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POPULATION AND MODERNIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The issue of population policies has to be set against the background of the development process and viewed in terms of strategies for change and alternative notions of what society should be. Because of its implications, it is related in the immediate present to questions of short - and medium-term policy; moreover, it is impossible to formulate the model for future social structures without dealing with such issues as population quality, quantity and location. Population policies inherently touch upon issues that vitally affect the beliefs and value commitments of social groups and classes, have an effect on the ideological framework in relation to which stability and change is gauged, and are associated with a redefinition of the system of human relations, in particular, the function of the family and the social role of women.

2. It is this multiplicity of facets that makes the issue at once so specific and so diffuse, specific when it simplifies into a bare outline of variables, diffuse when exploring its great variety and complexity. The aspects it touches upon can be formalized to a high degree, and yet it is difficult to understand the significance of such abstractions unless it is remembered that each of them is linked directly not only to the rational orientations of human beings but also to their vital images, identifications and life goals. The success of such policies as Governments may adopt in this field have so far depended rather less on the political consensus achieved at any particular moment than on the possibility of persuading individuals and families, subject to the goals set by the particular society, to move and physically locate themselves in certain areas of the national territory and to plan the size of their families. In turn, the ability to make political consensus a reality at the grass roots level is dependent on many factors that over the short run generally escape Government control and in any case respond to the pace and direction of over-all progress.

3. Latin America's population problems must be viewed against a background of economic and social semi-development. The broad diversity of national situations in the region may be described in terms of a typical pattern of evolution, in the sense that although the social structure and institutions

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of the rural past have been or are about to be superseded and significant progress has been made in industrialization, it is nevertheless difficult to affirm that countries have as yet established themselves as modern industrial societies.

Certain indicators can help to define the nature of this unusual state of affairs. There are significant differences between economic growth and the level of social progress, inter-related sectors corresponding to different stages of the modernization process tend to coexist, and there are indications of a high degree of cultural heterogeneity, as well as sharp contrasts in the relative access of social groups and regions to the benefits of technological progress. (See table 1).

4. It is difficult to interpret the trend of these indicators, particularly since it has proved all but impossible to project the future direction that countries will take on the basis of recent patterns. The events of the past decade have rendered obsolete the economic and social models that have been the basis for action by Governments and their oppositions for more than 30 years. The basic dilemma arises when determining whether the present situation is just a transitional stage in the complex itinerary of industrial evolution, or whether there are indications that the possibilities for significant advances have gradually been exhausted, with progress now depending on a modification of the rules of the game at the national and international levels.

In an atmosphere in which analytical work is concerned less and less with projecting social models and increasingly with identifying the assumptions and incongruencies of these models, giving rise to an almost introspective manner of reflecting on the direction and limits of recent development, the population issue comes to the fore as a result of the search for new strategies and avenues to dispel the ambiguities of this intermediate stage of semi-development.

It is clear that the current concern with the issue constitutes an indirect admission of the fact that the development of Latin America has been unbalanced and inadequate, and this in turn is prompted by new and higher levels of progress achieved in the region.

Table 1

INDICATORS OF DEVELOPMENT BY WORLD REGIONS AROUND 1970

World regions	Per capita GDP (dollars at 1969 prices)	Per capita consumption of commercial energy (kilograms) ^{a/} 1969	Life expectancy at birth 1965-1970	Percentage of adult illiteracy 1970	Percentage of popula- tion in urban agglomera- tions 1970
North America			70.5	1.5	62
United States	4 574	7 192			
Canada	3 473				
Europe	2 020	2 472	70.9	3.6	47
Soviet Union		2 753 ^{b/}	70.3		43
Oceania	2 708	-	64.8	10.3	58
Latin America	510	571	60.2	23.6	38
Asia	130	-	50.5 ^{c/}	46.8	22 ^{d/}
South Asia	-	-	-	-	16
Africa	190	-	43.3	46.8	16
Other developed countries		2 736			
Rest of the world		216			

Source: United Nations estimates based on official figures.

^{a/} Expressed in units of energy contained in 1 kilogramme of petroleum.

^{b/} Relates to Eastern Europe, including the USSR.

^{c/} Relates to East and South-East Asia, excluding Japan.

^{d/} Relates to East Asia.

5. This growing interest in the population issue springs from three complementary sources. First, the scientific and doctrinal interpretations of economic and social development which, in recognizing the importance of non-economic aspects, must identify the main interrelationships that appear to exist between population trends and over-all progress in order to define the role of population as a factor in development. Secondly, the evolution of demographic behaviour in different social groups reflects their effort at adapting their life styles to their concrete possibilities and circumstances within an over-all pattern of semi-industrialization. And thirdly, the action of Governments expressed through plans, policies and programmes, which respond to some extent to the need to compatibilize macro-strategies for development with the demand for services from family units.

II. POPULATION AND THE INTERPRETATIONS OF DEVELOPMENT^{1/}

1. Recent situation

6. During the past decade, the concern of Latin American academic circles for population problems followed in the wake of ideological considerations. The most popular analyses of development showed an indirect interest in the problem and incorporated the volume, localization and growth rate of the population as a datum or factor in the formulation of given interpretations of development. Throughout the 1960's, social research institutes and centres tended to limit themselves to demography in the strictest sense, for the most part leaving the study of the relationship between population and development and of policy design to social doctrines whose main source of inspiration was the ideological controversy regarding the nature of the social order and the role of Latin American countries in the world system.

The major arguments advanced by these doctrines related to the greater or lesser relevance of the population problem to development policies and, in the medium and long term, to the objectives of economic and social change. A closer look at the assumptions on which the arguments rest, reveals the existence of two trains of thought around which the various positions have been taken. With the realization that both the volume and growth rate of the population have some bearing on the transformation of the economic organization and social structure of countries, an effort was made to assess the impact of demographic factors and, above all, to determine at what point an unduly large population slows down the development process and under what conditions it can be converted into a positive factor for change.

The inverse relation between those two processes - that is, the effect that the economic and social development of Latin America might have in the near future on demographic trends - has also received considerable attention.

^{1/} See L. Ratinoff, "Población y desarrollo en América Latina: evolución de las doctrinas", Temas del BID, Nº12, April 1971.

In the first case, the arguments are based on certain diagnoses and interpretations of the nature of development; in the second, an attempt is made to form a clearer picture of the significance of the current demographic transition.

2. Diagnosis of the crisis and role of demographic growth

7. The state of semi-development achieved by the region indicated that there had not been sufficient progress to resolve several problems inherited from the past nor to resolve the new problems which were brought on by a greater degree of social differentiation.

Under these circumstances, it was recognized that the dynamic domestic policy of countries aiming at a more autonomous form of development was at variance with their growing need for resources, technology and scientific knowledge from the countries at the centre and with their dependency on the world market in raw materials. Rapid but limited growth appeared to have brought about a situation in which development potential was stifled by internal obstacles of a structural and institutional nature. The countries were faced with increasingly serious dilemmas in which they had to choose between social needs and aspirations and the requirements of general economic efficiency. Moreover, a critical lack of continuity was discernible between the capacity of institutions to mobilize groups and sectors, to bring about agreement among them and channel their aspirations in a functional manner, and their ability to work towards the achievement of social targets.

(a) The theses

8. As was to be expected, the diagnosis of the crisis took the form of theses regarding the possibility for the Establishment to explore new avenues and lay the foundations of a more efficient order.

In recent decades, the ideologies that have determined social change in Latin America have placed more and more emphasis on the need to run the nation with the greatest possible autonomy and ensure an increasing participation of the large majority of the population by means of the expansion of the domestic market and the reform of the administrative and political institutions. Naturally, the main differences have been in the industry

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of the reforms, the strategy or critical path adopted and the alternative models of social organization.

9. The conservative developmentist thesis is founded on the potential which the present Establishment offers for rapid development based on the consolidation of the domestic order, on the concentration of resources and their application to industrialization targets, on attracting foreign investment and on the more efficient exploitation of the markets of the economically advanced countries.

Others have stressed the need for the gradual removal, in the medium and long term, of those obstacles of a structural nature that hinder development, that is to say, the creation, at a reasonable economic and social "cost", of the appropriate conditions, incentives and institutions for adjusting the social order to a system of development under which the raising of industrial productivity is compatible with the expansion of the domestic market.

The revolutionary thesis predicates that the Establishment's potential has been exhausted and that the future of industrialization resides in the creation of a new system of political and social relationships involving a radical redefinition of the institutions of ownership and the structure of political power.

10. The three theses differ among themselves both in their interpretation of the relevance of the political and social variables and in their selection of models or projects of society. In the eyes of the conservatives, the consolidation of the political order depends on the relatively extensive opportunities for economic growth which in the long term will make it possible to correct the immediate imbalances and sacrifices implicit in development. It accepts, moreover, the model of the capitalist consumer society which tends towards a two-fold expansion of the domestic market, stepping up the consumption of the highest income groups while gradually incorporating those sectors of society which, because of the very speed of the process, stand on the threshold of incorporation. The images that are used to explain the meaning of the transition and of the critical phases are drawn essentially from the study of the processes of modernization that led to the creation of an industrial order in the more advanced countries.

/The revolutionary

The revolutionary viewpoint is that potential economic progress is imprisoned within the existing system of domination and that its liberation entails giving priority to the great task of political transformation and creation involved in the advance towards a socialist system. The model of the future social order is inspired by the revolutionary experience of the socialist countries and its application to local conditions means resorting to the instruments of analysis and to the guidelines afforded by the revolutionary ideologies.

