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UNITED NATIONS
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

SANTIAGO, CHILE, AUGUST 1986

C E P A L

Review

Santiago, Chile

Number 29

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Working-class youth and anomy

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The authors set themselves the difficult task of presenting some ideas to facilitate an understanding of the immense variety of typical forms of youth behaviour in Latin America in recent decades. Their first approach is to indicate two historical points characterized by a prevalence of different social models —comprehensive modernization and technocratic growth— within which different kinds of youth behaviour manifest themselves,

In the first model, the most striking forms of behaviour emerge when the comprehensive modernization project runs into crisis and arouses contrary reactions such as chronic withdrawal and political radicalization. In the second, the central axes, which determine the different attitudes of young people are their perceptions as to whether they are included in or excluded from the benefits of growth and the state of crisis or expansion of this growth.

On these two axes the authors construct their basic typology, which covers behaviour ranging from individual to collective mobility and passing through various forms of social maladjustment and rejection. As a theoretical substratum of their typology they emphasize certain central concepts such as integration, anomy and alternativity, which are developed in the main part of the article.

The idea of "comprehensive modernization"

The numerous sociological papers on youth in Latin America published in recent decades have focused their analysis on two terms descriptive of the attitudes, perceptions, values and behaviour of young people: rebellion and conformism. While these terms were suggested by the resounding influence of the student movements of the 1960s, it is nonetheless true that they reflected a well as growing consensus in the region about the "social modernization" project under way since the end of the Second World War and a perception of social change as a transition from a traditional to a modern society. From the Second World War to the end of the 1960s the consensus about development helped to define, on the basis of the "traditionalism-modernism" axis, the majority of the cultural conflicts of Latin American societies. Young people's rebelliousness or conformism were defined with reference to the traditional society, its oligarchic decision-making structures, its narrow standards and values, its lack of dynamism and its extreme inequality.

Against this image of traditional society, the modernization project was seen as an attempt to advance *simultaneously* towards economic growth, greater fairness in the distribution of its fruits, and the participation and integration of the social sectors hitherto excluded from collective life (the peasants and the marginal urban groups). This simultaneous progress in these three directions seemed, moreover, to be required and facilitated by the processes of secularization —i.e. by the introduction of principles and mechanisms of the formal rationalization of collective life (which in turn were fostered by the expansion of education and the mass communication media, the growth of domestic markets and urbanization). The image of a "virtuous circle" of development, to the extent that it was opposed to the perception of the stagnation of traditional society, gained ground rapidly, and the values of modernization

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became the guiding principles of the actions of the majority of the elites.

The predominance of this model of "comprehensive modernization" as the cultural orientation of the social protagonists was felt with particular force among young people. On the one hand, as is obvious, it offered a future of much richer opportunity than did a static society. In addition, since social conditioning in the traditional values was much more deeply rooted among adults, the struggle for modernization took on an important generational aspect. On the other hand, youth was the sector of society which experienced most directly the processes of change: the migrations from urban to rural areas, the expansion and changes in education, and the growth of industrial employment were for the most part processes which affected young people directly.

After a first and relatively successful stage, the concept of development as the simultaneous attainment of the goals of growth, equity and participation ran into serious obstacles. Although Latin American development has followed a very uneven pattern, it can be asserted as a general rule that the dynamics of economic growth (and of industrial growth in particular) was somewhat insufficient in relation to the expectations which had been created. In many cases this led to an element of radicalization in the demand for modernization, which then became identified with a demand for revolutionary change of the capitalist order. In

other cases, the idea that the process should be simultaneous tended to be abandoned and priority was given to some of the goals, at the cost of postponing others (the choice was often for economic growth, sacrificing the goals of equity and participation).

This conflict about the course which the modernization process should follow was not unconnected, from the beginning of the 1960s, with the East-West tensions which emerged in the region as a result of events in Cuba. Accordingly, the region was faced with two main comprehensive "models" of change: the socialist model, which was being established in the continent for the first time, and the liberal model of the Alianza para el Progreso (which in many cases was adopted as a reaction against the increasing ideological influence of the other model). Latin American societies were thus forced to define their options *within* the modernization model, and even the most traditional elites were to be persuaded that there must be a significant structural change. The "consensus" for modernization was very plausible, and the social groups which participated in the process already had demands from an earlier period which were now expressed in radicalism or in authoritarian approaches. For this reason, a description of youth conduct and movements of the time must take into account both the central dilemma of traditionalism or modernization and the subsequent course of the process of change.

