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#### SOCIAL PANORAMA OF LATIN AMERICA

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#### INTRODUCTION

This second edition of the Social panorama of Latin America is an expression of the ECLAC secretariat's continuing efforts to incorporate the social dimension into the Commission's annual appraisals of regional development.

The present report covers twice as many countries as the first, and the information has been updated using the most recent figures made available to the secretariat by the countries concerned; in addition, data for intervening years and for the latter part of the 1980s have been included. In the aggregate, the information analysed here is sufficient to provide a fairly detailed picture of events during the 1980s in respect of major social issues.

Although this overview does cover the most salient aspects of the region's social development during the 1980s, it does not claim to be a comprehensive report. A number of highly important aspects of social development —such as health, housing, social expenditure and recent trends in social stratification— are either not covered at all or are discussed only partially or indirectly. As will be explained more fully below, the range of information sources has also been quite limited, since most of the data used in the preparation of this edition of the **Social panorama** were drawn from household surveys. It is anticipated that future editions' subject coverage and spectrum of basic information sources will be broadened.

The statistical data on which this report is based are the result of the unflagging efforts of statistical offices and other agencies in Latin America and Caribbean to upgrade, update and give continuity to their countries' household surveys. ECLAC processed the original information, which was then incorporated into the Household Survey Data Bank (BADEHOG) maintained by the Statistics and Economic Projections Division, so that it might assess the quality of that information and establish an acceptable degree of standardization. Despite these efforts, there is still a certain amount of lag time between the collection of the data in the countries and the publication of the Social panorama; the Commission is confident, however, that this lag will gradually be reduced as the source information becomes available on an increasingly timely basis. In any event, this lag does not limit the validity of the findings presented in this report in any essential way.

A concern for social equity continues to be the central focus of this study. Those of its dimensions analysed here include employment, income distribution and poverty, as well as progress and setbacks with regard to equality among socioeconomic strata, between the sexes and between rural and urban areas in terms of both living conditions and social mobility.

<sup>\*</sup> The first edition to appear in English.

Within the context of these subject areas, a number of new lines of analysis have been incorporated into the 1993 edition. In regard to employment, for example, changes in income levels and in the structure of urban wage labour are analysed. The public sector is also examined with a view to detecting ways in which the crisis and adjustment policies of the 1980s may have affected the profile of workers in this sector. Looking into another aspect of this subject, links between employment status and poverty are studied in order to gain a fuller understanding of the structural causes of poverty.

On the subject of income distribution and poverty, this edition includes the most recent estimates prepared by ECLAC. The information presented here covers a large number of the countries in the region during the 1980s and early 1990s.

In view of the increasing demographic significance of the older population in some of the region's countries, as well as the economic and social problems involved in the maintenance of adequate social security systems, the changes occurring in some of the traits exhibited by this age group are examined. Finally, in an effort to provide input for the preparations for the International Year of the Family in 1994 and bearing in mind the responsive chord struck by the Convention on the Rights of the Child, changes in family structure and their implications for the well-being and development of children in the various socioeconomic strata are studied in greater depth.

# MAIN FINDINGS AND ELEMENTS USEFUL IN THEIR INTERPRETATION

In the field of employment, the high rates of open unemployment found in the majority of the Latin American countries during the worst years of the economic crisis are no longer in evidence, and in a number of cases great strides have been made in this respect. The progress achieved by some countries in the late 1980s was not substantial enough, however, to make any significant reduction in the percentage of their populations living in poverty or to diminish existing inequalities in income distribution. In fact, as of the early 1990s household income distribution in most of the countries exhibited higher levels of concentration than the already very high indexes registered in the late 1970s. Meanwhile, real wages clearly moved downward in the 1980s even though, in some countries, the trend in this variable during the last three years of that decade began to reflect the positive effects of their resumed growth. The combination of these factors had an adverse effect in terms of the level of poverty in the region, whose incidence and severity continued to increase during the second half of the 1980s.

The study underscores the fact that the majority of the poor are wage-earners and that a substantial proportion of the working poor are employed in large and medium-sized firms. These findings point up the need to link efforts to promote growth and achieve a more equitable distribution of income with an improvement in the status of large numbers of wage-earners who are living in poverty. At the same time, however, an examination of the data clearly indicates that in order to impede the mechanisms by which poverty is perpetuated from generation to generation, policies aimed at raising the incomes of the poor must be accompanied by policies designed to provide education, housing and support for the reinforcement of family structures. Indeed, the **Social panorama** emphasizes that the creation of conditions conducive to the strengthening of family structures among the urban working class is a crucial component of any policy that seeks to promote more equitable access to educational opportunities for all children.

Among young people, a continued increase is to be observed in what another ECLAC report referred to as the "frustration factor",¹ which is generated by the widening gap between their remunerations and their educational levels. This trend has taken shape despite the stagnation, or even retrogression, of the level of young people's educational attainments in recent years in some countries, probably as a delayed effect of the most severe phase of the crisis and of the drastic economic adjustment measures adopted in response to that crisis. The decline in social mobility is also probably linked to another phenomenon which is rapidly spreading among young people in working-class urban strata in particular. That phenomenon is the formation of consensual unions, and although the significance of such arrangements needs to be studied in greater depth by research projects designed specifically for that purpose, the social implications of the definite link found in all socioeconomic strata between parents joined in consensual unions and children with low levels of educational attainment cannot help but be a cause of concern.

Women's participation in economic activity continues to rise; however, it is occurring within an environment that obliges many households to resort to survival strategies that often involve an increased burden of housework unaccompanied by parallel advances in the coverage of child-care support services while, at the same time, marked wage discrimination against women continues to be a problem. These inequitable situations are a source of stress within the family.

The educational levels of the rural population remain low and considerably below those of the urban population. In view of the severity of rural areas' education deficit, innovative and comprehensive educational policies to upgrade the quality of instruction will have to be implemented if we are to rationalize agricultural activity and ensure that those children and young people from rural areas who do move to the cities are not foredoomed to a marginal existence.

The above-mentioned trends are merely a sample of the contents of this edition of the Social panorama and should be interpreted within the framework of more general processes taking place in the countries of the region. In the following discussion, some of the more salient aspects of those phenomena will be outlined.

The most recent evaluations contained in the Commission's periodic surveys of the economies of the region have found signs of a modest yet continuing reactivation of economic activity following the costly adjustments made by the countries in response to the protracted recession of the 1980s. Some of the countries have begun to reduce their macroeconomic imbalances, while most have concentrated on the difficult task of controlling inflation, which is in many cases firmly rooted in the habits and expectations of both consumers and producers. The findings of the present study indicate that in these early years of the 1990s the incipient recovery of some of the region's economies has not yet had an observable impact on the social situation. Be this as it may, a comparison between the present situation and that of the 1980s turns up at least two promising facts. One is that the 1990s opened with clear signs of progress in the areas of human rights and democracy. The other is that the positive growth rates achieved by some countries during the past two years have been coupled with a decrease in poverty, thanks in large measure to a decline in open unemployment.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> ECLAC/UNESCO, Regional Office for Education in Latin America and the Caribbean, Education and Knowledge: Basic Pillars of Changing Production Patterns with Social Equity (LC/G.1702/Rev.1-P), Santiago, Chile, 1992, p. 28. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.92.II.G.6.

Clearly, these are uncertain times for the region. This is evident in many aspects of the social situation, such as the ways in which households are organized, the increasing difficulty of gaining access to vehicles of social mobility (a phenomenon that is particularly a problem for young people) and the mounting complexity of implementing political initiatives to meet the pressing needs of broad sectors of the population. Consequently, in most of the countries in the region there are now many additional sources of social and political tension, including the continued existence or expansion of deprived social sectors that are excluded from mainstream society and an increase in income concentration, even though the idea is gaining ground in many circles that social integration is essential for the achievement of economic growth.

As is evidenced by the United Nations' decision to convene the World Summit for Social Development in 1995, the issue of social integration is beginning to become a focal point for the political concerns of the Governments of the region. In Latin America, the phenomenon of social disarticulation is being fueled by various sources of tension that are linked, either directly or indirectly, to the trends examined in this edition of the Social panorama. In addition to the progressively thorough-going changes taking place in such basic social institutions as politics, religion and the family and to the above-mentioned characteristics of current poverty and income-distribution trends, mention should be made of some of the other obstacles to social integration: i) the effect on today's population —a more educated, better informed population that is more aware of its rights— of the emergence in some countries of evidence of corruption among the power elites, which has cast doubt upon the very foundations for the legitimacy of traditional political institutions; ii) the incongruities of an economic situation in which both poverty and income concentration are on the rise and the differences in the quality of the services received by the various social strata and in the types of consumption patterns accessible to them are becoming increasingly obvious; and iii) the widening gap between rising levels of formal education and declining wage levels, which is clearly observable in the public sector and especially among young people.

The findings set forth in the 1993 edition of the Social panorama of Latin America provide a basis for exploring some of these sources of tension and, in some cases, for suggesting courses of action to neutralize them.

THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION

#### 1. The structure of wage labour

Wage-based employment clearly continues to be the predominant occupational status in Latin America. Seven out of every 10 employed persons in the urban population belong to this category, despite the increase in own-account workers. For many, this occupational status denotes a weak position within the workforce of today, since real wages are lower than they were in the late 1970s and vast numbers of wage-earners who were never poor before have now been pushed into poverty. Avenues for increased participation in labour affairs are, however, paving the way for an upturn in real wages.

The main changes to occur in the structure of wage labour in the region during the 1980s may be summed up as follows: i) a slight decline in the percentage of total employment accounted for by wage labour; ii) a significant reduction in the percentage of employment accounted for by the manufacturing sector and an increase in the number of wage-earners employed in the tertiary sector; iii) a less marked decline in the public sector's share in total employment; iv) increased employment in small businesses microenterprises at the expense of employment in larger establishments; and v) a decrease in the share of total employment accounted for by domestic work. Along with these changes, real wages were down sharply and the percentage of wage-earners classified as poor climbed in all the

countries. All these changes in the employment situation since the late 1970s set up different conditions for labour policies in the region.

Despite these changes, however, as of the early 1990s wage-based employment continued to represent a very large proportion of total employment in all the Latin American countries. At present, in eight out of ten countries containing a majority of the region's population, 70% or more of the total employed urban population are wage-earners<sup>2</sup> (see table 1).

The available data on Argentina (Greater Buenos Aires) indicate that the proportion of wage labour held steady at around 70%, since a steep drop in employment in the manufacturing and construction sectors was counterbalanced by an increase in employment in commerce and services. In Brazil, the decline from 75% to 72% between 1979 and 1990 was also accompanied by a change in sectoral distribution, as the proportion of employment in manufacturing and in the larger firms decreased while the percentage of employment in tertiary activities and microenterprises rose. In Colombia, no major changes were observed during the decade, with wage-earners retaining their share of about 70%. A drop from 77% to 75% in Costa Rica was largely attributable to a relative decline in public-sector employment. In Mexico, the percentage of wage-earners fell slightly between 1987 and 1990, but remained at 75% of total employment in the country's major urban centres. Panama and Venezuela, which had not yet seen a resumption of growth as of 1990 and had suffered from sharp increases in unemployment during the preceding decade, also experienced significant changes in the distribution of wage labour, especially in manufacturing but also, to a lesser extent, in the public sector. Although these countries registered the largest decreases in wage labour (nine and five points, respectively), this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> In rural areas, wage labour represents about 40% of the total except in Costa Rica, where it currently accounts for two thirds of the total. The trends reflected in the data on the rural employment structure in five countries of the region (Brazil, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama and Venezuela) are less clear cut, as well as being more difficult to analyse based on the information on employment in these areas obtained from household surveys (see table 2).

occupational category's share still amounts to about 70% of urban employment in each of them. The changes that took place in Uruguay were quite similar to those seen in Panama and Venezuela, although the decline witnessed during the decade was less pronounced (from 77% to 73%). Chile, on the other hand, exhibited an expansion in both absolute and relative terms despite a percentage decrease in employment in the public sector and in domestic work<sup>3</sup> (see table 3). This trend began to strengthen in 1985, a year when the pace of economic growth accelerated and unemployment dropped sharply. Between 1986 and 1990 nearly 700,000 jobs were created in urban areas, of which 68% were wage-based occupations in the private sector and 3% in the public sector. As of the end of 1990, wage-earners in urban areas represented 72% of the total.

The changes observed in all the countries studied were coupled with steep declines in average remunerations; these decreases, except in the case of Argentina, were larger than the reductions registered in per capita gross national income (see tables 4, 5, 6 and 7). Household survey data also show that, in most of the countries, wage-earners' incomes were down by significant amounts in the manufacturing sector, although not by as much as in the tertiary sector; this indicates that industrial workers have greater bargaining power or a greater capacity to defend their wage levels (see table 7). In Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Panama, Uruguay and Venezuela, the decreases in real wages during the decade amounted to 26%, 17%, 14%, 5%, 14% and 53%, respectively. In four countries (Argentina, Brazil, Panama and Venezuela), the largest drops were seen during the second half of the decade. Of all the cases studied, the trend in average wages during this latter period was positive only in Colombia, Costa Rica and Guatemala<sup>4</sup> (see table 7).

As a consequence of this situation, the percentage of wage-earners classified as poor increased. In urban areas, this was true of persons employed in larger firms and of personnel working in microenterprises (see table 8). In sectoral terms, the net result was equally negative for employees in manufacturing, construction, commerce and services. In respect of the manufacturing sector, the situation in Argentina (the data are for Greater Buenos Aires) was particularly noteworthy, since 23% of wage-earners in this sector were living in poverty as of the start of the 1990s, whereas persons employed in the manufacturing sector at the close of the 1970s were virtually assured that their income levels would keep them above the poverty line. According to the most recent figures available, no less than one half of poor employed persons in urban areas are wage earners in non-professional, non-technical occupations in the private sector, and if public-sector employees are taken into account, the figure rises to 60%. If workers in microenterprises are not included, then the percentage is around 45%

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> In the case of Chile, information was not available on income levels and poverty among employed persons in the early 1980s. This is the reason why Chile is not included in the tables on employment structure contained in this report. The data on Chile come mainly from its 1987 and 1990 National Socioeconomic Surveys (CASEN). The information on the structure of urban employment presented in section 1 was obtained from employment surveys taken by the National Institute of Statistics (INE).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Variations in wage levels calculated on the basis of household survey data may differ significantly from the figures yielded by wage indexes computed by the countries themselves. Apart from the differences between the two sources in terms of their geographic and socioeconomic coverage and the types of flows examined (gross or net salaries, in cash or in kind, for example), differences also exist in the ways that average remunerations are computed. The usual method is to average the wages using set weightings, i.e., based on an employment structure (by size and sector) that does not vary over time. However, calculations of average remunerations based on household survey data take into account not only changes in income levels, but also changes in the employment structure. This is why the wage declines presented in this study are larger than those shown by average wage indexes, since the proportion of wage-earners in lower-income strata and sectors rose during the decade. See A. Mizala and P. Romaguera, Indicadores de salarios y estimaciones de remuneraciones según tamaños: Chile 1982-1990, Nota técnica, Santiago, Chile, Economic Research Corporation for Latin America (CIEPLAN), December 1992.

(see table 10). The fact that policies designed to combat poverty —mainly by improving the living conditions of workers in small manufacturing enterprises— do in fact benefit wage-earners who have very low incomes should not make us lose sight of the need to direct efforts towards promoting growth and improving income distribution as a means of boosting wage levels in medium-sized and large firms, where significant numbers of the working poor are employed.

The sharp increase in poverty among wage-earners in the public and private sectors and, as noted earlier, among those employed in medium-sized and large firms points up the need to design wage policies that will cover a wider range of workers. Along these lines, and particularly with regard to feasible measures for raising labour productivity and income levels, ECLAC<sup>5</sup> has already suggested some guidelines for modernizing labour relations. These guidelines, which form part of the Commission's proposal for changing production patterns with social equity, underscore the need to link wage hikes to increases in productivity and to improve working conditions. Other important spheres of action are the improvement of labour laws (the protection of workers' rights; expansion of trade-union coverage and the creation of collective bargaining mechanisms; and improvement of individual labour contracts) and an increased State inspection and oversight capacity.

It should also be noted that increases in the minimum wage and in the incomes of the non-working population can be very effective in reducing the percentages of the poor and indigent in the total population. In Chile, for example, increases in retirement and other pensions and in the real minimum wage (which recent experience indicates is not incompatible with an expansion of employment), along with a reduction in open unemployment and a rise in average wages, have played an important role in the country's success in bringing down poverty indexes since 1987 and, in particular, since early 1990 (see section 7).

Wage trends between 1990 and 1992 reflect the positive impact of a resumption of growth in some countries. During the biennium, average wage indexes in Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Uruguay climbed by 9.6%, 2.9%, 9.1% and 6.4%, respectively. This brought wages in Chile and Colombia to around 15% above their 1980 levels, while in Mexico and Uruguay they were still below (15% and 25%) those levels. In Argentina and Brazil, however, wages in the manufacturing sector slipped by 5.9% and 6.3% between 1990 and 1992. Argentina constitutes a very special case in the sense that the fall in wages in its manufacturing sector coincided with a considerable expansion of output. In Peru, average wages in Lima rose even though per capita income continued on its downward path, but they were still less than one-half their 1980 level. The trend in the minimum wage in urban areas was less promising. Except in Argentina and Chile, which saw a substantial upturn in real minimum wages, and in Brazil, where wages were also up, although less sharply, the countries for which recent data were available (Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay) registered decreases of between 4 and 30 percentage points during the 1991-1992 biennium.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See ECLAC, Social Equity and Changing Production Patterns: An Integrated Approach (LC/G.1701/Rev.1-P), Santiago, Chile, 1992, and in particular chapter VI. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.92.II.G.5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> See ECLAC, Preliminary overview of the economy of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1992 (LC/G.1751), Santiago, Chile, 18 December 1992, table 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> **Ibid**, table 7.

#### THE METHOD USED TO ARRIVE AT POVERTY ESTIMATES

The estimates of extreme poverty presented in this report were prepared by ECLAC using what is known as the "income method", which is based on the calculation of poverty lines. These lines represent the amount of income required by each household in order to meet the basic needs of all its members. The placement of poverty lines for each country and geographic area was determined on the basis of the estimated cost of a shopping basket of staple foods that would meet the population's nutritional needs, conform to its eating habits and be in keeping with both the food supply actually available in the country and relative food prices. An estimate of the sum required by households to meet their basic non-food needs was then added to the value of this shopping basket.

The indigence line denotes the cost of the shopping basket of staple foods, and indigents (or those living in extreme poverty) are defined as people residing in households whose incomes are so low that even if the whole of their income were used to buy food, the household could not adequately cover the nutritional needs of all its members. For urban areas, the poverty line was drawn at twice the value of the indigence line; for rural areas, it was placed at a point 75% above the level of the basic food budget.

In calculating indigence lines, the differences among food prices in metropolitan areas, other urban areas and rural areas were taken into account. In most cases, estimates of the cost of shopping baskets of staple foods in non-metropolitan urban and rural areas were based on price levels 5% and 25%, respectively, below those used for metropolitan areas.

The percentages of households and of the population classified as poor and as indigent were obtained by comparing the monthly per capita value of the total budget with the total per capita income of each household. Country indexes of poverty and indigence were computed as weighted averages of the indexes for each geographical area and are therefore influenced not only by the extent of poverty in each of those areas, but also by the relative size of each area's population in terms of the total national population.

Although the coverage of this information is not comprehensive, 8 it does show that the wage increases achieved in recent years have been registered in countries in which continuing economic growth and rising employment have been coupled with redistributive efforts. In contrast, wages have fallen in countries subject to severe political tensions and to recessionary adjustment programmes that have not led to higher growth and lower inflation. This has not only increased the wage spread, but has also played a role in keeping urban poverty and indigence levels high.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> This is because: i) the coverage of wage indexes is limited, since they usually refer to wages in the manufacturing sector and, in some cases, only to those paid by firms located in the country's largest urban centre; and ii) information on the percentage of employed persons whose remunerations are equal to or near the level of the minimum wage for urban areas is not available.

#### 2. The employment and income status of young people

The fact that young people are now more highly educated but have lower real incomes is one of the most detrimental effects of the crisis of the 1980s. This situation has serious implications for the young people of Latin America, whose expectations are being increasingly thwarted.

As a result of the rapid expansion in the coverage of secondary and higher education in the region<sup>9</sup>—which was reflected in the postponement of entry into the labour force until a later age—together with higher open unemployment rates, an increase in the number of young people who neither attend school nor work and changes in the age distribution of the Latin American population, the share of total employment accounted for by young people shrank during the past decade.

Nevertheless, as of the early 1990s the percentage of the total economically active population under the age of 25 was still quite high: around 20% in Chile, Panama and Uruguay and nearly 30% in Brazil, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico (see tables 12 and 13).

The available information on six Latin American countries which are quite representative of the diversity found in the region provides an idea of the considerable rise in the educational levels of employed youth that took place during the 1980s. The percentage of persons under 25 years of age who have had 10 or more years of education (a number that can be regarded as the minimum needed to achieve levels of productivity and income that afford a high probability that a person will be protected against poverty)<sup>10</sup> is a good indicator of that improvement. The countries whose active population exhibited relatively lower educational levels were the ones that made the most progress between 1980 and 1990, with the rate rising from 16% to 22% in Brazil, from 25% to 39% in Colombia, and from 22% to 29% in Venezuela. In Uruguay, the increase in the proportion of young people having 10 years or more of schooling was smaller (from 36% to 39%), while in Costa Rica and Panama the rate held at about 40% during the decade. Chile, with a rate of 60%, and Guatemala and Honduras, where less than 20% of employed youth have over 10 years of education, are situated at the two extremes of the regional spectrum. This increase in young people's educational levels occurred, however, in parallel with steep

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> As noted in a recent ECLAC document, "In recent decades, the systems of education, training and scientific and technological development have registered noteworthy, albeit incomplete, expansion in most of the countries of the region. However, they still display obvious shortcomings with regard to the quality of their results, their degree of adaptation to the requirements of the economic and social environment, and the degree of equity in the access of the different strata of society to them." See ECLAC/UNESCO Regional Office for Education in Latin America and the Caribbean, Education and Knowledge: Basic Pillars of Changing Production Patterns with Social Equity (LC/G.1702/Rev.1-P), Santiago, Chile, 1992. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.92.II.G.6. The same document indicates that the gross enrolment ratio for secondary education in Latin America and the Caribbean (i.e., total enrolment in the relevant grades divided by the population between the ages of 12 and 17) rose from 25.5% in 1970 to 57.6% in 1988. The ratio for higher education (referring to the population between 18 and 23 years of age) climbed from 6.3% to 18.7% during the same period.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Table 12 shows that, in all the countries studied, employed youths having at least 10 years of schooling currently earn incomes equal, on average, to two and one half times the value of the poverty line in per capita terms; in five countries, their incomes were three times as high. The only exception is Paraguay (Asunción). This income level is considered to be sufficient to keep a family of three out of poverty even if only one member of the household has an income.

reductions in their real incomes<sup>11</sup> in the urban areas of five out of the six countries (Brazil, Costa Rica, Panama, Uruguay and Venezuela). The exception was Colombia, where young people's average income climbed by 5%.

#### INTERNATIONALLY COMPARABLE INCOME MEASUREMENTS

With a view to permitting comparisons at the international level, average household incomes and the incomes of the individuals actually earning those incomes were expressed in terms of the value of the per capita poverty line for each country. This measurement represents the buying power of a given income level in respect of the value of the shopping basket of staples used to prepare poverty estimates and thus, in that sense, denotes potential income. As may be seen from tables 12 and 13, in some cases this income measurement yields a higher value in rural areas than in urban zones. This outcome, which may give pause since it constitutes a departure from the known pattern of urban/rural income disparities, is due to the fact that in those cases average urban income levels exceed rural levels by less than 52% (i.e., the percentage difference between the urban and rural poverty lines according to the procedure used for their computation). The rural poverty line was placed at a lower value than the urban poverty line due to the lower cost of the goods included in the staple food basket and the less diversified consumption patterns found in rural zones.

At present, the incomes obtained in the labour market by a great majority of young people —those with fewer than 10 years of schooling— are less than twice the value of the per capita poverty line, which is equivalent, on average, to less than US\$ 120 per month in urban areas. Furthermore, in almost all the countries of the region the percentage of employed youth classified as poor is significantly higher than it was in the late 1970s and, in all cases, the incidence of poverty within this segment of the population is greater than it is among other employed persons. The figures vary between 15% (Costa Rica) and 85% (Honduras), with the rates for most of the countries ranging from 30% to 40%.

This deterioration in the situation is particularly worrisome in view of the fundamental role played by education in the formation of a trained workforce and the achievement of the higher levels of productivity necessary in order to change production patterns with social equity, as has been proposed by ECLAC. Nor should we underestimate the impact on young people —especially in terms of thwarted expectations— of the perception of an increasing lack of correspondence between the effort expended to obtain an education (by young people who, as a rule, have more years of schooling when they reach working age than their parents did) and the pay levels offered in the labour market, particularly in urban areas, where, in addition to the expansion and diversification of higher-income groups' consumption patterns, the mass media has come to have a growing influence.

The above situation is compounded by two factors that illustrate the especially difficult circumstances facing young people in the region today: the high and, in some countries, rising rate of unemployment, and the large number of young people who neither attend school nor work, particularly in the lowest-income households. Even in those countries which have managed to resume their economic

It should be noted that setting the cut-off point at 10 years of schooling —a number which was chosen primarily for reasons relating to the statistical significance of the household survey data used— obscures the advances made by countries with higher levels of education. Judging by the increase in gross enrolment rates in higher education, a number of countries probably saw an increase during the decade in the percentage of employed youth having 12 years or more of education. In Chile, for example, this group represents nearly 10% of the total employed population. However, 23% belong to poor households and their average income (50,200 pesos as of November 1990) is less than three times the value of the per capita urban poverty line.

growth and to reduce the level of open unemployment in recent years, unemployment among young people remains high. In the urban areas of Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Uruguay, unemployment among the young population amounted to 18.0%, 20.2%, 12.8% and 22.7%, respectively, in 1990. Colombia and Chile were the only countries in which the rates had fallen significantly since the mid-1980s; in Colombia, the decrease totalled five percentage points while in Chile it was six points. In Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela, where open unemployment continued to rise during the preceding three years, the rates reached 15.2%, 11.8% and 24.9%, respectively.

The number of young people who neither work nor attend school —a high-risk and highly vulnerable position occupied primarily by low-income youths—has climbed to between 10% and nearly 25% of the total population aged 25 years or under, while the percentage is one and one half to two times as high among the young people whose households are within the poorest 25% of the total household population (see section 16). In brief, the difficulty which a growing percentage of young people has in finding work, together with the lower incomes they obtain in the labour market today as compared to what they could have earned a decade ago, has led to a deterioration in living conditions and has exacerbated the marginalization of young people from poor households. This latter group of young people are being deprived of access to the usual channels for incorporation into consumer society and to opportunities for social mobility.

#### 3. The size of low-productivity urban strata

Two out of every five employed persons in urban areas are currently working in lowproductivity. low-income sectors having limited social security coverage. sluggishness of productive job creation processes in the past decade led to an increase in employment in smaller enterprises and in the number of unskilled independent workers in commerce and services.

One of the most conspicuous features of the urban employment structure in the countries of the region is the high percentage of employed persons who work in low-productivity sectors of the economy. These people are non-professional, non-technical workers employed in microenterprises and unskilled independent workers, and they currently represent between 30% (Uruguay) and somewhat more than 40% (Brazil) of the total employed population. In the smaller, poorer countries, the figure rises to 50% (see table 14). During the 1980s these sectors, in which the lower-income population is

concentrated, absorbed a large part of the increase in the urban labour force and thus helped to keep open unemployment rates during and after the crisis from climbing even higher than they did. It is significant that the countries which saw the largest increases in employment in these sectors, especially in commerce and services (Argentina, Panama and Venezuela) were also the countries that witnessed the steepest decreases in output during the second half of the 1980s, which were accompanied by even higher open unemployment levels than those registered around 1985. The expansion of these sectors is attributable not only to the rapid growth of the economically active population in urban areas (at an average annual

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> See ECLAC, Latin American poverty profiles for the early 1990s (LC/L.716(Conf.82/6)), Santiago, Chile, November 1992.

rate of over 3% and, in some countries, 4%), but also to a lower labour absorption rate in medium-sized and, especially, large firms as well as in the public sector.

Excluding employment in domestic service, which has been steadily declining as a percentage of total urban employment and which can also be regarded as a typical low-productivity, low-income activity, total employment in unstructured sectors<sup>13</sup> grew in both absolute and relative terms in Brazil, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay and Venezuela, while its share in total urban employment remained constant in Argentina and Costa Rica. In most of the countries, low-productivity urban employment also tended to expand more rapidly in commerce and services than in the manufacturing and construction sectors.

Income trends in low-productivity strata are one of the factors that helps account for the increase of income inequality seen in most of the countries during the 1980s. First, the striking difference between the wages paid by microenterprises and by larger production units (between 40% and 60%, on average, around 1990) did not lessen during the decade in spite of a steep decrease in the wages and salaries paid by firms in the structured and public sectors. Second, the incomes earned by own-account workers having low skill levels, especially in commercial and service activities, decreased by a proportionally greater amount than the average income of employed persons did. The available figures on urban zones indicate that in five of the six countries where incomes fell, the decline was steeper for the less skilled independent workers (see table 5). The exception was Venezuela, where the declining wages and rising inflation seen in recent years appear to have had a relatively greater impact on the employees of microenterprises, although this generated similar regressive effects. As will be seen later on, Argentina, Brazil, Panama and Venezuela are the Latin American countries in which income distribution worsened the most (see table 14).

One fact that merits further consideration in view of its implications for poverty-reduction policies is that, with the exception of Panama, the average incomes of wage-earners having low skill levels who are employed in microenterprises are substantially lower than the incomes of unskilled independent workers (see table 15). The available information for the early 1990s also shows that, within the low-productivity segments of the urban labour market, the largest proportion of the working poor are employed in small manufacturing enterprises, with the incidence of poverty in this group ranging from 22% in Costa Rica up to 62% in Guatemala. However, this group represents a very small portion of total employment (less than 5% in all the countries studied except Paraguay), has shrunk in size during the past decade and accounts for less than 10% of the urban poor. These figures indicate that, while policies designed to boost the income levels of those employed in microenterprises through credit, training and technical assistance programmes may be correctly targeted, since they are benefiting the poorest groups among the employed population, but their effectiveness in reducing the incidence of poverty may be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> In referring to activities conducted by non-professional, non-technical workers (employers and wage-earners) in small enterprises and by independent workers (own-account workers and unpaid family members) having low skill levels, the term "unstructured sectors" is used rather than the more usual "informal sector". The International Labour Office recently proposed an international definition for the latter term for use in statistical applications based on the traits of the relevant production units (i.e., size in terms of the number of persons employed and their status as registered or unregistered enterprises). The household survey data used in preparing this report does not provide information about the characteristics of enterprises. Apart from the information on production-unit size and social security coverage that can be obtained from a very few surveys, there is no information is generally available that would allow this segment of the labour market to be defined or described more accurately. Clearly, the working definition used for this purpose may, in fact, include persons employed in the small yet highly productive enterprises which are found with increasing frequency in a wide range of activities relating to communications, computer sciences and, in general, personal and business services.

limited because only a small number of people gain access to these programmes and the group of potential beneficiaries is fairly limited.

#### DETERMINATION OF SHOPPING BASKETS OF STAPLE FOODS AND OF THE PLACEMENT OF INDIGENCE AND POVERTY LINES

The definition of the shopping basket of staples for each country and urban/rural zone was based on actual observed expenditures on food in a selected stratum of the population, whose consumption pattern was then used as a benchmark. In most cases, the researchers chose the second quartile in the per capita household income distribution, which was estimated on the basis of data from household budget surveys taken in the region during the 1980s. The households in the lowest percentiles were not used for this purpose in order to avoid incorporating eating habits shaped by an extreme shortage of resources, since this usually results in insufficient, imbalanced diets.

The shopping baskets of staple foods are only a guideline, however, since they do not provide an exact indication of the level and structure of the relevant population stratum's food intake. This is because the diets were adjusted to conform to the caloric requirements set forth in the most recent recommendations of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations University (UNU); in addition, the baskets were modified by the exclusion of a large number of goods on the basis of their cost or non-essential character, although this does not mean that the baskets are of a minimum cost.

An effort was made to ensure that the diets used in calculating indigence lines were of a sufficient quality to meet both the total caloric and protein requirements of the population in each country and each urban/rural zone as well as certain dietary standards. These standards refer not only to vitamins and other basic nutrients, but also to calorie sources and protein quality. In this respect, a requirement that at least 35% of the total must be of animal origin was established.

The cost of the food basket per person/day in urban areas, using average prices for the second half of 1988, was estimated at around US\$ 0.90 at the average exchange rate in the "rf" series of International Monetary Fund (IMF) statistics. The following table summarizes the monthly values of the indigence and poverty lines on which poverty estimates for 10 Latin American countries were based.

	Indigence lines			Poverty lines			
	(Monthly budgets per person, in dollars, at prices for the second half of 1988)						
	Metropolitan area	Other urban	Rural area	Metropolitan area	Other urban	Rural area	
Argentina	31.5	30.0	23.6	63.1	59.9	41.4	
Brazil <sup>a</sup>	28.5	25.0	20.0	57.0	50.1	35.0	
Colombia	29.0	26.7	21.8	58.1	53.3	38.1	
Costa Rica	26.3	25.0	19.8	52.7	50.1	34.6	
Guatemala	26.0	21.0	17.8	51.9	41.9	31.2	
Mexico	- 26.5 -		22.1	- <b>53</b> .		38.6	
Panama	33.8	32.1	25.4	67.6	64.2	44.4	
Peru	26.8	25.4	20.1	53.6	50.9	35.1	
Uruguay	25.8	24.5	19.3	51.5	49.0	33.8	
Venezuela	35.3	33.5	26.5	70.6	67.1	46.3	

<sup>\*</sup> Weighted average of values for Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.

#### 4. Employment in the public sector

The decline in the remunerations of publicsector wage-earners has been accompanied by an increase in poverty among this group, and this situation indirectly limits the possibilities for reforming and modernizing the State. Nevertheless, the staff of the central-government civil service and those employed in public services are more highly skilled today than they were a decade ago. The deep cuts made in fiscal spending and the privatization of public-sector firms (and, in some cases, of basic health and education services) undertaken in Latin America as a consequence of the crisis and subsequent structural adjustment programmes have hurt public-sector wage-earners' employment levels less than their income levels. During the 1980s, the level of employment in the central-government civil service, in public services (health, education, social security) and in State companies declined as a percentage of total employment in four of the seven countries for

which the most complete information was available: Costa Rica, Panama, Uruguay and Venezuela. Nevertheless, in the second half of the 1980s the percentage of employment in the civil service expanded in five countries (see table 16). In all the cases —even those in which the relative magnitude of public-sector employment was lower in 1990 than in 1980 (Costa Rica, Uruguay and Venezuela)— the number of public-sector wage-earners increased in absolute terms.<sup>14</sup>

During the past decade, the trend in average public-sector wages was similar to that of labour income; <sup>15</sup> remunerations for public employees were down considerably in Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela, with the percentage decreases ranging from 14% (Brazil) and 56% (Venezuela). The exceptions were Colombia and Panama. The available data lend weight to the assumption that wage-earners in the decentralized components of the public sector managed to defend their income levels more effectively than civil servants did, presumably because the persons employed in State-run companies were in a stronger position to negotiate their wage levels. In Costa Rica, Uruguay and Venezuela, the decline in income was similar in the two subsectors (see table 16).


