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FOREWORD

The economic development of Latin America during the last few decades has been at once a positive and an unsatisfactory achievement: positive, inasmuch as growth can at no time be said to have ceased altogether; yet none the less unsatisfactory by reason of its relatively slow rate, its erratic tempo, the disparities it exhibits from one Latin American country to another, and the disquieting emergence of a trend towards stagnation in recent years, marked at least in some parts of the region.

The endeavour to account for this unsatisfactory situation - setting aside its political repercussions and its calls for immediate action - constitutes in itself a stimulating exercise in intellectual analysis. The problem is not an easy one to solve, since a partial view of it is out of the question. A historical phenomenon of such far-reaching significance must be explored from every angle. And its manifestations extend from the shifting kaleidoscope of the international constellation, by way of the most strictly economic issues - those relating to investment and productivity, for example -, to the seemingly remote sphere of the region's time-honoured ideas, feelings and customs. The economists were perhaps the first to tackle the problem, and they offer plenty of explanations, varying according to the instrument of analysis adopted. Discussion of these would be out of place here; but it must be pointed out that, however sound they may be, they are necessarily partial, that is, confined within the limits set by their special angle of vision.

In the following pages an attempt is made to supplement them with the no less partial contribution represented by the sociological interpretation. In this instance, the element of limitation or incompleteness is still greater. Apart from the fact that this too is merely one among other lines of approach, the aim is not to envisage Latin American society in all its present - and, necessarily, past - complexity, but to examine a narrow cross-section of it. A factor, and perhaps a decisive one, in the inadequacy of Latin America's economic development seems to be the bottleneck created by the fact that 50 per cent of the active population generates 20 per cent of the gross product: in a word, the agricultural productivity bottleneck in what is still a predominantly agricultural region.

/Would it

Would it not be possible for sociological analysis to concentrate on this stark fact, with a view to extracting the full essence of its social significance? Some sort of interpretation, however unpretentious, would emerge as a result. And such an interpretation is bound to take the form of a structural analysis, comparing the urban and rural environments. The social relationships between town and country constitute, at a first glance, a limited horizon. On the contrary, however, successive enlargements of this horizon might in the event reveal if not the key, at least one of the keys to an understanding of the problem mooted. Perhaps the economic bottleneck aforesaid might prove to be merely one aspect of a social and cultural bottleneck of more comprehensive significance: a bottleneck deriving from a distortion of the over-all process of modernization - of rationalization, if the reader prefers - which has been generated everywhere in Latin America by the objective conditions of the region's social structure. It is a temptation to save time by immediate reference to the theory of structural dualism in vogue today. The allusion is neither incorrect nor inaccurate. But perhaps it would be advisable to shelve all such designations for the moment and simply study the facts.

It should be recalled from the outset, however, that, as in any sociological interpretation of a macroscopic nature, nothing whatever in the way of conclusive proof can be offered. The only claim that can be made is that the interpretation is fairly plausible, and all that can be hoped is that the series of hypotheses on which it is founded may later provide a basis for more specific and detailed research. But in default of an outline interpretation, whether entirely valid or not, no light at all can be shed on the situation under consideration, and any attempt to influence it becomes meaningless.

Again, the dimensions of the situation in question - and therefore of its interpretation - necessitate the simplifying devices for which the theoretical term is "types" or "models", and which in any case, far from portraying reality as a whole, merely trace the prevailing patterns that are indispensable for an understanding of those aspects of the existing state of affairs which deviate or diverge from them. Latin America is complex in the extreme, and its countries are at widely differing stages of their social, economic and cultural history. At the same time, however, the region is sufficiently homogeneous

/for certain

for certain structural "types" - the most decisive or fundamental - to be applicable within fairly wide limits. If these types or patterns are to be clearly defined, it will not always be possible, with all due respect to strict methodological procedure, to avoid over-emphasizing certain features.

The most striking aspect of the social structure of the majority of the Latin American countries is the rapidity of their urbanization process - a seemingly hopeful circumstance, in apparent contradiction with the agricultural bottleneck referred to above. Is it not precisely the big city that is, figuratively speaking, the vehicle of modernity? A rapid urbanization process should imply the presence of conditions similar to those found elsewhere. In other words, there should presumably be that continuum between the urban and rural sectors which is typical of the great industrial countries of our time. In Latin America, however, no such continuum exists, but a complete rupture: no smooth, straightforward transmission line - whereby distances are naturally abridged -, but a ragged series of abrupt switchovers, jumps and hiatuses.

May there not be a flaw in the prevailing theory with respect to the urbanization process? How is it possible to account for a steady expansion of the larger towns alongside a stationary agricultural productivity?

The data leave no room for doubt as to whether this is an accurate description of the phenomenon. The trend towards concentration in the larger towns registered in many of the Latin American countries during the last few decades, the low rate of growth of the small and medium-sized towns, and the uneven distribution of the population which such a state of affairs entails, are now existing ecological facts, which should be examined in every possible connexion. Why are these things so? What is the cause of the disproportionate growth of the cities? Is it due to the parallel and ever-increasing expansion of their industries?

Were this the case, the curious concomitant phenomenon of the marginality of the rural population - the term used to express, in the language of sociology, the social status of the rural sector, which is still marginal to modern urban life - would not have come into being, and neither would the gap between the structural patterns of the two ways of life. It is therefore important to call attention to the component features of this type of marginality,

/even at

even at the risk of over-emphasis. These features can be indicated without much difficulty, by the mere mention of three basic aspects of the problem: social stratification in the rural sector, the level of living prevailing in rural areas and the degree of integration of the country-dweller in national life, that is, the part he plays in politics, the social protection he enjoys and the education he can obtain. All these features, separately and as a whole, reveal the vastness of the gap between the urban and the rural patterns of living. Thus, the stagnation of the agricultural economy is linked to a historical stagnation of human relationships in the countryside. Is there any hypothesis which will account at one and at the same time for both these kinds of stagnation? There must surely be some intermediary mechanism, restraining rather than facilitating the modernizing influence of the town. Here the economist would cite the inadequacy and inefficient operation of the economic system. The sociologist translates this into terms of inadequacy and inefficiency in the realm of personal and cultural relationships. The sociological hypothesis would therefore identify the circuit-breaker with the "social structure of the agricultural enterprise". Both at the economic and at the social level, the old type of organization of work known as the hacienda holds out against the rationalization and modernization called for today. It is a survival of the past that hinders quick and easy adaptation to the demands of modern industry. Unfortunately, the full implications of this hypothesis cannot be tested, for want of a clear and definite reply to the following query: what is the social structure of the agricultural enterprise? What are the social conditions attendant upon entrepreneurial activity in rural areas? But whether it can or cannot be "verified", the hypothesis in question indubitably calls immediate attention to one of the points on which research is most urgently required.

Does the explanation of the phenomenon lie only within the Latin American rural sector itself? Must it not rather depend upon a much more comprehensive chain of causes? This suggests the importance of analysing how the urbanization process in Latin America has really come about, and what has been the city's true function in the march of events in recent times.

The postulate of a correlation between urbanization and economic development is often accepted as a dogma. The inevitable corollary would seem to be that any more or less rapid expansion of the larger towns is attributable to

/the concurrent

the concurrent establishment of thriving industrial activities in the urban areas concerned. But the correlation is so tenuous - quite irrespective of its probable causal links - that it has become a matter of controversy. History and observation of contemporary life give warrant for the doubts expressed. While such a correlation admittedly has been and may be found in specific historical circumstances, it is no less true that the possibility of substantial urban expansion without industrialization, or of intensive economic development without the formation of large urban centres, has existed and continues to exist. The former case, at least, has been by no means exceptional.

This would seem to be the situation in Latin America. The basic politico-administrative origin of most of its major towns, their subsequent conversion into influential trade centres and their cultural importance made many of them powerful magnets, even before they became the scene of industrial development in the strict sense of the term. Undeniably, in their case too the absorption capacity of their industrial complexes of varying size has carried considerable weight, specially in recent years. Even so, it seems highly likely that industrial development is not in itself enough to account for the sometimes positively monstrous expansion of the agglomerates concerned. The attraction of the town as such - that is, as an assembly of greater conveniences and facilities - has combined with the "expulsion" of agricultural population to constitute the true causes of the many migratory movements from rural to urban areas. The incapacity of the latter's new industries to absorb the swarms of manpower that thus came pouring into the outskirts of the bigger towns confirms the foregoing hypothesis, and accounts for the formation of the various marginal urban strata, with the series of problems they bring in their train.

The fact that in Latin America, as elsewhere, the history of the urban sector disproves the validity of the correlation in question does not mean that there has been no industrialization process, or that Latin American towns have failed to play their part as centres for the diffusion of modernity. Herein lies the crux of the problem, for the suggestion in the preceding paragraphs is not that there has been no widespread modernizing effort - the rationalization process has been in effective operation, as everywhere - but that the degree of modernization achieved has not been sufficient. What is the cause of this insufficiency? The hypothesis postulated in the present study is that the "traditional" structure has been relatively permeable, and that this permeability

/has enabled

has enabled it to absorb such elements of "modernity" as it has needed without damage to the structure itself. The current concern with the situation of the so-called traditional societies - in the last analysis, the whole of le tiers monde - has been dominated by an over-hasty interpretation. Perhaps the far-echoing reverberations of a Weberian theory (the dissolution of traditional societies before the onslaught of revolutions based either on reason or on a mystique) have been responsible for the concept of traditional societies as more or less hardened shells, capable only of remaining obdurately intact or shattering into fragments. The fact of the matter is that traditional societies have proved to be fairly flexible, and frequently capable of assimilating extremely rational elements at some points, without thereby losing their characteristic features. According to their philosophical conception of history, some will deplore this possibility, and others will rejoice at it, if they think that not all the values attaching to a particular tradition should be jettisoned at one sweep. Discussion of such a topic would be out of place here. What is of interest from the standpoint of sociological analysis, once a fact has been demonstrated, is the possibility of indicating the social mechanisms or processes by virtue of which it takes place. And this is what matters now in relation to Latin America. Its "traditional structure", far from having been rigid and impenetrable, has had sufficient permeability for a good many of its component parts to be modernized, without this having implied a swift and radical process of "modernization". Its social progress is a reality, like its economic development, but the rate of this progress - viewed by an outsider or through justifiably impatient eyes - has been far from rapid. The traditional type of society has managed to adapt itself, has succeeded in assimilating such and such "enclaves" of modernity; but this degree of modernization is no longer enough. By means of what mechanisms did it achieve this assimilation, and, until a short time ago achieve it smoothly? It is not surprising that contemporary scholars in the countries of Southern Europe - so close to those of Latin America in more than one respect - should have fashioned a new category (also of more or less Weberian origin), although only its designation, rather than its content, can strictly be described as novel. Thus, the term used in the interpretation of modern Greece or of Southern Italy to describe a certain form of rule (and equally applicable in the case of Spain

/and Portugal).

and Portugal) is the "clientele" system. The Spaniards, it should be noted, bestowed an "American" name on the same phenomenon; it was not by chance that caciquismo was long spoken of. The clientele system, far from invariably constituting a regressive factor, has at some junctures been an instrument of progress. It makes innovation possible, promotes upward social mobility and permits an outward and visible predominance of the symbols of modernity. But social mobility is channelled along different lines, the economic enterprise secures its footing with different instruments and bureaucracy operates in different ways. There is a minimum of rationalization, which, while never complete or firmly established, naturally comes into freer play in the town than in the country.

The hypothesis adopted in the present study is that the flexibility of Latin America's traditional structure has hitherto been based on a similar clientele or patronage system. The present crisis would seem to be identifiable with the critical state of this mechanism, worn out as it is by long use and demographic pressure.

In principle, a clientele system may not be inimical to the urge towards progress, but its structure is incompatible with that required for the full operation of modern industrial societies, if they wish to remain democratic. In them upward social mobility is based on merit; the groups composing them are organically inter-related, even in their antagonisms, never "watertight compartments", in Ortega's sense; they aim at more or less stable commitments; and social fluidity, both horizontal and vertical, has its solid prop and stay in a rationality that is embodied in legal justice and bureaucratic procedure alike. Briefly, clientele systems are incompatible with modern pluralistic democracies and with their economic dependence on industrial organization.

The hypothesis formulated in the present study would lend itself to pursuit of the most widely varying ramifications. Some have been noted incidentally, and others will be referred to later. But to prove its validity would be an undertaking for an ambitious study, capable of covering, in all their complexity and diversity, the historical events - not always purely internal, but resulting from powerful external influences - that during the last few decades have followed so hard on one another's heels. Even so, one aspect of the hypothesis, namely, the question of the so-called middle class, demands at least a cursory

/glance. The

glance. The equivocal and debateable nature of the term is well-known. It is in the same case as others no less common and apparently less assailable; for instance, it is impossible to speak of feudalism in general - there have been so many sorts of feudalism - nor can absolute values be assigned to the term "bourgeoisie". For instance, les bourgeois conquérants may be a provocative title for a book; but the French bourgeois has not been the same as his counterpart in Germany, England or the United States.

Another apparent correlation has been noted between economic development and the creative activity of the middle classes. In the last few decades, social sectors of this type have been emerging all over Latin America. There were bound to be interpretations that also attributed to them a considerable share of the responsibility for achievements in the field of economic development, and, in addition, the duty of shouldering this burden to the end. Such interpretations assume that the groups whose income or social position places them statistically in the middle category cannot but display the appropriate class conscience, or, to put it as simply as possible, the social and economic attitudes which characterized the corresponding strata in the formation of the great industrial countries. In Latin America, however, the patent fact of the present relative stagnation of some countries which had not only forged ahead at the close of the last century, but also possessed quantitatively larger middle classes, would have called the old doctrine in question, even if there had not been plenty of other historical evidence against it. Hence the dictum that quantity was not enough; quality was needed too. This interpretation is unsatisfactory without knowledge of what such quality consists in, of its origins and the extent of its mutability.

On the basis of the broad hypothesis as to the flexibility of traditional structures, a more specific hypothesis can now be put forward with respect to the middle classes, which contradicts, without altogether refuting, the commoner and more familiar assumption. Which of the two hypotheses has the greater general validity? Possibly neither, in so far as their value is purely circumstantial. Perhaps the second - the assimilation of the middle classes by the traditional system - may help to explain some of the enigmas of the existing situation in Latin America, but its usefulness in every case is doubtful, since in some instances, given the complexity of the web of history, the elucidatory elements in the two hypotheses might be found to overlap.

/The general

The general approach adopted in the present study also brings under review the position with regard to the trade union movement in Latin America, which is by no means bound to go through the same phases as in other countries, or, in particular, to reproduce the structure of their urban labour strata. The analysis of this structure is extremely interesting, as it serves to indicate the "marginality" of some of the strata concerned and to demarcate the danger spots in the "mass situations" arising. A careful study of the structure in question is an indispensable prerequisite for every programme concerned with economic policy and social policy, whatever its content. That content, which is outside the scope of the present study, might determine varying approaches, according to its political colouring. From the sociological standpoint, what is important is to identify the objective problems which are created by such a structure, and which largely derive from its strong element of marginality: a marginality which perhaps can only be interpreted on the basis of the general hypothesis adopted in the present study.

At least some hasty indication must be given of the ideological implications of the position described. The history of some years is involved, during which the unsatisfactory economic situation has paradoxically corresponded not only to increased and more widespread economic knowledge, but also to an almost universal flowering of new expectations, new aspirations towards a higher standard of living. Brought face to face with reality, these expectations have been in some cases doomed to deep disappointment, which none the less has acted as a spur - sometimes frenziedly sharp - to renewed hopes and ambitions. In view of the extreme complexity of the background underlying the reality in question, an attempt has been made to simplify matters by outlining the political ideologies prevailing in the years concerned, and still lingering up to the present time: nationalism, populism and "progressive" traditionalism or conservatism. The truth is that the term "ideology" is perhaps not the right one. A more accurate description would be vague ideological orientations, which were never crystallized in a set of clearly-defined ideas. This makes it all the more important to work out the "ideal type" of such orientations, and to indicate, as far as possible, their most decisive and definitive characteristics. The importance of these "ideologies" derives from three main causes: (1) all envisage - more or less explicitly, with varying degrees of imprecision -

/economic development

economic development as the basic task of the present time; (2) all are imbued with elements of irrationality, which make it impossible to establish precise formulas; (3) all reflect the critical situation of the clientele systems, and the state of "massification" produced by demographic pressure and rapid urbanization, or, if the reader prefers, the decline in the assimilation capacity of the traditional society which still subsists.

The sign that a new structure has been introduced will be no other than the replacement of these semi-irrational ideologies by exact systems of ideas, whose content will include the formulation of a clearly defined development policy. This policy will, of course, vary in accordance with the different positions prevailing at the time when the aforesaid "vague ideological orientations" are transmuted into practical programmes of action of the type proper to the new parties required by the new epoch.

Lastly, it must be made clear that the present study is of the kind that has only a programmatical value, and necessitates lengthy subsequent research. In face of the urgent needs of the time, some will perhaps think that practical action cannot and must not wait upon such long-drawn-out investigations. There is no suggestion that it should. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to dismiss them as intellectual speculations of a purely academic type. It would be a mistake because, even if such action as may seem most immediately expedient is continually taken, unless the problems glimpsed are clearly brought to light, unless there is awareness of what is going on and of what is at stake, there will be no possibility of long-term action, which is the only sort for the true statesman to consider.

Chapter I

THE URBANIZATION PROCESS

1. Trends in urban growth

It is frequently pointed out that in Latin America as a whole a much higher level of urbanization is attained than in other under-developed regions of the world with which it may be compared. In 1950, according to estimates, 25 per cent of the Latin American population lived in towns of over 20,000 inhabitants, although the incidence of urbanization shows marked variations from one country to another. Thus, the Central American and Caribbean countries taken in conjunction are less highly urbanized than those of South America. Both areas, however, are far from constituting homogeneous entities. While in Haiti barely 10 per cent of the population lived in urban centres, the corresponding figure for Cuba was about 49 per cent. In South America, the 64 per cent registered for Argentina contrasted with 31 per cent in Brazil, or, again, 28 per cent in Ecuador.

Between 1950 and 1960 the number of Latin American countries whose urban population equalled or exceeded 30 per cent of their inhabitants rose from 11 to 17. At the same time, those with a rural population amounting to 70 per cent of the total, or more, decreased in number from 9 to 3 (see table 1).

Table 1
LATIN AMERICA: VARIATIONS IN PERCENTAGES OF URBAN POPULATION
BETWEEN 1950 AND 1960

<u>Percentage of population living in towns</u>	<u>Number of countries</u>	
	1950	1960
10 to 29	9	3
30 to 49	8	11
50 and over	3	6

Source: ECLA, on the basis of census data.

/Whereas in

Whereas in 1950 the number of Latin Americans living in urban areas was approximately 61,366,000 in absolute figures, by 1960 it had risen to an estimated 91,103,000. In short, the urban sectors had manifestly increased in both absolute and relative terms. It has more than once been pointed out that urban expansion during the period 1945-60 was roughly equivalent to twice the increase in the total population, and that there were towns in which the number of inhabitants was doubled within the short space of a single decade.

It can be estimated from the existing data that in many Latin American countries (the exceptions being those like Argentina, Chile and Cuba, in which a high proportion of the population was living in towns) the annual increments in the urban sector were in the neighbourhood of 5 per cent; the rural populations, on the other hand, increased at a rate which in no case exceeded 2 per cent per annum.

On the basis of the statistics for thirteen Latin American countries, it was possible to estimate that in 1950, 47.2 per cent of the urban population living within the administrative limits of the larger towns were to be found in population centres with over 100,000 inhabitants; extension of the same statistics to eighteen republics shows that 26.6 per cent of the total urban population resided in towns with 100,000 inhabitants or more.^{1/}

^{1/} The concept of administrative limits hinders assessment of the real magnitude of the large urban agglomerations, especially since the Second World War. Thus, for example, out of the 4,603,000 persons comprised in the Greater Buenos Aires agglomeration in 1947, only 2,981,000 were to be found within the administrative limits of the city. Much the same is true of Santiago, Chile: the population of Greater Santiago numbered 1,348,000 inhabitants, but only 665,000 lived within the municipal boundaries. It is interesting to note that in 1950 Buenos Aires, Mexico, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo formed agglomerations of over 2 million persons each, totalling about 13 million inhabitants in all. In Havana and in Santiago, Chile, there were more than 1 million residents, and Lima and Montevideo approached this figure. Between 1947 and 1960, the Buenos Aires agglomeration increased from 4.6 to 5.8 million persons. Between 1958 and 1960, the inhabitants of Mexico City increased in number from 3,051,000 to 4,829,000 persons, of whom 816,000 corresponded to the Federal District (outside the administrative limits of the city) at the beginning of the decade, and 2,131,000 at its close.

Perhaps the most outstanding characteristic of the rapid urbanization process which took place between 1945 and 1960 was the trend towards concentration of the population in the larger towns. A good deal of stress has been laid upon the general tendency for capital cities to grow much faster than small and medium-sized towns, although the latter increased in size more rapidly than the rural population. In and around the year 1960, the concentration of a considerable percentage of the population in one or two "primate" cities seems to have been an almost universal characteristic of the Latin American countries, whereas the towns comprising the next size-category were much smaller. In fact, the population of the capital, or the combined populations of the primate cities - never more than two in number - equalled or exceeded the whole of the rest of the urban sector.

Some provisional projections of population trends up to 1975 give a clearer idea of the magnitude and direction of the changes that took place during the period 1945-60.

Were the rates of growth registered in 1950-60 to remain constant, it could be estimated that by 1975 the combined urban population of the twenty republics would have increased by approximately 100 million inhabitants. It would be quadrupled and even quintupled in the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Venezuela; trebled in Colombia, Ecuador and some of the Central American countries; and doubled in the remainder, with the exception of Argentina, Uruguay and perhaps Cuba. The rural population would increase by only about 40 million persons, its rates of growth fluctuating from one republic to another.

Table 2 gives an approximate idea of the speed of the urbanization process characteristic of the Latin American countries during the post-war period. If the trends prevailing in the fifties were to be projected, within the short space of 15 years Latin America would present the aspect of a markedly urban continent. While in 1950 only 39 per cent of the population of the twenty republics were living in towns, the corresponding figure for 1975 would be 54 per cent or more.

/Table 2

Table 2

LATIN AMERICA: PREDOMINANCE OF URBAN AND RURAL SECTORS IN 1950,
AND ESTIMATES FOR 1975

Demographic situation	Number of countries	
	1950	1975
I. Predominance of urban sector	5	11
II. Balance between urban and rural sectors	5	7
III. Predominance of rural sector	10	2

Source: "The demographic situation in Latin America", Economic Bulletin for Latin America, Vol. VI, No. 2, Santiago, Chile, October 1961, p.13.

Even without the formulation of precise estimates, it can be foreseen that if current trends were maintained, it would be the large towns that attained the highest rates of growth. Thus, in 1975 the aggregate population of urban centres with 100,000 inhabitants or more would amount to over 80 million, urban agglomerations with over one million inhabitants accounting for 40 to 50 million. In 1950, 26 million persons were living in towns with over one million inhabitants.

The data available do not provide a basis for any very exact comparisons in respect of trends prior to 1945-60. Between 1920 and 1940, Brazil's total population increased by about 36 per cent, but there was a 61-per-cent increment in that of 22 of its larger towns. During the same period, similar growth rates were registered in Chile (34 and 69 per cent, respectively). Between 1918 and 1938, the total population and the urban population of Colombia increased by 49 and 126 per cent.^{2/}

The decision to break with the family environment traditionally characteristic of local structures and go in search of places where there is a better chance of satisfying individual hopes and aspirations would imply a substantial modification of the traditional personality types, and the mass appearance of such a phenomenon would in turn indicate the emergence of new institutional and ecological matrices. In the urban environment, the

^{2/} See H. L. Dunn, "Demographic Status of South America", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, No. 237, January 1945, p.25.

metamorphosis of the in-migrant from rural areas implies the adoption of a more modern way of life. But, as can be seen when observation is focused on society as a whole, this constitutes no guarantee that a homogeneous modernizing influence has been exerted on all institutional orders or on all sectors of the social organization. Again, the adoption of more up-to-date modes of life does not necessarily signify effective commitment to the urban and industrial patterns of a more developed society, since the complex processes of institutionalizing the new patterns may strengthen some of the traditional values and attitudes.

It seems that between 1910 and 1940, in Chile, Cuba, Mexico, Panama, Puerto Rico and Venezuela, towns with upwards of 100,000 inhabitants increased much more rapidly than the rest of the population, whether urban or rural.^{3/} Despite the piecemeal character of the available data, it may reasonably be assumed that during the post-war years the trends prevailing in the immediately preceding period must have been intensified. Thus, between 1945 and 1960, the maintenance of high growth rates in the big towns depended basically upon the high net rates of migration from rural to urban areas. Table 3 shows the large part played by migration in the expansion of cities in ten Latin American countries. Mass population shifts from the country to the town are a social phenomenon which generally denotes a radical modification of the social structure - a swerve towards real modernization of institutions.

No evaluation of the social significance of urbanization in Latin America can fail to take into account the most salient features of the ecological trends which seem to characterize the countries of the region as a whole. Their towns certainly did not grow in a vacuum, and the fact that the rapid urban development process was almost entirely confined to the major population centres suggests the need to analyse the complex inter-relationships within the urban system itself and between it and the rural social structures.

^{3/} See Kingsley and Anna Casis, "Urbanization in Latin America", Cities and Societies, pp. 148-149.

Table 3
LATIN AMERICA: INCIDENCE OF MIGRATION ON URBAN
GROWTH IN TEN COUNTRIES
(Percentages)

Country	Intercensal period	Causes of urban growth	
		Natural increase	Migration
Venezuela	1941-50	29	71
Colombia	1938-51	32	68
Dominican Republic	1935-50	35	65
Nicaragua	1940-50	35	65
Paraguay	1937-50	45	55
El Salvador	1930-50	46	54
Brazil	1940-50	51	49
Chile	1940-52	53	47
Mexico	1940-50	58	42
Cuba	1931-43	74	26

Source: UNESCO, Urbanization in Latin America, 1961, p. 110.

2. Digression on some ecological features of
the Latin American countries

Mention may be made of a few general characteristics of ecological organization in the Latin American countries which shed some light on the nature of urban growth.

The population, which is small in relation to the inhabitable territory, is grouped in clusters, as has already been seen, in areas of concentrated settlement. Only in exceptional cases do even these areas show a density of more than 125 inhabitants per square mile. In most instances the corresponding figure is less than 100 and in many as low as 25 inhabitants.^{4/} As each population cluster centres round an urban nucleus or primate city, density decreases as the distance from the said nucleus increases, so that between

^{4/} See Preston F. James, Latin America, The Odyssey Press, New York, 1959, p.6.

/the areas

the areas of concentrated settlement stretches a veritable no-man's land, virtually uninhabited. The sea of emptiness surrounding the high-density areas scattered like islands over the surface of Latin America has implications of vital importance with respect to the national integration processes presupposed by the new social and economic structures. First and foremost, the relative weakness of the urban network as a whole is worth noting. Inter-urban communication and transport systems have been and still are basically local, despite the obvious progress made during the period. Only exceptionally do they link up isolated areas of higher population density. At best, the overland routes join up a certain number of population centres round about a primate city or connect them with the most accessible ports.^{5/} The marked differences in size between the various population clusters and urban centres within each area of higher relative density suggests some degree of polarization by types of town: on the one hand the primate cities, and on the other the rest of the urban system.^{6/}

In 1945-60 this seems to have been a familiar pattern among the social structures prevailing in Latin America. The primate city, a veritable oasis of progress, the repository of all the outward and visible symbols of modernity,^{7/} contrasts with the small and medium-sized towns, which are in their turn, comparatively speaking, morasses of stagnation. With a little exaggeration of its typical features, the primate city may be conceived as relatively isolated within a territory where secondary towns are lacking, or, in other words, where there is no balanced and systematic distribution of the population among the various towns forming the urban network. Any analysis of the institutional development of national units in Latin America makes it clear that there has been a growing trend towards the concentration of the typically urban functions in the larger towns - often in the capital cities - and that in this sense the minor urban centres have gradually lost their importance and significance. The

^{5/} Preston E. James, op. cit., p. 9.

^{6/} See A. Pizzorno, "Sviluppo económico e urbanizzazione", Quaderni de Sociologia, Vol. XI, No. 1, 1962, pp. 23-51.

^{7/} R. M. Morse, "Latin American cities: aspects of function and structure", Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. IV, No. 4, July 1962, pp. 480 and 481.

new institutions were designed to operate in capital or primate cities, and only exceptionally have they penetrated beyond the confines of the urban areas. In this sense, the price of "progress" and "civilization" as a phenomenon typical of the primate cities has been the polarization and enfeeblement of the urban network, which in the final issue has implied over-polarization and severance of the continuity between town and country. To take a broader view, Latin America's urban centres have tended to fall into two sharply differentiated categories: local towns and cosmopolitan cities. The new institutional structures, created in the course of the modernization process, have been confined to the latter. The big cosmopolitan city, as a new factor in the organization of social life, has tended to make political and mercantile activities its predominant functions and to develop groups interested in external contacts, trade and cultural models - groups that may be described as "outward-looking" rather than "inward-looking" in relation to the national territory. The very leadership of the primate city has been largely bound up with this orientation of its structures and with its essentially metropolitan function as an intermediary between the country concerned and the outside world. The cosmopolitan groups in the primate city have tended to regard themselves as forming a bridge between the "civilization" of the great national units and the "barbarism" and backwardness of their own hinterland, and to develop a system of values which has discriminated negatively and radically against rural life and culture, exerting a markedly centripetal influence on the rest of the urban structure.^{8/} The sense of "self-improvement", of not being cut off from the world of culture, of "keeping up to date with current events", which is so significantly incorporated in the type of culture characteristic of the primate city, has in the end become the sort of social satisfaction obtainable only within cosmopolitan cities. The phenomenon has reached such an extreme that the possibility of distinguishing clearly between two essentially different patterns of living has finally come to constitute the actual justification of the large city.

^{8/} R. M. Morse, op. cit., pp. 481-482.

Another no less important ecological feature is the existence of expanding internal frontiers in most of the Latin American countries. The fact that the effective national territory is far smaller than the formal or total national territory remains virtually unchanged despite the exceptionally rapid growth registered by the primate cities.^{9/} The various settlement projects have made no significant difference to this situation. The building of Brasilia is unquestionably the most ambitious attempt of the kind made during the period 1945-60. To attribute these trends to the lack of individual "pioneer spirit" is an exaggeration that betrays a certain unawareness of the almost insurmountable difficulties involved in the task of expanding internal frontiers. In effect, scarcely any type of communal effort on a fairly broad scale has been steadily and uninterruptedly directed towards the opening-up and permanent control of the whole of the national territory. The dynamically expansive type of development implying the conquest of internal frontiers, in which the various institutional orders tend to channel their efforts in that direction, so that the indispensable policy decisions are gradually supported by the inter-play of economic and social factors itself, does not seem to have taken place during the period referred to.^{10/}

The tendency of modernization to be confined within the limits and the more immediate spheres of influence of the big cosmopolitan cities is highly significant of the type of evolution undergone by the Latin American countries.

^{9/} Preston E. James, op. cit., p. 9.

^{10/} K. Davis, "Recent Population Trends in the New World: an Over-all View" The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, No. 316, March 1958, p. 7.

Chapter II

THE RURAL SITUATION

1. Social stagnation in rural areas

In Latin America, urban growth has not been paralleled by commensurate progress in the rural environment. While the large towns have forged rapidly ahead, the development of rural life has continued to lag behind on every front. The changes and innovations introduced in agriculture have not substantially altered the traditional characteristics of the system. Agricultural technique has remained, with few modifications, at the same levels as in 1945, thus adversely affecting the utilization of available resources. Throughout the whole of the period under consideration, productivity in the agricultural sector increased very slowly, and the trend towards extensive methods of crop and stock farming is the most salient feature of the Latin American countryside. At the same time, the structures of production have tended to operate on the basis of single-crop farming, which depletes the soil, and is possible only when economic calculations assume the maintenance of a low yield per unit of area.

