosion of U.S. aid. "First, the world war gave way to detente and one of the prime stimulus of large aid levels was weakened; second,

U.S. involvement in the Viet Nam War reduced congressional support for U.S. aid; finally, domestic social concerns received heightened attention and stimulated rapidly expanded domestic objectives outlays." U.S. spending on social objectives at home rose from \$216 per person in 1966 to \$572 per person in 1976. During the same period, U.S. spending on foreign economic aid to developing countries fell from \$4.81 to \$1.59 per person. Thus, the report concludes, a significant attack on world poverty would require substantial increases in both bilateral and multi-lateral aid. An ODA level of \$10.8 billion (in 1977 dollar), or roughly double the present programs, is considered adequate by the Brookings study.

In conclusion the report recommends that a Coordinator for International Development Policy should be appointed, preferably in the Executive Office of the President. His functions would include to review all budgetary requests having to do with international development; to preside the Development Coordination Committee which would be reduced to include only those agencies with a major interest in development matters; and participate in inter-agency consideration of non-aid issues affecting development.

Note on U.S. and World Development

A more global outlook of the U.S. and world development is presented by the Overseas Development Council in its Agenda 1977.^{1/} The central choices open to the Carter Administration are analyzed as follows: One alternative provides for only marginal changes in existing policies but with more effective implementation. There would be some increased U.S. actions in areas such as aid, trade, commodities, etc. consonant with the more responsive official rhetoric of the recent past. A second alternative calls for a policy of accelerated reform, emphasizing the active search for a broader and more significant range of reforms of the existing international political and economic system. This would include the area of trade policy, items on the "global agenda", automatical resource transfers, greater access to IMF resources, and increased aid levels. A third choice, which could be combined with either of the first two alternatives, provides for greatly increased support for a "basic human needs" strategy of development, designed to eliminate by the end of the century the worst consequence of absolute poverty. The fourth option would be a combination of the previous three with certain limitations. Otherwise, it is concluded that the U.S. would be at a disadvantage for the future as well as the present.

As regards development assistance, the ODC report recommends (1) that the U.S. should significantly increase its financial support to programs in the low income countries that are designed to address the basic needs of their poor majorities; (2) the U.S. should support major research to identify the measures required to eliminate the worst aspects of poverty by the year 2000; and (3) the U.S. Government should emphasize its interest in significantly more supportive cooperation with governments that are prepared to seriously address the basic need of the "poor majority" of their population.

The ODC also feels that the new Administration should commit itself to an increase of U.S. development assistance, reaching a goal of 0.5% of GNP by 1981 and eventually increasing to 0.7%. An increase of U.S. development assistance of this magnitude would raise a number of questions concerning the mechanisms to ensure that these additional funds were spent wisely.

^{1/} Overseas Development Council, The United States and World Development, Agenda 1977.

A good portion of the increased amount of aid would have to be channeled through international financial institutions. Currently about 25% of U.S. aid --about \$1 billion-- is contributed to multilateral financial institutions. The ODC report points out that the 0.7% target figures are a measure of willingness to give but not a measure of need. Thus some type of "global development budget" would have to be formulated to assess the needs of the developing countries and to determine the share of participation by various donors.

As regards the American bilateral development aid program, the report notes that it has gone through a number of permutations since it was first established in the late 1940's. There was no significant change in the emphasis of development assistance between 1961 and 1973. In 1973 legislation for bilateral development assistance shifted the emphasis from strategies aimed at maximizing economic growth and industrialization to those focusing on helping the poorest groups within the poorest countries, particularly in the rural areas. The ODC recommends that (1) new U.S. economic assistance legislation should authorize a substantially increased level of development assistance expenditures; (2) legislation should make it clear that the principal purpose of the bilateral development aid program is to improve the productive capacity and well-being of people through development of recipient countries. All other benefits for the U.S. should be considered as beneficial side effects but subordinated to the central goal of development; (3) U.S. bilateral assistance to the low-income countries should be provided on substantially more concessional terms.

Note on Development Assistance in the 1970's

The recommendations put forward in the 1977 Brookings report, regarding U.S. development assistance strategy, reflect a long standing awareness that existing policies and mechanisms are outdated and need to be reviewed in the light of changing world conditions. Already in 1969, Robert Asher in his book Development Assistance in the Seventies^{1/} advocated a number of changes in U.S. policies which contain many of the same ingredients.

Asher recalls that Congress requested the President in late 1969 "to make a thorough and comprehensive reappraisal of U.S. foreign assistance programs" and submit his recommendations for such reforms and reorganization of future foreign assistance programs. Thus, Congress signaled to the Administration that it does not expect U.S. to be out of the foreign aid business within the near future, but that it does look forward to fundamental changes in the character of the U.S. effort.

The different perceptions by Congress and the President are reflected by the Administration's assurance that the foreign aid program is clearly in the national interest, that the sums asked for constitute a minimum request and that the taxpayer is getting a good return on his investment. The Congress however wants proof and has become increasingly unwilling to provide the sums requested by the President. In terms of policy options, Asher indicates that the U.S. can consider reducing, maintaining or increasing the levels of aid. Likewise, it can modify the proportion of bilateral as compared with multilateral, the proportion of grants to loans, technical assistance to capital assistance, and emphasis on specific sectors, e.g. education or agriculture. He feels that by 1969, the U.S. had reached the end of an era with respect to foreign aid. During the

^{1/} Robert Asher, Development Assistance in the Seventies, 1970.

1950's "... foreign aid had been justified primarily as a national security measure needed to strengthen allies and to build up low income countries so that they would be less vulnerable to communist invasion or take over... In the 1960's, development itself was given a high... priority, at least by the executive branch. On the more narrow security side, emphasis was given to the internal threat to the less developed countries from guerrilla or operatives trained abroad." The basic framework for foreign aid has been the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The decrease in appropriations has reduced the importance of foreign aid both in absolute and relative terms. At the same time, restrictions and provisions in the Act "considered offensive by several respecting nations have made this country's bilateral development assistance programs progressively more difficult --almost impossible-- to administer."

As the decade of the 1970's began, economic aid was still expected to serve a variety of contradictory purposes. According to Asher it is an arm of foreign policy but not yet well adapted to serve a long range goal of expediting balanced development in low income countries. Although it is an economic instrument, it serves political ends. Its relationship to commercial and investment policy is loose and poorly understood. Foreign aid continues to be viewed as a voluntary, annually emergency program, although everyone expects it to continue through the 1970's and beyond.

The foreign aid program operates in a world environment which has changed fundamentally, involving not only the domestic situation of the U.S. but a worldwide understanding of the nature of the development process.

With regard to Latin America, the Punta del Este Charter developed by the U.S. and Latin America in 1961 represented an important milestone in the effort to formulate feasible social as well as economic growth. But already in 1969, Asher observed that techniques for incorporating these goals into a decision-making process had yet to be devised. The annual country reviews of the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress were useful in bringing about greater specificity about desirable social and institutional measures in participating countries. Indeed, it will be recalled, that U.S. loan assistance to Latin American

countries was to be consistent with CIAP's conclusions and recommendations.

With the advent of the Kennedy Administration and the launching of the Alliance for Progress, the preparation of overall country development programs was given considerable impetus. The initial swing of the pendulum probably overemphasized the value of preparing an impressive, internally consistent five-year plan, based all too frequently on statistical data of doubtful validity and in any event unlikely to be carried out because of the absence of machinery and procedures linking the plan to the actual investment decisions of the government and the private sector.

The Country-Programming Process

In practice, the magnitude and composition of the American aid program in an aid-receiving country in any given year are determined primarily by the size and scope of the program in the preceding year. In theory, they are determined by an elaborate program planning process, which began as an effort to get away from the piecemeal approach of the 1950s and to substitute for it a more comprehensive analysis of needs and priorities. The process for a given year normally takes fifteen to eighteen months, spanning field mission analysis and discussions with host government, Washington review, Congressional action on the appropriations request, final allocation of funds to regions and countries, and commitment of funds for specific projects or programs. Radical changes in a country's economic or political situation may make necessary a readjustment of country program proposals at any time during this process.

Some of the principal advances of the 1960s in techniques for the use of outside assistance to expedite development can be attributed to the deep U.S. involvement in the programming process. Asher feels that the point of diminishing returns has been reached, and a more direct U.S. involvement during the 1970s would be preferable. This view is violently disputed by some of the ablest professionals in the AID.

The programming process begins with a statement of U.S. objectives in the low-income country. That statement "is almost always a pro forma quotation from earlier submissions or from State Department documents on

U.S. policy toward a country... It is seldom an independent statement of policy. This is as one would expect. The AID programming process is not the appropriate channel through which to determine basic U.S. policy toward a country."

In trying to clarify problems connected with country programming, it will be helpful to consider three issues separately: (1) whether the basic principles implicit in country programming are still valid; (2) if so, whether the locus of country programming should be changed; and (3) the relationship of country programming to leverage on the low-income country.

Development assistance could be allocated with little ado by adopting a formula for distribution based on population, or population and per capita income, or population, per capita income, and foreign trade as a fraction of gross national product (GNP). Though there is much to be said in favor of entitlement by formula, at present most donor governments will recoil in horror at anything so simple and straightforward. In its pristine form, the project approach was also a substitute for country programming; donors needed only to approve and finance "good" projects and reject "bad" ones.