In the view of those who consider that the Establishment is open to the introduction of successive reforms aimed at creating a more functional and just social order, it is essential to strike a balance between economic growth with measures to redistribute benefits and transform the institutional framework. The fundamental logic of this strategy resides in the advantages offered by the step-by-step approach, assuming that the accumulation of successive economic and social changes in a given direction eventually modifies the political system. It is difficult to pinpoint the precise model of society that is involved here, inasmuch as it involves the definition of non-revolutionary forms of life and controls while at the same time accepting the values of a liberal political order. Implicit in this is the notion of some kind of mixed social structure which is to evolve pragmatically out of the experience of development.

(b) Population and prospective change

11. These forecasts regarding the possibilities of the Establishment in the present situation of semi-industrialization constitute the frame of reference for the Latin American debate on population problems.

Traditionally, the doctrine accepted in the region was based on the idea that population growth was a favourable factor for development. The feeling was that population growth helped to increase and diversify demand, generated pressures for a better utilization of resources, and stimulated the creation of capacities which were essential in raising overall productivity. It was affirmed that the environment created by high population density facilitated the emergence of a modern industrial culture through progress towards social diversification and the division of

/labour and

labour and by creating a scale which oriented and gave meaning to scientific and technological development. It was even accepted that the more rapid replacement of generations helped to accelerate the changes, since better trained young minds had in fact new conceptions which were more in line with progress in production and social modernization.

It was also believed that only those countries which had attained an appreciable population could play a part in the world balance of power, and that for all practical purposes development opportunities should not be unrelated to the place which the nations occupied in the international system. The dilemmas posed by the state of under-development prompted the different groups to revise this traditional conception, in the light of their economic and social objectives of change.

(c) Population and conservative developmentism

12. To the more representative sectors of conservative opinion the high rates of population growth pose a dilemma which is difficult to resolve, since it involves balancing traditional moral considerations against the goal of achieving rapid progress within the established social order. It is recognized that accelerated population growth can give rise to insuperable contradictions between the goals of economic development and social improvement. The extreme view is that population growth conflicts with economic development, since the capacity of social services and institutions and the resources which can be used for productive purposes run the risk of lagging behind the demand of a rapidly increasing population. This position does not, however, exhaust the alternative possibilities offered by conservative developmentism. Others accept the importance of the problem, but emphasize that the idea of the "overwhelming" nature of population growth rates is based on the assumption, within the medium term of a state of mass mobilization. They maintain that wherever conditions guarantee a period of mediatization of the participation and continuity of the social order, excess population helps to keep wages down. Thus, in countries where the domestic market has reached a volume compatible with the level of modern technology, a curb on the rapid rise of industrial wages would be a comparative advantage as regards exports of manufactures.

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Furthermore, the population would have additional functions within a strategy of stepping up economic growth. With plentiful natural resources there would be a greater social capacity for land settlement and, in general, for opening up new frontiers within the country, incorporating new factors and possibilities into the economy. Moreover, with the assurance of economic growth during a transitional stage in a world that must increasingly adopt the scale of production imposed by modern technology, a subsequent phase of redistribution would offer a dynamic reserve of wide possibilities for consolidating whatever development had already been achieved.

(d) Population vis-a-vis revolutionary ethics and practice

13. Revolutionary developmentism focuses the problem of population growth in a dual perspective. At the level of private conduct, it favours responsible voluntary procreation, and ultimately the ethics of freedom and equality for women. It is accepted that in pre-revolutionary society, support should be given to efforts providing indispensable services and information to whoever may request them, but by no means to accept pressures or incentives of the power élite to control the birth rate of the broad masses for political purposes. The central idea is that the decisions of couples with respect to the birth rate should reflect a cultural change induced by a larger share in the benefits of progress, so that the full realization of these goals would be possible only in a revolutionary society.

At the level of general trends, excess population is considered to be a genuine instrument of change. Like their conservative counterparts, revolutionary ideologies point out that, given a minimum of political mobilization, rapid population growth accentuates pressures on institutions and resources, which, within the dynamics of a social confrontation between the masses and minorities, could help create the general conditions conducive to revolution. In addition, increased population pressure is in itself an incentive to the adoption of new and more progressive criteria of rationality and social justice. These two perspectives are summed up in the assertion that it is only in a revolutionary society, which develops in conformity with these criteria, that general population targets should

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and can coincide with the decisions of couples regarding the number of children they are to have.

(e) Population growth and structural changes

14. With regard to what might be called the structuralist approach to development, the central issue is defined by the historical singularity of the Latin American situation. Rapid though "insufficient" economic growth over the past three decades had disrupted the traditional balance between birth and death rates, in a context of technological modernization and increased consumer aspirations induced by the new levels of progress.

It thus became necessary to place population problems within this development framework and to determine how far population trends and the dynamics and bottlenecks of progress affected one another, in order to frame realistic policies which considered the part which population growth played in development.

These broad guiding principles lead to some general conclusions which help to define the structuralists' position. The crux of the argument is that the importance of these problems and of a population policy in Latin America stems from the need to accelerate change, but under no circumstances would such a policy constitute an alternative to efforts aimed at realizing economic and social changes. Moreover, strictly speaking, population policies are apparently inseparable from social policy, and to imagine options which acting independently could significantly alter population trends, is completely illusory. On the contrary, the rapid increase in excess population has short - and medium - term consequences which development policy should take into account.

The structuralists affirm that, while they accept a development strategy aimed at harmonizing the need to maximize general economic efficiency with a steady rise in the levels of living of the broad masses, within the medium - and long - term population growth rates will have to be compatible with the fulfilment of those objectives. The combination of economic growth and social justice, on the basis of sweeping technological change, presupposes that declining rates of population growth would rapidly be attained.

3. Images of the demographic transition

15. These conceptions of the role of population in present development conjunctures are based on particular images of the demographic transition. The decision whether or not to intervene in such matters implies that there are priority areas in development plans that are affected by population trends and, furthermore, that these trends reflect the level and nature of development attained. If one accepts that, starting from a certain point in the region's recent history, the modification of a traditional state of equilibrium has given rise to a distinctive demographic evolution, then there is reason to wonder what the "natural" course of this transition is, that is to say, what direction the process will assume if unchecked by policies and programmes having a direct bearing on the birth rate.

(a) Self-regulation

16. A widespread interpretation emphasizes the fact that the acceleration of development necessarily leads to the self-regulation of demographic processes, since the birth rate would depend directly on variables such as school attendance, the incorporation of women in the labour force and higher aspirations associated with higher income levels. In stressing that the play of factors in the modernization process finally leads to a new balance between the birth rate and the mortality rate, it is affirmed, on the one hand, that the demographic transition must necessarily follow the course taken by that process in the industrial countries, and it is suggested, on the other hand, that any attempt to alter the course determined by the forces and factors operating in the transition will bring negative consequences.

(b) The critical phase of indetermination

17. Those who accentuate the importance of internal disequilibria as characteristics of a situation of semi-development, argue that the "natural self-regulation cycle" is neither necessary nor irreversible, since there is a phase of "indetermination" which is the result of a lag in the decline of birth rates. Taking it for granted that modern medical practices bring about a historically different demographic situation, it may be concluded that the duration and the possibilities of modifying the

/trends during

trends during the "indetermination" phase are dependent upon the nature and degree of the disequilibria. Only an environment in which economic policy is based on social modernization measures makes for the creation of the social forces and institutional machinery which help to make birth control programmes successful.

(c) The demographic trap

18. Lastly, there is the position of those who believe that this transition leads towards a cumulative deterioration of certain relationships, and that to give the tendencies free rein necessarily leads to a "demographic trap" which could ultimately come to constitute an insurmountable obstacle to development.

The "trap" is the result of the semi-modernized state of society and the lack of synchronization in the rhythm of economic and social changes. When the death rate drops and a traditional birth rate is maintained, an age structure is created which tends to intensify the rate of demographic growth with a sustained increase in the dependent population at the base. In such conditions, the impact of policies to improve the "quality" of the population and assimilate the "marginal" social sectors into productive employment is retarded by the demographic aggravant, thus favoring the conditions leading to a situation of strangulation.

The demographic trap thus obliges the state to accept the responsibility of controlling demographic growth as part of general development policy.

III. SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND DEMOGRAPHIC GROWTH

1. Demographic trends in the region

19. The level of current information on past trends in the demographic variables which determined the growth and structure of Latin American population is such that only a superficial analysis can be made of the circumstances and the manner in which the process of demographic change has been occurring in the region. The following paragraphs outline a few aspects of demographic growth in the countries of the region during the present century and draw inferences regarding probable future trends within the limitations imposed by the availability and quality of the information, in particular that relating to components of demographic change.

Although the growth of population varied greatly from country to country a high degree of similarity in the trends can be observed. In most countries, the figures show a steady acceleration in the rate of population increase up to 1960 (see table 2). The few countries that depart from the general trend are those in which fertility fell appreciably (Chile) or in which international migration played an important role during a particularly period (Venezuela) or in which both phenomena occurred (Argentina, Uruguay and Cuba).