Another no less important aspect of the inadequacy of rural growth is the insensitivity of crop and stock farming to market incentives. These latter have been efficacious only in so far as response to them has been compatible with the maintenance of extensive farming practices, not when it has entailed a process of intensification. The problem is of a more general nature, and relates to the extent to which the agricultural enterprise has been incorporated in the expanding national market. In other words, the actual structure and orientation of the enterprises seem to have constituted a factor of by no means negligible importance which has limited their active participation in the dynamics of development and has tended to restrict the expansion of the agricultural market.

The economic calculations and the rationality of the agricultural enterprise have largely been based on considerations other than market logic, which have become so firmly welded into its structure and organization

/that they

that they have precluded flexible adjustment to the new economic conditions created by urban expansion. As is common knowledge, modern economic structure implies that the enterprise must be sufficiently adaptable and malleable to facilitate the transfer of resources to more productive uses. Despite a few innovations introduced during the period under discussion, broadly speaking the agricultural enterprise seems to have remained a rigid and traditional organization. Extensive methods of using land and labour, a conspicuously out-of-date technology and, in general, the under-utilization of resources, are features compatible only with economic calculations based on a specific social structure, whose hierarchy is conceived as emanating from an inviolable "natural order".

Moreover, it should be noted that at the same time the market for agricultural commodities tended to adapt itself to the rigidity of the producer enterprise and the expansion of urban demand. The outcome of this situation was the creation of internal marketing machinery which still further cushioned the impact of the market economy on agricultural production, so that the effects of price fluctuations were generally regressive where the farmer was concerned. The marketing system, inefficient as it was from the modern standpoint, constituted a veritable vicious circle. In effect, it helped to strengthen traditional structures of production in rural areas and to exert a negative influence on up-to-date enterprises.^{1/}

Living conditions in the rural environment, to judge both from the qualitative observations to be found in various studies and reports and from the few quantitative data available, present a heartrending picture. The vast majority of the 111 million human beings domiciled in rural areas in 1960 were living in definitely sub-human conditions as regards sanitation, diet, education and housing. These circumstances, and the isolation of rural areas, were factors making for the exclusion of the rural lower strata from the modernizing processes undergone by the large urban centres during the period under review.

^{1/} The machinery whereby traditional agriculture was adjusted to market demand seems to have operated in connexion with the most widely differing varieties of entrepreneurial action, and both at the local and at the metropolitan level. For a detailed study of certain types of "peasant economy" in Latin America, see E.R. Wolf, "Types of Latin American Peasantry: a Preliminary Discussion", American Anthropologist, June 1955, pp. 452-471.

It must be borne in mind, however, that low productivity, rudimentary technology, the unresponsiveness of the agricultural enterprise to modern market incentives, and endemic poverty are not mere sporadic phenomena, the product of maladjustments or "irrationality", but inherent features of the type of social structure which seems to have predominated in rural areas during the period 1945-60.

2. Social assumptions underlying the agricultural enterprise

The rural stagnation characteristic of the period suggests the survival of certain traditional modes of farming comparable to the hacienda type. The available statistics reveal a manifest preponderance of the large landed estate, which, in combination with the relatively small volume of investment in agriculture, would seem to indicate that during the years in question the agricultural enterprise was viable only by virtue of an organization based on extensive methods of utilizing land and labour.

Although in many places the traditional structure of the hacienda entered upon a process of adjustment to the new conditions created by development, as a result of which its classic patterns were broken up, the same was not true of its social prerequisites. All the relevant studies and monographs corroborate the idea that the system of social relationships characteristic of the hacienda survived as a model for the organization of labour, and that as such it continued to permeate a major part of the social structure prevailing in rural areas in Latin America up to 1960.

It may safely be asserted that during the period in question the different varieties of agricultural enterprise were based to a greater or lesser extent on social prerequisites similar to those of the great traditional hacienda, that is, on the existence of relatively closed stratification systems, the maintenance of the poverty and marginality of the peasantry and the prevalence of a primary system of labour relations.^{2/}

(a) Rural stratification systems

Perhaps the most essential of the features inherited from the traditional patterns of rural labour organization is the nature of the social stratification observable in the countryside, which was still practically unchanged at

^{2/} See the methodological annex appended to the present chapter.

the end of the Second World War. The available statistics all give the same impression that, in comparison with the stratification systems emerging in the urban areas of Latin America, social inequality assumed a very simple guise in the rural environment. Various studies agree that about 1950-55, throughout the Latin American rural sector, the population was divided into two horizontal strata, which corresponded to an inequitable social distribution of duties and rights.

It is easy enough to point out various exceptions, and to indicate that the specific stratification patterns reflected much more complex objective and subjective situations. Nevertheless, any comparison with urban inequalities in each individual country invariably shows that in the rural areas there was a marked trend towards the polarization of groups in the social hierarchy, whereas in the urban scale the tendency was for a considerable number of inhabitants to be concentrated in the middle sectors.

This means that only the growth of cities made it possible for the intermediate social sectors to increase in weight and importance in each individual country. Between 1945 and 1960 the middle classes were virtually insignificant in those countries where the population was employed primarily in agriculture, and their importance increased as the agricultural labour force decreased in size.

Table 4 suggests that of the fifteen countries taken into consideration, only Argentina and Colombia in South America and Costa Rica^{3/} in Central America present a somewhat different rural structure. While in these three countries there were fairly sizable middle strata in the rural areas, in the rest of the republics the increment in the intermediate social sectors was of a markedly urban character. As the proportion of persons employed in agriculture increases, the number of those found in the upper and middle sectors of the social hierarchy decreases, or, in other words, in countries with a predominantly rural economy the stratification system is simpler, showing a decided trend towards unequal distribution of the population in two horizontal strata, of which the upper comprises only a minority of the population. Moreover, a comparison between the upper and middle sectors in the rural

^{3/} The available data would seem to place Mexico too in this category.

environment on the one hand and in urban areas on the other shows that these sectors are grouped mainly in the large towns, and that only in exceptional cases - those of Argentina, Colombia and Costa Rica -- is the percentage of rural middle classes relatively significant.

Estimates based on census data for two Latin American countries show that about 1950 the middle social strata had attained a certain volume and importance only in the urban centres, whereas in rural areas the tendency to polarization at the upper and lower extremes of the social scale was clearly paramount (see table 5).

The percentages represented by the upper and middle strata in rural areas are almost certainly over-estimated in table 5, owing to the different social significance attaching to the same census categories in country and town.^{4/} But even if this statistical deficiency is taken into account, the data afford unequivocal evidence of the markedly urban character of the intermediate social sectors, both in Chile and in Ecuador, as well as of the insignificance of these middle strata in the rural areas of the two countries.

The same idea recurs in various monographs.^{5/} In a study carried out in the province of Aconcagua in Chile,^{6/} on the basis of the data obtained in the National Housing Census taken in 1952, the conclusion is reached that the greatest differences between the urban and rural stratification systems in that province related to four fundamental aspects of the problem:

- (i) Rural stratification showed a marked trend towards polarization of the population in two unequal groups at the upper and lower extremes of the social scale, whereas in large towns the biggest concentrations were found at the intermediate levels of the hierarchy;
- (ii) The strata were much less clearly demarcated in urban centres than in rural areas, where they were on the whole well-defined and easily identifiable;

^{4/} The nature and quality of the data were not such that the categories could be differentiated precisely enough for a satisfactory comparison. Moreover, the concept of rural areas used in the censuses includes some population centres which are not properly agricultural, such as mines, quarries, certain industrial units, etc.

^{5/} See, for example, Orlando Fals Borda, Campeñinos de los Andes, Bogotá, 1961.

^{6/} L. Fatincif, loc. cit.

Table 4

LATIN AMERICA: AGRICULTURAL POPULATION, DEGREE OF URBANIZATION AND
STRATIFICATION IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, ABOUT 1950

(Percentages)

Country	Rural population		Urban population	
	Persons employed in agriculture (Aged 15 or over)	Middle and upper strata	Middle and upper strata	Persons living in towns with 20,000 inhabi- tants or more
<u>Central America</u>				
Haiti	83	3	2	5
Honduras	83	4	4	7
Guatemala	68	8	6	11
El Salvador	62	10	9	13
Costa Rica	54	22	14	18
Panama	48	15	15	22
Cuba	41	22	21	37
<u>South America</u>				
Bolivia	70	8	7	20
Brazil	58	15	13	20
Colombia	54	22	12	32
Paraguay	54	14	12	15
Ecuador	53	10	10	18
Venezuela	53	18	16	31
Chile	30	22	21	45
Argentina	25	36	28	48

Sources: Organization of American States (OAS), Algunos aspectos salientes del desarrollo social de América Latina, 1962, p. 144; G. Germani, "The strategy of fostering social mobility", Social Aspects of Economic Development in Latin America, UNESCO, 1962, Vol. I, p. 211.

Table 5

CHILE AND ECUADOR: SOCIAL STRATA BY URBAN AND RURAL
AREAS, ABOUT 1950

(Percentages)

Strata	Chile		Ecuador	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
I. Upper and middle	49.4	17.8	28.9	15.2
II. Lower	50.6	82.2	71.1	84.8

Sources: For Chile: L. Ratinoff, research currently in progress on urban and rural stratification in the province of Aconcagua (University of Chile, Economic Planning Centre);
For Ecuador: R. Torres C., Los estratos socioeconómicos del Ecuador, National Economic Planning and Co-ordination Board, Quito, 1960.

/(iii) The

- (iii) The middle-class groups existing in rural areas - small in comparison with the urban middle classes - were less closely associated with those posts which implied some degree of participation in the power structure;
- (iv) In rural areas, the distribution of the population over the social scale did not facilitate the hypothetical possibilities of upward social mobility, especially where the worst-off sectors were concerned.

Many of the monographs prepared in other parts of Latin America present conclusions similar to the general findings obtained for the province of Aconcagua. Although variations exist, and social stratification displays widely varying complexities and special features in each different place, basically the prevailing distribution of power always seems to approximate to a pattern consisting in two hierarchical strata with unequal duties and rights.

This situation radically affected the structure of the agricultural productive enterprise, in particular the nature of internal power and authority, and therefore the degree and type of division of labour. Communication patterns, perception of the communal objectives of the enterprise and at the same time the complexity and nature of these objectives and the values and standards involved, as well as organizational adaptability and flexibility, all depended upon the bipolar character of social stratification.

(b) Rural poverty

The low levels of living of the peasantry are a typical aspect of the under-development of rural areas in Latin America. Only in recent years, and largely in consequence of the political mobilization of large sectors of the rural population, does the general public seem to have formed some conception of the main features of the poverty in question. The role played by the rural lower strata in the stagnation of a national economy has not been visualized, and in the discussion of rural living conditions political or purely humanitarian considerations have been paramount.

If due account is taken of agriculture's relatively small share in the national product in the great majority of the Latin American countries during

/the period

the period 1945-60, of the large number of persons who depend upon this branch of productive activity, and of the marked trend towards polarization of the rural population in unequal groups at each end of the social scale, it is not difficult to understand why levels of living among the peasantry are so low. Estimates based on census data show that over 80 per cent and sometimes more than 90 per cent of the rural population held the least privileged positions in the social hierarchy of the rural sectors. The inference is that the low levels of living are closely linked to the organization of the types of agricultural enterprise operating in the region.

From various indices some idea can be obtained of the deplorably low income levels of the rural lower strata. Data concerning the nature and amount of rural earnings show that the total or partial substitution of payment in kind or other forms of payment for the direct use of money is by no means uncommon. In Brazil, according to FAO estimates, the average annual income of the non-agricultural sectors is 440 dollars, as against only 110 dollars in the agricultural sectors. Within these latter marked income variations were observable. Thus, while annual income averaged 84 dollars in the Nordeste region, workers on the sugar plantations in the same area received less than 30 dollars.

As a result of a survey carried out in Cuba in 1956, it was estimated that whereas average annual income amounted to 368 dollars, the corresponding figure for the rural population was 92 dollars only. In 1959, 29.7 per cent of the population living on huasipungos earned an average daily income of up to 11 cents, while 36.5 per cent received between 11 and 20 cents, and 33.8 per cent between 20 and 27 cents. As the average daily wage of the free peons, i.e., those that were paid only in money, was about 40 cents, per capita income did not amount to more than 10 cents.

Other indices of rural poverty are the incredibly deficient diet and housing conditions prevailing in the countryside. The conclusion reached is always the same, whatever the indicators used.

Tables 6 and 7 ^{7/} illustrate housing levels in rural as compared with urban areas, from the standpoint both of the building materials used and of

^{7/} It should be borne in mind that the data presented in tables 6 and 7 are in the nature of indicators, which enable only general comparisons to be drawn between urban and rural housing levels. A "description" of the situation prevailing in rural areas would entail specialized research.
/sanitary conditions

sanitary conditions in each housing unit. In countries for which there are no census statistics broken down by urban and rural areas, it can be seen that the higher proportion of light building materials apparently bears some relation to the lesser degree of urbanization. In all probability, if detailed statistics were available for all the Latin American countries, the data would show that as a general rule rural housing conditions in the period under review were strikingly inferior to those prevailing in the larger towns during the same years.

Low income levels - averaging less than 100 dollars per annum in the region as a whole -, a diet often lacking in calories and almost always deficient in proteins and the protective foods, and unsatisfactory housing conditions are only some aspects of the poverty-stricken state in which the rural lower strata eke out their existence. In most cases these low levels of living seem to have been one of the social assumptions of the varieties of agricultural enterprise operating in the Latin American countries in 1945-60.

It may not have been by the farmer's own wish that his economic calculations had to assume the perpetuation of rural poverty, but it certainly did reflect the objective conditions of the rural structure.

The adoption of high-productivity agricultural techniques would necessitate, inter alia, the availability of workers with the required levels of education and skills. On the other hand, the traditional techniques - often the only sort practicable in view of the human resources at the entrepreneur's disposal - implied the employment of low-cost manpower, often paid in kind, and inured to penury.

The agricultural enterprise was compelled to operate in the framework defined by traditional living patterns, and only within that framework could it come to constitute a permanent productive organization, using the available resources in conformity with the incentives and motivations typical of the rural structure.

(c) Marginality of the rural population

Non-integration of the rural lower strata in the institutions of the national power system seems to have constituted another of the social

Table 6

LATIN AMERICA: HOUSING UNITS WITH EARTHEN FLOORS, STRAW-THATCHED ROOFS
AND ADOBE WALLS, IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, ABOUT 1950

(Percentages)

Country	Percentage of urban population	Housing units with:		
		Earthen floors	Straw-thatched roofs	Adobe walls
Argentina	64	23.8	18.1	19.8
Venezuela	49			
Urban		26.4	14.7	-
Rural		83.3	67.0	84.6
Panama	42			
Urban		4.8		
Rural	69.6			
Colombia	38	52.7	46.2	72.3
Paraguay	28	73.0	74.3	-
Honduras	17			
Urban		52.7	6.3	64.6
Rural		89.8	33.8	58.4

Source: Algunos aspectos salientes del desarrollo social de América Latina, op.cit., chapter II: "Vivienda".

/Table 7

Table 7

LATIN AMERICA: HOUSING UNITS WITH SANITARY FACILITIES AND RUNNING WATER,
BY URBAN AND RURAL AREAS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, ABOUT 1950

(Percentages)

Country	Housing units with:			
	Running water		Sanitary facilities	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Cuba	46	4	57	16
Honduras	8	1	9	8
Panama	38	6	41	20
Dominican Republic	20	9	24	65
Brazil	14	0.9	26	6
Chile	46	2		
Venezuela	27	3	36	5

Source: Algunos aspectos salientes del desarrollo social de América Latina, op.cit.

/assumptions on

assumptions on the basis of which the agricultural productive enterprise operated during the period under review.

The extension of citizenship to the rural areas progressed very slowly. Thus, while the institutions characteristic of a given national society were sustained by the urban centres, and especially the primate cities, Latin America's rural areas, in contrast, remained relatively cut off from the centre of power.^{8/}

Direct participation of the humbler country-dweller in the institutions of the nation-State was and still is an exceptional phenomenon. The agricultural enterprise was run on the assumption that the rights of citizenship were not quite the same for the rural lower strata as for town-dwellers.

Notwithstanding the total lack of statistics relating to the electoral participation of the rural population, there are signs that in general this was not a very significant sector of the electorate. It may have attained some numerical importance, but only exceptionally did it develop a sense of its own identity as a social group forming part of the national community. Hence its electoral participation tended on the whole to strengthen the political leanings of the upper rural strata. Hence it was, too, that the most conservative groups in Latin America recruited their contingent of voters from among the region's rural population, and that the recent incorporation of the agricultural worker into political life was apparently of a definitely "explosive" character in terms of the balance of power within each country. "Rural agitation" thus meant a radical break with the

^{8/} In a survey carried out in two small villages in Guatemala in 1950, that is, after seven years of upheaval and revolutionary government in the country in question, the respondents, generally speaking, displayed a very low level of political knowledge and participation. Nor was their degree of identification with national symbols and heroes particularly high. See the chapter entitled "The Silent Voices: The Nation and the Village", in K.H. Silvert, The Conflict Society: Reaction and Revolution in Latin America, pp. 35-46. Although the material cited does not readily lend itself to comparison, it is enlightening to note that the inhabitants of the Rio de Janeiro slums (favelas) evidenced a manifestly higher degree of knowledge of the national political structure and participation therein. See K.H. Silvert and F. Bonilla, Education and the social meaning of development (ST/ECLA/CONF.10/L.12).

traditional system of loyalties, but at the same time a relative advance in the direction of the incorporation of new strata in the institutions of national societies.

Since the rural population played its part in politics within a pre-national institutional framework and through the traditional ties of dependency, it is not surprising that the expansion of citizenship in rural areas should have seemed to carry serious implications not only for the bases of the power system in the rural areas, but also for the distribution and allocation of power in the urban sectors.^{9/} Whatever their relative electoral weight, the nature of the political participation of the rural lower strata reflected their degree of loyalty to local institutions rather than effective commitment to the institutions of the nation-State. In other words, consciousness of playing their part as "citizens" possessing specific duties and rights within a national community composed of all citizens and subject to impersonal norms does not seem to have superseded direct and personal dependency relationships in local power structures. This type of political action on the part of the rural lower strata was no doubt a factor of considerable importance in the maintenance and reinforcement of the local power structures in question, which sometimes competed and even held out against the infiltration of the institutions of the nation-State. Even so, the electoral participation of the rural workers, from the purely quantitative standpoint, probably fell far short of their numerical significance.^{10/}

^{9/} The maintenance of the traditional ties of dependency in rural areas was probably one of the factors that conditioned the location of urban groups within the power structure and limited their ascendancy. In future studies consideration should be given to the hypothesis that the traditional sectors retained a strategic position in the primate cities through their function as actual "integrators" of the rural lower strata in the national community, thus making it more difficult for the new urban élites to maintain a firm and open stand against traditionalism and its representatives.

^{10/} It has been pointed out that the lower the level reached in the urban social scale, the stronger the tendency to under-registration of voters, so that the potential electoral weight of the lower strata is greater than the number of citizens registered in this sector. The result is a comparative increase in the electoral incidence of the upper and middle social strata. No detailed information exists in this connexion with respect to rural areas, but under-registration of the lower strata is probably much greater in the country than in the town.

/But the

But the degree and nature of the electoral participation of the rural lower strata is only one of the indicators of their social role during the period 1945-60.^{11/}

Establishment of the right of agricultural workers to form associations to strive for the improvement of their living conditions frequently constituted an expression of goodwill on the part of the legislator. While industrial trade unionism and urban trade unionism in general expanded at a fairly rapid rate, in agriculture the workers' movement evolved more slowly. This fact can be ascribed to various causes, such as isolation - unpropitious to the development of a workers' conscience -, rural labour conditions and heterogeneous methods of farming. Although in the last few years rural trade unionism has grown to a certain extent in some countries, the phenomenon is of recent date and is often closely associated with political movements.^{12/}

^{11/} According to various sources, in many Latin American countries the electoral participation of the rural lower strata seems to have increased of late.

^{12/} Agricultural trade unions made their appearance in Chile in about 1950, and reached their apogee about 1955.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of trade unions</u>	<u>Number of members</u>
1950	11	843
1955	22	1,877
1959	20	1,656

Probably the number of rural trade unions that have not obtained legal recognition in Chile greatly exceeds that of the legal organizations, especially since the presidential election of 1958. De facto, a federation of rural trade unions exists. In Brazil, the "peasant leagues" have multiplied rapidly, especially in the Nordeste region, in São Paulo and in Rio Grande do Sul, in consequence of the political action of parties closely linked to the lower social strata in the primate cities. In Mexico rural trade unionism has for many years been encouraged by the Government. Such trade unions in fact form part of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) and, through it, are incorporated in the official political structure. Rural trade union organizations have also existed in other countries. Thus, for example, the workers on the banana plantations of Costa Rica have long had a trade union of their own, and rural organizations have recently come into being in Venezuela. See R. Alexander, "Algunas características generales del movimiento obrero en Latinoamérica", Política, No. 16, July 1961, and also Labor Relations in Argentina, Brazil and Chile, New York, McGraw Hill, 1962.

/Whatever the

Whatever the causes of the low level of rural trade unionism, it must be acknowledged that in effect State action in respect of workers' associations did not take the same form in the country as in the town. While in urban centres the social policy of the State, through the establishment of labour legislation, encouraged the organization of new trade unions, in rural areas nothing was done in most cases to promote the formation of trade unions by agricultural workers. This might be taken to mean that two different patterns of control were institutionalized for one and the same occupational stratum, on a basis of discrimination against agricultural labour. It is only fair to recognize, however, that at times the efforts of Governments in this direction do not seem to have been fully appreciated. Some writers have interpreted State promotion and legalization of the urban trade union as basically dictated by the aim of controlling and channelling labour protest through the legal sanction of workers' associations.^{13/} Had this been so, the most immediate effect of such a social policy would have been a relative integration of new strata in the community of citizens.

In rural areas, State institutions did not always exert direct control over the dependent social sectors, for this task was left to the local power structures that were traditional in the countryside. The apparent consequence of this situation was a lack of such positive political action as would effectively promote the incorporation of the rural lower strata in the institutional patterns of national society. On the contrary, in many cases the social policy of the State might rather seem to have by-passed the problem of the effective expansion of citizenship beyond the precincts of the towns.

^{13/} See Moisés Poblete Troncoso and E.G. Burnett, The Rise of the Latin American Labor Movement, Bookman Associates, New York, 1960; R.J. Alexander, op.cit. pp. 9-21.

/Although the

Although the right to form trade unions is recognized in the legislation of most Latin American countries, there are many cases in which the conditions governing the exercise of this right in the agricultural sector do not facilitate the organization of rural trade unions. In some countries - Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Panama - the legal definition of the "worker" with a right to form associations does not include the rural sectors. Elsewhere, such conditions of membership as ability to read and write limit the possibilities of organizing agricultural trade unions. In Chile and Venezuela, the law guarantees the fundamental right of agricultural workers to form associations, but special provisions are adopted which preclude assimilation of this branch of the labour force with the industrial workers, and at the same time make the establishment of agricultural trade unions more difficult. Chilean legislation considerably restricts the freedom of trade unions in rural enterprises, and is calculated to reduce trade unions to "isolated bodies which represent neither an occupational force nor a weapon to defend the interests of rural workers".^{14/} In Brazil the formation of rural trade unions is expressly forbidden, on the grounds that agriculture is an "essential activity", in which joining in a strike constitutes a reason for termination of the worker's contract.^{15/}

The relevant legal provisions only partly reflect the situation of agricultural workers in relation to the right to form associations for the protection of their interests. If to the legislative restrictions are added the lack of an effective social policy in rural areas on the part

^{14/} Seventh Conference of the American States Members of the International Labour Organisation (Buenos Aires, 1961), Condición de trabajo y de vida de los trabajadores agrícolas (Informe IV), pp. 42-43.

^{15/} R.J. Alexander, op.cit., p. 86.

of the State, and the definite ascendancy of local control and power systems in the areas in question, the only possible conclusion is that in 1945-60 the rural lower strata in many countries, despite the obvious progress achieved, were still living in pre-national social and political conditions, and participating in the political structure through traditional ties of dependency, practically irrespective of market relationships.

This situation is also reflected in any study of the social content of citizenship in relation to agricultural workers.^{16/} At this point it is worth while to refer to two institutions forming part of the national systems: social services, in so far as they afford minimum protection against poverty, disease and other misfortunes; and the school, since primary education has become an indispensable condition of citizenship,

^{16/} In analysing the content of citizenship, T.H. Marshall divides it into three parts or elements: (a) civil rights: "liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice". It is on the tribunals or courts of justice that the institutional function of safeguarding these rights is incumbent; (b) political rights: mainly the right to participate in the election of authorities and the correlative right to be elected to posts involving representation of the public. The various representative bodies constitute the machinery by means of which citizens can participate in the process of adoption of public decisions; (c) social rights: "from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security, to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society". The institutions responsible for watching over the application of these rights are the social services, which provide a minimum of protection against poverty and disease, and the school, whose function is to guarantee the right of all members of a national community to at least as much education as will fit them for active and intelligent participation (see T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, Cambridge University Press, 1950, pp. 1-85).

a minimum requisite for the economic, social and political co-ordination of the members of a national community. What is the effect of these institutions on the rural population?

It may safely be asserted that the occupational group of most importance as regards its numerical weight and contribution to the economy which is still outside the purview of the social security systems is that formed by the agricultural workers in each of the individual Latin American countries. Only in twelve of them have the rural workers secured some degree of protection, but in every case this protection has been confined to given risks and to certain groups and specific areas. It can be seen from table 8 that up to 1961 Latin America's social security systems basically covered those persons who were dependent on public administration, industry and trade, i.e., the urban sectors of the population; in the rural areas, if any type of social security existed at all, it usually consisted in piecemeal provisions relating to certain geographical regions and specific risks, and benefiting only some of the workers on the land. Rural social security, in short, is very far from constituting a system proper. Its restricted character, and the limited and sporadic nature of the provisions by which it is governed, suggest that there has not even been any declared intention to grant rural workers the minimum of social security sanctioned for the dependent urban sector. The existence of sporadic provisions might be interpreted as a minimum level of political action on the part of the central authority, designed to mitigate certain abuses deriving from failure to accord full recognition to the citizen status of the rural population. The provisions in question might also be thought to constitute the first steps towards the extension of citizenship to the rural areas.

There are signs that the provisions relating to social security in rural areas were effectively implemented only in exceptional cases. All too often they were no more than an expression of goodwill intended to give formal satisfaction to certain social demands incorporated in the programmes of political parties. If the operation of the social security systems was incomplete even in the urban sectors, it is not surprising that they were of little or no effect in the rural areas. It is no easy task to assess the

Table 8

LATIN AMERICA: SOCIAL SECURITY COVERAGE, BY OCCUPATIONAL SECTORS, 1961

Country	Public administration		Trade and industry		Domestic service		Self-employed workers		Rural workers	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
Argentina	x		x		x		x			x
Bolivia	x		x			x				
Brazil	x		x				x			
Chile	x		x		x			x		x
Colombia	x		x		x		x			x
Costa Rica	x		x		x					x
Cuba	x		x				x			x
Dominican Republic	x		x					x		x
Ecuador	x		x							
El Salvador	x		x							
Guatemala	x		x							x
Haiti	x		x							x
Honduras	x		x					x		
Mexico	x		x							x
Nicaragua	x		x							
Panama	x		x					x		
Paraguay	x		x							x
Peru	x		x							x
Uruguay	x		x		x					x
Venezuela	x		x		x					x

Source: Algunos aspectos salientes del desarrollo social de América Latina, op.cit., Chapter VI, "Bienestar social".

A: Blanket social security system.

B: Very restricted social security coverage.

/incidence of

incidence of social security in rural districts. A few comparisons between groups of countries with different degrees of urbanization clearly demonstrate that social security systems have been basically geared to the service of the urban population.

The indicators used in table 9 afford a very general idea of the efficacy of social security systems, on the basis of the number of persons living in towns with over 20,000 inhabitants. Only where over 30 per cent of the population was living in fairly sizable urban agglomerations does social security seem to have attained some degree of significance, or, in other words, only in such cases would it be justifiable to speak of a social content of citizenship sanctioned by the national community. The fact that social service legislation establishes comprehensive coverage only for the urban sectors completes the evidence to the effect that social security services have developed in relation to the growth of the large towns, and almost exclusively for the benefit of their population.

With regard to the extension of minimum education to the dependent social sectors, the differences between urban and rural areas are equally significant. If the level of literacy is taken as an indicator of the school attendance levels of the population, it can easily be seen that a minimum of formal education becomes more widespread only in so far as the importance of the agricultural sector decreases. Although the relation between levels of school attendance and urbanization is much more complete,^{17/} the foregoing statement is useful for illustrative purposes, especially with regard to the lower levels (see tables 10 and 11).

The relation between literacy and the rural population seems to be common to almost all the Latin American countries. The percentages of illiterate persons in rural areas are strikingly higher than the corresponding urban figures wherever data are available.

^{17/} See, for example, Report on the World Social Situation (E/CN.5/346/Rev.1), United Nations Publication, Sales No.: 61.IV.4; and also D. Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Societies, Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1958..

Table 9

LATIN AMERICA: SOME GENERAL INDICATORS OF THE EFFICACY OF SOCIAL SERVICES IN COUNTRIES WITH VARYING DEGREES OF URBANIZATION

Percentage of population living in towns with 20,000 inhabitants or over	Percentage of economically active persons covered by insurance	Number of hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants	Number of inhabitants per medical practitioner
Up to 30	13.8 ^{a/}	2.4 ^{b/}	5 120 ^{b/}
From 31 upwards	48.7 ^{a/}	4.3 ^{c/}	1 249 ^{d/}

Source: Inter-American Statistical Institute, América en Cifras 1960, Pan American Union, Washington, 1960.

^{a/} Thirteen countries.

^{b/} Fourteen countries.

^{c/} Four countries.

^{d/} Five countries.

Table 10

LATIN AMERICA: ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
AND TOTAL ILLITERATE POPULATION, 1950

(Percentages)

Country	Agricultural workers (aged 15 or over)	Total illiterate population
Argentina	25	10-15
Bolivia	70	65-70
Brazil	88	50-55
Chile	30	20-25
Colombia	54	45-50
Costa Rica	54	20-25
Cuba	41	20-25
Dominican Republic	56	35-40
Ecuador	53	40-45
El Salvador	62	60-65
Guatemala	68	70-75
Haiti	83	85-90
Honduras	83	60-65
Mexico	56	55-60
Nicaragua	68	60-65
Panama	48	30-35
Paraguay	54	30-35
Venezuela	40	45-50

Source: Algunos aspectos salientes del desarrollo social en América Latina, op.cit., Chapter III: "Educación".

/Table 11

Table 11

LATIN AMERICA: ILLITERATE PERSONS IN THE URBAN AND RURAL POPULATIONS
OF SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1950

(Percentages)

Country	Illiterate persons aged 15 or over	
	In the urban population	In the rural population
Brazil	27	67
Chile	11	35
Costa Rica	8	28
Dominican Republic	29	67
El Salvador	35	77
Nicaragua	30	80
Panama	8	46
Paraguay	14	37
Venezuela	30	72

Source: Algunos aspectos salientes del desarrollo social en América Latina,
op.cit., Chapter III: "Educación".