As was to be expected, these decreases in wage levels had the effect of raising the percentage of public employees living in poverty. In a number of countries —especially in Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela and, to a lesser extent, in Mexico and Paraguay— the increase in the number of public-sector employees classified as poor was greater, in percentage terms, than it was for the employed population as a whole. This indicates that wage-earners whose incomes were close to the poverty line saw their wages decline the most sharply. The exceptions were, once again, Colombia and Panama, where the incidence of poverty among employed persons climbed by three and six points, respectively, but declined by similar amounts among public employees.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> In the case of Mexico, information was to be had only on employment in the central-government civil service. These data indicate that between 1987 and 1990 the percentage of wage-earners in this sector fell from 7.3% to 6.0%, which signifies a decrease in the number of public employees of 115,000. In Chile, on the other hand, the data from employment surveys conducted by the National Institute of Statistics indicate that employment in the (centralized and decentralized) public sector slipped from 12.2% in 1980 to 10.1% in 1990, but the number of employees actually increased by nearly 90,000.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> In the early 1990s, the average remunerations obtained by public-sector wage-earners in the countries of the region varied markedly. Expressed in 1992 dollars, the monthly averages in the highest-paying countries (Argentina, Chile and Costa Rica) were around US\$ 390 (6.7 times the per capita poverty line). At the other end of the spectrum, the average was only about US\$ 200 (3.4 times the poverty line) in Guatemala, Paraguay and Venezuela.

These trends may reflect a major change from the situation as it stood in the late 1970s in many Latin American countries; at that time, in most cases, a job in the public sector was not only a fairly stable form of employment that brought with it certain social benefits but also afforded an income that was sufficiently high to provide public employees with a very good chance of remaining poverty-free. At least this was the case in the countries of the region where a large-scale public-sector apparatus was first established. With the exception of some teachers (mainly at the basic-education level) and most of the less skilled workers, particularly those employed in health services, public servants working in the central-government civil service and in State-run firms earned incomes far above the national average; what is more, these occupations enjoyed a certain social status or, at the least, provided an effective channel for employment-based social mobility. The lower incomes and higher percentage of poverty found among government employees today limits the possibilities for reforming and modernizing the public sector.

The information provided by household surveys does, however, bring out one positive fact as well: in all the countries, the educational level of public-sector wage-earners as a group has risen appreciably; during the 1980s, their average number of years of schooling climbed at least as fast as that of the active population (by slightly more than one year) and in all the countries except Uruguay, there was also a considerable increase in the number of professionals and technicians per 1,000 persons employed in the public sector, which denotes a higher degree of technical sophistication in the State apparatus (see table 16).



#### 5. Household income inequality

The regressive trend in income distribution registered during the first half of the decade eased off in some of the countries between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s. Nevertheless, current indexes of household income concentration reveal a definite regression in terms of social equity, even in relation to the already marked degree of inequality that existed in the region in the late 1970s.

The changes that occurred in income distribution in Latin America during the 1980s took place within economic environments marked by a very steep decrease in per capita income and other structural changes that altered the level of monetary and non-monetary resources involved in primary income distribution. The 1991 edition of this report noted that rising open unemployment, cuts in public spending and the deteriorating situation with regard to reductions in real remunerations —which were made during the crisis and then became a correlate of many adjustment policies— were the chief factors that

were depressing income levels and were affecting middle- and low-income households the most severely.

The information available at the time, which covered a limited but significant group of countries, showed that during the first half of the 1980s there was, predictably, a very considerable deterioration in household income distribution in all these countries (with the sole exception of Colombia). Evidence regarding factors of a more structural nature that might have played a role in that deterioration was very scanty, although mention was made of the increasingly sharp sectoral differences in output per worker and, in particular, the steep drop in average output in the services sector, where nearly one half of the labour force is employed in most of the countries. It was also stated that government action in the areas of employment, remunerations and social spending in general had contributed to the worsening situation in the poorest strata.

In this edition of the Panorama, estimates of household income distribution are presented for a larger number of countries and, in most cases, data are available for the entire period 1980-1990. This additional information provides corroboration, on a more solid basis, for the statements that: i) most of the countries lost a great deal of ground in terms of social equity during the crisis and subsequent structural adjustment processes, and their income distribution as of the early 1990s is therefore even more concentrated than it was in the late 1970s; ii) the deterioration in income distribution was due to a sharp drop in household income in the first two quartiles (income levels below the median) as compared to the gains (or smaller losses) in income of the richest 5% or even 10% of all households; iii) the largest income declines were not always sustained by the poorest households (the first quartile) since in some countries lower middle-income households (the second quartile) were the most severely affected group; iv) the scarcity of signs of any reduction in income concentration in countries where economic growth has resumed is indicative of the slow pace at which middle- and low-income households' income levels are recovering; and v) if these trends continue, then a small poverty reduction and no significant improvement in terms of social equity can be expected in the near future.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> See ECLAC, Panorama social de América Latina, edición 1991 (LC/G.1688), Santiago, Chile, October 1991, pp. 11-13.

Distributive changes<sup>17</sup> are summarized in table 17. The increased income shares of the poorest 25% and 40% of households and the lower Gini coefficients indicate that during the second half of the 1980s inequality was reduced slightly in the urban areas of Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica and, to a lesser extent, in Brazil and Venezuela; however, in no case were these improvements great enough to make up for the setbacks experienced during the first half of that decade. In Argentina and Panama, the deterioration in income distribution continued through the end of the 1980s. According to the latest figures, urban income distribution in Mexico also worsened a great deal between 1987 and 1990, and, to a less acute degree, the same thing occurred in Guatemala (1986-1989).

Signs of a slight tempering of distributive inequality were also observed in rural areas. In four of five countries (Brazil, Costa Rica, Panama and Venezuela), household income distribution either showed a moderate improvement or stabilized (see figures 1 and 2). The exception was Chile, where a marked downturn in the level of social equity in rural areas was coupled with a very sharp rise (47%) in average household income between 1987 and 1990. This increase prevented the poorest households from sustaining a loss of income in absolute terms; in fact, the average income of the bottom quartile, whose share of total income shrank from 10.7% to 7.1% during this three-year period, held virtually constant, while the poorest 40% of households marked up a 9% increase. The richest 10% of households, however, registered a gain of over 90%, which means that their real income nearly doubled (see tables 18 and 19).

A summarization of the distributive changes that took place during the 1980s in 10 Latin American countries will provide a clearer picture of the situation as it now stands in the region.<sup>18</sup> This overview is based primarily on trends in urban areas, for which more information and more reliable estimates are available. This limitation notwithstanding, the trends identified in rural areas indicate that the picture would probably be very much the same if distributive profiles at the national level were used.


It is noteworthy that the changes which gave rise to an increased concentration of income during the decade did not greatly alter the countries' rankings in the regional scale of inequality in household income distribution.<sup>19</sup> The marked regressions observed in Argentina and Panama and the gradual improvement in distribution in Colombia were the only trends that resulted in a change in the country rankings as compared to the situation before the crisis (see figure 3).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> All estimates of income distribution refer to households rather than individuals. Concentration coefficients and the percentage income shares for the various percentiles in the income distribution scheme were obtained by ranking the households according to their per capita incomes.


<sup>18</sup> The classification of the countries in terms of levels and changes in the degree of distributive inequality was based on the income shares of the poorest 25% and, especially, 40% of households and on the Gini coefficient of income concentration. The latter was calculated from the per capita household income distribution by deciles. The scale of relative inequality within the Latin American context is based on the percentage income share of the first four deciles in the distribution. For the years around both 1980 and 1990 inequality was classified as "high" in countries where these deciles' income share was under 12.5%, as "medium" if the percentage was between 12.5% and 15.5%, and as "low" if the share was greater than 15.5%.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> As will be obvious, the fact that a country may be ranked as having a low degree of inequality in this regional scale does not mean that it compares favourably with countries in other areas of the world. Currently, only Costa Rica and Uruguay exhibit levels of concentration that might be regarded as low outside the context of Latin America.

CORRESPONDING TO POOREST 40% AND RICHEST 10% OF HOUSEHOLDS, 1980-1990 LATIN AMERICA (12 COUNTRIES): CHANGES IN SHARES OF TOTAL INCOME Figure 1




CORRESPONDING TO POOREST 40% AND RICHEST 10% OF HOUSEHOLDS, 1980-1990 LATIN AMERICA (5 COUNTRIES): CHANGES IN SHARES OF TOTAL INCOME Figure 2



Source: ECLAC, Statistics and Economic Projections Division, on the basis of special tabulations of household survey data. The information regarding Chile was drawn from that country's 1978 and 1988 household budget surveys.

Figure 3
LATIN AMERICA (8 COUNTRIES): CHANGES IN INCOME
DISTRIBUTION DURING THE 1980s



Source: ECLAC, Social Development Division, on the basis of household survey data.

Gini coefficient in 1980

	Changes in level of inequality		Level in 1990 as compared to	Inequality in the Latin American context	
	1980-1986	1986-1990	1980	1980	1990
Argentina	increase	increase	higher	low	medium
Brazil	increase slight decrease higher		higher	high	high
Colombia	decrease	decrease	lower	high	medium
Costa Rica	increase	slight decrease	higher	low	low
Chile	increase	same	higher	medium	medium
Guatemala	•••	increase	(higher)	(high)	high
Mexico		increase	(higher)	(medium)	high
Panama	increase	increase	higher	medium	high
Uruguay	increase	decrease	lower	low	low
Venezuela	increase	slight decrease	higher	low	low

The available data on Mexico were not complete enough to confirm the supposition that during the 1980s income distribution shifted from intermediate to high levels of concentration, although this was probably the case. This analysis does not cover the 1970s, when major distributive changes occurred in some countries. Thus, for example, the fact that Chile has remained at an intermediate level of inequality since the early 1980s does not reflect the sharp deterioration in distribution that took place between 1972 and 1978. Much the same is true of Argentina, where an intensification of the regressive trend in income distribution began to be observed in the mid-1970s.

### 6. Income differentials between high- and low-income strata

The greater inequality of income distribution that currently exists in most of the Latin American countries is manifested in a widening gap between the incomes of the poorest 40% of households and the richest 10%. The top decile receives over 40% of total income in the countries with the most highly concentrated distribution patterns, and obtains slightly less than 30% in only two cases.

As a consequence of the region's heightened distributive inequality, during the 1980s the income gap between high- and low-income households widened. In particular, an increase was seen in the differential between the poorest 40% of households—whose incomes are not even half the national average— and the richest 10%, which receives over four times that average.<sup>20</sup> In six of the eight countries studied, this differential grew, and the income of the richest 10% is therefore now nearly 10 times as much as that of the poorest 40% (see table 17). The exceptions in this case are Colombia and Uruguay, where the

degree of inequality decreased. The circumstances under which this gap widened were different in each country. The worst situations were those of Argentina and Venezuela, where the poorest 40% of households sustained losses in terms of both their income share and their average income level, whereas the incomes of the richest decile held steady or actually rose despite deep recessions in those countries' economies (see table 4).

A different sort of case is found in Chile, where the reduction in the poorer strata's share of total income did not translate into such a sharp decrease in their real income levels during the 1980s. Instead, the increased income gap in this country is due to the steep rise in the income share and real income levels of the upper strata. These two different ways of arriving at an expanded income differential between upper and lower strata differ in that the resulting increase in the degree of inequity may be more socially disruptive when the upturn in the upper strata's consumption capacity is accompanied by a reduction in that of the lower strata, especially if the latter's incomes were already insufficient to cover the cost of staple goods. On the other hand, if the poorest groups' incomes rise, albeit rather slowly, the widening of the gap between them and the upper strata may be more tolerable.

The sharp rise in the incomes of the uppermost decile in economies that registered steep decreases in per capita GDP had the effect of increasing the proportion of total income received by the households in that group. Data for Greater Buenos Aires point to an increase of between 30% and 35% for the richest 10% of households while the poorest 40% saw their share shrink by nearly two points (from 18% to 16%) during the period 1980-1986. Preliminary estimates based on the same source suggest that the gap between the richest 10% and the poorest 40% may have grown even wider between 1986 and 1990,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> The household survey data used in calculating the income distribution figures presented in this report probably underestimate the incomes of high-income strata more than of other strata, whether due to omission or under-reporting. Accordingly, a special effort was made to correct and adjust the figures for the various income flows that were obtained from these surveys by comparing them with data from each country's national accounts to make sure that the totals for high-income households' capital gains and incomes were in keeping with those accounts. It is possible that high-income strata's incomes may have nevertheless been underestimated, which would mean that the income differentials between high- and low-income strata calculated for this study would also be underestimates. For these same reasons, the decision was taken to consider the average income of the highest decile rather than of the richest 5%.

since the income share of the top decile climbed to 37% while that of the four lowest deciles appears to have fallen by around 13%. Substantial increases in the highest decile's income share (more than three points) together with an appreciable drop in that of the four lowest deciles were also observed in the urban areas of Chile, Venezuela and Panama.<sup>21</sup> <sup>22</sup> In Brazil and Costa Rica the increase in the differential was smaller, while in Colombia the gap narrowed. For its part, Uruguay regained its traditional degree of relatively equitable income distribution during the second half of the decade. In net terms, the richest 10% saw its share expand by less than two points (to 33% as of 1989), while the poorest 40% achieved an increase of over one point in the course of the decade. Thus, with the exception of Colombia, the differences between the incomes of the poorest quartile of the urban household population and the richest 5% generally tended to expand even further (see figures 4, 5 and 6).

	Changes in income share 1980-1990		Variations in average household income 1980-1990		Income gap during the period	Variation in average income of all households
	poorest 40%	richest 10%	poorest 40%	richest 10%	richest 10%/ poorest 40%	•
Argentina	••	++		+	++	
Brazil		+ 1		+	++	-
Colombia	++	* *	++	+	-	+
Costa Rica	-	+	w m	-	+	-
Chile		++	-	++	++	+
Panama		++	-	++	++	+
Uruguay	+	==	-	-	-	•
Venezuela	• • •	++			++	

The plus sign (+) signifies an increase and the minus sign (-) a decrease. A doubled sign means that the change was very marked. The = sign indicates that no change occurred during the period.


As noted in the preceding section, a marked re-concentration of income occurred in the rural areas of Chile between 1987 and 1990. The highest decile's share expanded from 31.2% to 40.6%, while that of the poorest 40% fell by over five percentage points (from 20% to 14.8%). Even so, the average income of this group grew by 7%.


The re-concentration of income distribution and the swift impoverishment of the Venezuela population during the closing years of the 1980s surely helped to set the scene for the mass disturbance that has come to be known as the <u>caracazo</u>, or "Caracas coup attempt".


Figure 4


LATIN AMERICA (10 COUNTRIES): VARIATIONS IN AVERAGE
HOUSEHOLD INCOME, URBAN ZONES, 1980-1990
(Percentages)


BRAZII

















Figure 4 (concluded)





Source: ECLAC, Social Development Division, on the basis of household surveys conducted by the corresponding countries.


Figure 5
LATIN AMERICA (5 COUNTRIES): VARIATIONS IN AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD INCOME, RURAL ZONES, 1980-1990












Source: ECLAC, Social Development Division, on the basis of household surveys conducted by the corresponding countries.

CORRESPONDING TO POOREST 25% AND RICHEST 5% OF HOUSEHOLDS, 1980-1990 LATIN AMERICA (12 COUNTRIES): CHANGES IN SHARES OF TOTAL INCOME Figure 6





## 7. The incidence of poverty in Latin America

The second half of the 1980s saw a further increase in poverty in Latin America, especially in the larger countries. Today, two out of every five urban residents are poor, and the ratio in rural areas is three out of every five. Although the majority of the poor population lives in urban areas, the incidence of extreme poverty remains higher in rural areas.

The most recent estimates prepared by ECLAC place the percentage of the population living in poverty in the region in 1990 at 46%, which was an increase over the 43% level recorded midway through the preceding decade. Between 1980 and 1990 the total number of poor people in Latin America rose by 60 million, thereby wiping out the progress made in the 1970s. The urban population was more severely affected than the inhabitants of rural areas, since 53 million of those 60 million "new poor" were living in the cities. Poverty in Latin America thus became an

overwhelmingly urban phenomenon even though its incidence and severity remain greater in rural zones (see table 20).

These figures bring to light two disturbing facts. One is that during the past decade the number of people suffering from extreme poverty, i.e., the population whose incomes are below the indigence line, rose to 95 million, which represented an increase from 19% to 22% of the total population. At present, one out of every five Latin Americans does not have sufficient monetary resources to ensure a nutritionally adequate diet. The second fact is that, despite a resumption of growth in some countries (Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and Uruguay), poverty continued to increase in the region. Contributing factors included the sharp economic downturns seen in Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela and the slowness of the improvement in the income levels of poor households in the countries that achieved faster rates of economic growth during the second half of the 1980s.

An examination of poverty trends between the mid-1980s and 1990 shows that both poverty and indigence expanded considerably in Argentina, Brazil, Panama and Venezuela (see table 21). Preliminary estimates for Greater Buenos Aires based on the 1990 current household survey indicate that the poverty rate jumped from 12% to 25% while indigence expanded from 3% to 7%. The causes of these increases were a 15% drop in per capita income and a sharp downturn in average remunerations (-21%) and in the minimum wage for urban areas (-64%) (see table 4). In the urban areas of Brazil, poverty and indigence indexes also climbed substantially between 1987 and 1990 (from 34% to 39% and from 13% to 16%, respectively), although the declines in per capita income and in average and minimum wages were smaller. In Panama, too, the four-point rise in the poverty rate and the two-point increase in indigence took place within a severe recessionary setting, with per capita national income plunging 22% between 1986 and 1989.

Venezuela experienced the second sharpest increase in poverty (Argentina's was the steepest) during the second half of the 1980s, as poverty climbed from 25% to 33% in urban areas and indigence rose from 8% to 11% against a backdrop of rising unemployment and accelerating inflation. The adverse trends in both of these cases were quite pronounced, especially in view of the fact that in the late 1970s these two countries had some of the highest incomes and lowest poverty rates in the region. In the case of Mexico, estimates based on a nationwide incomes and expenditures survey indicate that urban poverty

rose by six percentage points between 1984 and 1989 owing to a steep drop in the minimum wage and a re-concentration of the urban pattern of income distribution.

In Chile, Uruguay and, to a lesser extent, Colombia and Costa Rica, household poverty indexes showed an improvement, although, as noted earlier, the rate of that progress was slow in comparison to the speed at which these indexes had deteriorated up to the mid-1980s. Chile represents a case apart, since the rapid growth of income, the reduction in open unemployment and the slowing of inflation achieved between 1987 and 1990 led to no more than a fairly modest decrease in urban poverty (from 37% to 34%), while the indigence rate only dropped from 13% to 11%. These advances were not accompanied by any major change in household income distribution. The increase in income levels had a greater relative impact among the rural population, since the poverty rate there fell from 45% to 36%. However, the very small decline in the percentage of households suffering from extreme poverty (from 16% to 15%) indicates that the rise in income did not benefit the poorest sectors of the population to the same extent, as is reflected in the increase in income concentration in rural areas.

The countries of the region currently exhibit a greater degree of homogeneity with regard to the extent of poverty as measured in terms of insufficient household income levels. This fact should not, however, be allowed to obscure the substantial differences existing among them in terms of social infrastructure (housing, drinking water, sewerage and electricity), the availability of education and basic health care, and mechanisms for transferring resources to the poorest sectors of the population, including the "social safety nets" provided by the State (see table 22). In view of the foregoing, it could be stated that in Argentina, Chile and Venezuela, where poverty indexes were substantially lower two decades ago than they are today, significant progress could be achieved in reducing poverty and, in particular, indigence, through a combination of growth and a moderate degree of income redistribution. It should be remembered that these countries are very highly urbanized and that wages are the principal source of income for a predominant share of the households near the poverty line (see section 9).

#### 8. Poverty and social security coverage

The countries' pension and retirement systems' insufficient coverage and payment levels have helped to boost the region's urban poverty rates even further. Corrective measures in this area could therefore make a significant contribution to its reduction, especially since these benefits represent such a substantial share of extremely poor households' total resources.

The aging of the Latin American population, especially in countries in which the demographic transition began earlier (Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay) calls for an examination of the living conditions of the older population and the design of policies to benefit that sector.<sup>23</sup> In this edition of the Social Panorama of Latin America, a special effort has been made to provide information on poverty among older adults (see section 17). Accordingly, this section will focus on the significance of the incomes received by the inactive population (in the form of

retirement and other pensions) as a portion of total household income, especially in the case of poor households.

The available indicators for the urban areas of 10 countries provide an idea of how large a portion of the inactive population receives income in the form of retirement and other pensions and of the striking differences that exist in the region in terms of social security coverage. Economically inactive heads of household who receive some sort of pension were found to constitute between 12% and 14% of all heads of household in four countries (Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and Panama); the figure was between 5% and 7% in another three countries (Colombia, Mexico and Paraguay) and was only 3% in just two countries (Guatemala and Honduras). At the other extreme, in Uruguay 30% of all heads of household are economically inactive pension recipients (see table 23).

The index of pension coverage among heads of household aged 60 or over provides additional evidence in this respect. According to this indicator, the proportion of the adult population that receives income in the form of retirement and/or other pensions is less than 20% in the countries having the least social security coverage and over 50% in those with the fullest coverage (see the fifth column of table 23).

When the poverty rate among heads of household over 60 years of age who receive some sort of income from the social security system was compared with the rate among the total population of heads of household in the same age group, it became clear that this form of income is a highly influential factor in terms of the older population's living conditions: in the urban areas of eight out of the 10 countries analysed, the poverty rate was sharply lower —by 10% or more, except in Chile— for households in which the head of household receives this sort of income (see table 23).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> A recent ECLAC study presented at the Ibero-American Summit of Heads of State and Government reports that, as a consequence of declining birth rates and increasing life expectancies in Latin America, "...a change has begun to be observed in the age distribution of the population; the population is tending to grow older [...] As of 1990, it was estimated that in countries in the early stages of transition, children under 15 years of age accounted for nearly 40% of the population and persons over 64 years of age made up about 5%, whereas in the countries with older populations, children represented 28% and the elderly totalled 10%, on average." See ECLAC, Nota sobre el desarrollo social en América Latina (LC/G.1665), Santiago, Chile, June 1991, p. 19.

Retirement and other pensions constitute a very significant proportion of household income, especially in the case of the extremely poor or indigent, despite the fact that the purchasing power of pension payments declined during the past decade because they were not readjusted enough to keep up with inflation (see the last three columns of table 23). In the countries with the most limited social security coverage (Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras and Paraguay), retirement and other pensions account for nearly 10% of urban households' incomes. In Uruguay, at the other end of the spectrum, they provide 22% of total income. In indigent households, the percentage increases; in fact, in five countries (Bolivia, Costa Rica, Panama, Uruguay and Venezuela) pensions account for no less than one third and as much as two fifths of such households' monetary incomes. The figure is lower among the non-indigent poor, but in most cases pensions still contribute over 20% of total household income.

A comparison of the index of pension coverage for the various categories of the poor population shows that among poor and indigent households, the percentage of the population aged 60 or over that receives retirement benefits, survivorship benefits or other pensions is far lower than among non-poor households, particularly in countries where social security coverage is very limited (Colombia, Guatemala and Honduras). These data demonstrate that policies aimed at increasing the real value of pensions and the creation of special subsidies for older adults not covered by social security can play an important role in raising the incomes of critically poor households. Examples of such measures include the "welfare pensions" (PASIS) and "consolidated household subsidies" (SUF) which form part of the monetary transfers made in Chile. Chile's experiences of the past few years indicate that these subsidies are currently its most accurately targeted instruments because they provide a more effective means of actually reaching the country's lowest-income households.<sup>24</sup>

#### 9. Economic growth, poverty and redistributive policies

The Latin American countries with the most urbanized populations and highest per capita incomes can make considerable progress in reducing poverty if, in conjunction with sustained growth, they pursue moderate redistributive policies that focus on productive job creation and a restitution of wage levels.

An analysis of the process by which vast sectors of the population became impoverished during the 1980s is essential in order to assess the magnitude of the challenge facing the region and to gauge the potential of policies designed to reduce critical income poverty, especially among the urban population.

When households are ranked on the basis of their per capita income levels, expressed as a multiple of the value of the poverty line, the

results show that, in most countries, urban households having incomes between 0.9 and 1.0 times the poverty line currently represent about 4% of the total (see table 24). These households would cease to be poor if their real incomes were to rise at an average annual rate of 3.2% for three years, providing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Although eligibility requirements for these subsides are well defined in a formal sense, some of these funds do end up going to non-poor households. Data gathered in the 1990 National Socioeconomic Survey (CASEN) show that about 70% of the total sum earmarked for welfare pensions went to households whose incomes place them in the first two quintiles. In the case of the consolidated household subsidy (SUF), the figure rises to 80%. Since around 35% of the country's households are classified as poor, it can be concluded that over two thirds of the sum allocated for these two subsidies was received by poor households.

that the distribution of income were to remain constant.<sup>25</sup> The same is true of rural sectors, where the percentage of households in this income bracket is also around 4%.<sup>26</sup>

Profiles of the distribution of households by income bracket demonstrate that if the real incomes of middle- and low-income households were to fall by about 25%—and such reductions were not infrequent in the course of the adjustment processes made by the Latin American countries—then those households whose incomes were between 1 and 1.25 times the corresponding poverty line would be pushed below that critical threshold.<sup>27</sup> In the countries studied, the percentages of households in this income bracket varies between 6% and 14% for urban areas and between 4% and 12% in rural areas.

These indicators of the severity of poverty show that achieving an appreciable reduction in the incidence of poverty may prove to be a long-range task for many countries, especially those in which poverty is a mass phenomenon and existing redistributive mechanisms are not equal to the task of dealing with the problem owing to its structural nature and the severity of the shortfall in such areas as education, health, housing and basic services (see table 22). On the other hand, in countries where income distribution became less equitable during the 1980s but in which poverty is not so widespread, the situation could be considerably improved by a combination of growth and moderate redistributive measures, especially if such measures are effective in raising wages and the incomes of the inactive population. The fact should be borne in mind that these are highly urbanized countries in which the main income sources of most of the households near the poverty line are wages and other monetary income (chiefly retirement and other pensions).

Two of these countries (Argentina and Venezuela), although still in the category of countries with the least severe inequalities in Latin America, have experienced sharp increases in urban poverty in recent years. In Greater Buenos Aires, the increase amounted to 13 points between 1986 and 1990, while in the urban areas of Venezuela, the rate rose by 8% during the same period. These increases were caused by recessions that entailed steeper reductions in the incomes of households in the lower strata. Hence, a recovery of employment and wage levels that proceeded at a pace similar to historical rates, coupled with an aggressive minimum wage policy, ought to have a strong positive impact in terms of poverty reduction.<sup>28</sup>

The two Latin American countries to turn in the best economic performances between 1987 and 1990 —Colombia and Chile— grew at average rates of 2.3% and 4.4%, respectively. Average wages, however, did not reflect this expansion, falling at an annual rate of 0.9% in Colombia and rising at a pace of 2.5% in Chile. Minimum wages for urban areas decreased even more sharply (an annual rate of -1.4%) in Colombia, but rose in Chile at the same rate as per capita GDP, although during the period 1988-1991 their growth rate had been higher (8.1%). These figures suggest that wages and salaries—which provide nearly 60% of the income of households near the poverty line— have lagged behind

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Chile came close to achieving this goal when its real GDP grew by 9.4% in a single year (1992).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> However, to attain this same objective the income from both wages and salaries and from retirement and other pensions would have to increase at a rate of no less than 5% per year for three years, since for households whose incomes are near the poverty line, these two flows supply, on average, about two thirds of household income.

During the crisis, declines in per capita income were sometimes accompanied by a deterioration in income distribution; in these cases, a reduction in income averaging less than 25% would signify a considerably larger decrease in the incomes of the more vulnerable households living near the poverty line.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> In Argentina, the minimum wage for urban areas fell by over 50% in real terms between 1986 and 1990. In Venezuela, the decrease totalled 34% during that period (see table 1).

GDP growth. Nevertheless, poverty was reduced in both countries: from 37% to 34% in the urban areas of Chile and from 36% to 35% in those of Colombia. In the latter case, the reduction in extreme poverty was somewhat larger (from 15% to 12%).

# INEQUALITIES IN EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOCIAL MOBILITY

### 10. Trends in the population's educational capital

Against a general backdrop of rising educational levels, during the second half of the decade scattered signs of stagnation or regression began to appear. These probably reflect the delayed effects of adjustment policies on educational capital formation.

In order to analyse how the economic crisis and adjustment policies may have affected educational achievement levels, it is helpful to break down the population into age groups, since each such group was affected differently depending on how many of its members' school-age years were spent in the socioeconomic context of the 1980s. Thus, the level of formal education among adults continued to rise, with few exceptions, in both urban and

rural areas (see table 25). In one of the cases studied (Chile, urban sector, 1990), more than one half of the total population between the ages of 25 and 59 had more than 10 years of formal schooling.

Progress was made in both urban and rural areas, although low educational levels continue to exist among a significant proportion of the rural population. An analysis of the rural zones of six countries in the region in the early 1990s shows that even under the best of circumstances in terms of human resources, four out of every 10 adults still have completed fewer than six years of primary education.

Much of the headway made by the adult population in the area of education in the 1980s was a result of the expansion of the educational system's coverage during the two preceding decades.<sup>29</sup> The population that entered the educational system during this growth stage tended to remain in the system for several years after completing elementary school, thereby generating an upward trend in average educational levels. These are clearly positive signs, both because they indicate an increase in the skill levels of the human resources available for production activities and because this trend implies that the households headed by these more educated adults will be better able to socialize the children being raised in those households.

Among the youth of the region, the average number of years of schooling completed has continued to rise in a majority of the countries (see table 26), thus strengthening the trend registered midway through the decade.<sup>30</sup> These advances have not been great enough, however, to offset the negative effects which the economic crisis had on young people during their school years. Its impact is reflected in the educational profiles of young people in some of the countries in the early 1990s, as is evidenced by the fact that in the urban areas of Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Paraguay and in rural areas of Venezuela there are signs of retrogression or stagnation in respect of the educational system's coverage as well as in the number of years that young people remain within that system (see table 27).

One particularly disturbing development is that in some countries around 40%—and even more in some household income brackets— of young people between the ages of 15 and 19 have completed fewer than six years of primary education. This amount of schooling is clearly incompatible with the labour market's current requirements. Thus, a serious problem is posed by the possibility of exclusion through marginalization at an early age, since the programmes aimed at reintegrating these youths into

ECLAC, La equidad en el panorama social de América Latina durante los ochenta, edición 1991 (LC/G.1686),
 Santiago, Chile, 31 October 1991, p. 124.
 Ibid. p. 99.

the educational system are, unfortunately, beyond the reach of a large proportion of them,<sup>31</sup> either because they have forgotten their study habits (if they ever had the chance to acquire them in the first place) or because the investment in terms of time and effort required to attain a level of training that will meet the demands of technical progress often exceeds what a majority of these youths can afford to make.

With respect to children, no general trend can be identified from the data on hand. It is encouraging that, of the countries studied, the ones that had the highest drop-out and repeater rates as of the early 1980s (Brazil and Colombia) made a considerable improvement in terms of the utilization of the educational potential of their school-age children (see table 28). When the same table is used to examine the percentages of children in urban areas who had fallen behind in their studies during the second half of the 1980s, however, the results reveal a stagnation or retrogression in six out of the nine countries. The fact that Brazil and Colombia were among the few countries in the region that increased their real per capital expenditure on education during the 1980s suggests that a relationship may exist between progress in realizing children's educational potentials and the adoption of important policy decisions concerning the allocation of government funds.

Generally speaking, the seriousness of any signal of a deterioration in a country's development of its human resources should be evaluated on the basis of the urgency of raising the educational levels of those large segments of the population whose qualifications fall far short of the requirements of technical progress. In this field, the challenge to be met in the 1990s is that of constituting a critical mass of human resources equipped with the basic knowledge necessary to fulfil those requirements; this is an implied condition of any attempt to restructure production in a way that will enable a country to maintain or expand its share in an increasingly competitive world market.

#### 11. Determinants of educational attainment

#### a) Material resources

Profound differences among different children's life prospects continue to be generated by the differing amounts of material resources at the command of their respective households. This provides grounds for the expectation that social inequalities will be perpetuated in the coming generation of young people and adults. These disparities are manifested in the educational achievements of children and adolescents from different social strata.

One of the objectives associated with the attainment of increased social equity is "to promote the development of the latent skills existing in all groups of society, progressively doing away with legally established privileges and forms of discrimination, as well as any other forms of inequality of opportunity, including those associated with social, ethnic or geographical origin or gender."<sup>32</sup>

The degree of inequality of opportunity existing during a person's formative years is one of the most important parameters for measuring progress or regression in the area of social equity.

<sup>31</sup> ECLAC, La equidad en el panorama..., op. cit.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> ECLAC, Social Equity and Changing..., op. cit., p. 15.

From this standpoint, the world of children is a particularly suitable framework for assessing how equitable or inequitable a society is over time. One indicator of inequality of opportunity among children is the percentage of children who are behind in their studies (i.e., drop-outs plus repeaters) in the population aged 7 to 14 years, broken down into low- and high-income households.

At the start of the 1990s, the percentage of children who were behind in their studies was between 10% and 40% higher for low-income households than it was for high-income households (see table 28). Thus, in the urban areas of Brazil, despite significant progress in reducing repeater and drop-out rates among lower-income strata, in 1990 one out of every two poor children was still behind in his/her studies, whereas only one out of every 10 children from the highest-income quartile was in that position (see figure 7). In Brazil, as well as in Costa Rica, Guatemala and Venezuela, these differences became greater in the course of the decade, denoting an increase in social inequity; where progress was made, the higher-income strata advanced more than the rest of the population, and where setbacks occurred, they were the most marked among the lowest-income groups. In contrast, favourable trends were observed in the other six countries for which information is available (Chile, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay and Uruguay).

An analysis of the situation for young people indicates that their situation is similar to that of children in terms of equality of opportunity; this is reflected in their average educational levels (see table 26) as well as their school attendance rates (see table 27). In fact, both of these indicators consistently rise in step with per capita household income. In extreme cases, such as the urban areas of Brazil, in 1990 high-income youths had an average of 4.6 more years of formal education and a 28% higher school attendance rate than low-income youths did.

The trends in these differentials are discouraging, since the gap between rich and poor youths in terms of educational attainment and attendance rates narrowed in only two countries (Chile and Uruguay). In all the rest, the gap widened in at least one of these two indicators.

A lower degree of equity was observed in respect of the educational achievements of young people as opposed to children in a majority of the countries in the region. This contrast is linked to a steady rise in net primary school attendance rates among poor sectors<sup>33</sup> and points to an upward shift in social inequality thresholds. Whereas the more affluent young people are able to continue their educations, the poorer ones leave school some time around the end of the basic education cycle. The widening educational gap between these two groups of young people observed during the 1980s cancels out a portion of the progress in social equity associated with the increase in educational coverage for the school-age population.

