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MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND TRANSPARENCY IN DEFENCE SPENDING BETWEEN CHILE AND ARGENTINA

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UNITED NATIONS

ECLAC

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean

Chile and Argentina, neighbouring countries with a long history of cooperation but also friction over borders, have taken an important step forward with the official presentation of the technical study *Standardized Methodology for Comparing Defence Spending and Its Applications in Argentina and Chile*, prepared by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), upon request from both governments. For the first time, Argentina and Chile have an instrument for comparing defence spending.

This was the culmination of a process begun in 1998, when both governments requested that the United

Nations' Regional Commission prepare a technical report that would give them a standard, shared methodology for measuring defence spending. With this, ECLAC fulfils the official mandate of the United Nations to work to strengthen and maintain international security and peace.

During the official presentation of the document, José Antonio Ocampo, ECLAC's Executive Secretary said: "There is little study of the nature of public spending on defence in the region, or of its impact, effectiveness and efficiency, and its links with the development process. This study contributes to filling part of that vacuum."

He added that "more precise responses about the appropriate level of defence spending in our countries remains, in our opinion, within the sphere of national dialogues and therefore it would be premature for an institution such as ECLAC to express an opinion on this issue." In his judgement, the real result of the exercise is the accumulation of a "store of confidence and transparency between Argentina and Chile," along with the methodology itself.



A Qualitative Breakthrough

Horacio Jaunarena, Argentine Defence Minister, said that the technical instrument now

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EDUCATION AND THE LABOUR MARKET: LATIN AMERICA IS FALLING BEHIND

Latin American countries are falling behind their competitors in the key educational areas of upper secondary and technical education," concludes Beverly Carlson, in her study *Education and the Labour Market in Latin America: Why Measurement is Important and What it Tells Us About Policies, Reforms and Performance*, No. 114 in ECLAC's Desarrollo Productivo Series. The paper reviews the state of the art in the collection and analysis of related education and labour market indicators and considers the policy field from a regional perspective.

In recent years the trend worldwide has been to measure skill and human capital, particularly their relationship to economic progress. These measurements have revealed a much lower "functional" adult literacy than expected, and have shown that both literacy and education are major determinants of earnings in most countries.

Chile's experience as the first Latin American country to measure itself and publish its results, "is sobering," Carlson notes, "and shows the very large gap in basic

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LESSONS FROM THE ARGENTINE CRISIS

JOSE ANTONIO OCAMPO

The adoption of convertibility scheme in Argentina a decade ago was a legitimate effort to re-establish a viable financial and monetary system in a country that had lost confidence in its authorities' ability to manage the currency. Of all the possible alternatives, however, it offered the least margin for those authorities to manoeuvre. Argentina was the only country to make this choice: no other Latin American country in the grips of hyperinflation adopted a similar system.

The new approach worked well for a while. In particular, it produced a rapid recovery early in the 1990s that included re-monetization and the reconstruction of the financial system. Faced with severe external shocks, however, the lack of flexibility generated the most extreme economic cycle anywhere in Latin America. With the radical change in capital flows toward emerging countries triggered by the Asian crisis, this over-valuation turned into a structural crisis. Since the "exit costs" for the convertible system were explicit and high (in fact, in the eyes of its defenders, this was its main virtue) the authorities clung to the system and it collapsed, as it had in the past, amidst chaos and the massive withdrawal of deposits from the financial system.

This experience leaves us with three fundamental lessons. The first and main one is that faced with an unstable world, this system was no substitute for solid discretionary management on the part of

the authorities. This, in other words, is the only way to build "credibility". The second is the repeated lesson that, sooner or later, overvaluing the exchange rate will inevitably lead to a crisis. The third is that these problems are further deepened by the severity of the financial cycles that developing economies face today, as markets euphoric about "reform successes" suddenly swing into a "flight toward quality" that in turn leads to the massive withdrawal of external financing.

"...the lack of flexibility generated the most extreme economic cycle anywhere in Latin America."

An international financial system that generates crises with the frequency of the current system is deficient and must be reformed.

Alternative explanations do of course continue to exist. One of these suggests that prices and wages weren't flexible enough. In practice they were, although only modestly so. It must be remembered, however, that in the era of the gold standard it was discovered that flexibility was no panacea, and, prior to that, that it tends to make crises worse because the balances outstanding on debts aren't flexible and therefore their real impact rises quickly when deflation is present.

