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> THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL DETERIORATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN IN THE 1980s

> > Note by the Secretariat *

^{*} Reference document prepared by the ECIAC Social Development Division on Theme I, crime prevention and criminal justice in the context of development: facts and prospects for international co-operation.

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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

At this moment in time there is an awareness that the persistent economic crisis affecting Latin America and Caribbean countries has had a high social cost shown by the severe deterioration in the standard of living of broad social sectors and, particularly, an increase in unsatisfied basic needs in poorer social strata (G.A. Cornia, 1987; PRFALC, 1988b; ECLAC, 1987). This report is an effort to bring together and update some of the fragmentary and dispersed data existing in the region on this subject. It also attempts a general analysis of the dynamics of this deterioration. It is not, therefore, an "assessment" of the social situation—not everything has deteriorated since in many countries there have also been improvements in some areas—but a warning and a step towards defining those areas and negative social tendencies which should draw the attention of government planners and action in coming years.*/

On the whole, it suggests that there seems to have been a rupture in the social and economic development style which predominated in the region before 1982 (ECIAC, 1989). In the majority of the countries, there can already be seen what could be a new way of functioning of the economy which exacerbates some distorsions of the previous model --such as productive heterogeneity-- and to which new distorsions are added -- such as the already chronic shortage of capital, a virtual stagnation in the creation of highly productive jobs and a reduction in per capita public social spending. The social cost of the economic crisis has been greater or less and more or less equitably distributed in each country according to a complex causality which combines the seriousness of the economic retrogression, the policies applied to meet it, the growth rate of the population, the present stage of development of each country, the degree of democratic participation, and the strength of community and trade-union organizations. In almost all the countries, however, the new dynamics mentioned present a strong challenge to social policy in the 1990s; there is a real danger that the slow social progress achieved before could stagnate and the vicious circle of social problems which feeds itself could broaden. Particularly worrying is the increase in the number of young adults without sufficient access to education and productive employment, who are excluded from productive modernization, both in the countries of the region where the most rapid phase of development has been recent, now the majority, and in the less developed countries which have not yet taken off.

^{*/} The implications of these negative social trends must be taken into account in the formulation of crime prevention policies. This theme will be analysed in a document prepared for this meeting by the United Nations Latin American Institute for Crime Prevention and the Treatment of Offenders.


II. MAIN REPERCUSSIONS ON SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS

It is not the purpose of this paper to repeat the analysis of the "debt crisis" or of the economic growth problems presently confronting the region (ECLAC, 1988a). It is absolutely necessary, however, to stress some changes in economic trends which are central to the dynamics of the social deterioration analysed below.

The first of these economic changes is the negative flow of capital (see figure 1) which appeared for the first time in the region in 1982 as a result of the increase in foreign debt service, the pronounced drop in new loans and investments, and unfavourable market conditions for many of the region's exports. The result has been a net transfer of resources from the region to developed countries which, far from being conjunctural and limited to 1982, has been similar or greater in each following year (see figure 1). The persistence of this net transfer of resources and the difficulties for saving and investing this imposes, contribute to a notorious and equally persistent drop in historical rates of product growth (see figure 2) and, given demographic growth, in the value of the per capita gross domestic product in almost all the countries of the region. In fact, only Colombia and Cuba showed significant per capita GDP growth between 1982 and 1988. Starting in 1984, the GDP has grown significantly in Chile (see figure 3 and table 1 of annex 1), while in the other countries, in Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, and (in 1988) Panama, this key indicator stagnated or fell more than 10% and up to 39% in the last seven years. Inevitably, these retrogressions in economic growth and investment capacity have had negative effects on employment, income, and spending on social services and human resource training.

Figure 1


LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET INFLOW OF CAPITAL AND NET TRANSFER OF RESOURCES



Source: ECLAC, Preliminary Overview of the Latin American Economy (LC/G.1536), Santiago, Chile, 1988, p.38.

Figure 2

LATIN AMERICA: ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT




^aPreliminary estimate.

Figure 3

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT PER CAPITA: LATIN AMERICA AND REPRESENTATIVE COUNTRIES

11980 dollars a



Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures provided by the countries.

aFor 1950-1970, approximate conversion of 1970 dollars to 1980 dollars. For 1988, provisional

figures.

III. EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME IN THE CRISIS

1. Open unemployment

One of the most immediate and dramatic social effects of the foreign debt crisis was the strong increase in <u>open unemployment</u> in several of the countries of the region such as Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela (see table 2 of annex 1).

However, except in five countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras and Panama), open unemployment in Latin America had shown a general tendency in recent years to stabilize at historical levels (see figure 4). On the other hand, the social cost to labour of the economic crisis seems increasingly more apparent in other aspects, which already threaten to become chronic problems: the stagnation of employment in the modern sector, the low participation of wages in the national product, and the absorption of the work force in "residual" sectors of low income employment —that is, in less productive jobs within the informal urban sector and, to a lesser degree, in agriculture (see tables 1 and 2).


2. Recent change in employment structure

In the 1960s and 1970s, the sustained economic growth of the majority of Latin American and Caribbean countries was accompanied by a growing absorption into the modern sector of increasingly better qualified and more productive human resources, while unqualified labour in agriculture was rapidly diminishing as a proportion of the economically active population. This "structural occupational mobility" (ECLAC, 1989), although insufficient to reduce the relative size of the informal urban sector or the absolute number of poor persons, brought with it a growing number of relatively well-paid jobs in the formal sector, especially salaried posts in large and medium-sized private enterprises and in the public sector. But during 1980-1987 this positive dynamic was reversed in many countries and became negative.

In the first place, the creation of new posts in large private enterprises (on average, the most productive and better paid) has been practically stagnant for seven years in five of the seven countries where PREAIC has been able to provide detailed data (see table 3). Stagnation in absolute numbers can be seen in Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Colombia and Mexico. Only Chile (where there has also been a transfer of large State enterprises to the private sector and high unemployment) and Venezuela showed growth rates in employment in large private enterprises, barely equivalent to the growth rates of the total economically active population (see tables 3 to 9 of annex 1).

Figure 4

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT



Source: ECLAC, Preliminary Overview of the Latin American Economy (LC/G.1536), Santiago, Chile, 1988, p. 28.

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IATIN AMERICA: BREAKDOWN OF THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION, 1980, 1983 AND 1987 2/

Table 1

(Index 1980 = 100)

		E	Þ	Population employed	Informal	Fc	ormal urban s	ector
Years	EAP	Employed	Unemployed	in	urban	Public	Pri	vate
		population	population	agriculture	sector		Large enterprises	Small enterprises
1980	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1983	110.9	108.8	151.7	105.1	124.1	113.6	93.1	130.1
1987	124.8	125.2	116.1	112.7	156.1	132.4	103.1	155.1

Source: PREALC, <u>La evolución del mercado laboral entre 1980 y 1987</u>. Work document 328, Santiago, Chile, 1988.

Includes Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela.

Table 2

LATIN AMERICA: AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF THE POPULATION EMPLOYED IN AGRICULTURE AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT

*	1950-1960	1960-1970	1970-1980	1980-1987
 Population employed in agriculture 	0.8	0.7	0.3	1.7 ª/
2. Agricultural product	3.7	3.5	3.7	2.4

Fuente: ECIAC, on the basis of official information.

Cuadro 3

LATIN AMERICA: INDEXES OF ABSOLUTE GROWIH OF THE ECONOMICALLY
ACTIVE POPULATION BETWEEN 1980 AND 1987

¥	Economically active population (1980=100)	Population employed in the informal urban sector (1980=100)	Population employed in large private enterprises (1980=100)
Argentina	111	118	103
Chile	120	109	123
Brazil	129	170	102
Costa Rica	124	127	107
Colombia	123	148	105
Mexico	125	182	99
Venezuela	125	118	122

Source: ECIAC, on the basis of information provided by PREALC from official sources and household surveys.

PREALC, preliminary estimates on the basis of official information from seven countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela).

Meanwhile, the economically active population has shown steadily increased, although at highly varied rates according to the current demographic transition stages of the various countries in 1980-1987.

There have been two more general consequences of both phenomena. The first is a notable reversal from the historical decrease in the proportion of the population working in agriculture (see table 2), to an accumulated growth of almost 13% in seven years. The second consequence has been a staggering growth of the informal urban sector in many countries of the region. In Colombia this was 48% greater in 1987 than in 1980; in Brazil its growth was 70% and in Mexico 82%, according to PREALC data.

As a result, the informal urban sector (including self-employed non-professional workers or workers in non-agricultural private enterprises with fewer than 10 salaried employees) is estimated to be the segment which most increased its relative weight in the non-agricultural economic active population between 1980 and 1987 in all of the countries for which there is information (see tables 3 to 9 of annex 1). This situation is in contrast with the previous historical trend in the three decades previous to the crisis when the informal urban sector remained a constant proportion of the non-agricultural economically active population (García and Tokman, 1985). The inversion of the relative weight of formal and informal segments in non-agricultural employment and the growing difference separating them can also be seen in figure 1 of annex 2. As shown in the last tables mentioned, the remaining sector of the economically active population —the public sector—shows different trends according to the intensity of privatization policy in each country, but in no case recovers the role of massive generation of qualified employment which the public sector played in previous years.

3. <u>Impacts on income</u>

As a first approximation for understanding the impact of the crisis on income, the data collected by ECIAC (ECIAC, 1988a) indicate that both the minimum wage and average wages have developed very distinctly in the different countries and, in some cases, by 1988 would appear to have recovered their real value of eight years ago (see tables 10 and 11 of annex 1). However, some caution is necessary in interpreting these data. On the one hand, the minimum wage is a legal norm which may or may not correspond to wages actually paid. Also, because of the very high inflation rates in some countries (see table 12 of annex 1) salary and wage adjustments have been insufficient to maintain their real value, with few exceptions. On the other hand, the "average wage" mentioned refers almost exclusively to the industrial sector which both has the greatest trade-union negotiating capacity and least absorbs labour these years.

Data from household surveys provide a view more consistent with the trends observed in the economies of the region and in their labour markets. Actually, between 1980 and 1987, the industrial wage is the only wage which shows a slightly more favourable evolution than the per capita gross national income (see figure 2 of annex 2). Particularly notable is the drop in wages in construction, gateway to the modern sector for less qualified labourers.