II

Conflicts within "modernization"

Only in the second stage of the modernization process, when the point of reference had ceased to be the traditional society and had moved on to become, in contrast, that of an insufficiently dynamic development, did the activities of the various social groups—including the youth movements—take on a new character. The resistance to modernization, which in the first

stage had been conservative in outlook, then expressed itself—already *from within* the modernization model—as a demand for economic growth which sacrificed the elements of equity and participation, formerly considered essential to the idea of development: in other words, in an authoritarian approach. The element of anomic withdrawal from the

modernization model, which had been expressed in the first stage mainly in the form of sectarian approaches, now tended —especially in the countries in which the secularization process was most heterogeneous and broad sectors were excluded from participation and the benefits of growth— to manifest itself in a fundamentalist outlook. And the strictly modernizing approach, which in the first stage had expressed itself homogeneously in terms of collective mobility and had embraced the most diverse ideological visions, now emerged in parties under the banner of political radicalism: although this remained throughout the period the predominant orientation of the youth movements in the majority of Latin America, there is no doubt that it already had a more limited appeal and was becoming profoundly ideologized, especially among student movements.

A cause and effect of this change in the nature of activities was that the concept of development had ceased to have —owing to the dynamic insufficiencies of the growth process itself— a common and shared significance for the various social sectors. The idea of the "virtuous circle" of social and economic development was being replaced by "technocratic" and "populist" models which supposed the existence of a conflict, in the short term at least, between growth and equity, which meant that priority must be given to one of these elements at the expense of the other.

Even at the risk of excessive simplification of the region's development, some of the cultural guidelines for action characteristic of the "populist" and "technocratic" scenarios can be indicated as keys to the understanding of the youth movements of the past decade. (Of course, these keys have to be re-cut in the analysis of each national case.)

In fact, in both the "populist" and the "technocratic" model can be seen a broad range of unsatisfied expectations of the development process on the part of the social protagonists, as a result either of the process's dynamic insufficiency of the clear disparity in the distribution of its fruits. However, in neither case is the central key to understanding concerned with the "traditional versus modern

society" dilemma, but rather with the "inclusion" or "exclusion" of the participants in modern society. Whereas the "populist" models tend to create in the middle and upper strata the perception of slowness in incorporation in modern life when their situation is compared with that of their counterparts in other nations, the "technocratic" models —whose predominance has been characteristic of the past decade in Latin America— produce a situation in which the majority groups in the population are perceived as fundamentally excluded from the benefits of growth, and they see the society of which they are part as *split*, in dichotomic terms.

It has already been argued that, when the models which give priority to participation and equity over the goal of economic growth predominate, the main guidelines for action tend to be those of authoritarianism or political radicalism, in so far as it is possible to detect certain fundamental features in the less secularized social sectors. The situation is a little more complicated in the societies in which the model of growth without participation prevails: it is important to distinguish in this case between the behaviour patterns characteristic of periods of expansion (when they occur) within the framework of this model and those which tend to surface in times of crisis; in other words, times in which the lack of participation and the unequal forms of distribution of income amount to a slow rate of economic growth or even negative growth.

In periods of expansion two types of society seem to develop within a single nation. On the one hand, the sector *included* in the process of economic growth which is taking place seems to be affected by the traditional problems of integration and dislocation which accompany modernization. Since collective forms of participation are heavily penalized, *individual mobility* becomes the key to the system and it is encouraged by reward. On the other hand, the dislocation of the normal situation emerges in various forms of passive *withdrawal*, in which compulsive pleasure-seeking predominates (alcoholism, drugs, pornography, etc.), often compensating for the low level of satisfaction provided by the institutionalized behaviour favoured by the system.