If, however, overall resource use by the less developed country is to rank as a major consideration, some system for reviewing past, present, and proposed uses of its resources is necessary. The idea of regularly looking ahead for several years at a time, of trying to ascertain whether the country's policies are sufficiently conducive to development and how the host country's resources can best be combined with external resources in order to achieve priority goals, can only be lauded. Country-programming arrangements are deficient, not because the basic objective is obsolete, but because current procedures are so ponderous, make so many superfluous demands on scarce and overworked decision makers, and are not designed to satisfy simultaneously a larger number of interested parties. The substantial investment of U.S. time and energy in independently amassing detailed information tends to downgrade the developing country's assessment of its

own needs and priorities, encourage a Papa-knows-best attitude on the part of the United States, and involve the United States too intimately in the internal affairs of other countries.

Technical Assistance from the United States

With regards to technical assistance, or technical cooperation, as it is frequently called in order to stress the mutuality of the relationship, Asher feels that if there had never been a European Recovery Program or a Mutual Defense Assistance Program, and American aid to the less developed countries had evolved more organically from President Truman's original Point Four proposal, the potentialities and limitations of technical assistance might today be better known. Financial and commodity assistance would doubtless also have been provided, but they would probably have become available primarily within the framework of technical assistance efforts, as adjuncts to programs of teaching and training. Speculation about what might have been is not necessarily fruitful, however, and realism requires us to accept the fact that technical assistance, although popular among donors, has been regarded by receivers not as the heart of development assistance but as a fringe benefit.

Neither the promise of technical assistance nor the threat to withdraw it will impel the receiving nation to incur the political and financial risks involved in introducing major changes in policy. Nevertheless, technical assistance is reported with growing frequency to be the most productive form of assistance per dollar spent, to be essential at all phases of the foreign aid cycle (not just at the beginning), and as has been indicated, to be needed after the "trade limit on growth" --the inability to earn enough through exports to finance necessary imports-- has been overcome.

United States technical assistance has consistently been concentrated in three sectors, agriculture, health, and education, although this fact has from time to time been revealed with all the éclat of a brand new discovery. A background document prepared in July 1949 for the House Committee on Foreign Affairs said, "Among inhabitants of least-developed areas, basic improvement(s) in education, health, and agriculture are essential before there can be an increase in production or a rise in the standard of living."

Seventeen years later, in the proposed economic assistance program for the fiscal year 1967, the government announced, with a certain amount of fanfare, that "major changes in U.S. foreign assistance programs are proposed for fiscal year 1967... (To meet the challenge of hunger, disease, and ignorance) AID assistance will be directed toward maximum progress in agriculture, health and education."

Asher's purpose is not to discuss the content of technical assistance programs but rather their financing and organization. It was noted earlier that increasing amounts of technical assistance are being supplied by international lending agencies in conjunction with their regular capital assistance loans and credits. A U.S. development cooperation fund should also cover the financing of technical assistance that is integrally related to the capital assistance it provides.

In addition to the kind of technical assistance that can be furnished in connection with multimillion dollar loans for capital improvements, Asher suggested that the 1970s ought to see more loans and credits in the \$1 million to \$10 million range made available to poor countries specifically for technical assistance. Loan arrangements of this kind would permit borrowers to hire their own experts, supervise their work, get their money's worth out of them, and remove them from U.S. embassy compounds and "little Americas" in foreign capitals. Technical assistance loans should be obtainable not only from international lending agencies but from the United States as well; in fact, it would be desirable for the United States to do some pioneering in this type of lending.

The figures on U.S. economic aid vary substantially according to whether one cites authorizations, appropriations, gross or net obligations, or gross or net expenditures. They also vary according to whether one includes or excludes Food-for-Freedom, the Peace Corps, long-term loans of the Export-Import Bank, and related sources of assistance. Furthermore, it is important to know not only what proportion of the total is in grant form and what proportion is in loan form, but also what the terms of the loans are.

Technical assistance comes in many shapes, sizes, and varieties and is peculiarly difficult to administer effectively. American government

agencies tend to be too cumbersome, inflexible, and regulation-ridden to fulfill the bilateral role well, especially for technical assistance in the fields of science and education.

What is needed, according to Asher, is a government-subsidized technical cooperation foundation or institute capable of performing a number of functions. First of all, it should be an intermediary to help aid-receiving countries buy the technical assistance they want from the United States. Aid receivers should not be discouraged from going directly to the General Electric Company, the University of Utah, or the Bureau of the Census to spend the proceeds of their loans. Often, however, they will prefer to deal with a foundation or institute that already knows something about their problems, their procurement procedures, and their idiosyncrasies.

In the second place, it should be a center for continued educational, scientific, and technical cooperation with countries after the need for capital assistance on concessional terms has ended.

Recently, a sizable interagency working group on technical cooperation, aware that "a country's capacity to earn enough foreign exchange to pay for essential imports does not necessarily mean that it no longer needs technical assistance," produced a comprehensive report on American technical cooperation with non-AID countries.

A technical cooperation institute should be authorized to accept private contributions. It should be concerned with the improvement of educational, training, and research facilities in the low-income world. Finally, it could form some judgments about the services of the heterogeneous array of American voluntary agencies that are probably spending twice as much per year as the U.S. government in technical assistance to less developed countries. The technical cooperation institute could remain in close touch with the proposed U.S. development cooperation fund which would be the principal development financing agency of the U.S. government.

The establishment of a U.S. development cooperation fund or bank, a technical cooperation foundation or institute, and an overseas private investment corporation and other changes required by the altered domestic and international environment will eliminate or redistribute most of the

functions currently performed by the Agency for International Development. The AID now shares responsibility with the Department of Agriculture and others for the Food-for-Freedom program authorized by Public Law 480.

At the field level, Asher envisages drastically reduced aid missions, primarily because most of the technical assistance personnel would be employees of aid-receiving nations, but also because of greater reliance on the less developed countries and on international agencies for the establishment of priorities and requirements and the monitoring of performance.

Some arrangement will be needed to give overall policy guidance to the development cooperation fund, the technical assistance foundation or institute, the private investment corporation, the Public Law 480 program, and the U.S. participants in consortia and consultative groups. The loan program will be the guts of the U.S. bilateral effort and a case could therefore be made for vesting coordinating responsibility in the proposed development cooperation fund or bank. More logical, however, in view of the wide range of U.S. foreign policy interests to be served by bilateral programs, would be coordination by a White House office comparable to the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations.

In 1950, the case for a powerful U.S. Economic Cooperation Administration was overwhelming, and in 1960 the case for the Agency for International Development was strong. At the dawn of the 1970s, the situation at home and abroad is quite different. The reasons for shifting to a predominantly multilateral effort have been given. That shift will inevitably be hindered rather than helped by retaining a bilateral agency with a large field staff, equipped to offer a full range of capital and technical assistance as well as investment guarantees, wedded to the present U.S. way of doing things, subconsciously if not consciously resisting multilateralization, and burdened with an unshakable heritage of legislative restrictions. Moreover, it seems today highly unlikely that the Congress could be persuaded to free the AID of its shackles, fund it for several years at a time, authorize it to tap the private capital market in various new ways, and reinvest it with glamour and status.

In the circumstances, the conclusion Asher reaches favors phasing out the AID while seeking to provide a new organizational framework, a fresh lease on life, and additional autonomy for the three principal functions that should continue to be carried on bilaterally: development lending over and above multilateral efforts, a broker's role in procuring from a variety of sources technical assistance that the United States can advantageously provide, and the promotion of private U.S. foreign investment in areas prepared to receive it. These functions will have to be performed throughout the 1970s.

A Basic Act for International Development

The interrelations among trade, aid, and investment policies have long been known but are now more widely appreciated than at any time since the end of World War II. Changes in each are required. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 need not, and probably should not, be replaced by another aid bill. The time has come for the United States to adopt a basic act for international development designed to integrate aid, trade, and investment policies and educational and scientific cooperation into a broad, long-range strategy for facilitating growth in the low-income countries.

Specialists may recall that in 1950 the United States did adopt, as Title IV of the Foreign Economic Assistance Act, an Act for International Development. Intended only to establish the machinery for the Point Four Program, that act dealt almost exclusively with technical assistance. It was amended by the Mutual Security Acts of 1951, 1952, and 1953, and repealed by Mutual Security Act of 1954. Specialists may also recall that the report of President Kennedy's Task Force on Foreign Economic Assistance was published under the title, "An Act for International Development", and was subtitled, "A Program for the Decade of Development". Although in many respects a landmark report, it dealt largely with proposals for more effective use of the familiar ingredients of foreign aid programs--grants, loans, and technical assistance-- to support country development programs.

The legislation subsequently adopted was entitled the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. (In the field of trade policy the Kennedy administration's great achievement was the Trade Expansion Act of 1962). Amended almost beyond recognition, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was still in effect in mid-1969.

The act for international development should make it evident that the United States recognizes international development as the long-term job that it is, is eager to make development assistance primarily a multilateral enterprise, will contribute its full share to a cooperative effort, will administer its residual capital assistance through a development cooperation fund or other appropriate mechanism, and will carry on activities such as the promotion of private investment and the satisfaction of needs for technical assistance through quasi-governmental entities designed for the long pull.

A White House office of development coordination could be assigned responsibility for keeping interested organizational entities from working at cross-purposes, for speaking up on behalf of the multilateral development agencies when their coffers required replenishment from appropriated funds, and for seeing that, as far as possible, multilateral and bilateral activities were mutually reinforcing. The hand of the coordinator could be strengthened by establishing under his chairmanship a strong interagency committee on development policy. An undersecretary of state for economic affairs could serve as deputy chairman. For formulating policies toward less developed countries, the Treasury's long-standing domination of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policy established by the Bretton Woods Agreement Act of 1945 ought to be modified in favor of the interagency committee on development policy.