The other explanation is that there was a lack of fiscal austerity. This is partly true, but it is also true that the fiscal crisis was to a large degree endogenous: the contraction in productive activity, through its impact on tax revenue and higher country risk margins and therefore the higher cost of the public debt, generated a vicious circle in which cuts to primary spending were never enough to offset the deficit's tendency to rise.

The explicit abandonment of convertibility has not yet fulfilled the most pessimistic forecasts: there has been no explosion in the exchange rate or inflation. But the fact that it further intensified the contraction in the economy, which began during the second half of 2001 and worsened in December with the paralysis of the payment system, is critical. A recovery in productive activity and a better distribution of the proprietary costs and benefits of devaluation are essential not only to manage the social impacts of the crisis, but also to achieve the virtuous circle that contributes to sustainable public accounting and financial system recovery. International support for this is essential. The international community, private and multilateral, was no stranger to the crisis: nor can it afford to dissociate itself from the solution. 藥

The author is ECLAC's Executive Secretary.

available “could be a model for those nations that wish to deepen their relationships in confidence and friendship” and that, in the regional framework, “could be a concrete step forward toward a shared analysis of questions of international security, starting with the transparency of our defence spending.”

Mario Fernández, then Chile’s Defence Minister, agreed that this initiative constitutes “a qualitative breakthrough in bilateral Argentina-Chile relations in the area of defence.” He said it reflects how in less than a decade “we have moved the basis for intra-hemispheric relations away from the rivalry that arose during the prolonged stage of forming and consolidating our nation states toward association and cooperation.”

Both officials believe that these results open the way to cooperation throughout the region, an effect reflected in the recent agreement between Chile and Peru to develop a similar methodology, along with the interest expressed by other countries.

Given different governmental accounting criteria used in each country and the lack of research about public spending on defence, ECLAC proposed setting up a bi-national technical group, called the Advisory Group, to support the study, facilitate access to the required information, and make technical comments on the progress of this work. The process advanced steadily, with representatives of both governments reviewing preliminary drafts of reports, until a final version was reached.

In its first chapter, the final document explains the background for this initiative and the process carried out by both parties, with a special mention of the contribution afforded by the **Libro de la Defensa Nacional de Chile** (Book of Chilean National Defence, 1997) and the **Libro Blanco de la Defensa Nacional** (Book of National Defence, Argentina 1999). Chapter two examines the main international sources of public information on defence spending, particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and bodies such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the United Nations itself.

A concrete proposal for a shared standard methodology for measuring defence spending is included in chapter three. This examines the characteristics of the basic structures of the governments of Argentina and Chile and particularly their Armed Forces. The proposal defines a three-stage sequence (G₁, G₂, G₃) for measuring defence spending, that includes basic, broader (including pension spending by the Armed Forces), and total (which adds in certain spending by other industries and defence activities) spending.


In terms of the reach and coverage of these measurements of defence spending, the agreement refers to “national defence” that is “the protection of each country’s geographic borders from foreign threats”. Internal security spending has been excluded.

Along with this proposal, ECLAC provided a comparative exercise for the 1996-1998 period, which used qualitative and quantitative data from both countries. These figures were provided by national governments, as well as some external sources such as the IMF, the IISS, and “the itself”.



Some indicators for the 1996-1998 period

- The Argentine population was 35,672,000, while Chile’s was 14,621,000.
- Argentina’s Gross Domestic Product was US\$287.986 billion, while Chile’s was US\$72.306 billion.
- Per capita income in Argentina reached US\$8,072 compared to US\$4,945 in Chile.
- Basic defence spending in Argentina was US\$2,232 in 1998, with per capita spending reaching US\$61.8. In Chile, it reached US\$1,305 in 1998, with per capita spending reaching US\$88.
- On average, at the G₃ level, Argentina spends US\$3,191.1 million per year on defence spending, that is, 1.11% of GDP and US\$89.4 per capita.
- At the G₃ level, Chile spent on average US\$1,921.5 million on defence, 2.66% of GDP or US\$131.4 per capita.