These trends are reflected in a growing acceleration of the rate of increase of the region's total population. The growth rate came close to its maximum height at the beginning of the 1960s, when the rising trend lost impetus as a result of the slackening of growth in some countries, chiefly Brazil, which together with the continued decline in the rate of increase in Argentina, Uruguay, Chile and Cuba, offset the acceleration in the growth rate that is still occurring in many countries.

20. Except in the cases of Argentina, Uruguay, Cuba and Venezuela, where international migration has been an important factor in growth during given periods, the population of Latin American countries has grown virtually exclusively as a result of natural growth processes.

/Table 2

Table 2

LATIN AMERICA: RATES OF POPULATION INCREASE, BY COUNTRIES, 1920-1970

Country	1920-1925	1925-1930	1930-1935	1935-1940	1940-1945	1945-1950	1950-1955	1955-1960	1960-1965	1965-1970
Argentina	3.17	2.81	1.86	1.67	1.67	2.11	2.05	1.98	1.58	1.56
Bolivia	1.06	1.26	1.45	1.62	1.78	1.92	1.97	2.16	2.29	2.41
Brazil	2.05	2.05	2.05	2.11	2.27	2.55	2.97	3.03	2.86	2.87
Colombia	1.94	1.96	2.09	2.19	2.36	2.65	3.05	3.27	3.32	3.46
Costa Rica	1.61	1.82	2.00	2.35	2.98	3.44	3.74	4.13	3.65	3.05
Cuba	2.66	2.67	1.93	1.58	1.55	2.28	2.13	2.14	2.07	2.00
Chile	1.54	1.61	1.55	1.50	1.54	1.74	2.41	2.40	2.50	2.26
Ecuador	1.14	1.46	1.71	1.91	2.06	2.41	2.89	3.31	3.35	3.41
El Salvador	2.18	2.09	1.19	1.30	1.23	2.05	2.51	2.90	3.04	3.36
Guatemala	1.11	2.94	2.42	1.97	3.36	3.10	2.67	2.82	2.93	2.89
Haiti	1.25	1.39	1.51	1.60	1.78	1.84	1.95	2.15	2.28	2.45
Honduras	1.94	1.92	1.61	1.73	2.01	2.36	2.62	3.18	3.37	3.43
Mexico	0.95	1.76	1.75	1.84	2.88	3.12	2.94	3.20	3.45	3.50
Nicaragua	1.46	1.55	1.74	2.00	2.27	2.55	2.66	3.04	3.06	2.98
Panama	1.58	1.59	0.86	2.57	2.55	2.53	2.39	2.97	3.23	3.27
Paraguay	2.35	2.31	2.34	2.37	1.82	2.01	2.60	2.78	3.24	3.46
Peru	1.47	1.56	1.65	1.72	1.75	1.81	1.98	2.66	3.05	3.12
Dominican Republic	1.99	2.16	2.28	2.34	2.62	2.84	3.02	3.20	3.25	3.44
Uruguay	2.06	2.04	1.50	1.18	1.13	1.30	1.48	1.44	1.35	1.23
Venezuela	1.93	2.17	2.27	2.37	2.84	3.11	3.99	3.92	3.31	3.37
Subtotal (20 countries)	<u>1.86</u>	<u>2.03</u>	<u>1.89</u>	<u>1.91</u>	<u>2.22</u>	<u>2.54</u>	<u>2.73</u>	<u>2.85</u>	<u>2.85</u>	<u>2.91</u>
Other countries of the region										
Barbados	0.13									
Guyana	0.17									
Jamaica	1.52									
Trinidad and Tobago	0.05									
Subtotal other countries	<u>0.88</u>	<u>1.22</u>	<u>1.74</u>	<u>1.82</u>	<u>1.68</u>	<u>1.72</u>	<u>1.97</u>	<u>2.19</u>	<u>2.34</u>	<u>2.13</u>
Total	<u>1.84</u>	<u>2.01</u>	<u>1.88</u>	<u>1.91</u>	<u>2.21</u>	<u>2.52</u>	<u>2.71</u>	<u>2.84</u>	<u>2.84</u>	<u>2.90</u>

Source: Martins and Peldsz, *op.cit.*

At the beginning of the present century, gross mortality rates in most of the countries of the region probably ranged between 30 and 35 per thousand, and since then have gradually declined, at different rates in different countries and periods, to presently lower levels. It is estimated that in 1970, 13 of the 20 countries listed in table 3 had a gross mortality rate of less than 10 per thousand, and that only two countries had rates higher than 15 per thousand. There are clear indications that the decline was not uniform over time but rather that it was relatively slow up to about 1930 and slightly faster between then and the Second World War, after which it accelerated appreciably.

21. It is estimated that at the beginning of the century, birth rates in all countries of the region were above 40 per thousand, and in many cases over 45 per thousand. Until recently, all analyses of fertility trends in Latin America have ended up with the generalization that, except for a few countries (Argentina, Uruguay, Chile and Cuba, which are at different but relatively advanced stages of the process of demographic change) "birth rates have remained high - between 40 and 50 per thousand - and there are no symptoms of significant change such as might suggest that a period of decreasing fertility is beginning".^{1/} It has generally been affirmed that the fluctuations observable in the birth rates of these countries do not reflect real changes in the reproductive behaviour of the population but rather stem from a variety of other factors such as improvement of records, better health conditions, changes in the level of mortality, increased stability of marriages and changes in the nuptiality rate. In all these analyses, the notion that fertility is closely associated with economic, social, psychological and cultural variables that change slowly in tune with the modernization process has probably been overemphasized. It is true true that the effect of the factors mentioned above may explain some part or even

^{1/} ECIA, Social change and social development policy in Latin America (United Nations publication, Sales N° E.70.II.G.3), page 43.

Table 3

LATIN AMERICA: AVERAGE ANNUAL RATES OF NATURAL INCREASE, BIRTHS AND DEATHS BY COUNTRIES, 1960-1970

Country	Population 1970 (in 000's)	Average annual rate of natural increase (per 1 000)		Crude birth rate (per 1 000)		Crude death rate (per 1 000)	
		1960	1970	1960	1970	1960	1970
		Argentina	24 352	1.66	1.52	23.3	22.9
Bolivia	4 658	2.30	2.46	44.0	43.8	21.0	19.2
Brazil	93 245	3.03	2.88	39.8	37.3	9.5	8.5
Colombia	22 160	3.29	3.51	45.0	44.0	12.1	8.9
Chile	9 717	2.45	1.96	38.3	27.4	13.8	7.8
Ecuador	6 028	3.23	3.41	46.0	45.0	13.7	10.9
Paraguay	2 419	2.95	3.53	45.0	45.0	15.5	9.7
Peru	13 586	2.85	3.14	43.0	41.0	14.5	9.6
Uruguay	2 889	1.39	1.21	22.0	21.1	8.1	9.0
Venezuela	10 755	3.59	3.26	43.4	40.6	7.5	8.0
Costa Rica	1 736	3.89	2.92	48.0	34.5	9.1	5.3
El Salvador	3 441	2.81	3.44	47.6	46.7	19.5	12.3
Guatemala	5 282	2.88	2.88	47.6	42.5	18.8	13.7
Honduras	2 583	3.12	3.30	46.7	48.3	15.5	15.3
Nicaragua	2 021	3.05	3.12	47.0	46.4	16.5	15.2
Panama	1 406	3.10	3.26	42.1	39.8	11.1	7.2
Mexico	50 718	3.32	3.50	45.0	44.0	11.8	9.0
Cuba	8 341	2.42	2.00	31.5	28.0	7.3	8.0
Haiti	5 299	2.20	2.54	44.0	44.0	22.0	18.6
Dominican Republic	4 348	3.22	3.51	49.1	48.3	16.9	13.2
Total (20 countries)	274 914	2.90	2.91	40.1	38.2	11.1	9.2

Source: Martine and Peláez, *op.cit.*

/perhaps a

perhaps a significant part of the fluctuations, but it is also increasingly evident that the population of Latin American countries includes socio-economic groups with different levels of fertility, and that these differences, viewed in the context of the process of social change taking place in the countries, must have some influence on the variations observable in the birth rates. This would appear to indicate that the phenomenon of fertility is probably much more dynamic than analyses of birth rates would suggest.

22. Recent studies would seem to bear out this assertion.^{1/} The cases of Brazil and Costa Rica are worthy of note here, the first because of its weight in the growth of fertility in the region, the second because of the rapidity with which change is occurring, a decline unprecedented in Latin America and one of the most rapid on record in the history of the Western world.

On the basis of available census data on the number of live births per woman in Brazil it is possible to estimate the evolution of the birth and gross reproduction rates during the last three decades.^{2/} According to these estimates, Brazil's birth rate declined from about 46 per 1,000 in 1940 to less than 40 per 1,000 in 1960 and to a little over 37 per 1,000 in 1970. At the same time, the gross reproduction rate fell from 2.8 in the period 1940-1950 to 2.6 in 1960-1970. A more detailed analysis by physiographic regions, social groups, and migration status among the residents of urban areas confirms the slow gradual decline of these rates.^{3/}

The sharp decline in fertility in Costa Rica is clearly shown in various studies.^{4/} During the 1950's, the gross birth rate reached

1/ George Martine and César Peláez, "Population trends in the 1960's: Some implications for development" (ECLA, in press).

2/ Carmen Arretx, "Revisión de las estimaciones de fecundidad de Brasil a base de los censos de 1940, 1950, 1960 y 1970", CELADE, S/66/25.