In sum, as far back as 1969 proposals were advanced by Asher and others^{1/} which bear close resemblance to the one being put forward in 1977, reflecting not only the correct perception of the problems, but also revealing the time-frame required to introduce the major institutional changes advocated then and today.

^{1/} See: Poats (Annex IV)

Annex IV

Note on Technology for Developing Nations

A perceptive study on the future of technical assistance for developing nations by Rutherford Poats was published in 1972^{1/}. It shows that there was little enthusiasm in the United States in a global campaign against poverty at the beginning of the 1970's. The times were not propitious. The American people were not interested in a commitment to international development on the scale commensurate with the needs. Their mood was turning inward, responding to newly realized domestic problems and the weary frustration of Vietnam, but also reflecting disappointments in other foreign fields.

In Congress suggestions were made that both Vietnam and the 1972 elections should be settled before considering fundamental changes in U.S. participation in international development. It was felt that better results would build stronger public and congressional support for more adequate appropriations.

Poats feels that major contributions can be made by technical assistance in helping to design and adapt technological and social innovations that stretch available resources and create new ones. This has been the core of the technical assistance concept from the beginnings of international development cooperation, and it has been reaffirmed in the latest reappraisals. It is not a prescription for uncritically following the technological paths of the western nations. Rather, it is a systematic effort to adapt technologies and the social organizations for using them to local factors and cultural values. However it is now clearer than ever before that no lasting solutions

^{1/} Rutherford M. Poats, Technology for Developing Nations: New Directions for U.S. Technical Assistance, 1972.

to the development problems of low income countries can be achieved without continuous technological and social innovations grounded in research and experience.

The study shows where and how U.S. technical assistance has been and can be highly effective. It explores specific opportunities for action and focuses on new directions in technical assistance using research, research-based experimental projects, and new networks of international professional cooperation.

Poats defines technical assistance as a deliberate effort by public service institutions to reduce a developing country's human and technical disadvantages --as distinguished from its immediate capital shortages-- in the planning, designing, and execution of social or technological changes. In the process it may influence a country's basic values and goals, but that seldom can be an explicit aim of multilateral or government-to-government technical assistance.

The initial efforts during the 1950's were directed by simplistic "know-how, show-how" interpretations of President Truman's Point Four idea. Many believed, or acted as if the U.S. could transfer the knowledge, techniques, and some of the equipment of its development to the diverse ecologies of Asia, Africa and Latin America with little or no research and adaptation. The resulting disillusionment was followed by demands for other keys to instant, visible progress. As Poats puts it, new schools of "quick fix" theories and programs emerged. The slower route, through research, experiment, evaluation, and institution building was not well received in the political echelons of most developing countries. Furthermore, compartmentalized bureaucratic structures in both the aid-giving and aid-receiving countries discouraged integrated approaches to problems. According to Poats, a destructive dichotomy in both U.S. and multilateral aid programs soon developed between the champions of capital-oriented aid and the proponents of direct action on the human variables.

The consolidation of the U.S. aid in the 1960's under the Agency for International Development was designed to help correct these tendencies. This sensible reform fell short of expectations. Too much faith was placed in stronger economic growth to improve the lives of disadvantaged elements within changing societies. AID tended to downgrade technical and social issues and the staff representing these interests. The Agency's managers became preoccupied with comprehensive country programming, the conditioning, provision, and policing of capital assistance, a host of congressional and balance of payments strictures, and a complex annual budgetary process.

By 1970 the political implication of a more collaborative style in technical assistance relationships had become more practicable. Pressure for change in U.S. technical assistance programs stemmed from three main sources during the late 1960's. One was a rediscovery that a concentrated and well-managed applied research can create or adapt technologies of enormous value to the less developed countries. A second major pressure for change came from members of the U.S. Congress who insisted that there must be better ways of assuring popular participation in development and a broader sharing of its fruits. They criticized AID's reliance on the "trickle-down" theory of benefits to the disadvantaged masses. In this they were supported by American youth influenced by the pessimism of the "New Left", who questioned the purposes of US aid programs that supported aggregate economic growth in countries where little was being done to reduce social and economic disparities among the people.

A third major force for change lay in the new facts of international life. The developing countries had acquired greater confidence and competence in planning and executing their own programs. According to Poats these new realities were compatible with the judgement of the Nixon Administration in 1969-70 that it was time for a less activist and visible U.S. government role in the affairs of Latin American and other developing regions.

Drawing on the recommendation of the Peterson Report, the Administration proposed a wholesale reorganization of U.S. foreign assistance, and a progressively increasing reliance on multilateral institutions. It proposed two development agencies: a capital-lending International Development Corporation and a technical assistance agency to be called the US International Development Institute.

The lessons of two decades of experience and the key problems common to many developing countries point to the desirable evolution of U.S. technical assistance in the years ahead. Poats feels that the new directions lie in systematic operations-oriented research in research-disciplined experimental projects and in a less tutelary, more collaborative set up professional relationship in all aspects of technical cooperation. He concludes that the Administrators of U.S. technical assistance should focus more sharply on the fundamental human problems and specialize in areas where its strong comparative advantage has been proven and where U.S. professional involvement is politically acceptable to the developing countries.

To this end, the study recommends involving expert manpower for technical assistance work in a variety of ways: direct staffing of an official aid agency, such as the UN specialized agencies or the U.S. technical assistance agency; pooling of individuals or teams from domestic public agencies, such as the U.S. Agricultural Research Services, the Public Health Services or the Census Bureau; contracting between an aid-receiving government and a foreign corporation or university; and preliminary financing of the programs of private or quasi-private institutions, such as regional development bodies.

In conclusion, Poats feels that the execution of technical cooperation in projects supported by US regional assistance should be almost entirely in the hands of experts and institutions other than the technical assistance agency, that is, through use of professional intermediaries. Technical cooperation supported by U.S. public funds will continue to be a necessary and desirable role for Americans in the 1980's and beyond. Poats exhorts the U.S. to accept this fact of international life and make technical cooperation a permanent yet consistently renewed commitment of all its professional communities.

Note on Private Voluntary Organizations

A large number of private voluntary organizations are operating abroad, many engaged in charitable work and, more recently, development related activities. Many of these PVO's rely on contributions from the public, whereas others are quite dependent on U.S. government funds or private foundation support.

Proposals have been advanced to establish closer institutional links with these PVO's and to ensure some degree of coordination of their activities under government auspices, such as the International Development Foundation.

In a recent book ^{1/} John Summer reviews the history and prospects of Private Voluntary Organizations and in this connection, citing an outstanding example, refers specifically to the Inter-American Foundation as follows:

In relation to Latin America the case of the Inter-American Foundation --a U.S. Government corporation that is semi-private in nature-- may be relevant to the discussion of the type of PVO's for the future. The legislation that established the Inter-American Foundation in 1969 originated in the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs through the efforts of two highly committed congressmen --Dante B. Fascell and F. Bradford Morse. The assumptions behind its establishment were:

First, that during the past 8 years all too little United States assistance has reached the masses of the Latin American people or made a visible impact on their daily lives; second, that the social development goals of the Act of Bogota, the Charter of Punta del Este and the Declaration of American Presidents, whose objectives of expanding opportunity for the great majority of people form the very cornerstone of the Alliance for Progress, are not being achieved in any substantial, meaningful sense; and third, that while Alliance for Progress programs operating at the government-to-government level have done an impressive job in promoting industrial and economic growth of Latin America, they have proved much less effective in responding to the requirements of social and civic change on that continent. ^{2/}

1/ John G. Summer, Beyond Charity: U.S. Voluntary Aid for a Changing Third World, 1977

2/ Bennett Schiff: "First Steps: The Inter-American Foundation's First Three Years, 1971-1973" quoted in Summer op.cit.

The IAF was expected to rectify these shortcomings and to restore "the necessary and proper balance between the economic and social objectives of inter-American cooperation and development." It was to direct its efforts through local organizations dedicated to broader popular participation in development, and generally was to help Latin Americans pave the way for the modernization of their societies. Furthermore, it was seen from the beginning that the organization's effectiveness would be determined not only by the caliber of its directors and staff but also by the institution's insulation from the ebb and flow of political currents that are always present in direct government-to-government relations. To better ensure its independence from day-to-day political considerations, funding on the level of \$50 million plus an additional \$78 million in local currencies was made available "until expended." This alleviated the normal government bureaucratic need both to hurriedly obligate all annually appropriated funds before the end of the given fiscal year and to expend the considerable amount of energy required to justify and wait for new funds.

The IAF is not without its critics, partly because of its independent operating style and partly because of its highly privileged status of being protected by Congress. Yet its early record, reflected in a 1977 introspective review of its first five years, has been impressive. ^{1/} Its grants --made only to Latin American (rather than U.S.) groups-- have focused heavily on local intermediary organizations that have activities in credit and production cooperatives, workers' self-managed enterprises, low-cost housing projects, legal aid clinics, consumer co-ops, peasant associations, cultural awareness programs, health care projects, agricultural extension services, and leadership training programs. As IAF's president, William Dyal, stated before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Senate Appropriations Committee in 1975, "We attempt to respond to peoples' efforts to solve their own problems by their own methods, recognizing that other societies are different than our own, having different histories, needs, and desires. The focus always remains on people --individuals and communities-- rather than on macro-economic questions...Once a decision has been made to fund a particular activity we stand aside. While we observe with sympathetic interest, we don't intervene or interfere."^{2/} Of all the U.S. assistance efforts in Latin America--public and private--the IAF enjoys perhaps the best reputation among Latin Americans for both the relevance of its programs and its open, nonpaternalistic style of operation.

During the period when the IAF legislation was being drawn up, emphasis was placed on the Foundation's experimental role as a possible precedent for equivalent initiatives in other parts of the Third World.