The study was carried out during the last quarter of 1999 and August 2001, financed by both governments. 

This study, from the Seminarios y Conferencias Series, No. 14 (LC/L.1624-P, Spanish and English, US\$ 10 for a printed version), is available on our web site.

Defence Expenditure in Argentina and Chile: Selected Key Indicators, 1996-1998 (Annual averages for the triennium)

Indicators	Argentina	Chile
A. General		
1. Total population (thousand inhabitants)	35,672	14,621
2. Gross domestic product (millions of current dollars)	287,986	72,306
3. GDP per capita (current dollars)	8,072	4,945
B. Level G₁ (Basic), and complementary indicators		
4. Defence expenditure, Level G ₁ (Basic) (as a percentage of GDP)	0.79	1.79
5. Defence expenditure, Level G ₁ (Basic) (millions of current dollars)	2,270.4	1,293.2
6. Defence expenditure, Level G ₁ (Basic), per capita (current dollars)	63.7	88.4
7. Total expenditure of National Government (Argentina) and Central Government (Chile) as a percentage of GDP	15.35	22.01
8. Defence expenditure, Level G ₁ (Basic), as a percentage of total government expenditure	5.15	8.14
9. Payroll expenses (Personnel) in Level G ₁ (Basic) (millions of current dollars)	1,821.6	713.2
10. Payroll expenses as a percentage of Level G ₁ (Basic)	80.23	55.15
11. Number of military personnel in active service	77,920 a/	62,200 b/
C. Level G₂ (Expanded), including pension expenditures		
12. Net pension expenditures or net pension payments (millions of current dollars)	882.3	622.9
13. Net pension expenditures or net pension payments (as a percentage of GDP)	0.31	0.86
14. Number of retired or contributing retired military personnel	84,164	81,845
15. Defence expenditure, Level G ₂ (Expanded) (millions of current dollars)	3,152.7	1,916.1
16. Defence expenditure, Level G ₂ (Expanded) (as a percentage of GDP)	1.10	2.65
17. Defence expenditure, Level G ₂ (Expanded), per capita (current dollars)	88.3	131.0
D. Level G₃ (Total); National defence expenditure (including net pension expenditures)		
18. Defence expenditure, Level G ₃ (Total) (millions of current dollars)	3,191.4	1,921.5
19. Defence expenditure, Level G ₃ (Total) (as a percentage of GDP)	1.11	2.66
20. Defence expenditure, Level G ₃ (Total), per capita (current dollars)	89.4	131.4

Source: ECLAC secretariat, on the basis of official statistics.

Note: Differences due to rounding.

a/ Includes 20,550 volunteer soldiers. Source: ECLAC secretariat, on the basis of official statistics.

b/ Excludes 32,300 conscripts. Source: IISS, *The Military Balance 1998/1999*. Approximate estimate.

FINANCIAL VOLATILITY AND INVESTMENT: LATIN AMERICA AT THE START OF A NEW MILLENNIUM

GRACIELA MOGUILLANSKY

Financial liberalization and capital markets have allowed the region to attract foreign investment and expand its capacity for financing investment projects. At the same time, they have facilitated the spread of financial crises originating within or outside of Latin America. Each of these crises, which during the 1990s were more frequent than in previous decades, continually interrupted growth and financing. This led to more in-depth studies of the impact of unstable capital flows on investment.


Transmission mechanisms for the impact of capital flows and their volatility on investment occur in the macro and microeconomic spheres.

At the macroeconomic level, they affect the domestic interest rate, expectations for devaluation or revaluation of the exchange rate, inflationary pressures, and expenditure. The magnitude of the impact on these variables depends on the exchange rate regime in effect, monetary policy (if there are inflationary targets, how supply is set, presence or absence of sterilization policies) and the degree of financial openness (the existence or lack of controls on capital flows). How these policies combine creates a context of greater or lesser vulnerability if capital suddenly dries up or there's an international financial crisis.

Aside from the macroeconomic transmission mechanisms described, there is a microeconomic transmission mechanism that operates by amplifying and propagating the initial effects of financial or monetary shocks, acting as a "financial accelerator". This mechanism transmits along two channels. The first involves the "flight to quality", that is, the fact that international financing heads for lower risk countries when faced with a financial crisis inside the region or elsewhere. During booms, in contrast, flows are excessive and tend to encourage over-indebtedness.

