


LC/CAR/G.353

ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
Subregional Headquarters for the Caribbean

ECLAC/CELADE DEMOGRAPHY UNIT



CARIBBEAN POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT
TRENDS AND INTERRELATIONS:
A 1990-1991 ASSESSMENT

VOLUME 2

We wish to acknowledge with gratitude the financial assistance given by United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) under Project No. RLA/88/P61.




TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

PART I: INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

- A. Study Purposes and Contents
- B. Summary of Findings, Comments, Recommendations: Political, Geographic, and Economic Aspects of Population Size....Population Size and Growth....Fertility....Mortality....International Migration....Age Distribution....Urban/Rural Distributions....Population Policies....Demographic Data Shortcomings and Needs....Demographic Research Shortcomings and Needs....Population-Development Interrelations

PART II: 10 SETS OF DEMOGRAPHIC HIGHLIGHTS

- A. Comparative Political, Geographic and Economic Aspects of Population Size
- B. Three Distinctive Further Perspectives
- C. Population Size Dynamics
- D. Mortality Transition Dynamics
- E. Fertility Transition Dynamics
- F. International Migration Dynamics
- G. Age Distributions and Dependency Patterns
- H. Urban-Rural Distributions
- I. Population Policies
- J. Sex Ratios

PART III: UN AND EXTENDED CARIBBEAN DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITIONS: A CLOSER LOOK

- A. Introduction
- B. Mortality
- C. Fertility: Two Guengant reviews....Fertility survey indications....Fertility preference aspects....Contraceptive use patterns....Methodological aspects....Fertility differentials and their correlates
- D. Addendum III-A: Four recent fertility (DHS) studies....Westoff et. al.....Tactuk et.al.....Heath et.al.....Abdulah

et.al

- E. Addendum III-B: Demographic estimation uncertainties; Haiti's effect on Caribbean averages

BIBLIOGRAPHY TO PARTS I-III

PART IV: INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND URBANIZATION

- A. UN Definitions: Problems and Prospects: Early Approaches....The Changing Context of International Migration
- B. International Migration, 1950-85
 - 1. Main Trends: 1950-1965 Emigration to Mother Countries....1950-1980 International Migration Estimates....Immigrant/Emigrant Stocks....Variations in International Mobility

- Strategies....Intra- vs. Extra-Regional Migration:
1950-85
2. Migration-Demographic Relations
 3. Summary of Main Trends in Caribbean International Migration
- C. Urbanization**
1. Main Trends: 1950-2000 Urbanization Estimates....Underestimation of Caribbean Urbanization....Primate City Dominance and Uneven Population Distribution....Internal Migration and Rural-Urban Flow Estimates
 2. Summary of Main Trends of Urbanization
- D. Policy Implications of International Migration and Urbanization Trends: International Migration Policies....Urbanization Policies....Development Relations**
- E. Recommendations: Data Needs, Co-operative Measurement & Reporting**
1. International Movement Data Needs
 2. Needed Census Enumerations
 3. Extra-Regional Population Estimates
 4. Needed Sample surveys of Entries/Exits
 5. Needed Annual Estimates of International Flows
 6. Internal Migration and Urbanization Data Needs: Programs of Replicated Surveys of Mobility and Fertility "life courses" of individuals/households....New Research Program Initiatives....Re-examinations/Initial Examinations of Institutional Data Sets
- F. Chart IV.1. World Context and Evolution of UN Recommendations on International Migration Statistics**
- G. Tables IV.1 - IV.13**

APPENDIX IV.1. U.N. Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration

BIBLIOGRAPHY TO PART IV

PART V: POPULATION-ECONOMIC INTERRELATIONS

BIBLIOGRAPHY TO PART V

ANNEX TABLES 1-10

PREFACE

The present report has been prepared under special service agreement between analysts representing the Indiana University Population Institute for Research and Training and the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. The project was carried out under the direction of George J. Stolnitz, Institute Director and Professor of Economics, with the collaboration of Dennis Conway, Associate Professor in the Indiana University Department of Geography and with assistance from Adrian Bailey, now Assistant Professor in the Dartmouth University Department of Geography.

Dr. Barbara Boland, Population Affairs Officer of the ECLAC/CELADE Demography Unit of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean provided valuable contributions by developing the study's main terms of reference, by offering advice when needed at important research junctures and, not least, by serving to provide prerequisite source materials or information on how such materials could be made available.

Much thanks go to the Population Institute's Martha Zuppann for continual dedication and patience in managing all the report's presentational phases from initial to final manuscript.

**PART IV: MAJOR TRENDS IN
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND URBANIZATION**

A. United Nation's Definitions: Problems and Prospects

1. Early Approaches

Prior to 1950, the International Labor Organization, with its interest in international migration movements because of their implications for employment and working conditions, was the primary agency involved with recommending policies, measurement practices, and reporting on cross-border movements (Kraly and Gnanasekaran, 1987). Compilation of international migration statistics by the United Nations began in 1949 and its first recommendations with explicit demographic concerns were published in 1953 (United Nations, 1953).

A major objective of 1953 recommendations was to distinguish "permanent" immigrants from "temporary" visitors on the basis of their intended duration of stay (one year or more *versus* less than one year), using information on all arrivals and departures from a country with the exception of daily border or frontier crossings. Detailed demographic information was to be collected at admission for temporary and permanent migrants, refugees and transferred populations.

By the early 1970s, changes in both the volume and nature of international migration, as well as in national policy concerns with such movements, prompted UN evaluation and critical revisions of the 1953 recommendations. In particular, other agencies' interest in types of international travel suggested a

need for better co-ordination among agencies and countries in their measurement of travel and migration flows. Recommendations adopted in 1976 by the UN therefore constituted a new set of guidelines, one which focused on four areas of migration statistics: definitions, sources of data, topics to be investigated, and preferred tabulations and publications (United Nations, 1976). After considerable discussion and revision, these recommendations were published in 1980 as a technical report, which the authors admitted involved an "extremely complex conceptual framework" (United Nations, 1980). The recommendations were especially complex in their concern for data sources and the kinds of data required to produce estimates of migrant flows (Simmons, 1987).

In 1985, changes in international patterns of movements again influenced UN and national concerns for improved assessment of these processes. A United Nations report (1985) on "Consolidated Statistics for All International Arrivals and Departures" proposed that data on selected classes of international travellers -- tourists, students, businessmen, refugees, border workers and all classes of short and temporary travellers -- should be included in travel statistics and measured so as to be compatible with statistics on longer-term migrant flows (Simmons, 1987).

2. The changing context of international migration

A major problem with international migration during the twentieth century has been that its context and character have

been continually changing. World travel patterns, technologies and international relations and capital flows indeed the "new international economic (dis)order" (Thrift, 1986) have all been dynamic along with international migration patterns -- volumes, directions, mobility strategies and adaptations. Chart 1 below presented by Simmons (1987), relates world trends since the 1940s to changes in the United Nations' recommendations on international migration.

As can be seen, the decade prior to 1955 was largely shaped by World War II and its aftermath. International migrants included refugees and families seeking long-term residential displacements as a consequence of the East/West "cold war," the Korean war, and ongoing social conflicts and political change in South America, Africa and South East Asia. From the mid-1950s into the early 1960s national borders were relatively open among the industrialized, capitalist nations of the West in Europe and North America. There was also relatively easy movement from lesser developed European countries and many developing nations (belonging to pre-war "empires") to their metropolises. In addition international tourism, international travel for business and studies abroad began to increase rapidly.

The years since 1965, have witnessed considerable changes in the international contexts and nature of international mobility. Two tendencies can be identified: a tremendous expansion of international tourism, business travel and flows of students, businessmen and temporary repetitive visitors, combined with

selective shifts toward more restrictive entry regulations for long-term immigrants in "previously open" industrialized, advanced capitalist receiving countries (Chart 1). Today, the changing global economic system, with its ever-evolving realignment of relations among core and periphery nations, has generated contradictory forces in both source and potential destination countries. Policies to promote and facilitate tourism and business travel might confound or complicate legislative policies and administrative practices affecting the limits and selection of long-term immigrants. Thus, too, labor shortages which could be met by short-term contractual arrangements could become complicated by illegal "stayover" practices. Clandestine and illegal immigration could result from restrictive entry policies, while amnesty programs and voluntary return schemes appear to have had only short-term interruptive effects on the evolving complex system of international mobility (Massey, 1989). Concerns with unfettered emigration of needed human resources -- the "brain drain" phenomenon -- were complicated by concerns for balance in the exchange of international residents, given the match -- or mismatch -- between prevalent immigrant and emigrant characteristics (Harewood, 1975a, 1975b).

In sum, the rapidly changing context and nature of international migration since the 1950s has meant that the data on international movements which made sense in the early 1950s and 1960s were no longer appropriate in the 1980s (Simmons,

1987). While decennial census reporting can be a relatively straightforward method for assessing the size and characteristics of immigrant stocks, the many problems which are associated with estimating changing stocks through the use of censuses, especially those involving short-term migrations, call for the use of flow data. Such data, in the form of immigrant and emigrant yearly numbers, become increasingly problematic in terms of most needed definitions (involving especially duration of stay criteria) and measures (when legal and illegal movement are intermingle).

A critical factor in these respects has been that the UN recommendations have tended to be developed on the basis of governmental "hindsight," i.e. after changes have occurred, been measured and been appraised to be problematic. A major challenge to UN has been how to anticipate changing demographic and development contexts affecting both statistical objectives and policies on international mobility.

A second major challenge, specifically relating to the Caribbean region, is that the systematic source of international migration data, by the UN, appears to be considerably downward biased in its estimates and near-term projections of net emigration volumes. Interregional variations are likewise underestimated, as discussed towards the end of the following section.

B. International Migration, 1950-1985

1. Preview of main trends

The population history of the Caribbean has been dominated by immigration and emigration processes (Harewood, 1975b). Roberts (1955) has documented a succession of demographic change phases within the Commonwealth Caribbean which cogently reflects international migration's pervasive influence on the region. The period in question here, 1950-1985, represents Robert's latest phase, in which international mobility in many different guises has been widely adopted as a sustenance strategy by all classes of people throughout the region except in Cuba (Conway, 1989a). International migration continues to be an extremely influential force in the determination of demographic, social and economic transitions throughout the territories of the Caribbean region (Harewood, 1975b).

This review of main trends during 1950-1985 first deals with the trends in Caribbean "net emigration" to colonial mother countries during the period prior to the watershed dates of 1962-1965, when influential institutional shifts in immigration legislation among major "traditional" receiving countries dramatically altered extra-regional flow patterns and directions. Several Caribbean territories, such as Guadeloupe, Martinique, French Guiana, and the Netherlands Antilles, have retained their colonial ties with their European mother countries to the present, so that their institutional experience was relatively unchanged throughout the 1950-1985 period. Thus, Suriname's accession to independence in 1976 prompted a mass international emigration more in keeping with British West Indian exoduses of

the late 1950s and early 1960s. For the majority, however, 1965 signified a definite realignment of international mobility patterns and processes, with North America and the United States in particular becoming the dominant receiving areas for the Caribbean region as a whole (Conway, 1989a).

A second point to be addressed concerns estimates of continued high rates of international migration through the three decades to 1985. Contrary to opinions drawn from the experience of the 1950s, high levels of out-migration from Caribbean countries throughout the 1970s and the 1980s have continued. Conservative but reliable estimates of net emigration volumes of Caribbean countries reveal this and indirect evidence reinforces it, taking account of the fact that international mobility strategies used by Caribbean people have been widened to include illegal as well as legal modes of entry.¹ After a brief description of immigrant/emigrant stocks in Caribbean territories, movements within the Caribbean are compared to movements outside the region to the immediate neighboring mainland of North America. Severe data limitations prevent accurate quantitative assessment of the magnitude of flows within the region and indirect estimation procedures have had to be relied upon to assess extra-regional magnitudes. The section concludes with several generalizations concerning UN estimates,

¹The distinction between emigration and circulation as two different international migration strategies is significant and draws on theoretical arguments developed by the author (Conway, 1988, 1989a).

regional perceptions of "emigration estimates," and the author's "best estimates" of the main trends suggested by the available evidence.

a. 1950-1965 Emigration to Mother Countries

The 1950s were a period of sustained emigration to colonial "mother countries," with major reducing impacts on the population growth rates of many Commonwealth Caribbean territories (Reubens, 1962). Davison (1962) points out that there was an inverse relationship between income levels in the British West Indies territories, measured in terms of GDP per capita, and their degrees of emigration (with migration pressure measured by the ratio of passports issued between 1955-60 to population). Table IV-1 documents several of these emigration rates, shown as percentages. It will be seen that output levels per capita in these territories did not coincide with mass emigration outflows. Peach (1962) suggests that external factors, such as the recruiting activities of the central government and city corporations which accompanied the expansion of the U.K economy were equally significant "proximate determinants" of these post-1950 emigrations to colonial mother countries. Also involved were British debates on restricting immigrant entry, which prompted many to gain entry before the "door slammed shut" (Conway, 1986c, 1989a).

During 1955-59 West Indian migrations to Britain were on the order of 20,000 to 30,000 persons per year. As a result, some of the smaller Windward and Leeward Islands experienced depopulation: Montserrat lost over 30 percent of its population;

Carriacou, a ward island of Grenada, lost approximately 20 percent; Nevis, sister island to St. Kitts, lost 13 percent, and St. Lucia lost 9 percent. Habitually female dominated in terms of sex ratios because of male migration traditions, maritime absences, and temporary circulation habits, these small islands were severely impacted by their mass outpouring to the mother country (Momsen, 1986). Predictably, the influx to Britain reached a peak in 1960-1962, when emigrant hopefuls and family dependents learned of impending restrictions on entry and hastened to arrive before the deadline. The Caribbean's contribution to the mass influx of New Commonwealth citizens in the two years prior to the implementation of the restrictive Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962 was approximately 168,000 immigrants (Conway, 1989a). Freeman (1982) estimates that Britain's net migration total for 1961 was 66,300 West Indians and that flows were drastically curtailed after enforcement of the 1962 Act. Thereafter, net international migration from Britain's Caribbean Commonwealth fluctuated dramatically from a high of 14,848 people in 1964 to a low of 688 in 1969, to a net loss of 1,163 West Indians in 1971 and a last recorded net loss of 2,130 West Indians in 1973, after which the British Home Office stopped publishing such statistics (Freeman, 1982).

In the case of Puerto Rico and the United States, it was not until after World War II that mass international migration took place to the mother country. As a consequence of dramatic changes in the island's economic landscape, involving rapid

industrialization and urbanization along with rapid declines in agricultural production, there was soon a distinct upsurge of mobility trends. Between 1908 and 1946, 100,000 Puerto Ricans left for the United States and many chose to return home after working on the mainland (Senior, 1947). On the other hand, between 1955 and 1970 approximately one-third of the entire Puerto Rican population circulated and/or emigrated to the United States. Most (approximately 70 percent) made for New York City, so that by 1970 some 1.5 million Puerto Ricans were recorded in the United States, with 817,712 residing in New York City alone. By 1980 the resident Puerto Rican population on the mainland was estimated to be 1.8 million (Boswell, 1985).

Another U.S. "satellite" territory, Cuba, also experienced mass outflows of citizenry to the mainland "mother country". Between 1951 and 1959 approximately ten thousand Cuban exiles became naturalized citizens of the U.S. The major politically-induced exodus really occurred with Castro's ascent to power in 1959 (Boswell and Curtis, 1984). Between 1959 and 1962 "Golden Exiles" left their island en masse. Although the refugee flows were more intermittent later, approximately ten percent -- one million -- of the Cuban population left for the United States because of political motives during 1960-1979 (Moncarz and Jorge, 1982).

Emigration to the mother country and selective return migration were complementary strategies for relatively small numbers of French West Indians (from Guadeloupe. Martinique and

St, Martin) and Dutch West Indians (from Suriname, Aruba, Curacao, St. Maarten and Bonaire). Prior to the mid-1960s, the modest flows of Caribbean migrants to these other European mother countries were from the elite, professional and middle classes. A fair proportion returned after having gained an education, skills or professional training if their class allegiances assured employment in a suitable professional career or a prestigious position in society. But, there were also considerable "emigration leakages" of such favored youth (Conway, 1988), when the mother country beckoned with its more sophisticated urbane life and wider range of professional opportunities.

b. 1950-1980 International Migration Estimates

In a mid-1980s survey of Caribbean demographic trends, Guengant (1985) presents net international migration estimates for the period 1950 through 1980. For the Caribbean as a whole, the estimated loss has been over 4 million, approximately 25 percent of the natural increase between 1950 and 1980. The region's time trajectory for this period involved relatively modest emigration during the 1950s, accelerated exodus during the 1960s and continued unexpectedly high levels of emigration during the 1970s. Numerically, there was 845,000 net emigration during 1950-59, a more than doubling to 1.7 million during 1960-69 and another 1.7 million net outflow during 1970-79. In combination, such emigration represented a quarter of the region's 1950 population and one seventh of the 1980 population (Table IV-2).

There were many exceptions to these region-wide general trends. Indeed, Puerto Rico's trends were of an opposite kind. Almost half of the entire country's total out-movements (470,000) left in the 1950s, the movements slowed to 212,000 during the 1960s, and dropped to only 41,000 during the 1970s.

Cuban emigration experiences have reflected refugee flights, restricted permissions to emigrate during the 1970s, an irregular migration regime of mass outflows caused (or very much influenced) by direct institutional encouragement on the part of the receiving country, the United States, political manoeuvring by the Castro regime and an ebb and flow of political wrangling and diplomatic posturing histories by each of the two countries. The high 1960s volume of 475,000 exiles contrasts with the more modest outflow of 222,000 refugees during the 1970s.

Suriname's unprecedented mass exodus in the two years immediately prior to gaining political independence in 1976 was reflected by that country's dramatic decadal increase of out-movements from 27,000 net emigrants in the 1960s to an estimated (conservative) 97,000 emigrants during 1970-1979 (see Conway, [1989a] for an explanation of this panic-driven outflow of ethnic minorities). Other countries with upsurges of outflows in the 1970s included the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Guyana, Grenada, Dominica, Belize, Guadeloupe and Martinique. As will be noted later, the Haitian diaspora appears to have been an exceptional case. Guyana in most recent times is another troubled society, whose estimated emigration volumes could be considerably

undercounted. The Dominican Republic, where the most dramatic increase in outflow occurred between the 1960s and 1970s (from 175,000 to 450,000 net emigrants), certainly has been much affected by this abrupt acceleration.

The Bahamas, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and French Guiana, all had net immigration increases during the 1960s and 1970s. This apparent "migration transition" will also be treated later in the report. Finally, several countries had net emigration volumes in the 1970s which were 50 percent lower than in the previous decade: in Barbados the decline was from 38,000 to 15,000, in St.Kitts-Nevis from 17,000 to 8,000, in Montserrat from 3,000 to 1,000, and in Aruba from 10,000 to 5,000.

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) records of numbers of immigrants admitted on residency visas to the United States indicate a pattern of continuously high Caribbean emigration flows to North America during the twenty years after 1965. Between 1965 and 1985 emigrant volumes to North America assumed considerable importance in terms of their impacts on that region's current population dynamics (Table IV-3). For the Commonwealth Caribbean countries in contrast, the corresponding yearly volumes were lower than during the mass exodus years of emigration to Britain in 1955-1961. When comparing the aforementioned pre-1962 "mass exodus" of British West Indians to the United Kingdom (227,000 persons) to the post-1965 period of immigration into the United States, it is seen that twice the absolute volume departed to the latter destination. Particularly

during 1979-1985, the exodus from the same group of Commonwealth Caribbean countries to the United States was more than the equal of that to the "mother country" (Table IV-3). When Canadian immigration flows are added to those to the United States, the overall implication of this continued high level of Commonwealth Caribbean emigration to "North America" in more recent times, is further confirmed (Table IV-4).

A recent study of "The Future Flow of Legal Immigration to the United States" by the U.S. Government Accounting Office(GAO) concludes that projected moderate increases of immigration will be caused by larger numbers of "exempt-immediate-relative immigrants" over and above the annual entry totals of about 265,000 people. Jamaica and the Dominican Republic rank among the top ten sources so identified in the GAO estimates (GAO, 1988). According to the most recent enumerations of legal immigrant admissions to the United States prior to and immediately after the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), Jamaican, Haitian, Dominican Republican and Cuban admissions continued to be high in 1987 and 1988 (although many had been apparently illegally resident since 1982). These most recent records of U.S. legal entries suggest continued substantial volumes of Caribbean immigration as of the late 1980s, when estimated totals ranged from over 93 thousand in 1985 to over 122 thousand in 1988 (Table IV-5).

Reinforcement of the above observations concerning continuing high levels of Caribbean immigration to North America,

especially the United States, is recorded in the latest World Population Trends and Policies: 1989 Monitoring Report (United Nations, 1989b). In this recent assessment of international migration trends, the report finds that refugee settlement and family reunions have been the driving forces behind increased immigration to the United States despite that country's control systems. Whereas in 1970 about 77 percent of all admissions belonged to preference and refugee categories subject to numerical limitation, by 1985 that proportion had dropped to 55 percent. On the other hand, since refugees and immediate relatives of citizens, naturalized or native, are not subject to such limitations, high volumes of family member inflows and refugees from the Caribbean are to be expected in the near future (United Nations, 1989).

Comparisons between 1980 UN measures for several Caribbean countries of projected "net international emigration" amounts by decades during 1970-2000, and estimates of actual Caribbean immigration numbers during 1970/71-1980, further demonstrate the shortcomings of assuming declining "net emigration" levels (Table IV-4). Projected declines in 1980-1990 and 1990-2000 for countries such as Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana appear to be excessive, given the sustained trends of their migration volumes to North America during recent decades (Tables IV-3 through IV-5). On the other hand, the projections for the Windward Islands as a group, which the UN expects to experience considerable net outflows, are not suggested by its actual extra-

regional transfers to North America; such large outflows could only come about via intra-regional transfers (moves to other Caribbean countries). The latter outcome is unlikely, given the contemporary restrictions and controls of most Caribbean countries on immigration of unskilled categories (United Nations, 1989).