^{1/} Inter-American Foundation, *They Know How...*, an Experiment in Development. Assistance (Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977) quoted in Summer *op.cit.*

^{2/} William M. Dyal, Jr. (President, Inter-American Foundation), testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, April 30, 1975, quoted in Summer, *op.cit.*

APPENDIX 4

Canada and Development Cooperation

1971-72 to 1976-77

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Latin America: Foreign Policy for Canadians (Extracts, pp.25-32)
(Published by authority of the Honourable
Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for
External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada, 1970)
2. Canada and Development Cooperation
Annual Review 1975-1976
Canadian International Development Agency (Extracts, pp.51-60)
3. Annual Review 1976-1977
Canadian International Development Agency (Extracts, pp.21-22
and statistical tables
1971-72 to 1976-77,
pp. 47-48)
4. OECD, DAC Table on Canada's Technical
Cooperation to Latin America and the
Caribbean

Latin America

Foreign Policy for Canadians

Chapter IV

FUTURE POLICY: SYSTEMATIC STRENGTHENING OF LINKS

The mainspring of the Government's policy is the proposition that, between Canada and Latin American countries as neighbours in one hemisphere, between Canada and regional groupings of such countries and between Canadians and Latin Americans on a people-to-people basis, there are expanding possibilities for mutual benefits, especially in terms of economic growth, enhancement of the quality of life and promotion of social justice between different parts of the hemisphere. The various facets of Canada's relations with Latin America will tend to be mutually reinforcing. Best results can be obtained in any one field by a comprehensive approach in all main fields. While Canada's involvement in the Inter-American System will visibly broaden and deepen under this policy, its central aim will be to enable Canada to play a distinctively Canadian role in those aspects of hemispheric affairs which are of importance to Canada and at the same time to reinforce Canadian independence by more incisively defining a hitherto somewhat blurred dimension of Canada's external relations. There will be maximum scope for Canada to learn more about the workings of the Inter-American System in its various aspects and to appraise the possibilities for future collaboration. Canada will be able to work with and through UN organizations in Latin America.

Objectives of the Policy

The objectives of the Government's policy are:

- a) to develop and strengthen, in a coherent and clear-cut way, Canada's distinctive position in hemispheric affairs, in terms both of Canadian national interests and of Canada's relationships with Latin American countries individually and collectively;

Published by authority of the

Honourable Mitchell Sharp,

Secretary of State for External Affairs,

Ottawa, Canada

1970

- b) to enhance the quality of life both in Canada and in Latin America by encouraging and supporting cultural and scientific exchanges;
- c) to make Canada and the quality of Canadian life better known in Latin America, and to give Canadians a greater awareness of the life, the values, and the aspirations of Latin Americans;
- d) wherever possible, to co-operate with Latin American countries in enterprises designed to preserve the harmonious natural environment in the hemisphere;
- e) by means of development assistance, research and otherwise, to contribute to economic development in Latin America and thus to foster social justice between regions of the hemisphere;
- f) to foster Canadian economic growth by promoting Canadian business interests, permanent or transient, in Latin America;
- g) to promote world peace and security by working with Latin American governments on those international issues to the solution of which both they and Canada can contribute compatibly;
- h) to encourage people-to-people relationships of all kinds and, in particular, to look after the well-being of individual Canadians resident or travelling in Latin America.

Programmes

Enhancing the Quality of Life

The Government will take the following steps to foster greater co-operation between Canada and Latin America in the scientific and cultural spheres:

- a) In the field of science and technology the Government will
 - (i) encourage and assist private Canadian companies to take technology and technical training into Latin America along with investment; (ii) under conditions to be approved by the Government, allow Departments or agencies which dispose of "know-how" or which engage in scientific or industrial research to receive Latin American personnel or to transfer information either to individual countries or to an appropriate inter-American body; and (iii) continue to support efforts in UN bodies to make technology more universally available.
- b) In the field of academic exchanges, the Government will (i) facilitate exchanges at the university level; (ii) sponsor a modest programme to facilitate relatively short periods of training for Latin American specialists at less-advanced academic levels, in

such fields as management techniques, forestry and audio-visual aids; and (iii) apply to Latin America the recently inaugurated programme of research associateships for scientists from developing countries under which the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) provides financing and NRC selects the foreign associates on the basis of nomination from Canadian institutions.

- c) Given the cultural riches of Latin America—whether derived from the pre-Columbian period, the European connection or the modern creative impulse—and the corresponding cultures of Canada, there are almost endless possibilities for more extensive artistic exchanges. It is felt that some attention should be paid not only to artistic quality but also to the potential effect on Latin American development. For example, exhibitions of pre-Columbian art or presentations of Latin American folk dances would not only please Canadian audiences but would also do much to encourage Canadian tourism in Latin America. At the same time there is room for more frequent exhibitions in Canada of Latin American culture of all kinds and *vice versa*, for co-operation between Canadian and Latin American artists and craftsmen, and for exchanges of artists and craftsmen who would work for a period in each other's territory.
- d) In the special field of film, television and audio-visual aids, steps will be taken to encourage exchanges or co-production arrangements with Latin American countries having a particular interest or competence in this field.

In administering the above programmes, it will be necessary to exercise selectivity as to the sectors which may be most effectively exploited, and to establish priorities among countries.

Public Communication

Future information programmes in Latin America will strike a careful balance between general information about Canada and information designed specifically to support particular Canadian programmes. The capacity of Canadian information offices to serve Latin America effectively will be progressively increased, first by the appointment of one or more regional officers and thereafter by the opening of two or three regional information centres which will also serve as centres for Canadian cultural activities.



As resources allow, concrete steps such as the following will be taken in addition to those described on Pages 10 and 11:

- a) An expanded effort in the field of film distribution, with greater emphasis on Spanish- and Portuguese-language versions.
- b) Production of more publications in the Spanish and Portuguese languages specifically designed to interest Latin American readers.
- c) An increase in the number and variety of exhibitions and displays sent to Latin America.
- d) High priority under the External Affairs visits programme for invitations to Latin American opinion-formers to visit Canada.

To help make Latin America better known in Canada every possible assistance will be afforded to Canadian press or media representatives wishing to visit Latin America. Any disposition on the part of the press or media to establish a bureau in Latin America will be welcomed.

Development Assistance

In the capital assistance field, the Government wishes to continue to work through the Inter-American Development Bank. Canada is a member of other regional banks that accept non-regional members—the Asian and Caribbean Development Banks—and is prepared to enter into an active association with the African Development Bank. The Government believes that it is feasible to work out with the Inter-American Bank a basis for a future association which would overcome problems of the kind mentioned on Page 13. However, because membership in the Bank would absorb a relatively high proportion of Canada's total development assistance budget, the Government does not contemplate joining the Bank at the present time but will keep this possibility under review either as an aspect of the larger question of joining the OAS or as a proposition which in itself merits consideration.

In the technical assistance field, the Government wishes to proceed more on a bilateral basis. At the same time, it is recognized that a Canadian technical assistance programme in Latin America should be operated so as effectively to supplement existing programmes, whether multilateral or bilateral, in that area. To this end, a bilateral Canadian programme will be carried out in consultation with multilateral institutions already operating in Latin America and also with those private organizations which have special knowledge of the region. The Canadian programme will also need to be selective in area and scope. Initiation of a bilateral technical assistance programme in Latin America will bring Canada's

development assistance programme for that area broadly into line with its programmes for other areas in which Canada is working through both multilateral and bilateral channels.

On the above basis, Canadian development assistance to Latin America will increase and expand in the following ways, which, taken together, will in absolute terms more than double the present allocation of development assistance to Latin America and in relative terms somewhat increase the proportion of Canada's development assistance directed to that area:

- a) The present annual contribution to the Inter-American Development Bank will be continued, and may be increased if mutually agreeable arrangements can be negotiated with the Bank—for example, with respect to procurement and simplification of the administration of the Canadian credit.
- b) A bilateral technical assistance programme will be initiated.
- c) Support for Canadian private agencies providing development assistance to Latin America will be increased.
- d) Other ways of encouraging the private sector to participate in Latin American development will be sought.
- e) Careful consideration will be given to ways in which Canada could directly assist development assistance or development research through multilateral bodies such as the ECLA.

If the International Development Research Centre devotes attention to Latin American problems, this will add an important new dimension to Canada's relationship with Latin America in the development assistance field.

Multilateral Institutions

Canada will continue and intensify its participation in the work of the multilateral bodies mentioned on Page 15 and will also seek full membership in the following additional organizations:

- Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO)
- Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences (IAIAS)
- Inter-American Indian Institute (IAII)
- Inter-American Conference on Social Security (CISS)

Canada will also contribute to the Inter-American Emergency Assistance Fund (FIASE).

Trade

While the private sector is central in the conduct of Canada's trade, carefully-considered measures on the part of the Government may also be

needed if trade with Latin America is to reach its full potential in the decade ahead. On the export side, what is required is not so much a change in particular aspects of policy—which remains based on a general exchange of most-favoured-nation treatment—as a more systematic approach to trade with Latin America and integration of this approach into Canada's general policy toward Latin America. With regard to imports, the central question is how to find ways of enabling the Latin American countries to sell more in Canada and other developed nations.

Among the measures to be taken to expand Canadian exports are the following:

- a) Development of a carefully-conceived programme of selected priorities in the promotion of trade, including identification of, and concentration on, particular industrial sectors and types of technical expertise in which Canada has special competence and to which Latin American development programmes attach importance.
- b) Maintenance of closer and more comprehensive contacts with Latin American governmental and intergovernmental bodies dealing with trade and development, with regional development agencies, and with those international economic organizations of which both Canada and the Latin American countries are members and in which they may collaborate to ensure the achievement of common objectives.
- c) Broader use of the credit and insurance facilities afforded by the Export Development Corporation.
- d) Maintenance and improvement of access to Latin American markets for Canadian goods, both bilaterally and through international moves toward further liberalization of world trade.