The second operates through a "crowding out" mechanism in the case of crisis and a "crowding in" mechanism during booms. In the first case, banks concentrate credits on large firms, displacing financing away from small and medium-sized companies. In the second case, small and medium-sized firms not only get financing again, but are also encouraged toward over-indebtedness. Both the "flight toward quality" in terms of external financing and "crowding out" within the domestic financial system, and over-indebtedness during boom periods, make cycles more pronounced and asymmetrical, intensifying the initial recession derived from an international financial crisis.

Latin America: Volatility in Net Resource Transfers and Investment Coefficient over GDP by Decades
(Percentage, average for the decade)



Source: ECLAC data base

a/ Coefficient for changes in net transfers of resources from abroad during the decade

INDICATORS

Finally, as with political or economic instability, unexpected financial shocks affect the degree of certainty and the willingness to accept risk among agents. This is another route by which the volatility of capital flows affect investment.


An estimate of the effects of volatility on capital flows and the uncertainty thus produced shows that in the case of Latin America a reversion to 1% of GDP in capital flows reduces investment's participation in regional output by 0.64% directly, by causing financing to contract. If this flow reversion increases the volatility of same, causing greater uncertainty among economic agents, the result could be expressed in an additional 0.11% fall in the investment coefficient. This, without considering the impact that the reversion in flows could generate on the interest rate, the exchange rate, and expenditure, picked up in the function by the Keynesian accelerator.

Estimating the differentiated impact of coefficients on countries, we find that changes in capital flows positively and significantly affect investment only in one of the countries considered, Mexico. In the rest (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Peru), they contribute to feeding consumption, while flow volatility clearly weighs in negatively in most, except Chile and Costa Rica. At the time of this study, these two countries' economies were less open to international capital flows or had more control over the capital market within the selected set.




Negative Effects Can Be Mitigated


The same study permits the conclusion that openness to the international capital market has a favourable effect on regional investment during periods of financial liquidity, but given the unstable and volatile nature of flows can become a two-edged sword. One way of mitigating negative effects is by including barriers to capital flows during periods of enormous liquidity. This worked successfully for Chile at specific points in time, preventing the economy from overheating.

Another alternative is applying anti-cyclical macroeconomic (fiscal and monetary) policies, even in the restricted sphere of globalization. If the country is exposed to a liquidity trap, an insolvent financial system, or maintains a fixed exchange rate regime in a context of full openness of the capital market, monetary policy will be inefficient, and in that case, anti-cyclic policies should be based on the fiscal instrument. This requires better institutions, greater independence, and more flexibility in fiscal policy than are common today in most Latin American countries. Finally, defending small and medium-sized firms' access to credit at times of crisis leads to a review of financial legislation and the role of development banking. 


The author is an economist with ECLAC's Investment and Business Strategies Unit.



Source: ECLAC



Source: ECLAC



Source: ECLAC

competencies as well as the large internal inequalities that will need to be corrected.” The message is that countries must improve public education and make lifelong learning a high priority.

The four main problem areas for education in Latin America (high dropout rates, high disparity, low returns to education, low quality for low-income students) are the result of profound stratification that perpetuates rather than corrects income inequalities. ECLAC has found that completing secondary school (12 years of education) provides 80% of graduates with enough earnings to stay out of poverty, but also that young people from low-income families earn 30-40% less than high-income youths with the same education.

Providing the poor with better access to education and skills training and lowering access barriers to the labour market can significantly reduce inequality. Nonetheless, previous studies have concluded that the wage gap between workers with low and high education has widened, as the labour market pays a premium to more educated workers.

Essentially, Latin American countries are failing to supply enough trained youth to meet workforce demand. Carlson emphasizes that upper secondary graduation rates are significantly below where they should be, and recommends making education more specific to job market and national productivity needs, particularly for more trained scientists and engineers.