/In short,

In short, the marginality of the rural population seems to have been the general rule during the period 1945-60. The farm worker had no real place in the national community. Only the upper strata in the organization of the agricultural enterprise were directly integrated in the central structures of society, whereas in the majority of cases the rural worker retained not merely his economic dependency but also a socially and politically dependent status in relation to the local power systems. It would seem that the extension of citizenship affected the rural areas only superficially, and that the duties and rights of the rural population remained socially defined within the framework of local structures.

The peasant became indirectly integrated in the national system less as a citizen than as one of the "clientele" of a citizen,^{18/} while full citizen status was reserved for the positively privileged sectors in local structures.

The agricultural enterprise operated on this assumption, and in its capacity as an "intermediary" strengthened the traditional bases of authority which had enabled a similarly traditional system of labour organization to become an institution. In other words, the effect of the urban "democratization" process on the rural areas, ostensibly at least, was to contribute to the maintenance of the traditional structures of production.

(d) Primary system of social relations

In considering the over-all systems of social relations which were the prerequisites on which the various forms of entrepreneurial action were based, it should be pointed out that only in exceptional cases did they follow the contractual type of model. While the political authorities encouraged contractual relations in urban enterprises - not only by

^{18/} The Weber-inspired concept of the "clientele" system has recently been coming into use in the interpretation of the social structures prevailing in the countries of Southern Europe. See, for example, K.H. Pfeffer and I. Shaafhausen, "Griechenland", Grenzenwirtschaftlicher Hilfe für den Entwicklungserfolg, Hamburg, 1959, p. 92; and J. Gn. Papalekas, "Zur Problematik der Griechischen Sozialstruktur", Griechische Entwicklungsprobleme, Köln-Fraunsfeld, 1962, pp. 13-25.

/establishing in

establishing in labour legislation the formal conditions to which labour relations should be subject, but also by creating administrative machinery for the application of the legislation concerned - similar State action was not always taken in respect of rural areas. In these latter the actual use of money in the remuneration system was almost always accompanied, and very often wholly or partly superseded, by other modes of payment. Rural life was based on some degree of institutionalization of the direct bartering of services and even the exchange of favours. These institutions sometimes acquired considerable complexity, and the expansion of the network of primary relations beyond the family nucleus enabled some of the more intricate social functions to develop normally within the social framework of the rural structure.

The present-day or modern use of money - i.e., the capacity to participate fully in all the opportunities and obligations of the complex modern economy - whatever its degree of intensity, seems to have been basically associated with the groups holding positively privileged positions in the rural stratification system, that is, with the individuals and families through whom rural life was linked to the national institutions operating in the large towns. The magnitude of this phenomenon cannot be assessed in quantitative terms, although the huge income disparities existing in rural areas probably reflect the presence of social co-operation patterns in which money plays a secondary role. In a survey carried out by UNESCO about 1950,^{19/} in the Minas Velhas region (a rural area in Central Brazil), the conclusion was reached that on the basis of wealth and occupation alone it was easy to identify an upper social stratum composed of families whose private capital amounted to over 50,000 cruzeiros and whose monthly income exceeded 1,500, as against another and lower stratum with no capital and an income corresponding to the minimum living wage (400 cruzeiros a month).

The same is apparently true of other Latin American countries, where rural income distribution largely tended to reflect the rural stratification systems. It should be added that the magnitude of the disparities suggests

^{19/} UNESCO, Races et classes dans le Brésil rural, 1951, p. 70.

/the existence

the existence of a close relation between the positions held in the social hierarchy and the use of money (see table 12).

The distribution of net income among the rural population of Colombia in about 1953 confirms this idea, although the classification "labourers and smallholders" is too imprecise, especially as Colombia is one of the few Latin American countries where there is a significant rural middle class. The net annual income of agricultural workers was probably less than the sum of 377 Colombian pesos indicated in table 13.

The national structures - of a markedly urban character - and the local power systems seem to have been able to adjust themselves to one another in so far as the positively privileged rural sectors really did act as intermediaries between the national institutions in question and the rural population at large. The striking income disparities might be interpreted to mean that there was a close relation between rural stratification patterns and the degree of participation of the various social sectors in national market institutions. It was probably the upper strata in the rural social scale that were directly and continuously guided by market considerations pure and simple.

Rural stratification, whatever its traditional bases, adapted itself to the requirements created by urban development and, generally speaking, by the national institutions which evolved in the primate cities. The role of the ruling groups was to act as intermediaries between the nation-State and the rural lower strata, a strategic position which enabled them to acquire new sources of power and authority. This phenomenon may well be attributable to the fact that the traditional rural structure was sufficiently permeable to adapt itself to the new conditions, or, in other words, that urban modernization did not go far enough to undermine the foundations of the rural organization. Just as the use of money - in the sense described above - tended to be confined in rural areas to the positively privileged groups, thus encouraging types of agricultural enterprise whose organization criteria took no account of the need to improve productivity and efficiency, so, inversely, labour relations corresponded to a traditional type of system.

Perhaps the positively privileged positions existing in the rural structure implied a primary type of submissiveness on the part of other groups.

Table 12

CHILE: DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL INCOME, 1955

	Total income (Thousands of escudos)	Monthly <u>per capita</u> income (Escudos)
Wage-earners	31,400	21.30
Smallholders	9,600	347.70
Employees	11,000	173.10
Large landowners	70,000	693.20
<u>Total</u>	<u>122,000</u>	<u>Average</u> <u>63.00</u>

Source: Jorge Ahumada, En Vez de la Miseria, Santiago, Chile, 1958, p.108.

Table 13

COLOMBIA: ANNUAL DISTRIBUTION OF PER CAPITA INCOME AMONG THE
RURAL POPULATION, 1953

(Colombian pesos)

	<u>Per capita</u> income
Labourers and smallholders	377
Large landowners	2,146
<u>Average</u>	<u>499</u>

Source: The Economic Development of Colombia (E/CN.12/365/Rev.1),
United Nations Publication, Sales No.: 57.II.G.3.

/This is

This is tantamount to saying it was taken for granted that relations of dependency not only involved segments of a given person's behaviour, but constituted more or less traditionally established situations which covered individual behaviour in its entirety. The reciprocal claims implicit in these relations appeared to presuppose a system of direct and personal loyalties, in which dependency included the idea that the holders of the higher positions in the social scale possessed specific "virtues" that commanded respect. The various forms of enterprise were apparently based on the assumption of this complex set of vaguely defined obligations,^{20/} and the "rationality" of the modern productive unit does not seem to have exerted any decisive influence as a guiding principle in the operation of the different types of agricultural productive organization. Everything seems to indicate that manpower was recruited essentially on family bases, and that the labour force as a whole was made up of families rather than individuals. What was and still is the nature of labour relations in rural areas? The relations defined in censuses as contractual may be taken as a very general indicator of a certain degree of specificity in labour relations. In other words, relations between employers and workers would in such circumstances be basically confined to those duties and rights which derive - directly and more or less impersonally - from the payment of wages on the one hand and the fulfilment of the obligation to work on the other. It is true that census data do not indicate the existence of a formal work contract, whence the inference is that the proportion of labour-employer relations subject to contracts is lower than the totals shown in census data. However, in so far as these data are only taken as approximate indicators of the existing situation, it is not unlikely that the trend towards increased specificity or contractualism in labour relations may have sharpened commensurately with the growth of the active population employed in non-agricultural occupations. A perfect correlation cannot be said to exist between contractualism and the performance of work of a strictly urban character. In any event, the figures presented in table 14 show the lesser degree of specificity of the system of labour relations in agricultural enterprises about the year 1950.

^{20/} The type of farm known as a "plantation" is of course not taken into consideration. In this connexion see the methodological annex appended to the present chapter.

Table 14

LATIN AMERICA: ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION EMPLOYED ON CONTRACTUAL TERMS, AND ACTIVE POPULATION EMPLOYED IN NON-AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1950

(Percentages)

Country	Active population employed on contractual terms	Active population employed in non-agricultural activities
Argentina	86	75
Costa Rica	77	44
Chile	75	70
Cuba	72	56
Nicaragua	69	30
Colombia	63	44
El Salvador	59	36
Venezuela	58	59
Brazil	54	39
Mexico	47	42
Guatemala	43	25
Panama	40	45
Paraguay	38	42
Bolivia	33	47
Dominican Republic	29	30
Haiti	14	23

$r_{he} = .699$

Source: ECLA, unpublished study on manpower in Latin America, 1957.

/The data

The data given in table 14 may be related to the figures showing the proportion of the active population represented by unpaid family workers in countries among which the incidence of the agricultural sector proper on economic activity as a whole differs from one to another (see table 15).

It can be seen from table 15 that as a rule employment of a high percentage of the active population in agriculture is associated with higher percentages of unpaid family workers in the labour force as a whole, especially if it is taken into account that over 90 per cent. of the total number of such unpaid family workers were engaged in agricultural work (see table 16).

The existence of similar correlations may be established when the part played in farm work by children under fifteen years of age is studied, together with the percentage of the total population employed in agriculture in various countries (see table 17). It is also possible to note a certain relationship between child labour and the relative importance of agriculture in the structure of production.

Hence it is clear that patterns of entrepreneurial action existed which must to some extent have presupposed basically non-contractual systems of labour relations. The model implicit in the organization of agricultural labour may well have been the family patterns in which personal loyalty prevails, together with, in general, the application of ascriptive criteria in the selection and placing of individuals: that is, forms of enterprise in which individual merit and greater efficiency did not always constitute the most important organizational principles. Non-monetary methods of remuneration, family labour, personal loyalty, are all factors unlikely to promote in entrepreneurial action those individual incentives and motivations which modern productive units require in their personnel.

Table 15

LATIN AMERICA: PROPORTION OF ACTIVE POPULATION REPRESENTED BY UNPAID FAMILY WORKERS, AND AGRICULTURAL LABOUR FORCE, IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1950

(Percentages)

Country	Percentage of total active population represented by unpaid family workers	Percentage of total active population employed in the agricultural sector
Argentina	2.8	25
Bolivia	40.6	63
Brazil	16.8	61
Chile	2.3	30
Costa Rica	9.5	56
Dominican Republic	13.9	70
Ecuador	8.2	51
El Salvador	12.9	64
Haiti	41.0	77
Honduras	38.0	76
Mexico	11.7	88
Nicaragua	6.5	70
Panama	15.1	55
Paraguay	13.9	58
Venezuela	8.2	41

rho = .699

Sources: Inter-American Statistical Institute, América en Cifras 1960, op.cit., and ECLA, unpublished study on manpower in Latin America, 1957.

/Table 16

Table 16

LATIN AMERICA: UNPAID FAMILY WORKERS IN NON-AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES
IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1950

Country	Percentage of active population
Argentina	29.7
Bolivia	5.7
Brazil	5.0
Chile	2.7
Costa Rica	7.2
Dominican Republic	4.0
Ecuador	16.3
El Salvador	7.2
Haiti	1.8
Honduras	2.3
Mexico	12.0
Nicaragua	6.2
Panama	4.6
Paraguay	7.7
Venezuela	10.0

Source: ECLA, unpublished study on manpower in Latin America, 1957.

Table 17

LATIN AMERICA: CHILDREN UNDER 15 EMPLOYED IN AGRICULTURE AND TOTAL AGRICULTURAL LABOUR FORCE IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1950

(Percentages)

Country	Age (Years)	Children under 15 employed in agriculture, as a percentage of total economically active age group	Total agricultural labour force as a percentage of total economically active population
Argentina	14-17	32.4	25.2
Bolivia	10-14	88.3	72.1
Brazil	10-14	76.5	59.6
Chile	12-14	52.2	30.1
Colombia	12-14	49.5	53.9
Costa Rica	12-14	69.9	54.7
Cuba	-14	69.2	41.5
Ecuador	12-14	55.0	53.2
El Salvador	10-14	76.4	63.1
Haiti	-14	78.3	82.2
Mexico	12-14	79.6	57.8
Panama	10-14	86.3	49.8
Paraguay	12-14	42.3	53.6
Venezuela	10-14	64.0	41.3

rho = .644

Source: Inter-American Statistical Institute, La Estructura Demográfica de las Naciones Americanas, Pan American Union, Washington, June 1959, Vol. II, Part I, p.52, table 16-05.

/METHODOLOGICAL ANNEX

METHODOLOGICAL ANNEX

It should not be deduced from the foregoing remarks that the typical hacienda structure was maintained as the organizational model for agricultural production, since rural systems had to be adjusted over and over again to new requirements. It may safely be asserted, however, that the patterns of labour organization which emerged during the process of adaptation tended primarily to follow social patterns similar to those "typical" of the hacienda. The following observations may shed some further light on the problem.

(1) First and foremost, the probability that changes implying an effort to assimilate more modern patterns of living were really exceptional must be clearly established. Such changes en masse must be regarded as confined to countries like Mexico and Bolivia, with, in addition, Cuba and Venezuela in recent years; that is, to those countries which at one level or another have pursued a policy aiming at reform of their rural structures.

(2) The analysis of regional differences calls for specialized studies, which were few and far between at the time of writing the present report. Even so, examination of some of the statistics, data and monographs on economic and social conditions in rural areas enables a "typical" picture of the situation prevailing in Latin America to be drawn up. Such a picture cannot include the dynamics of the situation existing today, and its scope does not extend beyond the construction of a sort of "interpretative balance sheet", on the assumption that the real structures would constitute variations of the "standard type" indicated in the analysis.

(3) Precisely on account of the remarkably wide range of regional differences and local contrasts, it was necessary to discuss the problem of the social assumptions of the agricultural enterprise before analysing its structure as a productive organization. Such an analysis would have necessitated some kind of typology and specialized studies. Consideration of the social assumptions admitted of higher levels of generalization, compatible with the regional character of the report. Since it was recognized that different modes of entrepreneurial action may operate on the basis of typically analogous social assumptions, all that was attempted was to indicate those features which, to judge from the various sources, predominated in Latin America as a whole.

/Broadly speaking

Broadly speaking, it may be said that both in subsistence farming and in farming for the market entrepreneurial action may operate on the basis of similar social prerequisites. The same holds good for the minifundio and the hacienda. But this does not imply that the social operation of all forms of entrepreneurial action is based on the assumptions described. On the contrary, these assumptions exclude what might be somewhat arbitrarily termed "modern types of entrepreneurial calculation".

The selection of the variables adopted as "assumptions" makes no claim to be exhaustive, and is on the whole dictated by the nature and extent of the data available. Future studies and better and more adequate statistics will no doubt enable various aspects of the nature of Latin American rural structures to be more accurately defined. As far as present knowledge goes, the variables selected would seem to be "typical", inasmuch as they do not unduly distort reality and help to facilitate the interpretation of the rural situation prevailing in the Latin American countries as a whole.

For example, the fact that the minifundio and the latifundium, agricultural production for consumption and for the market, have frequently coexisted for centuries in the same parts of Latin America suggests that various forms of agricultural enterprise - many of which include the opposing characteristics aforesaid - may form part of one and the same social structure at an acceptable level of tension and may even make a positive contribution to the maintenance of the system. In view of this situation, and in order to give an approximate idea of the main features of the social structure prevailing in rural areas during the period under review, the angle of approach represented by the social assumptions of entrepreneurial action was adopted.

(4) The variables chosen as social assumptions of entrepreneurial action do not include farms of the "plantation" type. In these latter, entrepreneurial action assumes the existence of secondary ties of dependency centering around a markedly contractual relationship. Again, the characteristic rationale of the entrepreneur's calculations could be explained almost entirely by reference to market considerations pure and simple, and on the basis of a labour force aiming, up to a point, at the improvement of its living conditions.

/It is

It is no easy matter to evaluate the social incidence of plantations on the agricultural situation in Latin America. From the economic and social standpoint, farms of this type constitute a highly significant phenomenon in some countries, but if the region is considered as a whole, plantations cannot be defined as typical organizations generically applicable in any kind of farming. As far as is known, the plantation is an enterprise primarily engaged in growing specialized crops, and as such it does not represent a typical alternative for the modernization of any traditional productive organization in the agricultural sector. Since in addition, according to various reports, the social assumptions of the type of entrepreneurial calculation implicit in the operation of a plantation have not become characteristic features of agriculture in Latin America, it may safely be suggested that the plantation and other forms of speculative farming should be accorded specialized treatment in relation to the metamorphosis of rural life.

The interested reader may consult the following publications: Plantation systems of the New World, Monographic Studies, VII, Pan American Union, Washington, 1960; and F. Tannenbaum, "Toward an appreciation of Latin America", The United States and Latin America, The American Assembly, Columbia University, December 1959.

(5) This chapter makes no reference to what may properly be termed the dynamic aspects of the situation. According to various sources and indicators, traditional rural structures have undergone diverse changes, but the significance and direction of these modifications could not be interpreted on the basis of the information available. Broadly speaking, they do not seem to have radically altered the rural structure, or at any rate the aspects of it most apparent to the eye.

The political socialization of the rural population which has taken place in recent times in one way and another has probably helped to create more flexible conditions and social demands favourable to reform of the traditional systems prevailing in rural areas. But the immediate effects of political socialization cannot yet be described as heading in that direction.

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Chapter III

THE URBAN SITUATION

1. The industrialization process and the urban population explosion

It is a common practice to associate the idea of "progress" with the urban growth and industrialization processes, and to assume that the relation between these latter is so close and so inevitable that the two terms can be used almost interchangeably. Admittedly, however, in Latin America, during the period 1945-60, industrialization was, at most, but one of the factors in the rapid development process of the larger towns. Indeed, urban growth - particularly in the case of the primate cities - came prior to industry, so that the emergence of intermediate social sectors and urban working classes dates from long before the creation of the more modern structures of production. It is by no means an insignificant fact that in many countries the advent of labour legislation, the State regulation and centralization of trade unions, the protection of the working-class family - social legislation as a whole, in other words - preceded that of modern urban industry.

Apparently, all that industrial expansion did was to give additional impetus to a process of growth that was already well under way, and was characterized by a trend towards concentration of the population in the major urban nuclei. It cannot be contended, therefore, that the modern structure of production was the mainspring of the process in question.

Industrial employment indexes support the foregoing statement. In seven Latin American countries, industrial workers and employees in or about the year 1950 represented only one-third or one-fourth of the population living in towns with 20,000 inhabitants or more. In seven European countries, on the other hand, the corresponding proportion was as much as one-half of the population, and in many cases nearly two-thirds.

The significance of this fact becomes more clearly evident in the light of past trends. In three Latin American countries, although the development of industry progressed steadily on the whole, it was outstripped by the urbanization process. During a similar period, in the Soviet Union, Sweden and the United States there was a much more balanced relation between industrial development and urban growth (see table 18).

Table 18

RELATION BETWEEN INDUSTRIALIZATION AND URBANIZATION
IN SELECTED COUNTRIES

(Percentages)

Country	Census year	Urbanization	Industrialization
		a/	b/
Chile	1920	28	30
	1950	40	30
Cuba	1919	23	20
	1943	31	18
Mexico	1910	11 ^{c/}	22
	1950	24 ^{c/}	17
Soviet Union	1928	12	8
	1955	32	31
Sweden	1910	16	27
	1950	30	41
United States	1910	31	31
	1950	42	27

Source: "The demographic situation in Latin America", Economic Bulletin for Latin America, Vol.VI, No.2, Santiago, Chile, October 1961, p.34, table 17.

- a/ Percentage of total population living in towns with 20,000 inhabitants or more.
- b/ Percentage of total labour force engaged in mining and quarrying, manufacturing, construction and public utility services (electricity, gas and water).
- c/ Percentage of total population living in towns with 100,000 inhabitants or more.

/All the

All the data to hand seem to coincide in suggesting that - in contrast to what took place in Europe, the Soviet Union and the United States - urban growth in Latin America was not accompanied by proportionally commensurate progress on the part of modern industry. This is a point of interest in connexion with the type of urbanization and development that characterized almost all the countries of the region during the period 1945-60. The low incidence of modern industry in the big cosmopolitan city probably helped to account in part for the increasing disequilibrium among the larger towns, as well as for the restricted character of the modernization processes that took place up to 1960.

2. The adjustment mechanisms of the traditional city

Small as was the share of modern industry in urban growth, the larger towns of Latin America were able to provide some sort of livelihood for surplus manpower. Obviously, the support thus afforded - a patent manifestation of the insufficiently dynamic nature of development - was not uniform, and a glance at the phenomenon from the historical standpoint clearly shows that it was not labour which adapted itself to the requirements of an expanding occupational structure, but rather vice versa. Demand for employment, and the aspirations of those who sought it, were not always in keeping with the skills of the human resources concerned, nor were these resources in their turn consonant with the possibilities of the occupational structure. The most immediate consequence was a serious disequilibrium in the structure of urban employment itself.

Services expanded so much more rapidly than industry that in the end they strikingly outweighed it. But even within the services sector a clearly-marked trend towards disequilibrium prevailed. The notable growth of public utility services, private services and public administration was offset by under-development in other fields, such as education and public health.

Much the same was true of the composition of industrial employment. Up-to-date plants with high levels of productivity and efficiency were the exception rather than the rule, for most people found employment in small and medium-sized industrial establishments - many of them old-fashioned -

/in artisan

in artisan activities or in home industries in general. Since the unbalanced expansion of employment was accompanied by a measure of economic instability - basically affecting the building industry in urban areas - it is easy to recognize the existence of serious and very widespread under-employment, especially in the services sector.

This incredible ability of the larger Latin American towns to cope with the handicap of insufficient dynamism and somehow or other maintain their surplus manpower is deserving of comment. It is worth while to consider, even if only in passing, the typical patterns or mechanisms which enabled the big urban centres to provide some outlet for the employment demand of a rapidly increasing population. The nature of each of these mechanisms indicates the salient characteristics of the process whereby the traditional city, despite the relatively limited expansion of the modern industrial sector, adapted itself to the new conditions deriving from the wholesale growth of its population. Between 1945 and 1960, four types of structural mechanisms, in the main traditional, helped to determine the most outstanding features of the urban scene in Latin America's primate cities. Firstly there was the survival of most of the traditional production and business structures; secondly, the increase of the population employed in the services sector; thirdly, the maintenance of many of the traditional family patterns; and, lastly, the expansion of the marginal urban population.^{1/}

(a) Survival of traditional production and business structures ^{2/}

Generally speaking, the economic structures of the traditional city adapted themselves to the new conditions. In the industrial sector it was the small and medium-sized establishments - whose organizational patterns to a large extent resembled those of artisan industry - which showed the greatest capacity to provide some sort of employment for surplus manpower.

^{1/} These four types of machinery must be taken as parts or aspects of one and the same phenomenon, so that they are necessarily superimposed upon and implicit in one another.

^{2/} See Urbanization in Latin America, UNESCO, 1961, passim, and particularly "Creation of employment opportunities in relation to labour supply", pp. 118 et seq.

These production units, inefficient though they were from the technical standpoint, increased in number and, on the whole, in relative capacity, while continuing to operate on traditional bases. The new groups engaged in modern manufacturing industry had no alternative but to arrive at a compromise, and gradually adapt their line of conduct to the inefficient organization of the small and medium-sized establishments. In turn, the great industrial combines with high levels of productivity found no means of completely satisfying their skilled manpower requirements.

Although this is not the moment to expatiate on the economic consequences of such a situation, it is worth while to note its manifestly negative effects on the establishment of an effective and up-to-date industrial discipline. The proliferation of low-productivity small and medium-sized establishments may possibly have provided the necessary stepping-stones to education of the urban working-classes in the standards of modern productive organizations, but it is no less possible that the new habits inculcated in workers and employees may have hardened into something more than a merely transitional phase - a relatively lasting type of adjustment. While specialized research is needed on this point, the differences between the typically modern productive organization and the varieties of small and medium-sized enterprises which flourished during the period under review are such as to warrant the assumption that relatively diverse forms of industrial socialization must have grown up in one and the same sector of economic activity. If in addition other factors are taken into account, in particular the instability that characterized the Latin American economies during the period and principally affected enterprises whose productivity was low, the foregoing assertion is still more understandable. Progress was probably made, in relative terms, towards the formation of an industrial labour force, but at the cost of encountering new and by no means negligible stumbling-blocks on the way.

Commitment to the work habits and traditions characteristic of low-productivity establishments was not confined to the working-classes alone. It is probable too that the intermediate and top-level sectors in such enterprises came to take the prevailing inefficiency for granted as a "natural" phenomenon. And undoubtedly this attitude must also have influenced

/the whole

the whole set of organizations and institutions directly or indirectly linked with industrial production. The over-all conditions in which both efficient, up-to-date enterprises and low-productivity establishments had to operate tended to undergo adjustment to the latter's requirements. The former thus found themselves faced with what was in fact an exceptional situation, the dynamics of which did not imply, at any rate during the period under discussion, the establishment of new structures more likely to promote standards of greater economic efficiency and rationality. If it is recalled that the protectionist policy presupposed by development was largely conditioned by all sorts of internal pressures, and especially by the need to create employment for the urban lower strata, it is not surprising that discrimination was seldom exercised with respect to the productivity of the units benefiting by protection. Be this as it may, the two kinds of enterprise seem to have sought a modus vivendi and to have tended to constitute an industrial system whose relative integration in terms of actual social conditions differed greatly from the type of integration and co-ordination found in the industrial systems of the highly-developed countries. Government action itself appeared to encourage the institutionalization of norms conducive to the reciprocal adjustment of the two structures of production.

Something similar took place in the business world. The marketing of goods was often in the hands of inefficient enterprises. A swarm of small family businesses existed alongside more ambitious establishments which often operated on essentially speculative bases. As they increased in number and capacity to meet a growing demand, they helped to absorb some part of urban unemployment. Market conditions and the inefficient structure of production constituted a fertile breeding-ground for undertakings of this type. As a result, a large number of middlemen was sometimes to be found over against a limited number of wholesale distributors operating on relatively monopolistic and occasionally speculative lines. The trend towards greater rationality in the marketing of goods did not seem to prevail in the rest of the system. Probably, therefore, reciprocal adjustments led to the maintenance of certain more or less traditional patterns in the business sphere.

/(b) Expansion

(b) Expansion of the population employed in the services sector ^{3/}

A sizable quota of the urban population found employment in the services sector during the period 1945-60. To judge from the available statistics, the number of persons employed in the provision of services would seem to have increased more rapidly than the industrial labour force. As various studies relating to other regions of the world show that urbanization exerts a direct influence on the development of employment in services, it may well be supposed that the relatively autonomous growth of the larger towns fostered the rapid expansion of this sector of economic activity.

Data for 1950 or thereabouts indicate that of the total active population in the sector in question the highest percentages were employed in business and personal services. As already pointed out, it seems that "business" - to use the term adopted in the various Latin American censuses -, which covered a very large proportion of the urban active population, included many small tradesmen and itinerant salesmen, which would account for the low average level of income in the sector. Indeed, a considerable proportion of the "business" concerned was represented by economically marginal population. If in addition it is borne in mind that a high percentage of business undertakings were geared to traditional routine, there is no difficulty in grasping that a substantial number of individuals and families were engaged in typically pre-capitalist activities, even when they were ostensibly dependent on "business".

The personal services category was mainly composed of domestic servants, although the relevant trends cannot be accurately estimated for want of data. While its relative importance within the total urban active population probably declined, the number of persons engaged in this activity increased to a remarkable extent. Broadly speaking, the number of servants per family unit presumably decreased, although at the same time the proportion of families in the middle strata of the urban population expanded. It may therefore safely be asserted that there was a steady demand for domestic service during the process of urban growth.

^{3/} Ibidem.

The number of persons for whom the rest of the services sector provided employment was much smaller than the corresponding totals in the two branches mentioned above. In the field of public utilities, the highest proportions were found in communications and transport. Although there was a trend towards the replacement of traditional means of communication and transport by more advanced techniques, it is no exaggeration to say that inefficiency was widespread. In many instances, the manpower employed in the different branches of transport exceeded real requirements. This was the case, for example, in various municipal markets, the railways, the stevedores' unions, etc. In the professional and social welfare services - especially those connected with education and public health - employment figures climbed very slowly. Another interesting point is that, to judge from appearances, public administration services expanded steadily throughout the period.

To sum up, study of the increase in the population employed in the services sector reveals certain general characteristics of the process which are of some significance for the purposes of evaluating the nature of the changes that took place in Latin American cities between 1945 and 1960. The first point to be noted is that a high proportion of the population found employment in "traditional" services whose productivity was low (domestic service, petty services and odd jobs). Even under the head of "business", a large number of persons carried on marginal activities (peddling and small-scale retailing). It seems, moreover, that in each branch of the services sector it was the number of persons employed in occupations calling for relatively low levels of skill that increased most rapidly, with the result that the expansion of employment in services was unbalanced in relation to the requirements of greater rationality within each specific activity.

Lastly, an almost universal characteristic of the period was that most organized institutional systems steadily increased their personnel without radically improving the efficiency of their performance. Consequently, the expansion of services was based not only on over-staffing but also on the maintenance of the traditionally low level of efficiency of the activities concerned. This was sometimes combined with an investment policy designed to absorb urban manpower surpluses in construction and maintenance work.

/(c) Maintenance

(c) Maintenance of traditional family patterns

Even in the absence of significant statistical data, information of various kinds suggests that the perpetuation of certain traditional family behaviour patterns helped to mitigate urban unemployment. The maintenance of primary ties of kinship may come to constitute a widely-adopted strategy to ensure individual survival in the major towns. The solidarity deriving from kinship, and, generally speaking, the value of the family as a unit of co-operation, does not seem to have been a purely fortuitous aspect of urban culture in Latin America during the period 1945-60. The most widely varying descriptions of "familism" and its influence on politics, the structure of administration, business and enterprise relate, in the main, to phenomena more or less typical of the large cosmopolitan cities in each of the twenty republics.^{4/} Thus, familism as a latent or manifest model for the organization of human relations seems to have taken deep root in most of the new and supposedly impersonal institutional systems created as a result of the development process. This is why it is impossible to draw an unequivocal and formal distinction between the traditional institutions and the new community institutions, or to assume that the concrete patterns adopted by the latter at any given moment represented transitional stages on the road to specific targets, in so far as these patterns tended to persist with the passage of time.

It is likely that urban growth helped to modify the norms and values of the traditional family organizations, although perhaps this was not the case in all sectors of society. The effect of the limited expansion of

^{4/} See, for example, Council on Foreign Relations, Social change in Latin America today, Harper Brothers, New York, 1960, pp. 33 and 34; W. Foote Whyte and A. R. Holmberg, "Human Problems of United States Enterprise in Latin America", Human Organization, Fall, 1956; pp. 15-18; F. Dotson, "A Note on Participation in Voluntary Associations in a Mexican City", American Sociological Review, XVIII, 4, August 1953, pp. 380-386; E. Willems, "The Structure of the Brazilian Family", Social Forces, XXXI, 4, May 1953, p. 343; Ford Foundation Mission to Colombia, Political and Economic Profile of Colombia, June 1960; R. Morse, "Latin American Cities: Aspects of Function and Structure", Comparative studies in society and history, Vol. IV, No. 4, July 1962, pp. 484-485. There are also many articles and monographs in Spanish and Portuguese, too scattered for reference.

modern industry was probably that exposure to "urban modernity" tended to alter only certain aspects of the family organization, at the same time giving new life and new functions - in terms of the new conditions - to more or less traditional family behaviour patterns. If this were so, the value attaching to the solidarity of the family group may have served as a strategy for survival in the urban environment.

To judge from some reports, a considerable percentage of the urban population would seem to have found employment in small family businesses, that is, in enterprises whose economic viability depended upon the solidarity of a group of relatives. The social norms prescribing mutual aid among kinsfolk may have enabled some members of the group to depend wholly or partly on those who were receiving regular remuneration or income. There are also signs of a tendency to stretch the ties of family solidarity beyond the circle of kinsfolk proper. In many families, not belonging to the lower sectors of the urban environment alone, the survival of the group seems to have depended upon individual contributions to the communal economy of the family, which sometimes meant that two or more families shared one and the same housing unit for periods of varying length.