The Canadian Government will facilitate imports from Latin America in the following ways:

- a) by continuing, in international bodies, to adopt a positive attitude toward the adoption of a system of general, non-reciprocal, non-discriminatory tariff preferences which would facilitate the export of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods by the developing countries;
- b) by continuing, in international bodies and elsewhere, to adopt a positive attitude toward the removal of tariffs on tropical food-stuffs;

- c) by continuing, in international bodies and elsewhere, to seek the most equitable solutions possible to the problem of low-cost imports;

- d) by taking specific measures to increase Latin American knowledge of Canadian markets and marketing methods, channels of distribution, marketing laws and regulations and other information necessary to effective promotion of trade in this country; and
- e) by joining the Inter-American Export Promotion Centre (CIPE).

Among the general problems affecting trade between Canada and Latin America is that of encouraging a more direct flow of trade in both directions. In the case of both Canadian exports to Latin America and Latin American exports to Canada, a high proportion is transshipped through the United States. There would appear to be good grounds for examining the possibility of more direct air and sea transportation, particularly with regard to air-shipments of seasonal perishables, in view of the seasonal complementarity that exists between this country and much of Latin America.

A trade which is important to both Canada and Latin America is that in basic commodities. Canada has actively participated in negotiating international agreements on coffee, sugar, tin and wheat, all of which have been of interest to Latin American countries. The Canadian Government is willing to examine proposals in regard to other commodities not yet covered by such agreements.

Investment

Future Canadian investment in Latin America will be assisted by the Government in the following ways:

- a) Dissemination in Canada of information about investment opportunities in Latin America and about the general conditions under which the investments would likely be made.
- b) Investigation of investment opportunities in Latin America which could lead to joint ventures with an export potential for Canadian industry.
- c) By making EDC investment insurance available to potential investors who might desire this.
- d) By negotiating double taxation agreements where feasible and appropriate.
- e) By encouraging Canadian investors to respect the policies and interests of host countries.

Movement of People

The Office of Tourism of the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce stands ready to co-operate with the authorities responsible for tourism in Latin American countries with regard to ways and means of increasing the number of Canadian visitors to these countries. In the reverse direction, the Canadian Government Travel Bureau has plans for increasing the number of Latin Americans coming to Canada as tourists.

* * * * *

Faced with a choice between letting Canada's relations with Latin America grow at their present rate, undertaking a systematic strengthening of those relations bilaterally and through the agencies of the Inter-American System and the UN, and joining the OAS as a full member now, the Government has decided to follow the middle course. This will permit Canada's relations with the countries of Latin America to develop rapidly and, by improving Canadian knowledge and understanding of those countries and their regional institutions, prepare for a better-informed and more useful Canadian participation as a full member of the OAS should Canada, at some future date, opt for full participation.

To facilitate this process and to enable the Canadian Government to follow developments of interest to it on a systematic basis, it is intended that, if the OAS member countries agree, a formal link between Canada and the OAS countries will be established at a suitable level. The establishment of such a link would also seem justified by the degree of Canadian participation in the work of the OAS bodies which is now contemplated. An appointed representative of the Canadian Government would arrange for Canadian attendance at meetings of inter-American bodies in which Canada has an interest and at which Canadian attendance would be appropriate, and he would generally concern himself with all aspects of inter-American affairs which are of interest to the Canadian Government.

Annual Review 1975-1976

Canadian International Development Agency

Commonwealth Caribbean

Canada's ties with the Caribbean date back to early in the 17th century when the French shipped timber from Quebec and Acadia to the West Indies and later sailing ships took regular cargoes of cod from English settlements in the Maritimes to return from the islands with sugar, rum, molasses and spices.

Today, in addition to strong trading ties and agreements, private Canadian investment holdings in the Caribbean exceed half a billion dollars. Banking, insurance, bauxite extraction and processing, travel and tourism are among Canadian interests. The islands are also a source of immigrants for this country and a favorite winter resort for Canadians.

CIDA's development assistance in the Caribbean began in 1958 as a five-year, \$10 million program with the newly-formed Federation of the West Indies. When the Federation was dissolved in 1962 the program continued as one of capital and technical assistance to each of the member states. Between 1958 and the end of fiscal year 1975-1976, more than \$152 million in CIDA grants and concessional loans had been used for development projects in the region. In 1975-1976 the spending ceiling was \$14.6 million on loans and \$16.4 million on grants.

Although per capita incomes in the Caribbean countries are high compared to the rest of the developing world, the area will need outside assistance for many years to stimulate economic development. Recent political, economic and social difficulties have been compounded by inflation and balance of payments problems made worse by the rise in oil prices.

The major natural resources of the Commonwealth Caribbean are found in four countries: Trinidad has petroleum and asphalt; Jamaica, bauxite; Guyana, bauxite, other minerals and forests; and Belize, forests. Nearly all the islands have soil suitable for agriculture and may grow sugar cane.

Non-Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean—Cuba, Haiti, and some republics on the mainland of Central and South America—receive Canadian assistance under the Latin America program. The Commonwealth Caribbean assistance program covers Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, seven of the Leeward and Windward Islands (Grenada, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, Dominica, Antigua, Montserrat and St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla) and the mainland countries of Guyana and Belize. Total population of this vast region is only 4.7 million, which in part accounts for the fact they receive more Canadian assistance per capita than any other area in the world.

Over the years hundreds of Canadian advisers and educators have served in the Caribbean on CIDA assignments and thousands of students and trainees from the West Indies have studied in Canada or in third countries under CIDA auspices. On January 1, 1976 there were 40 advisers and educators in the region while 219 students and trainees were in Canada and 272 CIDA-sponsored Caribbean students followed courses at the University of the West Indies and other institutions in the region.



Fish dry in the sun at La Union, El Salvador. Photo: Jack Redden, CIDA

Belize

Belize, formerly British Honduras, is situated in the northern part of Central America, wedged between Guatemala and the Caribbean Sea. Although about 65,000 of its total population of 120,000 live in urban areas—about a third in Belize City alone—the country holds development promise in the continued growth of the agricultural sector. Belize is beginning to reach self-sufficiency in several crops, and in 1973 established exports in beef, rice and mangoes. The agricultural sector makes up 21 per cent of

GNP and accounts for 75 per cent of all exports. Further development of the agricultural sector is a priority both for the government of the country and for CIDA, but not to the exclusion of other sectors.

Construction of a water and sewer system for Belize City to meet demands for at least a decade beyond its completion date around 1980 is Canada's major contribution to the country. It is financed by a loan of \$7.9 million, as well as a grant of \$2.3 million to cover costs of a Canadian project team leader, two engineers and an administrator.

Canada provided a loan of \$1 million to the Belize Development Finance Corporation to be loaned out to private borrowers in agricultural, industrial or tourist development.

CIDA also opened a \$200,000 line of credit to enable the Belize Government to purchase material and equipment in Canada; provided a grant of \$120,000 to supervise construction of a deep water harbor which is financed with a \$10 million loan from the Caribbean Development Bank; supplied a planning expert in the Ministry of Finance and an adviser on petroleum legislation.

A grant of \$913,600 was approved to enable Belizean undergraduates to study engineering, education, surveying, management, forestry, accounting and agriculture in Canada. There were 28 students studying in Canada on January 1, 1976.

Guyana

During the year under review CIDA's program of assistance to Guyana continued its transition towards sectoral concentration on renewable resource development and the transfer of management skills.

Several older projects entered their final phases. The Guyana Electricity Corporation (GEC) received \$1.2 million worth of equipment to help it expand its distribution network and contracts were let for the balance of the \$1.9 million project. This will complete CIDA capital assistance to a multi-donor project costing \$25 million. Complementing this capital assistance is a training project providing both Canadian training advisers to the GEC and training awards for GEC employees to increase their skills.

Contracts were let and the first shipments made in a \$1 million project to provide two water-well drilling rigs and ancillary equipment to Guyana.

Four more air navigation beacons were in-

stalled and contracts were let for additional landing aids at Timehri International Airport. The Guyana Air Corporation received an additional \$145,000 of freight handling equipment.

CIDA planning has concentrated on projects involving renewable resource development. In the forestry sector, discussions were held on projects involving sawmilling and logging equipment, forestry road building equipment, and technical assistance to the forestry service. CIDA is currently providing technical assistance to the state-owned Guyana Timbers Ltd., the largest sawmilling firm in Guyana.

Commitments were made for assistance to the Guyana Agricultural Products Corporation and for designing a fisheries development plan. Design work was started on a Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory. Technical assistance and specialized scientific equipment will be provided for an Applied Technical Institute, which will be heavily concerned with rational development of Guyana's resources.

On January 1, 1976 there were 4 Canadian advisers in Guyana and 28 Guyanese trainees in Canada.

Jamaica

About twice the size of Prince Edward Island, Jamaica has a population of two million, who have a per capita GNP of \$1,000. It has rich bauxite deposits and manufactures rum, molasses and tobacco products. Sugar, bananas and coffee are the principal agricultural products.

The total cost of CIDA-financed projects under way in Jamaica is about \$20 million and they are concentrated in the sectors of transportation, education, water development and management training. Annual disbursements are about \$3.7 million. The traditional heavy concentration in transport (22 per cent of the total program) supports rural development programs, particularly the rural bridge rebuilding programs.