A net effect is that total income from labour has grown less than total gross national income since 1983 (see figure 3 of annex 2). Another is that, in seven countries representing more than 80% of the regional population, taken as a whole, the average income from labour dropped strongly in all segments of the economically active population (see table 4). It increased only in Colombia (where there was growth in total product) and in Costa Rica (apparently due to trade-union participation in agreeing to a more equitable strategy for meeting the crisis).

As stated in the PREALC study, "... the way the region adjusted to the external problem of this decade was to compress wage levels more than was necessary to exactly compensate the drop in per capita national income ... It seems reasonable to think that these effects were not entirely inevitable ..." (PREALC, 1988a, pp. 25 and 32).

4. Income in the informal urban sector

Recent studies (Klein, 1988, ECIAC, 1988b) have emphasized the heterogeneous character of the quality of the self-employed manual jobs and the jobs in small enterprises. A significant subsegment of this statistical set, commonly used as a proxy/variable for the informal urban sector, shows a capacity to provide productive employment. However, probably the great growth of jobs in the informal sector has concentrated in "low income and productivity" jobs, jobs created by those who do them, disguised unemployment, or in small enterprises whose owners have taken advantage of the drop in the cost of labour by adopting relationships which more intensively use labour, frequently outside labour protection laws and social security. In fact, the average income in the informal sector dropped by more than 40% in seven years (see table 4).

Table 4

INCOME FROM WORK BY GROWTH a/

(Indexes 1980=100 and growth rates)

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	annual	Cumulative change 1980-1987
			EVOLUT	ION OF A	VERAGE L	ABOUR IA	ICOME		9	e s
From agricultural										
empl oyment	100	100.5	93.6	88.8	87.1	78.5	93.8	77.2	-3.6	-22.8
From private formal sector employment,										
large enterprises	100	98.4	99.8	90.4	90.1	93.4	95.5	85.1	-2.3	-14.9
From private formal sector employment,										
small enterprises	100	98.8	96.5	87.0	82.1	84.1	82.1	69.1	-5.1	-30.9
From public employment	100	92.7	90.2	80.7	76.4	79.3	76.0	68.0	-5.4	-32.0
From informal employment	100	88.1	80.6	71.5	68.0	67.1	68.1	58.9	-7.3	-41.1
FROM TOTAL EXPLOYMENT	100_0	94.8	91.6	81.8	79.2	79.9	82.6	72.1	-4.6	-27.9

Source: PREALC, La evolución del mercado laboral entre 1980 y 1987, work document 328, Santiago, Chile, 1988, p. 37.

a/ Includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and Venezuela.

IV. GOVERNMENT SOCIAL SPENDING: EQUITY AND HUMAN RESOURCE CREATION

State spending on health, education, nutrition, housing, social security, etc., serves two general functions in overall social policy. In the short term, it redistributes income from taxes, contributions, and loans paid by society as a whole in the form of benefits or "social consumption" which supplement monetary income and compensate its inequitable distribution. In the medium term, it raises the quality of the human resources of a country both by progressively improving the productivity of the labour force and by providing more personal capital, in the form of knowledge, to social sectors previously left behind.

This last aspect will be treated in section VI on possible future dynamics of social change. The first aspect, on the other hand, belongs to the evaluation of the income and consumption situation of the poorer social strata.

On the one hand, the trends vary considerably from one country to another with respect to relative social spending considered as a proportion of gross domestic product or total government spending (see tables 13 and 17 of annex 1). However, about half of the cases have shown a deterioration in one or both of these indicators for one or more social services, a trend which was not very frequently sustained before the crisis. If we take into account that both product and government spending have fallen in almost all cases while total population continues increasing, probably per capita social spending in real values has fallen absolutely in the majority of the countries. Evidently, this aggravates even more the panorama of the drop in monetary and non-monetary income of the majority, in its standard of living and in its ability to satisfy basic needs. The long-term repercussions are equally evident and especially negative for the evolution of human resources and in relation to the dynamic of social deterioration. In education, particularly, the prolonging of restrictive government policies which were supposed to be short term has already had an influence in the omission of some absolutely necessary investments. "It is different to claim that over a period of one or two years new investments cannot be made" in the educational sector, from following "a non-investment policy in educational services or other social sectors over a long period" (Lagos, 1988, p. 57). In some countries an increase in the number of pupils per teacher has already been noted (see table 18 of annex 1) as well as a tendency suggesting a growing dichotomization of the social structure: an increase in attendance at private educational institutions of children from families which can pay (see table 19 of annex 1).

These data are still too fragmentary to permit speaking with certainty of a clear trend. Indications in some countries of a deterioration in social services is a concern, however, although others seem to have been more successful in public response to present social needs.

V. RECENT TREND OF SOME WELFARE INDICATORS

The secular improvement of the main aggregate welfare indicators such as the rate of infant mortality or the mortality rate for children under five years of age is not immediately affected by fluctuations in the economic growth rate (see figure 4 of annex 2). These indicators are associated with other variables such as the dissemination of existing medical technology, the provision of State services, the increase in educational levels, the extension of communications, water and sewage infrastructure, etc., which have diffuse positive effects in improving gradually, but persistently, the basic conditions of mortality, sickness, and life expectancy and their delayed effects have a strong positive inertia.

However, with pronounced and very prolonged decreases in monetary and social income, even the semi-autonomous improvement processes inevitably lose momentum compared with the speed of progress before the crisis. This is logically predictable, particularly among the higher risk groups and social sectors which are the most affected by the reduction in productive employment, the drop in real wages, and the reduction in public social services with respect to growing needs. In fact, there has been no delay in the appearance of some indications of a drop in the rate of improvement of infant mortality rates (see figures 5 and 6 of annex 2) which are alarming even though they refer to specific populations. This is true above all when the deterioration happens in countries where these rates are still relatively high and it could have been expected that they would continue to decline even in situations of economic stagnation.

There is also fragmentary, but elequent, evidence relative to the most direct causes of the lack of improvement in infant mortality rates. Not only have the indicators of maternal-child care begun to fall again, but also in some countries and metropolitan areas, the indicators of child malnutrition, of underweight pregnancies, and underweight births have worsened or stagnated (Patiño et al., 1988; Macedo, 1987), all of which have obvious causal relationships with the danger of child death and are also a logical result of the deterioration of real income in low-income groups.

VI. THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL DETERIORATION: THE CHALLENGE FOR SOCIAL PLANNING

1. A wicked example

It is undoubtedly evident that the economic, political and social processes summarized here are closely interrelated. Simply put, the net loss of capital (among other factors) brakes economic growth and the creation of productive jobs; this leads to an oversupply of labour which, combined with austerity adjustment policies and measures to increase earnings from exports leads (especially with inflation) to a reduction in the real income of the poorer levels which is exacerbated by the reduction of governmental redistributive spending on social services. The final effect is of a persistent braking of the progress achieved by the basic social welfare indicators in the period before the crisis. The fact that the social cost has not only not been equitably distributed but, in many countries, has, to the contrary, fallen disproportionately on the less influencial majority, carries the serious risk of an increase in social conflicts, a situation which has already actually been seen in more than one country.

2. Economic prospects for the nineties

What are the prospects of aggravating or alleviating this negative dynamic? On the one hand, at the moment there is cautious optimism concerning the possibility of diminishing the net capital transfer from the region to the industrialized countries in a few more years (see figure 1) by changing the financial negotiation of the debt to an international political negotiation. Also, there are proposals and experiences of new growth impulses and new stimuli for economic competitivity, at least in the countries of the region with greater productive potential. However, there is still no forecast of a return of the strong positive flows of capital which helped to feed product growth in the sixties and seventies. To the extent that the recovery of competitivity rests exclusively on the sectors of greater productivity the present inequity could be maintained or increased even with economic growth.

It is known that before the crisis the concentration of income in many countries of the region was already very high with respect to other regions. The key difference from the present situation is that, before, growth allowed an absolute increase in the income of the lower levels while the expansion of jobs in the modern sector and the educational boom supported an expectation of rising social mobility for the poor (ECIAC, 1989).

These positive circumstances, which gave a degree of legitimacy to the style of development and made inequity more tolerable, are absent from both the present situation and medium-term possibilities.

3. Human resources and social mobility: changes in the educational and occupational situation of young adults

One of the relatively more precise methods for detecting the direction of medium-term changes in the socio-occupational structure is to examine the changes and recent situation of young adults (between 15 and 24 years of age). More than a simple evaluation of the present problems of youth or a projection of the human resources available to the economy, the purpose of the exercise rests on the possibility of analysing these human resources as holders of valuable personal capital, whose hopes for incorporation and mobility in productive employment over their future adult working cycles will be determined by a given range of employment opportunities.

Thus, in the sixties and seventies, the tendency for school attendance at secondary and higher levels to increase contributed directly to raising the average productivity of the work force, which found a dynamic demand for qualified labour, especially in modern non-manual services. This improvement of the educational level of successive new generations constituted one of the most important social advances of the decades prior to the crisis. Presently, one of the most worrying aspects of the drop in household income is the danger that youth from families which cannot continue to pay the cost (and the opportunity cost) of their studies will prematurely leave school. Data for recent years on school attendance rates, although they do not allow a detailed analysis, suggest important differences in the level and trend of the proportion of children and youth studying in different countries. In some, there are indications that, in recent years, the historical trend towards better educational coverage could be slowing down (see tables 20 to 24 of annex 1).

In the medium and long term, the probable consequence of today's adolescents prematurely leaving school is the creation of a growing mass of low-qualified workers competing for an always relatively decreasing number of productive manual jobs. Youths without secondary education are virtually condemned (since the great majority will not be able to return to school) to an adult life without socio-occupational mobility, since it has been shown that such a low level of qualification usually limits work prospects to alternatives such as cleaner, loader, street-seller, domestic servant, etc. (Martínez, 1985).

Before the crisis the following secular trend was typical of the socio-productive modernization process in almost all the countries of the region: increases, both among men and women, of the percentage of youth and young adults pursuing formal studies. However, preliminary data taken from household surveys suggests that, since the crisis, the percentage of young men studying has dropped at the secondary school level (15-19 age group) in some countries of the region.