More than one monograph puts forward the hypothesis that familistic relations represented an endeavour to supply the manifest deficiencies of the organized institutional structures, which were often unintegrated or imperfectly developed. At times the converse seems to have been the case: the social efficiency of behaviour patterns based on familistic models may have been a factor militating against the full development of the new organizations whose guiding principles and values were of an impersonal nature.

Whatever their value, these two hypotheses describe on the one hand the adjustment of traditional family patterns to living conditions in the cosmopolitan cities of Latin America and on the other their influence on urban institutional structures. Their more specific significance undoubtedly relates to the fact that some types of familism were apparently functional for the survival of individuals in the urban environment. In other words, given the conditions created by the kind of urbanization which was so characteristic of the majority of the Latin American countries,

/the maintenance

the maintenance of certain social norms based on traditional values of family solidarity would seem to have been of considerable importance as mechanism not only to ensure survival in the midst of under-employment, but also to permit upward social mobility and the conservation of individual status.

(d) Emergence of a marginal population ^{5/}

The formation of a marginal and sub-marginal population, often living on the very edge of subsistence levels, was the most obvious price that the major Latin American towns had to pay for reconciling their high rates of population growth with the low levels of productivity of their economic structure. The barriadas, slums, shanty towns, favelas and so forth, which during the period 1945-60 spread and multiplied within the bounds of the urban horizon, must be regarded as indicators of a more general phenomenon: a huge sector of the urban population was living in economically, socially and politically marginal conditions. Various sources seem to suggest that population groups of this type should be regarded as an extreme case of marginality, and that between them and the social sectors which were, relatively speaking, integrated in the urban environment there was probably a complex series of strata living in more or less marginal conditions, although not in such utter penury.

5/ See, in general, Urbanization in Latin America, op.cit., and, in particular, the studies by J. Matos Mar, "Migration and urbanization: the 'barriadas' of Lima: an example of integration into urban life" (E/CN.12/URB/11); A. Pearse, "Some characteristics of urbanization in the city of Rio de Janeiro" (E/CN.12/URB/17); G. Germani, "Inquiry into the social effects of urbanization in a working-class sector of Greater Buenos Aires" (E/CN.12/URB/10); and J. R. Brandão Lopes, "Aspects of the adjustment of rural migrants to urban-industrial conditions in São Paulo, Brazil" (E/CN.12/URB/3), all of which were presented at the Seminar on Urbanization Problems in Latin America (Santiago, Chile, 6 to 18 July 1959), and incorporated in the UNESCO publication referred to. See also J. Ortiz, "Algunas dificultades de adaptación de los problemas rurales al pasar al medio urbano en los países latinoamericanos y especialmente en Colombia", Revista Mexicana de Sociología, XIX, 1, 1957, pp. 25-38; Th. Caplow, "The Social Ecology of Guatemala City", Social Forces, XXVIII, 2, December 1949, pp. 114-115, 124-125, 127, 133; Floyd and Lillian Ota Dotson, "Ecological Trends in the City of Guadalajara, Mexico", Social Forces, XXXII, 4, May 1944, p. 367; and R. M. Morse, loc. cit.

It is not easy to estimate the quantitative magnitude of the phenomenon in question. Employment statistics generally register very low income groups in various urban sectors of economic activity which comprise considerable proportions of the active population. Another indicator may be the swift and striking deterioration of housing units, such that certain districts in the larger towns became veritable slums where deplorably low levels of living prevailed. In one commune in Santiago, Chile, it was estimated that 50 per cent of the housing units were in sub-normal condition, and that 20 per cent of them were definitely unfit for habitation. It may be calculated that by about 1961 over 46 per cent of the housing units in the urban sectors of Santiago accommodated more than two persons per room.

According to the most recent Latin American censuses, from 10 to 30 per cent of the housing units in the primate cities lacked running water, electricity and main drains. In 1959 the Organization of American States estimated that it was necessary to rebuild 4.5 million housing units in the urban and metropolitan areas of Latin America, a figure which roughly corresponded to the number of families in the urban slums and marginal barriadas that had grown up in the larger towns.

In 1950, 25 per cent of the population in São Paulo, Belo Horizonte and Rio de Janeiro had no proper dwellings. Estimates show that in 1958, 50 per cent of the population of Venezuela lived in wretchedly inadequate housing units or had no homes at all, and that 75 per cent of the housing deficit was to be found in urban areas.

As a rule, the problem of the marginal urban population has been discussed in relation to two kinds of phenomena appearing in the course of the urbanization process in Latin America, namely, the emergence of relatively segregated urban nuclei - such as some barriadas, the favelas, villa-miserias, shanty towns, etc. - and the adaptation or adjustment of the rural migrant to the conditions and requirements of city life. Most interpretations link up the two phenomena within the framework of an optimistic conception, the gist of which is that rural features melt away and the individual ends by participating fully in the impersonal cultural patterns of urban life. Everything would appear to work out for the best, within certain conditions, so that in the long run the superior culture of the town completely and

/satisfactorily absorbs

satisfactorily absorbs most of the rural surpluses. The function of the segregated urban nuclei - in the absence of specific institutions or measures designed to serve this end - is presumably to permit or facilitate the transition from one social system to another.

It is worth while to note that those population segments which live in segregated urban nuclei are not composed entirely of rural in-migrants. The significance of this fact has not always been realized. Such nuclei may conceivably form a relatively permanent part of the ecological organization of the large urban agglomerations. It often happens that between 20 and 40 per cent of the inhabitants of such nuclei come from other urban centres, and many of them were born and brought up in the city.

The existence of barriadas or marginal urban sectors should not be regarded as a recent phenomenon in the ecological structure of the primate cities of Latin America, since they seem to have grown up alongside the cities themselves, especially in the post-war period. Thus, for example, some districts of Mexico City have remained relatively isolated and conserved authentically rural living patterns for more than 50 years, notwithstanding the general modernization and industrialization processes that have taken place.

It seems, too, that socially segregated urban populations have tended to set up internal organizations of a fairly lasting character, by means of which the public opinion and communal aspirations of each of these nuclei can be channelled. It is seldom that the authorities have had anything to do with the establishment of these organizations. They may rather be regarded as a reaction on the part of individuals and groups in similar positions of extreme urban marginality, in an effort to survive in the town environment. In the upshot, they have undoubtedly given institutional expression to situations that in effect existed more or less all the time, and this trend accounts for the conditions of extreme marginality in which these sectors of the population live, sometimes almost entirely cut off from the rest of the city. They cannot, however, be described as the product of spontaneous action on the part of individual members of the marginal population, but rather as deriving from the contact of the socially segregated groups with other typically urban organizations (political parties, religious groups, benevolent associations, etc.).

/The most

The most characteristic institutions of the socially segregated urban nuclei seem to approximate to the model of a "free association of equals", although their structures are really more primitive, showing a frequent preponderance of very elementary patterns of participation and loyalty in relation to the effective operation of the organizations in question. In such population nuclei a complex network of primary and "informal" relations - that is, spontaneous and unorganized - apparently provides the indispensable minimum support for integration. It is understandable that internal conflicts in these aggregations are often settled through the intervention of outside forces from the urban environment proper, which mediate between warring factions, and that such intervention generally makes every endeavour to avoid breaking up the formal structure of the population groups concerned. Their internal cohesion undoubtedly derives from the very conditions of their "segregated life", but at the same time it cannot come into being without the contact and influence of other "urban" groups and organizations, whereby awareness of their own position vis-à-vis the city is aroused and shaped. Both elements are equally important, and only through their interplay can the nature of the population groups in question be understood: firstly, the economic, social and political conditions in which such groups live, and, secondly, their contacts with other urban institutions and organizations and the influence exerted on them by these. The interaction of the two factors helps to break down mere passive resignation and to prevent anomie, at the same time encouraging certain forms of community action by means of which such population groups are led to participate in civic life, even if in a psychologically ambivalent fashion. This ambivalence consists in that acceptance and repudiation are as striking as they are reciprocal, and although the tension involved is not simultaneously operative at all levels of conduct, the conflicting stresses can be partly relieved only in so far as they are cushioned, so to speak, by the elasticity of the ambivalence in question. Consequently, the "integration" of these marginal population groups in the urban environment is based, in the last analysis, on the recognition and maintenance of their marginality by both parties. Thus, in practice the over-all picture of the situation may perhaps indicate that the social forces generated by the

/emergence of

emergence of segregated population nuclei had to be largely channeled towards the institutionalization of norms of conduct capable of regulating the maintenance and relative improvement of the living conditions of the population groups concerned, on the basis of their acceptance de facto as a more or less permanent phenomenon within what may almost be termed the usual ecological patterns of the bigger Latin American towns. In other words, the complex conditions that generally prevail in urban environments and customarily produce states of marginality must have been combined with the action of agents and institutions that paradoxically compelled the population groups in question to organize themselves as segregated units within the framework of city life precisely in order to secure their integration. And this led to the emergence, not so much of a transient phenomenon, as of a relatively stable ecological pattern.

The conception of segregated urban nuclei as sociological or ecological stepping-stones or "halfway houses" enabling in-migrants from rural areas to adapt themselves more easily to city life is prone to ascribe paramount importance to features that may well correspond to exceptional situations. In default of specialized research, the available data suggest that, precisely in so far as the structure of the segregated nuclei is that of fairly permanent social organisms, they may better be described as "communal adjustment patterns"; that is, they form separate social systems encysted, as it were, on the circumference of the larger towns. The standard patterns they develop, without being exact replicas of typical urban or rural models, to some extent incorporate elements of both. It is owing to this undeniably hybrid character that they have been defined as transitional, whereas what really happens is that cultural systems of the type in question may acquire some degree of permanence and survive as such for a considerable length of time within the dynamics of the big city. Consequently, their tendency to persist must be attributable to the simple fact that they help to fulfil certain functions, inasmuch as in the time and at the level of the nuclei of settlers they represent social systems readier to hand and more efficient than the abstract structures of the city, and also because - as was remarked earlier - the adjustment of urban institutions to the presence of such marginal population groups tends to be

/so ambivalent

so ambivalent as actually to result in their institutionalization as a "natural" feature of the urban scene.

Cultural systems of this kind would seem to permit the maintenance of considerable sectors of the population which, while making use of the various instruments and facilities provided by the large towns, are likely to retain a high degree of commitment and loyalty to more primary and elementary norms, values and institutions. Exactly in so far as the segregated urban nuclei constitute the "social milieu" which, in its structures, institutions and interaction, represents a form of communal adjustment to town life on the part of marginal individuals, the effect of their permanence will be, on the whole, to relieve such people of the obligation to assimilate and adopt the more abstract, competitive and impersonal norms prevailing in the urban environment proper. In fact, the existence of the segregated nuclei makes it possible, and even easy, for some individuals to spend their whole lives constantly switching over from one type of social structure to another. Given the segmentary character of urban norms and the ambivalence of the action and evaluation patterns of individual citizens and urban institutions vis-à-vis the marginal population, it is readily understandable that tensions and conflicts of all sorts should arise, and that such conflicts should in turn become the basis for new institutions and organizations.

The existence of segregated nuclei is no new feature of the ecological structure of Latin American cities, for in many instances they date back to periods immediately preceding the establishment of the large towns. Hence their appearance does nothing to distort the prevailing images of the urban structure. But the dramatic nature of the social phenomenon represented by the emergence of the new segregated urban nuclei seems to bear some relation to the formation of a social conscience which renders such population groups impermeable to the infiltration of the more or less rationalized ideologies prevailing among the rest of the urban population. The existence of this special type of social conscience or of the attitudes to the world at large which it engenders probably accounts for what appear to be strange phenomena in the process of "political socialization" of the groups concerned. And it no doubt plays some part in the series of illegal actions resulting from that process, which are regarded by their perpetrators as perfectly normal.

/Again, although

Again, although the presence of a sizable population group living in virtual detachment from urban culture is, in practice, in line with the traditions of the Latin American city, the segregated nuclei that have always existed in the primate cities of the region cannot be dealt with in the same way as the new marginal populations formed in recent times. The situation as a whole began to change as soon and in so far as the old traditional urban structures were forced to acknowledge and adapt themselves to certain requirements (those deriving, for example, from the changes that took place in the structure of employment or from the extension of citizenship to new strata of the dependent urban population). The situation of the new population groups is usually more precarious than that of the traditional marginal sectors, especially with regard to employment and housing, but at the same time it cannot be denied that actually or potentially they constitute a considerable proportion of the urban electorate. For these reasons, the traditional situation of dependency as a mode of incorporating the marginal sectors of the population in the urban scene would seem to be giving way to the institutionalization, within the ecological organization of the city, of large numbers of people in the lower social strata who, despite their marginality, are not governed by the traditional dependency relationships. In many countries one manifestation of this phenomenon is apparently the fact that, within the so-called "working-classes", the figure of the "settler" - probably a fusion of the rural smallholder and the urban worker - has gradually been acquiring undeniable importance alongside the organized minorities of the industrial workers.

3. Latent and manifest aspects of urban change

It is not easy to form a considered opinion on the social significance of the changes that took place between 1945 and 1960 in the traditional structures of the primate cities of Latin America, as reviewed above. A good deal of dogmatism - optimistic at times, pessimistic at others - often characterizes the analysis of the complex processes of social change. Various data and studies coincide in demonstrating the inexpediency of simply assuming that the changes registered in the different components

/and levels

and levels of a social structure are homogeneous and take place in a single direction. Nor can it be postulated that changes occurring within any one component of the social organization must necessarily produce similar and functional effects on the rest. Broadly speaking, moreover, the processes of change do not always seem to follow one or other of the known models of linear progress.

Another source of dogmatism is to be found in questions concerning the supposed nature of the traditional structures. A frequent commonplace in the most widely differing analyses is the assumption that the traditional society is made up of a set of more or less rigid and static structures, so that any divergence from the prevailing patterns is immediately interpreted as a step towards the complete metamorphosis of the society concerned. As a better knowledge of the so-called "traditional structures" is acquired, a more realistic interpretation ousts the old analytical conception of the system which emphasizes its static features and elements of rigidity. In effect, when the traditional structures are sufficiently complex, they show considerable adaptability, that is, a certain permeability in relation to the requirements of their external environment. So far is this the case that, for a limited time, of course, the characteristics in question seem to strengthen rather than enfeeble them.

It is likewise a customary belief that the transplantation of specific institutions to another environment suffices to ensure that they will bear the same fruits as in the social soil where they had their origin. Yet history has over and over again refuted this belief. Consequently, when it is accepted without more ado as a basis for practical action - in the political, economic or social field - the most likely outcome is disappointment and failure. To begin with, the effects produced in the new conditions are far from being "revolutionary" from the start, in accordance with expectations, and the idea that "it is enough to sow the seed and lie down to sleep" is absurdly naive. The history of developing countries affords ample evidence that this, like every other sowing, however liberally the seed is scattered, is only a beginning, and will never come to harvest without long and indefatigable tending; and it is thus ingenuous in the extreme to conceive of economic growth as a "naturally cumulative" process.

/The famous

The famous "take-off" does not come about as easily as used to be believed. Nor, conversely, is it always true that a social structure is ultimately bound to arrive at a higher degree of "rationality" and "co-ordination" by the mere internal interaction of a series of "conflicts", "bottlenecks", "rigidities" or whatever they may be called. So felicitous a type of automaticity would be welcome indeed.

Mistakes also spring from the assumption that specific measures are bound to be of a temporary nature. It may in fact happen that the secondary effects of such measures are favourable to certain social aims and interests which consequently seek to endow them with permanence. Thus, what was devised as a temporary instrument ends by becoming a measure which, because it is functionally positive, even though only partial in its scope, has the backing of all those benefiting by it, who do everything in their power to justify it as universally useful. This perpetuation of objectives not desired for their own sake - mere latent aspects of a structure - is manifest in many of the phenomena of change, and must be foreseen and carefully taken into account in any economic and social planning policy. There is a possibility that planning aims may ultimately be overborne by others not sought or desired in the plan; and, consequently, that some latent planning targets may contradict or at least differ from the objectives expressly or overtly established. The most serious aspect of this phenomenon is not so much that the measures adopted may temporarily benefit this or that group within the social structure, but that by their perpetuation they may, under cover of their partial success, become real barriers obstructing the road to development, obstacles which prevent full modernization and the complete reform of social structures.

Another no less dangerous belief lays too much stress on the systematization of social structures, in the conviction that a society can function only when the main values on which it is built are fully compatible or consistent with one another. This is, of course, a matter of emphasis, since the trend of specific societies is towards integration in a system, but this is never fully achieved. For the moment, only two things are important in this context. In the first place, the belief in question, in so far as it overestimates the factors making for equilibrium, may

/underestimate the

underestimate the significance of many changes, which are viewed only as distortions. And, secondly - the point of major interest for our problem - it tends to blind its votaries to the real fact that at any given moment fairly complex societies can function with internal tensions as between their values and objectives. This is all the more likely to happen when there is some degree of ambivalence - a relative lack of precision - in the pluralism of the different values concerned. And this is exactly what characterizes traditional societies at a transitional stage. In the long run, the process is disruptive unless guided by a vigorous creative capacity. But in the meantime, there is no knowing how long it may drift rudderless down the stream of history.

Consequently, a study of the more or less typical manifestations of lack of dynamism during the period 1945-60 showed how relatively slight was the significance attaching to modern high-productivity structures. Moreover, close scrutiny of certain typically traditional urban institutions instantly reveals their exceptional permeability, thanks to which they do not reject outright the new demands generated by the rapid growth of the primate cities. The phenomenon is unquestionably significant, especially in view of the contrast between the modernity of the big Latin American cities - expressed in a considerable variety of symbols - and the low degree of dynamism often displayed by their economic and social structures. This state of affairs has induced some observers to postulate a sort of latent conservatism (that is, not overtly acknowledged as such) in the behaviour of large sectors of the population of the primate cities.

Rapid urban expansion not only preceded modern industry, but, as already pointed out, registered relatively higher rates of growth. The situation as a whole shows that traditional economic activities evinced marked vitality. They afforded some sort of livelihood, at a mediocre level, to a large number of persons, and were thus actually able to develop by virtue of the low-cost utilization of redundant manpower.

Unquestionably, the over-all picture indicates the continued predominance of low-productivity structures and the prevalence of economic orientations of the traditional type. Nevertheless, it would be more than a mere overstatement to assert that nothing changed at all, and that the old

/patterns remained

patterns remained intact and exactly the same as before. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The tensions that gradually developed in the course of the process under way provoked many vigorous reactions in the direction of innovation. Elements of modernity were incorporated in plenty. But in no case was this reforming trend intensive enough to create a social order capable of generating on its own account, in successive stages, all the economic and social forces whose action results in the establishment of an authentic industrial society. In other words, the traditional society was enabled by its permeability to hold its own, but at the same time that very permeability had to allow the infiltration of many modern ingredients, which only apparently rendered possible the coexistence or compatibility of the old and the new, the out-of-date and the contemporary. However, such compatibility did exist - although its degree of security varied - without producing the "revolutionary" consequences expected in some quarters. In the upshot, it is clear that the efforts made during the period lacked the requisite impetus and intensity to bring about a genuine reform. All this implies, from the sociological standpoint, that the perpetuation of the traditional society is only the reverse side of a lack of dynamism in economic development.

This and no other is the major problem facing the sociological interpretation of the period, the riddle that social research must solve. What mechanisms account for it? Which social sectors support it? What behaviour patterns maintain it? What types of ideas seek its justification?

Chapter IV

THE NEW URBAN GROUPS: THE MIDDLE CLASSES

I. GENERAL PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE MIDDLE CLASSES

The foregoing chapters, in which an attempt was made to come to grips with the question of structural relations between the urban and rural environments, constitute in themselves an essay at a clear-cut sociological interpretation. But notwithstanding all the sound quantitative bases on which this interpretation rests, it makes no claim to be the only one possible; on the contrary, it may, not to say must, be the subject of lively discussion. What is more, it contains in nuce other interpretations bearing on certain problems which are not only of importance where the desire for knowledge is concerned - theory in the strictest acceptance of the word - but also of immediate and pressing interest in relation to current economic development policy, or perhaps indeed to policy in general. This feature of such questions - the fact that they are equally significant in precept and in practice - makes them clearly illustrative of the inexorable inter-relationship between theory and praxis represented by the social problems in which everyone is involved, willy-nilly, and whose prompt solution calls for a detached approach. Consequently, if discussion is required to substantiate the broader hypothesis represented by the overall interpretation - i.e., the postulate that the so-called urbanization and industrialization processes have not run parallel in Latin America, and that their failure to keep in step accounts, at least in part, for the present lack of dynamism in the Latin American economy - the same is bound to be true of the questions now to be considered. Moreover, not only are these questions more elusive, in so far as quantitative is gradually superseded by qualitative analysis, but they are in addition highly debatable, since they are the patrimony of "public opinions" that are often common currency in the shoddiest sense of the term. At the same time, however, they are controversial on a higher plane, for although

/the scientific

the scientific approach is based on the strictest "critical neutrality", it may sometimes be impossible to avoid adopting a specific position - clearly demarcated, of course - when the problems under discussion are such that for purposes of practical action the task of propounding the future objectives deemed to be the most desirable cannot be shirked.

The first of the major questions implicit in the over-all interpretation referred to above - and unquestionably one of the most important from the standpoint of economic and social development - is that of the so-called middle classes. It is almost a commonplace by now to state that the middle classes not only represent in principle a phenomenon of urban differentiation, but have also exhibited, during the course of history, a very close, and in the view of some a directly causal, relationship with economic development, especially since Britain's famous industrial revolution. For these reasons, before embarking upon so specialized a topic, it would be wise to take note of a few general considerations which may clear away certain misapprehensions and help to bring the problem up to date.

1. Nature of modern societies viewed from this standpoint

One of the movements characterizing the present day is a sustained intellectual effort to grasp the essential traits of the most advanced societies of our time. This quest for the typical pattern of existing "industrial societies" has already given rise to a voluminous literature. And almost, though not quite, as voluminous is the list of proposed definitions. Here are a few of them: "mass societies", "technocratic societies", "affluent societies", "societies of élites", "societies made up of secondary systems", "consumer societies", "manager societies", "societies absorbed by social security", "societies ruled by a new human type", and so forth.

Of all these definitions, however, the most directly relevant to the present study is that describing the advanced industrial countries as "levelled-up-middle-class societies". Sociologically speaking, there is no more equivocal term than the expression "middle class", so often and so readily used. But to attempt here and now a thorough exploration of the hidden convolutions of this category, or rather, of the reality it

/stands for,

stands for, would mean straying off into a long and perhaps futile digression: What are its components? How can it be demarcated? What degree of "consciousness" does it possess? etc.^{1/}

Consequently, the best thing for the present is to dispense with investigations of this kind and assume the foregoing definition to be valid, accepting the most general features it presents as typical of the more advanced "industrial societies".^{2/} The characteristics of the levelling-up referred to will be discussed below, from three points of view only.

In the first place, income structure. From this standpoint, such societies are characterized by a relatively equitable distribution of income. The graph by which its structure can be indicated differs greatly from the pyramid typical of societies in which the middle sectors are much smaller, and is shaped like the humbler onion. To pursue this image, the cross-section corresponding to the middle income groups is extremely broad, the base formed by the lower income groups somewhat narrower, and the tip represented by the higher income groups very small indeed. Needless to say, the structure thus symbolized varies from one country to another, and within it the income patterns of the different sectors overlap in diverse ways. In the last analysis, the essential point is the breadth or magnitude attained by the middle income stratum. And perhaps no less important is the decrease in the relative proportions of both the higher and the lower income groups.

Such a society, thus typified on the basis of average income, is levelled up not only from the economic standpoint, as described, but also from the social and cultural angles. Here the levelling process is evidenced in modes of existence and cultural aspirations. Despite undeniable qualitative differences, living patterns conform to a certain mean, the result being a palpable standardization of human behaviour in

^{1/} The best book written so far - perhaps already out-of-date - is that by Fritz Marbach, Theorie des Mitterlstands, 1942. The literature on the subject is as voluminous as may be supposed.

^{2/} The most significant analysis of the whole set of problems relating to this designation must unhesitatingly be ascribed to one of its advocates: Helmut Shelsky. See in particular his article "Die Bedeutung des Klassenbegriffes für die Analyse unserer Gesellschaft", Jahrbuch für Sozialwissenschaft, Bd. 12 (1961), Ht. 3, p. 237.

all its manifestations. In addition, the most widely-shared "aspirations" adhere to a common model, and communication media - radio, the cinema, the press, and so forth - disseminate a popular culture which is, in point of fact, a middle-class culture. Consequently, a cultural levelling-up exists alongside the corresponding economic process.

But in a third direction the tendency in question is still more marked. Class conflicts are on the wane, as, for instance, in the countries - those of Europe, of course - where about fifty years ago they were acrimonious in the extreme. The over-all improvement in levels of living, the institutionalization of the means of peaceful settlement (on a basis of temporary commitments, valid for varying lengths of time), and common participation in identical models of behaviour (desires and relative achievements), have combined to establish a more harmonious relationship, an acceptable modus vivendi, among different and formerly antagonistic social classes.

This typological outline of the "levelled-up-middle-class society" in the most dynamic industrial countries of Europe and America - and of the Soviet industrial society, it might also be added, but that complications might thus be introduced which are needless at the present stage - by no means represents a description applicable without major modifications to all the countries concerned, much less (to sound a necessary note of warning) a categorical assertion that class conflicts and even the class struggle are things of the past. It may, indeed, be regarded as yet another hypothesis within the classic theory of social classes, which stresses the trends towards "adjustment" registered in the last few decades, but is not on that account devoid of its own peculiar problems.

Notwithstanding its possible limitations, the definition cited - as one alternative among others - seems to approximate fairly closely to the empirical interpretation of the facts, and above all is the one of most immediate interest, at least as a postulate, in connexion with the subject of the present paper.

2. The paradox of the situation

Even if the definition of the social structure of industrial countries as a "levelled-up middle-class society" is assumed to be approximately valid,

/contemporary sociological

contemporary sociological analysis cannot blink the paradoxical aspect of the situation. And this paradox lies - or rather, almost leaps to the eye - in the fact that just precisely at the juncture when the middle classes have thus come to the fore, their original spirit seems most evanescent. Indeed, it is implicit in the very formula enshrining the concept in question, inasmuch as the term "levelling-up" goes hand in hand with the epithet "middle-class". What was and is the substance of this paradox, to which careful attention is nowadays devoted by historians and sociologists, and which has been the subject of books whose circulation rivals that of the most famous best-sellers? In such a context, certain terms must not be shunned which may seem obsolete to some, but for others retain the full force of their emotional impact.

With this proviso, the paradox referred to can simply be described as one aspect of the crisis through which bourgeois culture is passing in our time. The bourgeois society (whatever we may think of this term, which is used here in its strictest acceptance as a scientific category) that flourished throughout the whole of the nineteenth century, and during that period reached its prime, began to totter, as is common knowledge, at the time of the First World War, and, in the years that followed, betrayed all the symptoms of radical inner change. But reference to a bourgeois society is understood to imply the existence of a bourgeois culture as well, and of a human type to which the same epithet is applied. And it is likewise taken for granted that the type in question, at any rate in its "ideal" manifestation, adopted sharply-defined characteristic attitudes vis-à-vis the world at large. In what did the essence of the crisis that overtook bourgeois society and culture consist? Time presses. Consequently, abstract postulates must be called into service, if they afford at least a glimmer of a clue to an initial hypothesis.

Only a past master in sociology and history,^{3/} with all his wealth of experience, could venture upon so formidable an undertaking and propound an interpretation in the fewest possible words. Here it is. The crisis suffered by bourgeois culture consisted in the upsetting of the balance for some time maintained between the two greatest internal contradictions implicit in this pattern of living: the diametrically opposite trends represented by "personality

3/ See Alfred von Martin, "Die Krisis des Bürgerlichen Menschen", Kolner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozial Psychologie, 14 Jahrg, H.3, p. 417.

/and "rationalization".

and "rationalization". Everybody is aware that one aspect of the history of contemporary man is the exaltation to a record pitch of the "person", or the individual as such, a unique, irreducible and irreplaceable entity; but another is the culmination of the general process of "rationalization", which keeps pace step by step with the efficiency of the objective shapes and movements of "things". The bourgeois, whether an entrepreneur or an intellectual, was actuated at one and the same time by the impetus of his strong individuality and by eagerness to fit in with the objective process making for rationality in all sectors of practical life, and more particularly, of course, in the technical and scientific, economic and political fields. Bourgeois society and culture were able to hold their own for just so long as they were effectively stimulated by this tension, maintained within certain limits.

But as from a particular moment - the early decades of the present century - the rationalization process gathered such speed that it outstripped the effort simultaneously required for the survival and growth of personality. It is not by chance that the supreme panegyric on the entrepreneur is the mournful swan-song of a farewell. And the real economic prop and stay of bourgeois culture was the entrepreneurial type which the great Austrian economist observed in its season of decline.

The figure of the intellectual - counterpart to the entrepreneur - underwent similar metamorphoses. And nowadays it seems that in general the psychological type which - however it originated - became the carrier of bourgeois culture is dying out. Herein lies the paradigmatic value of United States experience, and the explanation of the widespread interest aroused, in other countries with a similar structure, by books such as those of Riesmann White or Mills, which touch the most sensitive chords of our time with brilliant skill, whether or not their interpretation is beyond criticism. The organization man, the entirely other-directed individual, is a product that reflects no longer a typical bourgeois society, but a post-bourgeois culture (to avoid the less accurate designation of anti-bourgeois).

The story of les bourgeois conquérants,^{4/} worked out by the human type referred to above, is not historically homogeneous. If in England the bourgeois

^{4/} See C. Morazé, Les bourgeois conquérants, Colin, Paris, 1957.

clung to industry, in France he took his stand on politics, in Germany he more timidly sought refuge in the feudalism of Junkerdom, while in the United States he emerged in his quintessential form. His practical activities covered so widely varied a range that only in a detailed description could any account of them be given. Unquestionably, the nineteenth century was the epoch of these "bourgeois conquistadors", but, again like the conquistadors every age, they did not always use the same weapons or adopt the same strategies.

What has all this to do with the question of the middle classes in Latin America? Is not the gap between its countries and those previously discussed still relatively wide? What is the point of all these critical and cultural considerations, when what we are concerned with now is quite a different issue? They are directly apposite, for the simple reason that the peoples of Latin America do not live in the moon, but on this terrestrial globe, and nothing that happens on it can fail to affect them. Which means that at the present time, just when the Latin American is called upon to make his greatest effort to promote economic development, he is confronted with a series of contradictory images. On which of them should the so-called "middle classes" fix their attention now? The much-talked-of "demonstration effect" does not involve material facts alone. It also disseminates models that are incompatible with others still propagated as "extant".

II. LATIN AMERICA'S TWO MAJOR "MIDDLE CLASS" PROBLEMS

To shelve these considerations for the time being, in recent years the almost universal need to support economic development has brought to the fore, in a number of places, the problem of the groups best fitted to constitute its pillars. Such groups are sometimes called "élites", and consequently a question frequently raised in contemporary literature on the subject is that of the nature and composition of these élites in countries which have undergone a radical transformation or which are now entering upon their career as self-governing States. The literature concerned^{5/} - especially where it

5/ Outstanding among these in form and substance is Fatma Mansur's Process of Independence, Routledge, London, 1962.

bears on countries that have recently acquired their independence - is of purely analogical value in relation to the burning questions of the day in Latin America. For it must not be forgotten that this is neither a continent whose culture has been profoundly modified by contact with the Western world, nor a region whose countries are just embarking upon independent life. For centuries the entire content of Western culture has been implicit in Latin America's own trends, and its countries have been self-governing for a hundred and fifty years.