Pending the results of the recent, 1990/1991, round of decennial censuses, the 1980s international migration flow trends cannot be deduced with any certainty. Given the admittedly incomplete data available, firm estimates of Caribbean "net international emigration" for the 1980-1989 decade cannot be provided. However, it appears that reduced levels of "net emigration" which were expected in the 1970s and did not occur, were again lacking in the 1980s. Evidence from a combination of indirect measures, i.e. U.S. and Canadian official immigration estimates (aliens registered for entry), estimates of the "emigration leakage" from Caribbean non-immigrant entry cohorts (Kraly and Warren, 1989) and other indirect indications of the prevalence of "illegal overstaying," strongly suggest continuation of large Caribbean emigration movements through the 1980s and, with few indications of reductions, during the 1990s (GAO, 1988; United Nations, 1989b). Our understanding of the growing complexity of the modes of international mobility, both within the Caribbean and to North American and European external havens, lend added support to this tentative conclusion (Conway, 1986b, 1989a).

c. Immigrant and Emigrant Stocks

Decennial census reports in Caribbean destination areas allow examination of some national immigrant populations, even though the "place of birth" enumeration needed to identify immigrant stocks is irregularly reported. For example, specifics of regional national origins are obscured by tabulations such as "British West Indians" or "Other Caribbean" for foreign-born Caribbean immigrants in a number of countries, e.g. Jamaica and Antigua. Nevertheless, a region-wide comparison of foreign-born immigrant proportions can be useful.

Current estimates of foreign-born (migrant stock) percentages of resident populations in Caribbean countries indicate significant increases for almost all countries since 1960 as well as for most ex-colonies (Table IV-6A). Proportions range from a negligible 0.3 percent foreign born in Haiti, to 50 percent in the United States Virgin Islands. Large Caribbean countries generally have small foreign immigrant stocks, such as Haiti with 0.3 percent, Cuba with 1.5 percent, the Dominican Republic with 0.8 percent and Jamaica with 1.5 percent. Guyana is the only country with a relatively small population and an equally small foreign stock sub-population, 0.8 percent. In contrast, several small territories show appreciable foreign stock proportions: the U.S. Virgin Islands with almost 50 percent, the British Virgin Islands with 35.2 percent, French Guiana with 43.6 percent, Bermuda with 26.2 percent and the Cayman Islands with 25.4 percent. In contrast, other Caribbean

countries equally small in area and population have small foreign stock proportions: St. Vincent and the Grenadines with 2.2 percent, St. Lucia with 3.1 percent, Grenada with 2.7 percent, and Dominica with 2.4 percent. These Windward islands (with the exception of St. Lucia) have also experienced declines in foreign-born proportions during the period 1960 to 1980, a trend contrary to the region as a whole. An interesting comparison is between two of the French Departments D'Outre Mer; Guadeloupe has a relatively large foreign population proportion (11 percent), but Martinique has only a small proportion (0.8 percent). An intermediate group of territories, including Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Puerto Rico, St. Kitts and Nevis and Trinidad and Tobago, with percentages above 6 percent and below 20 percent, make up the remainder (Table IV-6A). Where temporal differences are recorded, increases in foreign-born proportions during the period 1960 to 1980 have occurred in Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, the Cayman Islands, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Turks and Caicos. This trend suggests, but scarcely confirms, the possibility of replacement effects, according to which immigrants are replacing native emigrants. This has also been suggested by McElroy and de Albuquerque (1988) in their depictions of small Caribbean islands like the Cayman Islands, the Bahamas, Turks and Caicos and the U.S. and British Virgin Islands as undergoing "migration transitions."

The 1980/1981 Commonwealth Caribbean censuses provide data

for a selective examination of four regional areas for which main intra-Caribbean movements can be deduced from immigrant stock proportions (Table IV-6B). All four geographically dispersed cases experienced increases in foreign-born proportions from 1960 to 1980. In Barbados significant streams from St. Lucia and St. Vincent are evident, with Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago also contributing appreciable proportions. In the British Virgin Islands, St. Kitts-Nevis was the dominant immigrant source. St. Lucia did not really have any dominant immigrant population, although Guyanese were recorded as the most populous group of any Caribbean origin. Trinidad and Tobago, on the other hand, had two distinct Caribbean immigrant populations, from Grenada and St. Vincent. These census enumerations confirm historical findings of persistent traditional inter-island migration between certain small islands (Conway, 1989a). This is briefly treated later below.

Emigrant populations outside the region are much larger in size. Although the historical record demonstrates the emergence and continuation of emigrant streams to mother countries and other Americas, current estimates of Caribbean people resident outside the Caribbean are somewhat speculative. Definitional categories of residency, citizenship and legality status vary across the major receiving countries and regions, i.e. Europe, the United States and Canada, and estimates of the volumes in the expatriate communities do not rest on firm statistical data (see Tables 7A and 7B).

A recent estimate by Boswell suggests that the percentage of Caribbean people living outside the region approximates 24 percent of the region's 1980 population, a total of almost 7.5 million expatriates. Almost 80 percent of these are believed to be resident in the United States, 16 percent in Europe, and 5 percent in Canada. Country estimates of overseas populations range from over 2.5 million Puerto Ricans, over one million Cubans, 800,000 Dominican Republicans and Haitians, and 600,000 British West Indians in the United States, plus 650,000 West Indians in the United Kingdom, 300,000 West Indians in their French mother country, and 210,000 Dutch West Indians in the Netherlands. Canada is believed to contain over 350,000 Caribbean people, mainly from Haiti and the Commonwealth Caribbean (Boswell, 1989).

The latest estimates provided by the United Nations in its 1989 "Monitoring Report," (1990) are drawn from CELADE measures and differ considerably from the Boswell (1989) data (Table IV-7B). The CELADE estimates of Latin American and Caribbean origin populations living in other American receiving countries are considerably lower than Boswell's more general estimates. Thus the Cuban population resident in North America is estimated to be only 627,500 persons, compared to the above 1 million, while only 187,600 Dominican Republicans and only 120,800 Haitians are recorded as resident in the United States and Canada, compared to Boswell's 800,000 estimate. If we use the CELADE estimates as a lower bound, and Boswell's estimates as an upper bound, the

suggested expatriate volumes still appear to represent a considerable proportion of the Caribbean's native population who have left the region and thereby contributed to a lower rate of population growth.

d. Variations in International Mobility Strategies

Over the last twenty years, or since major changes have taken place in North American immigration policies (in 1962 for Canada, 1965 for the United States), circulation (intentionally temporary moves to the mainland and returns, often repeated) and unmeasured "illegal overstaying" approaches are becoming recognized as significant means for Caribbean people to achieve international sojourns in North America (Chaney, 1985; Conway, 1986a, 1988, 1989a; Marshall, 1985; U.S. Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, 1981). Increasingly, there is a perception that the temporary presence of persons (staying less than a year) can have important socio-economic effects on their countries of sojourn (Zlotnik, 1987).

Estimates of the increasing significance of Caribbean "visiting" patterns can be garnered from the Immigration and Naturalization Service records of non-immigrant volumes admitted to the United States during the period 1970-1985 (Table IV-8). In almost all cases recorded by countries of origin (with St. Kitts and Nevis and St. Lucia as exceptions), increases in visiting volumes occurred in the second half of the 1970s. Although there was some reduction in volumes through 1985, a trend definitely impacted by the regional and global recessions of 1980-1983, all Caribbean countries had significant volumes of visitations to the U.S. In 1985, the average annual volume for the region as a proportion of sending country resident populations was three percent. A few countries, e.g. the

Dominican Republic, Haiti and Martinique, sent approximately one percent of their population as annual visitors to the United States. Several others had non-immigrant annual admissions to the United States of 2-3 percent of their population, such as Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guyana, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Suriname. Another group, with non-immigrant annual admissions of 5-10 percent of their population, included Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Dominica, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis and Trinidad and Tobago. The remaining Caribbean countries, which sent especially large proportions of their populations to the United States (or to their Caribbean "extensions," Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands) as annual visitors, were either very small islands and/or geographically proximate countries to the mainland -- Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Netherlands Antilles, and Turks and Caicos Islands (Table IV-8). Relations between such visiting volumes, overstaying rates and illegal emigration levels have not been investigated, except via indirect methods (Kraly and Warren, 1989). Estimates of the illegal volumes of Caribbean immigrants or sojourners in the United States differ over specific numbers, but are firm in their demonstration that after Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Haiti rank among relatively major sources (U.S. Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, 1981). The above indications of short-term international mobility patterns between the Caribbean and the United States are only

qualitatively representative of the increase in the variety of Caribbean international mobility options since 1965.

Repetitive circulation, return and recurrent international mobility patterns between Caribbean countries and North America are also categories of movements which appear to have increased in importance since 1965. Measurement of such flows, both legal and illegal (via over-staying), would require a system for enumerating arrivals and departures that exists, to some extent, among European countries (Kelly, 1987; Salt, 1987), but is a long way from fruition among Caribbean countries and the United States and Canada (Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1987).

e. Intra- vs. Extra- Regional Migration: 1950-85

A long history of inter-territorial migrations within the Caribbean has established paths across boundaries, between islands and via intermediary steps to other territories. Communities of these migrants in the "foreign" destinations provide requisite reception societies, obligatory socio-cultural communities in which new migrants can familiarize themselves with their place in new surroundings. Time-honored inter-regional movements like those from Grenada and St. Vincent to Trinidad, from St. Lucia to Barbados and/or Guyana, from St. Kitts and Nevis to Antigua or to St. Thomas and St. Croix, from Antigua to the U.S. Virgin Islands, and from Dominica to Guadeloupe, were some of the routes undertaken by British West Indians. Barbadians went wherever regional opportunities opened up, as in Trinidad and Tobago, Aruba, Guyana, Bermuda, Belize, Jamaica and

Antigua (Massiah, 1988). Paths among British, French, Dutch and Spanish colonial domains also served smaller numbers of transitory laborers. Leeward Islanders travelled to the Dominican Republic; Dominicans moved to Martinique and back, as well as to the small island dependencies of Guadeloupe like Marie Galante and Les Saintes. Jamaicans undertook temporary laboring contracts in Cuba and Puerto Rico. There were small streams of inter-island movements within the Bahamas, the U.S. and British Virgin Islands and Turks and Caicos. Traditions of short distance temporary movements from island to island have prevailed to the present (Conway, 1989a).

During the 1960s and 1970s, opportunities beckoned in island economies which were experiencing relative prosperity due to tourist industry growth, (e.g. Barbados, the Bahamas), colonial supports (e.g. St. Maarten and St. Martin, Guadeloupe and Martinique) or oil-related expansions (e.g. Trinidad and Tobago, Aruba and Curacao), and unskilled small-islanders born into a tradition of migration responded. By the same token, a few of these recipient economies, like Barbados, the Bahamas, the U.S. Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands have prospered so much more compared to their neighbors that their resident populations no longer choose emigration as an inevitable alternative; rather they have preferred to stay or to opt for international circulation if and when they needed to travel "off the island". Increasing opportunities at home also appear to have encouraged return migration of emigrants to Caribbean territories undergoing

a "migration transition" phase (McElroy and de Albuquerque, 1988). With immigration from neighboring islands also occurring, the net effect has been to reverse international movements from negative to positive amounts (McElroy and de Albuquerque, 1988).

Caribbean countries with land borders like the Guianas, Haiti and the Dominican Republic had always experienced migrant flows of poor rural laborers who responded to harvesting and laboring opportunities across permeable borders. Given the depressed political and economic situations in places like Haiti and Guyana in the late 1960s and 1970s as well as the concomitant demands for cheap labor in neighboring Dominican Republic and Suriname, illegal recruitments and flows across borders accelerated during these decades.

With the deterioration of political and economic conditions in President Forbes Burnham's Republic during the 1970s, Guyanese left their homeland for Caribbean and extra-regional destinations. While the professional classes found it easier to gain legal (or illegal) entry into Canada and the United States, the lower classes headed for nearby countries like Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago, with most crossing the land border into Suriname. At first seasonal workers moved into rural areas; after that the Guyanese urban proletariat began to migrate into Paramaribo to find permanent employment. Between 1976 and 1980, while Guyana's population natural increase came to 80,000 persons, emigration to Suriname was of the order of 62,000 persons, so that by 1980 one in every nine persons living in

Suriname was Guyanese born (Thomas, 1982). Many of these however, retained strong return motivations, having left "until conditions in Guyana improve" (Johnson, 1982a).

Prior to 1965, Dominican Republicans had rarely undertaken extra-regional international mobility en masse. Beginning in the mid-1960s, however, steady flows of professionals and youths seeking educational opportunities in the United States rose greatly, taking the form of legal and illegal entries from all segments of society. Since 1970, between 34,000 and 40,000 non-immigrant visas annually have been given to Dominicans, compared to their annual immigration quotas of 12 to 13 thousand immigrant visas (Morrison and Sinkin, 1982). By 1980, an estimated 300,000 Dominicans had emigrated to the United States (Boswell, 1989; Lowenthal, 1976).

Extra-regional emigration from several hard-hit Caribbean countries gained considerable momentum in the 1970s. In part, this exodus had its roots in tradition; equally significant were the influences of repressive political and social conditions together with accompanying economic hardships in the home country. Wholesale flights of the middle classes, brought about by the authoritarian or politically unstable regimes of several Caribbean countries during 1965-1985, occurred from Haiti, Cuba, Jamaica, Suriname and Guyana. Recent increases of immigrant entries to the United States in 1987 and 1988 from Trinidad and Tobago (Table IV-13), are suggestive of that country's inclusion in the list of Caribbean economies where crisis-induced

conditions have prompted extra-regional emigration of professional classes.

Jamaican professional classes emigrated to their most accessible "port of entry" when Michael Manley's experiment in "Democratic Socialism" failed to improve social conditions in that economically troubled country. Taking advantage of U.S. immigration policies which favored professional class recruitments and kin repatriations, the United States proved to be the most suitable "waiting station" until conditions improved for Jamaicans. Between 1970 and 1985 approximately 1.5 million Jamaicans gained permanent residence in the United States. It is unknown, however, how many of these have returned in this same period or how many view permanent resident status as an emigration option or temporary phase of an international circulation strategy. In such cases, a mainland home base can serve as well as an island base for adjustments to living in the two worlds of the Caribbean and the United States (Conway, 1988).

For many Haitians mass exodus was relatively permanent, reflecting intentions to escape once and for all from the island's oppressive conditions. The persistent stagnation of the country's economy and the excessively repressive character of the Duvalier regimes ushered in a Haitian diaspora which was far-flung and different from other Caribbean international mobility patterns (Allman, 1982; Perusek, 1984). Overriding considerations prompting massive numbers to emigrate were Haitian "push" factors and the availability of opportunities to leave;

for many, crisis decision-making prompting emigrant flight was a hurried option (Kunz, 1973).

Haitian elites, mostly obtaining legal entry papers, constituted a small but significant "brain drain" group in the 1960s. It is estimated that almost three-quarters of the country's professional classes fled "Papa Doc" and his Tonton Macoutes to French Canada, especially urban Montreal and Quebec, and to francophone Africa; a few went to the United States (Passaris, 1983). By 1970 there were "nearly ten times more Haitian psychiatrists in Montreal than in Port-au-Prince, more Haitian physicians overseas than in Haiti and more indigenous economists working for the United Nations and the Organization of American States than for the government of Haiti" (Heinl and Heinl, 1978). This mass exodus, largely documented but even more largely undocumented, really got underway in the 1970s (Allman, 1982). So many Haitians went to the Bahamas archipelago that as many as 40,000 undocumented Haitians were to be found in the Bahamas in 1970. Although the Bahamian government then began deporting thousands, many continue to find a way in, stay under cover, labor there, move on or return (Marshall, 1985). Many Haitians moved on to other areas in the Caribbean, whether to accessible South American countries like Venezuela and Suriname, or to France, French Canada (Quebec province), New York and Miami. One estimate of the approximate volume of the Haitian diaspora estimates that the United States received 500,000 persons, the Dominican Republic 400,000, French Canada 34,000,

the Bahamas 25,000, France 9,000, Venezuela 6,000, Suriname 10,000 and the French Antilles 32,000 (Johnson, 1982b). The flight to Martinique and Guadeloupe started in 1974, when unrest among the local sugar workers encouraged the plantocracy and the French government to arrange for Haitians to be strikebreakers. Since that time, Haitians have emigrated to these two Departments d'Outre Mer. Many have stayed beyond their contracts, and those who have avoided deportation have sent for their families and relatives (Johnson, 1982b).

While the British government had virtually outlawed immigration from the Caribbean by 1965, the other two European "mother countries", the Netherlands and France, were still admitting students, professionals and laborers via controlled immigration procedures. During the 1950s and early 1960s, the majority of Surinamese moving to the Netherlands were from the elite, professional and middle classes. A fair proportion (over 25 percent) returned after having gained educational backgrounds, further technical skills or professional training. By the late 1960s, the elite vanguards abroad were joined by urban proletariat groups from Paramaribo, the result being that more Surinamese of African and Asian origin began to emigrate to the Netherlands. By the early 1970s the proportion of returnees had fallen to about 10 percent. When independence was placed on the agenda of the Arron Creole/African party in 1973, it triggered panic among other ethnic groups. As many as 150,000 persons from all walks of life and of all ages emigrated to the Netherlands by November,

1975, an extraordinary depopulation of almost half of Suriname's population in the span of three or so years (Johnson, 1982a).

Since the French Caribbean territories were departments of France, there was no occasion for "immigration" as such to a foreign area. Rather, travel costs, educational objectives and laboring opportunities served as indirect controls. In the early 1960s the French government, responding to the need for labor on the mainland took steps to organize larger movements of its citizens from overseas. In 1963 it set up on a limited scale a sponsored immigration scheme managed by the Bureau for Migration from the Overseas Departments (BUMIDOM). This Bureau operated to help finance one-way tickets and to foster accommodation and employment in metropolitan France for about 6,000 young skilled applicants from both Martinique and Guadeloupe and a few hundred from French Guiana. One estimate suggests that over 250,000 persons from the French departments in the Caribbean had left for France by 1974 (Freeman, 1982).

At the same time, counter flows into the Caribbean were also important in these territories. French Guiana registered a net gain during the 1970s and the Departments d'Outre Mer appear to have experienced significant replacements of their emigrant skilled Caribbean youths by immigrant European citizens.

2. Migration-demographic relations

In Caribbean studies of migration-fertility relations, the primary focus has been on the effects of long-term emigration on fertility decline (Ebanks, et al., 1975; McElroy and de

Albuquerque, 1986; McElroy and Radke, 1988; Segal, 1975). These studies demonstrate conclusively that emigration has not only reduced population growth directly, but also did so indirectly by depressing birth rates. Evidence is less definitive on the possible positive influences Caribbean immigration may have had on receiving country fertility regimes (McElroy and Radke, 1988).

Whether short-term sojourning or longer-term overstaying beyond a year (according to the UN definition of an "emigrant") are equivalent in terms of their demographic impacts on Caribbean source societies has not been researched. Blake (1955) has suggested that overseas sojourning would theoretically impact fertility levels negatively according to her version of the "migration as disruption" hypothesis (also see Cruz, et. al., 1987; de Albuquerque et al, 1976; Massey and Mullan, 1984).

Traditions of international migration in the Caribbean are rooted in regional social history (Conway, 1989a). Male selectivity in the earlier emigrations from many small islands impacted resident sex ratios to the extent that the resultant female surpluses are believed to have contributed to the special family relational structures found in Caribbean societies (Goossen, 1976; Laguerre, 1978; Lowenthal, 1972). More recently, after 1965, Caribbean emigration to North America appears to have become female dominant. Annual proportions of female immigrants to the U.S. range from a high of 55.3 percent for Belize to 50.1 percent for Dominica, with St. Lucia the only Caribbean country with a dominant male inflow (Houstoun et al, 1984). However,

given the complexity of the region's contemporary migration processes and the absence of reliably measured short- and long-term flows from its territories, accurate assessments of whether this demographic shift is region-wide or will persist are not possible.

Selective emigration of the region's youth is believed to influence the age profiles of small Caribbean territories (Bouvier, 1983/1984 series). Among the smallest of the region's islands, the dual threat of "depopulation" and "aging" have been cited as consequences of continuous emigration or mass exodus processes (Lowenthal and Comitas, 1962). Selective emigration of highly skilled individuals, or of those with entrepreneurial skills, other "much needed" skills and other categories of human capital perceived to be especially scarce, has been characterized as a "brain drain" by a number of observers (Girling, 1974; Henderson, 1970; Massiah, 1988; Palmer, 1974; Portes, 1976, UNITAR, 1971). In contrast, less judgmental empirical studies of "white collar emigration," such as those by Anderson (1985), Harewood (1983) and Thomas-Hope (1983, 1988), have concluded that the international mobility of middle-class individuals and their families has been more a logical consequence of Caribbean national economic inabilities to engage the human capital it educates in gainful employment. Worrell (1986) alluded to such movements as a characteristic response by the region's people to limited opportunities "at home" in his depiction of the challenges facing the Caribbean in the 1990s. Too little

empirical work has been undertaken to permit assessment of the extent to which negative consequences have resulted from the occupational selectivity of Caribbean long-term emigration flows, or to judge whether such flows are unequivocally "negative" in their impacts (Worrell, 1986). On the other hand, the latest 1990 reforms in US immigration procedures instituting an expansion of legal entry for those with "needed and preferred" occupations, might very well lead to an acceleration of emigrating professionals from the region. This new situation requires urgent monitoring and possible policy responses.

The nature and rates of return flows as a balance to permanent emigration have been recognized to be an extremely important counter to the above possibly negative consequences. Return migration, even of long-departed Caribbean emigrants, is a major feature of the region's international mobility landscape (Chaney, 1985; Conway, 1988; Marshall, 1983; Patterson, 1978; Philpott, 1973; Rubenstein, 1979). Unfortunately, quantitative estimates of return flows of nationals are not available on a regional scale; the many case studies which have been undertaken on the basis of return migrant samples do not permit generalization (Conway and Glesne, 1986). A recent attempt at such generalization has come to the same conclusion (Stinner et al., 1982). Furthermore, remittance flows remain unrecorded or at best underestimated, although evidence for some countries like Jamaica and Barbados suggest that these account for appreciable proportions of foreign exchange earnings (Bascom, 1990; Conway

and Glesne, 1986; Gmelch, 1987; Boland, 1990).