With the proportion of goods with medium to high technology levels rising steadily (from 33% in 1976 to 54% in 1996), educational shortcomings are particularly alarming. Carlson points out that the Latin American skill gap is growing rapidly, and even the developing countries of East and Southeast Asia as a

Unemployment Rates by Level of Educational Attainment 1998: Population Age 25 to 64					
Country		Level of educational attainment			
		Below upper secondary	Upper secondary and non-tertiary post secondary	Tertiary type B 3	Tertiary type A 4
		(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Brazil	men	5.9	4.7	2.7	3.7
	women	12.5	9.0	3.4	1.5
Chile	men	4.7	4.1	5.6	2.4
	women	3.6	5.0	7.7	2.3
Mexico	men	1.7	2.0	2.1	2.4
	women	3.3	4.6	1.9	2.6
Paraguay	men	2.6	2.8	3.5	2.8
	women	5.5	4.5	2.5	2.7
Uruguay	men	5.4	5.2	-	1.4 a/
	women	12.8	8.7	-	2.7 a/
OECD	men	8.9	5.3	4.3	3.3
Country mean	women	10.0	7.6	5.2	4.6

Source: B. Carlson, based on data from Education at a Glance: OECD Indicators 2000.
a/ All tertiary.

whole have now overtaken the Latin American region at the secondary level.

While nearly all youths complete upper secondary education in developed countries, just half attend and less than a third complete it in Latin America and the Caribbean, versus 75% in the newly industrialized Asian economies. These low retention rates are a particular problem in Argentina, for example, where for every 100 students who enter primary school, only 40 will start their last year of secondary school, and just seven will graduate from university. Latin America is also lagging behind other regions in dual system apprenticeship programs and vocational-technical education at the secondary level. One solution, suggests the study, would be to develop stronger links between academic and industrial sectors.

policy model has broken down, with highly specialized professionals taking over administrative and managerial positions which traditionally employed secondary graduates. More general university education could ease this situation. Increased post-secondary training for technical employment, as is already occurring in Argentina and Chile, would also help.

The relationship between education, employment and unemployment needs to be explored far more thoroughly, and better figures are necessary to evaluate earning differentials within as well as between countries. Initial figures suggest that the difference between women's and men's earnings among workers with the same education remains as in the past, or in some cases, has worsened in recent years. "A great deal of turbulence lies underneath the often-benign aggregate rates," Carlson warns.

Traditional Policy Model Breaks Down


Because the university systems in the region are producing more graduates than there are places the workforce, the basic

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The symbols used in this newsletter represent the various indigenous cultures of the Americas and some of the milestones in the region's history. The symbols are engraved on the outside of the conference rooms at ECLAC headquarters in Santiago, Chile.




Corn




God or Priest with Hoes



Mining and trade



Education, Suffrage, Planning



Nahua Glyphs



TIME FOR A WORLD ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATION

In their study, *Debt for Nature: A Swap Whose Time has Gone?*, No. 4 in ECLAC's Estudios y Perspectivas Series, Mexico-based researchers Raghendra Jha and Claudia Schatan conclude that creating a World Environmental Organization could be crucial to the future of North-South cooperation not only in terms of debt but above all in environmental terms.

Debt for Nature Swap (DNS) programs were born of the economic crises in the 1980s and 1990s, and sought to ease the financial burden then crushing developing countries. Several studies had found that repayment of this debt through higher exports was causing "serious environmental degradation."

First generation swaps focused on deforestation, mainly through complex private agreements, but multiple difficulties meant that from 1987 to 1994 just US\$177.5 million went to this mechanism. Nonetheless, with governments taking the lead for the second generation, significant improvements occurred.

Germany and Kenya were the first in 1988. Sweden, the Netherlands and eventually the United States, with its

Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI), followed soon after. After a slow start, the EAI saw official debt reductions for Bolivia, Chile and Jamaica, worth some US\$26.3 million by mid-1992, rising to US\$90 million in benefits to Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Uruguay, Argentina and Jamaica the next year.


Second generation DNS improvements included: the incorporation of public debt, which involved more resources, thus providing more continuous financing to groups handling environmental programs; the inclusion of public debt which also overcame the previous system's restrictions on debt transferral for environmental purposes; low threat of inflation, because disbursements were small and over longer periods.

Pending challenges arise primarily from the wide gap between international and national environmental agendas, with the former focusing on world heritage, global warming, etc. while the latter want to clean up city air, polluted lakes and rivers, and improve quality of life. Enforceability - and how to measure progress where so few indicators are available - is another problem.