Nevertheless, if it is admitted that the dominant theme is economic development, on the understanding, of course, that it is not the sole motif, but, whether we like it or not, the focal point for others of no less importance, but different in kind, the question of which social sector is to bear the brunt of the development effort must be faced.

At all times of social and political change in a given country, political and sociological shrewdness has always consisted - where it has existed at all - in picking out the social group or groups, the social class or classes, that were to play the decisive role in the process of change concerned. In other words, it has consisted in identifying the sectors without whose cooperation the transformation could not easily be brought about. At the precise moment when the work of a Bismarck had come to full fruition, a gaze as penetrating as that of Max Weber roved the scene in search of the social class that would be capable of re-shaping what he believed to be his country's destiny. Was it the military and bureaucratic aristocracy, capable of wielding authority and viewing the nation's affairs as a whole, but worn out by the task it had seen to a finish? Was it the new bourgeoisie, inexperienced in politics, powerful as its economic driving force might be? Was it the working class, well organized, but likewise unpractised in government, and lacking in insight at the national level? Doubtless the great sociologist asked himself these questions with the possibilities of his country's power politics still in mind. But the manner of posing them remains the same, although the ends in view may differ. In present-day Latin America, where widespread awareness of the need for immediate and rapid economic development prevails, there is undoubtedly room for such queries. Can development be promoted by the old traditional strata which may perhaps have worthily

/discharged their

discharged their role in history, but which now seem too exhausted to meet the demands of our day? Can it be carried through by the classes at the lower end of the social scale, unless they are forced into the mould of a strict discipline that may to some extent make up for the deficiencies of their past experience? Is it not perhaps from the so-called middle sectors - which, apart from their higher cultural level, have a far from negligible stock of political experience - that the greatest effort, or at least the strongest impetus, must come? The lack of dynamism in Latin American development cannot be overcome unless capital formation derives mainly from the higher income sectors, with contributions from the others in proportion to their relative strength. But if these social sectors' capacity for capital formation and investment is of paramount importance from the economic standpoint, from the sociological angle the presence or absence among them of a positive will to create and to reform is no less vital. The acceleration of economic development as a national undertaking - for the purposes of welfare, not of power - cannot be successfully achieved without the most enthusiastic co-operation possible on the part of all social sectors. But the previous question still holds good. Which sector is to play the most decisive part? Have the middle classes in Latin America the requisite drive and readiness to discharge in this part of the world the role they formerly played elsewhere?

In recent years, however, a riddle has presented itself which for the sake of brevity or in deference to scientific usage has been summed up under the title of the "Hoselitz hypothesis".^{6/} The enigma consists in the fact that the Latin American countries which thrived most vigorously at the end of the nineteenth century, and which show not only the most favourable set of social indicators, but also the largest middle sectors, are precisely those which in the last few decades have displayed the gravest symptoms of economic atony, not to say stagnation. Over against them, others have been conspicuous by the rapidity of their recent expansion, despite their less well-balanced complex of social indices and their apparently less numerous and perhaps less experienced middle classes.

^{6/} See José Medina Echavarría, Economic development in Latin America. Sociological considerations (E/CN.12/646).

What is the explanation of this phenomenon - from the sociological standpoint, be it understood? How are we to interpret the contrast between the relative stagnation registered in some of the more southerly countries - Argentina, Chile, Uruguay - as against the drive observable of late in Mexico, for instance, or in Brazil? The attempt at elucidation termed the Hoselitz hypothesis^{7/} consisted in insinuating that, in the case under discussion, where the middle classes are concerned what matters is not so much quantity as quality; in other words, what are of interest are their psychological bents and attitudes. In this sense, a middle class that is numerically larger but is permeated by a certain desire for security may exert less influence on economic development than another which, although smaller, has the dynamic energy hitherto regarded as typical of this social sector. The hypothesis, however, does no more than raise a problem, and that problem opens up a wide field for research which can be explored here only in broad outline.

III. THE IMAGE OF THE FUNCTION OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

1. Bourgeois society as a whole

The bourgeois conquérants that standardized the world in one century, disrupting time-honoured cultures and shattering the routine submissiveness of the scattered tribal units, did not of course act in the same way and at exactly the same time in the various centres - European and American - where they came into being. But the long view of history hardly differentiates between them, since what remains in common is a single cultural and psychological tone. This explains an earlier remark to the effect that the bourgeois society - today apparently sinking into its decline - can only be understood if it is considered in its entirety, as a system in which economics, politics and culture drew their nourishment from the same roots. Its economic founders were called entrepreneurs, and those who sustained its spiritual life were the intellectuals. For the entrepreneur there is a model that corresponds exclusively to the great "captain of industry", as for the

^{7/} Bert F. Hoselitz, "Economic Growth in Latin America", a contribution to the First International Conference of Economic History, Mouton, Stockholm, 1960.

/intellectual there

intellectual there is another appertaining only to the great "mandarin". But it would be a mistake to suppose that bourgeois culture owed its survival solely to the merits of the major industrialists or the most distinguished intellectuals. Less imposing figures laboured shoulder to shoulder with these. What sets the tone of a culture is precisely the diversity of the minor figure in any of its fields: beside the great captain of industry, the average independent entrepreneur, as well as his fellow who operates on a smaller scale and is hardly independent at all. Just as one country acquires outstanding intellectual prestige not so much because it possesses a galaxy of eminent leaders of thought - men of letters, scholars, research workers - as by virtue of the troop of secondary figures that propagate good style or spread ideas among the numbler folk, so the economic importance of other countries derives not only from the presence of a few entrepreneurs of distinction but from the many who, actuated by the same spirit, represent a major or minor contribution to national income. It is this prevailing savour of a particular moment in history that the intellectual analysis of the historian and the sociologist distils and stylizes.

2. The typological schema

This stylized essence, then, is what is known as the "type". And there has certainly been no lack of attempts to define the bourgeois type, the human being who whether he knows it or not, whether he is dependent or independent, is a member of the so-called middle classes. The schema lays particular stress on the various aspects of an attitude, or, more accurately, a will: aspects that are often contradictory, but perhaps from that very tension draw their greatest strength. They must now once more be reviewed, on the basis of the strictest schematism.

(a) Will to economic creation

The human type in question was primarily the creator of an economic structure - that known as "industrial" - which had formerly not existed at all, or only in embryo, and which, beginning with the manufacturing phase, has culminated in the large-scale mass production characterizing the world of today. The structure thus created embodied - and still does, in so far as the type persists - the following assumptions:

/(i) Productive

- (i) Productive organisms were built up by virtue of capital investment, and steady capital formation was therefore a sine qua non. But such capital formation was not possible without saving, i.e., refraining from transferring to consumption a substantial proportion of the income obtained;
- (ii) The possibilities afforded by a world no longer subject to the trammels of tradition were to be unflaggingly exploited. And the most powerful instrument wherewith to utilize these possibilities - which in almost all cases opened up virtually infinite prospects - was the most anti-traditional element ever heard of, namely, science and technique. This anti-traditional utilization complex was what became known as innovation. The entrepreneur and the middle sectors were therefore innovators in relation to production processes, through technique, through organization, through new combinations of factors already familiar;
- (iii) Such innovation, however, - invention and creation - could not be undertaken in a world of wide but uncertain possibilities without prior acceptance of the element of adventure in enterprise, and without willingness to face, as in every adventure, a risk, a danger of failure. Innovation and risk go hand in hand, and the vaster and more alluring seem the dimly-discerned possibilities on the horizon, the more scope there is for innovation and the greater is the risk. As in every era of adventure and conquest, many enterprises would never have been undertaken but for the spur of example, the challenge of the forerunner. In the economic field, this challenge bears the name of competition. And at first the entrepreneur - great or small - was not afraid of such competition, but saw in it the driving force behind his activities. Competition cropped up in any and every field, and the competitor had to be outrivalled by one means or another: by harder work, by lower costs, by new sales tactics, etc. Here, then, is the classic trinity of the new economic conquistador: innovation, risk and competition. Only later, when one of these elements broke down, did the decline of the old type of entrepreneur set in;

/(iv) But

(iv) But the bourgeois culture - a similar creation of the middle classes - would not have been possible without two cultural elements of basic significance. The first was the exaltation of labour as a primary ethical value, culminating, in its extreme form, in the enjoyment of work for work's sake. Another no less decisive factor, linked, of course, to the foregoing, was a more or less ascetic code of conduct, in which abstinence derived from the idea that it was not so much what was acquired that was important, but the method and manner of its acquisition. The asceticism of the Calvinistic sects springs first to the mind - from Max Weber onwards -, but no less ascetic were the Japanese Samurais, and perhaps, although in another type of world, the early leaders of the Soviet movement. The literature concerned with the analysis of this asceticism may embody some contradictions (the signs of salvation were not invariably thought to be manifested in success), but it seems most likely that the trait in question was never absent in the early stages of any "modern" economic expansion. It could not be wanting for two reasons, each with its own particular repercussions: firstly, because capital formation is impossible without a minimum of asceticism; and, secondly, because without it no standard of morality would have been set by the men who were the pillars of a movement that could not be fully successful unless it pervaded all social classes in any given society. It is true that the swing of the pendulum can be discerned in the concrete events of history, but in the type the propensity to asceticism remains a basic quality.

A combination of these elements - with the emphasis falling now on one, now on another - has always characterized the typical image of the entrepreneur, raised to its highest dignity in the pages of Schumpeter, in a sort of funeral oration.

(b) Will to independence vis-à-vis the State

Bourgeois culture was the product of the man of energy, confident of attaining security - or truth - by his own devices. Consequently, it was wary of the State and averse to Government intervention. Perhaps the famous laissez-faire of the textbooks was never really found in its quintessential form, and the State always intervened in one way or another, even if only through the mere timely manipulation of the rate of interest, which is not so small a matter after all. But the attitude of the middle classes - even under the aegis of the traditional sectors - was always anti-interventionist. What they asked of the State was an efficacious juridical system and administration which would give them full scope to manage their real mainstay: property. Property was their Alpha and Omega, and at the same time the raison d'être of their faith both in independence and in the certainty of a tomorrow they had earned for themselves.

(c) Will to social reform

Fused with confidence in progress, the will to reform was founded on the postulate of equality, not of liberty as at the preceding juncture of history. Even so, liberty and equality were the components of the paramount cultural ideal, that of human personality, which, as already pointed out, entered the lists thenceforward against the objective process of rationalization, no less characteristic of the same culture.

The equality in question is, in the first place, equality under the law, which in its political manifestation implies the rule of democracy: a democracy which was to be the more ardently defended, the stronger became the urge of the middle classes towards upward social mobility. But, in the second place, it is equality at the purely human level, the belief in the free development of personality by means of an education designed to train the man rather than the professional. In a word, the ideal of humanistic education, which, although its most thorough-going and perfectionist exponents were to be found in German idealism, long determined, with this and that variant, the educational aims of Europeans and Americans alike.

3. Application of the schema to the Latin American situation

No one who takes this schema as a guide to the Latin American situation will find difficulty in detecting its traces, more or less strongly marked, from the very beginning of the Independence. It would be a grave mistake, however, to forget that the Independence itself was precisely the achievement of a predominantly traditional class which, to meet the requirements of political opposition to the former Empire, emphasized the features of a liberalism found throughout the Western world, not excluding Spain itself, where, indeed, the very term was coined. But the result of this historic bid for freedom was the creation of a liberalism that was Utopian inasmuch as it was far from being reflected in or consonant with a social situation in which the traditional groups were still dominant. Nevertheless, alongside this ideological liberalism of the founders of the Independence, a bourgeoisie began to grow up in the towns which nowadays would be called "independent", or, more strictly, of the estamento type. It was this urban middle class, already coming into being in the earliest days of the Independence, which gradually stimulated the emergence of new sectors, new facets of itself.

Nor must it be forgotten that, apart from the paradoxical situation implied by a liberal ideology in conflict with the facts, the real formation of the Latin American middle classes was a relatively belated phenomenon, whose characteristics only began to take increasingly definite shape as from the last few decades of the nineteenth century. Both the initial anomaly and the late formation of the real mentality of the middle sectors suggest that the latter's role in history could not be of exactly the same nature as in other countries, whether those of Europe or the United States. Nevertheless - and although this is one of the aspects of our social history on which thorough research is most needed ^{8/} - there have

^{8/} Attention may be drawn, however, to the valuable contributions represented by the Pan American Union studies, Materiales para el estudio de la clase media en América Latina, 6 vols., Washington, 1950-1951. Reference may also be made to Las clases medias en Centroamérica: características que presentan en la actualidad y requisitos para su desarrollo (E/CN.12/CCE/176/Rev.2), a study prepared by Marshall Wolfe, of the United Nations Bureau of Social Affairs, for the Central American Economic Co-operation Committee of ECLA. In the latter publication the data available in 1960 are usefully summed up, criteria for their evaluation are established and a picture of the probable behaviour pattern of the social sectors in question is presented.

been repeated attempts to apply the schema set forth above to the study of the formation and functional value of the Latin American middle classes, especially from the end of last century onwards.

A relatively recent book by John J. Johnson^{2/} may be cited in this connexion as a representative example. And the fact that its approach is based on the schema aforesaid may perhaps account for the well-meaning optimism that some have detected in the general tone of this work, notwithstanding its indubitable merits. The epithet "optimistic" or "pessimistic" is inappropriate to interpretations of this type, which aim at objectivity. But perhaps the model valid for the middle classes in other Western countries may not afford the best vantage point from which to examine the nature of the corresponding sectors in Latin America. However, it constitutes a working hypothesis which cannot be rejected out of hand, and whose application must now be concisely analysed. Viewed from the standpoint it represents, the middle sectors would seem to have grown up in close association with technological changes, the expansion of demand and the growth of public services. Consequently, they had their origin in the social mobility brought about by the demands of new skilled jobs and functions chiefly in evidence since the days of the First World War. These jobs and functions had to be gradually filled and fulfilled by new social groups. Johnson himself, however, notes that the lack of continuity in their history and the heterogeneity of the component elements of the new sectors seem largely to have prevented the formation of an authentic class consciousness; which is tantamount to saying that these elements were not welded into a compact social stratum, capable of becoming "politically monolithic". Despite this implication, the functions performed by the middle classes, above all from the final decades of the nineteenth century onwards, tended to coincide with those that were to be expected in accordance with the model adopted. Thus it is asserted that the middle sectors had a measure of political cohesion and that their interests were to some extent convergent. In this sense:

^{2/} John J. Johnson, Political change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors, Stanford University Press, 1958.

/(i) They

- (i) They appear as groups firmly established in the urban milieu, whose aim was to promote both urban and economic development by allocation of substantial public funds primarily to urban centres proper;
- (ii) For these middle sectors, school attendance levels undoubtedly constituted an important status symbol, so that their propensity was to support an expansionist public education policy. As industrial development gradually produced some of its typical effects, and other commercial and industrial elements found their way into these middle sectors, there was a tendency to replace the traditional humanistic education by one with a scientific bias. Moreover, an attempt was made to orientate the educational system in such a way that alongside the classic university professions some attention was also devoted to the training of semi-professional graduates. This last development seems an obvious reflection of the increasing response of the middle sectors to the demands and requirements of the industrial order;
- (iii) Industrialization could not fail to constitute a supremely important objective for the middle sectors, especially once the effects of the First World War began to make themselves felt. While interest had been exclusively concentrated to begin with on the development of the extractive industries, the painful experience of the economic repercussions of the two great world wars induced some of the leaders of the middle classes to encourage the establishment both of manufacturing industry and of heavy industry, and compelled them to urge the adoption of various measures conducive to the formation of an expanding internal market;
- (iv) The intellectuals - indisputably members of these middle classes - tended to formulate nationalistic economic policies, and when once they secured direct participation in the power structure, they made this nationalism a sort of official State ideology;

/(v) State

- (v) State interventionism would seem to have been an invariable watchword of the political leadership of these middle sectors, which advocated the use of official machinery to develop industrial structures and promote social welfare;
- (vi) As a result of the steadily increasing social mobility in the urban environment, as well as of the progressive social emancipation of women, the social importance of the family declined, and, consequently, so did its traditional significance in the determination of the place of individuals in the occupational and political strata. In this last field, parties with ideal targets and with some measure of organization tended to supersede the influence of kindred. In a word, just as had happened elsewhere, the first steps were taken towards the establishment of a society in which the reward of merit and the transfer of political loyalty to common and impersonal objectives were the prevailing rule.

As the middle sectors expanded, other non-professional groups began to join their ranks and compete for political rewards. At first the professionals with a university background constituted the most important segment of the middle sectors, either because of their culture and prestige or because they held a virtual monopoly in the formulation of doctrines and ideologies. But the very success achieved by these segments deprived them of their numerical significance, inasmuch as it resulted in a broadening of the bases of democratization. Thus, the prestige and importance of primary and secondary school teachers was enhanced, manifest interest being displayed in giving them more adequate training. Bureaucrats increased and multiplied in conformity with their steadily growing importance and with the fact that many social functions which had formerly depended on private enterprise passed into the hands of the political authorities. Moreover, the position of the existing middle sectors was necessarily affected by the emergence and subsequent growth of the commercial and industrial segments. Consequently, these segments thenceforward tended more and more to operate not only as veto groups, but constructively, and it is their influence that nowadays, according to Johnson, carries most weight within the middle sectors.

/On the

On the other hand, scientists, technicians and business managers tended to identify themselves politically with their employers as economic development progressed,

Similarly, this movement was accompanied, as elsewhere, by a parallel increase in anti-clericalism.

In the social field, the middle sectors allied themselves - especially at the start - with the lower urban strata, and these commitments led them to promote new social institutions based on the recognition of merit, ability and hard work. In this sense, the middle sectors' rise to power signified a considerable reform of the social structure.

To sum up, as the outcome of this whole process, which developed primarily in the major Latin American countries, the middle sectors or classes were able to accumulate a substantial hoard of political experience, and, in Johnson's opinion, in the future both their social and their economic and political influence will in all probability be strengthened. This hopeful view emphasizes the skill acquired by these middle sectors, during a long apprenticeship, in the gentle art of political compromise, which may enable them to strike a balance between extremist tendencies within a viable political framework. Accordingly, the political destiny of the middle sectors would seem to consist in the fulfilment of such functions of stabilization and reconciliation. It is the economic field, however, that has been the basic concern of the middle sectors in most of the Latin American countries, and in it they have gained considerable experience. It is therefore not surprising that, to judge from all appearances, they have become the group best fitted to carry out an effective economic and social reform.

Given the topic under discussion, this would seem to be the point of key importance, since, in accordance with the usual interpretation, the existing middle classes in Latin America are regarded as the authentic prop and stay of the region's future economic development.

This view of the situation would appear to be consistent with experience in Latin America as a whole, as there are many places where entrepreneurs from the middle sectors play a very energetic part in economic activity. On that assumption, the Latin American middle classes

/would undoubtedly

would undoubtedly be fulfilling, in the countries concerned, the function they discharged in other nations which today are completely industrialized. Yet in the foregoing résumé itself, there are divergences from the course of events elsewhere. They should be analysed with the utmost care. But, for the moment, the important point is that even if this hypothesis is granted to be valid for the region as a whole and over the long term, it leaves us high and dry in the sense that it offers no answer - at first sight at least - to the greatest socio-economic riddle posed by Latin America in our time: why is it that some of the South American countries have witnessed a reduction of their rate of economic growth in recent years, despite the fact that they possess the biggest middle classes with the longest and most continuous participation in political and economic affairs.^{10/} May there not be another possible interpretation which, whatever its degree of over-all validity - and there is no such thing as absolute truth - can account for such phenomena even if only as transient episodes?

IV. THE FACELESS MIDDLE CLASSES

If the classic schema of the role of the middle classes in economic development, although an "ideal type", is none the less based strictly on historical data, the history of some Latin American countries should now be studied with a view to outlining the "model" the process has followed and seeing how far it approximates to or differs from the model just described; or, in other words, which of the possible "hypotheses" is belied or borne out by the facts. But as all the component events of the history in question cannot be fully analysed here, a precipitate in the shape of a new "ideal type" will have to be provisionally accepted, in the hope that its degree of validity may later be put to the test.

1. The historical constellation of the decisive years (1917-60)

On the not-too-distant day when the cultivation of social history bears fruit in Latin America, it will be possible to elucidate what are at present only conjectures or intuitive suppositions. In the meantime, there can be

^{10/} See Bert F. Hoselitz, op.cit.

no doubt that the repercussions of the First World War started all the ferment of reform now astir in Latin America and inciting the region to decisive action. The most significant internal factors operative in 1917-60 were largely described in the opening chapters of the present study, where special attention was devoted to the unequal rates of development of the urbanization and industrialization processes. The formation of the primate cities brought about an internal social differentiation which did not, however, extend beyond their immediate vicinity, and left the traditional structure of the rural sector virtually intact. At the same time, in the sphere of culture and mores, the cities in question began to display every sign of their incorporation in modern life; but this modernity was confined to urban circles, and was often the merest reflection of changes induced by the mimetic influence of external contacts.

The second internal factor or determinant need not be described here and now; a passing allusion will suffice. It is that deriving from the vicissitudes undergone by economic development in the Latin American countries, mainly as a result of their dependence on international markets. Alongside these internal factors, due consideration must be given to the external factors which operated during certain decades that were unquestionably among the most dramatic in history. Those were the years that witnessed two world wars, the revolution of 1917 in Russia, the reactions of European Fascism and, in general, the propagation of a whole series of muddled ideologies which sometimes faded out of existence as swiftly as they had entered it. Consequently, one of the most significant aspects of the drama of those years would seem to have been the great ideological bewilderment that prevailed. The impact of such external events and such ideological confusion on the course of history in the Latin American countries was bound to effect the normal formation of the middle sectors, already under way.

Lastly, it must not be forgotten that one of these external factors, operative at the very time when the increasing vitality of the Latin American middle classes was beginning to express itself in action, consisted in the first signs of the cracking-up of bourgeois culture; the crisis on which emphasis has been laid elsewhere in the present chapter.^{11/} It was thus

^{11/} See section III.

impossible for the Latin American peoples to escape the influence of the more or less vague models which gradually took shape during the years under consideration. The typical inner-directed bourgeois was succeeded by the post-bourgeois figure of the "other-directed" man, and the classic entrepreneur was superseded by the "manager" of the modern enterprise, both these figures being contained, in greater or lesser degree, within the type of the "organization man".

It is not surprising, therefore, that the schema determined by the history of the middle classes in some of the Latin American countries reveals marked oscillations in their attitudes and activities, and, consequently, a perceptible ambivalence vis-à-vis the traditional structure of the countries concerned. This ambivalence, these swings of the pendulum, would seem to constitute the most characteristic features of the evolution of the middle classes from the First World War to the present time.

Nor is the existence of ambivalence and oscillations to be wondered at, if it is borne in mind that by then the political viability of the traditional system based on the classic two-party pattern - conservatives and liberals - was on the wane, and no substitute had yet been found in keeping with the changes that had occurred in the real structure of societies. The implication seems to be that the type we are considering must be described as the faceless middle classes. This is an inference of the utmost gravity, however soberly stated, in so far as the present time calls for exactly opposite characteristics: that is, for a clear-cut and energetic approach to the task of restoring dynamism to our economic development. In the ensuing pages, an attempt will be made to formulate, in terms of a schema and an ideal type, the nature and raison d'être of these faceless middle classes, on the basis of their main political, economic and social aspirations.

2. Political aspiration patterns

In a nutshell, the general trend of behaviour in the middle sectors may be said to have inclined towards adaptation to the existing traditional
/patterns, 12/

patterns,^{12/} and action not so much through the channels of social, political and economic mobility that are typical of modern countries, as through the formation of a clientele system which was not always inimical to progress, and allowed scope for more or less limited forms of reconstruction and creative capacity.

As in the case of other changes to be discussed later, in the political field it must always be borne in mind that there was a cardinal distinction between the two stages that corresponded to upward mobility and to stabilization. During the upward-mobility phase of the political process, the middle sectors began their rise to power by seeking, as a rule, the support of the broad masses of the working population, and consequently by creating various institutions whose cherished aim or manifesto was the improvement of the social and economic status of workers and employees. But the undeclared or latent effect of these institutions seems to have consisted rather in the expansion and betterment of the middle sectors themselves. There are indications that under their leadership the various component strata of these middle classes were successively enlarged, and that this phenomenon resulted not only from the extension of citizenship within urban areas, and from the creation of new institutions and units of production, in addition to the over-all modernization process, but also, unquestionably, from the pressing need for direct satisfaction of certain social and economic aspirations, which was the psychological mainspring of the political mobilization of the middle sectors. In these years of upward mobility, however, systematic use was likewise made of certain traditional institutions, just as other new ones were promoted, with the aim of safeguarding and improving the status already acquired by the rising middle classes.

During the stabilization phase, on the other hand, the original alliance between the middle sectors and the broad masses of the working population -- as expressed in a body of doctrine often rather blurred in its outlines, but unmistakably "social" and "labourist" in its sympathies --

^{12/} A short time ago, A. Pizzorno put forward certain hypotheses with respect to the relationship between urbanization and the development process, pointing out that the rapid growth of the primate cities, in combination with the stagnation of development in small and medium-sized towns and in rural areas in general, was probably associated with the tendency of the urban middle classes to share political power with the traditional sectors. The implications of this phenomenon would be manifold, and would include, inter alia, the existence of a niche for the traditional groups in the new economy, and a slackening of middle-class pressure for reform. See A. Pizzorno, "Sviluppo economico e urbanizzazioni", Quaderni di Sociologia, vol. XI, 1962, pp. 21-51.

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began to show signs of dissolving. In this sense, labourism and populism were ultimately watered down by various forms of compromise with the different elements of the prevailing order. Nevertheless, this phase of stabilization had three very clearly marked characteristics, of which a preliminary outline may be given as follows:

- (i) The establishment of a "clientele" and "patronage" system;
- (ii) Trends towards what might be called "self-promotion", or a partial upward mobility under the system in force; and
- (iii) A marked bias in favour of State interventionism.

The impact of economic expansion in recent decades had inevitable repercussions on what was formerly termed the "patronage" system. The fact that demand for employment at the intermediate levels generally exceeded the real possibilities of satisfying it precluded full "institutionalization" of genuine competition, based on objective qualifications, in recruitment and selection procedures. This intensified a long-standing tendency - not peculiar to the Latin American countries alone - consisting in the interplay of a set of clienteles, whose mechanism permitted upward social mobility and access to better careers. Thus, the existing family ties and political parties with a "prebendary" orientation were generally based on the perpetuation of primary or personal relationships, which formed a complex network, extending over the public and private sectors alike, and affording a flexible means of maintaining and improving the status of the middle class.^{13/} Consequently, considerable social mobility existed; but study of the careers of individual members of the middle strata gives the impression that the advantages of a system of semi-closed relationships - a veritably "prebendary" distribution of opportunities - were not neglected, and that the opportunities open to the various groups in the middle of the social scale were therefore highly unequal. In other words, it seems most unlikely that values like competition, merit and technical efficiency, as principles of social organization, can have played the same role as in the more advanced industrial societies. Thus, the importance and social prestige of certain groups and associations was usually closely

^{13/} See A. Leeds, Brazilian Careers and Social Structure: a case history and model (revised version of a paper presented to the Washington Anthropological Society on 16 October 1962).

linked with their real capacity to do their members and clients favours, whatever may have been their declared aims or manifestos. In other countries, especially those of Southern Europe,^{14/} whose kinship with the Latin American countries is very close in many respects, a similar "clientele" system operated, and perhaps may still be operating in part. But a detailed study of this question, however enlightening, might seem an untimely digression here. At present the important thing is to stress that such a system may certainly be progressive when the "patrons" are endowed with a modern consciousness, but becomes regressive - sometimes terrifyingly so - the moment these same patrons or heads of clientele see a threat to their security or their social prestige.

What was previously termed "self-promotion" reflects the fact that during the historical process registered in recent years, some of the groups belonging to the middle sectors frequently found themselves completely cut off from all possibility of upward social mobility - and even of employment - by the virtually closed "prebendary" system referred to. In these circumstances, sporadic action on the part of numbers of individuals and groups in the newly-emerging middle classes obviously represented their only available means of exerting some degree of pressure on the "exclusivist" circles, and thus opening a breach - wider or narrower, as the case might be - to let in the rebels against the social monopoly of which the former were the holders. This is why in many instances the "self-promotional" objectives of the nuclei interested in particular social reforms only temporarily appeared as "ideals", for as they were really instruments of upward mobility they were relinquished as soon as power had been achieved.

Another special feature, at marked variance with the classic model, is the third characteristic mentioned above, i.e., that of interventionism. This is not, of course, the moment to recall how and to what extent the bourgeoisie in other countries also availed itself of the various forms of State protection to develop a capitalism that would not otherwise have been

^{14/} See K.H. Pfeffer and Irma Schlaphausen, op.cit., and Johannes Papalekas, op.cit.

viable. The feature peculiar to Latin America is that the image of the State as the supreme dispenser of opportunities was mainly based on the "interventionist" action of Governments in which the middle classes participated. The direct or indirect dependence on State action of the most diverse sectors of economic activity was no transient feature of development in Latin America, and both the dependent and the independent middle classes endeavoured to found their social and economic possibilities, in large measure, on the diverse policies promoted by the State. Modernization processes, the establishment of new institutions, the creation of new units of production, the improvement of general living conditions, the expansion of the market and of economic opportunities, all commonly originated in moves of a political nature. Given the additional fact that the steady demand for various social services - not merely on the part of employees, but also on that of manual workers - could only be satisfied by the expansion of one public institution after another, it is not hard to understand that widely varying strata of the middle sectors, including the most over and resolute partisans of free enterprise, should always have been de facto interested in interventionism or definitely committed to it.

The ambivalence described, and the patterns of political upward mobility of the middle sectors, are reflected in their "constitutional" position. In theory, the middle classes were constitutionalist, i.e., upholders of the rule of law^{15/} and civil government, but it was no rare occurrence for some of the middle-class nuclei to waive their principles in face of the allurements offered by one form or another of authoritarianism or dictatorship.

During the phase of their rise to power, the middle sectors seem to have been ideologically prepared to set certain social limits to the classic rights of the individual. Hence, for example, the new and complex State regulations effecting contractual freedom - above all in respect of labour

^{15/} See, for example, F.F. Palavicini, Política constitucional, Editorial Beatriz de Silva, Mexico, 1950; G. Plaza, Problems of Democracy in Latin America, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1955; J. Posada, La revolución democrática, Editorial Iqueima, Bogotá, 1955; G. Arciniegas, Entre la libertad y el miedo, 10th edition, Editorial Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, 1958; J. Johnson, op.cit.

and social security -; the introduction of a number of regulations to control the interplay of market forces, either in order to maintain favourable conditions or with a view to forestalling adverse effects; and the establishment of specific limits to property rights. The new institutions thus brought into being were an expression of the original social orientation of the middle sectors, but later on, the binding commitments they contracted reversed the trend, and less importance was attached to the "solemn" social rights in question.

3. Economic aspiration patterns

If, in the sphere of power relations, the middle classes, clinging to a "clientele" system, ended by adapting their aspirations in respect of upward mobility, in one fashion or another, to a traditional structure which still retained its capacity for resistance and absorption, in the field of economic aspirations - economic creation in the strict sense of the term - they followed a parallel course, and ultimately allowed concern for security to over-ride the spirit of adventure and readiness to accept the arduous challenge of competition.

During the phase of upward mobility, the keynote of the middle sectors' aspirations seems to have been, in many places, what may be called "the quarrel against capitalism".^{16/} This quarrel, largely sustained and fostered by the new leaders, reflected the profound misgivings aroused by economic liberalism in the middle classes during their initial phase. According to the images that most frequently recur in the course of the dispute, capitalism as a system was envisaged as a parasitic growth, which in the long run could only lead to exploitation, moral corruption and poverty. To some thinkers of the period, the ideals of human solidarity implicit in Hispanic and Latin American culture did not seem compatible with the materialism and individualism of the capitalistic organization.