<sup>33</sup> ECLAC/UNESCO, Education and Knowledge..., op. cit., table II.1, p. 39.


Figure 7


#### LATIN AMERICA (9 COUNTRIES): CHILDREN AGED 7 TO 14 WHO ARE BEHIND IN THIER STUDIES, URBAN ZONES

(Percentages)


BRAZIL

COLOMBIA






#### **COSTA RICA**



#### **VENEZUELA**



Indigents




Non-indigent poor



Non-poor

Figure 7 (concluded)



Source: ECLAC, Social Development Division, on the basis of household surveys conducted by the corresponding countries.

#### PER CAPITA HOUSEHOLD INCOME QUARTILES: A METHOD FOR DEALING WITH INCOME STRATA

To ensure the comparability over time of the various social differences among income strata, the composition of the groups to be compared must be kept the same. This prevents the information on one group from becoming "contaminated" by information on another between the periods chosen for trend evaluation purposes.

The "panel" is the most suitable sample design for analysing inter-group differences based on survey data. This system involves maintaining all or a significant portion of the sample units throughout the various measurement periods. Since this design is not the one most commonly used for household surveys in the region, which are this study's main information source, an alternative methodology had to be used in order to minimize the chances of changes occurring in the groups' composition between the relevant study periods. The option that was selected was to assimilate income strata to the quartiles containing the relevant households ordered by per capita income levels.

This choice proved to be the most appropriate one, particularly because this relative quartile structure causes the make-up of the groups to be less sensitive to general changes in household income levels, such as those that occurred in the region during the 1980s.

The analysis as such was conducted by observing the behaviour of the four quartiles, although this study presents results only for the first and fourth quartiles for the sake of clarity.

The above statement calls for some qualification. On the one hand, many young people from the households that were most severely affected by the crisis and adjustment policies of the 1980s were obliged to enter the labour market, and this had a particularly marked impact on the scholastic performance of youth from poor households. Within this context, any future upturn in household income levels could ease the economic pressure on these young people and thus help to reverse the trend towards increasing inequity as regards the opportunities open to this segment of the population. On the other hand, however, our assessment of the trend in social equity may become somewhat gloomier when we consider the fact that the axis of educational stratification is shifting from the quantity (years of schooling) to the quality of education. It is becoming increasingly clear that the region has hierarchical educational paths that correspond to the various social groups according to their educational capital and income levels. This segmentation is reflected in the differences in the academic performance of graduates from the educational institutions making up each of those paths. The segmentation is reflected in the differences in the academic performance of graduates from the educational institutions making up each of those paths.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> ECLAC/UNESCO, Education and Knowledge..., op. cit. p. 52.

<sup>35</sup> ECLAC, Panorama social de América..., op. cit.

## PROGRAMME FOR BETTER-QUALITY EDUCATION WITH GREATER SOCIAL EQUITY (MECE) MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, CHILE, 1992-1997

The MECE programme represents the central component of the Chilean Government's effort to make a substantive improvement in the quality and social equity of the basic and preschool educational system during this decade. Its strategy combines investments in conventional areas—infrastructure, textbooks, instructional materials, support programmes— designed to enhance the basic learning environment with highly original initiatives aimed at upgrading the operational processes of educational units and with special remedial programmes for schools where achievement levels are far below standard. A total of US\$ 243 million has been allocated for the implementation of this six-year plan.

This programme's main innovation is the creation of a fund to finance Educational Improvement Projects (PME) originating in the schools. The aim of these projects is to improve the learning process as it relates to one of the basic cultural skills as defined by the programme (language, mathematics, natural sciences, social sciences); the schools compete for the funding, which, depending on enrolment levels, ranges between US\$ 4,200 and US\$ 9,500. The projects are of between two and three years in length. This innovative approach is intended to serve as a direct means of raising students' levels of learning. One of its basic indirect aims is to galvanize the school organization on an ongoing basis by introducing project logic and utilizing the schools' own resources to upgrade the quality of the educational experience. The MECE programme will fund 5,000 PME between 1992 and 1996 (a number equivalent to two thirds of the publicly-funded primary educational institutions in the country).

The foregoing information leads to the conclusion that although the countries have succeeded in considerably reducing the percentages of lower-income children repeating grades and/or dropping out of school and of lower-income young people having insufficient educational levels, in most of the countries the amount of progress made in these respects has been less than it has been in the higher-income sectors, with the result that the performance gap between the two has widened. In response to this situation, some of the Governments of the region have begun to design educational policies that will surely help to raise the degree of social equity significantly during the 1990s; the objective of these policies is to compensate for the adverse effects which the weak socialization capabilities of many households have on the performance of children and young people.

#### b) The educational environment of the household

Parents' educational levels have a very strong influence on their children's potential achievement levels. Therefore, in seeking to forestall the perpetuation of poverty across generations, an increase in poor households' income levels needs to be complemented by a large increase in investment in education.

Table 29 illustrates the relationship among scholastic achievement, poverty and the household educational environment.<sup>36</sup> The most striking fact brought out by these figures is that children from indigent households who none the less enjoy a supportive educational environment attain higher levels of scholastic performance than children who do not come from poor households but do lack a suitable educational environment. In other words, it may be that reaching a sufficient income

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> In this regard, see also figure 2, which shows the differences between the average years of schooling completed by children from households at the two extremes of the income distribution spectrum.

level to rise above the poverty line may not significantly alter the probability of the following generation falling below that line unless the necessary stock of educational capital has also been formed. A higher income level is not enough to make up for a household's inability to assist the school in its task. The young population is in a similar situation, as may be seen from table 30. Nearly twice as many young people from indigent households having a favourable educational environment attend school as do non-poor youth who reside in households having an inadequate educational environment (in Paraguay, the attendance rate of the former group is seven times that of the latter's).

### THE EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT WITHIN THE HOUSEHOLD: A CRITICAL INDICATOR OF CHILDREN'S SOCIALIZATION

This indicator registers the average number of years of schooling completed by all the people aged 15 years or over who reside in a given household. It is calculated by dividing the total number of years of schooling completed by the members of that age group in the household by the total number of such members.

In tests conducted using various measurements of children's scholastic performance, this indicator exhibited a greater discriminatory capacity than such other options as, for example, the head of household's educational level. There may be at least two reasons for this improved statistical performance. The first is that, by definition, the educational-environment indicator incorporates more information about each household's educational context than indicators that refer only to some of a household's members. The second is that, as a consequence of the above, it is a more dynamic measurement from the standpoint of the household life cycle because it allows for a more timely incorporation of the effect of inter-generational changes in the overall educational structure. It thus includes, for example, the value added by the educational attainment of a child aged 15 years or over to that of his/her parents in shaping the educational environment for a younger child in that same household.

The seeming paradox represented by the fact that the educational achievements of the younger members of a household are not necessarily directly related to the material resources at the command of that household can be accounted for, at least in part, in two ways. First, regardless of a household's material resources, the quality of its educational environment is a good indicator of that household's ability to complement the school's functions; if it is of a high quality, then the children and young people living within the household will be encouraged to attend school and steps will be taken to see to it that their performances meet the school's requirements; if its quality is insufficient, it will have the opposite effect (see table 31 and figure 8).

The second reason has to do with the relationship between the educational environment and the priority assigned by the household to children's and young people's scholastic achievement. The influence of that priority on the allocation of household resources may help to account for the fact that there are indigent households in which more of the younger members attend school than in poor or even non-poor households. The decision to keep a child of working age in school means that the household has decided to forgo a potential source of income that would surely increase that household's chances of overcoming its poverty or indigence in a shorter period of time. Conversely, households that opt for immediate relief from their economic hardship through the entry of their younger members into the labour market do so at the cost of deferring —sometimes indefinitely— the development of those members' potential as human resources.

Figure 8

LATIN AMERICA (10 COUNTRIES): CHILDREN AGED 7 TO 14 WHO ARE BEHIND IN THEIR STUDIES, BY INCOME QUARTILE AND EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN THE HOME, URBAN ZONES





Figure 8 (concluded)



**Source:** ECLAC, Social Development Division, on the basis of household surveys conducted by the corresponding countries.

The above analysis suggests that the educational environment within the household is one of the most effective individual indicators in accounting for differences in children's and young people's educational attainments and, hence, in their opportunities for social mobility. In this connection, one promising development is that, thanks to the expansion of educational coverage over the past few decades, an improvement in the household educational environment was seen in a majority of the countries during the 1980s as well (see table 32), which has undoubtedly strengthened those households' socialization capabilities. A more detailed examination of the data (see the last column of table 32), however, reveals that this progress was proportionally greater among the children of higher-income households and therefore heightened existing inter-strata differences in relation to one of the main determinants of future opportunities for upward social mobility.

#### c) Overcrowded housing

Children's and young people's educational attainments are not only influenced by their households' incomes and educational environments; housing conditions have a strong impact on academic performance as well. This is therefore one of the key areas to consider when designing policies aimed at breaking down the reproductive cycles of poverty.

Because of their effects on the well-being of the members of a household, on the quality of their interpersonal relationships, health, socialization and on children's academic performance, the characteristics of a household's dwelling generally form part of the set of indicators used to measure the extent to which the household's basic needs are being met. Accordingly, one dimension of those characteristics—overcrowding— has been selected for inclusion in this edition of the Social panorama; this selection was made on the basis of this variable's analytical significance and the

availability of comparable information over time and space (the data were drawn from household surveys).

The density of a dwelling's occupancy has extremely important implications for the development of the children residing within it. Overcrowding entails a failure to satisfy the need for privacy and independence and, in some cases, may lead to problems of promiscuity. A shortage of space and unavoidable cohabitation with others makes it particularly difficult to establish and maintain personal routines, do homework or concentrate on educational games, all of which plays a very important role in readying children for school. Generally speaking, deficient environmental conditions diminish a household's ability to complement the education received by children in school.<sup>37</sup>

Recent findings have underscored the importance of overcrowding as an explanatory factor for poor academic performance,<sup>38</sup> and it now appears to be an important element in the inter-generational perpetuation of inequality and economic vulnerability as well. As may be seen from table 33, given a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Since there is no generally accepted definition of overcrowding, for the purposes of this report households are regarded as suffering from overcrowding if they have an average of more than three persons per bedroom or an average of more than two persons per room in cases where the number of bedrooms cannot be determined. In view of the widespread use of the level of overcrowding as a component of indexes of basic needs satisfaction and national poverty maps, the correlations observed between this indicator and children's educational attainment levels are particularly significant.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> See Central Administrative Council of the National Public Education Administration/ECLAC, Enseñanza primaria y ciclo básico de la educación media en el Uruguay, Montevideo, Instituto Nacional del Libro, 1990.

constant socioeconomic level, the percentage of students who have fallen behind in their schooling who live in overcrowded conditions may be as much as double that of students from households having more space. Table 33 also shows that there are cases (such as the urban areas of Honduras and Venezuela) in which the percentage of children who are behind in their studies is greater among children from non-poor but overcrowded households than among their counterparts in indigent households that are not overcrowded.

The results of an examination of the trend in the percentage of children subject to overcrowding is encouraging, since in all the cases analysed except Honduras, the proportion of such children has decreased both as a percentage of all households and as a percentage of the poorest households.<sup>39</sup> Even so, the number of children living in overcrowded conditions is still very large --between 20% and 40% in urban centres and between 40% and 90% in rural areas; huge differences also exist between one income stratum and another in terms of the frequency of overcrowding.

These findings have important implications for the design of programmes aimed at improving human resources development, since they demonstrate that, in order to be effective, such initiatives must be adequately linked with educational and housing policies or must be accompanied by the adoption of measures to help compensate for the effects of overcrowding on educational achievement by, for example, extending school hours for children from overcrowded homes or setting up community facilities where such children may study or do their homework in a supervised environment.

#### d) Household structure

One of the factors that influences a child's academic performance is the structure of the child's home.

"Altering a trend in social organization by means of an educational system that acts almost entirely upon children rather than on their household and social environment demands a high degree of policy coordination oriented towards positive discrimination, i.e., towards intentionally

providing better educational opportunities within the institutional structure to people from materially and culturally impoverished households. If an institution attempts to offer an equal quality of services [to all], it will actually be consolidating inequality in respect of those children who are less well prepared in cultural and normative terms and have more difficulties—because what they are actually doing is undergoing a process of "acculturation"— in apprehending the institutional assets being made available to them by the schools."

Regardless of a household's income level, its structure (which in this case is defined on the basis of the mother's marital status) has major implications in terms of a child's expectations and goals. In analysing this correlation, only three categories of nuclear families were considered:<sup>41</sup> households headed

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> This finding is important not only because of its implications for the well-being of children, but also because it points to the advisability of re-examining the empirical basis for a very widely-held belief in the region, namely that the crisis led to a greater concentration of households under a single roof as part of those households' cost-cutting strategies.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> ECLAC, Qué aprenden y quiénes aprenden en las escuelas del Uruguay, Montevideo, ECLAC office in Montevideo, 1991, p. 176.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Nuclear families may be composed of: i) a head of household and spouse, without children; ii) a head of household and spouse, with children; and iii) a head of household without a spouse but with children.

by single women; households formed by couples joined in consensual unions; and households established by legally-wedded couples. According to an estimate based on an unweighted index of the percentages of children in each of these types of households who become repeaters or drop-outs, children living in consensual-union households are twice as likely to repeat a grade or drop out of school as their counterparts in households where the founding couple is legally married; in turn, the probability of repeating a grade or dropping out is 50% greater for children from households headed by a single woman (see table 34 and figure 9).

With some slight variations, the relationship between family structure and educational achievement is repeated in each income stratum and cannot, therefore, be attributed to the higher concentration of consensual unions and single women heads of household in lower-income sectors. It is notable, however, that in upper-income sectors, the scholastic performance of children from households headed by single women approaches or exceeds that of children from households formed by legally-wed couples. Thus, the fact that a woman may be the sole guardian of her children does not appear to affect their academic performance provided that the household has sufficient resources at its command. On the other hand, even when sufficient resources are available, if the union is a consensual one only, the percentage of children who fall behind in their studies tends to be twice as high as among children from legally-sanctioned marriages.

With the sole exception of Paraguay, during the 1980s the percentage of children belonging to households formed by consensual unions increased in all the countries studied and in all strata. As a result, at the start of the 1990s, such children represented between 10% and 25% of all children living in nuclear families in lower-income strata and between 5% and 10% in high-income sectors (see table 35).

Accounting for the relationship between family structure and scholastic performance is no easy task. Its complexity may lie in the fact that the controversy surrounding the advantages and disadvantages of a greater diversity of family structures has a great deal to do with value systems.<sup>42</sup>

In any event, research findings in this field indicate that a larger proportion of "undivided" households are to be found in the category of "legally-sanctioned unions" than in the other two categories and that the children from these households generally have a series of advantages over the rest: greater certainty as to the stability of the relationship between the adults in the household and, hence, as to their presence; more attention and care devoted to the child; and a more permanent, solid household authority structure. All these elements would appear to be reflected in academic performance.

One of the underlying reasons for the growing interest in identifying the changes taking place in family structure and in ascertaining how those changes affect the way in which it functions has to do with the convergence of two factors: the first is a recognition of the fact that the pivotal element in changing production patterns and in the effort to achieve an equitable form of development in the region is, increasingly, the development of human resources; the second is the growing amount of evidence that the various family structures differ in terms of their capacity to develop that potential in children and young people.


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Many people associate a diversity of family structures with the idea of progress because they feel, on the one hand, that it provides greater freedom of choice for the members of a couple and, on the other, that it permits more autonomous decision-making in regard to what form the relationship should take and when and on what grounds it may be dissolved.

Figure 9


# LATIN AMERICA (8 COUNTRIES): CHILDREN AGED 7 TO 14 WHO ARE BEHIND IN THEIR STUDIES, BY NUCLEAR-FAMILY INCOME QUARTILE BASED ON MARITAL STATUS OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD

(Percentages)


COLOMBIA (1990)




COSTA RICA (1990)




CHILE (1990)



GUATEMALA (1989)














Figure 9 (concluded)







#### MEXICO (1990)




#### **URUGUAY (1989)**




#### VENEZUELA (1990)



Single woman head of household



Legal union



Source: ECLAC, Social Development Division, on the basis of household surveys conducted by the corresponding countries.

#### 12. The trend in consensual unions among young people

Of the total number of young people between the ages of 15 and 24 who have a mate, the percentage choosing to form consensual unions is on the rise. In most of the countries in the region, more than one half of the unions formed by less educated youths are of this type. This is a disturbing development in view of the relationship that exists between consensual unions and the generation of conditions conducive to the perpetuation of poverty.

Table 36 (see also figure 10) illustrates the sharp increase in consensual unions among young people, which in some cases are twice as frequent, in percentage terms, as they were at the start of the 1980s. The magnitude of this phenomenon among young people varies in inverse proportion to the level of education they have attained; in many countries of the region, it characterizes more than half of all the young people in the less educated strata.

Three facts serve to focus attention on trends in the formation of consensual unions among young people. Undoubtedly, the most important


one has to do with the adverse consequences, as discussed earlier, of consensual unions in terms of their children's success in taking advantage of educational opportunities (see table 34). The second factor is the rising percentage of children between the ages of 0 and 14 who are socialized in those households (see table 35). The third is the widening gap between the percentages of young people at the two extremes of the educational spectrum who have formed consensual unions (see the final column of table 36). In some cases, as in Greater Buenos Aires in 1986, among young people having a low level of education, one out of every two unions were of the consensual type whereas among young people with over 10 years of schooling, the ratio was only 1 out of every 25 youths.

The above findings indicate that the concept of "consensual union", as such, needs to be analysed. This term does not have just one, clearly defined meaning, but instead encompasses at least three types of situations, each one of which arises out of phenomena having different causes and different consequences. The first situation corresponds to the pattern by which couples are formed in the more traditional rural areas. As may be seen from table 36, this pattern was not observed in the countries analysed here, since no significant difference was found to exist between the proportion of consensual unions in urban and rural areas. The second type of situation is very frequent in developed countries and is deeply rooted in today's demographic, economic, technological and cultural changes. In this situation, a consensual union is a rational behaviour and is established for a limited period as a way of testing how compatible the partners are in terms of their personalities and life agendas. In this context, matrimony is seen as a rite that reaffirms an established conjugal relationship rather than as a rite of initiation into married life. One of the traits of this phenomenon in developed countries is that it correlates positively with the educational levels of the partners. As shown in table 36, the situation is the opposite in the countries of the region, where young people with lower educational levels are overrepresented in the population of those who have formed consensual unions.


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> See Wilfred Dumon, The situation of families in Western Europe (IYF/PM.2.3), a paper presented at the United Nations Europe and North America Preparatory Meeting for the International Year of the Family, Valetta, Malta, 26-30 April 1993.

Figure 10

LATIN AMERICA (10 COUNTRIES): CONSENSUAL UNIONS AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE AGED
15 TO 24 YEARS WHO HAVE A PARTNER, BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, URBAN ZONES



#### Figure 10 (concluded)



**Source:** ECLAC, Social Development Division, on the basis of household surveys conducted by the corresponding countries.

A third interpretation of the consensual union which fits in better with the traits of the phenomenon currently being observed in the region has to do with the increasing marginalization and even anomie characterizing young people today. The marginality of the poorest and least educated young men may be prompting them to evade or defer any undertaking that might tend to confirm them in their role as the main person responsible for a household's economic upkeep. It is also probable that the consensual union manifests a search for affective gratification in compensation for a prolonged experience of deprivation.

The evidence suggests that, in any of these three situations, given the form the phenomenon has taken in the countries of the region, consensual unions provide a fairly weak foundation for the establishment of family structures equipped with an adequate socialization capacity. The reason for this weakness may have to do with two characteristics that have been observed repeatedly in the Latin American countries as well as other regions of the world. The first is the greater instability of consensual unions as compared to legally-sanctioned marriages. The second is that matrimony continues to be the model of reference for the majority of poor women. These factors suggest that a significant conflict of expectations may exist among the members of consensual unions in lower-income strata which may inhibit a family from formulating a viable collective agenda.

In summary, the increasing frequency of consensual unions, particularly among the poorest couples, warrants close attention because it constitutes a social phenomenon which, owing to its adverse effects on a household's socialization capacity, may be contributing to the inter-generational perpetuation of inequalities. In interpreting this phenomenon, researchers should avoid indiscriminate transpositions of schemes that have arisen out of radically different contexts, such as those influencing the behaviour of young people in more developed countries.

## 13. Trends in young people's incomes and in the percentage who neither study nor work

In a majority of the countries an increase in inequality was observed in the different social strata's educational and employment opportunities. In those cases where young people's incomes rose, they did so only among the more educated youths.

The percentage of young people who neither attend school nor work is a risk indicator and sign of vulnerability which refers primarily to poorer youths. Around 1990, in the bottom income quartile for urban areas, 45 one out of every five young men were in this situation in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay; one out of every four in Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica and Honduras; and nearly one out of every three young men in

Mexico, Panama, Paraguay and Venezuela, as may be seen from table 37. This table also shows that the situation was much better in the other household income quartiles and particularly so among the youths

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Josefina Rossetti (consultant), Hacia un perfil de la familia actual en Latinoamérica y el Caribe (LC/R.1208;LC/DEM/R.153), Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, November 1992. See also Norma Ojeda (consultant), Tendencias de la formación y la disolución marital frente a la crisis económica en México (LC/R.1081;LC/DEM/R.145), Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, May 1992.

<sup>45</sup> Only urban areas have been considered here because the seasonal nature of rural work, which is a particularly influential factor in the case of young people, could skew the data and their interpretation.

in the highest income quartile. In the five countries for which comparable information for the early and late 1980s is available (Brazil, Colombia, Panama, Uruguay and Venezuela), an increase was observed in the percentage of young men who neither studied nor worked. A more detailed analysis reveals that during the second half of the 1980s (possibly as a consequence of the economic troubles affecting the countries of the region during this period), the employment or educational status of young people improved in six countries and worsened in three. Overall, the differential between the percentages of urban youths from households at the two extremes of the income-distribution spectrum who neither studied nor worked widened in 7 of the 12 countries analysed.

The information concerning young people's income patterns is not conclusive, since their monthly income capacity equivalents (CEMITs) rose in some of the countries (especially during the second half of the decade) and fell in others. In those cases where the status of young people improved, the more educated youths experienced the greatest improvement, and income differentials by level of education were therefore heightened. In the other countries, just the opposite occurred: the general decline in remunerations was sharpest among the more educated youths (see table 38). This would seem to indicate that although the more educated youths' incomes suffer the most during times of widespread declines in salaries and wages, they are also the ones that stand to benefit the most during an economic reactivation.

In sum, the growing marginalization in terms of the labour market suffered by youths who are from poor households or have fewer than six years of schooling—and in many countries, this also holds true for those having fewer than 10 years of formal education— seems to point to an incipient trend towards a more polarized system of social stratification involving sharper inequalities with regard to job quality and productivity. As will be seen in the following section, however, this polarization was not apparent during the 1980s, when the economic crisis and subsequent adjustment policies were reflected in the downward mobility of middle-income strata.

#### 14. The educational status and incomes of the adult population

For adult workers, educational capital has become of less importance as a determinant of income level.

The figures presented in table 39 show, first of all, that, except in Guatemala and the rural areas of Panama, labour income declined during the 1980s. Second, the differences between the incomes of more highly educated and less educated adults also narrowed in almost all the

countries. Third, the narrowing of this gap was primarily due to a decline in the more educated adults' remunerations rather than of any increase in the less educated adults' earnings. These trends indicate that educational achievement became a less effective wage-protection mechanism during the 1980s, as well as corroborating a finding underscored in the preceding edition of this study, namely that adjustment policies—and in some cases incipient changes in production patterns— have had a strong impact on the middle class.

Education is considered to be an important vehicle of social mobility because each successive educational level affords relative advantages in terms of access to the labour market, as well as determining a person's probable income bracket during their working years. In the preceding section it was noted that during the second half of the 1980s some countries registered a larger relative increase

#### MONTHLY LABOUR INCOME CAPACITY EQUIVALENT (CEMIT): AN INDICATOR USEFUL IN MAKING A RELATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE VARIOUS OCCUPATIONS

This indicator refers to gainfully employed persons who work more than 20 hours per week. It is computed by dividing the monthly equivalent of hourly income by the per capita value of the poverty line. The monthly equivalent is the level of income corresponding to 44 hours per week, calculated on the basis of the hourly remunerations actually earned. The per capita poverty line was estimated by ECLAC for each country and area according to their corresponding sociodemographic composition and economic characteristics.

In short, this indicator standardizes labour compensation per unit of time and purchasing power in order to express the earned income corresponding to a 44-hour work week as a multiple of the value of the per capita poverty line.

Consequently, the CEMIT values should not be interpreted as indicators of each wage level's capacity for ensuring a state of well-being; they can, however, be regarded as providing an approximate idea of the different relative values of each type of occupation.

In this case, the usual drawbacks of standardizing income by hours worked are not a factor, for at least two reasons. First, the fact that the calculations are confined to people who work more than 20 hours per week focuses the analysis on that portion of the labour force that is more fully integrated into the production system and limits the range of variation of the work-hours standardization coefficient. The second reason is that the indicator is designed to measure the relative value of the rewards provided for each type of occupation and does not refer directly to the level of actual well-being that those rewards are capable of providing.

in more highly educated youths' incomes than in the earnings of less educated young people, which augmented the former group's relative advantage in securing entry-level jobs following a weakening of their position in this respect during the first half of the decade. The same did not hold true, however, in regard to the benefits associated with professional careers. Table 40 shows that the higher a person's educational level is, the greater their salary range will be in the course of the person's working life. It also shows, however, that while wage levels tended to move downward during the 1980s, the decrease was larger for more highly educated groups than for less well educated ones.

The possibility remains that, due to the limitations inherent in the household survey data used, these results may be skewed in at least two directions. First, the ongoing increase in the educational levels of the population may have shifted the breakpoints of the educational stratification upward, and a more detailed classification of educational levels would therefore be needed in order to determine whether the trends in the incomes of the more highly skilled workers have been more favourable. Second, it is apparent that qualitative differences in education have a growing influence on the occupational prospects of young people in the various social strata, and the information on years of schooling tells us nothing about such differences.

Be this as it may, assuming that the observed trends are accurate, they are probably the reflection of a transitional stage. Within the context of this transition, it is not that the educational system is becoming ineffective as a vehicle for social mobility, but rather that certain educational orientations and contents —precisely because they are geared to production patterns that have already reached a crisis point— no longer meet the demands generated by the changes taking place in those production patterns. If this is the case, i.e., if the narrowing gap between the incomes of more and less educated persons is in part a reflection of a lag between the supply of skills and the demands created by incipient processes of economic reorganization, then it may be anticipated that in those countries which manage to change their production patterns and galvanize their economies, the firms in the vanguard of this process will open up new channels of social mobility for the more highly educated members of the population. Even under these circumstances, however, formidable obstacles will have to be surmounted in order to shift

skilled manpower into the most productive sectors. The countries will have to overcome the inertia of the educational system and of students' preferences, which will in part depend on how clear the market's signals regarding new job opportunities are. In addition, effective retraining programmes will have to be designed and implemented.

#### 15. Wage discrimination against women

Severe wage discrimination against women continues to be a problem. This situation is all the more serious because it is coupled with an increase in women's participation in the labour market and changes in household organizational patterns that often entail a heavier domestic workload.

A growing number of households depend upon the income provided by women members. This is due not only to the larger number of households headed by women, but also to a long-term upward trend, which was further heightened by the crisis, in the number of jobs which do not pay well enough to support a family and thus put pressure on women to enter the labour market in order to supplement the household's income. This increase in the number of working women has not,

however, brought with it a corresponding change in the general perception of the burden of domestic duties shouldered by women; nor has the increasing equality of men and women with regard to the economic upkeep of the household been taken into due consideration in the determination of wage levels.

The available information on wage differentials between men and women clearly proves the existence of widespread wage discrimination against women (see figure 11). No country in the region pays equal wages to men and women with similar skills. The incomes earned by women, whether they are young or older adults, are habitually lower than men's at all educational levels (see table 41). Table 42 illustrates the fact that such discrimination occurs consistently in all occupational categories; this finding is in agreement with the results of other studies conducted by ECLAC.<sup>46</sup>

Although the severity of the phenomenon differs from country to country, wage discrimination is generally more marked among the less educated groups than among their more highly educated counterparts (see table 41). In the case of women, the completion of more years of schooling therefore not only improves their incomes but also helps to diminish the discrimination to which they are subjected in the labour market, although in no case does this entirely eliminate the differential between their income levels and those of men. Adult women's relative disadvantage <u>vis-à-vis</u> men in terms of hourly wages is equivalent to roughly four years of formal education.<sup>47</sup> This may be part of the reason for the sharp rise in female enrolment rates and the relatively high educational levels being reached by women. In view of the discrimination to which they are subject, women's greater achievements in this area may be regarded as the result of a rational effort to deal with an employment situation that demands higher levels of formal training on their part if they are to obtain benefits similar to those available to their male counterparts in the market.


<sup>46</sup> See ECLAC, Women, work and crisis (LC/L.458(CRM.4/6)), Santiago, Chile, August 1988.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> This reference to hourly wages takes into account the construction of the index of monthly labour income equivalents.

#### Figure 11

LATIN AMERICA (10 COUNTRIES): CEMIT FOR WOMEN AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE CEMIT FOR MEN IN THE POPULATION OF GAINFULLY EMPLOYED PERSONS AGED 25 TO 59 YEARS WORKING OVER 20 HOURS PER WEEK, BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL,

#### **URBAN ZONES**




0-5 years

6-9 years

10 years and over

Figure 11 (concluded)



**Source**: ECLAC, Social Development Division, on the basis of household surveys conducted by the corresponding countries.

As a result of the crisis, the hourly labour incomes of men and women have declined in all the countries considered. Perhaps because they are closer to the base of the income pyramid, women's earnings decreased less than men's; by the same token, the reduction in the incomes of less educated women was smaller than in the case of more educated women. Consequently, in 10 of the 14 cases examined, the male/female labour-income gap narrowed.

The underlying ethical basis for the need to do away with gender-based discrimination in the sphere of labour income is the principle that there should be equal pay for equal effort and ability; a consideration of the implications in terms of the reproduction of existing social conditions is equally important. Under existing circumstances in the Latin American and Caribbean countries, discrimination against women in the areas of employment and wages has an increasingly high cost for society; this is because, as the numbers of households headed by women, of consensual unions and of babies born to single women rise, the responsibility of caring for and socializing coming generations increasingly falls into the hands of those people who have the least access to productive jobs and adequate remunerations, i.e., women.

#### 16. Rural/urban educational inequalities

In some countries the rural population lags so far behind the urban population in terms of education that the possibility of national integration is reduced. Even though all the countries studied have succeeded in raising the educational levels of their rural populations, the indicators in these areas are still far below those of urban areas (see tables 1, 2 and 4). The findings of various studies on the subject make it possible to determine just how important a role education plays in agricultural

productivity. According to these studies, farmworkers cannot meet the demands involved in using new technologies unless they are capable of handling the types of basic operations that generally begin to be taught in the fourth year of elementary school and are further developed from the sixth year on; these capabilities are further increased when that knowledge is reinforced through contacts with outreach services. This is the level at which a definite increase in the capability to use new technologies, adapt them to on-site conditions and raise the overall efficiency of input use begins to be seen. In 1990, however, in four of the six countries analysed, the average educational levels of young people living in rural areas were equivalent to less than six years of formal schooling and remained far below those of their urban counterparts. It should be noted that in those countries, agricultural products account for a major portion of total exports, which makes the absorption of technological progress an essential element in giving exporters a chance to compete successfully in the international market for these products.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> Adolfo Figueroa, **Productividad y educación en la agricultura campesina de América Latina**, Rio de Janeiro, Joint Program on Latin American Economic Integration (ECIEL), 1986.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> Daniel Cotlear, "The effects of education on farm productivity", **Journal of Development Planning**, No. 19 (ST/ESA/209), New York, United Nations, 1989; M.E. Lockheed, D.T. Jamison and L.J. Lau, "Farmer education and farm efficiency: a survey", **Economic Development and Cultural Change**, vol. 29, No. 1, The University of Chicago Press, 1980; Joseph M. Phillips, "A comment on farmer education and farm efficiency: a survey", **Economic Development and Cultural Change**, vol. 35, No. 3, The University of Chicago Press, April 1987.

The level of investment in human capital determines the current and future well-being of the rural population. It should be remembered, however, that it also influences the degree and form of rural areas' integration into the national community, as well as that of the people who move from rural zones to the cities. Unskilled rural migrants' inability to compete successfully in urban labour markets may discourage workers in rural areas from moving to the cities or, once they are there, may lock them into a permanent marginal status. As may be seen from table 26, the education differential separating rural and urban youths ranges, depending on the country, from two to four years of formal education. It is encouraging to note, however, that during the 1980s this differential tended to diminish in the majority of the cases studied (see table 26).

There are many factors that play a role in keeping the rural population behind in terms of education: the difficulty of gaining access to educational services, the low level of qualifications that has traditionally been required in the agricultural labour market, and the overall depressed state of the educational environment in rural homes. As noted earlier, this has a strong influence on the academic achievements of children and young people (see table 31) and sustains a cycle that perpetuates the under-qualification of the rural population. Since enhancing the educational environment in rural homes is a task that will require a sustained effort over the span of a number of generations, improving the skill level of rural youths will probably call for radical programmes which, based on an explicit acknowledgement of the majority of rural homes' inability to complement the work of the schools, will focus on investments in education in those areas in order to reinforce the schools' infrastructure, upgrade the quality of teaching staff and, in particular, extend the amount of time spent in school and provide increased supervision of schoolwork.

#### 17. The status of older adults

The failure to provide for the older population is another phenomenon of increasing importance in the social panorama of Latin America's societies. Many older adults receive no income at all or such a small one that they must rely on their families to maintain an adequate living standard. Fortunately, despite the crisis, an increase in the percentage of older people who are covered by social security was observed during the past decade in a majority of the countries.

Increased life expectancy and progressive aging of the population have prompted a growing interest in the status of the elderly. In particular, the Governments have evidenced increasing concern about the need to identify social mechanisms for ensuring the support of older people, to determine their degree of access to services and to ascertain the origin and quality of the material resources at their disposal, especially in view of the fact that during the 1980s the inability of many national social security systems to perform these functions became even more marked.

At the start of the 1990s, in the countries studied here, around one half of the older

population in urban areas and one third of those in rural zones were in a position typically associated with retirement, i.e., they were not gainfully employed but did receive some type of income. These average figures conceal marked cross-country differences, however. For example, the percentage of such persons in urban areas ranged from 18% in Mexico to 72% in Chile (see table 43); hence, in some countries of the region a very large number of older people still do not receive social security benefits.

Some of the older adults who lack social security coverage —between 10% and 60%, depending on the country— receive no income whatsoever. Between 2% and 12% of this group is composed of men, with the majority being women who, perhaps, were not gainfully employed when they were of working age and relied on their husbands to support them (see table 43). There is also an undetermined percentage of older men and women who are not covered by any social security system and who, despite their age, continue to perform some type of paid work; the number of such people is probably even higher in rural areas (see the first two columns of table 43).