3/ George Martine and César Peláez, op. cit.

4/ See documents presented at the Fifth National Demographic Seminar, Costa Rica, September 1970, particularly Miguel Gómez B., "El rápido descenso de la fecundidad en Costa Rica", pages 271-308.

to one of the highest known levels, and in 1960 it still stood at 48 per 1,000. Subsequently it started to decline, gradually during the first half of the decade and more rapidly in the second half, so that by 1970, it had dropped to 35 per 1,000, that is, a reduction of 30 per cent in 10 years.

2. Hypotheses on demographic change

23. In short, population trends in Latin American countries may be said to have varied widely, having now reached very different stages of the demographic transition. In most countries, however, the trend has been towards an acceleration of population growth as a result of the increasing imbalance between the birth and mortality rates. What is likely to be the future course of population growth in such countries? To answer this question properly, it would be necessary to make a careful and far-reaching analysis of the situation and trends in components of demographic change and related economic and social factors in each individual country such an endeavor goes far beyond the scope of the present study. Nevertheless, some general observations may be made here regarding population growth prospects in these countries.^{1/}

First of all, given that the probable range of variation of mortality in the future will be relatively limited, and that international migration, although unpredictable, will probably exert very little influence in most countries, it can be concluded that fertility will be the key variable in future growth process; its evolution will largely determine the rate of population increase.

Secondly, recent research into the existence of differential fertility rates, and into birth control attitudes and practice in the populations of many countries, together with the growth in the coverage of family planning programmes and the interest of Governments in them, lead to the conclusion that the process of change in the reproductive behaviour of the population is much more than dynamic than would be

^{1/} Social change and social development policy in Latin America, op. cit., page 47.

suggested by analyses of recent trends in an over-all indicator such as the crude birth rate.

Thirdly, it is becoming increasingly evident that the progress which has been registered in the technology of birth control techniques, together with the increase in the scope and effectiveness of the mass communications media, have weakened the causal relationship between socio-economic change and fertility decline. These developments would thus come to reinforce prediction made by the United Nations,^{1/} on the basis of an analysis of the relationship between fertility patterns and socio-economic indicators, that several countries with currently high rates of population growth would now be on the verge of experiencing a drop in their birth rates. The decreases observed in several countries during the past decade would appear to bear out this predicted trend.

Lastly, it is worth noting that, given recent developments in birth control technology and mass communications media, declines in birth rates could possibly become accelerated in much the same way as mortality has been lowered in developing regions. That is, the demographic transition which took more than a century to unfold in the technologically-advanced nations could be telescoped into a few decades in many Latin American countries.

3. Urbanization and fertility

25. It is in the urban environment, particularly in the large cities, that the principal changes in reproductive behaviour occur. The situations that this social structure determines, the motivations it induces and the expectations it creates, constitute the dynamic factor par excellence in the process of modernizing demographic behaviour.

Although the Latin American city is at once the stage and the focal point of this transformation, in many countries the very nature of urban development, while creating the conditions essential for change, also maintains other conditions that constitute veritable barriers to the spread of change.

1/ Population Bulletin of the United Nations, N° 7 (United Nations publications, Sales N° 64.XIII.2).

A brief examination of the cities of the region viewed as systems for living suggests the existence of social structures that perhaps represent moments in a typical pattern of development, with each moment having its corresponding and clearly defined fertility patterns.

To illustrate the trend of these changes it may be useful to look at four types of urban establishment. Historical urban social structures can be classified according to the nature of the predominant elite into aristocracies and oligarchies. Contemporary structures, can be defined in terms of the impact of industrialization into two types of establishment, in one of which the domination of the middle classes becomes stronger, and the other in which progress in industrialization generates a situation of semi-development where expectations rise far above concrete possibilities.

Available data would indicate that there has been a steady evolution in the sense of replacing birth-promoting attitudes based on an ideology and a religious ethic with secular criteria induced by social mobility and consumption, and that these new values have in part emerged out of the transformations of the elite and the consolidation of a middle-class culture.

(a) The structures of the past

26. Here, it may be worthwhile to refer to cities as they were typically in the past - generally relatively small agglomerations that were organized to provide services for a fairly small elite during pre-industrial stages of Latin American development.

(1) The aristocratic city

The aristocratic urban establishment was structured around a group of families whose livelihood was based on the ownership and exploitation of land. The relative absence of economic differentiation reflected a social structure in which the élite not only occupied the central and predominant place, but also to a large extent constituted the direct source of most employment opportunities and income for the other sectors of the city. Criteria of stratification were

/predominant and

predominant and the small middle classes occupied a subordinate service position. The masses, while more numerous, were stratified in accordance with the location of their activities vis-à-vis the aristocracy.

In this atmosphere of limited opportunities, and hence of little mobility, where competitive values had little significance as compared with stratification criteria, the reproduction of the elite and the middle classes was ideologically regulated by transcendental norms that favoured abundant fertility and this also permeated the behaviour of the masses.

(ii) The oligarchic city

27. The oligarchic urban establishment reflects a stage of greater differentiation. Exports of raw materials to international markets herein favour the consolidation of a social structure based on an alliance of the interests of landowners and exporters. The size of the city swells and the quantity of the economic surplus multiplies.

Exporting requires more specialized services, and hence through these changes new opportunities are created that foster the formation of a more extensive and complex middle class, and of lower strata that are larger and yet less diverse. However, within the lower strata, artisan-type skills maintain their traditional importance and lead to the emergence of a sub-elite which gradually organizes itself, often under the guise of forming a workers' culture.

The middle classes monopolize opportunities for social mobility, and the elite ceases to be a hard core of inter-related families now that it has been joined by interests associated with the export trade. After this breakthrough, there is a change in the ideologies justifying the social order. Many of the transcendental notions that formerly governed behaviour become secularized, and the importance of acquisitive values grows.

The new levels of competition, however, do not seriously affect the positions held by the elite, which tends to retain its traditional reproductive behaviour. As the middle classes increase in size, they
/strengthen their

strengthen their commitment to secular values, and here the first signs of a reproductive behaviour oriented towards mobility and the acquisition of status can be observed in a slow gradual decline of average family size. The lower strata maintain their traditional level of fertility.

(b) Present-day structures

28. Industrialization brings with it a complete upheaval of the patterns of urban life, a major transformation in the structure of employment and an unprecedented opening up of new opportunities. Cities expand rapidly until, in some cases, they attain the proportion of metropolises and even megalopolises. The growth rate of the economic surplus not only exceeds past trends but swiftly reaches high levels. Along with schools, the expansion of the urban market plays a key role in the socialization of the population, both institutions creating new expectations and consumer patterns.

The elite changes its character. A new social pact leads to the gradual admission of industrialists, administrators and technocrats. The norms that determine power structures have to be adjusted to the requirements of a larger, more fluid and complex elite. Not only do ideologies become increasingly secularized; they begin to be permeated by concepts that emphasize functionality targets at the expense of values of hierarchical ranking.

This expansion opens up new avenues of social mobility and preference is given to ideologies that justify the social displacement of families and individuals. Some sectors of the middle classes are absorbed into the elite and the rules governing entry into it are partly relaxed.

Craftsmanship loses all meaning in city life and the organized industrial workers become the sector through which the social demands of the masses are voiced. The system of qualifications is modified and, along with it, the notion of a natural working-class hierarchy based on skills. It is the access to the urban market by means of industrial employment and the possibility of influencing the power structure through organization that determine the degree of integration

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in the culture of the city. Accordingly, new paths slowly begin to open up for the social mobility of individuals making their way up from the lower classes.

29. The balance between the expectations and the possibilities of mobility is generally critical. Inadequate development is a factor that tends to create expectations that go beyond the available opportunities.

Within this general pattern two stages can be distinguished. The first begins with the crisis of the system of oligarchical domination as, between the fissures of the crumbling order, a Establishment evolves in which the middle classes gradually come to play a central role. In the second stage, the main phenomenon is industrialization, whose effects are felt at every level of the social structure but which has a limited capacity for creating a system of life based on technology and on production of the industrial type.

(i) The mesocratic urban Establishment

30. In its early stages, industrialization encouraged the formation of an urban Establishment possessing three fundamental characteristics:

1. A quantitative increase in the masses which come to represent a large proportion of the population of the city but of which only a very small nucleus is politically organized.

2. An expansion of the middle classes which increase their political and social influence to a significant degree and which include various entrepreneurial segments of the population.

3. An intensification of the process of secularization based on the development of the urban market and on a middle class committed to the values of an acquisitive and socially mobile society.

In this context, the rise of the middle classes is bound up with ideologies that question the legitimacy of the existing order and offer alternatives that emphasize the recognition of personal merit. The basic idea is to create a stable hierarchy that permits the free acquisition of a position in society on the basis of individual ability.

/As the

As the middle class comes to constitute the principal support of the social order and its standard of living rises, so there is an intensification in competition for the means and symbols that are indispensable for acquiring and maintaining social status.

The fate of the masses is determined by their access to stable and productive employment and to culture and by their ability to organize themselves. The objective of the struggle of vast masses is in any case to gain a foothold in the market by means of organizations that emphasize solidarity, and thus considerations of acquisition and social mobility filter down to them only in a slow and selective manner.

Fertility follows this general pattern extremely closely. The social groups most intensely committed to the acquisition of status tend to employ birth control, a tendency which rapidly becomes one of the distinctive features of the nascent culture of the middle class. It will likewise be found that the frequency of induced abortions is greater among these groups.