Debt-servicing burdens, however, remain very severe and DNS has not been enough to remedy this, partly because there is a low correlation between high indebtedness and sizable forested areas within countries. Nonetheless, DNS usefulness to North-South environmental cooperation has risen with Agenda 21, particularly given that developed countries have failed to meet their target of contributing 0.7% of GDP to official aid.

Other international funding initiatives have performed well, but still fall far too short of targets. The most important, the Global Environment Facility (GEF), implemented by the UNDP, the UNEP and the World Bank, has provided US\$2 billion to more than 500 projects in 120 countries since 1991, as well as financing another US\$5 billion worth in public-private projects.

One potentially successful mechanism - if conflicts over land ownership can be resolved - is the Clean Management Development Mechanism that forms part of the Climate Change Convention, which allows industrial countries to meet emission reduction requirements by financing CO2 sequestration or renewable energy in developing countries. In Central America, where tropical forests are disappearing at a rate of 2.5% per year, trading up to 55 million tons of CO2 could bring in net income of as much as US\$1.1 billion, or over 10% of total regional exports, per year.

Nonetheless, the need for new creative mechanisms to transfer resources from the North to the South with environmental protection purposes seems particularly urgent. "DNS has a more important role to play in the environmental rather than the debt arena," the researchers write. They conclude that expanding the DNS to deal with water, air and other environmental issues, and bringing it under the direction of a World Environmental Organization would go a long way to standardizing procedures, servicing deals, and improving North-South environmental cooperation. 

First Generation Debt-for-Nature Swaps: 1987-1994

(Millions of dollars)


Country	Year	Cost	Face Value	Conservation Funds	Purchase Price (%)	Redemption Price (%)	Millions of dollars	Organization/Country
Bolivia	1987	0.10	0.65	0.25	15.4	38.5	2.5	Conservation International
Ecuador	1987	0.35	1.00	1.00	35.4	100.0	2.8	World Wildlife Fund
Costa Rica	1988	5.00	33.0	9.90	15.2	30.0	2.0	The Netherlands
Costa Rica	1988	0.92	5.40	4.05	17.0	75.0	4.4	National Park Foundation of Costa Rica
Costa Rica	1989	3.50	24.50	17.10	14.3	69.8	4.9	Sweden
Costa Rica	1989	0.78	5.60	1.68	14.0	30.0	2.1	The Nature Conservancy
Ecuador	1989	1.07	9.00	9.00	11.9	100.0	8.4	World Wildlife Fund/The Nature Conservancy/Missouri Botanical Gardens
Costa Rica	1990	1.95	10.75	9.60	18.2	89.3	4.9	Sweden/World Wildlife Fund/The Nature Conservancy
Dominican Rep.	1990	0.12	0.58	0.58	19.9	100.0	5.0	Conservation Trust of Puerto Rico/The Nature Conservancy
Costa Rica	1991	0.36	0.60	0.54	60.0	90.0	1.5	Rainforest Alliance/Monteverde Conservation League/The Nature Conservancy
Mexico	1991	0.18	0.25	0.25	72.0	100.0	1.4	Conservation International
Mexico	1991	0.00	0.25	0.25	0.0	100.0	n.a.	Conservation International
Jamaica	1991	0.30	0.44	0.44	68.6	100.0	1.5	The Nature Conservancy
Guatemala	1991	0.08	0.10	0.09	75.0	90.0	1.2	The Nature Conservancy
Mexico	1992	0.36	0.44	0.44	80.5	100.0	1.2	Conservation International/ USAID
Guatemala	1992	1.20	1.33	1.33	90.0	100.0	1.1	Conservation International/ USAID
Guatemala	1992	1.20	1.33	1.33	90.0	100.0	1.1	Conservation International/ USAID
Brazil	1992	0.75	2.20	2.20	34.0	100.0	2.9	Conservation International
Panama	1992	7.50	30.0	30.0	25.0	100.0	1.1	Conservation International/ USAID
Bolivia	1992	0.0	11.50	2.76	0.0	24.0	n.a.	World Wildlife Fund/Conservation International
Total Average		46.30	177.56	128.77	37.2	86.3	2.3	

Source: World Wildlife Fund, The Nature Conservancy and World Bank, 1994, pp. 165.