At the same time, however, the nature of economic growth constantly extends the segment of the population *excluded* from the normal life—institutionalized or tolerated—of the system. To the extent that the fragmentation characteristic of the formal rationalization of economic life prevails, together with the penalization of collective forms of participation, so the "dark side" of society tends towards various kinds of *criminal* activity or towards the recreation of the *community* based on alternative values, depending on the degree to which the internalization of the goals of success set by the system has been achieved among the various excluded social groups. In both cases, however, these are secularized social groups which, far from feeling nostalgia for a former traditional order, aspire either to achieve full integration in modern society or to correct a deviation in that society's development.

Given these elements of dispersal, the periods of crisis in the growth pattern open the way to collective behaviour of great significance. The included segment of modern society displays abundantly the *mass culture* (collective counterpart of integration through individual mobility) which seeks to incorporate the segments of the population whose dislocation takes the form of increasing *apathy* towards the material and symbolic satisfactions which the system provides. In the large excluded sector, on the other hand, the rejection of institutionalized procedures takes the form of mass expression of anomic *revolt*, for the assertion of alternative values implies the increasing *organic mobilization* of various sectors of the population.

Of course this set of guidelines for action can have differing degrees of force, depending on the specific characteristics of the society in question. Where the economic growth has been strongly dynamic and has been facilitated by the availability of special sources of external funds, it is probable that the patterns of exclusion themselves are of little relevance to the forms of individual mobility and withdrawal, or that the

tension between apathy and mass culture emerges as a normal problem of the legitimation of the existing institutional order. The forms of anomy, on the other hand, can differ in degree and quality—leading, for example, to various forms of "alienation"—if an exclusive economic scheme is superimposed on a political system which has long inflicted exclusion from decision-making on broad masses of the population.

The tensions within the excluded segment in the technocratic schemes can also vary greatly according to the relative degree of homogeneity or heterogeneity of the preceding social structures: while grouping or mobilization on the basis of alternative values can be the dominant patterns of action in relatively homogeneous societies, the anomic ingredients of crime or revolt can be decisive in societies which already had great structural heterogeneity or divisions in the civic and political culture at the beginning of the technocratic experiments.

It must be specially emphasized that the various patterns of action described above can be, and often are, present simultaneously in a given society and within a single social sector, such as marginal urban youth. Sometimes the development schemes affect only superficially the guidelines for action which have come into being in different contexts and they remain in force in the actors who are their typical supporters or who contributed to their formation in the past. Social action operates within a complex framework of feelings, among which those deliberately promoted by a given social order are often only the tip of the iceberg.

For this reason, the concepts described above must be seen as mere methodological guidelines, whose value should be reassessed in each case in the light of its relationship with the existing data. In any event, since they are put forward as keys to the interpretation of behaviour, outlooks and attitudes on the part of popular urban youth in the framework of the recent development of Latin America, it is necessary to dwell briefly on each of them, in order to break them down into their constituent elements.

III

Intregation

The concept of integration is one of the most widely used—and debated—in modern sociology. At the theoretical level it expresses, on the one hand, the functional equilibrium of a social system (cultural and normative consistency of the systems of roles and functions) and, on the other hand, the correspondence between the institutionalized role expectations and the structures of personal motivations, i.e. the proper internalization of the socially established behaviour patterns. Disintegration or anomie arise from structural disorders (objective anomie) or from defective internalization of the prevailing standards and values (subjective anomie).

The concepts of integration and anomie are based on a premise: that modern societies should be considered as functionally different and self-regulated systems. On the one hand, these are complex systems which allow a great diversity of roles (by extension and development of the social division of labour) and great individualization (by extension of the chosen sphere of action). In this sense they exceed the limits of the community usually called traditional, whose nexus is founded on primary relations (as opposed to functional relations) and on uniform or ascriptive acceptance by individuals of the group's standards and values.