Premature school-learning seems to coincide with a greater tendency for youth to seek paid work. Between 1970 and 1980, in the countries in process of social modernization, labour participation of young men tendend to decrease as their education was prolonged while young women, abandoning exclusive dedication to the home, increased both their educational attendance

and their participation in the labour force (ECIAC, 1989). In the period after the crisis, in contrast, labour participation of young men seems to have increased again in some countries as compared with the overall tendency of the adult population which does not seem to have changed (PREAIC, 1988, pp. 45-47).

At the same time as more youth seek work, they are the last to be hired and the first to be fired. In fact, the unemployment rate of the 15 to 19 age group in the crisis period doubled, tripled and reached up to six times the unemployment rate of active persons of about 40 years of age (see table 25 of annex 1). The doubt arising now is whether these youths (who in 1995 will be between 24 and 33) will manage to lower their unemployment rates in the future to the same levels as their seniors now or whether the development style emerging in the region is generating a growing population of unemployables. A different social problem is presented by the growing number of youth with higher education who cannot find suitable employment because of the above-mentioned stagnation in the formal sector. Although in the long term their prospects are less serious than those of the "unemployables" with little education, in the short and medium term the unemployed youths with higher education harbour strong frustration of their expectations based on the traditional role of secondary and higher education as a vehicle for rising social mobility.

4. The challenge and the independent variable

Although the fragmentary information available on education and employment is still inadequate for definitive conclusions, the mere fact that in many countries long-term progress seems to be slowing down, constitutes a relative worsening considering, above all, the strong present and future growth in the number of youths (see table 26 of annex 1). In various countries of the region, a challenge can be seen for the medium term in the form of the rapid growth of a subsector of adult society, uneducated and difficult to employ in the technified economy of the nineties. One should be aware of the possible social dynamics which could create in the region countries increasingly more dichotomized, inequitable, and where open social conflict is becoming a daily emergency.

The independent (or semi-independent) variable is public policy both in the immediate sense (such as alleviating the shortages and problems created by the style) and strategic (such as breaking the vicious circle of poverty reproduction through a multisectoral attack), and in the wider sense, such as creating development styles which increase equity, through a national project which brings together all the instruments of economic planning with the social instruments and which manages to mobilize the civic support of the majority.

Both the problems and the solutions they require are very distinct from one kind of country to another. At a more abstract level, social dynamics in a country where the educational level of youths is relatively high, but the creation of new productive jobs is slow for structural reasons (premature exhaustion of the rapid phase of productive modernization), is different from that of a country where the number of youths grows appreciably from year to

year, with a high percentage under-educated, but where the potential for productive modernization is greater, given its low initial level. Both need to find new sources of dynamism in the creation of productive employment and in the training of human resources to the level of technological change. However, particularly in the second case, a strategy satisfying the criteria of real development —that is, the conditions for increasing equity and progressively eliminating poverty and exclusion— will be more radically different from past styles, from the style imposed by the crisis, and from the orthodox formulas for imitative growth. To achieve this general purpose, and to design the three types of social planning enumerated above, it is absolutely necessary to carry out more empirical research on the various facets of the possible dynamics of social deterioration which this paper has tried to point out.

In conclusion, an analysis of the preliminary data suggests that the present economic crisis has social repercussions which go beyond the immediate present deterioration observed in the welfare level of large sectors of the population of the countries of latin America and the Caribbean. Prospects for the 1990s of predictable rates of economic growth, the creation of new productive jobs, and government resources suggest that a new social dynamic may arise lacking various processes of social progress which characterized the periods of rapid development, the sixties and seventies. Although the seriousness of the dynamics of deterioration or social stagnation will be more or less accentuated according to the particular characteristics of each country, an increase in social problems (especially those affecting the new generation of young adults who cannot realize their aspirations for occupational mobility through education and the rapid creation of new jobs in the modern sector) will be a challenge which social policy, in its overall formulation and in its various subsectors, will probably have to meet in the 1990s.

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ANNEX 1 - TABLES

Table I

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EVOLUTION OF PER CAPITA GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT

			Annua	il growth	races			Cumulative variation
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988ª	1981-1988°
Latin America (excluding Cuba)	-3.5	-4.7	1.4	1.4	1.6	0.3	-1.5	-6.6
Oil-exporting								
countries	-3.1	-7.5	0.1	-0.1	-3.3	-0.9	-1.4	-12.5
Bolivia	-6.9	-9.0	-3.0	-2.8	-5.6	-0.3	-0.3	-26.3
Ecuador	-1.8	-4.0	1.8	1.9	0.5	-11.2	5.0	-7.6
Mexico	-3.0	-6.5	1.2	0.2	-6.1	-0.8	-1.7	-10.6
Peru	-2.3	-14.1	2.1	-0.3	6.2	3.8	-9.8	-13.6
Trinidad and Tobago	-1.2	-15.0	-6.4	-3.3	-5.3	-8.1	-5.5	-38.6
Venezuela	-4.0	-8.1	-4.2	-1.4	4.0	0.3	2.3	-14.6
Non-oil-exporting								
cauntries	-3.7	-2.9	2.2	2.3	4.6	1.0	-1.5	-2.9
Argentina	-7.2	1.1	0.8	-5.8	4.4	0.3	-0.8	-15.2
Barbados	-5.2	0.0	3.2	0.6	4.8	1.4	2.1	4.3
Brazil	-1.4	-4.6	3.4	6.0	5.8	0.7	-2.3	1.5
Colombia	-1.1	-0.3	1.6	1.6	3.7	3.3	1.9	11,1
Costa Rica	-10.0	-0.3	4.8	-2.1	2.4	1.7	0.4	-8.7
Cuba ^b	3.3	4.3	6.5	3.9	0.3	-4.7	1.0	33.1
Chile	-14.5	-2.2	4.3	0.7	3.6	3.7	4.5	1.9
El Salvador	-6.5	-0.3	1.3	0.5	-1.2	0.8	-0.8	-15.2
Guatemala	-6.1	-5.4	-2.8	-3.3	-2.6	0.2	0.6	-19.5
Guyana	-12.6	-11.7	0.3	-0.8	-1.6	-1.1		***
Haiti	-5.2	-1.2	-1.4	-1.3	-1.3	-2.4	-6.8	-21.7
Honduras	-5.4	-3.6	-1.2	-1.9	-0.9	0.9	-0.2	-14.1
Jamaica	-1.5	-0.4	-2.2	-6.9	1.0	4.1	1.4	-2.8
Nicaragua	-4.0	1.2	-4.8	-7.3	-3.9	-1.7	-12.1	-27.4
Panama	2.7	-2.2	-2.6	2.6	1.3	0.0	-26.6	-24.0
Paraguay	-4.0	-6.0	0.0	0.9	-3.3	1.4	3.1	-3.0
Dominican Republic	-1.1	2.5	-2.0	-4.1	0.8	5.5	-1.3	1.4
Uruguay	-10.7	-6.6	-2.0	-0.6	6.3	4.5	-0.8	-9.8

Source: ECLAC, Preliminary overview of the Latin American economy, (LC/G.1536), Santiago, Chile, 1988, page 18.

*Preliminary figures, subject to revision.

*Refers to total social product.

Table 2

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT

(Average annual rates)

Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Argentina ^a 2.6 4.7 5.3 4.7 4.6 6.1 5.2 Bolivia ^b 7.1 5.9 8.2 8.5 6.9 5.8 7.0 Brazil ^c 6.2 7.9 6.3 6.7 7.1 5.3 3.6	1987 5.9	1988
Bolivia 7.1 5.9 8.2 8.5 6.9 5.8 7.0 Brazil 6.2 7.9 6.3 6.7 7.1 5.3 3.6		6.5
Bolivia 7.1 5.9 8.2 8.5 6.9 5.8 7.0 Brazil 6.2 7.9 6.3 6.7 7.1 5.3 3.6	- 2	
Brazif 6.2 7.9 6.3 6.7 7.1 5.3 3.6	5.2	11.7
	3.7	4.0
Colombia ^d 9.7 8.3 9.1 11.7 13.4 14.0 13.8	11.7	11.4
Costa Rica* 6.0 9.1 9.9 8.5 6.6 6.7 6.7	5.6	5.2
Chile ^f 11.7 9.0 20.0 19.0 18.5 17.0 13.1	11.9	11.2
Ecuador ⁸ 5.7 6.0 6.3 6.7 10.5 10.4 12.0	12.0	13.0
Guaternala 2.2 1.5 6.0 9.9 9.1 12.0 14.2	12.6	12.0
Honduras ^h 8.8 9.0 9.2 9.5 10.7 11.7 12.1	13.0	13.1
Jamaica 13.8 11.2 14.3 13.1 12.1 10.9 10.9	8.6	8.7
Mexico 4.5 4.2 4.2 6.6 5.7 4.4 4.3	3.9	3.6
Panama ^k 10.4 10.7 10.1 11.7 12.4 15.6 12.6	14.1	20.8
	5.6	
Paraguay 3.9 2.2 5.6 8.3 7.3 5.1 6.1 Peru 7.1 6.8 6.6 9.0 8.9 10.1 5.4	4.8	
Uruguay ^h 7.4 6.7 11.9 15.5 14.0 13.1 10.7	9.3	9.2
Venezuelaº 6.6 6.8 7.8 11.2 14.3 14.3 12.1	9.9	8.3

Source: ECLAC, Preliminary overview of the Latin American economy, (LC/G.1536), Santiago, Chile, 1988, page 18.