The traditional elite groups see reproduction in terms of transcendental considerations, while among the lower classes, children continue to be an inevitable phenomenon.

(ii) The semi-industrial city

31. The semi-industrial city is characterized by the initiation of a far-reaching transformation of urban culture and, by the imbalance between social expectations and the inability of the system to fulfil them as well as an imbalance between the requirements and the possibility of resolving the problems posed by the human agglomeration.

The middle classes presently constitute a large proportion of the population; there exists a more complex elite in which primary relationships lose their relative importance and a social stratification of the masses is taking place as a result of the appearance of marginality.

Social capilarity increases but the secularization and universalization of customs come up against limits that are implicit in prestige systems and in the distribution of opportunities for mobility. The fruits of urban progress are distributed on a selective basis so that only the upper segments of the popular sectors acquire access to the market and to social mobility. This insufficient and selective diversification gives

/greater stability

greater stability to prestige systems and to principles that were traditionally associated with the rank of the families.

Below the level of the specialized industrial workers, the various nuclei that are in situations of marginality organize themselves in terms of their most fundamental problems of incorporation so as to assure a foothold in the market.

32. Reproductive behaviour conforms to the following set of situations:

1. The new complexity of the elite and the replacement of the system of primary relationships by a system of representation and administration of interests leads to a lower birth rate in accordance with heightened inter-personal competition.

2. In the middle classes, the birth rate continues to go down as consumption levels go up and competition for opportunities of social mobility increases.

3. A similar phenomenon occurs among industrial workers belonging to trade unions as they develop aspirations towards mobility and become consumption-minded.

4. In marginal sectors, political mobilization and basic organization are factors that tend towards a rationalization of reproductive behaviour, as opposed to what happens among sectors that still constitute an amorphous mass.

Bearing in mind the limitations of the process of urbanization and cultural secularization on the one hand and the intensification of aspirations towards consumption and mobility on the other, an increase in the frequency of induced abortions is discernible, especially among the masses.

4. Social structure of the city and impact of selected variables

33. Recent research would indicate that the behaviour of certain key variables which influence the reproductive conduct of the population would seem to modify their effects according to types of urban social structures. Unfortunately, the results are barely indicative of the existence of relationships, and the data at most permit us to formulate educated guesses regarding their significance.

/(a) Educational

(a) Educational level of mother

34. The data show that the educational level influences reproductive behaviour in Latin America as elsewhere. Studies indicate an inverse ratio between number of children and women's education. Nevertheless, although the relationship is monotonic in all the cases studied, there are important variations as regards birth rate and educational levels. In some urban centres, the differences in birth rate attributable to education would seem to be smaller; in other cities the critical point at which the educational level has the effect of reducing the birth rate is higher, and different critical levels may even exist. It is clear that although education has a univocal effect on the birth rate, its role varies according to the specific social context.^{1/}

Several hypotheses will serve to illustrate the trend of these variations. It would in fact appear that in the social environments having a more widespread experience of mobility and market participation, and a higher degree of cultural secularization, sizable increases in educational level lead to small differences in birth rates, the critical threshold being reached only with respect to those who in practice have no education, in other words, those who are excluded from the market and from mobility.^{2/}

1/ Ana María Rothman, "La fecundidad en Buenos Aires según algunas características demográficas y socioeconómicas", CELADE, Series C, N° 99, 1967; Carmen Miró and Walter Mertens, "Influencia de algunas variables intermedias en el nivel y en los diferenciales de fecundidad urbana y rural en América Latina", CELADE, Series A, N° 92, 1969; Virginia Rodríguez, "Fecundidad diferencial según nivel de instrucción", CELADE, Series C, N° 97, 1971; Alfredo Enrique Lattes, "La fecundidad efectiva en República Argentina según algunas características de la madre", CELADE, Series C, N° 96, 1967; M. Elsa Cerisola, "Fecundidad diferencial en la República del Paraguay según condición de ruralidad y nivel de instrucción de la mujer", CELADE, Series C. N° 101, 1967.

2/ Virginia Rodríguez, op. cit.

Table 4

AVERAGE NUMBER OF LIVE BIRTHS BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF WOMEN INTERVIEWED

Educational level	Bogotá	Buenos Aires	Caracas	México City	Panamá City	Río de Janeiro	San José
<u>All women</u>	<u>3.16</u>	<u>1.49</u>	<u>2.97</u>	<u>3.28</u>	<u>2.74</u>	<u>2.25</u>	<u>2.98</u>
No education	4.12	2.50	4.27	4.53	4.00	3.33	3.89
1 to 3 years of primary education	3.36	1.55	3.82	4.16	4.18	2.93	3.73
4 years or more of primary education	3.17	1.90	2.97	3.83	3.73	2.46	3.74
Primary education completed	3.23	1.74	2.61	3.14	3.14	2.17	2.83
1 to 3 years of secondary education	2.89	1.46	1.88	2.20	2.67	1.63	2.26
4 years or more of secondary education	2.52	1.35	2.16	1.85	2.14	1.43	1.91
Secondary education completed	2.52	1.07	1.71	1.83	1.65	1.38	2.00
Less than 5 years of university education	0.68	1.12	0.68	1.41	1.09	1.05	1.59
5 years or more of university education	1.89	1.03	1.31	1.89	1.22	1.21	1.18
Not stated	2.00	1.23	6.00	-	3.00	2.00	-

Source: Carmen A. Marg, Un programa de encuestas de fecundidad en América Latina: refutación de algunos conceptos erróneos (CELADE, Series A, No 49, Santiago, Chile, 1970) cf. p. 15.

In urban social environments having low levels of market participation and wherein mobility experiences are more restricted and occur within a less secularized culture, education has a different role. As a general rule, birth rates are higher and hence rates similar to those in the first type of environment described require a lengthier period of formal education. Furthermore, there are significant differences in the number of children as a result of the education received. A rapid examination of education thresholds appears to show a direct relationship between a greater degree of mobility and participation in the market and the critical level of education at which the birth rates begins to fall.^{1/}

It should also be added here that in the environments in which the standards of a transcendental culture prevail, the more educated the mother the more likely she seems to adopt secular notions regarding reproductive behaviour.

(b) Participation of women in urban economic activity

35. Studies show that the birth rate is lower for working women.^{2/} Although this is the conclusion reached in most research, the data do not make it possible to clarify the significance of the relationship.

The central assumption is that there is a fundamental incompatibility between work outside the household and bringing up children.

This would seem to be borne out by studies showing that the difference between the ideal number of children aspired to and the actual number is significantly higher with working women, owing to a greater propensity to remain single or to marry at later ages.^{3/}

1/ Alfredo Lattes, op. cit..

2/ Ana María Rothman, La participación femenina en actividades económicas en su relación con el nivel de fecundidad en Buenos Aires y México (CELADE, Series C, N° 108, 1969); Paula Hollerbach Hass, Maternal Employment and Fertility in Metropolitan Latin America (Duke University, 1971); Henry Kirsch, "Development strategy implications of population growth and labour force absorption in Latin America" (ECLA, 1971).

3/ Ana María Rothman, op. cit..

Table 5
 ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE FEMALE POPULATION, BY CITY AND COUNTRY
 (Percentages)

City	Economically active	Country a/	Economically active
Bogotá	39.1	Colombia	20.3
Buenos Aires	38.2	Argentina	23.2
Caracas	26.8	Venezuela	20.2
México	26.8	Mexico	19.7
Panamá	38.1	Panama	24.7
San José	39.5	Costa Rica	17.5
Río de Janeiro	30.7	Brazil	18.4

Source: CRLADE (PECFAL-U), Tabulation Group II, variables 25 x 12; and International Labour Office, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1969. Based on data from table 2 A. a/ 15 and over, according to the 1960 censuses.

Table 6

ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE FEMALE POPULATION BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

City	A. Percentage economically active by educational level				B. Distribution of economically active female population by educational level				
	No education 3 years primary	4 years or more primary and primary completed	Secondary	University	No education 3 years primary	4 years or more primary and primary completed	Secondary	University	Total
Bogotá	40.6	37.2	38.2	69.0	38.8	30.3	28.3	2.6	100.0
Buenos Aires	39.6	31.6	46.4	65.9	6.9	52.4	29.3	11.4	100.0
Caracas	29.4	29.7	35.3	57.5	32.3	38.5	22.8	6.4	100.0
México	37.9	27.5	37.1	50.0	36.3	29.3	26.1	8.3	100.0
Panamá	32.0	32.0	39.0	63.3	7.5	31.7	45.0	15.8	100.0
San José	34.1	36.2	42.5	70.5	22.6	37.9	27.8	11.7	100.0
Río de Janeiro	35.3	24.5	31.8	49.3	34.8	28.6	32.0	4.6	100.0

Source: CELADE (PECFAL-U), Tabulation Group II, variables 20 x 25.