This effort in rural development is continuing and is in line with Jamaica's priorities to upgrade agriculture and create more jobs in the farm sector.

Phase four of the bridge rebuilding program got under way early in 1976 with a loan of \$1.6 million for the supply of Canadian steel and related equipment. Jamaica is responsible for foundations, approaches and construction. The earlier phases resulted in construction of 26 bridges and involved loans of \$1.8 million. A team of eight Canadian experts is helping the country to carry out the program and is training

Jamaican counterparts. CIDA also provided loans of \$1.75 million for transportation studies covering the costs of moving people and goods by road, rail, air and coastal shipping. This was followed up by feasibility studies of road transport which paved the way for specific projects to be financed by international lending agencies.

To assist education, Canada financed construction of 128 prefabricated primary schools with \$1.5 million in grants and has provided structural steel for another 42 schools nearing completion under a \$2 million loan. A grant of \$800,000 and a loan of \$480,000 are being used to assist in the building, equipping and staffing of a technical teacher training department at Kingston's College of Arts, Science and Technology.

Agriculture, which occupies more than 30 per cent of Jamaica's labor force, has also received assistance. A grant of \$185,000 has provided the Jamaican Ministry of Agriculture with breeding stock, equipment and an adviser for the hog industry. The program is being supervised by the University of Guelph, Ont. Some training for Jamaicans is also provided at Guelph.

New projects in the past year included an \$850,000 grant to finance seven Canadian computer programming experts to assist Jamaica in establishing a management information system; a \$400,000 grant to provide advisers to the Bureau of Standards and related training in Canada; \$80,000 to underwrite the cost of an operations officer to the country's airport authority for two years; \$125,000 to improve transport of sugar cane from field to factory to maintain freshness; and \$850,000 to provide five full-time and two part-time advisers to the Jamaican Railway Corporation.

As of January 1, 1976 there were 13 Canadian experts in Jamaica and 31 Jamaican students and trainees in Canada.

Windward and Leeward Islands

(Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts, St. Lucia and St. Vincent)

Like a curving picket fence this row of small islands closes off the eastern Caribbean sea between Puerto Rico and Trinidad.

The seven islands total only a quarter of Prince Edward Island's area and have a population of roughly half a million. In Dominica a few hundred Carib Indians—the last of the original occupants of the Caribbean—remain on a reserve.

Canadian assistance to the islands is concentrated in agriculture, transport, water development and education. The major input to date has been in development of the airport facilities of the islands. Airports are vital to one of the major growth industries—tourism. A \$12 million grant was allotted in 1975-76 for an airport expansion program to meet current and projected demand until 1983. The funds will be spent on improving airport facilities in all the islands with the largest share, \$6.9 million, going to Coolidge International Airport in Antigua.

The airport program includes architectural, engineering, construction, supervision and administration costs. Canadian contractors undertake the designing. Sharing the balance of the grant funds are: Grenada, Pearls Airport, \$680,000; St. Vincent, Arnos Vale Airport, \$650,000; Dominica, Melville Hall Airport, \$835,000; Montserrat, Blackburne Airport, \$100,000; St. Kitts, Golden Rock Airport, \$2.5 million.

Other on-going projects include those listed below:

A \$300,000 grant spread over three years was given the Windward Islands Banana Growers Association for research.

A \$175,000 grant is being used to finance three local agricultural specialists participating in a five-man team for the Caribbean Common Market (Caricom).

A \$280,000 grant provides for comfith* demonstration machines, protein supplements and technical assistance to 12 Commonwealth Caribbean countries and to the University of the West Indies.

The third phase of a study in Dominica aimed at improving operations of the banana industry is being completed with a grant of \$275,000 and a loan of \$800,000 has been given the growers association for purchase of materials and equipment.

A grant of \$351,000 is financing construction of a fish storage plant in Grenada as well as providing the services of a Canadian adviser and training of nationals in Canada.

Fertilizer is being provided to the Grenada cocoa industry under a loan of \$850,000.

Construction of 20 primary and junior secondary schools and additions is being made possible by a grant of \$10 million.

Training of technical and vocational teachers is under way with a grant of \$1 million. CIDA grants are also financing the training of animal health assistants (\$275,000), public works technicians (\$360,000), hotel staff (\$115,000), and agricultural experts (\$480,000).

Construction of a large junior secondary

*Comfith—inner core of sugar cane. See Barbados section.

school in St. Lucia was completed with a grant of \$3.9 million and Canadian staff is being provided while local counterparts are trained.

Various phases of water development programs were carried on in all of the islands under grants and loans totalling about \$12 million.

There were 17 Canadian advisers and educators in the Leewards and Windwards on January 1, 1976, and 99 trainees from the islands studying in Canada.

Other Countries

Barbados

The most easterly island in the Caribbean, Barbados, smaller in size than Montreal, relies heavily on tourism and sugar exports. Its government is in the process of rationalizing the sugar industry by reducing the number of factories and installing new equipment.

The largest ongoing Canadian development project is the modernization and expansion of Seawell International Airport under a \$10 million loan. It is to be completed in 1978. CIDA continued capital assistance for expansion of the water system in 1975 with a \$3.5 million loan, largely for pipe and equipment to be procured in Canada.

Another ongoing project in Barbados and other Caribbean countries is an attempt to make building materials, paper and animal fodder out of sugar cane once the sucrose has been extracted. Traditionally, sugar cane produces only sugar, while the waste is burned in the factory's steam engines. A new type of cane separating machine, invented and built in Canada, makes it possible to produce a strong, light, water- and mildew-proof building material in both sheets and blocks from the cane's tough outer rind, which was formerly crushed in the extraction process.

The new machine also makes it possible to make animal fodder from the soft inner core—called *comfith*—while at the same time producing a higher quality of sugar. If the new cane-feed technology succeeds it will not only help diversify Barbados' one-crop economy—sugar accounts for 53 per cent of the island's exports—but be of great interest to other sugar producing countries as well.

To date CIDA has spent more than \$2 million in loans and grants in the region on this project, including a loan of \$1.5 million and grants of \$160,000 for the Barbados Uplands Sugar Mill,

where the new separator is being tested on a practical scale in a full-fledged commercial operation.

On January 1, 1976 there was one CIDA adviser in the island, while 13 Barbadians were receiving training in Canada under CIDA auspices.

Trinidad and Tobago

Several ongoing projects were the main focus of CIDA's program in Trinidad and Tobago during the past year. Over \$1 million worth of electrical equipment was provided as part of the \$2.3 million rural electrification project.

Development of the \$10 million Piarco Airport extension continued with proposals for engineering design and supervision being requested from Canadian consulting firms. The actual design work is scheduled for 1976-77.


CIDA provided \$120,000 worth of equipment for the Trinidad and Tobago Metal Industries Company.

Canada continued to provide technical assistance to the National Training Board and to the Trinidad and Tobago Hotel School. Three of the four Canadian instructors at the hotel school have returned to Canada and trained counterparts have taken over their work. Canadian training continued for 20 Trinidadians in a variety of disciplines including accounting, radio therapy, mechanical technology and hotel administration. As of January 1, 1976 there was one CIDA adviser in Trinidad.

Additional activity took place in the forestry and health sectors. A design study for the reconstruction of a government-owned teak mill was undertaken. The second stage of this project will involve \$1 million worth of capital assistance. Work is scheduled to start in 1976-77 on an inventory of the forest resources of Trinidad and Tobago. The Port of Spain hospital laundry received an additional \$250,000 worth of equipment. A two-year program of Canadian assistance to the Community Mental Health Program will start in 1976-77.

Regional

In 1970 Canada initiated the Agricultural Development Fund of the Caribbean Development Bank to increase agricultural productivity and efficiency in Commonwealth Caribbean countries. Canada's initial contribution was \$5 million, half of which was administered by the bank, the other half by CIDA. Canada has agreed to replenish the fund with \$6.1 million, of which \$2.2 million was paid in during 1975. The new contribution will be administered entirely by the bank. The fund is being used to finance projects either through island governments or through agricultural credit institutions and cooperative societies.



Canada is also supplying the CDB with two fisheries experts to assist the bank in considering loan applications related to the fishing industry.

University of the West Indies


This regional institution is supported by 14 Caribbean governments and has campuses in Jamaica (Mona), Trinidad (St. Augustine) and Barbados (Cave Hill), as well as extension centres on Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Antigua, St. Kitts, St. Lucia and St. Vincent.

Canada has assisted the university since the early 1960 s with grants, personnel and scholarships and has funded the construction of student residences in Trinidad and Barbados, a faculty building in Trinidad, two library buildings in Jamaica and the extension centres on the Leeward and Windward Islands. A CIDA-financed extension centre in Belize is under construction.

Under a five-year assistance plan started in 1971, the faculties of agriculture, engineering, education and management studies were strengthened. Under this plan, the UWI has entered into a twinning arrangement with the University of Western Ontario, to develop a management course, West Indian in content and environment, on the Jamaica and Trinidad campuses. Aided by a \$1.6 million CIDA grant, classroom and office facilities have been built, special course materials have been developed, and UWO professors are acting as consultants and teachers. Some 28 West Indian students are to enter Western's Business School over a four-year period, to return to the Caribbean as teachers.

The UWI also processed the 1970 census returns of various Caribbean countries, using an IBM computer supplied by Canada in 1971. Statistics Canada provided training and advisory assistance.

CIDA is also financing the construction of residences for the Marine Biology Laboratory at Discovery Bay, Jamaica (\$320,000) and supporting an examinations research unit to develop standards for school exams throughout the Caribbean (\$237,000).