"National urban rate, average for April-October. 1986: October, 1988: May. "Whole country, official estimates. The figures are not strictly comparable over time because the geographical coverage of the surveys has been expanding of year by Metropolitan Areas of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Salvador and Recife, average for ^dBogotá, Barranquilla, Medellín and Cali, 12 months; 1980, average June-December; 1988, average January-September. average for March, June, September and December; 1985: average for March, July and December; 1986: average for April, June, September and December; 1988: average for March, June and September. 'National urban. Average for March, July and November; 1984, average March and November; 1986: average March and July; 1987; July. As from the latter data. the figures are not strictly comparable with the preceding ones as they correspond to the new Multi-Purpose Household Greater Santiago. Average for four quarters. As from Survey, in which there have been changes in the methodology. August 1983 data relate to the Metropolitan Region of Santiago. Since October 1985 the figures are not strictly comparable with the preceding ones due to changes in the design and size of the sample. Whole country. Official estimates. Whole country, official estimates, 1986: Urban Labour Force Survey; 1987: March, Central District. National average, April and October. Metropolitan areas of Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey, National urban, August of each year. From 1978 refer to average for four quarters; 1988: average January-September. Metropolitan Region. 1980: data from population census of that year. Asunción, Fernando de la Mora, Lambaré and urban areas of Luque and San Lorenzo, annual averages; 1981: first half of year; 1983: average for September, October and November; 1984: average for August, September and October; 1985: average for November and December.

*Metropolitan Lima; 1985: official estimates.

*Montevideo, average of four quarters, 1988: average of December. Country-wide urban rate, average for the two half-years; 1984 and 1985, country-wide rate; 1986: second half of year; 1988: first half of year.

Table 3

ARGENTINA: BREAKDOWN OF THE EAP 1980-1987,
EMPLOYED AND UNEMPLOYED POPULATION

		EAP				
Years	EAP	Employed population	Unemployed population			
1980	100	97.5	2.5			
1983	100	96.0	4.0			
1987	100	94.6	5.4			

Table 4

ARGENTINA: EMPLOYED POPULATION, AGRICULTURAL AND NON-AGRICULTURAL

W	Daniel at i au	Situation of employed population				
Years	Population employed	Agricultural	Non-agricultural			
1980	100	12.5	87.5			
1983	100	12.5	87.5			
1987	100	12.4	87.6			

Source: PREALC, on the basis of official information.

Table 5

ARGENTINA: FORMAL AND INFORMAL NON-AGRICULTURALLY EMPLOYED POPULATION

				Formal sector	
	Non- agriculturally	Informal		Pri	vate
Years	employed population	urban sector	Public	Large enterprises	Small enterprises
1980	100	26.3	18.9	41.8	13.0
1983	100	27.1	18.4	41.5	13.0
1987	100	28.8	18.8	39.9	12.5

Table 6

BRAZIL: BREAKDOWN OF THE EAP 1980-1987,
EMPLOYED AND UNEMPLOYED POPULATION

Years		E	AP
	EAP	Employed population	Unemployed population
1980	100	95.7	4.3
1983	100	95.1	4.9
1987	100	97.2	2.8

Table 7

BRAZIL: EMPLOYED POPULATION, AGRICULTURAL AND NON-AGRICULTURAL

17.	D1	Situation of employed populati	
Years	Population Employed	Agricultural	Non-agricultural
1980	100	28.8	71.2
1983	100	27.1	72.9
1987	100	25.4	74.6

Source: PREALC, on the basis of official information.

Table 8

ERAZIL: FORMAL AND INFORMAL NON-AGRICULTURALLY EMPLOYED POPULATION

				Formal sector	
	Non- agriculturally	Informal		Pri	vate
Years	employed population	urban sector	Public	Large enterprises	Small enterprises
1980	100	24.0	10.8	52.0	13.2
1983	100	29.6	10.9	40.5	19.1
1987	100	29.7	11.0	38.6	20.8

Table 9

COLOMBIA: EREAKDOWN OF THE EAP 1980-1987,
EMPLOYED AND UNEMPLOYED POPULATION

Years		E	AP
	EAP	Employed population	Unemployed population
1980	100	91.0	9.0
1983	100	88.0	12.0
1987	100	89.0	11.0

Table 10
COLOMBIA: EMPLOYED POPULATION, AGRICULTURAL AND NON-AGRICULTURAL

37	Marris and an	Situation of employed population		
Years	Population Employed	Agricultural	Non-agricultural	
1980	100	32.5	67.5	
1983	100	30.8	69.2	
1987	100	28.8	71.2	

Source: PREALC, on the basis of official information.

Table 11
COLOMBIA: FORMAL AND INFORMAL NON-AGRICULTURALLY EMPLOYED POPULATION

Non-				Formal sector	•
Non- agriculturally Informal			Pri	vate	
Years	employed population	urban sector	Public	Large enterprises	Small enterprises
1980	100	32.0	13.8	35.9	18.3
1983	100	34.4	13.1	31.0	21.4
1987	100	37.3	12.1	29.5	21.2

Table 12

COSTA RICA: BREAKDOWN OF THE EAP 1980-1987,
EMPLOYED AND UNEMPLOYED POPULATION

		E	AP
Years	EAP	Employed population	Unemployed population
1980	100	95.4	4.6
1983	100	91.0	9.0
1987	100	94.5	5.5

Table 13
COSTA RICA: EMPLOYED POPULATION, AGRICULTURAL AND NON-AGRICULTURAL

W	D11	Situation of employed populat	
Years	Population Employed	Agricultural	Non-agricultural
1980	100	27.8	72.2
1983	100	28.8	71.2
1987	100	26.5	73.5

Source: PREALC, on the basis of official information.

Table 14

COSTA RICA: FORMAL AND INFORMAL NON-AGRICULTURALLY EMPLOYED POPULATION

			Formal sector		
Non- agriculturally Informal				Pri	vate
Years	employed population	urban sector	Public	Large enterprises	Small enterprises
1980	100	28.6	26.7	29.7	15.1
1983	100	29.3	27.6	25.5	17.7
1987	100	29.1	27.2	25.4	18.3

Table 15
CHILE: BREAKDOWN OF THE EAP 1980-1987,
EMPLOYED AND UNEMPLOYED POPULATION

		E	AP
Years	EAP	Employed population	Unemployed population
1980	100	83.9	16.1
1983	100	74.7	27.9
1987	100	90.0	10.0

Table 16
CHILE: EMPLOYED POPULATION, AGRICULTURAL AND NON-AGRICULTURAL

V	D	Situation of employed population		
Years	Population Employed	Agricultural	Non-agricultural	
1980	100	19.7	80.3	
1983	100	23.7	76.3	
1987	100	23.5	76.5	

Source: PREALC, on the basis of official information.

Table 17
CHILE: FORMAL AND INFORMAL NON-ACRICULTURALLY EMPLOYED POPULATION

			Formal sector		
Non- agriculturally Informal				Pri	vate
Years	employed population	urban sector	Public	Large enterprises	Small enterprises
1980	100	36.1	11.9	34.4	17.6
1983	100	37.2	11.7	30.3	20.9
1987	100	32.1	8.6	34.5	24.8

Table 18

MEXICO: BREAKDOWN OF THE EAP 1980-1987,
EMPLOYED AND UNEMPLOYED POPULATION

		E	AP
Years	EAP	Employed population	Unemployed population
1980	100	95.5	4.5
1983	100	93.3	6.7
1987	100	96.0	4.0

Table 19
MEXICO: EMPLOYED POPULATION, AGRICULTURAL AND NON-AGRICULTURAL

Years	D2-a4	Situation of employed population			
	Population employed	Agricultural	Non-agricultural		
1980	100	29.5	70.5		
1983	100	28.4	71.6		
1987	100	25.2	74.8		

Source: PREALC, on the basis of official information.

Table 20

MEXICO: FORMAL AND INFORMAL NON-AGRICULTURALLY EMPLOYED POPULATION

Years	Non- agriculturally employed population			Formal sector				
		Informal urban sector	Public	Private				
				Large enterprises	Small enterprises			
1980	100	24.2	21.8	29.1	24.9			
1983	100	25.3	24.7	26.5	23.6			
1987	100	33.0	25.5	21.6	19.8			

Table 21

VENEZUELA: BREAKDOWN OF THE EAP 1980-1987,
EMPLOYED AND UNEMPLOYED POPULATION

Years		EAP				
	EAP	Employed population	Unemployed population			
1980	100	94.3	5.7			
1983	100	89.8	10.2			
1987	100	90.2	9.8			

Table 22

VENEZUELA: EMPLOYED POPULATION, AGRICULTURAL AND NON-AGRICULTURAL

Years	Denvil at law	Situation of employed population			
	Population employed	Agricultural	Non-agricultural		
1980	100	16.7	83.3		
1983	100	17.4	82.6		
1987	100	15.4	84.6		

Source: PREALC, on the basis of official information.

Table 23

VENEZUELA: FORMAL AND INFORMAL NON-AGRICULTURALLY EMPLOYED POPULATION

			Formal sector				
Years	Non- agriculturally	Informal		Private			
	employed population	urban sector	Public	Large enterprises	Small enterprises		
1980	100	25.8	25.6	39.8	8.8		
1983	100	27.4	26.6	36.4	9.6		
1987	100	25.0	22.8	40.3	11.8		

Table 24

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EVOLUTION OF URBAN REAL MINIMUM WAGES

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	19 8 6	1987	1988ª
		Annual a	verage in	dexes (1	980 = 10	0)			
Argentina"	100.0	97.8	97.8	136.9	167.7	117.1	111.1	122.3	95.8
Brazil	100.0	104.4	104.9	93.0	86.0	88.8	87.1	71.2	67.1
Colombia ^d	100.0	98.9	103.6	107.9	113.5	109.4	114.2	113.0	111.3
Costa Ricae	100.0	90.4	85.9	99.3	104.4	112.2	118.7	118.6	116.5
Chile ^f	100.0	115.7	117.2	94.2	80.7	76.4	73.6	69.1	73.4
Ecuador ⁸	100.0	86.2	75.9	63.6	62.8	60.4	65.0	61.4	53.6
Mexico ^h	100.0	101.9	92.7	76.6	72.3	71.1	64.9	60.6	53.6
Paraguay'	100.0	103.9	101.9	94.2	93.8	99.6	108.3	122.6	134.2
Peru	100.0	84.2	77.8	89.2	69.0	60.3	62.5	64.0	60.1
Uruguay*	100.0	103.4	104.6	89.6	89.9	94.1	88.3	91.1	85.6
Venezuela [']	100.0	86.2	78.5	73.9	66.5	96.8	92.3	95.3	76.2
			Percentag	e variatio	n‴				
Argentina	17.3	-2.2	0.0	40.0	22.5	-30.2	-5.1	10.1	-21.8
Brazil	2.6	4.4	0.5	-11.3	-7.5	3.3	-1.9	-18.3	-7.4
Colombia	2.5	-1.1	4.8	4.1	5.2	-3.6	4.4	-0.1	-3.0
Costa Rica	1.4	-9.6	-5.1	15.7	5.2	7.4	5.8	0.0	-2.5
Chile	0.3	15.6	1.3	-19.6	-14.4	-5.3	-3.6	-6.1	6.1
Ecuador	65.5	-13.8	-11.9	-16.2	-1.3	-3.8	7.6	-5.5	-12.6
Mexico	-6.7	1.9	-9.0	-17.4	-5.6	-1.7	-8.8	-6.6	-11.6
Paraguay	8.2	3.9	-1.9	-7.5	-0.5	6.2	8.7	13.2	9.5
Peru	23.8	-15.8	-7.6	14.7	-22.7	-12.6	3.6	2.5	-3.1
Uruguay	-4.6	3.4	1.2	-14.3	0.3	4.7	-6.2	3.2	-6.0
Venezuela	62.8	-14.1	-8.9	-5.9	-10.0	45.5	-4.7	3.4	-22.2

Source: ECLAC, Preliminary overview of the Latin American economy, (LC/G.1536), Santiago, Chile, 1988, page 20.