3. Summary of main trends in Caribbean international migration

Between 1950 and 1979, the Caribbean experienced a net loss of approximately 5.8 million people through extra-regional international migration (Simmons and Guengant, 1990). Another estimate locates 24 percent of the region's 1980 population, almost 7.5 million expatriates, as residing outside the Caribbean. Almost 80 percent of these emigrant populations are believed to be resident in the United States, 16 percent resident in Europe and 5 percent in Canada (Boswell, 1989). Several Caribbean countries, such as Cuba, Puerto Rico, Suriname, Jamaica, Haiti, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago, have experienced "emigration exoduses" which peaked at different times during 1950-1985. These appear to have been prompted by multiple causes: political crises and economic pressures (especially, impoverishment) in source countries, changes in (anticipated as well as instituted) immigration policies in potential destination countries, region-wide migration traditions, and well developed cultural and kinship network systems abroad (Conway, 1989a; Levine 1987; Pastor, 1989; Richardson, 1989). Their timing does not appear to have coincided with adverse economic trends or recorded economic downturns, though there may have been lag effects. Nor have upturns in economic fortune been promptly accompanied by reductions of emigration volumes, though here too lag effects may occur if such upturns are sustained. The one comparative study undertaken to assess the causal

interrelationships between net international migration levels and possible social and economic "push" factors, found significant differences in decadal experiences which confound causal generalizations for the post-World War II period (Simmons and Guengant, 1990). In short, there are no straightforward relationships between Caribbean socio-economic changes or their labor market, demographic and employment characteristics, on the one hand, and net increases or decreases of emigration to extra-regional destinations, on the other hand (Diaz-Briquets, 1980).

The UN estimates of modest Caribbean levels of "net international emigration" have assumed that continued considerable return volumes, currently not measured, have offset recorded North American (US and Canadian) estimates of annual immigrant volumes. The lack of appropriate data on separate in- and out-flows, either annually or for five-year periods prior to decennial censuses, means that such modest estimates of net losses or gains are open to challenge. As a result, the associated demographic effects of international mobility for the Caribbean region as a whole cannot be deduced without better data.

Subjective opinions on the possible restrictions to be imposed by main destination countries, such as Canada and the United States, consistently flavor policy statements about future levels of Caribbean international emigration (CDCC 1980). In the short-run, migration to North America and circulation among Caribbean countries and in Caribbean and North American circuits

are likely to continue unabated (Conway, 1989c; GAO, 1988), despite host country policy restrictions which seek to pose limitations and obstacles (Roney, 1990; U.S. Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, 1990). Indeed, the most recent (1990) Kennedy-Simpson sponsored legislation to revise the U.S. preference system, making it more responsive to the needs of the country's economy for skilled labor, opens up the possibility for more liberal recruitment of the region's professionals and threatens an acceleration of the "brain drain," (Bean, et. al., 1989; Report of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, 1990).

Among Commonwealth Caribbean countries, the 1955-1961 mass exodus to the United Kingdom was more than matched, both in terms of volume and periodic levels, by emigration to North American destinations in 1979-1985. An unknown element has been the volumes of return flows from Europe or North America, although anecdotal evidence suggests return migration from the latter is substantial. "Exits" from the United States are not recorded, hence estimates of these return flows to the Caribbean are unavailable (see Warren and Kraly, [1985] for a discussion of data limitations on this subject). Over short and long term periods, extra-regional movements will be predominantly between the region and North America, the exception being institutionally sanctioned patterns of circulation and movement between two European mother countries, France and the Netherlands, and their Caribbean dependencies (Conway, 1989a).

Temporary visiting and circulation movements between region-wide Caribbean home areas and the North American mainland are large in volume, except for Cuba. "Overstaying" the six-month length of permitted stay on U.S. B-1 and B-2 visas is believed to be common, although its extent, impacts and short- and long-term consequences on source and destination economies have not been investigated, much less quantified.

International movements within the Caribbean region appear to have increased in the post-1965 period, but systematic measurement of these has not been undertaken except via "indirect" analyses of immigrant/emigrant stocks. Enumerations of such intra-regional patterns in earlier periods by Proudfoot (1970) and Reubens (1962) remain the sole referents available. Current estimates of foreign-born (migrant stock) percentages of resident populations in Caribbean countries indicate significant increases for almost all countries since 1960. Large Caribbean countries generally have small foreign immigrant percentages, while small territories, whether in area or total population size, vary widely in their foreign stock proportions. Where temporal differences are recorded, increases in foreign-born proportions during the period 1960 to 1980 have occurred in several instances. This suggests that there may have been replacement effects, in which immigrants have replaced native emigrants in some island territories. The Cayman Islands, the Bahamas, Turks and Caicos and the U.S. and British Virgin Islands are believed to have experienced such "migration transitions"

(McElroy and de Albuquerque (1988)).

Overall regional trends of international emigration during 1950-1985 have been pronounced and available indications are that such levels of extra-regional movements will persist. There are to be sure, exceptions to this general pattern. Puerto Rico, for example, has experienced a recent reversal of flows. However, Haiti continues to experience a diaspora, while structural adjustment programs as well as economic stagnation and downturns in several countries -- Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago-- appear to be fueling emigration, or at least circulation, of their professional classes (Conway, 1989c; Thomas-Hope, 1988). In the near future and through the 1990s, temporal fluctuations of immigration and emigration are better treated as country-specific trends with some general regularities, e.g. that continued net emigration for the majority of the region's populations will continue and that recent net immigration in a few small islands have been greatly affected by tourism and international financial activity (in the Bahamas, Turks and Caicos, the Cayman Islands, the U.S. and British Virgin Islands). Cuban refugee movements constitute an exceptional case.

Estimates of return flows of people to Caribbean countries or of remittance flows of capital as well as of goods in kind, such as might precede and/or accompany returning nationals, are not available to attempt regional comparisons or for investigating their consequences. Return migration, either of retirees or of international movers who prefer circulation to

emigration, is a region-wide, culturally and socially reinforced preference (Conway, 1988, 1989a; Thomas-Hope, 1985; Stinner et al., 1982). While estimates of international circulation and returnee patterns are unavailable, fragmentary evidence (via case studies) suggests that remittance flows are significant (Conway, 1985). Recent commentaries on the value of remittances for Caribbean development and needs for the effective utilization of returnees, emphasize the importance of analysis and better estimates of these international mobility processes (Bascom, 1990; Conway, 1985; North and Whitehead, 1990; Rogers, 1990).

Extra-regional emigration was sufficiently large in volume during 1950-1985 to imply that natives residing outside the region in Europe and North America comprise between 20 to 30 percent of the region's 1980 population. This "safety valve" outflow has had a major effect on population growth trends, reduced it both directly and indirectly (e.g. by reducing birth rates). Although smaller in volume, intra-regional movements have also impacted population growth in sending and receiving countries, reducing rates of fertility where net outflows predominated and contributed partially to maintaining higher natality rates in receiving countries (McElroy and de Albuquerque, 1990). The few studies that have attempted to link other demographic factors to international migration, such as population density (Welch, 1968) and cohort sizes (Brittain, 1990), have failed to confirm causal relationships. On the other hand, the demographic consequences of continuing growth rates on

youthful demographic profiles for the region's small islands suggest that "safety-valve" growth reductions and selective emigration have not been substitutes for policy implementation (Bouvier, 1983/84). The maintenance of relatively substantial population growth rates, though not high by contemporary LDC standards, and their retrogressive effects on Caribbean development goals -- full employment, societal stability, economic growth, expansion and diversification -- is a continuing cause for concern (Anderson, 1990; Boland, 1986, 1990).

The sizable Caribbean enclave populations overseas today are both social extensions of their home countries and important facilitators of international mobility (Massey, 1988; Levine 1987). Flows between the region and North America in particular need to be measured and the exchanges of people and capital within these networks estimated, before assessment of the influences of these overseas populations on their Caribbean sources can be better understood. Some commentators view these overseas enclaves as potential progressive influences on their origin areas in the Caribbean, in that they are capable of stimulating regional human resource development trends and tendencies (Henry, 1990; Levine, 1987; North and Whitehead, 1990).

C. Urbanization

1. Main trends

Regardless of their area and population size, the countries and territories of the Caribbean region are all experiencing internal migration of rural populations to urban centers. Rates of natural increase range between two and three percent per annum, with growth rates reduced to an extent by net international emigration. Increases in urban growth rates since World War II, particularly of the largest cities and capitals, have largely been outcomes of accumulating populations in both rural and urban areas.

Measurement of internal migration flows, urbanization rates, spatial expansions of urbanized areas and trends in spatial concentration and deconcentration is not consistent among Caribbean areas. While the urbanization experiences of some countries, such as Jamaica, Cuba and Puerto Rico have been documented in considerable detail, others, such as the Windward and Leeward Islands, have not been similarly reported. With census enumeration procedures varying greatly in terms of urban area, rural and suburban definitions, among others, and with little consistency in the reporting of rural-to-urban flows, objective comparisons of urbanization experiences throughout the Caribbean region are extremely difficult. Despite these difficulties, the section that follows attempts to elicit the salient features of the rapid urbanization processes which are acknowledged to be taking place.

a. 1950-2000 Urbanization Estimates

As replicated in Table IV-9, the 1980 urbanized proportions of Caribbean countries according to UN estimates range from lows of 25 and 30 for Haiti and Guyana, respectively, to highs of 66, 67 and 68 percent for Martinique, Puerto Rico and Cuba, respectively (United Nations, 1989). By the year 2000, nearly all national urban proportions are expected to have risen to over 50 per cent. The only exceptions are Guyana with 42 per cent and Haiti with 37 per cent. Martinique, Puerto Rico and Cuba are expected to be joined by Trinidad in reaching 75 per cent or more (United Nations, 1989) (see also Annex A-10 of Part I).

The Caribbean countries can be divided into two major groups, with respect to urbanization rates. A minority group, consisting of Barbados, Cuba, Guadeloupe, and Martinique, do not have expected annual urban growth rates over two per cent as of 1990. More rapid urban growth is experienced by a second group, including Jamaica and Suriname, with growth rates in excess of two and a half per annum. Two other countries, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, appear to be urbanizing at annual rates of over three and a half per cent. In contrast, for two more rapidly urbanizing areas, Puerto Rico and Trinidad and Tobago, the UN (1989) projections assume declines from their current rapid rates of increase as the year 2000 approaches (Table IV-9).

Contrasting the current UN estimates with the earlier projections of urban and rural growth rates during 1950-1970 undertaken by Davis (1969) provides a more detailed account of

regional differences in urbanization within the Caribbean region (Table IV-10). The comparison also demonstrates the conservative nature of the UN estimates. In several cases the two assessments vary considerably. For example, Barbados in 1960-70 was projected by Davis to have an annual urban growth rate of two per cent, while the UN estimates a modest annual rate of 0.8 per cent. Davis further projected that Guadeloupe in 1960-70 would have a relatively high annual growth rate of 4.5 per cent; yet the UN estimates an annual rate below two per cent. Clearly, these assessments differ markedly. Moreover, the Davis (1969) projections of annual rates of change of rural and urban populations did not use consistent census definitions of enumeration areas (Table IV-10). In spite of these wide disparities, the Davis (1969) projections are illustrative of the different rates of rural and urban growth in the Caribbean. They conclusively point to declines in rural growth rates and consequent accelerations of urban growth rates during the 1950-1970 period.

Few countries have deviated from the regional trend of higher urban growth. Only Belize has equal rural and urban growth rates. The U.S. Virgin Islands in 1950-60 had less urban than rural growth, probably attributable to an urban bias in emigration proportions, but during 1960-70 experienced extremely high rates of both rural and urban growth, patterns probably enhanced by immigration and return migration. Rates of urban growth in Trinidad and Tobago and the Dominican Republic during

the 1960s were extremely high, being over four times the rural growth rate in the former and twice the rural growth rate in the latter (Table IV-10). UN (1989) and Davis (1969) estimates of these patterns agree. Subsequent rates for both urban and rural areas are expected to decline according to the U.N (Table IV-9).

In several Caribbean countries, rural growth rates during 1950-1970 were either extremely low or negative. Such cases included Barbados with 0.2 percent, the Leeward Islands with 0.1, Martinique with 0.6, the Netherlands Antilles with -0.2, Puerto Rico with 0.6, and Trinidad and Tobago with 0.5 per cent, respectively (Table IV-10). At the same time urban growth rates varied considerably in these countries. Barbados recorded a relatively modest urban growth rate of 2.1 per cent, the Leewards 2.8 per cent, and Puerto Rico experienced 2.1 per cent. Other countries with high annual urban growth rates included Martinique with 5.0 per cent, the Netherlands Antilles 3.3 per cent, and Trinidad and Tobago 6.6 percent (Table IV-10). Average annual rural growth for the Caribbean as a whole was 1.7 per cent during 1950-1970 and urban rates were double this level. According to the UN estimates (United Nations, 1988), urban growth rates between 1970 and 1980 often were more than four times those of rural areas (Hope, 1986).

b. Underestimation of Caribbean Urbanization

The criteria used for census classifications of urban-rural ratios are not uniform across the region. Nor do the urbanization proportions in Table IV-9 reflect degrees of "social

urbanization" (i.e. urbanization of rural life styles) of the hinterland populations around each area's primate or capital city (Conway, 1984). The UN estimates of Caribbean urban proportions recorded in Table IV-9 and discussed above should be considered unduly conservative quantifications of urbanized population statuses. Not only do the census definitions of urban places vary across areas, making temporal and comparative analysis difficult, but the frequent use of formal (administrative) delimitations of "urban areas" as census enumeration boundaries overlooks the degree of "social urbanization" in small island territories. One author has described this as "the socioeconomic transformation of space and ideological extension of the urban system... resulting in new forms of integration between country and city [and] the structural breakdown of conventional geographical dichotomies" (Margolis, 1979). Many of the islands have relatively well-developed infrastructure (roads, airports, communications systems) and their rural resident and urban resident populations have long-held traditions of emigration, return, recurrent and circular international and internal mobility backgrounds; all of these contribute to island-wide adoptions of urban life styles with the exceptions of extremely remote rural enclaves (Clarke, 1974; Potter, 1989).

Restrictive definitions of urban areas in many censuses have led to considerable under-reporting of actually or effectively urbanized populations. Published UN urban growth rates and urbanized population proportions are especially underestimated

for the smaller areas (United Nations, 1989). Barbados and the Windward Islands, either separately or together (the latter as the UN groups them), are a revealing example of this tendency (Table IV-9). According to the UN estimates, the Windward Islands have no urban populations (Table IV-9), whereas I estimated the collective populations of their primate cities to be approximately twenty six percent of their total population in 1983 (Table IV-11). The UN proportion urban in Barbados in 1980 was only 40 percent, whereas I estimate the population size of Bridgetown, the capital and primate city, to be 124,000, or over 50 percent of the total population (Table IV-11). The UN projects an urban proportion of 51 percent for Barbados in the year 2000, which I estimate it had already reached by 1980 (compare Tables 9 and 11).

c. Primate City Dominance and Uneven Population Distribution

In 1950, there were only seven cities with populations of over 100,000. By 1980 there were 19 metropolitan areas in the Caribbean with populations over that size; three, Havana (Cuba), San Juan (Puerto Rico) and Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic), exceeded 1 million inhabitants. Table IV-11 lists the capital and other major cities of each Caribbean area, indicates their 1960 to 1980 growth and available 1983 estimates. These comparative populations cannot realistically be used to derive growth rates, since the primate city's areal extents may change over time because of reclassification. What is clear from this tabulation is the dominance or primacy of the capital city. Only

in the cases of Belize and Guadeloupe is the largest city not the administrative capital. Comparisons of the proportions of the national population resident in the primate city can often give a clearer, if variable, perspective of the degree to which a population has been urbanized than do the published urban numbers and proportions (Table IV-11).

In sum, the Caribbean is more urbanized than UN estimates suggest, the spatial concentration of island populations is highly uneven, and decentralization policies and plans may already have been overtaken by contemporary patterns of primate area concentrations and dominance (Conway, 1984, 1989).

A critical term, "dependent urbanization," has been levelled at these high degrees of urban primacy in the Caribbean. Regional levels of urban primacy are estimated to be over 30 percent region-wide and as much as 40 percent in several countries, e.g. Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Puerto Rico. In many cases, these primate cities are situated on narrow coastal plains or on equally limited sites at the mouths of estuaries or bays, causing problems of overcrowding in the capital city and high intra-urban residential densities. Yet, despite the introduction and development of physical planning models and land-use planning documents and policies, there remains among those with executive power an apparent lack of interest in spatial planning, control of urbanization patterns and prevention of urban sprawl. Plans abound, but empowerment of policies and land-use control remains in the domain of patronage and

privilege; nor have the aims of physical planning been integrated with the macro-objectives of national economic development plans (Conway, 1984; Potter, 1989). Rather, state management has focused on strategies for economic sectoral expansion and on economic accounting procedures to evaluate sectoral performances, all the while paying little attention to the spatial consequences of macro-economic restructuring for urban sprawl, uncontrolled residential development, social infrastructure inadequacies, and other aspects of unfettered development of the "built environment." Somewhat of an exception to this region-wide oversight is Cuba.

d. Internal Migration and Rural-Urban Flow Estimates

Virtually every Caribbean country or territory is experiencing migration of its rural population to urban centers, particularly the capital city. In 1960, for example, only 38 percent of all West Indians lived in cities. By 1987, this proportion had increased to 54 percent, and by the year 2000 it is expected to be near 65 percent (Boswell, 1989). Available studies of Caribbean internal migration indicate that rural migration to the primate or capital city began prior to 1950, then continued and in some cases, such as Bridgetown (Barbados) and Nassau (the Bahamas), accelerated during 1950-1980 (Boswell, 1986; Caplow et. al., 1964; Cross, 1979). As part of such urbanization, suburban and capital city areal expansions accompanied the influx of population. Thus, surrounding hinterland areas accommodated the bulk of in-migrants to Kingston

(Jamaica), Port of Spain (Trinidad and Tobago) and San Juan (Puerto Rico) in recent decades (Roberts, 1989; Caplow et. al., 1964; Conway, 1984). In part, such intensified suburbanization resulted from rising incomes of the middle classes, from desires to flee the overcrowded "down-towns," from lack of inner city space to house the poor and from government policies on island-wide dispersal strategies for low-income housing and road-building programs. Suburban expansion of residential sub-divisions was also accelerated by spiralling land and housing market prices fueled by speculation and excessive inflows of local and external finance capital (Potter, 1989).

The relatively large sizes of most Caribbean primate cities are mainly indicative of the scale and significance of rural-to-urban migration within the region. This explains why the UN conventionally assumes negligible international migration effects and considers the "rate of urbanization as approximately equivalent to 'net urban in-migration'."

Only four Caribbean populations are regarded as large enough to warrant explicit UN attention with respect to their internal migration dynamics. These are Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico and Guyana (United Nations, 1988), for which the data record net rural outflows and net urban in-flows by decadal periods prior to 1980. These show that Guyana's urban in-migration volume has been extremely large compared to the others. No apparent male/female differentials emerge in these internal migrations out of and into rural and urban areas (Table IV-12).

Since such estimates assume no international migration, they should be considered illustrative rather than objective indicators of internal settlement patterns. An indication of the possible interrelationships between Caribbean urban growth and international migration is suggested by the urban selectivity of emigrants. Cross (1979) has suggested that rates of emigration from Jamaica in 1962 differed considerably among rural, semi-urban or urban areas of origin: these were estimated to be 1.4, 2.4 and 3.9 per 1,000 inhabitants, respectively. To date, quantitative estimates of migration effects on Caribbean urbanization are extremely limited. It is hoped that the 1990/91 census enumerations will allow researchers to identify international and internal migration flows into and between regions or enumeration districts differentiated by their rural, urban, capital city and suburban characters, so that a more informed examination of international and internal migration trends and their contributions to urban growth can be documented throughout the Caribbean.

2. Summary of main trends in Caribbean urbanization

The significance of Caribbean primate cities is apparent. In 1950, there were only seven cities with populations of over 100,000. By 1980 there were 19 metropolitan areas in the Caribbean with populations over that size and three -- Havana (Cuba), San Juan (Puerto Rico) and Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic) -- exceeded 1 million inhabitants. Estimates of primate city growth illustrate the dominance of the capital city

in every Caribbean country except Cuba. The larger countries -- in area and population -- have secondary cities, but the majority have only one primate city, serving as their main port and administrative center. Only in Belize and Guadeloupe is the largest city not the administrative capital.

Rates of urban growth in excess of national population rates are expected by the UN to the year 2000. UN estimates of rapid growth in the Caribbean's urban proportion to about two-thirds by the year 2000 are downward biased; they reflect conservative estimates of the urbanization of most Caribbean countries, with the exceptions of Haiti and Guyana. Although conservative, they appear adequate to represent the rapid transformation of Caribbean societies to urban and/or metropolitan status in "life style and socialization aspects."

Regardless of their area and population sizes, Caribbean countries are all experiencing internal migration from rural to urban sectors. Urban rates of growth vary typically between two and three per cent per annum and are offset to an extent by net international emigration. The high urban growth rates since World War II, particularly of the region's largest cities, have been largely outcomes of movements out of rural areas. Although Cuba at one time appeared to have slowed down Havana's growth while stimulating growth of its intermediate-size cities, recent evidence suggests an acceleration of primate city growth in Cuba during the last twelve years, with annual growth rates at or over four per cent (Catasus, et. al., 1988).

Spatial distributions of population have become uneven and continued growth of primate cities should exacerbate this trend. Some rural areas have experienced depopulation while others still serve as reservoirs of potential cityward migrants.

Urbanization, tourism and residential landscape changes have occurred at the expense of agricultural and natural (coastal and montane) environmental landscapes. The larger areas appear to have greater regional inequalities in terms of rural-urban population balances than do the smaller ones.

Data for 1980 levels of urbanization indicate that the Caribbean is more highly urbanized than the world as a whole. The highest proportion of urban population is that of Cuba with close to 70 (and more recently 75) per cent, but fractions over 50 percent are encountered in the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago, Martinique and the Netherlands Antilles. Suburban expansion of many of the region's capital cities is now well underway and this areal spread beyond the jurisdiction of the capital's government has complicated implementation of spatial planning policies (Potter, 1989).