Latin America

Launched in 1970, CIDA's bilateral development program in Latin America gained momentum gradually until fiscal year 1975-76, when it made a considerable leap forward. Total commitments moved from \$68.9 million to \$111.5 million, from 82 projects in operation to 109. The reasons for this 60 per cent increase are linked to the world food crisis, the priorities of the countries and Canada's *Strategy for International Development Cooperation 1975-1980*.

From the outset, the goal was to transfer technical assistance rather than capital to enable Latin Americans to use their own physical and human resources. From an experimental beginning to learn about the needs and priorities of the countries and to gain experience, the program reached a turning point in 1974. Plans for a program with wider horizons were made and new mechanisms for transferring resources were initiated. The entire spectrum of rural development

was identified as the sector for maximum development efforts in order to have the most effective social impact on the large, poor, rural populations. Food crops, mining, energy, forestry, transport and communications, irrigation, drainage and soil conservation, logging and sawmills, and fishing are being developed. Assistance to public administration and planning, health and population, social infrastructure, welfare and institutional development supplement the employment-oriented projects.

Canada's proven expertise in these fields also indicates a high return on a relatively small investment in technical assistance.

Funds committed to the rural development sector total \$41 million or 37 per cent of the total program. Education is second with \$15.5 million, nearly 14 per cent.

Particular attention is being paid to marginal groups in each country and to building up a de-

velopment cooperation program in Haiti, the least developed country in Latin America.

The emphasis on rural development to reach the most disadvantaged was already under way when the Strategy—which makes the sector a top priority—was published in September 1975. In addition to providing more impetus to this sector, the Strategy unties bilateral loans to procurement within Latin American regional markets, giving the Canadian aid dollar a multiplier potential.

Regional

In line with this trend to stretch aid dollars by strengthening regional markets, reciprocal trade and integrating agricultural and industrial production, CIDA launched 16 new projects in 1975-76. A grant of \$2.85 million to the Andean Group,

which has a total population of 77 million in Peru, Colombia, Bolivia, Venezuela, Chile, and Ecuador, will cover technical cooperation in 12 of the new projects. Canadian advisers will help increase cereal and oil seed crops, milk and meat production; improve maritime transport and communications; develop a regional market for the agro-industry; develop more local technology in the pharmaceutical, chemical and telecommunications industries; equip a forestry lab and train forestry engineers and technicians; and verify the potential of establishing a 5,000-man truck assembly plant in Bolivia, the poorest member of the group.

Another \$2.1 million in grant funds is aimed at increasing the nutritional value of maize, maize flour, wheat, barley and triticale, and in boosting production per acre by 40 per cent in Colombia and Ecuador. The program will be carried out in cooperation with the International Centre for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) in Colombia and with help from the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre (CIMMYT) in Mexico.

A grant of \$1.65 million spread over three years was provided to the Latin American Demography Centre (CELADE), an independent research institution based in Santiago, which serves Chile, Bolivia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Paraguay and Peru with population studies and related health, education and housing data.

On January 1, 1976 there were 42 Canadian experts in Latin America and 19 Latin Americans were receiving training in Canada under CIDA auspices.

Central America

El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras

El Salvador

Among the least developed countries of Latin America, densely populated El Salvador has a population growth rate of 3.3 per cent, a 25 per cent inflation rate (1974) and an increased balance of payments deficit. Growth in agriculture was high—5.6 per cent—but appears to be reaching a maximum limit.

CIDA's objective is to raise living standards by helping to create jobs and productivity in rural areas, by boosting agriculture, fisheries production and education, and by supporting public institutions and health schemes.

A five-year project of assistance in fisheries training which began under a \$3.8 million grant in

1973 is continuing. Provision in 1976 of a multi-purpose fisheries training vessel, a Canadian coordinator and five instructors in nautical science, fishing and food technology, marine engine mechanics, boat construction and fisheries sciences for four years is included. High school students are trained at the National Institute of Navigation and Fishing at La Union, which may become a regional school for other Central American countries. Canada has offered 20 bursaries to candidates from nearby countries and 60 man-years for training in Canada for graduates of the institute.

Guatemala

The earthquake that struck Guatemala on February 4, 1976 drastically changed priorities in the republic. Canada continued its regular program and allocated additional funds for emergency relief. As soon as news of the quake reached Ottawa, \$100,000 in cash was given the League of Red Cross Societies and the Canadian Embassy in Guatemala was provided with an equal amount for on-the-spot emergency relief. Within a few days, \$1 million in food aid, blankets and orthopedic material was airlifted to the disaster area, where it was distributed through the Canadian Embassy. In March, a shipload of \$3 million worth of material for construction of temporary shelters was sent from Saint John, N.B. These do-it-yourself kits for about 8,000 families included tin roofing material, lumber, plywood and hand tools. Long-term development assistance towards rebuilding homes, schools and potable water systems in rural areas was being planned for the immediate future.

Honduras

The least developed country in Central America, Honduras depends on its main export: bananas. In 1974 its GNP slid by 0.5 per cent after Hurricane Fifi destroyed or damaged 40 per cent of the crop. A balance of payments problem was made worse by rising import prices for oil and other commodities. Canada's program is aimed at helping the low-income or subsistence farmer and consumer and at assistance in the marketing and development of hardwoods. Since crop damage from the hurricane in 1974 was compounded in 1975 by the worst drought in 25 years, the largest disbursement—\$925,000—was for food aid. This included shipping costs from Canada and was additional to \$500,000 in emergency relief and \$1 million in food aid sent immediately after the hurricane.

Colombia

The most significant rural development project will provide some 300,000 marginal peasant farmers on Colombia's Atlantic Coast with easy credit terms—under a loan of \$13.5 million and a \$500,000 grant. These small farm owners, who now earn about \$100 a year or less, will benefit through 12 sub-projects going beyond farm credit to include technological advice, marketing, agricultural training, forestry, fish farming, rural electrification, roads, water supplies, medical services, education and other services aimed at raising standards of living. The loan, repayable over 30 years at three per cent interest, will enable purchases of fertilizers, vehicles, farm equipment and transmission lines in Canada. The grant finances technical assistance. A second loan for \$3 million on terms similar to those above will enable National Fund for Development Projects (FONADE) to finance feasibility studies for private and public institutions. Canada's current commitments to Colombia now represent some \$26 million, with more than 50 per cent of them in the rural sector.

A one-time exporter of oil, Colombia is now a net importer with a balance of payments deficit and severely reduced foreign exchange. It also has a serious inflation problem. Per capita GNP at market prices was estimated at \$500 in 1974.

The republic's main development goals are to achieve an economic growth which will permit creation of productive employment with particular emphasis on the least privileged 50 per cent of Colombian society.

Colombia is the fourth most populous nation in Latin America after Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. Its large population of young, dependent people burdens educational and health facilities. The migration to urban areas has been heavy and the trend continues.

Haiti

Haiti has the unenviable distinction of being one of the 25 poorest nations in the world as well as the most poverty stricken in the American hemisphere. Eighty per cent of its 4.5 million population lives in rural areas, where they eke out a living on about \$60 per capita per year compared to an average for the country of about \$120. Port-au-Prince is the social and economic focus of the country and, with the exception of Cap Haitien, there are no towns equipped to serve the back country where the 3.6 million peasant farmers live.

Haiti embarked on a program to develop the hinterland by creating regional economic and social growth centres to stem the flow of migrants to Port-au-Prince. Canada was asked to participate. In 1974 a Canadian team selected the 2,600-square-kilometre (about 1,000-square-mile) region between Petit Goave and Petit Trou de Nippes, with a population of 600,000, for a totally integrated program that will cost an estimated \$3.8 million in grants over a five-year period. The program is based on a \$1.8 million four-year study. As the study progresses and developmental needs and potentialities are identified, projects will be launched. The program integrates all aspects of the region's development from physical resources and land tenure to health, nutrition and education. Within these sectors, projects identifying greater farm production, erosion control, rehabilitation of arable lands, establishment of marketing and credit structures will be launched. Turning Petit Goave into a regional capital is one of the anticipated results. But the prime aim is greater food production and all the economic spin-offs. Petit Goave, if successful, would spark neighboring developments. While integrated projects are not unique, this one is being followed closely by the international community.

Other developmental grants include \$3.6 million in support of the faculty of agronomy and veterinary medicine at the University of Haiti; \$3 million over six years for a vocational training centre in Port-au-Prince; and \$1.65 million for a hydraulic resources inventory.

Peru

Peru's change of government by coup d'état in August 1975 has not altered the country's socio-economic development policy. This Andean country continued programs of agrarian and educational reform, marked in 1974 by the distribution of a million hectares (2.47 million acres) of land to 39,000 families. Insufficient food production continued to be a major problem of the country's 14.5 million people. Food imports doubled in value in 1974 over 1973. Heavy government subsidies on imported foods and on oil of up to 50 per cent of total value kept domestic inflation down to a rate of 17 per cent. Agricultural production increased at 2.3 per cent in 1974, slightly behind population growth of 2.5 per cent. Fisheries recovered in 1974, with a 41 per cent increase as a result of a tripling of the anchovy catch of 1973 and a 15 per cent rise in the catch of other species.

CIDA's 24 projects, which are funded with \$15.8 million in grant funds and \$8 million in loans, are closely tied to Peru's priorities in rural

development (35 per cent of funds), natural resources (40 per cent), education and institutional support (17 per cent), telecommunications, transport and others (8 per cent).

Three major projects launched by CIDA in 1975-76 are aimed directly at improving the food sector while the fourth is a new tool for uncovering mineral resources.