^{16/} See, for example, W.S. Stokes, Latin American Politics, Thomas Y. Crowell & Co., New York, 1959, pp. 156-157. Other works of reference are: L. Correa Prieto, Aspectos negativos de la intervención económica, Editorial Zig-Zag, Santiago, Chile, 1955; F. Ayala, El problema del liberalismo, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico, 1941; J. Silva Herzog, El pensamiento económico en México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico, 1947.

At that time, certain pre-eminently Catholic groups advocated the establishment of an economic system which would give the "common good" precedence over individual interests, some maintaining that capitalism "dehumanizes, corrupts and poisons". These undoubtedly extremist views rejected both individualism and economic and political liberalism, the idea being that in order to preserve the essence of Christianity it was essential to safeguard the spiritual content of society by means of a system which, while popular, would at the same time escape the contagion of liberalism. Property should be socialized, and perhaps subject to some form of planning on Christian lines. The new social organization was to be authoritarian, popular and planned - a middle way between capitalism and socialism.^{17/} Again, in the same "quarrel" the more left-wing intellectuals and leaders, likewise in favour of avoiding the capitalist phase, but apprehensive of any definitely revolutionary action, were often inclined to contemplate the possibility of certain transitional patterns which, through a mixed economic system, might finally culminate in some sort of diluted socialism.

Once the phase of securing access to power was over, however, and the last echoes of the "quarrel against capitalism" had died away, the middle sectors, now in one way or another participants in the power structure, tended to express themselves relatively vaguely on all questions relating to the structure of production, although at the same time they were extremely specific with respect to the redistribution of existing resources; so much so, indeed, that these redistributive aims might be regarded as the keynote of the time, for they could almost be said to have reappeared in the so-called policy of "social gains", which,

^{17/} See for example, C.M. Londoño, Economía social colombiana, Imprenta Nacional, Bogotá, 1953; A. Silva Bascuñán, Una experiencia social cristiana, Editorial del Pacífico, Santiago, Chile, 1949; V.A. Belaúnde, La crisis presente, 1914-1939, Editorial Mercurio Peruano, Lima; A. Amoroso Lima, O Problema do Trabalho, Ensaio de Filosofia Economica, Complete Works, vol. 20, AGIR, Rio de Janeiro, 1947; S. Dana Montañó, Justicia social y reforma constitucional, Universidad del Litoral, Institute of Juridico-Political Research, Santa Fe, Argentina, 1948; A. Ponte, Cómo salvar a Venezuela, New York, 1937, pp. 320-334. On synarchism in Mexico abundant literature exists.

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formulated as an ideal valid for society as a whole, in practice more often than not consisted in procuring special benefits for the sectors capable of exerting the strongest pressure. At about this date, however, the combination of the growing demand for new "social gains" (both in the middle sectors and in the dependent urban strata) with the crisis deriving from the vicissitudes of international trade awakened a more or less widespread awareness of the need to remodel the structure of production. A pledge to raise the levels of living of the broad masses, economic nationalism and industrial development seem to have been the three watchwords of the middle sectors' new lines of economic thought when the concept of mere participation in the benefits of the system turned out to be a blind alley. The new policy was decidedly popular in urban areas, where the factories seemed to emerge as the only true symbols of progress.

The middle-class political parties, then, were in favour of much more radical and direct State intervention in the economic field,^{18/} so that they frequently had to adjust their policy to the image of what nowadays we should call State capitalism or socialism. In other words, there was often a transition from the idea of the "beneficent" State to the concept of a veritable "entrepreneur" State, whose duty would consist in encouraging and maintaining economic activity, by taking over the risks attaching to a good many of the functions of the private entrepreneur. Perhaps this too was an extremist pattern, reminiscent of the old-time mercantilism in its zeal for self-sufficiency, and of course by no means acceptable to all; but hardly anybody seems to have held out against the temptations of State interventionism.

It would therefore be well to take note here of the complementarity, if not the strict consonance, which was almost bound to exist between this idea of interventionism and the concern for income redistribution referred

^{18/} See, for example, A. Manero, "El fomento industrial en México", Memoria del Segundo Congreso Mexicano de Ciencias Sociales, Artes Gráficas del Estado, Mexico, 1946, pp.171-293; A. Pinto, Hacia nuestra independencia económica, Editorial del Pacífico, Santiago, Chile, 1953, p.52; S. Oria, El estado argentino y la nueva economía, Editorial Peuser S.A., Buenos Aires, 1944; A. Frondizi, Petróleo y Política, Editorial Raigal, Buenos Aires, 1954.

to above. The swing of the pendulum between the two kinds of aspiration - redistributational and interventionist - was, as shown by its results, strikingly out of keeping with the aggressively and vigorously creative attitudes typical of every bourgeoisie.

Consequently, there was no combined drive to recast the structure of the economy, but rather a general leaning towards the introduction of fragmentary changes in the hope that they themselves would in the fullness of time give rise to a more sweeping structural reform.

The idea of industrialization, however, continued to thrive, in close connexion with the promise of higher over-all levels of living for the population. But as an aim, it found expression in a series of unrelated efforts, which were not properly synchronized and co-ordinated with the still extent policy of progressively extending the area of new social gains. No wonder that an industrialization process conducted on these lines disappointed initial expectations, and that its results frustrated aspirations towards greater social equality. It should not be forgotten that in the years under review the fluctuations in the rate of development and the effects of the more or less intensive inflationary process registered in many countries accentuated social inequalities and kindled the conflict of interests in which different groups strove to defend the purchasing power of their wages and security of tenure in their jobs. As a result, the disconcerting or utterly incomprehensible effects of piecemeal industrialization programmes gave rise to specific situations in which people felt they were living in a veritable economic and social chaos. It is thus not surprising that the typical orientations of middle-class governments had to adapt themselves to circumstances, practically oscillating between the so-called "stabilization" policy and the policy dictated by this or that variant of the deep-rooted mystique of social gains. It was at this time that the idea of economic development began to gain ground throughout Latin America, together with the realization that the development in question should not be left to chance, but should, on the contrary, form part of the content of an over-all plan or programme.

Nevertheless, the weight of the interventionist traditions which had already been crystallized in many vested interest, often of a monopolistic

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character, in conjunction with the constantly renewed hope of stabilization, ultimately gave rise to the problem, almost typical of this sixth decade, which has been and still is the subject of so much discussion: whether stabilization and development can go hand in hand, or whether a choice must be made between them. To sum up, the psychological attitude of the middle sectors has tended towards excessive moderation, towards enjoyment of the privileges acquired or pursuit of the barren mirage of security.

4. Social aspiration patterns

In the social field again, the position of the middle sectors was out of line with that of the classic ideal type, since, consciously or not, it was bound to reflect the phenomenon of a belated bourgeoisie, whose tardy emergence made it thrifty of its political energy and economic creation, but, on the contrary, generous in the extreme where social policy was concerned - an inevitable development, in so far as this "belated bourgeoisie", under the influence of what had been done in other countries, tended to formulate a social policy far in advance of the real structure of the economy.

Thus, during the phase of their rise to power, the groups at the head of the middle-class movement put up a struggle against the privileges implicit in the established order, giving patent evidence of anti-oligarchical feeling. And this attitude was reflected in a determined intention to promote universal participation in citizenship, to raise over-all levels of education and to formulate advanced social policy programmes. The extension of citizenship to the dependent urban sectors was generally the strategy whereby the traditional order could be jockeyed into according the middle-class political and social nuclei their share of power and influence. The leaders of the rising middle strata had been quick to realize that the possibilities for action on their part and on that of the various groups which followed them were primarily contingent on the early incorporation of new social sectors into political life. To judge from the information available on this initial period, the right to vote and to participate actively in politics would seem to have been extended to relatively marginal social strata on a considerable scale. This extension of the suffrage was

/usually accompanied

usually accompanied by a series of measures designed not only to establish the minimum economic and social conditions required for the effective exercise of citizenship, but also to do away with the discriminatory consequences of the system prevailing in traditional societies.

A strategy of this kind, conducive to the improvement of the living conditions of the lower social strata, was often associated with the granting or extension of the right to join trade-union organizations. It was the very governments in which the middle classes participated that, through the State, openly favoured the formation of urban workers' trade unions. Labour claims were thus channelled, as far as possible, through the institutions closely linked to the political power structure, and this undoubtedly enabled the new power groups to consolidate their recently-acquired positions. The phenomenon becomes even more clearly perceptible when it is recalled that trade-unionism was not confined to labour alone. Employees' unions, and even some professional associations, constituted an important aspect of this movement in Latin America. Some have alleged that the labour trade unions were organized and operated in their early stages under the aegis of middle-class politicians holding government posts. And although this assertion is not always borne out by the facts, it might be contended in general terms that the beginnings of the political orientation of the labour movement coincided with the middle sectors' rise to power and the consolidation of their status.

The expansion of educational services was another priority feature of the social policy pursued by the leading middle-class nuclei. "Education for all" implied the strengthening of public education, the reduction of illiteracy, the gradual improvement of school attendance levels, the building of new school premises, and - in varying degrees of depth - the introduction of the teaching of science; in general, the placing of culture within the reach of increasingly broad segments of the population. Educational curricula were modified in various ways, but although there were signs of interest in the development of the technical branch of public education, it cannot be said that a radical reform of the educational system took place. The most significant changes consisted mainly in the systematic centralization of the agencies concerned. Broadly speaking,

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each successive measure seems to have curtailed the prerogatives of the local authorities, while enlarging the sphere of action of the central government under the direct influence and control of the new power nuclei. The middle classes were unquestionably defenders and promoters of State intervention in the field of education, and even of the establishment of a veritable State monopoly. For several years free and compulsory lay education was one of the slogans of the middle-class ideologists and intellectuals.

The aim of the social security programmes was to enable the lower strata of the population, through the State, to enjoy reasonable minimum living conditions. It has been said, with some justification, that such programmes served to repay part of the political debt to the working-class sectors contracted during the phase of the rise to power, although in many instances those who really benefited were the dependent middle strata. It was this aspect of the action of the middle-class groups in power that most accurately reflected the above-mentioned ideal of "social gains" and even that of income redistribution. To begin with, however, the social security programmes consisted in a body of sporadic measures - often mutually contradictory - which were adopted under the immediate pressure of imperative needs. As a rule, both the control and the administration of the institutions concerned were in the hands of the political representatives of the ruling middle strata.

The results of this social policy on the part of the middle classes - as the product of a "belated bourgeoisie" - apparently fell short of expectations. The introduction of universal suffrage did not lead to a genuine mass incorporation of the marginal sectors in the body politic. Indubitably, there were successive enlargements of the urban electorate, but the numerical size of the marginal social groups was quite disproportionate to their participation in the new sectors' contingent. Needless to say, the rural strata were hardly represented at all.

The promotion of trade-unionism had only a relative success. It certainly gave rise to more responsible and organized trade-union movements, almost always at the national level, but the number of members of trade unions never rose so high as to comprise the great majority of the dependent sectors.

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The various social security programmes were mainly geared to the needs of the dependent middle strata, while the lower sectors benefited on a much smaller scale. The result of the immense difficulty of applying labour legislation in practice was that many such programmes were never more than the expression of a set of good intentions. Even so, for the majority of the urban lower strata this legislation, with all its imperfections, did represent the institutionalization of cash wages, the right to form trade unions, the right to equality and the right to minimum medical benefits. Least of all must it be forgotten that the legislation in question was a potent factor in the formation, within the urban environment, of the consciousness that all groups were entitled to general respect, without distinction of persons, and to equality of political rights and safeguards.

The expansion of public education, however, was restricted to the urban areas, and did not lead to the establishment of a state monopoly in this field, even where primary schooling was concerned. An analysis of school wastage ("dropping-off") figures suggests that this expansion was turned to account mainly for the middle classes, and that the benefits of the system instituted were therefore not evenly distributed throughout all the social strata. As for redistribution policy, there can be no doubt that it redounded primarily to the advantage of those same middle strata that promoted it.

The outcome of all these experiments in the field of social policy - discouraging in some cases - was that once the phase of upward mobility was over, and the middle classes embarked upon the stage of commitment, their social orientations inevitably underwent a change of emphasis and direction. Perhaps it is in this respect that their tendency to come to terms with the more or less vigorous residua of the traditional system is most clearly manifest. Far from pressing on until the "intermediary powers" of the old-time society were wiped out, the middle sectors frequently bowed to the necessity of perpetuating them. Consequently, at this stage the original equalitarian movement assumed a much more pragmatical tone. For many, universal suffrage ceased to be a basic principle, and was accepted only as a sort of inevitable instrument; the

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abuses of trade-unionism were stressed and the need to check its advances was urged; an educational policy which gave protection to private education was advocated; and, lastly, the social welfare services were often consciously accepted as a way of mitigating the supposed revolutionary tendencies of the dispossessed urban sectors and a means of avoiding unpleasantness, even if only for the time being. In this sense, the social movements of the middle class were markedly weaker during its phase of commitment than they had been during its rise to political and economic power. And one of the more extreme views advanced is actually that the prevailing attitude was a sort of fatalistic resignation to the implacable and inevitable fact of poverty. It has been said in this connexion that the initial drive for a better distribution of power, prestige and wealth gradually lost momentum, and that the middle sectors became much more interested in availing themselves of the relative advantages they had secured than in striving for a new social organization. In short, in so far as existing social mechanisms were conducive to an inequitable distribution of social duties and rewards in favour of the new middle classes, these latter showed an increasing tendency to identify themselves with the established social order and to grasp the opportunities it offered.

This analytical schema - which represents, not the specific history of any one country, but the ideal type of a process of events to which many approximated - gives us, in the final issue, what might be called, after the style of Nietzsche, a "tame middle class". But if the phrase should seem too harsh, or inappropriate to sociological analysis, the alternative would be to revert to the title of this section of the present chapter, and simply say: a faceless middle class. Necessarily faceless, because it lapsed into three kinds of resignation; resignation in the sphere of political ambition, resignation in the field of economic creation and resignation in face of the frustration of social policy.

V. THE MIDDLE CLASSES AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE

Whether it is expressly recognized or not, whether it is stated in unemotional or in impassioned terms, the fact to which no-one can be blind at the present juncture is that Latin America stands at a crossroads in its history; and that, in the last analysis, everything depends upon whether its peoples are or are not capable of remedying, once and for all, the state of dynamic weakness which has characterized economic development in the last few decades. If they can do so, they have every chance of quickly overtaking the more advanced countries of the contemporary world. If they cannot, prospect in view, alongside stagnation, is the terrifying "undiscovered country" to which the way lies through chaos, frustration and despair.

The effort to raise the region's rate of growth to the requisite level can be deferred no longer; and it entails the demolition of many of the obstacles placed in its way by the existing social structure. With one of these the foregoing pages have been concerned. It has been rightly asserted in this context that "modern production techniques have an ever-increasing need of men of initiative, drive and resolution, who are capable of taking risks and shouldering responsibility", and that "the need for these dynamic elements increases at a rate far more rapid than that of development itself".^{19/}

Furthermore, if this new phalanx of creative personalities is to come into being, a clean break must be made with all those forms of privilege that have traditionally corroded the region's indisputable heritage of initiative, mainly because the incentive of competition has been lacking. Most important of all from the historical standpoint is the disruption of the land tenure system, since the burden it represents has been carried for centuries; but it is only one among all the other forms of privilege which must be eliminated, and which include "the misuse of political power or of certain types of artificial State intervention".^{20/}

^{19/} See the document entitled Towards a dynamic development policy for Latin America (E/CN.12/680), presented at the tenth session of ECIA.

^{20/} Ibid.

What an economist with a wealth of long-accumulated experience has put so trenchantly is implied - in the slower and more circuitous fashion proper to sociological analysis - in the considerations formulated in this chapter with respect to the middle classes and the role they have played in recent years.

It is not a matter of optimism or pessimism, for there are always aspects or facets of the problem that can be viewed in either light. Undeniably, the history of Latin America as a whole during the immediate past - nearly a century - affords striking instances of creative energy, examples of outstanding personalities comparable to those that emerged elsewhere, evidence of the persevering contribution of elements classifiable as pertaining to the middle sectors. But the analysis carried out, while hinting at underlying causes, leaves no room for doubt that in the formation of the middle sectors the requisite levels of density and intensity were never attained. That is, a sufficiently close approximation to the ideal type of the creators of the great industrial societies of Europe and the United States can scarcely be said to have made its appearance. Many bold impulses yielded to the defensive permeability of the traditional structure, and, in the upshot, the tendency of the existing middle classes was to settle down to a comfortable acceptance of circumstances. It is true that the image of the faceless middle classes is particularly valid for certain countries which, by an unexpected turn of history, have drifted into a dangerous backwater of stagnation after a powerful initial effort. Conversely, it may prove totally inapplicable to those other countries which, with fewer reserves in the past, have surprisingly begun to develop by leaps and bounds of late. This contrast would seem to provide obvious confirmation of the "Hoselitz hypothesis", with its contention that a difference in quality or kind is more important than a numerical disparity. But it should not be forgotten that in the countries concerned the rising tide has coincided with the effects of social upheavals - revolutionary in some instances in the strict sense of the term - and that it is by no means clear how far influence has been exerted by the operation of "artificial"

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factors, an excess of "conjunctural capitalism", speculative or political, equally inconsistent with the normal patterns of the classic model. Both in this and in the preceding case, only the careful research at present wanting will enable us to say the last word, and thus provide us with an authentic instead of a merely approximate interpretation. The almost untouched field represented by the significance of the middle classes in Latin America during the last few decades - above all the activities and type of the entrepreneur - may still have some surprises in store when it is thoroughly explored, and compel us to formulate new interpretative hypotheses.

Nevertheless, in face of the needs of the moment, and on the basis of what is so far known of past experience, a few specific assertions may safely be hazarded.

1. The need for revitalization

(a) Economic development means, of course, so many things that from the sociological standpoint it may be regarded as the "dominant theme" of our time, in the sense that everything else is in one way or another related to it - not a function of it, as there is an incipient and dangerously erroneous tendency to suppose. But, while of so multiple a nature, it is first and foremost a problem of effective investment, a prerequisite for which is the provision of the necessary capital. This capital - apart from such funds as international co-operation may contribute - can only be supplied, in relatively poor countries, by those who at a given moment are benefiting by higher income levels and therefore have a greater capacity to save. The middle classes, and particularly the upper middle classes, cannot ignore this imperative need of our time. Should they refuse to accept the initial sacrifice involved, they will have no one but themselves to blame if, sooner or later, development is achieved in a different way, that is, through recourse to other means of building up capital.

(b) It would be a mistake, however, to believe that nothing is involved but this strictly economic factor: capital formation and investment. After their years of apathetic drifting, the middle sectors are in need

of a complete revitalization of their behaviour patterns. If they are to assume all the responsibilities incumbent upon them, their vital impulses must be quickened at the very root: desire for self-improvement, inventive ability, willingness to take risks, enjoyment of enterprise for its own sake and for what it means in terms of the welfare of all. They must accept a new discipline, if they want to earn, by their exemplary conduct, by the model which their code of moral values represents, the respect of all social classes and their co-operation in the common task. In a word, they need to re-create, in modern dress, something of what was the image - idealized, perhaps, and now vanished - of their heroic age, in the more advanced countries.

2. The middle sectors in the new circumstances

(a) It would be unfair, however, in calling for this revitalization, to make no allowance for all that has happened in the interim. Revitalization cannot consist in an effort, foredoomed to failure, to reproduce in exact facsimile a historical model, that is, one belonging to the past, and therefore obsolete today. It lies rather in adapting to new and unquestionably very different circumstances some of the impulses and values which that model embodied: those that are viable nowadays, no more and no less. The non-interventionist State of other days has vanished; the former "captain of industry" type of entrepreneur exists no longer; the purely humanistic educational ideal is a thing of the past. Yet many of the values contributed by the bourgeoisie - something more than a class: a pattern of civilization and a human ideal - still survive, inasmuch as they are a long-standing precipitate of history, or rather, of its most shining and creative moments. Nothing worth while can be said of the needful revitalization of the middle sectors in Latin America without some knowledge of the substance and requirements of our epoch. And our epoch, subject to an inexorable process of rationalization and organization, demands that we accept it and face up to it as such, but also that we should be able to cope with all its undeniable hazards.

The inventive capacity and creative imagination of the new middle classes will have to work through the State, whose intervention may

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nowadays be "beneficent" and "maleficent" at one and the same time; for the State of today, even if it wishes to do so, cannot fold its arms and look on at the spontaneous process of economic life. But it is one thing to load off all responsibilities on to the State, and quite another to use its greater elevation as a vantage - point from which to view the economic activities of all as a single whole. And this over-all view is nothing more or less than what is nowadays called programming or planning, which consists everywhere - but especially in the case of developing countries - simply in knowing one's road and one's goal, that is, having in mind a clearly conceived and formulated list of targets and instruments. The "creative capacity" of the middle sectors does not disappear in a programmed economy. In the first place, these sectors have the necessary knowledge for the study and formulation of a programme; to them, too, belong the means of immediately filling in the outlines traced in the plans for both public and private activity. The democratic State bases its action on a minimum of compulsion, but, on the other hand, offers human inventiveness - "innovation" again - a wide range of mechanisms within the domains of incentive and inducement. The task that lies immediately ahead of what has hitherto been termed the middle class - and not, of course, of the middle class alone - consists entirely in zealous utilization of the opportunities offered by political action to create new procedures within the sphere of democratic State activity, new methods of persuasion, encouragement and regulation; so that economic policy - or over-all policy, if it is so desired - may make the State an efficacious and rational instrument, without turning it into the inhuman Juggernaut which, given the slightest chance, it always, and especially nowadays, tends to become.

The maintenance of the programming State, within the limits set by human freedom, is in itself a task of "innovation" which the middle classes must undertake in close co-operation with the so-called "popular" sectors.

(b) Today no country that is striving to increase its rate of development can reckon with the old type of entrepreneur - the proprietor, organizer and absolute director of his own industry or activity. All the Western

/countries have,

countries have, of course, entrepreneurs of the most varied types, and even the "small" entrepreneur of classic terminology has by no means died out. But - not to go over the whole story again - the predominant figure is the new manager type associated with the directorate system. In this field likewise the mechanical imitation to which so many extension courses on "organization of enterprises" are geared is quite impracticable. Here again the inventive ability of the revitalized middle sectors will encounter a new challenge. As in the case of technique, organization too must be worked out on the spot, that is, with due regard for very specific and peculiar circumstances. The vigorous initiative of the new dynamic personalities our time requires - men full of "drive and resolution" - now finds its typical line of battle among the new patterns of "organization" called for in private activity, alongside the public activity to which allusion was previously made.

But in addition, while it seems inevitable that the organization man should be the figurehead of our day, in the present phase of post-bourgeois culture that is spreading everywhere, this necessity is certainly not one to be lightly and casually accepted. So that if in the very places where it is most markedly in evidence concern is shown to soften its "depersonalizing" aspects without attempting the impossible feat of eliminating it, in those parts of the world where it is beginning to make itself felt, formulas whereby the inevitable tension it involves can be rendered humanly bearable may perhaps be easier to discover. Would not this be another stimulating task for the new dynamic figures in our culture?

(c) The old extemporization myths have also collapsed, and hardly any common soldier carries a marshal's baton in his knapsack. The technical structure of our time - the economy in the first place - cannot be maintained without arduous training. It is at the present juncture that the meaning of education in modern societies has penetrated the consciousness of all their members. And it is therefore now that in the less advanced countries the close interdependence of education and economic development has just become a recognized fact. Much could be said, of course, on this point, but reference to it will more than suffice. The

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crux of the matter is that much of the revitalization of the middle sectors under discussion here can be effected only through a complete and appropriate "revitalization" of education. The new scientists, the new technicians, the new organizers, the new political leaders, must be the product of a mighty educational effort, which will have to be sustained - it would be foolish to pretend otherwise, for time presses - to the limits of exhaustion. This is what has been done elsewhere.

3. Internal tensions in the task of the new middle classes

If the work of planning must be done by all and for all, from top to bottom and vice versa - if it is to be democratic, that is - and if "organization" must be kept human, the strongest pillars of these democratic values can only be, by virtue of their upbringing and the tradition in which they are steeped, the best representatives of the educated middle classes. Will not this, after all, be asking too much? May not such a task put too great a strain on the good will of the new personalities we need? No. Hard work is man's work, and men have never shrunk from doing it at any of the great moments in history. But this does not mean that the inevitable internal tensions it involves cannot and should not be foreseen and pointed out in time.

The first of them has long existed, although only now is it becoming acutely apparent. It consists in the fact that if the educated members of the middle sectors must constitute the mainspring of sustained innovation, they are on the other hand, at the same time, the sole buttresses of tradition, of the eternally valid elements that all tradition embodies. To be a traditionalist is and always has been anachronistic, but every tradition, stripped of its outdated results and outworn externals, represents the thread of continuity which all who are true to their own humanity will accept.

The second was formulated in the abstract at the very start, and has since been repeatedly touched on in various concrete allusions. It is the tension typical of the Western man, or, in other words, of the man of modern times, who has been able to walk the tightrope for a while, but is now veering perilously over to one side or the other. It derives from

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the latent and insuperable contradiction between the codifying and impersonal tendencies of the inevitable rationalization process, and the no less enduring bent of the ideal of "personality". It is the tension, as was previously remarked, between the "organization" and the "individual" as a unique and irreplaceable entity.

The third derives from the structure and operation of modern industrial societies, which, while on the one hand they are "mass societies", are also, on the other, "societies of élites". This, perhaps even more than the two preceding forms of tension, deserves to be studied with greater care and detail than would be appropriate here. But a few concise allusions seemed better than dead silence, for keeping silence on this matter is tantamount to shutting our eyes to the truth, just at a time when some are being called upon to undertake a truly herculean task.

Chapter V

EVOLUTION AND INTEGRATION OF THE URBAN LOWER STRATA

1. General conditions

The rapid growth of the primate cities was accompanied by a significant increase in the number of persons and households constituting the lower echelons of the urban stratification system. Study has often been devoted to the problem of these dependent urban sectors and of the creation of a labour force fitted for the purposes of industrial development, the focal point of the analysis being the adaptation of workers, as individual human beings, to modern structures of production. It has repeatedly been asserted that the worker whose behaviour pattern shows the closest relation to the industrial order is the one who spends most of his lifetime doing the same job, generally in the same firm or industry. In the light of this criterion, the available data suggest that genuine commitment to industrial living patterns is to be found only in very limited sectors of the urban labour force. The difficulties derive in part from the need to turn what was originally agricultural manpower into a disciplined industrial labour force, capable of adapting itself permanently to a new way of life. The agricultural worker, tied to his household and his village, with his narrow horizons and his activities determined by the rhythm of the seasons, is drawn into a world of new incentives, governed by different rules and norms of conduct. Industrial routine is determined by technology, not by natural phenomena. The worker's remuneration for his toil is in great measure proportionate to his own skill and effort. The process of adjustment is not easy, and is frequently cited as one of the most formidable obstacles to development.

As has often been remarked, the workers in question remain marginal to the environment they enter, and take only a faint interest in communal problems, whether these relate to work itself or to labour action.

During the period covered by the present study, the expansion of skilled occupations lagged far behind that of unskilled or traditional jobs. Low productivity was the general rule in enterprises, so that, in conjunction with the prevailing economic instability, it directly affected the operation of the labour market. As a result, the essential characteristics of the labour

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force were its low level of skills and its lack of stability. Furthermore, these two distinctive features were closely inter-related, each reinforcing the other. The almost universal mediocrity of labour skills gave rise to complex problems. Vocational training was often poorly organized, quantitatively inadequate and out of line with the real requirements of the industries that were being established; in many instances, it was almost non-existent, except in the form of in-service training.

Although both the State and private enterprise showed signs of interest in the training of industrial manpower, their aims in this direction very seldom found concrete expression in systematic measures, and where these did exist, their scope was limited, so that today the need for a group of highly-skilled workers accustomed to the discipline of organized industry still makes itself felt. The solution of the so-called "human problems" of the enterprise was often left to chance, in the hope that the introduction of modern techniques must surely evoke a spontaneous response on the part of the urban population in general and the lower strata in particular. More often than not, the low productivity of industrial manpower came to be fatalistically accepted as an unfortunate fact that only the natural course of events could alter. Although the commitment of the dependent urban sectors to the requirements of modern industry is of unquestionable importance for the development process, the problem must be considered as only one aspect of a much more complex and general phenomenon. The incorporation of new social strata and groups into the institutions of a national community involves not only the formation of the manpower resources required for the efficient operation of modern productive activities, but also the education of individual human beings capable of acting intelligently in relation to the whole set of social and political institutions pertaining to a society motivated by change and creative capacity, in which modern industrial structures, far from representing sporadic grafts, express or constitute, and day by day put into effect, the values and prospects of the entire system.

2. Origins of Latin American Trade-Unionism

As a manifestation of the labour movement in Latin America, trade-unionism dates from the beginning of the century. In Argentina and Chile, organizations of railway workers - engine-drivers and stokers - made their appearance in the middle of the eighteen-eighties. In the same period, important printers' and bakers' organizations also existed. As from the early years of the century, the trade unions known as mancomunales formed by the Chilean nitrate workers began to play an extremely important role.

Not only was the labour movement organized with little delay, but the scope of its activities was far-reaching. In 1913, the dock labourers of Callao, in Peru, organized the first general movement in that country in favour of an eight-hour day. In Argentina, Chile, Cuba and Uruguay, workers of the same type played a leading part in the wave of strikes which followed the First World War. In Mexico in 1910, before the fall of Porfirio Díaz, the miners and textile workers were among the first organized groups, and led important strikes.

To give a better understanding of this trade-unionism, which constituted the origin of the labour movement in Latin America, two features that may help to define its nature have often been described: (a) the type of worker who joined such organizations; and (b) the ideological and political orientation of the trade unions in question.

The groups concerned were composed mainly of workers whose types of job resembled the traditional artisan activity. Rather than workmen proper, therefore, they were practically semi-craftsmen, with a clear awareness of their position as "producers". If in addition it is borne in mind that in some countries the trade union movement was influenced, when it was not organized, by groups of European immigrants, who transported to the New World the ideological orientations which at that time characterized the labour movement in their own countries of origin, it will not seem surprising that a distinctive feature of the earliest trade unions was the possession of a strong working-class consciousness. This class consciousness found expression in ideologies which held that in one way or another it would be possible to remodel society on the basis of a working-class culture arising and developing out of the trade union itself.

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Moreover, as some writers have pointed out, 1/ it is highly likely that the revolutionary bias - carried almost to extremes - which characterized the early trade-union organizations is linked to these latter's weakness as a group vis-à-vis the rest of society. The success of their struggle at the occupational and economic levels can be seen to have fluctuated in proportion to their degree of weakness as a power group. This prompted them to reject the prevailing system outright and to conceive of an ideal society in which the worker, the "producer", would be the basic element.