Rising land prices, often affected by competition for limited land among commercial, residential and tourism users, is an issue of some importance in several islands -- the French West Indies, the Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the Grenadines. Quantitative estimates of the spiralling price gradients of urban land markets in the Caribbean are generally lacking, however.

The UN's assumption that international migration effects on urban growth is negligible is quantitatively unverified. In certain cases -- Barbados, Trinidad, and Puerto Rico for example -- indirect evidence suggests it has had positive size impacts on primate city growth (Boswell, 1989; Conway, 1984, 1989b; Cross, 1979). This point is overlooked by the UN system of estimation, which focuses on rural and urban balances as if only internal net migration related the two. To date, there are no estimates of the extent to which international migration influences primate city growth, secondary city growth, or internal population redistributions.

D. Policy Implications of International Migration and Urbanization Trends

1. International migration

International migration policies respond to changing socio-historical contexts and the changing patterns of international mobility which affect such contexts. However, (as observed earlier) they are invariably "backward-looking" rather than anticipatory in compiling the data requisite for adopting such responses (Simmons, 1987). The United Nations has recommended that countries use compatible definitions of immigrants, emigrants, temporary migrants, refugees and tourist or business travellers, among others, and should develop a standardized methodology for estimating international flows on a year-to-year basis (United Nations, 1976, 1980, 1985). None of the region's countries has complied with this recommendation. The region's

areas, their major countries of destination, the United States and Canada, and such destinations as France and the Netherlands all continue to employ concepts and formulate policies which are based on their own national interests and traditions, rather than on statistical criteria which would satisfy needs for regional comparabilities (Kritz, 1987).

Expert opinions on the needs for a "Strategy for the Caribbean Countries during the Third Development Decade" have certainly recognized the problem (CDCC, 1980). So have expert counsels concerned with "Policies, Measures and Actions" to develop a Caribbean statistical data base on international migration movements and to undertake timely analyses of such flows to enhance policy (CDCC, 1980). Eventually, all will depend upon cooperation among Caribbean and North American policy makers. The recent U.S. Congressional **Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development** might well be a useful start toward developing such cooperative efforts, for example with respect to generating a viable statistical data base for analyzing and comparing international mobility patterns.

The Caribbean cooperation needed to achieve conformity of definitions, concepts and policies concerning cross-border entries and exits, as well as to achieve adequate enumerations of moves, optimal questionnaires, efficient data base management practices and reliable statistical recording procedures, with all the costs these imply, will be a formidable task. Nevertheless,

the economic importance of tourism to Caribbean development prospects, combined with policy concerns with losses and gains of human capital resources underscores the judgment that co-ordinated and continuous monitoring and consistent recording of international travel statistics would be an important advance. The European Community's SOPEMI initiative to hold annual meetings where international migration trends and their consequences would be discussed by national experts suggests itself as a possible "less-costly" solution (Salt, 1987; SOPEMI, 1988). Even here, however, appropriate arrivals and departures data, using definitions of travellers which go beyond UN guidelines (United Nations, 1985) would be a minimum prerequisite (see the discussion E below on recommendations).

2. Urbanization

The uneven spatial distribution of Caribbean populations continues to be a major concern of the region's policy makers, even though rates of urbanization, while high compared to national growth rates, are not excessive by general LDC (or Latin American) standards. Among the countries within the area of responsibility of ECLAC, only the government of Barbados appears to perceive its urbanization patterns to be satisfactory. Half of ECLAC's Caribbean countries perceive rapid urbanization to be a problem and have adopted policies designed to slow primate city or metropolitan growth. Five - Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica and Suriname -- have adopted policies designed to promote the growth of small towns and intermediate cities. All

governments are unanimous in their perception of needs to promote rural development. Two-thirds have adopted policies to develop lagging rural regions, but only three (Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Suriname) have contemplated land colonization programs (United Nations, 1988a). Concern with basic trends in internal migration is also widespread, though fewer than half of the ECLAC Caribbean countries (the Bahamas, Cuba, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago) see a need to reduce their rates of rural-to-urban migration. The small islands of the Windwards and Leewards do not yet perceive that the cityward flow of their rural populations requires intervention (United Nations, 1988a).

Notably, the government of Cuba reported at the 1984 International Conference on Population in Mexico City that its internal migration policy had succeeded in stabilizing the growth of Cuba's largest cities (those with over 100,000 inhabitants). In addition, Cuba claimed that its centrally planned controls had revitalized several medium-sized cities and had consolidated dispersed rural populations into viable rural towns (United Nations, 1984; 1988). Trinidad and Tobago adopted a major physical planning document in 1984 to guide its infrastructural development and decentralization policies. However, Trinidad's plan has been strongly criticized for the tardiness of its implementation and lack of realism in expecting that the country's uneven urbanization patterns could be controlled (Conway, 1984, 1989b).

3. Development aspects

Caribbean development trends during the last two decades, regardless of their pace or mode, have clearly led to significant societal transformations. Predominantly rural, agrarian (plantation) societies based on small-scale institutions, relatively stable social stratification structures and limited markets have rapidly evolved into urbanized societies dominated by large bureaucratic institutions, fluid social organizations and established, dependent market structures (see Massey [1988] for reference to the Mexican case). Such processes of change are inherently disruptive, since they cause displacements from earlier livelihoods and familiar, traditional ways of life. When such societal disruptions are superimposed on entrenched traditions of international and internal mobility, both large-scale emigration and rural-to-urban migration becomes inevitable. In the Caribbean, rural out-migration was alternately diffused in its effect by internal and international migration, was initially driven by successive cycles of economic opportunities at home or abroad, and eventually became dual "circular and cumulative processes" (Myrdal, 1957) relying on varied structural and agency mechanisms to perpetuate opportunistic mobility strategies (Carnegie, 1982; Conway, 1986a, 1986b, 1989a). Once processes of cumulative causation become entrenched in sending communities and combine forces with overseas enclave and network institutions, international income redistribution (remittance) influences and host-society structural changes, subsequent policy efforts to

reduce or control flows of migrants become difficult or impossible to implement successfully (Pastor, 1983).

A comparison of recent GDP changes (1980-85) and legal immigrant flows into the United States (Table IV-13) scarcely suggests directly "determining" linkages between economic trends in potential areas of Caribbean origin and volumes of their out-migrants. Similarly, Worrell's recent (1987) evaluation of the performance of Caribbean economies since 1970 does not establish persuasive linkages between emigration and economic stagnation. His comments on the "Caribbean Economy in the Nineties" echoes the pragmatic views that international migration is rooted in tradition, can be beneficial as well as a threat, and always represents a popular response to economic mismanagement (Worrell, 1986).

Realistic appraisal of contemporary development patterns in the Caribbean region, its contemporary societal transformations and its internal and international migration and circulation tendencies, suggests that policies to promote additional economic growth in the region will not reduce emigration and circulation to the United States in the short run. In the near future we should expect continuation of inter- and extra- regional population shifts. North American host societies and the more developed Caribbean host societies, such as Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, the French Department D'Outre Mer and the Netherlands Antilles, should recognize that immigration (whether by legal or illegal means)

will continue in the short term. In the long run, although economic growth in Caribbean countries may at times reduce incentives for extra-regional movements (e.g. to North America), it is nevertheless more likely to promote than retard interregional international relocations. Nor can rates of urbanization in Caribbean countries be reduced or controlled, given the parallel nature of internal and international migration processes. Among these Caribbean areas, continued rapid urbanization should also be expected.

E. Recommendations: Data Needs, Co-operative Measurement and Reporting

1. International movement data needs

The UN (1976, 1980) recommendations and subsequent guidelines on collection of international travel data should serve as the basis for co-operative efforts by Caribbean countries to improve their monitoring of international migration flows and stocks. As Simmons (1987) advises, however, these guidelines themselves will require restructuring and strengthening if they are to take adequate account of contemporary and emerging concerns. More specifically, they should:

- a. give more explicit attention to "legal residency", "legal nationality," and "citizenship" categories of movers, as well as to the access of each category to political and welfare benefits (especially their human rights) in areas of destination;

b. more carefully distinguish various sub-classes of international movers (see accompanying Appendix IV.1), such as refugees, (arriving, departing, repatriating), contract labor workers, students, retirees, and other categories of movers whose demographic, social and economic impacts on receiving societies are likely to be distinct;

c. expand the objectives of data collection to include assessments of social and cultural impacts (e.g. with respect to ethnic, language and religious consequences), so as to complement the current focus on demographic and economic impacts, and

d. give more careful attention to ways of estimating undocumented migrants and workers among major types of travellers, particularly tourists, short-term visitors and business travellers (Simmons, 1987; p.1011).

2. Needed census enumerations

Procedures to gather data on the above movements and migrant sub-classes will certainly have to go beyond collection of arrivals and departures data. It is to be hoped that the 1990/1991 decennial census procedures undertaken in Caribbean countries have included questions concerning place of birth, nationality, and de facto place of previous residence (both 5 years earlier and 1 year previously) of all non-institutional populations resident at times of enumeration. This should allow estimation of international migrant stocks belonging to the foreign-born, Caribbean origin, and returning nationals

categories. Current estimates of foreign-born (migrant stock) percentages of resident populations indicate significant increases for almost all Caribbean countries since 1960, as well as for most ex-colonies since political independence. Until now, census records have been irregular with respect to differentiating among the Caribbean proportions of foreign residents.

3. Extra-regional population estimates

Current estimates of Caribbean peoples resident outside the Caribbean are speculative, since definitional changes concerning residency, citizenship and legal statuses vary across the major receiving regions and countries, i.e. Europe, the United States and Canada (Tables IV-7A and IV-7B). Estimates of illegal residents in the United States have been attempted, but considerable controversy exists over their minimum and maximum bounds (Passel and Woodrow, 1984, 1987; Warren and Passel, 1987). For example, Larson and Sullivan (1987) question the accepted "conventional wisdom" that 500,000 Dominican Republicans live in the United States. The resultant attempts (like Table IV-7A), to enumerate the total numbers of Caribbean native-born living outside the region, can best be characterized as "guesstimates." Perhaps as many as one-quarter of the region's native-born population reside abroad, but the margins of error surrounding such estimates are likely to be considerable. Again, collaboration between regional institutions and those of the major receiving countries is paramount if better estimates of

extra-regional resident populations are to be achieved.

4. Needed sample surveys of entries/exits

Further work on sample survey studies of travellers at airports plus sea arrivals and departures should be undertaken. Improved international traveler statistics -- through inclusion of distinctions between returning nationals who have residences overseas, returning residents by length of absences, and corresponding outgoing categories -- should be standardized, as should distinctions important for monitoring tourism and migration proper. Such data collection recommendations would be best implemented on a region-wide basis, with all Caribbean countries agreeing on standard arrival and departure recording procedures for all air and sea travellers (for example, the Trinidad and Tobago International E/D Card, [Tarjeta Internacional E/D]).

5. Needed annual estimates of international flows

Needs to assess the determinants and consequences of international and internal migration flows, whether from the Caribbean region to North America and Europe, among Caribbean countries or within individual countries, are **immediate** and pressing. An appropriate statistical data base for documenting such will take time to develop, however, even assuming that regional support for its establishment is forthcoming. Annual reporting on national trends at regional meetings, at which experts share data and findings, may serve as a useful substitute (see for example, SOPEMI, 1988). Co-operation with U.S.

congressional committees, United States and Canadian immigration and statistical institutions, and with European (French and Dutch) immigration agencies, also needs to be sought if systematically comprehensive recording procedures for movements into and out of the entire Caribbean region are to be established. Without information on the international movements of visitors, businessmen, returning nationals, emigrants and immigrants, refugees and students within and outside of the Caribbean region, policymakers will be unable to estimate short- or long-term changes in demographic, societal and economic respects. Until now, subjective opinions on net emigration and its perceived "deleterious" consequences have continued to exert undue influence on policy approaches to its control (Conway, 1989c).

6. Internal migration and urbanization data needs:

Our understanding of the determinants and consequences of contemporary patterns of internal migration -- rural-to-urban, rural-to-rural, urban-to-urban, and urban-to rural-- in the Caribbean is extremely limited. Apart from the dearth of studies, existing research suffers from cross-study non-comparabilities in population units utilized, main definitions, data collection procedures, modelling specifics, and selections of surrogate indices for measuring causal factors or associated linkages. The few comparative studies attempted only deal with the larger countries of the region (see Hope, 1986). Case study approaches and one-time survey attempts characterize most of the

research on the urbanization and internal migration experiences of the region's smaller territories. An appropriately organized research program, whether sponsored by international, regional or private sector agencies, could greatly advance our quantitative knowledge and policy-oriented research concerning Caribbean development-population linkages by promoting any or all of the following:

a. Programs of Replicated Surveys of Mobility and Fertility "life courses" of individuals and households

The UN ESCAP project is one example to follow, where the alternative hypotheses of migration's linkages with fertility; "selectivity," "adaptation," and "migration as disruption," are tested as alternative features of Caribbean rural-to-urban transformation. Such future surveys should document, in addition to current personal and household characteristics, retrospectively identified residences (both overseas and internal locations), childbearing, marital (or common-law) co-habitational statuses, employment and work status histories.

b. New Research Program Initiatives

Salient but neglected aspects of demographic-population relationships need to be understood: for example, interrelationships between international and internal migration processes and their joint or competing effects upon fertility and mortality, the effects of return migration and/or remittances on fertility rates, or the

geographically differentiated effects of return vs. outmigration vs. emigration patterns on within-country (regional) fertility and mortality trends.

c. Re-examinations and/or Initial Examinations of Institutional Data Sets

Relevant interrelationships and geographic disaggregations of the kinds cited above can often be extracted from already existing data bases. CELADE samples (tapes) drawn from 1970s, 1980s, and 1990/1991 decennial censuses could usefully be centrally archived -- at the ECLAC, Port of Spain Office, for example -- and made available to regional policy analysts as well as to both regional and international population and development researchers.

TABLE IV.1: EMIGRANTS TO UNITED KINGDOM AS PERCENTAGE OF WEST INDIAN POPULATIONS IN 1960

Country	Pop. 1960	Total Emigration to U.K. 1955-61	Emigrants as % of 1960 pop	1946-60 Rates of Nat. Increase (per annum)	1957 GDP per capita BWI \$s
Jamaica	1,609,814	148,369	9.2	2.34	572.00
Barbados	232,085	18,741	8.1	1.93	443.00
Trinidad and Tobago	825,700	9,741	1.2	2.67	822.00
British Guiana	558,769	7,141	1.3	n.a.	455.00
Antigua	54,060	4,687	8.7	2.29	290.00
Montserrat	12,167	3,835	31.5	1.74	203.00
St. Kitts-Nevis and Anguilla	56,693	7,503	13.2	2.53	282.00
<u>LEeward ISLES</u>	122,920	16,025	13.0		
Dominica	59,479	7,915	13.3	2.42	
Grenada	88,617	7,663	8.6	2.73	
St. Lucia	86,194	7,291	8.5	2.56	
St. Vincent	80,705	4,285	5.3	2.97	
<u>WINDWARD ISLES</u>	314,995	27,154	8.6		258.00

Source: Peach, C. West Indian Migration to Britain, (London: Oxford University Press, 1962: from Tables 4,6, and 12, pps. 15,18, and 32).

TABLE IV.2: CARIBBEAN POPULATIONS, NATURAL INCREASE, AND NET EMIGRATION, 1950-80

Countries	1950	1980	Natural	Estimated	Net Emigration			Emigration/
	Pop. (000s)	Pop (000s)	Increase 1950-79 (000s)	'50-59 (000s)	'60-69 (000s)	'70-79 (000s)	Pop. 1980 (x100)	
Antigua/ Barbuda	45	65	35	3		5	7	23.1
Bahamas	79	208	88	(13)	(24)	(4)	(19.9)	
Barbados	208	249	114	20	38	15	29.4	
Belize	65	145	108	1	7	20	19.3	
Cuba	5,750	9,748	4,705	10	475	222	7.3	
Dominica	51	74	51	6	9	13	37.8	
Dominican Republic	2,330	5,525	3,645	55	175	450	8.1	
Fr. Guiana	25	68	25	(2)	(8)	(8)	(26.5)	
Grenada	75	93	70	12	19	21	55.9	
Guadeloupe	206	327	200	4	25	50	24.2	
Guyana	410	759	536	4	53	130	24.6	
Haiti	3,050	4,885	2,535	50	220	430	14.3	
Jamaica	1,375	2,053	1,404	165	290	270	35.3	
Martinique	214	326	194	5	31	46	25.2	
Montserrat	14	12	6	4	3	1	66.7	
Neth. Antilles								
Aruba	52	60	36	13	10	5	47.2	
Curacao	98	147	89	5	18	17	27.0	
Puerto Rico	2,204	3,184	1,703	470	212	41	22.7	
St Kitts-Nevis	43	44	32	6	17	8	70.5	
St. Lucia	78	115	87	13	18	19	43.5	
St. Vincent & The Grenadines	66	98	77	10	20	15	45.9	
Suriname	213	361	276	4	27	97	35.5	
Trinidad & Tobago	623	1,055	636	-	110	94	19.3	
U.S. Virgin Isles	27	96	42	1	(27)	(1)	(28.1)	
TOTAL:	17,300	29,699	16,694	845	1,722	1,731		
Percent:							14.4%	

Source: Guengant, 1985 Appendix 1.

Note: Figures in parentheses are net immigration measures.

TABLE IV.3: COMPARISON OF COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN IMMIGRATION VOLUMES TO UNITED KINGDOM DURING 1955-61 AND TO THE UNITED STATES DURING EQUIVALENT PERIODS AFTER 1965: 1965-71, 1972-78, AND 1979-85.

COUNTRY	1960 Pop.	Total Emigration to U.K., 1955-61	Immigration 1965-71	Immigration 1972-78	Immigration 1979-85	TOTAL '72-'85	1980 Pop.
Barbados	232,085	18,741	9,400	14,089	14,534	28,623	249,000
Jamaica	1,609,814	148,369	79,000	88,740	139,244	227,984	2,053,000
Trinidad & Tobago	825,700	9,610	30,000	44,267	27,397	71,664	1,055,000
British Guiana/ Guyana	558,769	7,141	7,700	26,708	58,107	84,815	759,000
EASTWARD ISLES							
Antigua	54,060	4,687	N.A.	4,033	9,823	13,856	65,000
Montserrat	12,167	3,835	N.A.	1,422	1,029	2,451	12,000
St. Kitts-Nevis	56,693	7,503	N.A.	4,443	8,756	13,199	44,000
Anguilla	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	866	704	1,570	
WESTWARD ISLES							
Dominica	59,479	7,915	N.A.	2,510	4,673	7,183	74,000
Grenada	88,617	7,663	N.A.	5,260	7,398	12,658	93,000
St. Lucia	86,194	7,291	N.A.	2,559	5,109	7,668	115,000
St. Vincent & Grenadines	80,705	4,285	N.A.	3,039	5,075	8,114	98,000
TOTAL	3,664,283	227,040		197,936	281,849	479,785	
(6.2% of 1960 Pop.)			[%1980]	[4.3%]	[6.1%]		

Sources: Table 4, C. Peach, (1968) West Indian Migration to Britain, (London: Oxford University Press) p. 15;
: 1978-85 Statistical Yearbooks, 1964/68, Annual Reports, (Washington D.C.: Immigration and Naturalization Services).

TABLE IV.4: A COMPARISON OF U.N. ESTIMATES OF CARIBBEAN "NET INTERNATIONAL EMIGRANTS" 1970-2000, AND CARIBBEAN IMMIGRANTS ADMITTED TO NORTH AMERICA, 1970/71-1980.

Country	U.N. Estimates of "Net International Emigration"			Caribbean Immigrants to U.S.A. to Canada	
	1970-80	1980-90	1990-2000	1971-80	1970-80
Cuba	240,000	300,000	0	276,790	456
Dominican Rep.	114,000	114,000	114,000	148,016	389
Haiti	130,000	130,000	125,000	58,705	22,921
Puerto Rico	(452,000)	(440,000)	(15,000)	n.a.	178
Jamaica	162,000	98,000	50,000	141,995	64,319
Trinidad & Tobago	52,000	10,000	10,000	61,776	32,275
Barbados	9,000	0	0	20,948	6,720
Dominica				4,581	1,122
Grenada				7,765	2,609
St. Lucia				4,947	969
St. Vincent				4,735	3,046
-----				-----	-----
WINDWARD ISLES	50,000	63,000	40,000	22,028	7,746
Guadeloupe	58,000	30,000	15,000	591	118
Martinique	64,000	25,000	10,000	336	192
Guyana	32,000	20,000	10,000	47,531	32,588
Suriname	102,000	24,000	16,000	779	236
All Other Caribbean Isles.	4,000	8,000	8,000		

Total Region (less Belize and Fr. Guiana)	559,000	384,000	381,000	815,524	175,563

Source: Guengant, 1985, Appendices 2,3, and 5.

TABLE IV.5: RECENT CARIBBEAN IMMIGRANTS ADMITTED TO UNITED STATES, 1985-1988

Country	Years of Admission to Permanent Resident Status			
	1985	1986	1987	1988
Antigua/Barbuda	957	812	874	837
Bahamas	533	570	556	1,283
Barbados	1,625	1,595	1,665	1,455
Belize	1,353	1,385	1,354	1,497
Cuba	20,334	33,114	28,916	17,558*
Dominica	540	564	740	611
Dominican Republic	23,787	26,175	24,858	27,189*
Grenada	934	1,045	1,098	842
Guyana	8,531	10,367	11,384	8,747
Haiti	10,165	12,666	14,819	34,806*
Jamaica	18,923	19,595	23,148	20,966
St.Kitts-Nevis	769	573	589	660
St.Lucia	499	502	na	606
St.Vincent & The Grenadines	693	635	746	634
Trinidad & Tobago	2,831	2,891	3,543	3,947
Other Caribbean	691	895	1,347	963
	93,165	113,384	115,637	122,601

* Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (all residents since 1982).

Sources: (1987) Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, (Washington D.C.: Department of Justice); Immigration Statistics-Fiscal Years 1987,1988-Advance Reports, (Washington D.C.: Department of Justice, 1988,1989).