With a \$1.5 million loan and a \$1.3 million grant, CIDA is manning and equipping a rape-seed growing project in the Puno area near Lake Titicaca in part of the Sierra region, which is home to 40 per cent of Peruvians. Earlier CIDA studies showed that 170,000 acres at Puno are suitable for rape-seed, which could cut imports by 25 per cent. There is potential for making the country self-sufficient in edible oils production. Peru imported \$34 million worth in 1974.

A grant of \$1.05 million finances a six-year program to increase yields of wheat and barley. Peru imported \$120 million in wheat in 1974 but hopes to cut this to \$54 million by 1980. The grant covers agricultural research equipment from Canada, scholarships for Peruvians to study in Mexico or Canada, and expenses of research experts of the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre (CIMMYT) in Mexico.

Four Canadian specialists in soils, flood control, hydrology and agricultural economics are establishing three pilot projects in three Andean ecological zones in a move to boost crop and livestock production by millions of peasants. The grant funds of \$1.12 million will cover 40 man-months of training in Canada and in a third country for Peruvians engaged in the water and soil conservation project.

Peruvians will be trained to make use of remote sensing data beamed from the Hertz II satellite on its north-south orbit under a grant of \$622,000.

Like most developing countries, Peru needs more information on its mineral resources, which makes the satellite data significant. With help from the Canadian Centre for Remote Sensing, Ottawa, the possibility of creating a similar centre in Peru is being studied.

Other Countries

Brazil

The thrust in rural development continued eastward into the impoverished reaches of northeastern Brazil. Comprising half the continent, with an economy as diverse as any in the

developing world, Brazil has a per capita income of \$700. A five-year program was begun at two federal universities that are being integrated in the northeast. Rural extension, modernization of laboratories and scholarships are included under a grant of \$995,000.

A unique, audio-visual literacy project—using radio, printed matter and animateurs—was begun in the State of Bahia where 60 per cent of the 8.3 million population is illiterate. Canadian experts in audio-visual techniques and production will participate for three years under a \$990,000 grant.

Five Canadians are already teaching geology, mining engineering and petrology at the Federal University of Bahia, while other projects include the expansion of the engineering faculty at the Polytechnical School of Paraiba, training of computer specialists, a mineral study in the State of Goias, and social development research.

Costa Rica

The University of Costa Rica is improving its financial administration with the help of two Canadian advisers, training fellowships in Canada and some equipment under grants totalling \$235,000. Another grant of \$115,000 is aimed at improving the social and economic condition of low-income groups.

Cuba

Cuba has a \$10 million program loan at three per cent interest to buy a variety of Canadian materials to be used mainly in public health services, the pharmaceutical industry and an animal health laboratory.

The island also received technical cooperation—mainly in support of agriculture, fisheries and public health programs—totalling \$2.67 million in grant funds.

Ecuador

In an effort to diversify the one-crop agricultural base of the Guayas River basin, CIDA continued support for an experimental fishpond, to which it has contributed \$325,000 for construction and operation.

Canada and Development Cooperation

Annual Review 1976-1977

Canadian International Development Agency

Commonwealth Caribbean

CIDA's development assistance to the Caribbean began in 1958 as a five-year, \$10 million program with the Federation of the West Indies. When the Federation was dissolved in 1962 the program continued as one of capital and technical assistance to each of the member states.

Canada disbursed \$23.36 million in the area during the 1976-77 fiscal year, including \$1.52 million for food aid to Belize, Guyana and Jamaica. The education sector absorbed most of the funds, \$6.32 million, followed by waterworks and water supply programs, \$4.85 million; transport, \$3.47 million; and rural development, \$1.82 million. The balance went to a variety of projects which cut across sectoral lines.

As of January 1, 1977 there were 71 development workers in the Caribbean, 80 trainees in Canada, and 269 trainees under CIDA awards in other countries.

Per capita incomes in the Caribbean countries are high compared to the rest of the developing world but this statistic distorts the real socio-economic problem of the area. An in-depth study by CIDA published in October 1976 states that unless productive employment is generated "there will be serious social and political unrest".

The study's main recommendation "is that CIDA continue a program of development cooperation in the Commonwealth Caribbean, having productive employment generation as the major objective."

Latin America

Launched in 1970, CIDA's bilateral development assistance to Latin America has grown rapidly, reaching disbursements of \$26.47 million on 400 projects in the 1976-77 fiscal year. Food aid accounted for \$1.29 million of the total disbursements.

Almost a third of the projects are concentrated on rural development which includes agriculture, forestry, fisheries, environmental protection, crop storage, and wheat and barley research.

There are 93 education projects, 76 in public administration, 32 to help promote industry, commerce, trade and tourism, 18 in transport, 18 in communications and 15 aimed at improving public health. The remainder includes projects in community development, demographic studies, energy

and projects related to more than one sector.

From the beginning CIDA's goal was to transfer know-how and skills rather than capital, to enable Latin American countries to use their own physical and human resources in their drive towards greater self-sufficiency.

Particular attention is being paid to marginal groups in each country. The emphasis on rural development to reach the most disadvantaged is also in line with Canada's *Strategy for International Development Cooperation 1975-1980*.

As of January 1, 1977 there were 123 Canadian advisers in Latin America, 41 Latin American trainees in Canada, and four trainees under CIDA awards in other countries.

1971-72 to 1976-77 (\$ million)

Per Capita Income Figures
Based on 1973 U.S. Dollars

	1971-72	1972-73	1973-74	1974-75	1975-76	1976-77 (initial)
Rhodesia ²	.04	.08	.09	.01	—	.01
Seychelles	—	—	—	—	—	.04
Zambia	1.51	2.10	2.35	4.39	6.59	11.85
Regional Programs and Institutions						
East African Community	11.27	1.87	2.50	11.39	15.73	6.65
Regional Programs	.01	.07	.51	.24	.29	.59
University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland	.27	1.08	.39	.70	.63	.81
Total Commonwealth Africa	49.93	53.95	64.22	109.47	108.32	92.99
Commonwealth Caribbean						
Countries with Per Capita Income of \$200 to \$375 inclusive						
Dominica	.44	.62	.61	.56	.41	.43
Grenada	.47	.54	.35	.24	1.18	1.82
St. Vincent	.72	.53	.17	.76	1.26	.89
Countries with Per Capita Income of more than \$375						
Antigua	.25	.50	.14	.15	.40	1.01
Barbados	.77	1.74	2.93	.77	2.14	1.49
Belize	.49	.80	.41	1.39	1.46	1.06
Guyana	2.36	1.54	2.85	4.05	2.33	2.25
Jamaica	3.91	4.74	3.24	3.11	3.43	3.83
Montserrat	.46	.79	.51	.68	.61	.13
St. Kitts	.35	.41	.37	.21	.26	.13
St. Lucia	1.72	1.35	1.39	2.93	1.39	1.93
Trinidad and Tobago	.63	.65	.90	.57	1.80	1.10
Regional Programs and Institutions						
Agricultural Development Fund	—	—	—	—	.17	.09
Regional Programs	.28	.02	.12	.17	.53	2.48
Leeward and Windward Islands	.21	.08	.36	3.31	3.42	4.24
University of West Indies	.57	1.19	.99	.73	1.11	.48
Total Commonwealth Caribbean	13.63	15.50	15.34	19.63	21.90	23.36
Latin America						
Countries with Per Capita Income of Less than \$200						
Haiti	—	—	.15	1.34	2.90	4.33
Countries with Per Capita Income of \$200 to \$375 inclusive						
Bolivia	—	—	.56	.99	.21	.05
El Salvador	.19	.07	.11	1.42	2.07	.90
Honduras	.16	.53	.31	2.19	1.44	.44
Countries with Per Capita Income of more than \$375						
Argentina	.19	—	—	—	—	—
Brazil	1.80	3.10	1.13	1.44	2.70	3.14
Chile	.74	2.11	2.15	.30	.08	.04

DETAILS OF BILATERAL DISBURSEMENTS (cont'd)

1971-72 to 1976-77 (\$ million)

Per Capita Income Figures
Based on 1973 U.S. Dollars

	1971-72	1972-73	1973-74	1974-75	1975-76	1976-77 (initial)
Colombia	4.27	5.28	3.71	1.74	2.11	4.04
Costa Rica	—	—	.05	.15	.14	.04
Cuba	—	.05	.43	.43	3.68	4.26
Dominican Republic	—	—	.16	3.71	1.81	1.63
Ecuador	1.33	.57	1.07	3.33	3.35	.88
Guatemala	.01	.13	.05	.02	3.32	1.48
Mexico	.04	—	.01	—	—	—
Nicaragua	.01	.01	1.41	1.02	.13	.57
Peru	.05	.17	.66	1.61	2.51	2.90
Regional Programs and Institutions						
CABEI (Central American Bank for Economic Integration)	—	—	—	—	.04	.31
Regional Programs, Central America	.17	.15	.27	.13	.11	.15
Regional Programs, Latin America	1.46	.33	.55	.80	.42	1.31
Total Latin America	10.42	12.50	12.78	20.62	27.02	26.47
Other Programs						
International Emergency Relief	13.79	10.40	.60	.60	2.00	4.00
Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan	1.59	1.28	1.80	1.90	1.99	1.94
Other	.39	1.91	2.54	3.47	1.68	3.09
Total Other Programs	15.77	13.59	4.94	5.97	5.67	9.03
Total Bilateral	283.28	329.26	367.73	498.48	525.71	477.74

1. Part of the 1971-72 disbursements listed under Pakistan were for Bangladesh. In addition, a portion of the disbursements for relief in Bangladesh amounting to over \$13 million is included under the International Emergency Relief grant.

2. CIDA funds cover the cost of training black Rhodesian students in countries other than their homeland.