One encouraging fact that emerges from the analysis of the countries examined here is that in all of them except Chile and Paraguay, the social insurance coverage of the population aged 65 and over expanded during the second half of the decade.

In regard to the economic aspects of the older population's living conditions, it should be noted that, except in Brazil, those lacking social security coverage are mainly members of lower-income households (see table 44). This is due partly to the fact that poverty is associated with the performance of activities for which no social security contributions are made and partly to the fact that the presence within a household of older members who do not contribute to its economic upkeep increases the likelihood that the household's income will not rise above the poverty line. Indeed, between 22% and 40% of older adults in urban areas live in households that are below the poverty line, and the percentage is slightly higher in rural zones. In all the countries, the largest percentage of older people was concentrated in poor rural households.

When the economic status of older people was compared with that of the general population, the results showed that in nine countries of the region, apart from Costa Rica, the incidence of poverty was lower among the older population. The fact that the older population is relatively better off than the rest of the population may be attributed to a number of factors. First, the more affluent older adults live longer, and the percentage of the older population which is relatively well off therefore increases with age. Second, some of the conditions associated with old age involve changes in consumption patterns: people's habits change and there is less need to replenish fixed assets. Finally, in old age the economic burden associated with child-rearing is reduced.

The support of older adults entails a great deal of effort on the part of their families, since most of them—between 40% and 80%, depending on the country—live with other relatives, in addition to their spouse (see table 45). As is to be expected, the countries with the highest percentages of older people who live alone or with their spouses are also the ones that have the highest levels of social security coverage, as in the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. In these four countries, the percentage of older people who have no income and live with their families is below 10%; in the other countries, the figure varies between 20% and 40%, with the highest levels being in such countries as Guatemala, Mexico and Colombia, whose social security systems have very limited coverage (see table 43). Nevertheless, contrary to what might be expected in view of the social security crisis, the percentage of people aged 65 or over living alone or with their spouse continued to climb in a majority of the countries.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> This conclusion is drawn from a comparison of the data presented in table 44 with estimates of the percentage of households below the poverty line which were prepared by the Statistics and Economic Projections Division of ECLAC based on household survey data.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> In evaluating these figures, the reader should bear in mind that the information sources used do not cover collective housing arrangements, and there appears to have been a significant increase in retirement and rest homes in recent years.



Table 1
LATIN AMERICA (10 COUNTRIES): DISTRIBUTION OF THE EMPLOYED ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION,
BY OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY, 1980-1990
(Percentages)

URBAN ZONES

	Total	Employers	URBAN ZONES Wage-earners						Own-account and		
										family workers	
			Total	Public sector		Private	sector		Total a/	Non-profes-	
				3000	Total a/	In manufactur- ing and cons- truction estab- lishments employing more than 5 persons b/	In commercial & services establishments employing up to 5 persons b/	In establish- ments employing up to 5 persons	av	sional, non- technical	
Argentina						o persons o					
(Greater Bs.Aires)											
1980	100.0	5.5	69.2	-	69.2	24.1	21.9	12.8	25.3	22.4	
1986	100.0	5.0	68.8	-	68.8	18.7	24.0	12.9	26.1	23.0	
1990	100.0	5.4	69.2	-	69.2	17.5	25.5	12.6	25.4	21.8	
Brazil c/	400.0	,.									
1979	100.0	4.4	75.4	-	75.4	21.7	21.5	16.5	20.2	19.3	
1987 1990	100.0 100.0	4.0 5.2	74.1	-	74.1	17.5	22.6	18.3	21.8	20.6	
Colombia	100.0	5.2	72.4	-	72.4	16.3	22.7	18.5	22.4	21.2	
(8 major cities)											
1980	100.0	4.0	69.6	10.6	59.1	22.5	24.9		26.4	04.6	
1986	100.0	3.7	68.7	10.6	58.1	19.8	26.7		26.4 27.6	24.6 25.6	
1990	100.0	4.2	69.5	10.4	59.2	20.2	26.6		26.3	23.9	
Costa Rica							20.0	·	20.0	20.3	
1981	100.0	3.9	77.3	29.9	47.5	13.6	12.4	11.8	18.7	17.8	
1988	100.0	4.8	75.9	26.8	49.2	15.2	13.0	11.7	19.2	17.7	
1990	100.0	5.5	74.8	25.0	49.7	15.0	14.5	10.0	19.7	18.2	
Guatemala											
1986 1989	100.0	4.5	62.1	13.8	48.3	9.4	8.1	15.3	33.3	32.5	
Mexico	100.0	2.6	63.8	14.7	49.2	11.0	9.3	14.3	33.6	32.7	
1987	100.0	4.1	75.1	_	75.1	20.0	01.4	40.77			
1990	100.0	4.5	73.6		73.6	22.2	31.1	10.7	20.8	19.7	
Panama	.55.5	ا د	70.0	·	13.0	21.3	30.7	11.0	21.9	20.8	
1979	100.0	2.1	80.6 d/	31.1	44.7	11.9	21.1	_	17.3	17.0	
1986	100.0	1.9	75.7	27.8	47.9	9.0	20.7	5.4	22.4	21.9	
1989	100.0	2.0	71.6	29.3	42.2	7.2	16.0	5.9	26.5	25.6	
Paraguay	ĺ	İ					l	• •	,		
(Asunción)											
1986	100.0	7.7	65.4	12.6	52.8	10.1	11.9	12.3	26.9	24.9	
1990	100.0	9.2	66.3	12.9	53.4	9.9	11.2	15.8	24.5	22.9	
Uruguay 1981	100.0	4.6	76.7	23.7	ا جو ر	00.7	44-			·	
1989	100.0	5.7	73.3	23.7	53.0	20.7	14.7	8.0	18.7	17.1 a/	
Venezuela	100.0	5.7	13.3	21.5	51.8	16.8	14.2	8.5	21.0	18.8	
1981	100.0	6.0	75.0	24.8	50.2	17.3	17.1	-, -, I	40.0	ا	
1986	100.0	7.5	71.2	21.7	49.6	17.3 17.1	16.9	7.7 6.6	19.0 21.3	18.4 20.6	
1990	100.0	7.5	70.0	22.5	47.5	14.4	16.9	6.5	22.5	20.6	

Source: ECLAC, Statistics and Economic Projections Division, on the basis of special tabulations prepared by the corresponding countries.

a/ Includes wage-earners in the agricultural, forestry, hunting and fisheries sectors together with wage-earners in professional and technical occupations. For Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, also includes public-sector wage-earners.

b/ Does not include professionals or technicians.

c/ Brazil's National Household Survey (PNAD) does not provide information on the size of business establishments. Accordingly, the figure given for Brazil in the column for establishments employing over 5 persons corresponds to the percentage of workers who have employments contracts ("carteira"), while the column for establishments employing 5 or fewer workers shows the percentage of workers who do not have such contracts.

d/ Includes persons employed in the Panama Canal Zone.

Table 2

## LATIN AMERICA (10 COUNTRIES): DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYED ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION, BY OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY, 1980 - 1990 (Percentages)

**RUBAL ZONES** 

	Total	Employers		HUHAL ZO	Wage-ear	ners		Own-a	ccount
			Total	Public	Pri	vate sector		Works Total	ers Agriculture
				sector		1		a/	b/
					Total a/	In agricul- tural estab- lishments employing more than 5 persons b/	In agricul- tural estab- lishments employing up to 5 persons b/		
Brazil c/									
1979	100.0	2.8	38.0		38.0	3.1	20.8	59.2	53.2
1987	100.0	2.2	43.8	-	43.8	4.8	19.8	54.0	46.1
1990	100.0	3.0	44.2	_	44.2	4.9	17.6	52.8	44.5
Costa Rica							1 .,.0	02.0	74.5
1981	100.0	3.3	70.0	12.2	57.8	16.0	13.4	26.7	17.0
1988	100.0	4.9	65.8	10.3	55.5	15.4	10.7	29.3	18.6
1990	100.0	5.1	66.2	10.5	55.7	14.3	9.7	28.7	16.8
Guatemala							İ		
1986	100.0	0.5	39.8	2.3	37.5	16.5	9.9	59.7	46.4
1989	100.0	0.5	38.3	2.9	35.4	16.6	6.7	61.2	47.9
Panama									
1979	100.0	0.7	40.1 d/	13.5	25.8	12.8	-	59.2	48.9
1986	100.0	2.3	47.7	15.0	32.7	9.7	9.4	50.0	39.1
1989	100.0	2.0	38.9	11.5	27.5	7.9	6.5	59.1	47.3
Venezuela									
1981	100.0	6.8	47.6	9.2	38.4	14.8	5.7	45.6	30.9
1986	100.0	6.3	44.8	7.9	36.9	14.1	5.6	48.8	36.0
1990	100.0	6.9	46.6	8.3	38.3	15.3	7.3	46.5	33.3

Source: ECLAC, Statistics and Economic Projections Division, on the basis of special tabulations prepared by the corresponding countries.

a/ Includes wage-earners in all sectors of activity. For Brazil also includes public-sector wage-earners.

b/ Does not include wage-earners in professional or technical occupations.

c/ Brazil's National Household Survey (PNAD) does not provide information on the size of business establishments. Accordingly, the figure given for Brazil in the column for establishments employing over 5 persons corresponds to the percentage of workers who have employment contracts ("carteira"), while the column for establishments employing 5 or fewer workers shows the percentage of workers who do not have such contracts.

d/ Includes persons employed in the Panama Canal Zone.

CHILE: URBAN EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURE, 1980 - 1990 Table 3

	9	Employed population	ulation		Average annual	nual		Percentage	-   e		Increased	Increased in employed population	ved popu	lation				
	_	(thousands)			growth rates for	s for	ס	distribution			Thousands	şţ		Structure	Ī	Average	Incidence	Percent.
				-	the employed	<u>ت</u>	0	of employed	<b>T</b>						4 444	income	of poverty distr.	distr.
					population			population						(%)		1990 a/	in 1990	of poor
				1980/	1986/	1980/	_		<del>- , , ,</del>		1986-	1980-	1980-	1986-	1980-			populat.
	1980	1986	1990	1986	1990	1990	1980	1986	1990	1986	1990	1990	1986	1990	1990	-		in 1990
			0.00	, ,					4,				,					
Employers	292	103.2	163.6	10.7	12.2		23	3.4	4 ئ	47.0	60.4	107.4	7.1	8.3	177	23.2	•	•
	0000	o Lo	. 200	,	,		Ç		, ,	,		ž	ļ	Ç		C		ţ
Fublic sector wage earners	6757	7. O	4:125	40	α: •		2753		1.0	4.4	- 67	C 20	7.6	5.5	4, 0	2.0	4.0	3.5
Profes. & tech. occup.		152.8	2:Tar			zo .	5.0 0	0.0	2. ر دن ر	T.81	χο ί 4. ί	70.5	7.7	21.0	د. ئن	12.5	9.0	- ·
Non-prof., non-tech. occup	158.2	204.5	220.2	4.4	F.	3.4 4.	9.9	6.7	2. 8.	46.3	15.7	62.0	6.9	2.2	4 7	2.0	16.0	3.4
Private sector wade earners	1181.2	1601.5	2072.4	5.2	2.9	5.8	49.4	52.3	54.7	420.3	470.9	891.2	63.1	64.8	640	4.8	28.9	57.7
Profes. & tech. occup.	8	126.1	177.6	14.0	8.9	12.0	2.4		_		51.5	1202	10.3	7.1	8.6	16.0	0.5	0.1
Non-prof., non-tech. occup	<del>-</del>	1475.4	1894.8	4.6	6.5	5.4	47.0				419.4	771.0	52.8	57.7	55.3	3.8	31.6	57.6
•																		
Domestic employees	185.4	185.4 250.9 272.3	272.3	5.2	21	3.9	7.7	8.2 7.2	7.2	65.5	21.4	86.9	8.6	2.9	62	1.7	37.2	9.6
	0	,	0.00	,	į	Ċ	000	- 22	1.00	- 33		0		000	1	,	,	C C C
Cwn-account workersov	8779	747.1	27.62	Q'I	4.7	2.7 7	583	24.4	ू अं	59.3	149.9	7.617	10.4	50.5	7.0	۵./	33.6	0.85
Profes. & tech. occup.		20.0	27.2	-3.4	8.0	1.0	1.0		0.7		7.2	2.6	-0.7	1.0	0.2	7.3	15.8	0.4
Non-prof., non-tech, occup		727.1	869.8	1.8	4.6	2.9	27.3		 0.		142.7	216.6		19.6	15.5	3.6	- ਲੱ	28.6
Agriculture	38.9	6.09	79.5	7.8	6.9	7.4	9:	5.0	 	22.0	18.6	40.6	3.3	5.6	2.9	3.0	4.1	3.4
Manufacturing	96.5	90.0	120.8	-1.2	9.7	23	4.0	2.9	3.2	-6.5	30.8	24.3	-1.0	4.2	7.7	 	31.9	3.7
Construction	21.4	40.0	67.4	11.0	13.9	12.2	0.9	5.	<del>6</del> .	18.6	27.4	46.0	2.8	3.8	3.3	ლ	42.4	2.8
Commerce	269.5	284.5	326.1	6.0	3.5	1.9	11.3	9.3	9.6	15.0	41.6	9.99	2.3	2.7	4.1	3.7	31.3	9.6
Services	226.9	251.7	276.0	1.7	2.3	2:0	9.5	8.2	7.3	24.8	24.3	49.1	3.7	3.3	3.5	4.0	34.4	9.1
Total employed EAP	2393.5	2393 5 3060 0	3786.7	42	55	4.7	1000 1000 1000	1000	2300	565 5 7	7967 1393.2		1000 1000 1000	1000	180	7.5	P 1.6	100.0
Employed in Minimum						<del></del>			_									
Employment Programme	190.7	164.6	,	-2.4	1	1											(39.3)	

Source: Special tabulations from employment surveys conducted by the National Institute of Statistics (fourth quarter). The data on average incomes and the incidence of poverty were obtained from the 1990 CASEN survey.

a/ Expressed in terms of the per capita poverty line for November 1990 (18,594 pesos). b/ Includes unpaid family workers.

Table 4

LATIN AMERICA (10 COUNTRIES): BASIC ECONOMIC INDICATORS 1980-1990

	Per capita GDP	Per capita income	Open urban	Variation between monthly		Percentage	variations	
	(in 1980 dollars)	(in 1980 dollars) a/	unemploy- ment	averages of consumer price index	Periods	Per capita GDP	Per capita income a/	Urban minimum wage
Argentina								
1980	4110	4054	2.6	6.0	1980-1986	-11.0	-17.2	10.0
1986	3659	3358	5.6	5.5	1986-1990	-10.4	-14.0	-63.5
1990	3278	2887	7.5	30.4	1980-1990	-20.2	-28.8	-59.8
Brazil	4000							
1979	1879	1849	6.4	3.5	1979-1987	8.5	3.7	-25.5
1987 1990	2038 1903	1917	3.7	10.2	1987-1990	<b>-</b> 6.6	-6.8	-26.4
Colombia	1903	1786	4.3	32.8	1979-1990	1.3	-3.4	-45.2
1980	1225	1221	9.7	2.0	1000 1000			
1986	1310	1282	13.8	1.4	1980-1986 1986-1990	7.0 10.2	4.9 5.6	14.2
1990	1444	1354	10.3	2.1	1980-1990	17.9	10.8	-5.5 7.9
Costa Rica						11.5	10.6	7.9
1981	1471	1224	9.1	2.7	1981-1986	-3.9	-4.8	26.8
1988	1414	1166	6.3	1.6	1988-1990	3.4	0.8	5.1
1990 Chile	1461	1176	5.4	1.5	1981-1990	-0.6	-4.0	33.3
1980	2315	2228	9.0	0.5	4000 4000			
1985	2100	1729	17.0	2.5 2.2	1980-1985 1985-1990	-9.3	-22.4	-23.6
1990	2599	2301	6.5	1.9	1980-1990	23.7 12.3	33.1	14.5
Guatemala			0.0	1.0	1300-1330	12.3	3.2	-12.5
1986	901	879	14.0	2.4				
1989	923	901	6.2	1.0	1986-1989	2.5	2.4	_
Mexico	2422							
1987 1990	2400	2150	3.9	7.3				
Panama	2456	2244	2.9	2.0	1987-1990	2.3	4.4	-26.0
1979	1592	1569	11.6	0.6	1979-1986	45.0		
1986	1845	1925	12.7	0.0	1986-1989	15.9 -19.4	22.7	-
1989	1488	1499	20.4	0.0	1979-1989	-19.4 -6.6	-22.1 -4.4	-
Paraguay						0.0	-4.4	-
1986	1199	1209	6.1	2.3				
1990	1299	1331	6.6	2.7	1986-1990	8.4	10.1	21.5
Uruguay								<b>.</b>
1981	2289	2255	6.7	2.5	1981-1985	-18.1	-29.0	-9.9
1985 1989	1875	1600	13.1	4.6	1985-1989	16.0	30.0	-16.3
Venezuela	2176	2080	8.6	5.0	1981-1989	-5.0	-7.7	-24.6
1981	3905	3938	6.8	1.3	1081-1006	107	20.5	
1986	3371	2738	12.1	0.9	1981-1986 1986-1990	-13.7 -1.5	-30.5	4.9
1990	3322	2823	10.5	2.9	1981-1990	-1.5 -14.9	3.1	-34.4
			. 5.0		.501 1830	-14.9	-28.3	-31.2

Source: ECLAC, Statistics and Economic Projections Division, on the basis of official figures supplied by the countries.

a/ Refers to real per capita gross national income.

#### Table 5 LATIN AMERICA (10 COUNTRIES): AVERAGE INCOMES OF THE EMPLOYED ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION, BY OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY, 1980-1990 a/

					(Percent	ages)				
					URBAN	ZONES				
	Total	Employers				Wage-earners			Own-accou	
			Total	Public sector		Pri	vate sector		paid family Total b/	Non-prof. non-tech.
					Total	In manufacturing &	In commercial	in establish-	1 "	non toon.
					b/	construction	& services	ments employ-		
						establishments	establishments	ing up to		
						employing	employing up	5 persons		
						more than	to 5 persons b/			
Argentina						5 persons of			1	
(Greater Bs. Aires)			ł							
1980	8.1	19.3	6.6	١.	6.6	6.3	6.8	4.9	9.6	8.7
1986	7.5	19.9	6.4	١.	6.4	6.4	6.4	4.6	8.0	7.0
1990	5.7	18.8	4.9	١.	4.9	4.8	4.7	3.8	5.4	1
Brazil d/				1	"	4.0	7.7	5.6	5.4	4.7
1979	5.6	21.8	4.6		4.6	4.9	5.0	3.1		٠,
1987	5.2	22.2	4.3		4.3	4.7	5.0	2.7	5.8	5.2
1990	4.4	15.5	3.8	l .	3.8	4.0	4.0	2.7	5.5	4.9
Colombia	1	10.0	0.0		0.0	4.0	4.0	2.8	3.7	3.3
(8 major cities)									1	ł
1980	4.0	17.1	3.1	4.8	2.8	2.3	2.6		1 40	0.7
1986	4.1	12.1	3.3	5.1	2.9	2.7	2.8	1 -	4.3	3.7
1990	3.9	11.7	3.3	5.1	3.0	2.5	2.6	-	4.8	4.4
Costa Rica		''''	0.0	5.1	0.0	2.5	2.7	-	4.4	3.7
1981	6.6	13.1	6.3	8.9	4.6	4.7	5.6	ا م	l	
1988	5.4	8.9	5.1	6.8	4.2	4.1	5.0	3.5	7.3	6.9
1990	5.2	6.8	5.4	7.3	4.4	4.4	4.9	3.0 3.3	5.4	5.1
Guatemala		0.0	J	'	1 7.7	7	4.5	3.3	3.7	3.5
1986	3.1	10.6	2.9	4.6	2.5	3.0	3.5	1.6	2.4	
1989	3.5	18.1	3.1	4.8	2.5	2.8	3.5	i i	2.4	2.2
Mexico	0.0	10.1	0	7.0	2.5	2.0	3.7	1.7	3.2	3.0
1987	5.2	20.7	3.7	١.	3.7	3.9	3.9	25	٦,	
1990	5.6	27.6	3.5	١.	3.5	3.6	3.7	2.5 2.5	7.5	7.1
Panama			0.0		0.5	0.0	3.7	2.5	8.0	7.4
1979	5.6	12.5	5.9 e/	6.0	5.4	5.2	6.3	-		
1986	5.5	12.8	6.2	7.1	5.6	5.2	6.7		3.0	2.9
1989	4.9	13.4	5.6	7.4	4.4	4.7	5.1	3.1	2.7	2.6
Paraguay	1		0.0	/	7.7	7./	3.1	3.0	2.2	2.0
(Asunción)										
1986	3.1	8.2	2.6	3.3	2.4	2.7	3.5	1.7		
1990	3.4	10.2	2.4	3.4	2.2	2.8	2.9	1.7	2.6 3.8	2.2
Uruguay				0.7		2.0	2.5	1.0	3.8	3.6
1981	6.0	23.6	4.3	5.0	4.0	4.3	4.7	3.0	77	7.
1989	5.1	20.2	3.7	4.1	3.5	ł	1		7.7	7.1
Venezuela	<b> </b>	2.0.2	5.,	7.1	3.5	3.9	4.2	2.6	6.0	5.5
1981	7.6	11.5	7.8	8.8	72	75				
1986	5.7	11.9	7.8 5.3	1	7.3	7.5	7.7	5.0	5.2	5.0
1000	3.7	11.5	0.0	5.9	5.0	5.5	5.6	3.5	4.4	4.2

2.5 4.5 Source: ECLAC, Statistics and Economic Projections Division, on the basis of special tabulations prepared by the corresponding countries.

3.6

4.1

3.9

4.3

12.0

1990

a/ Incomes are expressed in terms of per capita poverty lines.

b/ Includes wage-earners in the agricultural, forestry, hunting and fisheries sectors together with wage-earners in professional and technical occupations. For Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, also includes public-sector wage-earners.

c/ Does not include professionals or technicians.

d/ Brazil's National Household Survey (PNAD) does not provide information on the size of business establishments. Accordingly, the figure given for Brazil in the column for establishments employing over 5 persons corresponds to the percentage of workers who have employment contracts ("carteiras"), while the column for establishments employing 5 or fewer workers shows the percentage of workers who do not have such contracts. e/Includes persons employed in the Panama Canal Zone.

Table 6

## LATIN AMERICA (10 COUNTRIES): AVERAGE INCOMES OF THE EMPLOYED ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION, BY OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY, 1980-1990 a/

(Percentages)

**RURAL ZONES** 

	и		·	RUI	RAL ZONE	S			
	Total	Employers		Wag	ge-earners			Own-accor	unt workers
			Total	Public- sector wage-	Private-	sector wage-ear	rners	Total b/	Agriculture c/
			10 April 1	eamers	Total b/	In agricultural establishments employing more than 5 persons c/	In agricultural establishments employing up to 5 persons c/	3	
Brazil d/									
1979	2.1	10.9	2.3	-	2.3	2.7	1.6	1.5	1.3
1987	3.0	20.3	2.4	-	2.4	2.8	1.7	2.7	2.4
1990	2.4	10.7	2.6	-	2.6	3.2	2.0	1.8	1.6
Costa Rica									•
1981	5.9	16.6	5.1	9.8	4.1	4.8	2.8	7.1	6.9
1988	5.2	11.5	4.8	6.8	4.4	5.3	3.4	5.1	4.6
1990	5.1	9.9	5.2	8.4	4.6	4.8	3.2	4.0	3.9
Guatemala									
1986	2.4	16.4	2.1	5.0	1.9	2.0	1.4	2.2	2.1
1989	2.5	21.2	2.3	4.9	2.1	1.9	1.5	2.4	2.1
Panama									
1979	3.6	4.0	5.6 e/	6.7	4.6	3.8	-	2.3	2.0
1986	3.9	11.3	5.0	7.8	3.7	4.4	2.1	2.5	2.2
1989	3.1	9.4	5.0	8.0	3.7	4.8	2.0	1.7	1.5
Venezuela									
1981	6.1	11.0	7.4	9.4	6.9	5.1	4.7	3.9	3.3
1986	4.3	11.9	4.4	6.2	4.0	3.1	2.8	3.1	2.8
1990	3.8	9.5	3.3	4.3	3.1	2.7	2.2	3.5	2.9

Source: ECLAC, Statistics and Economic Projections Division, on the basis of information from household surveys, conducted by the corresponding countries.

a/ Incomes are expressed in terms of per capita poverty lines.

b/ Includes wage-earners in all sectors of activity. For Brazil, also includes public-sector wage-earners.

c/ Does not include wage-earners in professional or technical activities.

d/ Brazil's National Household Survey (PNAD) does not provide information on the size of business establishments. Accordingly, the figure given for Brazil in the column for establishments employing over 5 persons corresponds to the percentage of workers who have employment contracts ("carteira"), while the column for establishments employing 5 or fewer workers shows the percentage of workers who do not have such contracts.

e/ Includes persons employed in the Panama Canal Zone.

Table 7

## LATIN AMERICA (10 COUNTRIES): VARIATIONS IN AVERAGE INCOMES OF THE EMPLOYED ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION BY OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY, 1980-1990 (Percentages)

**URBAN ZONES** 

			1 40040-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0		URBAN					
	Total	Employers				Wage-earners			Own-accou	66-160-200-200-200-2
			Total	Public sector			Public sector		unpaid fam Total a/	Non-prof. non-tech.
					Total a/	In manufacturing and construc- tion establish- ments employ, more than 5 persons b/	In commercial and services establishments employing up to 5 persons b/	In establishments employing, up to 5 persons	8	norrech.
Argentina (Greater Bs. Aires)										
1980 - 86	-7	3	-3	-	-3	2	-6	-6	-17	-20
1986 - 90	-24	-6	-23	-	-23	-25	-27	-17	-32	-33
1980 - 90 Brazil c/	-30	-3	-26	•	-26	-24	-31	-22	-44	-46
1979 - 87	-7	2	-7	-	-7	-4	0	-13	-5	-6
1987 - 90	-15	-30	-12	-	-12	-15	-20	4	-33	-33
1979 - 90	-21	-29	-17		-17	-18	-20	-10	-36	-37
Colombia (8 major cities)										
1980 - 86	2	-29	6	6	4	17	8	-	12	19
1986 - 90	-5	-3	0	0	3	-7	-4	-	-8	-16
1980 - 90	-3	-32	6	6	7	9	4	-	2	0
Costa Rica									:	
1981 - 86	-18	-32	-19	-24	-9	-13	-11	-14	-26	-26
1988 - 90	-4	-24	6	7	5	7	-2	10	-31	-31
1981 - 90	-21	-48	-14	-18	-4	-6	-12	-6	-49	-49
Guatemala 1986 - 89	13	71	7	4	0	-7	6	6	33	36
Mexico										
1987 - 90 Panama	8	33	-5	-	-5	-8	-5	0	7	4
1979 - 86	-2	2	5 d/	18	4	0	6	_	-10	-10
1986 - 89	-11	5	-10	4	-21	-10	-24	-3	-19	-23
1979 - 89	-12	7	-5	23	-19	-10	-19		-27	-31
Paraguay (Asuncion)										
1986 - 90 Uruquay	10	24	-8	3	-8	4	-17	6	. 46	64
1981 - 89 Venezuela	-15	-14	-14	-18	-13	-9	-11	-13	-22	-23
1981 - 86	-25	3	-32	-33	-32	-27	-27	-30	-15	-16
1986 - 90	-21	1	-30	-34	-28	-25	-30	-29	2	2
1981 - 90	-41	4	-53	-56	-51	-45	-49	-50	-13	-14

Source: ECLAC, Statistics and Economic Projections Division, on the basis of special tabulations prepared by the corresponding countries.

a/ Includes wage-earners in the agricultural, forestry, hunting and fisheries sectors together with wage-earners in professional and technical occupations. For Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, also includes public-sector wage-earners.

b/ Does not include professionals or technicians.

c/ Brazil's National Household Survey (PNAD) does not provide information on the size of business establishments. Accordingly, the figure given for Brazil in the column for establishments employing over 5 persons corresponds to the percentage of workers who have employment contracts ("carteira"), while the column for establishments employing 5 or fewer workers shows the percentage of workers who do not have such contracts.

d/ Includes persons employed in the Panama Canal Zone.

Table 8

LATIN AMERICA (10 COUNTRIES): INCIDENCE OF POVERTY IN SELECTED OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES a/

URBAN ZONES

	Total	Total	Private se	ctor wage-ea technical occ	mers in non-pr	ofessional		Non-professional, non- technical own-account		
	population	employed population	In establishm	ents	In establishmemploying up 5 persons b/	ents to	Domestic employees	workers	raccount	
			Manuf. & construct.	Commerce and serv.	Manuf. & construct.	Commerce and serv.		Manuf. & construct.	Commerce and serv.	
Argentina (Greater Bs. Aires)										
1980	9	3	6	2	5	3	4	2	1	
1986 1990	15 05	4	6	3	9	5	6	7	4	
Brazil b/	25	19	23	18	30	18	35	31	22	
1979	30	24	23	18	43	25	32	25	23	
1987 1990	34 43	27 34	23 31	21	47	32	43	33	29	
Colombia	70	54	31	29	55	38	53	43	37	
(8 major cities) 1980	40		40							
1986	40	26 26	40 39	30 32	-	•	7	29	26	
1990	39	29	38	33	-	-	19 27	24 30	25 34	
Costa Rica 1981	18	15	23	13	24	00				
1988	24	14	17	14	23	23 25	30 37	19 15	13 16	
1990 Guatemala	25	15	16	12	22	20	28	28	24	
1986	60	48	53	41	69	57	38	64	48	
1989 Marian	53	42	45	32	62	52	42	47	34	
Mexico 1987	33	22	29	24	40	25				
1990	34	23	33	26	42	35 35	22 26	14 12	12 10	
Panama 1979	36	22	24	18						
1986	36	23	18	13	- 44	19	25 24	36 38	33 32	
1989 Paraguay	41	28	23	21	31	33	31	43	43	
(Asunción)										
1986	52	40	51	39	75	48	30	61	49	
1990 Uruquay	42	32	44	32	57	44	29	41	31	
1981	13	8	11	7	13	11	23	4 .	6	
1989 Venezuela	20	12	12	8	27	16	31	10	11	
1981	20	10	8	7	12	11	14	22	19	
1986	30	15	13	14	23	19	20	22 25	21	
1990	39	22	24	20	38	32	30	25	22	

a/ Refers to the percentage of employed persons in each category residing in households situated below the poverty line.

b/ The figures given in the columns for establishments employing more than 5 and up to 5 persons correspond to wage-earners with and without employment contracts ("carteira"), respectively.

Table 9

LATIN AMERICA (5 COUNTRIES): INCIDENCE OF POVERTY IN SELECTED OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES a/

**RURAL ZONES** 

	Total	Total		-sector wage- technical occu		-professional,		Non-professi technical own	
	population	employed population	in establish employing r than 5 pers	nore	In establish employing u 5 persons b	up to	Domestic employees	workers	
48048112.5			Total	Agriculture & fisheries	Total	Agriculture & fisheries		Total	Agriculture & fisheries
Brazil b/									
1979	68	64	36	49	66	69	46	71	74
1987	66	58	36	50	65	68	49	63	65
1990	63	55	34	43	58	62	55	62	65
Costa Rica				1					
1981	28	25	23	28	41	50	41	19	19
1988	30	19	12	12	29	35	34	24	29
1990	27	17	13	19	23	32	22	24	27
Guatemala									
1986	80	73	76	79	81	86	60	73	78
1989	78	70	72	79	76	84	64	71	76
Panama		4.0	-						
1979 1986	60 52	40 39	23 27	28 33	40	-	42	54 50	59
1989	57	39 46	27	25	49 45	55 50	44 42	50 61	54 67
Venezuela	3,	40	""	25	45	50	42	01	6/
1981	43	30	17	22	20	24	28	45	52
1986	42	29	22	30	28	33	35	37	42
1990	47	31	35	43	36	39	44	32	37

a/ Refers to the percentage of employed persons in each category residing in households situated below the poverty line.

b/ The figures given in the columns for establishments employing more than 5 and up to 5 persons correspond to wage-earners with and without employment contracts ("carteira"), respectively.

Table 10

LATIN AMERICA (10 COUNTRIES): DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL POOR POPULATION, BY OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY

URBAN ZONES

	non	ector wage-ea technical occu	mers in non-p pations	rofessional		Non-profess technical ow	ional, non-	TOTAL a/
Secretarion of the secretarion o	In establishmemploying m 5 persons		In establishn employing u 5 persons	nents o to	Domestic employees	Workers		d
	Manufact, & constr.	Commerce & serv.	Manufact. & constr.	Commerce & serv.		Manufact. & constr.	Commerce & serv.	
Argentina (Greater Bs. Aires)								
1980	52	16	8	9	5	4		00
1986	27	18	8	11	8	11	16	98 99
1990	22	24	6	8	8	11	18	99
Brazil b/ 1979	21	17	8		40	_		
1987	15	18	8	9	10 11	3	13	81
1990	15	20	8	13	10	5 5	16 17	85 88
Colombia							] ''	00
(8 major cities) 1980	35	29						
1986	29	32	-	_	2 5	9	16	91
1990	27	31	-		5	6 6	18 21	90
Costa Rica							21	90
1981 1988	22	11	6	13	11	7	10	80
1990	18 16	13 12	4 4	15	9	6	12	77
Guatemala	10	12	4	9	8	12	17	78
1986	10	7	7	8	7	9	16	64
1989	12	7	7	9	7	9	13	64
Mexico 1987	20	00	_					
1990	29 31	33 35	5 5	12 12	4 4	2	9	94
Panama	<u>.                                    </u>		3	12	4	1	8	96
1979	13	17	-		7	7	15	59
1986	7	12	1	3	7	8	13	51
1989 Paraguay	6	12	1	5	8	7	18	57
(Asunción)								
1986	13	12	9	8	11	10	21	84
1990	14	12	12	12	10	7	16	83
Uruquay	00		_	_				
1981 1989	28 18	12 10	3 5	8 9	21	3	9 ·	84
Venezuela	10		5	9	18	5	12	77
1981	14	11	3	5	5	9	23	70 -
1986	14	15	3	6	5	7	20	70
1990	16	16	3,	7	6	5	16	69

a/ The totals are less than 100% owing to the exclusion of employers, professionals and technicians, and public-sector wage-earners. b/ The figures given in the columns for establishments employing more than 5 and up to 5 persons correspond to wage-earners with and without employment contracts ("carteira"), respectively.