TABLE IV.6A: FOREIGN-BORN RESIDENT POPULATIONS IN SELECTED CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES, 1960-80

Countries	Population at most recent Census (000s)	Foreign-Born Populations			Percent Foreign-Born in most recent Census
		1960 (000s)	1970/1 (000s)	1980/1 (000s)	
Antigua/Barbuda	65	4.5	7		10.6
Bahamas	169		31		18.4
Barbados	244	10.0	13	19	7.6
Belize	153	7.6	10	12	7.8
Bermuda	54			14	26.2
British Virgin Isles.	11			4	35.2
Cayman Isles.	17	1.5		4	25.4
Cuba	8,569		128		1.5
Dominica	74	2.4		2	2.4
Dominican Republic.	4,006		32		0.8
French Guiana	73			32	43.6
Grenada	89	4.0		2	2.7
Guadeloupe	327			35	10.7
Guyana	759			6	0.8
Haiti	4,330		11		0.3
Jamaica	2,230	21.8	34		1.5
Martinique	327			3	0.8
Montserrat	12			1	12.8
Neth. Antilles	218		31		14.2
Puerto Rico	3,197			270	8.5
St.Kitts-Nevis	43	3.4		3	6.0
St.Lucia	113	2.4		4	3.1
St.Vincent & The Grenadines	98	2.4		2	2.2
Suriname			N.D.		
Trinidad/Tobago	931	42.1		62	6.6
Turks & Caicos	7	0.2		1	16.2
U.S.V.I.	97			48	49.7
<hr/>					
United States	226,546			14,080	6.2

Sources: (1988) World Population Trends and Policies, 1987: Monitoring Report, (United Nations Population Studies, No.103: Table 84) : "Caribbean Censuses, 1960-1981".

TABLE IV.6B: FOREIGN-BORN CARIBBEAN POPULATION IN SELECTED CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES:
1980-81 CENSUS ENUMERATIONS.

Country of Birth	Barbados		British Virgins		St. Lucia		Trinidad	
	Nos.	Percent For.born	Nos.	Percent For.born	Nos.	Percent For.born	Nos.	Percent For.born
Antigua			393	10.2%				
Barbados	226,587	(92.4)	45	1.0%	326	9.3%	3,995	6.5%
B.V.I.			7,110	(64.8)				
Dominica			185	5.0%	168	4.8%		
Grenada			113	3.0%			21,216	34.5%
Guyana	1,627	8.7%	125	3.0%	489	14.0%	2,906	4.7%
Jamaica			44	1.0%				
Montserrat			92	2.0%				
St. Kitts-Nevis			1,068	27.7%				
St. Lucia	3,317	17.8%	74	2.0%	109,872	(96.9)	1,540	2.5%
St. Vincent	3,349	18.0%	370	9.6%	173	4.9%	13,662	22.2%
Trinidad & Tobago (93.4)	1,517	8.0%	60	1.5%			870,530	
Other Comwl Caribbean	2,291	12.3%	138	3.6%	1,017	29.0%	3,257	5.3%
U.S.V.I.			200	5.2%				
Dominican Rep.			72	2.0%				
U.K.	2,843	15.0%	312	8.1%	542	15.5%	4,043	6.6%
U.S.A.	952	5.0%	318	8.2%	195	5.6%	2,502	4.1%
Canada	579	3.0%	56	1.4%	109	3.1%		
India	401	2.0%					957	1.6%
Elsewhere	1,761	9.0%	197	5.0%	485	13.8%	7,433	12.1%
Total								
Foreign-Born	18,637	100.0%	3,862	100.0%	3,515	100.0%	61,511	100.0%

Sources: 1980-81 Population Censuses of the Commonwealth Caribbean: Barbados, British Virgin Islands, St. Lucia and Trinidad and Tobago.

TABLE IV.7A: ESTIMATES OF CARIBBEAN PEOPLE LIVING IN SELECTED REGIONS AND COUNTRIES: MID 1980s

Receiving Region and Country	Estimated Numbers	Percentage of Overseas Population
EUROPE	1,160,000	15.8%
United Kingdom	650,000 ^a	(8.8%)
France	300,000 ^b	(4.1%)
Netherlands	210,000 ^c	(2.9%)
UNITED STATES	5,848,000	79.5%
: Puerto Ricans	2,562,000 ^d	(34.7%)
: Cubans	1,036,000 ^e	(14.1%)
: Dominican Republicans	800,000 ^f	(10.9%)
: Haitians	800,000 ^g	(10.9%)
: British West Indians	600,000 ^h	(8.2%)
: Other Caribbean people	50,000 ⁱ	(0.7%)
CANADA	350,000 ^j	4.7%
TOTAL	7,358,000	100%

As Percentage of the regional population of the Caribbean (approximately 31 million) 23.7%

Source : Boswell (1989): Table 5.2, p.110.

^a Richardson (1989) estimation

^b Lowenthal (1978) estimation

^c Richardson (1989)-includes 180,000 immigrants from Suriname and 30,000 from the Netherlands Antilles.

^d U.S. Department of Commerce (1986)- includes all people who consider themselves to be of Puerto Rican descent (not solely in-migrants from Puerto Rico).

^e U.S. Department of Commerce (1986)- include all people who consider themselves of Cuban descent(not solely in-migrants from Cuba).

^f Pastor (1985)- includes 318,644 immigrants between 1950 and 1983, 225,000 estimated illegal immigrants, and an estimated (by Boswell, 1989) 256,356 children born to Dominican Republican parents living in the United States.

^g Richardson (1989)-includes 150,000 naturalized Haitians, 50,000 estimated Haitian students, an estimated 400,000 illegal immigrants, and estimated 200,000 children born to Haitian parents.

^h Richardson (1989) estimation

ⁱ Boswell (1989) estimation

^j Richardson (1989)- includes 172,245 West Indian immigrants enumerated in 1981 Canadian Census, plus estimated 177,755 West Indian immigrants who came via the United Kingdom.

TABLE IV.7B: UN/CELADE ESTIMATES OF CARIBBEAN POPULATIONS ENUMERATED IN OTHER AMERICAN COUNTRIES, 1980.

Countries	Population Enumerated in Other Americas (000s)	Main Receiving Countries	Percent of Emigrants in Main Receiving Countries (%)
Barbados	28.0	United States	95.8
Cuba	627.5	United States	96.9
Dominican Republic	187.6	United States	90.2
		Canada	9.4
Guyana	89.0	United States	54.6
		Canada	42.7
Haiti	120.8	United States	76.5
		Canada	22.2
Jamaica	277.9	United States	70.8
		Canada	28.1
Trinidad & Tobago	111.5	United States	59.1
		Canada	34.7

Source: CELADE (1986) "Investigacion de la Migracion Internacional en Latinoamerica (IMILA) Boletin Demografico, XIX(37): cited in United Nations (1989) World Population Trends & Policies: 1989 Monitoring Report, (preliminary version, February), New York. Table 66, pp. 382-3.

TABLE IV.8: CARIBBEAN NONIMMIGRANTS ADMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES, 1970-85.

Country	Population in 1985 (000s)	1970-74 (000s)	1975-79 ¹ (000s)	1981-85 (000s)		TOTAL 1970-85 (000s)	Annual x as % 1985 Country
					Direction of change		
						>1980-5	
Anguilla	7	na	4	4			14%
Antigua/Barbuda	78		(17)	20			14%
Bahamas	225	446	441	823	+	1,710	91%
Barbados	251	63	82	89	+	234	9%
Belize	153	22	40	44	+	106	7%
Bermuda	63	86	112	24	-	222	9%
B.V.I.	12	37	49	174	+	260	35%
Cayman Isles	12		(17)	58			121%
Dominica	74	41	18	(21)?		(80)?	8%
Dominican Republic	6,600	560	813	334	-	1,707	1%
Grenada	114		(4)	11			3%
Guadeloupe	318		(8)	25			2%
Guyana	818	58	76	50	-	184	2%
Haiti	5,700	147	264	257	-	668	1%
Jamaica	2,300	486	683	491	-	1,660	5%
Martinique	311		(7)	18			1%
Montserrat	13		(2)	4			8%
Neth. Antilles	256	64	82	67	-	213	13%
St. Kitts-Nevis	53	97	49	21	-	167	10%
St. Lucia	125	27	19	16	-	62	3%
St. Vincent & The Grenadines	102		(4)	11			3%
Suriname	404		(6)	32			2%
Trinidad & Tobago	1,200	207	267	373	+	847	8%
Turks & Caicos	7		(3)	21			75%
U.S.V.I.	101		NA	NA			

. () indicates incomplete data: enumerations for 1975, and 1978 only.
. Average x, annual nonimmigrant volumes for 1981-85 period (1980 data not recorded by INS)
. INS records of Dominica visitors complicated due to irregularities in distinguishing (self-enumerated) "Dominican" Republicans from "Dominicans."
[Author's assessment].

Sources: (1978-1985) Statistical Yearbooks of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, (Washington D.C.: Department of Justice).

TABLE IV.9: ESTIMATES OF URBANIZATION RATES AND PRIMACY MEASURES FOR SELECTED CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES

Country	Percent Urban 1950	Percent Urban 1980	Percent Urban 2000	Urban growth Rates							% Primate	
				1965-70	1970-75	1975-80	1980-85	1985-90	1990-95	1995-2000	Total (1983)	Urban (1980)
Barbados	34	40	51	0.8	1.4	1.1	1.3	1.8	2.1	2.3	52%	124%
Cuba	49	68	80	2.8	3.0	2.0	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.3	21%	30%
Dominican Republic	24	50	68	5.8	5.0	4.6	4.3	3.8	3.3	2.8	26%	55%
Guadeloupe	42	43	55	1.8	1.1	0.7	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.8	8%	17%
Guyana	28	30	42	2.0	2.0	2.7	3.0	3.2	3.2	3.4	20%	71%
Haiti	12	25	37	4.5	4.2	3.9	3.9	4.0	4.0	3.9	11%	13%
Jamaica	27	47	58	3.2	3.0	2.4	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.4	35%	74%
Martinique	28	66	79	3.6	2.6	1.7	1.5	1.2	1.1	1.3	32%	46%
Puerto Rico	41	67	79	3.4	3.4	2.6	2.6	2.3	2.0	1.7	39%	47%
Suriname	47	45	54	1.8	-0.9	-0.5	1.5	2.3	2.7	2.9	7%	43%
Trinidad & Tobago	23	57	75	6.4	5.5	4.9	3.9	3.2	2.6	1.9	31%	56%
Windward* Islands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	26%	110%

* Windward Islands estimates provided in United Nation, (1988) World Demographic Estimates and Projections, 1950-2025. (New York: United Nations), ST/ESA/SER.R/79. Not recorded in United Nations (1989).

Sources: United Nations, (1989) World Population Prospects, (New York: United Nations, Population Studies, No 106) Tables by Country, pps. 292-547.

: Table IV.11: Primate city (metropolitan areas-city+suburbs)/
/Total Population in 1983.

TABLE IV.10: URBAN AND RURAL ANNUAL GROWTH RATES IN THE CARIBBEAN, 1950-1970

Country	Annual Growth Rates (%) ¹				Urban Absorption Rate ²		Change in Proportion of Urban Pop. 1960-70 (%)
	1950-60		1960-70		1950-60	1960-70	
	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	(%)	(%)	
Bahamas	2.7	6.0	1.3	4.4	64	76	+7
Barbados	0.2	2.2	0.1	2.0	90	95	+5
Belize	3.0	3.0	3.2	3.3	35	38	0
Cuba	1.9	2.3	2.2	2.6	61	62	+1
Dominican Republic	2.7	6.1	2.6	5.7	46	53	+7
Guadeloupe	2.3	5.4	1.6	4.5	31	42	+4
Guyana	2.7	3.2	2.6	3.2	32	33	+1
Haiti	2.3	4.6	1.6	3.8	24	31	+3
Jamaica	0.9	4.3	1.2	4.3	62	64	+7
Leeward Islands	0.5	3.5	-0.3	2.2	73	150	+6
Martinique	1.0	5.6	0.3	4.4	75	91	+10
Netherlands Antilles	-0.1	3.6	-0.3	3.1	104	110	+8
Puerto Rico	-0.0	1.5	1.3	2.8	102	64	+4
Suriname	2.4	3.2	3.7	4.5	42	42	+2
Trinidad & Tobago	0.7	7.2	0.3	6.0	84	94	+13
U.S. Virgin Islands	2.4	1.4	6.7	9.3	40	67	+6
Windward Islands	1.7	2.7	1.6	2.6	24	37	+2
Caribbean Average	1.7	3.0	1.7	3.3	51	56	+4

¹ These are annual rates of change of population so defined at each census, not strictly "growth rates" since rural and urban areas change over time.

² The "urban absorption rate" is the proportion of total growth attributable to population growth in urban areas exceeds 100 when there has been an absolute decline in rural population.

Source: Cross, (1979) Table 4.9, pp. 74 [projection estimates drawn from Davis, (1969): Tables A and D].

TABLE IV.11: CARIBBEAN URBAN PRIMACY

Country	Population	Capital (1983) City	Capital City Pop (000s) ¹			1983 ¹ Or Latest Pop.
			1960	1970	1980	
Bahamas	222,000	Nassau	81(63)	102	102	
		Freeport			16	
Belize	153,000	Belize City	33	39	40	
		Belmopan			3	
Bermuda	63,000	Hamilton	14	14	14	
Cuba	9,877,000	Havana	978	1,751	1,861(76)	2 million(83)
		Santiago de Cuba	220	278	316(76)	550,000(83)
		Camaguey	162	198	222(76)	345,000(83)
		Holguin	80	132	152	
D. Republic	5,908,000	Santo Domingo	370	669	923(75)	1,551,000(83)
		Santiago de los Caballeros	86	155	209(76)	
Haiti	5,300,000	Port-au-Prince	240	494	588	
Jamaica	2,264,000	Kingston	377	476	626(75)	800,000(83)
Puerto Rico	3,267,000	San Juan	542	820	1,000	1,290,000(85)
		Bayamon	15	148	196	
U.S.V.I.	101,000	Charlotte Amalie	13	12	12	
B.V.I.	12,000	Road Town(Tortola)			4	
Turks & Caicos	7,500	Cockburn Town(Grand/T)			3	
Cayman Isles	12,000	George Town			8	
Med. Antilles	256,000	Willemstad(Curacao)	94		140	
Martinique	311,000	Fort-de-France	85	97	101	
Guadeloupe	318,000	Point-a-Pitre			24	
Anguilla	7,000	The Valley				
Antigua & Barbuda	78,000 1,500	St. Johns			26	
Montserrat	13,000	Plymouth			2.5	
St. Kitts/ Nevis	36,000 13,000	Basseterre Charlestown			16 8	
Barbados	260,000	Bridgetown	94	115	124	
Dominica	81,000	Roseau			18	
Grenada	114,000	St. Georges			8	
St. Lucia	125,000	Castries			50	
St. Vincent & The Grenadines	102,000	Kingstown			34	
Trinidad & Tobago	1,140,000	Port of Spain San Fernando	94		350 37	
Guyana	920,000	Georgetown	148	167	187(76)	
Suriname	406,000	Paramaribo	111	102(71)	68	
French Guiana	73,500	Cayenne	18	25	30(74)	38,000(82)

1. Dates in () indicate census enumerations.

Sources: Atlas of Central America and the Caribbean (London:MacMillan,1985)
: Showers, V., World Facts and Figures, (New York: John Wiley, 1979)

TABLE IV.12: AVERAGE ANNUAL RATES OF NET URBAN IN-MIGRATION FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES

Country	Period	Net Rural Out-Migration		Net Urban In-Migration	
		Males	Females	Males	Females
Cuba	1971-1981	25,900	31,500	14,800	15,500
Dominican Republic	1960-1970	14,200	17,600	28,400	29,100
Puerto Rico	1970-1980	23,800	27,500	14,800	15,600
Guyana	1960-1970	19,400	20,800	66,500	63,800

Source: U.N. (1988) World Population Trends and Policies: 1987 Monitoring Report (Washington D.C.: U.N. Population Studies, No. 103), Table 79.

TABLE IV.13: IMMIGRATION TRENDS TO THE UNITED STATES
AND RECENT GDP PERFORMANCE OF CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES

Countries	GDP/capita		% Change in GDP 1980-85 (Average growth at constant prices)	Immigration to U.S.	
	1974 (US\$)	1985 (US\$)		1972-78	1979-85
Antigua/ Barbuda	689	2,244	6.00	4,033	9,823
Bahamas	3,362	7,822	4.73	2,796	3,858
Barbados	1,296	4,894	0.29	14,089	14,534
Belize	614	1,110	1.16	4,734	9,933
Cuba	1,524	2,690	6.07	224,534	89,617
Dominica	378	1,132	5.64	2,510	4,673
Dominican Republic	639	712	1.83	100,628	121,908
Grenada	346	961	3.11	5,260	7,398
Guyana	538	584	-2.88	26,708	58,107
Haiti	125	368	1.16	38,288	56,863
Jamaica	1,038	858	-0.87	88,740	139,244
St. Kitt- Nevis	634	1,469	2.86	4,443	8,756
St. Lucia	448	1,245	2.97	2,559	5,109
St. Vincent & The Grenadines	310	933	4.87	3,039	5,075
Suriname	1,100	2,360	0.34	554	642
Trinidad & Tobago	1,778	6,538	-2.04	44,267	27,397
B.V.I.	-	7,101	5.22	2,241	1,309
Montserrat	886	3,118	3.45	1,422	1,029
Netherlands Antilles	-	6,110	-	1,970	1,495
U.S. V.I.	-	9,280	-	<u>Not Applicable</u>	
				572,815	566,77

Sources: Table IV.3 and CDCC (1987: Table 1.1).

BIBLIOGRAPHY
PART IV

Allman, J. (1982) "Haitian Migration: 30 Years Assessed," Migration Today, 10(1): 6-12

Anderson, P.Y. (1985) "Migration and Development in Jamaica." In R. A. Pastor (ed), Migration and Development in the Caribbean: The Unexplored Connection, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press) pp. 117-139

Anderson, P.Y. (1988) "Manpower Losses and Employment Adequacy Among Skilled Workers in Jamaica: 1976-1985." In P.R. Pessar (ed), When Borders Don't Divide: Labor Migration and Refugee Movements in the Americas, (Staten Island, NY: Center for Migration Studies) pp. 96-128

Anderson, P.Y. (1990) "The Demographic Basis of Social Instability in the Caribbean of the Eighties." In A.T. Bryan, J.E. Greene and T.M. Shaw (eds), Peace, Development and Security in the Caribbean, (New York: St. Martin's Press) pp. 160-179.

Appleyard, R. (1988) International Migration Today: Volume 1: Trends and Prospects, (Nedlands, Western Australia: University of Western Australia, Center for Migration and Development Studies, and Paris: UNESCO).

Atlas of Central America and the Caribbean, (1985) (London: MacMillan)

Bach, R.L. (1985) "Western Hemisphere Immigration to the United States: A Review of Selected Research Trends," Hemispheric Migration Project Occasional Paper No 3. (Washington D.C.: Center for Immigration Policy and Refugee Assistance, Georgetown University)

Baerga, M. del C., and L. Thompson (1990), "Migration in a Small Semiperiphery: The Movement of Puerto Ricans and Dominicans," International Migration Review, 24(4): 656- 683.

Bascom, W.O. (1990), "Remittance Inflows and Economic Development in Selected Anglophone Caribbean Countries." Working Paper, No. 58, Commission for the Study of International Migration and Co-operative Economic Development, (Washington, D.C. July).

Bean, F.D., Vernez, G. and C.B. Keely, (1989) Opening and Closing the Doors: Evaluating Immigration Reform and Control. (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press).

Blake, J. (1955) "Family Instability and Reproductive Behavior in Jamaica," Current Research in Human Fertility, Milbank Memorial Fund pp. 24-41

Boland, B. (1986) Population, Human Resources and Development Planning: Need for Multisectoral Institutional Network for Population Policy Implementation, (Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago: ECLAC/CELADE Demography Unit).

Boland, B. (1990) " Caribbean Population Policies: Immediate Needs for the 21st Century." Paper presented at the XV Annual Conference of the Caribbean Studies Association, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, May, 1990.

Boswell, T.D. (1985) "Puerto Ricans Living in the United States." In J.O. McKee (ed), Ethnicity in Contemporary America: A Geographical Appraisal, (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt) pp. 117-144.

Boswell, T.D. (1986) "The Characteristics of Internal Migration To and From New Providence Island (Greater Nassau), Bahamas, 1960-70," Social and Economic Studies, 35(1): 111-150.

Boswell, T.D. (1989) "Population and Political Geography of the Present-Day West Indies." In R.C. West and J.P. Augelli (eds) Middle America: Its Lands and Peoples, 3rd Edition, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall) pp. 103-127

Bouvier, L. (1983/1984) Occasional Series: The Caribbean, Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, (Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau). Profiles of Antigua/Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Kitts/Nevis and St. Vincent and the Grenadines: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow.

Brittain, A.W. (1990) "Cohort Size and Migration in a West Indian Population," International Migration Review, 24(4): 703- 721.

CDCC, (1980) Strategy for the Caribbean Countries During the Third Development Decade, (Port of Spain, Trinidad & Tobago: CEPAL, Caribbean Development and Cooperation Committee, E/CEPAL/CDCC/61/Rev.1)

CDCC, (1987) The Caribbean in the Context of the Global Economic Crisis, (Port of Spain, Trinidad & Tobago: ECLAC, Caribbean Development and Cooperation Committee, LC/CAR/G.225).

Caldwell, J.C., Harrison, G.E. and P. Quiggins, (1980), "The Demography of Micro-States," World Development, 8(12):953-967

Caplow, T. et al., (1964) The Urban Ambience: A Study of San Juan, Puerto Rico, (Totowa, NJ: Bedminster Press)

CARICOM, (1981) The Caribbean Community in the 1980s, Report by a Group of Experts to the Caribbean Common Market Council of Ministers, (Georgetown, Guyana: The Caribbean Community Secretariat)

Carnegie, C.V. (1982) "Strategic Flexibility in the West Indies: A Social Psychology of Caribbean Migration," Caribbean Review, 11(1): 10-13, 54.