The mechanisms of integration in very different (so-called modern) systems are not the same as the nexus which predominates in the community. These are formal interconnected mechanisms which seek the attainment of certain ends in a given social structure; for example, the integration of individual and society through motivational adaptation to the institutionalized expectations of social role. The balance between standards and motivations is achieved "spontaneously". The standards define the possibilities of action and at the same time the corresponding sanctions. Individuals rationally oriented towards gratification will behave in accordance with these standards and will thus avoid sanction. This is the same principle as underlies the behaviour of

individuals in the market: gaining maximum benefit. The development of a purely formal rationality leads in one case to macroeconomic equilibrium, in others to social integration. Of course, both equilibrium and integration are limited concepts without empirical verification, as has been established and emphasized many times. However, it is of interest to consider the following problem: this principle of integration of the system or the market resulting from formal rationality constitutes an integration mechanism different from the community mechanism, since it does not require a value to legitimize and guide the actions of individuals or to ensure their acceptance of the system. In fact, this is a *formal* mechanism of integration based solely on the "rationally" oriented behaviour of individuals with respect to their own advantage, and it requires nothing more than this behaviour. This is Weber's celebrated distinction between action in accordance with purposes (society) or —Parson's scheme— between traditional and modern action.

This latter distinction has been widely applied in Latin American sociology, which defines our stage of development as a transitional situation between a traditional society which is fading away and a modern one which is trying to establish itself. In fact, it is assumed that modernization is synonymous with progress and freedom: on the one hand, diversification and increasing complexity of the social system (extension, urbanization, industrialization); on the other, a breakaway from ascriptive modes of living (servitude; etc.), and human emancipation. In this scheme, the traditional community has been dislocated. Modernization requires a completely different principle of integration, no longer based on primary relations or on values external to the system (such as religious absolutism, charismatic leadership, etc.). Modernization implies a natural tendency towards the secularization of values and the extension of a logic of "formal rationalities." A concept which clearly combines these two terms is the concept of *mobility*.

Through it the balance between greater gratification and normative adaptation is fully achieved. This is why the study of integrated behaviour nearly always comes down to an investigation of social mobility.

The conditions of mobility are twofold: a) they imply the existence of individuals rationally oriented towards obtaining greater benefits, i.e. individuals who have duly internalized the "modern" patterns and standards of social action; b) they also imply a social *structure* capable of providing opportunities for mobility (gratification) for all who have sufficient qualification and ability. The concept of integration, therefore, embraces these two aspects: the existence of a relatively open structure of opportunities and of individuals culturally motivated to demand benefits. Hence the concept of mobility is neutral towards values: it does not imply any pre-established value, nor does it impose any belief in the "goodness" of any given ends or means; it implies rather the increased value of certain ends, a relatively high degree of freedom of choice and effectiveness of the institutional means available for their attainment. Of course, these conditions obtain to very different degrees in the various social structures; moreover, attitudes towards mobility vary greatly between social groupings.

The studies on mobility make a clear distinction between structural and subjective mobility. In one case it is a question of determining the quantitative range and the characteristics of the processes of mobility in a given structure; in the other, it is the attitudes towards mobility displayed by the social actors. This latter type of study was singularly important during the 1960s, when it was a question of calculating the magnitude and the degree of cultural integration of migrants in modern urban society, specifically by means of surveys. The attitudes towards mobility were used as an indicator of secularization. An important study of this type is the one carried out by Gurrieri (1971) among marginal young people in Greater Santiago, in which the basic measurements were concerned with the level and nature of their aspirations and with the means considered legitimate and effective in the attainment of these aspirations. Gurrieri managed to determine, on the one hand, a level

of aspirations similar to the pattern of the urban middle class and, on the other, a particular faith in education (over and above the traditional means) as an instrument of social ascent. Both these characteristics were strongly indicative of the powerful aspiration of a generation for the modern patterns, in contrast with the apathetic and fatalistic outlook attributed to the traditional migrant.

Another decisive measurement in this connection—one still in current use—is of the subjective perception of the system of social stratification. Dichotomic perceptions (rich-poor, upper class-lower class) are usually indicative of a closed social system which blocks opportunities of ascent; on the other hand, trichotomic perceptions (upper-middle-lower class) express an open society. In this study Gurrieri found precisely these trichotomic perceptions. A third and last indicator which must be mentioned is concerned with existing perceptions about the possibilities of intergenerational mobility. References to a better future than that of their parents were a consistent sign of the historical optimism of the 1960s generation, as can be seen, for example, in the study on young people in El Salvador by E. Torres Rivas (1971). Among today's young people in Chile, in contrast, the perception has changed: their future is assumed to be worse than their parents' was—a dramatic expression of the collapse of the expectations of progress and development which had been aroused even when these expectations are still being promoted by society.