Table 11

LATIN AMERICA (5 COUNTRIES): DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL POOR POPULATION, BY OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY

RURAL ZONES

		s in profession	al, non-				TOTAL a/
in establishr	nents		p to	Domestic employees	workers		3
Total	Agriculture and fisheries	Total	Agriculture and fisheries		Total	Agriculture and fisheries	
6	2	25	23	2	66	62	99
8	4	29	23	3	59	52	99
9	4	25	20	4	60	53	98
	1		1		20	14	95
		R	F			28	92
25	16	23	19	6	41	27	95
	1 40						
			1	2	II .	1	99
22	19	12	8	2	62	52	98
10							
831		10	10		0		95
				4			95
′	"	'0	'	٥	/*	69	98
15	11	7	5	2	60	52	92
8:D			I.				92 93
28	22		9	5		39	93 93
	technical oculin establishr employing m 5 persons  Total  6 8 9 29 20 25 22 22 22 13 11 7 7 15 19	technical occupations In establishments employing more than 5 persons  Total Agriculture and fisheries  6 2 8 4 9 4 29 19 20 10 25 16 22 18 22 19 13 9 11 8 7 4 15 11 19 15	Total   Agriculture and fisheries   In establishments employing more than   5 persons   Total   Agriculture and fisheries   Total   25   8	In establishments	In establishments	Total   Agriculture and fisheries   In establishments employing more than 5 persons   Total   Agriculture and fisheries   Total   Total   Total   Agriculture and fisheries   Total   Agriculture and fisheries   Total   Total   To	In establishments

a/ The totals are less than 100% owing to the exclusion of employers, professionals and technicians, and public-sector wage-earners. b/ The figures given in the columns for establishments employing more than 5 and up to 5 persons correspond to wage-earners with and without employment contracts ("carteira"), respectively.

Table 12

LATIN AMERICA (12 COUNTRIES): INCIDENCE OF POVERTY AND AVERAGE INCOMES OF EMPLOYED POPULATION, BY YEARS OF SCHOOLING AND AGE GROUP URBAN ZONES

				BRAZIL						٥	COLOMBIA			
	Employed [%]	Average Income a/	Indd. of poverty by	EAP (%) I	Average income a/	lncid. of poverty b/	Variation in average income 1979-1990 (%)	Envioyed EAP (%)	Average income af	incid. of poverty b/	Employed EAP (%)	Average income a/	incid. of poverty b/	Variation in average income 1980-1990 (%)
24 years of are and under	34.6	2.5	25	29.0	67	39	-24.1	30.3	2.1	26	21.7	2.2	29	2.9
Up to 5 years of schooling 6-9 years of schooling 10 or more years of schooling	19.0 10.1 5.6	1.8 2.6 4.9	36 15 4	13.3 9.4 6.3	1.2 1.9 3.4	56 32 12	-33.3 -25.5 -29.9	13.0 9.8 7.6	1.5	36 27 9	6.2 7.0 8.5	1.6	41 35 15	4.6 4.4 -19.4
25-39 years of age	37.0	6'9	23	40.7	5.1	32	-26.6	40.3	4.3	26	48.1	4.1	29	-3.2
Up to 5 years of schooling 6-9 years of schooling 10 or more years of schooling	21.4 5.9 9.7	4.2 6.9 12.8	36 11 2	16.9 8.4 15.4	2.6 3.9 8.4	54 31 9	-38.1 -43.7 -34.6	17.3 9.6 13.4	2.3 3.2 7.6	44 22 5	12.4 11.7 24.1	2.3 2.9 5.7	55 38 12	-0.4 -10.5 -24.8
40 years of age and over	28.4	7.7	22	30.3	5.9	31	-22.6	29.4	5,4	23	30.2	4.9	28	-9.4
Up to 5 years of schooling 6-9 years of schooling 10 or more years of schooling	21.9 2.6 3.9	4.9 10.2 21.4	28 5 1	20.6 3.2 6.5	3.4 6.1 13.9	41 17 5	-30.5 -40.6 -35.2	18.2 4.8 6.4	2.8 5.1 12.9	33 12 5	15.6 5.0 9.6	2.8 4.1 8.7	41 27 7	-0.9 -19.5 -32.6
Total	100:0	5.6	24	100.0	4.4	34	-21.4	100.0	4.0	26	100.0	3.9	29	-1.5

		985.5			8	5		
	Variation in aver- age froome 1979-1989 (%)	-36.7	-25.1 -33.6 -36.4	-18,9	-25.3 -27.2 -24.8	-1.6	-34.6 -18.3 4.5	-12.7
	incid. of poverty b/	35	62 45 17	25	63 43 9	27	53 30 6	28
	Average income a/	2.2	1.4	5.1	2.3 3.1 6.6	6.2	2.3 4.1 11.2	4.9
PANAMA	Enployed EAP (%)	9'61	1.5 10.1 8.0	43.8	2.9 15.7 25.1	36.6	8.3 15.6 12.7	100.0
	froid, of poverty b/	21	39 27 13	22	55 32 6	22	40 22 3	22
	Average income a'	3.5	1.9 2.6 4.7	2.9	3.1 4.3 8.8	6.3	3.6 5.0 10.7	5.6
	Employed EAP (%)	23.0	1.8 10.8 10.4	44.7	3.8 20.4 20.5	32.3	8.9 14.1 9.3	100.0
	Variation in average income 1981-1990 (%)	-3.6	7.5 18.9 -18.4	-26.1	-37.5 -30.4 -30.2	-28.0	-38.9 -41.9 -24.2	-21.6
ء ا	Incid. of powerty b/	15	30 20 5	14	34 4 4	15	24 17 4	15
Coot	Average income a/	3.4	2.3 2.9 4.4	5.7	3.2 4.1 7.2	5.8	3.5 4.4 9.5	2.5
COSTA RICA	Employed EAP (%)	24.5	2.8 12.4 9.4	44.4	3.9 16.3 24.2	31.1	8.8 12.3 10.1	100:0
	Incid. of poverty b/	21	38 26 8	13	30 17 2	11	17 10 3	15
1981	Average income a/	3.5	2.1 2.4 5.4	7.7	5.1 5.9 10.3	8.0	5.6 7.5 12.5	9.9
	Employed EAP (%)	28.4	2.7 15.0 10.8	39.9	6.5 15.8 17.7	31.7	12.6 11.3	0:001
		ınd under	Up to 5 years of schooling 6-9 years of schooling 10 or more years of schooling	Đ	Up to 5 years of schooling 6-9 years of schooling 10 or more years of schooling	nd over	Up to 5 years of schooling 6-9 years of schooling 10 or more years of schooling	
		24 years of age and under	Up to 5 years of schooling 6-9 years of schooling 10 or more years of sc	25-39 years of age	Up to 5 years of schooling 6-9 years of schooling 10 or more years of sc	40 years of age and over	Up to 5 years of schooling 6-9 years of schooling 10 or more years of school	Total

Г	1	al sacca			8	6		
	Variation in aver- age income 1981:1990 (%)	-45.6	-48.3 -44.7 -51.4	-45.8	-41.6 -45.7 -53.6	-34.8	-36.1 -41.3 -47.4	40.9
	Incid. of poverty b/	22	39 23 11	22	44 28 10	20	33 20 6	22
	Average in noone of a po	2.8	2.0 2.7 3.3	4.5	3.3 4.0 5.5	5.6	3.7 5.0 8.5	4.5
VENEZUELA	Employed EAP (%)	20.3	2.9 11.4 5.9	45.2	5.1 21.2 18.8	34.5	10.1 15.1 9.3	100.0
	Incid. of poverty b/	6	16 9	10	23 10 2	П	19 8 2	11
Foot	Average income a/	5.1	3.9 4.9 6.8	8.4	5.7 7.4 11.9	8.5	5.8 8.6 16.2	7.6
	Employed EAP (%)	25.0	4.9 14.7 5.4	42.4	7.9 21.8 12.7	32.6	13.7 14.0 4.9	100.0
	Variation in aver- age income 1981-1989 (%)	-17.8	-21.2 -21.6 -15.2	-16.8	-15.6 -16.3 -22.7	-10.5	-16.3 -1.2 -31.4	-15.0
1989	Inoid. of poverty b/	18	46 23 7	13	41 19 3	8	16 7 2	11
	Average income a/	2.4	1.9 2.1 2.9	5.1	3.2 4.4 6.1	9'9	4.0 6.5 8.9	5.1
URUGUAY	Employed EAP (%)	17.6	0.9 9.9 6.9	35.0	2.5 16.0 16.5	47.4	11.9 21.7 13.9	0.001
	inad. of poverty b/	6	29 12 2	10	28 12 3	5	0 4 0	00
1981	Average income a/	2.9	2.4 2.7 3.4	6.1	3.8 5.3 7.9	7.3	4.8 6.6 13.0	0.9
	Employed EAP (%)	21.1	1.6 11.9 7.6	34.3	4.5 15.7 14.1	44.6	15.4 19.6 9.6	100:0
		d under	Up to 5 years of schooling 6-9 years of schooling 10 or more years of schooling		Up to 5 years of schooling 6-9 years of schooling 10 or more years of schooling	l over	of schooling hooling rs of schooling	
		24 years of age and under	Up to 5 years of schooling 6-9 years of schooling 10 or more years of school	25-39 years of age	Up to 5 years of schooling 6-9 years of schooling 10 or more years of school	40 years of age and over	Up to 5 years of schooling 6-9 years of schooling 10 or more years of schooling	Total

		BOLIVIA			CHILE		ß	GUATEMALA		H	HONDURAS	
		1989			1990			1989			1990	
	Employed EAP (%)	Average income a/	Incid. of poverty b/	Employed EAP (%)	Average income a/	Incid. of poverty b/	Employed EAP (%)	Average income a/	Incid. of poverty b/	Employed EAP (%)	Average income a/	Incid. of poverty
24 years of age and under	22.0	6.1	39	17.8	2.4	30	30.5	1.9	45	29.4	1.4	64
Up to 5 years of schooling 6-9 years of schooling 10 or more years of schooling	5.0 7.3 9.7	1.3	4 9 £	1.6 4.4 11.7	2.0 1.9 2.7	39 45 23	13.1 11.1 6.2	1.3 1.9 3.2	61 44 12	9.4 15.2 4.9	0.9 1.3 2.9	77 65 33
25-39 years of age	42.8	4,4	42	44.8	4.5	30	37.9	3.9	42	39.9	3.1	- 56
Up to 5 years of schooling 6-9 years of schooling 10 or more years of schooling	11.5 7.4 24.0	3.2 3.4 5.3	61 53 30	4.7 9.9 30.1	2.7 2.6 5.4	49 50 20	14.7 10.8 12.4	2.4 3.3 6.2	69 42 9	12.4 14.5 12.9	1.6 2.4 5.3	81 66 22
40 years of age and over	35.2	5.2	33	37.5	5.3	24	31.6	4.6	39	30.8	3.8	- 09
Up to 5 years of schooling 6-9 years of schooling 10 or more years of schooling	17.5 5.3 12.5	3.6 4.9 7.5	4 <del>8</del> 8 8 1	9.2 11.5 16.8	2.9 3.4 8.0	37 30 12	19.5 7.3 4.8	2.8 5.0 11.1	52 27 7	17.8 6.6 6.3	1.7 3.3 10.0	78 58 12
Total	100.0	4.1	40	100.0	4,4	27	100.0	3.5	42	100.0	2.8	- 09

Table 12 (concl.)

		MEXICO d	y.	1	PARAGUAY			
		1989			1990			
	Employed EAP (%)	Average income a/	Incid. of poverty b/	Employed EAP (%)	Average income a/	Incid, of poverty b/		
24 years of age and under	29.1	3.0	19	22.4	1,6	36		
Up to 5 years of schooling	2.6	2.1	30	2.6	0.9	48		
6-9 years of schooling	15.9	2.6	22	11.2	1.4	40		
10 or more years of schooling	10.6	3.7	13	8.6	2.0	26		
25-39 years of age	40.2	5.8	26	34.4	3.6	32		
Up to 5 years of schooling	4.8	3.9	45	3.6	2.1	62		
6-9 years of schooling	16.6	4.6	35	13.7	2.8	42		
10 or more years of schooling	18.8	7.3	13	17.1	4.5	18		
40 years of age and over	30.7	7.1	23	43.2	4.3	32		
Up to 5 years of schooling	10.9	5.0	28	7.5	2.4	47		
6-9 years of schooling	12.2	6.1	25	23.8	3.6	37		
10 or more years of schooling	7.6	11.7	12	11.8	7.0	14		
Total	100,0	5.6	23	100.0	3,4	32		

a/ Refers to average incomes expressed in terms of per capita poverty lines.

b/ Number of poor people (including indigents) as a percentage of total number of employed persons in each category. c/ Calculations based on a preliminary estimate of a 30% urban poverty rate at the household level.

Table 13

LATIN AMERICA (7 COUNTRIES): INCIDENCE OF POVERTY AND AVERAGE INCOMES OF EMPLOYED POPULATION, BY YEARS OF SCHOOLING AND AGE GROUP **RURAL ZONES** 

32.3 25.5 56.0 -16.8	-24.4 -28.7 -37.3	-34.3 -24.7 -35.2
15 24 15 2 18	28 19 4	20 13 4
3.6 3.0 3.4 5.5 5.9	4.7 5.3 8.4 5.9	4.9 6.7 11.4 5.1
33.4 7.4 21.8 4.2 38.6	8.6 21.1 8.8 28.1	18.0 8.0 2.1 100.0
31 40 31 15 20	31 16 4 19	22 10 1
2.7 2.2 6.6 7.8	6.2 7.4 13.4 8.2	7.4 8.8 17.5 5.9
39.3 8.6 26.5 4.2 33.6	13.5 15.3 4.7 27.1	20.5 5.4 1.2 100.0
31.0 26.6 9.1 -30.6	-1.6 -23.1 -28.8	-1.3 -33.0 -37.7
59 64 33 13	60 27 11	53 24 7 55
1.2 1.8 2.9 3.1	2.5 4.7 7.8	3.0 7.9 14.1
38.4 32.6 4.6 1.2 30.4	25.0 3.0 2.4 31.1	29.9 0.6 0.6 100.0
66 29 13 64	67 19 7 55	56 16 1 .
0.9 0.8 1.7 4.2 2.8	2.5 6.1 11.0	3.1 11.8 22.7 2.1
44.0 41.0 2.6 0.4 28:0	26.5 0.8 0.7 28.0	27.6 0.2 0.2 100.0
ears of age and under Up to 5 years of schooling 6-9 years of schooling 10 or more years of schooling	Up to 5 years of schooling 6-9 years of schooling 10 or more years of schooling ears of ager and over	11p to 5 years of schooling 6-9 years of schooling 10 or more years of schooling Total
	ling 41.0 0.8 69 32.6 1.0 64 26.6 8.6 2.4 40 7.4 3.0 24 15 nooling 0.4 4.2 13 1.2 2.9 13 -30.6 4.2 6.6 15 4.2 5.5 2.2 31 21.8 3.4 15 28.0 2.8 64 30.4 3.1 53 10.2 33.6 7.8 20 38.6 5.9 18	schooling         41.0         0.8         69         32.6         1.0         64         26.6         8.6         2.4         40         7.4         3.0         24           schooling         2.6         1.7         29         4.6         1.8         33         9.1         26.5         2.2         31         21.8         3.4         15           sof schooling         2.6         1.7         29         4.6         1.8         33         9.1         26.5         2.2         31         21.8         3.4         15           sof schooling         2.6         2.8         64         30.4         3.1         53         10.2         33.6         7.8         20         38.6         5.5         18           schooling         2.6.5         2.5         6.6         15.3         7.4         16         38.6         5.9         18           sof schooling         0.8         6.1         19         3.0         4.7         27         -23.1         15.3         7.4         16         3.1         4           sof schooling         0.7         11.0         7         2.4         2.8         4.7         13.4         4         8.8

	Т		1			90	)		
		Variation in average income 1981-1990	-47.0	-47.2 -48.7 -56.5	-40.7	-39.0 -44.4 -59.4	-26.1	-26.8 -35.4 -47.9	-37.7
		Incid. of poverty b/	33	39 27 13	32	43 26 8	28	31 18 8	31
	1000	Average income a/	2.1	1.7 2.5 3.6	4.3	3.6 4.8 5.6	4.9	4.3 6.3 9.5	3.8
VENEZI EI A		Employed EAP (%)	30.1	15.8 12.8 1.6	33.5	16.3 13.5 3.8	36.3	28.2 7.0 1.1	100.0
		Incid. of poverty b/	30	37 22 4	28	37 16 3	30	33 16 2	30
	1981	Average income a/	4.0	3.2 4.9 8.3	7.3	5.9 8.6 13.8	9.9	5.9 9.8 18.2	6.1
		EAP (%)	29.4	17.4 10.9 1.2	32.7	20.1 10.6 2.0	37.9	32.7 4.5 0.7	100.0
		Variation in average income 1979-1989 (%)	-37.2	-33.3 -31.0 -51.5	-10.9	-32.9 -30.4 -21.1	-5.7	-31.2 -5.4 -4.8	-13.9
	1989	Incid. of poverty b/	51	68 53 25	.43	68 49 12	45	56 32 4	46
	31	Average Income a/	1.6	1.1	3.9	2.0 3.2 6.7	3.5	2.1 4.5 11.1	3.1
PANAMA		EAP (%)	25.2	4.7 16.5 4.0	34.7	7.5 17.5 9.7	40.1	25.3 11.8 3.0	100.0
		Incid, of poverty b/	44	58 47 9	37	53 31 3	38	23 5	40
	1979	Average income a/	2.5	1.7 2.0 5.8	4.4	3.0 4.6 8.5	3.7	3.0 4.8 11.6	3.6
		EAP (%)	25.4	5.9 15.7 3.7	37,0	14.7 18.1 4.2	37.6	28.6 7.6 1.4	100.0
			24 years of age and under	Up to 5 years of schooling 6-9 years of schooling 10 or more years of schooling	25-39 years of age	Up to 5 years of schooling 6-9 years of schooling 10 or more years of schooling	40 years of age and over	Up to 5 years of schooling 6-9 years of schooling 10 or more years of schooling	Total

Table 13 (concl.)

		CHILE 1990		C	JAMENAL 1989	A		HONDURA:	3
	Employed EAP (%)	Average income a/	of poverty b/	Employed EAP (%)	Average Income a/	Incid. of poverty b/	Employed EAP (%)	Average Income a/	Incid. of poverty b/
24 years of age and under	24,6	2.3	29	39.0	1,1	72	36,4	0.7	85
Up to 5 years of schooling	4.8	2.6	40	30.8	0.9	77	24.0	0.6	90
6-9 years of schooling	14.3	1.9	30	7.7	1.5	57	11.9	0.9	79
10 or more years of schooling	5.5	3.2	17	0.5	3.8	14	0.6	3.5	25
25-39 years of age	38.8	3.9	33	30.4	3.2	72	30,4	2.1	81
Up to 5 years of schooling	10.4	2.6	46	25.4	2.7	78	21.9	1.7	89
6-9 years of schooling	17.7	3.1	36	3.8	4.8	52	7.1	2.7	67
10 or more years of schooling	10.7	6.5	17	1.1	8.7	15	1.5	5.4	24
40 years of age and over	36.6	5.5	26	30.6	3.6	65	33.1	2,3	83
Up to 5 years of schooling	22.6	3.6	30	29.0	3.3	67	30.2	2.0	85
6-9 years of schooling	8.6	4.8	24	1.3	6.6	35	2.3	5.5	64
10 or more years of schooling	5.4	15.0	12	0.3	13.7	10	0.6	9.7	5
Total	100.0	4.1	29	100.0	2.5	70	100.0	1.7	83

a/ Refers to average incomes expressed in terms of per capita poverty lines.

b/ Number of poor people (including indigents) as a percentage of total number of employed persons in each category.

Table 14

LATIN AMERICA (10 COUNTRIES): URBAN POPULATION EMPLOYED IN LOW-PRODUCTIVITY SECTORS OF THE LABOUR MARKET, 1980-1990

		Mi	croenterprise	: a/		Domestic employment	Unskilled i	ndependent w	orkers d/
	Employers		Wage-earr	ners					
	Linpoyers	Profession. and technic.	occupation						
		b/	Total c/	Manufactur. & constr.	Commerce & services		Total c/	Manufactur. & constr.	Commerce & services
Argentina (Greater Bs. Aires)									
1980	3.2	0.5	40.0				l		
1986	3.2 3.3	0.5 0.5	12.8	4.5	8.2	4.0	22.4	7.7	14.7
1990	3.8	l'	12.9	4.1	8.8	5.3	23.0	6.4	16.5
Brazil e/	J.0	0.4	12.6	3.6	9.0	4.5	21.8	6.6	15.2
1979	_	2.4	16.5	4.5					
1987		2.4	16.5 18.3	4.5	8.3	7.5	19.3	3.3	13.5
1990	_	3.0		4.8	10.2	7.0	20.6	3.7	14.7
Colombia	-	3.0	18.5	4.8	11.2	6.1	21.2	3.5	15.6
(8 major cities)	•		l			l i			]
1960	_	_							
1986	_	]	•	-	-	6.8	24.6	7.6	16.5
1990			-	-	-	6.2	25.6	6.1	19.0
Costa Rica		•		-	-	5.5	23.9	5.8	17.7
1981	2.8	0.2	11.8	20				1	}
1988	3.8	0.7	11.7	3.2	7.8	5.1	17.8	4.9	11.1
1990	4.4	0.6	10.0	2.4	8.4	3.4	17.7	5.9	10.5
Guatemala	-1,-1	0.0	10.0	2.6	6.8	4.4	18.2	6.5	10.6
1986	3.6	0.7	15.3	4.8	0.7				
1989	2.1	0.7	14.3		6.7	9.3	32.5	6.5	16.4
Mexico		0.7	14.5	4.9	7.0	7.0	32.7	7.6	16.3
1987	3.2	0.5	10.7	00					
1990	3.5	0.4	11.0	2.9	7.6	4.3	19.7	2.6	16.1
Panama	0.0	0.7	''.0	3.0	7.8	3.6	20.8	2.6	17.5
1979	•	<u>.</u>	_						
1986	1.3	0.2	5.4	0.7	-	6.2	17.0	4.0	9.9
1989	1,2	0.4	5.9	1.0	3.0	6.2	21.9	4.6	8.9
<sup>p</sup> araguay Asunción)		0.4	5.5	1.0	3.8	6.8	25.6	4.6	11.9
1986	6.1	0.3	122	, [					
1990	7.2	0.3	12.3	4.9	6.8	13.9	24.9	6.6	17.2
Jruguay	1.2	0.3	15.8	6.6	8.5	11.4	22.9	5.6	16.7
1981	2.9	0.2	8.0	1.8	٤ ١	7.	47.		
1969	2.6	0.3	8.5	2.2	6.2	7.0	17.1	5.5	11.2
/enezuela		J.5	0.5	۷.۷	6.3	6.7	18.8	5.8	12.9
1981	4.5	0.6	7.7	ا م					
1986	5.1	0.6	7.7 7.6	2.3	5.0	3.5	18.4	4.3	12.9
1990	4.9	0.1	7.6 6.5	2.3 1.6	4.9	3.8	20.6	4.2	14.7
		V.C.	0.0	1.0	4.5	4.0	21.5	4.1	15.5

a/ Refers to establishments employing up to 5 persons (up to 4 persons in the cases of Panama and Venezuela).

b/ Values for samples that are not statistically significant.

c/ Includes persons employed in the agricultural, forestry, hunting and fisheries sectors.

d/ Refers to own-account and unpaid family workers engaged in non-professional, non-technical occupations.

e/ Wage-earners lacking an employment contract are included under the heading "Microenterprise".

Table 15

LATIN AMERICA (10 COUNTRIES): AVERAGE INCOMES OF URBAN POPULATION EMPLOYED IN LOW-PRODUCTIVITY SECTORS OF THE LABOUR MARKET, 1980-1990 a/

Argentina (Greater Bs. Aires) 1980 18.4 10. 1986 18.7 11. 1990 16.8 8. 1990 1987 1990 7. Colombia (8 major cities) 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980	Total d/  5 4.9 3 4.6 4 3.8 9 3.1	essional, non-technical ons  Manufac- & Comm construction & servi		Total d/	Manufac-& contruction	Commerce
Argentina (Greater Bs. Aires) 1980 18.4 10. 1986 18.7 11. 1990 16.8 8.  Brazil f/ 1979 - 6. 1987 - 6. 1980 - 7.  Cokombia (8 major cities) 1986 - 1990 - Costa Rica 1981 12.9 5. 1989 8.1 5. 1989 8.1 5. Guatemala 1986 7.6 2. 1989 13.1 4.  Mexico 1987 18.5 4. 1990 24.6 4.  Parama 1979 - 1986 10.1 7. 1989 9.1 8.  Paraquay (Asunción) 1986 7.6 7.6	Total d/  5 4.9 3 4.6 4 3.8 9 3.1	Manufac- & Comm construction & servi				
Argentina (Greater Bs. Aires)  1980	5 4.9 3 4.6 4 3.8 9 3.1	construction & servi				
1980 18.4 10. 1986 18.7 11. 1990 16.8 8.  Brazil f/ 1979 - 6. 1987 - 6. 1990 - 7.  Colombia (8 major cities) 1986 - 1990 - Costa Rica 1981 12.9 5. 1988 8.1 5. 1988 8.1 5. 1990 6.5 6.  Guaternala 1986 7.6 2. 1989 13.1 4.  Mexico 1987 18.5 4. 1990 24.6 4.  Panama 1979 - 1986 10.1 7. 1989 9.1 8.  Paraguay (Asunción) 1986 7.6	3 4.6 4 3.8 9 3.1					& services
1986 18.7 11. 1990 16.8 8.  Brazil f/ 1979 - 6. 1987 - 6. 1990 - 7.  Cokombia (8 major cities) 1986 - 1990 - Costa Rica 1981 12.9 5. 1988 8.1 5. 1990 6.5 6.  Guatemala 1986 7.6 2. 1989 13.1 4.  Mexico 1987 18.5 4. 1990 24.6 4.  Panama 1979 - 1986 10.1 7. 1989 9.1 8.  Paraquay (Asunción) 1986 7.6	3 4.6 4 3.8 9 3.1		8	1		
1986 18.7 11. 1990 16.8 8.  Brazil t/ 1979 - 6. 1987 - 6. 1990 - 7.  Cokombia (8 major cities) 1986 - 1990 - Costa Rica 1981 12.9 5. 1988 8.1 5. 1990 6.5 6.  Guatemala 1986 7.6 2. 1989 13.1 4.  Mexico 1987 18.5 4. 1990 24.6 4.  Panama 1979 - 1986 10.1 7. 1989 9.1 8.  Paraquay (Asunción) 1986 7.6	3 4.6 4 3.8 9 3.1		4.8 3.2	8.7	8.0	9.1
1990 16.8 8.  Brazil f/ 1979 - 6. 1987 - 6. 1990 - 7.  Colombia (8 major cities) 1980 - 1986 - 1990 -  Costa Rica 1981 12.9 5. 1988 8.1 5. 1990 6.5 6.  Guatemala 1986 7.6 2. 1989 13.1 4.  Mexico 1987 18.5 4. 1990 24.6 4.  Panama 1979 - 1986 10.1 7. 1989 9.1 8.  Paraquay (Asunción) 1986 7.6	<ul><li>4 3.8</li><li>9 3.1</li></ul>	4.5	4.6 3.2	7.0	6.9	7.0
Brazil 1/  1979 - 6. 1987 - 6. 1990 - 7.  Colombia (8 major cities) 1986 - 1990 -  Costa Rica 1981 12.9 5. 1988 8.1 5. 1990 6.5 6.  Guaternala 1986 7.6 2. 1989 13.1 4.  Mexico 1987 18.5 4. 1990 24.6 4.  Panama 1979 - 1986 10.1 7. 1989 9.1 8.  Paraquay (Asunción) 1986 7.6	9 3.1	3.3	4.0 2.1	4.7	4.6	
1987 - 6. 1990 - 7.  Colombia (8 major cities) 1980 - 1986 - 1990 -  Costa Rica 1981 12.9 5. 1988 8.1 5. 1990 6.5 6.  Guatemala 1986 7.6 2. 1989 13.1 4.  Mexico 1987 18.5 4. 1990 24.6 4.  Panama 1979 - 1986 10.1 7. 1989 9.1 8.  Paraguay (Asunción) 1986 7.6				7./	4.0	4.7
1987 - 6. 1990 - 7. Colombia (8 major cities) 1980 - 1986 - 1990 - Costa Rica 1981 12.9 5. 1988 8.1 5. 1990 6.5 6. Guatemala 1986 7.6 2. 1989 13.1 4. Mexico 1987 18.5 4. 1990 24.6 4. Panama 1979 - 1986 10.1 7. 1989 9.1 8. Paraguay (Asunción) 1986 7.6		2.4	4.1 1.1	5.2	5.0	5.7
Cokombia (8 major cities) 1980 - 1986 - 1990 - Costa Rica 1981 12.9 5. 1988 8.1 5. 1990 6.5 6. Guatemala 1986 7.6 2. 1989 13.1 4. Mexico 1987 18.5 4. 1990 24.6 4. Panama 1979 - 1986 10.1 7. 1989 9.1 8. Paraquay (Asunción) 1986 7.6	- 1 5./	2.1	3.3 1.0	4.9	4.5	5.2
(8 major cities) 1980 - 1986 - 1990 - Costa Rica 1981 12.9 5. 1988 8.1 5. 1990 6.5 6. Guaternala 1986 7.6 2. 1989 13.1 4. Mexico 1987 18.5 4. 1990 24.6 4. Panama 1979 - 1986 10.1 7. 1989 9.1 8. Paraquay (Asunción) 1986 7.6		2.0	3.4 0.9	3.3	3.1	3.5
1980 - 1986 - 1990 - Costa Rica 1981 12.9 5. 1988 8.1 5. 1990 6.5 6. Guatemala 1986 7.6 2. 1989 13.1 4. Mexico 1987 18.5 4. 1990 24.6 4. Panama 1979 - 1986 10.1 7. 1989 9.1 8. Paraguay (Asunción) 1986 7.6			5.5	0.0	J 5.1	3.5
1986 - 1990 - Costa Rica 1981 12.9 5. 1988 8.1 5. 1990 6.5 6. Guatemala 1986 7.6 2. 1989 13.1 4. Mexico 1987 18.5 4. 1990 24.6 4. Panama 1979 - 1986 10.1 7. 1989 9.1 8. Paraquay (Asunción) 1986 7.6						
1990 - Costa Rica 1981 12.9 5. 1988 8.1 5. 1990 6.5 6.  Guatemala 1986 7.6 2. 1989 13.1 4.  Mexico 1987 18.5 4. 1990 24.6 4.  Panama 1979 - 1986 10.1 7. 1989 9.1 8.  Paraquay (Asunción) 1986 7.6	-   -	-	- 2.1	3.7	2.9	3.9
Costa Rica 1981 12.9 5. 1988 8.1 5. 1990 6.5 6.  Guaternala 1986 7.6 2. 1989 13.1 4.  Mexico 1987 18.5 4. 1990 24.6 4.  Panama 1979 - 1986 10.1 7. 1989 9.1 8.  Paraguay (Asunción) 1986 7.6	-   -		- 1.6	4.4	3.8	4.4
1981 12.9 5. 1988 8.1 5. 1990 6.5 6.  Guatemala 1986 7.6 2. 1989 13.1 4.  Mexico 1987 18.5 4. 1990 24.6 4.  Panama 1979 - 1986 10.1 7. 1989 9.1 8.  Paraquay (Asunción) 1986 7.6	-   -	-	- 1.7	3.7	3.3	3.8
1988 8.1 5. 1990 6.5 6.  Guatemala 1986 7.6 2. 1989 13.1 4.  Mexico 1987 18.5 4. 1990 24.6 4.  Panama 1979 - 1986 10.1 7. 1989 9.1 8.  Paraquay (Asunción) 1986 7.6				"	0.0	0.0
1990 6.5 6.  Guatemala 1996 7.6 2. 1999 13.1 4.  Mexico 1997 18.5 4. 1990 24.6 4.  Panama 1979 - 1986 10.1 7. 1989 9.1 8.  Paraquay (Asunción) 1986 7.6		3.2	3.6 1.7	6.9	5.6	7.1
Guatemala 1986 7.6 2. 1989 13.1 4.  Mexico 1987 18.5 4. 1990 24.6 4.  Panama 1979 - 1986 10.1 7. 1989 9.1 8.  Paraquay (Asunción) 1986 7.6	0 3.0	2.9	3.1 1.5	5.1	4.2	5.5
1986 7.6 2. 1989 13.1 4.  Mexico 1987 18.5 4. 1990 24.6 4.  Panama 1979 - 1986 10.1 7. 1989 9.1 8.  Paraguay (Asunción) 1986 7.6	1 3.3	3.0	3.5 1.5	3.5	3.0	3.7
1989 13.1 4.  Mexico 1987 18.5 4. 1990 24.6 4.  Panama 1979 - 1986 10.1 7. 1989 9.1 8.  Paraquay (Asunción) 1986 7.6		1 1		1		
Mexico  1987 18.5 4. 1990 24.6 4.  Panama  1979 - 1986 10.1 7. 1989 9.1 8.  Paraguay (Asunción) 1986 7.6		1.6	1.8 1.7	2.2	1.8	2.6
1987 18.5 4. 1990 24.6 4.  Panama 1979 - 1986 10.1 7. 1989 9.1 8.  Paraquay (Asunción) 1986 7.6	2   1.7	1.7	1.9 1.4	3.0	2.4	3.7
1990 24.6 4.  Panama 1979 - 1986 10.1 7. 1989 9.1 8.  Paraguay (Asunción) 1986 7.6	į			1		
Panama 1979 - 1986 10.1 7. 1989 9.1 8. Paraguay (Asunción) 1986 7.6			2.6 1.5	7.1	6.3	7.4
1979 - 1986 10.1 7. 1989 9.1 8. Paraguay (Asunción) 1986 7.6	0 2.5	2.3	2.6 1.8	7.4	7.0	7.6
1986 10.1 7. 1989 9.1 8. Paraguay (Asunción) 1986 7.6	l					
1989 9.1 8. Paraquay (Asunción) 1986 7.6	-   -	-	- 1.3	2.9	3.2	3.3
Paraguay (Asunción) 1986 7.6			4.1 1.5	2.6	3.0	3.5
(Asunción) 1986 7.6	2 3.0	2.6	3.4 1.3	2.0	2.4	2.5
1986 7.6						İ
						I
1990 8.3	- 1.7		1.8 0.7	2.2	1.7	2.5
	- 1.8	1.7	1.9 0.8	3.6	2.4	4.1
Uruquay 10.0						
1981 19.9 3.			2.9 1.7	7.1	5.7	7.9
1989 14.6 3.		2.3	2.7 1.5	5.5	4.7	5.9
Venezuela			1			!
1981 10.9 11.4	1 2.6		5.1 2.9	5.0	4.6	5.3
1986 9.5 5.	1 2.6 5 5.0		3.6 2.3	4.2	3.8	4.5
1990 9.6 3.	1 2.6 5 5.0 1 3.5	2.4	2.6 1.4	4.3	4.0	4.5

a/ Incomes are expressed in terms of per capita poverty lines.

b/ Refers to establishments employing up to 5 persons (up to 4 persons in the cases of Panama and Venezuela).

d Values for samples that are not statistically significant.

d/ Includes persons employed in the agricultural, forestry, hunting and fisheries sectors.

e/ Refers to own-account and unpaid family workers engaged in non-professional, non-technical occupations.

f/ Wage-earners lacking an employment contract are included under the heading "Microenterprise".