Catasus, S. et al., (1988) Cuban Women: Changing Roles and Population Trends, (Geneva: International Labour Office).

Chaney, E.M. (1985) "Migration from the Caribbean Region: Determinants and Effects of Current Movements," Hemispheric Migration Project Occasional Paper No 2. (Washington D.C.: Center for Immigration Policy and Refugee Assistance, Georgetown University, 1985).

Chapman, M. and R.M. Prothero, (1983) "Themes on circulation in the Third World," International Migration Review, 17(4),

C.I.C.R.E.D. (1974) The Population of Trinidad and Tobago, (Port of Spain, Trinidad and Paris: UNFPA Programme)

Clarke, G.C. (1974) "Urbanization in the Caribbean," Geography, 59(3): 223-232.

Coelho, E.B. (1989) "Effects of Migration on Social Change in the Country of Origin," International Migration (Geneva), 17(2): 183-190.

Cohen, R. (1987) The New Helots: Migrants in the International Division of Labour, Aldershot, Hants: Avebury Press)

Conway, D. (1984) Trinidad's Mismatched Expectations: Planning and Development Review, (Hanover, NH: University Field Staff Report 1984/No. 26)

Conway, D. (1985) "Remittance Impacts on Development in the Eastern Caribbean," Bulletin of Eastern Caribbean Affairs, 11(4 & 5): 31-40.

Conway, D. (1986a) "Caribbean Migration as International Circulation". Presented at the 82nd Annual Meetings of the Association of American Geographers, Minneapolis, Minnesota, April.

Conway, D. (1986b) Caribbean Migrants: Opportunistic and Individualistic Sojourners, Indianapolis: Universities Field Staff Report 1986/no. 24)

Conway, D. (1986c) "Patterns of Caribbean Migration." In J.W. Hopkins (ed), Latin America and Caribbean Contemporary Record, Volume IV, 1984-85, (New York: Holmes & Meier)

Conway, D. (1988) " Conceptualizing Contemporary Patterns of Caribbean International Mobility," Caribbean Geography, 2(3): 145-

Conway, D. (1989a) "Caribbean International Mobility Traditions," Boletin de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe, 46(3):17-47.

Conway, D. (1989b) "Trinidad and Tobago." In R.B. Potter (ed), Urbanization, Planning and Development in the Caribbean, (London and New York: Mansell Pubs.) pp. 49-76.

Conway, D. (1989c) " Emigration to North America: The Continuing Option for the Caribbean," Caribbean Affairs, 3(2): 109- 119.

Conway, D. and C. Glesne (1986) "Rural Livelihood, Return Migration and Remittances in St. Vincent." In D.L. Clawson (ed) Conference of Latin Americanist Geographers Yearbook, 1986, (Muncie, IN: Ball State University) pp. 3-11.

Cooper, D. (1985) "Migration from Jamaica in the 1970s: Political Protest or Economic Pull," International Migration Review, 19(4): 728-748

Cross, M. (1979) Urbanization and Urban Growth in the Caribbean, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Cruz, M et al., (1987) "The Demographic Dynamics of Small Island Societies," Ekistics, 54(323/324: 110-115.

Davis, K. (1969) World Urbanization, 1950-1970, Volume 1: Basic Data for Cities, Countries and Population, (Berkeley, California: University of California, Monograph No. 4).

Davison, R.B. (1962) West Indian Migrants: Social and Economic Facts of Migration from the West Indies, (London: Oxford University Press, Institute of Race Relations)

de Albuquerque, K., Mader, K.P. and W.Stinner, (1976) "Modernization, Delayed Marriage and Fertility in Puerto Rico: 1950 to 1970," Social and Economic Studies, 25(1): 55-65.

Demas, W.G. (1988) "Perspectives on the Future of the Caribbean in the World Economy," Bulletin of Eastern Caribbean Affairs, 14(3): 1-18.

Diaz-Briquet, S. (1980) International Migration Within Latin America and the Caribbean: A Review of Available Evidence, (Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau).

Ebanks, G.E., George, P.M. and C.E. Nobbe, (1975) "Emigration and Fertility Decline: The Case of Barbados," Demography, 12(3): 431-445.

Freeman, G.P. (1982) "Caribbean Migration to Britain and France," Caribbean Review, 11(1) GAO, (1988) Immigration: The Future Flow of

Legal Immigration to the United States, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate. (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, GAO1.13/PEMD-88-7)

Girling, R.K. (1974) "The Migration of Human Capital from the Third World; The Implications and Some Data on the Jamaican Case," Social and Economic Studies, 23(1):

Gmelch, G. (1987) "Work, Innovation, and Investment: The Impact of Return Migrants in Barbados," Human Organization, 46(2): 131-140.

Goossen, J. (1976) "The Migration of French West Indian Women to Metropolitan France," Anthropological Quarterly, 49(1): 45-52.

Guengant, J-P., (with D.I. Marshall), (1985) Caribbean Population Dynamics: Emigration and Fertility Challenges. (Barbados: Conference of Caribbean Parliamentarians on Population and Development).

Guengant, J-P. (1989) "Proximite Geographique et Culturelle, et Migrations." Presented at the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the Caribbean Studies Association, Barbados, May.

Harewood, J. (1972) "The Under-Utilization of Available Human Resources." In J. Harewood (ed), Human Resources in the Commonwealth Caribbean, (St. Augustine, Trinidad: The University of the West Indies, Institute for Social and Economic Research) pp. 85-104.

Harewood, J. (1975a) The Population of Trinidad and Tobago, Committee for International Cooperation in Research in Demography, (CICRED) Series.

Harewood, J. (1975b) "West Indian People." In G.L. Beckford (ed), Caribbean Economy: Dependence and Backwardness, (Mona, Jamaica: The University of the West Indies, Institute for Social and Economic Research) pp. 1-29.

Harewood, J. (1983) "White Collar Migrant Labor: Some Observations on the Case of Trinidad and Tobago in the Last Two Decades." In A.F. Marks and H.M.C. Vessuri (eds), White Collar Migrants in the Americas and the Caribbean, (Leiden, Netherlands: Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology) pp. 19-37

Henderson, G. (1970) Emigration of Skilled Manpower from the Developing Countries, (New York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research).

Heinl, R.D. and N.G. Heinl, (1978) Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People, 1492-1971. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin).

Henry, R.M. (1990) " A Reinterpretation of Labor Services of the Commonwealth Caribbean." Working Paper, No. 61, Commission for the Study of International Migration and Co-operative Economic Development, (Washington, D.C. July).

Hope, K.R. (1986) Urbanization of the Commonwealth Caribbean, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press).

Houstoun, M.F., Kramer, R.G. and J.M. Barrett, (1984), "Female Predominance in Immigration to the United States Since 1930: A First Look," International Migration Review, 28(4): 908-959.

IBRD, (1985) World Tables, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press)

I.N.S. (1964/68) Annual Reports, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, Immigration and Naturalization Service)

I.N.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service Statistical Yearbooks, 1978- 1986, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1979-1988).

Isaias, E.B. (1989) "Social Effects of Group Migration Between Developing Countries," International Migration (Geneva), 17(2): 225-231.

Jasso, G. and M. Rosenzweig, (1987) "Using National Recording Systems for the Measurement and Analysis of Immigration to the United States," International Migration Review, 21(4): 1212-1244.

Johnson, K. (1982a) Migration in the Caribbean: The Guyana-Suriname Case, (Bridgetown, Barbados: Caribbean Conference of Churches).

Johnson, K. (1982b) Haitian Refugees in the Caribbean: The Guadeloupe Case, (Bridgetown, Barbados: Caribbean Conference of Churches).

Kelly, J.J. (1987) "Improving the Comparability of International Migration Statistics: Contributions by the Conference of European Statisticians from 1971 to Date," International Migration Review, 21(4): 1017-1037

Kraly, E.P. and K.S. Gnanasekaran, (1987) "Efforts to Improve International Migration Statistics: A Historical Perspective," International Migration Review, 21(4): 967-995.

Kraly, E.P. and R. Warren (1989) "Length of Stay of Temporary Migrants and the Concept of Long-term Immigration to the United States." Paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the Association of American Geographers, Baltimore, MD, March.

Kritz, M.M. (1981) "International Migration Patterns in the

Caribbean Basin: An Overview." In M.M. Kritz, C.Keely and S. Tomasi (eds), Global trends in Migration, (New York: Center for Migration Studies) pp.208-233

Kritz, M.M. (1987) "International Migration Policies: Conceptual Problems," International Migration Review, 21(4): 947-964

Kunz, E.F. (1973) "The Refugee in Flight: Kinetic Models and Forms of Displacement," International Migration Review, 7(1): 125-146.

Laguerre, M.S. (1978) "The Impact of Migration on the Haitian Family and Household Organization." In A.F. Marks and R.A. Romer (eds), Family and Kinship in Middle America and the Caribbean, (Leiden, Netherlands: Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology, Department of Caribbean Studies) pp. 446-481.

Larson, E.M. and T.A. Sullivan (1987) "'Conventional Numbers' in Immigration Research: The Case of the Missing Dominicans," International Migration Review, 21(4): 1474-1497.

Levine, B.B. (1987) Caribbean Exodus, (New York: Praeger)

Lowenthal, D. (1957) "The Population of Barbados," Social and Economic Studies, 6(4): 445-501.

Lowenthal, D. (1972) West Indian Societies, (London: Oxford University Press).

Lowenthal, D. (1978) "West Indian Emigrants Overseas." In C.G. Clarke (ed) Caribbean Social Relations, (Liverpool: University of Liverpool, Centre for Latin American Studies, Monograph No. 8)

Lowenthal, D. and L. Comitas (1962) "Emigration and Depopulation: Some Neglected Aspects of Population Geography," The Geographical Review, 52(2): 195-210.

Margolies, L. (1979) The Venezuelan Peasant in Country and City, Caracas, Venezuela: Ediva Press).

Marshall, D.I. (1982) "The History of Caribbean Migrations", Caribbean Review, 11(1): 6-9 and 52-53.

Marshall, D.I. (1983) "Towards an Understanding of Caribbean Migration." In M.M. Kritz (ed), U.S. Immigration and Refugee Policy: Global and Domestic Issues, (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books).pp.113-131.

Marshall, D.I. (1985) "International Migration as Circulation: Haitian Movement to the Bahamas." In R.M. Prothero and M. Chapman (eds) Circulation in Third World Countries, (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul). pp. 226-240.

Massey, D.S. (1988) "Economic Development and International Migration in Comparative Perspective," Population and Development Review, 14(3):383-413

Massey, D.S. and B.P. Mullan, (1984) "A Demonstration of the Effect of Seasonal Migration on Fertility," Demography, 21(4):501-517.

Massiah, J. (1988) Population and Development in Barbados: The Story of the Seventies. (Cave Hill, Barbados: CARICOM/UNFPA Demographic Analysis Project)

McElroy, J. and K. de Albuquerque (1986) "The Impact of External Migration on the Fertility and Mortality Transitions of Insular Microstates: An East Caribbean Example." Forthcoming in Human Resource Development in the Caribbean, (San Juan, Puerto Rico: Caribbean Studies Association). draft manuscript.

McElroy J.L. and K. de Albuquerque, (1988) "The Migration Transition in Small Northern and Eastern Caribbean States: A Spectrum of Experience," International Migration Review, 21(2):

McElroy, J. and K. de Albuquerque, (1990) "Migration, Natality and Fertility: Some Caribbean Evidence," International Migration Review, 24(4): 783-802.

McElroy and T. Radke, (1988) "Migration and Fertility: Some Caribbean Evidence." Presented to the Midwest Association of Latin Americanists, (MALAS), Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, October)

Momsen, J. (1986) "Migration and Rural Development in the Caribbean," Tidjschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, 77(1): 50-58.

Moncarz, R. and A. Jorge (1982) "Cuban Immigration to the United States." D. L. Cuddy (ed) Contemporary American Immigration: Interpretive Essays, (Boston: Twayne Pubs). pp. 146-175.

Moore, E.G. (1989) Personal communication concerning Statistics Canada, Cooperative investigation on Immigration Retention. (Baltimore AAG Meeting, March)

Morrison, T.K. and R. Sinkin (1982) "International Migration in the Dominican Republic: Implications for Development Planning," International Migration Review, 16(4):

Myrdal, G. (1957) Rich Lands and Poor, (New York: Harper & Row)

North, D.S. and J.A. Whitehead (1990) "Policy Recommendations for Improving the Utilization of Emigrant Resources in Eastern Caribbean Nations." Working Paper, No. 25, Commission for the Study of International Migration and Co-operative Economic Development,

(Washington, D.C. March).

O.E.C.D. (1978) Migration, Growth and Development, (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).

Palmer, R.W. (1974) "A Decade of West Indian Migration to the United States, 1962-72: An Economic Analysis," Social and Economic Studies, 23(4):

Palmer, R. W. (1984) Problems of Development in Beautiful Countries Perspectives on the Caribbean, (Lanham, MD: North-South Pubs).

Palmer, R.W. (1990) In Search of a Better Life: Perspectives on Migration from the Caribbean, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger).

Passaris, C. (1983) "Immigration to Canada in the Post World War Period: Manpower Flows from the Caribbean." In A. Marks and H. Vessuri (eds), White-Collar Migrants in the Americas and the Caribbean, (Leiden, the Netherlands: Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology)

Passel, J.S. and K.A. Woodrow (1987) "Change in the Undocumented Alien Population in the United States, 1979-1983," International Migration Review, 21(4): 1304-1334

Passel J.S. and K.A. Woodrow, (1984) "Geographic Distribution of Undocumented Immigrants: Estimates of Undocumented Aliens Counted in the 1980 Census by State," International Migration Review, 18(3): 642-671

Pastor, .R.A. (1983) "Migration in the Caribbean Basin: The Need for an Approach as Dynamic as the Phenomenon," In M.M. Kritz, (ed) U.S. Immigration and Refugee Policy: Global and Domestic Issues, (Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath & Co) pp. 95-111.

Pastor, R.A. (1989) "Migration and Development in the Caribbean Basin: Implications and Recommendations for Policy." Working Paper, No. 7. Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development, (Washington, D.C.:CSIMCED).

Patterson, J.G. and N.R. Shrestha (1988) "Population Growth and Development in the Third World: The Neocolonial Context," Studies in Comparative International Development, 23(2): 3-32.

Patterson, O. (1978) "Migration in Caribbean Societies: Socio-economic and Symbolic Resource," In W.H. McNeill and R.S. Adams (eds.), Human Migration: Patterns and Policies, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press). pp. 106-145.

Patterson, O. (1987) "The Emerging West Atlantic System: Migration, Culture, and Underdevelopment in the United States and the Circum-Caribbean Region." In W. Alonso (ed), Population in an

Interacting World, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press). pp. 227-260.

Peach, C. (1968) West Indian Migration to Britain, (London: Oxford University Press).

Perusek, G. (1984) "Haitian Emigration in the Twentieth Century," International Migration Review, 18(1):4-18.

Pessar, P.R. (ed), (1988) When Borders Don't Divide: Labor Migration and Refugee Movements in the Americas, (New York: Center for Migration Studies).

Philpott, S. (1973) West Indian Migration: The Montserrat Case, (New York: Humanities Press Inc)

Portes, A. (1976) "Determinants of the Brain Drain," International Migration Review, 10(4): 489-508.

Portes, A. (1987) "One Field, Many Views: Competing Theories of International Migration." In J.T. Fawcett and B.V. Carino (eds), Pacific Bridges: The New Immigration from Asia and the Pacific Islands, New York: Center for Migration Studies).

Potter, R.B. (1989) "Rural-Urban Interaction in Barbados and the Southern Caribbean: Patterns and Processes of Dependent Development in Small Countries." In R.B. Potter and T. Unwin (eds), The Geography of Urban-Rural Interaction in Developing Countries, (London and New York: Routledge) pp. 257-293.

Potter, R.B. (1990) Urbanization, Planning and Development in the Caribbean, (London and New York: Mansell).

Proudfoot, M.J. (1970) Population Movements in the Caribbean, (New York: Negro Universities Press).

Report of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, (1990), "Labor Shortages, Worker Mobility, and Immigration," 1990 Report of the President's Council of Economic Advisers: Human Resources in the 1990s, (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office).

Reubens, E.P. (1962) Migration and Development in the West Indies, (Mona, Jamaica: University College of the West Indies, Institute of Social and Economic Research)

Richardson, B.C. (1989) "Caribbean Migrations, 1838-1985." In F.W. Knight and C.A. Palmer, (eds), The Modern Caribbean, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press) pp. 203-228.

Roberts, G.W. (1955) "Some Demographic Considerations of West Indian Federation," Social and Economic Studies, 4(3):

Roberts, G.W. (1957) The Population of Jamaica, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

Roberts, G.W. (1962) "Prospects for Population Growth in the West Indians," Social and Economic Studies, 11(4): 333-350.

Roberts, G.W. (1974) Recent Population Movements in Jamaica, (Paris: Comite International de Cooperation dans les Reserches Nationales en Demographie[CICRED])

Roberts, G.W. (1979) "Issues in the Measurement of External Migration," and "Note on Limitations of Data on External Migration in the Eastern Caribbean." In S.R. Couch and R.S. Bryce-Laporte (eds) Quantitative Data and Immigration Research, (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institute, RIIES, Research Notes No. 2)pp. 239-256.

Roberts, G.W. and D.O. Mills (1958) Study of External Migration Affecting Jamaica: 1953-55, (Mona, Jamaica: The University College of the West Indies, Institute of Social and Economic Research)

Roberts, G.W. and V.E. Nam (1989) "Recent Internal Migration in Jamaica." Presented at the XIV Annual Conference of the Caribbean Studies Association, Barbados, May.

Roney, L.S. (1990) "Amnesty for Illegal Aliens from the Caribbean: Implications for Future Immigration Flows." In R.W. Palmer (ed), In Search for a Better Life: Perspectives on Migration from the Caribbean, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger) pp. 153-161.

Rogers, R. (1990) "Return Migration, Migrants' Savings and Sending Countries' Economic Development: Lessons from Europe." Working Paper, No. 30, Commission for the Study of International migration and Co-operative Economic Development, (Washington, D.C., May).

Rubenstein, H. (1979) "The Return Ideology in West Indian Migration," Papers in Anthropology, 20(1):

Russell, S.S. (1986) "Remittances from International Migration: A Review in Perspective," World Development, 14(6):677-69 Salt, J. (1987) "The SOPEMI Experience: Genesis, Aims and Achievements," International Migration Review, 21(4): 1067-1073.

Segal, A. (1975) Population Policies in the Caribbean, Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath & Co)

Senior, C. (1947) Puerto Rican Emigration, (San Juan: Puerto Rico: University of Puerto Rico, Social Science Research Center)

Showers, V. (1979) World Facts and Figures, (New York: John Wiley & Sons)

Shrestha N.R. and D. Conway (1985) "Issues in Population Pressure,

Land Resettlement, and Development: The Case of Nepal," Studies in Comparative International Development, 20(1): 55-82.

Simmons, A.B. (1987), "The United Nations Recommendations and Data Efforts," International Migration Review, 21(4): 996-1016

Simmons, A.B. and J-P. Guengant, (1990) "Caribbean Exodus: Explaining Country Variation in Net-Migration Balance." [Unpublished manuscript, Centre for Research on Latin America and the Caribbean, York University, Toronto, Canada]

SOPEMI, (1988) Continuous Reporting System on Migration, (Paris: OECD Directorate for Social Affairs, Manpower and Education).

Stahl, C.W. (1982) "International Labour Migration and International Development," Working Paper, International Migration for Employment Branch, ILO, (Geneva: International Labour Organisation) ms. 70.

Stahl, C. (1988) International Migration Today: Volume 2: Emerging Issues (Nedlands, Western Australia: University of Western Australia, Center for Migration and Development Studies and Paris: UNESCO).

Standing, G. (ed), (1985) Labour Circulation and the Labour Process (London: Croom Helm)

Standing, G. and F. Sukdeo (1977) "Labour Migration and Development in Guyana," International Labour Review, 116(3): 303-313.

Stinner W.F. and K. de Albuquerque, (1982) "Introductory Essay: The Dynamics of Caribbean Return Migration." In W.F. Stinner et al, (eds) Return Migration and Remittances: Developing a Caribbean Perspective, (Washington D.C.; Smithsonian Institute, Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies, Occasional Papers No. 3,).

Stinner, W.F. de Albuquerque, K. and R.S. Bryce-Laporte (eds), (1982) Return Migration and Remittances: Developing a Caribbean Perspective, (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institute, Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies, Occasional Papers No. 3)

Thomas, C.Y. (1982) "The Collapse of Guyana's Economy," Caribbean Contact, (Bridgetown, Barbados: Caribbean Conference of Churches, January).

Thomas-Hope, E.M. (1983) "Off the Island: Population Mobility Among the Caribbean Middle Class." In A.F. Marks and H.M.C. Vessuri (eds), White Collar Migrants in the Americas and the Caribbean, (Leiden, Netherlands: Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology), pp. 39-59.

Thomas-Hope, E.M. (1985) "Return Migration and Its Implications for Development." In R. Pastor, (ed), Migration and Development in the Caribbean, (New York: Westview Press). pp.157-173.

Thomas-Hope, E.M. (1988) "Caribbean Skilled International Migration and the Transnational Household," Geoforum, 19(4): 423-432.

Thrift, N. (1988) "The Geography of International Economic Disorder." In R.J. Johnston and P.J. Taylor (eds), A World in Crisis ?, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).

Teitlebaum, M.S. (1986) "Intersections: Immigration and Demographic Change and Their Impact in the United States." In J. Menken (ed), World Population and U.S. Policy: The Choices Ahead, (New York: W.W. Norton), pp. 133-174.

UNITAR, (1971) The Brain Drain from Five Developing Countries: Cameroon, Colombia, Lebanon, the Philippines and Trinidad and Tobago, (New York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research).

United Nations, (1953) International Migration Statistics. Statistical Paper Series M, No. 20 (ST/SOA/SER. M /20), New York.

United Nations, (1976) Draft Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration: Report of the Secretary General, (E/CN.3/483), New York.

United Nations, (1980) Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration. Statistical Paper Series M, No. 58 (ST/ESA/STAT/SER. M/58) New York.