Table 7

DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE FEMALE POPULATION BY OCCUPATION

(Percentages)

Occupation	Bogotá	Buenos Aires	Caracas	México City	Panamá City	San José	Río de Janeiro
Professional	0.9	0.7	2.3	3.0	1.3	1.1	1.7
Managers	4.0	1.5	2.1	5.5	7.3	3.8	14.2
High-level supervisors	5.0	19.4	15.5	11.7	26.5	22.6	11.2
Low-level supervisors	17.9	28.4	14.0	25.6	6.3	13.5	8.1
Skilled manual workers	36.0	33.8	24.8	27.0	27.1	44.0	12.9
Unskilled manual workers	36.2	16.2	41.3	27.2	31.5	15.0	51.9
<u>Total</u>	<u>100.0</u>						

Source: CELADE (PECPAL-U), Tabulations Group II, variables 14 x 26.

Table 8

PERCENTAGE OF FEMALE POPULATION NOT ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE, AND
ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE WORKING IN AND OUTSIDE THE HOUSEHOLD

	Bogotá	Buenos Aires	Caracas	México City	Panamá City	San José	Río de Janeiro
Not economically active	60.9	61.8	73.2	73.2	61.9	60.5	69.3
Working in the household	19.7	8.5	7.6	9.3	7.6	14.2	13.1
Working outside the household	19.4	29.7	19.2	17.5	30.5	25.3	17.6
<u>Total</u>	<u>100.0</u>						

Source: CENSADE (PECFAL-U), Tabulation Group II, variables 25 x 12.

There are indications that work outside the home does not of itself determine a lower birth rate, as compared to the influence exerted by the motivations to take an outside job. It may be observed that in "white-collar" jobs, which represent a more definite trend towards mobility and consumption, the incompatibility between job and home is intensified.

It would also seem that urban culture conditions the degree of compatibility between women's roles in society. In cities where market experience and mobility affect small groups of the population, and where the secularization of culture is in its early stages, a high fertility rate is to be observed, along with low knowledge of contraceptive methods, low education, lack of stimuli to undertake work outside the home, and hence, a clear incompatibility between job and home.

Existing data show that in cities where consumer society organization predominates, women constitute a larger share in the labour force, and a greater proportion of the female labour force is employed in productive employment requiring some degree of qualification; thus women generally have attained educational levels comparable with those of men.

36. It should also be added that there appears to be a clear link between the type of urban social structure and levels of qualification and participation of women in the labour force by age. There are indications that in the least developed urban social systems the majority of working women have low levels of schooling; this means that with more education, women's share in employment drops, with the sole exception of the group which reaches university level. In cities, however, where social mobility is intensified and purchase criteria predominate, the converse ratio should occur, resulting in an increasingly smaller proportion of unqualified women.

A similar situation exists with regards to age participation. Data indicate that in the most traditional urban systems, there are few differences in female participation by age, and there is perhaps a slight tendency for participation to increase between 40 and 50 years of age; however, where the population is characterized by a higher degree of

/market experiences

market experiences and mobility, the tendencies appear to be different. The increase in female participation would be such as to gradually become a decreasing function, illustrating a new adjustment between consumption aspirations, mobility and family life.

To sum up the foregoing, it is obvious that the development of the aforementioned tendencies reflects the emergence of a new style of life dominated by a consumer culture wherein the market and social mobility finally redefine woman's role in society. The increase in female participation in economic activity is linked with schooling, with a slow but steady withdrawal from traditional low productivity employments, and with a postponement first of the age at marriage and subsequently of child-bearing. The net result is a drop in the birth rate.^{1/}

(c) Social stratification, mobility and reproductive behaviour

37. Up till now, the little research which has been carried out on the relation between the birth rate and social stratification has unfortunately utilized partial indicators and aggregate categories.

As a general rule, employment status has been used as an indicator to demonstrate the theory that the higher the occupational rank of the husband, the fewer children families tend to have.^{2/} As in the case of the above-mentioned variables, this ratio appears to be a function of the type of urban social structure.

Indeed, under certain conditions, the regulation of the number of children in accordance with rational criteria, is more closely associated with middle class values and culture, while in other circumstances these tendencies penetrate the elite levels and filter down towards the lower classes. The net impact on the city's birth rate evidently depends on the percentage of the population in each stratum. Where such behaviour is found only in the middle class, the effect on the city's birth rate will not be significant given the former's reduced number. Growth

1/ Paula Hollerbach Hass, op. cit.

2/ M. Helena Henriques, La movilidad social y la fecundidad en Río de Janeiro, CELADE, Series C, N° 112, 1968.

Table 9

FEMALE AGE SPECIFIC ACTIVITY RATES BY URBAN AREA AND BY COUNTRY

(Percentages)

Age	A. Female age specific activity rates by urban areas					B. Female age specific activity rates by country around 1960								
	Bogotá	Buenos Aires	Caracas	Mexico	Panamá	San José	Río de Janeiro	Colombia	Argentina	Venezuela	Mexico	Panama	Costa Rica	Brazil
20-24	45.6	59.1	32.0	32.8	37.4	34.6	28.0	26.3	39.7	25.8	23.0	31.2	24.4	22.5
25-29	37.2	36.9	30.6	25.8	38.2	35.7	26.6	21.6	29.4	23.8	16.9	28.3	20.3	18.8
30-34	36.4	34.4	31.2	29.2	33.9	30.6	24.4	19.8	24.4	22.9	16.1	27.7	18.8	17.4
35-39	29.7	37.0	30.7	29.6	33.3	33.2	19.9	19.7	22.6	22.0	17.1	27.1	17.9	17.2
40-44	37.0	30.1	38.2	33.0	41.9	33.3	18.4	19.8	21.5	21.0	18.3	27.0	16.6	16.8
45-49	37.3	23.5	31.1	34.6	40.3	30.0	22.2	19.3	19.4	19.3	18.3	26.1	14.9	16.3
50 or more	25.9	22.1	29.8	32.0	32.6	34.2	9.2							

Sources: For A: CELADE (CEPAL-U), Population group, variables 14 x 26.

For B: CELADE: Demographic Bulletin, Year 2, Vol. III, (January 1959), table 5 and El Colegio de México, Dinámica de la Población de México (Mexico 1970), table VI-7.

Table 10
FEMALE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY BY MARITAL STATUS
(Percentages)

City	Single	Married	Consensual union	Widowed, separated, etc.	Total
<u>A. Activity rates by marital status</u>					
Bogotá	72.0	25.4	34.3	62.1	39.3 a/
Buenos Aires	70.2	25.7	21.1	67.6	35.5 a/
Caracas	57.9	10.6	13.5	54.2	31.8 a/
México	62.0	17.6	27.6	61.6	30.4 a/
Panamá	55.6	31.5	24.4	59.6	37.9 a/
San José	60.4	21.5	26.6	50.5	33.2 a/
Río de Janeiro	49.3	12.2	29.3	43.9	23.3 a/
<u>B. Distribution of activity women by marital status</u>					
Bogotá	34.9	41.4	4.0	19.7	100.0
Buenos Aires	34.0	55.7	0.5	9.8	100.0
Caracas	29.2	34.4	6.3	30.1	100.0
México	33.7	37.7	7.2	21.4	100.0
Panamá	25.1	34.3	17.1	23.5	100.0
San José	38.6	39.1	5.9	16.4	100.0
Río de Janeiro	40.5	34.3	7.1	18.1	100.0
<u>C. Distribution of inactive women by marital status</u>					
Bogotá	8.8	78.6	4.9	7.7	100.0
Buenos Aires	8.0	88.3	1.1	2.6	100.0
Caracas	9.0	59.1	19.1	11.9	100.0
México	9.0	77.0	8.2	5.8	100.0
Panamá	12.3	45.5	32.5	9.7	100.0
San José	12.6	71.1	8.2	8.1	100.0
Río de Janeiro	12.7	75.1	5.2	7.0	100.0
<u>D. Distribution of all women by marital status</u>					
Bogotá	19.3	64.0	4.5	12.4	100.0
Buenos Aires	17.2	76.8	0.9	5.1	100.0
Caracas	16.0	52.3	15.0	17.7	100.0
México	16.5	65.0	7.9	10.6	100.0
Panamá	17.2	41.2	26.7	14.9	100.0
San José	21.3	60.5	7.4	10.8	100.0
Río de Janeiro	19.2	65.5	5.7	9.6	100.0

Source: CELADE (PECFAL-U), Tabulation group II, variables 19 x 26.

a/ Total activity rates vary from those of table 2 due to the different number of respondents.

Table 10a

AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN TO MARRIED WOMEN AND WOMEN LIVING IN CONSENSUAL UNION, BY OCCUPATIONAL CLASS: MEXICO, BUENOS AIRES AND RIO DE JANEIRO

City and occupational class	Total women		Total children	Average number of children
	Percentage	Absolute		
<u>México</u>				
Superior non manual workers	17.68	285	977	3.43
Inferior non manual workers	27.42	442	1 608	3.74
Manual workers	54.90	885	4 035	4.60
<u>Total</u>	<u>100.00</u>	<u>1 612</u>	<u>6 620</u>	<u>4.16</u>
<u>Buenos Aires</u>				
Superior non manual workers	9.56	151	268	1.91
Inferior non manual workers	45.47	719	1 264	1.76
Manual workers	44.97	711	1 332	1.91
<u>Total</u>	<u>100.00</u>	<u>1 581</u>	<u>2 864</u>	<u>1.84</u>
<u>Río de Janeiro</u>				
Superior non manual workers	13.20	228	532	2.33
Inferior non manual workers	31.33	541	1 221	2.26
Manual workers	55.47	958	3 030	3.16
<u>Total</u>	<u>100.00</u>	<u>1 727</u>	<u>4 783</u>	<u>2.77</u>

Source: María Helena Henríquez, La movilidad social y la fecundidad en Río de Janeiro, CELADE, Serie C, N°. 112, Santiago, Chile, 1968, p.8.

of the middle classes would bring a larger reduction in the city's reproduction rate and a gradual dissemination of their criteria amongst the élite and lower classes, resulting in a clear drop in average urban fertility.