Preliminary figures.

National minimum wage. 1988, average January-October.

National minimum wage. 1988: average January-October.

National minimum wage. 1988: First half of year.

Minimum wage for upper urban sectors, 1988: average January-October.

General minimum official living wage. 1988: average January-October.

Minimum wage in Mexico City, deflated by the corresponding CP1, 1988: January-October.

Minimum wage in Mexico City, deflated by the corresponding CP1, 1988: January-October.

Minimum wage in Metropolitan Lima for non-agricultural activities. 1988: January-October.

National minimum wage for persons over 18 years of age. 1988: average January-September.

National minimum wage for non-agricultural activities. 1988: average January-October.

Compared with the same period in the previous year.

Table 25

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EVOLUTION OF REAL AVERAGE WAGES

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988*
		Annual a	average in	dexes (1	980 = 100))			
Argentina ^b	100.0	89.4	80.1	100.5	127.1	107.8	109.5	103.0	97.9
Brazil									
Rio de Janeiro	100.0	108.5	121.6	112.7	105.1	112.7	121.8	102.4	99.8
São Paulo	0.001	104.7	107.2	94.0	97.9	120.4	150.7	143.2	147.5
Colombia*	100.0	101.4	104.8	110.3	118.5	114.9	120.2	119.7	119.0
Costa Rica	100.0	88.3	70.8	78.5	84.7	92.2	97.8	•••	
Chile ⁸	100.0	108.9	108.6	97.1	97.2	93.5	95.1	94.7	100.9
Mexico ^h	100.0	103.5	104.4	80.7	75.4	76.6	72.3	72.8	
Peru'	100.0	98.3	100.5	83.7	70.1	59.6	75.5	80.0	52.7
Uruguay'	100.0	107.5	107.1	84.9	77.1	88.1	94.0	98.5	100.8
			Percentag	ge variatio	on ^k				
Argentina Brazil	11.8	-10.6	-10.4	25.4	26.4	-15.2	1.6	-5.9	-5.0
Rio de Janeiro	5.2	8.5	12.1	7 2	-6.7	7.2	8.1	-16.0	12.0
São Paulo	8.0	4.7	2.4	-7.3 -12.3	4.1	23.0	25.2	-5.0	-12.8
Colombia	0.8	1.4	3.7	5.0			4.9	-0.4	4.6
Costa Rica	0.8	-11.7	-19.8		7.3	-3.0			-0.6
				10.9	7.8	8.9	6.1		
Chile	9.0	8.9	-0.2	-10.7	0.1	-3.8	1.7	-0.3	6.7
Mexico	-2.9	3.5	0.9	-22.7	-6.6	1.6	-5.6	0.7	245
Peru	12.4	-1.7	2.3	-16.7	-15.5	-15.0	26.7	6.0	-34.5
Uruguay	-0.4	7.5	-0.3	-20.7	-9.2	14.1	6.7	4.8	2.3

Source: ECLAC, Preliminary overview of the Latin American economy (LC/G.1536), Santiago, Chile, 1988, page 19.

"Preliminary figures." Average total monthly wages in manufacturing. Average for twelve months. 1988, average "Average wages in basic industry, deflated by the CPI for Rio de Janeiro. Average for twelve January-September. ^d Average wages in manufacturing in the State of São Paulo, deflated by the costmonths. 1988, average January-May. of-living index for the city of São Paulo. Average for twelve months. 1988, average January-September. Manual workers in manufacturing (except coffee processing). Average for twelve months, 1988, average January-Average wages declared for social security members.

*Average remuneration of wage-earners in non-ral sectors. Average for twelve months. 1988, average January-October.

*Average wages in manufacturing. July. agricultural sectors. Average for twelve months. 1988, average January-October. Average for twelve months. 'Wages of private-sector workers in Metropolitan Lima. Average for February, May, Index of average real wages. Average August and November. 1987, average for twelve months. 1988, January-October. for twelve months. 1988, average January-September. *Compared with the same period in the previous year.

Table 26

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EVOLUTION OF CONSUMER PRICES

(Variations from December to December)

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988°
Latin America	56.0	57.5	84.6	130.8	184.8	274.7	64.5	198.9	472.8
Argentina	87.6	131.2	209.7	433.7	688.0	385.4	81.9	174.8	372.0 ^b
Barbados	16.1	12.3	6.9	5.5	5.1	2.4	-0.5	6.3	4.3
Bolivia	23.9	25.2	296.5	328.5	2 177.2	8 170.5	66.0	10.7	20.9b
Brazil	95.3	91.2	97.9	179.2	203.3	228.0	58.4	365.9	816.1 ^b
Colombia ^d	26.5	27.5	24.1	16.5	18.3	22.3	21.0	24.0	27.7^{b}
Costa Rica	17.8	65.1	81.7	10.7	17.3	11.1	15.4	16.4	23.2e
Chile	31.2	9.5	20.7	23.6	23.0	26.4	17.4	21.5	10.9
Ecuador f	14.5	17.9	24.3	52.5	25.1	24.4	27.3	32.5	80.5^{b}
El Salvador	18.6	11.6	13.8	15.5	9.8	30.8	30.3	19.6	18.0b
Guatemala	9.1	8.7	-2.0	15.4	5.2	31.5	25.7	10.1	13.4°
Guyana	8.5	29.0	19.3	9.6					
Haiti	15.6	16.4	4.9	11.2	5.4	17.4	-11.4	-4.1	8.38
Honduras	11.5	9.2	8.8	7.2	3.7	4.2	3.2	2.7	6.6
Jamaica	28.6	4.8	7.0	16.7	31.2	23.9	10.4	8.4	7.78
Mexico	29.8	28.7	98.8	80.8	59.2	63.7	105.7	159.2	70.5b
Nicaragua	24.8	23.2	22.2	32.9	50.2	334.3	747.4	1 347.4	7 778.48
Panama	14.4	4.8	3.7	2.0	0.9	0.4	0.4	0.9	0.28
Paraguay	8.9	15.0	4.2	14.1	29.8	23.1	24.1	32.0	16.8^{b}
Peru	59.7	72.7	72.9	125.1	111.5	158.3	62.9	114.5	1 307.1
Dominican Republich	4.6	7.3	7.2	7.7	38.1	28.4	6.5	25.0	57.3°
Trinidad and Tobago	16.6	11.6	10.8	15.4	14.1	6.6	9.9	8.3	6.08
Uruguay	42.8	29.4	20.5	51.5	66.1	83.0	76.4	57.3	68.5^{b}
Venezuela	19.6	11.0	7.3	7.0	18.3	5.7	12.3	40.3	31.2 ^b

Source: ECLAC, Preliminary overview of the Latin American economy, (LC/G.1536), Santiago, Chile, 1988, page 19.

^a Figures corresponding to the variation in prices over the last twelve month period ending in the month given for each country.

^b Corresponds to variations between November 1987 and November 1988.

^c Corresponds to variation between August 1988.

^d Up to 1980, corresponds to variation in the Consumer Price Index for manual and non-manual workers.

^e Corresponds to the variation between October 1987 and October 1988.

^e Up to 1982, corresponds to the variation in the Consumer Price Index for the city of Quito; from 1983 onwards, corresponds to the variation in the nation-wide index.

^e Corresponds to variation between September 1987 and September 1988.

^e Up to 1982, corresponds to the variation in the nation-wide index.

^e Corresponds to variation between September 1987 and September 1988.

^e Up to 1982, corresponds to the variation in the nation-wide index.