Table 16
LATIN AMERICA (10 COUNTRIES): AVERAGE INCOMES, YEARS OF SCHOOLING AND INCIDENCE OF POVERTY AMONG PUBLIC-SECTOR WAGE-EARNERS, 1980-1990

		7/		1	980-1990		,		
				Р	ublic-sector w	age-eamers a/			
				Total			In civil serv	rice	
		Employed EAP (%)	Average income b/	Incidence of poverty c/	Average years of schooling	No. of profes. and technicians per 1,000 empl.	Employed EAP	Average income	Incidence of poverty
Argentin					- Controlling	per 1,000 empl.	(%)	b/	c/
	Bs. Aires)					]			
,	1980		_	_					
	1986	_			[	-	3.2	8.3	2.2
	1990		_			•	3.8	7.5	0.9
Brazil				<u> </u>	•	-	5.5	6.3	15.8
	1979	_		_	11.5				
	1987	_	_		11.5	-	5.2	7.3	16.1
	1990	_	_		10.6	-	6.1	6.3	19.7
Colombia			_		12.6	-	6.3	6.3	25.5
(8 major				Ì					
	1980	10.6	4.8	15.9	14.0	349	3.6	4.8	101
	1986	10.6	5.1	14.9		-	3.7	5.1	19.1 15.4
	1990	10.4	5.1	15.3	14.8	375	3.6	4.9	16.1
Costa Ri	ca					0.0	0.0	4.5	10.1
	1981	29.9	8.9	4.8	13.5	375	7.0	8.5	5.9
	1988	26.8	6.8	6.7			7.7	6.1	5.9
	1990	25.0	7.3	6.3	14.3	388	6.1	7.1	7.0
Guatema	ıla.					333	0.1	7.1	7.0
	1986	13.8	4.6	21.4		413	4.9	4.1	27.9
	1989	14.7	4.8	20.2	13.1	401	5.2	4.0	32.1
Mexico							J	4.0	JE.1
	1987	-	-	•	-	-	7.3	4.1	27.1
	1990	-	-	-	-	-	6.0	3.5	27.8
Panama								0.0	27.0
	1979	31.1	6.0	15.4	14.1	305	9.3	5.7	18.8
	1986	27.8	7.1	9.7			8.4	6.2	11.5
	1989	29.3	7.4	9.7	15.2	334	7.6	5.9	11.3
Paraguay	<u>/</u>								
(Asunciór	1986	12.6	20	00.0					
	1990	12.6 12.9	3.3 3.4	22.0 22.7	- 14.2	294	6.5	3.8	28.0
Uruguay			5.7	££.1	14.4	326	6.8	3.2	29.5
*****************	1981	23.7	5.0	5.5	13.3	228	100	E 0	
	1989	21.5	4.1	8.3	14.0	ı	12.2	5.3	6.9
Venezuel	н			0.0	14.0	228	14.2	4.2	10.1
	1981	24.8	8.8	6.7	8.9	300	70		
	1986	21.7	5.9	11.8	0.3	328	7.8	8.4	8.6
	1990	22.5	3.9	19.9	10.7	410	7.1	5.6	14.3
		tictics and E		10.0	10.7	413	6.9	3.7	23.0

a/ Includes employees in government service, employees of public services (health, education, social security, etc.) and wage-earners employed in State enterprises.

b/ Average income is expressed in terms of the per capita poverty line.

c/ Number of employed persons residing in poor households as a percentage of the total number of employed persons in each category.

Table 17 LATIN AMERICA: CHANGES IN HOUSEHOLD INCOME LEVELS AND DISTRIBUTION

ith •			70	Jes)	ı	,		72	75	74		,	,	,		99	98	65
nolds w iverage			Rural	(Percentages)	· · · · ·				-									-
Households with below-average	income		Urban	Pel	99	74		74	9/	75		75	72	73		8	88	65
come 0%	of	come 40%	Rural		•	•		8.4	11.5	10.5		1	ı	•		6.0	6.2	5.6
Average income of richest 10%	as multiple of	average income of poorest 40%	Urban		6.7	8.5		13.3	18.2	17.3		15.0	10.9	10.2		4.9	6.4	5.5
hare			Rural		ı	•		34.7	40.0	38.0		,	1	1		•	•	,
Income share of richest	10%		Urban		29.8	34.5		39.1	44.3	41.7		41.3	35.3	34.9		23.2	27.6	24.6
hare t			Rural	(Percentages)	1	f.		16.6	13.9	14.4		•	,	•		17.2	17.0	17.6
Income share of poorest	40%		Urban	(Perc	18.0	16.2		11.7	9.7	9.6		11.0	13.0	13.7		18.9	17.2	17.8
	hare		Rural		-	1		8.1	9.9	7.1		1	,	•		7.9	7.8	7.8
Poorest quartile's	income share	ζ	Urban		9.3	8.8		5.6	4.4	4.5		4.9	5.7	9.9		9.5	8.3	8.2
icient			Rural		1	•		0.407	0.472	0.458		1	1	1		0.355	0.358	0.351
Gini coefficient b/			Urban		0.365	0.406		0.493	0.543	0.535		0.518	0.455	0.450		0.328	0.364	0.345
ouse-			Rural		•	•		1.30	1.50	1.60		ı		١.		2.50	2.30	2.30
Average house- hold income	a/		Urban		4.56	4.30		3.21	3.43	3.16		2.05	2.36	2.59		2.95	2.57	2.56
Countries			Years	ARGENTINA	(Greater Bs. Aires) 1980	1986	BRAZIL	1979	1987	1990	COLOMBIA (8 major cities)	1980	1986	1990	COSTA RICA	1981	1988	1990

(Percentages) Households with 67 76 73 Rural 69 69 68 below-average 1 1 1 income Urban 72 74 76 67 73 73 2 2 8 99 69 10.7 9.7 4.0 6.7 Rural Average income average income of poorest 40% of richest 10% as multiple of 8.9 11.3 13.4 7.5 9.3 10.9 Urban 7.1 7.8 6.6 7.2 6.8 20.5 29.2 23.8 Rural Income share of richest 33.2 38.7 41.1 33.0 31.2 32.4 31.2 Urban 29.1 36.2 21.8 28.9 28.4 10% (Percentages) 13.6 17.8 15.0 20.5 17.6 Rural 19.8 Income share of poorest Urban 14.9 13.6 40% 15.5 14.2 13.2 17.7 17.3 18.9 20.2 16.3 16.8 9.5 6.8 10.1 9.0 Rural ncome share quartile's Poorest Urban 9.3 8.7 10.4 7.46.76.0 10.0 6.2 6.0 8.0 8.2 ઇ 0.453 0.347 0.432 0.288 0.370 0.316 Rural Gini coefficient 0.432 0.504 0.399 0.430 0.385 0.460 0.306 0.384 0.378 Urban Þ 2.42 8 1.67 1.80 2.00 1.80 Rural Average household income 2.71 3.01 3.35 2.65 2.89 2.86 3.91 3.50 3.60 2.90 2.53 Urban a/ VENEZUELA 1987 1989 1990 1979 Countries 1986 1989 1981 1986 1986 1989 1981 URUGUAY 1990 **PANAMA** MEXICO Years

Table 17 (cont.)

Table 17 (concl.)

Countries	Average house- hold income		Gini coefficient b/		Poorest quartile's		Income share of poorest		Income share of richest	hare	Average income of richest 10%	come 0%	Household with below-average	ld with erage
	a/			4	income share	hare	40%		10%		as multiple of	of	income	
					ς/						average income of poorest 40%	come 40%		
Years	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
CHILE d							(Perc	(Percentages)					(Perce	(Percentages)
1978	2.58	•	ı	,	6.9	,	14.5	,	30.1	ı	8.3	,	ı	ı
1988	2.82	ı	ı	1	5.7	ı	12.6	•	33.4	1	10.6	ı	ı	ı
CHILE e/	<u>.</u>									· · · · · ·				
1987	2.45	1.70	0.459	0.344	6.8	10.7	13.9	20.0	37.2	31.2	10.7	6.2	73	74
1990	2.46	2.50	0.450	0.454	7.0	7.1	14.3	14.8	37.2	40.6	10.4	11.0	73	11
GUATEMALA														
1986	1.55	1.01	0.464	0.472	5.8	6.1	12.5	13.1	36.4	39.5	11.6	12.1	72	76
1989	1.89	1.00	0.479	0.432	5.4	6.4	12.1	14.4	37.9	35.1	12.5	9.7	73	73
PARAGUAY														
(Asuncion) 1986	1.81	ı	0.404	,	8.0	1	16.3	1	31.8	ı	7.8	1	71	ı
1990	1.92	ı	0.357	•	9.4	,	18.6	ı	28.9	•	6.2	•	89	ı
BOLIVIA (17 Urb. Cent.)														
1989	1.76	ı	0.482		5.3	ı	,	·	•	•	12.4	1	72	t
HONDIBAS														
1990	1.27	0.70	0.487	0.465	5.4	6.1	12.2	13.1	ı	1	12.8	11.4	73	75
Ĭ		The state of the s												

a/ Average per capita household income divided by the per capita poverty line.

b/ Calculated on the basis of per capita household income distribution by deciles.

c/ Percentage of total income received by the 25% of all households having the lowest incomes.

d/ Estimates for Greater Santiago based on measurements of household consumption expenditure made as part of household budget surveys conducted

in 1988 and 1990.

e/ Calculations based on 1987 and 1990 CASEN survey data.

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Table 18
LATIN AMERICA (10 COUNTRIES): VARIATIONS IN AVERAGE INCOMES OF URBAN HOUSEHOLDS, BY PERCENTILE HOUSEHOLD GROUPS
(Percentages)

	Total	Quartile 1	Poorest	Ouartile 2	Quartile 3	Ouartile 4	Richest
		(poorest 25%)	40%	Ì	*		10%
Argentina							
(Greater Bs. Aires)							
1980 - 86	-6	-11	-15	-15	-13	2	9
Brazil							
1979 - 87	7	-16	-11	-6	-2	14	21
1987 - 90	-8	-5	-9	-11	-3	-9	-13
1979 - 90	-2	-20	-19	-17	-6	4	5
Colombia							
(8 major cities) 1980 - 86	15	35	36	43	36	2	
1986 - 90	10	25	16	43 7	30 4	3 11	-2 0
1980 - 90	26	69	57	53	42	14	9 7
Costa Rica	20	0)	57	] 33	72	17	. '
1981 - 86	-13	-23	-21	-18	-16	-7	4
1988 - 90	-0	-2	3	7	8	-6	-11
1981 - 90	-13	-25	-18	-12	-10	-12	-8
Chile							,
1978 - 88	9	-10	-5	0	1	18	21
Guatemala							
1986 - 89	22	15	18	13	23	24	27
Mexico					_		
1987 - 89	11	-0.3	1.4	3	-1	19	29
1989 - 90	11	-0.2	0.7	3	4	16	18
1987 - 90	24	-0.5	2.0	6	3	39	53
Panama 1979 - 86	9	-3	Λ1	2	5	1.4	24
1986 - 89	-1	-3 -4	-0.1 -8	3 -9	5 -11	14 6	24 9
1979 - 89	8	- <del>7</del>	-8	-6	-6	21	34
Paraguay	Ü	,	Ü	Ü	Ů		34
(Asunción)							
1986 - 90	6	25	21	18	14	-3	-4
Uruguay			-				
1981 - 86	-13	-17	-17	-16	-13	-12	-10
1986 - 89	6	24	18	8	4	3	2
1981 - 89	-8	3	-2	-10	-10	-9	-8
Venezuela	4.0	60			_	_	
1981 - 86	-13	-30	-30	-25	-21	1	16
1986 - 90	-14 25	-12	-11	-12	-13	-15	-15
1981 - 90	-25	-38	-37	-34	-31	-14	-2

Source: ECLAC, Statistics and Economic Projections Division, on the basis of information from household surveys conducted by the countries. The data regarding Chile are estimates based on household budget surveys taken in 1978 and 1988.

Table 19
LATIN AMERICA (5 COUNTRIES): VARIATIONS IN AVERAGE INCOMES
OF RURAL HOUSEHOLDS, BY PERCENTILE HOUSEHOLD GROUPS
(Percentages)

	Total	Quartile 1 (poorest 25%)	Poorest 40%	Quartile 2	Quartile 3	Quartile 4	Richest 10%
Brazil							
1979 - 87	15	-6	-3	-2	3	29	33
1987 - 90	7	15	11	4	10	5	.1
1979 - 90	23	8	7	2	14	36	35
Costa Rica							
1981 - 86	-8	-9	-9	-10	-8	-7	-5
1988 - 90	0	0	4	4	-0	-1	-7
1981 - 90	-8	-9	-6	-6	-8	-8	-12
Chile							
1987 - 90	47	-2	9	22	30	74	91
Guatemala							
1986 - 89	. 0	5	10	16	8	-7	-11
Venezuela							i
1981 - 86	-10	-21	-23	-25	-17	3	28
1986 - 90	0	12	12	16	7	-10	-18
1981 - 90	-10	-11	-13	-13	-11	-8	4

Source: ECLAC, Statistics and Economic Projections Division, on the basis of information from household surveys conducted by the countries. The data regarding Chile are estimates based on household budget surveys taken in 1978 and 1988.

Table 20

LATIN AMERICA: CHANGES IN THE EXTENT OF POVERTY, 1970 - 1990

Years		Poverty a/		Extreme	poverty b/	
	TOTAL	URBAN	RURAL	TOTAL	URBAN	RURAL
			(Perce	entages)		
1970	45	29	67	24	13	40
1980	41	30	60	19	11	33
1986	43	36	60	21	14	36
1990 c/	46	39	61	22	15	37
		·	(Thousand	ds of persor	1 <b>S</b> )	
1970	119800	44200	75600	63700	19900	43800
1980	135900	62900	73000	62400	22500	39900
1986	170200	94400	75800	81400	35800	45600
1990 c/	195900	115500	80400	93500	44900	48600

Source: ECLAC, Statistics and Economic Projections Division.

a/ Persons having incomes below the poverty line (about US\$ 60 per month per person). Includes that portion of the population living in extreme poverty.

b/ Persons having incomes below the indigence line (about US\$ 30 per month per person).

c/ Preliminary estimates for 19 countries in the region.

Table 21	
LATIN AMERICA (14 COUNTRIES): DISTRIBUTION OF POOR AND INDIGENT HOUSEHOLDS, BY U AND RURAL AREAS	RBAN

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	Percentage of urban		age of house poor or ind		ssified as	Structure	e of pover	y and ind	igence
Countries	population	<b></b>	Urban		Rural	† F	overty	Indig	ence
		Poor	Indigent	Poor	Indigent	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
ARGENTINA							l		
(Greater Bs. Aires)									
1980	83	7	2	16	4	68	32	69	31
1986	84	12	3	17	6	80	20	75	25
1990 a/	85	25	7	-	-		-	-	_
BOLIVIA									
1989	50	50	22	-	-	-	-	-	-
BRAZIL .									
1979	70	30	10	62	35	53	47	39	61
1987	76	34	13	60	34	64	36	55	45
1990	76	39	16	56	31	69	31	63	37
COLOMBIA	an.	3.	12		22		2.		4.5
1980	70	36	13	45	22	64	36	58	42
1986 1990	70	36 35	15 12	42	22	67	33	62	38
COSTA RICA	-	33	12	•	-	-	-	•	-
1981	50	16	5	28	8	36	64	42	58
1988	46	21	6	28	10	39	61	32	58 68
1990	46	22	7	25	12	43	57	33	67
CHILE	40		,		12	43	31	33	07
1987	82	37	13	45	16	79	21	79	21
1990	81	34	11	36	15	80	20	76	24
GUATEMALA								,,	
1980	36	41	13	79	44	22	78	14	86
1986	37	54	28	75	53	30	70	23	77
1989	38	48	23	72	45	29	71	24	76
HONDURAS									
1988	35	53	28	81	64	26	74	19	81
1990	44	65	38	84	66	38	62	31	69
MEXICO									
1984	63	28	7	45	20	53	47	39	61
1989	62	34	9	49	23	62	38	62	38
PANAMA			- 4						
1979	58	31	14	45	27	49	51	41	59
1986 1989	69 70	30 34	13 15	43 48	22 25	60	40	36	64
PARAGUAY	/0	34	13	40	25	62	38	58	42
(Asunción)									
1986		46	16	_	_	_			
1989		34	10	_			-	_	-
1990	_	37	10			1 -	-	_	_
PERU		"	20						_
1980	64	35	10	65	38	49	51	32	68
1986	62	45	16	64	39	53	47	40	60
URUGUAY							·	. <u>-</u>	- *
1981	89	9	2	21	7	77	23	71	29
1986	89	14	3	23	8	83	17	72	28
1989	-	10	2	23	8		•	-	
VENEZUELA									
1981	76	18	5	35	15	62	38	53	47
1986	80	25	8	34	14	75	25	70	30
1990	84	33	11	38	17	82	18	78	22

Source: ECLAC, Statistics and Economic Projections Division.

a/ Preliminary estimates based on the Permanent Household Survey of October 1990. b/ Preliminary estimates based on the National Urban Employment Survey conducted in the third quarter of 1990.

LATIN AMERICA (13 COUNTRIES): CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN POVERTY AROUND 1990

	Incidence of	e of:	Ratio bet M and w	Patio between avarage incom (Y) and values of PL (poverty	e income coverty fact	Measurements of poor poor poor poor poor poor poor p		Composit	ition of h	Composition of household income necessitates	incom dest	ie Donoione		Household with access	Household with 3 or	shold of		-louseholds with 4 or	Educational environmen	yrai nerit
				II BLANCE II KINGENSE III	D =	Ciency		wanes		215		2 5 5		water (%)	perro	per room (%)		pe/old	O-3 vears (Percentanes)	ars Panes)
	India.	Povertv (%)	Total Y PI	Y india.	¥ noor Pi	1 <i>al</i>	Mb/	Poor	Total P	Poor Ti	Total Pc	Poor Total	Ital Poor	r Total	I Poor	Total	Poor	Total	Poor	Total
Ardentina d/ 1990 (G. B. A.)		25.0																		
Bolivia 1989	22.	49.6	1.74	0.53	0.52	48.1	13.7	4	45	<u></u> ਲ	<del></del>	21	12 5	50 42	8	20	47	23	40	8
Brazil 1990	16.4	38.5	3.16	0.62	0.56	44.0	5.3	22	25	19		21 1	17 6	67 83	6	9	श्र	21	2	£
Colombia 1990	11.9	34.6	2.59	0.62	09:0	40.4	5.4	55	84	8	24	6		93 97	14	9	98	21	æ	79 79
Costa Rica 1990	6.9	22.2	2.56	0.37	0.59	41.1	3.6	20	8	53	8	-	4	1	1	•	31	15	89	श
Chile 1990	10.8	34.2	2.46	0.61	0.61	39.1	5.4	48	20	16	17	6	13 7	7 8	<u>ი</u>	4	27	15	88	8
Guatemala 1989	22.9	48.2	1.86	0.57	0.47	52.7	14.2	88	83	8	<del></del>	7	9	47 58	58	16	8	20	æ	55
Honduras 1990	38.0	64.5	1.27	0.57	0.46	54.0	27.5	83	22	8		9	6	24 36	- 39	8	27	83	29	47
Mexico 1989	10.0	30.0	3.01	0.76	99.0	25.	3.4	- 62	88	<u></u> О	24	7	6	-	-	'	ස	19	æ	88
Panama 1989	14.8	34.0	2.85	09:0	0.55	45.1	5.3	8	51	- 8	18	28 2	ឌ	•	•		35	19	4	24
Paraguay 1990	10.4	36.8	1.92	0.72	0.63	36.7	2.0	28	22	83		=	ი -	30	8	∞	ន	14	8	83
Unanav 1989	2.0	10.0	3.62	0.76	0.72	27.8	0.8	29	න	2	<del>2</del>	27 2	22	75 92	83	9	27	9	ස	83
Venezuela 1990	10.9	33.4	2.18	990	29.0	38.4	5.8	꼬	-22	12	78	24 11	_	95   97	35	14	45	33	42	8

Source: ECLAC, Statistics and Economic Projections Division, on the basis of special tabulations of national household survey data.

a/I = Insufficiency of poor population's per capita income (I=q(z-m)/qz), where z= income corresponding to the poverty line, q = number of poor households, and m = average income of poor households. By the income divided by total income (M=q(z-m)/nm²), where m² = total average income. C/Percentage of pourseholds in which the adult members' average number of years of schooling is between 0 and 3 years. C/Percentage of households in which the adult members' average number of years of schooling is between 0 and 3 years.

Table 23

LATIN AMERICA (12 COUNTRIES): COVERAGE OF RETIREMENT AND OTHER PENSIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF PENSION INCOME, BY POVERTY LEVEL, IN URBAN SECTORS

		Percentage	Incidence	Incidence	Incidence							
		ō	of	ō	of of	INDE	INDEX OF PENSION COVERAGE	<b>₹ COVERAGE</b>		Percen	Percentage of income from	Lou
		retiree	poverty	poverty	poverty	<u>გ</u>	OF HEADS OF HOUSEHOLD b/	USEHOLD b/		retirem	retirement and other pensions	ensions
		and ben-	in house-	in house-	among all							
		sioner heads	holds headed	holds headed	urban							
		of house-	by pensioners	by persons	house-	All house-	Indigent	Poor	Non-poor	₹	Indigent	Poor
		hold	or retirees	aged 60	holds	holds	households	households households	households	households households	households	households
			a/	or over								
							(Percentages)	des)				
BOLIVIA	1989	,	ı	56	22	•	•	ı	,	12	49	21
BRAZIL	1990	13	43	43	99	29	72	89	8	17	52	2
COLOMBIA	1990	9	41	24	32	35	ω	6	4	Ξ	œ	6
COSTA RICA	1990	72	49	59	22	22	4	37	83	4	40	83
CHILE	1990	14	20	22	8	09	40	29	61	13	7	o
GUATEMALA	1989	က	14	43	48	16	-	5	52	6	æ	7
MS.	1990	က	90	. 67	65	16	Ŋ	7	g	6	12	10
MEXICO	1989	5	<b>o</b>	19	8	53	16	15	8	တ	9	7
PANAMA	1989	<del>7</del>	4	90	뚕	22	18	53	62	83	35	78
PARAGUAY	1990	^	32	49	37	90	20	27	8	<b>o</b>	16	=
URUGUAY	1989	8	6	7	10	80	50	88	78	83	ಜ	27
VENEZUELA	1990		ŧ	37	33	-	1	•	1	11	46	24

Source: ECLAC, Statistics and Economic Projections Division, on the basis of special tabulations of household survey data.

al includes all retirees and pensioners who are heads of household, regardless of their age.

b/ Number of heads of household who receive retirement and/or other pensions as a percentage of all heads of household aged 60 or over.

Table 24
LATIN AMERICA (11 COUNTRIES): DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS BY PER CAPITA

			S N	ME BRACK	ET IN TE	INCOME BRACKET IN TERMS OF THE POVERTY LINE	OVERTY LI	빌			
Per capita income					URBAN	URBAN AREAS					
brackets expressed	BOLIVIA B	BRAZIL C	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CHILE	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	URUGUAY VENEZUELA	/ENEZUELA
in terms of the	1989	1990	1990	1990	1990	1989	1990	1989	1990	1989	1990
poverty line											
(Indigent) 0-0.5	22.1	16.4	11.9	7.3	10.8	1	38.0	14.8	10.4	1.5	10.9
0.5-0.9	23.5	18.1	18.7	11.2	19.0	21.0	22.7	15.7	21.7	6.4	17.5
0.9-1.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	3.7	4.4	4.3	3.8	3.5	4.7	2.4	5.0
(Poor).	-49,6	-38.5	-34.6	-22.2	-34.2		-64.5	-34.0	-36.8	-10.3	-33.4
1.0-1.25	9.2	7.5	9.7	7.9	10.1	8.5	8.2	8.4	13.6	6.3	10.9
1.25-2.0	16.5	15.7	1.61	21.9	20.3	17.3	12.0	17.8	19.6	22.3	21.5
2.0-3.0	10.3	9.11	13.4	20.2	14.4	11.0	6.5	14.2	14.2	22.7	14.8
over 3.0	14.4	26.7	23.2	27.9	21,1	15.0	8.8	25.6	15.9	38.4	19.4
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
						RURAL AREAS				2000	0.001
-			BRAZIL	COSTA RICA	CHILE	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	PANAMA	PANAMA VENEZUELA		
			1990	1990	1990	1989	1990	1989	1990		
(Indigent) 0-0.5			29.5	10.7	12.2	52.7	61.1	22.2	12.5		
0.5-0.9			25.5	10.8	18.9	25.4	20.1	20.1	21.6		
0.9-1.0			4.3	3.5	5.0	3.6	2.3	5.9	4.2		
(Poor)			-56.0	-25.0	-36.1	-81.7	-83.5	-48.2	-38.3		
1.0-1.25			9.2	9.5	11.2	4.9	4.3	8.2	11.1		
1.25-2.0			15.5	23.7	21.7	7.5	6.3	18.3	21.5		
2.0-3.0			9.8	19.1	13.2	2.9	2.6	11.1	14.3		
over 3.0			10,7	22.7	17.7	3.0	3.2	14.2	14.7		
			100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		

Source: ECLAC, Statistics and Economic Projections Division, on the basis of special tabulations of household survey data.

Table 25
LATIN AMERICA (12 COUNTRIES): POPULATION BETWEEN 25 AND
59 YEARS OF AGE, BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

(Percentages)

			(Percent	ages)	200000000000000000000000000000000000000		
		Urba	n areas		Aura	i areas	
		Educa	tional leve	at B	Educat	onal leve	8
Courtry Year		0-5	6 - 9	10 A +	0 - 5	6-9	104+
ARGENTINA 8	80	28.8	48.9	22.2	n/d	n/d	n/d
	86	16.8	51,9	31.3	n/d	n/d	n/d
	90	12.4	51.6	35.8	n/d	n/d	n/d
					.,	,	
BRAZIL	79	70.2	12.7	17.1	96.7	1.9	1.4
	87	53.3	18.2	28.5	86.9	7.3	5.8
	90	55.5	17.1	27.5	89.2	6.3	4.5
		55.5	17.1	27.0	00.2	0.0	4.0
COLOMBIA	80	52.4	22.3	25.3	n/d	n/d	n/đ
POLUMEIA	86	42.9	23.0	34.2	n/d n/d	n/d n/d	n/d n/d
			23.0	34.2 39.2			·
	90	37.4	∠3.4	33.2	n/d	n/d	n/d
	81	27.2	41.5	31.3	58.1	33.5	8.4
COSTA RICA							
	88	18.2	39.8	42.0	43.6	43.9	12.5
	90	16.9	40.9	42.3	40.3	45.2	14.5
		40-					40.0
CHILE	87	18.7	29.6	51.7	50.7	35.5	13.8
	90	15.7	29.5	54.7	43.8	37.5	18.8
GUATEMALA	86	52.8	26.3	21.0	92.8	5.9	1.3
	59	51.5	26.6	21.9	90.7	7.3	1.9
HONDURAS	88	40.1	30.8	29.6	83.2	13.2	3.7
	90	42.7	31.0	26.2	81.4	15.9	2.7
					١		
MEXICO	87	26.0	42.3	31.7	n/d	n/d	n/d
	89	23.4	42.8	33.8	n/d	n/d	n/d
				<b>-</b>			
PANAMA	79	18.2	47.8	34.0	57.4	36.6	6.0
	86	18.2	42.5	39.3	49.8	37.3	12.9
	翻	14.5	42.0	43.5	40.4	42.7	16.9
		- · -			l		
PARAGUAY	86	21.6	37.5	40.9	n/d	n/d	n/d
	90	16.9	40.5	42.7	n/d	n/d	n/d
URUGUAY	81	26.6	46.4	27.0	n/d	n/d	n/d
	89	17.6	47.5	34.9	n/d	n/d	n/d
VENEZUELA	81	30.0	49.4	20.6	73.5	22.8	3.8
	86	23.6	48.8	27.3	66.0	28.5	5.5
	90	19.4	48.3	32.3	61.0	32.4	6.6
					L		

Source: ECLAC, Social Development Division, on the basis of household surveys conducted by the corresponding countries.

a/ The categories of educational levels used here were elementary school uncompleted, elementary school completed/secondary school uncompleted, and second school completed and over, rather than 0-5, 6-9 and 10 and over. The survey data refer to Greater Buenos Aires only.

n.d. = no data available.

Table 26
LATIN AMERICA (11 COUNTRIES): AVERAGE YEARS OF SCHOOLING
COMPLETED BY NON-INDEPENDENT YOUNG PEOPLE AGED 15 TO 24,
BY HOUSEHOLD INCOME QUARTILE

		UA	BAN A	REAS		RI	JRAL A	AREAS	ľ
Country	Year	TOTAL	Q1	Q4	Differ. (Q4-Q1)	TOTAL	Q1	Q4	Differ. (Q4-Q1
BRAZIL	79	6.2	4.3	8.9	4.6	2.9	1.9	4.6	2.7
	87	7.0	5.1	9.3	4.2	4.1	3.1	5.5	2.4
	90	6.6	4.7	9.4	4.7	3.7	2.7	5.4	2.7
COLOMBIA	80	7.9	6.6	10.1	3.5	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	86	8.4	7.2	10.3	3.1	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	90	8.8	7.2	10.8	3.6	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
COSTA RICA	88	8.9	7.6	10.3	2.7	6.8	6.4	7.4	1.0
	90	8.7	7.3	10.7	3.4	6.6	5.8	7.6	1.8
CHILE	87	10.0	8.7	11.2	2.5	7.4	6.9	0.4	4 5
	90	10.2	9.1	11.4	2.3	7. <del>4</del> 7.9	7.4	8.4 8.8	1.5 1.4
GUATEMALA	86	7.0	5.0	9.6	4.6	2.8	20	4.4	0.4
	89	7.1	5.5	9.2	3.7	3.1	2.0 2.2	4.1 4.7	2.1 2.5
HONDURAS	88	7.6	6.4	9.7	3.3	4.1	3.3	5.7	0.4
	90	7.0	5.8	8.6	2.8	4.1	3.5	5. <i>7</i> 5.2	2.4 1.7
MEXICO	87	9.4	8.8	10.2	1.4	n/d	<i>l</i> .al	/-I	4.1
	89	9.4	9.0	10.2	1.2	n/d	n/d n/d	n/d n/d	n/d n/d
PANAMA	86	9.5	8.0	11.6	3.6	7.4	6.4		
	89	9.6	8.1	11.4	3.3	7. <del>4</del> 7.6	6.5	8.9 9.2	2.5 2.7
PARAGUAY	86	9.1	8.2	10.5	2.3	n/d	n/d	n/d	2/4
	90	9.6	8.8	11.0	2.2	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d n/d
URUGUAY	81	9.0	7.4	10.2	2.8	n/d	n/d	n/đ	5/-1
	89	9.0	8.1	10.5	2.4	n/d	n/d	n/a n/d	n/d n/d
VENEZUELA	81	8.1	7.4	0.4		5.0			
THEOLEM	86	8.3	7.4 7.6	9.4 9.8	2.0	5.3 5.9	4.9	6.0	1.1
	90	8.5	7.8 7.8	9.0 10.0	2.2	5.8 5.7	5.3 5.3	6.8 6.7	1.5 1.4

Table 27

LATIN AMERICA (12 COUNTRIES): NON-INDEPENDENT YOUNG PEOPLE AGED 15 TO 24 WHO ATTEND EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, BY HOUSEHOLD INCOME QUARTILE

			ntage)					
Carren V.		RBAN /	(0.0)(0.0)(0.0)			URAL /		
Country Year	TOTAL	Q1	U4	Differ.	TOTAL	Q1	Q 4	
				(Q4-Q1)				(Q4-Q1)
ARGENTINA a/	30 41.8	38.4	51.9	13.5	n/d	n/d	n/d	no fed
	53.3	50.7	67.6	16.9	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d n/d
		••••	00	10.0	1.00	11/4	IVu	1Vu
BRAZIL	79 50.7	42.7	70.0	27.3	23.8	26.0	26.4	0.4
	37 44.6	39.5	60.3	20.8	22.8	27.1	24.7	-2.4
	0 44.8	36.5	64.7	28.2	24.0	25.2	28.6	3.4
COLONOW .		40.0			l			
	54.5	49.3	71.6	22.3	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	6 51.3 0 53.1	46.0 45.7	62.5 71.1	16.5 25.4	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	33.1	40.7	/ 1.1	40.4	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
COSTA RICA	8 47.7	41.2	58.6	17.4	20.8	22.7	23.4	0.7
9	0 51.4	44.1	67.1	23.0	21.4	20.8	26.8	6.0
							20.0	0.0
	7 49.2	46.0	59.1	13.1	23.3	27.1	20.7	-6.4
ç	0 50.3	50.0	60.1	10.1	25.4	26.8	26.2	-0.6
Oliverna and a								
	6 30.5	22.1	44.8	22.7	8.0	7.3	11.9	4.6
C	9 29.4	26.9	36.7	9.8	7.7	5.0	13.0	8.0
HONDURAS 8	8 47.8	40.6	69.4	28.8	14.3	10.7	20.7	10.0
	0 42.1	34.4	59.5	25.1	12.1	11.1	15.6	4.5
							10.0	7.3
MEXICO 8	7 43.4	50.8	41.8	-9.0	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
8	9 44.4	52.6	44.0	-8.6	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
541141444								
PANAMA b/ 7	XXXXII	47.9	38.5	-9.4	30.1	27.3	29.7	2.4
8	00000	37.8 37.4	60.6	22.8	28.3	26.3	36.9	10.6
0	43.2	37.4	52.2	14.8	26.2	20.9	34.4	13.5
PARAGUAY b/ 8	6 34.1	32.4	38.0	5.6	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
9	98339	23.7	41.7	18.0	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
URUGUAY 8		26.8	53.7	26.9	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
8	46.8	39.3	60.5	21.2	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
VENEZUELA O		F0 0	ro					
VENEZUELA 8	888	52.3	53.2	0.9	29.0	35.9	23.2	-12.7
8	3000	47.2 47.9	53.2 57.5	6.0 9.6	24.9 24.1	25.2 28.5	26.3	1.1
5	70.2	71.3	J7.J	J.U	<b>24.</b> I	∠0.3	24.0	-4.5

a/ This information refers to Greater Buenos Aires only.

b/ Includes young people who study but who said that work was their principal activity. n.d. = no data available.