United Nations, (1984) Report on the International Conference on Population, 1984, (New York: United Nations, Sales No. E.84. XIII.8 and corrigendum)

United Nations, (1985) Consolidated Statistics of All International Arrivals and Departures: A Technical Report. Studies in Methods Series F. No. 36 (ST/ESA/STAT/SER. F/36) New York.

United Nations, (1986) World Population Prospects: Estimates and Projections as Assessed in 1984, Population Studies No.98 (ST/ESA/SER. A/98) New York.

United Nations, (1988a) World Population Trends and Policies: 1987 Monitoring Report, Population Studies No. 103 (ST/ESA/SER. A/103) New York.

United Nations, (1988b) World Demographic Estimates and Projections, 1950-2025, Population Studies, (ST/ESA/SER.R/79) New York.

United Nations, (1989) World Population Prospects, 1988, Population Studies No. 106, New York.

United Nations, (1990) World Population Trends and Policies: 1989 Monitoring Report, February, New York.

United Nations Secretariat (1986) "The Meaning, Modalities and Consequences of Return Migration," International Migration, (Geneva), 24(1): 77-93.

U.S. Department of Commerce (1986) "News, Census Bureau says Hispanic Population Jumped 16 percent Since 1980, Still Lagging in Schooling and Income." U.S. Department of Commerce, News Report, (Washington, D.C. January).

U.S. Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, (1981) U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest: Staff Report, Washington, D.C.

U.S. Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, (1990) Unauthorized Migration: An Economic Development Response, (Washington, D.C.: Report of the Commission for the Study of International migration and Cooperative Economic Development, July).

Warren, R. and E.P. Kraly (1985) The Elusive Exodus: Emigration from the United States, (Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, Population Trends and Public Policy Occasional Paper, No. 8, March)

Warren R. and J.S. Passel, (1987) "A Count of the Uncountable: Estimates of Undocumented Aliens Counted in the 1980 Census," Demography, 24(3): 375-394

Watson, H.A. (1982) "Theoretical and Methodological Problems in Commonwealth Caribbean Migration Research: Conditions and Causality", Social and Economic Studies, 31(1):

Welch, B. (1968) "Population Density and Emigration in Dominica," The Geographical Review, 134(2): 227-235.

Wood C.H. and T. McCoy, (1985) "Caribbean Cane Cutters in Florida: Implications for the International Division of Labor." In S.E. Sanderson (ed), The Americas in the New International Division of Labor, (New York: Holmes & Meier).

Worrell, D. (1986) "The Caribbean Economy in the Nineties: Challenge and Response." (Central Bank of Barbados: Sir Winston Scott Memorial Lectures, December).

Worrell, D. (1987) Small Island Economies: Structure and Performance in the English-speaking Caribbean, (New York: Praeger).

Zlotnik, H. (1987) "Introduction, Measuring International Migration: Theory and Practice," International Migration Review, 21(4): v-xii.

PART V: POPULATION-ECONOMIC INTERRELATIONS

It would be well beyond the assigned scope or allotted capacity of this report to do justice to the available interrelations literature, its factual data base and major theories. For one, the great bulk of the literature deals with already industrialized regions and non-Caribbean developing areas. The economies in neither set of regions comes close to resembling the Caribbean's combination of: small population sizes; extraordinarily pronounced external interdependencies with respect to foreign trade; elevated international migration; importance of tourism; size of economic setbacks during the past decade; needs for access to disproportionately large amounts of capital infusions from abroad; depth of socio-cultural and economic influences stemming from its proximity to the continental size, post-industrial economy represented by the United States. For another, the economic heterogeneities of the UN and Extended Caribbean regions, no less than their demographic contrasts, would require in depth treatment of structurally dissimilar subregions, such as those which are mainly agricultural, raw materials focused or oil-export reliant, in addition to those which are relatively diversified [on these dissimilarities see Graham and Edwards, 1984, Table 4.9].

Not least important, there appears to be only a highly limited literature on UN or Extended Caribbean economic development or longer run welfare issues which also pays appreciable attention to population concerns. Presumably such

interrelations, if deemed important by the region's leading economic analysts and monitoring agencies, would be reflected in main published economic reviews of the region. Yet such reflections are not encountered. Thus, one of the most recent available such reviews, by the Economic Commission for Latin America (UN, ECLA), has no reference to the possible importance of population size, growth, structural trends or policies for economic change in either the Latin American or the UN Caribbean regions. Since its intended scope included long-term as well as short-run and intermediate-term issues, the review presumably sought to deal with subject areas which had been selected as important from developmental and structural viewpoints and not only from cyclical (short-term) or macro-economic (intermediate-period) viewpoints; presumably too, therefore, population issues should have been given at least cursory attention. None such is found. Moreover, by combining "Small Central America and Caribbean countries" almost everywhere in its discussion, with only Haiti and the Dominican Republic singled out for inclusion in its supporting tables (except in one on consumer prices), the review effectively excludes the possibility of being usable for the areas of interest here [UN, ECLAC (CDCC), 1987].

Rather, as shown by this particular source and often by the other most relevant publications consulted, short-run crisis and "macro-economic imbalance" types of issues have been the dominant subject areas addressed by foremost economic (including developmental) authorities, whether in ECLAC or elsewhere [UN,

ECLAC, 1989b; Demas, 1984]. The multiple-period (three, five and seven year) economic plans announced by Trinidad and Tobago would appear to have no demographic component, at least as reported by an International Monetary Fund's detailed summary [IMF, 1989, pages 258-261]. Much the same comments concerning inattention to demographic aspects apply to the relatively recent Caribbean Development and Co-operation Committee (CDCC) review of "The Caribbean In the Context of the Global Economic Crisis." While 19 of the Caribbean areas covered by the present report are cited individually, nothing of a demographic nature is to be found apart from the undiscussed inclusion of data on population size and life expectancy in the first of 12 annex tables [UN, ECLAC (CDCC), 1987].

Despite these background limitations, at least several main points of orientation can be, and need to be, made for present purposes, if only in broad terms. Five in particular call for emphasis:

1. The Extended Caribbean regional economies under study almost uniquely well illustrate why adequate consideration of their population-economic interrelations call for bi-directional cause-effect analysis. Impacts of economic underdevelopment on population change are immediately evident from the unique magnitudes and persistence of the region's emigration movements. Conversely and no less strikingly evident are the pronounced encroachments to be found of people and urban territories on arable land resources, import needs, balance-of-payment pressures

and labor force absorptive capacities.

2. Demographic-development interrelations which are found to be most significant from development trend or policy viewpoints have been and are bound to remain highly differential among the 28 areas under study, rather than universally or necessarily widely relevant. The areas in question are much too diverse in geographic and historical backgrounds, resource endowments, actual or foreseeably attainable productive structures and economic or demographic oncoming prospects to permit clear-cut inter-relational generalizations, even when presented in broad-brush fashion.

3. Novel and possibly mounting account needs to be taken of the prospect that oncoming developmental trends in the Extended Caribbean, as in many other newly developing regions, can no longer be safely predicted to be rapidly forward-moving or overwhelmingly consistent in their directions of change. The frequent instances of prolonged setbacks or persistent near-stagnation encountered in the third world during the 1970s and even more so during the 1980s have been in marked contrast with what today appears to have been a "golden age" of ever-progressing development uptrends during the third quarter of this century.

This directly suggests two derivative guides to a realistic anticipation of interrelational possibilities in Caribbean areas. First, economic volatility, very much in addition to longer-run trends, should be taken prominently into account when weighing

the implications of population change and needs for population policy in relation to economic development prospects. Second, the possibility that non-demographic movements of short-run, intermediate-term or even longer-run durations may dominate demographic impacts on economic prospects or on required social adaptations does not, in itself, deny the importance of population factors for the Extended Caribbean region's socioeconomic destinies. Even with respect to the "macro-economic imbalance" issues of sub-decadal durations which commonly command most attention by the region's political leaders and their economic advisers, it is often also the case that population patterns and tendencies are likely to have significant relevance in numerous connections: internal migration implications; impacts on labor utilization capacities; guides to industrial location and relocations policies; size of fiscal commitments needed for individual and family income and welfare supports; feasible health maintenance targets; job retraining and related educational commitment levels, and much else. All this is apart from the fact that demographic-economic interrelations and the demands they make on policy and political responses inevitably become multiplied when "semi-secular" (e.g. 10 to 20 year) or "secular" (say over 20 year) periods are taken into account.

4. This last point merits special emphasis, since it involves an oversight whose origins go back to Malthus and the beginnings of both demographic and developmental analysis nearly

200 years ago yet continues to prevail today. The oversight consists of regarding population trends as either the overriding or dominant determinants of long-run economic progress -- as claimed by Malthus in his initial (1798) Essay on Population, a claim successively watered down in his subsequent editions, especially in his famous last (1834 Encyclopedia Britannica) assessment -- or as a wholly secondary and perhaps even negligible such determinant, the view of not a few development economists and planners today and not without support from a current subset of economic demographers.

The position taken here is that neither of these extremes is correct or even likely to be relevant. Rather, the necessary and relevant approach to take is that it is enough to show that population is important enough to warrant extended analytic and policy attention when considering, not only the conditions of long-run socioeconomic progress, but also when attempting to cope with short-run and, even more, with intermediate-period economic setbacks.

5. Finally, sex-age numbers of people and not only sex-age proportions are of central importance from both economic and social interrelational viewpoints. For it is numbers, not proportions, which determine needs for school and health care outlays, food import needs, or amounts of capital and natural resources prerequisite for utilizing labor force productively. These are obvious examples of quantities most immediately significant to both economic (including business) and social

planning institutions and their policy determinations. Although age proportions are obviously not unrelated to demographic size or growth, they are far from being as tightly linked from budgetary, investment and other economic (e.g. multiplier and accelerator) viewpoints as are number counts. Thus, while growth rates, age proportions and their vital rate linkages can uniquely yield findings of special comparative and interpretive interest, e.g. in stable age and dependency ratio analyses, such findings have little to do directly with the immediate and continual period-specific determinations which are needed by both private and public sector planners and administrators.

The evidence that Caribbean total population and sex-age numbers will have a significant bearing on the extent to which economic development and social modernization goals in the region can or will be met has numerous mutually reinforcing aspects. To begin with, the region's population growth potentials remain high despite its extraordinary fertility declines described earlier. Projected population increases over the next 35 years will at most add up to only a very few million less than the previous 35 year increases -- some 15 to 16 million compared to 17 to 18 million -- and this even if one assumes continued pronounced fertility declines and resulting lower future growth rates. Moreover, far greater growth in numbers during 1990-2025 than in 1955-1990 is expected to occur in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, two areas with least assured development prospects among the region's area-specific possibilities.

To put these population growth magnitudes in further perspective, any one of the nearly five million average increases implied by the UN projections for the region during each of the next three decades would, if experienced, exceed today's combined populations in three of the region's larger areas -- Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and Guyana. And at least half of such average increases would in each decade be registered in Haiti plus the Dominican Republic [UN, 1989, Table 2], each an area with especially pronounced demographic handicaps affecting development.

The age-specific components of these aggregates support tellingly the conclusion that population will matter greatly in its impacts on the region's development prospects. Among these, three in particular merit attention. First, increases in the 5 to 15 age group, a convenient, if somewhat inexact, indicator of the population sector for which primary and secondary educational resources need to be made available, are expected to add still another 1.75 million by 2025 to the 1.5 million rise registered since 1955. Even with allowance for possible economies of scale from already existing plant, equipment and personnel instructional resources, it is clear that an enormous next 35 year expansion of educational capital and skilled labor supplies will be needed, quite in addition to the replacement of plant and personnel which will be occasioned by depreciation and retirements.

Second, at least an equal and probably a far larger 35 year

addition of directly productive, non-human capital resources will be called for when compared to the past such period, if the region's oncoming labor force is to be utilized productively. Regional numbers in the main labour force ages of roughly 15 to 60 can be expected to rise by almost as much -- roughly 10 million -- during 1990-2025 as they did in 1955-1990 [UN, 1991, page 24]. After allowance for labor force participation rate trends, the expected next 35 year addition in the number economically active, also some 10 million, would be well above the estimated earlier such addition, which came to less than seven million [International Labour Office, 1986, page 4]. On the one hand, considerably lessened investment pressures and needs would seem indicated by the slow growth expected in the region's numbers 15 to 25, the main ages of labor force entry. On the other hand, considerably greater investment targets may well be needed to maintain or enhance productivity (output per worker) levels or goals as the older labor force increases and ages at far greater rates than in the past [International Labour Office, 1986, page 43]. Still greater investment inputs will also be needed if the region's chronically high rates of unemployment and still higher rates of underemployment are to give way to much enhanced levels of labor force utilization.

Third, a clearly major consumption-demanding and labor force-burdening prospect is indicated by a comparison of the estimated increase in the number 60 and above during the past 35 years with the one projected as likely during the next such

period. Where the earlier interval ended with a regional total of about three million belonging to this age sector, following an increase of under two million since 1955, the projected number for 2025 points to an extraordinary upsurge to 7.5 million, implying a rise which is well over double the 1955-1990 increase [UN, 1991, page 24]. For added perspectives on the added resource use and other adaptive economic adjustments potentially associated with these numbers, it is revealing to consider that only Cuba among the 28 areas studied has a current total population size larger than the region's expected 2025 number of elderly only.

It is also worth noting that the above projection of elderly (hence mainly retired) numbers is independent of erroneous fertility anticipations, usually the main uncertainty when dealing with anticipated long-run demographic changes. As to possible shifts in upper-age labor force participation rates which could, in principle, increase enough to offset the upper-age dependency burdens implied by added elderly numbers, such rates have in fact been steadily falling to markedly lower levels for both males and females, with no indication of probable trend reversals for either sex [International Labour Office, 1986, pages 43-45]. Nor are major offsets to projected elderly numbers to be expected from their accelerated net emigration, since those 60 plus as of 2025 were already over age 25 by 1990; moreover, the UN's projected survival rates to later-life ages are more likely to err on the low than on the high side.

Information was not available in preparing this report on how elderly pension, health care and other social program support costs in the areas under study may compare with young age health, educational and other childrearing outlays. Data from numerous European areas and North America, for example, point to considerably higher dependency costs per elderly recipient than per youngster. If similar cost relationships obtain in the areas under study here, possible savings from slowing growth or even declines among pre-elderly age sectors would be less likely than the above population counts suggest as possible offsets to the accelerated costs owing to population aging in the UN and Extended Caribbean regions.

All of these highly probable quantitative prospects are bound to have substantial consequences for output capacities, export potentials and labor supply-demand confrontations, interactions which will probably be adverse on balance to both economic development and welfare prospects in the UN and Other Caribbean areas. Moreover, the above quantitative indicators of age-specific numbers, total numbers and population proportions, such as they are, convey only partially the economic and social issues at stake. How well or poorly the region's economies can adapt to coming demographic impacts on their productive capacities, distributive mechanisms and microfamilial welfare patterns will be affected by a host of specific additional considerations, some direct implications for GNP and others "beyond GNP" in nature. In the latter category, for example,

what is likely to happen to child care and maternal health when fertility remains relatively high and resulting statuses of women are abridged? Or, at what feasible rates can new mortality-reducing and morbidity-control technologies be adopted, after these become known, in a region of high dependency ratios and low *per capita* incomes? In the former GNP category, what educational and job training opportunities can be made available for affecting labor productivity substantially and what health improvements for similarly affecting such productivity, given the UN and Extended Caribbean population size and age-structural changes in prospect? What likely impacts will the factual resolutions of these questions have on the region's potentials for reorienting its productive structure to meet changing foreign trade challenges, perhaps the most critical determinant of its long-run developmental and immediate economic destinies? Viewed over both long-run and less extended periods, these and related demographic interfaces with developmental change will need to be confronted if the full extent of their influences on regional socioeconomic progress is to be assessed appropriately.

It is also safe to say that population policy initiatives and their integrations with developmental objectives, even if highly successful, cannot by themselves steer the region's economies into decisively more favorable channels. The region's great post-1950 advances in developmental, macro-economic and social modernization terms occurred in the face of numerous major deterrent influences of a demographic nature; this alone should

be sufficient demonstration that demographic impacts and interactions are not the only ones of actual or potentially major importance. But it may also be that the postwar decades are a poor prologue of what lies ahead, in the sense that oncoming likely economic and demographic interrelations may have to operate under considerably less favorable economic circumstances than those which prevailed during the third quarter of this century.

Leading signs and augurs of this possibility are not hard to find. The apparent or at least increasingly likely end of a "golden" era of especially high economic growth rates in the industrialized regions, the United States in particular, clearly can have central -- and negative -- importance for all of the Extended Caribbean's economies. The rise of current and foreseeably debilitating long-run international debt burdens is another adverse possibility of prime significance, with capital transfer implications which ECLAC has described as the "greatest impediment to the achievement of expansionary adjustment and lasting stability" in Latin America and the Caribbean. As yet unmet needs for basic transformations of the Extended Caribbean's productive structure if the region's foreign trade sector is to provide its pre-1970s impetus to economic growth and stabilization is a third case in point. All of these point to a considerable lowering of both UN and Extended Caribbean economic, developmental and socioeconomic welfare prospects [UN, ECLAC, 1989a, especially pages 7-8 and Chapters I-III].

Six of the more populated areas in the region -- Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago -- experienced declining *per capita* incomes over large parts of the 1980s. Cuba, by numerous indications, has become highly vulnerable to stagnating or retrogressive developmental influences [The New York Times, January 16, 1989]. Only Puerto Rico, among the region's largest populations and clearly a case of atypical external economic relations, experienced substantial growth during the middle 1980s. Moderate or near zero *per capita* income growth, if not actual declines, have been the rule in such smaller areas as Barbados and Belize.

Among the region's main export earners, only tourism has given evidence of likely sustainable uptrends. Manufacturing except in Puerto Rico, sugar and minerals have become weak or declining export sectors; banana exports currently depend greatly on British preferences, an uncertain factor once the European common market's expected consolidation takes hold in about two years. Substantial growth rates, exceeding five per cent and largely sustained by tourism, have been mainly encountered among the OECS economies and the British Virgin Islands [Harker, 1990]. Much of the region is clearly in a wrenching transition from reliance on traditional foreign trade comparative advantages to those which will be increasingly required in future for international competitiveness, especially those involving service and informational industries.

It follows that the region's foreseeable capacities for

accommodating added numbers under rising living standards may well be appreciably below what they have been in previous postwar decades. Recent decadal indicators -- not only in the Caribbean but all other major third world regions -- suggest that the socioeconomic costs of mistaken, overlooked or ineffective population policies may be much less readily absorbed with limited social damage than has been the case to now.

To the foregoing relatively recent economic setbacks and newly persisting obstacles to dynamic uptrends should be added an array of significant older and more chronic economic disadvantages. Almost surely continuing major declines in arable lands *per capita* (largely as a result of population growth), together with sporadic declines in regional ratios of domestic agricultural production to total consumption, can both give rise to increasing or recurring unfavorable foreign trade balances [Graham and Edwards, 1984, Chapter 4] as well as to highly erratic and often adverse terms of trade (imports obtainable per unit of exports). Long enduring and widespread high unemployment rates have been entrenched parts of the region's economic systems throughout the postwar period [ECLAC, Subregional Headquarters for the Caribbean, 1984, pages 23, 24], to which large additional allowances should be made for the many discouraged unemployed and the common prevalence of greatly underutilized work force capabilities. Harker [1990] cites as the region's "most intractable problem" the facts that "in some cases 30% of the labour force is unemployed, with a significant portion of the

remainder underemployed or employed only in low productivity occupations." Unemployment rates for years between 1985 and 1989 in seven of eight documented areas (Barbados, Guadeloupe, Jamaica, Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago and U. S. Virgin Islands) ranged between 15 and over 30 per cent; the rate in the eighth (French Guiana) was over 10 per cent [International Labour Organization, 1991, Table 9].

Both individually and in combination, such patterns have long pointed persuasively to pronounced overpopulation pressures. An assessment as of the mid-1980s concluded that "Clearly the most crucial driving force behind the increased difficulty that many Caribbean countries will be facing in the future is the rapid rate of population growth [Graham and Edwards, 1984, page 158]. Guengant [1985, pages 26-35] stresses in connection with the region's emigration "the huge labour surpluses which characterize the Caribbean labour market." It is not accidental that the area rates of emigration he found as of the late 1970s were markedly inverse to GDP *per capita* levels, a telling indication of "push" incentives to leave the region.

The region's rising economic volatility and its expanded downward fluctuations about longer-run economic growth trends surely add to the above reasons for reaching the above "overpopulation" judgment. Since population growth can retain most or all of its momentum even in the face of severe economic downturns, a related outcome almost sure to occur in future would involve confrontations between diminishing social service and

welfare program (e.g. health and educational) deliveries, on the one hand, and ever-increasing numbers with mounting *per capita* support (e.g. elderly health care) needs, on the other. Adding emphasis to this point is that the human costs associated with such confrontations are bound to be especially concentrated among the most disadvantaged social sectors of the UN and Extended Caribbean regions. The one source located on this question while preparing the present report, a World Bank mission document for Jamaica, illustrates this possibility clearly:

"Social development in Jamaica has benefitted from a long tradition of public support. Among countries of comparable income per head, Jamaica has, over the decades, consistently ranked close to the top on conventional indicators of social development. But unavoidable adjustment measures during the mid-1980s, compounded with cumulative effects of economic decline since the early 1970s, resulted in significant economic hardship to important segments of the population. Real public expenditures for education, health, and other social services fell sharply during FY82-86 and remain severely depressed. Despite government efforts to mitigate the effect of these cuts on vulnerable population groups, the deterioration in basic public services has been severe; human capital formation and social well-being have been adversely affected. Without a major effort to recover from these setbacks and regain lost momentum, Jamaica faces possible erosion of its human resources and diminished

prospects for economic and social development. Such an effort calls for augmenting the flow of resources to the social sectors and enhancing their effectiveness through key policy reforms." [World Bank, 1988].

Numerous similar examples of actual or threatening damage to the region's human capital would surely have emerged if an attempt could have been made to ascertain the facts for the rest of the Extended Caribbean. It is fair to expect that, when population dimensions are greatly at variance with productive capacities or effective consumption demands, added social deprivations no less than their individual economic varieties are bound to be especially vulnerable to sustained economic setbacks.