The few existing studies on social mobility and fertility complement these theories. Research shows that the educational success of low class students may be related to the smaller size of the original family, and that the groups experiencing ascending mobility are typified by smaller family nuclei, than the downwardly-mobile, while those which do not undergo changes in status have larger families than the rest.^{1/}

(d) Mass mobilization and the birth rate

38. There exist various indications, the partial research results which suggest that political mobilization and organization could constitute a factor which would rationalize reproductive behaviour. While no conclusive evidence can be found, existing data are consistent with this theory.^{2/}

In the first place, it has been observed on various occasions that among the popular classes the members of Protestant groups, typified by a high level of organization and cohesion, have smaller families. It has been noted that in the popular classes, fertility tends to drop first in the organized workers category. In both cases, while the variables involved would by themselves explain the lower reproduction rate, it would however be erroneous to ignore the role of conscientization in these sectors.

Recent research shows that in the marginal strata, fertility declines with community organization and political mobilization. Studies of the

1/ Ruth Sautú, research carried out on the basis of the university census of Buenos Aires, 1958, and the Survey on stratification and social mobility in Greater Buenos Aires, carried out in 1960-1961 and published in the Research Bulletin of the Institute of Sociology of the University of Buenos Aires, 1963.

2/ Duque and Pastrana, Las estrategias de supervivencia económica del sector popular urbano, ELAS, FLAGSO, 1973; Ramiro Pavon González, Fecundidad diferencial en poblaciones periféricas del Gran Santiago, CELADE, 1972.

same age cohorts show that schooling and the participation of women in the labour force have different effects on reproductive behaviour depending on the existence of the above-mentioned conditions. In an amorphous social group, employment and education of women are variables which go a long way to explain the differences in fertility. However, where unstable educational levels and participation in employment exist, and where the social group is organized to attain goals, it may be observed that the birth rate also tends to drop.

39. Apparently, the mobilization of a marginal group to achieve specific aims, creates in individuals a level of consciousness which contributes to a better understanding of their situation in relation to the structure of society, and induces conduct tending to link individual destiny to specific action projects. Mobilization creates expectations of a better life, and forms aspirations to mobility in sectors which lack the attributes allowing them to participate in the market; it is a source of socialization which, through the understanding of the political opportunities offered to acquire concrete benefits from the authorities, aids the gradual assimilation of rational principles of action. It may also be assumed that the organization resulting from the initial mobilization completely redefines the situation of individuals and their families; by replacing the traditional solidarity based on primary relationships for survival in a hostile environment with the solidarity from the attainment of common goals through the power derived from greater cohesion, the idea that rational behaviour can redefine the destiny of the individual is reinforced.

IV. PUBLIC ACTION IN THE FIELD OF POPULATION

1. Considerations regarding population policies

40. One of the peculiarities of the Latin American situation is the intervention of the State in population matters - to a considerable extent in some countries and to a much lesser in others. This phenomenon is very likely due to the role which the State has played in the development process and to the long-standing tradition of public health and social medicine which is characteristic of most of the countries of the region.

The intervention of the public sector in this respect has obeyed two sets of considerations. The first, of an abstract nature, are founded on the projection of a model of future society and on the outline of global development strategies wherein it is assumed that both the volume of the population and the demographic growth rates will be of major relevance. The second have to do with the health and wellbeing of the families.

By and large, Latin American Governments have avoided explicit definitions of their population policies. Where specific proposals have been formulated with a view to modifying birth rates, they have taken a form which could be described as a demographic policy. The explicitness and implementations of such targets has so far varied widely - from mere general statements to the formulation of plans establishing time objectives and defining the methods for achieving them. The purely demographic dimension of such policies does not, however, cover the full extent of the public sector's involvement. Some countries have recognized the advisability of the State's refraining from formulating explicit demographic targets, but this does not imply the cessation of such specialized services as the community may require and which may have a bearing on the birth rate. This neutrality of the public sector has not been the rule everywhere; in some cases, commitments for the provision of services have been so far-reaching that they have in fact constituted tacit demographic objectives, while elsewhere they have been geared strictly to direct social demands and in other situations, to marginal considerations.

2. Social consensus and the justification of State intervention

41. A summary review of the situation indicates that, in formulating policies whose main purpose has been to alter the birth rate, a fundamental role has been played by interpretations of the nature of the development process and of the destiny of the country as a social project and by the leanings of religious groups and institutions exercising an influence on the definition of the community's moral values.

Such interpretations have served as a basis for the formulation of these policies wherever a genuine consensus has existed. This, however, has been the exception rather than the rule. Where no consensus has evolved, the conflicting interpretations have prevented the achievement of these objectives. A power of veto has likewise been wielded by religious groups.

The State's commitment to provide mere services requires, in practice, a much lesser degree of consensus. Programmes have been organized in order to meet concrete health requirements and have spread thanks to the support of the social sectors and professional groups most directly concerned. The relative neutrality of the State in terms of the establishment of demographic targets has partly reflected the dissuasive capacity of dissident sectors of opinion; moreover, the existence of programmes that commit the public sector often signifies broad acceptance of a set of indispensable measures which even its opponents are prepared to tolerate.

42. The justification for such policies varies according to whether or not the State holds a neutral position with regards to the decisions of the families. Efforts directed to alteration of the reproduction rate derive from economic considerations concerning the rate and nature of development, from concepts of land settlement and territorial integration and from geo-political visions of power and international influence.

On the other hand, when a policy of neutrality is adopted and the public sector's influence is exerted indirectly through specific programmes, the main factors are the wellbeing of the family nucleus and, possibly, the tacit awareness that the possibility of intervention is de facto restricted by the imbalances inherent in semi-development and by the

/existence of

existence of backward social sectors; consequently, these activities have to be designed in terms of social policy and not as part of an economic development strategy.

The concept of family wellbeing has frequently been linked to the idea that every woman has a right to decide freely how many children she wants to bear, and that the provision of the indispensable services and access to information should form part of the redistributive policy in the field of education and culture, thereby modifying the kind of situation where certain sectors are in a position to decide upon the size of their families while, for the vast masses, fate is the deciding factor.

3. The state of population policies

43. The public sector's ventures into the realm of population have not always culminated in the definition of concrete proposals. In countries like Argentina and Uruguay, the occasional interest shown by people in the public eye in a higher demographic growth rate, while not amounting to a policy in the strictest sense, does point to a desire among certain important sectors of public opinion that the State should intervene. This also would appear to have been the situation in the recent past in Ecuador.

In Venezuela, and until little more than a year ago, in Mexico, the State had shown some hesitation about becoming directly involved in attempts to modify the birth rate.

In Honduras, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic, demographic policies have been formulated with a view to reducing population growth, to the extent of defining birth rates and time horizons.

Generally speaking, the following represents the situation as to the definition of public population objectives in so far as they can be distinguished at the present time:

- (a) Governments in favour of faster population growth but which have not yet translated their intentions into policies (Argentina and Uruguay);
- (b) Governments which consider that present rates and current trends are acceptable and that the public sector should avoid defining demographic targets (Brazil and possibly Peru);

Table 11

DEMOGRAPHIC POLICIES AND FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES IN TWENTY LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

Policy	The Government:		does not provide family planning services
	provides family planning services in the form of:		
	national or far-reaching programmes	special, local or limited programmes	
<u>Have a demographic policy:</u>			
(a) In favour of rapid population growth			
(b) Opposed to rapid population growth	Honduras Dominican Republic El Salvador		
(c) Which accepts existing rates and trends			Brazil Peru
<u>Have no demographic policy:</u>			
(a) Public feeling in favour of more rapid population growth		Argentina Uruguay	
(b) Public feeling in favour of slower population growth	Colombia Costa Rica		Haiti
(c) Government neutrality	Cuba Chile Guatemala Mexico Nicaragua Panama	Ecuador Paraguay Venezuela	Bolivia

(c) Governments which manifest an intention to intervene through nation-wide programmes which would ultimately have repercussions on the birth rate yet, refrain from establishing demographic targets (Colombia, Cuba, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama);

(d) Governments which intervene by means of special programmes of local or limited scope (Venezuela and Paraguay);

(e) Governments which have defined targets for lower birth rates (El Salvador, Honduras and the Dominican Republic).

4. Public sector programmes

44. While Governments have expressed intentions and initiated policies that have varyingly supported or opposed family planning programmes, the public sector has in fact expanded its activities in this area.

Over the past decade, public health planners and experts in the region have recognized that there are unsatisfied needs in the field of mother and child health, and that there seem to be clear indications in urban areas of growing demand for family planning information and services.