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Table 27

SOCIAL SERVICES: EDUCATION. SECTOR PARTICIPATION IN TOTAL PUBLIC SPENDING OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, BY COUNTRIES, 1970-1987

														o. varyyon				
Country	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Argentina	11.1	6.7	12.4	13.3	12.5	13.5	6.9	9.9	10.1	11.3	12.2	10.6	9.4	9.1	13.4	8.5	8.5	9.1
Bahamas								***	***		21.8	19.1	19.7	21.0	22.4	20.9	21.8	,
Barbados	20.4	21.8	22.8	23.4	20.6	22.8	22.4	19.7	20.6	22.1	21.1	21.4	19.1	20.5	21.0	20.8	19.0	18.4
Bolivia	32.3	28.6	20.5	22.7	29.1	23.2	25.6	25.2	29.3	32.1	27.3	26.3	13.5	31.5	12.9	19.8		4-4
Brazil	11.5	10.6	11.1	11.8	12.0	6.1	5.2	4.0	3.9	4.2	2.7	2.9	3.4	2.5	2.2	89 12	***	***
Colombia		16.9	19.3	20.3	20.3	21.0	22.5	16.8	24.8	26.3	22.7	24.5	23.5	25.0	24.4	1.0		
Costa Rica	26.8	31.8	30.4	30.7	32.6	35.3	33.5	34.5	33.3	32.4	29.6	27.3	24.1	22.7	21.7	22.5	22.8	
Chile	9.5	9.8	12.0	9.4	8.0	9.5	10.2	13.5	12.8	12.9	13.1	10.9	9.9	9.5	9.7	98		
Ecuador	***	***	•••				36.6	33.9	38.7	37.1	37.5	33.7	32.9	34.0	31.4	24.5	25.9	
El Salvador	23.6	27.6	25.0	25.3	25.9	22.6	23.2	21.1	19.7	19.3	18.3	17.8	18.0	14.4	15.9	16.2	***	
Guatemala			16.6	18.7	17.2	15.5	12.4	11.9	12.5	12.1	12.7	11.2	12.3	12.6	12.9	12.9	13.3	
Guyana	13.9	8.7	14.2	15.7	15.5	10.0	8.2	14.4	14.6	13.5	11.5	11.2	9.2	8.3	7.1	9,9	5.6	7.9
Haiti	6.9	6.0	5.5	6.6	5.5	4.2	3.4	3.4	3.4	4.9	6.7	5.7	4.7	4.6	1.4	4.5		
Honduras	20.3	20.9	22.6	23.9	20.6	16.3	17.5	15.1	13.9	14.8	13.4	16.9	15.8	16.0	14.9	19.1	19.9	19.2
Jamaica	14.1	15.6	13.8	16.1	15.2	16.5	15.4	15.8	14.4	15.6	17.4	16.0	16.6	17.5	16.2	15.6	***	
Mexico		16.9	15.2	14.3	14.8	16.3	18.6	21.1	20.9	20.0	17.3	16.7	12.7	10.1	104	10.6		
Nicaragua	19.2	17.5	17.6	15.9	14.0	14.0	16.2	16.2	11.3	12.8	10.6	11.8	10.2	8.6	10.6	12.0	11.7	,
Panama	20.6	20.1	19.0	18.6	20.0	16.8	16.2	17.1	18.8	16.0	17.6	17.4	17.3	19.3	18.2	21.3		
Paraguay	13.9	14.0	14.0	16.3	14.9	15.2	13.3	15.3	16.4	14.1	3.9	4.3	7.2	7.8	11.9	12.2	14.4	13.9
Peru	21.4	21.0	21.5	22.9	21.7	19.4	18.5	15.6	14.3	15.3	15.6	17.4	16.4	15.2	16.0	16.1	***	
Dominican																		
Republic		14.4	13.7	14.5	12.1	10.1	11.6	11.5	12.1	12.5	11.9	15.3	15.0	13.3	14.0	11.5	10.0	,,
Suriname		12.4	12.9	13.1	16.3	14.4	15.4			1.5	0.8	1.1	0.7	1.0	***	***	***	
Trinidad													100001009		400000			
and Tobago			•••	14.5	9.6	7.9	8.8	7.5	8.7	8.5	8.0	6.8	9.6	10.5	11.6	12.6	15.5	15.4
Uruguay			15.8	17.2	18.0	15.9	15.9	16.8	11.7	13.4	12.1	11.0	9.7	8.4	7.4	8.4		• •
Venezuela	16.2	16.5	18.1	18.6	9.6	11.8	14.1	14.0	16.3	20.3	17.5	16.9	16.2	19.6	17.0	18.6	17.7	٠.

Source: Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Report on economic and social progress in Latin America. 1988. Washington, D.C., 1988.

Table 28

SOCIAL SERVICES: EDUCATION. SECTORAL PUBLIC SPENDING AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY COUNTRIES, 1970-1987

Country	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Argentina	1.0	0.6	1.2	1.6	1.4	1.8	0.8	1:4	1.6	1.4	1.9	1.8	1.4	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.7
Bahamas							• • •			***	3.7	4.1	4.2	4.4	3.9	3.8	3.9	
Barbados	6.1	6.5	6.8	7.7	5.8	6.2	7.0	6.5	6.3	6.6	6.5	7.0	5.9	5.7	6.3	6.4	5.8	5.9
Bolivia	3.1	3.4	3.1	3.0	3.1	2.7	3.3	3.2	3.7	3.9	3.8	3.4	2.8	2.9	-1.1	2.4		***
Brazil	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.0	0.7	0.8	1.0	0.8	0.6	1.2	1.6	
Colombia		1.7	2.0	1.9	1.8	2.0	1.9	1.4	2.1	2.4	2.3	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.9	1.0		525
Costa Rica	3.4	5.0	5.0	5.1	5.1	5.5	6.0	5.5	6.0	6.2	6.2	5.0	4.3	4.6	4.3	4.1	4.3	
Chile	3.9	4.9	6.0	4.4	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.7	4.4	4.2	4.1	3.5	3.8	3.3	3.4	3.3		
Ecuador	2.8	2.9	3.3	3.7	2.8	3.1	4.6	4.5	4.3	3.9	5.3	5.4	5.1	4.5	4.1	3.7	4.1	
El Salvador	2.9	3.6	3.2	3.1	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.0	2.9	3.4	3.8	3.6	3.0	3.0	2.8		- * *
Guatemala			1.9	1.9	1.8	1.5	1.6	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.4	
Guyana	4.4	4.5	4.8	6.6	5.5	5.4	5.8	7.0	6.3	7.0	7.2	8.5	7.0	7.0	6.6	7.4	5.9	5.9
Haiti	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.9	1.0	3.1	1.2	1.1	1.0	1.0	3.3	•
Honduras	3.3	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.2	2.8	2.8	2.8	3.0	3.5	3.7	3.8	5.9	4.7	4.7	4.5
Jamaica	3.2	3.8	3.7	4.1	5.3	5.9	6.6	6.2	6.0	6.1	7.5	7.2	7.2	7.3	5.7	5.3		
Mexico		1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.7	3.0	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.6	3.4	2.6	2.5	2.6		
Nicaragua	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.3	2.5	3.5	4.2	4.2	5.5	6.3	6.6	5.8	
Panama	4.2	3.8	4.0	3.7	4.1	3.9	3.8	3.9	4.5	5.0	4.5	4.4	4.6	4.9	4.7	4.7		**
Paraguay	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.6	13	0.4	0.5	0.8	0.8	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.0
Peru	3.2	3.3	3.5	3.7	3.4	3.5	3.4	3.1	2.6	2.5	3.0	3.2	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.6	0.0	
Dominican															20 0000			
Republic	***	2.6	2.2	2.3	2.0	1.8	1.9	1.7	2.0	2.4	2.1	2.2	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.5	1 1	153
Suriname		4.0	4.4	4.8	5.8	5.7	7.1		***	0.5	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.5				
Trinidad																		
and Tobego		***	***	2.7	2.5	2.1	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.4	4.1	4.3	4.7	4.9	5.5	5.6
Uruguay			2.5	2.7	3.1	2.6	2.6	2.7	8.1	1.9	2.0	1.9	2.3	1.7	1.4	1.5		***
Venezuela	3.1	3.2	3.7	3.7	3.4	4.0	3.9	4.4	4.6	4.2	4.3	5.1	4.6	5.0	4.3	49	4.5	

Source: Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Report on economic and social progress in Latin America. 1988. Washington, D.C., 1988.

Table 29

SOCIAL SERVICES: HEALTH. SECTOR PARTICIPATION IN TOTAL PUBLIC SPENDING OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, BY COUNTRIES, 1970-1987

Country	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Argentina	3.7	4.2	4.1	3.8	2.7	3.2	3.9	5.3	3.7	3.4	3.3	2.5	2.1	2.1	3.3	2.4	3.2	3.3
Bahamas		***	***							***	14.3	12.1	12.7	13.1	15.5	15.1	16.6	300
Barbados	16.7	15.8	16.4	16.4	15.3	15.8	14.2	13.2	14.6	16.4	16.3	15.0	13.3	14.0	14.4	13.2	13.4	13.0
Bolivia	9.1	9.7	6.8	8.8	11.1	8.3	8.0	7.9	8.7	9.1	12.4	7.8	1.9	3.8	1.6	3.1		.,
Brazil	12.5	10.9	10.6	10.4	11.3	5.8	6.6	5.5	5.8	5.7	5.2	5.5	5.8	4.8	5.3	3.3	2.9	
Colombia	***	7.9	6.4	8.0	8.4	7.6	7.8	6.9	8.9	9.5	7.6	7.9	6.4	6.7	5.7	•••		
Costa Rica	3.1	8.1	6.2	9.5	7.2	6.7	6.2	5.5	6.7	5.7	7.9	5.9	6.2	5.0	6.3	2.6	2.4	
Chile	4.3	6.0	6.8	5.9	4.7	5.5	5.2	6.4	6.3	5.8	6.6	9.0	9.2	8.8	8.6	8.2		
Scuader			***				11.4	11.1	16.0	15.6	12.8	13.2	13.9	15.0	14.7	7.3	7.2	
El Salvador	10.5	10.9	10.1	10.6	10.6	10.6	9.4	9.2	8.4	8.6	8.3	7.7	7.2	6.6	7.5	6.8		
iuatemala		***	8.1	8.7	8.3	8.3	6.3	7.1	8.5	8.7	11.2	7.1	10.8	6.3	7.1	7.4	9.4	
Suyana	6.7	3.7	6.2	6.7	5.8	4.6	3.6	5.9	7.4	6.5	6.6	5.9	6.5	4.8	4.0	5.5	3.7	5.8
laiti	7.9	6.7	6.2	6.6	10.0	7.7	6.2	4.3	4.3	6.9	5.5	4.5	5.1	4.3	4.3	4.2	272	
Iond uras	9.1	9.1	8.9	10.6	10.3	7.3	10.1	8.0	6.4	6.7	6.0	7.3	6.7	6.7	5.7	8.1	11.0	9.
amaica	8.7	9.4	8.8	9.2	8.0	7.6	7.2	7.5	6.1	7.7	9.0	8.1	8.8	8.4	8.3	8.5		
dexico		3.1	3.3	3.0	2.8	2.7	2.7	3.2	3.4	3.1	2.4	2.2	1.1	0.6	1.1	1.1		
Vicasagua	5.9	7.1	4.2	5.1	6.0	8.1	6.9	5.3	4.3	10.7	13.4	12.7	10.6	7.5	7.3	9.1	13.3	
anama	9.3	9.2	8.9	8.6	8.9	8.4	7.5	7.3	6.6	5.4	6.1	6.0	6.0	6.9	6.9	8.0	***	
araguay	3.4	3.3	3.0	3.8	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.2	4.1	3.9	4.3	7.2	7.8	8.4	7.8	5.8	5.
Peru	6.3	5.7	5.9	5.3	5.3	5.2	5.9	4.6	5.5	6.0	5.6	6.0	5.2	5.4	5.8	6.0		
Ominican Republic		10.6	10.3	10.1	10.0	8.8	11.1	10.9	11.5	11.4	11.5	14.5	9.5	8.5	9.6	7.6	6.9	.,
uriname		8.9	8.8	9.2	8.9	7.7	8.4			1.2	1.2	0.8	0.8	0.6		***	•••	
Trinidad and Tobago				9.2	5.4	5.0	5.2	4.1	5.1	5.2	4.1	4.2	5.4	6.0	6.7	7.0	8.4	8.5
Jruguay			3.3	6.9	8.5	5.5	5.8	5.6	7.2	6.2	6.7	5.4	4.1	5.4	4.3	5.3		**
Venezueta	7.6	7.1	7.3	7.2	3.3	4.1	5.2	4.8	5.1	5.8	4.7	5.0	5.1	5.2	4.7	4.8	5.2	

Source: Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Report on economic and social progress in Latin America. 1988, Washington, D.C., 1988.