Occasional exceptions to these broad generalizations concerning overpopulation pressures may well exist, such as possibly in the cases of Belize and Cuba, but their overridingly widespread relevance seems beyond dispute. And in fact few countries themselves dispute the relevance of this "bottom line" judgment, if one relies on either the population perceptions and policy goals reported in numerous government reports or, equally, on responses provided by governments to UN inquiries on the subject of excessive population growth [UN, 1990, Table 30]. Since rising mortality is an unacceptable policy tool for reducing such growth, while emigration may be substantially or erratically constrained by the region's limited access to preferred destination areas, only reduced fertility provides an option which is both quantitatively significant and potentially

acceptable for implementing lower population growth rate policies in much or most of the Extended Caribbean. Of the areas considered here which have over one million inhabitants, involving Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Puerto Rico and Trinidad and Tobago and including over 90 per cent of the region's total population, all but the first still have total fertility rates considerably above replacement levels. Scattered information for the smaller Caribbean nations -- for example, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenadines -- also clearly place them among areas with continued high population growth potentials [UN, ECLAC, 1990].

It is true that remittances to the region from its emigrants have been of considerable importance, but so have its costs of rearing and educating those departing. So far as could be judged from available materials, no conclusive research attempts have been made to compare these and other possible offsetting factors in terms of net benefits or costs. This would be a difficult task at best, e.g. if allowances were also to be made for such intangible aspects as re-integration difficulties faced by returning emigrants, a point much emphasized by Guengant [1985, page 18]. Conceivably, a policy-encouraged system for replacing permanent by seasonal or temporary migration flow patterns could, if feasible, provide a compromise approach providing both remittance and retained skilled labor advantages. One such approach, by a long-time student of U.S. and Latin American

migration movements, suggests that:

"One feasible alternative is a program of temporary foreign workers. Expanding from our longstanding and successful H-2 program, authorized foreign workers would come for stays of one to three years; without dependents; supervised by our Labor Department as to their working conditions and minimum wages; earnings partly withheld until their return home. By legally pre-empting the low-level jobs that now go to illegals, the temporaries would greatly and swiftly discourage unauthorized inflows, while legitimately earning U.S. dollars for themselves and their home country."

[letter by Edwin P. Reubens to the editor of The New York Times of June 21, 1990].

Adaptations such as these have always been possible and often been implemented. If the overall overpopulation judgments reached in this report are well founded -- or to the extent that they are -- creative and more efficient population-related policy initiatives will be far more essential than they have ever been as yet in the Extended Caribbean's post-colonial era.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Part V

Bourne, Compton (1988), Caribbean Development to the Year 2000: Challenges and Policies, CARICOM Document.

Demas, William G. (1984), Adjustment and Recovery in the Caricom Economies, Caribbean Development Bank.

Graham, Norman A. and Keith L. Edwards (1984), The Caribbean Basin to the Year 2000: Demographic, Economic, and Resource-Use Trends in Seventeen Countries, Westview Replica Edition.

Harker, Trevor (1990), "Sustained Development for the Caribbean," CEPAL Review, No. 41, August 1990, pages 55-72.

Guengant, Jean-Pierre (1985), Caribbean Population Dynamics: Emigration and Fertility Challenges, paper for Conference of Caribbean Parliamentarians on Population and Development Institute of Social and Economic Research in Barbados.

International Labour Office
(1986), Economically Active Population Estimates and Projections, 1950-2025, 3rd ed., Volume V.

(1991), Year Book of Labour Statistics 1989-1990.

International Monetary Fund (September 1989), IMF Survey.

The New York Times, (January 16, 1989), Midwest Edition, Section A.

United Nations
(1989), World Population Prospects, 1988, Sales No. E.88.XIII.7.

(1990), World Population Monitoring 1989; Special Report: The population situation in the least developed countries, Sales No. E.89.XIII.12.

(1991), The Sex and Age Distributions of Population: The 1990 Revision, Sales No. E.90.XIII.13.

United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, Subregional Headquarters for the Caribbean (1984), Trends in the Caribbean Economies in 1982, Santiago, Chile.

United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, Caribbean Development and Co-operating Committee (CDCC) (1987), The Caribbean in the Context of the Global Economic Crisis.

United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America,
(1987), Recent Economic Developments in Latin America and
the Caribbean, (Document LC/L.422).

(1989a), Preliminary Overview of the Latin American Economy
1988, (Document LC/G.1536).

(1989b), Towards Sustained Development in Latin America and
the Caribbean: Restrictions and Requisites, Santiago,
Chile, Sales No. E.89.II.G.3.

(1990), Subregional Headquarters for the Caribbean,
Population Projections for Eight Caribbean Countries, 1980-
2015.

World Bank

(1988), Jamaica: Summary Review of the Social Well-Being
Program, Report No. 7227-JM.

(1990a), World Bank Atlas 1989.

(1990b), World Development Report 1990.

(1990c), World Tables: 1989-90 Edition.

ANNEX TABLES 1 - 10

Annex Table 1

		"UN Caribbean" Selected Main		and "Added Demographic 1987		"Caribbean" Indicators			
Population		Midyear Number (1,000s)	Birth Rate c)	Death Rate c)	Rate of Natural Increase d)	Total Fertility Rate a),e)	Infant Mortality Rate (a),f)	Life Expectancy At Birth a),b),g)	
1.	Anquilla	7	25	9	1.6	3.10	19	73	
2.	Antigua & Barbuda	69	18	6	1.2	1.69	10	72	
3.	Bahamas	239	23	6	1.7	2.63	19	70	
4.	Barbados	256	19	8	1.0	2.02	19	75	
5.	British Virgin Isl.	12	21	6	1.6	2.36	15	74	
6.	Cayman Islands	23	18	5	1.3	1.96	12	76	
7.	Cuba	10,259	17	7	1.0	1.78	17	73	
8.	Dominica	94	28	5	2.3	3.16	12	76	
9.	Dominican Republic	6,961	24	8	2.5	4.02	70	62	
10.	Grenada	85	26	7	1.9	3.12	48	72	
11.	Guadeloupe	336	21	7	1.4	2.36	15	73	
12.	Haiti	6,198	26	13	2.1	4.60	95	55	
13.	Jamaica	2,431	27	5	2.2	3.12	18	76	
14.	Martinique	245	18	7	1.1	1.98	12	74	
15.	Montserrat	12	16	9	0.7	2.24	12	76	
16.	Netherlands Antilles	182	19	6	1.4	2.08	10	76	
17.	Puerto Rico	3,331	19	7	1.2	2.13	18	75	
18.	St.Kitts & Nevis	38	26	11	1.5	2.77	44	67	
19.	Saint Lucia	133	33	6	2.7	3.79	24	70	
20.	St.Vincent & Grenada	106	33	6	2.7	3.69	28	71	
21.	Trinidad & Tobago	1,251	28	6	2.2	3.22	16	70	
22.	Turks & Caicos Isl.	9	25	6	1.9	3.85	14	75	
23.	U.S. Virgin Islands	114	21	5	1.6	2.60	19	73	
Caribbean		32,480	25	8	1.7	2.92	57	66	
=====									
24.	Belize	168	27	6	3.1	5.22	37	68	
25.	Bermuda	58	14	7	0.7	1.91	17	73	

26.	French Guiana	92	28	7	2.1	3.40	42	67
27.	Guyana	766	26	7	1.9	2.93	44	66
28.	Suriname	389	27	7	2.1	3.15	42	67

Source: USBC, 1987

Notes: a) 1985-90; b) for combined sexes; c) per 1,000 population; d) in %; e) per woman; f) per 1,000 births; g) in years.

Annex Table 2

"UN Caribbean" and "Added Caribbean"
Total Population Estimates and Medium Projections
1950-2025
(In 1,000s)

Population	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025
1. Anquilla	5	5	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	8	8	9	9	10	10	11
2. Antigua & Barbuda	46	51	55	59	66	71	75	81	86	93	99	105	111	116	121	125
3. Bahamas	79	91	113	139	171	204	224	242	260	278	297	315	332	348	363	377
4. Barbados	211	227	231	235	239	246	249	253	261	272	285	298	311	323	336	346
5. British Virgin Isl.	6	7	7	9	10	10	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	18	19	20
6. Cayman Islands	6	7	9	9	10	14	17	20	21	23	24	26	27	29	30	31
7. Cuba	5858	6426	7028	7807	8571	9331	9732	9946	10324	10788	11189	11493	11710	11868	11958	11968
8. Dominica	51	57	60	65	71	72	73	76	81	87	93	100	107	113	120	126
9. Dominican Republic	2353	2737	3231	3806	4423	5048	5697	6416	7170	7915	8621	9282	9902	10480	11001	11447
10. Grenada	77	85	90	90	91	91	92	96	103	110	117	126	135	143	151	159
11. Guadeloupe	210	236	275	300	320	329	327	334	340	346	354	368	381	396	410	422
12. Haiti	3097	3353	3675	4047	4500	4957	5413	5922	6504	7148	7837	8558	9292	10036	10785	11534
13. Jamaica	1403	1542	1629	1760	1869	2043	2173	2336	2521	2706	2886	3059	3227	3402	3579	3758
14. Martinique	222	246	282	311	326	329	326	328	331	338	352	364	376	388	400	411
15. Montserrat	14	13	12	12	11	12	12	12	13	14	15	15	16	17	18	18
16. Nethrlnds. Antilles	162	176	192	208	222	196	172	180	193	207	221	235	247	259	270	280
17. Puerto Rico	2219	2250	2358	2594	2718	2993	3199	3451	3709	3958	4192	4409	4615	4818	5008	5178
18. St.Kitts & Nevis	44	50	51	49	46	45	45	46	50	53	57	60	64	67	70	72
19. Saint Lucia	79	87	88	95	101	111	118	128	136	146	156	168	179	190	201	211
20. St.Vincent & Grenada	67	73	80	84	88	93	99	104	111	118	127	136	145	154	163	171
21. Trinidad & Tobago	636	721	843	896	955	1009	1095	1185	1283	1385	1480	1572	1663	1754	1840	1918
22. Turks & Caicos Isl.	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	8	9	9	10	10	11	11	12	12
23. U.S. Virgin Islands	27	28	33	44	64	95	98	105	113	121	129	137	144	151	158	163
Caribbean	16878	18473	20353	22632	24881	27308	29260	31288	33640	36137	38566	40861	43022	45092	47021	48759
24. Belize	67	78	91	108	120	131	145	163	182	201	221	240	259	279	297	315
25. Bermuda	39	42	45	50	53	53	54	56	58	60	62	64	67	69	72	74
26. French Guiana	25	29	31	41	48	56	69	82	92	102	112	121	131	141	151	160

27.	Guyana	423	486	569	645	709	780	865	953	1040	1119	1197	1272	1352	1431	1504	1570
28.	Suriname	215	250	290	332	372	364	355	375	403	435	469	502	535	567	598	628

Source: UN, 1989, Table 2

		"UN Caribbean" and "Added Caribbean"														
		Population Growth Rate Estimates and Medium Projections														
		1950-55 to 2020-25														
		(In Percent)														
Population		1950-1955	1955-1960	1960-1965	1965-1970	1970-1975	1975-1980	1980-1985	1985-1990	1990-1995	1995-2000	2000-2005	2005-2010	2010-2015	2015-2020	2020-2025
1.	Anquilla	0.75	0.73	1.04	0.67	0.65	0.93	0.60	1.42	1.32	1.24	1.17	1.11	1.05	0.80	0.77
2.	Antigua & Barbuda	2.15	1.33	1.69	2.08	1.38	1.29	1.39	1.39	1.37	1.32	1.16	1.06	0.96	0.85	0.72
3.	Bahamas	2.83	4.33	4.17	4.09	3.54	1.84	1.61	1.41	1.34	1.33	1.18	1.05	0.95	0.85	0.72
4.	Barbados	1.49	0.29	0.39	0.30	0.56	0.28	0.31	0.62	0.82	0.96	0.88	0.83	0.80	0.73	0.64
5.	British Virgin Isl.	1.25	2.29	3.47	2.36	0.20	3.14	1.70	1.36	1.41	1.32	1.12	1.17	0.89	0.85	0.72
6.	Cayman Islands	2.11	3.88	2.01	1.44	6.67	3.74	3.15	1.45	1.27	1.36	1.19	1.05	0.93	0.89	0.66
7.	Cuba	1.85	1.79	2.10	1.87	1.70	0.84	0.44	0.75	0.88	0.73	0.54	0.37	0.27	0.15	0.02
8.	Dominica	2.00	1.20	1.35	1.86	0.42	0.27	0.72	1.32	1.33	1.38	1.43	1.30	1.22	1.10	0.98
9.	Dominican Republic	3.03	3.32	3.27	3.00	2.65	2.42	2.38	2.22	1.98	1.71	1.48	1.30	1.13	0.97	0.80
10.	Grenada	2.20	1.04	0.03	0.13	0.02	0.15	0.95	1.33	1.33	1.38	1.42	1.32	1.21	1.11	0.96
11.	Guadeloupe	2.33	3.07	1.75	1.27	0.52	-0.12	0.47	0.34	0.37	0.45	0.75	0.73	0.74	0.69	0.58
12.	Haiti	1.59	1.83	1.93	2.12	1.94	1.76	1.80	1.88	1.89	1.84	1.76	1.65	1.54	1.44	1.34
13.	Jamaica	1.89	1.10	1.55	1.20	1.78	1.24	1.45	1.52	1.41	1.29	1.17	1.07	1.05	1.02	0.98
14.	Martinique	2.04	2.73	2.00	0.89	0.18	-0.14	0.12	0.18	0.43	0.82	0.66	0.62	0.63	0.62	0.54
15.	Montserrat	-1.06	-1.12	-0.50	-0.98	0.89	-0.24	0.33	1.47	1.22	1.43	1.20	1.01	0.96	0.81	0.67
16.	Netherlands Antilles	1.61	1.80	1.57	1.31	-2.54	-2.54	0.92	1.41	1.35	1.32	1.18	1.05	0.95	0.84	0.72
17.	Puerto Rico	0.28	0.94	1.91	0.93	1.93	1.33	1.51	1.44	1.30	1.15	1.01	0.92	0.86	0.77	0.67
18.	St.Kitts & Nevis	2.30	0.56	-0.88	-1.18	-0.31	-0.31	0.75	1.41	1.32	1.34	1.19	1.03	0.95	0.85	0.71
19.	Saint Lucia	1.93	0.23	1.43	1.37	1.85	1.22	1.57	1.32	1.34	1.37	1.44	1.30	1.22	1.10	0.97
20.	St.Vincent & Grenada	1.72	1.83	0.90	0.89	1.22	1.21	0.95	1.33	1.34	1.36	1.45	1.31	1.20	1.11	0.98
21.	Trinidad & Tobago	2.51	3.13	1.23	1.27	1.09	1.64	1.58	1.59	1.53	1.32	1.21	1.12	1.06	0.96	0.83
22.	Turks & Caicos Isl.	0.00	-1.03	0.35	-0.70	1.38	4.19	1.31	1.46	1.36	1.28	1.20	0.95	1.08	0.69	0.83
23.	U.S. Virgin Islands	0.51	3.27	5.83	7.57	7.95	0.67	1.44	1.40	1.36	1.32	1.19	1.06	0.95	0.84	0.72
Caribbean		1.81	1.94	2.12	1.90	1.86	1.38	1.34	1.45	1.43	1.30	1.16	1.03	0.94	0.84	0.73
=====																
24.	Belize	3.03	3.01	3.37	2.15	1.79	2.03	2.30	2.19	2.02	1.85	1.69	1.56	1.43	1.30	1.17
25.	Bermuda	1.31	1.31	2.17	1.31	0.01	0.39	0.72	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70
26.	French Guiana	2.92	1.33	5.60	3.32	3.06	4.01	3.49	2.25	2.06	1.87	1.71	1.57	1.45	1.31	1.18

27.	Guyana	2.78	3.14	2.52	1.90	1.89	2.07	1.95	1.74	1.46	1.34	1.22	1.23	1.13	1.00	0.86
28.	Suriname	3.02	2.97	2.72	2.28	-0.42	-0.54	1.10	1.46	1.52	1.49	1.37	1.26	1.18	1.07	0.96

Source: UN, 1989, Table 2

27.	Guyana	48.1	43.9	40.4	35.4	32.5	31.5	28.5	24.8	21.6	19.3	18.0	17.4	16.6	15.6	14.8
28.	Suriname	43.8	44.4	44.4	40.0	34.6	29.5	28.8	25.9	23.2	20.3	19.0	18.0	17.2	16.3	15.4

Source: UN, 1989, Regional and Country Tables; ECLAC Subregional Demography Unit, 1990

27.	Guyana	13.5	10.7	8.6	7.7	7.6	6.7	5.9	5.4	5.2	5.0	5.0	5.1	5.3	5.7	6.2
28.	Suriname	12.6	11.4	10.3	8.8	7.5	7.3	6.8	6.1	5.6	5.4	5.3	5.4	5.5	5.6	5.8

Source: UN, 1989, Regional and Country Tables; ECLAC Subregional Demography Unit, 1990

27.	Guyana	6.68	6.76	6.05	5.33	4.55	3.94	3.26	2.75	2.42	2.19	2.09	2.09	2.09	2.09	2.09
28.	Suriname	6.56	6.56	6.56	5.94	5.29	4.63	3.59	2.97	2.56	2.25	2.15	2.09	2.09	2.09	2.09

Source: UN, 1989, Table 12; ECLAC Subregional Demography Unit, 1990

26.	French Guiana																
27.	Guyana	55.2	58.7	61.2	62.5	64.1	66.5	68.2	69.7	71.0	72.2	73.3	74.3	75.2	76.0	76.8	
28.	Suriname	56.0	58.7	61.5	63.5	64.9	66.1	68.0	69.5	70.8	72.0	73.1	74.1	75.1	75.9	76.7	

Source: UN, 1989, Table 15, ECLAC Subregional Demography Unit, 1990

26.	French Guiana																
27.	Guyana	93	76	61	56	56	49	36	30	25	21	18	15	13	11	9	
28.	Suriname	89	76	63	55	49	44	36	31	26	22	19	16	13	11	9	

Source: UN, 1989, Table 16, ECLAC Subregional Demography Unit, 1990

"UN Caribbean" and "Added Caribbean"
 Proportions 0-14, 15-64 and 65+: Estimates and Medium Projections
 Selected Years, 1950 to 2025
 (In Percent)

Population	1950			1970			1980			2000			2025		
	0-14	15-64	65+	0-14	15-64	65+	0-14	15-64	65+	0-14	15-64	65+	0-14	15-64	65+
1. Anquilla															
2. Antigua & Barbuda															
3. Bahamas															
4. Barbados	33.2	61.1	5.7	37.0	54.7	8.3	27.1	62.2	10.7	24.7	66.0	9.3	20.2	64.9	14.9
5. British Virgin Isl.							32.0	62.0	6.0	25.0	69.0	6.0			
6. Cayman Islands															
7. Cuba	36.2	59.3	4.5	37.1	57.0	5.9	25.7	66.3	8.0	21.4	69.2	9.4	16.7	68.2	15.1
8. Dominica							34.0	59.0	7.0	31.0	64.0	5.0			
9. Dominican Republic	44.5	52.3	3.2	47.3	49.7	3.0	39.7	57.1	3.2	33.9	61.8	4.3	24.0	67.4	8.6
10. Grenada							36.0	57.0	7.0	32.0	62.0	6.0			
11. Guadeloupe	39.5	56.2	4.3	42.8	52.4	4.8	28.0	63.9	8.1	25.4	64.5	10.1	20.8	64.5	14.7
12. Haiti	39.5	56.4	4.1	41.5	54.7	3.8	40.1	56.1	3.8	37.8	58.2	4.0	30.6	64.3	5.1
13. Jamaica	36.1	60.0	3.9	46.9	47.5	5.6	36.7	57.2	6.1	29.8	61.3	5.9	21.6	68.9	9.5
14. Martinique	37.4	57.4	5.2	41.4	53.4	5.2	24.4	66.4	9.2	24.6	64.3	11.1	20.2	64.2	15.6
15. Montserrat							28.0	60.0	12.0	27.0	65.0	8.0			
16. Netherlands Antilles															
17. Puerto Rico	43.3	52.9	3.8	37.0	56.5	6.5	29.7	62.0	8.3	26.2	64.7	9.1	20.8	65.3	13.9
18. St. Kitts & Nevis							35.0	55.0	10.0	32.0	62.0	6.0			
19. Saint Lucia							41.0	54.0	5.0	35.0	60.0	5.0			
20. St. Vincent & Grenada							40.0	54.0	6.0	32.0	63.0	5.0			
21. Trinidad & Tobago	40.4	55.7	3.9	42.1	53.5	4.4	32.9	61.7	5.4	28.3	66.2	5.5	21.9	67.1	11.0
22. Turks & Caicos Isl.															
23. U.S. Virgin Islands															
Caribbean	39.2	56.7	4.1	41.0	54.1	4.9	33.1	60.9	6.0	29.3	64.1	6.6	23.0	66.7	10.3
24. Belize							46.0	49.0	5.0	40.0	55.0	5.0			

25.	Bermuda																
26.	French Guiana																
27.	Guyana	41.0	54.5	4.5	47.6	48.9	3.5	37.0	59.1	3.9	28.2	66.9	4.9	21.6	67.8	10.6	
28.	Suriname	40.0	54.0	6.0	48.3	47.8	3.9	37.3	58.4	4.3	29.8	64.7	5.5	22.3	69.3	8.4	

Source: UN, 1989, Country Tables; ECLAC Subregional Demography Unit, 1990

26.	French Guiana																	
27.	Guyana	28.0	28.5	29.0	29.2	29.4	29.6	30.5	32.2	34.6	37.8	41.8	45.8	49.7	53.5	57.1	60.5	
28.	Suriname	46.9	47.1	47.3	47.1	45.9	44.8	44.8	45.7	47.5	50.4	54.1	57.7	61.0	64.2	67.1	69.8	

Source: UN, 1989, p. 150 and Country Tables; Other Caribbean Data, UN 1984 Assessment, pp. 150, 152.