Identification of the real opportunities of mobility and the subjective perception of these opportunities is a fundamental question, especially for studies on youth. Mobility is the main component of integration in modern societies: it represents the effectiveness and the extent of the secularization of values and of formal rationality.

The question of integration has moreover acquired a new dimension: mass culture. Mass culture (especially the penetration of the modern communication media) has been seen as reinforcing the motivations for personal mobility through the well-known "demonstration effect". The promotion of

certain life styles, the encouragement of consumption and the pressure for success foster the quest for mobility in accordance with socially established patterns. Mass culture is also spectacle, celebration, recreation—in other words, consumption. In all cases it is important to underline that mass culture is usually considered to be ethically a vacuum. Whether it is an incentive in the quest for gratification, or gratification in itself, it is a mechanism which reinforces integration in a *formal* order of maximization of benefits. Mass culture does not set up values in preference to the predominance of formal rationality, rather it represents rationality collectively. This lack of ethical weight in the culture of the communication media is a factor which must be taken into account. In fact, their capacity to induce conformist and apparently integrated behaviour is often overestimated. Nevertheless, this penetration always proves weak and spurious unless it is accompanied by real opportunities of social mobility. This is confirmed by the rebellion of young people in Uruguay or Chile who has been exposed for years to an almost exclusively commercial culture whose impact is easily verifiable. The opposite can also happen: when there are greater expectations of social advancement, criticism of the mass culture is usually more highly developed, as commonly happens in students' movements. Thus, the relations between attitudes towards individual mobility and integration within a mass culture do not necessarily correspond. Errors are frequently made when the two things are

identified with each other. It appears that individual attitudes are decisive in the study of integrated behaviour.

All the same, it is important to assess the effective impact of mass culture on the formation of young peoples' attitudes and guidelines for action, and especially their attitudes towards conformism or integration through social mobility. These matters are usually investigated by studying the exposure to the communication media or the volume and nature of cultural consumption, as well as the association of these factors with the tastes, aspirations and identification models of the person interviewed (desired life style, persons admired, etc.).

These aspects of the research often take the form of data which have their own innate heuristic capacity, going far beyond the problem of their correspondence or non-correspondence with the "models" proposed by the mass culture. Where musical tastes are concerned, for example, the liking for "heavy rock" found among broad segments of young people and the rejection—for example—of folk music or the romantic ballad can give important clues to the interpretation of the feelings and attitudes of young people, even if all these types of music are equally promoted (or, alternatively, disregarded) by the mass communication media and the culture industry. Moreover, precisely because of the "formal" nature of mass culture, there is no substitute for research into the substantive content of tastes, aspirations and identification models.

IV Anomy

As has been pointed out, anomy always implies some degree of disintegration, either cultural or normative. This concept is intended to describe all the social situations in which, for whatever reason, there is no proper conformity between the subjects and the role expectations assigned to

them in their functions. This "short-circuit" is caused by inconsistencies or contradictions in the role patterns or structures (objective anomy) or by a lack of correspondence between these patterns and the structure of the subjects' motivations (subjective anomy).