Table 30

SOCIAL SERVICES: HEALTH. SECTORAL PUBLIC SPENDING AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY COUNTRIES, 1970-1987

Country	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Argentina	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.6
Bahamas		***	,		•••	100	***		***	***	2.4	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.9	
Barbados	5.0	4.7	4.9	5.4	4.3	4.3	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.9	5.0	4.9	4.1	3.9	4.3	4.1	4.1	4.2
Bolivia	0.9	1.1	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.7	1.0	0.4	0.4	0.5	().4		
Brazil	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.7	1.5	1.5		***	663
Colombia		0.8	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.7	0.8	0.7		***	***
Costa Rica	0.4	1.3	1.0	1.6	1.1	1.0	1.1	0.9	1.2	1.1	1.6	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.2	0.5	0.4	1
Chile	1.7	3.0	3.4	2.8	2.5	2.4	2.1	2.2	2.2	1.9	2.1	2.9	3.6	3.0	3.0	2.7		
Ecuador	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.6	0.9	0.8	1.4	1.5	1.8	1.6	1.8	2.1	2.2	2.0	1.9	1.1	1.1	12.2
El Salvador	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.2	•	***
Guatemala	***	***	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.6	1.1	1.4	0.7	0.8	0.7	1.0	***
Guyana	2.1	1.9	2.1	2.8	2.0	2.5	2.5	2.8	3.2	3.4	4.1	4.4	4.9	4.0	3.7	4.2	4.0	4.4
Haiti	1.1	1.0	1.0	0.8	1.4	1.2	0.1	0.7	8.0	1.2	0.8	0.8	1.3	1.0	1.0	0.9		
Honduras	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.4	1.9	1.5	1.3	1.2	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.5	2.0	2.6	2.2
Jamaica	2.0	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.8	2.8	3.1	3.0	2.5	3.0	3.8	3.6	3.8	3.5	2.9	2.9	***	***
Mexico	***	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.3		
Nicaragua	0.7	1.0	0.6	0.7	1.0	1.5	1.2	0.9	0.9	2.1	4.4	4.6	4.4	4.8	4.3	5.0	6.6	
Panama	1.9	1.7	1.9	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.8	***	***
Paraguay	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.7	0.4	0.4
Peru	0.9	0.9	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.9	1.1	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0		
Dominican Republic		1.9	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.8	1.6	1.9	2.2	2.0	2.1	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.0	1.0	***
Suriname	***	2.9	3.0	3.3	3.1	3.0	3.9	***	***	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.3		***		
Trinidad and Tobago				1.7	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.3	1.5	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.7	3.0	3.2
Uruguay	***		0.5	1.1	1.5	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.1	0.9	1.1	0.9	1.0	1.1	0.8	0.9		
Venezuela	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.1	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.2	1.1	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.3	4.7

Source: Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Report on economic and vocaal progress in Latin America, 1988. Washington, D.C., 1988.

Table 31

LATIN AMERICA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT: SOCIAL SPENDING 3/, BY COUNTRY, 1980-1985

(Percentage of GDP)

Country	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Argentina	5.2	5.2	4.0	5.3	4.9	5.9
Bahamas	7.1	7.7	7.9	8.2	7.8	7.7
Barbados	16.3	16.6	14.3	13.8	14.9	15.6
Bolivia	6.0	4.8	9.7	n.a.	5.7	4.1
Brazil	8.6	9.3	10.6	9.5	8.7	n.a.
Colombia	4.5	5.0	5.0	5.1	5.5	n.a.
Costa Rica	9.8	7.9	7.3	8.7	7.8	8.5
Chile	16.8	20.0	25.3	20.8	20.4	19.4
Ecuador	11.4	12.2	11.8	10.8	9.9	4.8
El Salvador	6.2	6.2	5.8	5.5	5.9	5.1
Guatemala	6.0	5.5	5.2	2.8	2.8	2.0
Guyana	11.6	14-1	16.5	15.6	14.4	16.2
Haiti	2.2	2.3	2.8	2.3	2.3	2.2
Honduras	4.9	5.6	5.9	6.1	6.1	8.2
Jamaica	14.0	15.5	14.4	13.8	10.4	9.5
Mexico	3.8	4.4	4.9	3.6	3.6	3.5
Nicar ag ua	10.2	10.2	9.9	11.8	12.2	13.0
Panama	8.1	8.0	8.8	8.7	8.7	8.2
Paraguay	2.7	3.4	3.7	4.0	4.0	3.4
Peru	5.5	5.6	4.9	4.9	4.8	4.6
Dominican			, in			
Republic	5.4	5.5	3.2	3.1	2.9	2.7
Suriname	1.9	3.9	4.3	1.7	n.a.	n.a.
Trinidad and Tobago	8.8	9.2	12.2	13.1	13.7	14.0
Uruguay	8.3	8.7	13.0	10.3	8.3	8.2
Venezuela	8.3	9.4	10.0	9.8	9.4	9.8

Source: Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Report on economic and social progress in Latin America, 1988, Washington, D.C., 1988.

Includes education, health, social security, housing and other social services.
n.a. Not available.

Table 32 LATIN AMERICA: NUMBER OF PUPILS PER TEACHER IN PRIMARY EDUCATION

	1975	1982	1987 a ∕
Argentina	18	20	20 (86)
Bolivia	22	25 (84)	29
Brazil	22	25	24
Colombia	32	30	30
Costa Rica	29	33	32 (86)
Cuba	23	16	13
Chile	35	33	31
Ecuador	38	36	32
El Salvador	44	45	48
Guatemala	35	35	35
Haiti	41	43	40 (84)
Honduras	35	37	38 (84)
Mexico	45	37	32 `
Nicaragua	40	36	32
Panama	27	26	22
Paraguay	29	26	25 (86)
Peru	39	38	33
Dominican Republic	51	46	34
Uruguay	24	21 (83)	22 (86)
Venezuela	30	26	26

Source: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 1986 and 1987.

UNESCO, Sistema de Información Regional Integrado (SIRI), preliminary figures.

Table 33

LATIN AMERICA: PERCENTAGE OF CHILDREN REGISTERED
IN PRIVATE PRIMARY SCHOOLS

Country	1975	1980	1983	1984	1985	1987 a /
Argentina	17		•••	19	19	
Brazil	13	13	13	•••	• • •	12.3
Costa Rica	4	3	3	3		
Chile	18	20	27	29	• • •	35.3
Ecuador	- 17	16	16			16.6
El Salvador	6	7	8	•••		•••
Mexico	6	5	5.	.5		5.5
Panama	5	6	7	7		7.9
Peru	13	13	•••		14	12.1
Dominican						
Republic	12	12	13	•••	•••	•••
Uruguay	17	16	15	• • • •	• • •	•••
Venezuela	11	11	12		• • •	11.7

Source: Tedesco, J.C. (1987). Lagos, R. "Efectos del proceso de ajuste económico sobre la educación en América Iatina", UNESCO (1988).

2/ 1987, provisional figures from UNESCO, Sistema de Información Regional Integrado (SIRI) (1988).

Table 34

LATIN AMERICA: SCHOOL ATTENDANCE RATE

(Third level, gross rates by sex)

			1975	te to	¥	1981			1986	
		Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Argentina		27.2	28.1	26.2	24.0	22.2 (82)	25.8 (82)	38.7	35.9	41.5
Bol ivia		11.7	n.a.	n.a.	16.5	n.a.	n.a.	19.0 (85)	n.a.	n.a.
Brazil		10.7	n.a.	n.a.	11.6	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
chile		16.2	17.6	14.7	13.0	14.8	11.2	15.9 (85)	17.8 (85)	13.9 (85
Colombia		8.0	10.1	5.8	12.1 (82)	13.1 (82)	11.2 (82)	13.1	13.6	12.6
Costa Rica	(20-24)	17.5	n.a.	n.a.	23.5	n.a.	n.a.	23.8	n.a.	n.a.
tuba	(20-24)	11.0	n.a.	n.a.	19.9	17.8	20.6	22.5	20.1	25.0
cuador		26.9	n.a.	n.a.	34.1	42.2	25.9	33.1	n.a.	n.a.
l Salvador	(20-24)	7.9	10.4	5.4	5.7	7.9	3.5	14.1	15.9	12.3
iuatemala	(20-24)	4.3	6.5	2.0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	8.6	n.a.	n.a.
aiti	(20-24)	0.7	1.0	0.3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1.1 (84)	1.5 (84)	0.8 (84
londuras	(20-24)	4.6	6.0	3.2	9.7 (82)	11.1 (82)	8.3 (82)	9.5 (85)	11.0 (85)	7.9 (85
lexico		10.6	n.a.	n.a.	14.7	19.1	10.2	15.7	19.0	12.3
licaragua		8.3	11.0	5.7	12.2 (82)	13.1 (82)	11.4 (82)	8.7	7.5	9.9
anama		17.3	17.1	17.5	22.3	19.9	24.8	28.2	n.a.	n.a.
araguay		7.0	n.a.	n.a.	9.1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
eru		19.4	24.8	13.9	20.6	26.1	14.8	24.6	n.a.	n.a.
ominican					************	9		er and and an and a		
Republic	(20-24)	10.1	11.3	8.9	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	19.3 (85)	n.a.	n.a.
ruguay		16.0	17.8	14.2	15.9	n.a.	n.a.	41.6	n.a.	n.a.
/enezuela		18.1	n.a.	n.a.	22.3	n.a.	n.a.	26.4 (85)	30.6 (85)	22.1 (85

Source: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 1986 and 1987.