The characteristic trade union of the period under discussion represented what might well be called a trade-unionism of militant campaigners of élites. One of its most original manifestations was the tendency to create a working-class culture finding expression in an "academy of letters", in a working-class theatre, literature and journalism. It is a significant social fact that the influence of ideas of this type was not confined to the popular sectors; it spread to certain groups of intellectuals in the middle strata whose thinking and action were directed towards the ideal of a reform of society on "labourist" bases. From the identification of the middle-class intellectuals with the incipient trade-union movement arose the conception of a "labour policy" which denounced capitalism and was inspired by a rather muddled humanitarianism. The ultimate objective of this policy was a sweeping institutional reform in line with such ideological conceptions,

3. Labourism in politics

The influence of "labourism" on the political movements of the rising middle classes helped to determine, as has already been pointed out, the orientation of the "progressivism" of the social sectors in question, and, in some instances, to facilitate joint action, as well as a relative identity of aims and proposals. In some countries, significant nuclei of young intellectuals in the middle strata, deriving their support and inspiration

1/ Alain Touraine and Bernard Mottez, "Classe ouvrière et société globale" Traité de Sociologie du Travail, G. Friedman and P. Naville, Librairie Armand Colin, Paris, 1962, Vol. II, p. 264.

from the incipient labour movement, wholly repudiated the traditional order of society. Starting from the idea that they were living in an "epoch of revolution", ready to break with the past, and directing the best of their thinking towards the thoroughgoing social reform they envisaged, many of these intellectuals became the leaders of the budding labour movement; while others managed to guide and channel the political movements of the middle sectors - which were just then seeking to increase their participation in power structures - along more or less similar lines.

It must be pointed out that these early programmes of political action, formulated in terms of "social claims" and based on a variety of vague and contradictory ideological models, were more often than not the expression of an intention to promote a sweeping reform of social structures. Such programmes were indubitably the outcome of a certain community of orientations among the lower strata, headed by the first labour organizations, and a number of intellectuals in the middle sectors. If the recent evolution of some Latin American countries is considered, it will be possible to discover, in many of their aspirations towards industrialization, the traces of the urge to social reform represented by the labour ideologies of the trade-unionism of élites. And in the end that urge became identified with the process of political and economic upward mobility of the middle strata.

In the analysis of the role of the popular sectors in the development of Latin America, sufficient attention has not always been devoted to the fact that the initial stimulus in the process of social reform often came from the ideologies and patterns of action adopted by the labour trade unions in their early stages. No modern industry as yet existed, nor even any plan to establish it, when certain nuclei of workers in Latin America had already picked up the social ideologies propagated by European industrialism and were dreaming of a reorganization of society and devising the models on which it could be based, while at the same time they were creating the labour institutions on which would devolve the task of reform.

It should not therefore be supposed that the incentive in question came merely from imitation of the modern productive organization to be found in the developed countries, or from the fact that the organized intellectuals

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favoured the establishment of an industrial society, or from the motivations peculiar to the entrepreneurial sectors. It would be nearer the truth to say that industrialization also assumes the guise of one aspect and one phase of the "revolutionary" proposal to build "new societies", with which the development policies formulated in Latin America were invariably concerned. Even if only in passing, attention must be drawn to the probability that the influence exerted by the trade-unionism of élites did much to foment the intention to break with traditionalism, and that its effects were passed on to the middle strata through those nuclei of intellectuals which had at the time identified themselves with the objectives of the labour movement in the realm of social reform.

4. The paradox of Latin American Trade-unionism

The trade-unionism of militant campaigners or élites was replaced by a trade-union organization similar in its formal aspects to the bureaucratic models of the developed countries. It should be pointed out, however, that there is no type of structure peculiar to the new trade-unionism. In those countries and places where well-defined industries are to be found, an industrial trade union tends to develop. Where industry and technological development are less important - a state of affairs which often implies the existence of small-scale enterprises - and where a large number of occupations are carried on in a single locality, the model is more commonly a trade-unionism of the general type. 2/

It should be stressed that in the case of Latin America the change that came about was not the work of the trade unions themselves, since it was generally effected on the initiative of the State. For social policy purposes, and with the intention of exercising some sort of control over the new groups, the State took pains to establish regulations for labour organizations while at the same time guaranteeing the right of workers to form associations in the defence of their interests. It is worth while to underline two factors which directly affected the structure and orientation

2/ Walter Galenson, Labor and Economic Development, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York, 1959, p. 10.

adopted by the workers' organizations. In the first place, the new trade union structure was not a product of the trade-union organizations, which would have sought patterns of organization more consonant with the new economic and social conditions. Secondly, whatever its declared intention, if the nature of trade union legislation is studied it is readily conceivable that the control of labour movements through special laws and institutions was a highly important motive. In view of the political potential of the trade unions, the State often tended to encourage a particular trade union model as part of its new policy of social organization. 3/

In contrast to the order of events in Europe, the bureaucratic trade union preceded industrialism, just as labour legislation and social policy came before industry. Labour legislation and social policy were probably the result of the particular power constellation to which the growth of Latin America's pre-industrial primate cities gave rise. This is the only possible explanation of the apparently curious fact that in many cases the State initiated an active policy to promote trade-union organizations in the big urban agglomerations even before a real body of industrial workers existed. As has been pointed out with reference to Brazil, "the development of trade-unionism preceded that of the labour movement". 4/

The intensity of State action varied in accordance with local conditions. In some countries the political authorities interested themselves in the organization not only of trade unions but also of trade-union federations or central headquarters, and at times even went so far as to incorporate them in the State machinery. In other instances the State facilitated, or at least permitted, the establishment of workers' federations. But whatever the extent to which the State promoted workers' organizations in the large towns, the power-groups - especially those originating in the middle sectors, which were also conscious of the political potential of the trade-union

3/ See, in this connexion, Robert J. Alexander, Labor Relations in Argentina, Brazil and Chile, New York, 1962, pp. 13-17, and "Algunas características generales del movimiento obrero en Latinoamérica", Política, No. 16, Caracas, June-July 1961, p. 94; and Azis Simao, "Industrialization et syndicalism au Brésil", Sociologie du Travail, No. 4, October-December 1961, p. 67.

4/ See Alain Touraine, "Industrialisation et conscience ouvrière a São Paulo", Sociologie du Travail, No. 4, October-December 1961, p. 88.

organizations - often endeavoured to join up with them, in order to facilitate their own access to power or consolidate their position.

5. Special features of the formation of working-class consciousness in Latin America

To understand the existing trade union situation in Latin America a number of prior considerations must be taken into account. 5/ The development of the "industrial trade union" or the "general trade union" as against the "militant trade union" was not merely the result of the imposition (often by the State) of a structure or pattern of organization which in no way corresponded to the real situation of the labour sectors. The problem is more complex than this, and it may be that its solution does not lie simply in consideration of what might be termed a "worker status" or, consequently, in an analysis confined to the trade union itself, but that it is necessary to tackle the subject of social change and, in that context, endeavour to understand the trade union and the labour movement in its entirety.

The labour sector may be described as in process of formation in almost all the Latin American countries. Its orientations are in all probability largely determined not only by its situation as such, but also by its position within national societies, of which one of the characteristic features is the ambivalence deriving from simultaneous crisis and growth.

It has often been assumed that both in its attitudes and in its modes of action the Latin American working class would proceed as did its European prototype at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. The reason why its development has lagged behind would seem to be that the workers are still tied, up to a point, to the patterns of living and thinking characteristic of the pre-industrial environment from which they come. Touraine, although acknowledging that the transition from one cultural and social milieu to another is an essential factor in the analysis of the situation, notes that this explanation seems to him inadequate. In

5/ The remarks which follow constitute a generalization based on the analytical propositions set forth by Alain Touraine, *loc. cit.*, pp. 77-95. Although it relates to the situation in Brazil, this article affords an original and suggestive approach to the case of Latin America as a whole.

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his view, the crux of the matter is that in Latin America's case it is impossible to speak of a normal "industrial situation" in which new members of the class in process of formation would gradually be incorporated.

In considering the characteristics of urban society in the majority of the Latin American countries, it is of paramount importance to note the existence of a gap or time-lag between economic life on the one hand and social and cultural life on the other. In Europe, as is well known, social democracy was won by slow degrees, and mass culture is a recent development emerging only after a long history of economic development and political change. Conversely, in most of the urban societies of Latin America, "democracy", or rather, mass culture, can be seen to have made more rapid strides than strictly economic development.

Such and no other is the situation into which the new body of workers, mainly the product of immigration, is incorporated. As the urban centre of attraction often fails to satisfy the aspirations of the flow of immigrants, urban problems are of the first importance, and usually have repercussions on the labour situation, determining the orientations of these new workers.

The fact that the new labour sectors are formed in large measure through immigration therefore provides another element of decisive importance for an understanding of the present trade union situation. Thus, the new groups of workers adopt a series of attitudes vis-à-vis the urban world that embody the underlying reasons for their behaviour patterns.

Touraine points out that these attitudes develop at the following three levels:

- (a) The individual search for economic benefits;
- (b) A specific solidarity, or rather, a sense of belonging to primary groups, so that action is not motivated by ideological principles or by consciousness of the aims and strategy of the labour struggle;
- (c) The image of society which these workers form is based rather on the contraposition of social levels than on class conflicts, and is therefore of an agricultural rather than an industrial type.

/It is

It is awareness of being "poor", of belonging to the "people" as against the "gentry", etc.

"These attitudes at three levels, these three frames of reference for action, may come into conflict and may also operate in combination. The trade union, for example, appears at once as an instrument in the service of personal interest, as an expression of the solidarity of the primary working group and as a manifestation of the clash of interests between social levels, between the people and their masters. But this multiformity of trade union action is also its weakness, since its different levels are not unified within the framework of a stable class consciousness". 6/

6. The functions of the "Industrial trade union"
in the social history of Latin America

The situation described made the "industrial trade union" or the "general trade union" a workable proposition. As organizational models, both had a typically bureaucratic structure, consisting in a nucleus of leaders who were the statutory depositaries of multiple functions and powers - who were, in a word, responsible for trade union management - over against a heterogeneous mass of members with different jobs and skills. But the new trade union cannot be said to have represented "mass trade-unionism" in contrast with the former "minority trade-unionism". The new system of trade-union organization led to the purely formal affiliation of a large number of workers, whereas personal commitment to the trade union really involved only a minority.

The trade union turned into a medium for the distribution of "services" and became primarily an instrument for the solution of the individual and collective problems of wage-earners. The "bureaucratization of the trade-union cadres" so often referred to would thus seem to be a consequence of this situation, which entails handling "machinery", rather than leading social movements.

6/ Alain Touraine, loc. cit., p. 82.

The leaders of general trade unions were often able to fulfill, among other functions, that of serving as a bridge between a virtually marginal population and the institutions proper to the national society. This was one of the eminently integrative functions which devolved upon the leaders under the trade union régime. Perhaps the active part that many of them played in politics, within the established social canons, is the best testimony to the integrative character of these new groups of labour leaders. Nor is it surprising that in such circumstances their political importance was enhanced, especially vis-à-vis the middle-class groups. To enjoy the support of the trade union leaders meant in practice having "labour backing", and this very quickly involved the leaders in question in the play of political interests, sometimes affecting the internal cohesion of the workers' organizations. In their turn, the leaders had to combine their roles as political campaigners and as trade union leaders in conjunctures so difficult that it was often almost impossible to reconcile conflicting demands and expectations.

It should be noted, moreover, that, as was pointed out in earlier chapters, industrialization and the new institutions established gradually created, alongside the trade unions, other ties between the broad masses of the population and the national institutions. While it is true that in many instances a basic industrial labour sector began to take shape, the rapid growth of the primate cities led to the formation of a heterogeneous lower stratum in which the members of trade unions were a minority.

The policy of the trade-unionism of élites, whose action was based on the assumption that trade unions as such could attempt to bring about a radical reform of the social system, gradually lost strength, and was confined by preference to securing all the economic advantages which the existing social system could offer the lower strata of the population. This tendency to avail themselves of the various possibilities of securing economic gains through social institutions often coincided with the "reformist" and "progressivist" leanings of the middle strata, and frequently enabled trade union leaders and middle-class political nuclei to arrive at a sort of compromise beneficial to both parties.

It more than once happened that the broad masses of the urban population, including the members of trade unions, instead of acting only
/within the

within the framework of their organizations, became committed to all kinds of political movements, headed in most cases by local or national leaders or caudillos. On other occasions, even in highly critical circumstances, the claims of trade union leaders were not given sufficient support by the basic strata of their organizations. Thus it was often possible to influence the labour sectors even with relatively little recourse to the trade union organizations.

The beginnings of an explanation may be found in the fact, already noted, that the fundamental problems of the new sectors derived from their situation in the urban environment rather than from their position as industrial workers. The most serious of these problems was frequently poverty, and it could be solved only by political means, inasmuch as in most cases trade unionism offered no speedy remedy. Thus, in the absence of political organizations through which their claims could be channelled, the new groups of workers turned to other drastic alternatives, such as, for example, caudillismo.

Both the over-all inflationary situation existing in many of the Latin American countries, and the characteristics of urban under-employment and unemployment, exerted a decisive influence on the nature of trade union policy in respect of economic claims. As a result, the struggle to improve wages turned into an endeavour to maintain their current purchasing power. Furthermore, the trade union organizations had to recognize that what the workers en masse most desperately wanted was permanent employment and security of tenure in their jobs, even in extreme cases where wage levels were kept down and their purchasing power in many instances decreased.

7. Organized trade unionism and marginal urban strata

A striking point that emerges when the general effects of development and industrialization on Latin America's urban lower strata are considered is the fact that a relatively homogeneous working class with industrial employment as its hub is still an exceptional phenomenon. As already pointed out, there are indications that the growth of the urban popular

/sectors outstripped

sectors outstripped unionization. The result would seem to have been that a large number of individual members of those strata remained entirely dissociated from workers' organizations, a state of affairs which seems to have persisted throughout the growth process of the primate cities. If to this is added the formation of a segregated urban population - a typical feature of the development of the primate cities of the region to which allusion has already been made - the new popular sectors present a picture in which the dominant characteristics would seem to be heterogeneity of situations, the absence of any general and permanent system of leadership, political backwardness among the lower strata, and, in many cases, a rudimentary level of urban consciousness.

On the basis of these features, and of degrees of incorporation into national institutions, some analytical distinctions can be established whereby the several sectors making up the lower strata of the population can be more clearly differentiated. The following would seem to be the groups or sectors that can be singled out:

(a) Unionized popular sectors

This category is composed mainly of workers holding permanent jobs in large and medium-sized enterprises, possessing - at least on an average - certain minimum skills, and as a rule enjoying living conditions above subsistence levels;

(b) Non-unionized popular sectors

This category comprises workers employed in all sorts of small industrial and business concerns, workshops, repair jobs, services and construction, as well as hawkers and peddlers and odd-job-men in general. To this group should be added certain kinds of craftsmen, especially those whose type of work virtually precludes their incorporation in the modern industrial productive organization. Probably, the average levels of skill of the non-unionized workers are no lower than those characterizing the preceding category, nor are their skills different in kind from those required in complex productive organizations. Although their levels of living vary, in a large number of cases they fall below subsistence levels.

/(c) Marginal

(c) Marginal popular sectors

These usually consist of more or less unskilled types of worker, non-unionized and living below subsistence levels. One of their main characteristics is that they inhabit socially segregated urban settlements. This ecological feature helps to distinguish them from the other popular sectors.

With respect to the last category defined, it should be borne in mind that in many Latin American cities differing degrees of marginality have appeared, in so far as in some instances the segregation of the settlements referred to is no longer carried to extremes. But what is characteristic of these sectors, apart from their poverty and ignorance, is their unending struggle to obtain a place where they can make a permanent home, a roof to shelter them and certain basic urban services.

As was previously noted, for these sectors the problems of urban life acquire a greater importance than work problems proper. Consequently, the aim of the collective associations established is not to defend labour interests, but to improve the housing situation, and, in general, to secure conditions that will enable their members to survive in an urban environment which often seems hostile to them.

Such organizations, which generally by-passed the basic legal statutes and norms prevailing in national societies, finally obtained recognition. It might even be said that at times situations were tolerated, as exceptions, which infringed the most generally-accepted principles of society; cases in point were the practice of "squatting", the creation and adoption of authorities with no legal status, and a number of other veritable anomalies. In recent years, the political and administrative authorities have devoted a great deal of attention to this problem. Most social welfare programmes are seriously concerned with the right of such groups to survival.

The segregated urban nuclei acquire organizational patterns which paradoxically help, it would seem, to strengthen their condition and consciousness of marginality. This is precisely because it is as marginal groups that they make contact with the urban environment. It is therefore

/not surprising

not surprising that the highest degree of consciousness of marginality is found among the leaders of such organizations, whose task it is to establish a liaison between the group they represent and the rest of the urban structure.

8. Incorporation of the urban popular sectors into national societies

No analysis of the broader features of the incorporation of dependent urban sectors into the institutions of a national society could omit reference to the expansion of educational and social services in the primate cities, to the participation of the broad masses in the goods and services markets, to the effects of communication media and, in general, to the influence of the several component elements of modern life, absorption of which is more often than not involuntary. In an attempt to define this phenomenon, it has been described as "exposure to modernity".

A glance at the available data reveals the striking progress achieved in the primate cities of Latin America in respect of education, social services, the incorporation of new sectors into the market and mass communication facilities. Great as have been the efforts made, however, it must be borne in mind that their operation has been relatively slow and that in many instances the looked-for results have not made themselves felt as quickly as was to be desired, particularly where the promotion of social mobility was concerned. At first, one of the fundamental aims pursued in State programmes of social policy was that of enabling the broad masses of the urban population to participate actively in the institutions of the national system. The various ideologies stressed the value of equality in the ideal organization of the urban community. Accordingly, the dependent sectors were granted new rights, and care was thus taken that their incorporation should be gradually and progressively effected and that too drastic a change in the existing system should be as far as possible avoided.

This undeniable original urge towards equality was to be modified later, and it was sometimes tacitly admitted that certain conditions - poverty for example - would continue to be permanent features of the /social organization.

social organization. Consequently, State action - especially with regard to education, social security services and wage policy - was basically directed towards the improvement of the existing situation, although this often failed to imply the immediate creation of new social standards on the basis of which a more competitive society and a higher degree of social mobility could be established.

In brief, it may be estimated that large sectors of the population living in the primate cities of Latin America were composed of marginal workers and consumers, and that a substantial proportion of the population in question, although availing itself of some of the advantages of the town, did not really participate in the values and standards that characterize urban culture. Analysis of the school attendance levels attained shows that only exceptionally had absolute illiteracy been brought under control, and that, if the total number of those who relapsed into illiteracy for want of practice is taken into account, it may reasonably be supposed that the real percentage of the population able to read and write was much smaller than official statistics suggest. Wastage ("dropping-off") in urban primary schools reflected not only the harshness of the social and economic conditions prevailing in the large towns, but also certain structural limitations of the educational system. The other manifestations of State social policy, despite the efforts made, and largely because of the magnitude of the problems concerned, could afford no more than relative relief of the hardships to which the popular sectors were exposed.

At the beginning of the sixties, it could be seen that access to the opportunities and advantages which the national system was able to provide for its members still operated basically through institutions linked to class structures. 7/ Thus, for example, among the popular sectors an important role was discharged by the trade unions and by the associations which the inhabitants of "marginal settlements" established, among other

7/ In this connexion, see R. Bendiz and S. Roka, The Extension of National Citizenship to the Lower Classes: A Comparative Prospective, Fifth World Congress of Sociology, Washington, 1962, pp. 34-35, for suggested classifications. Reference may also be made to W. Kornhauser, Politics of Mass Society, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1960, chapter 2.

organizations. In short, social mobility was generally the result of efforts made by organized groups, which in one way or another contrived to secure greater advantages under the existing social system. On the other hand, the conditions that permit increased individual mobility did not yet seem to count for much in Latin America.

9. Prospects

For the attainment and implementation of development targets and programmes, the political, economic and social integration of the lower population strata would seem to be a vital need at the present time.

As far as social policy is concerned, the various programmes under way in the education, health and housing sectors represent considerable strides in the right direction. On the other hand, the improvement of income levels in the lowest sectors of the social stratification system is one of the measures urgently required to promote the more active participation of the urban popular sectors in economic life.

The problem that often looms largest is that of the incorporation and integration of the workers' organizations as such. Originally, the labour movement displayed, more often than not, a marked bias towards repudiation both of the economic and of the political and social systems in force. The role of the trade union is essentially one of opposition. As has been shown, this policy often coincides with a situation in which the workers as a class carry little weight in relation to society as a whole. Nevertheless, the popular sectors' acquisition of decisive importance both in the economy and in the power system is now a fait accompli. The problems of production and economic progress, for example, are currently one of the basic concerns of the organized labour movement, and this has led the workers to abandon their initial position of outright repudiation in favour of an attitude of readiness at least to compromise with regard to the pursuit of certain ends, at the level both of the enterprise and of society, the results of which would seriously affect the movement.

As is already apparent in the more developed countries, the labour movement should be regarded at the present time as one of the constitutive elements of the enterprise and a basic factor in economic planning.

/Commitment patterns

Commitment patterns must obviously make allowance for the peculiar characteristics of Latin American trade-unionism, since it would be a waste of effort to attempt to enforce patterns which, although they have been successful elsewhere, may not work in Latin America. The further studies required on the Latin American labour movement therefore cease to be a matter of purely academic interest, and come to constitute a sine qua non for the creative participation of the workers and their organizations.

Chapter VI

THE NEW IDEOLOGIES AND POLITICAL ACTION

1. Social history as a branch of knowledge: significance of its absence

The lack of studies on the social history of the development of the Latin American countries, especially as regards the period embracing the two world wars, is a factor which has greatly increased the difficulty of understanding the process in question. Such historical studies as exist are usually confined to the field of political activity in the strict sense of the words, seldom deal with the evolution of economic institutions and only in exceptional cases are concerned with social history. As a rule, moreover, the written history of the Latin American countries goes no farther than the nineteenth century or the beginning of the twentieth, so that only in a very few instances have the recent origins and initial studies of the contemporary processes of social change and reform been expounded and analysed. All the more justifiably can it be said that research on specific social groups, the evolution of institutions, the formation, nature and effect of ideologies in relation to the development of Latin American national structures, has yet to be undertaken. Some of the misapprehensions as to the significance of industrialization in the development of these countries are imputable to the lack of a sound historical conception of the social processes that took place during the first part of the twentieth century. The copious research already conducted in the field of economics and the recent, although scanty, sociological studies carried out pose dilemmas and propound alternatives to which no adequate answer can be found without a thorough knowledge of the evolution of the institutions and the social and ideological forces which have conditioned and are still conditioning the course of events. Briefly, the fact is that economic and sociological research, whatever the number, depth and scope of the studies undertaken, has not made it possible to evaluate

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the significance of the partial phenomena examined within the broader framework of the gradual metamorphosis of traditional society. It therefore seems reasonable to suppose that the satisfactory application and reinterpretation of scientific, economic and sociological models calls for a comprehensive view of the trends of social processes in all their complexity. Such a synthesis can only be formulated on the basis of the approaches and analyses proper to modern social history.

2. The importance of the twenties

Within the almost total want of research on the social history of the Latin American countries since they acquired the status of independent nations, the twenties seem to be the decade of crucial importance for the subsequent development of the countries in question. The present situation probably has its immediate roots in the period at the end of the First World War. The disruption of the traditional order in Europe seems to have had a profound effect on most of the Latin American countries, and to have unleashed a phase of veritably revolutionary unrest. It is possible to trace the part played by the Soviet revolution, by the European labour movement and by socialism in the break with traditional values. During the twenties, trade-unionism in Latin America began to gain ground. From that time dates the forging of a sense of the "historical destiny" of the Latin American republics on the part of the new middle sectors of society, particularly the intellectuals. The image of a decadent Europe, worn out by the horrors of war, as against the emergence of the young and vigorous peoples of Latin America, exerted a considerable influence on the new generations and on those social sectors whose modes of thought and action were to pervade the twenties. If it is borne in mind that these generations were largely responsible for leading and channelling the process of development and modernization, the repercussions of those troubled years on the subsequent evolution of the political, social and economic institutions of the Latin American countries can readily be imagined. The great ideological dichotomies of the period continued to make their influence felt in the successive social changes whose effect was so particularly striking in the large urban agglomerations.

/The men

The men of the twenties had to face a breakdown of the systems of political ideas traditionally prevalent in their countries since the time of the independence movement itself. Liberalism and conservatism, by whose principles the struggle for power and for State control had been governed for nearly a hundred years, were unable to cope with the fresh problems emanating from the catastrophe in Europe, and Latin America opened its gates to new influences which very soon produced results. Nevertheless, social conditions and forces - to some extent the outcome of the changes that took place - generated orientations which did not always correspond in practice to the political doctrines professed. The recurrence of such anomalies led to the formation of ideological models in which rational and irrational elements existed side by side, and which did much to determine the policy of the new social forces.

3. The problem of ideologies and development

The assertion that we are living in a post-ideological epoch is probably valid for countries that have attained a high level of industrialization, but the same cannot be said of those others which have barely started or are about to embark on the modernization of traditional structures. It has been pointed out that the ideological models linked to development are different from those formulated or engendered in nineteenth-century Europe. While the latter were of a universalist and humanistic nature, markedly intellectual and with a strong equalitarian and liberal bias, the new ideologies are focussed on economic growth and national power. Thus they would seem to constitute instruments precisely calculated to facilitate development and to have been fashioned in many cases by the leaders and guides of modernization themselves, in accordance with the needs and requirements of their political activity.^{1/} All this makes it impossible to ignore the importance of ideologies for development. Is rapid development feasible on the basis of democratic institutions? Conversely, would it be so in an authoritarian social structure? Implicit in the reply to these questions are the underlying assumptions of all economic and social policies within contemporary patterns of State organization. How far should the people's voluntary choice and will to self-sacrifice be relied

^{1/} See D. Bell, The End of Ideology, Collier Books, New York, 1961, pp. 397 and 398.

upon, and how far the authoritarian action of the State? How much coercion and how much persuasion is needed for the attainment of the targets established under a development plan?

Ideologies have by their very nature a political content which seeks expression in action. Their success will largely depend upon their capacity to channel individual behaviour towards the creation of institutions and the attainment of targets. It might be said that they are not operative in the world of ideas alone, but work changes in people, and that this partly accounts for the presence of irrational elements in their internal composition. Political orientations and modernization processes in general are fundamentally linked to the recruitment of the lower sectors in support of new aims and values, and here the role played by ideologies is of capital importance.

It is worth while to stress that ideologies are not mere flights of fancy, but rather the product of historical experience. While expressing and interpreting this experience, they cannot but incorporate, consciously or unconsciously, some part of its emotional content. It is no easy task to adjust ideologies to possible or real aims, to the means available, and at the same time to translate them into programmes of political action. This adjustment is usually feasible only when both the ideas concerned and the significance attributed to events and behaviour have undergone a process of decantation after what might be called a political and economic "maturation period".

The dichotomy between the tenets professed and rational political action is distinctly complex. On the one hand, historical experience is not a mere set of memories accumulated in the course of time, but leaves its traces in institutions, values, motivations, social forces and patterns of conflict; on the other hand, ideologies, which play an effective role in the crucial stages of the development process, seem to be firmly rooted in specific groups and institutions. The co-ordination of the aspirations, urges and motivations - not always rational and not always compatible - that are generally associated with political doctrines constitutes the complex task of translating ideologies into programmes of rational political action.

/4. Balance

4. Balance of the situation existing by 1960

By about the year 1960, it seemed that most of the leading groups in Latin America were more or less uniformly disposed to accept economic and social development as the only way whereby the populations concerned could reach the solution of their urgent problems. No wonder that in many political programmes the idea of development was acclaimed as one of the essential national objectives, or that its propagation through all sorts of publications was an easy matter.

The trade-union movement began to show signs of adopting a new strategy that could be formulated within the conceptual framework of a national development process. Similarly, the entrepreneurial sectors had ceased to regard the progress of economic activities as a purely individual undertaking. Most Governments, in their turn, were apparently committed, in one way or another, to the development of their country's economic and social activities, both in internal affairs and in international politics. The various political measures introduced, and, in general, programmes and decisions of all kinds, began to be definitely conceived in terms of development. There was a tendency for the idea of development planning to meet with a gradual response even in sectors which had traditionally scouted the need for State co-ordination of the national effort. Nevertheless, it was not difficult to discern profound divergencies in the current definitions of the nature and intensity of planning.

Even to a casual observer, the consensus of opinion revealed itself as apparent rather than real, and, at best, confined in each individual country to the urban sectors proper. At times it would seem that what took place was not so much a genuine change of direction as the application of a new terminology to old problems. The admission that, in outward form at least, the climate of opinion was favourable to development in general as a desirable national objective does not mean there were no radical differences of view as to what should be understood by a developed society or what were the best means of attaining such a goal. Considerable difficulties were sometimes encountered when attempts were made to give expression to this apparent agreement in specific measures of economic policy. Protracted discussion

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of minor details and subordinate aspects of the problems involved, and, in addition, the determination of some groups to safeguard their own interests and their persistence in attaching undue importance to points of doctrine, also constituted obstacles to the approval of concrete plans.^{2/}

All sorts of objections were raised, in the most diverse national circles, to the different programmes of action and the various reforms proposed. Much the same happened with respect to the application of projects. As a general rule, these were a target for stinging criticism which did not always represent an objective evaluation, and in fact sometimes seemed to imply doubts of the good faith and ability of both those who formulated and those who implemented development programmes. Most of the discussions merely reflected the severe social tensions prevailing in the Latin American countries, and the atmosphere of mistrust which prevented the adoption of fundamental decisions. The experience undergone by Latin America's urban groups in the course of their history, and the nature of the changes that came about, appeared to have left their mark on the population sectors concerned. The prints were deep, and determined two apparently contradictory types of attitude: on the one hand, distrust, frustration and scepticism; and on the other, alongside awareness of stagnation, the sense of a pressing need for betterment that was often conceived in terms of reforms as sweeping as they were unrealistic.

This pessimism was a manifestation of the bewilderment created by the relaxation of the standards pertaining to the traditional social order, and of a concurrent sense that institutions, values and expectations were in the melting-pot. The hopes pirred upon the changes that were taking place, especially in respect of what many imagined to be their typical or perhaps their socially desirable effects, were not matched by the outward and visible consequences of the urban metamorphosis. The pace of life had certainly been speeded up, but the magnitude and complexity of its problems seemed to have increased in a measure to which the attempts made to solve them were not as a rule proportionate. It was by no means unusual to hear people denouncing the "injustice" of the social order, declaring themselves in favour of all kinds of reforms and ending up with an outburst of pessimism. Amid this confusion, there had been a gradual slackening of the bonds of trust in

^{2/} See Social trends and programmes in Latin America (E/CN.12/645), pp. 1 et seq.

leaders, in political parties and even in the chances of success attending any attempt to solve the urgent problems of the community. Nor was a sense of futility uncommon. The generations that had lived through the whole of the period had seen that in many instances the best moves on the part of political groups had been prompted by time-serving aims. The same generations were witnesses of the corruption that change had brought in its train; they remembered some of the promises and hopes that had never been really fulfilled; and on occasion they had seen honest advocates of a particular doctrine becoming, once in power, mere distributors of "prebendary" benefits. In short, there may be said to have been a gradual weakening of elemental faith in the due social reward of individual effort and in the viability of collective efforts that would bear useful fruit. The reverse of the medal was perhaps an almost superstitious belief in the leader who was to save society and in redemption through revolution. To some groups revolutionary reform did not seem far off. It made no difference whether the inclination of such groups was to promote or to avert revolution or the advent of the heaven-sent leader: the result would be equally detrimental to the possibilities of an orderly process of change. The sense of a constructive social order had been gradually disappearing, and fear of change often became one of the factors making for the passive acquiescence and the pessimistic outlook that seemed to prevail in some urban nuclei. In short, for many the future was overcast by doubt, and this feeling of insecurity began to be reflected in economic phenomena as serious and as significant as reluctance to invest and the flight of national capital abroad.