This recognition has led to a rapid expansion of public and semi-public programmes of varying nature and scope which, as a general rule, tend to improve mother and child health and, within this context, provide information and medical services that have an influence on family planning. For example, in some government departments, specialized administrative units have been set up, action programmes and staff training programmes have been initiated and there has been a rapid increase in medical and social research, together with investment in installations and facilities. Given their preoccupation with the unit cost of medical care in a situation of meagre resources and given the disproportionate segment of the total budget spent on maternal-child care, it is not surprising that doctors and health administrators have formed the group that has pressed most forcefully for the establishment of such programmes. Frequently, such initiatives have met with success although opinion has been against them and the survival of programmes has depended on their ability to limit activities to public health issues. While at another level, arguments still rage over the role of population increase in development, growing awareness of the health

/problems of

problems of the lower strata and the need to improve the allocation of scarce resources assigned to the health sector, has resulted in public administration's becoming the sponsor of these initiatives and undertaking their expansion according to demands and needs.

5. Origin of activities

45. As a general rule, family planning activities have been initiated by private associations. It has been found that such programmes, often not recognized by the competent authorities, reached significant levels after their initial phase. The duration of this phase would seem to have been determined by the relationship between the level of concern for the social and medical problems in the community and the level of cultural and religious opposition.

A rapid examination of the development of these programmes shows that the later they were initiated the shorter their initial phase (See table 12). Everything indicates that there has been a change in the general situation, in the sense that opposition has been less radical. This may well have coincided with increases in school attendance, the growth of urbanization, the growing secularization of values, the increase in the number of live births per woman of child-bearing age observable from 1950 onwards, and the expansion of medical services, all of which have led to greater awareness of the health problems of the lower strata.

46. The private phase was followed in most cases by a stage in which the State took over control of activities. The work of private associations was then linked to the activities of the public sector in three ways:

(a) In many countries, private associations initiated their activities in collaboration with clinics and public hospitals. Subsequently, the public institutions became interested in expanding and rationalizing services.

(b) In other cases, the work of the associations paved the way for State intervention.

(c) There have also been countries in which the State has deliberately avoided intervention, although it has permitted the gradual strengthening of such activities and growing use of public facilities.

Table 12

DATES OF INITIATION AND CONSOLIDATION OF FAMILY PLANNING ACTIVITIES BY PRIVATE ASSOCIATIONS,
AND CO-OPERATIVE AGREEMENTS WITH UNIVERSITIES AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Date of initiation	Country	Date of consolidation					
		1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
Before 1940	Jamaica	X					
	Chile		X				
Between 1950 and 1959	Barbados (agreements with public sector)			X			
	Mexico					X	
	Trinidad and Tobago		X				
1961	Uruguay (agreements with public sector)						X
1962	Argentina (agreements with public sector)			X			
	Brazil				X		
	El Salvador						X
	Guatemala				X		
1963	Honduras (agreement with public sector)						
1964	Colombia						(agreements with public sector) X
1965	Ecuador						X (agreement with university)
	Panama						X (agreement with public sector)
	Venezuela (agreement with public sector)						X
1966	Costa Rica						X (agreements with university and public sector)
	Dominican Republic						X
	Paraguay						X (agreements with university and public sector)
1967	Peru						X

It is also noteworthy that public sector activities reached significant levels after a period of gestation or consolidation of programmes during which objectives were established and other problems such as administrative location, financing and methods of operation were resolved. It is evident that the specific evolution of programmes has depended on a number of factors, including the importance of these initiatives during the private phase, the social and cultural opposition encountered, and the ability to devise programmes of health administration. It is interesting that the longer it took to initiate such activities, the less time was needed to consolidate the programmes (See table 13).

6. Present stage of the programmes

47. It is difficult to assess the scope of such public sector activities. The majority of them are recent, and the available data are partial or incomplete and nearly three years dated. Differences in the national situations are quite evident, however, and recent developments have probably not greatly altered the general picture which existed up to 1969.

It can be observed that a critical factor in most cases is the provision of adequate infrastructure of services. In eight countries which represent over 80 per cent of the population of the region, there is an average of one family planning clinic for every 200,000 women of childbearing age, with the lowest ratio in this group of countries being 1 to 35,000. In four countries the ratio was between 10,000 and 20,000, while only five countries had less than 10,000 women of childbearing ages per clinic.

Neither do the results of the programmes seem satisfactory; in 13 countries less than 2 per cent of the women were protected, and only in two was the proportion above 10 per cent.

On the basis of a very preliminary review of these data, three situations may be distinguished: first, countries which in fact have no infrastructure of services; second, those which are in the process of expanding such services, and lastly, those which already have satisfactory facilities.

Table 13

DATES OF INITIATION AND CONSOLIDATION OF FAMILY PLANNING ACTIVITIES IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Date of initiation	Country	Date of consolidation			
		1967	1968	1969	1970
Before 1960	Barbados	X			
1963	Jamaica	X			
1964	Chile		X		
	Trinidad and Tobago		X		
1965	Venezuela		X		
1966	Colombia		X		
	Dominican Republic		X		
1967	Costa Rica			X	
	Honduras			X	
	Nicaragua		X		
	Panama				X
1968	El Salvador			X	
1969	Ecuador				X
	Guatemala				X

/In countries

In countries with a high birth rate, the lack of infrastructure may result from policies (or rather, demographic principles), which are opposed to State intervention, or from absence of an adequate system of medical services.

Where the infrastructure is insufficient and is in process of being expanded, the critical factors would seem to be that the programmes had only recently been consolidated, and that the system of health institutions was still very inadequate. In turn, countries which already have adequate services, either started much earlier and/or possess a better developed public health system, or else they are small countries with a low level of urbanization but with a rural population concentrated in some densely populated areas.

The results of the programmes in countries which have adequate facilities seem in their turn to depend on the general stage of development and modernization.

Table 14

COUNTRIES CLASSIFIED BY NUMBER OF WOMEN OF CHILDBEARING AGE PER FAMILY PLANNING CLINIC, AND PERCENTAGE OF PROTECTED WOMEN OF CHILDBEARING AGE AT THE BEGINNING OF 1969

Percentage of protected women of childbearing age	Number of women of childbearing age per family planning clinic			
	Under 10 000	10 000-20 000	20 000-50 000	Over 50 000
Under 3		Colombia	Haiti	Argentina
		Paraguay	Uruguay	Brazil
		Guatemala	Dominican Rep.	Mexico
		Nicaragua	Ecuador	
		El Salvador		
3 to 5		Panama		
		Honduras		
Over 10	Chile			
	Costa Rica			

V. CONCLUSIONS

48. The foregoing chapters show how current interest in Latin America in population problems is determined by factors and circumstances that arise from the level of economic growth and from the process of social modernization. These factors and circumstances have gradually found their expression in a revision of the development system and of its objectives, in profound modifications in the conduct and values of the population and in new solutions and institutional attitudes. Given the disequilibrium and ambivalence that exist in a state of semi-development, the subject has lost its apparent specificity and has instead become bound up with the concepts and ideologies of social change and has come to constitute, in its own right, one of the fundamental variables in the outlines and projects of society that are currently being debated.

It is therefore understandable that, when viewing the question of population within the context of present-day diagnoses and theses of development, the region should place so much emphasis on speeding up the process and clarifying its objectives. Many of the dilemmas which arise in discussing the role of population in development (and these are complicated even further by the introduction of immediate political considerations) are in fact dilemmas borrowed from the definition of the social and political objectives that determine economic growth. All this stems from a recognition of the crisis of conventional models of social coexistence and economic transformation and a desire to explore new avenues of social integration and institutional rationalization to overcome the social and political barriers that the economic process have encountered at this particular stage of semi-development.

Semi-development in the region has likewise brought major changes in population behaviour, particularly in urban centres. This is an obvious result of progress. What began as a barely perceptible adjustment is rapidly becoming the affirmation of new values and models of life.

In a little over half a century, a secular culture has evolved that is run more and more along acquisitive lines.

The imbalances and lack of continuity that are characteristic of semi-development give rise to a peculiar demographic situation in which

/the growth

the growth rate of the population increases. Progress, though evident, is limited and is selective in the way it affects classes, sectors and groups of society.

49. The secularization of behaviour is reflected in three parallel but asynchronous processes that define the nature of the system of modernization:

- (i) the intensification of market relationships and, concomitantly, the incorporation of new sectors of the population;
- (ii) the diffusion and intensification of experiments in social mobility;
- (iii) the expansion of the citizenry by means of political mobilization and the appearance of basic organizations.

Available information is indicative of the role that these processes play in the secularization of reproductive behaviour and of the selective way in which it evolves. In a stage of semi-development, its overall impact is necessarily slow and gradual, although the apparent stabilization of the rate of reproduction conceals underlying dynamic situations. The clearest symptoms of this trend are undoubtedly the redefinition of the role of women in society and the readjustment of family relationships in line with a more competitive, unstable and fluid urban context.

Further proof that a definite evolution is taking place, is the fact that, contrary to what happened in the industrialized countries in the past, population problems in Latin America have become a matter for action by the public sector. This raises the question of the definition of alternative development styles and the existence of social requirements and demands. State action has often taken place without there being any real consensus simply because the state has had to face the painful realities of human reproduction among the urban lower classes.

50. The foregoing all goes to show that the incorporation of the population variable in development policies must reflect the variety of situations that exists in Latin American countries and that the use of birth control as an alternative to development in any case implies neglect of the social forces that generate changes in reproductive behaviour.

It is also obvious that interpretations of population problems have evolved at two fairly isolated levels: at one level, the macro-interpretations which, generally speaking, do not consider social requirements and demands and, at the other, a more pragmatic attempt to solve specific problems of health and wellbeing directly. Population policies must be capable of integrating both approaches.