Table 35

ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN: GROSS RATE OF SCHOOL ATTENDANCE

(Third level, by sex)

			1975			1981	
		Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Barbados	(20-24)	10.0	n.a.	n.a.	18.7	n.a.	n.a.
Guyana		3.8	5.0	2.7	2.8	3.1	2.5
Jamaica		6.7	n.a.	n.a.	6.0	n.a.	n.a.
Trinidad ar	nd Tobago	5.1	6.0	4.2	4.8	5.8	3.8

Source: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 1986.

Table 36

LATIN AMERICA: GROSS RATE OF SCHOOL ATTENDANCE

(Secondary education, by sex)

			1975			1981			1986	
	*	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Argentina	(13-17)	54	51	57	60 (83)	57 (83)	62 (83)	74	68	79
Bolivia	(14-17)	31	n.a.	n.a.	34	37	31	37	40	34
Brazil	(15-17)	26	24	28	34	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Chile	(14-17)	47	44	51	56	51	60	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Colombia	(12-17)	39	39	39	46 (82)	45 (82)	47 (82)	56	55	56
Costa Rica	(12-16)	42	40	45	47	43	50	36	34	37
Cuba	(12-18)	48	44	52	75	72	77	86	84	89
Ecuador	(12-17)	39	41	38	53	53	53	55 (84)	n.a.	n.a.
El Salvador	(16-18)	19	21	17	20 .	19	21	24 (84)	23 (84)	26 (84
Guatemala	(13-18)	12	13	11	17	18	16	20	n.a.	n.a.
Haiti	(13-19)	8	. 8	7	12	13	12	18 (84)	19 (84)	17 (84
Honduras	(13-17)	16	16	17	32 (82)	30 (82)	34 (82)	33 (84)	31 (84)	36 (84
Mexico	(12-17)	34	41	28	51	54	49	55	56	64
Nicaragua	(13-18)	24	23	24	39 (82)	36 (82)	42 (82)	42	27 .	57
Panama	(12-17)	55	52	57	60	57	64	48	44	51
Paraguay	(13-18)	20	20	20	28	n.a.	n.a.	30	30	29
Peru	(12-16)	46	50	41	61	65	57	65 (85)	68 (85)	61 (85
ominican										
Republic	(13-18)	36	n.a.	n.a.	45	n.a.	n.a.	47	n.a.	n.a.
Jru gu ay	(12-17)	60	n.a.	n.a.	64	n.a.	n.a.	71 (85)	n.a.	n.a.
Venezuela	(13-17)	45	42	48	41	37	46	46	41	50

Source: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 1986.

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Table 37

ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN: GROSS RATE OF SCHOOL ATTENDANCE

(Secondary education)

		1975			1981			1986		
		Total	Mate	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Bar bed os	(11-16)	73	70	76	84	82	87	93 (84)	93 (84)	94 (84
Guyana	(12-17)	54	53	. 55	60	58	62	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Jamaica		58	53	63	60	n.a.	n.a.	58 (83)	56 (83)	60 (83
Trinidad	and									8
Tobago	(12-16)	51	49	54	72	71	72	50 (85)	48 (85)	53 (85

Source: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 1986 and 1987.

Table 38 LATIN AMERICA: GROSS RATE OF SCHOOL ATTENDANCE

(Primary school, by sex)

		1975			1980			1986		
		Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
rgentina	(6-12)	106	106	106	106	106	106	109	109	109
olivia	(6-13)	85	94	76	84	90	78	87	93	82
razil	(7-14)	88	89	87	99	101	97	105	n.a.	n.a.
hile	(6-13)	115	115	115	112	113	111	110	110	109
olombia	(7-11)	118	116	120	128	127	130	114	112	115
osta Rica	(6-11)	107	108	106	106	107	105	102	103	101
uba	(6-11)	124	126	122	108	111	105	105	108	101
cuador	(6-11)	101	103	99	113	115	112	114 ª/	n.a.	n.a.
l Salvador	(7-15)	75	76	74	74	74	74	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
uatemala	(6-10)	63	69	57	71	77	6 5	76	82	70
aiti	(7-12)	60	n.a.	n.a.	67	72	62	78 <u>a</u> /	83 <u>a</u> /	72 ª
onduras	(7-12)	88	89	86	95	96	95	102 b/	103 b/	102 b
lexico	(6-11)	109	112	106	120	121	119	114	115	113
icaragua	(7-12)	82	80	85	99	96	102	98	93	103
anama	(6-11)	114	116	111	106	108	104	106	109	104
araguay	(7-12)	102	106	97	103	107	99	99	102	97
eru	(6-11)	113	n.a.	n.a.	114	117	111	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
ominican										
Republic	(7-12)	104	n.a.	n.a.	114	n.a.	n.a.	133	1 31	135
ruguay	(6-11)	107	107	106	106	107	106	110	111	109
enezuela	(7-12)	100	99	100	109	n.a.	n.a.	110	110	110

Source: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 1988. a/ =1984. b/ =1985.

Table 39 LATIN AMERICA: UNEMPLOYMENT RATES BY AGE

Argentina a/	1980	1984	1987
15-19	6.8	13.5	15.2
20-34	2.5	3.6	5.4
35-49	1.5	2.4	3.3
50-64	1.2	1.6	3.6
Costa Rica	1980	1983	1986
12-29	9.4	13.1	9.6
30-49	2.1	5.0	3.1
50-69	2.4	4.1	3.1
70 and over	1.8	1.9	1.5
Chile	1980	1982	1985
15-24	20.4	30.5	24.3
25-44	7.4	17.6	10.8
45-54	6.2	13.3	7.2
55 and over	3.8	6.7	2.6
<u>Mexico</u>	1980	1983	1987 b/
15-19	12.2	18.9	11.9
20-24	6.4	10.8	8.2
25-34	3.0	4.2	3.4
35-44	1.4	3.1	1.7
45-54	1.7	3.1	1.8
55-64	1.7	2.4	2.4
65 and over	1.7	2.1	1.4
Peru C/		1984	1986
15-24		17.2	9.6
25-34		7.7	5.1
35-44		4.1	2.9
45-54		5.1	2.1
55 and over		4.2	2.6
Uruguay d/			1987
Under 25			23.8
Over 25		39	5.7
Venezuela	1980	1984	1987
15-24	11.5	23.2	16.1
25-44	3.9	11.3	6.7
45-54	2.0	6.6	4.2
55 and over	15.0	4.9	2.8
			

Source: PREALC, <u>La evolución del mercado laboral entre 1980 y 1987</u>, Work document 328, Santiago, Chile, 1988.

a/ October of each year; Greater Buenos Aires.
b/ Average of two quarters; Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey.
C/ Metropolitan Lima.

d/ Montevideo.

Table 40

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INCREASE IN ADDLESCENT POPULATION (15-19 YEARS), 1985-1995

Country	Absolute increase (in thousands)	Relative increase in 1995 (1985=100)
	7	
Argentina	760 357	131
Bolivia	226 986	134
Brazil	2 269 365	116
Colombia	202 053	106
Costa Rica	42 471	115
Cuba	-392 466	65
Chile	-61 827	95
Ecuador	230 687	122
El Salvador	161 644	130
Guatemala	325 882	139
Honduras	160 365	110
Haiti	83 315	113
Mexico	906 091	110
Nicaragua	132 263	136
Panama	18 950	107
Peru	450 428	121
Paraguay	90 227	123
Dominican Republic	49 943	107
Uruguay	25 594	110
Venezuela	394 252	121


Source: CELADE, <u>Demographic Bulletin</u>, Year XX, No. 40, Santiago, Chile, July 1987.

ANNEX 2 - FIGURES

Figure 1

LATIN AMERICA: EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURE, 1980-1987


(Percentages of non-agricultural employment)



Source: PREALC, La evolución del mercado laboral entre 1980 y 1987, work document 328, Santiago, Chile, 1988.

Figure 2


LATIN AMERICA: PER CAPITA WAGES AND INCOME, 1980-1987^a



Source: PREALC, La evolución del mercado laboral entre 1980 y 1987, work document 328, Santiago, Chile, 1988. aSeven countries.

Figure 3

LATIN AMERICA: WORK INCOME AND NATIONAL INCOME, 1980-1987^a




Source: PREALC, La evolución del mercado laboral entre 1980 y 1987, work document 328, Santiago, Chile, 1988. aSeven countries.

Figure 4 DEVELOPMENT GAPS


The narrowing gap

The gap between the industrialized world and the developing work is narrowing according to some social indicators such as the mortality rate of children under five years of age (MRC5)



The widening gap


The gap between industrialized and developing countries continues to widen with respect to per capita GNP.



Source: UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), J. Grant, State of the World's Children, 1989, New York, UNICEF, 1989, p.79.

Figure 5

VENEZUELA: EVOLUTION OF INFANT MORTALITY, POST-NEONATAL AND FROM ONE TO FOUR YEARS. 1973-1978-1983-1986*




Source: Castalla, V. and A. García (1988, Infancia y pobreza en Venezuela: los efectos de la recesión, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).

^{*}Shows only the 1986 figure for infant mortality.

^{**}Only information up to 1983 was available for this figure.

Figure 6
MUNICIPALITY OF SÃO PAULO – INFANT MORTALITY, 1979-1987



Source: Castalla, V. and A. García (1988), Infancia y pobreza en Venezuela: las efectos de la recesión, Caracas, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).