Table 28
LATIN AMERICA (10 COUNTRIES): CHILDREN AGED 7 TO 14 WHO ARE BEHIND IN THEIR STUDIES, BY HOUSEHOLD INCOME QUARTILE (Percentages)

		URBAN	AREA	S	R	URAL	AREAS	
Country Year	тот	AL Q1	Q4	Differ. (Q1-Q4		L Q1	Q 4	Differ. (Q1-Q4)
				(01-04	1			(01-04)
BRAZIL	79 42.	6 53.2	19.8	33.4	62.3	65.8	46.3	19.5
	37 34. 30 31.		12.2 9.1	35.9 36.0	56.4 52.2	64.2 59.4	36.2 32.5	28.0 26.9
	30 45. 36 32.			32.0 22.9	n/d n/d	n/d n/d	n/d n/d	n/đ n/d
	O 24.			21.2	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	23.		10.3	23.4	46.5	53.4	30.6	22.8
	38 19. 30 21.			21.0 23.5	36.3 36.5	41.1 45.4	25.4 19.8	15.7 25.6
CHILE (	37 11.9	9 18.0	4.7	13.3	24.3	28.7	15.3	13.4
	13.0	6 19.0	7.2	11.8	23.4	26.3	15.7	10.6
	36 34.			33.5	75.7	82.0	57.3	24.7
	36.	3 50.4	13.6	36.8	75.3	83.1	58.4	24.7
	19.		5.8	21.8	38.7	45.7	22.3	23.4
	00 22.3	3 27.1	7.1	20.0	43.2	50.3	32.2	18.1
	20.9		15.6	7.4	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	0 21.	3 23.5	16.2	7.3	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	6 20.3 0 13.3		11.3 9.8	12.8 8.7	n/d n/d	n/d n/d	n/d	n/d
	13.	1 10,3	9.0	0.7	iva	n/a	n/d	n/d
	1 15.9 9 14.9		5.5 3.6	18.0 17.0	n/d n/d	n/d n/d	n/d n/d	n/d n/d
				17.0	II/U	IVU	IVG	iva
	8 18.9 6 17.3		8.5 6.6	15.3 16.6	45.5 41.2	52.2 46.5	32.5 25.6	19.7 20.9
	0 22.6		9.7	20.6	50.6	56.5	33.8	20.9 22.7

a/ Includes children aged 12 to 14 in 1981 only.

b/ Includes children aged 10 to 14.

c/ Includes children aged 12 to 14.

d/ Includes children aged 10 to 14. Due to the fact that the school-entry age was lowered to 6 years of age in 1986, the calculation of repeater rates in 1990 was based on that entry age and corrections were later made to adjust for the cohorts aged 11, 12, 13 and 14 who began school at age 7.
 n.d. = no data available.

Table 29
LATIN AMERICA (9 COUNTRIES): CHILDREN AGED 7 TO 14 WHO ARE BEHIND IN THEIR STUDIES,
BY POVERTY LEVEL AND HOUSEHOLD EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
(Percentages, most recent year available)

			Urban	areas			Rura	il areas	
Country Year	Educat. environ- ment	TOTAL	Poor Indi- gent	Non-indi- gent	Non poor	TOTAL	Pool Indi- gent	Non-indi- gent	Non poor
BRAZIL 1990	0-5.99 6-9.99 10 & +	41.5 19.2 6.2	51.2 30.3 	41.1 23.6 	30.4 15.8 5.7	54.6 20.3 	59.4  	54.4  	45.4 18.4
COLOMBIA 1990	0-5,99	36.8	41.4	36.2	31.1	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	6-9,99	20.8	27.1	21.4	18.3	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	10 & +	10.1	17.6	11.1	9.7	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
COSTA RICA 1990	0-5.99 6-9.99 10 & +	41.6 21.1 6.4	45.7 37.5 0.0	43.2 20.2 6.5	38.1 19.8 6.5	47.9 24.1 7.8	52.8 37.2	49.5 26.3 	45.2 21.7 6.3
CHILE 1990	0-5.99	27.8	36.0	22.8	24.5	34.0	37.2	35.0	30.5
	6-9.99	14.7	20.2	14.9	11.1	13.8	13.0	13.6	14.5
	10 & +	6.3	8.8	7.2	5.7	5.6	0.2	6.7	6.3
GUATEMALA a/ 1989	0-5,99	49.5	57.0	49.8	37.3	77.7	82.0	76.6	65.7
	6-9,99	17.2	21.1	23.7	12.6	16.9	21.2	15.7	15.7
	10 & +	5.7			5.6	19.4			20.2
HONDURAS 1990	0-5.99	31.2	32.1	31.7	19.3	44.9	46.5	40.7	33.7
	6-9.99	12.9	12.1	16.1	9.8	21.9	24.7	19.6	18.8
	10 & +	4.7	11.4	2.6	4.2	4.4			1.3
PARAGUAY b/ 1990	0-5.99	30.2	34.9	26.5	24.6	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	6-9.99	10.9	8.1	13.3	8.7	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	10 & +	4.9		0.0	6.4	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
URUGUAY 1989	0-5.99 6-9.99 10 & +	29.0 13.3 2.4	37.2 25.1	27.8 20.8 3.8	26.1 8.9 2.3	n/d n/d n/d	n/d n/d n/d	n/d n/d n/d	n/d n/d n/d
VENEZUELA a/ 1990	0-5,99	39.3	42.3	41.7	34.1	57.3	59.4	59.4	54.3
	6-9,99	16.6	23.1	17.7	14.1	25.8	32.0	30.9	21.9
	10 & +	6.1	7.3	8.3	5.6	8.4			5.7

a/ Includes children aged 10 to 14.

b/ Includes children aged 12 to 14.

n.d. = no data available.

<sup>-.- =</sup> available information is not statistically significant.

Table 30

LATIN AMERICA (10 COUNTRIES): NON-INDEPENDENT YOUNG PEOPLE AGED 15 TO 24 WHO ATTEND EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, BY POVERTY LEVEL AND HOUSEHOLD EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT (Percentages, most recent year available)

			Urbar	areas			Rural	areas	
Country Year	Educat. environ.	TOTAL	Poor Indi- gent	Non- indigent	Non poor	TOTAL	Poo Indi- gent	r Non- indigent	Non poor
BRAZIL 1990	0-5.99	37.3	35.1	34.4	40.0	22.6	24.1	21.2	22.2
	6-9.99	58.1	51.7	51.6	59.8	48.4	-,-	-,-	48.2
	10 & +	74.8			75.2	-,-			-,-
COLOMBIA 1990	0-5.99	42.5	38.9	42.7	43.6	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	6-9.99	53.9	54.3	56.8	53.0	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	10 & +	73.7	80.9	64.2	74.4	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
COSTA RICA 1990	0-5.99	27.8	29.3	26.2	28.2	15.5	17.6	17.1	14.9
	6-9.99	53.8	71.2	55.6	52.4	32.6	27.3	48.5	31.5
	10 & +	79.0	70.2	82.5	79.1	60.1		-,-	60.8
CHILE 1990	0-5.99	36.9	37.6	39.9	34.0	19.6	18.4	25.2	17.5
	6-9.99	47.4	52.9	52.9	43.3	35.7	45.9	38.8	32.7
	10 & +	64.0	55.8	65.8	64.4	52.3	62.8	63.8	49.5
<b>GUATEMALA 1989</b>	0-5.99	22.0	22.1	19.2	24.1	7.0	6.2	5.9	9.8
	6-9.99	40.8	44.0	44.0	39.5	31.4			31.3
	10 & +	53.8			51.4	48.5			52.8
HONDURAS 1990	0-5.99	29.7	27.5	32.0	32.1	10.6	9.8	12.3	13.3
All the second second	6-9.99	49.7	45.5	44.0	57.2	35.8	33.7	34.3	38.8
	10 & +	79.2	77.2	76.7	79.7	51.8	-,-		44.0
PANAMA 1989	0-5.99	28.1	21.7	34.7	28.3	18.8	16.7	17.8	22.1
	6-9.99	44.0	47.7	43.5	43.3	34.2	36.2	41.9	30.9
	10 & +	54.2	45.0	48.0	55.1	55.0			53.4
PARAGUAY 1990		11.9	19.9	13.5	6.4	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	6-9.99	23.8	29.9	17.9	27.5	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	10 & +	45.9	49.1	38.7	47.0	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
URUGUAY 1990		29.5	24.6	27.5	31.0	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	6-9.99	46.3	31.3	42.6	47.6	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	10 & +	23.2	10.1	20.6	23.5	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
VENEZUELA 1990		34.0	41.3	34.1	31.4	20.4	29.2	23.3	16.7
	6-9.99	50.9	60.7	55.8	47.8	42.5	35.3	51.8	41.9
	10 & +	74.3	83.0	77.5	73.3	57.5		54.8	57.2

n.d. = no data available.

<sup>-.- =</sup> available information is not statistically significant.

Table 31 LATIN AMERICA (10 COUNTRIES): CHILDREN AGED 7 TO 14 WHO ARE BEHIND IN THEIR STUDIES, BY HOUSEHOLD INCOME QUARTILE AND EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT (Percentages, most recent year available)

		Ui	rban ar	eas		Ri	ıral are	as	
Country Year	Educational environment	TOTAL	Q1	Q 4	Differ. (Q1-Q4)	TOTAL	Q 4	Q4	Differ. (Q1-Q4)
BRAZIL 1990	0-5.99	41.5	47.9	19.3	28.6	54.6	59.7	38.5	21.2
	5-9.99	19.2	28.2	13.9	14.3	20.3	-,-	18.7	0.0
	10 & +	6.2	-,-	4.7	0.0		-,-	-,-	0.0
COLOMBIA 1990	0-5.99	36.8	39.0	29.6	9.4	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	6-9.99	20.8	24.9	15.3	9.6	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	10 & +	10.1	13.7	9.0	4.7	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
COSTA RICA 1990	0-5.99	41.6	42.8	28.7	14.1	47.9	51.2	38.9	12.3
	6-9.99	21.1	24.5	12.8	11.7	24.1	30.5	17.3	13.2
	10 & +	6.4	5.9	6.2	-0.3	7.8	33.7	4.1	29.6
CHILE 1990	0-5.99	27.8	30.2	16.1	14.1	34.0	36.2	36.9	-0.7
	6-9.99	14.7	17.6	9.4	8.2	13.8	13.7	12.9	0.8
	10 & +	6.3	8.4	6.5	1.9	5.6	3.4	4.7	-1.3
GUATEMALA a/ 1989	0-5.99	49.5	55.9	29.0	26.9	77.7	83.8	64.5	19.3
	6-9.99	17.2	24.0	13.8	10.2	16.9	18.0	16.7	1.3
	10 & +	5.7	15.4	3.5	11.9	19.4	-,-	20.2	0.0
HONDURAS 1990	0-5.99	31.2	32.5	17.8	14.7	44.9	50.9	36.0	14.9
	6-9.99	12.9	11.7	7.5	4.2	21.9	18.5	19.7	-1.2
	10 & +	4.7	7.3	4.2	3.1	4.4		1.3	0.0
MEXICO b/ 1989	0-5.99	37.5	33.4	41.8	-8.4	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	6-9.99	17.4	19.5	15.5	4.0	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	10 & +	6.4	6.6	6.0	0.6	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
PARAGUAY b/ 1990	0-5.99	30.2	34.0		0.0	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	6-9.99	10.9	10.0	15.3	-5.3	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	10 & +	4.9	0.0	5.7	-5.7	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
URUGUAY 1989	0-5.99	29.0	30.9	23.5	7.4	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	6-9.99	13.3	17.0	3.4	13.6	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	10 & +	2.4	2.9	1.6	1.3	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
VENEZUELA c/ 1990	0-5.99	39.3	42.7	31.4	11.3	57.3	60.1	47.5	12.6
	6-9.99	16.6	20.5	10.3	10.2	25.8	34.6	17.2	17.4
	10 & +	6.1	8.6	5.3	3.3	8.4	28.0	6.3	21.7

Source: ECLAC, Social Development Division, on the basis of household surveys conducted by the corresponding countries. a/ Includes children aged 10 to 14.

b/ Includes children aged 12 to 14.

c/ Includes children aged 10 to 14. The figures for 1990 have been corrected to adjust for the reduction of the school-entry age from 7 to 6 years of age. n.d. = no data available.

<sup>-.- =</sup> available information is not statistically significant.

Table 32

LATIN AMERICA (11 COUNTRIES): AVERAGE EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN HOUSEHOLDS CONTAINING CHILDREN AGED 0 TO 14 YEARS, BY HOUSEHOLD INCOME QUARTILE

			URBA	N ARE	AS		RURA	L ARE	AS
					Differ.				Differ.
Country Y	ear	TOTAL	<u>Q1</u>	04	(Q4-Q1)	TOTAL	<u>Q1</u>	Q 4	(04-01)
BRAZIL	79	5.0	3.4	8.4	5.0	2.8	2.3	4.1	1.7
	87	5.9	3.4	9.9	6.5	2.6	1.5	4.7	3.3
	90	6.1	3.7	10.5	6.8	2.8	1.7	5.0	3.4
COLOMBIA	80	6.2	4.8	9.2	4.4	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	86	7.1	5.7	10.0	4.4	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	90	7.9	5.9	11.8	6.0	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
COSTA RICA	81	8.9	6.8	11.7	4.9	6.1	4.8	8.4	3.6
	88	8.5	6.6	11.7	5.1	5.8	4.7	7.6	2.9
	90	8.5	6.3	12.1	5.9	6.0	4.7	8.0	3.3
CHILE	87	9.2	7.4	12.7	5.4	5.9	5.2	8.5	3.4
	90	9.3	7.8	12.5	4.7	6.4	5.6	9.3	3.6
GUATEMALA	86	4.8	2.8	8.5	5.7	1.6	1.1	2.6	1.5
	89	5.4	3.3	9.4	6.1	1.8	1.2	3.2	2.1
HONDURAS	88	6.7	4.4	10.9	6.4	2.8	2.1	4.7	2.7
	90	6.2	4.3	10.2	5.9	2.9	2.2	4.4	2.2
MEXICO	87	7.9	6.6	9.8	3.2	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	89	8.2	6.8	10.3	3.5	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
PANAMA	79	8.1	6.5	11.3	4.9	4.9	3.9	7.8	4.0
	86	8.7	6.4	13.1	6.7	5.6	4.2	9.1	4.8
	89	9.1	7.0	13.1	6.1	6.2	4.4	9.8	5.3
PARAGUAY	86	8.7	6.4	12.4	6.0	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	90	9.0	7.1	11.4	4.3	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
URUGUAY	81	7.4	6.2	10.1	3.9	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	89	8.1	6.6	10.7	4.1	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
VENEZUELA	81	8.5	7.7	10.6	2.9	7.5	7.0	8.0	1.1
	86	8.9	7.8	11.0	3.2	7.0	6.7	8.6	1.9
	90	7.9	6.2	11.0	4.9	4.2	3.4	6.1	2.6

Table 33
LATIN AMERICA (8 COUNTRIES): CHILDREN AGED 7 TO 14 WHO ARE BEHIND IN THEIR STUDIES, BY POVERTY LEVEL AND DEGREE OF OVERCROWDING IN THE HOME (Percentages, most recent year available)

			URBAI	N AREAS			RURAI	AREAS	
				DOR	NON-		Po	OOR	NON-
Country/Year Pe	ersons per edroom	TOTAL	Indi- gent	Non- indigent	POOR	TOTAL	Indi- gent	Non- indigent	POOR
BRAZIL	0-3	26.8	47.0	34.6	16.7	49.7	34.6	52.2	37.9
1990	over 3	42.4	50.6	40.9	30.7	56.2	40.9	54.8	47.9
COLOMBIA	0-3	20.4	29.7	24.1	16.3	n/d	24.1	n/d	n/d
1990	over 3	37.0	42.9	36.2	25.9	n/d	36.2	n/d	n/d
CHILE	0-3	10.7	18.9	12.5	8.1	20.7	12.5	23.1	17.3
1990	over 3	20.3	26.3	18.3	15.0	27.5	18.3	27.2	28.8
GUATEMALA	0-3	20.1	40.1	26.2	13.2	54.7	26.2	56.1	44.7
1989 a/	over 3	48.7	54.1	50.8	35.8	79.4	50.8	78.3	68.6
HONDURAS	0-3	10.8	16.0	13.1	5.5	33.3	13.1	37.7	17.2
1990	over 3	29.3	30.4	29.5	19.5	44.5	29.5	39.0	33.4
PARAGUAY	0-3	10.0	15.9	10.6	8.8	n/d	10.6	n/d	n/d
1990	over 3	21.1	32.2	17.8	8.0	n/d	17.8	n/d	n/d
URUGUAY	0-2	10.6	25.6	16.9	7.7	n/d	16.9	n/d	n/d
1989 b/	over 2	30.9	36.9	31.8	25.1	n/d	31.8	n/d	n/d
VENEZUELA	0-3	16.2	24.4	19.5	12.8	41.0	19.5	44.6	35.8
1990 a/	over 3	35.6	41.6	37.3	29.1	60.3	37.3	64.4	57.6

a/ Includes children aged 10 to 14.

b/ Number of persons per total number of rooms.

n.d. = no data available.

Table 34

## LATIN AMERICA (9 COUNTRIES): CHILDREN AGED 7 TO 14 WHO ARE BEHIND IN THEIR STUDIES, BY INCOME QUARTILE AND HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE BASED ON MEDICAL STATUS OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD

(Percentages, most recent year available)

			URB/	AN ARE	AS			RURA	AL ARE	AS	
Country/year	Quartile/difference	TOTAL	Nuclear t S.W.H.H.	Cons.	Legal	Other house-	TOTAL	Nuclear S.W.H.H			Other house-
			<u>c/</u>	union	union	holds		c/	union	union	holds
COLOMBIA	TOTAL	22.5	29.5	30.8	18.2	36.7	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
1990	Q1	31.0	37.6	36.8	25.7	48.5	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
,,,,,	Q4	10.1	15.5	13.1	9.3	14.3	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	Differ. (Q1-Q4)	20.9	22.1	23.7	16.4	34.2	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
COSTA RICA	TOTAL	19.7	26.6	39.7	15.0	25.3	34.1	43.9	50.3	28.9	43.8
1990	Q1	30.8	39.1	46.8	24.4	31.8	43.7	49.3	56.5	37.4	51.7
	Q4	7.2	0.0	23.2	6.8	5.5	20.4	10.6	34.8	18.8	16.5
	Differ, (Q1-Q4)	23.6	39.1	23.6	17.6	26.3	23.3	38.7	21.7	18.6	35.2
CHILE	TOTAL	12.1	20.8	17.7	10.6	14.6	21.0	22.2	23.3	20.8	26.7
1990	QC1	17.1	24.3	20.7	15.4	20.6	25.1	21.6	23.9	25.5	28.5
	Q4	7.0	11.3	2.2	6.9	6.2	10.1	-,-		10.5	24.8
	Differ: (Q1-Q4)	10.1	13.0	18.5	8.5	14.4	15.0	21.6	23.9	15.0	3.7
GUATEMALA a/	TOTAL	36.7	33.7	42.6	34.9	35.1	74.7	79.1	79.4	71.1	78.1
1989	Q1	51.7	47.0	56.5	50.6	47.0	81.5	84.8	84.0	78.9	88.4
	Q4	10.7	5.4	11.1	12.0	19.9	56.9	65.0	66.6	51.3	61.9
	Differ. (Q1-Q4)	41.0	41.6	45.4	38.6	27.1	24.6	19.8	17.4	27.6	26.5
HONDURAS	TOTAL	20.7	26.2	25.1	13.9	24.7	42.4	39.6	46.4	38.5	44.4
1990	Q1	24.7	26.9	28.1	17.1	30.5	49.2	51.3	53.2	44.1	52.1
	Q4	6.1	6.0	15.7	4.1	7.3	30.3	34.0	36.6	24.6	32.1
	Differ. (Q1-Q4)	18.6	20.9	12.4	13.0	23.2	18.9	17.3	16.6	19.5	20.0
MEXICO	TOTAL	18.8	31.2	33.1	16.4	28.3	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
1990	Q1	21.5	34.7	35.7	18.6	29.0	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	Q4	14.2	17.8	27.2	13.3	21.5	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	Differ. (Q1-Q4)	7.3	16.9	8.5	5.3	7.5	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
PARAGUAY W	TOTAL	27.4	30.4	47.4	24.7	40.4	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
1990	Q1	39.2			33.3	46.3	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	Q4	17.4			18.6	29.5	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	Differ. (Q1-Q4)	21.8	0.0	0.0	14.7	16.8	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
URUGUAY	TOTAL	14.0	22.0	25.7	11.5	16.4	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
1989	Q1	20.3	26.2	30.3	17.4	21.0	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	Q4	2.8		4.3	2.6	8.6	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	Differ. (Q1-Q4)	17.5	26.2	26.0	14.8	12.4	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
VENEZUELA a/	TOTAL	21.1	26.8	31.4	14.0	24.0	49.4	53.3	54.8	42.2	51.4
1990	Q1	30.2	32.3	40.2	20.7	30.6	55.9	52.9	61.7	49.7	57.1
	Q4	8.3	13.4	19.5	5.7	11.5	29.8	68.9	37.2	15.9	35.6
	Differ. (Q1-Q4)	21.9	18.9	20.7	15.0	19.1	26.1	-16.0	24.5	33.8	21.5

Source: ECLAC, Social Development Division, on the basis of household surveys conducted by the corresponding countries. a/ Calculations of repeater rates refers to children aged 10 to 14.

b/ Includes children aged 12 to 14.

c/ Single woman head of household.

n.d. = no data available.

<sup>-.- =</sup> available information is not statistically significant.

Table 35

LATIN AMERICA (10 COUNTRIES): CHILDREN AGED 0 TO 14 YEARS RESIDING IN NUCLEAR FAMILIES IN WHICH THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD PARTICIPATES IN A CONSENSUAL UNION, BY HOUSEHOLD INCOME QUARTILE

(Percentages)

		UR	BAN A	REAS			RU	JRAL A	REAS		
Country Y	'ear	TOTAL	Q1	Q 2	QЗ	Q 4	TOTAL	Q1	Q 2	Q 3	Q 4
ARGENTINA a/ b/	80	6.9	11.2	4.3	3.0	3.2	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	/al
ANGENTINA & D	86	8.5	12.6	4.3 5.7	3.3	3.2 4.1	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d n/d
	90	12.0	16.1	11.1	6.8	2.4	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
					0.0						
COLOMBIA	80	9.5	12.8	8.8	8.4	3.0	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	86	15.0	19.6	15.2	11.6	6.5	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	90	17.9	25.6	16.5	10.9	7.1	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
COSTA DICA	on	9.6	15.0	7.4	e 4	<b>-</b> 0	400	400	440		
COSTA RICA	88 90		15.6 14.7	7.4 10.4	5.4	5.2	13.8	16.0	14.9	11.8	9.1
	90	10.6	14.7	10.4	6.4	6.5	15.1	20.1	13.3	11.4	10.9
CHILE	87	3.9	6.3	3.2	1.6	1.5	4.6	5.5	4.5	3.5	2.4
	90	6.2	9.2	5.5	4.3	2.0	5.6	6.6	6.0	4.8	0.9
GUATEMALA c/	86	18.3	21.6	23.4	12.2	10.6	25.9	26.6	25.2	28.1	23.1
	89	17.5	19.3	20.3	16.7	9.4	23.8	24.7	22.9	25.7	21.3
HONDIDAG	-00	242	00.0	00.0	00.0		04.5				
HONDURAS	88 90	24.2 25.6	29.6 26.5	28.9 30.9	20.3 27.0	8.7 10.8	31.5 33.2	31.8 33.7	35.0	33.4	21.5
	ЭU	25.0	20.5	30.9	27.0	10.0	აა.∠	33.7	36.0	33.0	26.6
MEXICO	87	5.5	6.9	4.6	4.8	3.9	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	89	6.9	7.9	7.0	5.7	5.5	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
PARAGUAY	86	9.8	12.8	9.3	8.8	5.0	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	90	8.1	11.8	8.2	5.3	2.6	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
URUGUAY	81	5.8	10.3	2.1	1.5	1.1	n/d	n/d			<i>la</i> l
UNUGUAT	89	7.6	10.3	5.4	3.2	3.5	n/d	n/d	n/d n/d	n/d n/d	n/d n/d
	•	'	10.1	J.7	0.2	0.0	100	11/4	18/4	IVG	IVG
VENEZUELA	81	15.0	19.7	16.0	11.1	5.3	27.7	27.3	31.8	27.3	17.8
	86	17.0	22.4	17.2	12.7	8.2	28.4	31.6	30.3	25.3	18.0
	90	17.3	21.2	17.8	12.6	9.8	30.0	33.0	31.5	22.9	24.9

Source: ECLAC, Social Development Division, on the basis of household surveys conducted by the corresponding countries.

a/ Income figures have been corrected but have not been adjusted for under-reporting.

b/ This information refers to Greater Buenos Aires only.

c/ Figures for Guatemala include children aged 10 to 14 only.

n.d. = no data available.

Table 36
LATIN AMERICA (10 COUNTRIES): CONSENSUAL UNIONS AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE AGED 15 TO 24 YEARS WHO HAVE A PARTNER, BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL (Percentages)

		Į	Jrban ar	eas			F	lural are	as		
Country	Year	TOTAL	0-5	6-9	10 & +	Differ.	TOTAL	0-5	6-9	10 & +	Differ
ARGENTINA a/	80	17.4	36.4	18.5	0.0	36.4	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	86 90	24.9 32.1	51.8 59.7	26.0 36.0	4.5 7.3	47.3 52.4	n/d n/d	n/d n/d	n/d n/d	n/d n/d	n/d n/d
	au	32.1	39. <i>1</i>	30.0	7.3	32.4	IVG	II/U	IVG	100	100
COLOMBIA	80	28.8	45.0	24.6	6.6	38.4	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	86	43.6	57.9	45.9 51.7	22.8 26.3	35.1 46.0	n/d n/d	n/d n/d	n/d n/d	n/d n/d	n/d n/d
	90	49.7	72.3	51.7	20.3	46.0	11/0	IVQ	iva	iva	II/G
COSTA RICA	A 88	21.3	52.1	25.9	7.0	45.1	30.9	50.0	28.6	17.4	32.6
	90	31.6	68.3	36.7	11.7	56.6	33.8	52.9	31.7	18.3	34.6
CHILE	87	12.5	24.3	20.0	7.0	17.3	12.5	16.3	12.4	7.9	8.4
	90	16.5	40.9	23.8	8.9	32.0	17.7	27.9	17.2	9.7	18.2
GUATEMAL	A 86	41.9	49.8	42.1	17.5	32.3	50.4	51.5	42.1	31.8	19.7
	89	42.7	51.7	39.9	20.1	31.6	45.6	46.8	39.8	30.7	16.1
HONDURAS	88	64.2	81.6	66.1	31.1	50.5	66.0	67.6	63.6	38.6	29.0
	90	67.8	86.1	70.6	20.8	65.3	71.5	74.5	66.5	50.5	24.0
MEXICO	87	16.2	33.4	17.8	4.6	28.8	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	89	17.5	36.2	17.2	10.4	25.8	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
PARAGUAY	86	44.3	73.1	50.6	21.8	51.3	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	90	41.3	72.2	50.8	15.1	57.1	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
URUGUAY	81	10.7	30.6	11.4	4.3	26.3	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
OHOUSE!	89	23.8	66.7	26.7	9.0	57.7	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
VENEZUELA	L 81	33.9	58.1	33.4	14.0	44.1	53.5	62.1	46.5	26.7	35.4
	86	39.1	61.4	41.0	18.2	43.2	58.3	68.0	52.5	32.7	35.3
	90	42.7	69.2	46.9	21.6	47.6	59.8	69.0	56.8	36.1	32.9

a/ The categories of educational levels used here were elementary school uncompleted, elementary school completed/secondary school uncompleted, and second school completed and over, rather than 0-5, 6-9 and 10 and over. The survey data refer to Greater Buenos Aires only.

Table 37 LATIN AMERICA (12 COUNTRIES): NON-INDEPENDENT MEN AGED 15 TO 24 WHO NEITHER WORK NOR ATTEND SCHOOL, BY HOUSEHOLD INCOME QUARTILE (Percentages)

		Urban	areas		R	ıral are	as	
Country Year	TOTAL	0.1	0.4	Differ. (Q1-Q4)	TOTAL	0.1	Q.4	Differ. (Q1-Q4)
ARGENTINA a/ 80	10.7	17.1	5.8	11.3	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
86	9.3	19.3	2.0	17.3	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
BRAZIL 79	10.6	19.8	4.3	15.5	4.3	5.3	3.0	2.3
87 90	11.0 11.4	21.7 21.3	5.3 4.4	16.4 16.9	5.1 5.4	6.6 7.7	3.5 3.9	3.1 3.8
COLOMBIA 80	12.1	20.4	4.7	15.7	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
86 90	16.7 16.0	27.1 27.7	6.8 8.3	20.3 19.4	n/d n/d	n/d n/d	n/d n/d	n/d n/d
COSTA RICA 88	11.3	25.8	5.8	20.0	12.5	24.5	4.7	19.8
90	11.0	26.9	3.8	23.1	11.1	23.7	2.7	21.0
CHILE 87 90	18.2 16.5	27.5 26.4	10.0 7.4	17.5 19.0	21.1 16.2	32.6 28.0	9.5 8.1	23.1 19.9
GUATEMALA 86	11.5	17.9	8.0	9.9	6.4	13.4	4.9	8.5
89	9.4	12.6	5.9	6.7	5.1	8.5	3.5	5.0
HONDURAS 88	17.1 14.6	29.0 26.8	6.4 7.9	22.6 18.9	8.4 7.9	7.1 5.1	11.3 9.5	-4.2 -4.4
MEXICO 87		46.5	21.2					
MEXICO 87 89	30.5 25.9	38.4	19.0	25.3 19.4	n/d n/d	n/d n/d	n/d n/d	n/d n/d
PANAMA b/ 79	23.9	39.7	10.9	28.8	10.0	9.6	9.1	0.5
86 89	17.2 24.1	23.3 31.8	5.7 10.1	17.6 21.7	14.1 14.2	18.2 11.8	9.7 12.9	8.5 -1.1
PARAGUAY b/86	16.4	24.1	3.2	20.9	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
90	21.9	33.3	11.8	21.5	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
URUGUAY 81 89	12.0 13.2	21.1 20.6	4.1 4.5	17.0 16.1	n/d n/d	n/d n/d	n/d n/d	n/d n/d
VENEZUELA 81	15.0	23.8	8.3	15.5	10.9	11.9	8.5	3.4
86 90	20.9 20.6	31.0 31.7	11.9 10.5	19.1 21.2	14.0 14.3	16.2 19.3	9.6 10.2	6.6 9.1
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a/ This information refers to Greater Buenos Aires only.
b/ Includes young people who study but who said that work was their principal activity. n.d. = no data available.

Table 38
LATIN AMERICA (10 COUNTRIES): CEMIT OF YOUNG PEOPLE AGED 15 TO 24
YEARS WHO WORK OVER 20 HOURS PER WEEK AND DO NOT ATTEND SCHOOL,
BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL a/

		Ur	ban are	eas			R	ural are	as		
Country 1	<u>Year</u>	TOTAL	0-5	6-9	10 & over	Differ.	TOTAL	0-5	6-9	10 & over	Differ.
ARGENTINA b/	80	5.0	4.6	4.6	6.4	1.8	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	86	4.0	3.1	3.8	5.4	2.3	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
BRAZIL	79	3.4	2.3	4.0	8.1	5.8	2.2	2.0	3.3	7.6	5.5
	87	3.3	2.0	3.2	6.2	4.3	3.3	2.6	4.3	9.2	6.7
	90	2.7	1.8	2.8	4.7	2.9	2.5	2.2	3.4	5.0	2.8
COLOMBIA	80	2.2	1.6	2.0	4.8	3.2	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	86	2.3	1.6	2.4	3.6	2.0	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	90	2.5	1.7	2.0	4.5	2.8	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
COSTA RICA	88	3.7	2.4	3.6	4.3	1.9	5.1	4.0	5.2	6.2	2.2
	90	3.8	2.8	3.4	4.8	2.0	4.8	3.9	4.7	7.1	3.2
GUATEMALA	86	2.2	1.8	1.9	4.4	2.6	2.3	2.2	2.8	4.7	2.5
	89	2.6	1.8	2.7	5.3	3.6	2.7	2.5	2.7	12.6	10.1
HONDURAS	88	1.3	0.9	1.1	3.2	2.3	1.5	1.3	1.8	5.1	3.8
	90	1.5	1.0	1.4	3.3	2.3	1.8	1.3	2.0	5.8	4.5
PANAMA	79	4.1	1.6	2.7	6.9	5.3	4.9	2.8	4.0	9.6	6.9
	86	5.0	1.6	2.2	10.3	8.7	3.7	2.8	3.3	6.1	3.3
	89	2.7	2.0	1.9	4.1	2.2	2.8	2.3	2.7	3.7	1.3
PARAGUAY	86	1.0	8.0	0.9	2.0	1.2	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	90	1.4	8.0	1.1	2.5	1.7	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
URUGUAY	81	3.9	3.1	3.7	4.6	1.5	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	89	3.3	2.8	2.9	4.1	1.3	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
VENEZUELA	81	5.9	4.2	5.6	9.3	5.0	6.5	4.9	7.5	11.0	6.1
	86	4.1	3.1	3.7	6.2	3.1	4.9	3.8	5.3	9.2	5.4
	90	3.3	2.3	3.1	4.3	2.0	3.7	3.3	3.9	4.3	0.9

a/ The CEMIT (monthly income capacity equivalents) represent monthly income calculated on the basis of value per working hour and is expressed in terms of the poverty line.

b/ The categories of educational levels used here were elementary school uncompleted, elementary school completed/secondary school uncompleted, and second school completed and over, rather than 0-5, 6-9 and 10 and over. The survey data refer to Greater Buenos Aires only.

Table 39
LATIN AMERICA (10 COUNTRIES): CEMIT OF GAINFULLY EMPLOYED PERSONS AGED 25
TO 59 YEARS WHO WORK OVER 20 HOURS PER WEEK, BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

	U	rban ar	eas			I	Rural aı	eas		
Country Year	TOTAL	0-5	6-9	10 & over	Differ.	TOTAL	0-5	6-9	10 & over	Differ.
ARGENTINA a/ 80	9.2	5.5	7.2	13.7	8.2	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
86	6.3	3.7	4.9	9.4	5.7	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
BRAZIL 79	7.6	4.5	7.9	16.8	12.3	3.8	3.2	6.0	10.9	7.7
87	8.0	4.2	6.2	14.8	10.6	5.6	4.9	8.0	11.8	6.9
90	6.6	3.3	5.1	12.6	9.3	3.8	3.2	6.0	10.9	7.7
COLOMBIA 80	5.5	2.5	4.2	11.4	8.9	/el	/al	/-d	/-d	
COLUMBIA 80	5.3	3.1	4.2 4.0	8.1	5.0	n/d n/d	n/d n/d	n/d n/d	n/d n/d	n/d n/d
90	4.9	2.5	3.3	7.6	5.1	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
	"		0.0	7.10	<b></b>					100
COSTA RICA 81	8.0	5.2	6.2	11.5	6.3	8.1	7.1	7.6	14.4	7.3
88	6.2	3.8	4.4	8.3	4.5	6.2	5.5	5.9	8.8	3.3
90	5.7	3.2	4.0	7.7	4.5	5.8	4.8	5.3	8.9	4.1
GUATEMALA 86	3.9	2.2	3.5	7.7	E E	3.1	2.7	<b>50</b>	40.0	100
GUATEMALA 88	4.8	2.7	3.5 4.2	7.7 8.9	5.5 6.2	3.1 3.5	2.7 3.1	5.8 4.9	13.0 11.6	10.3 8.5
<b>U</b> 3	7.0	2	7.2	0.9		3.3	3.1	7.5	11.0	0.0
HONDURAS 88	3.8	1.7	2.6	6.9	5.2	2.3	1.9	2.6	7.3	5.4
90	3.4	1.6	2.5	6.7	5.1	2.3	1.9	3.4	7.5	5.6
DANIA		0.0		44.0					44.5	
PANAMA 79	7.9	3.9	5.4	11.9	8.0	4.8	3.4	5.3	11.3	7.9
86 89	6.9 6.7	3.1 3.4	4.7 4.4	10.0 8.9	6.9 5.5	5.4 6.0	3.5 3.4	5.2 4.7	11.0 9.8	7.5 6.4
	0.7	J.4	7.7	0.5	5.5	0.0	3.4	7.1	5.0	0.4
PARAGUAY 86	3.9	1.6	2.4	6.0	4.4	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
90	3.9	2.1	2.8	5.4	3.3	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
URUGUAY 81	6.2	4.4	5.4	8.8	4.5	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
89	5.3	3.6	4.4	7.0	3.4	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
VENEZUELA 81	8.5	6.0	7.9	12.4	6.4	7.4	6.1	9.2	16.3	10.2
86	6.8	4.3	5.6	10.1	5.8	5.7	4.7	6.1	13.4	8.7
90	5.4	3.9	4.6	7.0	3.1	5.1	4.4	5.8	7.3	2.9
			····							

a/ The categories of educational levels used here were elementary school uncompleted, elementary school completed/secondary school uncompleted, and second school completed and over, rather than 0-5, 6-9 and 10 and over. The survey data refer to Greater Buenos Aires only.

n.d. = no data available.