Perhaps the best-known statement on anomy is the one by Merton (1964) who defines it as the disassociation of cultural standards and objectives from the socially structured capacity of individuals in the group to work in accordance with them. The root cause of anomy lies in the conflict between the cultural goals and the possibility of using institutionalized means to attain them. Merton's typology of anomic behaviour is based on the various combinations of acceptance and rejection on the part of the subjects of the socially approved goals and means. For example, "innovation" usually means internalization of the cultural objectives combined with the use of illegitimate means of attaining them (this usually involves criminal behaviour). "Withdrawal" or "apathy", on the other hand, express a certain indifference or disdain for the institutionally established ends and means. "Rebellion" also expresses this comprehensive rejection of society's cultural goals, but it is distinguished from withdrawal, in which this rejection is made in the name of new or different values. Lastly, "ritualism" is the reverse of innovation: it implies attachment to the means but indifference to the ends (conduct traditionally associated with the bureaucrat). Merton's typology asserts therefore that all societies institutionalize certain values (in this case clearly the quest for success) and legitimize certain means of attaining them, while sanctioning others. The fundamental imbalance occurs when the opportunities of mobility are reduced or when there is excessive pressure for success, and individuals tend to bypass the institutionally accepted means. For Merton, the principal anomic type is innovation: North American society is usually described, in fact—with reason or not—as a definitely and homogeneously secularized society.

In Latin American sociology, however, anomy has almost always been studied in terms of the withdrawal type. As has been pointed out, the interest lies in the processes of transition and specifically in the potential for social anomy among migrants from rural origins who have no opportunities to integrate easily in urban society. Germani (1968) made a close study of this process of transition from the countryside to the town according to a scheme of transition of traditional structures towards modern ones:

starting from an original state of (traditional) integration there develops a breakdown or disintegration and dislocation, in the pre-existing structure of roles and values. The response to this dislocation can take two forms: withdrawal or a disposition for psychological mobilization, to use the author's terms. Psychological mobilization could be defined as an active propensity to re-establish the balance between the psychological and the other normative or ambient level (or levels); withdrawal, on the other hand, implies varying degrees of apathy or resistance to the new structure of norms and values. The first process (psychological mobilization) leads to integration; the second to anomy. Anomic withdrawal can be seen, in turn, as apathy ("lack of participation"), according to the well-known DESAL (1970) definition of urban marginality, or as restoration and predominance of the traditional values. This is the line taken in some studies, such as the one by the Belgian sociologist C Lalive (1968) on pentecostalism in Chile. According to this author, the pentecostal community, which grows up in these very frontier zones in the towns (especially among non-proletarianized workers, i.e., migrants who have not found industrial jobs), amounts to recreation of the traditional community based on primary relations and shared religious values. Lalive gave his study of Chilean pentecostalism the suggestive title of "El refugio de las masas" (The Refuge of the Masses), indicating withdrawal from the modern world caused by the uprooting of masses who were both rural and marginalized. Let us repeat, then, that anomic situations were viewed as part of these transition processes, i.e. of the collapse of traditional structures and lack of access to modernization. The aforementioned study by Gurrieri on attitudes towards social mobility among marginal young people has been repeated several times (including several works by DESAL itself) among adult migrants, in an attempt to identify accurately the potential anomy implicit in social marginality.

The subject of anomy, however, has been restated in new terms during the past decade. The breakdown of what may be called the culture and standards of traditional society has been a relatively universal and established process and

the difficulties of incorporation in the modern world persist and in many cases have become worse. The experience of the past decade shows the emergence of vast and growing areas of non-traditional marginality. It is usually a question of course, of marginal urban youth, exposed on the one hand to intensive secularization (through educational advances, extension and penetration of the modern communication media, and the experience of urbanization itself) and, on the other hand, to relatively intense and prolonged exclusion from the mechanisms of mobility and integration (mainly in the areas of employment, housing, and social and political participation). The anomic effects of the transition, which earlier had originated in the disintegration of traditional structures, have now become the anomic effects of the crisis (through a process of failed modernization). The so-called developmental frustration emerges in full flower, producing exceptionally intense anomic situations: recently many authors have attached more importance to the theme of rebellion.

Let us mention some of the indicators of objective anomie which are found everywhere in current studies on marginal youth: cultural disintegration of the working-class family (especially as a result of the spurious recomposition of the extended family, the loss of internal solidarity, and the decline of paternal authority); frustration of mobility through education (pointless schooling); de-industrialization and marginality in employment (especially informal and own-account work, which prevents among other things the association of interests); and political exclusion (which usually implies denial of the right to vote and various forms of repression). All these indicators appear to a greater or lesser extent in the picture of normative disintegration (fragmentation), exclusion from organized society (and re-emergence of a dichotomic perception of society based on the included-excluded axis), erosion or loss of confidence in the opportunities for social mobility, and uncertainty about the future (or "future crisis", as it has been called in several works on the young people of today).