Note: For complete table, please see pg. 22 of document.

This document is available as part of the Estudios y Perspectivas Series at <http://www.cepal.org.mx/>

1 *América Latina: las Exportaciones de Productos Básicos durante los Años Noventa*, (*Latin America: Basic Product Exports during the 1990s*), by Valentine Kouzmine. Comercio Internacional Series No. 14, (LC/L.1634-P, Spanish, US\$10). This paper provides data and analysis of this important issue, given that the income of almost every country in the region depends on commodity exports. [www](#)



2 *Notas de Población N° 73*, (*Population Notes #73*), from the Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) - Population Division / ECLAC (LCI/G.2124, Spanish, US\$12 per issue, US\$20 for an annual subscription). Nine articles focus on international migration in the region: trends and patterns, new methodologies, social aspects, remittances, globalization, and protection of migrants. [www](#)

3 *Prevenir en Drogas: Paradigmas, Conceptos y Criterios de Intervención*, (*Drug Prevention: Paradigms, Concepts and Intervention Criteria*), by Ibán de Rementería. Políticas Sociales Series No. 53 (LC/L.1596-P, Spanish, US\$10). A review of the diverse concepts governing the prevention of drug consumption. [www](#)

4 *El Turismo Rural en Chile. Experiencias de Agroturismo en las Regiones del Maule, La Araucanía y los Lagos*, (*Rural Tourism in Chile: Agrotourism Experiences in the Maule, Araucanía and Los Lagos Regions*), by Jorge Schaerer and Martine Dirven. Desarrollo Productivo Series No. 112 (LC/L. 1621-P, Spanish, US\$10). Case studies of rural families and professionals working together to maximize existing potential, diversify the rural economy and create new jobs. [www](#)

5 *Elementos de Competitividad Sistémica de las Pequeñas y Medianas Empresas (PYME) del Istmo Centroamericano*, (*Elements of Systemic Competitiveness in Small and Medium Companies of the Central American Isthmus*), by René Antonio Hernández, Estudios y Perspectivas Series No. 5 (LC/L.1637-P, Spanish, US\$10). The working hypothesis is that one of the

obstacles preventing development of small and medium-sized firms is their isolation from production processes, rather than their size, supply sources or marketing outlets. [www](#)

6 *Instituciones y Pobreza Rurales en México y Centroamérica*, (*Institutions and Rural Poverty in Mexico and Central America*), by Fernando Rello, Estudios y Perspectivas Series No. 2, (LC/L.1585-P, Spanish, US\$10). A study carried out in Costa Rica and Mexico of strategies used by rural families who make use of social capital to escape from poverty. [www](#)

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6 - 8	Latin America and Caribbean Regional Workshop on Science and Technology for Sustainable Development, ECLAC / Harvard University	ECLAC
14 - 15	Meeting of the Project of Economic Policy of the Andean Countries, ECLAC / Ford Foundation Ford/ International Dialogue.	ECLAC
18 - 22	International Conference on Financing for Development, United Nations/ ECLAC	Monterrey, Mexico
20 - 21	International Seminar about Policies of Transit Control, ECLAC / GTZ	ECLAC
25 - 26	First Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Statistical Conference of the Americas of ECLAC	Rio de Janeiro, Brasil
26 - 27	International Conference Towards Regional Currency Areas, ECLAC / CEFI/ CDC/ CEPIII/ Revue Économique	ECLAC
APRIL		
2 - 3	Experts Meeting on Gender Impacts on Pension Reforms in Latin America, ECLAC	ECLAC
4 - 5	Seminar "Project Management of Volatility and Financial Globalization", ECLAC / Ford Foundation	ECLAC
8	Seminar on Mining Policy in Chile and Latin America, ECLAC / Faculty of Engineering of University of Chile	ECLAC
10 - 12	Seminar "Human Development and Participation", ECLAC / UNESCO/ Bolivarian University	ECLAC
22 - 23	Second Meeting of Ibero-American Ex-Presidents, "The Social Agenda in Globalization", ECLAC	ECLAC
MAY		
6 - 10	Twenty-ninth session of ECLAC	Brasilia, Brazil
15 - 16	Hemispheric Cooperation on Competition, ECLAC / Organization of American States (OAS)	ECLAC