LATIN AMERICA (6 COUNTRIES): INCOME DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN EMPLOYED PERSONS AGED 15-24 AND 40 OR OVER, BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL  $a\prime$ Table 40

UELA 1990	1.7 2.3 5.2
VENEZUELA 1981 19	1.9 3.7 9.4
UAY 1989	2.1 4.4 6.0
URUGUAY	2.4 9.6 9.6
IA 1989	0.9 2.4 8.2
PANAMA 1979	1.7 2.4 6.0
RICA 1990	1.2 1.5 5.1
COSTA RICA	3.5 5.1 7.1
OMBIA 1990	1.2 2.2 5.8
COLOM 1980	1.3 3.3 9.3
L 1990	2.2 4.2 10.5
BRAZII 1979	3.1 7.6 15.5
cational level	0 - 5 6 - 9 10 and over
Education	10a

Source: ECLAC, Social Development Division, on the basis of household surveys conducted by the corresponding countries.

a/ Refers to average incomes expressed in terms of per capita poverty lines.

Table 41

LATIN AMERICA (10 COUNTRIES): CEMIT FOR WOMEN AS A PERCENTAGE OF CEMIT FOR MEN IN THE POPULATION OF GAINFULLY EMPLOYED PERSONS AGED 25 TO 59 YEARS WHO WORK OVER 20 HOURS PER WEEK, BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

	U	rban are	eas			F	lural ar	eas		
Country Yea	TOTAL	0-5	6-9	10 & over	Differ.	TOTAL	0-5	6-9	10 & over	Differ.
ARGENTINA a/8	9000 <b>7</b>	80	74	72	8.0	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
81	78	83	74	71	12.2	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
BRAZIL 7	53	47	51	45	2.0	57	52	44	49	3.0
81	58	51	52	52	-1.0	55	45	47	48	-3.0
9	66	51	54	61	-10.0	62	54	52	53	1.0
COLOMBIA 8	60	59	76	58	1.0	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
8	99998	68	72	68	0.0	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
91	73	67	75	69	-2.0	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
COSTA RICA 8	84	50	66	89	-39.0	78	50	68	98	-48.0
8	888	79	66	79	0.0	80	58	61	94	-36.0
91	83	65	72	80	-15.0	90	61	66	102	-41.0
GUATEMALA 8	76	73	86	73	0.0	78	76	45	63	13.0
8	88	71	95	81	-10.0	91	84	67	85	-1.0
HONDURAS 8	70	65	64	64	1.0	104	68	107	85	-17.0
9	70	53	53	70	-17.0	89	60	66	119	-59.0
PANAMA 7	78	61	62	74	-13.0	119	84	80	84	0.0
8	94	86	72	79	7.0	134	82	79	102	-20.0
8	85	75	68	80	-5.0	110	79	76	104	-25.0
PARAGUAY 8	61	70	62	63	7.0	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
9	62	67	57	64	3.0	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
URUGUAY 8	63	53	60	63	-10.0	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
8		64	68	67	-3.0	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
VENEZUELA 8	82	60	72	92	-32.0	85	64	72	123	-59.0
8	8888 <b>8</b>	65	69	74	-9.0	96	77	74	93	-16.0
9	74	66	70	70	-4.0	84	78	72	89	-11.0

a/ The categories of educational levels used here were elementary school uncompleted, elementary school completed/secondary school uncompleted, and second school completed and over, rather than 0-5, 6-9 and 10 and over. The survey data refer to Greater Buenos Aires only.

n.d. = no data available.

Table 42

LATIN AMERICA (8 COUNTRIES): PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN IN MOST COMMON OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES AND RATIO BETWEEN THE CEMITS

FOR MEN AND WOMEN

(Urban areas only)

	(Urban ar	eas Only)			
Decupational category by country	WOMEN Start tv	Finish :	CEMIT F/M Start (I)	B/ Finish (F)	income quotient (F/I)
COLOMBIA (1980-90)			4	66.8	0.86
Prof,Tec,Dir-OA,Emp.	16.4	27.2	77.4 50.8	79.7	1.57
Prof.Tec.Dir-As.Pub.	42.8	47.7	67.1	63.2	0.94
Prof.Tec.Dir-As:Priv.	32.2	39.9	81.7	95.9	1.17
AdmirAs:Pub.	53.0	50.0	113.6	96.4	0.85
AdmiAs.Priv.	52.5	56.9	53.2	78.9	1.48
Yend - Own account	27.4	34.2 44.8	66.5	78.8	1,19
VendAs.Priv.	38.1	23.5	64.7	114.8	1.77
M.W. & OpO. account	17.3	46.4	35.3	39.0	1.10
Serv.workOwn #ccount	84.3	· ·	83.1	83.7	1.01
M.w.& OpAs-Priv.	20.8	21.9	89.9	81.6	0.91
Serv. work - Az. Pub.	42.0	43.6	86.9	91.2	1.05
Serv. workAs.Priv.	57.4	35.7		105.4	1.25
Domestic service	97.8	98.8	84.6	103.4	1.20
COSTA RICA (1981-90)			F7.0	69.3	1,22
Prof.Mgr,Dir-OA,Emp.	15.7	14.7	57.0 90.9	71.1	0.78
Prof.Mgr,Dir-As.Pub.	52.3	52.1	90.9 86.1	86.3	1.00
Prof,Mgr,Dir-As-Priv.	15.1	23.9	95.6	101.8	1.06
AdmiAs.Pub.	44.5	45.0	83.0	93.7	1,13
Admi As.Priv.	43.0	59.6	-,-	64.5	
VendOwn account		25.4	83.1	65.7	0.79
Vend As. priv.	45.4	33.0	60.4	80.3	1.33
M.w.& Op. O. account	15.0	24.0	113.2	133.5	1,18
M.w.& Op As:Pub.	3.0	1.7	56.0	79.9	1.43
M.w.& OpAs.Priv.	16.9	24.9	83.5	88.8	1.06
Serv As:Pub.	33.6	27.9		74.2	1.37
Serv. As.Priv.	57.4	27.4	54.3	-,-	
Domestic service	n.d.	100.0	n.d.		
GUATEMALA (1986-89)			50.4	63.7	1.20
Prof.Mgr,Dir-OA,Emp.	28.3	32.1	53.1 103.6	111.2	1.07
Prof.Mgr.Dir-As.Pub.	41.6	45.2		67.6	1.10
Prof.Mgr,Dir-As.Priv.	27.1	35.8	61.6	99.2	0.92
AdmiAs:Pub.	41.0	49.5	1	122.4	1.59
Admir As.Priv.	53.3	52.3		57.7	0.84
VendOwn account	62.7	56.6	1	48.0	0.76
Vend As, priv.	51.5	44.8		58.9	
M.w. & Op.+O. account	37.1	39.9		53.5	l .
Serv. O. account	44.7	41.6	1	76.8	
M.w.& Op As.Priv.	16.5	16.2	_	107.3	1
Serv.: As.Pub.	21.2	20.7		52.1	1
Serv As.Priv.	63.9	54.9		105.9	,
Domestic service	28.3	97.5	139.9	100.9	0.70

Table 42 (cont.)

Occupational category	WOMEN		CEMIT F	M a/	Income
by country	Stert	Pinish	Start	Finish	quotient
	b		<u>(f)</u>	<u>(F)</u>	<u>(#/I)</u>
(Deel-1861) EARUONOH					
Frof Mgr.Dir-DA,Emp.	14.1	22.2	87.6	32.2	0.37
Prof.Mgr.Dir-As.Pub.	54.9	55.5	69.0	84.2	1.22
Prof.Mgr.Dir-As.Priv.	34.4	34.1	60.0	69.5	1.16
AdmiAs.Pub.	62.2	64.7	93.4	89.0	0.95
Admi As.Priv.	63.1	60.1	88.2	93.3	1.06
Vend-Own account	54.3	58.1	57.9	43.9	0.76
Vend.: As. priv.	47.6	40.2	67.7	69.9	1.03
M.w.& OpG. account	47.6	43.2	53.7	51.3	0.96
M.W.& Op As Priv.	12.7	11.9	83.3	71.9	0.86
Serv. C. account	44.7	53.8	66.8	37.9	0.57
Serv - As.Pub.	12.0	21.4	107.9	85.6	0.79
Serv As.Friv.	25.3	30.4	60.3	58.3	0.97
Domestic service	100.0	97.3	n.a.	32.6	•••
PANAMA (1979-1989)					
Prof.Mgr,Din-OA,Empl.	15.1	16.5	59.9	40.3	0.67
Prof,Mgr,Dir-As.Pub.	52.9	51.6	74.2	77.0	1.04
Prof.Mgr,Dir-As.Priv.	29.1	34.1	59.1	89.0	1.51
AdmiAs.Pub.	70.6	72.7	75.7	92.3	1.22
Admi As.Priv.	59.3	69.7	83.6	131.9	1.58
VendOwn account	25.3	39.3	58.2	95.1	1.63
Vend As. priv.	38.2	38.8	51.4	69.3	1.35
M.W. & Crafts O. account	5.0	9.5	65.1	98.9	1.52
Sarv. O. account	15.3	19.7	73.9	75.0	1.01
M.w. & Graffa, Priv.	16.8	17.5	72.6	86.0	1.19
Serv As. Pub.	36.3	28.3	45.3	76.6	1.69
Serv. As.Priv.	60.0	53.7	38.8	62.4	1.61
Domentic service	n.d.	92.2	n.d.	54.8	
FARAGUAY (1988-1990)					
Prof.Mgr.Dir-QA.Emp.	26.5	25.2	78.2	59.8	0.76
Prof.Mgr.Dir-As.Pub.	53.6	46.2	59.7	61.1	1.02
Prof.higs.Dir.As.Pris.	25.6	46.1	68.5	67.6	0.99
Admi. Asil'ub.	43.6	46.6	96.6	86.0	0.89
Admi. As.Priv	51.6	43.6	66.1	91.4	1.38
Venga Gwn account	65.0	61.4	51.8	58.8	1.14
Vend. As priv.	32.7	35.1	46.8	83.4	1.78
M.w. & Calle, O. account	47.3	41.4	52.8	88.6	1.68
M.W. & Crafts, Priv.	13.3	12.5	90.3	90.4	1.00
Serv. O. gecount	73.7	52.5	71.3	46.1	0.65
Berv. As.Pub.	15.5	2.8	54.6	34.5	0.63
Sarry Av. Priv.	24.0	32.0	80.3	80.7	1.01
Damastic service	96.9	100.0	119.9	n.a.	
	1			1	

Table 42 (concl.)

Occupational category	WOMEN		CEMIT F/N		income
by country		ilah	Start (I)	Finish (F)	quotient (F/I)
	<b>b</b> /		**************************************		
URUGUAY (1981-1989)					
Prof.Tec.Dir-CA,Emp.	26.1	33.8	67.0	71.8	1.07
Prof. Tec.Dir-As-Priv.	30.3	47.7	38.3	54.7	1.43
Prof.Tec.Dir-As.Pub.	61.3	63.5	69.3	80.2	1.16
Admi-As Priv	41.3	47.9	74.8	71.4	0.95
Admi-As:Pub.	47.6	51.7	89.8	86.5	0.96
VendAs.Priv.	34.5	42.4	50.1	50.1	1.00
Venit - Own account	29.4	40.2	78.6	63.1	0.80
M.w.& Op. As:Priv.	16.4	21.8	65.9	68.2	1.03
M.W.& Op. As Pub.	1.5	3.7	79.9	128.1	1.60
M.w.,Op. & Serv. C. acc.	40.3	36.3	52.2	67.5	1.29
Serv. workAs.Priv.	78.7	73.9	62.2	70.7	1.14
Serv. workAs.Pub.	16,4	19.9	72.5	84.1	1.16
DRIV. WOLK, WALL OFF					
VENEZUELA (1981-1990)				_	
Prof.Tec,Dir-OA,Emp.	14.4	20.7	82.5	82.9	1.00
Prof. Tec.Dir-As.Priv.	33.5	40.4	80.4	73.0	0.91
Prof.Tec,Dir-As.Pub.	62.3	66.0	82.4	74.2	0.90
fruossa rwo, trey	27.3	33.1	80.0	75.9	0.95
VendAs.Priv.	25.3	28.6	64.8	79.5	1.23
Driver-As Priv.	1.3	1.0	62.7	79.3	1.27
AdmiAs.Priv.	56.6	57.8	87.3	100.5	1.15
AdmiAs.Pub.	60.2	64.4	87.9	93.5	1.06
DriverO. account	1.7	2.7	98.9	127.0	1.28
M.W.& OpAs.Priv.	13.2	11.5	72.5	89.9	1.24
	19.0	23.3	60.0	72.7	1.21
M.w.& OpO. account	36.5	42.6	71.7	92.6	1.29
Serv. workAs Pub.	52.6	54.0	62.8	64.9	1.03
Serv. Work. As. Priv.	02.0	2.35			

a/ Female/male CEMIT ratio.

b/ Refers to the beginning and end of the period examined in each country.

n.d. = no data available.

<sup>-.- =</sup> available information is not statistically significant.

Table 43
LATIN AMERICA (10 COUNTRIES): PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS AGED 65 OR OVER,
BY GENDER AND INCOME STATUS

Active   Active   Active   Increme				R	URBAN AREAS	HEAS							RURA	RURAL AREAS	gn.				
March   Marc		Ш			3	incon	te recipi	ent						Type of	income	recipier	11		
85         2.0         31.6         35.3         3.6         21.7         66.9         25.4         n/d				macti	ų.	Non-re M	Ciptent	Total active	Total inactive	Total non- recipient	Acti		Inacti M	¥9	Non-re	cipient	Total		Total non-
7.0         2.2         3.08         3.9         7.0 <th></th> <td></td> <td>5.0</td> <td>31.6</td> <td>35.3</td> <td>3.6</td> <td>21.8</td> <td>7.5</td> <td>6.9</td> <td>25.4</td> <td>p/u</td> <td><b>1</b>/u</td> <td>7/2</td> <td>Ş</td> <td>3</td> <td></td> <td>Ŋ</td> <td></td> <td></td>			5.0	31.6	35.3	3.6	21.8	7.5	6.9	25.4	p/u	<b>1</b> /u	7/2	Ş	3		Ŋ		
7.8         2.2         31.2         40.8         1.7         16.3         10.0         72.0         18.0         nd	98		2.2	30.8	39.7	3.0	17.5	9.5	70.5	20.5	Ş	2	2	2	2	2 2	2 2	2 2	2 2
113         24         30.2         37.0         12         17.3         14.3         67.2         18.5         70.1         14.4         28.6         4.5         23.5         30.5         18.7         30.2         30.1         30.2         30.2         30.1         31.2         31.2         41.5         70.1         14.4         28.6         4.5         23.5         30.5         90.7         11.1         31.5         70.1         14.4         28.6         4.5         23.5         30.5         90.7         11.1         31.5         31.5         14.5         30.2         30.2         30.5         0.7         11.1         32.6         36.0         30.7         30.5         30.2         30.5         30.7         30.5         30.5         30.2         30.5 <th>06</th> <td></td> <td>2.2</td> <td>31.2</td> <td>40.8</td> <td>1.7</td> <td>16.3</td> <td>10.0</td> <td>72.0</td> <td>18.0</td> <td>ş</td> <td>β</td> <td>2</td> <td>Ş</td> <td><b>D/</b>2</td> <td>P<sub>2</sub></td> <td>Ş</td> <td>2</td> <td>2 2</td>	06		2.2	31.2	40.8	1.7	16.3	10.0	72.0	18.0	ş	β	2	Ş	<b>D/</b> 2	P <sub>2</sub>	Ş	2	2 2
121   34   303   398   0.7   13.7   15.5   70.1   14.4   28.5   4.1   23.5   30.5   0.7   12.2   33.1   54.0   56.1   14.5   14.5   14.5   12.4   28.5   4.1   23.8   32.5   0.4   11.1   32.6   56.1   56.1   14.5   14.5   14.5   32.			2.4	30.2	37.0	1.2	17.3	14.3	67.2	18.5	26.2	4.0	24.6	25.5	60	18.7	30.9	50.1	404
90         10.8         3.7         31.0         42.0         0.6         11.8         14.5         73.0         12.4         28.5         4.1         23.6         32.3         0.4         11.1         32.6         55.7           90         17.1         4.9         11.0         16.3         14.5         38.3         22.0         27.3         50.8         n/d	28		3.4	30.3	39.8	0.7	13.7	15.5	70.1	14.4	28.6	4.5	23.5	30.5	200	2 2	33.4	- 6	<u> </u>
90         17.1         4.9         11.0         16.3         14.5         36.3         22.0         27.3         50.8         n/d	06		3.7	31.0	45.0	9.0	11.8	14.5	73.0	12.4	28.5	4	23.8	32.3	9.	Ę	32.6	56.1	11.5
15.0   4.2   14.7   15.8   11.6   38.6   19.2   30.5   50.2   0.6   0.			4.9	11.0	16.3	14.5	36.3	22.0	27.3	50.8	2	2	ρ	p/u	þ	Ž	p/u	7/0	3
91         14.2         3.7         19.8         17.9         37.1         44.9         n/d	98		4.2	14.7	15.8	11.6	38.6	19.2	30.5	50.2	Ş	þ	Ž	þ	2	2	2	2 2	2 2
81         3.4         4.5         5.4         4.5         4.5         4.5         4.5         5.1         4.5         5.1         4.5         5.1         4.5         5.1         4.5         5.1         4.5         5.1         4.5         5.1         4.5         5.2         5.2         4.0         4.0         4.0         2.0         2.1         1.7         21.3         1.5         9.0         2.0         2.1         3.5         1.5         3.7         1.7         21.3         1.5         9.0         2.4         3.0         4.0         4.0         4.0         2.0         2.1         2.0         1.1         2.0         1.1         2.0         1.1         3.0         4.0         1.1         3.0         4.0         1.1         3.0         4.0 <th>96</th> <td></td> <td>3.7</td> <td>19.8</td> <td>17.3</td> <td>9.2</td> <td>35.7</td> <td>17.9</td> <td>37.1</td> <td>44.9</td> <td>Ņ</td> <td>p/u</td> <td>Ş</td> <td>p/u</td> <td>Ş</td> <td>2</td> <td>2</td> <td>2</td> <td>2</td>	96		3.7	19.8	17.3	9.2	35.7	17.9	37.1	44.9	Ņ	p/u	Ş	p/u	Ş	2	2	2	2
85         13.2         4.1         21.3         19.4         10.3         31.7         17.3         40.7         42.0         21.3         17.2         21.3         12.6         13.0         30.1         23.0         33.9           67         7.0         2.4         32.7         4.5         4.5         40.7         40.7         42.0         21.3         1.7         21.6         13.0         30.0         24.7         33.9           67         7.0         2.4         32.7         4.8         1.8         7.4         9.4         81.5         9.2         10.6         1.1         39.0         40.7         24.7         33.9         40.7         33.9         40.7         22.6         15.9         10.6         1.1         39.0         40.7         13.9         10.6         40.7         32.0         40.7         30.9         10.7         40.7         40.7         34.7         21.1         10.3         10.1         9.4         86.1         15.0         10.6         11.6         40.7         31.7         21.1         40.3         38.6         32.7         21.1         40.7         30.7         21.1         40.7         30.7         31.7         30.0         30.7<			14.1	4.5	5.4	12.8	32.7	44.5	6.6	45.5	33.4	ď	n.	4	ţ	90		Ġ	Ş
90         13.0         2.9         25.7         2.8         2.5         15.9         63.2         30.9         13.0         2.9         15.7         9.0         28.0         24.7         38.3           87         7.0         2.4         32.7         48.8         1.8         7.4         9.4         81.5         9.2         10.6         1.1         39.0         40.2         1.9         7.1         17.9         98.7           90         9.1         3.5         29.9         41.7         2.8         13.1         12.6         71.6         1.1         39.0         40.2         1.9         7.1         17.9         99.7           80         23.7         7.8         9.7         10.9         10.5         37.4         31.5         20.6         47.9         33.8         5.2         8.7         12.6         17.7         17.9         17.9         17.3         30.7         32.0         46.1         1.8         4.9         17.3         47.9         33.6         5.1         4.9         17.9         47.9         32.0         46.1         1.8         4.9         11.4         40.3         38.0         9.7         47.9         4.9         11.4         40.3			4.1	21.3	19.4	10.3	31.7	17.3	40.7	45.0	21.3	7.	213	12.6	13.0	3 5	2 - C	9. 50 0. 50 0. 50	46.4
67         7.0         2.4         3.2.7         48.8         1.8         7.4         9.4         81.5         9.2         10.6         1.1         39.0         40.2         1.9         7.1         17.5         15.9         16.1         1.8         35.0         34.7         2.1         10.3         17.9         69.7           86         23.7         7.8         9.7         10.5         37.4         31.5         20.6         47.9         33.8         5.2         6.2         9.7         12.6         32.5         9.7         10.9         17.9         69.7           86         23.3         7.2         11.8         49.0         21.8         17.5         60.8         n/d         n/	06		2.9	25.7	27.5	5.3	25.6	15.9	53.2	30.9	22.9	1.8	22.6	15.7	9.0	28.0	24.7	38.3	32.0
90         9.1         3.5         29.9         41.7         2.8         13.1         12.6         71.6         15.9         16.1         1.8         35.0         34.7         2.1         10.3         17.9         69.7           86         23.7         7.8         9.7         10.9         10.5         37.4         31.5         20.6         47.9         33.8         5.2         6.2         9.7         12.6         32.5         39.0         15.9           87         17.7         4.1         13.9         10.6         37.4         31.5         20.6         46.1         33.5         5.1         4.8         4.9         11.4         40.3         38.6         9.7           90         17.7         4.1         13.9         3.4         11.8         49.0         21.8         17.3         60.8         n/d			2.4	32.7	48.8	4.8	7.4	4.0	81.5	66	10.6	-	30.0	40.5	Ģ	,	,	Ġ	
86         23.7         7.8         9.7         10.9         10.5         37.4         31.5         20.6         47.9         33.8         5.2         6.2         6.2         9.7         12.6         32.5         39.0         15.9           97         17.7         4.1         11.9         10.1         9.4         36.7         32.0         46.1         33.5         5.1         4.8         4.9         11.4         40.3         38.6         9.7           90         17.2         5.4         13.7         3.9         11.8         49.0         21.8         17.5         59.9         n/d         n/d <th>96</th> <td></td> <td>3.5</td> <td>29.9</td> <td>41.7</td> <td>2.8</td> <td>13.1</td> <td>12.6</td> <td>71.6</td> <td>15.9</td> <td>16.1</td> <td>8:</td> <td>35.0</td> <td>34.7</td> <td>2.1</td> <td>10.3</td> <td>17.9</td> <td>7.69 2.7</td> <td>9.0 12.4</td>	96		3.5	29.9	41.7	2.8	13.1	12.6	71.6	15.9	16.1	8:	35.0	34.7	2.1	10.3	17.9	7.69 2.7	9.0 12.4
87 17.7 4.1 13.9 3.4 11.8 49.0 21.8 17.3 60.8 n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d			7.8	7.6	9 01	5	37.4	2	900	910		ć	ć	ļ	,		;		
87         17.7         4.1         13.9         3.4         11.8         49.0         21.8         17.3         60.8         n/d         n			8.1	11.9	10.1	9.4	36.7	32.0	22.0	46.1	33.5	5.1	6 4 7 8.	9.7 4.9	5.4 4.4	40.3 5.03	38.0 38.0	15.9	45.1
90         17.2         5.4         13.7         3.9         11.8         48.1         22.6         17.6         59.9         n/d         n			1.4	13.9	3.4	11.8	49.0	21.8	17.3	8.09	<b>5</b> 2	7	<b>1</b> /u	Ž	<b>7</b> /0	3	3	3	1
79         13.2         4.1         26.4         24.7         4.5         27.2         17.3         51.1         31.7         35.3         2.4         16.7         17.5         3.2         24.9         37.7         34.2           86         13.0         2.0         29.0         29.0         29.0         30.7         3.4         16.7         19.2         7.1         22.8         34.1         35.9           86         12.3         2.7         29.3         3.5         15.0         59.6         25.5         28.2         3.4         18.2         7.1         22.8         34.1         35.9           86         16.2         29.7         29.0         29.0         29.5         25.5         3.4         18.2         7.1         7.0         22.2         31.6         39.2           90         15.7         8.0         17.7         24.7         3.5         30.4         35.9         n/d	06		5.4	13.7	3.9	11.8	18.1	22.6	17.6	29.9	Ŋ	ş	Ş	2	2	2 2	2 2	<b>2</b>	2 2
86 12.3 2.7 29.3 26.3 7.2 21.8 15.0 56.0 29.0 30.7 3.4 16.7 19.2 71. 22.8 34.1 35.9 36.9 12.3 2.7 29.3 30.3 5.7 19.8 15.0 59.6 25.5 28.2 3.4 18.2 21.0 7.0 22.2 31.6 39.2 31.6 39.2 31.6 39.2 31.6 39.2 31.6 39.2 31.6 39.2 31.6 39.2 31.6 39.2 31.6 39.2 31.6 31.9 2.2 33.7 23.7 40.4 35.9 17d 17d 17d 17d 17d 17d 17d 17d 17d 11.4 83.2 5.4 17d 17d 17d 17d 17d 17d 17d 17d 17d 17d			1.4	26.4	24.7	4.5	27.2	17.3	51.1	31.7	35.3	2.4	16.7	17.5	33	249	27.7	34.9	00
86 12.3 2.7 29.3 30.3 5.7 19.8 15.0 59.6 25.5 28.2 3.4 18.2 21.0 7.0 22.2 31.6 39.2 39.2 8.6 15.2 6.9 17.7 24.7 3.5 30.9 23.1 42.4 34.4 n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d	98		5.0	29.7	26.3	7.2	21.8	15.0	26.0	29.0	30.7	3.4	16.7	19.2	1.7	22.8	34.1	3.5	. 00
86 16.2 6.9 17.7 24.7 3.5 30.9 23.1 42.4 34.4 n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d	88		2.7	29.3	30.3	2.7	19.8	15.0	29.6	25.5	28.2	3.4	18.2	21.0	7.0	22.2	31.6	39.2	29.2
90 15.7 8.0 18.5 21.9 2.2 33.7 23.7 40.4 35.9 n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d			6.9	17.7	24.7	3.5	30.9	23.1	45.4	34.4	ş	þ	Ş	ŋ/u	p/u	<b>P</b>	p/u	<b>P/u</b>	r)c
84 6.8 2.9 33.7 48.3 0.6 7.6 9.7 82.0 8.2 n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d	06		8.0	18.5	21.9	2.2	33.7	23.7	40.4	35.9	β	Ş	Ş	Ş	þ	2	p/u	<u> </u>	2
7.9 3.5 31.9 51.3 0.3 5.1 11.4 83.2 5.4 n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d		6.8	5.9	33.7	48.3	9.0	7.6	9.7	82.0	8.2	Ş	p/u	Ş	þ	p/u	P	<b>1</b> 0/d	p/u	Į,
	<b>28</b>	7.9	3.5	31.9	51.3	0.3	<del>.</del>	11.4	83.2	5.4	Ş	ρ⁄u	Ą	p/u	₽/u	Ş	Ş	<b>J</b>	þ

Source: ECLAC, Social Development Division, on the basis of household surveys conducted by the corresponding countries.

Table 44

LATIN AMERICA (8 COUNTRIES): PERSONS AGED 65 YEARS OR OVER, BY INCOME STATUS
IN INDIGENT AND NON-INDIGENT POOR HOUSEHOLDS
(Percentages, most recent year available)

			Urban area	oan areas			Rural areas			
		Type	of income	recipient		Type	of income	recipient		
Country/year	Poverty category	Active	Inactive	Non- recipient	TOTAL	Active	Inactive	Non- recipient	TOTAL	
ODA7II	INDIGENT	10.3	21.0	20.0	19.3	18.9	26.2	30.5	24.3	
BRAZIL 1990	POOR	22.8	24.7	20.8	23.9	23.9	40.0	23.2	32.8	
COLOMBIA	INDIGENT	7.8	2.2	10.7	7.0	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	
1990	POOR	17.8	13.2	23.7	18.7	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	
COSTA RICA	INDIGENT	5,1	11.8	19.7	13.2	8.3	27.2	31.1	24.0	
1990	POOR	12.3	17.5	17.1	16.5	10.0	10.5	9.4	9.9	
CHILE	INDIGENT	3.7	4.7	13.6	6.0	5.0	7.8	14.6	8.2	
1990	POOR	11.9	15.9	16.2	15.5	8.9	16.3	16.1	14.9	
GUATEMALA	INDIGENT	18.5	8.7	27.0	20.3	14.6	2.7	25.6	42.9	
1989	POOR	23.8	13.2	24.1	21.6	22.3	32.2	24.5	24.4	
PANAMA	INDIGENT	15.1	7.2	18.4	11.2	17.3	22.1	31.9	23.4	
1989	POOR	24.7	14.0	20.3	17.2	23.6	17.2	24.9	21.5	
PARAGUAY	INDIGENT	6.5	13.3	13.5	11.8	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	
1990	POOR	20.6	29.1	29.1	27.1	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	
URUGUAY	INDIGENT	0.6	1.0	3.5	1.1	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	
1989	POOR	4.3	9.3	15.3	9.1	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	

Table 45
LATIN AMERICA (10 COUNTRIES): PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS AGED 65 OR OVER,
BY DOMESTIC STRUCTURE AND INCOME STATUS

		7	URBAN AREAS	REAS								14.	RURAL AREAS	REAS				
	П	Recipients		Non-	Non-recipients	8		TOTAL		Reci	Recipients		Non-re	Non-recinients	Γ	101	TOTAL	
Country Year		Alone Spouse Family	Family	Alone	Alone Spouse Family	Family	Alone	Spouse Family	Family	Alone 5	Alone Spouse Family	Family	Alone :	Alone Spouse Family	Family	Alone	Alone Spouse Family	Family
ARGENTINA 80		22.0	31.7	0.8	10.0	13.0	13.1	32.0	7.44	þ/L	p/u	p/u	7/4	מ	Ţ	7)4	7	1
98	15.7	23.7	31.0	0.3	9.1	9.3	16.0	32.8	40.3	Ŋ	þ	Ş	<b>2</b>		2 2	2 5	ב ב	2 3
8		25.9	58.6	0.5	8.2	8.8	17.6	34.1	37.4	p/u	Ş	Ş	ş	2	Ş	2	2 2	2 2
BRAZIL 79		15.2	47.2	0.2	5.7	11.2	6.8	20.9	58.4	8.0	14.0	8.64	0.1	6.3	12.2	ά -	20.3	000
87	11.7	16.8	45.0	0.3	4.9	8.4	12.0	21.7	53.4	2.6	16.6	51.1	0.2	4.6	7.8		21.5	58.0
8		15.8	£9.1	0.2	3.8	7.9	12.5	19.6	57.0	10.3	15.9	54.9	0.1	3.9	7.2	10.4	19.8	62.1
COLOMBIA 80	4.7	5.3	8.	0.3	3.6	44.5	5.0	8.9	78.6	p/u	p/u	<b>P/</b>	Ş	p/u	Ş	7	<b>5</b> /2	ž
98		4.2	35.6	0.8	2.7	43.4	2.2	6.9	79.0	β	p/u	þ	P/L	þ	2	7	2	2 2
06		6.2	39.1	9.0	3.0	38.5	5.2	9.2	97.7	p/u	β	P	Ş	Ş	Ş	Ş	2 5	2 2
COSTA RICA 88	6.0	8.7	37.7	1.5	5.7	31.0	7.5	14.4	68.7	9.9	7.0	39.1	2.4	6.2	31.5	06	13.0	70.6
06	6. 8.	8.4	4.4	<u>გ.</u>	4.7	21.4	8.1	13.1	65.8	6.8	6.7	43.3	1.4	6.3	26.8	8.2	14.2	70.7
CHILE 87	9.1	13.7	58.1	0.0	12	7	1	140	65.0	7.7	9	C L	9	;	;	ì	;	
8	10.0	14.1	5	4	2.	:		9 0	3 3	: :	2 9	2 6	3 ;	<b>:</b>	4.	4.	12.0	72.4
1	1	Ē	3	?	ò	3	2	0.		χ. 4.	12.1	29.0	0.1	5.0	<u>.</u>	8.5	14.1	68.1
GUATEMALA 86	4.5	9.2	33.7	6.0	4.0	39.1	5.4	13.2	72.8									
68	6.3	6.1	36.4	6.0	4.9	38.4	7.2	11.0	74.8	4.4	7:1	33.3	1.9	5.5	41.2	6.3	12.6	74.5
MEXICO 87	3.7	6.8	25.9	5.1	7.3	45.4	8.8	14.1	68.3	ρ	Ş	PZ	<b>p</b> /2	<b>5</b> /2		Ţ	Ţ	3
96	3.9	6.7	26.7	5.8	7.3	39.8	9.7	14.0	66.5	n/d	p/u	잗	2	<b>b/</b>	2	2	Ş	2 2
PANAMA 79	12.8	9.4	24.7	0.0	0.2		12.8	9.6	24.7	13.8	9.5	33.9						··-
98	13.5	1.0	36.1	0.1	4.3	21.8	13.6	15.3	57.9	13.3	1.1	34.7	9.0		20.6	13.9	15.4	55.3
68	12.5	11.3	42.1	0.3	2.8	20.0	12.8	14.1	62.1	11.3	11.5	39.0	7.0	4.2	21.0	12.0	15.7	60.0
PARAGUAY 86	7.8	9.2	4.3	0.0	5.5	27.8	7.8	14.7	69.1	p/u	p/u	D/Q	<b>b/u</b>	p/u		7/2	Ţ	
8	9.5	7.6	8.	0.0	2.7	28.4	9.5	10.3	66.5	ρ	ΡĮ	ş	p/u	Ρ	P.	ş	2 2	2 2
URUGUAY 81	14.5	23.0	41.3	0.0	3.7	1.4	14.5	26.7	45.4	ρĮ	ρ	P	<u>1</u> /d	p/u		Ę,	Į,	
68	17.4	27.6	37.2	0.0	5.6	5.6	17.4	30.2	39.8	ρ	D/u	2	p/u	Ş	2	Z P	2 2	<u> </u>

Source: ECLAC, Social Development Division, on the basis of household surveys conducted by the corresponding countries.

n.d. = no data available. -∵- = available information is not statistically significant.