5. Ideological orientations in a period of bewilderment

For want of a social history of the generation of the twenties, no idea can be given of the origin and evolution of those typical reactions whereby the Latin Americans strove to rise above the feelings of bewilderment and frustration that events frequently evoked, and at the same time to create the basic consensus of public opinion which was an indispensable requisite for the solution of the difficult problems encountered. The various social movements and ideologies that emerged during the period endeavoured to fulfil

/such a

such a function. The traditional bases and techniques for the formation of a united public opinion had ceased to be operative in the principal Latin American countries. Vague as it was, the conception of "progress" as economic and social development called for new machinery whereby the changes grouped under the generic name of "national integration" could be carried out. Although confidence in the social systems concerned, as organizations efficient enough to solve their own tensions and problems, had been seriously undermined, the various tentative ideologies characteristic of the period sought to foster the emergence of new patterns of faith and hope.

Although it is not yet possible to write the history of the ideologies in question, some of their probable social bases can be indicated and their typical ideal features described, with reference not so much to the heterogeneity of political and economic doctrines as to their underlying or latent dimensions. State interventionism and the idea of programmed development once accepted, formally at least, as political concepts, the point of interest is to ascertain what vicissitudes such concepts really underwent from the standpoint of political action. Nationalism, populism, modern traditionalism and revolution seem to be the most characteristic of the ideological orientations generated during the period under discussion by the thinking and action of the various groups. Whatever the ideologies and doctrines professed by political parties and movements, on the whole their real activities and the proposals embodied in their programmes were geared to one or to a combination of these typical orientations.

(a) Nationalism

The collective desire for swifter economic progress has shaped contemporary patterns of nationalism in Latin America, especially in so far as State intervention is considered unavoidable if the interests of the national community are to be properly protected. In its early stages, the development of nationalism was closely related to the process whereby the middle strata secured access to the power system. It was certain nuclei of these strata that were wont, in referring to the traditional élites and the social order, to denounce their association with the interests of foreign "domination" and "exploitation". For them the attack on traditional institutions implied reaffirmation of the precedence of national interests

/over those

over those of the private sector and of any foreign country. Labour claims were often supported by the new power groups where foreign companies and, in general, enterprises directly linked to the traditional order were concerned.

The nationalism in question was unquestionably of an essentially economic character, at least to judge from its more concrete manifestations. The leaders of the middle classes became leaders of protectionism. Protection for national workers, capital and resources was the guiding principle of the copious economic legislation initially promoted by the political groups pertaining to the middle sectors. The policy of "economic independence" was reflected in industrialization and diversification of productive activities. The very idea of economic development, after the relative failure of piecemeal industrialization programmes, was conceived in nationalistic terms, on the basis of self-sufficiency tied to economic progress, and took a stand against the opposing interests of other nations. The middle-class leaders sometimes appealed to the nationalistic sentiments of the popular sectors, and often demanded all sorts of sacrifices for the sake of overriding national interests, especially during the phase of their access to power. As the middle sectors assumed power, however, they tended to repudiate extreme nationalism as a principle of political action. Although it still persisted, the nationalistic concept was gradually modified to the point of acknowledging that foreign private capital was necessary for economic and social development, as was also international assistance in the economic and technical fields.

The more uncompromising type of nationalism then came to be upheld by those political groups which aimed at representing the popular sectors, but the economic keynote was superseded by the purely political aspects of the problem. According to these leaders, the sole purpose of the nationalization of foreign enterprises was to free the country from external domination.

In many instances, nationalism was closely linked to populism. The view was then held that the nation as an organic unit would acquire modernity and pre-eminence in so far as the energies of the broad masses were spent on the establishment of a newer and more radical society, which, through the abolition of traditional privileges, would create conditions of increased equality and social participation, unlike the so-called "reactionary foreign interests".

A significant feature that has duly been pointed out is the ambivalence of the nationalistic impulse, inasmuch as on the one hand it urged the preservation of certain values implicit in the Latin American, Hispanic or indigenous traditions, and, on the other, advocated a radical remodelling of the traditional structures. This vacillation between acceptance and rejection of national or autochthonous elements and, at the same time, of certain social patterns from abroad, undoubtedly constituted a typical feature of both left-wing and right-wing nationalism. Broadly speaking, however, nationalism usually envisaged the planning of development and the concentration of regulatory functions in the central Government simply as additional means of attaining its ends.

No description of the forms taken by contemporary nationalism in Latin America could omit reference to certain more or less typical features of this ideology in connexion with the role of the political authorities in the internal and international fields. The primary tenet of nationalism is the emphatic reaffirmation of the precedence of State interests over any private interest whatever, since only the State can interpret the interests of the majority of the nation as anything other than the sum of private interests. The interests of the nation, in their turn, would be identified with economic and social development, and the State would have to assume the role of entrepreneur and planner, with or without the participation of private enterprise.

It has been said that one of the distinctive components of present-day nationalism is the conception of social reform as a public responsibility which should as a rule be incumbent upon the State. As far as the economy is concerned, nationalism has generally leaned towards the establishment of mixed economic patterns in which private enterprise would lose its classic significance.

The type of nationalism under discussion here tends to define international policy in accordance with the requirements of the process of internal reform, and describes as hostile to the "national interest" those countries which may really or supposedly be concerned to prevent the structural changes entailed by development planning. The State should

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therefore rebuff "interventionism" of any kind - political, economic or cultural - and aim at some degree of independence, which would have to be functional in relation to internal planning.

(b) Populism^{3/}

With the growth of the marginal population in the primate cities of Latin America, new conditions for political action emerged. The weakening of the powers that fulfilled an intermediary function and of the traditional ties of dependence in general meant that a large number of households - now independent - were entirely without power and influence. The suppression of dependency left a void which could not always be satisfactorily filled by national institutions, especially in view of the extremely marginal social and economic situation of the urban groups in question, for which wages had come to be almost their only link with the urban power structure. It might be said that they still cherished a latent "dependency wish", a desire to keep up relations of loyalty and personal protection, exactly in so far as they were devoid of that minimum of urban culture without which they could not avail themselves of the rights and institutions of the national State and of the advantages of the urban environment in general.

The political potential implicit in this situation was sometimes turned to account by the new power groups, which, thanks to their ability to express the wishes and feelings of the broad masses, ultimately became the latter's virtual leaders. It is worth noting that the pressure of the marginal groups, whose influence was almost always exercised through strictly urban leaders, was determined by an image of the role of political authority - the "patron State" - which the groups concerned had fashioned for themselves, of their own accord. In so far as the new power groups needed political support in order to gain access to positions of power or retain them when secured, they used the satisfaction of the demands of the marginal groups as an instrument of unremitting pressure on the State mechanisms.

To judge from the analysis of institutional history, the political authority seems to have tended to assume the guise of a "patron State",

^{3/} The description of the social roots of populism closely follows the essay by A. Pearse on "Some characteristics of urbanization in the City of Rio de Janeiro", included in Urbanization in Latin America, op.cit., pp.191 et seq. There are shades of difference in the interpretation of the social significance of populism.

in conformity with the demands to that effect voiced by the lower sectors in the primate cities. In exchange for their votes, these sectors obtained protective legislation, minimum wages, certain social security benefits and the recognition of some rights. In institutional terms, all this was reflected in a relationship between the State and the broad masses of the urban population which might be accurately described as a patronage system. Seeking as they did the support of these marginal sectors, it is not surprising that the new leaders should have established relations of the "clientele" and personalistic type, which would enable them to act on the basis of patronage, i.e., of primary relationships. Up to a point, these leaders came to fulfil the function of "patrons" for persons who, although independent, knew nothing of the existence or the significance of their rights, of the possibilities open to them in the urban environment or of how to improve their lot by their own efforts. The members of the marginal sectors demanded precisely those mechanisms which had been a part of their earlier experience, i.e., the personal aid of certain patrons or protectors to whom they were prepared to pledge their loyalty.

Since the viability of the clientele system usually depended upon the ease with which services were rendered - that is, upon the real power and influence of the leaders or "patrons" - it is not surprising that the political authority should in some cases have been pervaded at all levels by relations of an "informal" type whose most salient characteristics were personal loyalty, the exchange of favours, reciprocal assistance in respect of benefits or influence, etc. Consequently, the new leaders became an important component of the broad and complex fabric of relationships comprised in the State machinery and that of the local authorities. Thus, the enlistment of popular support and the utilization of political institutions became essential factors for access to power.

The "clientele" relationship also made its appearance in certain nuclei in the middle strata, owing to the fact that the ability to confer certain benefits was in the hands of these population sectors. The possibility of providing employment in Government offices and of extending contracts for the execution of public works or for the supply of State services, as
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well as of promoting the interests of specific regions and institutions, resulted in the commitment of substantial sectors of the middle strata likewise, and thus strengthened the social bases of the political movements or parties concerned. Thus, groups of interests were gradually created which in the main involved the middle sectors of the urban stratification system. In so far as this happened, the "populist" character of political action gradually lost its initial vigour. But whenever new groups from the middle sectors set foot on the road to power, it seems to have been almost always necessary to re-enlist popular support, and particularly that of the marginal strata.

Another aspect of populism is the quasi-charismatic nature of the most important leaders and even of the minor caudillos. As the old ties of dependence which legitimized traditional authority gradually disappeared, the inability of the lower strata to differentiate clearly as yet between the source of authority and its actual exercise meant that the "popular" leaders, to a large extent, fulfilled the function of demagogically identifying these social sectors with the institutions of the national State. Thus, by the spontaneous establishment of a uniform system of political action, they were able to meet with some flexibility, and up to a point efficiently, a variety of changing social demands with which the rigid structures of the new institutions would not have been able to cope satisfactorily.

There can be no doubt that the leaders' ability to mobilize the lower sectors was a factor of the first importance in the new power structures that accompanied urban development and the creation of industrial productive organizations. Through their mobilization various kinds of ties were established which delimited the marginality of the lower strata. It was not long before the primate cities of Latin America witnessed the spread of an urban popular culture whose demands could largely be satisfied by virtue of modern mass communication media. Populism as it then was also had to evolve on new lines. In many instances, the appeal to the broad masses acquired a different tone, tending to take the form of systematic criticism levelled at any kind of privilege - at conservatism, at the aristocratist

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groups, and so forth - and was generally viewed as at strife with a social order based on the existence of oligarchies. The abolition of privilege was postulated and the reward of effort advocated, no longer merely under the patron State, but also under forms of government that were accepted as legitimate, firstly in so far as they served to further the economic welfare of the lower strata and the spread of education, and secondly inasmuch as they proved capable of creating economic, social and political structures favourable to the active participation of large population sectors. Although populist orientations were often associated with revolutionary ideas, there were also conservative types of populism. Emphasizing the essentially "popular" nature of the traditional institutions - the supposed expression of the creative ability of a people organically integrated through their common historical experience -, the tendency of conservative populism was to set up the image of a sort of agricultural paternalism as a community organization model.

The leaders and ideologists of populism seem to have ended by reverting to the old principle which sees in the people the sole source of authority and power. According to this line of thought, a social order founded on justice should recognize the basic equality of human beings and their right to active and creative participation in the existing system. The essence of populist ideology thus appears to be faith in the capacity and potentialities of the people, in their desire to express themselves through the creation of new social patterns and in the possibility of building up a "fairer" social system on popular bases. From this standpoint, it might be argued (i) that pessimism, frustration and fear of change can be no other than symptoms of lack of confidence in the people; and (ii) that every creative impulse must spring from faith in the people's ability to solve their own problems and find appropriate means of establishing better patterns of living.

(c) Modern traditionalism

The type of development which characterized the rapid growth of Latin America's primate cities led to the emergence of new social groups, interested in change and progress, which gradually became committed to the maintenance of the power structures of the established order. Other groups that apparently

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adapted themselves flexibly to the new requirements of urbanization, technique and industry retained many of their traditional orientations. The result was the formation of a climate favourable to the advantages of modernity, alongside a certain tendency to repudiate the consequences of the changes that were taking place. Such attitudes constitute "normal" orientations in any society, especially during periods of rapid change. The propensity to conserve social patterns and institutions can be noted even in the most fanatical revolutionary ideologies. Idealization of the past and reaffirmation of certain values over and above considerations of time and space are not features peculiar to any one ideological orientation in particular. The term "modern conservatism" is specifically applied here to those situations in which practical action is systematically based on attitudes and motivations of the type described.

Some writers have attempted to present a few typical forms of modern traditionalism. One case in point is afforded by what has been called "ideological traditionalism".^{4/} This implies the existence of groups giving formal support to progress, but withstanding its consequences, especially inasmuch as these potentially or actually affect the relative advantages or privileges that the groups in question enjoy, or think they enjoy, within the existing social structure. It is perfectly conceivable that in such cases deliberate steps may be taken to reaffirm tradition, particularly in face of the "threat" seen in the mass incorporation of the popular sectors in urban life and in the exercise of the rights of citizenship. Development is accepted in part when an attempt is made to confine its social and cultural effects to the technical and economic sphere. The assumption underlying the model adopted by such groups is that a developed economic structure can coexist with a society organized on the basis of more or less traditional norms and values. This type of orientation is sometimes fused with certain forms of nationalism that stress the value of the family and the local community, and in other instances with varieties of populism that endeavour to make use of the traditional dependency sentiments of the new urban lower strata.

^{4/} Gino Germani, "Politica e massa", Estudios Sociais e Politicos, 13, University of Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, 1960, pp. 95-99.

Other descriptions relate to the so-called "contemporary urban traditionalism".^{5/} The urban traditionalist acts on apparently modern lines - participating, that is, in the symbols and consumption patterns of modernity -, but tries to preserve certain ethical values and certain ideas concerning the nature of social inequality. For him, human action has a transcendental and ultimate significance which constitutes the real criterion for social evaluation in relation to his own behaviour. The organization of personal loyalties is vertical, so that the family, religion and primary ties in general take precedence over secondary and secular ties. Thus the traditionalist of today thinks in unionist and corporate terms. In such an ideology he finds a means of preserving traditional norms and values in the very midst of technological change and the new requirements of industrialism.

Unquestionably, the rapid growth of the primate cities permitted all sorts of adjustments between traditional orientations and the modern requirements deriving from technology, industry and, in general, life in the larger urban agglomerations. In view of the metamorphosis of the Latin American cities, and the fact, to which attention has several times been drawn, that the changes which took place did not affect all the various institutions and areas of social behaviour alike, it is no wonder that modes of thought and political action sprang up which may be directly related to the situation in question. This would apply to certain doctrines that endeavoured to establish new organizational bases with a view to preventing the evils ascribed to industry and massification. These doctrines apparently envisaged the formula for preservation of the values attributed to the cultural ideals of Latin American societies - "human solidarity", order, hierarchy, social discipline or harmonious class relationships - as a third system, a middle way between the familiar patterns of social organization. They suggested that it was essential to reorganize society on such lines that the complex effects of modernization might be reabsorbed by institutions through which the values referred to could be safeguarded. Thus, envisaging society as

^{5/} K.H. Silvert, National values, developments, leaders and followers. A summary statement of theory, some research, and some implications, mimeographed text, 1962.

"one great family", they generally asserted the need for a strong central State firmly founded on moral or spiritual principles. Accordingly, on the basis of these assumptions, it was hoped that the existing social situation might be brought into line with the ideal requirements of a more "rational" order - i.e., an order fundamentally based on supposedly transcendent values -, and there even seems to have been a confused attempt to indicate the type of institutional organization which would make the "regeneration" of society possible. Broadly speaking, the changes in the political structure and in the world of labour proposed by these ideologies were designed to preserve the traditional values of the family and of religion against the disrupting effect of industrialism and of the massification of society. The various patterns of modern traditionalism all showed a propensity to lay stress on activism, aggressiveness and authoritarianism, as well as to foster ambivalent attitudes vis-à-vis the past and the future. The creation of a "new social order", which would be the terrestrial or concrete expression of more or less absolute values, was not conceived as a total break with the past, but rather as a way of remedying its superficial defects or "irrationalities", so as to re-establish in their full worth, on the basis of a new structure, the essential features of the traditional organization.

This tendency to reinterpret the values of the past, giving them contemporary and future validity within a process of social "regeneration", is not entirely dissociated from the different varieties of indigenism linked to nationalistic and populist ideologies in certain Latin American countries. Although they recognized the need to establish new patterns of social organization, on the whole these doctrines and political movements adopted an ambivalent attitude to change and tradition.

The urbanization and industrialization processes, on their part, generated all sorts of conflicts. The rapid changes that had taken place had prevented many groups and individuals from seeing certain aspirations and expectations fulfilled under the new conditions. It is even likely that in some bodies, communities and social categories serious disequilibria may have arisen between targets and aspirations on the one hand, and the institutional means of attaining them on the other. Substantial sectors of the population brought up under the traditional order suddenly or gradually

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found themselves subjected to general living conditions in which their traditional aspirations could not be fully satisfied, so that they were plunged into a state of acute frustration. A similar result may have derived from the fact that urban development, and the complex cultural and social contacts it involved, aroused in the most widely-differing population sectors new expectations which there was no real possibility of fulfilling. In some groups this same phenomenon led to a relative improvement of living conditions. Other symptoms point to urban change as one of the factors which undermined the general acceptance of traditional social norms and values and helped to create all sorts of incongruities and barriers between targets and aspirations that were already mutually contradictory. Moreover, the belief often came to be held that the real possibilities were incompatible or incommensurate with the ideals professed, and would preclude their being put into practice. Although this reciprocal want of consonance was mainly reflected in an attitude of widespread scepticism, it probably was also partly responsible, in many instances, for the existence of manifest states of individual or collective anxiety.

The changes that supervened seem to have had a much stronger effect on political and labour institutions than on the family and religion. Although the material aspects of urban life had altered fairly quickly, the same could not be said of the social norms by which the family was governed, or of those that were identified with religious values. As a result, individuals often found themselves assailed by incompatible demands, and this dichotomy may have promoted the creation of states of anxiety. One way of minimizing the conflict was to exploit the advantages of both types of requirements concurrently. Other psychological mechanisms might be devised to solve such dilemmas and alleviate anxiety in the face of change, but probably in most cases the upshot was that change was partly accepted, while traditional values and attitudes were still preserved. When the findings of surveys carried out in various Latin American countries are analysed, the conclusion may be reached that persons guided by traditional values were capable of adopting modern behaviour patterns and maintaining a complex system of conflicting attitudes, while authentically modern individuals were in the habit of thinking as if they were committed to traditional values.^{6/}

^{6/} K.H. Silvert, op.cit., pp. 10-12.

It must be recognized that in the case of some groups the changes under discussion may possibly have had a disrupting effect on family and religious values. The loss of the sense of security inherent in the traditional patterns, and the resultant high degree of anxiety, are probably more or less consciously associated with the propensity to safeguard the values of the past, or, in other words, to become committed to veritable "stereotypes" of the traditional institutions. This phenomenon may have been reflected in the tendency to reject the new norms and values, especially those regulating the participation and status of the different sectors of society.

In this context, it is worth pointing out that many groups and individuals in Latin America readily accept modern concepts as abstract ideas, and identify themselves with the outward and visible aspects of cultural models proper to the developed countries. But they find it hard to assimilate these new orientations and attitudes when it comes to translating them into guide-lines for behaviour, that is, inasmuch as they imply functional commitment to the institutions characteristic of development.^{7/}

A study of the evolution of modern conservatism would seem to show that in the first of the phases defined there was a tendency to radicalize the reactions produced by change and to express them as doctrinal approaches to the problem of the "regeneration" of society. The rejection of the new patterns, in which industrialization and massification are reflected, was apparently grounded on certain values that were "transcendent" or "absolute" by their very nature, and may have simultaneously expressed the repudiation of real or present social conditions and the conviction of the need to remould them in conformity with those transcendent values. Thus, ambivalence and anxiety vis-à-vis social change, the seeking of refuge in stereotypes

^{7/} A somewhat similar observation has been made with respect to the development process in Turkey, an important country for the purposes of comparison because it is an independent nation in which the impulse to change was largely generated by internal forces. See K.L. Prange, "Junge Türken - Wandel in Vorstellungen und Einstellungen", G.K. Kinderman, Kulturen im Umbruch Studien zur Problematik und Analyse des Kulturwandels in Entwicklungsländern, Rombach, Freiburg (Breisgau), 1962, p. 347.

of the traditional order, represented a form of conservatism which acknowledges the necessity of adapting traditional structures to the new conditions.

During the second phase, when collective experience of the problems initially raised by industrial structures and massification processes has reached a higher level, social groups emerge whose aim is to confine the remodelling of society to the technical and economic spheres. These groups assume that the full and efficient operation of a developed economy is possible within a society organized in accordance with traditional norms and values. They are apparently inclined to accept some of the advantages of modernization, but not the ensuing consequences.

From this second phase onwards, modern conservatism begins to take more clearly-defined shape, as an expression of the practical action and some of the ideological tenets of certain groups which, recognizing industrialism to be inevitable, identify themselves with the essential institutions of the past and endeavour to take precautions - as regards both long-standing institutions and the traditional social hierarchies - against the equalitarian influence of the urban lower strata and in some instances, too, against the supposed "materialism" implicit in modern economic institutions. While often contending that a "well-organized society" is an end in itself, and that law and order are essential in any system within the framework of a strong administration, they support modernization in so far as it helps to maintain the social order. The modern conservative stresses the value of the family, the church, private ownership and the traditional State, but seems to vacillate between acceptance and repudiation of pure self-interest and personal advantage as legitimate incentives. He does not object to social mobility or a more equitable distribution of opportunities, provided that they prevent tensions and thus enable "social harmony" to be achieved and the hierarchical order of society preserved. The modern traditionalist ideology, which has become involved in all sorts of political and economic compromises, tries to adjust itself flexibly to the new conditions in order to safeguard the established hierarchies against the actual or potential threat constituted by the revolutionary repercussions of modern industry.

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(d) The seeds of revolution

As a political orientation, whether active or latent, revolution represents an extreme reaction on the part of groups that regard individual and collective progress as radically incompatible with the maintenance of the existing institutions. Ideational systems with a revolutionary bias - mainly of European origin - are one thing, and revolution itself, conceived as an active and concrete political orientation, quite another. While the latter seems largely a product of the problems raised by the mass growth of the primate cities and in some instances by the social experience of the early stages of industrialism, the former might rather be associated with certain periods of social unrest that seem to precede subsequent development and modernization.

Many of the revolutionary ideologies began to exert their influence in Latin America from 1920 onwards. The idea of a "social revolution" on a labour basis was closely linked to the beginnings of trade unionism, and in many countries influenced some of the nuclei of intellectuals in the middle social sectors. The destruction of the social order and its replacement by new patterns of co-existence, to which a basically fairer and more equalitarian character was ascribed, seems to have captured the imagination of a few generations of labour leaders, intellectuals and rebels. For more than thirty years social revolution was a topic of controversy, and in many countries a kind of revolutionary culture came into being, with its own traditions, values, heroes and martyrs. At times a prevailing climate of violence played its part in the formation of this revolutionary culture, imbuing it with a somewhat factional spirit. Where political conditions were more settled, or where the revolutionaries rose to power and enforced their ideas, the rhetoric of revolution was widely propagated among the groups interested in change and in the remodelling of the traditional society.

These ideational systems with a revolutionary colouring may be said to have defined the problem of social reform on the basis of the new values and norms which grew up among the lower strata. The "oppressed" or "uncontaminated" sectors of society would be capable of redeeming themselves and the rest of the population through the ultimate elimination of the

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State and of the various forms of economic "exploitation". The cycle consisting in oppression-redemption by revolution-reorganization of society on new bases seems to have constituted a veritable "natural history" of social evolution, to judge from the images which these revolutionary doctrines embodied. The more Utopian concepts emphasized the idea that the organization of the future would be essentially a producers' society; the way to it lay through the total overthrow of the existing order. Where violence was a normal element in political strife, the revolutionary myth was probably associated with traditions of clandestine activities and terrorism. In those countries where violence was the exception and the revolutionaries did not come into power, the ideologies in question seem to have tended to become merely intellectual expressions of opposition to the existing political system and social order.

The revolutionary myth as a pattern of opposition cannot be considered a permanent manifestation of political extremism. The radicalism of ideological postulates must not be confused with the real orientations of the groups defined as revolutionary. In normal times, "oppositionism" was probably committed, at most, to obstructionist practices, demagogic exhortations, mobilization of the lower strata and use of popular pressure, or its leaders and upholders vented their impatience by promoting "demonstrations" in face of vacillations or mistakes on the part of the nuclei in power. Be this as it may, and whatever the effect aimed at, these forms of oppositionism can hardly be said to have overstepped the bounds of permissible political skirmishing. The potentially revolutionary implications of such activities are conceivable, but it must also be noted that probably the movements concerned, in so far as action was taken under the institutional system and within the accepted limits, were de facto committed to the maintenance of the existing order.

Whatever the nature of the doctrines based on revolutionary orientations, it was the conditions created by modernization that gave substance and operative force to the idea that social and economic problems could not be solved piecemeal. If this is true the experiences of the early stages of industrialism and urbanization are also likely to have fostered the conversion of such ideational systems, with their somewhat vague content, into specific political ideologies.

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It seems clear that the changes taking place helped to raise the aspirations of the urban population, especially those of certain groups, and that as a rule the aspirations in question could not be fully satisfied. In many countries, therefore, modernization was accompanied by a correlative increase of social tension. Economic instability and the gradual disappearance of certain social mechanisms which had traditionally contributed to the creation of a sense of security, and which had not been replaced by others that could fulfil a similar function, may have been factors that in some groups established an image of the existing social system as an unsuccessful pattern of organization of human relationships.

The aspirations that modernization had aroused and was unable to satisfy contrasted with a state of apparent general prosperity, within which marked economic and social disparities subsisted. In the first place, those sectors of the population which had pinned their hopes on State action as the vehicle of social reform were compelled to acknowledge that the real effects of interventionism did not always come up to their expectations, and that the State, almost invariably submerged in a welter of financial difficulties, was at times powerless to solve the problems arising. Secondly, in the well-to-do sectors of the population there were nuclei that unremittingly protested against what they sometimes called the demagogic orientation of State interventionism.

Apart from affecting the special interests of such groups, the political measures designed to remedy the economic and social problems deriving from development were often adopted in too much of a hurry for blatant errors to be avoided. All this aggravated the existing discontent, uncertainty and social tensions. Allusions to the inefficacy of the State machinery reflected de facto situations in most instances. The proliferation of agencies among which there was no proper co-ordination, as well as the successive administrative reforms of a piecemeal character, and the ensuing muddle, ended by making the State mechanisms unduly slow and complicated.

This over-all situation apparently curtailed the specific possibilities for individual or collective self-improvement and even the normal development of many persons and groups. Among such population nuclei the idea that their chances of prosperity were blocked by meaningless political
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measures and by de facto privileges was often quick to spread. For them, the social system was a symbol of flagrant injustice towards effort and merit.

The sense of living under an inequitable system, and the realization that the political authorities could not successfully over-rule the manoeuvres of the various interests - which were often conducive to arbitrariness or privilege -, may well have created a mistrustful and recalcitrant attitude towards Government decisions in different social circles. The various proposals for the implementation of basic reforms, whatever their level of cohesion or rationality, were the best testimony to the fact that some political groups, interpreting the opinions of broader population sectors, discerned a serious undermining of faith in the viability of the existing state of affairs, and believed it was essential to bring the latter into line with certain ideals.

There was no lack of intellectuals capable of giving articulate expression to such experiences and voicing the frustrated hopes of those who rebelled against the "injustices" of the social system in force. They helped to cast ideological orientations of a revolutionary character in organized moulds and to dramatize the "meaning" of events. They harped on the untenable and contradictory nature of the traditional institutions, on their incompatibility with any sort of equitable organization, and on the fact that those very contradictions were part of a "natural" evolution towards more advanced stages of civilization. "Progress", in their view, implied the abolition of one system and its replacement by another and totally different order. Such intellectuals were among those who denounced the ineptitude and decadence of the ruling groups, their lack of any sense of public responsibility, their want of integrity and, in general, their inability to solve the political, social and economic problems that development brought to the fore.

It is possible to indicate certain characteristic traits in the political behaviour of the groups identified with the idea of revolution. First and foremost, the "oppositionism" noted above, an attitude of overt hostility towards compromise and a tendency to use "demonstrations" of political strength as a means of exerting pressure. The leaders of the revolutionary groups were prone to describe themselves as heroic "servants"

of a "noble cause", and to proclaim that they were acting not only on behalf of their own organizations and parties, but also as representing the interests of broad sectors of the population. A better understanding of the nature of such behaviour and of these leaders' propensity to marked self-dramatization must be sought in the idea of "struggle", not in that of "competition".

The creation of a precise ideological orientation of a revolutionary type, superseding the mere ideational systems of an earlier day, may be said to have resulted from the thinking and the action of these groups. Little by little, shape was given to an image of real social reform as directly linked to revolutionary change, and, conversely, of the maintenance of social hierarchies and institutions similar to those of the existing order as the symbol of a basically conservative attitude. Development implied the elimination of every sort of "élitism" or aristocratism, the repudiation of traditional values and the total and immediate replacement of the power nuclei by new groups and personalities. Between the preservation of the status quo and the maintenance of progress, progress was to be preferred, whatever the social cost of such a choice. The massification of society was also desirable, and the idea of adapting institutions and human beings to the requirements of industrial technology could not be dismissed a priori, on purely moral or traditional grounds. In a "well-organized society" the principle of the reward of merit must over-ride every other consideration, and that implied the most radical form of equalitarianism. Since the legitimacy of the institutions that would be created to guarantee "progress" could not rest upon historical or traditional foundations, only the aims and ideologies of revolution sanctioned the new social structures.

In short, for the revolutionary ideologists development implied a total upheaval of the traditional social order - both its structure and its bases, as well as the behaviour patterns it involved. Only revolutionary reform and the corresponding ideologies could create new patterns of living and new objects of identification and loyalty.

6. Need for greater rationality in development ideologies

The irrational elements embodied in all these ideological orientations, and the contradictions inherent in the various proposed lines of conduct that could be derived therefrom, classify them as, in fact, ideological experiments, the product of an epoch of bewilderment and frustration. Both in their more extreme manifestations and in their milder forms, the various ideologies that grew up in Latin America during the period 1945-60 failed to concert a united effort and commit the populations of the region to more or less rational programmes of social and economic reform, although some faltering steps were taken in that direction.

Since they could not reconcile political doctrine and practical action, many of the groups interested in reform were likewise unable to draw up co-ordinated and rational programmes for the replacement of traditionalism by more dynamic structures and institutions. Perhaps in the last analysis the maladjustment in question favoured the maintenance of the traditional structures, since the formulation of ideologies that were consonant with the practical possibilities for action might have done much to create that consensus of public opinion which is an indispensable requisite for the application of a development policy. At all events, the whole situation seems to have redounded to the detriment of development itself.

In societies endowed with "traditions" and institutions that are functional in relation to change and innovation, the reform of social structures seems to be based mainly on the cultural system. In those of a different type, it is a difficult task to create a consensus of public opinion favourable to change, not only as regards the objectives pursued, but also, and basically, in relation to the means employed. The ideologies that accompany development help to establish such a consensus in so far as they are able to induce both the masses and the élites to accept the "rationality of the need" for sacrifices, the various stages of change and the new institutions.

The solution of the purely economic problems of modernization implies organized and coherent political decisions. The tempo of the process, its financing and the different priorities are not problems that can be solved

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on theoretical bases. Such questions as the degree of self-sufficiency or economic interdependence aimed at, the types of enterprise selected and the pressure to which these will be subject, the problem of birth control, the direction and rate of educational expansion, entail primarily political decisions whose relative success will depend upon the possibility of enlisting the population in their support. Planned development, whether dictated by democratic or by authoritarian systems of ideas, requires in each individual case ideological orientations compatible with rational utilization of the available means and resources. Emphasis on democratic or authoritarian ritual on the part of the various groups that shape opinion is not in itself a guarantee that both the leaders and the broad masses are sufficiently of one mind for a policy capable of modifying social institutions to be effectively formulated and applied.