The modernization crisis produces, then, an anomic effect which can be defined more appropriately in Durkheim's sense. Durkheim

uses the concept of anomie in its etymological sense, as the absence of norms and standards of value, as the alienation and separation of the individual from society, which leads in his restricted view to the loss of meaning in life (i.e. to suicide). Of course, these processes of disintegration are of variable intensity, but they do express in many cases the states of frustration, loss of confidence, aggressiveness and fragmentation which are typical of many sectors of Latin American youth today.

Anomie cannot be defined, however, as a limited concept, i.e., as suicide. We have already mentioned several kinds of anomic behaviour recorded empirically in recent research on young people. This behaviour includes withdrawal and apathy, innovation (crime, in Merton's sense) and revolt, the general definitions of which have been given above. It is important to note the existence of new forms of anomic withdrawal distinct from the traditional attitudes of apathy and fatalism (passive conformism). The spread of the use of drugs among marginal youth has been classified recently as behaviour of this type. For some authors, drug dependency and drug use and abuse is no longer a group practice as it was in the past (associated with the hippie movement) and has become a culturally less solid and less collective experience. Drugs have recovered their exclusively escapist effect: a refuge in immediate gratification from the hardships of life. They are a particular form of escape from the real world, but no longer in the name of a distinct ethic, as in the case of the hippies, but as a reaction to personal frustration. This is a practice, then, which does not achieve group consistency (alternativity) but which is certainly far removed from the imperatives of the normative order (for it replaces individual effort with pleasure).

Other authors (e.g., Valenzuela, 1984) have also studied specific forms of anomic rebellion, such as the revolt of Chilean youth against that country's military régime. It is argued that rebellion is originally inorganic and aggressive: an expression of the destructured groups in Chilean society (especially of the young people affected by the rates of open unemployment, or minimum employment, which are over 70% among marginal groups) in the form of uncontrolled revolt. At some levels the national

protests in Chile (which have extended to the peripheral districts with great repressive intensity) have produced a poorly organized youth which recognizes no specific leaders in the political opposition and has emerged as a force of negation and attack on social institutions. This has been called anomic rebellion (or revolt), which is different from the meaning Merton attaches to the concept of rebellion. In

fact, Merton includes here the concept of structured rebellion in the name of an alternative ethic which can be the vehicle of a very strict set of standards. But what characterizes revolt is its inorganic nature and aggressiveness, the lack of positive basic principles and any reference to alternative social projects, largely a reflection of the acute anomic tensions affecting marginal youth.

V

Alternativity

Integrational and anomic behaviour does not cover the whole field of youth action. We have kept the term "alternativity" to describe all behaviour which shows a certain level of rejection or organized resistance to the established cultural models. We are not referring to the level of corporative organization or association of interests (for example, participation in trade unions or politics), but still to the field of value standards.

In the discussion of the analytical framework of integrational behaviour we referred to the predominance and extension of formal rationality (and we specifically proposed giving emphasis to the study of personal mobility). In a study of "alternative" behaviour, account must be taken of the actions performed in accordance with values, which suggest feelings which escape the logic of the maximization of benefits and acquire, for that very reason, a collective and alternative dimension. Given the dominance of modernization, which is always seen as a formal system of exchange (market) and regulation (order), the social groups give preference to and

demand value standards. This arises from inclusion in the modernization processes (the traditional criticism levelled by student movements against the culture of success and personal advancement) or from exclusion and the need to re-establish feelings of collective identity: in both cases, a central role is given to action in accordance with values. A prime example in recent years has been the defence of human rights as a reaction against the purely formal imperatives of maintenance and perpetuation of the State. Another example is the response of the community to the extension and development of the relations of the market. In one case, human rights are given preference over the principle of security; in the other, co-operation and the restoration of the sense of community and solidarity are preferred to the competition and logic of private exchange. In both cases, recognition is given to values which stand outside the institutional logic, i.e. separate from the purely formal operation of power and the market.

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